

From the Streets to the Serail: Movement-to-Party Transformation within the Civil Society Movement in Lebanon



C.B.A. van Nieuwburg

3767876

Utrecht University

10 August 2018

A Thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree
of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights.

Dr. Mario Fumerton

10 August 2018

Program Trajectory: Field-Research and Thesis Writing Only (30 ECTS)

Word Count: 25.325

I hereby declare that this thesis was written by me and in my own words, except for quotations from published and unpublished sources, which are clearly indicated and acknowledged as such.

- Claire van Nieuwburg

Cover picture: Saad Hariri campaigning in Tripoli, Lebanon. 27 April 2018. All rights reserved to the photographer, Claire van Nieuwburg.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to all the respondents that have found time in their ever so busy schedules to sit with me and patiently answer all my questions. Your comments and insights have made this thesis possible, for which I am very grateful.

Additionally, I would like to thank all the people at the Lebanese Transparency Association for welcoming me in the organization and allowing me to learn from you. A special thanks to Dany, Ramz and Riwa, who have made me laugh every single day and who have helped me tremendously by simply letting me share my thoughts and offering me yours.

Then, a shout out to all the people that have made my time in Lebanon absolutely unforgettable. Especially to Cecile, Helena and Kory, who have offered me a home away from home and who were always there for a laugh, a drink or a good conversation after a long day of work. And of course, to Maud, thank you for all the coffees, study sessions, fun times and for putting up with my rambling whenever I was struggling with anything. You have no idea how much I valued having a familiar face nearby to set my head straight whenever necessary.

Also, I would like to thank my supervisor, Mario Fumerton, for enabling me to find structure in my often very unorganized thoughts, for teaching me to be critical and for providing me with much-needed feedback whenever I was in doubt about the direction of my research.

Obviously, a massive thanks to all my friends and family who have put up with my grumpiness and for being there with words of comfort when words of comfort were very much in need. A special thanks to Isabel for giving feedback at the last minute, and to Lars for keeping me company during my late-night writing sessions.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my very dear friends, Floor van Liemt and Isabelle Smits, two of the braves people I know, both in their own way. I deeply admire your strength, perseverance and positivity despite overwhelming hardship.

List of Abbreviations

AUB	–	American University of Beirut
CPI	–	Corruption Perceptions Index
CSMovement	–	Civil Society Movement
LAU	–	Lebanese American University
LTA	–	Lebanese Transparency Association
NDI	–	National Democratic Institute
SM	–	Social movement
SMO	–	Social movement organization
TI	–	Transparency International
UN	–	United Nations

Abstract

This thesis examines what conditions enable the movement-to-party transformation of some groups within the Civil Society Movement in Lebanon, as opposed to the non-transformation of other groups from that same social movement. Based on indicators regarding social movement emergence and development, derived from Social Movement Theory, and indicators regarding political party formation, derived from Political Party Theory, a comprehensive framework is developed. By incorporating factors that address both external influences and internal dynamics, the framework offers a broad set of indicators that enable movement-to-party transformation. In this research, the developed framework is used to analyse two groups from the Civil Society Movement in Lebanon: You Stink, as a group that is not transformed into a political party; and LiBaladi, as a group that did transform into a political party in the run up to the 2018 Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon. Utilizing the framework to analyse the two cases and comparing how the outcomes, three factors are identified as key indicators that enable movement-to-party transformation.

Lebanon.

It's filthy, frustrating and a nightmare to get anything done.
It's claustrophobic, threatening, chaotic, and all the rules
go out of the window.

And that's exactly why I love it.

- Ben Allen¹

¹ Ben Allen, 2018.

Table of Contents

Introduction	10-12
Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework	13-25
1.1. Theoretical gap	
1.2. Social Movement theory (SMT)	
1.3. Political Party Theory (PT)	
1.4. Framework for movement-to-party transformation	
1.5. Chapter recap	
Chapter 2: Methodology	26-32
2.1. Research strategy	
2.2. Ontology and epistemology	
2.3. Research design	
2.4. Research method	
2.5. Challenges	
2.6. Ethical considerations	
2.7. Chapter recap	
Chapter 3: Historical overview and political context	33-39
3.1. A brief history	
3.2. Lebanon after independence	
3.3. March 8 and March 14	
3.4. The 2015 garbage crisis	
3.5. After the ‘You Stink’ protests	
3.6. Chapter recap	
Chapter 4: The Civil Society Movement	40-44
4.1. Civil society in Lebanon	
4.2. A protracted movement	
4.3. The Civil Society Movement	
4.4. Chapter recap	
Chapter 5: You Stink	45-58
5.1. Emergence and development	
5.2. Testing the framework	
5.3. Chapter recap	
Chapter 6: LiBaladi	59-71
6.1. Emergence and development	
6.2. Testing the framework	

6.3. Chapter recap	
Conclusion	72-74
Bibliography	75-83
Appendix 1: Map of electoral districts	84
Appendix 2: List of interviewees	85
Appendix 3: Maps of electoral alliances in 2018 Parliamentary elections	86

Introduction

On May 6th, 2018, Parliamentary elections occurred in Lebanon for the first time in nine years. After having extended their mandate thrice (An Nahar, 2017), the political establishment had finally agreed upon a new electoral law, the absence of which justified the latest Parliamentary extension of April 2017. The run up to the elections was characterized by the appearance of new faces in the electoral scene. Despite a majority being independent candidates, the newcomers also included groups that gained prominence during the 2015 waste management crisis, such as You Stink, and groups who formed in the aftermath, such as LiBaladi and Sabaa. These groups have joined forces under the banner of Kuluna Watani, an electoral coalition consisting of groups that have their roots civil society. Kuluna Watani – popularly referred to as the ‘Civil Society Coalition’ – ran 66 candidates throughout Lebanon to oppose the political establishment. Noticeable was, however, the fact that not all groups who put forward candidates, indeed identified as being a political party. Some groups ran candidates but remained a grassroots organization, even if their candidate was to get elected. This sparked the interest of the researcher and raised questions about why groups that are not political parties were involved in elections and, if they aspire to be involved in elections, why did they not join or become a political party? Why did some groups remain a grassroots organization? This empirical notability and the questions that it raised with the researcher, have culminated into the following research puzzle:

Given that the multiple ‘civil society’ grassroots groups that formed in the aftermath of the waste management protests of 2015 are part of the same, protracted social movement, what conditions enable the transformation of some groups in the ‘Civil Society’ Movement – as opposed to the non-transformation of other groups – into political parties in the run up to the 2018 Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon?

The analytical frame that informs this puzzle is that of movement-to-party transformation. This analytical frame is derived from the academic perspectives of Social Science and Political Science, by combining Social Movement Theory (SMT) with Political Party Theory (PT). By combining these academic theories, this thesis aims to develop a framework with indicators that enable movement-to-party. Through this framework, two groups within the ‘Civil Society Movement’ are analysed and compared: You Stink, as a group that did *not* transform into a political party, and LiBaladi, as a group that *did* transform into a political party. By comparing the outcomes of the analyses of these two groups, the research aims to identify which factors are key enablers for movement-to-party transformation.

To be able to analyse and compare You Stink and LiBaladi on an equal basis, this thesis argues that both groups are part of a protracted social movement that has been happening in Lebanon since at least

2009. For the sake of clarity, the researcher has named it the ‘Civil Society Movement’ (CSMovement)². It is argued that a social movement is not a ‘fixed’, rigid or overly structured phenomenon but it’s something inherently fluid, flexible and unpredictable. Consequently, social movements consist of diverse groups who all identify with a common denominator that is associated with the social movement but remain autonomous.

It should be noted that there are two significant and, to some extent, comparable cases of movement-to-party transformation in Lebanon that are worth mentioning. This regards the cases of Hezbollah (Di Peri 2014) and Kataeb (Entelis 1973), which both originated as resistance- and para-military protest movements respectively but transformed their organizations into political parties. Both Hezbollah and Kataeb are currently part of the political establishment in Lebanon. However, since the groups’ transformation into political parties in 1952 and 1992 respectively, in the political context in Lebanon has changed, and with it the possibilities for political participation. As such, empirical knowledge regarding movement-to-party transformation in Lebanon is outdated. It is therefore relevant to research why and under what conditions contemporary movements in Lebanon transform into political parties.

The rest of this thesis is structured through the following chapters, which are guided by questions which collectively aim to answer the posed research puzzle. Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical framework that undergirds the analytical frame of movement-to-party transformation. This chapter is guided by the question: What academic framework helps to understand movement-to-party transformation?

Chapter 2 discusses the methodology that is utilized in this research and is guided by the question: How is movement-to-party transformation researched through field-work?

Chapters 3 and 4 are the contextual chapters of this thesis. Chapter 3 elaborates on the historical and political context in Lebanon, guided by the question: What is the political context of Lebanon and how did it arise?

Chapter 4 discusses the CSMovement more in-depth by elaborating on how this thesis defines ‘social movement’ and what the scope is of the CSMovement. This is guided by the question: What is the nature and scope of the CSMovement?

Chapters 5 and 6 comprise the analytical body of the thesis. In these chapters, the proposed framework of factors that enable movement-to-party transformation is tested to two cases within the

² The CSMovement is further elaborated in Chapter 4 of this research. For now, it suffices to emphasize that the decision to refer to the social movement, as it is understood in this thesis, as the ‘Civil Society Movement’ is made with the aim to provide clarity. The terms ‘movement’ or ‘social movement’ are often used indiscriminately in conversation, leading to the possibility of encountering these terms in respondents’ statements throughout this thesis, while they are referring to a group or organization that this research does not regard a (social) movement. It should be noted that the term ‘Civil Society Movement’ is adopted by the researcher and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of any of the respondents in this research.

CSMovement: You Stink and LiBaladi. Chapter 5 analyses You Stink and follows the question: What are the implications of the suggested framework when tested to the case of You Stink?

Chapter 6 analyses LiBaladi and is guided by the question: What are the implications of the suggested framework when tested to the case of LiBaladi?

The thesis finalizes with concluding on the analyses of You Stink and LiBaladi and by answering the research puzzle.

Chapter 1: The Theoretical Framework

This chapter elaborates in greater detail on the utilized theoretical framework. Significant debates in the literature on social movement and political parties are discussed, after which the analytical frame is presented. The analytical frame suggests a general framework that proposes certain indicators that give opportunity for movement-to-party transformation. It is explained why the researcher has chosen to incorporate the presented indicators into the developed framework and how testing the framework contributes to a better understanding of why, in a social movement, some groups do transform into a political party, while other groups do not.

1.1 Theoretical gap

Movement-to-party transformation is a relatively new topic in both social movement theory (SMT) as well as political party theory (PT). Social movement theorists have made some contributions on the topic of social movement (or social movement organization) transformation in general (Anderson & Dynes 1973; Andrew 2010; Rousseau & Hudson 2017; Zald & Ash 1966) but relatively few have discussed the transformation towards a political party specifically. Similarly, political party theory is rich with academic literature on the emergence of political parties and their subsequent success (Bolleyer & Bytzek 2013; Ishiyama & Batta 2011) but, to the researcher's knowledge, only a limited body of literature is dedicated to explaining why, in certain cases, political parties do *not* emerge. Specifically, the non-transformation of a social movement (or social movement organization) towards a political party is a highly under-researched topic. This discrepancy in academic knowledge is notable, as a social movement is arguably the perfect breeding ground for the formation of political parties (Zollner 2016:2). Thus, it is significant to attempt to bridge this theoretical gap. Combining insights from both social movement theory as well as political party theory, this research suggests a general framework of factors that identify opportunities for transformation from a social movement (organization) into a political party. Testing the model to two contemporary cases with the aim of identifying which factors are significant in influencing the step towards movement-to-party transformation is the main contribution of this research.

1.2 Social Movement Theory (SMT)

In this subchapter, Social Movement Theory (SMT) literature on social movement emergence and development³ is reviewed. SMT is a specific field in collective action research that contributes knowledge on how and why social movements participate in collective action (Demmers 2017:91). Sociologist Mario Diani defines a social movement as:

³ Here, development is understood in the broadest sense of the word. It can include development towards decline, abeyance and transformation.

“[...] a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity.” (Diani 1992:9 in Durac 2015:242).⁴

In the perspective of SMT, social movements are phenomena that can resort to collective action through their constituent groups (or: social movement organizations (SMOs)) (Tilly & Tarrow 2015:17). Tilly and Tarrow argue that social movements often are, but do not necessarily have to be, a form of *contentious* collective action (2015:11). Where collective action implies *any* action taken by a group⁵, contentious collective action entails those actions that “challenge existing social and political structures and practices” (Demmers 2017:91). It combines purposive action taken by a group, that shares certain interests, with the notion of *contention*, which entails an element of contradiction against the status quo.

In the literature on social movements, an understanding of the emergence and development of social movements is grounded in three theoretical approaches: the classical approach, informed by the Weber-Michels model; the resource mobilization approach; and the political process approach. In the following sections, each approach is briefly elaborated on and considered in the specific context of social movement development towards transformation.

The classical approach

Zald and Ash adopt the classical approach when addressing the transformation of social movements and refer to the Weber-Michels model to explain how changes occur within social movement organizations (SMOs) (1966:327). The model is based on the Weberian writings on bureaucracy⁶ and Michels studies on political parties⁷ (Markides 2009:309), hence the name Weber-Michels. Zald and Ash argue from the underlying assumption that social movement development is triggered by changes within SMOs. They state that social movements manifest themselves through a variety of SMOs, which are recipient to internal and external influences that can guide the SMO towards organizational changes (or transformations) (Zald & Ash 1966:327). Such transformations, predicted by the Weber-Michel model, influence the eb and flow of support towards the SMO and, consequently, towards the entire social movement (Zald & Ash 1966:330).

⁴ This definition of a social movement is adopted in this research. The concept of ‘social movement’ is further elaborated on in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

⁵ Indeed, this can also be coordinated efforts by a sports-team or neighbourhood collective (Tilly & Tarrow 2015:8).

⁶ Gerth, H.J. and Mills, C.W., 1946, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 297-301, in Markides 2009.

⁷ Michels, R., 1949, *Political Parties*, Illinois: The Free Press, in Markides 2009.

Zald and Ash depart from the assumption that a SMO's relation to their environment affects the possible transformation that the SMO may go through. The 'environment' includes the broader social movement which the SMO is identified with, as well as the society in which the social movement resides (Zald & Ash 1966:330). They proceed by discussing which factors "influence the direction" of the transformation of the SMO (Zald & Ash 1966:328). There are three factors that affect a SMO's development and influence its transformation: changes in the support-base of a SMO; success or failure in goal attainment; and relations with other SMOs (Zald & Ash 1966:330).

Thus, Zald and Ash's classical approach to social movement development argues from an intra-movement perspective, as it looks at social movement transformation through the transformation of its constituent SMOs. This perspective differs from the resource mobilization approach, which mainly focusses on processes of external support that affect social movement transformation from the 'outside'.

Resource mobilization approach

In the article by McCarthy and Zald (1977), a new approach to resource mobilization can be distinguished from the more traditional approach emphasized by scholars such as Oberschall (1973) and Gamson (1975). McCarthy and Zald argue that, where the 'old' approach focusses on the social-psychological approach of collective behaviour, their proposed 'new' approach is geared towards "political-sociological and economic theories" (1977:1213). As such, McCarthy and Zald move away from an individualistically influenced stance to understanding social movements, towards a more structuralist stance. They suggest that a focus on grievances and rational choice alone does not provide a comprehensive explanation for the emergence and development of social movements (1977:1215).

McCarthy and Zald state that SMOs have specific goals and to achieve these goals, SMOs need certain resources (legitimacy/funding/activists/facilities etc.). They state that "resources must be controlled or mobilized before action is possible" (McCarthy & Zald 1977:1221). The resource mobilization approach thus proposes that social movement emergence and development depends on the ability of SMOs to successfully mobilize for resources that support the social movement. Such mobilization can be influenced by either SMOs' ability to successfully mobilize and call upon a support base or by relying on the interference (support) of external actors (McCarthy & Zald 1977:1223).

While this approach seems logical in theory, in practice, as McAdam notes, SMOs often lack a broad resource pool to mobilize from and are thus to a great extent dependent on external support (McAdam 1999:326). From this argumentation flows the implication that social movement transformation is possible on the condition of the existence of external support. Thus, the resource mobilization approach predominantly – albeit implicitly – depends on external processes to explain social movement transformation. In accordance with the structurationist ontological stance of this

research, an approach that incorporates both internal and external factors to explain social movement development introduces a novel approach to social movement emergence and development. The political process approach offers interesting insights in this regard, which are discussed in the next section.

The political process approach

Employed by McAdam as one of the foundational approaches to comprehensively understand social movement emergence and development, the political process approach states three crucial factors to understand social movement dynamics: organizational strength of ‘movement forces’, the ‘structure of political opportunities’⁸ and the response of other groups to the social movement, also referred to as ‘cognitive liberation’ (Caren 2007; McAdam 1982; McAdam 1999:327). The approach, later also referred to as political process *theory* or PPT, has evolved since McAdam employed it in his 1982 book about the rise and decline of the Civil Rights Movement.

The premise regarding organizational strength of movement forces is replaced by the broader notion of mobilization structures as the former focussed on pre-existing organizations, creating a bias as it implicitly excluded movement organizations that emerged due to the social movement and other activist-networks. The new notion of mobilizing structures, defined as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996 in Caren 2007), covers a broader spectrum. Moreover, the notion of ‘cognitive liberation’ made place for a focus on a social movement’s framing processes. McAdam *et al* defined framing as the “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimize and motivate collective action” (McAdam et al 1996 in Caren 2007). Where the former notion was informed by an individual’s intrinsic drive to participate in a social movement, framing processes encompass a more strategic focus on the *process* that guides individuals towards participation in a social movement – i.e. through the framing of shared understandings.

The factor of political opportunities is grounded in the underlying assumptions that social movements are political phenomena (McAdam 1982:36) and that social movement dynamics are influenced by the political context in which they emerge and reside (Meyer 2004:125). Thus, to understand a social movement’s trajectory, political factors, that are external to the movement, need to be considered. Tarrow provides a significant definition of political opportunities, defined as:

⁸ Definition provided by Eisinger (1973:11): “The nature of the chief executive, the mode of aldermanic election, the distribution of social skills and status, and the degree of social disintegration, taken individually or collectively, [that] serve[s] in various ways to obstruct or facilitate citizen activity in pursuit of political goals.” It should be noted that Eisinger was the first to explicitly use a framework of political opportunity, in his research on riots in American cities in the 1960s. He discovered that protests are most likely to occur in cities with both ‘open’ (enabling) and ‘closed’ (limiting) structures of political opportunity (1973:28).

“Consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent or national – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.” (Tarrow 1994:85).

Eisinger (1973) was the first scholar to explicitly utilize a framework of political opportunity, on which scholars such as Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982) and Tarrow (1994) then developed their research. Problematic is the fact that scholars often clash over the broad definitions of political opportunity. Consequently, a critique on the notion of political opportunities is that the concept is in danger of becoming a “sponge” that indiscriminately soaks up all elements in a social movement’s environment (Gamson & Meyer 1996:275). McAdam has tried to overcome this critique. Based on different authors’ conception of the dimensions of political opportunity⁹, McAdam identifies four variables that are central to the concept of political opportunity: (1) access to the institutionalized political system; (2) divisions within the elite; (3) availability of elite allies; and (4) state ability towards repression (McAdam et al. 1996:27).

From the three discussed approaches, specific indicators are included in the proposed framework that aims to provide indicators that enable movement-to-party transformation¹⁰. Specifically, the classical approach is interesting as it identifies several factors due to which transformation of SMOs can occur. These factors are interesting relevant to this research as the groups under analysis are, arguably, SMOs as well. The transformation that Zald and Ash discuss, however, is a transformation in the broadest sense of the term: a change. It is not specifically a transformation towards a political party. Additionally, the authors fail to explain why some SMOs transform while others do not. Due to these gaps, it is significant to combine the approaches within SMT with additional academic research that bridges the gap between social movements and political parties. Political party theory, drawn from Political Science, provides relevant insights for this. Political party theory discusses, among others, the emergence and success of political parties. The framework of movement-to-party transformation implies the emergence of a political party, from a social movement (organization). Thus, it is significant to review literature on political party emergence and discuss the indicators that explain this emergence. This is done in the following sub-chapter.

