Master Thesis

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International Relations in Historical Perspective

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The dynamics of German-Iranian and British-Iranian relations after the Islamic Revolution, 1979-1988.

A neoclassical realist perspective.

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1. Abstract

Iran is a recurring topic in the field of international relations, due to its involvement in many events at the world stage. Most research focuses on US-Iranian relations or the recent strive of Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, despite the important role that European states play in Iran. Especially, the involvement of Britain and West Germany in less recent events, such as the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war, forms a research gap and a study could provide a new perspective on Western relations with the Islamic Republic at the time. A theory providing tools to explain the reactions of the two states is neoclassical realism. This research project thus seeks to explain to what extent neoclassical realism can explain the reactions of West Germany and Britain to the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war. To start, the historical premises of the two occurrences will be explained. Afterwards, neoclassical realism and its specificities will be introduced and its value over other theories will be illustrated. In the analysis, the systemic pressures emitted by the two events will be evaluated for the two states, as they have the largest influence on the foreign policy response. Later, the domestic factors will be determined because they potentially can influence the foreign policy. Lastly, the two reactions of Britain and West Germany will be compared for the sake of determining which case study is applicable with neoclassical realism. In the end, an image will be constructed in pursuance of illustrating to what extent neoclassical realism can explain the British and West German reaction to the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war.

2. Introduction

Europe and Iran have always had important ties – recently and in the past. Latterly, Iran has mostly been making headlines for its endeavor to obtain nuclear weapons. The world powers have been coordinating together in an effort to halt Iran from developing arms of mass destruction. Together with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in order to fulfill this objective. The JCPOA has henceforth been in danger, because the United States of America (U.S.) opted to withdraw from the agreement. However, the other signatory powers – especially the Europeans – remain committed to the plan of action. In the past, Europe had cultivated significant ties with Iran. The British Empire had been present in Persia and in the 19th century the Shah, Naser od-din, had already been fascinated with European culture.[1] Iran also proved to be a contested area in the Second World War between Germany and Britain. Ensuing the Second World War, the relations remained strong with Iran and a new Shah was installed in the country. Reza Pahlavi, the new shah, tried to westernize the country and built close ties with Europe. Consequently, the United Kingdom and West Germany had good relations with Iran. [2]

Henceforth, the Islamic revolution in 1979 came as a shock for the two major European economies and meant uncertainty for their relations with the Middle Eastern state, due to its anti-western nature.[3] The demand by the U.S. to put sanctions on the Iranian regime, due to ramifications after the Islamic revolution, had the potential to create tensions.[4] The request had implications for West Germany and Britain, as they were both close allies of the U.S. Aside from these international ramifications, both states had namely also domestic factors to take into account in their response to the revolution. Last but not least, the Iran-Iraq war shook the region and the newly established regime around Khomeini for years. All these factors can be applied to neoclassical realism, a theory of international relations. The objective of this project is to analyze to what extent

[1] Foltz, Richard: Iran in the World. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, P. 88-89.
[2] Ibid, p. 98.
[3] Rakel, Eva: Iranian Foreign Policy since the Iranian Islamic Revolution: 1967-2006. In: Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, Vo. 6/Nr. 1, 2007. P.167.
[4] Emery, Christian: The transatlantic and Cold War dynamics of Iran sanctions, 1979-1980. In: Cold War History, Vol. 10/Nr. 3, 2010. P. 372.

neoclassical realism can explain West German and British relations with Iran after the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. Therefore, the question can be raised:

To what extent can neoclassical realism explain West German and British relations with Iran after the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war?

More specific sub-questions about the West German and British relations with Iran are:

To what extent can neoclassical realism explain the relations of the United Kingdom with Iran after the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war?

To what extent can neoclassical realism explain the relations of West Germany with Iran after the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war?

A combination of primary sources and secondary sources will be used in this research project. Concerning the secondary sources, numerous works have been published on the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war and many scholars have written about these historic events. Most articles and work cover the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war more in general, while more specific work also exists, albeit rare to be found. Therefore, literature about the British-Iranian or German-Iranian relations is uncommon. Frank Bösch's scientific article "Zwischen Shah und Khomeini. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die islamische Revolution"[5] foregrounds the Islamic revolution and West Germany. The article decrypts how West Germany was torn during the revolution between its interests in Iran and its loyalty to the U.S. Similarly, Edward Posnett's piece "Treating His Imperial Majesty's Warts: British Policy towards Iran: 1977-1979"[6] covers the same topic, but from a British perspective. A drawback is that both authors cover the Islamic revolution essentially from a historical viewpoint and less from an international relations perspective. Other academic work that specifically targets the German and British relations with Iran during the time period of this research project is rare. It is more common to find research texts about European relations with Iran or specific aspects of these relations with the Islamic Republic. "The EEC and Iran: From the Revolution of 1979 to the Launch of the Critical

[5] Bösch, Frank: Zwischen Shah und Khomeini. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die islamische Revolution in Iran. In VFZ, 03/2015.
[6] Posnett, Edward: Treating His Imperial's Majesty's Warts: British Policy towards Iran 1977-79. In: Iranian Studies, Vol. 45/Nr. 1, 2012.

Dialogue in 1992"[7] by Claudia Castaglioni illustrates the relations of Italy, France, West Germany and Britain, the major EEC-states, with Iran during the timeframe of this thesis. Another example is Adam Tarock's "Iran Western Europe Relations on the Mend"[8] that handles the same specificities. However, the fact that these two articles cover large timeframes makes them lose some substance, because an overwhelmingly large ground has to be covered. Christine Gray's "The British Position with Regard to the Gulf Conflict (Iran-Iraq): Part 2"[9] has a similar deficiency. The publication deals with the Iran-Iraq war and studies the British position on several events in the conflict, such as the naval operations in the Gulf. Some insightful comments were provided, but the conflict was mostly scrutinized from a legal perspective, which reduced its usefulness for this project. Literature that fits the premises of the research project is thus rare and creates a research gap. This thesis could contribute to closing that gap.

Regarding the primary sources, internal documents of the reigning governing coalitions of the time provided a sound insight into their motivations. The German parliament for example, provided numerous documents and plenary protocols on its website.[10] British institutions, such as the national archives and the parliament of the United Kingdom, and their wide array of online tools to study historical primary sources offered great insight.[11] A document, that was commissioned by then British Foreign secretary, Lord Owen, on the British policy in the pre-revolutionary Iran was such an insightful source that was available at the national archives. [12] The World Bank, the United Nations, the German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce were other non-governmental sources that contributed great information. In general, numerous sources from legitimate organizations and institutions were available.

[7] Castiglioni, Claudia: The EEC and Iran: From the revolution of 1979 to the Launch of the Critical dialogue in 1992. In: Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 21/Nr. 1, 2015.
[8] Tarock, Adam: Iran-Western Europe Relations on the Mend. In: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26/Nr. 1, 1999.
[9] Gray, Christine: The British Position with Regard to the Gulf Conflict (Iran-Iraq): Part 2. In: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 40/No. 2, 1991.
[10] German Parliament: https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/
[11] National archives: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
[12] Browne, N.: British Policy on Iran 1974-1978, Foreign and Commonwealth Office: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120308154756/http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/iran-document-british-policy-on-iran.

As the research question reveals, neoclassical realism will be used as a theoretical lens to assess the reaction of West Germany and Britain to the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. It is based on the premises of neorealism and takes many of its assumptions into account.[13] Both theories claim that anarchy reigns in the international sphere and that systemic pressures are essential in the international system. In neoclassical realism and neorealism, anarchy is the cause for conflicts in the international system because in an anarchical international system no worldwide government exists.[14] They also share the assumptions of relative power distribution, the centrality of conflict groups and the hectic nature of politics. Therefore, they both use systemic independent variables.[15] Meanwhile, neoclassical realism has a variable that differentiates it from neorealism. This intervening variable acts on the unit-level, meaning the domestic affairs of states, which creates a connection to classical realism.[16] Leaders, coalition politics, domestic institutions and other domestic factors all act on the unit-level of the intervening variable and are generally linked to classical realism. Most theories do not take either systemic factors or domestic factors into account, so by considering both aspects, neoclassical realism has a unique perspective on international relations.[17] Overall, neoclassical realism boils down to the point that: "[…] the theory attempts to combine factors of micro and systemic theories in order to provide a better understanding of foreign policies of countries"[18], but it simply uses unit variables in different ways.

