SECURITISATION EXTENSION BEYOND TURKISH BORDERS:

LOCATING THE PRACTISES OF THE TURKISH STATE THAT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO SELF-CENSORSHIP AMONGST CRITICAL TURKISH ACADEMICS IN THE WEST SINCE 2016.

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<u>ABSTRACT</u>

This study seeks to understand if, and how, the securitisation of a group within one state can have extraterritorial effects on members of this group living beyond the borders of the securitising state. This is a phenomenon that I call "securitisation extension." This research was formulated with a view to addressing the "territorial limitation" (Adamson, 2016) in much of the securitisation theory literature. Turkish academics based in the West were the chosen unit of analysis, utilising in-depth, semi-structured interviews with academics known to be critical of Turkish state polices. This allowed me to locate the securitising practises used by Turkish state and pro-regime agents, with the perceived aim of encouraging self-censorship amongst oppositional voices in Europe and the U.S. This study finds that these practises have been partially successful, as self-censorship is occurring amongst a substantial number of critical Turkish academics. This was predominantly displayed in non-academic output, with respondents displaying greater resistance to reducing critical output in the academic sphere. The significance of this is in showing that a nation-state, supported by pro-regime agents, is employing practises aimed at curtailing freedom of speech beyond their own borders. Increased global interconnectivity has been shown to facilitate and amplify the effects of this phenomenon, as a significant finding of this research is that considerable changes in behaviour were displayed by academics who have not been directly affected by the practises of securitisation extension. This was due to living in a context of what is here called an "atmosphere of fear," which has extended from Turkey to impact lived experiences in Turkish communities abroad.

<u>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</u>

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

I will begin this thesis by relaying the initial interaction which lead me to pursue the empirical complication of my research, as it sums up succinctly what provoked my interest and will therefore hopefully do the same for the reader. This moment came at the very start of my first interview I conducted for this research. I was requesting permission to record the discussion, and the response was that this was fine, but the reasoning immediately struck me as interesting: "I have been doing this a long time, whatever I say will be… I self-censor myself." This articulation seemed strange to me, as it was coming from an esteemed Professor based in the U.S., and was said so nonchalantly, as if it was just a part of everyday interactions. The complication here is in understanding why a Professor would feel the need to self-censor at all, and it was this phenomenon that I wanted to understand. I was well aware of the crackdown on academia within Turkey itself, but when an academic based on the other side of the world is self-censoring, it provoked the obvious of question of "why?" This is what directed my research in speaking with Turkish academics based beyond Turkish borders, considering this through the lens of "securitisation extension." This led me to formulate the research question of:

How has the securitisation extension from the Turkish state affected perceptions of self-censorship amongst Turkish academics based in Europe and the U.S., from 2016 to the present day?

In order to answer this question effectively, I have broken it down into smaller research questions. These will be answered in turn throughout the thesis:

1.What contextual factors have enabled the successful securitisation of Turkish academics within Turkey?

- *What discourse and practises have been employed to achieve this successful securitisation within Turkey?*
- *What makes this period exceptional, and why has the securitisation occurred now?*

2.What are the contextual factors that affect the experiences of Turkish academics who live beyond Turkish borders, since the securitisation (extension) process began in 2016?

3.What are the socially meaningful patterns of action that Turkish academics experience in interacting with the Turkish state whilst living beyond Turkish borders?

4.What are the socially meaningful patterns of behaviour that Turkish academics experience in online interactions with the Turkish state or pro-regime agents whilst living beyond Turkish borders?

5.To what extent is self-censorship occurring amongst Turkish academics abroad due to the effects of securitisation extension?

- *What feelings have been produced amongst my dataset due to the effects of securitisation extension?*
- *What changes in behaviour have been displayed by my dataset due to the effects of securitisation extension?*

These questions were formulated through operationalising my analytical frame, which will be described in the following chapter, and assessing the existing knowledge on this phenomenon, which I will utilise and build upon. Most of this knowledge focuses on securitising practises aimed at (self-) censorship of critical Turkish voices within the Turkish state since 2016. The focus of this literature is in showing President Erdogan's securitisation of groups considered to be oppositional by himself and his AKP party, which includes academics. (Baser, et. al., 2017; Martin 2018). There is also a considerable amount of literature on the state's online practises in targeting critical voices within Turkey (Yesil & Sözeri, 2017; Topak, 2017; Saka, 2018). I am attempting to build on this literature by extending analysis beyond the Turkish state to understand if these phenomena are affecting Turkish academics abroad. There is no academic literature on this, but there are a few useful NGO reports which outline some of the practises that are occurring that affect Turkish academics abroad (Journalist and Writers Foundation, 2018; Platform for Peace and Justice, 2018; Stockholm Centre for Freedom, 2017a & 2017b). These reports are largely descriptive rather than analytical, so are mostly useful in providing empirical validation of the practises described in my dataset. As they are descriptive, they do not attempt to assess whether these practises have led to self-censorship, as I will do here.

Therefore, in locating and analysing securitising practises beyond Turkish borders, I will seek to add to the empirical literature that currently exists on Turkey's securitisation of academics. The result of these practises, as the anecdote at the start of this chapter alluded to, is that there is a significant amount of self-censorship occurring amongst Turkish academics, predominantly in non-academic output, in a wide variety of locations. The focus of this thesis will therefore be on demonstrating how this has come about, before assessing how successful the practises utilised have been in achieving their perceived aim.

<u>Chapter outline</u>

This thesis will begin by outlining securitisation (extension) theory (Chapter 2). The aim of the theoretical discussion will be to outline the analytical perspective I have taken, specifically focusing on the primary units of analysis that will be used for this study. Following this, the methodology (Chapter 3) will explain what research methods I have applied in order to come to the conclusions that I have. I will then turn to answering the research questions as outlined above. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will be dedicated to setting the context, firstly of securitisation within Turkey, and following this, the context that academics abroad are living in since the securitisation (extension) process began. This will be followed by two chapters on the practises of the Turkish state, and pro-regime agents, beyond the Turkish border that affects academics in my dataset. Chapter 6 will detail the real-life practises that have been implemented. These can be categorised as "low-tech" surveillance, harassment, and "civil death." Chapter 7 focuses on the online practises that have been described to me, which are trolling, hacking, and retrospective online surveillance. The penultimate chapter will assess the extent to which self-censorship is occurring, based on the feelings that the securitisation extension process has produced in my dataset, as well as the changes in behaviour that this process has seen come about. Finally, the concluding chapter will tie the findings presented here to wider academic literature.

CHAPTER 2 – ANALYTICAL FRAME: ADDRESSING GAPS & OPERATIONALISATION

This chapter will, firstly, define and outline my analytical frame by showing how it addresses two significant gaps in the securitisation literature: firstly, it aims to overcome the "territorial limitation" in much of the existing literature; and secondly, it aims to overcome the elite and state-centric bias in selected units of analysis in much of the contemporary analysis. I will then define and outline the key analytical concepts that will be used to answer the research puzzle. These will be "practises," "context," and the "audience(s)" because they are the predominant units of analysis in the Paris school's formulation of securitisation theory.[1]

1. Securitisation (extension) theory: addressing gaps in the literature

For my research, the chosen analytical frame is what I call "securitisation extension." This refers to the extension of securitisation theory in order to analyse the effects of securitisation beyond the borders of the nation-state in which the original securitisation process is occurring. In this case study, critical academics are being securitised within Turkey. Therefore, the predominant unit of analysis are academics beyond Turkish borders, in order to understand if, and how, the securitisation in their country of origin impacts them. A fitting visual metaphor, which is used at times in international relations literature, is to imagine securitisation extension as the "long arm" of the securitising actor; namely, the Turkish state. This extension of securitisation theory was chosen as in much of the academic literature the unit of analysis is securitisation occurring within a state (Salter, 2008; Van Der Borgh & Savenije, 2015; Wilkinson, 2007). It is therefore a response to Adamson's argument "that the future of security studies requires a "spatial turn'" (2016: 20). She says there is a "methodological nationalism" and "naturalization… of the nation-state" in the literature. This means that the dominant unit of analysis has been the securitising practises of the state within the borders of the securitising state. Adamson calls this "territorial limitation, which confines the study of social processes to the political and geographic boundaries of a particular nation-state" (2016: 21). Therefore, this thesis will attempt to develop securitisation theory as it exists now by presenting the analytical frame of "securitisation extension."

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[1] The Paris school's approach was selected because it moves beyond the original formulation of securitisation theory from the Copenhagen school, where the focus is on the "process" (Maguire et. al., 2014: 10) of socially constructing a threat. The emphasis is on discourse as the primary unit of analysis because of this. The problem with this is that "discourse-focused approaches often neglect how threats are managed once they are identified" (Lemon, 2016: 24). I therefore see the Paris school as more useful as it assesses "what security does" (Bigo & McCluskey, 2018: 124) after a threat has been identified through looking at practises, which can include discursive practises. This means it incorporates and develops the Copenhagen approach, and is therefore a stronger theoretical base for this research on securitisation extension.

The securitisation extension analytical frame will also seek to address the focus on elites and the subsequent state-centric approach commonly seen in much of the current securitisation literature. Wæver, one of the foundational securitisation scholars, says that "security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites" (1995: 57). As a result of this, the securitisation literature has "primarily employed a state centered approach" (Diphoorn & Grassiani, 2015: 7-8). Whilst this can be expected, it means there is a gap as the approach "serves to marginalize the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics, presenting them at best as part of an audience that can collectively consent to or contest securitizing moves, and at worst as passive recipients of elite discourses" (McDonald, 2008: 574).

This thesis will seek to address this by using the "affected" audience of securitisation extension as the predominant unit of analysis, here meaning critical Turkish academics in the West. This is in response to the recent call from Bigo & McCluskey who ask for a new PARIS approach[2] that "will concern itself with the lived experiences of people affected by the practises of those who claim they can decide what is security, insecurity, and fate" (2018: 120). This will allow a bottom-up understanding of what security "does." (2018: 124). I will do this through utilising a "critical anthropology of security" approach (Goldstein, 2010), which involves an anthropological methodology focusing on how security practises affect individuals. This is certainly useful for the securitisation extension frame due to its "claim to analyse local events as embedded within a wider (national and transnational) context makes it particularly suited to scrutinise questions of security that transcend the local level" (Schwell in Maguire et. al. 2014: 88). As this thesis will show, practises that transcend the local level are often less visible than those within sovereign states, and so an anthropological approach is necessary to locate them.

2. Operationalising securitisation (extension)

This section will operationalise securitisation in order to find "observable, empirical elements signifying different aspects of the "whole"" (Lund, 2014:228). This will make the analytical frame more researchable and enable finding an answer to my core question(s). As is evident in the name, my analytical frame has its roots in the Copenhagen school's seminal reformulation of how security is studied: securitisation theory.[3] They define securitisation as "when a

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[2] Bigo is one of the leading contributors to the Paris school of securitisation theory. Here he calls for an updated Paris approach: "Political Anthropological Research for International Sociology" (PARIS) (Bigo & McCluskey, 2018). What is new is the focus on those affected by securitising practises as the primary unit of analysis, and the utilisation of anthropological research methods due to this. This is adhered to in this study.

[3] The Copenhagen school's approach to security studies is where securitisation theory originated (Buzan et. al., 1998). The Paris school has developed the original framework to widen the units of analysis beyond discourse to primarily focus on practises (as well as context and audience). Therefore, "it is usually agreed that there are two broad approaches to securitization: securitization through speech act and securitization through practice… taken

securitising actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is "normal politics."' (Buzan et. al., 1998: 24-5). Based on this definition, the dominant method of studying securitisation has been through discourse analysis due to the need to understand the "rhetoric of existential threat" used by a securitising actor.

Since the original formulation, securitisation theory has developed greatly. The Copenhagen school retains value primarily in highlighting "that security is socially constructed." (Hameiri & Jones, 2015: 28) However, Balzacq's re-interpretation has become the dominant one: "securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction" (Balzacq, 2005: 172). This definition represents the Paris school approach to securitisation, and is useful for operationalising the theory as it highlights the three units of analysis of this approach: "instead of focusing on "speech acts," the Paris School emphasizes practices, audiences, and contexts." (CASE collective, 2006: 457-8). The recognition given to the power of both speaker and listener is particularly relevant for this study, as the audience play a vital role in the securitisation (extension) process. Below, these three units of analysis will be defined and explained further.

As mentioned, practises are the prevalent unit of analysis in studying securitisation through the Paris school lens, which is to "analyse 'security' as a 'device,' as a 'technique of government' - to use a Foucaldian framework" (Bigo, 2000: 326). These forms of control do as much as, if not more, to securitise a group as discourse and framing from a securitising actor. Practises are defined as "socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world" (Adler and Pouilot 2011:4). This definition is useful in highlighting the connection between practises and discourse, as it describes practises as being the more visible devices that reify the securitising discourse. Therefore, the two units of analysis work hand-in-hand. However, practises are the most significant unit of analysis in this case study. This is because elite discourse plays a reduced role in securitisation extension beyond the borders of the nation-state, where the securitising actor loses their direct repressive power, and so alternative practises come to the fore. "Practises" will be the dominant unit of

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individually, neither of these approaches can help us fully understand the contents of and variations among securitization processes." (Balzacq et. al. 2016, 517) Therefore, the Paris school approach was selected here as it still allows for the inclusion of discourse analysis by recognising the potential for discursive practises. I feel this makes the Paris approach better rounded and more applicable to this case, as the discourse of a securitising actor loses power when assessing securitisation beyond the borders of the securitising state.

analysis in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, when "state and pro-regime practises" and "online practises" will be outlined.

The Paris school also puts great emphasis on the necessity of dissecting the "context." Ciută correctly states that "to argue that context matters is in a way trivial. In practically all fields of analysis in IR – from realism to constructivism… one can find references to the significance of empirical variation, and as a consequence to the need to contextualise." (2009: 318) However, it is given particular salience by the Paris school. Balzacq articulates the idea that "security is contextually shaped. […] Depending on the context, certain actors will be exceptionally well positioned to articulate a security discourse. In a nutshell, context 'empowers or disempowers security actors.'" (Balzacq, et. al. 2016: 504). This is certainly applicable to my case, as the context within Turkey enables Erdogan to securitise academics, as will be shown in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the context that Turkish academics are experiencing beyond Turkish borders has played a vital role in the securitisation extension process as it has created an "atmosphere of fear," as I argue in Chapter 5.

There is an alternative viewpoint on context, however, which moves beyond seeing the context as solely enabling securitising actors, to recognise that this can work in the reverse. McDonald argues that the speech act plays an important role as "it serves to construct or produce the audience itself" (2008: 14). This can be seen in my study, as Erdogan's speech act in Turkey has produced an audience of pro-regime agents[4] which partakes in the securitisation (extension) process, in Turkey and beyond. This demonstrates the inter-relatedness of context and the final unit of analysis, which is the "audience."

The role of the audience is given much salience in the Copenhagen formulation of securitisation theory. According to Buzan et. al., "the issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such" (1998: 25). This view has been critiqued, however, as Balzacq et. al. rightly argue that "the complexity of determining the assent of the audience is further compounded by the fact that, in many instances, there is not one single audience but rather several possible audiences" (2016: 500). This is certainly true in my case. Therefore, I have categorised the audiences into the "reactive" audience, who are the pro-regime agents who play an active role in securitising practises, and the "affected" audience, who are those who are targeted by these securitising practises. This division takes inspiration from Floyd's work, as she argues that securitising moves serve as "one of two things: (1) a warning to an aggressor; or

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[4] Pro-regime agents are here defined as "a range of persons acting officially and unofficially in the service of the regime, including paid employees, genuine regime loyalists, and individuals who may have been coerced in some way to inform, both from within the home country and abroad." (Moss, 2018: 271).

(2) a promise to protect a referent object."[5] As a result, she concludes that the two audiences are the "aggressor" and the "referent object in need of protection" (2016: 688). In this case study, the reactive audience are Turkish nationalists who see Turkish identity as the referent object in need of protection, and the affected audience are the "aggressors" threatening this referent object; namely, the academics being targeted. The targeting of this group serves as a warning to other critical academics.

3. **Concluding comments**

In conclusion, the selected analytical frame of securitisation extension will extend securitisation theory empirically to understand its transnational effects, beyond the borders of the securitising actor's state. It will also extend the theory to incorporate a bottom-up, "critical anthropology of security" approach in order to understand the lived experiences of the victims of the securitisation (extension) process. This is with a view to addressing the elite, state-centric approaches that have dominated the literature up to this point. In the second sub-section, I have defined and explained the key analytical concepts which will be the units of analysis in this thesis, as taken from the Paris school. These concepts are practises, context, and audience.

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[5] Referent object is defined as "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival" (Buzan et. al., 1998: 36).

CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY

The aim of this chapter is to display how I have come to know what I argue in this thesis. Methodology is "a design for data-gathering and analysis" (Stel, 2008: 41). I will therefore address each of these in turn, beginning with outlining the research design which provided the base for the following processes. This will be followed by a subsection on data collection techniques which will detail step-by-step how I gathered the primary data necessary to gain insight into the phenomenon being studied. The next stage to be outlined will be on my data analysis methods in order to show how I have come to formulate the arguments in this thesis. Finally, I will highlight possible limitations of the research and how I have sought to overcome them.

1. Research design

My research design had to take into consideration the ontological roots of securitisation theory. It has a "close affinity with social constructivism, in particular with the works that examine the role of language, the status of practice and the power of argument" (Balzacq et. al. 2016: 496). This is because the theory looks at how groups are constructed as security threats, and the discourse and practises that enable this. This influenced my epistemological approach, as the focus is on understanding and interpreting the experiences of the group that is being constructed as a security threat through in-depth interviews. From doing this, it is possible to glean the discourse and practises that have enabled the construction of this threat.