1.3 Political Party Theory (PT)

Political party theory is an academic theory derived from Political Science, with a rich body of literature that looks at the emergence and subsequent success of newly formed political parties. Research has been

⁹ McAdam addresses the works of Brockett (1991), Kriesi et al. (1992), Rucht (in McAdam et al. 1996) and Tarrow (1994) (McAdam et al. 1996:27).

¹⁰ These factors are later elaborated on in this chapter.

done on specific categories of parties such as left-libertarian parties (Kitschelt 1988) or rebel parties (Di Peri 2014; Entelis 1973; Speight & Wittig 2017). Furthermore, a lot has been written on party *success*¹¹ after having emerged as a new player in the electoral arena (Azani 2012; Bolleyer & Bytzeck 2013; Gregg 2011; Hug 2010), and from a comparative perspective (Harmel & Robertson 1985). While the insights from Harmel and Robertson seem significant as it incorporates a comparative element in understanding political party emergence¹², the hypotheses from Harmel and Robertson's article cannot be applied directly to the case in this thesis. The indicators for political party emergence that Harmel and Robertson analyse, aim to explain party formation in Western Europe between 1960-1990. Thus, arguably, the hypotheses derived from their research are outdated. Furthermore, the socio-political context in Western Europe in the 20th century and Lebanon in the 21st century is quite different. As such, the framework proposed by Harmel and Robertson cannot undisputedly be applied to this research. Thus, debate remains on a *general* framework of variables that explains new party *emergence*. As Hug (2010) offers a comprehensive analysis of various indicators which seem to overlap to a great extent with the indicators discussed by above mentioned authors, this sub-chapter will focus on Hug's study.

Before elaborating on Hug, it should be specified how 'political party' is defined in the context of this research. Studies on political parties have been characterized by discussions over how to define 'political party' (Hug 2010:12). Harmel and Robertson define a political party as "an organization that purports to have as one of its goals the placement of its avowed members in governmental office" (1985:507). This simple yet concise definition relies on one criterion, namely the goal of getting one of an organization's members into government. Comparably succinct, Hug defines a party as "an organization that appoints candidates at general elections to the system's representative assembly" (Sjöblom 1968:21 in Hug 2010:12). Following this definition, the criterion of providing candidates for elections is key. In both definitions, the type of elections is left outside the scope of the definition, as well as the nature of the organizations that participate in them. This implies that all organizations that put forward a candidate in elections, can be categorized as a political party. Hug states that the element of presenting candidates in elections is what distinguishes political parties from other organizations (2010:12). While this argumentation may seem logical in theory, in practice it does not hold up. For example, as one of the groups under discussion in this thesis shows, an organization can put forward candidates in elections, without identifying as a political party or aspiring to act as such. You Stink put forward a candidate in the Parliamentary elections but chose to remain a grassroots organization. If their candidate was to get elected, he would leave You Stink and proceed in government as an independent

¹¹It should be noted that the notion of 'success' of the transformation-process and/or the success of the political party in the electoral scene is outside the scope of this research. The main aim of this thesis is to establish a comprehensive framework with analytical indicators that identify opportunities for movement-to-party transformation. The organizational practicalities of the transformation process itself, or the established political party's electoral success, are in that sense irrelevant for this research.

¹² As is the aim of this thesis: Chapter 7 offers a comparison between the two organizations from the CSMovement under analysis in this thesis.

candidate¹³. This empirical finding shows the necessity of incorporating an element of group representation in defining a political party. Thus, in this thesis, the following definition of a political party is utilized:

An organization that presents candidates for elections with the aim of representing that organization in governmental office.

This definition implies that the organization that puts forward candidates in elections, identifies as a political party and has certain political views that the organization wants to see represented in government. In the next section, the comprehensive framework of Hug is discussed, with the aim of reviewing its utility in the proposed framework in this research.

Hug's framework towards party formation

In his study on the emergence and subsequent success of newly formed political parties, Hug applies a game-theoretical model to explain party formation. Hug hereby adopts an individualistic ontological stance, as his application of Game Theory presumes rational decision making in an interactional context (Hug 2010:38-39). Implications of this are evident in the application of his model, as he discusses costs and benefits related to certain demands (Hug 2010:46-49). As the ontological stance of this thesis differs from the ontology from which Hug argues, his model cannot undisputedly be implemented in this research. However, the other factors in Hug's model can prove to be significant.

Hug discusses party formation as a product of the strategic interaction between an established party and a potential new party. His research is interesting as he mentions that a "potential new party can be a social movement, a citizen initiative, a political entrepreneur or even a group of members of an existing political party" (Hug 2010:40). By stating this, he – albeit implicitly – provides the basis for a framework that discusses movement-to-party transformation¹⁴.

The model that Hug proposes is summarized as follows: a potential new party can make a demand to an established party. The established party can either accept or reject the demand. This choice is made without prior knowledge of the strength of the potential new party. Based on the acceptance or rejection of the demand by the established party, the potential new party can decide to form a political party. Political party formation is more likely when the demand is rejected than when the demand is accepted (Hug 2010:44). With this model, Hug argues from two underlying assumptions: that the two actors¹⁵ are unitary and that an analysis of the interaction between the two actors is sufficient to explain

¹³ Author's interview with Wadih Al Asmal, co-founder You Stink, on 18 April 2018.

¹⁴ However, Hug fails to provide a definition for what he perceives as a social movement.

¹⁵ The potential new party and the established party.

party formation (Hug 2010: 40, footnote 6). This thesis disregards both assumptions. The first assumption, regarding the homogeneity of the actors, is based on the argumentation that party leadership makes decisions for the whole party and that the party follows this decision (Hug 2010:64). This assumption cannot be followed in this thesis, as a fragmentation within different groups in the CSMovement was observed during the field-research. Several groups splintered and separated due to internal disagreements¹⁶. Thus, the empirical observations made regarding the cases in this thesis contradict this ‘unitary actor assumption’. Furthermore, this thesis disregards the second assumption, which states that the interaction between the established party and the (potential) new party provides a sufficient explanation for political party emergence. This interactional perspective pays too little attention to structural factors, which contradicts the ontological stance of this thesis. It should be noted that Hug *does* discuss the ‘problem push’ and ‘opportunity pull’ as factors that are both significant to consider in understanding political party formation. The ‘problem push’ relates to neglected demands in society and the ‘opportunity pull’ relates to political and institutional factors that motivate political party formation (Hug 2010:37). Thus, although Hug agrees with incorporating structural elements as indicators for political party formation, he insufficiently emphasizes them in his model.

Looking at his model, five theoretical variables can be identified that, according to Hug, serve as indicators for political party formation: new issues in society; costs of political party formation; acceptance of demands by the established party; access to the political system; and benefits gained through participation in elections (2010:54). As this thesis argues from a predominantly structuralist ontological perspective, the element of the costs of political party formation and the element of benefits gained through participation in elections are disregarded. These indicators imply an element of rationality in the agency of the potential new party and this contradicts the ontological view of thesis.

Considering above stated insights from both SMT literature and PT literature, the following section combines the discussed conditions into a comprehensive framework. It is explained why these indicators are included in the framework and how the framework is tested later on in this thesis.

1.4 Framework for movement-to-party transformation

This sub-chapter explains the reasoning behind the indicators that are included in the proposed framework. The aim of this framework is to provide indicators that give opportunities for movement-to-party transformation to occur. By testing this framework to two groups from the CSMovement in Lebanon, the analytical utility of the framework will suggest conditions that enable movement-to-party transformation. Furthermore, the framework is used to identify which factors play a significant role in

¹⁶ The formation of LiBaladi is a good example of this. LiBaladi formed a new group after the decision was made by Beirut Madinati not to enter the Parliamentary elections (author’s interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018; author’s interview with Nadim Abou Ali, activist, on 31 May 2018).

understanding why certain movements do transform into a political party, while others do not. Before moving on to explaining the proposed framework, it needs to be assessed whether SMT and PT are indeed compatible to combine.

Combining Social Movement Theory and Political Party Theory

When assessing whether two theories are compatible, it is necessary to see whether they argue from the same ‘level’ of analysis, as well as whether they are ontologically and epistemologically in accordance. This thesis uses Political Party Theory literature in which the main object of analysis regards the (new) political party. Furthermore, in this thesis, it is understood that Social Movement Theory looks at a social movement as a phenomenon that manifests itself through SMOs (Zald & Ash 1966:327; Tilly & Tarrow 2015:17). As such, the level of analysis of both SMT and PT, as used in this thesis, is that of the ‘organization’.

Regarding the ontological compatibility, both SMT and PT incorporate a structuralist stance in their argumentation. For example, Hug, arguing from PT, acknowledges the importance of both a ‘problem push’ and an ‘opportunity pull’ as influencing factors to political party formation (Rudig 1990:9 in Hug 2010:37). This ‘opportunity pull’ builds on the same logic as the ideas about political opportunities within SMT: both theoretical approaches deem it necessary to consider indicators that are grounded in the political context of their object of analysis (the political party and the social movement (organization) respectively).

Epistemologically, the discussed authors that inspired the developed frame, all look at the object of analysis – the ‘organization’ – from *within*. This entails that the authors try to understand the reasoning behind the organization’s behaviour, thereby analysing how the organization reacts to certain situations, while also considering the context in which the organization is situated. For political parties, this is the political arena; for social movements, this is the socio-political context; for SMOs, this is the broader social movement. Such a stance corresponds with an interpretative epistemology (Demmers 2017:17).

Concluding that SMT and PT are compatible as they correspond on level of analysis, ontology and epistemology, the next sections explain the developed framework that is utilized in this thesis.

Movement-to-party transformation

This section explains how the developed framework came about and how each of the factors are operationalized to analytical use. Furthermore, it is explained what the implications are of applying different scopes of understanding a social movement to the framework.

To come to the developed framework, the researcher has combined the most significant factors that influence social movement development (identified from SMT) and political party emergence (identified from PT), derived from scholars that are discussed earlier in this Chapter. To sum up, figure 1.1 shows an overview of the factors.

Social Movement Theory¹⁷	Political Party Theory¹⁸
Eb and flow of support	New issues in society
Relations with other SMOs	Costs of political party formation
Success or failure of a SMO	Acceptance of demands by the established party
Availability of resources	Access to the political system
Political opportunities	Benefits gained through participation in elections
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to the political system 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Divisions within the elite 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Availability of elite allies 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State ability towards repression 	Lack of political trust

Figure 1.1

These factors are combined in the developed framework, shown below in figure 1.2. Due to the structurationist ontological stance of the researcher, the developed framework considers factors both external and internal to the groups under analysis. The reasoning behind this is that the external factors dictate whether (groups in) social movements *are able* to transform, whereas the internal factors indicate whether (groups in) social movements are *willing* and *likely* to. However, not all factors are explicitly included in the framework. The notion of success or failure of a SMO is disregarded, as the ‘group’ is taken as a starting point in movement-to-party transformation, where its ‘success’ is assumed to the degree of still being a group. Additionally, the explicit notions of ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ (from PT) are excluded from the framework, as the researcher structurationist ontological stance disagrees with Hug’s implementation of rationality in understanding political party emergence.

In the proposed framework, the external factors attempt to consider the societal context in which the social movement resides. The fact that there are neglected issues in society demands that policy needs to change. The fact that there is a lack of political trust, demands new faces in politics that will

¹⁷ Indicators derived from McAdam et al 1996; McAdam & Zald 1977; Zald & Ash 1966.

¹⁸ Indicators derived from Harmel & Robertson 1985; Hug 2010.

change the policy. Political opportunities pave the way to get to politics and societal support is necessary to get elected to politics. As such, these are the four key indicators that account as the external facilitators. It is argued that the presence of these factors incentivizes movement-to-party transformation.

The external factors are operationalized as follows. Neglected issues in society¹⁹ regard those issues that trigger contentious action within the group. This can be a myriad of issues, depending on the nature of the issues that the groups under analysis focus on. Secondly, lack of trust in the political establishment is important as this explains the emergence of *new* parties, as opposed to supporting a *different*, established party. The lack of trust is operationalized by Mary Kaldor through growing political dissatisfaction, declining membership in established parties and low voter turnout (2003:5). Thirdly, political opportunities are operationalized following the four factors proposed by McAdam et al: access to the political system, divisions within the elite, availability of elite allies and state repression (1996:27). Finally, the societal support base is understood as the support that the group under analysis receives from individuals outside the social movement.

The internal factors aim to account for conditions within the groups under analysis and between different groups in the social movement, as it is argued that these internal factors indicate whether the groups under analysis are willing and likely to transform. Availability of resources make the group *likely* to transform into a political party, whereas movement dynamics influence the group's *willingness*. A difference is made between intra-group and intra-movement factors. Intra-group factors regard those components that are significant to the specific group under analysis, whereas the intra-movement factors are about how the group under analysis relates to the rest of the groups within the broader social movement.

The internal factors are operationalized as follows. Resources are understood as means, both material and intangible, necessary for the existence and development of the group under analysis. It is argued that, without sufficient resources, the group will be unlikely to make the transformation towards a political party. Additionally, movement dynamics are understood as those interactions between and within groups in a social movement.²⁰ Movement dynamics are divided into intra-group ideologies and

¹⁹ The indicator of 'neglected issues in society' is a combination of the by Hug proposed factors of 'new issues in society' and 'acceptance of demands by the established party'. Potential new parties make demands to established parties in response to (new) issues in society. According to Hug, not meeting these demands (e.g. when they are ignored or neglected) incentivises the formation of new political parties (2010:45). The developed framework in this thesis has combined these two factors. The researcher argues that it is not the 'newness' of the issues combined with the fact that they are neglected, but the mere existence of any (significant) unresolved issue that incentivises party formation.

²⁰ This understanding is based on the definition provided by Bakke et al: "The interaction of organizations mobilized around a collective identity in pursuit of particular interests related to this identity in a fundamental way" (2012:266). In the understanding of movement dynamics, the notion of a 'shared identity' is disregarded as this notion is already incorporated in the definition of 'social movement'.

intra-movement ideologies.²¹ Intra-group ideologies regard the views on how to pursue the issues that the group centres around. It is argued that multiple and diverging intra-group ideologies causes the group to splinter, making the group unlikely to transform into a political party. The intra-movement factor of movement ideologies builds on the same logic. When views on how to pursue issues that the general movement centres around diverge between multiple groups in a social movement, fragmentation occurs (Bakke et al 2012:268). It is argued that, due to fragmentation, groups are less willing to transform into a political party.



Figure 1.2

In this thesis, a broad definition of a social movement is adopted to understand the CSMovement.²² When a broad definition is applied, the scope of the social movement is larger and thus the nature of the groups in the social movement may be more heterogenic. This causes a diversity of ideologies within the movement, that share a common denominator but do not completely align. Conversely, a narrow definition of a social movement produces a smaller scope of the social movement. This implies that the groups within the social movement are more homogenic and will attract groups with similar ideologies, that are focussed on the same, specific issues. In other words: The broader a social movement is defined, the more different groups can attribute to that movement and the more heterogeneous the movement is.

The application of a broad definition of a social movement in this research, causes the groups under analysis – You Stink and LiBaladi – to fall within the scope of the same social movement: the CSMovement. This is plausible in practice as well, as they share a common denominator: changing the

²¹ Ideology, in this thesis, is understood in accordance with the definition of Adorno et al: “An organization of opinions, attitudes and values – a way of thinking about man and society. We may speak of an individual’s total ideology or of his ideology with respect to different areas of social life; politics, economics, religion, minority groups, and so forth” (Adorno et al 1950:2 in Gerring 1997:958).

²² This is further elaborated on in Chapter 4.

political system in Lebanon.²³ However, the groups focus on diverging issues (waste management and governance respectively). Thus, for the analysis part of this thesis, the framework is tested to two groups that are *part of* the CSMovement. This raises the question of whether a group within a social movement can be treated, analytically, in a likewise manner as a complete social movement? The researcher believes that this is indeed the case. As is already stated, this thesis adopts the understanding that a social movement is a manifestation of its constituent groups. As such, the framework is tested on an ‘organizational’ level, regardless of the scope of the applied definition of a social movement. However, it is necessary to have a clear ‘profile’ of the group under analysis. The framework assumes the group to be a fixed entity, as the framework analyses group-specific factors such as group ideologies and topics in society that the group focusses on. Therefore, due to this research’s broad understanding of the CSMovement, the scope is too broad to analyse the movement as a whole, which explains the choice for analysing two groups *within* the CSMovement.

1.5 Chapter recap.

This chapter centred around the question: what academic framework helps understanding movement-to-party transformation? This question is answered by discussing the literature surrounding social movement development and political party emergence and subsequently combining these insights into a framework of internal and external factors that enable movement-to-party transformation. The next chapter presents the methodology on how to utilize such a framework through a research project.

²³ Authors’s interview with Assaad Thebian, co-founder You Stink, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

Chapter 2: Methodology

Key in any significant research project is a structured and informed methodology. In this chapter, the methodology of this research is presented. First, the research strategy is discussed, after which the body of the method is explained. The research design and research method provide insights in the decision-making process towards the chosen sources, research techniques, and sampling, and how these are utilized during the field-research process. Finally, an analysis of the challenges and ethical considerations is provided.

2.1 Research strategy

In order to create a methodology for a research project, it should first be established what kind of research is intended to be executed in the research project. The type of research, and thus the method, depends on the type of research question; the control over behavioural events; and the focus on either contemporary or historical events (Yin 2014:9). The research question is a ‘why’ question, there is no control over the events that are under study (the researcher is an observer rather than a participant) and the focus is on contemporary events (the context of the research is the 2018 Parliamentary elections in Beirut). Thus, Yin dictates that the best way of researching the topic at hand in this thesis is through a case study method (2014:9, Figure 1.2).

The aim of doing a case study is to gain understanding of an empirical case in the social world. This understanding is gained through the development of theoretical variables of interest but, simultaneously, it is assumed that such an understanding deems the analysis of contextual conditions necessary (Yin 2014:16). As such, according to Yin, the methodological features of a case study do not only involve theoretically developed variables of interest that guide data collection but also pay attention to illustrating the context in which these variables exist (2014:17). As such, the methodology of the case study is in accordance with the researcher’s structurationist ontological stance.

Case study research demands a qualitative research approach. As discussed in Chapter 1, the existing academic literature on the topic of this thesis has shown *that* movement-to-party transformation occurs and *how* movement-to-party transformation happens. In this *how* question, the literature also discusses *why* movements transform into political parties. However, research focussing on this *why* question, in particular literature on understanding why movement-to-party transformation does *not* occur, is relatively scarce. Answering these why/why-not questions demands an approach that considers both the subjects of the research (social movement (organizations) and political parties) as well as the context in which they reside. Such an approach is best researched through a qualitative research methodology, as this provide more contextual depth than quantitative research. According to Ragin, qualitative research

looks “at the commonalities that exist across a relatively small number of cases” (Ragin & Amoroso 2010:33). The proposed framework in this thesis is developed based on that exact premise. Considering several academic contributions on both social movement transformation as well as party formation, the research in this thesis attempts to bring the most important factors together in a model that bridges the gap between social movements and political parties.

2.2 Ontology and epistemology

As stated earlier in this thesis, the researcher identifies as a structurationist, after Giddens’ theory of structuration. This theory is grounded in the belief that “social theory [...] should incorporate an understanding of human behaviour as *action* [and] that such an understanding has to be made compatible with a focus upon the *structural components* of social institutions or societies” (Giddens 1982:197). Thus, a structurationist ontological stance argues from the premise that a social phenomenon cannot be explained through primacy of either structure or agency, but both are complementary. This ontology is in accordance with the framework that is proposed in Chapter 1, as the framework considers both internal and external factors, which correspond with an individualist and structuralist stance respectively. Epistemologically, the research is located on the interpretative side of the spectrum. This thesis tries to understand why certain groups in a social movement transform and why other do not. In other words, the research aims to “seek the meaning of action” by looking at social phenomena “from within” and placing them in a social context, specific to the case at hand (Demmers 2017:17).