A closer look will therefore be taken at the rudiments of how West Germany and the United Kingdom reacted to the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war with a neoclassical realist scope. However, prior to the analysis, an extensive historical outlook will be indispensable in order to be able to elicit the historical premises of the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. The analytical part will mainly encompass the West German and British reaction and a historical perspective from the Iranian stance will be useful to lay down the facts, but also to have some tangible groundwork on which the European angle can be elaborated. An understanding of the

[13] Ripsmann, Norrin: Neoclassical Realism. In: Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of International Studies. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011. P. 2.
[14] Taliaferro, Jeffrey et al: Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy. In: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy. Ed.: Taliaferro et al. Cambridge, 2012., P. 4.
[15] Ibid, p. 19.
[16] Ripsmann 2011, op. cit., p. 6.
[17] Rose, Gideon: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. In: World Politics, Vol. 51/Nr. 1, 1998. P. 152-153.
[18] Jalah Dehghani, Firoozabadi/Mojtaba Zare, Ashkezari: Neo-classical realism in International Relations. In: Asian Social Sciences, Vol. 12/Nr. 6, 2016. P. 95.

causes for these events in Iran will help to better comprehend the analytical part of this research project. After presenting the historical context, the theoretical framework will be explained. A general overview of neoclassical realism will be illustrated, which will be followed by a specific framework that pertains to the research question. Afterwards, the theoretical debate will clarify what advantages neoclassical realism offers for this research project compared to other theories. The analytical part will be the main part of the thesis. On the one hand, the pressures from the international system will be analyzed and on the other hand, the domestic factors will be determined. The systemic constraints and domestic factors will be analyzed for both countries. In order to analyze the British-Iranian and West German-Iranian relations, systemic and domestic constraints will thus be evaluated. Lastly, a comparison will be made between the two responses, based on the chosen theoretical framework, in order to conclude to what extend neoclassical realism helps in explaining the reactions of the two European states.

This research project has academic and social relevance, because in recent times Iran has been of utmost importance in the world news, and in international relations, due to JCPOA. After the Trump administration has pulled out of the JCPOA, the European Union is trying to determine its new stance on Iran. Henceforth, additional academic research on Iran could offer a broader understanding of the current political situation. In terms of academic research, the relations of West Germany and the United Kingdom with Iran after the Islamic revolution, as two signatories of JCPOA and major European powers, are important research topics. To this day, the British and German relations with Iran have not been thoroughly researched and this project might thus help in closing that research gap. Historically, the two countries have also played an important role in Iran and will probably be important agents in the future. Further research will therefore be important to have a better understanding of their relations with Iran. As the literature generally focuses on U.S.-Iran relations, an unprecedented outlook might be introduced on Western relations with the Islamic Republic. Besides the Islamic revolution, the Iran-Iraq chapter of this research project constitutes another cornerstone that has generally not been as well researched, as the other Gulf Wars.[19] Additionally, British-German relations with Iran have not yet been researched through a neoclassical realist scope and could therefore provide a new insightful vantage point.

[19] Axworthy, Michael: Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. P. 191.

3. The Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war

3.1 The Islamic revolution of 1979

Prior to the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the rise of Khomeini, the Pahlavi dynasty had been in charge of the country since 1925. Reza Shah had sided with Germany in the Second World War and was replaced after an invasion by Britain and the Soviet Union, by his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.[20] His long-lasting efforts to modernize the country were unsuccessful, as only the oil sector was growing. Agricultural reforms, for example, were not successful and the agricultural production merely grew 2-2,5% annually, while the population was growing faster. From the outside it seemed that the total production of the country was growing, although this increase was primarily attributed to the oil sector. Large parts of the population, however, did not profit from the growth and the recession of 1970s hit the Iranian economy hard. Furthermore, the Shah had many expenses to solidify his dynasty, which he tried to link back to Ancient Persia, and spent state resources for the 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire in 1971, for instance. These lavish uses of resources were not well received by the Iranian population. This uneven distribution of wealth in the Iranian society, was an important sparking factor for the Islamic revolution.[21] The opposition against the Shah subsequently grew in the mid-1970s. It is noteworthy that the opposition emerged from different parts of the society, as also intellectual circles opposed the Shah. However, the revolutionary process only started in 1977 and lasted until 1979. The Iranian intelligentsia criticised the Shah's regime and was protected by international interests. Additionally, the Shah's visit to Washington caused violent protests in the U.S. and were followed with interest by his opposition in Iran. A provocative article in the newspaper "Ettela'at" on January 7th 1978 lashed out against religious community, as well as the communist party. Ayatollah Khomeini in particular was attacked in the article. Protests soon rose to the occasion and students demanded that Khomeini was discharged from the allegations. The regime cracked down on these protests and the many deaths of these demonstrations were transformed into

[20] Foltz 2016, op. cit., p. 96-98.
[21] Seeberg 2014, op. cit., p. 487.

martyrs. Many protests were carried out by poverty-stricken youth, despite entailing a religious dimension. [22]

During these protests, the British and the American ambassador went abroad on leave because they assumed that the protests had become predictable. However, a fire in the Rex cinema in Abadan on 19 August 1978 killed 460 persons and Khomeini and the liberal opposition blamed Savak, the Iranian Secret police, for the fire.[23] The Shah in return blamed the Islamic fanatics for the incident, but the tragedy only added fuel to the fire. The end of Ramadan was shortly afterwards in September, and it was celebrated with massive protests against the Shah, where one demonstration demanded the lives of hundreds of people. The whole economy and infrastructure were affected by the protests and even the oil sector had trouble keeping up its production. The Shah also reacted with increasing violence and tried to reorganize his regime, which failed, as it did not prevent the protests.[24] During the entire revolution, Khomeini was abroad in Iraq, but he was increasingly in danger due to the pressure of the Iranian regime. Henceforth, he fled to France where he was allowed to stay for 90 days. On February 1st 1979, Khomeini would return to Iran after the Shah had fled on January 16th.[25]

Even though the Shah had been toppled and Khomeini had arrived in Iran, the consolidation of his power had not entirely been fulfilled yet. In the initial stages after the Shah had fled the country, Mehdi Bazargan, was the official prime minister of Iran and had a more liberal entourage. The different parties set out to create a new constitution, as the current one was still based on the fundamental laws of 1906. However, Khomeini intended to draw up a new constitution that had a larger number of Islamic elements, while Mehdi Bazargan and his camp were attempting to draft a constitution that was based on Charles de Gaulle's Fifth Republic.[26] In March 1979, the two camps clashed in a referendum about instituting an Islamic Republic. Bazargan wanted to add, besides the yes and no vote, a third possibility to vote for a Democratic Islamic Republic. Khomeini responded by proclaiming "Don't use the Western term 'democratic'"[27] and continued later on that "Islam does not adjectives such as democratic. […] It is sad for us to add another word near the

[22] Seeberg 2014, op. cit., p. 488-489.
[23] Buchan, James: The Iranian Revolution of 1979. In: Asian Affairs, Vol. 44/Nr. 3, 2013. P. 422-423.
[24] Seeberg 2014, op. cit., p. 490.
[25] Buchan 2013, op. cit., p. 424-425.
[26] Abrahamian, Ervand: A History of Modern Iran. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008. P. 162.
[27] Abrahamian, Ervand: A History of Modern Iran. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008. P. 163.

