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Greenpeace's identity formation: its organisational transformation and the strategic development of its anti-nuclear campaign in the 1980s and 1990s.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	3
Abbreviations	4
Abstract	5
Introduction	6
State of the art: The environmental movement activism	9
Diversity of EMOs	9
Institutionalisation and its dilemmas	10
Influence and effectiveness	12
Research question	13
Sub-questions	13
Conceptual and theoretical framework	13
Methodology	16
Chapter One: Institutionalisation and anti-nuclear campaigning	19
Chaotic decision-making structures	19
Conflicting improvement ideas	22
Implementation period	24
Reflection period	26
Greenpeace Inc. ?	27
Anti-nuclear campaigning and institutionalisation	29
Broadening the scope	31
Efficient budgeting	32
Creating continuity	33
Greenpeace's relationship with the IAEA	34
Chapter Two: The impact of external circumstances on anti-nuclear campaigning	38
Global external influences	39
National external influences	44
Chapter Three: Different internal approaches to anti-nuclear campaigning and consequent dilemmas	50
First dilemma: The credibility gap	51
Second dilemma: Legitimate reasons for action	53
Third dilemma: Relevant campaigning angles	56
Conclusion	60
Bibliography	63
Primary source material	63
Secondary source material	65

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Abbreviations

AGM – Annual General Meeting
DefCon - Defense readiness Condition
EMO – Environmental Movement Organisation
ENGO – Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation
GPIA – Greenpeace International Archives
GPI – Greenpeace International
IISG – Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis
Inc. – Incorporated Company
Ltd. – Limited Company
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
USA – United States of America
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII – World War 2

Abstract

This empirical study intends to explain a specific facet of the broader picture of Greenpeace's complex identity formation process over time. The overall research objective is to show how Greenpeace should not be regarded as a singular entity, but rather as an environmental organisation with many different ideological strands. By taking the anti-nuclear campaign in the 1980s and 1990s as a case study, this research aims to investigate different identity perceptions within Greenpeace. It argues that Greenpeace's diverging strategic approaches and consequent internal debates were constructed based on the impact of its organisational development as well as the influence of external conditions. The organisation's transformation from a grassroots group pursuing outside actions into a professional protest organisation working from within but also continuing to conduct unconventional actions, influenced anti-nuclear campaign actions and the internal perceptions of Greenpeace's identity. Likewise, external circumstances, such as the Cold War, had a profound impact on how the organisation was perceived, which led to different understandings of what anti-nuclear campaigning could achieve. This study aims to contribute to existing scholarship by looking at internal dynamics and the internal perception of identity in one of the largest-scale, furthest-reaching, most well-funded ENGOs in the world.

Introduction

“The truth is Greenpeace and I underwent divergent evolutions. I became a sensible environmentalist; Greenpeace became increasingly senseless as it adopted an agenda that is anti-science, anti-business, and downright anti-human.”¹

Patrick Moore, former member and co-founder of Greenpeace

Environmental issues have not always formed an inherent part of the political agenda; however, this trend started to change in the second half of the 20th century.² This study considers one of the most widely known contributors to this change: the environmental non-governmental organisation (ENGO) Greenpeace.³ More specifically, it aims to contribute a new aspect to the existing scholarship by investigating Greenpeace’s evolution, its decision-making structures and strategic approaches, from an internal perspective. Its identity formation process is evaluated against the backdrop of the historical and political context in which the ENGO was acting during the 1980s and 1990s.

Since its official founding in 1971, Greenpeace has undergone a significant transformation. It developed from a small grassroots group into one of the biggest transnational ENGOs conducting environmental campaigns on various fronts, ranging from the protection of the oceans to global warming.⁴ Originally, Greenpeace was founded as a response to nuclear tests which led to environmental ills; because the anti-nuclear campaign constitutes the inherent origin of the organisation, it is the focal point of this study. The organisation has since expanded the scope of its objectives and some campaigns caused Greenpeace to be involved in controversies, even reaching a point at which it was urged to alter its stand on genetically modified products by more than 100 Nobel Laureates.⁵ While promoting peace and democracy, Greenpeace has shown to concern itself mainly with environmental rather than human

¹ Moore, P. (2011). *Confessions of a Greenpeace Dropout: The Making of a Sensible Environmentalist*. Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: Beatty Street Publishing Inc.

² Van der Heijden, H.-A. (1997). Political opportunity structure and the institutionalisation of the environmental movement. *Environmental Politics*, 6(4), 25.

³ Eden, S. (2004). Greenpeace. *New Political Economy*, 9(4), 595.

⁴ Greenpeace International. (2018). Greenpeace International. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from The issues we work on: <https://www.greenpeace.org/international/explore/>.

⁵ Eyerman, R., & Jamison, A. (1989). Environmental knowledge as an organizational weapon: the case of Greenpeace. *Social Science Information*, 28(1), 116-117; Achenbach, J. (2016, June 30). *107 Nobel laureates sign letter blasting Greenpeace over GMOs*. Retrieved March 24, 2018, from The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-science/wp/2016/06/29/more-than-100-nobel-laureates-take-on-greenpeace-over-gmo-stance/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6f67ca64e03c.

struggles, demonstrating eco-centric environmentalism – meaning a prioritisation of environmental protectionist attitudes.⁶ Its hierarchical structure, with Greenpeace International constituting the core body of coordination and centre of development of global strategies, has drawn substantial criticism, receiving the label of a ‘protest business’ modelled on private business practices.⁷ Controversy was also sparked by Greenpeace’s trademark action method of ‘bearing witness’ – drawing attention to an environmental abuse through simple presence, with its actions labelled as ‘non-intervening cowardice’, lacking long-term impact while relying on media-backed ‘unscientific sensationalism’. Moreover, the adhocracy of its campaign strategies, while receiving praise based on its adjustability, led to additional criticism due to an alleged lack of coherence.⁸

This empirical research serves to investigate, from an internal perspective, how Greenpeace approached such challenges and dilemmas by considering previously unused primary source material from the Greenpeace International Archives in Amsterdam. There is no universal blueprint for the best path to address the various and complex environmental issues, which is why different angles and solutions deserve consideration. In light of increasing urgency to globally address environmental ills due to rising temperatures and a changing climate, the positioning of transnational ENGO’s in society and their perception of their role in the fight against environmental destruction requires examination.⁹ Greenpeace employs a mixed strategy, constantly re-drawing their blueprint of how to approach environmental ills. The organisation thus constitutes an interesting case study, due to its capacity to intervene via a diverse set of action strategies at any given time and place, as well as its ability to balance altering opinions and contrasting options of when, where, and how to act. The intended and unintended consequences of Greenpeace’s actions, alongside its centralised structure with

⁶ Greenpeace International. (2016). What's wrong with genetic engineering (GE)? Retrieved March 12, 2018, from Greenpeace International: <https://www.greenpeace.org/archive-international/en/campaigns/agriculture/problem/genetic-engineering/>.

⁷ Jordan & Maloney in Carter, N. (2007). Parties and movements: getting from here to there - Environmental Groups. In N. Carter, *The Politics of the Environment Ideas, Activism, Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 151.

⁸ Warkentin, C. (2001). *Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 67; Carmin, J., & Balser, D. B. (2002). Selecting Repertoires of Action in Environmental Movement Organizations An Interpretive Approach. *Organization & Environment*, 15(4), 378; Hall, N. L., & Taplin, R. (2007). Revolution or inch-by-inch? Campaign approaches on climate change by environmental groups. *Environmentalist*, 27, 100.; Grant, W. (2001). Pressure Politics: From ‘Insider’ Politics to Direct Action? *Parliamentary Affairs*, 54(2), 345; Rothwell, J. (Writer), & Rothwell, J. (Director). (2015). *How to change the world* [Motion Picture]; Mathiesen, K. (2015, June 11). *How to change the world: Greenpeace and the power of the mindbomb*. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/11/how-to-change-the-world-greenpeace-power-mindbomb>.

⁹ NASA. (2018, August 15). *Global Climate Change - Vital Signs of the Planet*. Retrieved August 17, 2018, from Global Climate Change - Vital Signs of the Planet: <https://climate.nasa.gov/>.

hierarchical leadership, professionalised staff, and a large group of resource-contributing passive supporters, make an investigation of its identity formation worthwhile.

The study of Greenpeace's internal perceptions is significant to understand how Greenpeace approached societal challenges, and how the historical context of protest influenced what campaigning actions could achieve. This type of investigation allows to trace the influences that led to the continuous adjustment of campaigning strategies, providing an insight into the roots of its strategic approaches. Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, during and after the end of the Cold War, Greenpeace had to deal with numerous challenges that had a substantial impact on its strategic approaches, facing dilemmas that illustrated Greenpeace's identity formation. With the nuclear arms race coming to an end, not only did Greenpeace have to adjust its anti-nuclear campaigning strategy to a new international political climate, but, as an ENGO, it also had to re-position itself within a global society in which capitalism had succeeded over communism. Moreover, during the last two decades of the twentieth century, Greenpeace weathered significant organisational and financial problems that put its viability and existence into jeopardy, eventually resulting in major restructuring and internal re-evaluations. These transformations constituted a decisive turning point in Greenpeace's history, as it had to re-define itself.

This study is divided in three sections to investigate the validity of the following hypothesis: *Greenpeace's strategic approaches were constructed based on various factors that influenced its decision-making. Diverging tendencies and shifts in campaigning strategies occurred due to organisational changes, external circumstances, and different internal perceptions and interpretations of Greenpeace's identity, thus demonstrating that Greenpeace's identity formation was a complex process over time.*

Overall, this study contributes to the analysis of the identity formation of Greenpeace in the context of its anti-nuclear campaign during the 1980s and 1990s. While Chapter One looks at the organisational development over time and its influence on anti-nuclear campaigning, Chapter Two evaluates the impact of external circumstances on the anti-nuclear campaign. In Chapter Three, internal conflicts and tensions are considered to evaluate different internal perceptions of the organisation's identity.

State of the art: The environmental movement activism

This thesis aims to establish the foundation for a framework of internal analysis of ENGOs; this section embeds the research in the relevant literature by reviewing key publications, including the main academic findings and shortcomings. Three major themes have been identified in pertinent scholarship on environmental movement activism and the dynamics of environmental protests: the diversity of environmental movement organisations (EMOs); institutionalisation and its dilemmas; and the influence and effectiveness of EMOs. Most of the discussed works were published around the turn of the century, when the Greenpeace archives were not yet accessible, therefore an empirical analysis of internal differences such as this one was impossible. Furthermore, this study feeds into a time-dependent interest, namely the interest in identities and the analysis of historical developments along constructivist lines.

Diversity of EMOs

The literature focuses on the nature of the environmental movement and its characterising diversity with regards to the organisational development, the cultural context, and the action repertoire. Russel Dalton provides a basic distinction of the environmental movement stating that, before the 1960s, the focus was on conservatism – the concern for the preservation of the environment. Since then, ecology, meaning the concern with environmental degradation, has gained significance.¹⁰ Michael Poole et al. reject a universalistic approach to EMOs and provide a variety of factors to understand the complex, multivariate interpretation of movement development.¹¹ Their analysis systematically treats EMOs as coherent actors that mainly differ in comparison to other EMOs.¹² Mario Diani and Paolo Donati develop a crude framework of four organisational types based on the responses to central issues of ENGOs, namely resource mobilisation and political efficacy, which also oversimplifies ENGOs and their structure.¹³ Timothy Doyle and Brian Doherty map social and environmental movements and argue for a diversity of movements. They define the social movement as an analytical concept with four main characteristics; an identity developed over time expressed via actions, regular member interaction, involvement in public protest, and posing a challenge to social,

¹⁰ Dalton, R. J. (2005). The Greening of the Globe? Cross-national Levels of Environmental Group Membership. *Environmental Politics*, 14(4), 441f.

¹¹ Poole, M., Lansbury, R., & Waiels, N. (2001). A Comparative Analysis of Developments in Industrial Democracy. *International Relations*, 40(3), 492-520.

¹² Compare also: Doherty, B. (2002). *Ideas and Actions in the Green Movement*. London: Routledge, 1.

¹³ Diani, M., & Donati, P. R. (1999) Organisational change in Western European Environmental Groups: A framework for analysis. *Environmental Politics*, 8(1), 13.

political, or cultural values.¹⁴ They claim that no specific ENGO type defines the movement, demonstrating the diversity of environmentalism: not all ENGOs exhibit the same social movement characteristics, and are hence not part of the same social movement. In line with the argument brought forward in this thesis, they argue that it is possible for a single ENGO to stand across and beyond various social movements, as the concept itself is diverse.¹⁵ Despite addressing the diversity between strands of the environmental movement, the existing literature builds on the assumption that single ENGOs act as coherent actors, which this thesis questions.¹⁶ It will be argued that Greenpeace constitutes a complex entity with various facets that does not neatly fit into environmental movement frameworks.¹⁷ Moreover, this study shifts the units of analysis from ENGOs to sections within a single ENGO; expanding on the hypothesis that, even within a single ENGO, different ideological strands can co-exist.

Institutionalisation and its dilemmas

A major academic focus is the institutionalisation of ENGOs and the consequent dilemmas. It has been suggested that institutionalisation, meaning the professionalisation and regularisation of activities, is possible once societal conditions are favourable; for example, when the existing political and legal framework offers access opportunities.¹⁸ Neil Carter defines institutionalisation as the acceptance of environmental values and concerns, so that environmental actions become a regular and normal feature of the established political system.¹⁹ The existing literature considers the tensions arising due to institutionalisation between action methods with varying degrees of radicalism, a matter that will also be discussed in this thesis.²⁰ John Dryzek outlines the downsides of the insider status, while Christopher Rootes examines the limits of local and unconventional actions. Both consider actions from an external perspective, focussing on the necessity to compromise and cooperate with corporations and the difficulty to think globally due to nationally diverse policy conditions.²¹

¹⁴ Doherty, B., & Doyle, T. (2006). Beyond borders: Transnational politics, social movements and modern environmentalisms. *Environmental Politics*, 15(5), 702-703.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 704.

¹⁶ Compare: Carter, N. (2007) *Parties and movements: Environmental Groups*, 143-170.

¹⁷ Dalton in Carmin, J., & Balser, D. B. (2002) *Selecting Repertoires of Action*, 369.

¹⁸ Van der Heijden, H.-A. (1997) *Political opportunity structure and institutionalisation*, 26f.

¹⁹ Carter, N. (2007) *Parties and movements: Environmental Groups*, 148.

²⁰ Compare Figure 2 for a more detailed description.

²¹ Dryzek, J. S., Downes, D., Hunold, C., Schlosberg, D., & Hernes, H.-K. (2003). Evaluating Movement Effectiveness and Strategy. In J. S. Dryzek, D. Downes, C. Hunold, D. Schlosberg, & H.-K. Hernes, *Green States and Social Movements Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 122-125; Rootes (1999) . Acting globally, thinking locally? Prospects for a global environmental movement. *Environmental Politics*, 8(1), 304-305.

In contrast, this study regards justifications for different strategic approaches from an internal perspective, influenced by various determinants. By understanding campaigning approaches as not simply dictated by outside factors, the research expands on Siti Rokhmawati Susanto's work on the transformation of Greenpeace's strategies.²²

The development of institutionalisation has sparked a vibrant discussion around how much it changed EMOs. While some contend that institutionalisation compromises the pure purpose and identity of the environmental movement, others believe that professionalisation is too complex to crudely classify EMOs accordingly: the process needs to be disentangled into different components, such as action method choices and participatory possibilities, as well as management structures.²³ Rootes, Diani, and Donati disagree with Wolfgang Rüdig's oversimplification that ENGOs either institutionalised or disappeared. They argue for the existence of radical groups alongside institutionalised ENGOs and not, as this study does, for varying degrees of radical strands within a single ENGO.²⁴ Offering a more nuanced approach, Peter Rawcliffe sees the process of transformation as plastic and non-deterministic, thus offering a variety of possible directions of development for the environmental organisations.²⁵ This research builds upon Rawcliffe's argument to evaluate how internal communication and organisational re-structuring developed over time. Overall, the scholarly debate centres around different positions on categorisation and classification of environmental organisations in the context of institutionalisation. This research intends to add to this by increasing the understanding of Greenpeace's organisational structure; the internal conditions and causes that led to campaigning decisions. It argues Greenpeace's development did not have a clear-cut outset, nor was it transnationally coherent – it was constantly re-formed by different internal perceptions, as well as different interpretations of external political and socio-cultural conditions.

²² Rokhmawati Susanto, S. (2007). The Transformation of Greenpeace Strategy in the 1990s: From Civil Disobedience to Moderate Movement. *Global & Strategic*, 1(2), 18.