Beyond ontological considerations, my research design has taken into consideration that I have sought to answer the call for a "critical anthropology of security" approach to securitisation, as seen in the previous chapter. This means researching the effects of securitisation on groups targeted by securitising practises, rather than looking predominantly at the group who are enacting these practises in constructing a security threat (the securitising actor). This affects my research design, as I have selected an anthropological approach based on qualitative interviews and iterative data collection and analysis, rather than the discourse analysis method usually employed in the securitisation literature. This is because solely dissecting the discourse of the securitising actor(s) would not enable locating the extraterritorial practises of securitisation extension, as they are not spoken publicly spoken about.

2. Data collection

In relation to data collection, Baxter and Jack say that "a hallmark of case study research is the use of multiple data sources" (2008: 554). This is adhered to in this study, beginning with

literature-based research in order to get an understanding of the empirical nature of Turkey's securitisation extension process. This was achieved through utilising online NGO and newspaper reports, as there was no academic literature on securitisation extension affecting Turkish academics beyond Turkish borders. The data gathered here was used to triangulate data collected in interviews.

This first stage, based on document analysis, helped in selecting who I would seek to interview for my research by indicating which groups were likely to be affected by securitisation (extension). The sampling method for my data collection was non-probability, "snowball" sampling (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 94). Non-probability sampling was possible based on the initial research I had conducted. This was refined after conducting initial interviews to focus predominantly on scholars working on Kurdish or Armenian issues, and signatories of the Academics for Peace petition in 2016, as it became clear it was these groups who are most likely to be targeted by the Turkish state or pro-regime agents. Snowball sampling was useful due to the sensitive nature of the topic, as academics were understandably more likely to respond if a colleague had given me their contact details. This sampling method was fitting, as it is not my aim to generalise through having a large and varied dataset, but instead to locate and understand the practises employed by the Turkish state and pro-regime agents as part of a securitisation extension process, from 2016 onwards. This time frame is sampled as this when the securitisation of academics began within Turkey, as Chapter 4 will show.

After the initial literature-based research, and locating who would be the focus of my study, the next stage was to begin collecting primary data. This would make up the bulk of my data, due to this being an exploratory case. For this I conducted (largely) in-depth, semi-structured interviews. My dataset consists of 15 Turkish, 3 Kurdish, and 1 Dutch-Turkish academic (19 respondents in total). They are based in Germany (8), the U.S. (5), the Netherlands (2), France (2), the U.K. (1) and Brazil (1). These respondents will not be named due to multiple requests for anonymity.[6] I sought to triangulate this data by speaking with Professor van Bruinessen, an Emeritus Professor of Turkish and Kurdish studies, and Mr Ercan Karakoyun, the spokesperson of the Hizmet/Gulen movement in Germany.[7] Within these interviews, 9 were

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[6] Anonymity was requested due to concerns about possible repercussions for criticising the Turkish state or Turkish diaspora. Some respondents were also awaiting trial as a signatory of the Academics for Peace petition.
[7] Mr Karakoyun was interviewed because, although he is not an academic, as the spokesperson of the Gulen movement I felt he would be well placed to give an overview of the situation in Germany for people being targeted by the Turkish state. The Gulen movement, also known as the Hizmet movement, is a community which follows the teachings of US-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen. They are influential within Turkey, and abroad, and were blamed for the 2016 attempted coup in Turkey by Erdogan. Gulenists have therefore been targeted by securitisation (extension) practises, and so I felt that interviewing their spokesperson in Germany could provide insight into the atmosphere in Turkish communities in Germany in which my respondents would

through Skype, 8 were face-to-face, and 4 were through written online correspondence on request of the respondent, usually due to lack of confidence in spoken English. Skype interviews were utilised as I felt this would give a better picture of the effects of securitisation extension than would be achieved through focusing on one location. I supplemented this by travelling to Berlin, however, as some respondents indicated their preference to speak face-to-face, and this is where the greatest concentration of academics in exile are.

In-depth, semi-structured interviews were chosen as the data collection method because there is not a lot known about the transnational practises of securitisation extension, and so there is not a prescriptive set of data from other cases to guide interview questions. This data collection method is advocated by Moss as she argues that open-ended, in-depth interviews are "a highly appropriate method for social scientists to discover and assess covert dynamics of state repression, particularly when the tactics used are disavowed by state officials and perpetrators alike and difficult to ascertain independently" (Moss, 2018: 269). This is certainly the case with securitisation extension, as state and pro-regime agent's practises cited here would be extremely difficult to locate without conducting interviews with those experiencing these practises directly.

However, as Arthur and Nazroo state, there are always a "set of issues which need to be covered broadly consistently with all participants," in order to allow "comparison," (Ritchie & Lewis, 110-11) and so I used semi-structured rather than open-ended interviews as Moss suggests. The questions I asked all participants can be broadly categorised as being on the context, practises, and role of the "reactive" audience, as these are the units of analysis advocated by the Paris school. The "affected" audience of Turkish academics are the primary unit of analysis, as their experiences inform data on the other units of analysis. I employed more exploratory interviews initially, a useful method if it is "an area about which little is so far known," (Arthur & Nazroo in Ritchie & Lewis, 111) but then added additional questions once clear themes emerged; for example, whilst exploring the practises of the state and pro-regime agents, online practises emerged as a recurrent phenomenon cited in my dataset, so I added a new question about online interactions.

3. **Data analysis**

Having collected the data through semi-structured, in-depth interviews, I began the data analysis stage by transcribing the interviews, producing a massive wealth of data. Analysing this data involves "breaking phenomena down into their constituent parts and viewing them in

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be living, as well as providing triangulation to the data I collected from academics affected by securitisaton (extension) practises.

relation to the whole they form" (Ragin, 1994:55-56). The first step in doing this was in conducting a process of "analytical induction," which entails "identifying patterns and themes in the data rather than deciding, prior to data collection or analysis, what the precise data variables or data categories would be" (Curtis & Curtis, 2012: 43). This suited my chosen analytical frame, as securitisation (extension) does not have prescribed categories (beyond broad units of analysis) that can be used to formulate precise analytical categories, and so analytical induction was utilised.

Open coding was used initially to facilitate analytical induction. This involves "selecting and naming categories from the analysis of the data" (Curtis & Curtis, 2012: 44). This was done through coding data into categories based on the words the respondents used themselves, known as "in vivo" concepts (Spencer et. al. in Ritchie & Lewis 2014: 203). This was followed by a process of axial coding in which relationships are identified between categories to group them together (Curtis & Curtis, 2012: 45). The outcome of this was a variety of typologies, based on a mixture of "indigenous" and "analyst constructed" classifications (Spencer et. al. in Ritchie & Lewis 2014: 214). These became the sub-headings within chapters; for example, in Chapter 8 the sub-heading of "burned bridges" was an indigenous classification as it was a term used by a respondent that was a fitting classification for other responses, whilst the subheadings of "fight responses" and "flight responses" were analyst constructed to add structure and clarity.

The final stage of data analysis was in "verifying associations" and "developing explanations" (Ritchie & Lewis 2014: 251-253). This was particularly relevant for the penultimate Chapter 8, in which I gauge the degree to which self-censorship is occurring in my dataset due to securitisation extension through assessing "numerical distributions" (Ritchie & Lewis 2014: 251) of responses, before offering explanations for this based on explicit reasoning from respondents, as well as implicit reasoning through looking for patterns in responses. The online coding app "Nvivo" was helpful for this stage of data analysis in providing numerical and visual data.

This process accounts for how I broke down my collected data into its constituent parts, making it easier to digest and enabling connections and meaning to be established. Throughout this process, it was important to continuously triangulate data through looking back on my initial empirical, document-based research, as well as searching for new sources of verification if necessary. This was with the aim of establishing which data was reliable enough to be included in my final thesis.

4. <u>Limitations of the research</u>

The chosen data collection method of in-depth interviews is susceptible to the limitations of most qualitative studies; namely, whether you can generalise from a specific case. However, whilst this limitation must be recognised, I believe it can be overcome by recognition that it is not the aim of this thesis to be applicable to a large quantity of academics. The aim is to understand the experiences of the affected audience in order to gain insight into practises employed by a state, and pro-regime agents, beyond the borders of their own state as part of a securitisation extension process. Ritchie argues that qualitative research is appropriate for "newly developing social phenomena" (Ritchie & Lewis, 2014: 32). This is certainly the case for this topic, as transnational extensions of security practises have only recently begun to be studied. I will also attempt to improve the generatability of this case by comparing the findings to wider academic literature. By highlighting similarities with other cases, this can show that the case is not just a "one-off" but rather part of an emerging and growing phenomenon.

It is also important to recognise the potential for bias in the research, on two levels. Firstly, as I am speaking to those who have been affected, often negatively, by the securitisation extension process, there is an obvious motivation for them to exaggerate in order to make the actions of the Turkish state, or pro-regime agents, seem more extreme. I have attempted to overcome this by only including data that has been verified in secondary literature, and by including this literature throughout the thesis. For data that has not been recorded in secondary literature, it has only been included if it is also mentioned by multiple other respondents.

Secondly, I must recognise my own potential biases. I do feel that academic freedom is an important trait of society, and the attacks on this freedom occurring in Turkey took my interest as I believe it to represent "early warning signs of political, social and cultural insecurity" (Scholars at Risk Network, 2015). To overcome this, I must recognise that I have a preconceived notion that attempts to censor academics is detrimental to society, and having recognised this, I have ensured that the purpose of this thesis is not to be "evaluative," in terms of making critical assessments of the practises detailed here. Instead, the purpose is "generative," meaning to "produce new ideas… as a contribution to the development of social theory" (Ritchie & Lewis, 2014: 23-24). This means that at no point do I express personal opinions or seek to suggest solutions. I solely focus on outlining the data collected and relating this to other academic literature, which will hopefully reduce the potential for my own personal bias affecting this thesis.

5. <u>Concluding comments</u>

This chapter has hopefully provided a clear step-by-step breakdown of how I have come to know what I claim to know in this thesis. The research design has been outlined, which was an important base to the data collection and subsequent data analysis that followed, as have been detailed here. I have finished the chapter with a section reflecting on potential biases, and how I have sought to overcome them. Now that it is clear how the arguments here have been formulated, it is time to dive into setting the context within Turkey, as this is where the securitisation (extension) process began.

CHAPTER 4 – CONTEXT IN TURKEY: SECURITISATION OF ACADEMICS

In this chapter, I will set the context for Turkey as this is a vital part of the Paris approach, as outlined in Chapter 2. The securitisation of academics in the Turkish context is important as Turkish academics based abroad, in my dataset, have shown an awareness of what is happening to academics within Turkey. This is a concern for them if they must return home, and therefore contributes to the "atmosphere of fear" in which many of these academics are living, as I will argue in Chapter 5. This chapter will begin by showing how the securitisation of academics has occurred, looking at Erdogan's discourse and state practises. I will then answer two important questions which arise when assessing the context and the securitisation process: firstly *what makes this period "exceptional" in the Turkish context?* Secondly, I will answer the question of *why has the securitisation of academics occurred now*?

1. Securitisation of academics

a. *Discourse*

The securitisation of academics by Erdogan and the Turkish state began following the Academics for Peace[8] petition on 10 January 2016 in response to "allegations of human rights abuses against civilians" in Kurdish towns in eastern Turkey" (Martin, 2018: 14). These included reports of 82 civilians, including children, being caught in the crossfire between Turkish forces and P.K.K. fighters, as well as the civilians in these towns being "without access to food or medical treatment" (Martin, 2018: 14). The Academics for Peace petition called on the Turkish government to "abandon its deliberate massacre and deportation of Kurdish and other peoples in the region," and in response the government launched an investigation into the 1128 signatories on various charges, of terrorism, inciting violence, and insulting the state" (Martin, 2018: 14). This "marked a new era" from the "sporadic and unsystematic" attacks on academics previously, due to "the government's approach to using counterterrorism discourse as a weapon against dissent" (Baser et. al. 2017: 275/6). This counterterrorism discourse was immediately utilised by Erdogan. The ferocity of his response was noted by one respondent, who pointed out how "wildly" he perceived Erdogan to have reacted as, on 12 January 2016, despite a terrorist attack on Istanbul killing 10 tourists (BBC, 2016) Erdogan spent "just two minutes" speaking about the terrorist attack during a speech, while dedicating "30 minutes

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[8] Academics for Peace are a group of academics who "petition against violence to both PKK and the Turkish state." They were founded in November 2012, originally making a statement on "the Kurdish prisoners' demands for peace in Turkey while on hunger strike" (Öztürk, 2018: 7).

talking about these traitor academics."[9]

This speech represented the onset of the securitisation of critical academics in Turkey. It is a classic example of the "speech act" in securitisation theory, defined as "the discursive representation of a certain issue as an existential threat to security" (Emmers, 2006: 112). Erdogan labelled the signatories "'ignorant' and 'so-called intellectuals,'" (Baser et. al., 2017: 286) and "fifth columns of foreign powers undermining Turkey" (Öney, 2016). This shows an attempt to de-legitimise, and to link the academics to an existential threat to Turkey through "foreign powers." Following the arrest of several of the signatories, Erdogan publicly called for an extension of the definition of a terrorist: "It might be the terrorist who pulls the trigger and detonates the bomb, but it is these supporters and accomplices who allow that attack to achieve its goal. The fact their title is politician, academic, writer, journalist… doesn't change the fact that individual is a terrorist" (Baser, et. al., 2017: 288). This discursive practise was mirrored by other government officials, as the Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said that "those who do not approve of the terror organisations' acts would not have signed this petition" (Öney, 2016). Similarly, the government spokesman, Bekir Bozdağ, "stated that 'the enlightened (aydın) who signed the petition are dark indeed' and even alleged that the petition was written by the PKK" (Öney, 2016). This represents a clear extension of the terrorist frame and is an obvious attempt to present the academics as an existential threat.

b. *Practises*

This discursive framing was supported by the state practises that followed. Erdogan called "upon all our institutions: everyone who benefits from this state but is now an enemy of the state must be punished without further delay" (Baser et. al., 2017: 275). This saw a "shocking wave of anticipatory obedience" from the judiciary, who launched investigations with the accused being charged with "terrorist organisation propaganda." At the same time, the Council for Higher Education, YÖK, enforced widespread dismissals (Baser et. al., 2017: 275-6). The ferocity of the state's pursuit of critical academics increased following the July 2016 attempted coup, as in "the nine months period of the state of emergency, the number of dismissed academicians reached 4,811, increasing to 7,619 with the addition of academicians who were working in the universities closed after the failed coup attempt." Furthermore, there was no legal basis for these practises as "the social media posts, the personal contacts of academicians or just being a signee of the peace petition are counted as sufficient shreds of evidence for the

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[9] Author's interview on 22 May 2018 with Respondent 17 in Berlin, a Turkish academic based in Germany.

dismissals or arrests of these academicians" (Non, 2017: 553). This demonstrates how everyday interactions and activities are being retrospectively framed as evidence of affiliations with terrorism. One can see from these processes the extent to which the judiciary and the Council for Higher Education were willing to support Erdogan's discursive practises.

Some private universities followed the state's lead also, as they have "taken cues from the wider repressive environment by creating a 'black list' based on signatories' national insurance numbers thus contributing to the systematic closing off of opportunities for academics dismissed from their posts." This has seen "social and economic exclusion that has resulted in a kind of 'civil death' for many of the signatories" (Tekdemir et. al., 2018: 107). This emphasises the all-encompassing nature of the securitised atmosphere as private institutions fall into line with the judiciary and state universities. The practises outlined here gives a clear idea of the scale of the securitisation of these academics.

These state practises affected some of my dataset directly, with one academic saying they were put in "a prison where Erdogan keeps a lot of his opponents, the highest security prison in Turkey, where we spent two weeks in isolation."[10] This demonstrates the extremity of the securitisation if the highest security prison in Turkey, according to this respondent, is used. There was a strong perception amongst my dataset that the aim of the state's practises was to create fear amongst academics beyond those who are directly affected by the state's practises: "I think they wanted to arrest us so that they make the others afraid."[11] Similarly, another respondent felt that the government does not "want to inflame the matter by putting academics into jail physically, but it is obvious that they wish to punish all the signatories with the threat of jail."[12] These perceptions are supported by Martin, who argues that "the A.K.P. has been able to securitize its political opponents by linking them with 'terrorism'… the inevitable deterrent effect of this strategy has further reduced the number of critical and/or scrutinizing voices usually provided by political opposition and civil society including academia" (2018: 16). This demonstrates how the use of the terrorist framing in the state's practises aimed at critical academics has the aim of deterring other critical voices.

Therefore, one can see that the state's practises have targeted critical academics through dismissals and imprisonment. This has been led by the judiciary and state universities, whilst some private universities have also dismissed and black listed academics. The perception of much of my dataset, supported by secondary literature, is that the aim of these practises is to

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[10] Author's interview on 22 May 2018 with Respondent 17 in Berlin, a Turkish academic based in Germany.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] Author's Skype interview on 18 April 2018 with Respondent 8, a Turkish academic based in Germany.

deter other critical voices. These practises relate to the discourse outlined previously as they have utilised the same terrorist framing as justification, mirroring Erdogan's speech act, and the subsequent discourse that supported this from other government officials.

2. __What makes this period "exceptional?"__

Erdogan's speech act and the subsequent state practises outlined above are representative of "the adoption of distinctive policies ('exceptional' or not)" (Balzacq, et. al., 2016: 495). The Paris school focuses only on distinctive policies rather than exceptional, however, I feel there is utility in showing this period to be exceptional, as advocated by the Copenhagen school (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 455). This is because, firstly, my dataset often cited this period as exceptional, as one respondent summarised: "even if we use the measures which are more adaptable to Turkey, even for Turkey the reaction (to the Academics for Peace petition) was really extreme."[13] Secondly, it is worth showing that this period is exceptional as it makes clear why this time frame was selected and is useful to research.

