Jan Eijking

Keeping the Monster Under the Bed

A Dialogical Approach to Security as Reasoned Emotion

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Supervision: Dr. Gerard van der Ree

Student No.: 4300750

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A Dialogical Approach to Security as Reasoned Emotion

Abstract   Emotion is essential to reason, and vice versa — an observation that is both crucial and overdue to acknowledge in International Relations, which has witnessed an upsurge in scholarship on the emotions in the last decade. In an exploratory attempt at introducing the emotion-reason debate to security studies, this thesis introduces a dialogical approach to security as a reasoned emotion. First, theories of reason and emotion will be reproduced genealogically, second a critique of instrumental reason is tentatively formulated on this basis, third the concept of emotion will be reviewed in light of contemporary appraisal theories, and finally a discourse analysis of so-called 'neighbourhood prevention networks' in Belgium and The Netherlands aims to discover all of these dynamics in day-to-day practices of securitisation. The insights gained thereupon bear significant implications for international security, as much in theory and research as in political practice.

Cover: F. Goya (1797), 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos'
('The sleep of reason produces monsters').

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I

Reason, Emotion, and Security
in International Relations

Let me start on a very personal note. During my second year of undergraduate studies, I went, not unlike many of my fellow students, through a time of mounting stress. Initially, I had responded to this stress with attempts to exert control over my feelings, primarily out of a conviction that they were *not me*. I tried to explain the stress away, and I did not want to open myself up to the emotional aspects of my decision-making — I did not want to *let them happen*. Rationalising the insecurity that came from this experience was my foremost means of establishing control and security. However, ultimately, the only way to actually overcome this experience was not by working *against* it, but by working *with* it: I had to embrace the experience as part of my being in order to let the emotions happen.

This initial position led me to observe that we tend to rationalise in order to remove or at least suppress anxieties and insecurities — only to discover that this strategy in itself creates a tension that necessitates (and therefore maintains) both itself and the insecurity it purports to dissolve. Ultimately, this behaviour keeps the insecurities alive rather mitigating them — it keeps the proverbial monster under the bed. This phenomenon, to come full circle, becomes crystal clear in the politics of securitisation: For security to work out, insecurity needs to be constantly in the air.

To be sure, I am not trying to compensate for an overemphasis on reason with an overemphasis on emotion — I am not searching for a way of 'bringing back the passions'. Instead, my deeply personal aim of this investigation is to come to terms with the co-constitution of our behaviour by emotion *and* reason. Keeping this dichotomy alive does not seem to help, which is why I want to look for accounts of reason that have included emotion already, such as the Platonic view and the Freudian view.

Emotion is essential to reason, and vice versa. This seemingly banal observation is both crucial and overdue to acknowledge in International Relations (IR). Emotion is a part of

our ability to reason, much as reason is a part of our ability to perceive and respond to emotion. Contemporary, but also relatively long established insights from psychology and cognitive neuroscience corroborate this view in that they suggest that the two processes are so closely intertwined that a sharp conceptual distinction fails to reflect reality (cf. Daniel Goleman's famous 'Emotional Intelligence', [1995] 2006). Although I do not aim at mobilising empirical evidence to strengthen my analysis, which points at what I regard an 'unobservable' quality anyhow, these findings do point at a growing cross-disciplinary adoption of non-mechanistic, non-atomistic views of rationality. Mainstream IR, however, continues to broadly implement the idea of a purely rational actor, understood as one that is able to calculate the best decision or outcome by weighing costs and benefits. Yet the classical, rational-choice utility maximisation model does not account for phenomena such as irrational outbursts, rage, pride, self-assertion, and so on — even though one may contend that these form as much the daily life of international politics as the well-balanced, 'truly' rational behaviour of other actors.

There is a subtle intellectual hypocrisy involved in the discrepancy between model and actuality. A pure rational actor model, as a Weberian ideal type, cannot account for the emotion involved in each particular situation — it seeks predictability and therefore needs to ignore the unpredictable. A politician may rationally consider a number of reports that different ministries or agencies have handed over to him. She or he will be able to formulate a reasoned (rationalised) statement in which everything seems to make sense. Now she or he may sit down with an adversary, for whom this statement was originally intended, and be overwhelmed by how emotional the situation gets — the adversary is appalled with the offer the politician has made and starts to shout. In light of this unpleasant company, the politician changes her or his mind and goes 'off the record'. Her or his rational prescription has failed to meet reality in its multi-faceted nature.

Before I delve into the intricacies of how reason, emotion, and security hang together, I should explain in what way this paper looks at emotion, which is of course a psychological concept yet here will not be discussed so explicitly on that level. There are two reasons for this decision. First, the psychological literature itself offers an abundance of scholarly work on the intricacies of emotion both at the individual and at the collective level. An adaptation

of these insights into the discipline of IR is an important task, yet one that is already being undertaken. The paper at hand will not contribute to such task but instead looks at what implications a socio-political account of emotion might bear with regard to the international politics of security. This is an account that I find to be largely lacking in IR thus far, especially when considering how the concept of emotion tends to be subsumed or integrated only instrumentally by one-dimensional understandings of security.

Second, the adaptation of emotion into IR is not (or should not be) a mere conceptual import; IR itself offers some insight on emotion as well. While contemporary mainstream psychology, constrained by methodological decisions, tends to lean towards reductive accounts of isolated functional phenomena (which are useful in their own right), interpretive research in IR is able to embed emotion into the social, political, collective context much more strongly. The interdisciplinary nature of IR offers a multitude of investigative pathways that together yield a quite broadly informed perspective. Therefore, rather than discussing what exactly an emotion is or should be, my paper tries to find a place for emotion among the many other composite parts of international, intersubjective, inter-*human* relations. In this sense, my research question might as well be: How does emotion relate to reason when we attempt to establish security? Not surprisingly thus, this paper sets out in a broad attempt to corroborate my argument on security as a reasoned emotion with the philosophical debate on how reason does or ought to relate to emotion. To be sure however, I read thinkers such as Plato and Freud not from broadly philosophically or psychoanalytically informed points of view but as heuristic starting points for an alternative discovery of reason and emotion. Only then I am able to embed such a perspective within IR's securitisation debate in order to finally move to an empirical exploration of the notion I seek to establish.

1.1   From reason to rationality

The ancient Greek philosophers offered a more nuanced account of reason, as an end in itself, than the means-oriented perspective that has taken hold after the Enlightenment. To Plato, for instance, reason in harmony with spirit is a way of becoming oneself by realising the ontological equality of others (Lebow 2008). It also realises an understanding of justice in that it allows us to grasp the parochial nature of our own points of view — something that

can take place, as Socrates would have it, in dialogue (I am aware that his 'elenchus' goes beyond mere dialogue, yet this debate would extend the scope of this paper). Emotion thus constitutes a crucial element to both community and justice, two fundamental concepts in political theory.

There is an increasing amount of IR contributions that take this insight into account. In his 2008 volume 'A Cultural Theory of International Relations', IR scholar Lebow conceptualises a parsimonious theory that is based on ancient Greek philosophy and more recent insights into the human psyche. His approach is based on the assumption that individual and society work more or less analogously. This take is informed by the Platonic "analogy between the psyche and the polis" (ibid.: 50). To Lebow, this is justified and overdue in IR as "[t]here can be no meaningful theory of international relations just at the system level" (ibid.: 53).

According to Lebow, the Enlightenment entailed a reconceptualisation of reason from end into means, what Weber famously coined 'instrumental reason'. However, the concept of instrumentality has been gradually undernourished after the Enlightenment so as to leave us with a unidimensional vision of actors' motives and behaviours, as perhaps most well-known in the algorithmic approaches of rational choice and strategic action. These, with Lebow, "homogenize [sic] and oversimplify human motivation" in severing means from their ends — although one cannot possibly understand one without the other (ibid.: 47).

At this point a brief intervention is due: Lebow shortly mentions Freud, whom he associates with Plato in that "the ego embodies reason" (ibid.: 45). One may however go a step further and wonder whether instrumental reason does actually, in turn and in consequence, work like a Freudian defence mechanism. I propose that we are *so tremendously terrified* with the spectre of irrationality and its metaphysical properties (which derive from a refusal to *understand* it) that instrumental reason is a rationalising reflex against the impurity of reason so as to establish ontological security.

The author further points out that, much to the contrary of the rational choice fallacy, "Plato and Aristotle recognize [sic] that their reason-informed worlds would be short-lived" (ibid.: 78). Mainstream IR theories, ignoring this early hint at the inaccuracy of pure and purely instrumental reason, account for external stimuli and "instrumental calculations of self-interest" (ibid.: 78), but do not speak about motives or willingness — in other words,

they sacrifice Plato's reason-the-drive for instrumental reason; they sacrifice the teacher of self-restraint (the essence of the polis) for the means of the elbow. This is problematic because this latter, blunted version of reason fatally (yet, as it appears, in bliss) ignores power and privilege. Tellingly, it is excited to increase its own standing (by pushing the spirit's urges) and its own material well-being (by answering to appetite's desires), yet shuts both eyes when it comes to the demands of collective coexistence (more detail on Plato in the next chapter). I further argue that blunt, instrumental rationality has moved from a rudimentary ideal type to discourse and practice. This requires a hermeneutical stance: With Ricoeur's concept of threefold mimesis, I am able to explicate the way in which this transformation (the 'self-fulfilling prophecy' in academic and everyday discourse and practice) actually takes shape (Ricoeur 1988). I elaborate on this in more detail in chapter 5.

Likewise, the paradox of security policy producing insecurity invites comprehension: The mimetic representation of instrumental reason as a) a short-cut to fulfil desire, and b) a fortress against the spectre of irrationality (effectively warding off, in a tragically generalising way, *all* emotion) makes us unable to handle the irrationality of threat with prudence: Irrationality is, suddenly, something we fear *and* something we cannot (must not) recognise in ourselves. All of that disregards those who had, at the time of the instrumentalist turn, still expressed a warning: Smith, who pointed at reason's beautiful capacity "to defer short-term gratification to make long-term gains" (ibid.: 81) or Hegel, who similarly stressed that "reason must combine with affect, and together they can teach people to act ethically and affirm their civic obligations" (ibid.: 82). To speak with Plato, appetite is suddenly king, spirit is scary, and reason is a ready auxiliary.

Lebow also delves into the question of fear. He describes it as the opposite of *confidence* and stresses that fear is always an "expectation, rather than the reality" of something bad going to happen (ibid.: 89). Fear, he goes on, creates a breakdown of order, which induces precaution and therefore some hypervigilance in the way threat is assessed. This in turn is how one perceives friends in a rich, nuanced way in contrast with the superficial stereotyping of one's adversaries (ibid.). Fear can thus be understood as what Lebow calls a "lobster trap", which is "easy to enter and difficult to leave" (ibid.: 92). In hermeneutic terms, a negative representation of threat (bias) has brought about a reification or 'snowball effect', which culminates in self-fulfilling prophecy. The origins of this effect

must therefore lie in some particular conceptualisation, namely, and here I concur, the ideal type of instrumental reason taken literally.

1.2   From rationality to the paradox of security

When trying to carve out how security is easily misunderstood, spawned by a misunderstanding of reason, some specifications are due: Why does it matter how we understand security? Political scientist Deborah Stone (2002) explains how security can actually, as paradoxical as it may seem, bring about insecurity.

First, she defines security generally as the absence of vulnerability (Stone 2002: 129), which she illustrates with the middle-class family bedtime ritual: It is the caretakers who convey a sense of trust and protection; something that quite aptly comes across in the Dutch term *geborgenheid* — the *feeling* of security. Stone further distinguishes between three types or layers of security: political security, achieved most frequently in military (or at least material) terms, psychological security, referring to a certain 'peace of mind', and scientific security, which is what I have thus far tangentially covered with reference to rational choice approaches to human behaviour.

The scientific approach literally *manages* security, which is why risk analysis is a particularly central tool to its practice. A typical case of rational choice theory, the likelihood of risk is here objectively measured by means of a simple algorithm in order to express estimates of expected value. This aims at facilitating cross-case comparison against a predetermined common denominator that describes cost, usually money or dead bodies. There are however logical flaws to risk analysis: According to its formula, we react equally to events with the same likelihood; but we are in fact selective — 'irrationally' (ibid.: 141).

On the other hand, the psychological dimension acknowledges that "security is ultimately a feeling" and that "[i]magination doesn't follow neat rules, least of all the rules of logic and rationality" (ibid.: 133). This imaginary capacity of the human being is what is able to produce "dread, anxiety and a sense of powerlessness to control events" (ibid.) — the monster under the bed. Now if we loose control, it seems intuitive to try to regain what we have lost. That means that we have to deny dread and anxiety their right to exist; we have to fight powerlessness with power.

Clearly, this is not very consistent, for how does one fight powerlessness with power, which one does not have, because one is powerless? We employ a mental trick to be able to live with such self-denial: We become the architects of our own 'fortress selves', establishing security by pushing away everything that hints at insecurity. This requires constant effort and turns into a nightmarish *perpetuum mobile*, namely in that every time we push something else out, that pushing reminds us of it having to be pushed — every act of security keeps danger in the air. Have we actually established security? No; rather we have institutionalised the state of being scared.

In line with the three types of security, Stone observes three equivalent types of establishing security in the polis: Harm can be mitigated politically, threat can be prevented from materialising by means of timely assessment, and citizens can be provided reassurance. The latter points at the many attempts that have been made, and are being made now and again, to speak to the psychological security needs of 'the people' — by means of policy that is by trend expensive, ineffective, and paranoid (think of the 'USA PATRIOT Act' of 2001 or the French 'vigipirate'). Such measures require backing through spirited (i.e. directed at self-esteem) rhetoric in order to handle the balancing act between the anxious 'we *need* high-level protection' and the assertive 'we *are* safe and *will* manage' — in Stone's words, "the fierceness of the promise eclipses any thoughts of failure" (ibid.: 138).

After having elucidated these psychological inconsistencies and incompatibilities between the experience of insecurity and the security response, Stone points at the practical implications of how security measures can generate insecurity. She calls this 'perverse effects' and dubs security a double-edged sword.

Five examples stand out: First, *risk assessment* makes risk visible and produces insecurity (a classic case of the availability heuristic). Second, *surveillance* invades privacy and conveys omnipresent suspicion. Third, *border controls* make for a fortress mentality (ibid.: 147) and thereby serve as a constant reminder of the possible transgression of borders. Fourth, *prisons* destabilise communities when they deprive families of opportunities, assign stigma, and yield recidivism. Fifth, *weapons* confront private versus public safety, yet the shotgun seems to have brought more suicide than homicide (ibid.: 149). Ultimately, this brings Stone to the 'security-democracy trade-off' where the powers of emergency rule challenge and even question the people's rule.

1.3   Preview

What does this paper *not* intend to be? First and foremost, it does not purport to serve as a normative or prescriptive reconsideration of the politics of international security, nor does it seek to formulate any particular policy recommendations. With a reflexivist perspective in mind, the idea is much more to open up a space for an unconventional understanding of security by de-emphasising rationalist points of view in IR. Secondly, the study at hand does not aim at reinventing a 'proper' vocabulary for emotion and reason, correcting misunderstandings of what reason entails or what the place of the emotions is or should be. Rather, it intends to explore and thereby elucidate what reason has *become* historically and what status emotion has been assigned respectively. Thirdly, references to reason and emotion in two distinct terms are not the same as actually treating them as two separate phenomena. I do not suggest that there is ontological value in doing so, and I will present my according arguments for assuming this position later on.

If the paper does not offer a causal analysis of where the reason-emotion debate has been, where it is right now and, as a result, where it ought to go in the future, what *is* its aim? Put simply: A deepening and widening of our understanding of emotional dynamics as they unfold and play out in human decision-making; again, emotion is here conceived not as a strictly psychological but a socio-political concept. This is based on two claims: The first is that the Platonic analogy between the individual human psyche and the political collective holds. It is moreover conceptually useful to replace the mechanic with an *organic* analogy. Second, rationalist accounts of international politics have thus far not been able to grasp what it means to experience and practice security; nor have non-mainstream attempts succeeded, at least not substantially, at overcoming the primacy of instrumental reason in security matters. Even more, rationalism has normalised strategy, risk management, and rational choice as the language of politics, in vivid intersection with local tropes of meaning that correspond to dominant security narratives. Therefore, pointing at inconsistencies and disconnections between rationalised assumptions and emotional experience of security, or even the paradoxical relationship between policy efforts to establish security and their contrary outcomes (Stone 2002), could be a way of getting *in tune* with security.

In an exploratory attempt at introducing the emotion-reason debate to security studies, this thesis introduces a dialogical approach to security as a reasoned emotion. To that end, I

proceed in two steps. First, I provide a tacit genealogy of reason and emotion. This endeavour divides into two sections: To begin, the myth of the rule of reason will be disclosed by re-reading holist accounts of reason and emotion in the works of Plato and Freud (chapter 2). Some examples will then illustrate how the intellectual debate in the 19th and 20th centuries was affected by antagonism, polarisation, and essentialism, culminating in an unfruitful opposition of purely 'rationalist' and purely 'sentimentalist' accounts. And finally, I show how more recent and still widely accepted notions of instrumental reason and rational choice are essentially a scholarly securitising move in and of themselves. The second section takes a closer look at the marginalisation of emotion (chapter 3). Here I use cognitive appraisal theory to centralise emotion as a place where the strivings of the passions meet the scrutiny and social demands of reason, culminating in what has been described as intuitive judgement with both discursive-narrative and relational-intersubjective qualities. I then go on to argue that rationalisation can be (i.e. is not always) a form of self-disconnection, which is how an attempt at security may in fact produce insecurity, and conclude the chapter with a discussion of how this relationship plays out in the politics of security.

Second, from this critique of instrumental reason I move on to securitisation theory and ways of considering emotional phenomena in practices and discourses of securitisation (chapter 4). This will mainly be a way of preparing the empirical component of this project, consisting of a chapter on a reflexivist methodology (chapter 5) that provides the background for the subsequent discourse analysis of so-called 'neighbourhood prevention' networks in Belgium and The Netherlands (chapter 6). This empirical analysis discovers emotional dynamics in the day-to-day practice of securitisation, understood as a continuous conversation between reason and emotion, embedded in and conditioned by a collective field of meaning. This conversation is marked by three recurring themes: belonging, certainty, and suspicion. A dialogical approach to security as reasoned emotion allows for theoretically grounded inquiry into these themes so as to overcome the neglect of these important aspects by embracing them as constitutive parts of security discourse and practice. These insights bear significant implications for international security, as much in theory and research as in policy practice. The approach introduced here is a novel contribution to IR in that it combines philosophical and IR scholarship on reason and emotion with securitisation theory and applies the resulting framework to quotidian security discourse and practice.

II

The Myth of the Rule of Reason

Before coming to grips with and locating emotion in international security discourse and practice, it is necessary to establish a firm understanding of how the concepts of reason and emotion have evolved over time. The status of reason as a 'ruler' is often traced back to Plato, whom contemporary critical scholars often refer to in an almost accusatory way for having established a hierarchical division of human nature into the two components appetite and spirit, ruled by the third and superordinate component, reason. However, the Platonic tripartition, as I will try to show in this chapter, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that reason is the absolute ruler, nor does it preclude a more holist, dynamic understanding of human nature as a space in which reason and emotion are in constant interaction.

After a re-reading of Plato along these lines, the Freudian view of human nature is taken into consideration as another contribution to this demystification. The question will be whether Freud was in fact a proponent of mechanistic understandings of human nature or whether, on the contrary, he conceived of emotion as part of an organic whole. Furthermore, the Freudian perspective allows for an understanding of the inner contradictions of human nature that give rise to tensions between security and insecurity of the self, an argument that helps explain how the reason-emotion debate is indeed in an intimate ontological relationship with security conceived broadly.

In the second section of this chapter, a few examples will illustrate how partisan readings and misreadings of the most significant theories of reason and emotion have fragmented the scholarly debate into counterproductive bifurcation. On the one hand the 'rationalists' essentialised the primacy of reason, actively contributing to the overemphasis of reason at the expense of anything 'unreasonable', a move that entailed a radical subjugation of the 'passions'. On the other hand the 'sentimentalists' reactively overemphasised the primacy of emotion and thereby done similar harm to the possibility of understanding human nature in more holistic terms. Neither of the two camps has been able to account for the

dynamism and conflict that lie at the heart of human affairs. There are however alternative ways of reading some of the major theorists in terms of said holistic understanding, and there is a fair number of contemporary scholars who offer less polarising points of entry.

Finally, the above notions culminate in the hypothesis that rationalisation, as expressed in contemporary rational choice theory, is in and of itself a practice of self-securitisation, stemming from a deep, paradoxical anxiety for or distrust in the imagined irrational ghosts that are suspected to be inside and among us.

2.1   Re-reading reason in Plato

Reading Plato today can go very different ways. While to some scholars it appears to be sufficient to reduce Plato to a one-dimensional notion of rationalism and realism, there is another side to the debate where scholars uphold a more nuanced picture and read Plato as a rich source of inspiration, be it in a literal or in a metaphorical interpretation of his work. In IR, the former reading appears more mainstream, as IR realists for instance mobilise the Platonic argument on the rule of reason as a justification for rational choice accounts of political behaviour. IR is however also witnessing an upsurge in publications that fit more comfortably with the latter part of the debate, avoiding to place Plato's concept of reason in opposition to emotion, such as Lebow (2008) whom I discussed in the introductory chapter. In the following section, I problematise the 'rule of reason' argument through my own reading as a heuristic starting point for the debate on reason and emotion. Thereafter I make a similar move toward the work of Freud. Both of these analyses pave the way for the 'demystification' of reason pursued in the present chapter.

In books III and IV of 'The Republic' (2007; in the 1955 translation by Lee), Plato understands the ideal polis by analogy of the human individual qualities of "wisdom, courage, self-discipline, and justice" (427e). The analogy is justified because "the elements and traits that belong to a state must also exist in the individuals that compose it" (435e). Socrates sets out by explaining that a state ought to be treated not as a unit but as a plurality (423a). It is therefore necessary to lay bare its subdivisions to obtain a full picture of such plurality. These subdivisions correspond to the three elements of human nature — reason, appetite, and spirit, — which are in conflict. Socrates starts with the relationship between the basic appetites of the human being, such as hunger and thirst: In a famous example, Socrates

purports that if some would be "unwilling to drink even though they are thirsty" (439c) there must be an element by which desire, or appetite, is qualified — in his opinion, reason fulfils this function, restricting or conditioning what the appetite craves. Reason is "the reflective element in the mind" that works in opposition to "the element of irrational appetite" (439d). We can therefore take the appetites for some elementary desires, while reason appears as a reflective entity, capable of qualifying or judging the appetites. Spirit, or *thumos*, then functions as the site of the struggle between appetite and reason, while it however itself, as Socrates emphasises, fights on the side of reason. The conflict is cast in explicitly political terms: "It's like a struggle between political factions, with indignation [thumos] fighting on the side of reason" (440b).

Plato is usually connected to the notion of the primacy of reason, ruling over the appetites and spirit, and therefore tends to be associated with contemporary proponents of emphatically rationalist accounts of human nature. He does indeed discuss the primacy of reason, yet there are multiple ways of reading the claims at which he then arrives. For instance, Socrates suggests an understanding of justice as the harmony of each of the three elements of the human soul performing its *proper function* (441d-e). He proposes that "*reason ought to rule*, having the wisdom and foresight to act for the whole, and the spirit ought to obey and support it" (441e; emphasis added). So far, so clear the distribution of authority — notwithstanding, a few lines further on he attenuates his position: "[E]ach element within him [man] is performing its proper function, whether it is giving or obeying orders" (443b). This seems to compromise the aforesaid emphasis on the authoritative powers of reason, as it now becomes slightly less clear how there would be a clear directive 'from above' *and* a 'giving or obeying' of orders at the same time.

It helps to remind oneself of the metaphorical and hypothetical character of Plato's framework, the goal remaining to be a "harmonious whole" so as to "become fully one instead of many" (443e). There is thus a plurality in the whole, and not if one were to consider each of the elements in (anyhow only artificial) isolation. Appetites, spirit and reason are, in this sense, not necessarily related *hierarchically*, even if reason does take up an elevated role. There is constant interaction between the three, while they generally lean toward reason — this is where reason does not need to be seen so much as a dictator, but as a composite inclination of human nature. Further, the appetites are not an oppositional force

but a controversial force that gives rise to there being a controversy (or a struggle to be resolved) in the first place. It is in this sense closely intertwined with reason; and in Hegelian terms thesis (appetite), antithesis (reason), and synthesis (spirit) are in perpetual encounter within one and the same, that is, human nature.