²³ Rootes, C. (1999) *Prospects for a global environmental movement*, 308; Diani, M., & Donati, P. R. (1999) *Organisational change in Western European Environmental Groups*, 21&25.

²⁴ Rootes, C. (1999). Environmental movements: From the local to the global. *Environmental Politics*, 8(1), 8-9; Diani, M., & Donati, P. R. (1999) *Organisational change in Western European Environmental Groups*, 24-25; Rüdig, W. (1995). Between Moderation and Marginalization: Environmental Radicalism in Britain. In B. R. Taylor, *Ecological Resistance Movements: The Global Emergence of Radical and Popular Environmentalism* New York: SUNY Press, 237.

²⁵ Rawcliffe, P. (1998). *Issues in Environmental Politics - Environmental Pressure Groups in Transition*. Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 112.

Influence and effectiveness

Current scholarship concerns itself with the influence and effectiveness of ENGOs.²⁶ ENGOs are often treated as rational actors with the overarching aim to achieve effectiveness, an argument that this research will critically evaluate.²⁷ While Tony Long and Larisa Lörinczi raise the issue that actual influence and effectiveness of ENGOs are difficult to measure, Ulrich Heink et al. define effectiveness as the extent to which procedures produce desired or intended outcomes.²⁸ Michele Betsill and Elisabeth Corell expand on this notion by stating that a position of power facilitates effectiveness; with power being defined as the ability to achieve desired outcomes. Hence, the comparison of outcomes with an ENGO's objectives – the goal attainment – sheds light on an ENGO's effectiveness.²⁹ Craig Warkentin contends that effectiveness is influenced by cultural and political contexts and Rootes questions the possibility to effectively oppose a system while operating within it – both arguments will be addressed in this thesis.³⁰ Wyn Grant discusses conflicts between insider politics and direct actions, reaching the conclusion that the discussion is ultimately a normative debate about the strategic effectiveness of pressure politics.³¹ This study aims to look at internal differences, not assuming logical attitudes but rather assessing the degree of rationality in the justifications of different strategic approaches. Moreover, it expands on the existing literature by investigating how organisational consensus and coherence affect effectiveness.³² Therefore, this study argues that internal dynamics of protest action can contribute towards an increased understanding of the ENGOs' effectiveness or lack thereof in achieving change.³³

²⁶ Compare for example: Betsill, M. M., & Corell, E. (2001). NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis. *Global Environmental Politics*, 1(4), 71-79.

²⁷ Hall, N. L., & Taplin, R. (2006). Influencing Climate Policy: The effectiveness of Australian NGO campaigns. *Australasian Political Studies Association Conference*. Newcastle: ResearchGate, 2f.

²⁸ Long, T., & Lörinczi, L. (2009). NGOs as Gatekeepers: A Green Vision. In D. Coen, & J. Richardson, *Lobbying in the European Union: Institutions, Actors, and Issues* (pp. 169-188). New York: Oxford University Press, 178; Heink, U., Marquard, E., Heubach, K., Jax, K., Kugel, C., Neßhöver, C., Vandewalle, M. (2015). Conceptualizing credibility, relevance and legitimacy for evaluating the effectiveness of science-policy interfaces: Challenges and Opportunities. *Science and Public Policy*, 2.

²⁹ Betsill, M. M., & Corell, E. (2001). *NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations*, 69-72.

³⁰ Warkentin, C. (2001). *Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society*, 75; Rootes, C. (1999). *Prospects for a global environmental movement*, 299.

³¹ Grant, W. (2001) *Pressure Politics*, 339; Beder, S. (1991). Activism versus negotiation: Strategies for the Environment Movement. *Social Alternatives*, 10(4), 53-56.

³² For a description of the process to reach organisational consensus, compare: Carter, N. (2007) *Parties and movements: Environmental Groups*, 158f.

³³ Riese, J. (2017). *Hairy Hippies and Bloody Butchers: The Greenpeace Anti-Whaling Campaign in Norway*. New York: Berghahn Books, 3.

Research question

How can differences in strategic approaches of Greenpeace during the anti-nuclear campaign throughout the 1980s and 1990s be explained?

Sub-questions

- How did internal conditions (organisational changes, new generations of activists and managers) alter the understanding of strategic approach tendencies in the 1980s and early 1990s?
- What role did external (socio-political and historical) conditions of the 1980s and 1990s play in the understanding of strategic approach tendencies?
- Which internal differences (battles of ideas, identity perceptions) could be traced in the strategies of the anti-nuclear campaign in the late 1980s and the 1990s?

Conceptual and theoretical framework

This study considers the diversity of ideas and perceptions within Greenpeace. Therefore, constructivism serves as a theoretical framework, as it emphasises the normative role of identities and interests in the formation of institutional structures.³⁴ Social constructivism originates from social ontology – the insistence that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meaning. Thus, this theoretical frame is apt to be employed in order to evaluate the differences of strategic anti-nuclear campaign approaches and internal interpretations.³⁵ Notably, the social constructivist lens acknowledges the potential for change rather than the inevitability of global processes by emphasising non-material forces and the construction of meaning.³⁶ The study's comprehensive aim is to reconstruct historical processes through which particular internal notions gained momentum. While a constructivist approach suitably forms the basis for this research, it should be noted that limits to a constructivist framework are that no consideration is given to why a problem occurred, or whether it could have been solved under different

³⁴ Behraves, M. (2011, February 3). *Constructivism: An Introduction*. Retrieved March 22, 2018, from E-international relations: <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/03/constructivism-an-introduction/>.

³⁵ Risse, T. (2004). Social Constructivism Meets Globalization. In D. Held, & A. McGrew, *Understanding Globalization: Theories and Controversies*. Cambridge: Polity Press Cambridge, 3.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 1.

conditions. These shortcomings imply a high degree of hypothesising, which has been considered unsuitable for this study.³⁷

The articulation of ideas, as well as their realisation stand at the centre of this research. To adequately grasp how different campaign activities related to campaign objectives, a conceptual framework was created, as illustrated in Figure 1. To understand how differences in strategic approaches within Greenpeace developed and to underline the dynamic and constant re-adjustment of its campaign strategies, a cycle of resilient influence was developed (Figure 1). This study argues that Greenpeace's strategy was in a constant state of re-affirmation and re-evaluation while it conducted protest actions. Cognitive filters, namely experience and core values, influenced interpretations of circumstances, which in turn led to certain choices of methods from the action repertoire that result in specific outcomes.³⁸ These outcomes were perceived by Greenpeace's members and had an impact on their cognitive filters, thus demonstrating a circular process.³⁹




Figure 1: Cycle of resilient influence

Chapter Three uses the three concepts of credibility, legitimacy, and relevance as analytical guidance for the evaluation of different internal understandings. Broadly speaking, these concepts deal with social processes and, more precisely, with relations between different

³⁷ Hjelmar, U. (1996). Constructivist Analysis and Movement Organizations: Conceptual Clarifications. *Acta Sociologica*, 39(2), 182-183.

³⁸ Compare Figure 2 for a more detailed account of the scheme of action repertoires; Carmin, J., & Balser, D. B. (2002) *Selecting Repertoires of Action*, 369.

³⁹ Rawcliffe, P. (1998) *Environmental Pressure Groups in Transition*, 112.

actors and the interpretation of such interactions, which is why their application was deemed helpful for the analysis of debates between different Greenpeace sections.⁴⁰

Credibility refers to the quality or power of inspiring belief. At the centre stand believability and the truthfulness of information. These result from the judgement of information properties, such as the scientific quality of data measured by one of the Greenpeace ships. Judging the process to obtain data and the data's quality determine whether a source is perceived as reliable or controversial. Additionally, consistency is crucial for credibility: it is essential to adhere to a coherent and consistent campaign message to support the truthfulness of any given information.⁴¹

Legitimacy can be understood as the conformity to rules and standards, such as respective national laws and internal Greenpeace policies. Decisions are legitimate if they confirm the internal procedures of decision-making of Greenpeace. Central for legitimacy are acceptance and acceptability; the factual acceptance of action by the involved people and acceptability according to a set of criteria, which in this case are Greenpeace's main aims and objectives of anti-nuclear campaigning.⁴²

Relevance can be connected to the degree of relation to the matter at hand. It is highly context-related and refers to an action having an effect that is considered meaningful by Greenpeace members. Logic establishes an important aspect of relevance – in the context of Greenpeace, relevant actions are specified as actions that have an impact and therefore it makes logical sense to conduct them.⁴³

Greenpeace chose different strategies to pursue their anti-nuclear campaign objectives, to alter prevailing dispositions in society.⁴⁴ To analyse these strategies, a scheme of different action repertoires (Figure 2) was compiled, relying on various academic contributions.⁴⁵ The scheme is divided in three categories – institutional approach, strategic approach, actions –

⁴⁰ Heink, U., Marquard, E., Heubach, K., Jax, K., Kugel, C., Neßhöver, C., Vandewalle, M. (2015). *Conceptualizing credibility, relevance and legitimacy*, 1-14.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 3-6.

⁴² *Ibid.* 4-5.

⁴³ *Ibid.* 3-5.

⁴⁴ Wapner, P. (1996). Greenpeace and Political Globalism. In P. Wapner, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*. Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 50.

⁴⁵ Doh, J., & Yaziji, M. (2009). NGO campaign types and company responses. In J. Doh, & M. Yaziji, *NGOs and Corporations: Conflict and Collaboration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 93-100; Hall, N. L., & Taplin, R. (2007) *Campaign approaches on climate change by environmental groups*, 98&104; List in Rokhmawati Susanto, S. (2007) *The Transformation of Greenpeace Strategy in the 1990s*, 4; Van der Heijden, H.-A. (1997) *Political opportunity structure and institutionalisation*, 32; Carter, N. (2007) *Parties and movements: Environmental Groups*, 161.

along a line measuring radicalism which is highlighted by colour coding and broken down in sections ranging from contra-institutional/unconventional to highly institutional/conventional.




Figure 2: Scheme of action repertoires

Methodology

An in-depth case study of a single campaign of a specific ENGO constitutes a solid research strategy for a detailed and contextualised analysis of the internal mechanisms behind campaigning actions.⁴⁶ Greenpeace represents an optimal subject due to its particular position in the environmental movement as an hierarchically-structured and strategically-hybrid international organisation.⁴⁷ The organisation remains distinct from other ENGOs, such as the mainly action-focussed, less hierarchical ENGO Earth First!.⁴⁸ Additionally, while other ENGOs, such as Friends of the Earth, have been evaluated internally, Greenpeace's turbulent development has yet to be assessed.⁴⁹

Due to the study's limited scope, the anti-nuclear campaign was chosen as its main focus. Greenpeace started as an anti-nuclear protest group and continued to focus solely on anti-nuclear issues until 1975; therefore, examining anti-nuclear campaigning means

⁴⁶ Geertz & Tilly in Riese, J. (2017). *Hairy Hippies and Bloody Butchers*, 3.

⁴⁷ Shaiko, R. G. (1993). Greenpeace U. S. A.: Something Old, New, Borrowed. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 528, 88.

⁴⁸ For a more detailed description: Doherty, B., Plows, A., & Wall, D. (2007). Environmental direct action in Manchester, Oxford and North Wales: A protest event analysis. *Environmental Politics*, 16(5), 806; Wapner, P. (1995). In Defense of Banner Hangers: The Dark Green Politics of Greenpeace. In B. R. Taylor, *Ecological Resistance Movements: The Global Emergence of Radical and Popular Environmentalism*. New York: SUNY Press, 302-303.

⁴⁹ Compare for example: Doherty, B. (2006). Friends of the Earth International: Negotiating transnational identity. *Environmental Politics*, 15(5), 860-880.

considering the roots of Greenpeace, which is key to its identity formation process.⁵⁰ Greenpeace's name indicates its main aims: the promotion of peace and environmental protection, which are well-reflected in its anti-nuclear campaign. A detailed campaign overview, published in July 1988 by the international anti-nuclear campaign manager Andy Stirling, offers a good summary list of reasons for campaigning against nuclear power. His reasons include the fact that the nuclear industry was at a turning point internationally due to nuclear reactor deterioration; the growing awareness of the diseconomies of nuclear power and the saturation of nuclear demand in nuclear enthusiastic states; and the unique symbolisation of nuclear power as a key environmental problem that lacked any consideration of future generations.⁵¹ Generally, nuclear power – whether in the form of energy or weapons – has been one of the most radicalising issues for modern environmentalism making the anti-nuclear campaign a valuable case study.⁵²

The political and historical context of the 1980s and 1990s, and in particular the campaign focus on disarmament and nuclear testing during the final period of the Cold War, make the study of this time period worthwhile. A newly emerging reality that no longer featured the anxious nuclear arms race of the two opposing super powers, as well as other important events, such as the Chernobyl accident in 1986, justify the chosen time period, as well as this study's focus on the anti-nuclear campaign.

The study contributes to academic research on Greenpeace by evaluating archival primary sources. Considering campaign proposals allows an insight into internal perceptions rather than external perspectives. The chosen archival sources were selected from the Greenpeace International Archives at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, which verifies the originality of the content, as well as the authenticity of the material. The material covers a range of different types of sources, ranging from letter and telefax correspondence over campaign proposals to policy paper drafts and scientific reports, allowing a multi-angled insight into internal attitudes. Campaign proposals, evaluations, as well as annual reports and monthly newsletters, are considered to gain an understanding of the internal reception of strategic campaigning approaches.

⁵⁰ Erwood, S. (2011). *The Greenpeace Chronicles 40 Years of Protecting the Planet*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Greenpeace International, 18f.

⁵¹ Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (hereafter: IISG), Greenpeace International (Amsterdam). Greenpeace International (Amsterdam) Archives (hereafter: GPIA), Folder 2977. Documents concerning the GP policy on nuclear power. With internal correspondence, discussion papers and proposals. 1987-1988, 1992-1995. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Andy Stirling, Detailed Anti-nuclear Campaign Overview, July 1988.

⁵² Rüdiger, W. (1995) *Environmental Radicalism in Britain*, 221.

To evaluate the diverse justifications of anti-nuclear campaign projects in the 1980s and 1990s, material was selected on an exemplary basis. Thus, because of the limited scope of this study, a possible limitation is the material's representative function, which poses a challenge due to the possibility to distort reality by excluding other material. Another shortcoming of the sources is the difference in quality and content over the two decades because no standardised proposal format existed until the early 1990s and official communication guidelines were often dismissed.

To address such shortcomings, semi-structured interviews with Greenpeace members would represent an ideal complement to the primary source material and should be conducted in the future. However, this proved to be difficult as some individuals are no longer alive, and the limited amount of time available led to an inability to contact many of the individuals.

Chapter One: Institutionalisation and anti-nuclear campaigning

“The mindbomb has to take different forms as we go forward. It can't just be hairy guys in speed boats. [...] There's been a tendency within the organisation to just paint a banner and hang it off a famous building and I think that just doesn't wash.”⁵³

Bob Hunter, co-founder of Greenpeace

A general description of Greenpeace's development contextualises the roots of its strategic approaches and illustrated the development of the 'mind bomb' that Bob Hunter envisioned – actions to raise public awareness of environmental ills – over time. An outline of its professionalisation, in connection with a summary of the organisational changes that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s, provides a foundation for an empirical source analysis. This serves as a backdrop to show how anti-nuclear campaigning developed due to Greenpeace's institutionalisation. This chapter argues that the organisation underwent a significant organisational transformation that influenced its actions; a small, poorly organised group of environmentally concerned 'hippies' became a thoroughly managed institution with considerable leverage in the global sphere. This had a significant impact on its strategic approaches and led to shifts in anti-nuclear campaigning methods in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Chaotic decision-making structures

During the 1980s and 1990s, Greenpeace developed from a grassroots organisation into a professional protest organisation. What started as a splinter group of the Sierra Club in Canada, called the 'Don't Make a Wave Committee', protesting in a 'rickety old boat', turned into a widely known, transnational ENGO.⁵⁴ In the 1970s, environmental organisation offices under the name 'Greenpeace' started to emerge in many countries without any strategic consultation and coherence among them.⁵⁵ The organisation underwent its first major restructuring in the late 1970s, which led to an umbrella construct under Greenpeace International (GPI). This was due to major involvement of David McTaggart, who pushed for the unification of the various regional, national, and local offices under a single 'mother agency', in order to clarify authority

⁵³ Grant, W. (2001) *Pressure Politics*, 345; Rothwell, J. (2015). *How to change the world* [Motion Picture].

⁵⁴ Erwood, S. (2011) *The Greenpeace Chronicles*, 3.