I will therefore briefly compare the current practises of the state to those of previous attacks on academic freedom to show why this period is exceptional even in the Turkish context. I will then focus on the social factors which contribute to making this period exceptional, according to my dataset and the secondary literature. These are categorised as, firstly, the polarisation of society, and secondly, the subsequent practises of the "reactive" audience in targeting critical academics.

a. _Extremity of state practises_

In the past, there have been state-led attacks on Turkish academics, so this in itself is not exceptional. The numbers affected currently, however, are "20 times larger than the number of academics expelled in the 1960, 1971 and 1980 military coups" (Degirmen & Alperen, 2017). Furthermore, the practises of imprisonment and black listing have not been utilised in previous attacks on academia as they have in the current context, as shown in the previous sub-section. These measures can therefore be seen as unprecedented. For these reasons, "the oppression academicians are facing today is much harder than they experienced in 1980s" (Non, 2017: 551). Tekdemir et. al. support this, claiming that the "present emergency is unprecedented in recent Turkish history" (2018: 109/10). This makes clear that the state's practises currently are exceptional, even for a country which has suffered attacks on academia historically. The

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[13] Author's Skype interview on 18 April 2018 with Respondent 8, a Turkish academic based in Germany.

following sub-sections will argue that societal factors also contribute to making this period exceptional.

b. *Polarisation of society*

The polarisation of Turkish society was cited amongst my respondents' numerous times, exemplified by the belief that Erdogan has "segregated the society into two: the AKP followers and the others."[14] Historically, there have been divisions in Turkish society, as "the major socio-cultural cleavages of Turkish politics have been determined by attitudes towards religion (Sunni Islam versus secularism) and ethnicity (Kurdish versus Turkish ethnicity)" (Yardimci-Geyikçi, 2014: 448). These cleavages have been deepened in Erdogan's third term, however, as "the government has started to ignore the demands of an important segment of society which tends to define itself as libertarian and secular… the government has moved from its responsible governing role and instead enhanced its representative role, particularly for the Islamic community," through utilising "bitter and divisive discourse." (Yardimci-Geyikçi, 2014: 451) This demonstrates how Erdogan, by playing on religious divides to cement a strong electoral base, has contributed to the polarisation of society. This escalated with the 2013 Gezi Park protests, which "deepened the already worrying degree of polarisation between the religious and secular sectors of society, i.e. between the supporters and opponents of the AKP" (Özbudun, 2014: 158). Professor van Bruinessen supported this view, and told me the significance of this for critical academics: "due to the polarization in Turkey there is a strong commitment from people who are pro-AKP to challenge and attack what they consider to be enemies of the AKP or traitors to the Turkish nation."[15] This results in extreme reactions to dissenting voices on religious or ethnic issues, as will be demonstrated in the following sub-section.

c. *The "reactive" audience*

The role of the "reactive" audience, here defined as pro-regime agents that respond to the state's securitisation of critical academics by partaking in their own practises involving the harassment of these academics, was cited multiple times as a contextual factor in making this period exceptional. This view is expressed by a respondent who says that the government has "made sure that there is also a public behind this academic purge."[16] Another believes this has resulted

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[14] Written notes shared with author on 5 June 2018; Respondent 21, a Kurdish PhD candidate based in Germany.
[15] Author's interview on 23 April 2018 in Utrecht, with Professor van Bruinessen, an Emeritus Professor of Turkish and Kurdish studies.
[16] Author's Skype interview on 18 April 2018 with Respondent 8, a Turkish academic based in Germany.

in a base which is "mobilised in a very Nazi-like and fascistic way."[17] This view is supported as one academic says: "previously you could say there would be strong state sanctions on what you can say and not say, but society wouldn't necessarily fully follow it, but now we see the same state theories... combined with very strong, verdant, popular angst against what can be said and what cannot be said, so that is what makes it much more intense."[18] This indicates that previously it was only the state who would target critical academics, but now this is combined with a supportive public. These testimonies demonstrate the belief that the populist support is exceptional in comparison to previous attacks. This is because the population identifies with the Islamist message of the AKP, who they have democratically elected, whilst previous attacks were following unpopular military coups, based on a "secular" and "liberal" agenda. (Ozturk, 2018: 4-5). This demonstrates that the populist support of the AKP is considered to be exceptional in this current academic purge.

The secondary literature details the extreme responses of the reactive audience. Academics have "received threats from students, neighbours and even random strangers. Their office doors at universities were marked with red signs which stated 'terrorist academics' were not welcome at the universities" (Baser, et. al., 2017: 286). This populist element has made the securitisation of academics a "very public lynching. Signatories have received death threats and have been targeted with social pressure to flee their neighbourhoods in parallel with the formal judicial measures of the state" (Tekdemir, et. al., 2018: 107). Multiple respondents in my dataset also received death threats.[19] These are clearly extreme reactions from pro-regime agents, and display that there is a reactive audience who are actively participating in the securitisation of academics. The practises cited here demonstrate why many would be likely to self-censor in order to avoid these negative reactions.

In conclusion, one can see that this period is exceptional based on the extremity of the state's practises in comparison to past attacks on academia. The polarisation of society contributes by fermenting extreme divisions along religious and ethnic lines, which results on extreme reactions in relation to these issues, as seen by the practises of the reactive audience. These elements are significant to show, beyond displaying that this is an unprecedented escalation in relation to attacks on academics and the climate they are working in, as the polarisation of society and the role of the reactive audience have been cited in my dataset as having extended abroad to affect their lived experiences as part of the securitisation extension

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[17] Author's Skype interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 14, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.
[18] Author's Skype interview on 24 April 2018 with Respondent 9, a Turkish academic based in Brazil.
[19] Author's Skype interview on 26 April 2018 with Respondent 10, a Kurdish academic based in the U.S.; and, Author's interview on 21 May 2018 with Respondent 16 in Berlin, a Turkish academic based in Germany.

process, as will be explained in the following chapters.

3. **Why now?**

The final sub-section in this contextual chapter will answer the next question that arose as part of this research: *whilst recognising that this is a clear escalation in Turkey's treatment of academics, why has the securitisation of academics occurred now?* This question arose whilst interviewing a Kurdish PhD candidate, who said that when the Academics for Peace started the petition, "to be honest, I did not sign. In Turkey I am part of the Kurdish movement… there were petitions like this, many times, many times, but nothing happened. For me, it was just a liberal activity. But when I understand the Turkish state was attacking these academics, I felt I had to become part of the petition, so I signed."[20] This immediately raised the question of why it was this petition that provoked this exceptional reaction from Erdogan. Based on my dataset and the secondary literature, the answer is that, firstly, it is part of Erdogan's attempts to consolidate power, and secondly, due to the timing of the petition in the relation to the end of the ceasefire with the Kurdish P.K.K.

a. *Consolidation of power*

The turning point in seeing Erdogan seek to consolidate power is from 2011 onwards, according to much of the secondary literature: "since winning a third term in office, Erdogan has become much more authoritarian and autocratic." (Yardimci-Geyikçi, 2014: 446). This has manifested itself in "the imposition of stricter constraints on freedom of expression and civil liberties and the growing use of the state's coercive capacity to suppress various forms of nonviolent, as well as violent, dissent" (Akkoyunlu & Öktem, 2016: 506). One can see, then, that Erdogan is trying to consolidate power through building a more autocratic regime, and this results in crackdowns on dissenting voices. Baser et. al. argue that the targeting of critical academics is a logical step in this process: "since educational institutions are among the most significant places for research, their control becomes crucial in autocratic states. Rulers want to closely monitor access to knowledge and therefore to power" (2017: 284). Seeking to purge these institutions of critical scholars would be an obvious motivation, then, as if critical academics are imparting knowledge amongst the population, it is possible that oppositional ideas could spread, which is dangerous to an autocratic regime. Preventing this, and suppressing dissenting voices in general, is therefore a means of consolidating power.

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[20] Author's interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 12 in Utrecht, a Kurdish PhD candidate based in the Netherlands.

b. The Kurdish "issue"

Very much related to the question of timing is the developments involving the Kurdish question prior to the Academics for Peace petition. The Kurdish issue has historically been seen as a threat to national identity, based on the ethnic cleavages described earlier in the chapter. However, as Professor van Bruinessen, an Emeritus Professor of Turkish and Kurdish studies, told me:

> *"the amazing thing here is the change in the AKP, as with the AKP for the first time the Kurdish question could be debated… the period from 2000 to 2012 was a period of unprecedented freedom, in fact, with hope that the Kurdish question and the Armenian question could be resolved."*[21]

This demonstrates how dramatically the situation has shifted, as "since 2014 there has been a gradual resumption of hostilities over the Kurdish 'issue' which led to the breakdown of the ceasefire with the P.K.K. in July 2015. […] Kurdish-associated groups have since been the subject of this terrorism securitization strategy… this should be seen as a result of the consolidation of power in the A.K.P" (Martin, 2018: 6). This displays Erdogan's response to the end of the ceasefire, and is significant in relation to the timing of the Academics for Peace petition, in January 2016, as it came when "Kurdish associated groups" were being securitised. It appears, therefore, that academics who supported Kurdish rights with the petition were incorporated into the securitisation of Kurdish-associated groups. This indicates why the timing of this petition saw an extreme reaction, when other petitions had been ignored before, and is demonstrative of the stretching the terrorist framing. This displays the effects of a "security meta-frame" technique, as will be explained in the following subsection.

4. Analysis and concluding comments

In Erdogan's discourse and the subsequent state practises outlined here, critical academics are framed as terrorists. This is a "rhetorical device of delegitimising one group by conflating it with the P.K.K." Martin argues Erdogan had done this with opposition political parties initially, before being "applied to less obvious critical voices in academia and civil society" (2018: 14). The stretching of the terrorist frame as a method of de-legitimisation, then, is a consistent tactic used by Erdogan. This shows a "security meta-frame" is being employed, which is described as a "dominant ordering principle" that can "subsume" all "other principles of social organization"

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[21] Author's interview on 23 April 2018 in Utrecht, with Professor van Bruinessen, an Emeritus Professor of Turkish and Kurdish studies.

(Bajc & de Lint, 2011: 3-4). This benefits Erdogan in his attempts to consolidate power, as this framing "blurs the boundaries between actual terrorism and civil disobedience, and by doing that, they arbitrarily limit freedom of speech. The narrative created around these laws can be instrumentalised to criminalise certain group and individuals" (Baser, et. al., 2017: 276). Therefore, the discourse and practises employed can be seen to be a tactic aimed at limiting critical speech from academics, as there is the threat of criminalisation through terrorist framing.

In relation to this discourse, Öney highlights that "Erdoğan's addressees were not just the diplomatic circles of Turkey: the speech was broadcast live on TV and so were his forthcoming speeches criticising the signatories" (2016). This demonstrates that his discourse likely played a role in producing the reactive audience, who are cited as one of the main reasons for this period being a clear escalation from previous times. This is particularly significant in this case, as the reactive audience beyond Turkish borders utilise the same discursive practises as Erdogan of de-legitimisation and terrorist framing, as will be shown in Chapter 6 and 7.

It is fair to draw a link between Erdogan's speech act and the practises of the reactive audience, or pro-regime agents, abroad, as "by insulting an entire profession as 'dissidents'" he has cultivated "a hostile anti-intellectual environment," (Baser et. al., 2017: 289) and this can be seen to have extended beyond Turkish borders into Turkish communities abroad also as this creates a motive for pro-regime agents in the diaspora to target critical academics abroad. Besides creating a reactive audience, this also contributes to the polarisation of society through presenting the image of Erdogan as the "'people's man', who is advocating 'the people's cause' against a corrupt elite" (Öney, 2016). This polarisation of society affects academics abroad as it has extended into Turkish communities also, as the following chapter will show.

In conclusion, this chapter has argued that the historical context has played an enabling factor in the current securitisation of Turkish academics due to the state's control over universities. A comparison with the historical context is also significant in showing the contemporary situation is unprecedented. This can be seen through the extreme discourse employed by the Erdogan, and the state practises that follow suit. The final two subsections in the chapter answer questions that arise when dissecting the context. Here I argue that the reason for the escalation is the polarisation of society, and the role of the reactive audience. The chapter finishes with the argument that Erdogan's consolidation of power, and the timing of the Academics for Peace petition in relation to the end of the ceasefire with the Kurdish P.K.K., were the primary reasons for the securitisation of academics commencing when it did. Having

understood the proximate context within Turkey, the next logical question to address is in asking what is the context that Turkish academics beyond Turkish borders are experiencing, since 2016 when the securitisation (extension) process began?

CHAPTER 5 – SECURITISATION EXTENSION: "ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR"

The context within Turkey, as described above, is a contributing factor in creating an "atmosphere of fear,"[22] as described by one of my respondents, that has emerged predominantly amongst oppositional voices in cities with a large Turkish diaspora since 2016, when the peace petition and attempted coup occurred. This description is similar to that of Tekdemir et. al., who say "the purge in Turkey has also produced a palpable climate of fear among academics who were not involved in the petition" (2018: 107-8). This chapter will therefore show how this atmosphere, or climate, of fear has also extended into Turkish communities abroad, in which the academics in my dataset are living and working. This is an intangible phenomenon which appears be supplemented by the interconnectivity of Turkish academics abroad as this allows for news, and rumours, to spread.

I will first detail the state practises in seeking to extradite those who have fled the country since 2016. Whilst Gulenists have been the primary target of this, some academics have also been targeted. This affects academics as they hear about what is occurring, and the length to which the Turkish state is going to capture opposition contributes to the atmosphere of fear, as one does not know if they could be targeted next. I will then look at the concerns over "spying" in Turkish communities, with the MIT[23] and imams cited here. Finally, I will explain how the polarisation of Turkish society has extended into the diaspora. The effects of this polarisation are similar to those within Turkey, as it has seen an increased likelihood of extreme reactions to dissenting voices, in the perceptions of some in my dataset, leading to them displaying changes in behaviour. The data collected from interviews will be supplemented with secondary literature for verification.

1. Extraditions

Following the 2016 attempted coup, there have been widespread attempts to extradite those considered to be opposition by the Turkish state. Members of the Gulen movement,[24] who were

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[22] Author's interview on 23 May 2018 with Mr Ercan Karakoyun, the spokesperson of the Hizmet movement in Germany. [*Note*: *Mr Karakoyun was interviewed because, although he is not an academic, as the spokesperson of the Gulen movement I felt he would be well placed to give an overview of the situation in Germany for people being targeted by the Turkish state. I felt that many of the practises used here would also affect academics living in Germany, both directly and also by contributing to the atmosphere.*]

[23] The MIT is Turkey's National Intelligence Organisation.

[24] The Gulen movement, also known as the Hizmet movement, is a community which follows the teachings of US-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen. They are influential within Turkey, and abroad, and were blamed for the 2016 attempted coup in Turkey by Erdogan. Gulenists have therefore been targeted by securitisation (extension) practises.

blamed for the coup, have been the primary target of this so far, but an awareness of this is displayed by academics in my dataset:

> *"Then you move outside the legal remit of the Turkish state and their arms extend, and we are reading about all these episodes of the Turkish intelligence agencies snatching people from countries abroad and bringing them to Turkey, which hasn't really happened to academics as far as I am aware, although some of them were school teachers in Kosovo. But hopefully it won't happen to academics like we are talking about because that would be a different level."[25]*

The incident referred to here is detailed in a report by the Journalist and Writers Foundation as "coordinated illegal actions" which saw intelligence agencies of Turkey and Kosovo abduct and immediately deport Turkish nationals working in educational institutions with alleged links to the Gulen movement.[26] The report outlines many cases similar to this, as well as the "abuse of INTERPOL systems"[27] (JWF, 2018: 56) in an attempt to force foreign states to detain and extradite political opponents. Some of these incidents saw academics targeted in Qatar and Georgia (JWF, 2018).

This is just one example of the "long arm" of Erdogan, and similar NGO reports detail many more (Stockholm Centre for Freedom: 2017a & 2017b). Confirmation of these practises is given by the Turkish state, with İbrahim Kalın, spokesperson for the presidency, admitting that the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) "is in contact with various countries about people who are abroad as fugitives and have requested asylum. We demand that they be captured and extradited to Turkey" (Stockholm Centre for Freedom, 2017b: 11). Erdogan similarly declared: "we will never leave alone those who fled abroad; we will chase them until they are punished like they deserve." (SCF 2017b: 8)

Therefore, it seems the concern alluded to by my respondent is a justified one, as academics are included in the group of people who have fled abroad. That the respondent says "we are reading about all these episodes" displays the interconnectivity of the world in this

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[25] Author's Skype interview on 24 April 2018 with Respondent 9, a Turkish academic based in Brazil.
[26] This incident was widely reported in international media, with the German website Deutsche Welle (DW) quoting the Kosovo Prime Minister as saying, "the entire operation – revoking their residence permits, detention, emergency deportation and the secret extradition to Turkey of the six Turkish citizens from Kosovo territory – was conducted without my knowledge and without my permission." As a result, the Interior Minister and intelligence service director were sacked. (DW, 2018a)
[27] This abuse was is verified by, and criticised in, a Foreign Policy report: "Entering 60,000 people into a database designed to help locate the most dangerous criminals on the planet is clearly an abuse of the system. To give a sense of perspective, in 2016 there were just under 13,000 new Red Notices issued across the globe" (Russell, 2018).

current globalised era, where covert extraditions in Kosovo have the potential to play on the conscience of an academic on the other side of the world in Brazil. This shows that academics have an awareness of what is occurring, and Erdogan's declaration to "never leave alone" those who fled abroad would be a fair reason for them to feel concerned that they could be targeted. The response above therefore represents the "atmosphere of fear" succinctly, as it is not necessary for one to be directly affected by the state's actions in order to feel concern, but merely awareness that these actions are taking place.