2.3 Research design

This research employs a qualitative method with a comparative element. The aim of this thesis is to test the proposed framework of conditions that enable movement-to-party transformation and contribute knowledge to the academic puzzle of why movement-to-party transformation does *not* occur. It is in this second aim of the research that the comparative element becomes apparent. By testing the proposed framework to two groups within the CSMovement and comparing the outcomes, the research aims to identify which conditions are significant in understanding why movement-to-party transformation does *not* occur. The sampling and data-collection techniques utilized in support of these research aims are discussed below.

Data-collection

The data-collection techniques to conduct the presented research are three-fold, with a specific emphasis on the first two techniques. The main body of the data is derived from semi-structured interviews. This is the generated data (Ritchie et al 2013:36). The interviews have been guided by a topic list to ascertain that the interviews covered the most important talking-points on which data-collection was necessary. However, to make sure the respondents gave sincere answers, the interviews were constructed as regular conversations. Multiple respondents had been interviewed often already in the period of the conducted

field-research, making the chance of the answering certain questions in a routinized manner. Each interview started with very general questions and were guided towards the more specified subjects as the interview progressed. The natural flow of the interview, however, gave several respondents the idea of having a regular conversation instead of being interviewed. This has helped in making sure the obtained data is as straightforward as possible.

The interviews served as an essential source of both data and general knowledge. There exists little literature, both theoretical as well as empirical, that has applied a broad definition of ‘social movement’ to the current case of civil society in Lebanon. Most authors explicitly or implicitly apply a narrow definition of ‘social movement’ and look at what this research describe as events or waves in a social movement²⁴ (examples are Beck 2015; Kerbage 2017; Kraidy 2016; Meier 2015). Also, the Parliamentary elections have only happened a mere few weeks ago, making the case highly contemporary. Thus, the interviews proved to serve both an analytical purpose as well as have an educational value in the sense of generating knowledge on the topic of this research.

Additional data is collected through document analysis. The data collected through this technique primarily serves the purpose of providing contextual and theoretical background to support the data that has been gathered through the interviews. The documents that have been analysed regard academic literature on social movements and political parties; organizational documents such as party programs, related to the two groups under analysis in this thesis; governmental documents such as the legal text of the 2017 Electoral Law; reports from (inter)national organizations and think-tanks; and news articles from (inter)national and regional media-outlets. Data collected through document analysis regards naturally occurring data (Ritchie et al 2013:34-35). The naturally occurring data is found in sources where the author of this thesis has made no substantive contributions to. Thus, data gathered from such sources are significant for triangulation. Triangulation entails the use of evidence gained from multiple sources to support your claim (Yin 2014:120). The researcher has *triangulated* the data gathered from the interviews with data gathered from analysing different documents, to make sure that the claims which are made in this thesis have a solid base of evidence.

Finally, albeit to a minimal extend, observations made during the field-research period are utilized as data in this thesis. The author has attended two events regarding the presentation of the political parties that ran for elections in Beirut and the political programs they supported, to gain a better understanding of how political parties in Lebanon work. Additionally, the researcher worked with the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA) in monitoring the elections on election day. From these experiences, combined with living in Beirut for over three months, the researcher has made observations

²⁴ This is elaborated on more in-depth in Chapter 4.

that may offer relevant insights. In the following section, the sampling of the subjects in these data-analysis techniques is discussed.

Sampling

The method of sampling is guided by asking the following questions: what, who, when, where? ‘What’ and ‘who’ regard certain units of observation that function as sources of data, whereas ‘when’ and ‘where’ regard a specific time and location.

Regarding ‘where’, the research is conducted in Beirut, Lebanon. Not only is this the city where most of the contentious action posed by the CSMovement has taken place,²⁵ Beirut is also the capital and the political heartstring of Lebanon. As this research focusses on politically engaged grassroots groups and political parties in the run up to the 2018 Parliamentary elections, it seemed obvious to stay as close to the political heart of Lebanon. Additionally, the organizations under analysis (You Stink and LiBaladi) are both located in Beirut.

Regarding ‘when’, the research has been conducted in the run up to and during the 2018 Parliamentary elections in Lebanon. This timeframe corresponds with the nature of the research, as the research aims to look at the contemporary case of the CSMovement and why some groups in the movement have transformed in response to the upcoming elections (as opposed to the non-transformation of other groups).

Regarding ‘what’, the main units of observation in the research are organizations that are associated to the CSMovement. The CSMovement consists of groups that explicitly or implicitly identify as being part of the movement. For the sake of clarity, this research shall continue referring to these organizations as *groups*, even though it should be noted that some groups are significantly organized to refer to them as *organizations*. This categorization is indiscriminately adopted as a further discussion of this fact is irrelevant to the research. Another unit of observation regards individuals, namely the individuals that are involved in the groups under analysis. The focus has been on significant members and the founders of each group, as this thesis conducts analysis from an organizational perspective and believes that only significant members of a group can speak on behalf of that group.

Regarding ‘who’, the organizations under analysis in this thesis regard the CSMovement in general, with a specific focus on You Stink and LiBaladi as groups that are associated with the CSMovement and that have respectively not transformed and transformed in response to the 2018 Parliamentary elections. These two groups have been purposefully selected as main subjects of

²⁵ See Chapter 4.

observation (samples) as both groups are, inarguably, deeply rooted in the CSMovement but they diverge regarding their respective organizational development (of movement-to-party transformation). As such, these two groups provide an interesting comparison and are sufficient to reach the goals of this research. All individuals are roughly identified based on their role in or knowledge about You Stink or LiBaladi and sampled for interviews through snowball sampling, where they were purposefully selected based on reference connections by other interviewees. Additionally, academics and activists from other groups have been interviewed for contextual purposes. These individuals have been samples through snowball sampling as well.

2.4 Research method

In accordance with Yin's idea of case study research, the researcher has developed a three-phase research method to answer the research-question at hand. These phases are briefly elaborated below.

Phase 1: Contextualization

The aim of the first phase of the research is to gain an understanding of the socio-political context in Lebanon in which the CSMovement exists and to elaborate on the scope of the CSMovement. This is done in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. To gain an understanding of the socio-political context in Lebanon, the researcher has conducted interviews with both academics as well as NGO-workers that focus on governance and politics, with the aim of gaining an understanding in how Lebanese society has developed to what it currently is. The data derived from these interviews is triangulated by analysing literature regarding the development of Lebanese political system.

The second part of the contextualization phase regards placing the main unit of analysis in this thesis – the CSMovement – into the socio-political context. The claim this thesis presents about the scope of the CSMovement is based on data derived from interviews with activists in the CSMovement, triangulated by data derived from interviews with academics from LAU and NGO workers. Additionally, reports from different news outlets are analysed. After constructing the socio-political background of Lebanon and elaborating on the CSMovement as it is understood in this thesis, the context phase is done and the next phase of testing the developed framework can commence.

Phase 2: Testing the framework

The developed framework provides indicators that enable movement-to-party transformation. The framework is tested through two case studies in the CSMovement: You Stink that did *not* transform into a political party and LiBaladi that *did* transform into a political party. Data regarding each of the organizations is collected by conducting interviews with significant members of each group. The interviews are guided by the aim of gaining a comprehensive idea of the organization: its emergence, its identity, its members and its development, including its (non)transformation. The data that has been

derived from these interviews is analysed by looking at how the data corresponds with the different factors in the framework. The derived data is triangulated by interviewing activists from other groups within the CSMovement and by analysing news articles and think-tank reports. These findings are elaborated on in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

Phase 3: Comparison

To be able to draw conclusions from the findings after testing the framework, a comparison between the two cases is necessary. By comparing what the data says about each element of the framework with the two groups under analysis, it can be identified which factors are significant enablers for movement-to-party transformation and which are not. These findings are presented in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

2.5 Challenges

Having explained the research strategy, design and method, it is now time to discuss some challenges that the researcher has encountered during the period of field research in Lebanon. The most obvious obstacle was the language, as Lebanon is an Arabic speaking country and the researcher is not fluent in Arabic. This turned out to be only a very minor challenge, as the Lebanese are multi-lingual and most people speak English and French very well in addition to Arabic. Additionally, the encountered language problem when analysing government texts or political party programs was easily solved as well, as all documents were also available in English, albeit upon special request. A challenge that proved to be of more difficulty, was the access to respondents. The researcher's time in Lebanon was characterized by the upcoming Parliamentary elections, which were held on 6 May 2018. As the main subject for this research regards the CSMovement, specifically You Stink and LiBaladi, and they ran candidates in elections, it was a challenge to get a foot in the door with the organizations, to schedule the interviews. People were very busy and their time to sit down with me was relatively scarce. This obstacle has been overcome by adopting an open and flexible attitude and leaving options open for conducting interviews outside office hours and on locations which were opportune for the respondents.

A personal note should also be made. Before the conducted field-research, the researcher had never been to a Middle-Eastern country. This was a challenge that required consideration before the actual field-research but was mitigated by making solid preparation. The researcher has read up on the history of the country, as well as the developments in the region, and spoken to several people about what it was like to live in Lebanon. The researcher expected to encounter cultural differences, especially in comparison to their current living environment in the Netherlands. However, the cultural differences in Lebanon were very minor as Lebanese society is characterized by societal divisions based on religion and ethnic descent. As such, the Lebanese are used to interacting with people from different backgrounds and ideologies, both in formal settings as well as in day to day life. Specifically, Beirut, once known as

the ‘Paris of the Middle East’ (BBC 2010), is very open-minded and tolerating to people from different cultural backgrounds. The fact that the researcher is female was expected to pose some challenges as well, but these turned out to be easily bypassed by dressing appropriately and conforming to societal standards that are set for women.

2.6 Ethical considerations

Finally, some ethical considerations deem to be considered. The societal divisions in Lebanon, based on religious and ethnic origin, create an environment where people are reluctant to speak out about their beliefs and dissatisfactions. An example of this is the fact that some of the respondents in this research preferred to remain anonymous as they feared that their public involvement in one of the political parties or groups may have consequences for their future career prospects²⁶. Employment in Lebanon is often distributed based on which religious group one identifies with, or at least is influenced by this fact. How respondents are portrayed in this thesis, can thus have consequences for their professional lives. While this problem is easily circumvented by being transparent on the potential implications of the research and straightforwardly asking permission for using the respondent’s real name, it is an ethical consideration that needs to be taken into account when writing this thesis.

Additionally, during the field research in Lebanon, the researcher noticed some scepticism regarding the fact that the research project was academically informed. Lebanon is quite a popular subject for academic field research. The respondents in this research mentioned that they receive a lot of interview requests, from journalists but also from academics and researchers. While they emphasized the importance of getting ‘their story’ out, it was not without some scepticism. In the researcher’s day-to-day interactions, multiple comments have been made on the fact that, while it is interesting to do academic research on what is happening in Lebanon, it would be more significant to write opinionated stories about solutions for the current situation in the country. Reason for this is the fact that such articles have the potential of reaching a broader audience and, as such, increases the general awareness on the challenges that the Lebanese face.

2.7 Chapter recap

By discussing the methodology on how this research has taken place, this chapter has answered the question: how is movement-to-party transformation researched through field-work? A three-phase research method is proposed. The following chapter marks the beginning of the first phase of this thesis by elaborating on the historical and political context of Lebanon, with the aim of providing the necessary background to understand the story that this thesis aims to tell.

²⁶ Author’s interview with Respondent 8, Sabaa volunteer, on 11 June 2018; author’s interview with Respondent 1, You Stink activist, on 10 March 2018.

Chapter 3 – Historical overview and political context

Having explained the theoretical groundwork and the methodology on which this research is based, this chapter explains the historical background and the political context of Lebanon. The run up to the country's independence is taken as a starting point, as it will be shown that this marks the start of alternating periods of relative stability and political turmoil. Two prominent coalitions in the Lebanese political landscape are briefly discussed, after which a small leap into the future takes this chapter to the most recent wave of events in Lebanese society, starting with the garbage crisis in the summer of 2015.

3.1 A brief history

Lebanon is a country divided. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed after World War I (WWI), Lebanon was put under French authority as Greater Lebanon on 1 September 1920. Greater Lebanon, or *Grand Liban*, consisting of Mount Lebanon and surrounding annexed rural areas, was characterized by mixed sectarian²⁷, cultural and ideological divides (Salloukh et al 2015:15). These cleavages produced different visions of what Lebanon is and should be, manifested in two different nationalities in the country: Lebanism and Arabism. The debate surrounding the two nationalities regards that of the cultural and historical origins of the country. The Lebanese nationality, supported mainly by the Maronites, emphasizes the Mediterranean influences, whereas the Arab nationality, of which mainly the Sunni Muslims were proponents, believes Lebanon to have been part of Syria and, thus, originally, has an Arab heritage (Salloukh et al 2015:15-16).

To mediate these diverging views on nationality, the 1943 National Pact was agreed upon, which formulated²⁸ a power-sharing agreement to bridge the differences between Lebanism and Arabism and offer a compromise. Lebanon would be considered an independent state but renounce its dependency on external (French) mandates and acknowledge its Arab heritage (Salloukh et al 2015:16; Preamble to the 1926 Lebanese Constitution). The National Pact, in accordance with the 1926 Lebanese Constitution²⁹, set the ratio of Christian to Muslim deputies in Parliament to 6:5. Furthermore, the National Pact reserved the post of President for Maronite representation, the Sunni were promised the post of Prime Minister and the the Speaker of Parliament would be represented by the Shia (Salloukh et al 2015:17; Makdisi 1996:25). Thus, a sectarian-based system of power-sharing was born.

3.2 Lebanon after independence

²⁷ Sectarianism is understood as a “socioeconomic and political power that produces and reproduces sectarian subjects and modes of political subjectification and mobilization through a dispersed ensemble of institutional, clientelist, and discursive practices” (Salloukh et al 2015:3).

²⁸ The National Pact was not a written document but more a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ (Salloukh et al 2015:16), of which written references have been found in a ministerial declaration of 7 October 1943 (Traboulsi 2007:110).

²⁹ Article 24, Lebanese 1926 Constitution – as amended by order 129 of 18 March 1943.

With the National Pact, a basis was formed for the Lebanese independency from France. After elections in the summer of 1943, Bishara al-Khoury was elected as president and appointed Riad al-Sulh to form the government (Traboulsi 2007:107). A demand for independence was, however, initially refused and resulted in the imprisonment of many of the newly elected politicians. The following political crisis ended after interference from Egypt and Great Britain, who demanded the release of the elites by threatening with a military intervention. On 22 November 1943, al-Khoury and his friends were released, marking this day as the official date of Lebanon's independence (Traboulsi 2007:108).

The years following Lebanon's independence were characterized by national and regional tensions caused by external alliances to fight local opponents. Disagreement over power in government, Palestinian presence in Lebanon and the direction of foreign policy culminated in the Lebanese Civil war of 1975 (Haddad 2009:404), proving that the National Pact was an insufficient tool to overcome the inherent cleavages in politics and maintain peace. The Civil War started as a war between Maronite and Palestinian forces but later developed into a multifaceted war, after sectarian militias and foreign powers became involved and aligned with different factions (Salloukh et al 2015:20). The Civil War ended with the Taif Agreement of 22 October 1989. This agreement disbanded all the militias involved in the Civil War and strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces as the main holder of a monopoly on violence in Lebanon (article IV, paragraph A and C of the Taif Agreement), supported by Syrian armed forces, which had come to Lebanon in 1976. Additionally, several reforms were agreed upon, one of which being the abolition of political sectarianism (article II, paragraph G Taif Agreement). This proved to create a structural problem, as the Taif Agreement was little more than a reformulation of the 1943 National Pact. It states that the political power is distributed in a 50:50 Muslim to Christian ratio in Parliament (article II, paragraph A (5) Taif Agreement), until an electoral law free from sectarian restrictions is established. This latter notion creates the dilemma, as it sets the responsibility to reform the sectarian power-sharing system with the political elite³⁰, who are the embodiment of the exact system that needs reforming (Salloukh et al 2015:21). Up until today, Lebanese politics is based on this sectarian power-sharing system, which forms the basis of the problems in response to which the CSMovement emerged.

3.3 March 8 and March 14

Before explaining how the Lebanese political system contributed to the emergence of the CSMovement, a brief notion must be made regarding two prominent coalitions in Lebanese politics. This regards the March 8 and March 14 Alliances. Where in the past political divides were based on religion (Christian-Muslim), two new camps emerged based on their position on Syria: the pro-Syrian March 8 alliance³¹,

³⁰ The political elite are understood as those individuals from the established political parties in Lebanon that have been in power for the past decades and currently hold influential positions in government.

³¹ Consisting of Hezbollah, Amal (Speaker of Parliament Berri's party) and other (smaller) pro-Syrian parties (Haddad 2009:406).

named after the date of a massive pro-Syrian demonstration against UN Resolution 1559³²; and the anti-Syrian March 14 alliance³³, named after the start of the Cedar Revolution. The Cedar Revolution was a series of demonstrations triggered by the assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005 (Al Jazeera 2005). The demonstrators called for the expulsion of Syrian forces from Lebanon, that had been there since 1976, and the resignation of the pro-Syrian government in power at that time. Both demands were met, and general elections were held in Lebanon in 2005, which were characterized by the rivalry between the two new political alliances. These opposing factions reshaped the political alliance structure in Lebanese politics but had a negative effect on sectarianism, which only increased as divisions within society were now not only based on religion but also on political bloc³⁴.

However interesting and significant the political history of Lebanon is, this thesis is not the place to present an elaborate historical overview. The presented historical background serves the purpose of illustrating the divides in Lebanese politics, which is the context that is relevant to this research. Thus, from the general elections of 2005, a small leap into the future takes this chapter to the start of the most recent chain of events in Lebanon, starting in the summer of 2015.

3.4 The 2015 garbage crisis

During the summer of 2015, garbage littered the streets in Beirut. The Naameh landfill in the South of Beirut, which had been the main dumping site for the capital's garbage for decades, was shut down by the government on July 17th due to it reaching its capacity and the accompanying environmental hazards this caused (Al Jazeera, 2015). The government had not provided an alternative scenario, due to their inability to agree on a solution to the problem. Reason for this was the political deadlock that the country had been in since former President Michel Suleiman's mandate ended in May 2014 and a new President had yet to be elected (BBC, 2016). In response to the closing of the Naameh landfill, Sukleen, Lebanon's main waste management company, refused to collect the garbage until the government provided a new dumping ground (Daily Star, 2015). Consequently, the garbage piled up in the streets, causing stench nuisance and health implications, as waste was openly burned in an attempt to make it disappear from public areas.

A public response to the garbage crisis quickly followed. Reacting to the stench of the garbage that flooded Beirut, a Facebook page was launched in July 2015 by a group called You Stink, a reference to both the smell of the garbage and the corruption of the political elite. The Facebook-page went viral and called for demonstrations to hold the government responsible for the garbage. The first demonstrations started off small but grew significantly in numbers after violent clashes between

³² This Resolution called upon the withdraw of all foreign armed forces from Lebanon (article 2, UN Resolution 1559).

³³ Consisting of the Future Movement (Prime Minister Hariri's party), the Progressive Socialist Party, the Lebanese Forces, the Phalangists and the Free Patriotic Movement (President Aoun's party) (Haddad 2009:406).

³⁴ Author's interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018.

protesters and the police were televised. August 29th, 2015 is considered the peak of the protests, with tens of thousands taking to the streets in Beirut (Kerbage 2017:5; interviews³⁵). The protests first emerged under the banner of You Stink, due to the group's initiative with the Facebook page, but several other groups mushroomed over the course of the protests as diverging opinions on the modus operandi of the protests became apparent.³⁶ Because the multiple groups all had their own discourse and claims they deemed most relevant, the protests started to become divided and seemed unorganized as the different groups all did their own thing. Due to the lack of organization, combined with the fact that the government came with a solution for the garbage³⁷, the protests lost their momentum (Kerbage 2017:21).

The protests over the garbage, arguably led by You Stink, are considered a turning point in Lebanese activism. Where previous episodes of contentious action happened on a smaller scale and were often characterized by sectarian divides and political discourse, the protests over the garbage crisis stood out due to their inclusivity for people from all sects, religions, ages and social backgrounds. The protests were in this sense unique and formed a basis for all contentious action taken in the following years, as the protests created a niche for calling for broad demands and challenging the robust political blocs formed by March 8 and March 14 (Kerbage 2017:6).