It is through such a holistic reading of Plato's thoughts on the faculties of the human soul that spaces can be explored in which the rule of reason is one out of several possible narratives, or stories, or *myths*. To follow up on this, and to bring the above notions more explicitly in touch with modern psychology, it proves fascinating to reconsider in a similar fashion the work of Sigmund Freud, founding father of psychoanalysis and theorist of the unconscious — but also a fervent proponent of the tripartite human soul. But are the two actually relatable?

2.2   Re-reading reason in Freud

In a famous 1946 article titled 'Plato and Freud', Edison, an admirer of the ancients and critic of the moderns, presents a detailed account of the nuances of Plato's relevance today. He points at a number of common misunderstandings of the Platonic tripartite soul and argues that the *mechanical* analogy is inapplicable — to Plato, Edison explains, reason was not a mere arbiter to the appetites and the spirit, but also a holistic, *organic* concept of the unity of the soul. This, the author claims, was blatantly disregarded by Freud, who borrowed from the tripartite model, yet presented the ego as a non-autonomous mediator who is not principled on its own but rather the product of mediation — returning to the mechanical interpretation.

Edison draws a sharp distinction between Plato and Freud and finds the latter guilty of reducing the former to some "hideous determinism of instinctual forces" (ibid.: 16). He flips the debate around: While usually Freud is seen as someone who challenged the premises of rationalism and Plato as a strong defender of rationalism, Edison defends Plato as someone who insisted on the complexity of human reason against what he sees as a largely predetermined view in Freud. The argument here is however not developed further: Edison does not point out where exactly he sees that distinction to be so clear; his citations from the writings of Freud do not convincingly stress the mechanical over the organic attributes of reason.

I would argue that both Freud and Plato offer a complex account of human reason, and that in this sense Freud is a Platonist himself. So where do Freud and Plato clearly meet on common ground? Edison himself, despite making the above distinction, does identify such a point of confluence — in emotion. Plato's spirit, understood as the emotional domain, is unlike the appetite "capable of being informed by reason" (ibid.: 9). This means that emotion, and in this Freud may disagree, can never be equated with irrationality (unreason), but to the contrary might even be called "the staunchest champion of the rights of reason" (ibid.). Drives, or appetites, become qualifiable only once they pass over (through what Freud calls sublimation) into spirit (appraised emotion) — drives are given motive or direction.

Despite the fierce critique of Freud's adaptation of Platonic tripartition, Edison uncovers one of the indeed frequently misunderstood aspects of reason according to Plato: its impurity and non-absolute primacy — Plato was simply "not silly enough to imagine that all men [sic] at all times are sublimely rational" (ibid.: 6).

A number of Freudian concepts already appeared in Edison's critique, but it helps to take a closer look at what Freud wrote himself. In his groundbreaking paper 'The Ego and the Id', published in 1923, Freud puts forward a comprehensive account of the human condition in order to understand the origins of both pathological and non-pathological aspects of human nature. He begins by explaining the categories of consciousness, the unconscious, and the latent preconscious. Thereafter, he details the relationship between 'ego' and 'id', borrowing the latter term from his contemporary Groddeck, who claimed that "the conduct through life of what we call our ego is essentially passive" and therefore suggested that "we are 'lived' by unknown and uncontrollable forces" — the 'Es', or id (Freud [1923] 2010: 27). Not surprisingly, this parallels the Platonic notion of appetite.

Importantly, Freud claims that "[t]he ego is not sharply separated from the id" as "its lower portion merges into it" (ibid.: 28). He specifies that "the ego is that *part of the id* which has been *modified* by the direct *influence of the external world*" (ibid.: 29; emphasis added). This overall presents a nested picture of human nature, in which the 'parts' with which Plato was concerned are not as separate entities but rather in terms of various fields in one whole that each come with their own tendencies. Plato never precluded such a reading, as he always stressed the malleable nature of his ideas — he was unspecific even with the term 'part' or

'element' itself, as it would bear the danger of suggesting clear delineation from other 'parts' or 'elements' of the human soul.

It seems a bit puzzling when Freud on the other hand posits that "[t]he ego represents what we call *reason and sanity*, in contrast to the id which contains the passions" (ibid.: 30; emphasis added). He does stress, mitigating the puzzle, the ideal-typical nature of this description and notes that actual experience will probably never very neatly correspond. Yet he adds a peculiar analogy: the relationship of the ego to the id is compared to that of "a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse" (ibid.), stressing the 'superiority' of the id (as Hume would). The holistic picture is thus compromised as again, this time in an opposite direction (compared to Plato), authority is assigned to one over another part. This was disappointing if there was not the added complication of the super-ego.

The super-ego stands in less direct connection to the other two parts. Nonetheless it powerfully balances out the superiority of the id: By enabling *sublimation* (i.e. the elevation of the id's desires to the realm of the socially acceptable practices of the ego) it offers "a method by which the ego can obtain control over the id and deepen its relations with it" (ibid.: 37). There is thus a most intimate interaction taking place between all three parts: The id brings to the fore an impulse that requires to be responded to; the ego takes on the responsibility of that response; the super-ego provides the methods by which that response can take place in a socially embedded manner.

Freud explains that the super-ego stems from the infant's identification with the father figure. This identification is intrinsically ambivalent, as it entails both *precept* (a positive normative prescription: 'You ought to') and *prohibition* (a negative normative prescription: 'You must not'). The ambivalence of that relationship stems, Freud says, from the suppression of the Oedipus complex, in which the identification with the father along with a complementary objectification of the mother and increasing sexual wishes toward the object-mother end up rendering the father an obstacle. Peculiar as it may be, I introduce this concept here because it helps understand the ego's relations to id and super-ego.

Against this background, Freud makes a powerful turn by which he suggests some degree of *plasticity* of the super-ego (and here Freud is clearly deviating from rationalism). He explains that "the more intense the Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to repression (under the influence of discipline, religious teaching, schooling and

reading) the more exacting later on is the domination of the super-ego over the ego" (ibid.: 45). One can thus assume that this domination, at other points described as being expressed in conscience, but also unconscious guilt, is a *malleable* one — there can be varying degrees of the 'rule of reason'. Even though the super-ego works as some sort of compulsive categorical imperative, it does not do so in absolute terms.

Freud offers an understanding of the super-ego that is far removed from what it is often referred to colloquially. The revolutionary repression of the Oedipus complex is a fundamental turning point from helplessness and dependence to, basically, the Enlightenment (the famous "exit from self-incurred tutelage"; Kant [1784] 2013) of the self. This turn resembles securitisation (see chapter 4): The ascendence to power of the super-ego (as an internalised father-figure) is an internalised 'self-tutelage' of sorts, which gives the false impression of having gotten rid of the principle of authority and subjugation altogether. This can be read as a symptom of self-fear and lack of trust in one's own passions and intuitions. The super-ego is therefore welcomed also to a degree that depends on the preceding state of the ego, in the Freudian model: security is a response to, if not the outcome of, insecurity. In addition, security is never a *removal* of insecurity but its *relocation* to a self-responsible place. As security and insecurity have become parts of one organic whole, they permeate one another — one implies the other, necessitating one another's omnipresence in themselves. In Freud's words: "When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared them; and later we took them into ourselves" (Freud [1923] 2010: 47).

Freud further elaborates the relationships of the ego to id and super-ego. He highlights once more that the super-ego takes on the role of "a memorial of the former weakness and dependence of the ego" and that "the mature ego remains subject to its domination" (ibid.: 69). The ego finds itself in a double bind: On the one hand, it is faced with the challenge of taming the wild horse, on the other hand it is constantly being evaluated and judged against the standards of the super-ego. To further complicate things, Freud adds that in fact "the super-ego is always in close touch with the id and can act as its representative in relation to the ego" (ibid.: 69-70).

Summarising this complex picture becomes challenging, as the functions of each element are never specified as clearly as one would like to have it. The lines are blurred, and there is constant multi-directional interaction and interdependence. To put it somewhat

concretely, Freud sums up his position in the following way: "[I]t may be said of the id that it is totally non-moral, of the ego that it strives to be moral, and of the super-ego that it can be hyper-moral and then becomes as ruthless as only the id can be" (ibid.: 79). In an almost circular relationship, the id contains the ego, which answers its demands in the language of the super-ego, which in turn is in close touch with the id.

The ego "tries to remain on good terms with the id" by covering up responses to its demands through rationalisation (ibid.: 83). It implies a 'making acceptable', but also a 'making socially recognisable' of emotion by means of acceptable language and behaviour. On the other hand, the ego's subordinate relationship to the super-ego is one of a "fear of conscience" (ibid.: 85). To bring this back to the vocabulary of emotion and reason, the 'rule of reason' is here rendered not only fundamentally ambiguous, but also compromised by the workings of all other elements involved. Despite the tripartition of Freud's model there is no neat equivalence with the Platonic concept; the ego is not simply reason, nor is the id necessarily the same as the appetite. There are certainly valid points of comparison, and one can indeed recognise a Platonic inspiration in the Freudian model, yet it would be a mistake to equate them. The ego is a place at which reason and emotion meet, at which there is perhaps more spirit involved than pure reason, but it is most importantly an inherently holistic concept of human nature at which, in a similar vein as in Plato, no one element is separable from the other and in which the conditions of one make the response of the other necessary. From this point of view, Plato and Freud have in common that neither of them conceived of reason in one-dimensional, absolute terms, and even the limited assignments of authority they did introduce were, crucially, those of an ideal type.

With such a nuanced reading of oft-cited theorists such as Plato and Freud, one can arrive at the conclusion that the rule of reason is no necessary corollary of Platonic nor of Freudian thought. Instead it is a 'myth', or a deliberate construction of an argument that carries considerable social and political weight — an argument with consequences too for the way we make sense of and seek to establish security (see chapter 4). The framework of rationality that mainstream IR subscribes to helps to establish a core of certainty regarding human nature, yet only at the cost of neglecting what is deemed irrational (more on the marginalising effect in chapter 3). Concluding the above takes on Plato and Freud, it should have become

clear how such a one-dimensional understanding is no necessary implication of their work —
rather, they are often being essentialised to a problematic extent.

2.3 Intellectual polarisation and essentialism

With 'Reason and Emotion in International Ethics', Australian IR theorist Renée Jeffery (2014) brings together ancient and modern philosophical thought with due attention to more nuanced concepts of reason and emotion. She first juxtaposes two camps of thought, the rationalists and the sentimentalists, in order to then explain how one cannot be rigidly separated from the other. Naturally, this is a balancing act risking to commit the very fallacy it aims to make visible, and Jeffery does not always avoid that — but even if compromising the strength of her argument, her incomplete success underlines the necessity of the exercise.

Sentimentalist arguments such as this are inspired by the moral sentiment theory of David Hume. In addition to that however, Jeffery also mobilises contemporary findings from the cognitive neurosciences to substantiate the contention that emotion and reason are virtually intertwined and inseparable. Even more importantly, she presents an intriguing account of the interpretations and misinterpretations that have led to intellectual polarisation and essentialism. Jeffery offers three central clues to this end.

First, she introduces 'Hume's law', which refers to the non-translatability of 'is' to 'ought'. Empirical observation, in this view, cannot be transformed into normative prescription *as is*. In other words, "premises about how human beings act cannot be simply transposed into statements about how they ought to act; the fact that people engage in particular types of behaviour does not make those behaviours good" (Jeffery 2014: 20). Of course, if 'ought' is to imply 'can', it always needs to reflect 'is' in some way — 'can' is the practical constraint of the 'is' to the normative possibilities of the 'ought' (ibid.: 23). Nevertheless, there can be no simple equation 'is' = 'ought'. This point also plays a serious role in academia, particularly when it comes to ideal types. It is ironic how the Weberian concept of ideal typification has sometimes been taken too literally, sometimes too vaguely: An *ideal* type is not a normative way of giving direction per se, but more importantly a methodological approach to a phenomenon *if it were other than it actually is*. This is precisely where it becomes so useful: in making possible the discovery of the difference between observation and ideal. If one linked this back to Hume's law, then one can without

much difficulty see how, if Jeffery is right and there are two rather bifurcated camps of rationalism and sentimentalism, each side has decided for a particular ideal type and taken it for 'the real thing' (for what is taken as 'subjectively valid'; more on ideal types in chapter 5).

This development is what Jeffery sees as the basic problem of the scholarly debate on reason and emotion. She sees this problem particularly at work in contemporary mainstream IR, where a rational choice type of actor rationality appears to occupy the intellectual high ground, even if decreasingly so. In her own words, the development from Humean thought to the current sway of rational choice "was less the result of the overt rationalism of Bentham and Kant (although that certainly played a part) and more to do with *excessively rationalist interpretations* of their work by later scholars, particularly in the twentieth century" (ibid.: 34; emphasis added). In this sense, the question revolves not so much around what has been proposed, but more around what has been made of those proposals.

A second insight that helps explain the polarisation of the reason-emotion debate is the widespread lack of clarity surrounding the concept of reason. The question 'what is reason?' has been answered in many different ways — so many, in fact, that the dispute actually took place "not really between rationalism and irrationalism per se, but between different understandings of rationality itself" (ibid.: 40). Although I do acknowledge the importance of recognising a variety in kinds, I will not go into too much detail regarding other understandings of it. My own critique is directed at a prescriptive, instrumental understanding of reason that takes a very particular idea of a rational actor from 'ought' to 'is' and in that way produces an observational model from an ideal type and formulates normative judgements and propositions on the basis of a one-dimensional, reductionist understanding of human nature; rational choice is an example of such an approach. In the remainder of this paper and for the sake of clarity, although some will disagree with the accuracy of the term, I call this kind of reason 'rationality'.

Third, Jeffery further backs up her argument with the observation that, through this process of gradual reduction particularly in the rationalist camp, narrow accounts such as rational choice were able to take hold in fields like IR. Despite other disciplines in the social sciences ceding less authority to rational choice theory, mainstream IR has been able to keep this perspective alive and maintain its central role in the larger schools of liberalism and realism, but even in constructivism. But what is so problematic about rational choice?

Generally, "a rational choice is one that is based on reasons, irrespective of what those reasons may be" — however, rational choice theory "does not accept all modes of reasoning as providing 'sufficient reasons' to deem a thought or course of actions as being rational", as it instead rather "equates rational actors with omniscient calculators" (ibid.: 46). The omniscient calculator is an ideal type and as such *would* be able to make the rational choice in a given situation. So far, so good — only does this, *even as an ideal type*, blatantly disregard everything that goes beyond the rational calculation of the ideal choice (cf. Green/ Shapiro 1994).

Such calculated interest maximisation, in rational choice theory, is conditioned by feasibility, rational beliefs about causality, and the ranking of alternatives — it is then, consequently, rational to choose the highest-ranked element. There is thus in fact room for multi-dimensional rational choice, depending on what principles such ranking will be based on. And indeed, in the early days of rational choice theory there have been scholars who suggested much more nuanced and explicitly hypothetical principles than those we today tend to be familiar with (cf. Friedman 1953). Again, and also to attenuate easy assignment of blame, the downgrading of alternative conceptions has to do with the bifurcation of and the discouragement of ambivalence in either intellectual camp and probably goes back more to reception and reading of such work than to its own original intentions.

Yet in IR we are most confronted with principles that are based on egocentric, selfish terms. Jeffery explains: "[U]nderstandings of rational choice in terms of the maximisation of self-interest, though an anomaly outside the social sciences, have come to dominate the study of international relations". Here "the rational actor is characterised as one who reasons correctly, where correct reasoning is […] that which is in accordance with […] the assumption that human nature is fundamentally egocentric" (Jeffery 2014: 47). This prevails in what Jeffery calls 'prescriptive realism', where an ought derives from what is seen to be an is, which originally had come into existence as an ought, and never an is in the first place.

In the language that dominates this sphere, 'rational' has become synonymous with 'self-interested'. Prescriptive realists maintain that the right response to an emotion like fear "ought to be strictly rational in nature" (ibid.: 48). In the context of security, this means that every upheaval of felt insecurity ought to be suppressed with the instrument of rationality — every threat ought to be managed in the mechanical sense of the term, every risk ought to be

mitigated. In short: emotional life ought to be *kept in check*. This is, to return to Plato and Freud, not only based on antagonistic, hostile understanding of reason and emotion, but also a securitising move in and of itself — the 'rational choice' is also the 'secure choice'.

Does Jeffery commit the fallacy of bifurcation herself? Yes and no. She clearly sides with Hume's moral sentiment theory, and she tends to critique rationalism at the expense of examining sentimentalism equally critically. To be fair, she does not end up proposing a one-sided solution to the debate either, but rather pays close attention to what are actually, excuse the pun, reasonable arguments on the rationalist end of the spectrum. She ultimately does bring forward and defend a relatively balanced, holistic account that cedes some ground to reason, but most importantly does not cancel out nor turn a blind eye to the emotions. A problem of terminology might be that she identifies this approach as 'sentimentalism'. Overall, she presents a comprehensive overview of the development of an intellectual debate that had the unfortunate outcome of marginalising the lesser purely rationalist accounts and thus splitting into two positions that would perceive one another in overly simplistic ways. This becomes clear in the role of stereotyped phrases that have been mobilised so as to delineate the boundaries of each camp — Plato's reason-as-ruler and Kant's categorical imperative are frequently referred to as *evidence* of the absoluteness of each proponent, whereas Hume's famous 'reason as the slave of the passions' is taken as proof of the radicalism of his account in turn. How this attitude could possibly bring about a fruitful conversation will most likely remain a mystery.

After a close reading of Plato and Freud presented a more nuanced, complex picture of the role of reason, this section explored the polarisation of the reason-emotion debate in order to understand how the myth of the rule of reason was established and centred in IR. In the following section, I will discuss why this myth is a problem and what the very form of this debate reveals about its content already.

2.4   Instrumental reason as securitising move

An unfortunate discursive development has backgrounded holistic understandings of reason such as those one may choose to highlight in reading Plato or Freud, and ceased

ground to reason understood in more unitarily instrumental terms, as visible in contemporary, reductionist accounts of rationality. In the present chapter, I have detailed my own reading of Plato and Freud as examples of how to conceive of reason in holistic terms, and lastly discussed how the possibility of such a perspective has been impeded — on a course marked by polarising and mutually essentialising one another's accounts. This development is problematic and revealing.

It is problematic in three ways. First, it renders the possibilities of conceptualising actorhood and interaction in IR very narrow — either one emphasises the rationality of an actor at the expense of emotional dimensions, or one emphasises the emotionality of an actor at the expense of rational dimensions. A full swing toward the latter, I contend, cannot possibly be a 'remedy' of sorts against an overemphasis on rational calculus either, as it simply inverts the picture and, simultaneously, could even introduce a peculiar potential of connecting back to *laissez faire* doctrines in the sense of a sentimental 'letting-go'. In the words of Judith Butler, "to identify the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse that uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different set of terms" (Butler 1999: 18).

Second, the scholarly development is problematic in that it stands in the way of thoroughly considering one of the perhaps most crucial concepts of IR theory: difference (Inayatullah/Blaney 2004). If one is to *understand* difference rather than to reify it, it must be accessed, opened up and deconstructed on all possible layers — and the reason-emotion dualism is certainly one of those layers. Normative judgement of the other, inherent to a unidimensional conception that favours one element over the other is highly problematic — as feminist and post-colonial scholars point out, the rule of reason did not just win the debate by coincidence, but it did so as part of a much broader, much more powerful discourse on domination and power relations. This includes the intrinsically gendered character of the reason-emotion juxtaposition (cf. Cohn 1987), relations between 'the West' and the former colonies, but also more broadly the frequent mobilisation of 'rational arguments', along with the simultaneous characterisation of external actors and factors as irrational or 'led astray by the passions', as part of delineating sharp lines between self and other.

The third way in which this discursive development is problematic ties in precisely with the latter point — it regards the ethical consequences of unidimensional, instrumental

reason (i.e. rationality). Jeffery (2014) has made this point visible in several dimensions, yet does not go beyond classical dilemma scenarios to illustrate her argument. In the following chapters I try to expand this illustration by zooming in on securitisation in an attempt to unfold and discover security dynamics in everyday security practices and to explore underlying discourses of power.

The development described thus far is on the other hand also quite revealing. The way IR scholars have tended either to opt for an emphasis on instrumental reason or to stress the other end of the spectrum instead is telling. What is more, it already hints at how the whole debate relates to security. To be more precise: *the emphasis on a unidimensional, instrumental understanding of reason and what it means to behave rationally as an actor in international politics is a securitising move in and of itself.* Further elaboration shall suggest that it this claim is crucial. The tendency thus far described has produced an ontological presumption about the rationality of actors which not only stands in the way of meaningful integration of the emotional, but also reveals itself as an act of meta-theoretical securitisation *ex ante*, i.e. before questions of security are themselves considered. How does this work? Two possible explanations pertain.

For one, one may argue that the assumption of a purely rational actor is a more reliable and stable one than that of a multi-dimensional, much more complex actor. It provides the comfort of not having to engage with the intricacies or complications of actual experience, but even caters to an inclination to wishful thinking: We would really like to trust ourselves in all matters rational. If this approach were merely an ideal type, it would be a quite obvious and perhaps superfluous point to make; yet as I have argued before, the rational actor has stepped outside the boundaries of ideal typification and entered the realm of real-life policy making — especially in the politics of security. This one-to-one translation into practice is a problem that necessarily begins in theory.

A second explanation is needed however, as the above does not yet answer the question *why* we would actually have such an inclination to wishful thinking. If one were to formulate this matter in terms of security, one might argue that the wish for 'pure' (that is, absolute and omnipotent) rationality originates in a need for ontological security (cf. Steele 2008). In psychological terms, and this brings us back to Freud, there would be a strong desire to be in charge of oneself, to exert control over one's impulses and urges. Clearly, there

should be no harm in such a desire, as what would the world look like if we would all 'let go' and *always and only* listen to our gut-feelings, without any prejudgement, preselection, moderation whatsoever? Such a world is so unimaginable to us that we even diagnose individuals who display such behaviour with 'disinhibition' or even psychopathy. It should be clear, therefore, that *some* degree of control over one's urges is a necessary component to our ability of living in a shared world.

It goes without saying that this is one of the most fundamental and obvious concerns of human affairs, be it in philosophy, politics, or economics. There is a desire for ontological security that is immediately linked to the social. Out of concern for the social, we need to establish some sense of control over our impulses — ontological security is produced whenever we establish such a sense of control. And what way of doing so would seem more straightforward than to simply assume absolute rationality of oneself? What understanding would seem more settling and reliable? Surely no other, it should seem. This is how the debate described in this chapter, especially with its impact on the disciplinary development of IR, is a securitising move itself, a scholarly means of removing uncertainty.

I have so far pointed out what I do *not* intend to do here, and delineated where things may have gone wrong. Yet where can this trend be mitigated, where does one intervene? In the following chapter, I delineate such a space for intervention first by trying to understand and explain the marginalisation of emotion; second, by offering cognitive appraisal theories as a 'way out' that does not make the mistake of overemphasising the emotions in turn; and third, by outlining the consequences of rationalism for the politics of security.

III

The Marginalisation of Emotion

Something peculiar struck me the other day. In the midst of a heated discussion, I suddenly could not help but turning increasingly aggravated and agitated — I defended my argument more and more fervently, and as more and more rational: How can you not see it this way? How does my point not seem clear enough? How is this not generally true? Blinded to the narrowing of my horizon, I had switched into an energetically defensive mode. As my counterpart pointed out to me, my emotional side was speaking, yet I instead defended it as *particularly* rational. I raised my voice, and would bring up more and more arguments almost ceaselessly — yet I *rationalised* every point by way of defence. Strength and defendability of the argument were assumed to coincide with rationality, not or in fact *never* with emotion. How does one make sense of this casual marginalisation of emotion? And what does it tell us about the security narratives we routinely develop? This chapter outlines the debate on emotion, and aims at approximating a deeper understanding of the pillars it stands on.