⁵⁵ Zelko, F. (2004). Making Greenpeace: The Development of Direct Action Environmentalism in British Columbia. *BC Studies*, 142/143, 199-213.

structures. GPI was considered the coordinative body responsible for global strategies, with a central corner stone of its management abilities being the Annual General Meeting.⁵⁶ Despite numerous inconsistencies concerning the labelling (e.g. confusing usage of the terms ‘coordinator’, ‘director’, and ‘manager’) and non-adherence to given authority structures, certain control lines have been identified for the period of the early 1980s. The GPI Board of Directors was the first instance of the management body, made up of various campaign directors and a chair. Additionally, the Executive Committee, consisting of representatives or trustees from different offices, contributed to organisational management. The international campaign coordinators communicated with the campaign directors from the different national and regional offices and kept close ties to the Board. Next in line came the project coordinators, who had authority over the campaigners. This top-down communication method was accompanied by a bottom-up approach, allowing lower authority levels to ask for permission for actions and proactively offer suggestions to the next higher levels within the management structure. Especially relevant for this study is the creation and reception of campaign proposals: national and regional proposals would mainly be submitted to the Board and the international directors via the regional and national coordinators, following agreements with the individual regional and national campaigners respectively. In the first half of the 1980s, GPI would ideally submit a proposal for each of Greenpeace’s campaign topics with objectives that corresponded with the national or regional proposals. The Board would then decide on the funding, which essentially meant accepting or rejecting proposed actions.⁵⁷ However, impeding on this study’s ability to coherently extract opinions from the proposals, Greenpeace members did not consistently act according to these guidelines and proposals were submitted and evaluated by different sections with varying frequency, consensus, and attention to detail.⁵⁸

Some people communicated more closely than others, either due to geographical proximity or because of personal relationships, which also contributed to the complex construct of vertical as well as horizontal checks and balances. Moreover, various people held more than one role at the same time, which also added to multi-layered communication structure.⁵⁹ This

⁵⁶ Zelko, F. (2017). Scaling Greenpeace: From Local Activism to Global Governance. *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung*, 42(2), 334-338.

⁵⁷ Compare for example: IISG, GPIA, Folder 2965, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1987-1991. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] John Willis, Proposal for Nuclear Free Future Work in Canada 1989, April 6, 1988.

⁵⁸ Compare for example: IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646, Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Telefax] Jean McSorley, a request for information, May 24, 1994.

⁵⁹ Compare for example: IISG, GPIA, Folder 2966, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1987-1991. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Andy Stirling and Michelle Sheather, The International Nuclear Campaign Proposal 1989/90.

multi-employment was partly because of staff shortage, which led to limitations in possibilities to act. However, at the same time, many campaigners stayed in their jobs for multiple years, which gave the organisation consistency and a degree of stability.⁶⁰

An example of such double-employment was Alan Pickaver. His case illustrates the chaotic conditions of Greenpeace and the organisational obstacles to reach consensus. In July 1986, the Executive Committee established that Pickaver would resign as the International Campaign Director, but would continue as co-ordinator for the toxics and ocean ecology campaign. His resignation triggered an evaluation of two conflicting management structures which, as Pickaver stated, had prevented him from doing his job properly and were the reason for his resignation. Previously, it had been decided that the Board was to pull back from daily decision-making and letting the Executive Committee handle it. In reality, Board members continued to intervene in the Committee's authority areas, and trustees felt the Board made decisions outside their assigned responsibilities, sometimes even outside accurately convened meetings. In conclusion, it was agreed that the envisioned structure had been implemented too quickly, thus impeding its effectiveness due to competences not having been properly recognised. Pickaver pointed out that as long as there was no agreement on responsibility and authority structures, decision-making remained unclear and prevented Greenpeace from acting consistently and efficiently.⁶¹

Similarly chaotic and unstructured was the budget allocation. Greenpeace's financial regulations had few consistent guidelines; exceptions included the basic rule of not accepting funds from governments or corporations in order to avoid having vested interests, and the obligation of every office to contribute a set percentage of their raised money to GPI. The procedure of financial distributions were based on the rule that "if an office wants to conduct a national campaign and fund it, it needs council approval to do so. Each year, budgets for all countries are set by the council. These budgets include overhead cost of fundraising, international campaigns and an amount for national campaigns".⁶² Yet in 1987, a financial division in campaign contingency and reserve, a two-fold and rather loose structure of short-

⁶⁰ Compare for other examples: IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2962, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1982-1984; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987; IISG, GPIA, Folder 50 Minutes agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. Amsterdam, 1-3 September 1993. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign activity]

⁶¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 15, Minutes agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. Rome, 24-30 July 1986. [Minutes] Minutes of Special Meeting of the Executive Committee, July 2, 1986.

⁶² IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Eric Fersht, Campaign Proposal ideas from Eric, June 7, 1985.

and long-term funding pots existed. Additionally, Andy Stirling, at this point an anti-nuclear campaign director, suggested establishing an international nuclear funding pot, so that he could plan more independently, and could include less well-off offices in pressing campaign work, if they communicated interest in participating.⁶³ Generally, in 1987 and 1988 many different budgets were involved in a single campaign and coordinators needed to apply from various pots.⁶⁴ Trying to avoid incoherence, a two-year planning cycle was introduced in 1988 with clear budget allocations depending on campaign projects. However, salaries continued to be paid out of international budgets, national budgets, as well as campaign-specific budgets, thus demonstrating that, in the 1980s, Greenpeace did not have a comprehensible financial system.⁶⁵

Conflicting improvement ideas

Ideas to improve the organisation and long-term development goals started to be discussed as a result of the disorganised state of the organisation.⁶⁶ The discussion about measures to improve the organisational structure was centred around an efficient and logical separation of campaign issues along geographical, thematic, or personnel-based lines. In January 1987, Douglas Mulhall, part of Greenpeace Canada and a Council member, suggested to create regional coordinating teams in order to profoundly re-structure Greenpeace's campaigns, as part of a Long-Term Plan. Reflecting existing authority structures, his suggestions were addressed to the Executive Committee and international campaign coordinators, as they were responsible for the implementation of progressive measures.⁶⁷ In addition to his motive to improve the organisation, and despite never stating it in the correspondence, it is possible that part of his personal agenda was also to become one of the regional coordination team leaders. While anti-nuclear campaign director Stirling supported Mulhall's improvement efforts, he questioned the efficiency of grouping different campaign issues together because, he argued, this would inevitably divide certain intrinsically interlinked

⁶³ IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987. [Telefax] Andy Stirling, Proposal for funding Nuclear Free Future Work in 1987, June 4, 1987.

⁶⁴ Compare for example: IISG, GPIA, Folder 2976, Documents concerning a campaign management structure for Greenpeace. 1987-1988. [Letter] Andy Stirling to nuclear campaigners, Nuclear Campaign Circular 17, December 9, 1987.

⁶⁵ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2966, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1987-1991. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Andy Stirling, Michelle Sheather, International Nuclear Campaign Proposal 1989/90 – a prospective.

⁶⁶ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2973, Documents concerning the long term development plan. 1986-1988. Draft. 1986. [Report] The Object of the Development Plan.

⁶⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2976, Documents concerning a campaign management structure for Greenpeace. 1987-1988. [Report] Doug Mulhall, Discussion Paper on a Campaign Management Structure for Greenpeace, January 15, 1987.

themes. For instance, focussing on nuclear issues in Europe, such as energy, would exclude nuclear waste dumping, even though both topics formed central aspects of the anti-nuclear campaign. This demonstrates how his first-hand experience with the anti-nuclear campaign theme influenced his approach to improvement in general. His discussion paper in November 1987 outlined the unavoidable differences in management structures in different campaign areas.⁶⁸ He also called for careful consideration before implementing any generalising structures throughout the organisation. He explained that topics such as “control over national campaigns” or “restricting new issues” were easily connected in the anti-nuclear campaign due to its global approach. At the same time, he stated: “We are never going to find a single category structure that adequately reflects the true complexity of the issues we address”.⁶⁹ Demonstrating the slow pace of internal correspondence, in January 1988, a year after Mulhall's paper, Pickaver also responded to Mulhall, stating he was against pre-fabricated imposed structures and argued for naturally emerging thematic and regional campaign divisions. Uta Bellion, chair of the GPI advisory board, confirmed this by saying that “Greenpeace[’s] world is not so easy to squeeze in such a classic hierarchical form”.⁷⁰ Both of them were competent to make such claims based on their previous experiences, as they were part of the final stages of the decision-making processes within Greenpeace.

In June 1988, conflicts between advocates of a dynamic process versus supporters of a static centralised development emerged over contradictory internal perceptions of the best management structure. Mulhall asked for comments on the Long-Term Plan's second draft; all responses came from long established offices, a possible symptom of failed consensus and inclusion across Greenpeace in the development process. While Greenpeace Switzerland “would like to make sure that we don't make the mistake of ‘organizing away’ our power to be creative and successful”, Alan Thornton, co-ordinator for Greenpeace UK, stated that an “inadequate process of involvement” and that resulting alienation was the reason for a lack of enthusiasm for the Long-Term Plan. Until then, the plan “failed to unite Greenpeace in facing the need to address the many pressing challenges”.⁷¹ In contrast, GPI member Roger Wilson commented: “We need to run this organisation in such a way that self-interest, national interest

⁶⁸ Hall, N. L., & Taplin, R. (2006) *Influencing Climate Policy*, 5.

⁶⁹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2976, Documents concerning a campaign management structure for Greenpeace. 1987-1988. [Report] Andy Stirling, Discussion Paper on Campaign Management, November 14, 1988.

⁷⁰ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2976, Documents concerning a campaign management structure for Greenpeace. 1987-1988. [Report] Uta Bellion, Long Term Plan, January 19, 1988.

⁷¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2974, Documents concerning the long term development plan. 1986-1988. Comments. 1987-1988. [Report] Allan Thornton, Long Term Plan – Comments on the Long Term Plan from Greenpeace UK, June 9, 1988.

and ego are not determining factors in decision making”. Finally, the Executive Committee stated that “if Greenpeace is going to develop and remain an active and effective force for the environment through the 90’s [...] we should accept that long term planning must be a continuous process”.⁷²

Implementation period

The above-mentioned debate about management structures marked the beginning of the institutionalisation process Greenpeace underwent throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Carter argues that an ENGO’s institutionalisation follows certain lines, such as organisational growth in membership and income, as well as external professionalisation in form of a shift from unconventional to conventional actions.⁷³ Notably, Greenpeace developed also due to a collapse of membership and income, using the crisis to redefine itself. Around the same time when Francis Fukuyama made the prognosis of the end of history and the triumph of Western capitalism in the early 1990s, Greenpeace faced comparable issues; the possible end of the ideological strife and the triumph of professionalisation as the ideologically noble fight for the environment met financial difficulties that forced the ENGO to prioritise issues in line with economic calculations.⁷⁴ The organisation’s transformation into a highly personalised and centralised executive structure with strong leadership created considerable obstacles.⁷⁵

The early 1990s saw a variety of measures taken to alter the organisation’s course. In 1992, a coordination proposal set out to establish a unit to address, at regular project coordinator meetings, four areas for more effective campaigning; internal coordination, leadership and team building, integration of projects and issue development.⁷⁶ A ‘Strategic Plan’ was formulated in response to advanced communication technology, making geographical distance less important and leading to a more closely interconnected world – “Greenpeace is bigger, and the world is smaller”.⁷⁷ Working groups tried to understand the relationship between Greenpeace and its external environment to be able to draft future

⁷² IISG, GPIA, Folder 2974, Documents concerning the long term development plan. 1986-1988. Comments. 1987-1988. [Report] Greenpeace Long Term Plan – Comments by the Executive Committee.

⁷³ Van der Heijden in Carter, N. (2007) *Parties and movements: Environmental Groups*, 144-148.

⁷⁴ Fukuyama, F. (1989). The End of History? *The National Interest*, 16, 3-18.

⁷⁵ Rucht in Carter, N. (2007) *Parties and movements: Environmental Groups*, 151; Zelko, F. (2017) *Scaling Greenpeace*, 330.

⁷⁶ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2967, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1991. International Nuclear Campaign proposal 1992. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals].

⁷⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 51, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. [Minutes] September 93 Board Meeting Minutes, September, 1, 2 and 3, 1993.

approaches to the difficulties Greenpeace was facing.⁷⁸ The Board received the task of overseeing the implementation of the agreements reached by the established working groups via a Board Audit Committee. The Board Audit Committee was also made responsible for incorporating the conclusions drawn at the AGM in 1992, which highlighted the importance of transparency and clarity of direction.⁷⁹ Major changes were implemented due to a revision of the organisation's structure, and an almost entirely new leadership was introduced. At the 1992 AGM, following demands for a professional, experienced ENGO manager, the Board elected a new chair and a new Executive Director to replace McTaggart, who, after having been chairman from 1979-1991, was no longer considered suitable.⁸⁰ As part of the review process, an external auditor was hired to analyse Greenpeace's financial handlings. The results were summarised in a report that recommended alterations and improvements by pursuing a simpler system to avoid confusion of accountability. Additionally, the Board Enterprise Team was created to initiate and assist future fundraising initiatives.⁸¹

A 'Statement of Purpose' was formulated based on the results of an organisation-wide survey, to evaluate how Greenpeace was perceived by its employees.⁸² This demonstrated tensions between the national offices and international bodies, which gave different degrees of importance to, for example, the short-term achievability of campaign goals. The proposed organisational direction was outlined as international in outlook, but locally relevant in its interpretation. Achieving this objective was believed to effectively transform Greenpeace into a cohesive, united and global ENGO.⁸³

In July 1993, a trademark system was legally formalised to license the Greenpeace name, thus advancing the development of a centralised and structured system. This new form summed up Greenpeace's principles and the creation of this standardised document laid the

⁷⁸ IISG, GPIA, Folder 50, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. Amsterdam, 1-3 September 1993. [Minutes] September 93 Board Meeting Minutes, Strategic Plan – How to move on.

⁷⁹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 51, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. 21-22 October 1993. [Minutes] Board meeting minutes, 12.

⁸⁰ IISG, GPIA, Folder 51, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. 21-22 October 1993. [Minutes] Board meeting minutes, 1; Eden, S. (2004) *Greenpeace*, 602.

⁸¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2967, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1991. Financial Review Report, November, 1992. [Report]

⁸² IISG, GPIA, Folder 678, ED Council Office Update. 10, 25 September 1993. OR Bulletin. 1993-1994. [Report] Becky, ED Council Office Update, September 10, 1993.

⁸³ IISG, GPIA, Folder 50, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. Amsterdam, 1-3 September 1993. [Minutes] September 93 Board Meeting Minutes.

foundations for new Greenpeace offices in the future.⁸⁴ At a Board meeting in September 1993 it was stated, the “primary benefit of having a Strategic Plan would be in its conveying a shared perception of the situation Greenpeace is currently encountering [for] a shared sense of direction towards achieving our goals”.⁸⁵ The Board’s report in 1993 read “now, perhaps for the first time, the Board’s role, responsibilities, and procedures have been clarified, agreed and written down”.⁸⁶

Reflection period

While Greenpeace was changing, many previously existing problems, such as multiple conflicting campaign and coordination levels, required long re-adjustment periods. In January 1994, a summary of internal surveys was published; however, the number of participants and their respective authority levels remain unclear. On the one hand, GPI’s structure was seen as a source of clear international coordination and line management; on the other hand, GPI was perceived as an instrument of one-way reporting with no strategy and not performing well together with other Greenpeace bodies. Campaigning was thought to work well because of continued employment of campaigners, which meant long-term stability; conversely, campaign strategies were seen to have an “inability to comprehend and adapt to realities of the outside world”. Having a national and international campaigning level received positive feedback for providing autonomy for the international coordinators from national offices, but was perceived less favourably due to its unclear chain of command and interaction, which continued to lead to tension between GPI and national and regional offices. Additionally, the international pool of finances resulted in dual accountability and unequal distribution of funds, which in turn created a climate of insecurity resulting in resistance to change.⁸⁷ The Executive Director’s 1995 report described it as a phase of renewal, stating: “In my view Greenpeace is moving out of one era and into the next”.⁸⁸ Furthermore, the Joint Campaign Meeting planned by Paul

⁸⁴ IISG, GPIA, Folder 50, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. [Official documents concerning Greenpeace license] Undertakings of the License, July, 23, 1993.

⁸⁵ IISG, GPIA, Folder 50, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. Amsterdam, 1-3 September 1993. [Minutes] September 93 Board Meeting Minutes.