3.5 After the 'You Stink' protests

After the decline of the waste management protests, two events are significant to discuss as they have had implications on the groups under analysis in this thesis. It regards the 2016 municipality elections in Beirut and the (third³⁸) extension of the Parliament's mandate, in 2017. These episodes are elaborated on below.

2016 Municipality elections

If the waste management crisis showed that there was a basis in society of people that were ready to stand up against the political establishment in Lebanon, the municipality elections in 2016 showed that this could be achieved through political participation. A newcomer in the political scene, Beirut Madinati, ran for a municipal seat in Beirut. Beirut Madinati, translated as 'Beirut My City', is a grassroots political organization, established by a group of activists that were also involved in the

³⁵ Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author's interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018; author's interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018.

³⁶ Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author's interview with Sima Ghaddar, activist, on 07 April 2018.

³⁷ The government re-opened the Naameh landfill and created two new ones, in South Beirut (Costa Brava Landfill) and in Bourj Hammoud (Bourj Hammoud landfill). Although this allowed the garbage to be collected and dumped in a place that does not disturb the population, the landfills are once again approach their capacity (HRW Report 2017:7). Thus, another garbage crisis is lurking.

³⁸ The first two extensions of the Parliament's mandate happened in May 2013 (until November 2014) and November 2014 (until June 2017). The government justified the extensions based on the instability in the region caused by the war in Syria and, later, the Presidential vacancy (Daily Star, 2013; Reuters, 2014). Opponents criticized the decision as being unconstitutional.

garbage protests³⁹. The 2015 waste management crisis had re-sparked a public awareness on the dysfunctionality of the political establishment and municipality elections seemed a viable option to change the political system from the inside out as municipalities are autonomous in their financial and administrative decision making⁴⁰. Thus, parties that have a seat in the Municipal Council have the power to significantly influence daily life in their municipality. Beirut Madinati presented a political program that addressed issues in the municipality of Beirut regarding traffic congestion, affordable housing, pollution, and access to public spaces (Al Jazeera, 2016; Daily Star, 2016). Being a newcomer in politics, the group had the element of surprise on their side. Municipality elections are often a formality as results are dictated by power-sharing arrangements among the political elites in Lebanon (Chaaban et al 2016:2). Thus, the participation of a new group with roots in civil society⁴¹ came somewhat unexpected. As a response, the political elites decided to join forces against Beirut Madinati, creating the ‘Beirutis List’, which consisted of candidates from both the March 8 and March 14 political blocs (Al Jazeera, 2016a). Beirut Madinati received 30,2% of the votes, the Beirutis List gained 44,23%.⁴² In accordance with the majoritarian electoral system that was in place at that time, a plurality of votes was necessary to obtain all the municipal seats.⁴³ Thus, the political elite won the municipality elections and Beirut Madinati did not succeed in getting a foot in the door. However, it did spark an awareness that the involvement of grassroots groups in politics was a reasonable possibility.

Extension of the Parliament’s mandate

The third extension of the mandate of the Lebanese Parliament in April 2017 came as a result of the disagreement over reform of the electoral law. After the second extension, the government had vowed to reform the electoral law from a majoritarian system into a law that implemented a system of proportional representation. When on 11 April 2017 a draft law was proposed to Parliament that, again, extended Parliament’s term and called for elections under the current (majoritarian) system, President Aoun refused to sign the bill, insisting that an extension of the mandate was only justified when combined with reform of the electoral system (An Nahar, 2017). As his mandate as President allows, Aoun suspended Parliament for a month, until halfway through May of 2017, to ease the tensions around the prospected political crisis (Reuters, 2017). Parliament finally agreed upon a new electoral law in June 2017 (Al Jazeera, 2017), implementing a system of proportional representation. Due to the new electoral law, Parliament extended its term for the third time, arguing that it required implementation

³⁹ Author’s interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018; author’s interview with Sima Ghaddar, activist, on 07 April 2018.

⁴⁰ Chapter IV, Municipal Act 1977.

⁴¹ Civil society, in Lebanon, is understood as: “Anyone who’s not involved in politics, who doesn’t have an official role in politics [but] who wants to have a voice or a say in politics” (Author’s interview with Respondent 6, LiBaladi activist, on 31 May 2018).

⁴² Numbers from official results, as shown to author by Andre Sleiman during interview (author’s interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018).

⁴³ Author’s interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018.

under the power of the current establishment. The 2017 Electoral Law, and the electoral system it embodies, is briefly explained below.

The 2017 Electoral Law

In comparison to the previous (2008) electoral law, the newly established 2017 Electoral Law implements some significant changes. Among others, the electoral districts are cut back to 15 (as opposed to 26 with the 2008 law), voting for Lebanese citizens living abroad is made possible, and voting for a political bloc under a plurality system is replaced by list voting with a proportional count. Under the new law, the country is divided into (15) electoral districts⁴⁴, where in each district the seats are divided by confession (Muslim/Christian) and sub-divided into sects. Parties and independent candidates are presented on electoral lists, which must be formed in accordance with the seat allocation of the district that the list wants to run in, as well as comply with the religious distribution of these seats.⁴⁵ In order to run in a certain district, the list must register itself in that district. The people are registered to vote in the town of their family's origin and are allowed two votes: one to indicate which list they want to vote for and one preferential vote for a specific candidate on that list. Lists must reach an electoral quotient, after which they are eligible for seat allocation. The seats are proportionally distributed among the elected lists in each electoral district, depending on the number of votes that the list obtained. Additionally, the allocation of the seats happens in compliance with the religious distribution of the seats in that district.⁴⁶

Although this sounds like a well-thought-out plan and a fair deal for all involved, the 2017 Electoral Law certainly has its flaws. For one, the reclassification of the electoral districts lacks transparency and consistency. The new divisions seem randomly established and following sectarian lines. For example, the division between the districts of Beirut I and Beirut II correspond to a great extent with the 'Green Line', separating the Muslims and Christians in East and West Beirut during the Civil War of 1975-1990. Sectarian grouping of the electoral districts, in combination with the new electoral law, could favour the current political establishment, due to their reliance on clientelist relations. The political elites in Lebanon are known to provide goods or services to their partisans in return for political support (LCPS, 2018). The preferential vote, incorporated in the proportional representation system, is a mechanism that can increase such clientelist relations as it is easy for the established political parties to utilize their strong financial status to buy voters' preferential vote; especially when those voters are distributed in electoral districts in a favourable manner.

⁴⁴ See Appendix 1 for a map of the electoral districts and the seat allocation in each district.

⁴⁵ Article 52, 2017 Electoral Law.

⁴⁶ Article 98, 2017 Electoral Law.

Secondly, the size of the districts is too small for a system of proportional representation to work, especially the districts where the seats are divided over too many sects (LCPS, 2017). In theory, proportional representation distributes seats proportionally, based on the number of votes that one list has obtained in comparison to the other lists. Let's say that two lists compete in a district where list A wins 80% of the votes and list B wins 20%. This means that list A would receive 80% of the seats. However, when, as for example in the Zahle district, only one seat for the Sunni is available, all the lists compete against each other over that one seat. In such situations, the proportional system does not hold and functions more like the old majoritarian system, where a winner-takes-all approach applied.

Another problem is the threshold that lists must pass to be eligible to obtain a seat in the first place. The electoral quota that minimally must be reached is calculated by the number of voters in relation to the allocated seats in that district.⁴⁷ Thus, if a district has 10,000 voters and 5 seats to allocate, the quota is set to 2,000 votes, which is 20%. In practice, this could lead to smaller parties being excluded as they are less known than the bigger, established parties and thus have more difficulties with mobilizing voters. This exclusion of the smaller parties is invigorated by the fact that the 2017 Electoral Law set the allowed amount of campaign spending to LL150 million (\$99,163⁴⁸) for each candidate individually *plus* LL150 million per candidate, which the list is allowed spend.⁴⁹ The high expenditure ceiling privileges the established parties, which have more capital than small, newcomer parties and can thus invest in a more rigorous electoral campaign. This disadvantaging of smaller parties goes against the idea of proportional representation that the 2017 Electoral Law propagates.

3.6 Chapter recap

Having explained the 'what' (theoretical frame) and 'how' (methodology) of this research and having provided the political context in which the research is settled, it is now time to zoom in and elaborate on the main subject that inspired the topic of this thesis: the CSMovement.

⁴⁷ Article 98, paragraph 2, 2017 Electoral Law.

⁴⁸ As per the Lebanese currency index of 04 August 2018.

⁴⁹ Article 61, 2017 Electoral Law.

Chapter 4 – The Civil Society Movement

This chapter will discuss the researcher's argumentation behind the applied scope and naming of the Civil Society Movement (CSMovement) in Lebanon. First, the idea of 'civil society' in Lebanon is briefly discussed, after which the notion of a 'social movement' is examined through different definitions of the phenomenon. The chapter ends with an explanation of the scope of the CSMovement and argues why this thesis has adopted this scope.

4.1 Civil society in Lebanon

Civil society is a universal term that, due to a lacking consensus on a definition, has different implications across different parts of the world (Safa 2011:3). The World Bank provides the following general definition of 'civil society':

“The wide array of non-governmental and not for profit organizations that have a presence in public life, express the interests and values of their members and others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific or philanthropic considerations” (World Bank, 2018).

The definition of civil society incorporates two key characteristics: its focus on the pursuance of public interests, and its independence from the governmental and corporate sectors. In Lebanon, contemporary civil society is the product of political instability and post-war difficulties. Towards the end of the Civil War (1975-1990), when the central authority of government needed to be re-established and state-provided services were very limited, the Lebanese people depended on civil society for support (Safa 2011:3) Civil society, through different sorts of communal organizations and NGOs, provided humanitarian aid and helped the population where the government was incapable of doing so. By partly taking over state responsibilities, civil society gained independence and took on a role of watchdog over the government (AbiYaghi 2012:20). Following the words of Fukuyama: “Civil society serves to balance the power of the state and to protect individuals from the state's power” (2001:11). According to this understanding, civil society is portrayed as a basis in society, consisting of organizations that speak up for the population against the government and work to limit the abuse of state power.

Civil society, as is understood in the definition of the World Bank and the authors cited above, differs from the notion of 'civil society' that is referred to by the respondents in this research. As Respondent 6, an activist that is involved in LiBaladi, states: “Civil society is anyone who's not involved in politics, who doesn't have an official role in politics [but] who wants to have a voice or a say in politics. Activists, proponents, NGO's who are trying to push an agenda to the Parliament, these are

civil society.”⁵⁰ This notion of ‘civil society’ differs from the definition provided by the World Bank in the sense that, based on the understanding stated by Respondent 6, civil society is comprised of both organizations as well as individuals. Additionally, this understanding of civil society is inherently focussed on influencing the political agenda, whereas Fukuyama implies that civil society merely aims to *protect* the population from the political agenda, instead of indeed influencing it.

4.2 A protracted movement

The previous section has discussed what is understood as ‘civil society’ in general, as well as in Lebanon specifically. By referring to the overarching subject of this thesis as the ‘Civil Society Movement’, it can be argued that the research implies that civil society is inherently connected to the social movement. This raises the question of what the difference between a social movement and civil society is. This difference is explained below. In order to do so, it is first necessary to discuss different ways of how a social movement is defined.

As stated in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the definition of a social movement that is adopted in this research is the one provided by Mario Diani. Diani states that:

“A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity.” (Diani 1992:9 in Durac 2015:242).

This definition is applied in this thesis for several reasons. First, the definition incorporates a broad understanding of the scope of a social movement, as it does not specify on a time-frame or specific environment in which the ‘informal interactions’ take place. Furthermore, the network of interactions can happen over a protracted period of time and be “loose and dispersed in character” (Durac 2015:241) or have direct ties to the entities engaged in conflict. Additionally, Diani emphasizes the need of a certain identity shared by the actors involved. This implies a common denominator between the entities involved in the interactions, which several respondents have emphasized as well.⁵¹

Another well-known definition of ‘social movement’ is provided by two founding-fathers of SMT: Charles Tilly and Sydney Tarrow. It regards the following definition:

⁵⁰ Author’s interview with Respondent 6, LiBaladi activist, on 31 May 2018.

⁵¹ Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018; interview with Respondent 6, LiBaladi activist, on 31 May 2018.

“A sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated performances that advertise that claim, based on organizations, networks traditions and solidarities that sustain these activities.” (Tilly & Tarrow 2015:11).

In comparison to the definition provided by Dani, this narrower definition emphasizes the continuity of the social movement over time and disregards the notion of a form of a shared identity within the social movement. In accordance with data gathered from respondents, the researcher adopts the view that a social movement is not a ‘fixed’ phenomenon which exists in a fixed time-frame and focusses solely on specific issues in society. Rather, a social movement is a flexible and inherently fluid phenomenon that is characterized by the waves of contentious action, employed by networks of groups or individuals which share a collective identity and mobilize on different occasions in pursuance of the views supported by that identity. The definition provided by Tilly and Tarrow thus focusses too much on the ‘process’ which is a social movement (namely, the making of claims) and less on the ‘entities’ that comprise the social movement (the different groups between which the ‘network of informal interactions’ manifests, which Diani focusses on).

Differences are noticed when comparing the definition of civil society to that of a social movement. Civil society encompasses non-governmental, non-profit organizations in society that safeguard the interests of the general population against the manifestation of power from the state. On the other hand, social movements are not directed by the interests of the specific members in the groups that associate with the social movement, but rather build on contentious interactions that people identify with, in response to which groups or organizations are formed that support those interactions. Thus, social movements are more characterized as being reactionary to issues in society. Additionally, civil society comprises of civil society *organizations*, whereas social movements can also comprise of communal groups or individuals. Finally, groups that identify with a social movement do not necessarily have to be non-profit.

4.3 The Civil Society Movement

Applying above stated definition of ‘social movement’, provided by Diani, to the case of Lebanon, requires some elaboration. As is argued in the previous chapter, the garbage protests of 2015 symbolise the starting point of a shift in activism in Lebanon. Since the garbage crisis, several episodes of contentious action have happened, like Beirut Madinati’s participation in the municipality elections as an opposition to the established political parties and the protests against the extension of the Parliament’s mandate. However, the culmination of the garbage protests can be traced back to earlier episodes (interviews⁵²; Kerbage 2017:6). By following above stated broad definition, this research argues from

⁵² Author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author’s interview with Jean Kassir, activist, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018.

the belief that those episodes of contentious action are all events or waves in a larger, protracted social movement. Instead of classifying these waves of contentious action as social movements in itself, they are rather contentious campaigns. Following Almeida, Tilly and Tarrow define contentious campaigns as:

“Combinations of performances that ‘focus on a particular policy and usually disassemble when that policy is implemented or overturned’” (Almeida 2014:6 in Tilly & Tarrow 2015:15).

This is the case for the garbage protests as well as for the participation of Beirut Madinati in the municipal elections and the protests against the extension of the Parliament’s mandate. The ‘waves’ all wound down after the ‘policy’ against which they emerged, either was executed (the extension of Parliament) or overturned (the garbage crisis).

Additionally, as is stated by several respondents⁵³, the waves of contentious action that have happened have attracted largely the same activists. As Sima Ghaddar stated:

*All of them, they know each other, it is a community of activists of some sort. [...] I know them as academics, professionals and practitioners in their own field. But they have been working [together], either through NGOs or whenever there is a crisis, they come together.*⁵⁴

This is also an observation that the researcher made during the fieldwork. Conducting snowball-sampling, the researcher asked respondents whether they had interesting connections the researcher could approach and interview as a respondent in the research. Often, the same individuals would be mentioned. The activist network in Lebanon is relatively small with the same people being actively involved and participating in multiple groups, campaigns or waves of contentious action, with the same underlying goal: to establish a secular state.⁵⁵ Combined with above argued protractedness of the social movement, this thesis believes it is necessary to adopt a broad scope to understand the social movement that is going on in Lebanon.

The choice of for the name ‘Civil Society Movement’ (CSMovement) is based on the understanding that civil society involves “anyone who is not involved in politics, who does not have an official role in politics [but] who wants to have a voice or a say in politics”.⁵⁶ Since 2005, different

⁵³ Author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author’s interview with Jean Kassir, activist, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018; author’s interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018; author’s interview with Sima Ghaddar, activist, on 07 April 2018.

⁵⁴ Author’s interview with Sima Ghaddar, activist, on 07 April 2018.

⁵⁵ Author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

⁵⁶ Author’s interview with Respondent 6, LiBaladi activist, on 31 May 2018.

waves of contentious action have revolved around interactions with the political establishment, by groups that are also involved in the so-called ‘civil society’, against certain decisions or policy.⁵⁷ As this research believes that these waves are all part of a broader social movement, the workable name for the movement, in this thesis, is the Civil Society Movement. However, it should, again, be emphasized that the application of this broad scope is completely the researcher’s interpretation and does not necessarily reflect the opinions or views of any of the respondents in this research. Furthermore, the choice to refer to the social movement as the ‘Civil Society Movement’ (CSMovement) mainly serves the purpose of establishing clarity. In existing literature and news sources, some waves of contentious action, which this research regards as being a manifestation of the CSMovement, are referred to as movements in itself. For example, the garbage protests of 2015 are often referred to as the ‘You Stink movement’. To prevent ambiguity about what this thesis is referring to, the name ‘Civil Society Movement’ is adopted. It is not a name that is specifically applied by any of the respondents involved in this research.

4.4 Chapter recap

Having explained the context in which this research is situated, as well as having elaborated on what this thesis understands as a social movement, this chapter ends the first phase of the research, which revolved around contextualization. The following chapters will present the second phase of the research, which regards testing the proposed framework to two groups within the CSMovement: You Stink, as having remained a grassroots organization, and LiBaladi, as having transformed into a political party. The choice to test the proposed framework to specifically these two groups is twofold: the groups are similar in the sense that the individuals involved in the groups are from the same network of activists. Indeed, LiBaladi is co-founded by the very people that have also been involved in You Stink in the past. Additionally, both groups are active in Beirut and focus on issues that occur in Beirut. As such, they are similar. However, LiBaladi transformed into a political party whereas You Stink remained a grassroots organization. Thus, they allow for an interesting comparison. The purpose of testing the framework to these cases is to identify which conditions are significant in enabling the possibility of movement-to-party transformation. The next chapter presents the analysis of You Stink.

⁵⁷ In 2005, protests against the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon (author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018); in 2011, protests in response to the Arab Spring, calling for a secular state (author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author’s interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018; author’s interview with Jean Kassir, activist, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Selim Mawad, activist, on 04 June 2018); in 2013-2014, protests in response to the (first and second) extension of Parliament’s mandate (author’s interview with Jean Kassir, activist, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Selim Mawad, activist, on 04 June 2018); in 2015, protests against the waste management crisis; in 2016, Beirut Madinati’s participation as political opposition to the established political parties; in 2017, protests against the (third) extension of Parliament’s mandate. These waves of contentious action are also (partially) elaborated on in Chapter 3.

Chapter 5 – You Stink

In this chapter, You Stink is analysed as a group that is part of the CS Movement but that did not transform to a political party. The choice to include You Stink in this research is made based on this exact fact. Thus, You Stink serves as a reference to compare with LiBaladi, which is analysed in the following chapter. First, in this chapter, the emergence and development of You Stink as a group is elaborated on, after which each of the factors in the proposed framework is tested to the case of You Stink, to see how the gathered data relates to the framework.

5.1 Emergence and development

The group ‘You Stink’ is the product of the 2015 waste management crisis in Lebanon. When the streets started to fill up with garbage, Assaad Thebian, co-founder of the group, decided it was time to show his concerns regarding the political dysfunctionality that led to the crisis and decided to make a video of the garbage crisis. He ended the video with the now-famous words ‘You Stink’, which would later be the name of the group that he co-founded to raise awareness for the garbage problem Lebanon faced in the summer of 2015. The video went viral and Assaad Thebian turned to activist friends of his.