I begin by trying to identify a space of intervention — on two levels: On the one hand, I outline a workable definition of emotion that allows me to avoid confining too narrowly the realm of what is emotion but does not introduce too unspecific a typology either. This is of course a frequent dilemma, yet the nature of this balancing act matters to my project. To this end, I discuss contemporary appraisal theories that are ontologically useful for conceiving of emotions in a more holistic manner. Special light will be shed on fear and anxiety as specified and unspecified types of emotions that are fundamental to security.

On the other hand, I discuss what kind of impact the marginalisation and sometimes discriminatory absence of emotion has on the 'worlding' of mainstream IR. This bears most severe implications for ontological entry points to international politics and day-to-day practices of security, which I want to make visible with some examples of rationalised political discourse. The chapter ends with a discussion of the consequences of rationalism for the politics of security.

3.1 Toward emotion as Platonic cognitive appraisal

Defining emotion is a complicated task, and perhaps too complicated to ever be resolved satisfactorily. Researchers in psychology have often tended to opt for a definition that fits the framework of analysis they would use in their respective projects, so that difficulties in comparative value become inevitable. It is further difficult to grasp the concept of emotion *in relation to* reason without understanding it *in opposition to* reason. My own approach retains and pays attention to these ambiguities as they are essential for a take on emotion that fits with the holistic account of reason presented in the preceding chapter.

Etymologically, emotion can be thought of as an *emotive* force, in two senses: in the Latin verb *emovere* (derived from *ex* and *movere*) it is a force of 'moving out', whereas based on the French *émouvoir* it is a force of excitement. Emotion thus relates to a movement or displacement characterised by arousal. The centuries old and often repetitive debate on emotion begins with the question of *what was first* — stimulus or response? There are three strands of theory that dominate this debate: Accounts of 'basic emotions', such as the Darwinian suggestion of inborn emotional inclinations; 'somatic theories' that suggest the precedence of sensation to cognition (or experience to mental representation), such as the famous James-Lange theory of emotion; and 'cognitivist accounts' that stress the appraisal or evaluative function of emotion as sense-makers, as upheld by many contemporaries who base their claims on the work of Hume and Aristotle (Jeffery 2014). Two fundamental problems that underly all of these proposals are: what is the order of sequence, and where are the emotions — are they primarily a bodily sensation or a cognitive phenomenon?

One possible answer to what almost appears to be a dead end is "a hybrid approach to the emotions that recognises that emotions are both embodied or felt and cognitive or thought-ridden" (Jeffery 2014: 129). Jeffery sketches this out mainly from the starting point of post-behaviourist cognitive appraisal theory, one of the most widely accepted perspectives on emotion in contemporary psychology. Cognitive appraisal appeals my own approach as a holistic concept which performs the split between reason and emotion without having to resort to dichotomy — precisely by discouraging the idea of a split being needed in the first place. Cognitive appraisal theory claims that emotions are not "something that *happens* to us but something we *do*" (ibid.: 148; emphasis in original). Appraisals are 'sense judgements' that can be either intuitive or reflective in nature — intuitive appraisals are direct, while

reflective appraisals *can* follow from intuitive ones and are more deliberate and rational as such. Three propositions follow from these claims: First, emotions are *directed* (toward referent objects); second, they presuppose cognitions (one has to first know or perceive the referent object in some way in order for it to be perceived as affecting one); third, emotions *require* value-judgements or appraisals.

As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, the psychological mainstream often leans toward a neopositivist examination of human nature that requires backing up with empirical proof. Claims about the relationship between reason and emotion, as in cognitive appraisal theory, are thus often sought to be corroborated for instance with neuroscientific research, which has repeatedly confirmed the intertwinement of reason and emotion. My own approach would much less resort to evidence and rather discuss the meaning of such claims. What are the consequences of pointing at the reason-emotion connection? And how do we then respond to rationalist claims? Do we, ironically, respond with a 'return of the passions', an ultraliberal *laissez faire* sentimentalism? Responding to an assumption about overregulation with deregulation may be as futile an attempt as that of the juvenile who would always do precisely the opposite of what her parents say, just for the sake of the principle. It is, after all, not truly a 'hybrid approach'.

To elucidate the interconnectedness of emotion and reason, let us consider the everyday (although hopefully not *every* day) practice of baking. As most people know, baking becomes a success more often when one improvises *on the basis of* the recipe than when one strictly follows the recipe. While the latter tends to yield a conventional cake (which is boring in that it is replaceable, and therefore has no character), the former allows the baker to insert her own character, to 'bake with love'. The cake may then turn out too sweet, or too salty, but it will certainly be more likely to taste *original*. Yet, this would have been impossible without any recipe at all, because that would have been more likely not to yield a cake at all (but a dough too dry to stick together, or so liquid that one would rather have to drink the cake than to eat it). In sum, good baking is a mix of rule and improvisation, regulation and deregulation, reason and emotion.

Jeffery makes an important contribution when she describes rationalism as a deontological judgement that is "a rational explanation for an emotional response" (ibid.: 195). The argument gets close to the one I make about security (see chapter 4). On the other

hand, she immediately proposes a *solution* to the problem she identifies; and not only do I disagree with the idea of 'offering' a 'solution', I also disagree with the nature of this particular solution, which I suspect to potentially circle back to the very problem. Making "the role played by the emotions more explicit," Jeffery argues, would make it easier for us "to understand what we are doing when we make such judgements but, ultimately, *it does nothing to change them*" (ibid.; emphasis added). From a reflexivist point of view, one can only disagree here, considering the significance of awareness, reflection, and consideration. To know one's emotions is to know parts of oneself; knowing not in the sense of objective truth-seeking but in the sense of deep familiarity with oneself and one's self. Such self-recognition and self-acceptance may subvert rationalist oppression and allow for a *constant conversation* between reason and emotion rather than an anxious battle. This conversation allows both reason and emotion to bring forward their perspectives and will at times yield one's, at other times the other's preferred outcome, and at yet other times a compromise.

Most important here are acceptance and permission, something very different from primacy or prescription. This constitutes what one might call a neo-Platonic move; it takes a dialogical interpretation of the Platonic rule of reason as a starting point from which to view the relationship of reason and emotion as an *interplay* much more than an *antagonism* (more on this dialogical approach in chapter 5). As political theorist George Klosko (1988) puts it, "reason desires knowledge and truth [...] in a sense closely related to that in which *to epithumētikon* [appetite] desires food, drink and sex" (ibid.: 344). In other words, all three parts of Plato's tripartite human nature have desires (*epithumiai*), including reason — there simply is no way to bifurcate spirit and appetite against reason, as none of these elements works in isolation from another. The marginalisation of emotion, to come full circle here, is thus but another story told in the mythology of instrumental reason, a necessary and perhaps sufficient condition for the primacy of calculative reason to unfold.

What do we make of these insights? Is it appropriate to formulate an 'ought' from the 'is'? Is sentimentalism an apt answer to acknowledging that emotion and reason are connected? As the above notion of a dialogue between reason and emotion shows, a resort to sentimentalism would actually amount to perilous short-sightedness and a circularity of the problem. This circularity begins with a misrecognition or *méconnaissance*: In deviation from Jeffery, I do not identify the narrow understanding of reason that prevails in IR scholarship as

a problem *in terms of* it resulting in a lack of emotion and, therefore, the solution to bring back emotion (and, actually, to subscribe to *its* reign instead of that of reason). Rather, I problematise the narrow understanding of reason *itself* so as to then try to conceive of it differently. Bringing back emotion would, in the latter sense, be an effort to no avail, as it would reproduce the skewed conditions I aim to critically reconsider in the first place. Ultimately, one can bring this argument closer to the understanding of security introduced here: To acknowledge the co-constitutive nature of reason and emotion, their mutual nestedness and their *intersectionality* in practice is to allow for uncertainties without 'unleashing' the irrational beasts.

In Goya's *El sueño de la razón produce monstruos* (cover page) it is not necessarily the 'sleep of reason' that 'produces monsters' but perhaps simply the emotionally tinged imagination of that happening which makes for rationality presenting itself as such a safe-haven in moments of insecurity. The monster under the bed is the terrifying fantasy of losing control, to which only a strictly and narrowly formulated rationality is considered a trustworthy enough defence. This fantasy suggests that the slightest slip of reason would endanger the self to fall into the vicious downward spiral of irrational being — a loss not only of control, but also of meaning altogether. Funnily enough, that fantasy is itself of course *not rational* by definition. Instead, reason might be the monster under the bed, not emotion, as this is actually what one avoids properly confronting or understanding.

Allowing for uncertainties is a way of enabling both emotion and reason — it is not to elevate uncertainties, nor to suppress them, but to be tolerant of them. It is not a breaking-free, not a euphemistic (and hubristic) liberating emancipatory step but, and here I will disappoint all academic excitement-seekers, a plain reconciliation, the vanilla ice cream of conflict resolution. As Inayatullah and Blaney put it, "when we can learn to engage instead of eradicate doubt, we may come to see differences as renewable sources of infinite creativity" (2004: 144).

This chapter has interrogated the concept of emotion in light of its relation to reason. Emotion is primarily understood as a socio-political concept to which the psychology of cognitive appraisal adds tentative insight, hinting at possibilities of reconciliation on three dimensions. First, emotion is part of an organic whole, as my discussion of Plato and Freud

has suggested already (chapter 2). This means that it is not separable from reason, nor that it can be seen in *either* isolation *or* constellation, but that it can only be understood both as a separate category that is able to have an independent effect and as one that only works as part and parcel of a whole organism in which there is an intimate interdependency at work. Second, emotion is in and of itself a form of cognitive appraisal, namely in that it *makes sense* (in a rational-deliberative way) of its referents and *assigns meaning* (in an emotive-semiotic way) to those referents.

Feeling secure about something, to subtly herald the coming chapters, is an appraisal of a given circumstance, event, development, relation, etc. as making sense in a particular way (a rational assessment of it as controllable), and as being meaningful due to a certain resonance between referent object and subject (an emotional assessment of the former as not existentially threatening). Third, all of the above offers a substantial alternative not only to the heavy weight of reason purported so frequently, but also to the dualism of reason and emotion altogether. This is particularly relevant to the further endeavour of the paper at hand, as it will form the basis for a reformulation, and thereupon re-assessment, of security as discourse and practice — specifically, security as a reasoned emotion.

How does such an understanding of emotion play out concretely in the case of fear and anxiety as objects of an emotionally based practice of rationalisation, and how do these connect to the politics of security? My answers highlights how rationalism fundamentally marginalises emotion by framing it in antagonistic and oftentimes hostile ways.

3.2   Fear and anxiety as objects of rationalisation

In his 1754 'Discourse on Inequality', French Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau suggests a relatively amicable relation between emotion and reason at the concrete example of fear:

> "It is by the activity of the passions that our reason is improved; for we desire knowledge only because we wish to enjoy; and it is impossible to conceive any reason *why a person who has neither fears nor desires should give himself* [sic] *the trouble of reasoning*"
>
> (Rousseau [1754] 1984: 14; emphasis added).

Rousseau's argument is in a way profoundly Platonic. He claims that reason is improved by emotion, as evident in the 'desire to know': In a holistic sense, appetite or desire permeates all elements, as we would otherwise not have the drive to exert reason in order to know, understand, and reflect. Therefore, he continues, why would anyone bother reasoning in the absence of fears or desires? What if not longing and anguish would bring about the impetus to know and reason in the first place? In line with this suggestion, the hanging-together of reason and emotion is especially visible in the case of fear and anxiety.

How do we distinguish one from the other? Fear can be understood as being directed at a cause (there is a concrete, identifiable source to a felt lack of security), whereas anxiety comes about in the absence of such a cause (a lack of security is felt in a generalised way). Often the two overlap, making distinction arguably difficult. Sometimes fear is supplemented with a suspicion that the cause one readily identified is actually not sufficient (think of terrorism: terrorism is the cause, but could not everyone potentially be a terrorist?), while at other times an anxiety is being kept in check by, more or less arbitrarily, identifying a single cause for it (think of scapegoat politics: if everyone could be a terrorist, then at least we could focus on the social/religious/economic group that stands out among perpetrators).

Fear and anxiety have a few things in common. Most importantly, they are both responses to threat — or, more accurately, to the assessment of a given referent (object, event, circumstance, development, etc.) *as a threat*. I will go into more detail regarding threat assessment and, more significantly for security as a practice, threat construction in the following chapter; for now it is important to remember that fear and anxiety are psychological responses (or, behaviourally speaking, patterns of response) to threat.

If emotion is cognitive appraisal, fear and anxiety are more than mere threat responses: They *make sense* of a given referent and *assign meaning* to it. If rationalism or the primacy of reason is however the appraisal's point of departure, then fear and anxiety become problems. Problematising these threat responses, in turn, will have the referent require some other form of threat-management or keeping-in-check. Rationalisation takes over that role by subjugating the feeling of fear or anxiety to the extent of judging its quality, appropriateness and, thus, its right to exist. Fear or anxiety are no longer legitimate but become visible only as objects of such rationalising practices. In other words, they are more *made sense of* than *assigned meaning to* — they are being strategically managed.

Such strategic antagonising of emotion is problematic once it disconnects oneself from one's self by denying access to one's emotions, as they were already prejudged before 'allowed in'. In that case it is not only a useful tool for putting rational considerations first, but also a routinely applied blindfold that shuts up dialogue between reason and emotion — reason turns into the distant referee without reference, a subject with no object. The rationalism discussed here (which renders reason a tool for the satisfaction of egocentric needs) is one that warps the world in a way that marginalises emotion by conceptualising it as an obstacle to strategic pursuit. In international politics, this takes the shape of assumptions about rational actors, strategic decision-making, and classical security dilemmas. But there are more consequences.

3.3   Consequences of rationalism for the politics of security

How do assumptions and expectations based on instrumental reason shape and modify security practices? Do they do justice to the security needs of the body politic, or do they stand in the way of a comprehensive realisation of self and other as relating practices of security through a rational-emotional nexus?

Van Rythoven (2015) explains how the politics of security are inherently connected to group-level emotion. Threat construction, he posits, is always collective and thus subject to fluctuations in the constitution of that collectivity. This argument takes social constructivism and securitisation theory beyond meaning generated purely in speech or in social relations by identifying threat construction as an emotional phenomenon (more on securitisation in chapter 4). Van Rythoven gets close to the argument made in this paper by starting out with a definition of emotions as "judgements over the competency of the practice of securitisation, judgements made against the background of the local security imaginary" (ibid.: 459). Fear appraisals are thus also *culturally* situated judgements. To theorise how these are generated, Van Rythoven claims, matters because it "offers new insights into how emotions may frustrate and contain practices of securitization [sic]" (ibid.: 459f.). Van Rythoven wants to provide an alternative to "a technical discourse which is alien to the everyday experience of security" (ibid.: 459).

It is precisely this technical discourse which I describe as a product of claims over the primacy of (instrumental, technical) reason. In this light, Van Rythoven's counterpoise is

elucidating: a renewed emphasis on how "collective fear appraisals are often fragile cultural assemblages vulnerable to contestation and destabilization [sic]" (ibid.: 464). Emotions, in his view, create intuitive judgements with three characteristics: First, they "stress the boundaries of articulation", highlighting a speechlessness of sorts (ibid.: 462). Second, they are embodied and have a tangible physiological dimension. Third, they can be unconscious when they affectively tinge or attenuate rational beliefs and judgements (ibid.). Van Rythoven gestures not only toward a multi-dimensional understanding of emotion, but also toward assigning emotion independent ontological status rather than simply 'adding it' to theory already out there. Although such an ontology of emotion needs to avoid separation, isolation, or claims to predominance, it is a useful way of avoiding to 'bring back the passions'.

On the collective level, Van Rythoven continues, emotions are "shared and embodied judgements which reflect an intuitive synthesis of relational meaning" (ibid.: 466). Again, this goes contrary to common views of security as a collectively negotiated practice that is brought about in rational deliberation. As emotions situationally structure "which cultural meanings matter and how," security is a kind of "creative 'imagining' of cultural meaning necessary for emotional appraisal to occur" (ibid.: 466). This contingency or fluidity of security as a collective practice is on the one hand crucial to understanding security as a reasoned emotion, while on the other hand it makes visible how a rationalist emphasis must be unfitting to the practice and experience of security and insecurity.

A rationalist guiding principle for the practice of security is in the above sense inappropriate. As security is actually a volatile, unstable collective and emotional construct, rationalist maxims will always be unable to avoid producing tensions (insofar as they antagonise emotional components), thereby creating insecurities rather than security. The underlying motive for this practice could furthermore be explained, with Freud, as a defence mechanism (rationalisation) that is inclined to exert mastery (subjugation) over one's unknown impulses that one is afraid of.

To summarise, this chapter has taken a look at the marginalisation of emotion through the 'rule of reason' in three ways. First, I have attempted to embed a provisional definition of emotion in the overarching holistic framework I use in this paper. This has yielded a view of emotion as appraisal, which can always be both deliberative *and* intuitive and therefore

allows for an inherently ambiguous and sometimes dialectical relationship between reason and emotion as parts of an organic whole. Second, I have detailed fear and anxiety as objects of practices of rationalisation that try to give priority to a making-sense-of at the expense of an assigning-meaning-to. Third, I have outlined a disproportionality in such rationalist accounts by presenting an alternative rendition of security as a collective emotional practice. This mismatch between concept, practice, and experience hints at a necessity to conceptualise security, and the practice of securitisation, in a way that is more accepting of ambiguity, volatility, and doubt. The following chapter will try to do so by illustrating how rationalist security practices tend to be inappropriate, and by theorising security as a reasoned emotion.

IV

Security as Reasoned Emotion

If emotion is cognitive appraisal, including both intuitive and deliberative processes, the term 'reasoned emotion' may sound redundant at first; nevertheless it serves the important function of re-conceiving security with an explicitly holistic ambition. Securitisation theory provides a point of entry as much as of departure here: On the one hand, it offers a wide account of security as a multi-dimensional concept that touches upon much more than mere military-political understandings of concepts like 'national security' or 'international security'. To repeat with Inayatullah and Blaney (2004), I understand the study of international politics first and foremost as the study of difference. Security, I contend, is a concept that mobilises difference through urgency and threat. This makes security a phenomenon that becomes an individualised, *felt* experience, but at the same time elicits collective reactions and so activates collective identities. These collective identities emphasise boundaries between self and other, reinforced through the continued subscription of the collective to security discourse and practice — the self, both collectively and individually, becomes securitised. If the self is securitised, the other is made into the threatening referent object of security. Simultaneously, security is rendered an immediate *and* vicarious relation between self and other — it projects fears and suspicions onto the other and thereby disconnects from and puts it at a 'secure' distance, while also getting extremely close to the other in its very suspicion that it might be among the self. This relation becomes visible, for example, when considering the threat and fear of terrorism: The buzzword 'terrorism' elicits linguistic terror before it elicits real terror. Likewise, the designation of someone as a 'terrorist' yields categorical exceptionality before trial. Difference becomes absolute and total.

In their seminal 'International Relations and the Problem of Difference', Inayatullah and Blaney (2004) propose an ethnological turn as a preliminary response to the problematic nature of difference-making and competitive comparison, much as I would like to in my own approach to security (for more detail see chapter 5). An ethnological politics of comparison,

they suggest, would use "comparison as a source of critical self-reflection" (ibid.: 112). In that ethnological spirit, this chapter will account for different ways of creatively blurring the boundaries between self and other in an experimental move towards security as reasoned emotion.

The approach will be carved out by outlining three major (ideal types of) debates in securitisation theory serving as source of inspiration for my own take on security. The first debate constitutes the 'birthday' of securitisation theory, when the 'wideners' of the Copenhagen School provided a counterweight to the 'traditionalists' of classical security studies. My approach is in line with such a widening agenda. The second debate is one between so-called 'externalists' and 'internalists', the dispute revolving around the question: Does security refer to 'real' threats out there or is threat always a construct? Here another dichotomy is created to which I respond, as shall become clear later, with ambiguity. The third debate considered in this chapter casts psychological against sociological and political accounts of security, an outstanding response to which is social appraisal theory. This allows for a socio-political account of emotion without disregarding the psychology of fear and threat. I adopt some of the perspectives brought forward in these debates and conclude by providing some illustration of how securitisation plays out in international politics, with an eye toward the case study presented in the subsequent chapter.

4.1   Wideners versus traditionalists

The first debate which can confidently be said to have opened up security studies to more than a narrow conception of security in terms of military threat and political-strategic response is one between traditionalists and wideners. Traditionalists advocate a rationalist understanding of security in terms of 'threat management', while wideners propose an opening up of security research to much further-reaching instantiations of security in a variety of places. This debate, taking place in the 1990s, ended with first attempts at a theory of securitisation, which by now plays a central role to security studies.

With 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis' (1997), Copenhagen scholars Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde provide one of the earlier and more critical attempts to 'widen' security studies. This 'widening' expands the research agenda by adding sectors that point beyond the military, economic and political realms, the mission being "to question the primacy of the

military element and the state in the conceptualization [sic] of security" (Buzan et al. 1997: 1). Where promoters of the opposite approach tend to argue that a progressive widening of the concept of security would yield an 'everything-and-nothing' view, Buzan and colleagues suggest that both poles of the debate could at least agree on a general understanding of security as relating to *the threat or use of force*. Force, understood in whatever way (physical or non-physical), is thus a pivotal variable in the security equation. Security does however not translate directly into the absence of the threat or use of force — it is not a universally positive value that ought to be sought after. Wæver refines the proposition, saying that "security is a kind of stabilization [sic] of conflictual or threatening relations, often through emergency mobilization [sic] of the state" (ibid.: 4). Importantly, he adds, "a secure relationship still contains serious conflicts — albeit ones against which some effective countermeasures have been taken" (ibid.).

This goes to say that security can never entail the absolute absence of force, rather it is understood as the *momentary containment of force*. The term 'containment' is important in two senses: For one, it refers to the way in which security is established through the keeping-in-check of insecurity by means of force. Second, it hints at how security *contains* insecurity. Consequently, security *is not inherently good*, rather it is *better* given the options available.

Here Wæver's notion of securitisation is illuminating: Wæver defines securitisation *in distinction from politicisation* as "understanding who can securitize [sic] what and under what conditions", whereby the act of 'securitising' refers to the making of an issue into a matter of security (ibid.: vii). It is crucial to understand that this separation of securitisation from politicisation is however not a severing of the ties that link the two intimately embedded realms; rather, Wæver specifies it so as to assign it particular relevance, making it a worthy object of specialised inquiry.

Ultimately, to return to how the authors describe security not as good but *better*, one is urged "to aim for desecuritization [sic]", which takes place by "the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere", that is a repoliticisation of the issue at hand (ibid.: 4). This point deserves strong emphasis. The claim that security contains insecurity lies at the very heart of understanding security as a reasoned emotion, which similarly points at the inevitably ambiguous nature of reason and emotion as instantiated in the case of security practice and discourse.

But what exactly does the practice of security entail? Understood as 'undetectable', it is difficult to get hold of security as an emerging phenomenon, or as a mode of engagement and reference constantly subject to negotiation. In the early days of securitisation, speech act theory serves as primary starting point from which one can make visible the discursive and engaged instantiations of security in the making. However provisionally, Buzan and colleagues carve out some cornerstones to the practice of security — first, they claim in order to count as security issues, threats and vulnerabilities

"have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing [sic] actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind."

(ibid.: 5)

The dramaturgical act of 'staging' is composed of: an existential threat, referent objects, securitising actors, and emergency measures. Securitisation thus takes place as a staging by which an actor (the securitising actor) is able to move an issue (the referent object) from the political to the security realm (i.e. from politics as usual to the politics of emergency) by means of claiming that the issue was under existential threat.

Understanding that "the key issue is *to whom* security becomes a consideration *in relation to whom*" (ibid.: 18; emphasis added), Buzan and colleagues resolve the levels-of-analysis question by highlighting how although something can be securitised at a global level, its 'major battles' may play out regionally, locally, interpersonally, and even individually. This stance opens up space for analyses such as mine, in which I look at neighbourhood-prevention networks in Belgium and The Netherlands as spaces where security practice and discourse are instantiated in ways that speak to security also in global terms (chapter 6). If one takes *relationality* and *intersubjectivity* for key concerns, the level of analysis matters less to the researcher's ability to reveal some of the dynamics that are important for a deep understanding of security.