word Islam, which is perfect."[28] Ultimately, Khomeini's camp managed to win the vote in a landslide, as 20 million, out of an electorate of 21 million, voted with an overwhelming 99% in favour of the Islamic Republic. Due to the outcome of the referendum, an election for a 73-man Assembly of Experts (*Majles-e Khebregan*) took place in August 1979. Once again Khomeini and his followers were successful and of the 73 spots in the Assembly, 66 were associated with him.[29] Meanwhile, Bazargan had resigned due to the storming of the U.S. embassy on November 4th and the following hostage crisis.[30] Henceforth, the new constitution, which was drafted by the Assembly of Experts, also favoured Khomeini's view of an Islamic constitution. A few elements of Bazargan's Fifth Republic constitution were part of the legislation, but it was mainly embedded in theocratic and clerical tenets.[31]

The Supreme Leader, Khomeini, substantiated his position as an authoritative public figure following the new constitution, as he became commander-in-chief. Through the new constitution, Khomeini gained more constitutional power than the Shah previously had, which also signified the consolidation of Khomeini's power in Iran.[32] Under Khomeini's rule, two guidelines were put forth for the Islamic Republic's foreign policy. Firstly, the foreign policy had to be based on "Neither East nor West, but the Islamic Republic".[33] One of the goals of the Islamic revolution had been to become independent from the West and to put an emphasis on Islamic independence and authenticity. This goal was therefore an important part in the foreign policy. Khomeini tried to be independent of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but did not cut all ties. The Islamic Republic tried to maintain relations with Western Europe, China and Japan, allies of the two superpowers. Secondly, the export of the Islamic revolution constituted the other guideline of the new foreign policy under Khomeini. The new Iranian political elite saw the revolution as a successful model and therefore strived to export it into the Middle East. Teheran tried to achieve this vision by action, rhetoric and financial support. For Khomeini and his followers, the export of the revolution was an opportunity for the oppressed and exploited people to engage against the great powers. Khomeini saw himself as not only the leader of the Islamic Republic, but of the entire Islamic

[28] Abrahamian, Ervand: A History of Modern Iran. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008. P.163.
[29] Ibid, p. 163.
[30] Foltz 2015, op. cit., p. 112.
[31] Abrahamian 2008, op. cit., p. 163-164.
[32] Ibid, p. 163-164.
[33] Rakel 2007, op. cit., p.167.

community and the export of the revolution was thus an important objective for him. [34] The Islamic Republic formed a threat for the West due to its exuberant resources of oil and the geographical location of its territory. Iran was a major oil exporting country and a stabilizing factor in the region under the Shah's regime, which, however, was put into question after the revolution. Economically and population wise, the Islamic Republic did not pose a big threat, because Iran listed a population of only 38,6 million in 1980 and had a GDP of 94,3 billion $.[35] While Iran had spent up to 10% of its GDP to military expenditures in prior years, these expenses amounted to only 5,5 % in 1979 and 5 % in 1980. During the following Iran-Iraq war, the military expenditures remained stagnant and subsequently never posed a real military threat to the West.[36] All in all, despite the fact that Iran did pose a threat, it never endangered the survival of Western states.

3.2 The Iran-Iraq war, 1980-1988

In 1980, Saddam Hussein saw an opportunity to go to war with Iran, because the country was still recovering from the ramifications of its revolution. Hussein envisaged that Iraq could gain control over Shatt al-Arab and the oilfields of Khuzestan. On top of this, the revolutionary scene in Iran had started the rhetoric of extending its influence to Shia Muslims in Iraq. However, Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party were in a dominant position in Iraq and this rhetoric posed no threat to destabilize the country. Nevertheless, Hussein saw the invasion as an opportunity to stop the revolutionary talk and to distinguish himself.[37] Iran's army was still in disorder after the Islamic revolution and Iraq could henceforth make quick advances into Iranian territory, while resisting in the air warfare. In the 8-year long conflict, both states were launching various offenses and the frontline changed many times. Iran, for example, succeeded after initial difficulties to fend Iraq off. Ultimately, the conflict resulted in a stalemate conflict and a war of attrition.[38]

[34] Rakel 2007, op. cit., p.167.
[35] World Bank: Data on Iran: https://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-rep, used on the 03.08.2018.
[36] World Bank: Military expenditures of Iran: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2017&locations=IR&start=1960&view=chart, used on the 03.08.2018.
[37] Axworthy 2013, op. cit., p. 188-189.
[38] Takeyh, Ray: The Iran-Iraq War: A reassessment. In: Middle East Journal, Vol. 64/ Nr. 3, 2010. P. 373-378.

Iran consequently softened its "Neither West nor East"-policy in 1984, as a more pragmatic approach was required. The war with Iraq and the prevalent economic problems due to war forced the state out of its isolation.[39] Teheran, for example, tried to better its relations with the Gulf States in the mid-1980s and succeeded with Oman. At the beginning of the conflict between Iraq and Iran, the Gulf States had endorsed Iraq financially and logistically. However, some Gulf States remained vigilant and especially the relations with Saudi Arabia worsened over the years.[40] Despite the new pragmatic approach, the costs of the war became increasingly high in 1988. The oil revenue for Iran was diminishing and was down to only 3/5 of the Iraqi oil revenue. Economically, Iran had reached its limit in the war.[41] On top of this, the Iraqi offensives had more success in 1988 than the Irani offensives, and a lot of pressure was put on Iran in the Persian Gulf.[42] Consequently, for the first time since 1982, Iraq managed to re-enter the Iranian territory. The continued use of chemical weapons by Iraq during the war was another cause of worry for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hence, Khomeini and his regime tried to find a way to end the war and softened their stance. For instance, one of their conditions no longer stipulated the disempowerment of Saddam Hussein.

Despite these odds against winning the war, resistance still existed in Iran against an end of the war, as the revolutionary guards were for example in favour of a continuation of the conflict.[43] However, in the end, Khomeini proclaimed that: "[…] To me, it would have been more bearable to accept death and martyrdom. Today's decision is based only on the interests of the Islamic Republic"[44] and accepted the UN Resolution 598 to end the war. The resolution urged Iran and Iraq to a ceasefire**,** to halt military actions and to withdraw military forces. On top of this, the resolution requested the UN Secretary-General to send a team of observers to oversee these proceedings.[45] The U.S. had drafted the resolution in 1987 in order to pressure Iran. Khomeini's regime did not reject the resolution immediately but asked for more clarifications.[46] However, the

[39] Rakel 2007, op. cit., p. 168.
[40] Ibid, p. 169.
[41] Axworthy 2013, op. cit., p. 272.
[42] Ibid, p. 278.
[43] Takeyh 2010, op. cit., p. 379-383.
[44] Takeyh, Ray: The Iran-Iraq War: A reassessment. In: Middle East Journal, Vol. 64/ Nr. 3, 2010. P. 382.
[45] United Nations: Security Council Resolution 598: Iraq-Islamic Republic of Iran, 20.07.1987: https://peacemaker.un.org/iraqiran-resolution598, used on the 29.05.2018.
[46] Takeyh 2010, op. cit., p. 380.

resolution was only accepted by Iran on the 17th July 1988 and a peace accord was never signed.[47] The Iran-Iraq war was disastrous for the Iranian population, as over 600.000 young men died in the war, food was rationed and major cities faced the risk of bombardment during these 8 years. Lastly, Khomeini's death one year after war marked the end of an era.[48]

4. Theory

4.1 Neoclassical realism

Neoclassical realism is an effective theory in attempting to answer the research question of this thesis. The theory considers many assumptions and premises of neorealism.[49] In both theories, the systemic pressures of the international system are essential, and the international sphere is anarchic. Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealism, writes about anarchy that "the difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it"[50]. Waltz continues that governments have "a monopoly on the legitimate use of force"[51] and that citizens of a state therefore do not have to defend themselves. In the international system, such an actor with the legitimate monopoly on force does not exist and is consequently a self-help system.[52] Relative power distribution, the tumultuous nature of politics and the centrality of conflict groups are also assumptions that both schools share, as they use systemic independent variables.[53] However, the dependent variables of both theories are different. While, neorealism tries to explain recurring patterns of international outcomes, neoclassical realism seeks to explain the foreign policy of states with its dependent variables. On

[47] United Nations: Security Council Resolution 598: Iraq-Islamic Republic of Iran, 20.0.1987: https://peacemaker.un.org/iraqiran-resolution598, used on the 29.05.2018.
[48] Foltz 2016, op. cit., p. 114.
[49] Ripsman 2011, op. cit. p. 2.
[50] Waltz, Kenneth: Theory of International Politics. Long Grove, Waveland Press, 2010. P. 103.
[51] Waltz, Kenneth: Theory of International Politics. Long Grove, Waveland Press, 2010. P. 104.
[52] Ibid, p. 103-104.
[53] Taliaferro, Jeffrey et al.: Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy. In: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy. Ed.: Taliaferro et al. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. P. 19.

top of this, neoclassical realism has an intervening variable that neorealism has not.[54] This variable further differentiates neoclassical realism from neorealism and makes the link with classical realism, because the intervening variable acts on the unit level.[55] The variable on the unit level pays attention to leaders, domestic institutions and other domestic factors.[56] Meanwhile, neorealism considers the internal politics of a state, as a "blackbox" and the internal characteristics do not matter.[57] For neoclassical realism, the unit level variables can be divided into two different categories.