“I texted a fellow activist friend of mine, telling him we need to do something about this. He replies with ‘Hahaha yeah two people are talking about the same thing the last half an hour. So, let’s organize something’. And between jokes and realities, we were out on the streets the second day.”⁵⁸

In the beginning, the protests were relatively small. Assaad Thebian recalls it being with around 20 people, mostly friends, and the protests primarily caught the attention of the people they already knew, the people around them. After a few small but slowly growing protests, the core group of the protests decided to organize a meeting to discuss how to raise the bar and attract more people. It was decided to set up a Facebook page under the name ‘You Stink’ and organize weekly protests, to raise awareness for the garbage problem and put pressure on the political elite to solve the crisis. From the end of July until the 19th of August, the protests continued on a regular basis and slowly gained traction (Kerbage 2017:34). August 19 proved to be a turning point. That was the day that the government was to announce the successful bids, put forward by companies, proposing a solution for the garbage problem and the overall management of the waste. That day, protesters that were protesting outside the Grand Serail⁵⁹ were met with water cannons and beatings by the police (Fox World News, 2015, interview⁶⁰). This was

⁵⁸ Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018.

⁵⁹ Office of the Lebanese Prime Minister, in downtown Beirut.

⁶⁰ Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018.

televised, which sparked massive public support for the protesters. Three days later, on August 22nd, the first big protest took place. Assaad Thebian recalls how this went:

*“People saw that young men and women were being beaten, thrown with water cannons, only because they were asking for a better management of waste. [...] So, this got a lot of attention and we got our friends as well. They would see you would get arrested and they would leave work and go down [to the streets]. And then the night ended with more than 500 people in the streets. That moment we knew there was a momentum, so we called for a demonstration on the 22nd which was three days after. And we weren’t thrown, 20.000 people poured into the square.”*⁶¹

The following days, the protests gained traction and the police responded with harsher measures to disperse the protesters. Besides water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets were used, causing several wounded and leading to a growing dissatisfaction with the people (interviews⁶²; NY Times, 2015).

Following these big protests, several other grassroots groups emerged on the scene, causing divisions between the protesters, as the different groups made diverging claims and had different views on the proceedings of the protests. While You Stink called for a postponement of protests until the 29th of August, a group called ‘Badna Nhasseb’ (‘We Want Accountability’) held a sit-in, refusing to abide by You Stink’s call (Kerbage 2017:44). On the 29th of August, the biggest protest of the garbage crisis happened, which was arguably also the biggest civil protest since the end of the Civil War (1975-1990).⁶³ By then, the protests had a leading narrative: a solution for the waste crisis and a resignation of the sectarian political establishment, as their corrupted policies were seen as the source of the crisis (interviews⁶⁴; NY Times, 2015a). However, the diverging groups in the protest remained divided in modus operandi and continued calling for different approaches to call upon the government. This divided the protests up to the point that the momentum declined, arguably due to a lack of leadership and the inability of the main groups in the protests to unify (Kerbage 2017:32). In March 2016, the waste, which was taken from the streets in Beirut and pushed to the suburbs of the city, was transferred to one of the three landfills that had been opened as a temporary solution to the garbage crisis (Al Jazeera, 2016a).

⁶¹ Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018.

⁶² Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018; author’s interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018.

⁶³ There have been protests of equal or bigger size, but these protests followed sectarian lines and were organized from political elites’ support base. The waste protests were the first massive protests that disregarded confessional and sectarian divides (author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; Reuters, 2015a).

⁶⁴ Author’s interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018.

After the peak of the garbage crisis, You Stink remained a grassroots organization. When the municipality elections were announced, and Beirut Madinati emerged, You Stink remained on the background. Defining themselves as “the hardcore street battle people”, the group refrained from being involved in local politics and let Beirut Madinati have its turn.⁶⁵ Their organizational structure primarily consisted of volunteers⁶⁶, who joined Beirut Madinati to work on their campaign. After the municipality elections in 2016, You Stink came into action to protest the extension of the Parliament’s mandate but mostly remained quiet. Until the announcement of the 2018 Parliamentary elections, when You Stink got involved in Kulluna Watani, the list comprising of groups from civil society running for elections. You Stink put forward one candidate, Lucien Bourjeily, that ran in the Beirut I district. However, if he was to get elected, he would leave You Stink and proceed as an independent candidate in Parliament.⁶⁷ This shows You Stink’s ambition to not become a political party but to remain a grassroots organization; to function as a watchdog, hold accountable those in politics and change the political discourse.⁶⁸

5.2 Testing the framework

Having explained You Stink’s emergence and development since its existence, this section now proceeds to test the proposed framework in chapter 1 to the case of You Stink, as a group that did *not* transform into a political party. In accordance with the framework, first the external factors are discussed. It is argued that these external factors provide conditions that render movement-to-party transformation possible, meaning that the presence of these conditions provide a basis in society on which a social movement can build, towards transforming into a political party. In accordance with the structurationist ontology of the research, these external factors are complementary to the internal factors, which are discussed later on in this chapter.

External factor – neglected issues in society

This factor revolves around the neglected issues in society that You Stink focussed on in setting their demands. In line with Hug’s argumentation (2010: 10), it is argued that the presence of neglected issues in society is an enabling factor for movement-to-party transformation.

Based on the gathered data, similar references to neglected issues have been identified. As You Stink is a group that emerged in response to the 2015 waste management crisis in Beirut, it is assumed that the group is primarily driven by the issues of waste management. This assumption is confirmed by several respondents involved in You Stink.⁶⁹ As the waste management crisis progressed during the

⁶⁵ Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018.

⁶⁶ Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018.

⁶⁷ Author’s interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018.

⁶⁸ Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018; author’s interview with Wadih Al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

⁶⁹ Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018; author’s interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018; author’s interview with Wadih Al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

summer of 2015, You Stink broadened the scope of issues they focussed on. During an interview with Hassan Chamoun, an activist involved with You Stink, he stated that, in the initial phases of the group's existence in 2015, the focus of the claims that the group made broadened towards the demand of the resignation of the Ministers of Environment and Interior,⁷⁰ as they were said to be responsible for the garbage crisis (Reuters, 2015). In other interviews, however, it became apparent that the frustration regarding the issue of garbage and who was accountable for it, had deeper roots:

“The focus was to find a solution for the garbage issue, definitely. For me the trigger was... I'm not an environmentalist, I don't do recycling, I'm not environmentalist. What triggered me is the corruption in that fight, it was a real example of a corrupt dossier that the government was basically dealing with for the last 17 years.”⁷¹

“We were focussing on garbage. We're focussing finally on garbage but putting it in a perspective. Not saying, talking about garbage as a technical. We were saying what lead us here was corruption, was an inability of those people to govern, was a governance bubble.”⁷²

This indicates that You Stink's focus on the garbage problem in Lebanon is a product of a dissatisfaction in society due to corruption. Transparency International (TI), an internationally recognized organization against corruption, defines corruption as:

“The abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Corruption can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs.” (TI, 2018).

According to TI's most recent Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Lebanon is ranked 143rd out of 180 countries (TI, 2017), receiving 28 out of 100 points⁷³. This makes Lebanon amongst the top-35 most corrupted counties in the world. In comparison, Somalia, being the most corrupted county according to the CPI, received only 9 points. Looking at Lebanon's ratings on TI's CPI for the past years,⁷⁴ the country has never scored more than 30 out of 100 points (TI, 2017). This indicates that Lebanon has had high corruption rates over the past years. Although these numbers alone do not provide a solid base to assume that corruption has indeed been a problem in Lebanon over a protracted period of time, combined with the data gathered from the interviews with the respondents, a pattern is observed, identifying corruption as a neglected issue in society.

⁷⁰ Author's interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018.

⁷¹ Author's interview with Marwan Maalouf, You-Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018.

⁷² Author's interview with Wadih Al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, 18 April 2018.

⁷³ Ranking: 0 points meaning highly corrupt, 100 points meaning completely clean.

⁷⁴ The CPI shows the numbers from 2012-2017.

External factor – lack of trust in the political establishment

As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis follows Mary Kaldor's operationalization of 'lack of trust' by looking at growing political dissatisfaction; declining membership in political parties; and low voter turnout (2003:5). During the field research, the researcher observed that there exists a general dissatisfaction with the political establishment. It should be emphasized that the generated data shows no coherent patterns that specifically demonstrate this dissatisfaction with the political elite. Rather, it is more an underlying frustration that was noticed by the researcher while conducting interviews and, in general, during the time when the researcher was living in Lebanon. The researcher recalls several occasions where the researcher spoke, informally, to a variety of Lebanese citizens.⁷⁵ During these conversations, the majority voiced their disagreement with the political establishment and complained about how the country was governed. Recurring topics of frustration were the daily power-cuts, the political deadlock, corruption and power-sharing arrangements between the political elites. However, after asking whether they were going to vote in the upcoming elections, a majority responded with a negative answer, stating that it made little sense to vote as the same people would end up in power anyway. From such responses, it seems that it is not per se a sense of political dissatisfaction but rather a sense of defeatism that dominates the Lebanese population.⁷⁶

This sense of defeatism corresponds to the low voter turnout that has been observed in Lebanon in the past elections. A report of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) stated a 53.37% voter turnout in the 2009 Parliamentary elections (NDI Report, 2009). Although this turnout may seem relatively low, it is in fact quite reasonable, as the voter turnout is calculated on the number of *eligible* voters. This includes Lebanese citizens living abroad. However, the electoral law in place during the 2009 elections did not allow for Lebanese citizens living abroad to vote at the Lebanese embassy of the country they were residing in, as opposed to the 2017 Electoral Law.⁷⁷ Thus, the voter turnout of 2009 is based on the people that went to vote *in Lebanon*, which is a significantly lower number than those that could have reasonably voted (NDI Report, 2009:36). When comparing this percentage to the voter turnout for the municipality elections in Beirut in 2016, a significant difference is observed. According to (international) news sources, the voter turnout floated around a mere 20% (Reuters, 2016; Al Jazeera, 2016b). This number is in accordance with the numbers that were shown by the researcher.⁷⁸ Although Parliamentary elections and Municipal elections differ in the sense that they represent different

⁷⁵ This regards taxi drivers, supermarket owners, bartenders and Lebanese friends. Due to the informal, and often brief, nature of the conversations, most of these 'respondents' are not included in the list of interviewees (Appendix 2). However, they do contribute to knowledge that the researcher gained through observations during the period of field-research. Thus, it is significant to mention these observations.

⁷⁶ Author's interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018.

⁷⁷ Article 34, paragraph 3, 2017 Electoral Law.

⁷⁸ Author's interview with Andre Sleiman, activist, on 04 May 2018.

governing bodies and scopes of political influence,⁷⁹ it is interesting to observe the relatively low voter turnout in both elections. These numbers make a case for the sense of defeatism the researcher observed during the period of field-research.

Particularly interesting to discuss is Kaldor's second indicator that operationalizes a lack of political trust, namely the declining membership in political parties. From the conducted interviews, the researcher has found no evidence of a decline in membership from the established political parties. During the garbage protests of 2015, a lot of people took to the streets, including members from established political parties. Regarding the people in the protests, two co-founders of You Stink state:

*"I think most of the Lebanese were there. This demonstration was the sigh that made all the politicians shake because they saw that many of their followers were there. In particular the FPM⁸⁰ lost a lot of its followers because they found that they were following a political party that was not representing them anymore but what the street is calling for represents them more. This also applies to the PSP⁸¹, some of the Future Movement, some of the Lebanese Forces, some of the Kataeb."*⁸²

*"Half of the people coming were coming from political parties. And I believe those people came to us because of the disappointment they have about their political party. Most of them believed [they were] in an ideological party, modern party, and they figured out at the end of the day that they were in a one-man show party. Or should I say a one-family show party."*⁸³

Although this might imply that the people in the protests had left their parties, no evidence is found to support this assumption. Rather, Assaad Thebian states that the people went back to their political parties.⁸⁴

External factor – political opportunities

In line with Tarrow's earlier stated definition, political opportunities are understood as being those elements in the political environment that incentivise collective action. In other words, this factor looks at which elements external to the group under analysis influence the possibilities of the group's participation in politics. Following McAdam et al, political opportunities are operationalized through four defining elements: access to the political system; divisions within the elite; elite allies; and state

⁷⁹ Parliamentary elections elect a national legislative body whereas Municipal elections elect a local executive body.

⁸⁰ Free Patriotic Movement, led by Gebran Bassil, founded by Michel Aoun (President).

⁸¹ Progressive Socialist Party, led by Walid Jumblatt.

⁸² Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018.

⁸³ Author's interview with Wadih Al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

⁸⁴ Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018.

repression (1996:27). It is argued that the presence or absence of these elements influence the political opportunities of the group under analysis.

From the data, returning patterns are identified relating access to the political system to the implementation of the 2017 Electoral Law. The argumentation for this is the fact that the 2017 Electoral Law represented a change in the electoral system, from a majoritarian system to a system of proportional representation, with the addition of a preferential vote. This change in the system offered openings for newcomers to the electoral scene, leading to the formation of the ‘Civil Society Coalition’.⁸⁵ Bassel Salloukh, associate professor of Political Science at the Lebanese American University (LAU) in Beirut, underscores the implications of institutional change on the dynamics in politics:

“Unlike in the old system, where people were just asked to vote for one list and to have as many votes as MPs in every district. Now, because you only have one vote, the political parties are having to appeal to voters in a different way. More importantly, candidates have decided that they have a better chance of winning and attracting opposition votes than in the old system. Which, I think, explains why we have all these people who come from outside the political arena, running for the elections. [...] The literature always argues that institutions shape voting behaviour, institutions shape behaviour and [this is] a fantastic example of how, once you change the institution, in this case the electoral law, you incentivise people to act in a different way.”⁸⁶

Here, Salloukh implies that the 2017 Electoral Law has made it difficult for the established parties to control the voting, something which was easier under the majoritarian system, as this system incorporated a winner-takes-all approach and the political elite control a larger support base in society. The incorporation of the preferential vote in the new proportional system provided a realistic opportunity for candidates to get into Parliament. Indeed, the preferential vote depends on how many people know and like you, causing public figures such as news anchors⁸⁷ and writers to run for elections.⁸⁸ This resulted in the mushrooming of a myriad of groups that put forward (independent) candidates in the elections and formed electoral alliances⁸⁹ to be able to create a list and with the aim of gathering as many votes as possible.⁹⁰ Thus, due to the 2017 Electoral Law, there was an increased opportunity for access

⁸⁵ Author’s interview with Respondent 3, You Stink activist, on 03 April 2018; author’s interview with Wadih Al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

⁸⁶ Author’s interview with Bassel Salloukh, associate professor at LAU, on 10 April 2018.

⁸⁷ The most famous example is Paula Yacoubian, former news anchor for Future TV (aligned to Hariri’s Future Movement) and newly elected MP from Sabaa.

⁸⁸ Author’s interview with Bassel Salloukh, associate professor at LAU, on 10 April 2018.

⁸⁹ See Appendix 3 for an overview of the electoral alliances during the 2018 Parliamentary elections.

⁹⁰ The underlining of the electoral character of the alliances is emphasized by several respondents: author’s interview with Bassel Salloukh, associate professor at LAU, on 10 April 2018; author’s interview with Sima Ghaddar, activist, on 07 April 2018; author’s interview with Wadih Al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

to the political system. Not only for You Stink, but basically for everyone that aspired to participate in elections.⁹¹

Regarding divisions within the elite in Lebanon, this has arguably both enabled and limited You Stink's development during the course of the group's existence. When You Stink emerged in July 2015, the political elites in Lebanon were highly divided, due to the Presidential vacuum at that time. Without a President, there is no head of state to put in place a system of checks and balances. Furthermore, the President is responsible for the continuation of the political decision-making process.⁹² Lacking a President, the government fell into a political deadlock due to the inability to agree on crucial decisions about regular governing issues. The 2015 waste management crisis was a direct consequence of this governmental gridlock, leading to the subsequent emergence of You Stink. During this period, the presence of divisions within the elite functioned as an enabling factor for You Stink and allowed the group to emerge and gain momentum in the garbage protests. However, in October 2016, Michael Aoun was elected, ending a Presidential vacancy of over two years. The product of an agreement between Aoun and Hariri, the nomination of Aoun as president created an alliance bridging the once fundamentally opposing blocs of March 8 and March 14:

“The election of Michel Aoun was a compromise that was made between the different parties that were opposed for years, almost a decade. From 2005-2016. About 10 years of complete polarization of a society, March 8 and March 14, until this moment where the compromise happened.”⁹³

Although Hariri met some resistance from within his own party, the agreement between Aoun and Hariri lifted the political deadlock and reduced the divisions within the political elite (BBC 2016; Reuters 2016a). Allegedly as a returning favour, Aoun later nominated Hariri as Prime Minister (BBC 2016a). Thus, by ending the political stalemate and bridging the rivalry between March 8 and March 14, the divisions within the elites no longer posed a political opportunity.

The third element of political opportunity is that of elite allies. This element presupposes that alliances between a group and elite actors, incentivizes that group's resort to collective action (McAdam et al 1996:29). By definition, You Stink is opposed to the established political elites in Lebanon, due to their sectarian nature.⁹⁴ As Bassel Salloukh explains, the political elite in Lebanon symbolize the elite in general:

⁹¹ These cited provisions of the 2017 Electoral Law also apply to LiBaladi, the group under analysis in Chapter 6.

⁹² Chapter 4, section 1, Lebanese Constitution, 1926 (with its amendments); author's interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018.

⁹³ Author's interview with Jean Kassir, activist, on 19 April 2018.

⁹⁴ Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018.

“What has happened after the war and it’s quite interesting is that you’ve had the sectarian political elite [who] is in many ways also the economic elite in the country. And so you have these big, these politicians who are also economic tycoons. And that gives them a lot of power. So, when I say sectarian political elite I’m thinking of the leaders of the political parties and the politicians around them. These are all members of the sectarian political elite in the country. And it’s in their interest, both political and economic, to maintain the sectarian system. Because it serves their interest.”⁹⁵

The elite’s interest to remain in power collides with You Stink’s fight against the elites as they maintain the system of corruption that causes the problems in Lebanese society which You Stink raises awareness for. Thus, based on this argumentation and corresponding with gathered data from respondents,⁹⁶ it is unlikely that You Stink allied with any elites.

The final element that operationalizes political opportunities is the tendency of the state towards the use of repression on challenging groups. This element presupposes that repression of challenging groups influences the “level and nature of movement activity” (McAdam et al 1996:28). In other words, state repression either limits or enables the political opportunities of a group. The gathered data indicates that You Stink has experienced acts of repression by the political establishment in Lebanon. A three-fold strategy is identified: ignore, co-opt, repress.⁹⁷ Assaad Thebian, co-founder of You Stink, elaborates:

“In Lebanon they treat any change in three steps manifesto. In the beginning they ignore you, you don’t exist, they don’t give you attention, they don’t think you’re there, they don’t even let the media cover you, they just say ‘they’re going to disappear one day’. [...] When you reach a critical mass, they try to assimilate you. They go and say: ‘We’re with you, these are our demands, we call our people to go and participate with you as well’. Until they see that they’re actually not part of you, you’re not giving them credibility, you’re not approving the way of the governing that’s happening, you’re not saying ‘this is the proper way I want a country to be managed in the 21st century’. And then the first step comes, and they hit you, they hit you hard.”⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Author’s interview with Bassel Salloukh, associate professor at LAU, on 10 April 2018.

⁹⁶ Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018; author’s interview with Respondent 3, You Stink activist, on 03 April 2018.

⁹⁷ Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author’s interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018; author’s interview with Sima Ghaddar, activist, on 07 April 2018.

⁹⁸ Author’s interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018.