If securitisation is primarily understood as "a more extreme version of politicization [sic]", security "takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics" (ibid.: 23). In essence, security is

thereby understood as a practice that frames a referent object in terms of urgency or emergency, and thereby offers a justification for exemption from the usual. Security is the entry point to the state of exception (cf. Schmitt [1932] 2008; Agamben 2005) — it is the practice of replacing democracy, the rule of the people, with a subscription to autocracy, the rule of the *threat*. Furthermore, security is

> "a *self-referential practice*, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue — not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat."
>
> (Buzan et al. 1997: 24; emphasis added)

This post-positivist position lies outside the realm of mainstream IR in that it renders security an unobservable in the more radical sense: If security only consists in the way it is practiced, if "the meaning of a concept lies in its usage" (ibid.), then it should be clear that there is no way to objectively judge or measure security and insecurity. Threat as a referent object is relative to the assessor of threat, the referent subject. Securitisation is always subject to negotiation, understood as "the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects" (ibid.: 25).

Critics have repeatedly accused the notion of self-referentiality of being an empty notion: if security is its use, it is nothing. The wideners do however in my reading not deny the existence of 'real threats'; instead, against attempts at establishing an objective value of threat they hold up the relativity of threat. The utterance of the security reference is the making of security as such, the saying is a doing — but it is not the same as saying that security is nothing but the utterance; rather, the argument foregrounds security as a social construction that emerges through discourse and practice and in that way is self-referential. Threat is always a threat *to someone*, and therefore never the same to everyone — it is a socio-political and psychological experience, not an objective value. It would be a mistake to assume that securitisation was "an innocent reflection of the issue [at hand] being a security threat" (ibid.: 29), where innocence lies in the claims to neutrality which actually exert the power of the 'factual' by hiding the construction of the fact — one might say, a fact is a choice. All of this is crucial to my approach in that it already hints at security as a reasoned

emotion — as both practice and discourse which are inseparable from positionality, relationality, and inter-subjectivity. So how does one study security? Through discourse primarily, the wideners say. The leading research question for this kind of security discourse analysis would be:

"When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?"

(ibid.: 25)

The question foregrounds the power of argument on the level of both rhetorics and semiotics, which are important in order to understand the multidimensional interaction or resonance between the securitising agent and her/his audience. There is however a threshold between a securitising *move*, understood as the securitising agent's attempt of producing resonance with an audience, and securitisation itself, referring to the *success* of such an attempt — in other words, the productive power of a security argument is not the production itself; the acceptance of a securitising move through the audience is a necessary requisite for an act to fall under the category of securitisation. Here the wideners deviate from the traditionalists not merely in considering more than one area in which security is made, but also in that they already, albeit only implicitly, consider reason and emotion as intertwined — the rational argument is not enough to 'make security', it needs to resonate as well.

It is on this basis that the second assumption, the assumption of intersubjectivity, makes all the more sense. The wideners claim that as there is no way to reliably ensure that a subjective threat could ever be an objective threat, an 'objectivist' approach to security should be impossible (ibid.: 30). The acknowledgement of subjectivity was no foreign vocabulary to classical realism, which tended to be well aware that "good statesmanship has to understand the threshold at which other actors will feel threatened and therefore more generally to understand how the world looks to those actors, even if one disagrees" (ibid.). Despite this more balanced stance unfortunately having ceded considerable ground to pretensions over 'real' threats and 'real' security, it begs the question of how others judge the 'reasonableness' of a security claim. How is a claim judged legitimate? When is it exaggerated or paranoid?

The security speech act must meet several conditions in order to be deemed successful. While the audience is the external (contextual-social) condition, another set of conditions is internal and concerns composition of the speech act prior to its utterance. This regards grammatical structure and rules — it matters "to follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out" (ibid.: 33).

The 'possible way out' is a neat reference to the power of the promise so prevalent to politics, and matters in two ways: Not only does it keep alive and necessary the act and reenactment of securitisation, but also does it provide the basis for the justification of the exceptionality of emergency measures — as in: if this is 'the way out', we endorse it, no matter the costs.

On a final note, one of the sectors the wideners propose to expand research to gets close to securitisation dynamics at a communal (neighbourhood) level as I investigate them — the *societal sector*: "Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community" (ibid.: 119). Further:

> "Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community."
>
> (ibid.: 119)
>
> "Threats to identity are thus always a question of the *construction* of something as threatening some "we" — and often thereby actually contributing to the construction or reproduction of "us.""
>
> (ibid.: 120)

In a society organised and a community produced along the lines of identity, security becomes deeply existential in that it questions the very survival of the community as such. Threat construction also entails and yields the repeated redefinition of the communal self as a security strategy. In this light, the existential threat to a community affords the redrawing of its boundaries. The re-contouring and maintenance of established or new boundaries between self and other is thus another politically salient component of securitisation — it is in this way an act of power, difference, and antagonism.

To sum up, in response to the more rigid concept of security according to the traditionalists, the wideners of the Copenhagen School provide an analytical framework that theorises securitisation relative to three main features: Self-referentiality, intersubjectivity and productive power (the production and reproduction of community). All of these are based on constructivist premises which preclude a conception of security in 'objective' terms. In an amendment to this attack on 'objective' notions of security, another debate went on to critically discuss some of the claims of securitisation theory: The debate between so-called internalists and externalists.

4.2   Internalists versus externalists

At the end of the debate between traditionalists and wideners was the firm establishment of securitisation theory within a variety of disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, political science, and IR. Notwithstanding some of its core premises remained open to debate and even dispute, first and foremost the post-positivist attitude that now endangered claims over concrete material manifestations of threat. This 'crisis of relativism' is of course not exclusive to the field of security studies, but it plays out in a way that is both pivotal and telling to my understanding of security as a reasoned emotion, as I shall demonstrate in the following account of the debate between so-called internalists and externalists, a terminology that I borrow from self-proclaimed externalist Balzacq (2011).

Political philosopher, IR theorist, and former advisor to the French Ministry of Defence and the European Commission Thierry Balzacq is known for his critique of the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School and the neopositivist amendments he has put forward in numerous publications on the matter. He distinguishes between 'philosophical' approaches to security, to which he counts the poststructural strand of the Copenhagen theorists in particular, and 'sociological' approaches, to which he counts his own, although he emphasises how this distinction does not do justice to actual overlaps.

It is difficult to classify Balzacq by either of these categories, as his own approach is a hybrid between the Copenhagen School, to which he does express subtle hostility, and an understanding of security as also *objectively* instantiated. How and whether these positions combine will be the focus of my reading of Balzacq (2011). He begins this sketch of the debate with the claim that "no issue is essentially a menace", but that rather "[s]omething

becomes a security problem through discursive politics" (Balzacq 2011: 1). This is a quite familiar and unproblematic assertion to readers of the Copenhagen proponents, yet the ambiguity by which Balzacq understands this position changes the picture substantially. To Balzacq, an analysis of securitisation instantiated in discourse and practice does not at all contradict the neopositivist examination of factual empirical material. Security, in this sense, is not an unobservable but always a reference to something that is actually tangibly manifested in 'real' objects and relations.

According to Balzacq, in the Copenhagen School's 'internalist' take on speech act theory utterances are taken to literally *do* something, as "they are 'performatives' as opposed to 'constatives' that simply report states of affairs" (ibid.). On the other hand, the externalists are informed by social theory, particularly Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*. This perspective pays special attention to practice, context, and power relations and in that vein zooms in on threat construction in the social playing field. Balzacq does not only arbitrarily bifurcate this debate in order to make different points of view visible; he also creates an artificial dichotomy that does not do justice to either perspective. The pioneers of the Copenhagen School have already placed themselves explicitly in the intellectual context of *both* speech act theory *and* social constructivism. This 'founding myth' however serves as the basis of all further antagonising arguments the externalist perspective puts forward.

It is thus ironically presented as something novel to methodologically expand securitisation beyond discourse by delving also into the realm of practice: Security goes further than the speech act, Balzacq posits, and "consists of practices which instantiate *intersubjective* understandings through the *habitus* inherited from different, often competing social fields" (ibid.: 2; emphasis in original). Again, the proponents of the Copenhagen School would probably not disagree with this view. Balzacq posits a strange polarity between intersubjectivity and self-referentiality, saying that "securitization [sic] is not a self-referential practice but an *intersubjective* process" (ibid.: 3; emphasis in original). Securitisation is roughly understood as

> "a set of interrelated practices, and the processes of their production, diffusion, and reception/ translation that bring threats into being […]."
>
> (ibid.)

In this understanding, the discursive component of securitisation is mobilised in a constructive endeavour *through* the securitising agent *towards* an audience. This mobilisation constitutes the practice component of securitisation; discourse *serves* practice. Importantly, Balzacq understands practice as an observable action, an empirically tangible manifestation of the act of securitisation. Social construction is thus not as 'out-and-about' (dynamic or even immaterial) as that of the internalists but instead concerns *construction as manifestation*.

The externalist critique of speech act theory is based on the claim that the speech act does not fully account for how discourse connects to practice. Balzacq distinguishes with Austin (1962) between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts: Locution is the containment of "a given sense and reference" (Balzacq 2011: 4); illocution is the self-referential articulation of a locution; and perlocution is the consequence of illocution, or the effects that an utterance creates — "the 'consequential effects' or 'sequels' that are aimed to evoke the feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions of the target audience" (ibid.: 5).

Balzacq claims that speech act theory produces a disjunction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. To him, the speech act *is* illocution, while there can be no securitisation without perlocution: "Perlocution does not belong literally to speech act since it is the causal response of a linguistic act" (ibid.: 5), although of course part of the speaker's intent underlying the issuance of a speech act is to bring about the perlocutionary effect. Therefore, the speech act taken in isolation is an inherently restrictive theoretical framework as it is unable to account for the connection between discourse and practice (ibid.: 6). In how far this is a solid argument is questionable, as Balzacq does for instance not present a clearcut argument as to why exactly the speech act would not at least imply perlocution in its very quality as an *act*. When he thereafter moves on to point to recent advances in securitisation theory, among which most prominently performativity (what he calls 'decisionism') and inter-subjectivity ('dynamism'), he does not explain how these would be novel notions that speech act theory would have excluded by definition.

On a more generous note, Balzacq opens up a possibility for conceiving of *audience* in a way that is more flexible than the view purported by the Copenhagen scholars. That is, he understands audience as not unitary but variable, for instance by setting. Differing actor and audience compositions amount to a fundamental variability of securitising moves, which is indeed more dynamic than the productive-causal fixation of the speech act (ibid.: 7).

Moreover, Balzacq highlights how the concept of audience is further complicated by how it plays such a central role mainly due to the importance of acceptance or rejection of securitising moves. The acceptance of a securitising move is a function of "grand narratives by which truth is authorized [sic]" (ibid.: 8), he claims. Acceptance, in that sense, relies on a broader subscription to the standards of a discourse according to which truthfulness (in the sense of accuracy) is established. Still, the reservation that one cannot embrace a causal relationship between audience and act either is retained.

Balzacq identifies three core assumptions that (ought to) underlie securitisation theory. The first is the centrality of the audience — *acceptance* is key here. Further, the identification of the audience with the securitising agent is substantial, as "the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience's experience" — identification is understood to emerge in a resonating semantic and semiotic repertoire (ibid.: 9-10). On the other hand, this identification, similar to the internal group identification Buzan and colleagues (1997) describe, works to reinforce and reproduce a stereotyped version of the audience in question — the securitising actor bases her or his target population maps, to which she or he is compelled to refer, on stereotypes about the referent subjects confronted (Balzacq 2011: 9).

The second assumption is that of the co-dependency of agency and context, resembling Giddens' social constructivist understanding of structuration (i.e. the co-constitution of structure and agency; Giddens 1984):

> "The semantic repertoire of security is a combination of textual meaning […] and cultural meaning […]. Thus, the performative dimension of security rests between semantic regularity and contextual circumstances."
>
> (Balzacq 2011: 11)

Such a 'consistent dynamism' points implicitly at what Balzacq coins the 'abductive power' of words, according to which "security utterances operate as 'instructions for the construction and interpretation of the situation'" (ibid.: 11). At this point he intervenes with the crucial and controversial question whether, if security were in this sense an agent in and of itself, it would then be rendered independent of 'real' threats. Does whatever happens *outside* of the utterances in question not matter? His answer: We ought to distinguish between *institutional*

threats (products of communicative relations) and *brute* threats (which are external and independent of linguistic mediation) (ibid.: 12). The latter matter so much to Balzacq precisely because in his opinion, "language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it" (ibid.), putting an end to a centuries-long philosophical controversy with the swift brush of a handful of sentences. The point is underdeveloped and stands out as the essence of the externalist's conflicting relationship with securitisation theory and practice theory on the one hand, and a neopositivist commitment on the other.

This commitment has him state: "Analyzing [sic] security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including *external objective developments* affect securitization [sic]" (ibid.: 13; emphasis added) and to propose an "externalist approach to connecting security utterances to a context" (ibid.). On this basis, Balzacq argues that securitisation success would depend on 'the right timing' and 'the right external circumstances'. It requires a match between external and internal factors, a coincidence of subject and object — structuration takes place between 'subjective' intentions and 'objective' circumstances. The latter take prevalence however, as the subject is only 'right' when it refers to 'external objective developments' (time, scenario, etc.).

The argument stops short of a few considerations, for it disregards that the interaction between 'external' factors (which are always also *internal*) and 'internal' ones cannot be theoretically reconciled or resolved (or *dissolved*) but needs to be retained creatively as a tension-in-flux. Surely circumstances provide the reference framework, but in their intimate interweaving with the historicity of an audience's (collective's) perception of circumstance (as historically grown from constructions of subject-object constellations and relations) they do so in both *affecting* and *affected* ways. To acknowledge this bi-directionality is not to relativise whatever 'external reality' the externalists wish to re-emphasise or re-vitalise, nor to retreat into the internalised institutionalism and anti-positivism he accuses the Copenhagen School of, but to remain in between, to stay true to the premise of intersubjectivity, wherein the 'external objective world' needs to be understood as *one among* the subjects which are party to such intersubjectivity. Balzacq reduces securitisation practices to an *induction of selective perception*, that is the perception of referent objects in terms of threat: "security is a symbol" (ibid.: 15) he proclaims. He does recognise that "every securitization [sic] is a historical process" (ibid.: 14) yet formulates a highly anachronistic argument.

The third assumption suggests that securitisation "consists of practices which instantiate intersubjective understandings and which are framed by tools and the habitus inherited from different social fields. The dispositif connects different practices" (ibid.: 15). The 'dispositif', a term borrowed from Bourdieu, is in this case the structural embedding of connected social fields of meaning and interaction, forming a dispositional network from where prepositions are produced.

Practices are understood as routinised behaviour that is primarily enacted "through policy tools" (ibid.). Considering practices in terms of 'policy tools' is indeed a useful analytical perspective for the purposes of my research. Such tools are "the social devices through which professionals of (in) security think about a threat" and which "contribute to the taken-for-grantedness of security practices" (ibid.: 16). They are structuring factors and as such "shape social relations in decisive ways" (ibid.) — being not only operational, but also political and symbolic. This will be of key importance to my later analysis of the neighbourhood-prevention networks in The Netherlands and Belgium, where an instant messaging platform serves as precisely this kind of a tool, which, in a Giddensian kind of view, is both structuring and being structured — security is produced as the result of the mutual constitution of tool and user.

The externalists confront an ontologically ambiguity: While they do commit to the epistemology of discourse and practice, they do not fit with the Copenhagen School conceptualisation which they reject explicitly on the basis of their neopositivist demands. At first, these demands seem not to combine with a discourse-and-practice stance, however Balzacq, for one, manages to merge them by distinguishing institutional from brute threats. However reconciling these commitments are, they ironically appear to be securitising the concept of securitisation — resembling the tendencies toward the myth of the rule of reason discussed in chapter 2.

Balzacq is unable to accept an *uncertain* understanding of security and wants to eliminate anything too 'blurry'. Although his suggestion of brute threats may stem from a need to also account for the very tangible urgency of lethal threats, such as terrorism, it simultaneously renders the whole notion of securitisation problematic in that it closes down its unique possibility to embrace a more wholesome picture that is accepting of the fundamental uncertainty of threat perception.

An even more recent debate, to which I shall turn now, confronts some of the deficits securitisation theory still has, but also provides some ways of thinking about how to work with these deficits in a meaningful way.

4.3   Psychology versus sociology

While Balzacq has pointed at a bifurcation between philosophical and sociological understandings of security, there is an even more recent debate that counters an emphasis on the sociology of security with one on the psychology of threat. It is important to highlight that this debate is more of an ideal type than an actual split, as most arguments on threat psychology in securitisation theory are presented as amendments rather than rejections. The psychological perspective is thus an addition or a further widening of the security research agenda. And I adhere to this ambition, as it seems indeed very peculiar that a field to which the notion of *threat construction* is central has faced a debate between philosophical and sociological approaches, yet not over the psychology that underlies security, insecurity, threat, and identity. The psychological contribution taken into consideration in the following is particularly powerful to my own approach in two ways: It is in tune with my understanding of the psychology of emotion in socio-political terms *and* broadens the possibilities of conceiving of security as a reasoned emotion.

One of the more recent advocates for the psychological road into securitisation theory is Eric van Rythoven (2015; cf. chapter 3). He criticises that securitisation theory, in spite of its laudable intentions, still suffered from "a technical discourse which is alien to the everyday experience of security" (ibid.: 459) — and indeed, both Buzan and colleagues (1997) and Balzacq (2011) share a procedural idea of securitisation. Both try to identify the right sequence of steps that securitisation needs to go through, or the right constitutive components and relational features.

Like Balzacq, Van Rythoven criticises the discursive focus of the Copenhagen School — such an "inward focus on semantics" misses context, he says in a tone of voice not far from the externalist amendments discussed above (Van Rythoven 2015: 460). Funnily thus, while Buzan and colleagues attempt to widen the security research agenda they are criticised for narrowing it down too much. Van Rythoven then however decides not to adhere further to the externalist premise and instead to work *with* the Copenhagen starting points towards his

own proposal of going "so far as to grant emotion […] ontological autonomy" (ibid.: 462). He does this, as I did in the last chapter, with the help of cognitive appraisal theory.

The psychological contribution to securitisation theory shows how important it is to account for the relationship between reason and emotion *before* making any significant claims about security in discourse and practice. This matters in particular to collective reason and emotion in acts of security appraisal, where the 'centrality of the audience' at which Balzacq so readily pointed suddenly becomes much less self-explanatory. According to common understanding "an audience's fear facilitates threat construction" (ibid.: 464), yet in a community context (*horizontally* intersubjective rather than top-down) who is audience, and who is actor? The boundaries blur, as "collective fear appraisals are often fragile cultural assemblages vulnerable to contestation and destabilization [sic]" (ibid.). Fear appraisal takes place within the confines of a 'local security imagery' which all referent subjects, including the uttering securitisation agent her- or himself, have already subscribed to.

While the Van Rythoven's critique becomes powerful in pointing at the emotional dimension of securitisation on the one hand, and at methodological pluralism on the other, he does not link the two arguments as radically as he could have. This prevents him from problematising the notion of 'audience' as much as I would. Although he realises, fully in line with securitisation theory as discussed so far, that threat construction ultimately depends on "intersubjective agreement", he also claims: "How the audience feels determines the success of the practice" (ibid.: 465). To be sure, Van Rythoven goes a significant step further in adding the notion of the audience's feeling, which Balzacq had still relegated to brackets and footnotes. However, if intersubjectivity were a truly central premise to securitisation theory, how valuable is the notion of actor and audience? Is there not rather an *audience of playwrights*? Is not the collective ensemble of referent subjects in its intersubjectivity always deeply both, audience *and* actor?

The psychological contribution hints at the possibility of this stance without allowing for it — it draws a richer picture by adding another factor, but it does not yet question the very framework it is adding to. To illustrate: Van Rythoven relates his argument to the concept of *social appraisal*. In this theory, appraisals cannot be understood in isolation from the social encounter; they are always *relational, perpetual,* and *adaptive*. In these qualities it relates diametrically to Balzacq's position which attempts to distinguish between discursive

and 'real' threats — social appraisal theory instead allows one to grasp otherwise undetectable collective 'senses', such as collectively felt insecurity. One can in this regard understand collective appraisal as "an intuitive synthesis of relational meaning" (ibid.: 466). In what Van Rythoven calls security imaginaries, emotions situationally structure "which cultural meanings matter and how" (ibid.: 467). Although he retains the distinctions, Van Rythoven does make the Giddensian structuration at work here explicit and describes indeed the co-constitution of agent, audience, and imaginary.

Ultimately, this psychological argument emphasises "the contingency of fear appraisals along the relational dimensions of relevance, incongruence, and coping ability" (ibid.) and thereby makes it possible to understand securitisation in much more inherently ambiguous terms, as I have suggested repeatedly. This ambiguity is the reason why I want to understand security not in mechanistic-rationalist terms, as the realist and rational choice perspective would, but as reasoned emotion. Van Rythoven puts this as follows:

> "[C]ollective fears are fragile, fugitive, and fickle phenomenon [sic] rather than the stable, steady, and settled social resources which can be reliably deployed in a security argument."
>
> (Van Rythoven 2014)

Perhaps less obviously, this essential ambiguity also necessitates historical reflexivity, which other accounts of securitisation theory do not yet point to as much. Social appraisal takes into consideration collective bonds that construct a particular lens through which to understand and make sense of threat perception. These collective bonds are in turn moulded by the historically grown narrative of that given collective and can, say by means of the retrieval of historical memory or by reference to traumatic events in the past, mediate threat construction considerably. This has happened, for example, in the way terrorist attacks around the globe are, since 9/11, routinely linked to 9/11 itself and made sense of by employing a similar rhetorical and semantic frame: national security, global threat, collective grief, resilience, et cetera. Another example is the Ukraine crisis, which has often been discussed in light of a possible 'new Cold War' — in both cases, threat is constructed with reference to collectively resonating historical memories that allow securitising actors to increase salience and urgency

significantly. I shall discuss ways in which a psychological understanding of processes of securitisation plays out in international politics more closely in the remainder of this chapter.

4.4   Security stories in international politics

This chapter has illustrated the trajectory of securitisation theory since its inception in the 1990s along three important debates. In the first debate the Copenhagen School satisfied a demand for widening the security research agenda with a linguistic turn to speech act theory. Securitisation is here coined as the act of making an issue into a matter of security, finding its most manifest expression in the *utterance* of security: The 'securitising actor' refers to a 'referent object' as 'existentially threatened', thereby legitimising an exemption from politics through the elevation of the issue into the realm of 'emergency measures'. The issue can now be treated by exceptional means — think of the 'vigipirate' agenda installed in France after the Paris terrorist attacks of 2015, which is part of a set of state-of-emergency measures and increases 'public security' in spaces such as airports, tourist attractions and open plazas, primarily in Paris.

'Public security' is understood primarily in terms of the number of military and military police personnel present. With Stone's 'policy paradox' (2002), one could argue that while reminders of insecurity have by this measure become omnipresent, further attacks have clearly not been prevented ('security' has meant to increase insecurity, strengthen a sense of communal self-defence and resilience, aggravate stereotypes and prejudice, and produce a general sense of potential threat).

The second debate discussed in this chapter is a confrontation of Copenhagen thought with neopositivist amendments such as those by Balzacq (2011), to whom the Copenhagen School is too 'internalist' and self-referential in that it conceives of security as *nothing but discourse*. He suggests the externalist perspective which distinguishes between 'institutional' (internal, subjective) and 'brute' (external, objective) threats. Securitisation theory, according to this view, needs always also to address threats that are 'really out there'. This turn to claims over objective reality however goes at the cost of commitments to social construction that lie at the very heart of securitisation theory. The externalist stance might stem from a strongly felt need to account for the very material, very tangible consequences that profoundly threatening events such as terrorist attacks can have on a community. The

drastic and urgent quality of those politically charged developments is devastating and can be fatal to a number of citizens, the intensity of the experience prohibiting denial.