2. <u>Spying in Turkish communities</u>

As seen in the previous section, extraditions are occurring (JFW, 2018; DW, 2018a; Amnesty International, 2017) but not so much in Europe and the U.S. Instead, more covert practises are being employed, such as the phenomenon of spying amongst Turkish diaspora. This was an often-cited concern in my dataset, whether it be the MIT, members of the Turkish community, or imams in the Diyanet. In relation to the MIT, one respondent said:

> *"Being spied by the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT) is a concern of us because it is known that the Turkish intelligence agency has more than 6000 MIT spies in and around Germany. This is a concern of us when we and if we organise an opposition event against the Turkish state policies here. This makes us worried. Us being suspected as spying happens when one comes here first time. The ones already here suspect the new comers first time. It was easy for me as I was very open to everyone while telling my story. I even tell them, joking, to search my name on Google."[28]*

This outline displays the awareness of MIT spying, as has been reported in German media[29] (DW, 2018b) and by NGOs (Stockholm Centre for Freedom, 2017b). As this is a concern when organising opposition events, one can assume the respondent perceives the spies to be there with the function of monitoring opposition voices. This view is supported by a German newspaper.[30] However, what is more interesting about the response is how it sheds light on the atmosphere amongst the Turkish diaspora, as they are immediately suspicious of "new comers" and the respondent had to confirm his credentials, in a sense, by showing that they had been critical of the government in Turkey. This demonstrates that, in oppositional circles in Germany at least, there is an "atmosphere of fear," as immediately suspecting people of being spies is

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[28] Author's written interview on 5 June 2018 with Respondent 21, a Kurdish PhD student based in Germany.
[29] This article outlines a report from "Die Welt" newspaper. It claims that "Ankara had 6,000 informants of its MIT national intelligence agency plus MIT officers in Germany who were putting pressure on 'German Turks.'"
[30] This perceived function is also reported on in German media, as "German federal prosecutors were looking into claims that three men - two Turks and a German national - were instructed by MIT to spy on Erdogan critics in Cologne" (DW 2018b).

unusual and extreme behaviour, but demonstrative of the environment they are living in.

Another respondent alludes to the same phenomenon, saying that:

"neighbours are monitoring neighbours, there is so much surveillance but not just at the state and embassy level, so you are scared of your neighbours, and in Berlin, for example in Kreuzberg, you have to worry about what another Turkish person sitting at another table is thinking because there is snitching. It creates this kind of dynamics."[31]

This shows how pervasive the fear of spying is, and was also cited for the U.S., where there is "some kind of concern" about informants "because there are many Gulenists over here."[32] This displays that the atmosphere of fear is manifesting itself in similar ways in different parts of the world. One noteworthy element is that the "concern" about informants is reasoned as there being Gulenists in the area. This indicated the possibility of the concern being due to an awareness that the Turkish state is looking for Gulenists, rather than direct evidence that there were informants. When asked about concrete evidence, then, they cited German media reports, but in terms of knowledge of actual experiences of thit hadn't "risen higher than the rumour level as of now to more concrete evidence of any friend that I know, but it is generally friends of friends."[33] Therefore, this is demonstrative of how the atmosphere can provoke concern in academics who have never had direct evidence of their concerns happening in reality.

The second institution referenced as being responsible for spying was the Diyanet and its imams. The Diyanet is described as a "religious actor, an institution or an epistemic community," and is responsible for "identity and ideology construction on the one hand, for example by issuing fetvas (Islamic legal opinions)" (Ozturk & Sozeri, 2018: 5). However, it has also been accused of functioning as a "sophisticated intelligence gathering agency... increasingly imams of Diyanet funded mosques also incite worshippers to spy on followers of the Hizmet (Gulen) movement and affiliated institutions, including schools." (JWF, 2018: 54) Ozturk & Sozeri provide evidence of this as they detail how the Turkish Embassy's Religious Affairs Attaché admitted on Dutch national television to gathering information on Gulenists in the Netherlands (2018: 16). The authors also point out that the "publicity around the case indirectly serves Turkish state's purposes by revealing to the diaspora that its actions are being monitored and reported to the Turkish government. In this way, both domestic conflict and domestic

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[31] Author's Skype interview on 17 April 2018 with Respondent 7, a Turkish academic based in the U.K.
[32] Author's Skype interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 14, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.
[33] Author's Skype interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 14, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.

surveillance practices are exported abroad via Diyanet" (2018: 16). It is this element that ensures the Diyanet's spying function contributes to the atmosphere of fear, as knowing that information is being gathered, even in places of worship, is sure to contribute to the atmosphere of fear and suspicion for academics living in these communities also.

An anecdote from my dataset alludes to this phenomenon:

"I decided to go to a mosque one time and the scene that I saw there was also very interesting. So, after the prayers he prayed to 'our' government, 'our' army, so I was joking with a friend saying, 'he must mean the German army, right?' as these are German mosques basically. So, it was an ultranationalist mosque so I was afraid I could be recognised by somebody, but it was not the case and even with my friend we were talking civilly about my case, my signature and nothing happened."[34]

This story displays the politicised atmosphere of mosques in Germany, as experienced by the respondent. That the prayers were to "our" army and "our" government shows that this institution is an extension of the Turkish state abroad, and this clearly influences the respondent, as they felt afraid. However, the fact that they were able to talk about their case, meaning the Academics for Peace petition, without consequence indicates the perceived threat may be more than the reality. The caveat here is that if one is not religious and does not attend mosques then they are unlikely to be concerned about this development. However, as the anecdote displays, this intangible atmosphere has permeated into seemingly unrelated spheres of everyday life, such as during religious worship.

3. <u>Polarisation of Turkish society: extension into diaspora</u>

The fears of spying likely contribute to the extreme polarisation of Turkish society, as described in Chapter 4, which has also extended into the Turkish communities in which much of my dataset are living and working in the West. Mr Karakoyun describes how "there are a lot of people who are worried, and the division in the Turkish community goes even through families. Turkish society is a very polarised society… so now the society is divided into pro-AKP people, pro-Erdogan and contra-Erdogan, and the people who are pro-Erdogan do everything to make the life of contra-Erdogan people almost impossible in Germany."[35] This description indicates

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[34] Author's Skype interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 14, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.
[35] Author's interview on 23 May 2018 with Mr Ercan Karakoyun, the spokesperson of the Hizmet movement in Germany.

the difficulty in being in opposition to the AKP in Germany due to reactions from pro-Erdogan diaspora.

Another respondent alluded to the same phenomenon in France. He said the community is:

> *"over-represented in the Islamic and nationalistic way, or represented in the Kurdish side here. There is an over-representation of the AKP supporters or sympathizers and so it has become difficult being a Turkish academic working in France too. [...] The oppression that is within Turkey, it is not applicable for the university, but it is applicable in the context of Strasbourg, it's a small city. So, yes, I see the connection and I feel myself within France, within this diaspora, less comfortable then I was 10 years ago."[36]*

This response highlights polarisation along religious and ethnic lines. And alludes to the difficulties for non-AKP supporters as he relates the "oppression" in the diasporic community to that within Turkey, saying this makes it more difficult to work on what the AKP, and its supporters, consider contentious issues.

Similarly, an academic based in the Netherlands described comparable difficulties, saying they felt "limited by the presence of a strong, well-organised nationalist Turkish diaspora… it limits me in the public events I can do, it limits me in the publications or the media presence that I can have. If I was to go on television to talk about how bad Erdogan is, you can bet that one day I will be assaulted by one of these vigilantes."[37] One can see, then, that the polarisation of society has extended into Turkish communities abroad, with similar concerns expressed about Turkish diaspora in Germany, France and the Netherlands. This affects these academics as they feel limited in what they can do or say due to concerns over extreme reactions from the diaspora.

4. Analysis & concluding comments

Having shown how this atmosphere of fear has manifested itself amongst my dataset in Turkish diasporic communities, I will now analyse the dynamics that make this intangible phenomenon affect lived experiences of academics who have never directly been affected by any of the practises described. Mr Karakoyun succinctly described how this atmosphere comes about as he says:

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[36] Author's Skype interview on 13 April 2018 with Respondent 5, a Turkish academic based in France.
[37] Author's interview on 8 May 2018 with Respondent 11, a Dutch-Turkish academic based in the Netherlands.

"By arresting 10 academics he may bring 1000 academics to his line, so they won't speak any more. So, I think what he does is pick cases with symbolic character, so taking the academics who write something against them and throwing them in jail and so all the other academics become afraid to write what they want to, and he does this with a journalist and with a businessman and then people think: "ok, as a businessman I also need to be careful." Then he takes the student, he maybe takes a woman, he takes somebody who donates to an NGO, and this is how it works and then there is an atmosphere of fear and then you don't donate, you don't get into contact with critics."[38]

This encapsulates clearly how the atmosphere of fear works and is transferred into Germany, as it does not require every critical voice to be targeted, but merely an awareness that this is happening to others.

In order for this to be successful, however, it requires knowledge of what is happening to others. This is facilitated, of course, by the internet and the interconnectivity this provides, as stories of what is happening to others spreads rapidly. However, another element mentioned to me in my dataset is likely a contributing factor, as when I asked about how this respondent was aware of spying in communities, the response was that within the "Academics for Peace, the email group, there is a lot of circulation of information and experiences, but they haven't risen higher than the rumour level as of now to more concrete evidence."[39] This aptly demonstrates how rumours of what happens to one academic can be spread around all academics, in Germany at least, where the academics in exile are a tight-knit community. This community is useful as a support network, but it seems it may indirectly feed in to the atmosphere of fear, and so works in to the hands of the Turkish state as news of their actions will be spread and discussed, which increases their effectiveness.

Another academic displayed recognition of this, saying he is:

"trying to gauge the actual intensity of this witch hunt because I also feel that we create, amongst academics abroad, a sort of narrative ourselves, and I'm not saying it's a false narrative, it is a subjective narrative as well, so it is difficult to be fully objective, to get a sense of the degree to which this witch hunt is going on. Within Turkey it is very clear that it is quite extensive and quite targeted. Abroad, it is a little bit more complex, I think. So it

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[38] Author's interview on 23 May 2018 with Mr Ercan Karakoyun, the spokesperson of the Hizmet movement in Germany.

[39] Author's Skype interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 14, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.

is a bit difficult because on one hand as an academic you have a responsibility to objective analysis as much as possible but on the other hand this is such a personal issue, it affects everyone personally so I think it is difficult to strike a balance."[40]

This analysis succinctly outlines how Turkish academics abroad may contribute to creating a certain narrative, as it is clear there is some level of targeting of opposition occurring, but they often do not know the full extent, or whether it is systematic or random. This facilitates the state's practises, as it creates uncertainty about who could be targeted next, as does discussion and rumours about what is occurring. This potentially increases the impact of practises such as extraditions and spying. One can see, therefore, that the practises of the Turkish state and its diaspora create a certain atmosphere, and this is facilitated through the interconnectivity of Turkish academics abroad and their discussion of what is happening elsewhere.

In conclusion, this chapter has described the context in which critical Turkish academics are experiencing within diasporic communities in the West, which can be classified as an atmosphere of fear. It is interesting to note that an NGO used the same description, saying that: "the main policy followed by the Government has been to create an atmosphere of 'fear'" for the opponent groups through a policy of "keeping them under control," citing the "many incidents of kidnapping by the intelligence service have taken place" (Platform for Peace and Justice, 2018: 7). This shows how securitisation (extension) practises have extended abroad through illegal extraditions and abuse of INTERPOL "Red Notices,"[41] as detailed in this chapter. This affects academics in my dataset as they are aware of this, and the length to which the Turkish state is going to capture opposition will concern them, as outlined above. This creates an atmosphere of fear as academics wonder if they will be next, as Erdogan clearly stated that he "will never leave alone those who fled abroad." Location will play a factor in if this is possible, however, which is why spying in communities in Europe, and possibly the U.S., has been put in place as an alternative. A final issue outlined is the polarisation of Turkish communities abroad, which makes it harder to be critical of the Turkish state for fear of the reaction of the diaspora. These factors display how "Turks abroad have also become a factor in the hyper-securitized political environment of Turkey" (Cornell, 2017). Having understood the context in which academics are living, it is now logical to dissect the practises that are directly affecting academics specifically as part of this securitisation extension.

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[40] Author's Skype interview on 24 April 2018 with Respondent 9, a Turkish academic based in Brazil.
[41] This database "works as an international criminal alert, notifying all 192 countries in the database that a person is wanted by police." Turkey uploaded 60,000 political opponents to this database (Russell, 2018).

CHAPTER 6 – SECURITISATION EXTENSION: STATE & PRO-REGIME AGENT'S PRACTISES

This chapter builds upon the atmosphere of fear that is a vital component of the securitisation extension occurring beyond Turkish borders to look at more tangible and visible practises which serve as forms of control, and, I will argue, are aimed at encouraging self-censorship. "Practises" here will be taken to mean "socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world" (Adler and Pouilot, 2011: 4).The research question formulated to gain insight into the practises that are implemented was simply:

What are the socially meaningful patterns of action that Turkish academics experience in interacting with the Turkish state or pro-regime agents whilst living beyond Turkish borders?

The answers to this at times included interactions with non-state actors, who were perceived to be doing the state's bidding, so this chapter will analyse the practises of the Turkish state as well as "pro-regime agents," who are here defined as "a range of persons acting officially and unofficially in the service of the regime, including paid employees, genuine regime loyalists, and individuals who may have been coerced in some way to inform, both from within the home country and abroad." (Moss, 2018: 271). The reason that the practises of the state and pro-regime agents are grouped together is that many of the practises described are hard to place clearly as the state, or as a nationalistic agent acting of their own accord. Many of the academics perceive state involvement, but this is often difficult to verify. Therefore, it is not the aim of this thesis to judge with certainty when the state is involved or not, but merely to present the experiences and perceptions of my dataset. This being said, many of the practises are very clearly state-orchestrated, such as imposing "civil death" on academics.

The practises that are used by the state and pro-regime agents as an element of securitisation extension beyond Turkish borders and in to the West can be divided into: "low-tech" surveillance; harassment; and "civil death." These will be looked at in turn.

1. "Low-tech" surveillance

"Low-tech" surveillance is very often cited in my dataset as a practise employed by both the state and pro-regime agents. This is defined by Bonelli and Ragazzi as "a heuristic device" that involves "old-fashioned technologies of data collection and analysis, such as observation, informants, archival work, and the production of files, notes and memos" (Bonelli & Ragazzi, 2014: 480).

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A typical example of this low-tech surveillance, as described by my respondents, is outlined here:

> *"In my city we have the Turkish consulate and they are very eager to know what is going on, and on the issues they are sensitive about they are particularly eager to follow those events, especially when we are organising events on the Kurdish issue or the Armenian genocide they will be really wanting to attend those events. [...] I'm sure many people have files about their activities to the extent that they intersect with the interests of the state."[42]*

This implies that attendance is more than merely an interest in Turkish academic affairs, as they are more eager to attend conferences on topics that the state has a strong view, such as the Armenian and Kurdish issues. It also displays direct state involvement through the consulate. The mention of keeping files is noteworthy, as another academic based in the Netherlands also believes that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs keeps files on academics working on the Armenian genocide.[43] He argues that this is why "whenever I would give a lecture, a public lecture, an academic lecture, there would be embassy staff present, consulate staff present," with this being the case no matter where he lectured.[44] Whether the Turkish state are keeping files on academics abroad is difficult to verify, of course, but what is clear is that Turkish officials attend and record details of academic conferences that are deemed to be on sensitive topics, according to my dataset.

Whilst the attendance of consulate officials is cited often, the function of this practise is perceived in very different ways by the academics in my dataset. For example, one respondent said that "I may have the representative from the consulate come, sometimes to intervene and to ask questions. It does not mean we are observed like a spy activity, it is quite normal. But they do not miss anything that we organise as academics but they come to listen, to understand, but not as speakers."[45] This contradicts quite clearly with the perception of another academic who said the attendance of "embassy representatives… would make you sort of feel like a Soviet commissar coming to report, but they wouldn't really engage."[46] This is fascinating, as one likens the practise to those seen in Soviet Union, while the other clearly states that they do not perceive it to be a form of spying. This displays how the mere attendance of Turkish state officials can affect academics in completely opposing ways, and serves as an indication of why some will choose to self-censor whilst others carry on with their work regardless.

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[42] Author's Skype interview on 11 April 2018 with Respondent 4, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.

[43] The Armenian Genocide is a contentious topic in Turkey, and beyond, as the Turkish state does not officially recognise the events as a "genocide." The International Association of Genocide Scholars does, however (IAGS, 2005. For a recent discussion, see the work of Üngör (2014) as referenced in the bibliography.

[44] Author's interview on 8 May 2018 with Respondent 11, a Dutch-Turkish academic based in the Netherlands.

[45] Author's Skype interview on 13 April 2018 with Respondent 5, a Turkish academic based in France.

[46] Author's Skype interview on 24 April 2018 with Respondent 9, a Turkish academic based in Brazil.

Furthermore, whilst it was most often consulate officials cited as attending conferences, the practise of low-tech surveillance is also employed by pro-regime agents, as one respondent told me that "every time I give a talk in the UK people from pro-government think tanks and pro-government universities attend conferences and take photos of PowerPoint slides of dissident academics."[47] What is clear, then, is that state officials, and at times pro-regime agents, will attend academic conferences on sensitive issues to take notes or take pictures, according to my dataset, in what can be described as a form of low-tech surveillance. This makes some academics uncomfortable, as seen in responses above, and having a state official observing conferences logically makes it more difficult to be critical of the Turkish state at these conferences.