⁸⁶ IISG, GPIA, Folder 50, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. Amsterdam, 1-3 September 1993. [Report] Board’s Report to AGM 1993.

⁸⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 54, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. Washington, 2-3 March 1994. [Report] Elaine Lawrence, Steve Shallhorn, John Willis, Nuclear & Disarmament Campaigns Review, Final Report: Recommendations to the International Executive Director, February 1994.

⁸⁸ IISG, GPIA, Folder 54, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. Washington, 2-3 March 1994. [Report] ED’s report to the Board.

Hohnen, director of GPI, broadly reviewed the development of crucial organisational issues, such as the budget, and provided a platform to discuss campaign proposals in detail.⁸⁹

Greenpeace Inc.?

Due to its organisational transformation, Greenpeace was in a precarious situation in the late 1990s; it was balancing its newly implemented, highly structuralised measures to effectively steer out of the crisis, and the aim of staying true to its original grassroots' goals of saving the planet. Sarah Stroup and Wendy Wong expand on this challenge, defining it as an 'authority trap'. The term refers to the decision to prioritise organisational imperatives over changing the status quo to remain in a powerful position, or to pursue the organisation's uncompromised objectives without having their voices heard.⁹⁰ Figure 3 illustrates how Greenpeace approached this authority trap: the professionalised structure that emerged was formed upon the basis of the Council, which functioned as the central coordinator, accompanied by licensed regional and national offices. Each office was governed by a national board which appointed a trustee to the Council; all offices that fulfilled the requirements, such as the annual financial contribution to the Council, were allowed to vote in the Council. Trustees met once a year to agree on a Long-Term Strategic Plan and to make possible changes to governance structures; to decide on the spending threshold; and to elect seven members to the supervisory Board of Directors. The Board approved the budget and appointed the Executive Director, who was responsible for carrying out the Council's mandates and lead the ENGO in consultation with its various offices who had a direct input at bi-annual meetings.⁹¹

⁸⁹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2968, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1993-1995 [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] ; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2971, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1996-1997. [Telefax] Paul Hohnen, Provisional agenda, January 25, 1995.

⁹⁰ Stroup, S. S., & Wong, W. H. (2017). The Exceptional Nature of INGO Authority. In S. S. Stroup, & W. H. Wong, *The Authority Trap : Strategic Choices of International NGOs*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2.

⁹¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 668, Annual reports. With correspondence and pamphlets. 1996. [Report] 1996 Annual report.



Figure 3: Greenpeace's organisational structure in the 1996 Annual Report⁹²

Despite a clearer institutional structure, the mission statement introducing the 1997 campaign planning overview demonstrates the divided position of Greenpeace. It lists, among other features, “Greenpeace does not wait; it acts. The cornerstone of its action is the precautionary principle: that it is better to be safe than sorry, often acting in advance of absolute scientific proof or political consensus”.⁹³ This illustrates the conflict: the organisation developed a more structured approach thanks to a clearly formulated mission statement, but its actions were still torn and undecided. Indeed, the statement suggested to take action before

⁹² IISG, GPIA, Folder 668, Annual reports. With correspondence and pamphlets. 1996. [Report] 1996 Annual report.

⁹³ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2971, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1996-1997. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Campaign Planning Overview for 1997, September 13, 1996.

having a basis of scientific proof or political consensus, thus promoting unconventional and confrontational action methods (Figure 2).

Through its evolution, Greenpeace ended up maintaining its hierarchy, a significant number of full-time specialised staff, and a small-scale group of professionally trained activists. These activists made up the active membership section of the organisation, while it was funded by a large passive group of financial supporters. Thus, its composition resembled that of a corporation, regarding its supporters mainly as a source of income.⁹⁴ It has even been labelled a 'protest business' modelled on private business practices, due to its investment in recruitment and marketing.⁹⁵ The fact that decision-makers were not elected democratically made it assume a corporate model of accountability. This meant accountability was created by persuading their supporters that Greenpeace's actions were effective and impactful, which in turn created obstacles for the organisation's institutionalisation as outside support was often mainly lent to unconventional actions (Figure 2).⁹⁶ Grant considers this difficult balancing act of maintaining a responsible relationship with governments while simultaneously following the demands of members for more confrontational strategies. He offers an explanation for Greenpeace's undemocratic structure by stating that undemocratic structures of pressure groups ease the challenging balancing act, as it limits the possible input from members.⁹⁷

Anti-nuclear campaigning and institutionalisation

The following section examines anti-nuclear campaigning activities, including the main issues and objectives on Greenpeace's campaign agenda, to show how the organisation's institutionalisation influenced the development of the campaign throughout the entire period of the 1980s and 1990s. An introduction to the roots of the anti-nuclear campaign provides a historical basis for the following analysis, which aims to reveal the link between campaign activities and organisational institutionalisation. The main features of professionalisation have been discerned to evaluate how this organisational process played out in the context of the anti-nuclear campaign, including respective shifts and changes to campaign activities over time. In general, Greenpeace's professionalisation aimed to create a smoothly running machine of environmental activism, with two main objectives: clarity and coherence. From the

⁹⁴ Jordan & Maloney in Carter, N. (2007) *Parties and movements: Environmental Groups*, 151; Eden (2004) *Greenpeace*, 599.

⁹⁵ Jordan & Maloney in Carter, N. (2007) *Parties and movements: Environmental Groups*, 151.

⁹⁶ Rootes, C. (1999) *Prospects for a global environmental movement*, 304-305.

⁹⁷ Grant, W. (2001) *Pressure Politics*, 339&343.

organisational and management side, this entailed transparent decision-making structures with unambiguous divisions of responsibility and authority – a centralised executive structure – as well as a comprehensible financial system with straightforward funding allocation.⁹⁸ Concerning campaign activities, this meant an efficient and logical division of campaign issues along geographical or thematic lines with an overarching internationally coherent direction that was guided by particular understandings of specific circumstances. As illustrated in the scheme of action repertoires (Figure 2) institutionalisation also refers to a shift towards reformist insider strategies, dismissing the pursuit of radical outsider strategies and disruptive forms of pressure.⁹⁹

The name ‘Greenpeace’ indicates the organisation’s overall aims: the promotion of peace and environmental protection. Allegedly, the name emerged after a meeting in 1971, when Irving Stowe, while leaving, said “peace” and flashed a V-sign; another founding member, Bill Darnell, responded “make it a green peace”.¹⁰⁰ The combination of peace and environmental protection was reflected in the anti-nuclear campaign, as described in an anti-nuclear position paper from all European offices in 1982: “Greenpeace is opposed to the testing, development, production, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons by all nations for two primary reasons: because of the threat to all life should nuclear weapons ever be used in the event of a war; because the present environmental and health effects of the global arms race”.¹⁰¹ To achieve these objectives, Greenpeace employed various action methods that offered the ability to adjust to diverse conditions.¹⁰² Famously, Greenpeace raised public awareness by creating sensational situations, which formed the foundation of its campaign strategies. In the 1960s, a group of war veterans and environmentalists decided to protest against US nuclear testing at Amchitka Island.¹⁰³ The official version of the story states that, after a long debate about which form of action to take, Marie Bohlen proposed to send a boat – a suggestion inspired by the Quaker tactics of ‘bearing witness’.¹⁰⁴ The tactic had developed as, according to the Quaker’s beliefs, every person had a potential direct channel to God and the truth. Yet, war impeded this connection; by being peacefully present, Quakers demonstrated their disapproval and drew attention to the matter.¹⁰⁵ This first action, despite not

⁹⁸ Beder, S. (1991) *Activism versus negotiation*, 53-56.

⁹⁹ Carter, N. (2007) *Parties and movements: Environmental Groups*, 144.

¹⁰⁰ Zelko, F. (2004) *Making Greenpeace*, 237.

¹⁰¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2962. Nuclear campaign proposals. 1982-1984. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign activity] European Offices, Suggested Position Paper on Disarmament.

¹⁰² Eden (2004) *Greenpeace*, 604.

¹⁰³ Zelko, F. (2004) *Making Greenpeace*, 198-233; Zelko, F. (2017) *Scaling Greenpeace*, 320-324.

¹⁰⁴ Erwood, S. (2011) *The Greenpeace Chronicles*, 8-9.

¹⁰⁵ Zelko, F. (2004) *Making Greenpeace*, 198-203.

achieving its objective to get a boat to the nuclear testing site, constituted the start of what became Greenpeace's trademark: non-violent, direct action.

Broadening the scope

From around 1985 to 1986, the first signs of more coherent campaigning emerged. Greenpeace began to develop a more far-sighted and inclusive attitude towards campaigning with long-term strategies and geographically far-reaching objectives. Campaign strategies started to be marked by the integration and linkage of various campaign themes, illustrating a more structured approach to campaigning. For instance, the 1986 Uranium proposal by GPI suggested to connect the uranium shipping campaign in a number of the countries by applying pressure to the shipping companies transporting uranium between these countries.¹⁰⁶ In the following year, the Uranium proposal by GPI linked uranium shipping to disarmament, arguing that supposedly peaceful supplier countries could not be considered peaceful if they exported to nuclear testing countries. Thus, a degree of consistency started to emerge between different campaign themes.¹⁰⁷

Greenpeace started to incorporate a more inclusive campaign angle in order to efficiently address the issues of nuclear arms in all affected regions. To clarify its objectives, Greenpeace launched campaigns under umbrella terms that incorporated a wider geographical scope. In 1985, the international disarmament campaign moved away from the narrow approach of only targeting testing nations. The 'Disarm The Seas' notion, later renamed to 'Nuclear Free Seas', expanded the focus of testing to entire maritime regions, such as the 'Nuclear-free Mediterranean'. The aim was to dismiss nuclear arms testing globally and to construct a more comprehensive campaign theme that not only considered the testing countries, but also the areas they were tested in.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, in 1986, Jim Bohlen – one of Greenpeace's founders and at that point part of Greenpeace Canada – suggested to the Board to create a 'Nuclear Weapons Free Zone'. He argued the campaign approach would send a comprehensible message by uniting the campaign under an umbrella term and met its objectives due to its wide geographical scope, which would encourage far-reaching support (or wide-spread non-participation in the case of testing) that would form the basis for

¹⁰⁶ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2962, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1982-1984. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] International Uranium Mining and Transport Proposal 1986.

¹⁰⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] International Uranium Mining and Transport Campaign 1987 Proposal.

¹⁰⁸ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] 1987 Pacific Campaign proposal.

demonstrative and direct-democratic campaigning strategies (Figure 2).¹⁰⁹ Another attempt to establish an internationally coherent campaign approach was the concept of a ‘Nuclear Free Future’ that aimed for an absolute nuclear abolition, broadening the geographical scope to include the entire world.¹¹⁰

In the mid-1990s, Greenpeace broadened campaigning approaches and moved campaign actions towards the conventional end of the spectrum (Figure 2) by starting to implement a series of solutions-led approaches, such as offering alternative energy solutions and engaging with governments and companies in a meaningful debate about solving waste disposal issues.¹¹¹ This strategy, referred to as positive campaigning, and which will be illustrated in more depth in Chapter Three, demonstrates Greenpeace’s re-positioning as a relevant ENGO within society through the adjustment of its actions methods, to not only emphasise the negative environmental impact, but also to find ways to fix the problems. The newly emerging angle shows the influence of institutionalisation on anti-nuclear campaigning, as solutions-led campaign approaches meant a dialogue with governments, institutions, and companies, which was only possible if the organisation turned towards reformist and non-disruptive action methods.

Efficient budgeting

In light of limited funding and a lack of campaigners, the degree of tangible impact and of the potential to achieve campaign objectives of the different anti-nuclear campaign themes shifted into focus.¹¹² The overall approach was to not simply cut the budget by proportion, but rather to efficiently budget and evaluate the campaign actions’ significance, while simultaneously improving the organisation.¹¹³ This explains a move towards reflected and

¹⁰⁹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Jim Bohlen, 1986 National Disarmament proposal, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Canada, December 19, 1986.

¹¹⁰ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Jim Bohlen, 1986 National Disarmament proposal, Nuclear Free Future, December 19, 1986.

¹¹¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 54, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. Washington, 2-3 March 1994. [Report] Nuclear and Disarmament campaigns review, Final report: recommendations to the international executive director; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2978, Documents concerning the GP policy on nuclear power. With internal correspondence, discussion papers and proposals. 1987-1988, 1992-1995. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] promotion of solutions-led started in mid-90s; IISG, GPIA, Folder 665, Annual reports. With correspondence and pamphlets. [Letter].

¹¹² IISG, GPIA, Folder 2969, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1994-1995. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Paul Hohnen, Campaign Statement, December 23, 1994.

¹¹³ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2969, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1994-1995. [Report] Board meeting, Organisational and Financial Strategy Years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, April 24, 1994.

structured campaigning, such as the concentration on the weak links of the nuclear industry. The 1985 International Disarmament proposal advocated for Canada to focus on cruise missiles, since the essentially non-military nation constituted the most vulnerable target of NATO's commitment to cruise missiles.¹¹⁴ A tendency towards selective and targeted campaigning also became clear thanks to a focus on countries that constituted a convenient and effective starting point to harm the nuclear industry. Since 1990, the 'Nuclear Free Future' proposals by GPI aimed at pushing the private investment markets of various countries to refrain from investing in British nuclear power, so that the building of a new reactor series at Hinkley Point C could be halted.¹¹⁵ In a similar vein, the Swiss nuclear energy proposal from 1994 suggested a joint campaign to advocate the cancellation of the Swiss, German, and Dutch contracts with British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.¹¹⁶ Thus, the British nuclear industry was identified as the weak link based on the fact that the British nuclear market was financially weakened. Moreover, the public opinion in Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands was shifting, which gave rise to a discussion about a nuclear phase-out, therefore making these countries more receptive to the idea of distancing themselves from the nuclear industry.¹¹⁷

Creating continuity

Greenpeace distanced itself from other environmental activist groups, especially newly emerging grassroots groups, and, in the 1990s, tried to re-position itself in society and on the spectrum of environmental activism as a long-established and therefore respectable environmental organisation.¹¹⁸ It did so by emphasising its unprecedented character, referencing the roots and uniqueness of Greenpeace's anti-nuclear campaign. In particular, the 'Disarm the Seas' campaign was understood as a favourable campaigning angle because of its

¹¹⁴ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2962, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1982-1984. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Jim Bohlen, 1885 Internal Disarmament Proposal.

¹¹⁵ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2969, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1994-1995. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Nuclear Free Future campaign proposals; IISG, GPIA, Folder 680, Greenpeace International Executive Director's Monthly Report. 1995-1999. September-November 1995 [Report]; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2961, Minutes, agenda and other related documents of the Civil Nuclear Campaigners' Meeting. 11-14 December 1989. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Nuclear Free Future Campaign – Draft Campaign Proposals, 1990, November 23, 1989.

¹¹⁶ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2961, Minutes, agenda and other related documents of the Civil Nuclear Campaigners' Meeting. 11-14 December 1989. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Bernard van Dierendonck, Proposal Nuclear Campaign 1990, November 14, 1989.

¹¹⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2964, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Andy Stirling, Michelle Sheather, The International Nuclear Campaign Proposal 1989/90.

¹¹⁸ Beder, S. (1991) *Activism versus negotiation*, 54; Carter, N. (2007) *Parties and movements: Environmental Groups*, 144.

connection to Greenpeace's maritime history, and because it gave Greenpeace a unique role in the disarmament and environmental movement as the only ENGO campaigning against nuclear weapons at sea.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, to justify the legitimate continuation of its anti-nuclear campaign, the anti-nuclear campaign maintained specific slogans but altered their interpretation to fit society's current tendencies and adjusted their understanding to the contemporary demands of the wider public. These redefinitions symbolise Greenpeace's objective to either stay or become relevant in the nuclear debate – a sign of professionalisation due to geographically diverse re-interpretations of existing wordings to maximise impact, yet at the same time sticking to an internationally coherent terminology. For example, 'nuclear threat' was used in the 1990 nuclear campaign proposal for South America as a political threat. The proposal stated that in order to form an anti-nuclear movement and to raise public awareness of nuclear problems, the connection between democratisation and denuclearisation should be emphasised: the loosening political grip of the nuclear industry and the consideration of the people's choice of energy sources.¹²⁰ In contrast, a Swiss proposal submitted to GPI in the same year argued the political threat was obsolete and the focus should be on 'radiophobia' which re-defined the nuclear threat as an immediate health threat.¹²¹ Similarly, the concept of safety was interpreted differently by various national offices. The safety discussion in the 1992 international anti-nuclear proposal centred around reactor safety and upgrading technologies for Germany, while Greenpeace UK and USA were to focus on safe long-term storage of existing waste. This nationally diverging understanding was due to developments of the nuclear industry in the respective countries, as Germany had started to discuss a nuclear phase-out.¹²²

*Greenpeace's relationship with the IAEA*¹²³

By evaluating Greenpeace's altering relationship with an influential and international institution – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Greenpeace's conflicting and

¹¹⁹ Compare argument by: Doherty, B., & Doyle, T. (2006) *Beyond borders*, 697-712.