However, the point of a transfactual view of security which foregrounds discourse and practice, to which my account of security as reasoned emotion would certainly count, is not at all to deny the tangible impact of destructive events — instead, the material destruction is simply not the focus of analysis. Threat construction, collective subscription to such construction, and the enactment and exertion of power intrinsic to it are central concerns, not the 'actual' possible consequences of 'failed' securitisation. With Buzan and colleagues, *desecuritisation* would be the only possible normative end of securitisation theory, the bringing back to 'normal' politics of a securitised issue (Buzan et al. 1997).

Finally, the third debate portrayed in this chapter allows for a critique of the externalist tendency without retreating into 'internalism'. The psychological contribution to securitisation theory is unique in that it pays special attention to the emotional components that necessarily underly threat construction, avoiding to dichotomise 'subjective' versus 'objective' threat assessments. Laudably, Van Rythoven takes speech act theory and social constructivism as *starting points* from which to move on to also incorporate social cognitive appraisal to securitisation theory. This also opens up security to *historicity*, by which the researcher is able to account for the embeddedness of security discourses and practices ('imageries') in historically grown frames of reference. In the following, let me illustrate with two case examples what can be taken from these debates toward a concrete understanding of security as a reasoned emotion.

The New Cold War. In the Ukraine crisis, differences between East and West are played out in the internally divided country of Ukraine. In light of the Russian annexation of Crimea and, in turn, the extension of NATO bases in Eastern European countries that are part of the alliance's *Partnership for Peace* programme that reaches out eastwards since shortly after the Cold War, the 'New Cold War' analogy has become a common reference. This suspicion may be inspired by 'external objective developments', but the whole security discourse that it activates is emotionally charged — an emotional charge that works out through the historical reference to nuclear threats of the Cold War. A historically emerged discourse prevents Russia and NATO from reconciling or establishing meaningful, productive

encounter. The hostilities are constituted, at least to a large extent, by an affective response that selectively activates the historical memory of the Cold War, reproducing its binary logic. This response moreover serves to reinforce communal identity and a stereotype of the other, as many antagonistic gestures toward Russia in politics, public debate, and in the press show. Securitisation here as well primarily produces insecurity, namely the omnipresent and omnipotent 'what if' of the now *potential* new Cold War. Both sides furthermore rationalise their emotional investment in the matter by claiming that their measures were merely objective regulatory responses to 'external objective developments' in Eastern Europe.

The Trojan Horse. Another example of how security as reasoned emotion surfaces in international politics is the European refugee crisis that has unfolded since 2015. An increasing number of economic migrants and war refugees, especially from Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, moves to Europe, often carried by human smuggling networks on boats across the Mediterranean Sea. Hundreds of thousands are dying on their way, while those who survive the dangerous passage are held in refugee camps under rather terrible conditions. On the European side of the story, the discourse revolves around a completely different picture: The refugee crisis, it is said, divides Europe into 'humanitarians' and 'protectionists'. The latter have used the issue, and the failures of many governments to respond to the demands of the refugee population, to resort to a discourse that centres around security. The refugees, in this view, are seen as a Trojan horse — in this revealing analogy, the refugee population is naively welcomed in blissful ignorance of the hidden threats that it contained. The story highlights instances of terrorist attacks that have strongly increased in Europe over the last years, but also stereotypes the other as otherwise generally violent: The refugee population is portrayed in terms of masculinist, aggressive danger, as perhaps most tellingly in the discussions about organised sexual assault that took place during New Year's Eve celebrations in the German city of Cologne in 2015/2016. In that case, it was claimed that most suspects were of Arab or North African appearance and that this type of incident was something completely new in Germany (turning a blind eye, for the sake of 'othering', to the fact that sexual assault is something that takes place on a daily basis as part of the sexist culture we live in). In this example too, threat construction is interwoven with a rationalist claim ('the refugee

population needs to be managed, and terrorism is a real threat') that brushes over the sheer possibility of prejudice ('this is just an objective assessment') and refuses to acknowledge the emotional tinge of the whole affair. The latter in fact mediates the issue so strongly that even the least prejudiced individual suddenly feels inclined to *wonder what this bearded man with a large suitcase is really up to*. Through social appraisal a frame is readily provided according to which the refugee crisis and the discourse of 'global terrorism' are merged and equally understood in terms of subversive danger.

This chapter has provided a transition from the initial discussion of the role of reason, the role of emotion, and the relationship between the two to a discussion of security as a phenomenon in which this relationship plays out. In this discussion, I went through three debates within securitisation theory and through my own reading of each debate I started to indicate how my own approach relates to reason, emotion, and security in IR. In the following chapter, I will elaborate on this understanding of securitisation and formulate a methodological framework on the basis of the theoretical explorations thus far undertaken. The focus is on a dialogical (rather than dialectical) approach to security as a reasoned emotion and is grounded in a reflexivist understanding of the relationship between researcher and research. This will shed light on how security as an object of inquiry is informed by the securitising moves of the researcher her- or himself, but also on how one can study security from this perspective.

V

A Dialogical Approach to Security

Any methodology that wants to do justice to the concept of security, incredibly complex and convoluted as it is, faces the challenge of accounting not only for the immense diversity of the notion, but also for its continuous subjection to dynamics of change, arbitrariness, and ambiguity. The latter stands out like no other factor in that it renders the observation of security in empirical research fundamentally difficult — and, as I shall argue, in that it cannot be understood without understanding the dialogical relationship between reason and emotion.

This chapter focusses on this relationship in order to retain the centrality of the reason-emotion nexus that lies at the heart of my research. I proceed in the following order: First, I return to the meta-theoretical matters touched upon in the second and third chapter. Which ontological assumptions made it possible that one of the two parties of the dialogue, namely emotion, was and is being shut so effectively? How did this development bring about a strong inclination to pretend the actuality of an ideal type? I argue, with Weber's ideal typification as conceived originally and Ricoeur's hermeneutics of *mimesis*, that this transition has, as much in everyday discourse and practice as in scholarly presumption, effectively yielded a confusion about how reason and emotion relate, and about what security means. This confusion remains covered up with the pretension of certainty instead of being resolved — it is disguised rather than confronted.

Second, I turn to methodological debates more directly connected to my own empirical inquiry that will follow in the subsequent chapter, situating my approach along two turns that are subject to quite vivid disciplinary debate in IR: The reflexive turn and the ethnographic turn. I bring these two together mainly in order to be able to get discourse and practice more closely in touch instead of choosing for one at the cost of sacrificing the other. Ultimately, the chapter outlines what a dialogical approach to security as reasoned emotion would entail, how I implement it in my case study, and what such an approach could contribute to future investigations of the matter.

5.1   Ideal types and the problem of representation

Weber's theory of ideal types starts with the assumption that social scientists are confronted with a chaotic reality which they are urged to account for by means of models. Such models, importantly, are not exact resemblances of that chaotic reality but are instead, to clarify or make that reality be more easily understood, oriented along characteristic features of that reality while leaving out those features deemed non-essential: They are, in his own words, "like a *utopia* which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality" (Weber [1904] 1949: 90). Most crucially, Weber emphasises the non-identity of ideal type and reality, as it should be clear from the very methodological intention he proposes the ideal type to have. In other words, the real world will never be as lucid and clear-cut as the ideal type, the latter serving merely as a way of abstract modelling (distancing) for the sake of conceptual understanding of a given phenomenon. Ideal types are a *simplification* of the object of inquiry, and Weber cautions the engaged researcher against the fallacy of taking one for the other — the fallacy of misplaced concreteness or hypostatisation, in which a hypothesis, belief, or abstraction is misrecognised or even misrepresented as an entity belonging to the real:

> "An ideal type is formed by the one-sided *accentuation* of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized [sic] viewpoints into a unified *analytical* construct (*Gedankenbild*). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (*Gedankenbild*) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a *utopia*."
>
> (ibid.: 90; emphasis in original)

This utopian quality is however easily disregarded, and frequently so in IR — as Lebow puts it, realist IR scholars "do not think of their paradigm as an ideal type, but as a description of the real world of international relations" (Lebow 2008: 94).

To be sure, Weber does not at all discourage the use of ideal typification, quite to the contrary he simply makes it explicit as an analytical tool that has always been part and parcel of social scientific research. With Weber's own example:

"In order, for example, to understand how a war is conducted, it is necessary to imagine an ideal commander-in-chief for each side — even though not explicitly or in detailed form. Each of these commanders must know the total fighting resources of each side and all the possibilities arising therefrom of attaining the concretely unambiguous goal, namely, the destruction of the enemy's military power […] they must act entirely without error and in a logically "perfect" way. For only then can the consequences of the fact that the real commanders neither had the knowledge nor were they free from error, and that they were not purely rational thinking machines, be unambiguously established. […] The "ideal" constructions of rigorous and errorless rational conduct which we find in pure economic theory have exactly the same significance."

(Weber [1904] 1949: 42)

On this basis, however, he recommends a more reflected relationship between researcher and research by way of distinction between ideal and real. On a further note, Weber here describes, not without a constructivist sensitivity, ideal typification as a hermeneutic practice of representation or a rendering of some phenomenon as more broadly intelligible.

To follow up on this, the result of confusing ideal and real is an act of power — an imposition of a *particular* representation by claiming it was a *universal* representation, marginalising all other particular representations there might be. It is thus an imposition of one understanding of reality above all others — which does not even have to be a deliberate act, it can be a collective practice that we all participate in. One such practice is the creation of the myth of the rule of reason. Rationality is of course an ideal type, an abstraction of what human reasoning entails, but turns into imposition and marginalisation once upheld as an accurate depiction of what human reasoning *is*. Here Weber points at the ontological tension that underlies the antagonism of reason and emotion.

To Weber, ideal types are a necessary starting point from which the researcher formulates hypotheses but also compares across cases — classification and conceptualisation start from schematic representation in order to make something visible in terms of a concept, not as what it presumably is. Ideal typification takes place when we speak of categories such as the nation-state, the distribution of wealth, the exertion of authority and power, or even rational behaviour. It depends on internal consistency, not external objectivity — it ought to adequately account for a phenomenon, not reproduce it in all detail. One might compare this to the statue of a national hero, which will differ in size, detail, posture, colour, and of course

material from the person it aims to depict, but is nevertheless able to stand for a particular understanding of that person (as a national hero). The statue will thus *signify* the person, but never be *identical* with the person.

One such ideal type is the *homo economicus*, which remains to play an important role in classical economic theory until today. This type entails a very particular understanding of the rational character of human behaviour and decision-making and has been one of the key composite elements to further theories such as the theory of rational choice. The wide acceptance of this type has also sept through other disciplines of the social sciences; and often without accompanying recognition of that framework as an ideal type. It is important not to blame the economist for not taking seriously enough the ideal type nature of her or his constructs, but rather to locate responsibility in the way such a concept is being transported and possibly adapted across disciplines. To be specific, IR as a discipline appears to have if not completely disregarded at least backgrounded or blurred the ideal type nature of the rational actor assumption in international politics.

Every distancing by way of abstraction requires a getting-close by way of repositioning and making sense of the deviations from that initial abstraction; if however the ideal type remains the only object of reference to further conceptualisation it becomes increasingly difficult to think of the actor in other terms than 'rational'. This happens exclusively on the level of language, namely in that it sets the cornerstones (the conditions) for the discursive engagement with international politics.

More crucial are however the practice-related repercussions of this discursive setting of the stage. This becomes particularly distinguishable in discourse and practice of security (but also, as Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004, suggest, more generally in IR understood *as a practice*). Here, the everyday engagement with questions of security necessitates a particular standing of the securitising actor in relation to referent objects subjects, to threat and to audience (in whatever way one conceptualises any of these; cf. the way I problematise the notion of 'audience' in chapter 4). In the on-the-spot engagement of *concepts* with *action*, the hypostatisation fallacy translates into misrepresentation and thus mistaken assessment of the situation at hand and the adequacy and inadequacy of particular responses. With 'misrepresentation', I do not intend to suggest that there was one particular accurate representation of security, but rather that a representation of security will always miss the

point as long as it holds security to be *one particular thing*. Security is multi-dimensional and ambiguous, and in that sense it cannot be described or understood a discrete, definitive entity.

The hypostatisation of the rational actor will thus impose a much sought after provision of certainty upon the uncertainties that are inherent to security and insecurity and thereby create a tension between ought and is, the outcome of an inclination that is as futile as it is attractive to the securitising actor: While a security problem *is* experienced as terrifying, conflicting, and urgently impending, the certainties of the rational actor confine this to the boundaries of an *ought* desire, namely the well-managed security strategy.

The problem of representation is a central concern to all reflexivist scholarship. It is also one that frequently surfaces in securitisation theory, as the making of something into a security issue is bound up with the hermeneutics of representing something. This notion finds an especially useful expression in the work of Paul Ricoeur (1981; 1988), whose theory of representation helps clarify the epistemological underpinnings of 'representation' in the context of a dialogical approach to security.

Key to the hermeneutic perspective is the recognition that understanding never reaches absolute knowledge but rather always presupposes narrative. Every understanding is embedded in historical narration, in a web of meanings that weaves all parts together and renders them essentially inseparable. The act of interpretation is thus a sense-making that always falls short of the whole. Narrative, as Teles Fazendeiro (2016) puts it with Ricoeur, is 'emplotment', or "practical reason based on integrating dispersed and heterogeneous occurrences" (ibid.: 493). Fazendeiro applies Ricoeur's Aristotelean theory of mimesis to IR, understood as "the manner in which we make sense of events and attempt to represent them in a meaningful whole" (ibid.) — mimesis is representation by imitation, a distancing that tries to get close.

Ricoeur distinguishes between mimesis-1, mimesis-2, and mimesis-3, passing from pre-understandings to new understandings, paralleling the passage of time. Mimesis-1 is past prefiguration, wherein a narrative preconception provides the basis for assigning meaning. Mimesis-2 is present configuration, it is the aforementioned act of 'emplotment' and therefore acts by way of mediation. It does so by *temporalising* the interpretive sequence in between the mobilisation of past experience and the projection of the future (ibid.).

Mimesis-3 in turn is future refiguration, or the essential yield of the mimetic act; it points to the future in that it serves as the intersection between text and world. The assignment of roles, features, and relationships here goes beyond merely the interweaving with narrative history to an actual predicating effect. In other words, mimesis-3 is world-constitutive as it brings about a *refigured world* according to a given interpretation (Ricoeur 1988).

In essence, Ricoeur compartmentalises the temporality of interpretation by three sequences according to each grammatical tense by which we make sense of time. What stands out with regard to representation is how the process constructs a representation that does not just remain internal, but actually predicates the subject to a particular type of engagement with the world: Mimesis-3 is the production of predisposition. This predisposition is not arbitrary but embedded in a broader narrative history. Fazendeiro explicates the 'predicate-process': Predication, as in Ricoeur's hermeneutics, "designates a kind of quality, a class of things, a type of relation, or a type of action" (Teles Fazendeiro 2016: 496) — generalisations that highlight *one side of the subject-position*.

Important for the case of security is now to understand how world-constitution translates into concrete action tendencies — the argument ultimately is that discourse and practice are much more than close neighbours; they are identical. The dialogical approach to security takes precisely this into account and seeks to understand security not in a dialectical sense (that would be: in tandem-type alteration) but as a dialogue in which it is already clear that the parties of the conversation are constitutive of one another. This conversation however is crucially not 'just language', as Balzacq (2002) would criticise it — it is always *necessarily* both saying and doing, semiotics and engagement, semantics and intervention alike. Put differently, the conversation is a *conversion,* a transitory move from discourse to practice and from practice to discourse. This discourse-practice relation is a focus of the methodological suggestions of the following section of this chapter.

5.2   Reflexivism and ethnographic dialogics

I now turn to the methodological debates that are more directly connected to the empirical inquiry that follows in the subsequent chapter, situating my approach along two important turns in IR: The reflexive turn and the ethnographic turn. Both perspectives are crucial to a dialogical approach to security as reasoned emotion — while the former opens up spaces for

the overcoming of the rationalist hurdle, the latter allows me to undo the discourse-versus-practice bifurcation that is being posed by contemporary security scholars such as Thierry Balzacq (2011; cf. chapter 4). Reflexivism serves as an ontological and epistemological foundation for the world in which security is discovered, whereas the ethnographic method offers the empirical framework within which one can understand discourse and practice, assumption and certainty, reason and emotion as most intimately interwoven.

So far, an engagement of both Weber and Ricoeur has highlighted the picture in which on the one hand, echoing the reflexivist perspective, ideal typification and representation need to be made visible as what they are, namely configurations for the sake of analytical simplification and not *corresponding* accounts of an external reality out there, while on the other hand, in the ethnographic spirit, a recognition of representation as immediately predisposing the subject (i.e. producing an action tendency) makes necessary an acknowledgement of the identity of discourse and practice.

To combine a reflexivist perspective with 'ethnographic dialogics' is to acknowledge their fundamental agreement on an *interpretive* approach to qualitative research. Epistemological reflexivity sets out by questioning disciplinary boundaries and proceeds by going further than the non-interpretive researcher who would stop after having *identified* a phenomenon. To interpretive research, identification is insufficient, and instead reflexivity and positionality are brought into the playing field (Wilkinson 201: 132). Reflexivism in this light is not navel-gazing but "a way of exposing and questioning our assumptions" (ibid.). This takes place by conscious reflection upon the researcher's own thoughts, emotions, actions, reactions during research, adding multiple layers that would otherwise be left aside. It is an ethnographic stance in the sense of Geertz' famous 'thick description' (Geertz 1994). Reflexive research is in this way uniquely able to not only discover internal perspectives (by using methods such as participant observation) but also to identify dynamics of power, representation, othering, and ownership (Wilkinson 2013: 132). In the words of Wilkinson:

> "[R]eflexivity is not about being completely transparent about what we do and feel […], but rather about explicitly acknowledging the co-constitutive nature of the research process and results […] by focussing on the ambiguities, dissonances and differences of the multiple interpretations that emerge."

(ibid.)

Reflexive ethnography is thus perfectly suited for a dialogical approach to security as reasoned emotion. In that spirit, I present two arguments that draw this connection, with two main questions in mind: First, how does one locate ethnography in the ontological, epistemological, and methodological playing field of IR, and what can ethnography specifically contribute to the discipline? Second, how can such an ethnography elucidate the notion of security in ways that other methodologies cannot?

As to the first question, Wanda Vrasti (2008) presents a convincing case. She claims that the 'ethnographic turn' in IR has somehow adopted a rather "selective, instrumental, and somewhat timid understanding" of what ethnographic is, should be, and can be (Vrasti 2008: 280). While within the anthropological discipline fierce debates had uprooted the ethnographic method substantially and thrown it into fundamental disagreement, she argues that "in international studies the 'ethnographic turn' was used to facilitate a return to empiricism" (ibid.: 281). Ironically, ethnography was used to reintroduce *certainty* by means of what Vrasti calls 'ethno-empiricism' (the idea to use ethnographic methods as a way of getting to an unmediated, more authentic and essential reality) and *normativity,* a sort of emancipatory teleological purpose. In other words, IR appropriated an outdated form of ethnography that had just been overcome by an introspective move within anthropology.

This introspective move, Vrasti explains, had introduced symbolic and interpretive understandings of anthropological research so as to account for a more reflexive notion of self and other as co-constitutive entities — self and other here also being researcher and research. The former "narrative authority" of cultural anthropology as a colonial practice was "dissolved to reveal the intersubjective nature of ethnographic texts" (ibid.: 282). Geertz, whom I have already mentioned above, was one of the pioneers of this change with his emphasis on 'thick description' (Geertz 1994). Ethnography would be redefined so as to stand more broadly for "a textual negotiation of cultural and political meaning where description and interpretation, experience and theory, are inseparable" (Vrasti 2008: 282). This definition suggests ethnography as the discovery of meaning in a reflexive encounter between self and other, rather than limiting it to the confines of a positivist pursuit of 'authentic knowledge'.

The latter attempt would however resurface in IR, where an empiricist emphasis on ethnography, narrowly understood as little more than the method of participant observation, would presume that ethnography could deliver "unmediated reality", reducing it "to a

positivist data-gathering machine" (ibid.: 286). In this view, Vrasti contends, "ethnography is a mimetic tool of representation, which can impose empirical order upon our home-made theoretical puzzles" (ibid.). It is no coincidence that we stumble upon the word *mimesis* here — the problem is, again, the non-recognition of the representation *as a representation.* Problematic about ethnography conceived this narrowly is, in other words, "the fact that the social world is not a laboratory one can report on without becoming a part of it" (ibid.: 287), rendering strivings for 'moral innocence' or 'narrative authority' futile.

There is however more to the way IR has adapted ethnography, Vrasti goes on. In addition to the 'ethno-empiricist' adaptation, another one could be called 'ethnographilia' — a stance by which ethnography is understood as the missing link, for social constructivists, between structure and agency, something one might call 'Bourdieuism'. In this conception, ethnography is reduced to participant observation which then serves as a middle ground between rationalism and reflexivism. This is 'ethno-empiricism' *light*: Thick description is embraced *only* under the condition of 'objectivist' contextualisation. 'Ethnographilia' is "a mildly interpretivist stance constantly kept *en guarde* by an endemic fear not to corrupt or compromise the scientific project" (ibid.: 292; emphasis in original). Vrasti argues that a fear to fall from disciplinary grace (the regulatory disciplinary boundaries of IR) is the reason for this uneasy reconciliation — a scholarly securitisation move against the threatening uncertainties of an approach that would leave too much 'out in the open'.

This reactionary adaptation of ethnography is explicitly manifested in what some take the 'practice turn' in the social sciences to be: "[T]he 'practice turn' invites us to replace the discourse theories of Wittgenstein an Foucault with the social action theories of Bourdieu and de Certeau" (ibid.: 292). While this is perhaps a rather narrow depiction of the often valuable contributions the practice turn has made, it is an illuminating juxtaposition nevertheless that stand out as a critique of dichotomising tendencies in this debate. For why would a turn to embodied action, visual knowledge, and other more concrete practices need to sever all ties with discourse theory? As Vrasti claims, "Foucault's theory of discourse can accommodate both discursive and non-discursive elements" (ibid.: 293) — put more frankly, as I have paraphrased before: "Discourse and practice are not only inseparable in this context, but also identical" (ibid.). Not to acknowledge the ties between discourse and practice, according to Vrasti, stems from the way in which Foucault has been received in IR with a tendency "to

generate mostly one-dimensional […], exclusively linguistic, interpretations of social reality" (ibid.). Not surprisingly, this points back at Thierry Balzacq (cf. chapter 4), whose claims become very much transparent against the background of such undernourished views on discourse merely for the sake of relative gains for the concept of practice.

In sum, Vrasti argues that a more updated definition of ethnography, as it is already quite the convention within its 'mother discipline' anthropology itself, is needed in IR so as to re-examine the ways the field has so far adapted a rather impoverished notion of the methodology. Vrasti concludes that through "radical difference as a source for cultural self-examination, the ethnological stance has a unique ability to destabilise the essentially colour- and culture-blind discourse of IR" (Vrasti 2008: 300).

A second question needs to be answered in order to justify a reflexive ethnography for the study of security as a reasoned emotion: How can such an IR ethnography elucidate the notion of security in ways that other methodologies cannot? One way to get to the co-constitution of self and other, and discourse and practice, is to review the ways in which we thus far make sense of security. Security as an intrinsically cultural and collective discourse and practice deserves the ethnographic attention it has received in other disciplines (cf. Gledhill 2015, a rich anthropological take on the production of insecurity). IR needs to make sense of the everyday discourse and practice of security precisely because security cannot be artificially isolated from its emotional dimensions nor, in turn, from its rational dimensions. A dialogical approach to security as reasoned emotion should of course be rather transdisciplinary, but confronts special relevance in IR as an interdisciplinary field.

To the detriment of the intricacies of the concept however security research is often reduced to "a call to provide expert knowledge on enemy "culture" so that military operations can be more effectively carried out and foreign-policy objectives realized [sic]" (Goldstein 2010: 488). Alternatively, a broader understanding of security as already put forward by the scholars of the Copenhagen School, resets the focus of security research on an "analysis of a truly global reality played out in local contexts", something ethnography is especially suited for (ibid.). How does such a 'security culture' permeate through everyday discourse and practice to an extent that makes an analysis of the mundane so revealing that it could speak to the goals of IR? With Goldstein, who imagines a 'critical anthropology of security':

"The proper disposition of the neoliberal subject in this security society, inculcated by the state's immanent securitization [sic] techniques, is one of *perpetual alertness* and individual "preparedness," being continually on one's guard against the emergence of any and all possible threats […]. *Suspicion* is a key component of this neoliberal disposition, with each individual encouraged to assume a habitually anxious, cautious engagement with anyone or anything deemed unfamiliar and potentially threatening."