This pattern is recognized in news reports as well, where the protests developed peacefully until You Stink mobilized more and more people. The first big protest, on August 22nd, was followed by violent reactions from the police, which continued throughout the following protests as well (Kerbage 2017:34-36). This system of repression by the state is a ‘negative’ political opportunity for You Stink, as a decline in the momentum of the protests is observed since the violent response of the police.⁹⁹

External factor – societal support base

During the peak of the garbage protests, You Stink had a large support base from the Lebanese population, which is indicated by the thousands of people that gathered in the streets in response to the group’s call for demonstrations. However, when the demands of You Stink broadened during the protests, they lost support as people were mostly concerned with raising the issue of the garbage and did not necessarily identify with the call for political change. Respondent 4 recalled receiving a phone call from his mother, who had come from outside Beirut to Martyr Square to protest the garbage at the end of August 2015. Shortly after arriving, she called her son to complain about the fact that the calls being made in the protests were too broad and politically motivated and that this was not why she had come down to Beirut.¹⁰⁰ This corresponds with the significant decline of societal support for You Stink after the waste was removed from the streets in Beirut. With the garbage out of sight, people saw no direct need to go to protest anymore, as the broader demands raised by You Stink¹⁰¹ did not correspond with their own anymore. According to Zald and Ash, this influences societal support (1966:330). As Jean Kassir noticed about the protests:

“What it triggered was something what made it known, made it beyond the movement, which was a sudden hope for a broader political alternative, a real change in the status quo at the country level. Which was very premature and impossible to achieve. [...]. And people were not here for that, you know. The organizers were maybe having this progressive anti-system, anti-regime ambition but it was clear that it wasn’t shared by many people that demonstrated with us.”¹⁰²

Having discussed the external factors, the following sections analyse the internal factors. These factors are group-specific and have implications on the *willingness* and *likelihood* of a group’s transformation into a political party.

⁹⁹ It should be noted that respondents also indicated that, additional to the use of violence by the police against You Stink during the garbage protests, You Stink members were also personally attacked, through public smearing campaigns. However, the researcher has not found convincing evidence to substantiate this.

¹⁰⁰ Author’s interview with Respondent 4, elections specialist, on 24 April 2018.

¹⁰¹ And the other grassroots groups involved in the protests (Kerbage 2017:38).

¹⁰² Author’s interview with Jean Kassir, activist, on 19 April 2018.

Internal factor – resources

Following McCarthy and Zald, it is argued that group development depends on the group's ability to obtain resources (1977:1221). Based on the conducted interviews, three types of resources are identified as being necessary for the development of You Stink: time, money and manpower.¹⁰³ During the garbage protests the core group of You Stink was relatively small and consisted of about 10 people but You Stink was able to utilize the momentum of the protests to attract volunteers.¹⁰⁴ Hassan Chamoun, an with You Stink, recalls that, in the beginning of August, different teams were established with each their specific tasks, such as crowd-funding and media communication. Hassan was responsible for taking pictures and making videos.¹⁰⁵ However, the lack of financial resources proved to be a problem:

“The thing is, we barely had enough capital to sustain ourselves and our people. A lot of You Stink members began to give their entire time for the whole movement, which is a normal matter but some members of You Stink left because at some point they saw that nothing changed and ‘I might also need to take care of myself’.”¹⁰⁶

In the run up to the Parliamentary elections, You Stink remained to struggle with the problem of resources. Two co-founders of You Stink stated money and time as the most important resources: time to prepare for participation in the elections and money to advertise their candidate and political statements.¹⁰⁷ The co-founders emphasized the lack of money as an obstacle in the participation in elections, stating especially the costs for media exposure were extensively high.¹⁰⁸ Although no reliable evidence is found to support these claims, the need for sufficient financial resources is implied in the provisions of the 2017 Electoral law. The law stipulates that all electoral advertising is paid and in accordance with a fixed price-list from which it is prohibited to deviate.¹⁰⁹ Thus, all electoral advertising in the mainstream media costs money.

Internal factor – intra-group ideologies

As stated in Chapter 1, intra-group ideologies regard the views of the group under analysis on how to pursue the issues that the group centres around. Ideology is understood here as an ideology concerning politics.¹¹⁰ Earlier in this Chapter, it is asserted that You Stink is focussed on the issue of waste

¹⁰³ Author's interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018; author's interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018; author's interview with Wadih al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

¹⁰⁴ Author's interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018.

¹⁰⁵ Author's interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018.

¹⁰⁶ Author's interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018.

¹⁰⁷ Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author's interview with Wadih al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

¹⁰⁸ Costs of \$6.000-\$7.000 have been mentioned for advertising on billboards and costs for media exposure ranged between \$30.000-\$50.000 (Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author's interview with Wadih al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018).

¹⁰⁹ Article 71, paragraph 2, Electoral Law 2017.

¹¹⁰ In accordance with the definition of Aderno et al (1950:2), as stated in Chapter 1, footnote 18, of this thesis.

management, which derives from the broader issue of corruption in society. In this section, the views of You Stink on how to address these issues are described.

When You Stink emerged, it was a grassroots organization in response to the garbage crisis in Beirut. Assaad Thebian, co-founder of You Stink, states the group's ideology as the following:

*“You Stink was really neutral. Not neutral, it’s actually against the whole system, against even the bridging between 8 and 14 March, we believe they’re one, we believe they’re the same, different faces of the same coin.”*¹¹¹

This shows You Stink's contention against the political establishment. Consequently, the group's involvement in the elections is stated to be an electoral alliance with other groups that are involved in the Civil Society Coalition, for the purpose of the elections.¹¹² It is stated that *people* from You Stink will go into politics, but You Stink as a *group* should stay grassroots, with the aim to change society, not politics.¹¹³ For example, if Lucien Bourjeily, the candidate put forward by You Stink, was to get elected, he would have continued as an independent.¹¹⁴ This shows You Stink's ambition to remain a grassroots organization. According to Wadih al Asmal, co-founder of You Stink, the group intends to remain a watchdog after elections, to mobilize people from different groups in society, around political parties.¹¹⁵ Hassan Chamoun confirms this, stating that it will not be You Stink as a political party in Parliament but as a group in society, criticizing politicians on the flaws in their policy and the overall political system.¹¹⁶ However, Wadih al Asmal also states:

*“A lot of people are ready to go to the streets with You Stink, but maybe they are not ready to vote for You Stink. So, we have to work on this.”*¹¹⁷

Although it should be noted that the respondents have emphasized to speak on their personal behalf and not necessarily on behalf of You Stink as a group, this statement implies that You Stink *does* intend to become more politicized in the future. It also implies that whether or not the group will pursue this intention, depends on the people's willingness to support them. This can be perceived as a reference to the external factor of societal support. However, this is an interpretation made by the researcher, as supporting evidence for this is not found in the acquired data.

¹¹¹ Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018.

¹¹² Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018.

¹¹³ Author's interview with Wadih al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

¹¹⁴ Author's interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018.

¹¹⁵ Author's interview with Wadih al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

¹¹⁶ Author's interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018.

¹¹⁷ Author's interview with Wadih al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

Internal factor – Intra-movement ideologies

This factor discusses the ideologies between groups *within* the CS Movement, from the perspective of You Stink. It is argued that that diverging intra-movement ideologies influences a group's willingness to transform into a political party.

As shown earlier in this chapter, You Stink was not the only group active during the 2015 garbage protests. Several other groups mushroomed over the course of the protests (Kerbage 2017:38), of which Badna Nhaseb was the most prominent.¹¹⁸ While both groups, during the garbage protests, raised awareness for problems in society that came about as a product of corruption, You Stink specifically focussed on the waste whereas Badna Nhaseb focussed on taking back public spaces.¹¹⁹ This is an example of diverging ideologies that You Stink encountered during the garbage protests. Later, when Beirut Madinati emerged for the 2016 Municipality elections, You Stink took a step back. Assaad Thebian explains:

“We as You Stink, we decided that it’s their turn. We are the hardcore street battle people and they are the politics face of our movement and they can do the job and we actually sat down and we watched, and we supported. All our volunteers wanted to volunteer with them, all our communication was to support them, we distanced ourselves.”¹²⁰

This indicates You Stink's recognition of other groups that pursue similar goals to You Stink but have different ideologies on how to approach them. When looking at the Civil Society Coalition, it consisted of multiple groups that put forward candidates in elections.¹²¹ Although operating under the umbrella of Kuluna Watani, there was a lot of disagreement in the coalition. Wadih al Asmal gives an example:

“We agree on ‘which’, but we don’t agree on ‘why’, ‘how’. For example, we all agree that we need a social caring state. But for some of the group, caring state means... They believe that the caring state is about having private hospitals and the state paying the hospitals. But majority believe now that a caring state is enforcing the public sector.”¹²²

According to Bakke et al, the presence of multiple groups in a social movement that claim to represent a common identity and pursue interest corresponding with that identity, increases the chance of social movement fragmentation (2012:268). It is argued here that social movement fragmentation influences

¹¹⁸ Author's interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018; Kerbage 2017:13.

¹¹⁹ Author's interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018.

¹²⁰ Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018.

¹²¹ See Appendix 3 for an overview of electoral alliances; the Civil Society Coalition is presented in the right-lower corner as 'National Coalition'.

¹²² Author's interview with Wadih al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

the willingness of a group to transform into a political party. As the image in Appendix 4 shows, the Civil Society Coalition consisted of multiple groups. As indicated above but returning in multiple interviews,¹²³ these groups had diverging ideologies and strategies. This indicates a fragmentation within the CSMovement, from which Kuluna Watani is a product.

5.3 Chapter recap

Having tested the framework to the case of You Stink, some observations can be made. Regarding the external factors, You Stink focussed on clear neglected topics in society but lacked a proper support base and did not enjoy favourable political opportunities. Similarly, the data shows that the group had problems with acquiring significant resources and the diverging intra-movement ideologies indicate movement fragmentation. In itself, these observations do not provide insights into which factors have significantly influenced the non-transformation of You Stink. In the next chapter, LiBaladi is tested by means of the framework, to offer a comparison to the outcomes of the analysis of You Stink.

¹²³ Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author's interview with Hassan Chamoun, activist, on 10 April 2018; author's interview with Patrick Azrak, activist, on 06 June 2018; author's interview with Respondent 1, You Stink activist, on 10 March 2018; author's interview with Selim Mawad, activist, on 04 June 2018; author's interview with Wadhih al Asmal, You Stink co-founder, on 18 April 2018.

Chapter 6 - LiBaladi

After analysing at the case of You Stink, this chapter discusses the case of LiBaladi as a group that is part of the CSMovement and that *did* transform into a political party.¹²⁴ The group's emergence and development are elaborated on, after which the framework is tested to the case of LiBaladi by analysing how the gathered data corresponds to the factors in the framework.

6.1 Emergence and development

While little data is available on the emergence of LiBaladi, interviews with respondents that are involved in Libaladi all state that LiBaladi is formed by the people that were also involved in Beirut Madinati.¹²⁵ Beirut Madinati is a political organization that emerged in the run up to the 2016 Municipal elections in Beirut. After the 2015 waste management crisis, the political elites in Lebanon were still very much divided due to the Presidential vacancy. When the Municipal elections were announced, this created the perfect basis for a new group to emerge. Andre Sleiman recalls:

*“Everybody was disagreeing with everybody at the government level, so it was a very right moment for a new group to emerge. You could see the stars were aligned for something like Beirut Madinati. To set up a list that was seen as the dream-team. Half women, half men. First list like that in the history of the Arab world. With some respect for tradition, not to change everything, so half Muslim half Christian, everything to please the Lebanese voter.”*¹²⁶

Similar to You Stink, the idea of Beirut Madinati was also to offer opposition to the political establishment in Lebanon, but through political participation instead of activism in the streets. What made Beirut Madinati different from other groups is their active, instead of reactive, approach.¹²⁷ During an interview with Jounama Talhouk, an activist involved in Beirut Madinati, she explained that the 2015 garbage protests were a reaction to a specific issue that had occurred, namely, the garbage in the streets. She argued that such approaches are problematic because, when the issue to which the group reacted to,

¹²⁴ Although opinions of respondents differ on the matter, for analytical purposes this research categorizes LiBaladi as a ‘political party’ in the sense of what is understood as a political party, according to the definition that is provided in Chapter 1. Gilbert Doumit discusses where this aversion of using the term ‘political party’ derives from: *“If you notice, we call LiBaladi not a political group. Because I think it’s an initial of linguistics. It’s not that people are against the concept of parties but because the term party anchored in the context has a different meaning than in political science. A ‘political party’ [in Lebanon] means an institution that can choose to be violent. This is in the collective memory. Can be violent, is only about power and not about issues. [...] So, in the collective consciousness, we need it to differentiate between a political party that is sectarian, that has a centralized power and is only about power and can be violent, versus a group of people who want a secular state, who are working on issues and supposedly they have high integrity.”* (author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018).

¹²⁵ Author’s interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018; author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author’s interview with Nadim Abou Ali, activist, on 31 May 2018; author’s interview with Yorgui Teyrouz, LiBaladi candidate, on 31 May 2018.

¹²⁶ Author’s interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018.

¹²⁷ Author’s interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018; author’s interview with Jounama Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018.

disappears, the group's mission gets lost in the process.¹²⁸ The reason Beirut Madinati emerged, was to offer an alternative approach to making a change in society.

“We had a lot of negatively connotated names that all focussed on what was wrong with the system and what was wrong with the ruling parties. Whereas Beirut Madinati tried to have a shift in paradigm in a sense. So, we tried to focus on what we had to offer. Beirut Madinati translates to ‘Beirut my City’, that alone is a very big change from You Stink. [...] It was really all about injecting hope in people, trying to give solutions to problems, trying to rethink what’s positive.”¹²⁹

This approach seemed to catch on. During the Municipal elections, Beirut Madinati obtained an unprecedented high percentage of votes.¹³⁰ However, they could not compete with the list backed by the established political parties¹³¹ and thus did not gain seats in the municipality of Beirut, due to the majoritarian electoral system that was in place then. When in 2017 the new Electoral Law was passed through Parliament and elections were announced for May 2018, Beirut Madinati decided not to run for Parliament. According to Gilbert Doumit, who had been involved in Beirut Madinati and ran as a candidate for LiBaladi, this decision was influenced by both political and inter-personal differences.¹³² He stated that people in Beirut Madinati had diverging views on how to establish change: some felt that organizing local governance campaigns was the way to go, others felt that Beirut Madinati should give it a try in national politics. Because of this cleavage, Beirut Madinati decided to vote on the matter, which resulted in a majority that was in favour of remaining at the local level. Joumana Talhouk reiterates:

“It was perfect for the battle that it carried. So, it was perfect for the 2016 Beirut municipal elections because it was engineered in a way that really fit very well for the circumstances for that event. The discourse, the branding, the issues that it focussed on and the issues it didn’t focus on. They were all tactical and strategic decisions too, knowing that the point was to get a really good score or to win municipal elections in Beirut. It wasn’t meant to become a party, it wasn’t meant to move on to national elections, it wasn’t meant to do all of these things because as great as the communication was, it wasn’t really politicized in a way that would be enough to carry it to a nation-wide campaign or party.”¹³³

¹²⁸ Author’s interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018.

¹²⁹ Author’s interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018.

¹³⁰ For a grassroots organization trying to break through into politics. Beirut Madinati received 30,2% of the votes in Beirut, according to the official results shown to the author by Andre Sleiman (author’s interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018).

¹³¹ The ‘Beirutis List’ gained 44,23% of the votes (numbers from official results, as shown to author by Andre Sleiman during interview (author’s interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018)).

¹³² Author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

¹³³ Author’s interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018.

This resulted in a splintering of the group and led to the emergence of LiBaladi. As such, LiBaladi emerged through fission. Fission occurs when members from an existing party separate themselves and form a new party (Hug 2010:13). Yorgui Teyrouz, a candidate that ran for elections with LiBaladi, recalled that the idea for LiBaladi was born on 01 January 2017 and was worked on for a year under the code-name ‘Operation 117’, before coming out as LiBaladi.¹³⁴ LiBaladi emerged as an alternative to the established political system.¹³⁵ Their underlying ideology is the establishment a non-sectarian state, which they tried to achieve by fighting the political system through running for Parliament in Beirut I district.¹³⁶ The political program with which LiBaladi ran was based on 11 points and focussed on social, public and local issues in Beirut, towards “citizen well-being and social stability”.¹³⁷ The organizational structure of LiBaladi is, in comparison to You Stink, more organized. The group created a structure by building a team around each individual candidate and developing committees for each candidate’s team.¹³⁸

6.2 Testing the framework

This section now proceeds with testing how the developed framework corresponds with the gathered data about LiBaladi, as this is a group that *did* transform into a political party. First, the external factors are discussed, after which the internal factors are elaborated on. It should be noted that, as the external factors regard the societal context in which the group resides, it has some similarities in comparison to You Stink. This is logical, as both groups under analysis are based in Beirut and are analysed in (roughly) the same time-frame. Thus, the analysis of some external factors will be based on the same argumentation.

External factor – neglected issues in society

This section presents the neglected issues in society that LiBaladi focussed on. Iterating Hug, it is argued that the presence of neglected issues in society is an enabling factor for movement-to-party transformation (2010:10). From interviews with respondents from both Beirut Madinati and LiBaladi, it became apparent that LiBaladi and Beirut Madinati have similar opinions on which issues in society are most prominent to address.¹³⁹ This is a logical pattern, as the people in LiBaladi were part of Beirut Madinati before LiBaladi separated from Beirut Madinati and transformed into a political party. Gilbert

¹³⁴ Author’s interview with Yorgui Teyrouz, LiBaladi candidate, on 31 May 2018.

¹³⁵ LiBaladi Mission Statement, 2018.

¹³⁶ Author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author’s interview with Yorgui Teyrouz, LiBaladi candidate, on 31 May 2018.

¹³⁷ LiBaladi Mission Statement, 2018.

¹³⁸ Author’s interview with Nadim Abou Ali, activist, on 31 May 2018.

¹³⁹ Author’s interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018; author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author’s interview with Nadim Abou Ali, activist, on 31 May 2018.

Doumit states that Beirut Madinati and LiBaladi are connected in the sense that LiBaladi represents link between the local – Beirut Madinati – and the national.¹⁴⁰

LiBaladi has developed a political program with which the group ran for Parliamentary elections. It is assumed that the issues that LiBaladi focusses on in their political program, are the main issues in society that the group wants to change. The political program of LiBaladi centres around 11 key points: the establishment of a productive economy welfare and social security; effective and transparent administration; universal healthcare; affordable and high-quality education for all; uniting heritage and culture; pursuing a sustainable and productive environment; independence of the judiciary; public and private liberties; vibrant cities; and an enabling infrastructure.¹⁴¹

When looking at the gathered data, the issues addressed in LiBaladi's political program are in line with the issues emphasized during the interviews with respondents from both Beirut Madinati and LiBaladi. The gathered data reiterates that LiBaladi's aim was to provide an alternative for the political establishment.¹⁴² The issues addressed in LiBaladi's political program are in line with this aim, as the points focus on improving existing social services, thereby implying that these services are insufficiently provided by the government.

Additionally, as Beirut Madinati was a culmination of the You Stink protests, the group emerged as a response to the corruption that infiltrated the political ranks as well. Andre Sleiman recalls:

“There was a lot of momentum in 2015. [From] You Stink, of course. The You Stink movement was when corruption was no longer an abstract thing, you could smell it.”¹⁴³

However, Beirut Madinati took a different approach than You Stink:

“When you go to the streets and you feel like something is wrong. It's bankrupt politics, it's corrupt, you want to do something. Let's challenge the establishment with a campaign.”¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

¹⁴¹ LiBaladi Party Program, 2018.

¹⁴² LiBaladi Mission Statement, 2018; author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author's interview with Yorgui Teyrouz, LiBaladi candidate, on 31 May 2018; author's interview with Respondent 6, LiBaladi volunteer, on 31 May 2018.

¹⁴³ Author's interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018.

¹⁴⁴ Author's interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018.

“Beirut Madinati’s proposition was ‘okay, let’s move our opposition from the streets into the ballot box and let’s try to, instead of demanding and demanding as we had been for years, let’s be the change we want to see in the world’.”¹⁴⁵

Taking their opposition from the streets to the (municipal) electoral arena, Beirut Madinati needed to develop a program which stated the group’s political views. Although the gathered data provides insufficient evidence regarding the content of this program, Gilbert Doumit has stated that LiBaladi’s local agenda is drafted in line with Beirut Madinati’s political program. Thus, it is assumed that the main neglected issues in society that both Beirut Madinati and LiBaladi focus on, are in line with the 11 points cited in the political program of LiBaladi and derive their basis from challenging the corruption in Lebanon and providing a political alternative for Lebanese citizens.