Firstly, states don't always react consistently with the systemic pressures. "Underbalancing" can be such an inconsistent reaction to systemic imperatives, because a state fails to balance appropriately to a threat. Nonetheless, a state can also overreact to systemic imperatives and start interventions that hurt its interests. Neoclassical realism explains these inconsistencies with domestic politics. Cohesion and elite consensus affect the willingness of the state to balance, while government vulnerability and social cohesion explain the state's capability to use resources from the society to apply a balancing strategy. In the event that a state does not have one or all of these four variables, it is weakened and cannot react properly to systemic pressures.[58] Secondly, the international system does not present a clear threat on certain occasions, giving states more options on how to react. The policy is thus dictated by strong systemic pressures, but depends more on the preferences of leaders, domestic coalitions and domestic political constraints. In some cases, the choice is limited, because the framework of a decision is determined by systemic pressures, but domestic politics can affect the timing and the sort of policy response. In other cases, however, a wide array of options is available. States and domestic actors can thus bargain more over policy and it is more deeply linked to domestic considerations.[59] Both of these categories boil down to the point that: "[…] the theory attempts to combine factors of micro and systemic theories in order to provide a better understanding of foreign policies of countries"[60], but they simply use unit variables in different ways.

[54] Taliaferro et al. 2009, op. cit., p. 20.
[55] Ripsman 2011, op. cit., p. 6.
[56] Ibid, p. 2.
[57] Taliaferro et al. 2009, op. cit., p. 17.
[58] Ripsman 2011, op cit., p. 6.
[59] Ibid, p.7.
[60] Jalah Dehghani, Firoozabadi/Mojtaba Zare, Ashkezari: Neo-classical realism in International Relations. In: Asian Social Sciences, Vol. 12/Nr. 6, 2016. P. 95.

As mentioned in the citation above, neoclassical realism seeks to explain the foreign policies of countries. Other theories, like neorealism, lack in that regard, as Waltz argues for example that a theory of foreign policy "is out of bounds due to its complexity".[61] It is more a theory about international politics and only makes assumption about the motivations of individual states. Attempts to create theories on foreign policy have been made, but they focus more on *Innenpolitik* or on systemic factors. Meanwhile, neoclassical realism highlights internal and external factors for its theory of foreign policy. Foremostly, the place of a state in the international system and its capabilities, and therefore systemic factors, drive a country's foreign policy. Waltz explains that capabilities are made of factors like economic capability, resources, territory, military and size of population, factors that were already mentioned in the chapter about the Islamic revolution.[62] However, neoclassical realists also argue that the unit level affects a state's foreign policy. [63] Yet, these domestic factors are relegated to the second level of analysis, because in the long run the international system will shape more the foreign policy of a state.[64] Systemic incentives are the independent variable in neoclassical realism, while internal factors are the intervening variable. Together, the two variables shape the foreign policy.[65]

In their book: "Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy"[66], Steven E. Lobell, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Norris Ripsman come up with a coherent approach of neoclassical realism to determine the foreign policy of a state. They argue that the state, as in the head of government and ministers, is the main foreign policy executive. These executives have more access to information than domestic actors out of government and therefore also have different preferences and interests but are also better suited to respond to exigencies in the international system. However, societal actors out of governments can still influence them, as governmental executives often have to bargain with them. In neoclassical realism, the policy in the foreign affairs of a state can therefore be deviated from systemic imperatives.[67] The theory can thus explain why national foreign policies can differ from systemic requirements, various foreign policies exist and

[61] Rose 1998, op. cit., p. 145.
[62] Waltz 1979, op. cit., p. 131.
[63] Rose, 1998, op. cit., p. 146.
[64] Ibid, p. 151.
[65] Ibid, p. 154.
[66] Ripsman et al.: Conclusion: The state of neoclassical realism. In: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy. Ed.: Taliaferro et al., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
[67] Ripsman et al. 2009, op. cit., p. 280-281.

what distinct preferences states have. As it was determined earlier, the analysis begins with the international system in neoclassical realism and the clarity of systemic imperative that a state faces is thus essential, because the utility of neoclassical realism, as an approach to explain the foreign policy, will depend on it. [68]

Therefore, Ripsman and his colleagues have created a framework in order to determine how applicable neoclassical realism is. They argue that along two dimensions, four different worlds exist that states can inhibit. The first dimension regards opportunities, the national interest, and the clarity of the international structure regarding threats. Meanwhile, the second dimension determines the degree of information that is provided in order to react most effectively to these structural conditions of the first dimension.[69] In World 1, clear information on policy responses is available and the domestic actors only affect the styling and the time of the policy. For this world, the usefulness of neoclassical realism consists only in explaining dysfunctional behavior. World 2 is unclear on information about policy responses and domestic actors influence the timing and style of policy, but also affect the nature of policy replies to international challenges. In this world, neoclassical realism is useful and can explain the foreign policy choices of different states. Meanwhile, World 3 is unclear on information on policy responses and is inconsistent with realism, as domestic actors have a play in determining the national interests and policy responses. In general, *Innenpolitik*-theories are more useful, but neoclassical realism can still offer some insight. Lastly, World 4 is clear on information regarding policy responses and domestic actors help set national interests. However, international institutions determine the policy responses and this world is not consistent with realism. On top of this, neoclassical realism is not very well suited to explain the behavior of states in this world.[70]

Through this framework the research question: **"**To what extent can neoclassical realism explain West German and British relations with Iran after the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war?" can be explained. The analysis, through the tools of neoclassical realism, will reveal to which world the two case studies are associated, before exposing if neoclassical realism was an insightful theory in that case. The two worlds, out of the four, that come into play for the reaction of Britain and West Germany are World 1 and World 2, because they corroborate with neorealism.

[68] Ripsman et al. 2009, op. cit., p. 282.
[69] Ibid, p. 282.
[70] Ibid, p. 283.

In World 3 and World 4, their reaction would not have aligned with realism. However, they both acted under concrete constraints and incentives from the international system.[71] The difference is that in World 1 states receive clear information on how to respond to the international constraints, while in World 2 unclear information on their policy response is offered. Despite having clear information in World 1, some states fail at times to assess the situation correctly or respond inappropriately due to domestic constraints. In this case, neoclassical realism helps to explain why a state chooses a suboptimal foreign policy response. In World 2, no optimal response to the constraints and incentives exists, therefore domestic factors, such as coalition politics and institutional preferences, will determine the foreign policy response of a state.[72] In the case of this research project, the systemic constraints were known for the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, and were thus consistent with World 1 and World 2. Therefore, domestic factors had the opportunity to influence the foreign policy response of both states in the aftermath of the revolution and are elemental in explaining to which world the British and West German reaction belonged.