2. Harassment

Having shown that the practise of low-tech surveillance is a common experience amongst my respondents, I will now detail how a more direct form of control occurs through harassment. An example of this comes from a historian working on the Armenian genocide who said that "consulate staff" very often "disturb the proceedings to hijack the question and answer section, to delegitimise my work, to spout denial, to turn my lecture upside down, to not respond in a serious way to the issues."[48] This demonstrates the difficulty some may face in an academic setting. They said that this also continued outside conferences, as "they would show up at dinner and say, 'we are paying for our own people, can we join you,' and of course you would have a well-meaning academic colleague who doesn't necessarily know or understand the Turkish context. He or she would then invite these people to dinner and they would pester me, sit next to me, bullying." This respondent therefore concluded that "the efforts of the Turkish foreign ministry are consistent: counter discussions on the Armenian genocide, make sure that you undermine and delegitimise academics, especially Turkish academics or what are perceived as Turkish academics, and those efforts are consistent everywhere."[49] This description aptly demonstrates the difficulties one may face if they work on a sensitive issue such as the Armenian genocide.

The discursive practise of de-legitimisation is also alluded to by another respondent who said their conferences are disrupted with people claiming that "I take money from the Armenians, this, that, and the other, to undermine my scholarship and academic personality."[50] This is a recurring theme in terms of framing techniques, as was seen within the Turkish context

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[47] Author's Skype interview on 17 April 2018 with Respondent 7, a Turkish academic based in the U.K.
[48] Author's interview on 8 May 2018 with Respondent 11, a Dutch-Turkish academic based in the Netherlands.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] Author's Skype interview on 26 March 2018 with Respondent 1, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.

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as Erdogan referred to the signatories of the Academics for Peace petition as "so-called" academics. These practises are perceived by my respondents to be aimed at encouraging self-censorship, and even if this does not succeed amongst those who are directly targeted, it has the potential to see others who are less prominent deviate from working on these sensitive topics to avoid the negative effects of harassment and de-legitimisation.

The issue of prominence is an important caveat to mention here, however. All the academics who have described the more extreme forms of harassment are very much influential figures amongst the Armenian genocide scholarship. This means one cannot claim this harassment is happening to all academics working on the Armenian issue. What appears to happen with less prominent academics in this area is that consulate officials "engaged with debates but not in a very productive way, they would make their presence more sort of known."[51] Another respondent concurred with this assessment, saying they "would come, they would say the state's position, they would just express it."[52] This is a less overt form of harassment in comparison to the de-legitimisation and disruption described prior.

Another element of harassment besides challenging academics at conferences is that state officials or pro-regime agents make approaches in what can be seen as pre-emptive tactics to alter academic work, rather than the disruptive harassment described previously. This is displayed as one respondent described how "just yesterday" their friend had sent them an email they had received from a "Turkish ultra-nationalist working for the government" in the U.S., who had:

> *"literally emailed each and everybody in the history department of Stanford and warned them about certain Professors there, saying they are complicit in spreading lies, and it was a really, you know, threatening message. […] Also, even just this morning I received an email from a friend… she said about the Turkish consulate paying a visit to her and telling her not to work with certain organisations because they are Gulenist. […] She was about to say: 'well, you have jailed so many people and dismissed so many people,' but she said she then couldn't say that, but you can imagine how they are now pressuring these governments and societies in every area, in any occasion and any context. Where ever they can reach, they are reaching and engaging. They have really made this their obsession and they have so many volunteers to do that."[53]*

This description touches on many elements of the harassment that is occurring. For example, these two interactions had come "just yesterday" and "even just this morning." This gives an

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[51] Author's Skype interview on 24 April 2018 with Respondent 9, a Turkish academic based in Brazil.
[52] Author's Skype interview on 11 April 2018 with Respondent 4, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.
[53] Author's Skype interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 14, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.

idea of how pervasive these practises are, to the extent where it appears to be occurring on an almost daily basis, where this respondent is working at least. It also builds upon the atmosphere of fear that was described in the previous chapter, as stories of the harassment that academics are experiencing are being spread amongst colleagues daily, and thus heightens the effectiveness of these practises. Another aspect is that the academic said she wanted to challenge the consulate officials but decided she could not, displaying a certain fear that resulted in withholding an opinion.

This shows that there is a concerted effort by the Turkish state and pro-regime agents to put pressure on (prominent) academics to alter their academic work if it is on sensitive topics, through harassment and de-legitimisation. Another pre-emptive technique described to me also touched on the use of a negative framing, but this time in drawing links between the academics and terrorism. A scholar based in the U.S. said:

> *"I think they would like us to maybe self-censor by various methods... I got a letter from the consulate here... he was basically saying the conference was full of people who would not call the PKK a terrorist organisation, whereas the Turkish state and the U.S. state do. He said these people were basically doing terrorist propaganda by not saying the PKK were a terrorist organisation. [...] I mean, how many academics in the world, especially in the U.S., get a message, like a letter, or two letters, or three letters, from the representative of a state questioning the merits of the conference. [...] It doesn't say you are necessarily doing terrorist propaganda but there... are things that they say like: Turkey is a country where there is rule of law and if you're not acting within the bounds of that law then there will be some effects, some impact on you, kind of."[54]*

This response shows how the terrorist framing is stretched to include academics who work on Kurdish issues. This technique, in the same vein as the attempted de-legitimisation of the Armenian genocide scholars, applies a negative framing to the academics. The final sentence of this testimony, mentioning that there could be "some effects" could be perceived as a veiled threat, which may be why this scholar believes the aim is self-censorship. The terrorist frame has been heavily utilised in securitising academics within Turkey, as chapter 4 demonstrated, and therefore one can see how the same securitisation technique is extending to be used against Turkish academics abroad.

The final aspect of harassment that has been outlined in my dataset is that of targeting family who remain within Turkey, as one respondent said: "I guess due to official agreements between the governments, the German state informed the Turkish state that I applied for

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[54] Author's Skype interview on 11 April 2018 with Respondent 4, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.

asylum in Germany and asked for documents to check my application documents. My family was being harassed by the Turkish police for that."[55] An interesting note is that this respondent was a PhD candidate signatory of the peace petition who had to flee the country, which displays that it is not just prominent academics who the state will target with heavy-handed measures. This is an effective form of control, as it is easier to reach family within Turkey, especially in the context of the state of emergency in which the police have sweeping powers to harass opposition.[56] This demonstrates once again a practice which enables the securitisation within one country to have extraterritorial effects, and can be perceived as a threat to cease oppositional activity.

Therefore, the practise of harassment has proven to be a multi-faceted phenomenon, often involving state officials. These practises, as detailed in this section, include disruption of academic conferences, as well as pre-emptive interventions from state officials that may be perceived as threatening, seen here to include visiting academics or sending letters to warn them about working with certain people or hosting a conference. The use of de-legitimisation, and terrorist framing, are regularly cited discursive practises throughout. These forms of harassment are dictated by the academic's topic; specifically, the Armenian genocide or Kurdish politics are the topics which draw harassment. The final state practise I will outline is a step away from the academic sphere, to what is a more overt form of securitisation (extension). The final form of harassment outlined above, of targeting families, is again seen in the following sub-section, where the measures are a clear escalation in relation to the harassment outlined here.

3. **"Civil death"**

"Civil death" was an often-cited practise employed by the state, but the targets of this practise differ from the previous sub-sections in this chapter. This technique only affects signatories of the Academics for Peace petition, rather than critical scholars working on sensitive topics, according to my dataset. Civil death is an extreme manifestation of securitisation, and the nature of this practise means it extends beyond the Turkish state as any Turkish citizen can be targeted. The term first emerged in my dataset as an academic told me that the practise is "officially called by government workers themselves 'civil death.'"[57] For this reason, the victims

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[55] Author's written interview on 5 June 2018 with Respondent 21, a Kurdish PhD student based in Germany.
[56] "The AKP-controlled parliament passed 'the Internal Security Package' in March 2015 to… extend legal detention periods and limit the scope of court approval for police searches, detainments and wiretapping. Finally, to ensure their complicity in these successive waves of violence, the government took steps to protect police forces from judicial scrutiny, thereby deepening the culture of impunity in Turkey" (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016: 1594)

[57] Author's Skype interview on 18 April 2018 with Respondent 8, a Turkish academic based in Germany.

of this practise were now calling it this also. Gumus provides a description of this, saying "a new civil death is meted out to citizens accused of crimes in the form of a substantial and permanent change in legal status, operationalized by decree laws." This includes practises such as immediate dismissal without administrative proceedings, and lifelong prohibition to working in public service (Gumus, 2017). It therefore has the dual function of, firstly, punishing dissenting voices, which at the same time acts as a deterrent to others. Secondly, it once again strengthens the de-legitimising frame of the academics as "so-called" academics and "terrorists." This is because such an extreme form of punishment is usually reserved for extreme crimes, so it may convince the audience in Turkey, and amongst its diaspora, of the illegitimacy and danger of the academics in question.

The main way this practise impacts academics abroad is the cancellation of passports. This was imposed by Emergency Decree on the grounds that they "posed a threat to the national security and they had membership, affiliation, link or connection with the terrorist organisations" (Platform for Peace and Justice, 2018: 7). In my dataset, this had happened to all academics who had recently worked in Turkey, including a PhD student. Other signatories who had been living outside Turkey for an extended period of time had not suffered this fate, as of yet. A typical case is described by a respondent in Germany who said: "I was discharged from public service so my passport is not valid anymore. Here, I have a resident permit but next year when my passport expires I have no idea what to do… I think here it is just possible to get a resident card but this means it would not be possible to leave Germany and to attend international conferences, or at least it is difficult."[58] This demonstrates their dilemma, as they will likely have to remain within Germany which restricts freedom of movement, as well as their academic work in that it will be difficult to attend international conferences. This is a typical case of Academics for Peace signatories in Europe and the U.S.

Another effect of civil death, beyond the restriction of travel, is that consular services are denied. This is an extension of securitisation that will only impact academics who are outside Turkey. One respondent explained this, saying that "the Turkish consulate for Academics for Peace did not execute their initiatives… many of our colleagues have difficulty in their relationship with the consulate, mostly because of the passport issues."[59] The main difficulty this manifests as, besides the passport issues, is that "to vote in the upcoming snap elections, our addresses in Germany should be registered in the Turkish registration system. Many of my friends and colleagues are denied to register their addresses at the Turkish

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[58] Author's interview on 21 May 2018 with Respondent 16, a Turkish academic based in Germany.
[59] Author's Skype interview on 18 April 2018 with Respondent 8, a Turkish academic based in Germany.

Embassies. This is the newest version of the 'civil death' that we are facing at the moment."[60] These problems are again demonstrative of an extreme form of securitisation that reaches academics beyond Turkish borders, as not being able to use one's consulate to vote, besides serving as a punishment, strengthens the framing of academics as criminals who are therefore illegitimate or a threat to national security.

The final element of this practise, and arguably the most shocking, is the extension of civil death to include family members, as outlined by a respondent:

> *"my husband's passport was cancelled as well because of me, so he couldn't come here to visit me for a long time because he had to have some security investigations, and then later he got a new passport so now he can visit me here. So, when you are dismissed your families' passport is usually cancelled and you have to deal with a security investigation and then if it is true that they are not a so-called terrorist then they can get a new passport."[61]*

This displays the lengths to which the state will go in the securitisation of academics, as targeting family does not appear to have a clear function because they are not the oppositional voice who has criticised the government on its Kurdish policy. Therefore, one can only conclude, as my respondent did when I asked what they considered the purpose of this to be, that it is done as a form of punishment. If this is the case, then a logical conclusion is that it is in the hope of deterring the academic in question, and others who hear about these practises, from again criticising the government.

As the extension of civil death to include family was cited to me by one person, it was important to attempt to verify. An NGO report from the Platform for Peace and Justice provided this as they detail how a new Emergency Decree (no. 773) was passed which said "the passports of the spouses of the persons whose names are reported to the passport unit concerned under the first paragraph of this Article may also be cancelled by the Ministry of the Interior on the same date if they are found to be prejudicial in terms of general security" (2018: 8). This report also, interestingly, comes to the same conclusion as my respondent on the function of the passport cancellations, saying they are "being used as method of collective punishment by the government for the individuals and families even without bothering to find any link with the alleged crime" (2018: 16).[62] Therefore, the extension of securitisation is affecting Turkish

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[60] Author's written interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 13, a Turkish PhD student based in Germany.
[61] Author's interview on 21 May 2018 with Respondent 16, a Turkish academic based in Germany.
[62] For a more detailed outline of the illegalities of these practises, as this is beyond the scope of this thesis, see: Platform for Peace and Justice (2018) *Cancellation of Turkish Passports and Prevention of The Freedom of*

academics abroad, as they are being punished by having their own civil death extended to include their spouses. This is certainly an unpleasant experience, and so would likely serve as a motivation for some to self-censor to avoid this negative experience.

4. <u>**Analysis and concluding comments**</u>

In summary, the practises of the Turkish state and pro-regime agents are classified as "low-tech" surveillance, harassment and civil death. These practises, as well as the motives and outcomes, hold similarities to Lewis' work on the "extraterritorial security practises" of Uzbekistan (2015), and can therefore contribute to this emerging strand of security studies. This comparison will be fleshed out in Chapter 9, due to the necessity to first display the perceived motives and outcomes of Turkey's securitisation extension practises in in Chapter 8 (on perceptions of self-censorship).

The practises outlined here are part of the securitisation extension affecting academics beyond Turkish borders. Due to this being outside the state's jurisdiction, the practises employed are subtler than the heavy-handed punishment and suppression of dissenting voices seen within Turkey, such as through imprisonment, as outlined in Chapter 4. The function of the practises is the same however: firstly, and most obviously, to punish oppositional voices, as this serves as a deterrent to them and to others; secondly, to de-legitimise academics through criminalising them, which weakens the power their criticism has; and thirdly, to frame the academics as terrorist-affiliated and a threat to national security because of this. It is this last element that is most likely to serve as motivation for the online practises of pro-regime agents, which will be detailed in the next chapter. All the practises are a form of control and can logically be seen to be aimed at discouraging dissenting voices, as those affected are only academics who are critical of the Turkish state.

Movement. Available at: http://www.platformpj.org/wp-content/uploads/Cancellation-of-Turkish-Passports.pdf [Accessed on: 24 June 2018]

CHAPTER 7 – SECURITISATION EXTENSION: ONLINE PRACTISES OF STATE AND PRO-REGIME AGENTS

In researching the practises of the Turkish state and pro-regime agents that reach Turkish academics abroad as a part of the securitisation extension process, my dataset often referenced online practices, which led me to formulate the research question:

What are the socially meaningful patterns of behaviour that Turkish academics experience in online interactions with the Turkish state or pro-regime agents whilst living beyond Turkish borders?

The online practises described can be divided into subgroups of: trolling, hacking, and retrospective online surveillance. These practises will be detailed in turn, before verifying this through secondary literature on these practises within the Turkish state. This can serve as verification as, based on the experiences of my dataset and the nature of social media's interconnectivity, I contend that the practises implemented within Turkey extend beyond Turkish borders to reach academics abroad, and so is relevant for verification of online practises in relation to securitisation extension.

1. Trolling

Trolling is an online activity, with the defining aim being to "to disrupt and upset as many people as possible, using whatever linguistic or behavioural tools are available" (Phillips, 2015: 2). This impacts Turkish academics abroad as one respondent outlined:

> *"Trolling is definitely an issue, the guy I just mentioned was a troll. I have a Twitter account, but I don't use it, also for that reason by the way. Twitter becomes a minefield... of course you see the Facebook messages that I got from nationalist Turks, imagine the lengths the people go to troll somebody. [...] So I get trolled every once in a while, but I'm used to it. But I know the nightmare I would have to face if I was to have a higher public profile."[63]*

Prior to this, the respondent had shown me just a snippet of the abusive messages he received on Facebook, and had detailed an "online slander campaign" orchestrated by one "nationalist Turk" which accused him of being a "terrorist and a plagiariser."[64] This experience highlights the recurring themes of de-legitimising and terrorist framing techniques, as well as prominence as a perceived factor in who is targeted.

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[63] Author's interview on 8 May 2018 with Respondent 11, a Dutch-Turkish academic based in the Netherlands.
[64] Author's interview on 8 May 2018 with Respondent 11, a Dutch-Turkish academic based in the Netherlands.

This testimony is similar to the "social media lynch" another respondent experienced after giving an interview to a Kurdish paper in Germany. She was subjected to "death threats" and was "insulted sexually."[65] These experiences demonstrate the extremity of the trolling that academics are subject to, and explain how one can be forced to alter behaviour, such as ceasing Twitter output as mentioned above, due to this trolling. This change in behaviour indicates the success of this practise from the perspective of the pro-regime agents who are trolling.

Another demonstrative example comes from an academic based in the U.S., who said:

"if I criticised Turkey for their policies in Syria… they would call me 'liar academic,' they would say I do not know the facts about ISIS, and you would get 10 or 20 of them coming onto you at the same time. So, cyberbullying and cyber harassment were very common. What happened recently as I continued to speak out, for example against what happened in Afrin, the tweeters of my tweets were pulled by the police and a prosecution opened against them because of my tweets so that tells me a lot about where I would be if I was still in Turkey."[66]

The experience cited here demonstrates that the aim of the trolls seems to be drowning out criticism of the state's actions, as can be seen by the fact there would be "10 or 20" trolls at a time. As well as this, delegitimising the source in the eyes of potential online audiences is a recurring tactic. This testimony also shows how the climate of securitisation extends to reach this academic, as an awareness of "where I would be if I was still in Turkey" due to what happened to those who re-tweeted their tweet is sure to be an ominous warning if they must return to Turkey for any reason, or are concerned about the effects on those who shared their tweet.

There is a huge amount of secondary literature which can be taken as verification of the practise of trolling as detailed by my respondents (Yüksel, 2018; Benedictus, 2016). This literature refers to AKP trolls, or AKTrolls, which are made up of a "6,000-member team, comprised of anonymous progovernment influencers." (Yesil et. al., 2017: 17).[67] They are perceived to be the source of Twitter trolling by a respondent based in the U.S., who said "the

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[65] Author's Skype interview on 26 April 2018 with Respondent 10, a Kurdish academic based in the U.S.