¹²⁰ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2961, Minutes, agenda and other related documents of the Civil Nuclear Campaigners' Meeting. 11-14 December 1989. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Proposals for an antinuclear campaign in South America.

¹²¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2961, Minutes, agenda and other related documents of the Civil Nuclear Campaigners' Meeting. 11-14 December 1989. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Bernard van Dierendonck, Proposal Nuclear Campaign 1990, November 14, 1989.

¹²² IISG, GPIA, Folder 2967, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1991. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] International Nuclear Campaign Proposals 1991.

¹²³ **Disclaimer:** the author is aware of the European project, its development during the discussed time period, and recognises its increasing importance for the respective Greenpeace offices. Yet, it was decided to exclude it due to the thesis' limited scope and its lesser importance for the central question of this thesis. The European project constitutes a different layer than the international organisation of the IAEA, its consideration of only

changing connection to an official institution becomes apparent, as well as its shifting on the scheme of action repertoires (Figure 2). This leads to the question of whether an ENGO is more relevant when it has a seat at the negotiations table working with global institutional giants, or when it critically raises awareness from the outside to gain the public's attention and support. This question demonstrates the struggle and dilemma of institutionalisation for Greenpeace.

The IAEA was created in 1957 due to the advancement of nuclear technologies. The autonomous organisation works under the mandate "to promote and control the atom".¹²⁴ Its mission is to work with its signatory states and partners to promote secure and peaceful nuclear technology by drafting rules and commands, ranging from nuclear policies and safeguard system proposals to judgements on compliance. As part of the UN system and via reports to the Security Council, it is a global institutional body to moderate conflict over nuclear issues, thus executing political authority on issues of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.¹²⁵

Greenpeace's relationship with the IAEA altered over time, portraying a conflicting development. On the one hand, Greenpeace was working together with the Agency, on the other hand, Greenpeace was actively targeting it. The 1985 Nuclear Wastes proposal suggested to delay the IAEA's efforts to re-define radioactive waste in a manner that would allow more dumping. Specifically, the proposal called for interventions by Greenpeace-hired scientists at IAEA meetings to prevent the IAEA from reaching a consensus in time before the London Dumping Convention, where the proposed amended annexes were to be discussed.¹²⁶ The approach illustrates Greenpeace's opposing position to the institution; yet, Greenpeace also attempted to work from within by attending an IAEA meeting. In 1987, the IAEA approached Greenpeace to convene a technical working group to review the issue of reactor safety, which, according to anti-nuclear coordinator Stirling, should be considered with caution: he warned the Board that "Greenpeace might become the IAEA's puppet".¹²⁷ Moreover, the German and British offices voiced the concern that, in light of the IAEA reactor safety conference in Vienna,

some of the discussed Greenpeace offices and the fact that Euratom is a separate legal entity from the EU – despite being governed by the EU institutions – have been determined as reasons why tracking the influence of European nuclear policies and national divergences on nuclear policies would deviate and go beyond this dissertation's aim. This is why the author suggests a separate study on the influence of Euratom.

¹²⁴ Treaty, Euratom (2007, October 19). *Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)*. Retrieved June 4, 2018, from Eur-Lex Access to European Union Law: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0024>.

¹²⁵ Brown, R. (2015). *The IAEA Challenged, 1986-1998*. In R. Brown, *Nuclear Authority: The IAEA and the Absolute Weapon*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 137-8; Agency, International Atomic (n.d.). *History of IAEA*. Retrieved June 4, 2018, from IAEA Web site: <https://www.iaea.org/about/overview/history>.

¹²⁶ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2962, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1982-1984. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Ocean Disposal of Nuclear Wastes, Campaign Proposals 1985.

¹²⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987. [Telefax] Andy Stirling, Proposal for funding Nuclear Free Future Work in 1987, June 4, 1987.

they were planning to conduct independent scientific studies to check the Agency's data, as well as to protest the Agency's friendly attitude towards the nuclear industry.¹²⁸ Greenpeace's rising institutional profile and capacities become apparent, despite its critical attitude and external pressure exerted on the IAEA.

However, by 1989, Greenpeace was officially involved with the Agency. The 1989 IAEA Nuclear Safety Liability Planning Meeting, which revolved around nuclear safety and the liability claims of victims, constituted a demonstration of Greenpeace's close cooperation with the institution, indicating its advancing institutionalisation by sitting at the negotiating table.¹²⁹ Additionally, the 'Nuclear Free Future' proposal for 1989 and 1990 defined the IAEA as a good and useful platform, and mentioned that Greenpeace was the only anti-nuclear ENGO pursuing active initiatives on nuclear power at the international and institutional level.¹³⁰ Nonetheless, whilst working within institutional boundaries was an obvious indicator of institutionalisation, the proposal also set out to provoke public pressure in selected non-nuclear IAEA member states, such as Ireland, Austria, and Denmark, to adopt positions in favour of changing the statute of IAEA to remove the obligation to promote nuclear power.¹³¹ Similarly, in 1992, the core aim of all civil nuclear campaigns was to damage the IAEA's ability to promote nuclear industries.¹³² The Pacific proposal of 1997 focussed on the IAEA's 40th anniversary to repeat Greenpeace's message to stop the promotion of nuclear technology and to start the implementation of renewable energy sources.¹³³ These shifts reveal the conflicting development Greenpeace underwent, and how professionalisation was not a linear process; it required choosing between either working against a global organisation, or using the Agency's institutional platform, which entailed a constant adjustment of Greenpeace's campaign strategies.

Overall, Greenpeace developed from a grassroots organisation into a professional protest organisation, incorporating the characteristics of a hybrid ENGO due to its continuous

¹²⁸ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Telefax] Elaine Lawrence, Nuclear Campaign proposals for 1987, September 20, 1986 for 1987.

¹²⁹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2959, Minutes of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Safety / Liability Planning Meeting, March 16, 1989. [Minutes].

¹³⁰ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2964, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Andy Stirling, Michelle Sheather, The International Nuclear Campaign Proposal 1989/90.

¹³¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2965, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1987-1991. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Draft Nuclear Free Future Proposal: 1989

¹³² IISG, GPIA, Folder 2967 Nuclear campaign proposals. 1991. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] International Nuclear Campaign proposal 1992.

¹³³ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2971, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1996-1997. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals]; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2970, Nuclear Campaign Proposals. 1982-1998. 1996-1997. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals].

employment of unconventional action methods, despite becoming a cooperation-like organisation with substantial influence in society and the political realm. Upon the exemplary basis of a selection of campaign proposals, it has been demonstrated how the nature of Greenpeace's anti-nuclear campaigning activities evolved over time due to the effects of institutionalisation. Greenpeace's organisational development raises the questions of how this outcome came about, how it was perceived internally, and whether it was inevitable for Greenpeace to reach its peculiar form as a hybrid ENGO, namely enjoying a status in society as a professional protest organisation working from within while also continuing to conduct unconventional actions that penetrate the establishment from the outside. Chapter Two suggests an answer by looking at the influence of external circumstances on anti-nuclear campaigning.

Chapter Two: The impact of external circumstances on anti-nuclear campaigning

*“It is not just ideologies and attitudes that are creating the mess, but the structure of the world’s economic and political institutions. The attitudes, ideologies and interests of individual people are often symptomatic of this, rather than causes in themselves.”*¹³⁴

Andy Stirling, anti-nuclear campaign coordinator

This chapter explores the influence of external conditions on Greenpeace’s anti-nuclear campaign, as well as the question of how Greenpeace adjusted to the different contexts it was acting in. Reconstructing global and national settings shows that outside factors strongly affected Greenpeace actions: as described by the cycle of resilient influence (Figure 1), members interpreted the campaign’s context and external circumstances, which in turn influenced their choice of action methods and campaign approaches. After having identified the organisational development of Greenpeace and the impact of institutionalisation on anti-nuclear campaign activities in Chapter One, the objective is to find an answer to what extent the changes in the nature of the anti-nuclear campaign can be explained as a response to altering external circumstances. This chapter argues, in line with the existing scholarship, that social and national contexts influenced not only what protest action could objectively achieve, but also the activists’ perceptions of these possibilities.¹³⁵ By looking through a constructivist lens, this section suggests that different contexts produce different sets of conditions.¹³⁶ This is done by identifying influential turning points in the era of the 1980s and 1990s, and by dividing them into global and national external influences.

¹³⁴ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2974, Documents concerning the long term development plan. 1986-1988. Comments. 1987-1988. [Telefax] Andy Stirling, Comments requested on the Long Term Plan Document and Associated Energy Policy Discussion Paper, Recognising the Problem, September 8, 1987.

¹³⁵ Compare: Hall, N. L., & Taplin, R. (2007, December). Solar Festivals and Climate Bills: Comparing NGO Climate Change Campaigns in the UK and Australia. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 18(4), 317&335; Dryzek, J. S., Downes, D., Hunold, C., Schlosberg, D., & Hernes, H.-K. (2003) *Evaluating Movement Effectiveness and Strategy*, 132f.; Van der Heijden, H.-A. (1999). Environmental movements, ecological modernisation and political opportunity structures. *Environmental Politics*, 8(1), 199-200; Riese, J. (2017) *Hairy Hippies and Bloody Butchers*, 3; Balser, D. B. (1997, September). The Impact of Environmental Factors on Factionalism and Schism in Social Movement Organizations. *Social Forces*, 76(1), 212-224.

¹³⁶ Hjelm, U. (1996) *Constructivist Analysis and Movement Organizations*, 182-183.

Global external influences

From an international perspective, an important factor that led to specific circumstances, which majorly influenced anti-nuclear campaigning, was the Cold War. The delicate political climate resulted in various constructed realities that had a profound impact on the internal perception of the anti-nuclear campaign and the organisation – the interpretation of the circumstances had a pronounced impact on campaigning actions (Figure 1).¹³⁷ The global division in East and West was mirrored in Greenpeace's campaign emphases at the time, and showed the acute and timely awareness that many anti-nuclear campaigners had of outside factors and conditions that could aid, as well as impede, the campaign's objectives to stop testing and nuclear armament, thus shaping the campaign's nature. Firstly, a general outline of the period helps to understand the historical backdrop and thought processes that influenced Greenpeace's anti-nuclear campaign.

The Cold War marked the period that started at the end of WWII and lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. It was characterised by an ideological battle between communism versus capitalism and Western-style democracy. The name refers to the perpetual tension between two blocs of nations and two opposing superpowers – the USA in the West and the Soviet Union in the East – which did not conduct overt hostilities.¹³⁸ However, the struggle was not bipolar, as other nations at the frontline replicated and expanded the policies made in Washington and Moscow. Instead of aggressive war actions, the period was marked by the importance of ideas and the portrayal of two incompatible systems that both struggled for world domination.¹³⁹ The era was defined by strategic security thinking, meaning accepting limited national sovereignty as a price for relative safety.¹⁴⁰ Being prepared to prevail in case of an attack by the opposing side led to an arms race to guarantee the ability to retaliate.¹⁴¹ Reinhold Niebuhr contended that this 'balance of weapons' would prove irrelevant due to the deadly nature of nuclear weapons.¹⁴² Others argued that the nuclear arms race was a contest to gain political supremacy, which never intended to ignite into a 'hot war'.¹⁴³ During this period, speculations and slow or inaccurate communication defined and split public opinion. Some

¹³⁷ Risse, T. (2004) *Social Constructivism Meets Globalization*, 3.

¹³⁸ Niebuhr, R. (1959). The Cold War and the nuclear dilemma. *CrossCurrents*, 9(3), 212-213.

¹³⁹ Sharp, J. (2000). The Beginnings of Cold War. In J. Sharp, *Condensing the Cold War: Reader's Digest and American Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 83-106.

¹⁴⁰ Compare: Krasner, S. (1999). *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

¹⁴¹ Kimball, D. (2012). FOCUS: Ending Cold War Nuclear Thinking. *Arms Control Today*, 42(2), 4.

¹⁴² Niebuhr, R. (1959) *The Cold War and the nuclear dilemma*, 212-213.

¹⁴³ for a comprehensive overview compare: Gaddis, J. (2006). *The Cold War*. London, UK: Penguin Random House.

Europeans appreciated the US nuclear umbrella, while others believed the mere presence of nuclear weapons made them more vulnerable to an attack from the East.¹⁴⁴ The abolition of nuclear weapons seemed virtually impossible, as nations on both sides chose security over peace. Overall, nuclear disarmament involved a risk to national security even if it was conducted mutually; moreover, it was impossible to achieve without reviewing the total power relations of the contestants.¹⁴⁵

In this climate of competition, angst, and encompassing uncertainty, Greenpeace conducted its anti-nuclear campaign activities, which explains why different anti-nuclear coordinators prioritised different sides and aspects of the Cold War as campaign approaches. In other words, referring to the constructivist theoretical framework and the cycle of resilient influence (Figure 1): different anti-nuclear campaigners interpreted the external circumstances, and thus the relevance of campaigning actions, based on diversely constructed realities. While, in some cases, it remains unclear from the source material whether the Greenpeace coordinators stated their personal or their office's opinion, their statements reveal the influence of external circumstances on the campaigners' different perceptions. In 1983, Eric Fersht, at this point the US disarmament coordinator, stated that "internationally, Greenpeace identified the United States as the most important target of the Anti-Testing Campaign".¹⁴⁶ Yet, in 1984, Gerd Leipold, the German nuclear coordinator, maintained to continue the anti-nuclear campaign from the opposite angle: "The Soviet-Union [*sic*] conducts more tests than any other single nation. To test whether the Soviet willingness to end testing is more than tactical, we have to actively propose the idea of a limited, unilateral moratorium. Minor direct actions in the Soviet-Union or one of its satellite countries will in addition voice our opposition to the numerous Soviet [*sic*] tests and increase our credibility in the West".¹⁴⁷ While Greenpeace did not have an office in the USSR, Leipold referred to possible campaigning activities that targeted it from the outside, for example by flying over the Berlin Wall in an hot air balloon in 1983.¹⁴⁸ Additionally, Leipold expanded on the testing theme by stating that "large parts of the peace

¹⁴⁴ Falk, A. (2010). Afterword: The Cold War Epic. *Upstaging the Cold War: American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy*, 212-214.

¹⁴⁵ Niebuhr, R. (1959) *The Cold War and the nuclear dilemma*, 212-213.

¹⁴⁶ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2962, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1982-1984. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Eric Fersht, Summary of the 1984 Greenpeace Disarmament Proposal, September, 1983.

¹⁴⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2962, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1982-1984. [Letter] Gerd Leipold, The importance of a test-stop, October 28, 1983.

¹⁴⁸ Greenpeace UK. (2014, August 29). *The Day Greenpeace Flew Over The Berlin Wall - 28.08.1983*. Retrieved May 12, 2018, from Greenpeace UK - Youtube Channel: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HET9GLreKXQ>.

movement lack long-term perspectives, continuity and strategy. It is in this respect that Greenpeace can and should serve as an example and encouragement for other groups".¹⁴⁹ In the light of the ongoing non-combative war, he referred to an objective deeply ingrained in the organisation: world peace.

Emotion-targeted campaigning was another feature of the anti-nuclear campaign's distinct nature that resulted from the Cold War and expressed the campaign's focus on relevant and timely campaigning. The choice to introduce a proactive and value-laden media communications campaign departed from the traditional way of informative and awareness-raising campaigning.¹⁵⁰ This campaign method adjustment can be traced back to similar alterations in the stance of the US Government at the time – a strategic shift away from campaigning based on hard facts due to US President Reagan's increasingly emotionally laden approach to the Cold War. GPI communicated to the Board in its introduction to the media strategy proposal that "while we're still arguing our case, President Reagan is marketing his".¹⁵¹ This shift in strategy illustrates the changing attitude and disillusionment of Greenpeace USA members due to their awareness that Greenpeace was not controlling the nuclear debate, and was therefore failing to convincingly reach the public (see Figure 1).¹⁵² The so-called 'DefCon' approach, referring to an alert state used by the US Armed Forces called 'DEFense readiness CONdition', tried to raise public awareness and interest in nuclear disarmament by relying on emotional messages feeding in American national pride by promoting US' responsibility as the leader of the democratic, Western world to work towards world peace.¹⁵³

The nature of the disarmament campaign reflected the internal awareness of external circumstances. Campaigning was conducted with a long-term perspective; regarding disarmament as a process involving multiple steps along the way. The 1986 proposal by GPI observed disarmament to be fundamentally different from other anti-nuclear campaign topics.