Ripsman dedicates a chapter to neoclassical realism and domestic groups and portrays how they can influence the foreign policy of a state.[73] He argues that many domestic actors can have an interest in the foreign security policy. Typical actors that try to influence the policy are the public, the economic sector, the industrial sector, labor unions, members of state legislature, ethnic groups, the media and key domestic political institutions.[74] Domestic actors can influence policies when they provide an adequate payoff for policy-makers or if they can garner penalties against the policy-makers. For instance, groups with a large following could thus deny policy-makers in an election and henceforth are effective for the task. Furthermore, a domestic actor needs to be united and have a common goal. A single-issue group would be more efficient and credible than an actor with many issues.[75] An actor that can provide financial security for political leaders can also be a factor that influences policy-makers because it helps them in retaining power. Members of state legislature or other groups that can obstruct the agenda of the government due to a veto, for example, are as well domestic actors that can sway the foreign security policy. In general, actors

[71] Ripsman et al. 2009, op. cit., P. 282-283.
[72] Ibid, p. 283-284.
[73] Ripsman, Norrin: Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups. In: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy. In: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy. Ed.: Taliaferro et al. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
[74] Ibid, p. 179-180.
[75] Ibid, p.181-182.

that fulfill most of these criteria are the most successful in their endeavor and actors that wish to enable the continuity of a policy should ultimately be more prosperous. However, the international climate is important, because domestic actors will have more success during stable periods, where no grave international threats are faced. In a high-risk environment in the international system, the state will predominantly try to ensure its survival.[76] In the case that a government is weak, for example in case of an expected electoral defeat, domestic actors can gain more sway. If ambiguity and confusion on a policy, rather than a national consensus, exist, then domestic actors can obtain more traction for a policy change. Ultimately, domestic actors with sufficient power to remove a leader that can obstruct or veto a government, or can shape the national interest, are the most effective. However, domestic actors are more likely to influence the style and timing of a national policy than to define the national interest.[77]

The foreign policy of Britain and West Germany towards Iran after the Islamic revolution could thus be well explained by neoclassical realism. Meanwhile, other schools of realism do not pertain the above-mentioned aspect.[78] In general, the framework of neoclassical realism will allow micro and systemic points to be analyzed in order to understand the effect of the Islamic revolution on the relations of Britain and Germany with Iran. Systemic factors that affected the two European states are the threat that the Islamic revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and its shockwaves posed to London and Bonn.[79] Furthermore, the systemic constraints will be the main point of the analysis, because they are the independent variable and have the biggest influence. However, Iran did not pose such an essential threat to the national security of the FRG and Britain, compared to other dangers, such as the Cold War. Therefore, the systemic pressures were not that strong and domestic factors also had an impact on the British and West German reaction.

[76] Ripsman 2009, op. cit., p. 183-186.
[77] Ibid, p. 188-192.
[78] Wohlforth, William: Realism. In: The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. P.140.
[79] Taliaferro, Jeffrey et al: Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy. In: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy. Ed.: Taliaferro et al. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. P. 3.

4.2 Theoretical debate

The previous chapter demonstrated the extent to which neoclassical realism provides a solid framework to explain the British-Iranian and West German-Iranian relations after the Islamic revolution of 1979. However, neoclassical realism is only one tool in the theoretic toolbox of international relations. Many other theories offer valuable and credible perspectives that could potentially be used to explain the British and West German reaction. A debate about the different theories in regard to the research question is therefore necessary in order to explain why the best alternative in this case is neoclassical realism. Republican liberalism, neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism are the theories that are going to be compared to neoclassical realism in this theoretic debate.

One of the theories that could provide a good explanation to the research question is the "Liberal International Relations Theory" by Andrew Moravcsik. This theory is based on the assumption that core actors in international relations are rational individuals and private groups that try to exchange and organize themselves in order to promote their interests. Secondly, states represent parts of the domestic society, whose interest state officials purse in their foreign policy. Lastly, state behavior is determined by the configuration of state preferences.[80] One fitting variant of the liberal IR theory is republican liberalism. In this variant, social demands are transformed into state policy by domestic institutions and practices. The most important point of republican liberalism is the nature of domestic political representation, as it determines how much weight is given to each social preference. The policy of a government thus depends on the domestic group that is in power. Consequently, powerful domestic groups or the governing coalition determine the foreign policy.[81] Andrew Moravcsik explains that: "Liberal theory is analytically prior to both realism and institutionalism because it defines the conditions under which their assumptions hold."[82] However, republican liberalism explains mostly the choices done on the unit-level and

[80] Moravcsik, Andrew: Liberal International Relations Theory: A Social Scientific Assessment. Cambridge, Harvard University, 2001. P.5-6.
[81] Moravcsik, Andrew: Liberal International Relations Theory: A Social Scientific Assessment. Cambridge, Harvard University, 2001. P.16.
[82] Moravcsik, Andrew: Taking preferences seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. In: International Organization, Vol. 51/Nr. 4, 1997, P.516.

does not take into consideration systemic variables. A main problem of theories that only focus on the *Innenpolitik* is that they struggle in explaining why states with similar domestic systems operate differently in the field of foreign relations. Meanwhile, neoclassical realism also takes some of the assumptions of republican liberalism into account, the *Innenpolitik*, while also considering systemic imperatives, which help explain why similar domestic systems can act differently in the international sphere.[83] On top of this, neoclassical realism argues that if one dominant factor is shaping the foreign policy of a state, the analysis should begin with the material power of a state towards other nations of the international system and not internal factors because in its opinion material power is the most dominant factor.[84]

Similar to republican liberalism, neorealism could be a viable theory to explain the relations of Britain and West Germany towards Iran. However, the distribution of capabilities among states is defining the structure of the international system and the unit-level, as has been previously mentioned, is thus not considered.[85] Accordingly, an important part of the decision-making process is ignored by neorealism. These two theories thus lack both important elements for this research project, while neoclassical realism covers these missing aspects.

Other well-known theories of international relations are constructivism and neoliberal institutionalism. The latter theory has gained awareness with the growing importance of multilateral institutions in the international system. Since the Second World War, international institutions have grown in numbers and played a greater role than before. Neoliberal institutionalism argues that institutions can limit the anarchic proportions of the international system through an increased supranational governance. Henceforth, neoliberal institutionalism has some of the core assumptions of neorealism and neoclassical realism, as the international system is also seen as anarchic. Neorealists often criticize that cooperation fails in the international system, but Robert Keohane, one of the founders of neoliberal institutionalism, argues that "our awareness of cooperation's fragility does not require us to accept dogmatic forms of realism" and shows that neoliberal institutionalism does not share every assumption of neorealist theories.[86] Similar to

[83] Gideon, 1998, op. cit., p. 148.
[84] Ibid, p. 150.
[85] Kenneth, Waltz: Realist thought and Neorealist theory. In: Journal of International Affairs, Vol 44/Issue 1 1990, P. 36-37.
[86] Keohane, Robert: International Institutions: Two approaches. In: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, Nr. 4, 1988. P. 381.

neorealism, the lack of analysis on the unit-level discredits neoliberal institutionalism. An analysis of the interdependence between West Germany, Britain and Iran through institutions would not present such a complete picture as neoclassical realism.

On the other side, constructivism doesn't share the common assumption of neoclassical realism. In constructivism "social construction of interests, its relationship between structures and agents, and its multiple logics of anarchy"[87] are important and distinguish it from other theories. Alexander Wendt, the founder of constructivism, highlights the constructivist approach with the phrase: "500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons".[88] Accordingly, states and people, following constructivism, act in world politics along their own understanding of the international system. The identities of other actors, their own beliefs and common practices between states are all part of their understanding.[89] Interests, material power and other important elements of theories like neorealism and neoclassical realism play therefore a less important role in constructivism. Alexander Wendt writes that "the dominant ontology today in mainstream theories of international politics is materialist. […] This approach is clearest in Neorealism, but Neoliberalism seems to be based on it as well. I have defended an idealist or social ontology."[90] Wendt explains that he uses another ontology than the other main theories that are also discussed in this theoretical debate. Their different natures develop in different kinds of analysis which would result in very divergent outcomes for this research project. Neoclassical realism and constructivism would thus analyze the research question in different ways. Constructivism would analyze social constructs that would determine the reaction of Britain and West Germany to the Islamic revolution, while neoclassical realism would consider more empirical and materialistic elements, such as the distribution of power. Both theories have their merits and are proven theories of international relations, but the wide array of analysis on different structural levels with empirical tools gives neoclassical realism more insight for this research project than constructivism.