When comparing LiBaladi’s focus on neglected topics in society to those of You Stink, significant differences are observed. This thus appears to be a decisive factor in movement-to-party transformation.

External factor – lack of trust in political establishment

Consistent with the analysis of You Stink, the factor in this section is operationalized following Mary Kaldor’s indicators as well: growing political dissatisfaction, declining membership in established parties and low voter turnout (2003:5).

Iterating what has been stated regarding growing political dissatisfaction in the previous chapter, the researcher has found no concrete patterns in the conducted interviews, indicating a growing political dissatisfaction. It is rather something that is experienced in daily interactions when living in Lebanon. Additionally, the gathered evidence regarding the low voter turnout in the previous chapter is equally applicable to the case of LiBaladi, as the low voter turnout is a given fact derived from numbers from previous elections. The evidence supporting this fact is applicable to the case of You Stink as well as to the case of LiBaladi and thus requires no further elaboration in this section. It is argued that these two elements also indicate a lack of political trust in the case of LiBaladi.

However, Kaldor’s second indicator for a lack of trust – declining membership in political parties – does require some elaboration. In the interview with Gilbert Doumit, he states that people have left their political parties because the clientelist interest they used to receive, are not there anymore.¹⁴⁶ Although this statement is not further elaborated on and additional evidence is not found in the gathered data, it is interesting to theorize on where this statement derives from. As Gilbert Doumit implies, political party affiliations are grounded in clientelist relations between the political elite and the

¹⁴⁵ Author’s interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018.

¹⁴⁶ Author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

Lebanese population. Clientelism is discussed by Bassel Salloukh as a key characteristic of sectarianism.¹⁴⁷ He states that the sectarian system is sustained through clientelist practices, which in turn produce sectarian subjects.¹⁴⁸ In other words: the political elite's system of providing services to their partisans in return for political support, creates a dependency on these services, which in turn gives the elites leverage over their partisans. In his book, Salloukh states that not abiding by the rules of the sectarian system puts citizens in danger of being denied the clientelist services provided by the elites (Salloukh 2015:7). Putting Gilbert Doumit's statement in this context, it implies that people have, indeed, stopped abiding by the sectarian system by changing their political alliance. However, no supporting evidence for this claim has been found.

The factor of lack of political trust is thus observed to be present with both You Stink and LiBaladi. As such, this factor appears not to be decisive in movement-to-party transformation, as it is present with both You Stink and LiBaladi but You Stink remained a grassroots organization.

External factor – political opportunities

In this section, the notion of political opportunities is operationalized in accordance with McAdam et al as well, through: access to the political system; divisions within the elite; elite allies; and state repression (1996:27).

In line with the previous chapter regarding the analysis of You Stink, no evidence has been found in the data that shows that LiBaladi had any affiliations with elites. This appears to be logical, as the 'elites' in Lebanon regard the political elites,¹⁴⁹ and thus any elite affiliations that LiBaladi has contradicts the core of group's existence, which is to provide a political alternative to the established parties in Lebanon. Thus, following this argumentation and based on the lack of evidence proving otherwise, it is assumed that LiBaladi did not have any elite allies.

The component regarding access to the political system is interesting to briefly elaborate on, even though this component has been analysed in the previous chapter and this analysis applies to the case of LiBaladi as well. Patterns in the gathered data from several interviews¹⁵⁰ with respondents from LiBaladi indicate that the 2017 Electoral Law had a positive effect on the party's possibilities to participate in the Parliamentary elections. However, it should be noted that before the 2017 Electoral Law was announced, the precursor of LiBaladi, 'Operation 117', was already a work in progress.¹⁵¹ Thus, although the 2017 Electoral Law *did* provide an increased opportunity for LiBaladi's access to

¹⁴⁷ Author's interview with Bassel Salloukh, associate professor at LAU, on 10 April 2018.

¹⁴⁸ Author's interview with Bassel Salloukh, associate professor at LAU, on 10 April 2018.

¹⁴⁹ Author's interview with Bassel Salloukh, associate professor at LAU, on 10 April 2018.

¹⁵⁰ Author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author's interview with Jean Kassir, activist, on 19 April 2018; author's interview with Yorgui Teyrouz, LiBaladi candidate, on 31 May 2018.

¹⁵¹ The 2017 Electoral Law was issued on 17 June 2017, whereas 'Operation 117' existed since 01 January 2017 (author's interview with Yorgui Teyrouz, LiBaladi candidate; author's interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018).

the political system due to the change in the electoral system that the law implements,¹⁵² plans to transform into a political party were already discussed. This implies that LiBaladi's participation in the Parliamentary elections was not necessarily driven by the political opportunity of a more favourable access to the political system.

Regarding the divisions within the elite, the data shows patterns indicating a negative political opportunity. This negative political opportunity is understood here as a decline in the divisions within the elite. Where the starts were aligned for Beirut Madinati,¹⁵³ the odds were less in favour of LiBaladi. Since the election of Michel Aoun as President in October 2016, the divisions within the political elite had narrowed. The agreement between Hariri and Aoun regarding the nomination of Aoun as President had formed an implicit alliance bridging the March 8 and March 14 alliances, causing a decline in political polarization within the political establishment. Jean Kassir states:

“It’s not a regime per se that has one face and one command, one sector only. But it’s looking more and more like this because now they’re all allied in one government. They’re all sharing the cake of oil and gas and many other cakes. So, there is something that looks much more like a regime than before, where before you had some sort of... You felt that there was pluralism because they’re all against each other but now they’re all together.”¹⁵⁴

The final component that operationalizes political opportunities is that of state repression. Whereas with You Stink, repression happened through a three-step manifesto of ignore, co-opt, repress¹⁵⁵ - and the repression happened violently - LiBaladi experienced less direct forms of repression. In an interview with Gilbert Doumit, he mentions how LiBaladi experienced difficulties with getting media exposure in the run up to the Parliamentary elections. As an explanation for this, he states:

“On a political level, media has interests in the political sphere. There’s a limit to how much they can risk themselves and their relationships with the political elite, with groups like us. They can push until the limit is there, that is a red line. If they cross, they’re in trouble. They can be in jail, they can lose business, they can be closed. [...]. So, when in elections, there is a civil movement, and it’s organized, and there are some candidates that might be a threat, they make sure not to allow them in at any point.”¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² Article 98, 2017 Electoral Law.

¹⁵³ Author's interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018; author's interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018.

¹⁵⁴ Author's interview with Jean Kassir, activist, on 19 April 2018.

¹⁵⁵ Author's interview with Assaad Thebian, You Stink co-founder, on 19 April 2018; author's interview with Marwan Maalouf, You Stink co-founder, on 24 April 2018; author's interview with Sima Ghaddar, activist, on 07 April 2018.

¹⁵⁶ Author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

In accordance with what Gilbert Doumit states, several respondents¹⁵⁷ have made references to the fact that the media in Lebanon is influenced by politics. All the political elites own specific media platforms that are aligned with their party, through which they convey news that they can frame in favour to their party. The researcher has experienced this herself as well, during the conducted period of field-research in Beirut. Part of the researcher's work at the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA) involved monitoring the media in search of possible violations of the Electoral Law, on election day (May 6th, 2018). While the media reported on several violations, it was remarkable to notice when an alleged violation regarded a specific political party, the media outlet aligned with that party would not report on that specific violation. This confirms the influence of the political elite on the media and indicates the possibility of the elites using the media as a way to repress political contenders.

As significant differences in the political opportunities are observed between LiBaladi and You Stink, this appears to be a significant factor in movement-to-party transformation.

External factor – societal support

During the Municipality elections of 2016, Beirut Madinati was able to successfully mobilize a relatively broad support base in society, which is demonstrated through the fact that they gained 30,2% of the votes in the elections.¹⁵⁸ With LiBaladi, however, the data is inconclusive. No convincing patterns in the evidence can be identified which allow for a substantiated claim to be made about the base of support that LiBaladi enjoyed. An interesting statement about mobilizing societal support was made by Jean Kassir, an activist who was formerly involved in Beirut Madinati. When the researcher asked about the observed lack of enthusiasm with Lebanese citizens to vote, he stated:

*“Things have gotten to a point that's really unbearable in this country. It's very normal that people feel this way. Because they don't see in any of the contenders, including civil society, a real, long-term alternative. Civil society is not able to provide the answers for these people.”*¹⁵⁹

This implies the difficulty for newcomers in the political arena to mobilize support, due to scepticism of Lebanese citizens. Gilbert Doumit recognizes this obstacle and acknowledges that it is a high-risk bet for people to vote on a party outside the established political elite.¹⁶⁰

As the data regarding societal support for You Stink and LiBaladi shows no significant difference between the two groups, this factor is regarded as inconsiderable for movement-to-party transformation.

¹⁵⁷ Author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author's interview with Respondent 1, activist, on 10 March 2018; author's interview with Selim Mawad, activist, on 04 June 2018.

¹⁵⁸ According to the official results shown to the author by Andre Sleiman (author's interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018).

¹⁵⁹ Author's interview with Jean Kassir, activist, on 19 April 2018.

¹⁶⁰ Author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

Having elaborated on how the gathered data corresponds with the external factors of the framework, the following section discusses the internal factors.

Internal factor – available resources

According to McCarthy and Zald, group development depends on the group's ability to obtain resources (1977:1221). Following their claim, it is argued that the presence and availability of resources to a group, enables movement-to-party transformation. Corresponding with what the data showed about You Stink, the collected data about LiBaladi identifies the same three key resources: time, money and manpower.¹⁶¹ Andre Sleiman, activist involved in Beirut Madinati, stated that one of the reasons that Beirut Madinati did not participate in the Parliamentary elections was due to a lack of time to sufficiently prepare.¹⁶² Joumana Talhouk confirms this, stating:

*“We weren't a political party. So, we were a bunch of academics and consultants and experts and activists and urban activists. And that was really what joined us together. And for that to become a political party is a very long and hard process I think, that we didn't really do. We weren't ready to do that in the span of one year from municipal elections to Parliamentary elections.”*¹⁶³

It is interesting to note the fact that Beirut Madinati decided not to run for Parliamentary elections due to a lack of time but that LiBaladi disregarded this notion, as they transformed into a political party after the Municipality elections¹⁶⁴ and thus had a comparable time-frame to organize for elections. Indeed, the respondents involved in LiBaladi lay more emphasis on the importance of money and manpower.¹⁶⁵ However, the gathered data shows that LiBaladi encountered problems with both these resources.

*“We had no resources. [...] I think our full budget does not exceed \$100,000 and was mainly personal contributions from a lot of the members and crowdfunding and a couple fund-raising events and few individuals who have put a bit of money, \$5,000 here, \$10,000 there. So, we had no resources. Talking about \$100,000 for six candidates.”*¹⁶⁶

¹⁶¹ Author's interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018; author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author's interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018; author's interview with Jean Kassir, activist, on 19 April 2018; author's interview with Nadim Abou Ali, LiBaladi volunteer, on 31 May 2018.

¹⁶² Author's interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018.

¹⁶³ Author's interview with Joumana Talhouk, activist, on 31 May 2018.

¹⁶⁴ Discussions about the formation of LiBaladi commenced on 01 January 2017 with 'Operation 117' (author's interview with Yorgui Teyrouz, LiBaladi candidate, on 31 May 2018).

¹⁶⁵ Author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author's interview with Nadim Abou Ali, LiBaladi volunteer, on 31 May 2018; author's interview with Respondent 6, LiBaladi volunteer, on 31 May 2018.

¹⁶⁶ Author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

Regarding manpower, Respondent 6 recalls that LiBaladi did have access to volunteers but that stated that the organization of the workflows within the organizational structure of LiBaladi made it difficult to place volunteers, which caused them not to be fully utilized. As such, the structure of LiBaladi's organization inhibited the maximization of the value of the resources at the group's disposal.¹⁶⁷ This emphasis on the importance of organization is also implied in above statement by Joumana Talhouk. For Beirut Madinati, this was reason not to participate in Parliamentary elections. For LiBaladi, this was not a factor they considered, as they transformed into a political party and ran in elections anyway.

This analysis of available resources shows similarities between You Stink and LiBaladi. Data gathered around both groups showed a need for more time to properly organize for elections and both groups have emphasized their lack in financial resources. Additionally, where You Stink showed shortage in the availability of manpower, LiBaladi did have access to volunteers but was unable to utilize this resource due to incompatibility of organizational workflows. As such, the availability of resources in the cases of You Stink and LiBaladi are comparable and show no significant differences. Thus, this factor does not appear to be a significant enabler for movement-to-party transformation.

Internal factor – intra-group ideology

Iterating Chapter 1, intra-group ideologies regard the views of the group under analysis on how to pursue the issues that the group centres around. Ideology, here, is understood as an ideology concerning politics.¹⁶⁸ The political ideology of LiBaladi is to establish a change in society, towards an anti-sectarian system, which is achieved through participation in elections.¹⁶⁹ Andre Sleiman agrees with this, stating:

“It's not that we want power but eventually to change things, you have to be in power. That's it, that's very clear. Which means that a political movement is by default a contender in any election. [...] The only way to change is to have a political movement, it can be grassroots, social, everything you want, but it has to be organized like a party. Otherwise it's too fluid, people can just switch allegiances.”¹⁷⁰

The fact that LiBaladi's ideology – or 'theory of change', as Gilbert Doumit calls it – centres around participation in elections, explains the fact that talks about transforming into a political party had already commenced before the 2017 Electoral Law was issued. Thus, although the provisions of the 2017 Electoral Law may have turned out be favourable to LiBaladi and may therefore have provided the group with an additional incentive to transform into a political party, the data shows evidence that this was not a decisive factor.

¹⁶⁷ Author's interview with Respondent 6, LiBaladi volunteer, on 31 May 2018; author's interview with Yorgui Teyrouz, LiBaladi candidate, on 31 May 2018.

¹⁶⁸ In accordance with the definition of Aderno et al (1950:2), as stated in Chapter 1, footnote 18, of this thesis.

¹⁶⁹ Author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

¹⁷⁰ Author's interview with Andre Sleiman, Beirut Madinati activist, on 04 May 2018.

Regarding the specifics of LiBaladi's ideology, Gilbert Doumit states the following:

“In terms of ideology, on economic level, we're centre-left. We believe that government is the core responsible of ensuring basic rights and basic services. When it comes to public-private partnerships; we're not very keen on having it unless within very concise conditions, related to governance but also not on issues that pertain to basic rights of citizens as well as when we go into the tax system but also breaking the relation between the banking sector, the political elite and our debts. We're very clear about it but also with some very specific positions on how to break this relationship. Come to social, we're very liberal social so pro total LGBT rights, refugee rights in Lebanon, gender equality at the extreme so we're very liberal socially. This came out of the civil state, we're a little bit more extreme in this sense, in the sense that it's not only enough to implement the constitution but we also need to reform the sectarian, the confessional institution so they fit into the constitution.”¹⁷¹

Above concretization of the ideology of LiBaladi shows a focus on issues that are inherently political and decided upon on a Parliamentary level. Thus, the issues cannot sufficiently be pursued by remaining a grassroots group or by operating on a local – municipal – political level. This creates an incentive to transform into a political party.

The intra-group ideologies show to be significantly different from the intra-group ideology of You Stink. As this factor shows a significant discrepancy between the two groups, it may be a decisive factor in movement-to-party transformation. Thus, this is further elaborated on in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

Internal factor – intra-movement ideologies

Iterating Chapter 5, it is argued that diverging intra-movement ideologies influences a group's willingness to transform into a political party. In the case of the CSMovement, the data indicates that there are two groups that focus on similar issues as LiBaladi does: Beirut Madinati and Sabaa. The diverging ideologies between these groups and LiBaladi are discussed below.

As is already discussed in this chapter, LiBaladi splintered from Beirut Madinati due to diverging ideologies about how to establish political change. While Beirut Madinati voted to remain on the local level, LiBaladi beliefs change is achieved through political participation on the national level.¹⁷² However, the gathered data shows no evidence that indicates a decline in the willingness of LiBaladi to

¹⁷¹ Author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

¹⁷² Author's interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

transform into a political party due to these diverging ideologies. On the contrary, LiBaladi transformed into a political party *because* of this, with the aim of linking the national level with the local level.¹⁷³

Conversely, LiBaladi and Sabaa differ in ideology regarding their organizational manifestation. While LiBaladi claims to be issue-driven,¹⁷⁴ Sabaa seems to be organizationally driven, meaning that the group primarily focusses on providing a solid organizational structure. In an interview with Jad Dagher, co-founder and Secretary General of Sabaa, he states the following reason for creating the group:

*“We did a diagnosis on the country and we saw that we didn’t have political parties in the international meaning of political parties. We have personal and family leadership which build organizations around a person. But no real platform at the disposal of society to organize political activism. We saw that there was a huge gap in the country on that level and this is why we decided to create this kind of platform. [...] And this platform is at the disposal of people who want to do politics.”*¹⁷⁵

Although this statement implies that Sabaa provided a platform for others to do politics, it should be noted that this claim cannot be further substantiated through data, as the researcher did not receive the additional information she was promised from Sabaa, regarding the group’s political program and political orientation. Based on observations when visiting the office of Sabaa on two occasions, the researcher can attest to the solid organization of the group. Sabaa has built a professional brand around itself, including a logo, a colour, a sign and a business office. However, no claims can be made regarding the content or political stance of the issues that Sabaa focusses on.

Contrary to You Stink, the analysis of the intra-movement ideologies that LiBaladi experienced lacks sufficient data to make any substantiated claims about diverging ideologies between groups within the CSMovement that are similar to LiBaladi. Therefore, the significance of this factor in enabling movement-to-party transformation is disregarded from further analysis, as a substantial comparison between You Stink and LiBaladi is not possible.

6.3 Chapter recap

The analysis of LiBaladi by means of the developed framework has revealed some interesting differences compared to You Stink. Regarding the external factors, it is shown that LiBaladi adopts a broader focus on neglected issues in society as compared to You Stink and LiBaladi has encountered more negative political opportunities. Regarding the internal factors, a major discrepancy is observed

¹⁷³ Author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018.

¹⁷⁴ Author’s interview with Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate, on 11 June 2018; author’s interview with Yorgui Teyrouz, LiBaladi candidate, on 31 May 2018.

¹⁷⁵ Author’s interview with Jad Dagher, co-founder of Sabaa, on 12 June 2018.

between the intra-group ideologies of You Stink and LiBaladi. Due to the significant differences in these factors between You Stink and LiBaladi, it is argued that these indicators are key enablers for movement-to-party transformation. These three factors – neglected issues in society, political opportunities and intra-group ideology – are further elaborated on in the concluding chapter of this thesis, presented next.

Conclusion

What conditions enable the transformation of some groups in the 'Civil Society' Movement - as opposed to the non-transformation of other groups – into political parties in the run up to the 2018 Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon?

This is the question that the researcher has aimed to answer in this thesis. To answer this question, a comprehensive framework is developed, considering both internal and external factors, borrowed from Social Movement Theory (SMT) and Political Party Theory (PT), that influence movement-to-party transformation. The underlying assumption followed in this thesis is that a factor (external or internal) is regarded a key enabler to movement-to-party transformation when a significant discrepancy occurs in the outcome of applying that factor to both cases. This assumption follows the following reasoning: a comprehensive framework is developed, considering all significant factors that may enable movement-to-party transformation. By analysing how these factors correspond with a group that *did* transform into a political party, and a group that did *not* transform into a political party, the key factors that enable movement-to-party transformation are identified as those factors where the two groups under analysis differ the most, as the 'outcome' of the groups (a political party and a grassroots organization respectively) significantly differ as well.

When comparing the outcomes of the analysis of You Stink and LiBaladi, three factors showed significant differences between the two groups. This regards the groups' focus on neglected issues in society, the political opportunities, and the intra-group ideologies. These three factors are discussed below.