[66] Author's Skype interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 14, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.

[67] The AKP "has denied the existence (o)f AKTrolls given their usage of social media is problematic" (Yüksel, 2018). Despite this, there is a great deal of literature on their recruitment of a social media team. For example, in 2016, AKP party officials were quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying, "they were recruiting '6,000' people for a 'social media army'" (Saka, 2018: 6). That being said, it is worth noting that it is likely some of the trolling cited here came from pro-regime agents, rather than directly from the 6000-people recruited by the AKP. However, as has been said before, the aim of this thesis is to present the experiences and perceptions of my dataset, rather than judge for certainty the source of the trolling.

people who are following and harassing you are generally AKP trolls."[68] This indicates that the reach of this group extends beyond Turkish borders. Another respondent had a similar view, stating that "I think we have all had our fair share (of trolls). It doesn't really matter where you are tweeting from but it has more to do with what language you are tweeting in, and what you are tweeting, so there are certain things that get caught that trolls catch or look for."[69] Secondary literature supports this, saying AKTrolls are "becoming active in targeting foreign nationals who are critical of AKP policies. Steven A. Cook… senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, often posts complaints about AKTrolls" (Saka, 2018: 12). Therefore, this demonstrates that the practises of AKTrolls reach beyond the Turkish state to impact academics outside Turkey also, and is therefore a form of the "long arm" of securitisation extension.

The mobilisation of online trolls by the state demonstrates how alternative practises of control are being established which embrace social media. This "intensified" following the 2016 attempted coup (Saka, 2018: 26). Prior to 2016, the focus had been on shutting down websites, or "formal, direct, hard forms of control (e.g. legal and technical restrictions)." This then shifted to "indirect, soft" forms of control such as trolling, which "points to the emergence of a decentralized and distributed network of online censorship" (Saka, 2018: 26-7). The function of this is "two-fold: Surveillance through surfing the net; and disruption, by targeting critical accounts in a wide array of ways to change the discourse, discredit the individual or movement, obtain proprietary information, or block an account" (Saka, 2018: 12).

While proof of the surveillance function cannot be verified here, one can see how the disruptive function matches very clearly with the experiences of my respondents, with a respondent citing harassment from "10 or 20" trolls at a time. Delegitimising claims of being a terrorist or liar can also be seen as disruptive in seeking to anger and undermine the academic in question. Yesil & Sözeri conclude that AKTrolls seek to establish "norms for permissible speech online," and can therefore be seen as part of the "AKP's broader agenda to suppress criticism in the communicative space and maintain its legitimacy at all costs" (2017: 548). This assessment puts forward the belief that AKTrolls are seeking to suppress critical voices within Turkey, and having established that this phenomenon is also affecting academics in the West, one can conclude that AKTrolls are also attempting to encourage self-censorship amongst critical academics beyond Turkish borders.

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[68] Author's Skype interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 14, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.
[69] Author's Skype interview on 24 April 2018 with Respondent 9, a Turkish academic based in Brazil.

2. **Hacking**

Hacking of social media accounts was cited multiple times amongst my dataset. Given the definition given in the previous sub-section of trolling, one can see hacking as a form of trolling, given it is also aimed at causing disruption. However, it is arguably a more direct attempt at censorship, given that trolling focuses on countering and disrupting online discussions, while hacking social media accounts has the aim of denying access to the platform upon which one can begin, or contribute to, online discussions. It also indicates a higher level of technical capabilities than those required to troll.

A Kurdish scholar detailed their experience of this to me, explaining how her Facebook was "shut down" and they could not open another one because she believed that "they cracked my password." This respondent recreated an account four times, but it was consistently shut down again "because I think they took my telephone number and the IP of my computers so I can't open it."[70] Another academic reported a similar experience of having their Facebook hacked two weeks after signing the Academics for Peace petition. However, they did not bother attempting to re-open the account, which demonstrates how some will accept having a form of censorship imposed upon them.[71] The result was similar in both cases, however, as the hacked social media platform was unable to be accessed, despite the attempts by the Kurdish scholar. Their perception was that this, as part of a "very big lynch" against them, was "definitely designed by the state against me, to silence me."[72] Part of the reasoning for this was because Facebook was ignoring her requests, as well as those of a fellow academic seeking to help her, for a case to be opened to resolve this.

A similar perception of social media companies colluding with the Turkish state was outlined by another respondent, who in reference to Twitter said that "we found out that they are complying with many of the wishes of the Turkish government in suspending certain accounts" as "people who are critical of Erdogan are suspended" but there are "not insults in their tweets," which implies to them that it is state-directed. They said a "typical example" was the director of a theatre play called The Dictator, which "was sarcastic, of course, it did not mention Erdogan by name, but the person who wrote the play had his account suspended for a while by Twitter."[73] Therefore, in the perceptions of these academics, having social media accounts hacked or suspended may involve some level of state and social media collusion. These claims are difficult to verify, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to do so. What is

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[70] Author's Skype interview on 26 April 2018 with Respondent 10, a Kurdish academic based in the U.S.
[71] Author's interview on 24 May 2018 with Respondent 19, a Turkish academic based in Germany.
[72] Author's Skype interview on 26 April 2018 with Respondent 10, a Kurdish academic based in the U.S.
[73] Author's Skype interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 14, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.

significant, however, is that this is the perceptions of the academics in question. This demonstrates how sophisticated the attempts at censorship are if they assume state involvement, and it may add to the feeling of pervasiveness which makes it harder to continue with criticism of the state, as having to "fight" back against a state is more intimidating than if it is perceived to be a lone pro-regime agent, for example. These experiences therefore demonstrate another extension of the securitisation of academics that has effects in the West. The practise of hacking is related to trolling, but is more overtly an attempt at imposing censorship rather than countering and undermining opposition.

3. <u>Retrospective online surveillance</u>

One function of the earlier cited AKTrolls is to establish "norms for permissible speech online" (Yesil & Sözeri, 2017: 548). According to my respondents, another practise is implemented by the Turkish state with this aim, which is the retrospective analysis of social media posts when returning to Turkey. This was described by a respondent, who said that for "the last two years I censor myself. Because many people from sharing on social media are now in prison. So, because of this I censor myself… when I went back last year I cancelled all my social media, I changed my phone. They control you with everything."[74] The perception here is clearly that once you return to Turkey, you can be prosecuted for social media activity retrospectively. This is an effective form of control, as Turkish academics, for any number of reasons, will have to return to their country. In the case of this respondent it is because "my family are there, so I need to go back."[75] The necessity of being able to return to Turkey without being retrospectively punished is a clear motivation for academics to self-censor, as was the case with this respondent.

> Another academic similarly referred to this practise, saying that it is facilitated by the:

> *"deterioration of rule of law, so you don't know from one day to the next if what you have wrote will be retrospectively criminalised. It might be ok for you to say what you said today, but a week from now if alliances shift and you are on the wrong side as an academic and what you have written is pulled out and you are retrospectively labelled as a traitor or a terrorist… it goes against a sort of institutionalised and predictable state power."[76]*

The sentiments here, of uncertainty because of a volatile situation in which alliances shift and you may be on the "wrong side" because of your opinions in the past, coupled with a perceived deterioration of rule of law which enables retrospective punishment without legal basis if those

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[74] Author's interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 12, a Kurdish PhD candidate based in the Netherlands.
[75] *Ibid.*
[76] Author's Skype interview on 24 April 2018 with Respondent 9, a Turkish academic based in Brazil.

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in power so wish it, are very evidently reasons to refrain from voicing strong opinions which could encourage punishment in the future.

The secondary literature confirms the utilisation of retrospective online surveillance as Topak argues that "the practice of surveilling past activities of dissidents" has "intensified" in Turkey. They say that "security agencies dig into the past activities of dissidents, including tweets, financial activities, and personal associations, in order to find some information to charge them with terrorism. No matter how absurd the gathered information is, the AKPfriendly prosecutors use their unlimited discretionary powers to imprison dissidents" (Topak, 2017: 539/40). This description very succinctly highlights the methods which make the practise of retrospective survellience and punishment effective: security agencies looking for any evidence that can be framed as terrorist-related, and this being facilitated by the deterioration in rule of law as "AKPfriendly prosecutors" ensure punishment.

This matches Larsson's description of "soft" surveillance, which "entails the monitoring of everyday life and the surveillance of various everyday sites of social interaction." (2017: 97) This is effective as it gives the impression that any sphere of life may be a source for retrospective punishment, such as online interactions. For academics abroad, this only becomes a problem if and when they must return home, and therefore if one has decided to not return to Turkey, this will not affect them. However, as my respondent alluded to, family ties mean they often will return home, and therefore this practise can clearly be seen as an effective extension of securitisation that reaches beyond Turkish borders to encourage self-censorship amongst some academics.

4. <u>Analysis and concluding comments</u>

In relating these finding to other academic research, many of the online practises employed here are similar to studies on "networked authoritarianism" (MacKinnon 2011). In this area, "little research has been done on how ICTs globalize the reach of authoritarian regimes" (Moss, 2018, 266) and "as a consequence, we know little about how authoritarian states… exert their influence and control into the transnational realm" (Michaelsen, 2017: 465). This is because the phenomenon is a recent one, as "autocrats have begun to move beyond 'negative control' of the internet, in which regimes attempt to block (and) censor" (Gunitsky, 2015: 42) due to the necessity for "more subtle harassment in the twenty-first century transnational activism and social media era" (Pearce, 2015: 1158). One of the methods cited is the "bolstering of legitimacy through social media" by "discourse framing" and "counter-mobilisation." (Gunitsky, 2015: 42) These are demonstrated in my case through the de-legitimising and terrorist framing practises

of trolls, as well as counter-mobilisation through overwhelming opposition with a large number of trolls and hacking or suspension of accounts.

In this body of literature, Moss's recent study on "the transnational reach of networked authoritarianism" of the Syrian regime highlights the same practises as those cited in my dataset. She details "surveillance, harassment and the deployment of hackers," (2018: 278) which "led respondents to self-censor their grievances… the regime's transnational reach subjected populations residing thousands of miles from Syria to the deterrent effects of authoritarian state repression" (2018: 276). This displays that similar practises are utilised, with similar outcomes, as self-censorship in the online realm is also occurring in this case, as this chapter has shown. This can serve as verification that online practises aimed at self-censorship are being utilised by authoritarian regimes. The Turkish case can add to the literature by displaying the similarities in online practises used by the Syrian, Russian (Gunitsky, 2015: 46) and Iranian (Michaelsen, 2017) regimes. Beyond highlighting the authoritarian turn in Turkey and its transnational repercussions, it also displays a growing global trend, which has the potential to become ever more prominent due to the increasing interconnectivity of the world. One can see, then, that forms of control can extend to diaspora transnationally through online practises, as shown by my study and supported by the "networked authoritarianism" literature.

In conclusion, this chapter has displayed the online practises of the Turkish state, and pro-regime agents in support of the Turkish state. Trolling is the most common in the experiences of my dataset, although hacking and suspension of social media accounts are also cited multiple times. Finally, retrospective online surveillance has been shown to be an effective form of control, as academics who have to return to Turkey are aware that this is occurring and may choose to self-censor due to concern over this, as demonstrated by a respondent. This completes the analysis of Turkish state and pro-regime agent's practises, both in real life interactions and online interactions, as part of the securitisation process, which now means the focus of this thesis will turn to assessing how successful these practises have been in achieving their (perceived) aim.

CHAPTER 8 – PERCEPTIONS OF SELF-CENSORSHIP

Having outlined the practises of the Turkish state and pro-regime agents which reach academics beyond Turkish borders as part of this process of securitisation extension, the next logical question that needed answered was, simply:

To what extent is self-censorship occurring amongst Turkish academics abroad due to the effects of securitisation extension?

The reason that perceptions of self-censorship will be assessed is that a very substantial number of my dataset explicitly say that they perceive this to be the goal of the state and its pro-regime agents' practises, and it is therefore logical to seek to understand the extent to which this has been successful. Furthermore, through building the argumentation in the previous chapters, I hope that it has been demonstrated that: firstly, the context in which academics are living and working, both within Turkey and beyond because of what is here described as the "atmosphere of fear," may be motivation for some to self-censor; and, secondly, that it is the logical to conclude that the aim of the practises outlined in the previous two chapters has been to encourage self-censorship amongst critical academics.

The first sub-section of this chapter will therefore be on defining self-censorship. Following this, I will produce sub-sections on: the "feelings produced," as the aim of the practises has been to produce negative emotions, which serves as motivation for self-censorship. The second sub-heading will be on the "observable changes in behaviour" in my dataset, as the changes in behaviour they have had to make due to the effects of securitisation extension will measure if self-censorship is occurring. These changes in behaviour have been categorised as either "fight" responses or "flight" responses. The final sub-section will be concluding comments, making an assessment on the extent to which self-censoring is occurring in my dataset.

1. Definition

Censorship as a concept has two layers; "broadly speaking, censorship is understood to be a form of supervision and control of the information and ideas that are circulated among people within a society. It could be either institutional or self-imposed" (Leonardi, 2008: 83). Due to the nature of this case study, it is "self-imposed" censorship which is most relevant here, as direct, "institutional" censorship is not possible, or at least extremely difficult, for states to implement beyond their own borders. It is reasonable to conclude this is happening within Turkey, as academics are being imprisoned and dismissed, and therefore directly censored by the state, but the practises cited here are less overt. The focus will be on self-censorship, then, which is defined as "a form of control imposed upon us by ourselves" (Leonardi, 2008: 84) that involves

"intentionally and voluntarily withholding information from others in the absence of formal obstacles" (Bar-Tal, 2017: 4). Based on this definition, I will use observable changes in behaviour which have occurred due to the effects of securitisation extension as a means of assessing if self-imposed form(s) of control are evident in my dataset. This will allow an assessment of the extent to which self-censorship is occurring, and will be the third sub-section of this chapter.

For clarification, the second sub-section on "feelings produced" is a selected lens of analysis as "individuals practice self-censorship for reasons of self-interest to avoid external negative sanctions and gain positive ones... This motivation is underlined by fear" (Bar-Tal, 2017: 9). I concur with this assessment as negative emotions due to fear of negative sanctions are a necessary precursor to self-censorship. It is therefore necessary to trace the feelings produced in my dataset, as this will help explain what motivates observable changes in behaviour.

Furthermore, due to the nature of self-censorship, it is also likely that those who are self-censoring would not have responded to my request for interview. Therefore, there is value in understanding if the effects of securitisation extension invokes negative emotions in my dataset, as if this is occurring one can assume these emotions have motivated others to self-censor outside my dataset.

2. <u>Feelings produced</u>

The feelings produced amongst my dataset can be classified as such:

a. Anxiety
b. Suspicion
c. Alienation
d. Suspicion
e. "Burned Bridges"
f. Not affected

A, B and C responses can be classified as negative experiences. The evidence in the previous two chapters indicates that this was the intention of the state and pro-regime agents. These responses are likely the motivation for the "flight" responses in the next sub-section on changes in behaviour.

D and E responses are when respondents do not experience the feelings that the state and pro-regime agent's practises are likely aimed at producing. The feeling of "burned bridges" can logically be seen as the motivation for "fight" responses in the next sub-section on changes in

behaviour. Those who feel they are "not affected" are unlikely to have a strong "fight" or "flight" response.

a. *Anxiety*

An example of an anxiety-based response comes from an academic based in the U.S. who says:

> *'I feel anxious about things, I don't necessarily self-censor that much, I am doing pretty much what I thought I would be doing in this position, but every time I feel anxious, like, would this be a problem for me personally or would this be a problem for the institution that I'm working for… so there is a lot of anxiety. At the end of the day, what we do, we get together and we speak about research. I mean, these things shouldn't really be anxiety-driven but there is that.'[77]*

This is quite clearly a negative emotional response to the effects of the atmosphere and the practises of securitisation extension. While this academic says that they do not necessarily self-censor, they go on to say that, when working on the Kurdish issue, "we have to balance when promoting that particular issue so I guess there are some serious concerns and anxieties and the tendency to balance things a little bit."[78] The necessity to balance arguments when discussing this issue may indicate an adaptation in output that would not be necessary if the feelings of anxiety were not present, so this could arguably be seen as a form of self-censorship.

b. *Suspicion*

This emotional response is another negative effect of securitisation extension, which is described succinctly by an academic based in Brazil who drew comparisons between Iran, where they had conducted research, and the current climate Turkish academics are experiencing, saying that there was a:

> *"state of paranoia… I was very conscious of what I was saying, I deleted some of the past things I have written. So, I went there but nothing happened personally it was a very peaceful moment but throughout the whole time I was thinking 'what if someone is watching or listening to what I am doing.' The atmosphere introduced what was definitely self-censorship and insecurity on a personal psychological level… this is now exactly what*

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[77] Author's Skype interview on 11 April 2018 with Respondent 4, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.
[78] *Ibid.*

me and others are living with."[79]

One can see very clearly how this description encapsulates emotions of suspicion as there is paranoia and insecurity about potentially being watched or listened to. This description encapsulates the atmosphere of fear, as described in Chapter 4, as there was self-censorship in deleting past writing without anything having happened directly to the academic. This demonstrates the atmosphere that Turkish academics are experiencing, resulting in negative suspicious and paranoid emotional responses.