[87] Hurd, Ian: Constructivism. In: The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. P. 297.
[88] Hurd, Ian: Constructivism. In: The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. P. 297.
[89] Ibid, p. 312-313.
[90] Wendt, Alexander: Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. P. 370-371.

All in all, the theoretical debate has shown that many theories have their merits and could serve as important explanatory tools, but neoclassical realism with its analysis on different levels has the edge. Compared to the other theories, neoclassical realism allows to have a more complete picture of the British and West German relations with Iran and simply offers more insight.

5. The reactions of West Germany and Britain towards the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war

5.1 The West German reaction

The analysis of the West German reaction will start with the systemic incentives of the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war and will conclude with the evaluation of the domestic factors. To start, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) became one of the powerhouses in the European Economic Community (EEC) after the Second World War and its success was largely built on its exports.[91] Before the revolution, the FRG had been an essential trade partner of Iran and was already its largest trading partner in 1952.[92] Therefore, Iran also played a relevant role for West Germany. Besides being a trading partner, Iran invested in the West German industry in the 1970s.[93] Another indication of these fruitful relations between the two states was that West German companies had been commissioned by Teheran to build two nuclear facilities in Bushehr in the Persian Gulf.[94] Furthermore, from a security standpoint, Iran had become a regional power in the Middle East. Additionally, West Germany was one of the main recipients of Iranian oil. In total, the FRG got one fifth of its oil imports from Iran and thus was its biggest supplier.[95]

[91] Schwelling, Birgit: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik und die deutsche Vergangenheit. In: Handbuch zur deutschen Vergangenheit. Ed.: Schmidt et al. Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007. P.102-103.P.88-90.
[92] Bösch 2015, op. cit., p. 322.
[93] Castiglioni, Claudia: The EEC and Iran: From the revolution of 1979 to the Launch of the Critical dialogue in 1992. In: Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 21/Nr. 1, 2015. P. 71.
[94] Tarock, Adam: Iran-Western Europe Relations on the Mend. In: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26/Nr. 1, 1999. P. 54.
[95] Bösch 2015, op. cit., p. 322.

The FRG and Iran shared fruitful bilateral relations, as they had a few state visits in the 1970s. For instance, in 1975, Helmut Schmidt, the West German chancellor, stopped in Iran for two days on the way back from a visit in China.[96] Besides, the Shah had married Soraya Esfandiary Bakhtiary, an Iranian-German woman, in the 1950s, which gained them a lot of positive attention from the German yellow press. Furthermore, thousands of Iranian students studied in West Germany and a German-Iranian University was founded 1974 in Gilan.[97] Likewise, the German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce was established in Teheran in 1975.[98] However, some parts of the German society did not look as sympathetic towards Iran. For instance, many protests took place during the Shah's visit to Germany in 1967.[99] A British report therefore argues that "Of the three Western powers discussed, the Federal Republic's political links with the Shah were the least close. […]".[100] In 1979, the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan caused great concern in West Germany. In a declaration in front of the German Bundestag, Helmut Schmidt said that the Soviet Union had moved closer to the Indian Ocean, the Oil countries and the Persian Gulf through the invasion and could therefore emit more political pressure on the regional states. Moreover, he condemned the invasion, explained that West German interests were affected and demanded that Soviet Union retreated its troops from Afghanistan. [101]

The Islamic revolution in Iran thus came as a shock for West Germany, as it could potentially have many implications for Bonn. Systemic and domestic factors had an effect on the West German response to the successful revolution in Iran. At the beginning, the change of regime was not seen as an immediate threat, because it was unclear which forces in Iran would cement their power. While the economic relations got a hit through the revolution, West Germany remained open to trading with Iran. The maintenance of the economic ties with Iran was also the biggest worry of the European states and generally they were not as critical, as the U.S. towards

[96] Der Spiegel: Article about Helmut Schmidt's visit in Iran, 10.11.1975: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-41389443.html, used on the 22.06.2018.
[97] Bösch 2015, op. cit., p. 322.
[98] Tarock 1999, op. cit., p. 54.
[99] Bösch 2015, op, cit., p. 322.
[100] Browne, N.: British Policy on Iran 1974-1978, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, p.63,: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120308154756/http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/iran-document-british-policy-on-iran, used on the 22.06.2018.
[101] Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany: Declaration of Helmut Schmidt before the Bundestag, 17.01.1980, p. 2-3: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/erklarung_von_helmut_schmidt_vor_dem_bundestag_bonn_17_januar_1980-de-9510b09c-9414-4d3c-8b6f-e86217176885.html, used on the 19.06.2018.

the Islamic revolution, because Europe had not been portrayed as a "Great Satan".[102] More specifically, West Germany profited most from the situation, because France and Britain had previously been involved in the internal affairs of Iran, while Germany had abstained from such an involvement. Anthony Parsons, the British ambassador to Iran from 1974 until 1979, said about the German-Iranian relations that "Germans in Iran were [at the time of the revolution] liked and respected without resentment"[103].

The creation of instability through the revolution was thus the biggest concern for the FRG and put many systemic pressures on West Germany. As Iran was the biggest oil supplier for West Germany, Bonn was worried that the regime change could cause an oil shortage and a security crisis for Western Europe. In his declaration in front of the Bundestag in 1980, Helmut Schmidt warns the parliamentarians that oil price has doubled in 1979 and the supply of oil would make up to 4% of their gross national product (GDP).[104] Moreover, the Shah's regime had been a pillar of the West to contain the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Hence, the Islamic revolution signalized the potential loss of the most essential security partner of the West in the region and the fear prevailed that Iran could fall under Soviet influence. Finally, the Soviet Union failed to ensure strong relations with Iran, partly because Khomeini isolated Iran's communist party after the revolution.[105] The FRG and Western Europe therefore adopted a "wait and see policy" and waited until there was less uncertainty about the political future of Iran.[106] A template for Helmut Schmidt described the policy towards Iran as follows "Not Khomeini, not the Shah, but the potentially rich country [is] our partner."[107]

However, the seizure of the U.S. Embassy on the 4th November 1979 created more tensions between Iran and the West and put a strain on transatlantic relations. In his declaration in front of the Bundestag on the 17th January 1980, Helmut Schmidt said that "we respect the right of the

[102] Tarock, Adam: Iran-Western Europe Relations on the Mend. In: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26/Nr. 1, 1999. P. 44.
[103] Tarock, Adam: Iran-Western Europe Relations on the Mend. In: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26/Nr. 1, 1999. P. 54.
[104]Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany: Declaration of Helmut Schmidt before the Bundestag, 17.01.1980, p. 8: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/erklarung_von_helmut_schmidt_vor_dem_bundestag_bonn_17_januar_1980-de-9510b09c-9414-4d3c-8b6f-e86217176885.html, used on the 20.06.2018.
[105] Emery 2010, op. cit., p. 372.
[106] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p. 75.
[107] Bösch, Frank: Zwischen Shah und Khomeini. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die islamische Revolution in Iran. In: VFZ, 03/2015, P. 324.