(ibid.: 492; emphases added)

The pervasive presence of security in everyday life described here is precisely what an ethnographic, that is *dialogical*, account of security as reasoned emotion in discourse and practice can discover and make visible. The incredibly rich and valuable contribution ethnography conceived in this way can therefore make to security research lies in its ability to take seriously the 'everyday-ness' of security, or as Goldstein adds:

"[A] perspective on security as made and understood by actors and groups outside of the state and its official institutions helps to broaden our perspective on what security means, how it is produced, what it includes, and what it excludes in *the ordinary and exceptional struggles of daily life* […], [highlighting] the manifold ways in which global discourses are adopted, manipulated, transformed and deployed in quotidian interactions and events, revealing the full range of security as lived social experience."

(ibid.: 492-493; emphasis added)

On the one hand, such an ethnography of security can thus make visible the ordinary in the exceptional, and the exceptional in the ordinary alike. On the other hand, this methodological opportunity pertains to IR in particular in that it allows for a perspective by which not only the 'quotidian interactions' of security help illustrate and elucidate its simultaneous global dimensions, but also how vice versa those global dimensions and international struggles bring about constellations of power that permeate all spheres of political, social, and cultural life.

5.3   Studying local security dynamics

The approach considered in this paper can still take the form of a discourse analysis — importantly one however in which the practice dimensions of the very discourse engaged

in are stressed and taken into account as integral part of the overall analysis. This forms the basis for the examination of security discourse and practice engaged in the case of neighbourhood prevention networks in Belgium and The Netherlands.

I chose to study local security dynamics in small neighbourhood in Belgium and The Netherlands for three different sets of reasons: Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and methodological reasons. First, in practical terms, conducting research in such a small context has improved feasibility of the inquiry considering the scope of this paper and the limited material means available for getting 'out there'. Both of the places taken into consideration were within reach yet still rather different cases.

The research was however not conducted in this context merely for these practical benefits. Rather, my case selection is in line with the overall socio-political take on emotion that lies at the heart of the theoretical underpinnings I have thus far established. To understand security as a reasoned emotion is to identify security in the making on all levels of human interaction. I already pointed out how to Buzan and colleagues (1997) "the key issue is *to whom* security becomes a consideration *in relation to whom*" (ibid.: 18; emphasis added) — this resolves the levels-of-analysis question by stressing that while something can be securitised globally, its 'major battles' may play out regionally, locally, interpersonally, and even individually. It is thus not less IR nor less politics to study the collective, socio-political dynamics of reasoned emotion at the level of small neighbourhoods.

There are also good methodological reasons for choosing this case so as to pursue a dialogical approach to security as reasoned emotion. By highlighting *dialogue* rather than dialectics, the approach pays attention to one of the central premises of securitisation theory: reiterative negotiation. As I have pointed out in chapter 4, the cornerstones of this theory are self-referentiality, intersubjectivity, and productive power — all of which are highly visible in the case of neighbourhood prevention initiatives and networks, as shall become clear in the next chapter. In addition, the instant messaging platform by which preventive communication takes place in these networks are a tangible example of a 'security tool'. According to Balzacq, practice or routinised behaviour is primarily enacted through such tools, which he describes as "basic elements contributing to the emergence of a security field" (Balzacq 2011: 16). These "social devices", he continues, "contribute to the taken-for-granted-ness of security practices" (ibid.), which is why I consider the instant messaging tool I look at to be

exemplary for the purposes of my inquiry. The neighbourhood prevention networks in Belgium and The Netherlands are, as shall become clear in the next chapter, illustrations of ways in which security is dialogically established as a reasoned emotion by means of a tool that is not only operational, but also socio-political and symbolic.

If the cornerstones of securitisation are self-referentiality, intersubjectivity, and productive power, one can identify a number of themes to focus on in the discourse analysis of the case at hand. I choose to focus on the themes of belonging, contradiction, and suspicion — for the following reasons:

A. The *productive power* of securitisation, as pointed out by the proponents of the Copenhagen School, implies that securitisation as a collective practice always redefines community and redraws boundaries. Therefore I assume that a sense of **belonging** should play an important role in discursive references to security as well as in the kinds of practical measures that are being taken to establish security.

B. The notion of *intersubjectivity* as it is highlighted by the psychological amendment of the third debate emphasises the role of constant (re-) negotiation of what security entails and what is worth securitising. This should be revealed in recurring disagreement or uncertainty about precisely these questions, yielding confusion and **contradiction** in discourse and practice.

C. The *self-referentiality* of securitisation (here not understood as 'empty' but as revealed in its emergence and application) relates to the hypostatisation fallacy: If security is what discourse and practice make of it, then any established discourse/practice should quickly come to be seen as a reality. The hermeneutics of mimesis would then suggest an altered predication according to the predisposition that this 'security reality' entails. **Suspicion** should stand out here as an assumption (ideal) that is seen as truth (real).

The above three themes will serve as points of reference and analytical grid along which I conduct an analysis of discourse and practice in the case of two neighbourhood prevention networks in Belgium and The Netherlands.

VI

Security Conversations

Neighbourhood Prevention Networks in Belgium and The Netherlands

Security is everywhere. Be it the routine check at the airport, the collective shock and grief that circulate after a terrorist attack, or the way in which we securitise even the most banal aspects of everyday life by way of precaution: do not trust the stranger, do not walk in the dark, do not go to such-and-such part of town, and so on. I stumbled upon a striking manifestation of such efforts in The Netherlands and Belgium. Here, a peculiar phenomenon is spreading rather quickly: instant messaging neighbourhood prevention networks (NPN) against burglary and other criminal offences on a local scale, primarily via groups of the so-called 'WhatsApp buurtpreventie' (WABP). These are groupings of households in neighbourhoods which can decide to join efforts and become part of the coordinated network of WABP, which is spread throughout the whole region of The Netherlands and Belgium. Founded in 2015 as a response to a decreased presence of neighbourhood police ('wijkagenten' in Dutch), WABP claims that as of 2017, 17% of the Dutch are part of an NPN group as part of the WABP model, which they say amounts to approximately 6,800 initiatives (individual NPN groups) and a total membership of around 500,000 in both countries. The founders of the WABP coordination platform claim to have *proven* that in several municipalities crime had decreased by 50% (Niessen/Nap 2017).

The multi-faceted nature of the WABP initiative directly points toward security as a reasoned emotion. Hubristic confidence combined with a narrowing of collective identity already come across in the following account: During carnival celebrations in 2017, festivities in the municipality of Heumen in the northern Dutch province of Gelderland featured a 'WhatsApp buurtpreventie' (WABP) themed float (WABP 2017). It consisted mainly of a flat landscape on wheels, resembling a small neighbourhood, above which floated a giant police officer and an equally giant burglar trying to escape. A second part of the float resembled an armoured police van painted with the 'WhatsApp' logo. Around both parts of

the float people walk and cheer, dressed up as police officers or criminals in striped pyjamas, waving their clubs and proudly presenting their creation. Block letters along the sides of the float read: "The new neighbourhood prevention app hits the nail on the head, that's how we put all criminal business upside down" (original: 'De nieuwe buurtpreventieapp slaat de nagel op z'n kop, daarmee helpen we alle criminele zaken over de kop'). Securitisation is thus presented as a triumph of group confidence over group vulnerability and quickly gives rise to a rather violent and stereotyping discourse. Despite a conviction to the contrary, emotion is not made disappear but instead, problematically, claimed to be rational.

While there is a network of networks (the WABP coordination) which appeals to the certainty of its claims (to having a direct impact on crime rates) and has in that way established a grassroots level securitisation regime, it is the very localised instantiations of the constituent initiatives of this network that I want to focus on. I do not take the proposed intentions of the founders of WABP as a guideline for thinking about this case as a security discourse and practice, but primarily the local NPN groups that are engaged and confronted with the practice of being a member of such a network on an almost daily basis. What do these groups do? Which issues do they consider worthy securitising, which not? What are the criteria, and how do those groups establish criteria? Who decides what, and how much room is there for change? What impact does the group have on the actual constitution of the local community and its relations to the outside and to outsiders? These questions were addressed in three interviews in two places, one neighbourhood in Belgium (a village in the province of Antwerp) and one in The Netherlands (a neighbourhood in the outskirts of Rotterdam). My foremost aim was to delve as deeply as possible into the everyday, mundane experience of seeing, conversing, and making security; the conversations I had thus focussed on the banality, the 'everyday-ness' of securitisation, while I tried to get to the underlying meaning-making practices that their discursive references would imply. In the following, I go through each of the cases in detail, introduce the individuals I spoke to, and discuss their stories with regard to the theoretical and methodological framework of security as a reasoned emotion.

6.1   The Belgian network

The Belgian village of Poppel is special for two reasons: First, it borders directly with The Netherlands and has therefore a large number of Dutch inhabitants, some of whom work in

The Netherlands (the Dutch towns Tilburg and Breda are both about 20 minutes by car away) but live in Belgium, as that tends to be cheaper. Poppel is in fact the first and only Belgian village with a majority of Dutch immigrants (Nieuwsblad 2007). Until the early 19th century, Poppel was part of the duchy of Brabant, which is today one of the Southern provinces of The Netherlands, and was then handed over to the province of Antwerp in Belgium.

Second, Poppel is special in that most of its inhabitants are elderly and entrepreneurs; what strikes one most upon entry into the village community is thus wealth. The combination of considerable wealth and the elderly as a relatively vulnerable group has made the place a popular target for burglars who have frequently sought easy material gain from breaking into an elderly couple's home who would be defenceless. Before I went to visit Poppel, I had heard that not so long ago there had been a series of burglaries that had upset and uprooted the community substantially. Threat and fear had become omnipresent during and after a half-year period in which about 15 households had fallen prey to what the inhabitants presumed to be an organised group of burglars. I had also heard that the community of Poppel, in coordination with other parts of the municipality of Ravels, had decided to take local security into their own hands, considering the police reaction time too long (as the police covered a rather large area, and Ravels lay in that area's extreme periphery, it could take up to half an hour until they would arrive in case something happened). Now, while I could not help but picture the stereotypical country-side mob patrolling through the village at night, armed with torches and pitchforks, I knew I had to go, talk and listen to the people and their experiences of self-managed security. I wanted to see what they were doing, why they were doing it and what those practices felt like, in short: I wanted to get close to their *experience* of security.

At the heart of this self-managed security network lay an NPN group the community had set up as part of the WABP network of the region. But there were more security measures taken: People had heightened the security standards of their houses considerably, be that by means of alarm systems, electrical ports, dangerous-looking dogs, or even clubs placed next to the bed, as I would later find out. All of these 'everyday weapons' were part of a rich mix of different security practices and discourses in reaction to the special vulnerability of the community and in light of the recent series of offences.

The inhabitants of Poppel were open to share their experiences with me and showed keen interest in my questions. Although I only had the chance to have in-depth interviews

with two individuals, a married couple with both Dutch and Belgian roots, I was able to take a close look at the overall community as well and was being shown around so as to get an impression of what it is like to live in Poppel and what it is like to engage in the everyday security structures they had gradually built up. In the following, I will analyse excerpts from the conversations I have had with Anneke and Thijs (names have been changed to maintain confidentiality) along the lines of the three central themes that I elaborated in the previous chapter and that I was able to substantiate in my discourse analysis. I use both interviews in tandem and focus on corroborating the themes rather than foregrounding nuances between the respondents.

Theme 1:   Belonging and threat objectification vs individuation

The productive power of securitisation, as the Copenhagen scholars have it (chapter 4), consists of how its collectively engaged practice tends to redefine community and redraw its internal and external boundaries — a sense of belonging can therefore be expected to be of quite central value to discourse and practice in Poppel.

And indeed both respondents were surprisingly quick to construct the polarities of a baseline discourse of communal belonging ('togetherness', or in Dutch: 'saamhorigheid') in diametrical juxtaposition to the individuation that seemed to have taken place. The very nature of the NPN means that its members would replace face-to-face conversation and negotiation of a security situation at hand with instant messaging on their smartphones — physical contact between neighbours could thus be expected to have diminished. At the same time, both respondents would emphasise strengthened bonds with their neighbourhood and a growing feeling of belonging to one another. Anneke describes Poppel and being a part of the local community as follows:

> "The friendliness is very important here. I like that. And in this neighbourhood the social control is better now, because there have been a couple of burglaries, because there was, yes, quite a threat, as in 'who is it that's walking there?'. And effectively there were quite some people walking around here who didn't have any business here, and who were looking at people like 'What will be our next address?'. And you just noticed that, from the people who were walking here. So, because of that the community grew much closer, so you also, two times a year something is … in summer we have a barbecue, in winter new years drinks are

organised by the neighbourhood association. And those are much more popular actually! [smiles] So, because there was this threat, of insecurity experienced, here in this neighbourhood. So yes, you see one another, you can count on one another. And there is not a lot of envy or hatred here. Everyone here sees eye to eye."

Anneke couples social control with a sense of belonging and 'togetherness' (a connection Buzan et al. 1997 point out too), while leaving out any further descriptions of how that 'togetherness' would manifest itself in everyday life. Except for some annual events, which are relatively common in many neighbourhoods, she does not specify how the change she describes had actually taken place. It seems as if an emphasis on proximity and familiarity, with a particularly emotional choice of wording and speaking (phrases like 'the community grew much closer' or 'everyone sees eye to eye', accompanied by frequent smiles), would make up for a lack of actual descriptives that could strengthen the argument.

Strikingly, the sense of belonging is established only in terms of a sense of threat, in other words: belonging is explicitly rendered a mode of defence, Anneke says "because of that the community grew much closer", "that" referring to the experience of strangers walking through the neighbourhood. This also mobilises belonging as a response to threat, or integration as a reaction to disintegration. The dichotomy is of course artificial, as both threat and disintegration are not actually substantiated but suspected or feared. In order to establish a sense of security, Anneke discursively constructs this dichotomy by which an *emotion is reasoned* — while a sense of threat is mitigated by activating a sense of community, Anneke's discursive account presents a material threat that is being kept in check with rational resistance. Thijs is more open about this contradiction:

"We've had a get-together once, of the Aarlen group, during the time of the burglaries, in order to somehow, well *something had to happen*. There was some sort of gang doing their thing here, probably, so then we also said like, if everyone takes a little walk at night, once a month or whatever, then [hesitant] — that was actually the only time that there was a real get-together. Other than that it's all just via the app."

First, it stands out how Thijs similarly makes an emotional experience into a matter of rational management; his language speaks of a formalistic-procedural attitude towards the

problem at hand. As "something had to happen", there is a straightforward plan of action that ought to be pursued in order to make sure things would go back to normal. Belonging here also means negotiation of what to do; the means of securitisation are a product of the collective practice of imagining threat and problem-solving — agents and context are mutually constitutive and co-dependent (Balzacq 2011).

Second, Thijs also stresses the 'growing-together' of the community. At another point he even says that "with the WhatsApp group you get a bit of that feeling of belonging back" or that "this is the new social feeling". This unusual emphasis on one's belonging to the community can be understood as a case of what the psychological amendment to securitisation theory points out as social appraisal: Security is 'made' through the collective appraisal of fear (Van Rythoven 2015). Emotions, as intuitive judgements, are integrated into a pattern of relational meaning wherein security is the product of creative imagination. In this case, this imagination is the imagination of the strongly integrated community, an imagination that increases the salience of relational meaning and thus makes meaning-making and security itself dependent on an explicit subscription to the community.

Further, the internal, emotionally based idealisation of the, well, fortress of Poppel is defended as fiercely as possible against outsiders' intrusions, invasions, and attacks — an *emotionally* constituted self is *rationally* defended against an *emotionally* imagined other. This echoes the mutual constitution of reason and emotion as much as it highlights the inevitability of these two getting 'mixed up', which hints more at the difficulties in distinguishing them along fixed boundaries than at the confusion of the individuals using those categorical references, or my own confusion in trying to make sense of the above utterances by means of structured analysis.

An additional composite element of the sense of belonging, that stands here in opposition to an individuation taking place by using the NPN as a medium of mediation and negotiation, is othering by objectification. The threat is peculiarly objectified every time either of the respondents refer to the burglaries or even just changes in the social structure that took place in Poppel over time. One example is a short anecdote Thijs tells me as an example of how the NPN group can 'get physical' sometimes; the words chosen for this narration deserve special attention:

"So we spoke to this man, like 'listen', this and that, and it all kind of went the wrong way a little bit, because it turned a little bit into this mix-up, because — I sat in the car and I asked, like 'who are you and what are you doing here?', and he didn't want to give an answer, and then I said 'well, then I'm going to take a picture of you, *so that I know in any case who or what you are*', when he leaned into my car and tried to grab my phone, so it turned into this little mix-up."

Semantically and semiotically, this story exemplifies the ways in which security mobilises difference and the drawing or reinforcement of boundaries through urgency and threat (Buzan et al. 1997). On the one hand the narrator's perspective is marked by casual and informal comments such as "this and that", "a little bit" or "this mix-up", downsizing any potentially controversial action on the narrator's side. On the other hand, and in considerable contrast, the intruder's action is described shortly and to the point: "he leaned into my car and tried to grab my phone". This style creates an unbalanced availability of empirical evidence to the benefit of Thijs — while his own involvement (and possible culpability) is not presented clearly at all, the anonymous intruder's offence is lucid and thus self-evident. This disproportionality is not accidental, but reflects the inevitable connections between reason and emotion, as pointed out by authors such as Lebow (2008) or Jeffery (2014), and in the same vein it reflects the fundamental ambiguity of security.

   Furthermore, Thijs' choice of example is interesting in itself: The event was exciting and thus especially memorable to him; as he got caught up in a fight he was suddenly physically engaged in the encounter between the neighbourhood-self and the hypothesised other, which had normally tended to be an absent suspicion sustained primarily through the NPN group chat. In addition, the example reveals how far-reaching the objectification of that external threat actually had been. Thijs describes a scenario in which he sits in the safety of his car, while the intruder appears to disrespect that blatantly and leans into the car — the other is made visible primarily in terms of an invasion or penetration of the self against its will. The listener of course does not know any of the concrete dynamics that had lead up to this intrusion; she or he is deprived of any information that might explain why exactly a stranger would suddenly try to grab Thijs' phone. What stands out is the phrasing 'so that I know in any case *who or what* you are' — identification is here explicitly equated with objectification.

In a similar way, Anneke ascribes the change of the social structure of Poppel and the way people's interactions presumably had changed to outsider intrusion. This is readily conflated with anti-immigrant discourse. I asked her how the security situation in Poppel had developed over time, and whether apart from the burglaries there were other reasons for taking security in one's own hands. Her reply:

> "[L]ayabout youths ['hangjongeren'] of Moroccan descent, and that was indeed already going on back when I went to high school, but now people just turn more and more, they walk on, they don't see anything, [gesticulates emphatically] they just have this, this working together isn't being done as it used to. Back then we could, if someone was making problems then we could still say 'Hey, what are you doing?', now you are scared that you'd get a bullet through your head right away. So that very much hardens what happens all around you, and that I just find very uncomfortable, that idea. And there I also do feel afraid, also because my children have to bike to school, and who knows what they run into, what kind of bothersome people? [plays with hands nervously] And the worst is that there are people who walk around doing *nothing*, then I think, yes, that's just the worst of the worst. People are really afraid for their own lives."

What are the implications? Anneke sees connections between 'outsiders' disturbing the idealised peace of the community, Moroccan immigrants, and gun violence. The picture she paints reminds one of civil warfare. Why this grotesque analogy? Primarily it serves the function of drawing boundaries between self and other in contours as clear and sharp as possible: There is a dangerous outside world which threatens to subvert the ideal inside community. As pointed out in chapter 4, security serves to mobilise difference by means of urgency and threat (Buzan et al. 1997). Securitisation is understood as a staging of threats and vulnerabilities with the effect of exerting a power that is *productive of the community* itself. This productive power can be explained with Ricoeur's hermeneutical account of mimesis, by which representation is always also predisposition (Ricoeur 1988). The 'security world' thus created is therefore not only a 'security lens' through which interpretation alters, but also a predication of practice. The security conversation, as I have pointed out in chapter 5, is consequently also a *conversion*; the making of a world is also a making of an inclination.

Further, the vehemence or eagerness of the metaphor may link to an attempt to somehow 'cover up' the experience of actual communal fragmentation — insecurities of

other sorts, including personal insecurities (and hesitations, uncertainties, ambiguities), constantly confront the impossibility of reconciling wish with world. The one thing that all the neighbours in Poppel do have in common is NPN membership, not some sort of shared communal utopia. The story ignores the fundamental contradiction between the experience of 'we are insecure, therefore we get closer together' and the experience of 'we are insecure, therefore we are torn apart'; a tension that is between, once again, is and ought.

Theme 2:   Contradiction and confusion vs certainty

The tension between is and ought constitutes another strand running through both interviews: A juggling between contradiction and confusion versus certainty, or the striving towards certainty. As expected (see chapter 5), intersubjectivity conditions constant negotiation, which is why disagreement and uncertainty arise, manifested in confusion and contradiction. This relationship is expressed along two sub-themes: nostalgia and fantasy on the one hand, and the fear of vulnerability on the other.

As to the former, the interviews revealed a peculiar sense of what I want to call 'security time': Two past tenses were constantly held up against a single present tense. Both provided an emotional background against which the respondents' relationship with their current securitisation policies (discourses, practices) was presented as purely rational. Again, this confronts the intertwinement of reason and emotion, wherein security becomes visible once more as what I tentatively call *reasoned emotion*. The most distant past tense of 'security time' is the realm of nostalgic fantasy, along the lines of the statement: 'Back in the day, all the doors were open.' Take, for instance, the following *schwärmerei* from my conversation with Anneke:

> "It just [stutters] *upsets* me. I think, damn, back then I just used to leave my door open for a whole week, it would have crossed no one's, *no one's* mind to just walk in — except for the postman because he wanted to deliver something. That used to be possible back then. In this neighbourhood, here in Poppel, the postman would just walk to the back door, that's customary here in Belgium. The front door is seized up, we never use it. That had to be possible. So now that's not possible anymore. It does change the living-together, the way of living together changes. You do notice that. It's the small things, details, that you start thinking, like 'Ah, that's a bummer, that this has changed now'. Much less cosy ['gemütlich'

in original], much less, yes, just, let's just live together and respect each other. And trust one another up to a safe level. That's a shame, that that is gone now."

An idyllic past is contrasted with a not-so-idyllic present — apparently, this is all 'gone now'. How does that combine with the notion that since the time of the burglaries and preventive practices in reaction, such as the NPN groups, the community had grown much closer? It makes sense only with respect to security time — only in terms of two different pasts, the idealised 'back then' (an unspecified yet desired 'state of nature') and the more immediate past which serves as an impending reminder of the insecurities that the community seeks to overcome right now. The latter is expressed in the following way, as Thijs puts it:

"I do get the idea that you get somewhat *closer* [in original] with one another, you're more in touch. Look, because in this neighbourhood, everyone sits behind his hedge, nobody approaches nobody. It's all a bunch of rich business people who live here, and they all go like 'I've retired now and I [incomprehensible]'. They don't really come, they're not really […], they're mostly people who sit by themselves, as in 'I don't do all that anymore'."

How does one make sense of such contradictory (or multi-levelled) accounts of the past? How does this anachronistic notion of time fit in with the overall discursive justifications of the present securitisation practices in Poppel? Perhaps the temporal contradiction stems from an unresolved or even unresolvable ambiguity that underlies the very concept of security. And even though there is this ambiguity one tries to get rid of it — contradiction in this case results from a desire to make each isolated statement as internally coherent as possible without drawing connections between them; they are being separated as neatly as reason and emotion, according to the view implied.