¹⁴⁹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2962, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1982-1984. [Letter] Gerd Leipold, The anti-testing campaign – not winnable but valuable, October 28, 1983.

¹⁵⁰ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Report] DefCon: Analysis and Overview, February 1986.

¹⁵¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2962, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1982-1984. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Greenpeace International, Disarmament media campaign.

¹⁵² IISG, GPIA, Folder 2962, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1982-1984. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Disarmament Media Campaign.

¹⁵³ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Report] DefCon: Analysis and Overview, February 1986; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Telefax] Eric Fersht, Sebja Hawkins, Memorandum – 1986 Greenpeace USA Non-Proliferation/Disarmament Campaign, Nuclear Free Pacific, June 7, 1985; compare for other examples: IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] 1983 Pacific Campaign proposal; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] International Uranium Mining and Transport campaign 1987 proposal.

It was perceived that no ‘quick fix’ solution existed; no state wanted to disarm for fear of giving up power in the international arena.¹⁵⁴ With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, however, the nuclear world was at a crossroads; the main implication for Greenpeace’s anti-nuclear campaign was that it had to adjust to the altered global arena and resulting contrasting opinions. While the awareness of changing external circumstances is traceable in all anti-nuclear campaigners, their understanding of the rapid geopolitical changes differed according to which opportunities they saw in the redundancy of nuclear weapons in a peaceful world. Overall, it was a period of re-orientation of world politics, with the end of the arms race due to the cessation of the Soviet threat, resulting in altered security perceptions. The dissolution of the Cold War frontier demanded a change of focus to re-define power identities, as the strict black and white picture started to be replaced by a new polychromatic world order.¹⁵⁵

Recognising the political climate of peace as an opportunity to end nuclear testing, the campaign evaluations conducted by GPI in 1991, which served as a foreword to that year’s collection of anti-nuclear proposals submitted to the Board, declared “if Greenpeace wants to have a nuclear testing campaign that is relevant, rather than merely a sentimental hangover from the early days, then it is necessary to recognise that we have the best political opportunity that we are likely to see for a decade to push the nuclear weapons states to stop testing”.¹⁵⁶

German disarmament coordinator Leipold went further and interpreted the atmosphere of change as a unique opportunity to permanently abolish nuclear weapons. This fed into the widespread initial euphoria that Germany’s reunification would constitute a fresh start to a united and ‘normal’ state, moving on from past scarring experiences.¹⁵⁷ Leipold’s opinion confirmed the theory of nuclear deterrence, which determined that nuclear weapons had been a defence measure and therefore the result of fear of an attack, therefore the end of the Cold War was seen as an opportunity to eliminate nuclear weapons because they had become obsolete for world affairs.¹⁵⁸ In June 1990, Leipold stated, “we live in a phase where world

¹⁵⁴ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2962, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1982-1984. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Greenpeace International, 1986 Disarmament Proposal – Overview.

¹⁵⁵ Sharp, J. (2000) *The Beginnings of Cold War*, 137-139.

¹⁵⁶ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2964, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1987-1991. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Proposal overviews for 1991.

¹⁵⁷ McAdams, A. (1997). Germany after Unification: Normal at Last? *World Politics*, 49(2), 290-306; Görtemaker, M. (2009, November 6). The Berlin Republic: Reunification and Reorientation. *20 Years: Fall of the Berlin Wall: Insights into Southeast Asian and European Affairs*, 1, 21.

¹⁵⁸ McGwire, M. (2010). *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; Reiss, M. (1995). A Nuclear-Free World: Is It Plausible? *The Brookings Review*, 13(3), 2.

politics changes by the day, and for the first time in 40 years real disarmament is a realistic project".¹⁵⁹

In comparison, despite the source's incompleteness and the consequent uncertainty regarding whether this opinion was representative of the entire US office, the nuclear power campaign proposal submitted by Greenpeace USA in 1990 indicates a different interpretation of the possibilities arising due to changing external conditions. It saw the end of the Cold War as a chance to focus on new topics, deeming the disarmament issue obsolete. In the US, this was due to a widespread sense of victory over the Eastern communist enemy and increasing international awareness of the need to cooperatively act against human-induced environmental destruction, such as acid rain and the ozone layer hole.¹⁶⁰ The introduction to the US proposal expressed that "this is a time of great political change, as signified by the Berlin Wall being opened; with new global challenges such as the Greenhouse effect and destruction of ozone layer clearly requiring international cooperation and massive resources of minds and money, nuclear weapons are mindbogglingly irrelevant and a criminal waste."¹⁶¹

Demonstrating yet another view on the opportunities of the new peaceful era, British disarmament campaigners shifted their campaigning focus from geo-political to geo-financial issues, due to the country's recession in 1991 and 1992.¹⁶² The understanding of security was re-interpreted; the UK's disarmament proposal for 1991 established a neoliberal strategic angle by focussing on financial security instead of national security. The aim was to use economic and environmental data to show that investments in nuclear power were financially unattractive, constituting a risk for the taxpayers, and also embodying a risk to the environment, leaving the consumers with exorbitant costs in form of declining living standards.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2964, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1987-1991. [Letter] Discussion paper on the future of Greenpeace's disarmament work.

¹⁶⁰ Hahn, R., & McGartland, A. (1989). Political Economy of Instrument Choice: An Examination of the U.S. Role in Implementing the Montreal Protocol. *Northwestern University Law Review*, 83(3), 592-611; Unites States Environmental Protection Agency. (2018, April 3). *Acid Rain Program*. Retrieved July 20, 2018, from Clean Air Markets - Acid Rain Program: <https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/acid-rain-program>; United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2015, August 15). *Title IV of the Clean Air Act – Acid Deposition Control*. Retrieved July 21, 2018, from Acid Rain Program Laws and Regulations: <https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/acid-rain-program-laws-and-regulations>.

¹⁶¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2964, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1987-1991. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Summary 1991 Nuclear Power Campaign Proposal.

¹⁶² Statistics, U. O. (2015, February 27). *Trends in the UK economy*. Retrieved July 28, 2018, from Office for National Statistics: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/productivitymeasures/articles/trendsintheukconomy/2015-02-27>; The Guardian. (2016). *UK GDP since 1955*. Retrieved July 18, 2018, from The Guardian - Data Blog : <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2009/nov/25/gdp-uk-1948-growth-economy>; Rhys, H. (2003, November). Economic Trends – the first fifty years in Economic Trends. *Economic Trends* 600, 40-48.

¹⁶³ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2961, Minutes, agenda and other related documents of the Civil Nuclear Campaigners' Meeting. 11-14 December 1989. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Greenpeace

National external influences

The previous section demonstrated the influence of global politics, showing how the ENGO's approaches went across and beyond geographical boundaries via its transnational organisational structure. It also illustrated how different countries – particularly the US, Germany, and the UK – reacted to changing international conditions based on diversely constructed realities. The following paragraphs take a closer look at how Greenpeace tried to maintain campaigning strategies with an international vision, while at the same time interpreting them locally: external influences in the form of national governments and societies constructed different sets of conditions that affected campaign strategies and action choices.¹⁶⁴ Along constructivist lines, different realities existed in different regional and national contexts with different characteristics, such as public debates, geographical location, or the availability of different energy sources.¹⁶⁵ This variety in local realities influenced perceptions within Greenpeace and shaped anti-nuclear campaign projects. More specifically, the distinct circumstantial variations impacted the choice of campaign themes, the degree of the campaigning radicalism, and the way of imposing the campaign actions.

The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 in particular sparked different reactions among many Greenpeace offices. This event, the worst and largest nuclear accident in history, triggered the realisation that nationally diverse understandings of the anti-nuclear campaign existed within Greenpeace due to the influence of diverse national characteristics. In the following, a historical synopsis embeds the analysis in its context, accompanied by an overview of new campaign angles and an evaluation of the anti-nuclear policy debate between different Greenpeace offices, as well as an examination of what the realisation of national divergence meant for the nature of other anti-nuclear campaign themes.

On 26th April 1986, unit four of the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl was destroyed following an experiment on the electrical system that deliberately disabled various safety systems.¹⁶⁶ The steam explosion led to a fire in the reactor. Many of the early helpers and

UK – Civil Nuclear Power Campaign – Overview 1989, November 23, 1989; compare for other examples: IISG, GPIA, Folder 54, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. Washington, 2-3 March 1994. [Report] Elaine Lawrence, Steve Shallhorn, John Willis, Nuclear & Disarmament Campaigns Review, Final Report: Recommendations to the International Executive Director, February 1994.

¹⁶⁴ Behraves, M. (2011) *Constructivism: An Introduction*. Retrieved March 22, 2018; Risse, T. (2004) *Social Constructivism Meets Globalization*, 3.

¹⁶⁵ Hjelm, U. (1996) *Constructivist Analysis and Movement Organizations*, 182-183.

¹⁶⁶ Smith, J., & Beresford, N. (2005). Introduction. In J. T. Smith, & N. A. Beresford, *Chernobyl - Catastrophe and Consequences*. Heidelberg: Springer Verlag. 1-2.

firemen died within days from exposure to lethal dosages of radiation.¹⁶⁷ However, the seriousness of the accident did not become public until a Swedish power plant registered unusually high rates of radioactivity and contacted the director of the IAEA, Hans Blix, to inquire about a major radioactive leak somewhere in Europe, from which radioactive dust was carried by the wind to other parts of the world.¹⁶⁸ The Soviet government was alerted of the seriousness of the situation. The message that an accident of immense magnitude at a nuclear reactor in Soviet-Ukraine had triggered the release of large amounts of radioactivity spread rapidly across Europe, and fear of contamination – either externally by radioactive clouds or internally via contaminated water and food – led to restrictions on food consumption and imports.¹⁶⁹

The disaster divided the second half of the 1980s for Greenpeace, as for much of the world, into pre- and post-Chernobyl. The catastrophic incident changed the public and political views regarding the desirability of nuclear energy and a debate on reactor safety and nuclear energy emerged in the aftermath of the accident.¹⁷⁰ This led to the emergence of an additional campaigning focus on secure energy sources, demonstrating Greenpeace's adjustment to and re-interpretation of external circumstances (Figure 1). As the nuclear industry was in a particularly vulnerable position, many Greenpeace branches aimed to make use of this opportunity and nuclear energy rose above disarmament on the campaign agenda.¹⁷¹ While protests in the 1970s had already targeted the construction of nuclear reactors, post-Chernobyl attention shifted explicitly to reactor safety and alternative energy supplies.¹⁷² The energy campaign argued that nuclear energy was unsafe, referring to the Chernobyl reactor as an example of the high risk potential and highlighting particularly unsafe and outdated reactors in

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 4&16.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 15.

¹⁶⁹ Nuclear Energy Agency. (2002). *Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and Health Impact: Reactions of national authorities*. Retrieved June 22, 2018, from OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: <https://www.oecd-neo.org/rp/chernobyl/c03.html>.

¹⁷⁰ Barkenbus, J. (1987). Nuclear Power Safety and the Role of International Organization. *International Organization*, 41(3), 476; Verplanken, B. (1989). Beliefs, Attitudes, and Intentions toward Nuclear Energy before and after Chernobyl. *Environment and Behavior*, 21(4), 381. Compare also: Tsoukalas, L., & Gao, R. (2014). A Future Role for Nuclear Energy? In E. Coyle, & R. Simmons, *Understanding the Global Energy Crisis*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

¹⁷¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2965, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1987-1991. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Civil Nuclear Campaign Proposals 1988.

¹⁷² Milder, S. (2017). *Greening Democracy: The Anti-Nuclear Movement and Political Environmentalism in Germany and Beyond, 1986-1983*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Tompkins, A. (2016). *Better Active than Radioactive! Anti-Nuclear Protest in 1970s France and West Germany*. Oxford: Oxford Historical Monographs; Kirchhof, A., & Meyer, J. (2014). Global Protest against Nuclear Power. Transfer and Transnational Exchange in the 1970s and 1980s. *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung*, 39(1), 165-190; Vogt, M. (2012). The Lessons of Chernobyl and Fukushima: An Ethical Evaluation. *RCC Perspectives*, 1, 34.

other countries, thereby playing into the existing fear and the rising mentality of ‘not in my backyard’.¹⁷³

Diverging trends in opinions on how to implement the energy campaign emerged along national borders, depending on the image and societal stand Greenpeace had in the respective countries and how its campaigners perceived the ENGO, thus demonstrating the application of the resilient cycle. In addition, there had been disagreement on Greenpeace’s public statement on the accident, which had led to a delay in reactions in the immediate aftermath of the accident.¹⁷⁴ It was therefore decided to formulate, for future reference, a nuclear policy paper that provided a globally coherent, long-term overview of Greenpeace’s integrated position as well as a framework for credible short-term reactions from nation-specific angles.¹⁷⁵

A nuclear policy paper distributed by anti-nuclear campaign coordinator Elaine Lawrence sparked a debate that can be broken down along national lines. Divisions over positions and questions were related to various aspects, including: the relevance and saliency of the accident based on the respective geographical locations; previous nation-wide experiences connected to the nuclear issue; the credibility in connection with the achievability of the paper’s objectives; long-term and short-term views of the anti-nuclear campaign; and the degree of environmental concerns.¹⁷⁶ The reactions of certain offices were deemed representative of all different national stances within Greenpeace. David Albright, from Greenpeace USA, criticised the paper’s stark focus on Chernobyl and reactor safety, maintaining that the Cold War remained the most relevant item on the campaign agenda, due to its geographical distance to the accident and the consequently limited amount of perceived consequences.¹⁷⁷ This was reflected in the statement by Reagan’s press secretary Larry M. Speakes following the accident, which called for the USSR to communicate more closely with the West, using the opportunity to push for ‘glasnost’ – increased governmental transparency

¹⁷³ IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Andy Stirling, Funding Proposal for Limited Post Chernobyl Work in 1987, March 25, 1987; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2965, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1987-1991. Civil Nuclear Campaign Proposals 1988.

¹⁷⁴ IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987. [Telefax] Andy Stirling, Elaine Lawrence, To nuclear campaigners and any other interested parties, September 3, 1986.

¹⁷⁵ IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987. [Telefax] Andy Stirling, Elaine Lawrence, To nuclear campaigners and any other interested parties, September 3, 1986.

¹⁷⁶ IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987. [Telefax] Various office responses to Elaine Lawrence, Greenpeace Nuclear Policy, June 11, 1986; for secondary literature underlying this debate compare: Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 94(2), 251-267; Mahoney, J. (2000). Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. *Theory and Society*, 29(4), 507-548.

¹⁷⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987. [Telefax] Andy Stirling, Elaine Lawrence, To nuclear campaigners and any other interested parties, September 3, 1986.

of the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁸ Mickey Kaufmann, nuclear coordinator for Greenpeace Switzerland, supported the paper, but wanted to omit the naming of specific reactors that posed a risk. This was because no Swiss reactor was on the list and Kaufmann feared Swiss people would be less receptive to the paper as they would think an accident was less likely if a country was not listed, which shows his concerns about the saliency of a reactor accident.¹⁷⁹ Members of Greenpeace Sweden wanted to make the paper waterproof against criticism by reformulating many parts. This was due to previous national experiences in connection with the nuclear issue, namely a failed national referendum on the abolition of nuclear power in 1980 that had since caused Swedish anti-nuclear campaigners to act cautiously, constantly considering the fragile anti-nuclear stance in Swedish society.¹⁸⁰ Dan McDermott, co-founder of Greenpeace Toronto, voiced concerns about the long-term safe energy goals, as he believed short-term achievable goals should be a priority to guarantee Greenpeace's credibility. His approach to ensure Greenpeace's consolidated position as a legitimate organisation in society resulted from the organisation's intricate position in Canada, which, while being the organisation's birth country, was also where it had fallen into disrepute already in the 1970s.¹⁸¹ Greenpeace Germany took a strong stand against coal-burning energy production as a transitional option following a nuclear phase-out and during the introduction of renewable energy sources. In the first draft Lawrence argued that it was the most realistic process and "the lesser of two evils". However, Greenpeace Germany believed the support of coal would contradict the fundamental objective to protect the environment, as the burning of coal and fossil fuels led to pollution.¹⁸² This was

¹⁷⁸ Ronald Reagan - Presidential Library & Museum. (1986, April 30). *Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the Soviet Nuclear Reactor Accident at Chernobyl*. Retrieved July 18, 2018, from Ronald Reagan - Presidential Library & Museum: <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/43086b>; Mason, D. (1988). Glasnost, Perestroika and Eastern Europe. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 64(3), 431-442.