Neglected issues in society

It is shown that You Stink and LiBaladi focus on different issues in society, which require different approaches to solving them. The issue that You Stink primarily focussed on is the waste management issue, even though the focus on this issue is related to the dissatisfaction with the degree of corruption in the political establishment. Contrastingly, LiBaladi focusses on a wider range of topics, reflected in the group's political program, with the underlying aim of offering a political alternative to the established parties. Thus, the issues that LiBaladi focussed on are inherently political. Solving the issues that the groups focus on, require different approaches and different types of organization. Indeed, for the purpose of solving the waste management issue, a grassroots approach of campaigning and raising awareness suffices. However, LiBaladi's focus on more political issues such as building an inclusive economy and providing healthcare in Lebanon, deem a political approach necessary. In other words, the

nature and scope of the neglected issues that a group focusses on, or aspires to focus on, influences the likelihood of that group transforming into a political party.

Political opportunities

Regarding the political opportunities of You Stink and LiBaladi, the data shows some interesting discrepancies. The 2017 Electoral Law has provided openings in the access to the political system for both groups, but, as the data indicated, this was not decisive for LiBaladi, as discussions about transforming into a political party had already commenced in the group before the law was issued. Additionally, LiBaladi experiences two ‘negative political opportunities’: a lack of divisions within the elite and acts of repression. Contrastingly, You Stink only experienced acts of repression, and even had the ‘positive’ political opportunity of divisions within the elite due to the Presidential vacancy at the time. Although SMT scholars have emphasized the importance of political opportunities in social movement emergence and development, as is discussed in the literature review presented in the beginning of this thesis, it is remarkable to observe the transformation of LiBaladi into a political party despite the groups unfavourable political opportunities in comparison with You Stink. This indicates that an argument can be made about how unfavourable political opportunities may be an incentive to pursue a political change through transforming into a political party. However, this research has not generated any data to further develop or support this argument, nor is it the place in this thesis to do so.

Intra-group ideologies

As the analysis of You Stink and LiBaldi shows, the diverging intra-group ideologies raise different sorts of groups. Where You Stink believes that the change they want to establish – solving the issue of waste management – is best achieved through a grassroots approach, LiBaladi believes that change in Lebanese society is best achieved by influencing policies from within the political system. Hence, they believed that participation in elections and thereby offering an alternative to the political establishment, is the way to achieve the issues they focussed on. Thus, the diverging intra-group ideologies of both You Stink and LiBaladi relate to the groups’ respective focus on the neglected issues in society. The factor of intra-movement ideologies is a key enabler of movement-to-party transformation, as it dictates the means through which a group aims to solve the issues it raises in society and thus whether it is necessary to pursue these means by transforming into a political party, or not.

Conclusion

With the aim of answering the research puzzle of what conditions enable movement-to-party transformation of some groups in the CSMovement, as opposed to other groups, this research has developed a comprehensive framework and applied it to the cases of You Stink and LiBaladi. Resulting from the analysis, the research has identified three key indicators for movement-to-party transformation:

the neglected issues in society that a group focusses on, political opportunities and intra-group ideologies. These three factors indicate *what issues* a group focusses on, *how* the group wants to achieve a solution for these issues and whether structures in society are *opportune* to pursue this solution. Movement-to-party transformation occurs when the issues in society that a group focusses on are inherently political and deem participation in the political arena necessary and possible. It should be noted that this conclusion does not disregard the other factors in the framework; it is merely implied that these are secondary to the identified three key indicators that enable movement-to-party transformation.

Further research

This thesis has focussed on the conditions that *enable* movement-to-party transformation, by comparing how the factors in the developed framework applied to a group that did *not* transform into a political party, and how the factors applied to a group that *did* transform into a political party. The organizational practicalities of the movement-to-party transformation process itself have been disregarded, as the focus of the research was to identify which conditions are significant enablers that make a group transform into a political party. Further, large-scale qualitative research is necessary to ascertain whether the conclusions made in this thesis are reproduced when applied to a broader range of (groups in) social movements.

Additionally, as this research has disregarded the notion of party success after transformation, the research cannot make statements about the sustainability or electoral success of parties that have transformed from social movements. Further research is necessary regarding the political success of groups within a social movement that have transformed into a political party.

- *Khalas*.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ Arabic expression, in this context roughly translated as ‘it is done’.

Bibliography

Academic articles

AbiYaghi, M., 2012, 'Civil Mobilization and Peace in Lebanon: Beyond the Reach of the Arab Spring?', *Accord – An International Review of Peace Initiatives*, 24, pp. 20-23.

Anderson, W. A. and Dynes, R. R., 1973, 'Organizational and Political Transformation of a Social Movement: A Study of the 30th of May Movement in Curacao', *Social Forces*, 51(3), pp. 330-341.

Andrew, M., 2010, 'Women's Movement Institutionalization: The Need for New Approaches', *Politics & Gender*, 6(4), pp. 609-616.

Azani, E., 2012, 'Hezbollah's Strategy of "Walking on the Edge": Between Political Game and Political Violence', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35(11), pp. 741-759.

Bakke, K.M., Gallagher Cunningham, K. and Seymour, L. J. M., 2012, 'A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion and Infighting in Civil Wars', *Perspectives on Politics*, 10(2), pp. 265-283.

Bolleyer, N. and Bytzek, E., 2013, 'Origins of Party Transformation and New Party Success in Advanced Democracies', *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(1), pp. 773-796.

Chaaban, J., Haidar, D., Ismail, R., Khoury, R. and Shidrawi, M., 2016, 'Beirut's 2016 Municipal Elections: Did Beirut Madinati Permanently Change Lebanon's Electoral Scene?', *Case Analysis – Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies*, pp. 1-18.

Di Peri, R., 2014, 'Islamist Actors from an Anti-System Perspective: The Case of Hizbullah', *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 15(4), pp. 487-503.

Durac, V., 2015, 'Social Movements, Protest Movements and Cross-Ideological Coalitions: The Arab Uprisings Re-Appraised', *Democratization*, 22(2), pp. 239-258.

Eisinger, P.K., 1973, 'The Conditions of Protest Behaviour in American Cities', *The American Political Science Review*, 67(1), pp. 11-28.

- Entelis, J. P., 1973, 'Party Transformation in Lebanon: Al-Kata'ib As a Case Study', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 9(3), pp. 325-340.
- Fukuyama, F., 2001, 'Social Capital, Civil Society and Development', *Third World Quarterly*, 22(1), pp. 7-20.
- Gagyi, A., 2015, 'Social Movement Studies for East Central Europe? The Challenge of a Time-Space Bias on Post-War Western Societies', *East European Journal of Society and Politics*, 1(3), pp. 16-36.
- Gerring, J., 'Ideology: A Definitional Analysis', *Political Research Quarterly*, 50(4), pp. 957-994.
- Gregg, H. S., 2011, 'Setting a Place at the Table: Ending Insurgencies Through the Political Process', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 22(4), pp. 644-668.
- Haddad, S., 2009, 'Lebanon: From Consociationalism to Conciliation', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 15(3-4), pp. 398-416.
- Harmel, R. and Robertson, J. D., 1985, 'Formation and Success of New Parties: A Cross-National Analysis', *International Political Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique*, 6(4), pp. 501-523.
- Ishiyama, J. and Batta, A., 2011, 'Swords into Plowshares: The Organizational Transformation of Rebel Groups into Political Parties', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 44(4), pp. 369-379.
- Kaldor, M., 2003, 'Civil Society and Accountability', *Journal of Human Development*, 4(1), pp. 5-27.
- Kerbage, C., 2017, 'Politics of Coincidence: The Harak Confronts its "Peoples"', *Issam Fares Institute Working Paper*, 41.
- Kitschelt, H. P., 1988, 'Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems', *World Politics*, 40(2), pp. 194-234.
- Kraidy, M. M., 2016, 'Trashing the Sectarian System? Lebanon's "You Stink" Movement and the Making of Affective Publics', *Communication and the Public*, 1(1), pp. 19-26.
- Makdisi, U., 1996, 'Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon', *Middle East Report*, 200, pp. 23-26+30.

McAdam, D., 1999, The Decline of the Civil Rights Movement. In Bromley, D.G. et al. (Eds.), *Waves of Protest: Social Movements in the Sixties*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., pp. 325-348.

McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M.N., 1977, 'Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory', *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(6), pp. 1212-1241.

Meier, D., 2015, 'Popular Mobilizations in Lebanon: From Anti-System to Sectarian Claims', *Democracy and Security*, 11(2), pp. 176-189.

Meyer, D.S., 2004, 'Protest and Political Opportunities', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30, pp.125-145.

Rousseau, S., Hudson, A. M., 2017, Indigenous Women's Movements: An Intersectional Approach to Studying Social Movements. In: Indigenous Women's Movements in Latin America. Crossing Boundaries of Gender and Politics in the Global South, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Safa, O., 2011, Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in the Arab World: The Work of Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon and Morocco. In Austin, B. et al (Eds.), *Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Bergman Handbook II*, Berlin: Barbara Budrich Publishers, pp. 1-18.

Speight, J. and Wittig, K., 2017, 'Pathways from Rebellion: Rebel-Party Configurations in Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi', *African Affairs*, 117(466), pp. 21-43.

Zald, M.N. and Ash, R., 1966, 'Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change', *Social Forces*, 44(3), pp. 327-341.

Books

Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., Sanford, R. N., 1950, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Harper.

Demmers, J., 2017, *Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction*, New York: Routledge.

Gamson, W. A., 1975, *The Strategy of Protest*, Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey.

Giddens, A., 1982, *Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory*, London: Pelgrave.

Hug, S., 2010, *Interests, Identities and Institutions in Comparative Politics: Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behaviour and the Emergence of New Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

McAdam, D., 1982, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, D., McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M.N. (Eds.), 1996, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Meyer, D. S. and Tarrow, S., 1998, *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, Lanham: Rowmand & Littlefield Publishers.

Oberschall, A., 1973, *Social Conflict and Social Movements*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Ragin, C. C. and Amoroso, L. M. (Eds.), 2010, *Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method*, Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.

Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, C. M. and Ormston, R. (Eds.), 2013, *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Salloukh, B., Barakat, R., Al-Habbal, J. S., Khattab, L. W., Mikaelian, S., and Nerguizian, A., 2015, *The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon*, London: Pluto Press.

Tarrow, S., 1994, *Power in Movement: Social movements, Collective Action and Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C., 2015, *Contentious Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Tilly, C., 1978, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Traboulsi, F., 2007, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, London: Pluto Press.

Yin, R. K., 2014, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc.

Legal/organizational documents

Lebanese Constitution, 1926. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.lp.gov.lb/backoffice/uploads/files/Lebanese%20%20Constitution-%20En.pdf> [Accessed on 09 August 2018].

Lebanese Electoral Law, 2017. [ONLINE]. Available at: <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2017/Jul-07/411988-lebanese-electoral-law-2017-full-text-in-english.ashx> [Accessed on 09 August 2018].

Lebanese Municipal Act, 1977. [ONLINE]. Available at: www.interior.gov.lb/oldmoim/moim/.../Municipal_Act_Eng.doc [Accessed on 09 August 2018].

LiBaladi Mission Statement, 2018. [n.p].¹⁷⁷

LiBaladi Party Program Summary, 2018. [n.p].¹⁷⁸

Taif Agreement, 1989. [ONLINE]. Available at: https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the_tauf_agreement_english_version_.pdf [Accessed on 09 August 2018].

United Nations Security Council, 2004, *Resolution 1559*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sc8181.doc.htm> [Accessed on 09 August 2018].

Online sources

Al Jazeera, 2005, *Beirut Protesters Demand Syria Pullout*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/03/200849154914733873.html> [Accessed on 25 July 2018].

Al Jazeera, 2015, *Lebanese Protests Against Waste-Disposal Crisis*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/lebanon-beirut-trash-rubbish-crisis-150725060723178.html> [Accessed on 24 July 2018].

¹⁷⁷ Document not published. Received upon special request from Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate.

¹⁷⁸ Document not published. Received upon special request from Gilbert Doumit, LiBaladi candidate.

Al Jazeera, 2016, *Lebanon: Civil Groups Seek Change in Local Elections*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/lebanon-civil-groups-seek-change-local-elections-160427092123356.html> [Accessed on 24 July 2018].

Al Jazeera, 2016a, *Rubbish Pickup Resumes in Lebanon in Bid to End Crisis*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/trash-pickup-resumes-lebanon-month-garbage-crisis-beirut-160320035647973.html> [Accessed on 02 August 2018].

Al Jazeera, 2016b, *Beirutis List Claims Victory in Lebanon Municipal Polls*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/beirutis-list-claims-victory-lebanon-municipal-polls-160509114827112.html> [Accessed on 24 July 2018].

Al Jazeera, 2017, *Will Lebanon's New Electoral Law End the Stalemate?* [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/lebanon-electoral-law-stalemate-170615064815219.html> [Accessed on 25 July 2018].

An Nahar, 2017, *Lebanon Readies for Third Extension of Parliament's Term*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://en.annahar.com/article/568745-lebanon-readies-for-third-extension-of-parliaments-term> [Accessed on 25 July 2018].

BBC, 2010, *'Ugly Beirut' Struggles to Survive Peace*. [ONLINE]. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8665696.stm [Accessed on 23 July 2018].

BBC, 2016, *Lebanon: Michel Aoun Elected President, Ending Two-Year Stalemate*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37821597> [Accessed on 24 July 2018].

BBC, 2016a, *Saad Hariri Named Lebanon's New Prime Minister*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37860414> [Accessed on 03 August 2018].

Beck, M., 2015, *Contextualizing the Current Social Protest Movement in Lebanon*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/10/10/contextualizing-the-current-social-protest-movement-in-lebanon/> [Accessed on 15 July 2018].

Ben Allen, 2018, *Lebanon*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.gapyear.com/articles/opinion/lebanon-filthy-frustrating-fun-fantastic> [Accessed on 06 August 2018]

Caren, N., 2007, Political Process Theory. In Ritzer, G. (Ed.), *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.nealcaren.web.unc.edu/files/2012/05/Political-Process-Theory- -Blackwell-Encyclopedia-of-Sociology- -Blackwell-Reference-Online.pdf> [Accessed on 06 August 2018].

Daily Star, 2013, *Parliament Extends Term By 17 Months*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2013/May-31/219022-parliament-extends-term-by-17-months.ashx> [Accessed on 24 July 2018].

Daily Star, 2015, *Garbage Collection Halted in Beirut, Mount Lebanon*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jul-20/307416-garbage-collection-halted-in-beirut-mount-lebanon.ashx> [Accessed on 24 July 2018].

Daily Star, 2016, *New Group Sets Out Issue-Based Beirut Manifesto*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2016/Mar-23/343620-new-group-sets-out-issue-based-beirut-manifesto.ashx> [Accessed on 24 July 2018].

Daily Star, 2018, *Lebanese Electoral Law 2017: Full Text in English*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2017/Jul-07/411988-lebanese-electoral-law-2017-full-text-in-english.ashx> [Accessed on 25 July 2018].

Fox World News, 2015, *Lebanese Protesters Clash With Police Officers in Downtown Beirut Over Trash Crisis*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/08/19/lebanese-protesters-clash-with-police-officers-in-downtown-beirut-over-trash.html> [Accessed on 02 August 2018].

Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies (LCPS), 2017, “Our” *New Electoral Law: Proportional in Form, Majoritarian at Heart*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=117> [Accessed on 25 July 2018].

Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies (LCPS), 2018, *Lebanese Elections: Clientelist As a Strategy to Garner Votes*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=134> [Accessed on 25 July 2018].

Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies (LCPS), 2018a, *Party Coalitions in Parliamentary Elections Lists*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://twitter.com/lcpslebanon/status/992695112730849280> [Accessed on 03 August 2018].

National Democratic Institute (NDI), 2009, *Final Report on the Lebanese Parliamentary Election, 7 June 2009*. [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Lebanese_Elections_Report_2009.pdf [Accessed on 02 August 2018].

New York Times (NY Times), 2015, *Clashes Break Out During Protests Over Trash Crisis Lebanon*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/24/world/middleeast/lebanese-protest-as-trash-piles-up-in-beirut.html> [Accessed on 02 August 2018].

New York Times (NY Times), 2015a, *Lebanese Protesters Aim for Rare Unity Against Gridlocked Government*. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/world/middleeast/lebanon-protests-garbage-government-corruption.html> [Accessed on 02 August 2018].

Reuters, 2014, *Lebanese Parliament Extends Own Term Till 2017 Amid Protests*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-parliament/lebanese-parliament-extends-own-term-till-2017-amid-protests-idUSKBN0IP18T20141105> [Accessed on 24 July 2018].

Reuters, 2015, *Beirut Protesters Occupy Ministry, Demand Minister Resigns*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-protest/beirut-protesters-occupy-ministry-demand-minister-resigns-idUSKCN0R13G120150901> [Accessed on 02 August 2018].

Reuters, 2015a, *Thousands Rally in Beirut Against Political Leaders, Rot*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-crisis-politics/thousands-rally-in-beirut-against-political-leaders-rot-idUSKCN0QY08S20150830> [Accessed on 03 August 2018].

Reuters, 2016, *Hariri Backed List Wins Beirut Vote – Leader, Local Media*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-election-idUSKCN0Y001A> [Accessed on 02 August 2018].

Reuters, 2016a, *Lebanon's Hariri Backs Aoun as President in Bid to End Political Deadlock*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-politics/lebanons-hariri-backs-aoun-as-president-in-bid-to-end-political-deadlock-idUSKCN12K1UM> [Accessed on 03 August 2018].

Reuters, 2017, *Lebanese President Blocks Expected Extension of Parliament's Term*. [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-parliament-idUSKBN17E1JM> [Accessed on 25 July 2018].

Sulaksono, T., 2017, [n.p.], *Street or Senayan? FPI Between Contentious Politics and Transformation into Party*. Manuscript. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://repository.umsida.ac.id/bitstream/handle/123456789/13321/Street%20or%20Senayan%20FPI%20Between%20Contentious%20Politics.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [Accessed on 20 July 2018].


Transparency International, 2017, *Corruption Perceptions Index 2017* [ONLINE]. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 [Accessed on 02 August 2018].

Transparency International, 2018, *How Do You Define Corruption?* [ONLINE]. Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define> [Accessed on 02 August 2018].

World Bank, 2018, *Civil Society*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/partners/civil-society#2> [Accessed on 04 August 2018].

Zollner, B., 2016, [n.p.], *The Metamorphosis of Social Movements into Political Parties During Democratic Transition Processes. A Comparison of Egyptian and Tunisian Movements and Parties*. Manuscript. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/15014/1/Zollner%20Metamorphosis%20ISA%20submission.pdf> [Accessed on 20 July 2018].

Appendix 1 – Map of electoral districts¹⁷⁹




¹⁷⁹ Source of image: Daily Star, 2018.

Appendix 2 – List of interviewees

Name	Profession/Organization	Date of interview	Location
Andre Sleiman	Beirut Madinati	04 May 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Assaad Thebian	You Stink	19 April 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Bassel Salloukh	Professor at LAU	10 April 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Dany Haddad	Executive Director at LTA	12 June 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Gilbert Doumit	Candidate with LiBaladi	11 June 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Hassan Chamoun	You Stink / activist	10 April 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Jad Dagher	Sabaa	12 June 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Jean Kassir	Beirut Madinati / activist	19 April 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Joana Hamour	NAHNOO	22 March 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Joumana Talhouk	Beirut Madinati / activist	31 May 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Marwan Maalouf	You Stink / activist	24 April 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Nadim Abou Ali	LiBaladi	31 May 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Omar Karem	Sabaa	25 April 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Patrick Azrak	Activist	06 June 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Respondent 1	You Stink / activist	10 March 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Respondent 2	Taxi Driver	24 March 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Respondent 3	You Stink	03 April 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Respondent 4	Elections specialist	24 April 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Respondent 5	You Stink	23 May 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Respondent 6	LiBaladi	31 May 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Respondent 7	Activist	08 June 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Respondent 8	Sabaa	11 June 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Riwa Zoghraib	LTA	18 May 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Selim Mawad	(Former) activist	04 June 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Sima Ghaddar	Activist	07 April 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Wadih Al Asmal	You Stink	18 April 2018	Beirut, Lebanon
Yorgui Teyrouz	Candidate with LiBaladi	31 May 2018	Beirut, Lebanon

Appendix 3 – Map of Electoral Alliances in 2018 Parliamentary Elections¹⁸⁰



Source of image: LCPS, 2018a.