Iranian people to determine its own future. But together with our friends of the U.S., together with the governments in the world, together with Security Council of the United Nations, we insist that all states of the world act in accordance with international law and that the hostages get released"[108]. Shortly after the seizure of the embassy, the U.S. froze Iranian assets and created an embargo on Iranian oil exports in order to ramp up the pressure on Iran, but the FRG did not join this oil embargo.[109] Bonn feared that sanctions would further increase the oil price and they were simply against their interest.[110] Ultimately, the pressures from the U.S., the main security partner of the FRG, were too strong and an independent policy was therefore limited. West Germany and other European states could not act radically different from the U.S.[111] In May 1980 the EEC did finally start enacting sanctions on Iran, 5 months after the U.S. had declared its first measures.[112] Finally, the hostage crisis came to an end after 444 days and the German foreign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher and the West German ambassador, Gerhard Ritzels, had played an important role in the release, due to their negotiations with the Iranian regime.[113]

In 1980, the European dependence on Iranian oil had started to decrease, because the EEC countries were worried about a consequential instability within Iran. Furthermore, the start of the Iran-Iraq war did not help in making Iran a more reliable supplier. Accordingly, the oil imports into the EEC had decreased from 829 million $ in January 1980 to 100 million $ in October 1980.[114] Having hit a low in 1981, with an import of oil from Iran worth only one million €, the imports rose again in the following years, but remained below the numbers prior to the revolution.[115] Nonetheless, the Islamic revolution had an impact on the oil market and had repercussions in the FRG. The unemployment rate in West Germany rose in the 1980s due to the

[108]Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany: Declaration of Helmut Schmidt before the Bundestag, 17.01,1980, p. 3: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/erklarung_von_helmut_schmidt_vor_dem_bundestag_bonn_17_januar_1980-de-9510b09c-9414-4d3c-8b6f-e86217176885.html, used on the 20.06.2018.
[109] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p.77.
[110] Bösch 2015, op. cit., p. 339.
[111] Halliday, Fred: An Elusive Normalization: Western Europe and the Iranian Revolution. In: Middle East Journal, Vol. 48/Nr. 2, 1994. P. 312.
[112] Emery 2010, op. cit., p. 373.
[113] Bosch 2015, op. cit., p. 342-348.
[114] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p. 77.
[115] German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce: Data sheet on Iran: https://iran.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_iran/landesinfo/Merkblatt_Iran090924.pdf, used on the 20.07.2018.

second oil crisis and doubled to 2,25 million people in 1982 and 1983.[116] As a matter of fact, the increase of the oil prices by the OPEC-states after the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war caused the biggest recession that the FRG had met in its history.[117] Economically and politically, West Germany was thus in an unstable phase, but it was not a high-threat environment, because the survival of West Germany was not put into question by the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. It was therefore still possible for domestic actors to influence the foreign policy executive.[118]

The Iran-Iraq war lasted from 1980 until 1988 and during that timeframe a lot of changes occurred in the FRG. After being chancellor from 1974 until 1982, Helmut Schmidt's SPD, the Social Democratic Party, had a break with its coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Schmidt was kicked out of office with a vote of no confidence in the German Parliament. Helmut Kohl, from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), entered in a new coalition with the FDP and formed a new government. To gain legitimacy, new elections were planned for 1983 and the CDU and FDP managed to gain a majority of the votes. Hence, Helmut Kohl stayed chancellor and Genscher from the FDP remained foreign minister. Therefore, two different governments were in power during the Iran-Iraq war and naturally had different dynamics in their foreign policies. However, the cornerstones of the German foreign policy were continued by the new government of Helmut Kohl.[119] The discrepancies between the SPD and the CDU were not too big on foreign policy in the federal elections of 1983. The CDU aimed at deepening its ties with its Western partners, as they shared the same values. They claimed that the SPD had forgotten these ties and should finish its political neutrality. A closing of ranks with the U.S. would be in favour of the FRG.[120] Meanwhile, the SPD did not deny at any point its ties to the Western community, but wanted to continue its policy of détente. Furthermore, the SPD claimed that the FRG's external

[116] Wolfrum, Edgar: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In: Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte. Ed.: Gebhardt. Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 2005. P. 427.
[117] Bresselau von Bressensdorf, Agnes: Frieden durch Kommunikation: Das System Genscher und die Entspannungspolitik im Zweiten Kalten Krieg 1979-1982/93. In: Studien zur Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 88, 2015. P. 99.
[118] Ripsman et al. 2009, op. cit., p.186.
[119] Klecha, Stephan: Bundeskanzler in Deutschland. Grundlagen, Funktionen, Typen. Opladen, B. Budrich, 2012. P. 149-152.
[120] CSU-Landesleitung: Electoral Program of the CDU, 1983, p. 13-14: https://www.hss.de/fileadmin/user_upload/HSS/Dokumente/ACSP/Bundestagswahlen/BTW-1983_CDU-CSU.pdf, used on the 25.07.2018.

security was only achievable in the Western community, but their interests were not always the same and the FRG had to represent its own interests.[121]

In 1987, the CDU continued with its stance that the FRG should keep its close ties with the West and that the neutral position of the SPD and the hostile position of its allies, the Greens, towards the Western alliance was a danger.[122] Similarly, the SPD adopted its old position from the last federal elections.[123] Both parties agreed on the importance of the Western and the European community and wanted the reunification of Germany. Their differences lay in the approach because the CDU was in favour of a more traditional foreign policy, while the SPD was trying to build more bridges. The conflicts in the Middle East did not play a significant role in their election campaigns.[124] Therefore, the underlying topic did not summon up notable disagreements between the two parties because the Middle East would have been a more sensitive point of discussion in that case. All in all, West Germany, similarly to other European states, adopted a position of neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war, which was in line with its general approach to foreign affairs, despite the change of government.[125]

In general, the FRG maintained a particularly cautious position in its foreign policy since the Second World War. One of the pillars of its foreign policy was a multilateral approach. Therefore, West Germany was part of NATO and the European community in order to provide security, but also to appease fears of a resurging FRG. West Germany kept trying to make amends after the Second World War and many European states were still wary of Bonn. The membership in these institutions allowed Bonn to be transparent and predictable.[126] Unilateral actions and military power in the international scene became less relevant for West Germany and instead

[121] Board of the SPD: Electoral Program of the SPD, 1983, p. 53: http://library.fes.de/prodok/fa87-04520.pdf, used on the 25.07.2018.
[122] CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle: Electoral Program of the CDU, 1987, p. 8: http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Programme_Bundestag/1987_Wahlprogramm.pdf, used on the 25.07.2018.
[123] Board of the SPD: Electoral Program of the SPD, 1987, p. 39-43: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bibliothek/retro-scans/a87-04013.pdf, used on the 25.07.2018.
[124] Electoral Program of the SPD and CDU, 1987: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bibliothek/retro-scans/a87-04013.pdf; http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Programme_Bundestag/1987_Wahlprogramm.pdf, used on the 25.07. 2018.
[125] Halliday, Fred: An Elusive Normalization: Western Europe and the Iranian Revolution. In: Middle East Journal, Vol. 48/Nr. 2, 1994. P. 312.
[126] Bierling, Stephan: Vormacht wider Willen: Deutsche Außenpolitik von der Wiedervereinigung bis zur Gegenwart. München, C.H. Beck, 2014. P. 14.

commercial politics, international law, diplomacy and multilateralism were the new pillars of its foreign policy.[127] This approach can also be seen in the FRG's policy towards Iran.