¹⁷⁹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987. [Telefax] Andy Stirling, Elaine Lawrence, To nuclear campaigners and any other interested parties, September 3, 1986; World Nuclear Association. (2018, July). *Nuclear Power in Switzerland*. Retrieved July 25, 2018, from World Nuclear Association: <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/switzerland.aspx>.

¹⁸⁰ Nohrstedt, D. (2008, May). The Politics of Crisis Policymaking: Chernobyl and Swedish Nuclear Energy Policy. *Policy Studies Journal*, 36(2), 258-263.

¹⁸¹ For a detailed account compare: Zelko, F. (2017) *Scaling Greenpeace*, 320-331; De Boer, C., & Catsburg, I. (1988). A Report: The Impact of Nuclear Accidents on Attitudes Toward Nuclear Energy. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 52(2), 258.

¹⁸² IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987. [Telefax] Andy Stirling, Elaine Lawrence, To nuclear campaigners and any other interested parties, September 3, 1986.

because of the widespread environmental public concerns in Western Germany in the 1980s, which focussed on issues such as ‘Waldsterben’ – the dying of German forests.¹⁸³

Nation-specific influences on the anti-nuclear campaign’s nature and conducted action methods could also be seen in the implementation of the 1987 ‘Nuclear Free Future’ campaign.¹⁸⁴ The campaigning actions differed according to the national context and embodied opposing ends of the action repertoire (Figure 2). While the UK decided to rely on an approach based on scientific studies, Sweden counted on a more grassroots approach via non-violent direct action in the form of protests and a billboard campaign, which stated: “We don’t need nuclear power, do you want to know why? Call Greenpeace...”.¹⁸⁵ The UK’s reasoning for their strategic choice was because of a national myth that without nuclear power the entire country would be in darkness, due to the British coal industry’s uncertainties, which arose in the form of strikes and widespread worries about high gas prices.¹⁸⁶ Greenpeace UK aimed to disprove the widely perceived necessity to rely on nuclear energy by providing research-based evidence. Sweden’s rationale was the failure of the aforementioned referendum in 1980 to abolish nuclear energy and the resulting side-lining of anti-nuclear protests. Swedish campaigners felt the anti-nuclear cause first needed firm rooting in society again before a push for changes at higher institutional levels was feasible.¹⁸⁷

In conclusion, the socio-political contexts in which Greenpeace operated significantly influenced its approach towards anti-nuclear issues. Globally, the Cold War had a substantial impact on Greenpeace’s strategic approaches and different perceptions of external conditions in the 1980s and 1990s, based on national backgrounds, led to varying understandings of Greenpeace’s societal role and appropriate campaigning actions. However, campaigning cannot simply be explained as a construction based on national and global realities; other

¹⁸³ De Boer, C., & Catsburg, I. (1988) *The Impact of Nuclear Accidents on Attitudes Toward Nuclear Energy*, 260; Metzger, B. (2015). »Erst stirbt der Wald, dann du!«: *Das Waldsterben als westdeutsches Politikum (1978-1986)*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.

¹⁸⁴ compare Chapter One: Broadening the scope.

¹⁸⁵ IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Elaine Lawrence, Analysis of the Applicability of the “Nuclear Free Future” Campaign, September 1987.

¹⁸⁶ Pearson, P., & Watson, J. (2012). *UK Energy Policy 1980-2010 A history and lessons to be learnt - a review to mark 30 years of the Parliamentary Group for Energy Studies*. The Institution of Engineering and Technology. London: Parliamentary Group for Energy Studies - An Associate All Party Parliamentary Group, 5-6.

¹⁸⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 3048, Correspondence concerning the Greenpeace nuclear policy. 1986-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Elaine Lawrence, Analysis of the Applicability of the “Nuclear Free Future” Campaign, September 1987. For other examples of strategically diverse approaches in different nations, compare also: IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] 1986 National Disarmament Proposal, December 19, 1986.

factors were at play that caused internal divergences and differing perceptions of Greenpeace's self-understanding. Chapter Three therefore focuses on exploring internal clashes and debates about different strategic approaches to the anti-nuclear campaign, evaluating dilemmas and their effect on the self-understanding of Greenpeace's identity over time.

Chapter Three: Different internal approaches to anti-nuclear campaigning and consequent dilemmas

“[These conflicts] can best be described as a meltdown of the nukes campaign from internal infighting. Events culminated in a complete breakdown of communication within the campaign.”¹⁸⁸

Paul Gilding, Executive Director of Greenpeace International

This chapter concerns itself with different internal perceptions of Greenpeace’s identity over time. It specifically focuses on the late 1980s, a time when institutionalisation started to become a matter of concern until the organisation had thoroughly restructured by the end of the 1990s. The following paragraphs discuss the conflicts and debates arising between the supporters of a radical fight for the environment and those who advocated for the prioritisation of salient impact over ideology. The diversity of self-understandings within Greenpeace is illustrated by arguing that internal discrepancies led to clashes and incoherencies. The cycle of resilient influence (Figure 1), its different cognitive filters, as well as the perception of the outcomes of campaigning actions, play a central role in this analysis, as they are argued to be the main factor influencing the development of internal perceptions within Greenpeace.

Building upon the tensions introduced in the previous chapters, this chapter evaluates, upon a representative basis, three main dilemmas that Greenpeace faced as a consequence of both its hybrid campaigning approach illustrated in Chapter One, and the argument of Chapter Two that external circumstances shaped campaign strategies. The present analysis integrates, against the theoretical backdrop of constructivism, the introduced concepts of relevance, legitimacy, and credibility.¹⁸⁹ These concepts serve as a guiding framework to consider social processes and, in particular, relations and interactions between different actors and sections within Greenpeace. Each concept caused internal conflict due to different objectives and ideals of individual Greenpeace sections, as well as the manner – means, methods, and actions (Figure 2) – according to which Greenpeace members perceived the organisation’s targets could be effectively obtained. The first dilemma considered the tensions between different Greenpeace

¹⁸⁸ IISG, GPIA, Folder 54 Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. 48 covers and 48 folders. NB. Official name of the meeting is SGC (Stichting Greenpeace Council) Board of Directors. Washington, 2-3 March 1994. [Letter].

¹⁸⁹ Heink, U., Marquard, E., Heubach, K., Jax, K., Kugel, C., Neßhöver, C., Vandewalle, M. (2015) *Conceptualizing credibility, relevance and legitimacy*, 3-6.

entities due to different perceptions of how the organisation could portray itself and its agenda as credible to the public. Conflicting views arose because Greenpeace attempted a balancing act to simultaneously cater to both radical activists and the establishment. It aimed to act on both ends of the action repertoire spectrum, conducting spontaneous protests to highlight environmental issues, while forming alliances with large businesses to enhance technical developments to better tackle environmental issues (Figure 2). The second dilemma and consequent internal clashes occurred due to the different prioritisation of short-term achievability of campaign goals versus long-term considerations of consequences of campaign actions. Due to varying interpretations of Greenpeace's identity – its role and function in society in the post-Cold War era – different understandings of the legitimate manner and guidelines according to which Greenpeace should conduct actions emerged. The third dilemma surfaced because of a shift in attitudes towards relevant campaign angles. Inconclusiveness on whether positive or negative campaigning was more effective and relevant led to further inconsistencies and internal debates. These dilemmas were representative of key challenges Greenpeace continuously faced due to its multi-faceted identity.

First dilemma: The credibility gap

The concept of credibility deals with believability and truthfulness. Consistency is critical for credibility, as a change in stance ultimately weakens the believability of the opinion.¹⁹⁰ Greenpeace was perceived by some members as unable to effectively and credibly oppose the system while it was operating within it, leading to some sections advocating a coherent and uncompromised opposition to the establishment.¹⁹¹ However, in light of its institutionalisation, other sections viewed the ability to influence governments and institutions from within as paramount. A progressing organisational professionalisation sparked internal clashes over whether and how Greenpeace could approach this dilemma and bridge the gap in credibility between being a hybrid ENGO with an institutionalised character and conducting disruptive actions against the same establishment that it claimed to be part of.¹⁹² Disagreement and inconsistency arose over which attitudes and campaigning strategies would prove to be more effective: a professional organisation relying on credibility by working conventionally from within, or an outside pressure group remaining true to its ideological roots by raising

¹⁹⁰ Heink, U., Marquard, E., Heubach, K., Jax, K., Kugel, C., Neßhöver, C., Vandewalle, M. (2015). *Conceptualizing credibility, relevance and legitimacy*, 3-6.

¹⁹¹ Compare: Rootes, C. (1999). *Prospects for a global environmental movement*, 299.

¹⁹² Stroup, S. S., & Wong, W. H. (2017) *The Exceptional Nature of INGO Authority*, 42.

awareness with radical actions. Being positioned at both ends of the action repertoire scheme (Figure 2) illustrates Greenpeace's conflicting identity formation process.

Already in 1987, GPI supported a conventional approach, supporting the achievement of environmental improvements via the institutional framework, while the regional Pacific office and Greenpeace USA backed an unconventional campaigning method, interpreting Greenpeace's identity in more radical terms. The 1987 International Nuclear Transports proposal submitted to the Board by GPI stated that awareness should be raised via a public statement claiming that shipping of uranium from Namibia was an unlawful exploitation of the country's resources, according to the UN Decree for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia. Such a statement would represent a call to action within the official legal framework.¹⁹³ In the same year, the Pacific campaign proposal, submitted jointly by the Pacific office and Greenpeace USA, stated that an arrest of Greenpeace activists due to illegally accessing a US testing site and weapons storage could be an interesting opportunity to raise public awareness of the site's existence and purpose, showing how Greenpeace continued to conduct direct actions that went against the law.¹⁹⁴

In 1995, the dilemma of credibility manifested itself in light of the UN Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference, an event aimed at reviewing a multilateral nuclear ban treaty first concluded in 1968. The goal of the conference was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to foster peaceful usage of nuclear energy, with the Non-Proliferation Treaty being a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.¹⁹⁵ Various campaigners from Greenpeace USA voiced their support for Greenpeace's official attendance at the conference, as they believed a seat at the negotiating table would allow them to influence the signatory states via professional lobbying.¹⁹⁶ In contrast, Steve D'Esposito, at the time head of the American office, wrote to GPI stating his objections to this plan. He believed Greenpeace should keep conducting outside actions to highlight the shortcomings of the conference participants, based on what he called "the credibility gap which professional pundits suffer vis-à-vis the REAL

¹⁹³ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Greenpeace International, International Nuclear Transport Proposal.

¹⁹⁴ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2963, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1983-1987. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] Joint Pacific Proposal.

¹⁹⁵ International Atomic Energy Agency. (2017). *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*. Retrieved July 18, 2018, from International Atomic Energy Agency: <https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/treaties/npt>; U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). *Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty*. Retrieved July 22, 2018, from U.S. Department of State - Diplomacy in Action: <https://www.state.gov/t/isn/npt/>.

¹⁹⁶ IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Report] Steve D'Esposito to International Coordinators list and Greenpeace Board, Nuclear Campaign Strategy Paper, June 30, 1994, 19.

political players”.¹⁹⁷ Hence, D’Esposito regarded the dilemma of credibility as a problem of integrity that Greenpeace faced by cooperating with the political establishment that had advanced environmental destructions in the first place. He declared that it was impossible for Greenpeace to claim to adhere to its objectives if it used the platform provided by the establishment.¹⁹⁸ This hesitant stance towards Greenpeace’s participation within the system occurred on a broader level, as demonstrated in the comments by various national offices on the 1997 International Disarmament proposal. The suggestion to foster closer cooperation with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs was met rather critically; Greenpeace Italy recommended to “regroup and reflect” until 1998, while Greenpeace Germany called the agenda an “old shopping list”. Greenpeace Sweden assessed that the proposal lacked a realistic and narrow focus, and suggested to find “Achilles’ heel of the nuclear industry” before continuing the disarmament campaign.¹⁹⁹

Second dilemma: Legitimate reasons for action

The concept of legitimacy is linked to the conformity to rules. For an ENGO, both the acceptance of actions by the involved people, as well as the acceptability according to internal procedures are necessary to make campaign decisions legitimate.²⁰⁰ Many disputes about acceptability occurred in the 1980s and 1990s; the example of anti-nuclear campaigning actions by a Greenpeace ship in Eastern Asia in 1994 was selected as a representative dilemma because of the completeness and the elaborateness of the correspondence about campaigning actions. Diverging opinions about the legitimacy of its actions resulted from different perceptions of what Greenpeace’s institutionalisation, its resulting stand in society, and the new peace time era meant for the organisation’s identity. A clash occurred due to different applications of the cognitive filters of experience and core values (Figure 1), which led to diverging interpretations of legitimate reasons for actions. One side argued for short-term goals, stating that action was required based on the immediate circumstances and options; the opposing side displayed a long-term view, calling for careful consideration of any consequence that could harm

¹⁹⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Report] Steve D’Esposito to International Coordinators list and Greenpeace Board, Nuclear Campaign Strategy Paper, June 30, 1994, 19.

¹⁹⁸ IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Report] Steve D’Esposito to International Coordinators list and Greenpeace Board, Nuclear Campaign Strategy Paper, June 30, 1994, 19.

¹⁹⁹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2971, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1996-1997. [Telefax] Various offices, Comments on the International Disarmament proposal.

²⁰⁰ Heink, U., Marquard, E., Heubach, K., Jax, K., Kugel, C., Neßhöver, C., Vandewalle, M. (2015) *Conceptualizing credibility, relevance and legitimacy*, 4-5.

Greenpeace's reputation. Thus, the foundation of this debate about the organisation's identity was formed by different approaches to the temporal dimension of campaigning, and by the different understandings of action legitimacy.

While the end of the Cold War changed the perception of security in Eastern Asia, the transformation was slower there than in Europe, due to an ongoing fear of conflict. In particular, the development of the Korean peninsula continued to be riddled by frictions.²⁰¹ In 1994, after offering to start a dialogue, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea henceforth) broke off unification talks with South Korea. The continued division on the Korean peninsula kept fuelling the Cold-War-era thinking that nuclear weapons conferred power and provided civil defence to a state.²⁰² Ensuring security against possible external threats and the fear of invasion thus continued to be an important part of national policy.²⁰³ From an international perspective, the concern was that the communist state of North Korea could be in a position to export nuclear technologies and weapons to rogue regimes around the world, thereby unleashing an uncontrollable spread of the nuclear threat.²⁰⁴ Therefore, in November 1994, the UN Security Council reaffirmed the importance of denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula to maintain peace, as well as the necessity to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty on nuclear weapons to normalise the relationship with North Korea.²⁰⁵

Against this backdrop, the MV Greenpeace vessel sailed to East Asia for anti-nuclear campaigning. The ship first sailed to Japan to highlight the threat of Japan's plutonium programme and the risk of nuclear accidents. The next stop of the campaign tour was South Korea, also to address the safety hazards posed by the country's reactors. In the following, the outline of the campaign strategy had envisioned to also visit North Korea; Greenpeace had tried to arrange a meeting with the Korean 'Anti-Nuke Peace Committee' and the Atomic Energy Ministry, as well as other related authorities.²⁰⁶ Despite a negative response from the Committee, the arrangement of a visit to North Korea still seemed possible if the government

²⁰¹ Buzan, B. & Segal, G. (1994). Rethinking Asian security. *Survival - Global Politics and Strategy*, 36(2), 8-16.

²⁰² Flisfeder, M. (2017). Nuclear 1. In I. Szeman, J. Wenzel, & P. Yaeger, *Fueling Culture: 101 Words for Energy and Environment*. New York: Fordham University Press, 242.

²⁰³ Compare Chapter Two for a detailed description of the Cold War security thinking.

²⁰⁴ Nuckolls, J. (1995). Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers: Proliferation and Terrorism. *Science*, 267(5201), 1112-1114.

²⁰⁵ UN Security Council. (1994, November 4). *Statement by the President of the Security Council at 3451st meeting*. Retrieved July 27, 2018, from UN Security Council: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/1994/64.

²⁰⁶ IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. [Letter] Campaign issues. Simon Carroll, Letter to the Ambassador of the Permanent Representation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the International Maritime Organisation, March 22, 1994.

were to welcome the MV Greenpeace vessel. However, Greenpeace had no success in securing an official invitation from the communist regime. As the ship's stay in South Korea was due to end, the decision on how to proceed led to diverging opinions on legitimate actions within Greenpeace.