Another "suspicious" emotional state due to the atmosphere of fear can be seen as one respondent explained that "being suspected as spying happens when one comes here first time. The ones already here suspect the new comers first time."[80] This shows how doubts and paranoia are often present due to the stories about the MIT spies in Germany. Another academic similarly alluded to this mental state, but in a more academic setting, saying that during conferences in the U.K. they would be "looking at the audience suspiciously thinking who is listening to me," due to having witnessed pro-regime agents taking pictures of "dissident" academic's PowerPoints in the past.[81] This once again is clearly an unpleasant emotional state due to the current atmosphere of fear. This will see some self-censor, as described above.

c. *Alienation*

This emotion is defined by the Collins English dictionary as "estrangement," or the "state of being an outsider or the feeling of being isolated, as from society." (Collins Dictionary, 2018) This was demonstrated multiple times amongst my respondents in reference to their experiences with the Turkish consulate whilst abroad. One respondent described the feeling whilst there as "quite alienated and quite estranged from everything in the building," despite the fact that they weren't denied service. This emotional response, based on the description cited above, indicates that the respondent felt like an outsider in their own consulate.

Similarly, another academic had relatable feelings at the consulate, saying that they had been once but did not want to return because they "felt very uncomfortable. They didn't say anything to me in reality, but the documentation they asked for from us, like a list of questions...

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[79] Author's Skype interview on 24 April 2018 with Respondent 9, a Turkish academic based in Brazil.
[80] Written notes shared with author on 5 June 2018; Respondent 21, a Kurdish PhD candidate based in Germany.
[81] Author's Skype interview on 17 April 2018 with Respondent 7, a Turkish academic based in the U.K.

I really felt very uncomfortable, maybe it is routine but I didn't really like it."[82] This once again demonstrates the disconnect between what is happening in reality and the perception of academics living in the atmosphere of securitisation extension, as nothing happened and they recognise the questions may have been routine, but they still felt very uncomfortable.

d. *"Burned Bridges"*

The definition of burning one's bridges is "to eliminate the possibility of return or retreat" (American Heritage Dictionary, 2011). This response first emerged in my dataset as one academic stated that "you come to a certain point that you burn bridges, you say there is no turning back."[83] This was a fitting classification to group together the emotions described to me which entailed consideration of the negative consequences of continuing criticism of the Turkish state, but then taking the decision to disregard this and proceed on this path. This sentiment is very evident in another response, which said that they "made a decision to speak freely instead of censoring myself and always thinking twice, and making calculations about whether this would send me to jail. I know I won't be going back to Turkey in the near future."[84] This demonstrates an awareness of the possible negative consequences of not self-censoring, but this is disregarded. In order to do this, one must decide they will not be returning to Turkey, as this respondent alluded to.

An example of what deciding to burn bridges entails, in this context, is that some of this academic's family, who "cannot be changed," have "cut off contact" due to the respondent's criticism of the AKP. They say this is a "painful process."[85] This demonstrates how academics who have made this decision really have to alter their lives in dramatic ways, and many will therefore decide to self-censor due to an unwillingness to make these alterations, as will be shown in the flight responses in the next subsection. The feeling of deciding to burn bridges with Turkey is therefore closely related to the fight responses, which are a behavioural manifestation of this sentiment.

e. *Not affected*

There were a small number of respondents who did not indicate that they were emotionally affected by the effects of securitisation extension. One respondent said that they do not consider

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[82] Author's Skype interview on 26 April 2018 with Respondent 10, a Kurdish academic based in the U.S.
[83] Author's Skype interview on 17 April 2018 with Respondent 7, a Turkish academic based in the U.K.
[84] Author's Skype interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 14, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.
[85] *Ibid.*

themselves to be "under immediate threat or risk, which changes the situation for some people." Their reasoning for this was that they had been out of Turkey for a long time, and that "people who are more established or more known are more affected."[86] This demonstrates two of the main caveats on who is experiencing the securitisation extension effects: where they have been based over recent years, and prominence. The respondent did reveal, however, that there was a point when they were "actively thinking" about self-censoring, but in the end decided not to.[87] This shows that even those who consider themselves to not be under "immediate threat" can still be affected enough to consider self-censorship.

This is a fitting point to outline the caveats that are dictating factors in if one is likely to be affected by securitisation extension. As mentioned, location in recent years was cited often, as if an academic left Turkey recently the perception was that there was a "trail that leads you out of Turkey which means the state will be more attentive to you."[88] Specific location also plays a role, as respondents often said that being based in "main cities" would make harassment more likely: "there would be particular places where state surveillance would be higher… places in Europe or the United States where Turkey has high diplomatic presence or strategic relationships, or where there would be a high number of Turkey-based diaspora."[89] Therefore, academics are more likely to be affected if they recently left Turkey or are based in cities with an embassy and/or a strong diaspora.

To wrap up this subsection, A, B and C responses of anxiety, suspicion and alienation were the negative feelings produced in my dataset due to the effects of securitisation extension. These were significantly more common than the D and E responses of "burned bridges" or "not affected." This demonstrates that the state's practises, and the atmosphere of fear this has created, is having the desired effect on a significant amount of my dataset.

3. <u>Changes in behaviour</u>

In this section, I will detail how the academics in my dataset have had to alter behaviour, as this will be evidence of self-imposed forms of control due to the effects of securitisation extension. Floyd argues, in her "revision" of the securitisation framework, that there should be "heavy emphasis on observable action or behavioural change" by "relevant actors act in response to the speech act" (Floyd, 2016: 687). In this case, the relevant actors are, firstly, the reactive audience (pro-regime agents), whose observable changes in behaviour were traced in the previous chapters. Secondly, there is the affected audience, meaning the academics who have felt the

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[86] Author's interview on 21 May 2018 with Respondent 15 in Berlin, a Turkish academic based in Germany.
[87] *Ibid.*
[88] Author's Skype interview on 24 April 2018 with Respondent 9, a Turkish academic based in Brazil.
[89] *Ibid.*

effects of securitisation extension. Their changes in behaviour will be outlined here. Floyd points out that the choice of observable behaviour as a unit of analysis "is not, however, because an action or change of behaviour that cannot be observed does not count, but purely because scholars otherwise will not easily be able to locate securitisation" (Floyd, 2016: 687/8). I feel Floyd's method is particularly useful for this case study, as self-censorship in the sense of withholding information is not visible and thus hard to locate. Changes in behaviour that are likely the aim of the state's practises are more visible, however, and are self-imposed forms of control that will see critical opinions reach less people, and can therefore be seen as a form of self-censorship.

The changes in behaviour that are observed here are divided into "fight" or "flight" responses. This is defined as "the instinctive physiological response to a threatening situation, which readies one either to resist forcibly or to run away" (Oxford English Living Dictionaries, 2018).[90] In this case study, this division is essentially used to separate responses which resist behaving as the state and pro-regime agent's likely desire ("fight") and those which adapt behaviour in a manner which is likely to be the aim of the state and its agent's practises ("flight"). This will help make an assessment on the extent and forms of self-censorship occurring within my dataset.

a. *"Fight" responses*

The fight responses can be classified as: not self-censoring in the academic sphere; online activism; and political activism. The most cited example of fight responses is in not self-censoring in the academic sphere. This is seen as one respondent stated that they "speak very openly and this is our duty, we should not lie. What you see, you should say it, because we have a duty to produce true information for society, so if I'm not doing it, I'm not being scientific."[91] This is a fairly typical response amongst my respondents, and the majority of my dataset make a point of not self-censoring academic work due to the belief of it being their duty to be objective. This is closely related to the "burned bridges" emotion outlined above, as in order to refuse to self-censor it requires consideration of the potential negative consequences, and a decision to proceed with this regardless. This is demonstrated by one respondent, who used the term "burned bridges," as they said that they "now publish with the conscience that something might

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[90] I would like to add that the choice to categorise responses into "fight" and "flight" was made as I saw it as an effective way to add clarity by using two of the most basic and well known psychological responses to a threatening situation. It should therefore only be taken as for this purpose, and not as a judgement on the types of responses. For example, some may interpret a fight response to be braver than a flight response based on making associations with these words. This should not be the perception here, as there are a vast number of contextual factors which influence one's response, as will be shown in this section.

[91] Author's Skype interview on 26 April 2018 with Respondent 10, a Kurdish academic based in the U.S.

happen to me because of what I published."[92] This is very much a fight response, as they are not self-censoring regardless of possible negative repercussions.

Another form of a fight response can be classified as online activism. One respondent particularly exemplified this as they outlined the extent to which they get online abuse on Facebook, even from friends and family who are still in Turkey who are "harassing" or "insulting" them. The response to this was that they are "now even more vocal, so I am targeting Erdogan personally," despite having "a lot of friends who are AKP MPs as well." This is most certainly a fight response, as rather than cease online criticism of the state, they are more vocal. They do point out that being able to do this "is a luxury of being abroad as well. I can imagine certain people would just mind their own business but I feel this is the goal of the government... if the harassment we get is not directly from the government but from these government paid trolls then let be it."[93] Once again, this is demonstrative of recognition of the potential negative consequences in the form of harassment from trolls, before this is disregarded. The reference to the luxury of being abroad is also noteworthy, as this respondent had burned bridges with Turkey and accepted they would not be returning. They therefore can continue critical output, while others who have to return to Turkey will be more likely to have a flight response, as seen in the next subsection.

The final type of fight response is displayed by a Mathematics professor who, having been imprisoned for 40 days for signing the Academics for Peace petition, has turned to political activism in Germany, campaigning for the opposition in the build up to the June 2018 elections. This displays that the harassment of the Turkish state did not have the desired effect on this respondent, as they have become more active in criticising the state. They say they are "not afraid" of being imprisoned once again, demonstrating recognition but disregard of the possible negative consequences. They are "proud" of being an "activist against such a regime" but there are sacrifices they have had to make in pursuit of this:

> *"being in exile has some difficulties of course, I have a son in Turkey who is 7 years old, until I left Turkey I seen him at least every weekend but now I have not seen him since December. I can see him more or less every day on Skype but it is not enough, so it has those disadvantages for me but I am sure he will be proud of me when he is grown up."[94]*

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[92] Author's Skype interview on 17 April 2018 with Respondent 7, a Turkish academic based in the U.K.
[93] *Ibid.*
[94] Author's interview on 22 May 2018 with Respondent 17 in Berlin, a Turkish academic based in Germany.

Therefore, one can see that the respondent who has been most directly affected by the securitisation (extension) of academics in my dataset, through imprisonment, has displayed a change in behaviour that is very clearly an example of the fight response, as he has disregarded all the negative effects that the state's practises have had and continued to be critical.

To conclude this subsection, one can see the variety of fight responses as: not self-censoring academic output; online activism; and political activism. Refusing to alter academic output is the most common, whilst the forms of activism are rarer as they are a step beyond not self-censoring, to actively fighting back against the state.

b. *"Flight" responses*

"Flight" responses involve changes in behaviour that are beneficial to the state, and are the result of the atmosphere and the practises of securitisation extension. They are therefore not always self-censorship in the traditional sense of with-holding information, but rather they are self-imposed forms of control that mean critical opinions are less likely to reach a wider audience. These responses can be classified as: self-censoring outside academia; avoidance of diaspora; physical avoidance of certain countries. I will end this sub-section by drawing parallels between the behavioural responses displayed and Mac Ginty's "everyday peace" framework.

A common response was to self-censor in the form of avoiding interactions beyond the academic sphere, as one respondent explained how they "always stay within the parameters of academia" because here they know the "rules and regulations of the interaction." At the same time, they "tried also hard not to go on popular media, so interviews in newspapers and such, I would only speak to academic audiences."[95] This is a form of self-censorship, as it is a self-imposed form of control that is beneficial to the state due to a critical voice choosing to only speak within the academic sphere. Another respondent who organises conferences said because "people are scared to talk, there are people who come to me and asked that we keep the conference strictly academic, no public allowed."[96] These responses show that due to the fear of negative consequences from the Turkish state or its agents, academics are altering behaviour in a way that will see their criticism reach a reduced audience outside academia, which benefits the state.

Self-censorship is also cited, beyond academia, in the form of diluting or ceasing online criticism of Turkey, as one respondent described:

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[95] Author's Skype interview on 26 March 2018 with Respondent 1, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.
[96] Author's Skype interview on 11 April 2018 with Respondent 4, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.

"I might be doing self-censorship... usually anytime something important happened in Turkey I would write an article for The Conversation about my own ideas and I was really active on social media but I cut down my social media posts a little, although my Facebook is not public, but I still didn't think it was safe."[97]

This demonstrates avoidance of speaking online about Turkish developments, which is a change in behaviour that benefits the state, due to fears over it not being safe. A similar sentiment is expressed as another respondent alluded to the diluting of their social media posts, saying that for "the last two years I censor myself. Because many people from sharing on social media are now in prison. So, because of this I censor myself. Before I wrote my opinion, but now I only share news, from newspaper articles." When they returned to Turkey they "cancelled" all their social media, as their belief was that only those who do not have to return to Turkey can choose to not self-censor online.[98] These examples again demonstrate a flight behavioural response, as they are diluting, or ceasing altogether, critical output online, which is certainly a form of self-censorship.

Another behavioural response to the effects of securitisation extension amongst my dataset is avoidance of interactions with diaspora. The most extreme example of this was an academic who, since moving to Germany lived a "secluded life" as they "purposefully avoid interaction with the state institutions and the diaspora."[99] Another respondent from the Netherlands said that "because they are not nationalistic enough" and are "researching taboo subjects" they try to make themselves "relatively less visible in this society."[100] This demonstrates avoidance of interactions due to concern about negative consequences. A way of coping with potential difficult interactions with diaspora, said one respondent, was to not "heat it up" and to "avoid talking too much."[101] This technique of avoidance was also utilised in choosing where to eat and where to shop "based on who is a supporter of the government."[102] This demonstrates how the political situation has an effect on everyday life. This is a form of self-censorship as it is a self-imposed form of control which benefits the state because critical voices are choosing to avoid expressing their opinions with the diaspora based on a pre-

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[97] Author's Skype interview on 17 April 2018 with Respondent 7, a Turkish academic based in the U.K.
[98] Author's interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 12 in Utrecht, a Kurdish PhD candidate based in the Netherlands.
[99] Email correspondence with author on 24 May 2018; Respondent 20, a Turkish academic based in Germany.
[100] Author's interview on 8 May 2018 with Respondent 11 in Utrecht, a Dutch-Turkish academic based in the Netherlands.
[101] Author's Skype interview on 16 May 2018 with Respondent 14, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.
[102] *Ibid.*

conceived perception of what the interaction will be like, and therefore members of the diaspora are less likely to hear critical opinions.

One comment by a respondent indicated the lengths to which some academics go to avoid uncomfortable interactions with diaspora, as they said:

"Erdogan has come to dominate the student association here but they are not necessarily from the religious or Islamist camp, like for example I seen the President drinking beer, but he is still a strong ultra-nationalist guy, so it is a nationalist one but not a religious one."[103]

This comment was striking, as it demonstrates how they were looking for signs in an everyday setting such as a bar to place what "camp" this member of the diaspora was in. This response indicates divisions along religious lines amongst the diaspora, and it also displays a coping mechanism employed in order to interpret small actions and from this surmise how they should approach interactions.

The final change in behaviour which can be seen to be a form of control that benefits the Turkish state is that of physical avoidance of a country, with Germany and Turkey cited. One academic stated that they had planned to take their sabbatical this year in Germany but decided to cancel as they "couldn't take the risk of being there for my own security and safety." This was due to a fear of a more mobilised diaspora there, having attended a recent conference in Berlin where they had experienced a great deal of harassment.[104] The more frequent physical change in behaviour, however, was in avoidance of returning to Turkey, demonstrated by a respondent from France who said:

"since the coup attempt and the petition for peace my physical connections with Turkish academia became less; for example, giving conferences or taking classes in Turkish universities. A few years ago I organise many conferences in Turkey, I wouldn't do that today… so in that sense yes, I think there is a certain loss of freedom."[105]

These changes in behaviour demonstrate a self-imposed form of control due to the fear of negative consequences which could happen if they go to Turkey for research. This is a flight response as it involves avoidance of a perceived threatening environment, and is beneficial to

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[103] *Ibid.*

[104] Author's Skype interview on 26 March 2018 with Respondent 1, a Turkish academic based in the U.S.

[105] Author's Skype interview on 13 April 2018 with Respondent 5, a Turkish academic based in France.

the Turkish state if less critical voices are organising and participating in events within Turkey.

These behavioural responses hold much in common with Mac Ginty's concept of "everyday peace." This is defined as "the practices and norms deployed by individuals and groups in deeply divided societies to avoid and minimize conflict and awkward situations" (2014: 553). This is evident in a number of ways. Mac Ginty says that "avoidance" is "perhaps the principal everyday peace activity." The "most prominent" practise related to this is "the avoidance of controversial and sensitive (e.g. political or religious) conversation topics when in mixed company" (2014: 555) This is very clearly what my respondents are doing when they ensure not to "heat it up" when interacting with diaspora. He also argues that avoidance of "high-risk people and places" is a common practise, (2014: 556) seen in my case through avoiding nationalist diaspora, and travel to Germany and Turkey. The final element of his framework which is displayed amongst my dataset is "social identification and social categorization whereby individuals attempt to ascertain the identity and affiliation of others" (2014: 557). This is demonstrated as one academic identified consumption of alcohol to categorise the background of a member of the diaspora. The significance of the flight responses fitting with the everyday peace framework is in demonstrating how polarised society within Turkey has extended abroad to create an atmosphere which sees academics employ similar coping mechanisms of avoidance and social categorisation to those used in deeply divided societies. This shows how pervasive the effects of securitisation extension are as it influences everyday practises.

In conclusion, the flight responses are evidence that the context of the atmosphere of fear and the practises used by the state and pro-regime agents as part of the securitisation extension process are seeing self-imposed forms of control amongst Turkish academics abroad. These are in the form of self-censorship in the non-academic sphere, avoiding interactions with the diaspora, and avoiding physical contact with countries that are perceived to put one at risk (predominantly Turkey).

4. <u>Analysis and concluding comments</u>

In this section I will tie the data presented together to highlight the major trends, and to make an assessment on the extent to which self-censorship is occurring amongst my dataset and the wider implications of this.