Securitisation is an *attempt* to establish security as a response to insecurity, but is it a successful one? Primarily, it is the elevation of an issue from the political to the sphere of emergency or exemption/exception (Buzan et al. 1997). This permits extraordinary measures (such as infringements upon privacy or military interventions abroad) and allocates an unusual amount of public attention to a given issue. Such distortions are part of the security mode, a mode which is desirable to *overcome* — this is why the Copenhagen scholars advocate for 'desecuritisation', as a prolongation of the state of security would be an

untenable strain on all kinds of political, social, and cultural resources (ibid.). Here, the state of security is always one of heightened arousal and tension — a state of stress.

The state of stress, in turn, is a source of contradiction and confusion that render security a constantly negotiated, disputed, unfixable relational quality. This points back at essential ambiguity, which also implies an unreconcilability or ungovernability — yet this feature is constantly denied, so it does not occur to either of my respondents that the 'old' and 'new' pasts do not combine into one background against which to justify present practice. Even further, the present description is contradictory itself, as the first theme in this analysis has shown: while apparently with the NPN in place the community got "more in touch" actually only one single face-to-face get-together had taken place.

The second sub-theme that makes part of the tension between contradiction and certainty is the fear of vulnerability. If with Stone (2002) security is the absence of vulnerability, and with Lebow (2008) fear is the opposite of confidence, then the fear of vulnerability is almost a fear of fear which only a display of regained (or disregarding) confidence could remedy. This becomes lucid in the ways Thijs and Anneke describe moments of actively getting involved with neighbourhood prevention strategies and activities. For example, Anneke recounts how she once decided to 'get out there':

"As long as I can sit in the car I feel a bit safer, then I would also go there. Because one time, I've chased a couple of guys, I've tried to find them. They were here also walking around, and I think 'I'm just going, I just want to know', like 'I've seen you!', even if I do it with my camera and take a picture of them or something. Then at least they know they've been seen. […] I find it very exciting, but I am also thinking 'Yes, if I don't do anything, then you are certain they can go' so, if I do do something and I just drive over the city paths in the neighbourhood to see if I can find them, and in any case take a picture — and then drive away quickly [laughing nervously] — for example, then you at least have the feeling that you are doing something about it. Because you do it for yourself of course, but you also do it for all those people who are getting alarm systems because they fear for their own safety."

Several aspects stand out in this narrative. First, Anneke highlights the excitement of the chase, and how in the car she felt safe enough to go after 'a couple of guys'. Second, she justifies her action as a way of knowing, spotting, identifying, using the exact same discourse as her husband Thijs (see his above description of a 'mix-up' he had gotten involved in).

Third, her description seems to nervously oscillate between self-empowerment (standing up against 'them') and a need to provide justification. There is some vulnerability in the argument, but also some vulnerability that had to be protected immediately, by stepping into the car. On a more revealing note, Thijs recounts the following rather embarrassing moment:

"I am not at all a hero or anything. Last week as well, the dog started to bark at night, and then you do get up with that club, like 'Ah! Where do I have to go?', and the dog jumped all over the place — so yeah, dog out, just let it go, and then I stand there swivelling that club, butt naked, but yeah. There was nothing, but it was something that made you *wince,* you think like: something can happen. So then I am happy that it [the dog] reacts the way it does. But yes. I don't feel unsafe or something, not at all."

The style in which Thijs tells this story is almost deceptive to the listener: He talks about the event in such a casual and humorous way that it is almost impossible not to empathise with him and laugh about the whole scenery — disregarding the very essence of it, namely that Thijs had actually been serious and alert enough to get up and out upon the dog's barking, a weapon in hand. Even more strikingly, Thijs uses this story to clarify two things he presumes he may likely be accused of: First, he is not a hero — even though his wife Anneke prefers to imagine him as such ("Thijs is someone who gets in the car and goes there").

Second, returning to contradiction, he concludes why he is not a hero (because he can also just be a naked someone swivelling his club outside, in the middle of the night) with: "But yes. I don't feel unsafe or something, *not at all*". Thijs does not want to come across as emotional, although he is also able to show that he is actually scared and confused. Humour allows for this honesty, but is also quick to shut that down. Not vulnerability sums up Thijs' stance, but a *fear* of vulnerability which the voice of the manager appears to fight with confidence. In the end, the inner rationalist is still there to save Thijs from total exposure.

Theme 3:   Suspicion, symbols, and truth

A third and final theme connects relatively closely to the above argument on contradiction and certainty as the polarities of an unreconcilable tension inherent to security. This theme concerns the production of certainty by yet another means: assertiveness and conviction over

the appropriateness of measures taken. Suspicion, symbols, and truth are the points of reference to this side of the discursive-practical engagement. If self-referentiality is understood as security being revealed in its emergence and application, then the hypostatisation fallacy is likely: What security is being made into will be likely to be taken for what it is — a 'security reality' is created. Again, Ricoeur's mimesis (1988) is elucidating in this context, as they explain how an altered representation (a representation that is created under conditions of emergency) yields an altered predication (an action tendency toward particular practices of establishing a sense of security). This predication is manifested in how ideal is taken for real, more specifically: how suspicion becomes truth.

Analysing the conversations with Anneke and Thijs has shown how NPN participants construct security in precisely these terms. 'Suspicion as truth' aptly illustrates reasoned emotion, or *reasoned-away* emotion: As a result of feeling scared, the other is seen as a suspect — every stranger entering the neighbourhood *must* be up to something. Quick qualification of the other is sped up by the escalatory possibilities of NPN groups; the availability of an exciting practice where a willing audience readily embraces suspicion makes suspicion always immediately *established.* The collective effort of establishment acts as a truth-making moment — once the community decides whether a suspicion was worthy investigating, it successfully makes that suspicion into a fact. What once was uttered as 'I am scared' is now blissfully concluded as 'This is a threat' — a representation of a reference object is formed which then yields predisposition or predication upon which one's interaction with that reference object is shaped (see chapter 5). It also echoes the hypostatisation fallacy, according to which one mistakenly treats an abstraction as real (or, in hermeneutic terms, a representation for what it represents) — the suspicion, an emotional representation of an event or a relation to given circumstances, is mistakenly treated as the source of accurate information about the 'real' world out there.

One striking example of how suspicion is established as truth stands out in the following account of Anneke, who explains how there is a collective power structure in her NPN group as well as that of an adjacent neighbourhood, including an informal set of rules according to which suspicion is judged either appropriate or misplaced:

"[T]hat guy also just kicks people out because they made a wrong remark. It was being said as well, some time ago, that a drone was hovering over the meadows. And then I say, yes, that's a bit stupid of me in that moment apparently, but I think oh, a drone, does anybody have a rifle or something I said, like shoot it down! Something like that, I made a remark, well, I was kicked out of the WhatsApp group immediately, like because these are remarks that have nothing to do with what this group is about. And then I think, like yeah then you're going a bit too far, and the fact that you are actually a community, all together, and in that way he's kicked a whole lot of people already, because they didn't make the right remark. Because they were like 'Whoa', telling that there was a car driving around, well that man's spent his whole life here already, and he wasn't allowed more than 30 km/h, but then he's immediately seen as a suspect and 'he's looking inside everyone's houses'. It's not true, but people's fantasy goes off the rails. And they go ring immediately, and then they get back something like 'Listen, you've got the wrong end of the stick, this is just a farmer, he's not allowed more than 30, don't worry about him', so … yes, that, I do find that important that you don't take a WhatsApp group too seriously either, that you don't make it bigger than it is."

Anneke describes an unmediated internal imposition of power, exerted by a 'guy' who would 'kick people out' for the 'wrong remark', something she finds exaggerated — one ought not to "take a WhatsApp group too seriously either". She further reflects on how she participated in what is regarded too trivial for the purposes of the NPN group and was subsequently deprived of membership in the municipality-level group. Her suggestion was to "shoot down" a drone that was for unknown reasons seen flying above the fields by the village. She thus makes an attempt to securitise the drone with the help of the collective efforts of the NPN group, which then fails as it is not deemed suspicious enough.

Similarly, a slow-driving car is being observed so closely that the neighbours could suddenly swear that "he's looking inside everyone's houses". In this case however, Anneke strangely meets the proposal with dismissal — "people's fantasy goes off the rails". In light of this judgement it remains open to interpretation what exactly she means when she finally demands "that you don't make it bigger than it is". Should 'trivialities' be included or not? Should the NPN group be more 'fun' and less 'serious'? The vagueness of her remarks, in spite of detailed illustration, seems to point once more at the hurdle of ambiguity that somehow cannot be overcome.

What does become clear in the above account is that the Poppel NPN group seems to be governed by a set of informal rules according to which suspicion is negotiated in order for

the collective to decide whether it deserves 'truth status' or not. The general tendency however also seems to be that individuals who are part of the group are inclined to consider 'cues' around them in terms of suspicion, threat, security, so that the 'everyday-ness' of things is absorbed by the 'security-ness' of the everyday.

The triviality of everything is first questioned, then assessed in terms of security, and only then either discarded or elevated (by means of collective securitisation) to the state of emergency. This predisposition reveals a notion of rational behaviour that is far removed from my reading of Plato and Freud (chapter 2), resembling the transition from reason to rationalism — from Plato's composite inclination of human nature to a strategic management tool. It further disregards the Freudian notion that security is never a removal but a relocation and that the lines between the elements are *blurred* — the fallacy of hypostatisation is a result also of the assumption that reason could possibly be severed from emotion.

A further dimension, and another means of truth-making, is the overall *symbolism* of the whole grid of NPN discourse and practice: Both Thijs and Anneke acknowledge that most of what their security measures entail remains symbolic, at best a message to potential burglars and at worst a whole lot of ado in vain. Yet at the same time they claim that they are utterly convinced that these measures would work and help nevertheless. Consider the following passages from my interview with Anneke; I asked her how she had felt during the peak time of burglaries in her neighbourhood:

> "Well, it took a while before I dared to walk the dog again late at night. That is still a violation of your privacy, yes, I was very scared. During the day, normally, I always leave the door open when I'm home, but we stopped doing that. We have got an electrical gate installed so it wouldn't be so easy to come here 'round the back. But alarm systems we already had. Yes, those are things, actions you take, and a feeling of fear, of yes, to protect yourself [hesitates] — to protect your family. I lock my cars every time now, even if they are under the car gate, we always forgot that before, those are things that have an impact on you. And I think for everyone, everyone has gotten into a sort of worrisome mode, to try at least to prevent, you become very alert. So that has really had an effect on your normal way of acting, living, how you live."

A generalised sense of insecurity stands out, a sensation that is not tangible, that cannot be pinpointed, and is thus the more frightening. The measures she immediately takes are in turn

precisely that: tangible, concrete, visible. She stops walking the dog at night, locks every door, installs an electrical gate, and so on. Knowing however: keeping the dog at home does not keep the burglars out, a locked door has never stopped them either, and one can always jump over the gate, no matter its technical sophistication. Although Anneke does not fully admit that the measures she takes are therefore symbolic, she does explicate them as an attempt "to at least prevent" — a way of making sense of "a sort of worrisome mode" which is too upsetting not to react to it in some way.

The steps Anneke and her family take appear as self-reassurance: they provide a *sense* of security, not necessarily concrete material security. The state of emergency is not pacified nor overcome, but perpetuated — one does not 'remove' the insecurity by means of practicing security, one rather makes sure to have done something so as to make the insecurity more bearable. The surgical strike is a fantasy; the surgeon's knife is rusty. It is as though one threw an aspirine after catching a bullet — one keeps on bleeding, but at least one did something, which is supposed to be better than nothing.

To make the question of symbols more explicit, I asked Anneke about the street signs that almost every NPN neighbourhood participating in the WABP network puts in the entrance to its streets. The sign usually features a stereotype burglar and says "Watch out! Neighbourhood prevention!" ('Attentie! Buurtpreventie!' in Dutch). When I asked whether the community expected the sign itself to help by way of prevention, she replied:

"I hope so, that is the purpose indeed, yes. To let people who get here know, like 'Oh, I am being watched'. And then it's, that just goes *so fast*! One little message ['WhatsAppje' in original], because everyone reacts immediately [claps hands], and sees it at responds, and yes, people come outside. And that has really happened here, that you would just then all of a sudden have ten men standing in the street to see 'what's going on here?' And I do find that great, that that actually happens, I do find that good. So I do think that it works, also the preventive work does, at least I hope so. It's never happened again [pulls up shoulders], so [laughing], knock on wood [knocks on table]! [Now in a very soft voice:] So it works, yes."

Anneke signals hesitation, hopes, and wishes. Not at all does she radiate confidence or conviction, rather it seems as though she tried to defeat her feelings with words, swinging back and forth between 'I hope so' and 'it works'. In the same fashion, Thijs says:

"Interviewer: But so it is about mobilising the neighbourhood first, looking what's up, and then, if it's something serious, calling the police.

Respondent: Yes, I mean I don't go fight or quarrel myself or something. Imagine there was something at someone's home, so then if you get in there with a couple guys I also take my dog with me, and then I'll check out what's going on in there.

Interviewer: If there's an assault.

Respondent: Yes, if there's someone inside with a weapon I don't get in there, then I'm more like 'well, whatever' ['zoek het maar uit' in original]. Yes, I think it's good."

Even though Thijs actually *does* "go fight or quarrel" himself "or something", he has his limits. If he caught a burglar in the act, he would take a dog and some fellow neighbours to go and see what they could do. If the burglar was *armed with a gun* however, he would not intervene. There is more to this story than fair pragmatism, as Thijs implies that *if* a burglar had a gun, the whole of the NPN group would not be able to prevent anything from happening anyway. The point of prevention is of course to decrease the likelihood of someone making any such attempt in the first place, yet there appears not to be more than the hope for the street sign to be deterring enough to the potential burglar. The 'getting out', too, must then be understood as part of a symbolic trope of action, born from the ambiguous yet regulatory discourse and practice that surrounds it.

To conclude, the Belgian network described here engages in a threefold discourse and practice along the themes of (a) belonging and threat objectification versus individuation, (b) contradiction and confusion versus certainty, and (c) suspicion, symbols, and truth. What stands out in all of them as a recurring thread is a fear of uncertainty, ambiguity, and doubt against which rationalism is deployed, albeit unsuccessfully, as a tool of self-securitisation. This is in line with Lebow (2008), who describes fear as the opposite of confidence, and Stone (2002), to whom security is the absence of vulnerability. The common response to a lack of confidence is a rebuilding of confidence by means of hypervigilance and reassurance so as to make vulnerability absent again. However, Stone also points out that the imagination

does not follow rules — even if rationalism is thus seen to be an apt countermeasure, it is one not necessarily against an 'actuality' but possibly against a spectre (cf. chapter 1, 2). Furthermore, the NPN groups appear as platforms of social appraisal, by which discourses and practices are not only subject to constant negotiation, but they are also mutually reinforced and produce mimetic predispositions (cf. Ricoeur 1988). Finally, the empirical experience deviates from conventional theories of securitisation as it is extremely difficult to draw a clear distinction in both cases between actors and audience, contrary to Balzacq's claim of the centrality of the audience (2011) — instead, the NPN groups stand for self-government and provide spaces in which social roles are constantly in flux.

6.2 The Dutch network

In The Netherlands, NPN groups are widespread. In the 'randstad', the most densely populated area in the northwest of the country, but also in a large number of rural communities, one can see the signs of the WABP network decorate more and more streets. One example for these local initiatives in The Netherlands is an NPN group in the suburban neighbourhood of Ommoord, part of the Prins Alexander borough, located in the northeast of Rotterdam. Ommoord is a hybrid between urban and rural, as it sits at the edge of the city area, and is thus primarily residential.

In Ommoord I spoke to Saskia, who is about 55 years old and a mother of two. She works as a teacher at a school for seriously ill children and decided (although it is questionable whether this was a conscious decision, as shall become clear below) to join the NPN group in her neighbourhood two months ago. She has spent the past twenty years in Ommoord and now lives there mostly on her own, as her children are moving out to study elsewhere. What she finds stands out in her community is steadiness — although things are changing, they do so only very slowly and reluctantly, as most people who decide to move here tend to stay. Of her immediate neighbours, she adds by way of illustration, only one has moved out to make space for new tenants. As one would expect, the community is thus also quite close-knit; almost everyone knows each other and offers to help out where needed.

This case differs considerably from the Belgian community of Poppel, which was a ready target for burglars by its very constitution (wealth and vulnerable population). As Saskia points out herself, Ommoord does not attract planned burglary but rather the

occasional "sneak thief" or opportunity criminal. Therefore one could expect there to be less of a sense of generalised insecurity over an omnipresent and omnipotent threat. My main question was why, despite such a close-knit community and a low potential threat level, people had set up an NPN group at all? Why did it seem important? What did they hope the tool would contribute to? In the following, I relate what Saskia disclosed to me to the same three themes carved out before, but also discuss in how far the discourse and practice she mobilises differs from that referred to in the Belgian case.

Theme 1:   Belonging and threat objectification vs individuation

In Ommoord, belonging and group identification stand out more as a given than as a desire. Saskia, for one, sees herself in an ambiguous relation to her community. On the one hand she highlights how she prefers to be on her own, on the other hand she repeatedly describes exceptionally friendly exchanges with her neighbours; it therefore almost appears as if she would underemphasise an actually quite close and mutually supportive community. When asked whether she was under the impression that the NPN group would bring the community closer together (as in Belgium), she replied:

> "I'm not really that kind of person anyway, so for me that wouldn't really matter. I don't know whether it [hesitant] … I don't get that feeling, that I'd notice that people [hesitant] … be much more in touch with each other. But I'm also just a little bit more on my own, I … I'm always interested, but if I hear something I do go and check, like 'did you hear this', say, … Yes, that I, that the neighbour suddenly falls ill, then I go and visit her and so on, but, I am interested but I don't think that people now … that they'd now, because of the group, do more things together."

While Saskia makes clear that she does not identify as a 'community person' who would reach out to the collective all too much, she also describes how she sometimes acts as a reliable and helping neighbour who does not have a problem with proactive community commitment. This stands in contrast to the picture I was presented with in Belgium, where I found the notion of *belonging together* very much stressed, despite a lack of real life instances of such togetherness.

In other words, Saskia more transparently embodies and is honest about the juxtaposition of communal-collective values and individuation — to her, all is well as long as there is some sort of reliability or trustworthiness in how she relates to the local community, but a legitimate 'minding one's own business' as well. This somewhat 'healthier' mix also precludes the possibility of extensive threat objectification, which however may also be attributed to a much lower-level experience of confronting threat in Saskia's day-to-day.

How does securitisation impact the constitution of this community? Of course, the level of material threat is barely comparable to the series of burglaries in Poppel. Notwithstanding, the NPN as a 'policy tool' (Balzacq 2011) and security platform does render everyday securitisation constantly available and easily accessed — the threshold to securitise should thus have decreased at least somewhat (more on this in theme 3).

If this were the case, belonging may have ultimately if not become more salient at least assumed a different role; it is a pre-established frame the differentiating function of which should now be foregrounded simply through the availability of the security platform. In other words, the emergence of the NPN may not have drawn boundaries between self and other that had not been there before, but redrawn existing boundaries so as to specify and identify difference (Buzan et al. 1997). The NPN does thus not stand for a drastic change but, as Saskia puts it, "you keep an eye on things a bit more" and "we do take care of each other a bit more". The premise of the productive power of securitisation thus still holds — even in the comparatively subliminal scenario of Ommoord.

Theme 2:   Contradiction and confusion vs certainty

For understanding security as a reasoned emotion the premise of intersubjectivity is of course crucial, as it is for securitisation theory in general. Intersubjectivity involves constant negotiation, so in Ommoord too the NPN should give rise to disagreements, uncertainty about what or whether to securitise and contradictory behaviour — contrary to the maxims of rationalism. Contradiction and confusion surface in a peculiar way when Saskia justifies her decision to join the local NPN group. She appears almost not at all to be confused about her position: She does not see herself to be a particularly anxious or scared person; she is daring, self-aware, and overall confident that there is no need to exaggerate threat (and that she does not do so). What stands out the most is her self-reflection, her ability to weigh the spectre of

suspicion against a sober pragmatic position. Nevertheless, she also appears to experience a need to mobilise a security story in order to make her pragmatism fit with the recent decision to join the group — after all, the NPN group appealed to her. In this act of appraisal a mismatch demands straightening out, as apparent in the following.

Again, we can subdivide the theme of contradiction into nostalgia and fantasy on the one hand, and fear of vulnerability on the other. As to nostalgia and fantasy, it is interesting to observe that Saskia subscribes to a strikingly similar notion of temporality as Thijs and Anneke. She as well uses 'security time', comparing contradictory points in time — an idealised distant past, a justificatory proximate past, and an ambiguously constituted present. The distant past, the realm of nostalgia and perhaps some fantasy, looks the following way:

> "[T]he people that live here for some more time already, I did take it that back in the day, when their children were little, that they did many more things together. When I came here I had relatively, I had small children, and the other children where all a bit older already, so they said like well we used to always have a real big barbecue or something, and everyone would bring something, you know, then you grow up with this communal factor as small children, to organise some chummy ['gezellig' in original] things together."

This account does not come without some sense of a 'paradise lost', something that may demand restoration, although something that Saskia would not necessarily feel inclined to strive for. Nevertheless, the account does show how historically grown constructions of subject-object constellations and relations contribute to the present sense-making. Historicity, the interweaving of discourse with temporal frames of reference, is the basis for 'security time' and serves as a cornerstone of securitisation (cf. Van Rythoven 2015). The more proximate past on the other hand differs in description from that employed in Belgian 'security time' — it is still relatively rosy:

> "Well, this little street for sure, and this neighbourhood, it is indeed a neighbourhood where people are open to each other, and like, if they know you're on holiday, that you could easily ask your neighbours to take care of the plants for a short while, we're well in touch. I can even easily ask my neighbours' neighbour to take care of my cats, you trust each other, and you give one another the key. You help each other if it's necessary. Also when it comes to

lending things, just like, often they just approach you, or recently my father was visiting, to fix the toilet and change the hallway, well the neighbour walked over looking curiously, like 'Oh, I have some tools you might want to use'."

The Ommoord neighbourhood apparently is very communal already, and seems to benefit from a comparatively high level of social integration. How does this provide the background against which measures such as the NPN group would be necessary means against possible threats from the outside? Why did Saskia join?

"Only just because it does keep you a bit more alert. Because [hesitant] … I've had a couple of burglaries here as well, once while I was still living in Rotterdam in the centre, that was one of the first times, I'd been on holiday, and it didn't impress me too much, they hadn't taken too much either. And twice right here, once when we'd just, when we hadn't really moved in yet, that's when they got in, and another time when I was there with my daughter and my son. Then they also tried to get inside, and it didn't work out and one time they were drilling into the left window so that one night we sat on the couch and thought 'huh, there's two holes in the frame!'

In that way they try to get the lock out. They drill holes and try to pull up the lock, this way [makes gestures]. And yeah, you know, this other time my daughter was here, it was in the middle of the night, I heard noises and went downstairs, I thought it was something else, I would have never thought, until suddenly I saw those people standing in front of the door. That did carry some weight. I was a bit like if you're a member of that group, and I was hoping not to get loads of messages every day, because that I find very annoying, but if there's a burglary somewhere that you're a bit more alert then, because I always leave my window open. I'd been away for a week now and then I think 'oh, true, I better close my window'. If they want to, they'll get in."

Apparently, Saskia wants to be kept "a bit more alert", she *wants* to securitise her everyday life. She explains that preference by describing her experiences with burglary, setting out by underlining self-assertion: "it didn't impress me too much," she says, just in order to then go on about the technical details of how exactly the burglars would try to break into her house. Such technical detail, as Jeffery (2014) points out (chapter 3), serves to marginalise emotion — it is, to speak with another critic of rationalism, an "imposition of order upon the chaos of sense impressions" (Lichtheim 1965: 171).

When she however describes direct physical confrontation with the burglars ("those people standing in front of the door"), Saskia suddenly startles and adds: "That did carry some weight." Interestingly, she does not expand on this emotional experience, but goes on with, again, technical detail and remarks such as "oh, true, I better close my window". The parts of the story Saskia chooses to present do not focus on fear or threat, but on managing the situation and on assertion. More importantly, her account cedes space to *both* sides. Despite not delving into emotional detail of the experience of burglary, Saskia ends on a most *ambiguous* note, not an actually assertive one: "If they want to, they'll get in".