Steve Shallhorn, who was on board of the vessel, argued from a short-term perspective demanding protest action stating: "We've sent the squisher here, we need to use it".²⁰⁷ He contended that acceptability would be fulfilled based on the ship's presence in the region and understood this as a legitimate reason for action, showing how considerate campaigning as a result of Greenpeace's institutionalisation was, for him, a secondary concern compared to the chance to raise awareness via confrontational action methods (Figure 2). His proactive stance can further be explained by his presence on board, feeling the need to make the trip worthwhile, as well as the influence of a cognitive filter in the form of his more radical environmental beliefs that made him prioritise unconventional actions over idly standing by out of concern to cause trouble. This opinion was countered by Ulrich Jürgens, at the time disarmament campaign director and stationed in Amsterdam, who harshly labelled Shallhorn's suggestion to conduct offshore non-violent direct action as "plain bullshit" and "clearly a joke".²⁰⁸ He stated that the location of a ship was not a justification to conduct campaigning actions, demanding careful planning instead of imprudent behaviour. He thus demonstrated a different understanding of the legitimate rules for action and acceptability, prioritising Greenpeace's secured position as a respected institutionalised organisation over confrontational action. This reaction can further be traced back to the cognitive filter of experience (Figure 1), namely Jürgens' years of involvement in the anti-nuclear campaign.²⁰⁹ John Willis, an anti-nuclear campaign coordinator, was equally unconvinced by uninvited actions in North Korea.²¹⁰ While Willis agreed with Shallhorn regarding the potential to raise awareness, stating that campaigning action would be "bad for the planet, but good for publicity", in his response he identified the regional security problem, thus demonstrating an understanding of Greenpeace as a conscious organisation. Hence, by pointing to the sensitive situation in the divided

²⁰⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Letter] Steve Shallhorn to John Willis, 15 miles, April 26, 1994.

²⁰⁸ IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Letter] Ulrich Jürgens, Comments on letter from MV Greenpeace to Koreacore list, April 25, 1994, 18; [Telefax] Ulrich Jürgens, Comments on telefax from MV Greenpeace to Koreacore list, April 29, 1994, 6.

²⁰⁹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals].

²¹⁰ IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Telefax] John Willis to Becky Marshal and Steve D'Esposito, Korea/Trident, April 23, 1994.

peninsula and to the possible exploitation of Greenpeace by the North Korean propaganda machines, he interpreted acceptability based on his understanding of Greenpeace as an influential and reflected environmental actor.²¹¹ He stated that political positioning was inherently against Greenpeace's principles and that conducting badly planned campaigning targeting a communist regime could easily backfire: North Korea would portray it as a Western attack, leading Greenpeace to be caught up in a political dispute.²¹² In the end, Shallhorn was advised to not conduct any "half way measure", nonetheless, his decision to conduct action was reluctantly accepted due to his ability to judge the situation on the ground.²¹³ The ship issued a plea for disarmament in legal distance from the North Korean coast by hanging a banner from the side of the ship. Blair Palese, a senior manager for GPI, stated in a letter to Greenpeace's press and media group that they were "having a bit of a hard time getting interest".²¹⁴ The limited media attention indicates that half-hearted campaigning actions were not a recipe for success and that the dilemma of legitimate action still required thorough review within the organisation.

Third dilemma: Relevant campaigning angles

The concept of relevance refers to the meaningful effect and salient impact of an action, limited to a specific context.²¹⁵ Within Greenpeace, campaigning inconsistencies surfaced due to inconclusiveness on whether positive or negative campaigning was more effective, impactful and relevant, adding another facet to the organisation's complex identity formation process.²¹⁶ Positive campaigning described solutions-oriented campaigning; negative campaigning constituted the traditional campaigning method of Greenpeace, and referred to an emphasis on the environmental legacy of nuclear waste, the threat to future generations, the possibility of reactor accidents, and the reality of continued radioactive waste production with no safe storage

²¹¹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Telefax]. John Willis to Becky Marshal and Steve D'Esposito, Korea/Trident, April 23, 1994.

²¹² IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Telefax]. John Willis to Becky Marshal and Steve D'Esposito, Korea/Trident, April 23, 1994.

²¹³ IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Telefax]. Steve D'Esposito to MV Greenpeace, Attention: Steve Shallhorn, April 25, 1994.

²¹⁴ IISG, GPIA, Folder 644-646 Correspondence of Ulrich Jürgens concerning the nuclear campaign. 1994. Campaign issues. [Telefax] Blair Palese, press release from waters near north korea—statement follows, May 3, 1994.

²¹⁵ Heink, U., Marquard, E., Heubach, K., Jax, K., Kugel, C., Neßhöver, C., Vandewalle, M. (2015) *Conceptualizing credibility, relevance and legitimacy*, 3-5.

²¹⁶ compare Chapter One: Broadening the scope.

solution.²¹⁷ Thus, disagreement over campaigning angles resulted from diverse internal understandings of the future direction into which Greenpeace should develop: a professionalised organisation trying to resolve environmental problems in cooperation with established companies and institutions, or an activists' group acting against the settled rules of society to call out the environmental misconduct of corporations. Hence, the dilemma of relevance occurred because various features of the resilient cycle of influence were interpreted in different ways by different Greenpeace members (Figure 1) and because of a clash over Greenpeace's positioning on the scheme of action repertoires (Figure 2).

In 1994, a review committee for the anti-nuclear campaign attempted to re-structure the anti-nuclear campaign coherently with clearly formulated objectives to improve anti-nuclear campaigning, to achieve a maximum in impact and efficiency in the light of changing external conditions due to the end of the Cold War.²¹⁸ The committee, consisting of anti-nuclear campaign coordinators Lawrence, Willis, and Shallhorn, recommended concentrating on positive rather than negative campaigning with a focus on the root of the problem, namely nuclear power. It advocated alternative energy solutions to positively influence the nuclear policy discussions, instead of negatively emphasising causes such as waste storage problems.²¹⁹ These recommendations were based on the fact that new technologies, such as solar energy, had started to be researched and developed more widely.²²⁰ The review committee understood Greenpeace's contribution to this development as the most relevant and logical next step for the anti-nuclear campaign as they believed it to be the most impactful approach. Moreover, international attitudes were shaped by increasing concerns about the consequences

²¹⁷ IISG, GPIA, Folder 54, Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. Washington, 2-3 March 1994. [Report] Nuclear and Disarmament campaigns review Final report: recommendations to the international executive director; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2978, Documents concerning the GP policy on nuclear power. With internal correspondence, discussion papers and proposals. 1987-1988, 1992-1995. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals] promotion of solutions-led started in mid-90s; IISG, GPIA, Folder 665, Annual reports. With correspondence and pamphlets.

²¹⁸ IISG, GPIA, Folder 54 Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. 48 covers and 48 folders. NB. Official name of the meeting is SGC (Stichting Greenpeace Council) Board of Directors. Washington, 2-3 March 1994. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals].

²¹⁹ IISG, GPIA, Folder 54 Minutes, agenda, correspondence and working papers of the meetings of the Board of Directors. 1979-2001. 48 covers and 48 folders. NB. Official name of the meeting is SGC (Stichting Greenpeace Council) Board of Directors. Washington, 2-3 March 1994. [Official documents concerning anti-nuclear campaign proposals]; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2969, Nuclear campaign proposals. 1994-1995. [Letter] Naoki Ohara, My Departure Time, December 14, 1994.

²²⁰ Various. (1980). Publication: Highlights in Energy History. *Science, Technology, & Human Values*, 5(30), 48-49; Boetzkes, A. (2017). Solar. In I. Szeman, J. Wenzel, & P. Yaeger, *Fueling Culture: 101 Words for Energy and Environment*. New York: Fordham University Press, 314; Sheppard, L. (2009). 75 years of Climate Change, & Renewable Research Unchanged. *AQ: Australian Quarterly*, 81(6), 11-14; see also: Schwartzman, D. (1996). Solar Communism. *Science & Society*, 60(3), 307-331.

of greenhouse gas emissions and the subsequent rising awareness of the necessity to form international alliances against further environmental destruction, resulting in the signing of the Kyoto protocol in 1992.²²¹ This future-oriented climate led Executive Director Thilo Bode to believe that Greenpeace should adapt by altering its approach, advocating alternative energy and other solutions to the problems that the organisation had pointed out for over two decades.²²² His review report of the anti-nuclear campaign in September 1998 called for a move away from a “complaining organisation” towards becoming a “learning organisation”.²²³ In his leading role within Greenpeace, his approach was likely guided by the idea to prepare the organisation to stay relevant and influential in the future fight for the environment. In contrast, in 1996, Laura Hakokongas, head of Greenpeace Finland, was convinced Greenpeace needed to continue to condemn the harm done to the environment by the nuclear industry based on the international efforts to implement the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, a number of countries had acknowledged nuclear power as a clean and sustainable energy source with no greenhouse gas emissions.²²⁴ She contended that Greenpeace’s core function was to expose crimes against the environment and to make them understood by the general public. She believed that to stay relevant in the fight against environmental ills, Greenpeace should not adapt to the solutions-led mood, as meaningful impact would rather result from institutionally neutral and contra-institutional approaches (Figure 2). This demonstrates the stark discrepancy in opinions and perceptions of Greenpeace future direction of actions.²²⁵

Evaluating the internally different stands resulting from varying perceptions of the organisation’s identity leads to the conclusion that all strategic approaches were to a certain degree rooted in Paul Wapner’s notion that Greenpeace’s objective is to disseminate ecological sensibility, increase global awareness, and heighten concern for the environment to achieve a

²²¹ Lovett, J. (2005). 1997 Kyoto Protocol. *Journal of African Law*, 49(1), 94-96; Böhringer, C., & Vogt, C. (2003). Economic and Environmental Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol. *The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne D'Economie*, 36(2), 479-484.

²²² IISG, GPIA, Folder 680-684 Greenpeace International Executive Director’s Monthly Report. 1995-1999. September-November 1995. January-December 1996. January, March-May, August -December 1997. 1998. February-April, August 1999. [Report]; IISG, GPIA, Folder 686 Campaigns Monthly Report. March-August 1997. With campaign updates and correspondence. [Report]; IISG, GPIA, Folder 2970, Nuclear Campaign Proposals. 1982-1998. 1996-1997. [Letter] Laura Hakokongas, On passions, solutions and multinationals, October 7, 1996.

²²³ IISG, GPIA, Folder 680-684 Greenpeace International Executive Director’s Monthly Report. 1995-1999. September-November 1995. January-December 1996. January, March-May, August -December 1997. 1998. February-April, August 1999 [Report]; IISG, GPIA, Folder 686 Campaigns Monthly Report . March-August 1997. With campaign updates and correspondence. [Report].

²²⁴ OECD NEA. (1999, July 1). *The 1998 Annual Report of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)*. Retrieved July 27, 2018, from Nuclear Energy Agency - OECD: <https://www.oecd-neo.org/news/1999/1999-70.html>.

²²⁵ IISG, GPIA, Folder 2970, Nuclear Campaign Proposals. 1982-1998. 1996-1997. [Letter] Laura Hakokongas, On passions, solutions and multinationals, October 7, 1996.

qualitative shift in the collective environmental understanding in society.²²⁶ However, the timeline and the approach to achieve these objectives differed widely across the organisation based on different interpretations of Greenpeace's identity guided by the analytical concepts of credibility, legitimacy, and relevance. Different sections within Greenpeace demonstrated contrasting views on the manner of employed action methods as well as on overarching campaign objectives. These contrasts show that the ENGO cannot be regarded as a single entity and a coherent actor with a unified opinion or identity, but rather as a multi-faceted organisation with various ideological strands.

²²⁶ Wapner, P. (1996) *Greenpeace and Political Globalism*, 64-71; Wapner, P. (1995) *The Dark Green Politics of Greenpeace*, 300&310.

Conclusion

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Greenpeace underwent a turbulent transformation from a small grassroots group into one of the biggest transnational ENGOs. This research aimed to explain a specific facet of Greenpeace's complex identity formation process over time. It contributed an additional viewpoint to the existing scholarship by shedding light on Greenpeace's organisational evolution and the consequent development and alterations of its anti-nuclear agenda. Against the backdrop of the historical and political context of the 1980s and 1990s, it was demonstrated how Greenpeace was an organisation characterised by different and conflicting ideological strands, and showed the intricacy of the organisation's identity formation. This empirical research intended to answer the question as to how the diversity in anti-nuclear campaigning approaches throughout the 1980s and 1990s could be explained; it investigated the hypothesis that the different strategic approaches were constructed based on organisational changes, varying external circumstances, and varying internal interpretations of Greenpeace's identity. This process was influenced by and, at the same time, influenced Greenpeace's campaigning choices, which is why an analytical framework was created to evaluate this cycle of influence. Social constructivism served as a useful theoretical framework, illustrating how constructed perceptions shaped proposed action strategies, which in turn mirrored conducted actions and led to the construction of re-evaluated perceptions: a cycle of resilient influence.

The analysis was conducted upon an exemplary source basis and through an evaluation of representative primary sources, considering an assessment of the organisational transformation, an interpretation of historical and socio-political conditions, as well as an analysis of internal disagreements. Chapter One established that Greenpeace became a hybrid ENGO, transforming from a grassroots group pursuing outside actions into a professional protest organisation working from within, but also continuing to conduct unconventional outside actions. This was manifested in the nature of the anti-nuclear campaign; strategic approaches changed to achieve coherently structured campaigning, and while Greenpeace started to work with official institutions, it also continued to conduct unconventional actions against them. Chapter Two proved the influence of external circumstances – both global and national – on Greenpeace's strategic anti-nuclear campaigning approaches. While the Chernobyl accident resulted in nation-specific re-adjustments of anti-nuclear campaigning, the reality of the Cold War influenced the perception of tangible campaign approaches, and led to the rise of new strategies. Chapter Three showed how the organisation's identity was perceived in different ways within Greenpeace, which led to contrasting views on the credibility of

Greenpeace's position; the legitimate reasons and justifications to conduct campaigning actions; and the relevant campaign angles, classified in positive and negative campaigning.

It was investigated how Greenpeace positioned itself in society, alluding to certain group dynamics within the ENGO – whether based on authority levels or on national backgrounds. Additionally, the analysis traced the organisation's handling of the delicate trade-off problem that institutionalisation entails: either holding institutional authority and giving up a degree of independence, or being organisationally independent but less impactful. Considering Greenpeace's impact, both practical and symbolical, this study showed how perceptions of environmental activism altered during the development of the global world structure during the last two decades of the 20th century. Advocates for an ideologically radical fight for the environment against the establishment continued to exist, but at the same time a growing number of supporters of less radical environmental activism emerged, who prioritised pertinent impact via cooperation with official institutions and governments.

It was shown that the influence of inside and outside factors caused Greenpeace's protest approaches to constantly change, leading to alleged adhocism of campaign strategies. Over time, Greenpeace's strategies became more structured and, in addition to negative awareness raising in the form of unconventional action methods, the ENGO started to conduct positive, solutions-led campaigns within the institutional framework. Nonetheless, Greenpeace still conducted outside actions, thus aiming to unite contrasting ideological strands within one organisation. Whether these campaign strategies were a conscious choice or the result of a compromise among different wings within Greenpeace, each with different views on the identity and preferred strategic choices, has proven to be the incorrect question to ask, as both interpretations were right at times. The conceptualisation of Greenpeace's internal stance therefore required a detailed and nuanced approach, meaning the careful weighing of many different influences to adequately depict Greenpeace's multi-faceted identity.

The present research provided an analytical conceptual basis to further study the identity formation process of other ENGOs, enabling broader conclusions in future work. It was demonstrated that Greenpeace should not be treated as a single coherent entity, but rather as an ENGO with a complex and multi-faceted structure, for which conventional analytical approaches may not apply. Moreover, despite being beyond this study's scope, the identified trends of anti-nuclear campaigning could serve as a basis for further Greenpeace identity research backed by interviews and additional source material. The anti-nuclear campaign has, in fact, been naturally extended into a wider debate about alternative and renewable energy sources, which constitute a large part of Greenpeace's current action plan. Questions about the

degree of effectiveness of ENGOs inside and outside of the institutional framework and the influence of such on their identity require detailed analysis and should be the main subject of research projects with a wider scope. Consequently, by looking at a specific fraction of a broad and complex picture, this study offered a starting point that not only highlighted the need for further research, but added value to the study of Greenpeace as it set the basis for further, more in-depth academic evaluation to obtain a better grasp of internal dynamics and perceptions of identity in one of the largest-scale, furthest-reaching, most well-funded ENGOs in the world.

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