Firstly, what is very clear from my data is that the perception of the academics is that the

practises of the Turkish state and pro-regime agents are aimed at suppressing critical voices (Armenian genocide scholars, advocates of Kurdish rights, and those critical of the AKP and Erdogan). The belief is that they would like these academics to self-censor, due to not having the capabilities to directly censor as they can within Turkey.

In my dataset, the majority of academics are not self-censoring in the academic sphere. Outside academic output, there is substantial evidence of changes in observable behaviour, here seen as self-censorship in that they are self-imposed forms of control which result in a reduction in criticism of the Turkish state. These self-imposed forms of control are a sign of the success of the state and pro-regime agent's practises, and the atmosphere of fear that has been created. These are classified as the flight responses.

There are a few cases of academics who "fight" back as a behavioural response to the perceived attempts at censorship, which clearly displays the practises of the state and its agents and the subsequent atmosphere this context has created, have not succeeded in achieving their aim. However, an important consideration, which is beyond the capabilities of this case study to fully judge, is that whilst these respondents have decided to not self-censor, it is possible that the knowledge of what has happened to these academics (such as the respondent who was imprisoned for 40 days, but still displayed a fight response) has encouraged other academics to self-censor. This is due to the interconnectivity available due to the internet, as well as the tight-knit community of Turkish scholars abroad which allows for news and rumours to spread. This element will be expanded on in the next chapter, when I will relate the findings of this case study to a form of transnational "governmentality."

Therefore, self-censorship is occurring amongst my dataset in relation to non-academic output and behaviour, which represents success of the state and pro-regime agent's practises. That those who were most directly affected by securitisation extension were more likely to show the fight responses, whilst those who showed the flight behavioural responses were often not direct victims of these practises, is indicative that the atmosphere of fear created is a more effective form of control than the direct actions of imprisonment or civil death.

One significant caveat is that it is fair to presume that my dataset is over-representative of those who are not self-censoring, or showing a fight response, as an academic who is self-censoring, or displaying a flight response, would be very unlikely to respond to my request for interview (for example, a helpful respondent forwarded my request for interviews to an email

list of the Academics for Peace group in Germany, and the response rate was very low). This leads me to conclude that the securitisation extension beyond Turkish borders is seeing a higher level of self-censorship (in relation to non-academic output that is critical of the Turkish state) than my dataset would suggest.

Another reason to conclude this is due to the high degree of negative emotions that were cited (A, B, C responses above: anxiety, suspicion, alienation). These were much more frequent than D and E responses (burned bridges or not affected). The significance of this is that if the atmosphere of fear and the practises implemented by the state and pro-regime agents are creating negative emotional effects amongst academics in my dataset, then this is an indicator that self-censorship is occurring amongst other Turkish academics. This is because negative emotions, and the fear of negative consequences, are the motivator of self-censorship, as cited in the definition at the outset of this chapter.

In conclusion, this chapter has defined self-censorship in order to clearly show the angle for assessing the success of the Turkish state and pro-regime agent's practises. This was followed by outlining the feelings that these practises have produced in my dataset, before looking at the subsequent behavioural responses to this, here divided into fight and flight responses. Finally, I made a final assessment on what the data means, and to what extent one can conclude that forms of self-censorship are occurring due to the effects, here seen to be the atmosphere of fear and the practises, of securitisation extension. Having outlined all the data, the following, and final, chapter will relate these findings to the wider academic knowledge that currently exists within securitisation theory and security studies.

CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSION: RELATING FINDINGS TO ACADEMIC LITERATURE

In this concluding chapter, I will relate the findings to wider academic debates. Firstly, I will consider the role of the audience in securitisation theory and how my findings can contribute to knowledge on this by dividing the audience into "reactive" and "affected," for greater understanding of the variety of effects of securitisation (extension). Next, I will look at the specific strand of security studies which holds most in common with my study; namely, the small body of work on extraterritorial security practices/governance. I will show how my findings hold similarities to existing knowledge, which serves as verification that states are attempting to censor oppositional voices abroad and shows that the Turkish case is not just a one-off with no generatability. I will then demonstrate what my case can add to this knowledge by highlighting that "governmentality" is a more appropriate lens than "security practises" or "governance" for my case study. I will finish by offering suggestions for future research, before concluding the thesis with a final summary of the findings.

1. Role of the audience

The role of the audience in this case study can contribute to the academic debate in securitisation theory by displaying the active role of the audience in securitising practises, and offering a suggestion as to how this could be better incorporated as a unit of analysis. My findings strongly support Adam Côté's research in which he conducted a "meta-synthesis" of 32 empirical studies on securitisation and concluded that audiences are "central to the securitization process and its outcome" (2016: 543). This was because the audience could influence the securitising actor's actions, or partake in their own actions which had "tangible security effects" (2016: 551). This was certainly evident in the Turkish case, where pro-regime agents at home and abroad engaged in securitising practises.

Despite Côté's findings, however, "the ability of audiences to engage actively in the process is nearly nonexistent within securitisation theory" (2016: 543). My suggestion of looking at the "reactive" audience is therefore a tentative suggestion to help address this gap in existing theoretical literature, as this responds to Côté's desire for a "reformulated view of the audience as an active agent" (2016: 551/2). If one considers how the audience reacts to the speech act through assessing visible changes in behaviour, one can easily locate the effects an active audience has on the securitisation (extension) process. This is particularly relevant for studies on securitisation extension, where the reactive audience plays a more significant role in forms

of control, such as spying or harassment, due to the difficulty in a state exerting direct control within a foreign nation as they can within their own territory.

Moving on from the "reactive" audience, I have also extended the audience as a unit of analysis by focusing on the "affected" audience. That there is an affected audience is not new, ofcourse, as all securitisation processes have a group being securitised. Recognition of how this affects the group, however, is widely neglected in the securitisation literature due to the state-centric, "elite" focus of the theory (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 446). Therefore, by responding to the calls for a "critical anthropology of security" approach through speaking to those affected by securitisation, I hope to have highlighted the necessity for greater recognition of the variety in types of audience, as the securitisation (extension) process has a very different impact on lived experiences based on who is taken as the unit of analysis. By focusing on the affected audience, one can locate securitising practises that are not as visible through discourse analysis or a state-centric approach, such as "low-tech" surveillance or hacking.

I also believe this has contributed to the newly developing "critical anthropology of security" strand of security studies through using the affected audience as a unit of analysis, as much of the literature has responded to Goldstein's call (2010) by utilising anthropological research to better understand the field of security "professionals" who are "performing securitisation," such as police (Fassin in Maguire et. al., 2014), policy professionals (Feldman in Maguire et. al., 2014), and airport staff (Maguire in Maguire et. al., 2014). My research takes the same epistemological approach, but differs in that it is focused on the group being securitised, which again has the benefit of locating securitising practises that may not be as visible when utilising other units of analysis.

2. Extraterritorial security practises & transnational "governmentality"

Extraterritorial security practises are extremely under-researched in securitisation theory. There is a small body of work to which my research holds similarities. These are on "extraterritorial security practices" (Lewis, 2015), and a PhD thesis on "Transnational Authoritarian Security Governance" of Tajikistan (Lemon, 2016). Lewis' work on the extraterritorial security practises of Uzbekistan is the most relevant for comparison, as he displays that they have similar aim(s), practises, and outcomes as those located in my case study. Firstly, in relation to the aim, Lewis says it was to "counter political opposition among migrant and exile communities" through utilising security practises (2015: 140). This matches the perceived aim, amongst respondents and secondary literature, of Turkey's securitisation extension practises in targeting oppositional voices.

Furthermore, the practises employed by the Turkish state hold much in common with Uzbekistan. For example, "the Uzbek security forces use a range of mechanisms – including Interpol – to attempt to detain individuals abroad and restrict their movement," and they "use a range of legal and extra-legal mechanisms to return individuals from other jurisdictions to face prosecution in Uzbekistan" (2015, 151). These state practises aimed at extradition were cited as being employed by Turkey in Chapter 5. Building upon this, Lewis also says that "surveillance, intelligence-gathering, and informal controls" are used to "exert discipline and shape discourse even without formal jurisdiction or policing powers," as "the Uzbek SNB is active both through its own officers and by relying on informant networks in countries with extensive Uzbek communities." (2015: 147). These practises can be seen in the Turkish case, with "low-tech" surveillance practises and spying in communities cited.

Finally, the outcomes of both Uzbek and Turkish practises have been comparable. Lewis concludes that the practises:

> *"extend the authoritarian system of Uzbekistan's regime security beyond its boundaries into other jurisdictions, producing a new state space that reproduces elements of Uzbekistan's domestic repression in transnational spaces. These practices have a profound effect on localities in which Uzbek nationals in exile are active, constraining their public political activity and discourse even within liberal political environments" (2015, 154).*

This comparison is worth drawing with my case, as I argue that the outcome is very similar: the practises of the Turkish state, and the subsequent atmosphere of fear, have also seen domestic repression extended transnationally, and Lewis' conclusion that it has restrained political discourse clearly matches my view that self-censorship is occurring amongst some critical academics. Therefore, this strand of work on extraterritorial state practises within security studies is where my research fits in. I feel that through using the "affected" audience of oppositional academics as my primary unit of analysis I have added to this emerging body of research by locating different practises, such as harassment, trolling, hacking and retrospective online surveillance.

However, my study does differ somewhat to this related literature due to the use of the "securitisation extension" frame. This frame was selected over "extraterritorial state practises" due to the active role of the (reactive) audience. I felt that the Paris school's use of the audience as a unit of analysis made securitisation (extension) a better frame for this reason, as Lewis' frame focused specifically on state action. Furthermore, there is value here in retaining the securitisation frame due to the defining feature of the social construction of a threat, as prior to Erdogan's speech act the academics were not treated as an existential threat, which shows that

the threat has been constructed through a speech act. Therefore, the securitisation frame was extended rather than discarded altogether.

In addition, the recognition of an "atmosphere of fear" that sees actors change their behaviour without being directly affected by the securitising practises is a new concept in this body of literature. Due to this, considering the effects of securitisation extension as a form of transnational "governmentality" rather than "governance," as seen in related literature, can add a new layer of analysis to the burgeoning field of transnational security practises.

Governmentality is a Foucauldian concept, with a great deal of literature dedicated to interpretation and development of his ideas on this. It "involves domination and discipline techniques, as well as ethics of 'self-government'" (Holmes, 2002: 85). These broad techniques can be seen in this case, with the practises of the state and its agents relating to domination and discipline, and the subsequent atmosphere of fear resulting in changes in behaviour, which can be seen as forms of self-governing. One of the key tenets of self-governing is the "Panopticon." This was a concept developed by Bentham. It is based on a form of "visibility" in prison design: "the prisoners can always be seen from the central control tower, but through the use of blinds or screens the presence of guards can be concealed. This means that the power of the Panopticon rests on… what Bentham calls the "*apparent omnipresence* of the inspector"… rather than the physical presence of a guard" (Gane, 2012: 615). This has the effect of controlling the behaviour of prisoners due to the perception of being watched at all times, without a guard being present. Whilst the forms of control in a prison are much more extreme, the concept has much in keeping with this case, or more specifically the atmosphere of fear cited by respondents and secondary literature (Chapter 5). Self-imposed forms of control are displayed without ever physically experiencing the practises that are cited, showing an awareness that they are occurring to others is enough.

This concept is fascinating, as creating fear amongst a securitised group within a nation-state which results in changes in behaviour, or self-governing, is much easier to achieve due to the limited territorial space and ability to use direct repressive apparatus such as a police force. That the constraining effects of the atmosphere has been extended into different sovereign nations, creating similar effects within these different nations, often without physical interactions, is a new lens of analysis from which to consider securitisation (extension). Looking at how transnational governmentality is practised and achieved may be a useful lens for future studies, as with the growing interconnectivity of the world the potential for illiberal regimes to influence diaspora is likely to be a growing phenomenon.

3. __Possibilities for future research__

In this section, one can see that Turkey's extraterritorial practises match those used by an authoritarian state in Uzbekistan. As well as this, Chapter 7 has shown the online practises utilised are similar to "networked authoritarianism" literature on Syria, Iran, and Russia. Therefore, one can conclude that securitisation extension is only relevant for studying authoritarian states at this time. Therefore, future research could involve employing a similar "critical anthropology of security" approach to other diasporic communities of authoritarian regimes, if one can locate the securitisation of a group occurring within one of these regimes as a starting point. This would help to recognise similarities and differences in practises implemented.

In relation to Turkey, a useful step for future research would be to gain insight into the full extent to which the practises cited in this study are being implemented through utilising quantitative methods. When I reflect on my approach now, I realise this would add significant value to my research. Therefore, if I had more time to conduct my study, I would have added a quantitative method, such as distribution of questionnaires. However, I feel this would only now be possible having successfully located what practises are commonly utilised through qualitative data collection. This would potentially allow a set of questions using these practises as indicators, enabling one to quantify how common these practises are. The benefit of this would be to allow greater generalisability for the findings of this study.

Another approach to future research would be to stretch the unit of analysis beyond academics to include members of the Hizmet/Gulen movement, as the securitisation extension affecting them is more overt. This would require more time and resources than I had for this study, however, as they are not a homogenous group and so it would likely take more time to access data.

Finally, an interesting point of further analysis would be to delve into forms of resistance to the securitisation (extension) of academics, through looking at the fight responses in greater detail. In my dataset, there was some very intriguing work cited as taking place in response to the securitisation (extension) process, with a "Peace University" being set up in Germany, "established for and by academics from Turkey,"[106] and "street academies" such as

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[106] For more information, see: http://off-university.com/en-US/page/vision

the "Solidarity Academy"[107] in Turkey, which academics set up to remain active in response to their dismissals.

4. <u>**Concluding comments**</u>

In this thesis, I hope to have demonstrated that, due to a phenomenon that I have called "securitisation extension," a significant number of Turkish academics abroad are self-censoring as they are altering behaviour through self-imposed forms of control that see critical opinions reach a reduced audience, particularly in non-academic output. The perception of the respondents, supported by the secondary literature, is that the Turkish state and pro-regime agent's practises are aimed at encouraging self-censorship amongst critical voices. Due to the qualitative nature of this research, the aim was not to ascertain the volume of people self-censoring, but rather to understand what practises are used with the aim of achieving this.

After outlining the theory and methodology which served as a base for this thesis in the opening chapters, Chapter 4 provided context by demonstrating that academics within Turkey are being securitised. This was important to show, as an awareness and implicit fear about what is occurring within Turkey is present in my dataset, particularly amongst academics who know they may have to return to Turkey at some point. Chapter 5 built upon this by outlining the proximate context academics are living in beyond Turkish borders. State practises in conducting extraditions, despite primarily affecting Gulenists, have been shown to be of concern to some academics as the extremity of the attempts at extradition create a fear over whether critical academics abroad could be targeted next. Spying within communities and polarisation amongst the diaspora were also cited as contributing factors in an atmosphere of fear that had become prevalent amongst oppositional voices in heavily populated Turkish communities in the West. These chapters can be classified as fitting within the "context" unit of analysis advocated by the Paris school of securitisation theory.

Chapter 6 & Chapter 7 proceeded to locate the practises of the state and pro-regime agents that were directly affecting academics in my dataset. Chapter 6 outlines physical practises of "low-tech" surveillance, harassment, and civil death. Chapter 7 describes online practises of trolling, hacking, and retrospective online surveillance. These demonstrate the difficulties academics face if they are considered a dissenting voice by the state or pro-regime agents. These practises are aimed at encouraging self-censorship amongst critical voices, which some will do in order to avoid the negative consequences of these practises. These chapters are evidently based on "practises" as the unit of analysis.

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[107] Written notes shared with author on 5 June 2018; Respondent 21, a Kurdish PhD candidate based in Germany.

The penultimate chapter then assessed the feelings produced, showing a very significant amount of negative emotional reactions amongst my dataset. This is of value, as negative emotions and fear of negative repercussions are the motivating factors for self-censorship. By showing that these are being created as a result of state practises, it is logical to conclude that this would see self-censorship occurring beyond my dataset. This chapter then presented the variety of behavioural responses, of which "flight" responses were more common than "fight" responses. This therefore showed that self-censorship was occurring amongst my dataset to a significant degree. This chapter was very much focused on the affected audience of critical academics abroad as the unit of analysis, but the perceptions of the affected audience and the role of the reactive audience are addressed throughout the thesis as key units of analysis.

Finally, this thesis was wrapped up by relating the findings to wider academic debates. This research has attempted to contribute to the conceptual development of the role of the audience within securitisation literature by highlighting two different groups within the audience, which allows greater clarity and focus. Firstly, assessing the "reactive" audience (here meaning pro-regime agents) is useful for highlighting the active role that the audience can play in securitisation (extension) processes, which supports Cote's (2016) argument for greater recognition of this. Secondly, the use of the "affected" audience (targeted critical academics) as the primary unit of analysis is of use in locating securitising practises that may not be visible through discourse analysis, or state-centred, elite approaches.

The concluding chapter also relates my findings to those on extraterritorial state practises. I hope to have added to this literature through assessing the power of an "atmosphere of fear" to alter behaviour. Here I suggest that a transnational "governmentality" concept is more appropriate that a "governance" lens for my case, which is hopefully an interesting addition to a relatively new strand of security studies. This focus on transnational effects of securitisation has also addressed the gap in the securitisation theory literature of "territorial limitation," as identified in Chapter 2, by extending the analysis to practises beyond the borders of the securitising state.

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Author's Skype interview on 13 April 2018 with Respondent 5, a Turkish academic based in France.

Author's Skype interview on 13 April 2018 with Respondent 6, a Turkish academic based in France.

Author's Skype interview on 17 April 2018 with Respondent 7, a Turkish academic based in the U.K.

Author's Skype interview on 18 April 2018 with Respondent 8, a Turkish academic based in Germany.

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