These two sides are further kept alive and in conversation because Saskia mobilises 'security time', as explained above. She describes a past that is marked by the rather traumatic experience of multiple burglaries, an experience so marking that it haunts her on a recurring basis. This past does not contradict the positive relationship with the neighbourhood per se, but it does attenuate or nuance the picture presented before to some extent — the cosiness and safety of the communal space is somehow under threat of external intrusion. With that in mind, Saskia goes on to explain how much this second-order past haunts her:

> "[T]his one time that they [hesitant] … that they almost got inside when I had woken up, that you're really, like, you still remember it. It's not like I have to think about it every day, but I do still remember it, just like, I sometimes even dream that someone broke into my house. But it doesn't hold sway over my life or something, but suddenly I dream about it. And then I think like, and I wake up very easily. Yes. I know that ever since. [incomprehensible] But other than that, I think that everyone who's gone through something like this, that you do retain some of it. But it's not like I felt unsafe, I often sleep here on my own, I'm often on my own here if my daughter or my son aren't there. And that's fine, you know. So, it's not like feel *more* safe, but I don't feel unsafe either."

The listener suddenly *does* get a rich account of emotional experience. The mode of engagement Saskia normally resorts to (a confident and reflexive mode) is replaced by that very same interplay or negotiation between uncertainty and certainty, ambiguity and clarity which I identified in the Belgian case: On the uncertain side of the spectrum, Saskia experiences problems falling asleep and nightmares that involve burglaries. On the certain side, she is quick to recruit a pattern of statements such as "it's not like I have to think about

it every day" or "it's not like I felt unsafe". Most interestingly, she then appears to resolve this tension with an embrace of ambiguity, something that I have to say I had not expected to come across before starting my field research: "it's not like I feel *more* safe, but I don't feel unsafe either." In other words, certainty seems this time not to *win* over uncertainty, nor does reason hold sway over emotion (cf. Jeffery 2014) — instead, Saskia is much more accepting of that tension, of knowing that the NPN group will probably not prevent anything from happening, but at least that it makes her feel safer in some unspecified way.

When it comes to the fear of vulnerability, one can however still identify some attempts to reconcile a felt sense of insecurity with a need for retaining an assertiveness in character. Saskia, as one can see in the excerpts above, does conclude ambiguities with some sense of *knowing* what is the right attitude to deal with things, and of *justifying* her decision to join the local NPN group. In that spirit, she identifies some vulnerabilities and is open to share some of her own vulnerabilities too, but highlights the *reasonableness* of the community's security discourse and practice nevertheless. For instance, she shows me some of the messages that are being posted in the NPN group, one of which captions a photograph of a street tile which someone scribbled two white stripes on with the words "suspicious…" — something she finds laughable and presents to me as an example of how some people can indeed exaggerate the matter. Notwithstanding, at another point she claims:

> "[P]eople don't, well, chatter about it all the time, not like a gossip culture, like 'Whoa, did you hear what happened over there?', but only just like something doesn't seem right, or just by talking about it constantly, who knows who did that, or why is this happening or keep an eye on them. I do like that, yes. That it's being used in a reasonable way. […] I thought I would get loads of messages, but you know, when I got this one message I thought 'no, don't tell me it's really going to be like this', when probably a child had drawn two stripes on a tile. I didn't know whether I could take that seriously, I mean it's possible that someone was serious about it, or whether it was just a joke. But then I do think like yes, you mustn't use something like this for a joke because then you don't know anymore whether to believe it or not. So I assume someone was serious about it."

Saskia contradicts herself, but she makes a conscious effort to not cede any space to that vulnerability — the vulnerability of admitting that parts of the group's practice might not actually be so very helpful. Although she says that the group probably does not prevent

anything from happening, she still finds it important to defend the group's reasonable commitment. She defends the rational attempt yet reveals an inherent uncertainty and ambiguity that she is unable to remove altogether. The NPN group swings back and forth between knowing and not knowing: "you don't know anymore whether to believe it or not" — but the overall tendency is to rather, for the sake of certainty, "assume someone was serious about it". The problem is that Saskia herself has some doubts and cannot resolve an ambiguity that is retained in all of her stories, while the NPN group induces a tendency: to prefer certainty over uncertainty, predictability over dialogue, reason over emotion. The mismatch is one between rationalist premises and the experience of security as a reasoned emotion (cf. Lebow 2008 in chapter 1 and Jeffery 2014 in chapter 3).

Theme 3:   Suspicion, symbols, and truth

The third theme, referring to how self-referentiality gives rise to hypostatisation and predication (cf. Buzan et al. 1997; Ricoeur 1988), is developed on a trajectory that largely differs from the Belgian case. As Saskia does not draw strict boundaries between self and other, which is why she does not objectify threat as much as Thijs and Anneke in Poppel, she does not mobilise as strong a framework of hypostatised suspicion. However she does connect burglaries to a broader threat context, on the basis of which she interweaves the local security discourse with a national and international one, expressing some sense of lurking threat in spite of claiming to 'know better' — she somehow views the local experience as representative for a much broader logic at play. In her own words:

> "I think, well yes, if something out of the ordinary happens, well, with burglaries, yes, but I wouldn't say that it would, well it surprises me already about Rotterdam *an sich*, but here in this neighbourhood certainly not, I'm not like something really serious could happen, in a way that it would connect people a lot. A terrorist attack as they call it, like in Brussels, London, Berlin, it surprises me that such a thing hasn't happened in Rotterdam yet. When does the day come? When is it going to happen? Some time — we're not exempted from it. But here in this neighbourhood, no, I don't think that people would, no, no."

Saskia reproduces a subtle 'fortress mentality' (cf. Stone 2002) under the presumption that her own neighbourhood would always be exempted from threat, although she still poses those

nagging, doubtful questions of "When is it going to happen?" and thus does not feel entirely self-exempted after all. Moreover, as mentioned previously, Saskia acknowledges that the NPN group practice is bound to remain symbolic in terms of actual impact or preventive power, yet still insists on its proper and reasonable functioning, which she finds worth defending — especially since she joined the group herself.

The tension between symbolism, rationalism, and actually 'knowing better' is what distinguishes Saskia from Thijs and Anneke. It also points back to self-referentiality — security is what actors make of it (cf. Buzan et al. 1997). After all, Saskia did join the NPN group and does participate in the practices she still contends she would sometimes disagree with. She is now among the securitising actors, even though she would describe herself more as part of a securitising audience. This further brings to the fore the rationalist assumptions that underly the NPN groups — Saskia acknowledges that most of the contributions of the platform are symbolic, and she goes another step further by even claiming that the NPN will not actually prevent burglaries, but she must still think that it somehow 'works' nevertheless, for she chose to join. Suspicion is truth, and ideal is real — security emerges as a guarantor of exemption from danger, disregarding once again Freud's observation that it is never a removal but only a relocation (chapter 2). It foots on the very same premise the Poppel community relies on: that reason could be separated from emotion (cf. Jeffery 2014).

6.3   Two cases, two conversations

There are some qualitative similarities and differences between the cases that need to be accounted for. On the one hand, there are similarities in terms of the *kind* of discourse and practice employed. Crucial elements of my argument on the dialogical aspects of security as a reasoned emotion stand out in both cases: A fear of uncertainty and ambiguity weighs against the unpredictable dimensions of the feeling of security; social appraisal works as a communal negotiation of which reference objects are worth securitising and which are not; and finally, distinctions between actors and audience are drawn only with difficulty.

On the other hand, the discourse analysis has also revealed differences that are worth discussing. While Poppel, a relatively vulnerable community in terms of crime potential, had set up its NPN group in direct response to a tangible threat level (a series of burglaries), Ommoord, a rather stable community in comparison, did not actually have such a salient

cause against which to justify the set-up of such a network. Here, on can assume, NPN served primarily as a deterrence measure. Although, in other words, securitisation is not as permeating, pervasive, or omnipresent as in the case of Poppel, Ommoord does employ a similar discourse and practice of security in the everyday. The communities differ in the level of securitisation practices, yet it stands out that Ommoord resorts to securitisation at all. This can be elucidated with social appraisal theory: In the social, intersubjective endeavour of the NPN group, social appraisals are inherently *relational* but also *perpetual* and *adaptive*. The latter two features become visible in that the NPN platform enables reiterative negotiation, but also in that it allows for the community to continually adapt to given circumstances. It is not difficult in this light to understand both cases in terms of the co-constitution of agent, audience, and imagery (Van Rythoven 2015).

The themes along which both cases were analysed provide further angles of comparison. First, the theme of belonging and objectification versus individuation plays out very visibly in Poppel: A sense of belonging appears to be a key reference point for the community and the way it relates to potential insecurities. A 'fortress mentality' stands out in the way Thijs and Anneke work within their NPN group to establish security — fear is appraised collectively as the intuitive judgement of a given referent object (Van Rythoven 2015; chapter 3). In the case of Ommoord, belonging is reinforced, but not made explicit, which may be due to the fact that belonging is highlighted as something already given. Objectification of the other as an outcome of a reinforced group identity (Buzan et al. 1997; chapter 4) is, as one would expect it, a much more prevalent feature in Poppel than in Ommoord. In both cases however, the individuation of each participant (a distancing from the community) is disregarded — belonging is stressed even though all practices described take place without any physical-collective engagement and without discussing the possibility of individual isolation out of mistrust.

Second, contradiction and confusion as opposed to certainty play out similarly in both cases. All three participants construct 'security time', which allows them to weave the nostalgia and fantasy of two different accounts of the past into their narrative justifications for present practice and future goal. This relates to the intersubjectivity of securitisation (Buzan et al. 1997), but also to how the historical embedding of discourse is important to the making of security (Van Rythoven 2015; chapter 4). The temporal contradiction is

necessitated by the ambiguity of security — attempts to establish certainty are always in tension with the experience and non-disappearance of contradiction. Both Poppel and Ommoord refer to 'security time' and a fear of vulnerability. It is more surprising that in Ommoord such a fear of vulnerability is salient enough to give rise to an NPN initiative.

Third, suspicion, symbols, and truth relate in both cases. In Poppel, suspicion is central to everyday discourse and practice, as Anneke points out in her accounts of a neighbour-turned-suspect or a drone she proposed to shoot down. Suspicion can quickly assume paranoid shape, as when Thijs runs out of the house with a club in his hand because the dog was barking. In Ommoord, symbols seem to be more important than suspicion, as its inhabitants have much less experience with threatening events or intrusions. Therefore, the symbolic value of establishing an NPN group at all appears more important than what it actually could help with — Saskia joins the group even though she does not believe that it would bring more security.

By and large, the analysis zooms in on the security of the everyday (Goldstein 2010) and reveals patterns of interaction and sense-making that underline the added value in understanding security as a reasoned emotion. I avoided to practice the 'ethno-empiricism' Vrasti (2008) cautions against by using an ethnographically embedded discourse analysis as a method not of revealing 'actual truths' but of exploring and relating themes that render securitisation something far beyond predictability and regulation, and thus as well far beyond the rationalism that marginalises emotion. Through a dialogical approach to security as reasoned emotion, threat is discovered as something that is subject to collective social appraisal and constant negotiation — in straightforward opposition to the managerial, computational claims of rationalist notions of security.

6.4   Monsters in the neighbourhood

The security conversations presented in this chapter both *in*stantiate and *sub*stantiate the theoretical framework established in this paper: A dialogical approach to security as a reasoned emotion. In the production and engagement of both discourse and practice, the increasingly popular NPN groups take local security into their own hands; yet the measures they take in order to establish security tend to produce or at least reinforce insecurity. It is a striking illustration of what Stone (2002) calls the 'policy paradox' of security: A security

policy ends up producing what it originally intended to overcome or at least mitigate. But there is more to this example.

The NPN groups pose two major challenges to understanding security: A meta-theoretical or perhaps ontological challenge, and a methodological challenge. The latter consists mainly in that securitisation tends to be understood in relatively restrictive terms that preclude the possibility of blurring the boundaries between securitising actors and audiences; a dialogical framework would be able to overcome this problem at least in that it allows for understanding security as the result of constant negotiation or conversation rather than a singularly produced entity. The former challenge hints at a larger problem of reconciling the all too often antagonised polarities of reason and emotion — a 'reasonable' group, in this case, can turn paranoid by reinforcing one another's fears, just as much as it can remain prudent and decide not to exaggerate threat.

A more holistic picture of reason and emotion and their co-constitutive relationship accounts for such blurred lines and essential ambiguities. A more accepting stance toward uncertainties can avoid myopic strategies of 'rationalising away' an emotion that remains at the heart of one's interaction with threat either way, whether one decided to acknowledge its presence or not. Security is always and necessarily a reasoned emotion, a discursively embedded practice of social cognitive appraisal. Nevertheless, this does not have to mean that by making security one would have to reason emotion away.

VII

Concluding Remarks

At the example of so-called neighbourhood prevention networks in The Netherlands and Belgium, this paper has explored three themes along which a dialogical approach to security as a reasoned emotion plays out in the everyday discourse and practice of securitisation: Belonging, contradiction, and suspicion. All of these link the day-to-day interactions inside the communities of Poppel in Belgium and Ommoord in The Netherlands to a broader discursive-practical frame of reference that strongly suggests that one-dimensional, rationalist understandings of security and securitisation are insufficient. They however also suggest that a close inspection of how one conceptualises the relationship between reason and emotion is a precondition for establishing an understanding of security.

The empirical analysis conducted in this paper highlights the importance of conceiving of discourse and practice, as much as of theory and engagement, as mutually contained and intimately interwoven — so intimately indeed that a distinction fails to capture the relationship. A close look at how Anneke, Thijs, and Saskia engage with and relate to their communities under the conditions of threat, and sometimes emergency, unravelled security as a highly polysemic, collective construct that is constantly subject to negotiation. Thus the notion of a *dialogical* concept as opposed to a dialectical one — mediation here takes not place between two ends of a spectrum, but in a plural playing field in which the outcome is never a compromise but sometimes one and sometimes the other; an outcome too that is never static but will further be formed and reformed by the conversation it originates from and feeds into.

Dialogical security as a reasoned emotion is the discovery of security in the making, on any level, in any context. It does not need to be widened — it could not be wider. It is a hermeneutical understanding of security that sets out with a crucial preconception of reason and emotion *reflected* in the way security is made, conversed, and experienced. The hermeneutical, with Ricoeur (1988), brings about a predication or a predisposition which

links discourse and practice immediately. This predisposition, as the case analysis illustrates, is crucially constituted by heuristic representations — oriented towards problem-solving but always imperfect. This is where the impurity of reason (chapter 2) is manifested in the impurity of securitisation, where the rational choice is an expression of a deep anxiety about internal insecurities rather than something that takes place in one's interaction with the world.

In the case of the rural community of Poppel in Belgium, where elderly and wealthy inhabitants are a more likely target for burglaries that it was frequently prey to, securitisation plays a central role in everyday life and has given rise to visible changes: A sense of belonging has not only intensified but turned into a defensive point of reference and the metaphorical fortress that ought to be protected against outside intrusion — with an objectification of the other as a straightforward corollary. This has however played out not as successfully as rational security-making would expect it; rather, belonging is constantly confronted with an individuation of the members of the community that is taking place simultaneously: The medium of the instant messaging platform makes it possible that a sense of belonging can be activated even though real-life contact among the members of the community has not increased.

Similarly, the making of security in Poppel does not dissolve tensions or diminish threat but is discursively and practically marked by contradiction: The intersubjective encounter gives rise to constant negotiation, in which some issues are securitised whereas others are not. There is thus always some unclarity as to what security and insecurity mean and what they do not mean, which in turn is reflected in the way Thijs and Anneke repeatedly contradict their own arguments or their accounts of different kinds of past tenses.

The third theme that does become very visible in the case of Poppel is the relationship between suspicion, symbolism, and truth: Suspicion is, as another less classically 'rational' composite element of security, established as truth, regardless of its actual truth-value outside the realm of a 'security reality'. Despite having been repeatedly criticised for emptying out the concept of security, the Copenhagen School notion of self-referentiality (Buzan et al. 1997) provides a useful analytical frame here — it explains securitisation as being revealed in emergence and application, so that the fallacy of hypostatisation is likely. Such false

concretisation conditions 'security reality' which in turn has a predisposing effect in the sense of Ricoeur's aforementioned mimesis-3 (Ricoeur 1988; Teles Fazendeiro 2016).

In the Dutch neighbourhood Ommoord in the outskirts of Rotterdam there are similarities in the workings of securitisation in discourse and practice, but some qualitative distinctions are due as well. As Saskia is part of a relatively stable community with a low target profile for burglaries, the prevention network is set up more with the intention of deterrence than as an immediate response to offences committed. Saskia embodies this circumstance, as she describes herself more as part of a reluctant audience that has only a short time ago decided to 'join the trend' than an active securitising actress. In the case of Ommoord, the setting up of a neighbourhood prevention network is thus much less easily justified, as there has been no actual emergency that urged the community to respond as in the case of Poppel. Securitisation may thus appear to take place at a much lower level, yet it is striking nevertheless that the community decided to join efforts merely by way of prevention of something that had in fact never been a properly salient experience.

The three themes consequently play out differently. A sense of belonging is already established, and Saskia describes this in relatively neutral terms as if self-explanatory — she does not highlight the community aspect a lot, nor does she refer to it with particular enthusiasm or euphemism; objectification is thus respectively a much less visible feature. Belonging plays less clearly the role of a justificatory discourse or an intensifier of boundaries, although it appears to be foregrounded as a result of the use of the instant messaging platform nevertheless — and again in disregard of the actual individuation that accompanies the use of such digital means necessarily.

Contradiction plays a comparable role on the other hand, and Saskia interestingly uses a very similar kind of 'security time' narrative as I call it, according to which securitisation necessitates two distinct and contradictory references to the past in order to justify present practice; the more distant past poses the ideal 'back in the day' which one strives to return to, while the more proximate past poses the recent threat that legitimises the present use of unusual means toward establishing security.

Finally, suspicion, symbolism, and truth are related slightly differently again. As discussed previously, symbolism is more central to Ommoord than to Poppel, especially due

to the absence of recent experiences of threat. Therefore, it seems as though almost the entire networking structure set up here takes on a role that compares to the street signs — it is an available option and a ready tool (Balzacq 2011) for the securitisation of the everyday, but not more than that. Saskia is honest about this but finds participation worthwhile regardless. And even here, attempts to securitise the mundane are part of the practice, as oddly apparent when one neighbour tries to establish an intersubjective truth about 'suspicious' chalk drawings on a street tile.

The theoretical, methodological, and empirical inquiry conducted and presented throughout this paper urges for a rethinking of security in discourse and practice. This entails less of a reconceptualisation, as notions such as securitisation (Buzan et al. 1997) or ontological security (Steele 2008) do already provide useful analytical concepts. Instead, the considerations put forward here suggest a different starting point. This starting point is primarily informed by an essential ambiguity. Common security discourse and practice attempt to subjugate this ambiguity by means of rationalist suppression, based on a certain paranoia of the rational that fears the irrational 'monster under the bed'. Yet as my case study of neighbourhood prevention networks has shown, such attempts are futile insofar as they do not eliminate but merely displace ambiguity — insecurities are not removed surgically but reshaped plastically (cf. Freud [1923] 2010; Lebow 2008).

A dialogical approach to security as a reasoned emotion hints more directly at the normative implication of securitisation, that is *desecuritisation*, which can ultimately only take place if security discourse and practice are reflected upon without the attempt of suppressing (which amounts to a pretence of suppression) their emotional or 'non-rational' elements. This is not at all a proposed solution to the 'security problem' but much more of a methodological as well as ontological implication of allowing securitisation theory to account for uncertainty and ambiguity as inevitable parts of the making of security and insecurity. Such an embrace is not to reproduce or advocate such uncertainties but to let go of their removal as an overarching maxim.

Attempts to establish certainty about community boundaries and object-qualities of the other, to disregard contradictory frames of justification, or to establish truths based on suspicion and symbolism all speak to this latter claim. The experiences in Ommoord and

Poppel however also show a flip side: Insecurity is constantly in the air, and recurrent reminders are manifested from a street sign to a club next to the bed — even where this is not an immediate response to tangible threat this takes place. Simultaneously, communal bonds appear to erode while a sense of belonging is discursively claimed to be growing.

These theoretical and empirical insights bear implications that cannot and must not be disregarded in the field of security studies and IR more broadly. There is an introspective quality to the matter, as I have discussed in detail in chapters 2 and 3: The myth of the rule of reason has without justification worked to marginalise emotion — not in a way that urges me to 'bring back the passions', as some would have it (cf. Jeffery 2014), but in a way that unrightfully renders both concepts reason and emotion one-dimensional with detrimental respective predisposing (or 'worlding') effects. These effects matter to IR as a discipline, which I argue has disproportionally adopted computational visions of rationality and rational choice without reflecting upon the implications of such a stance. These visions are expressed vividly in contemporary notions of security, although securitisation theory provides a ready (if recent) theoretical framework within which the rethinking I suggest can take place. However even here bifurcation does take place at the cost of severing discourse and practice as well as reason and emotion (cf. Balzacq 2011).

Not only IR realism and liberalism need to reflect on the implications of security as a reasoned emotion; the consequences reach further than that. Securitisation theory as a social constructivist and variably post-positivist or poststructuralist endeavour does not always avoid the tendency to stereotype actorhood in international politics either. Its various proposals for conceptual widening however are important impulses, as they open up IR to approaches such as the reflexive-dialogical ethnography I suggest in chapter 5. Such an approach also makes it possible to draw conclusions about the larger playing field of IR from a zooming-in on the very localised neighbourhood dynamics that I examined in chapter 6.

The phenomena I have highlighted and discussed most closely are but instantiations of reason and emotion as they unfold, interact, and converse in international relations conceived here as inter-human relations (or in other words: the politics of difference; Inayatullah/Blaney 2004). If discourse is practice, deliberation is sensation, and reason is emotion — not in equation but

in dialogue. Reason is not merely computation, although computation may very well be a helpful ideal type that can explain a lot about what reason would look like if it were to work out perfectly and in isolation (cf. Weber [1904] 1949). Emotion is not merely a sentiment, although a sentiment may very well be one way of understanding and making sense of the concept of emotion. Cognitive and social appraisal theories approximate the intertwining of both that I am trying to get close to, even if only tentatively so — they are successful accounts primarily in that they state that emotion is not only something that happens to one, but also something that one does — emotions are directed toward referent objects, they presuppose cognitions, and they require sense-making (Jeffery 2014).

All of these features parallel the way I described and defined securitisation, and not by coincidence. The parallel equally relates the bigger picture, the reason-emotion debate, to security as an instantiation of how reason inevitably interweaves with emotion and vice versa. Security is a field at which the dynamics between reason and emotion play out visibly because it fiercely tries to fight uncertainty with certainty, and insecurity with security.

Let me finish what I have started with an anecdote with a metaphor: *music*. Music is a fitting analogy for the argument I wish this paper to stand for — it stands for the reason-emotion nexus as much as for how security as a reasoned emotion is experienced, related, and made. A classical piece of music is composed of logical construction and regularised patterns which align with a certain set of rules — the musicians agree on a pattern, a rhythm, and a tonality. This is what makes them resonate and collectively create the musical performance. Further, the piece of music targets an audience and aims to emotionally resonate with it; one feels the vibrancy and the waves, one is captivated by the sudden ruptures and the building-up of the crescendo, one is moved by the melancholy moments, and one is shaken by the riveting rushes. In music, even silence does something to its audience.

Crucially, music does not actually split between the schematised composition of the piece and its stimulating performance, as the very composition has already to consider its emotional impact. In turn, such impact is not merely some stirred up sentiment but a product as well of tonal determination. Here music is analogous to the intertwinement of reason and emotion, and likewise to the making and shaping of security. Even if some theories claim otherwise, security is not drafted, designed, or legislated; it is composed. I have only one amendment to the analogy: There is no audience. We are all performers in the orchestra.

VIII

Appendix and References

Appendix: Photographic material from field research on neighbourhood prevention networks in Belgium and The Netherlands.

Image 1.   Street sign in the entrance to the subsection of
                        Poppel, Belgium, where Anneke and Thijs live.

Image 1.   Street sign in the entrance to the subsection of
                        Ommoord, The Netherlands, where Saskia lives.

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