The economic ties between Iran and West Germany did not suffer much from the war. Iran was still eager for European imports, while Europe also needed energy supplies. The West German exports towards Iran rose again after a low in 1979. In 1980, the exports were at nearly 1,4 billion € and climbed to an all-time high in 1983 when the FRG exported products worth 3,95 billion € into Iran. In the following years, the exports dropped compared to 1983, but were consistently higher than the low in 1979. However, imports from Iran suffered due to the Islamic revolution, as after 1980 they never reached 1 billion € again, while in 1979 imports were worth over 2,1 billion €.[128] West German companies maintained as well their relations to some sectors during the conflict and the bilateral ties between the two countries got stronger, as the conflict endured.[129] Domestic actors from the West German economy were also keen on supporting good relations with the newly formed Islamic Republic. The managing director of the German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce declared for example that "fortunately the German-Iranian relations are being continued".[130] On top of this, the managing director of the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce claimed that only a few foreign markets were bigger than Iran, despite it having been only a year since the revolution.[131] In the financial sector, Werner Blessing, board member of the Deutsche Bank, stated in 1984 that "Iran has become one of the most important trading partners."[132] The West German economic actors were therefore engaged with the government to maintain good relations with Iran. Good economic relations were also in favour of the West German government, due to economic recession. That the government wanted to maintain commercial relations and that the commercial sector had some success in influencing the foreign policy response of West Germany can be concluded from Hans-Dietrich Genscher's visit in Iran

[127] Bierling 2014, op. cit., p. 18-19.
[128] German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce: Data sheet on Iran: https://iran.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_iran/landesinfo/Merkblatt_Iran090924.pdf, used on the 20.07.2018.
[129] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p.85.
[130] Jannat, Masoud: Iranische Flüchtlinge im deutschen Exil. Probleme einer Abstiegssituation. Marburg, 2005. P. 141-142.
[131] Ibid, p. 142.
[132] Jannat, Masoud: Iranische Flüchtlinge im deutschen Exil. Probleme einer Abstiegssituation. Marburg, 2005. P. 141-142.

in 1984, as the first foreign minister of an ECC-state after the revolution.[133] In an interview after his visit, he said that:

"If we are to have any influence on its policy, we must ensure that Iran is not forced into isolation. It seems to me that Iran is now more open in the area of relations with Western states. This would also serve our interests. There is considerable interest in establishing and developing economic relations with the FRG, in particular."[134]

Genscher visited Iran a second time in 1988 in order to discuss the aftermath of the war and the preparations of a German-Iranian cultural agreement, but also to discuss commercial questions.[135] Another domestic actor who tried to influence the West German government were the exiled Iranians. Prior to the revolution, many Iranians had already been politically active against the Shah, but the West German government tried to restrict their activities in order not to endanger the relations with Iran.[136] After the Islamic revolution, many Iranians had fled the country and in the 1980s between three and four million people left Iran. The FRG was one of the biggest emigration countries of the Iranian community and they continued their fight against Khomeini's regime in West Germany. However, the situation did not improve for the exiled Iranians after the revolution, as the federal government maintained its stance towards Iran to foster commercial relations.[137]

In general, the West German press was critical of the Islamic republic, due to the violence and abuses occurring regularly in the state. Even "the Spiegel" a more leftist paper was critical of Khomeini's regime since the beginning, despite the more common romantic view that leftists had of the revolution in its aftermath because of its anti-imperialistic and revolutionary nature.[138] Ultimately, the economic sector proved to be more successful in its endeavour and managed to influence the foreign policy response. Human rights concerns were less of an issue than the economic factor. The economic sector did hit all the boxes to be an effective influencer of the

[133] Masoud 2005, op. cit., p. 143.
[134] Gerschoffer, Mark: Germany's Iran Policy: Beyond "Critical dialogue". Monterey, 1998. P.30
[135] Jannat 2005, op. cit., p. 144.
[136] Ibid, p. 157.
[137] Ibid, p. 158-159.
[138] Bösch 2015, op. cit., p. 332-334.

foreign policy. They were well-organized, had a single-issue interest and were vote-rich. That's why they had the capabilities to influence the foreign policy executive.[139]

On arms sales, West Germany was a lot more restrictive than other Western powers. The FRG could have been in a good position to sell arms to Iran, but Bonn was restricted by constitutional factors that constrained it from selling arms to either combatant party in the conflict.[140] During the Iran-Iraq war, the FRG only exported arms to Iraq and they only resulted in 0,1% of the worldwide arms sales to Iraq. The arms sales to Iran were even lower, as officially no weapons were sold to the Islamic Republic during the war.[141] Despite these constraints and the position of neutrality of the FRG in the Iran-Iraq conflict, West German private companies took the opportunity and smuggled weapons into Iran and Iraq and defied international laws.[142] Domestically, the West German defence industry was thus in a less favourable position to influence the foreign policy executive.

The softer approach towards the Islamic Republic of Iran was commonly used by the FRG at the world stage. West Germany had a less forceful foreign policy but rather tried building bridges. For example, Helmut Schmidt's government had applied a policy of détente with the Soviet Union in the 1970s. It fit into the new foreign policy where diplomacy and commercial politics were more important than military power.[143] Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war, this approach was at the forefront. In 1987, the U.S. were seeking an intensified presence in the Persian Gulf and simultaneously demanded an increased level of commitment from their European allies. However, the European states saw it as a pretext for the U.S. to act against Iran, which essentially opposed their interest. They feared that U.S. policy towards Iran could cause the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and cause disruptions on the oil market. Finally, many states of the European community did send naval forces to the Persian Gulf because the U.S. were in dire need of minesweepers. However, the FRG did not send any naval vessels into the Persian Gulf but sent forces into the Mediterranean Sea and the English Channel in order to compensate for their allies

[139] Ripsman et al. 2009, op. cit., p. 185.
[140] Halliday 1994, op. cit., p. 313.
[141] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p. 85.
[142] Ibid, p. 83
[143] Bresselau von Bressensdorf 2009, op. Cit., p.131

who had to send naval ships to the Gulf.[144] Therefore, West Germany refrained from being militarily involved in the conflict and maintained a neutral position. Bonn also supported the resolution 598, which was in line with their multilateral and diplomatic approach to international relations.[145] On the 30th September 1988, shortly after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, Genscher highlighted at the 43rd General Assembly of the UN that the path to peace by Iran and Iraq was an encouraging start and appealed to the two states to have negotiations in good faith.[146]

5.2 The British reaction

The analysis of the British reaction will also start with the illustration of systemic constraints and will finish with the evaluation of domestic factors. In general, Britain was not as unpopular as the U.S. in Iran after the revolution, but it was still the least popular state of Western Europe. In the past, the United Kingdom had been involved in the internal politics of Iran. Britain had destroyed the national aspirations of Iran on two separate occasions. The first time, Iran had been divided into two spheres of influence with the help of tsarist Russia and the second time Britain collaborated with the U.S. to overthrow the Mossadeq government in 1953. Consequently, Khomeini called Britain "the aged wolf of imperialism".[147] However, before the revolution, the United Kingdom cherished effective relations with the Shah. Britain was together with the U.S., the only state of the West that had almost daily interactions with the Shah or his confidants.[148] Culturally, the British Council, the United Kingdom's official institute for cultural relations and educational purposes, was active in Iran. Under the reforms of the Shah, English had also become

[144] Devore, Marc: A convenient framework: the Western European Union in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988 and 1990-1991. In: European Security, Vol. 18/Nr. 2, 2009. P. 231-236.
[145] German Government: Speech of Genscher at the 42nd General Assembly of the UN, 26.09.1987: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/1980-1989/1987/94-87_Genscher.html, used on the 03.08.2018.
[146] German Government: Speech of Genscher at the 43th General Assembly of the UN, 30.09.1988: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/1980-1989/1988/120-88_Genscher.html, used on the 03.08.2018.
[147] Tarock, Adam: Iran-Western Europe Relations on the Mend. In: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26/Nr. 1, 1999. P. 58.
[148] Ibid, p. 45.

the first foreign language in Iran and many British experts promoted the language first-hand.[149] Moreover, the operation of the British Council in Iran was their largest in the world, with six branches in the country.[150] Similar to the U.S., Iran was considered as the defender of its security interests in the region and an important supplier of oil by Britain. The United Kingdom had retreated from the Persian Gulf in 1971 and was thus keen on the Shah securing its interests in the region. Furthermore, the Shah had the role for the West to contain the Soviet Union in the region. Regarding the importance of the Iranian oil, Britain received 14% of its oil supply from Teheran. However, Iran controlled the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf where 60% of West Europe's supply of oil flowed through. Fruitful relations with Iran to protect Britain's commercial and security interests were therefore essential.[151]

Iran was the largest export market of Britain in the Middle East prior to the revolution and was generally one of its most important export markets. Therefore, the Middle Eastern country proved to be an essential market for the British industry for emphasizing trade of cars, industrial machine other manufacturing good to Iran.[152] Given their strong military collaboration, the sales of weapons to Iran turned out to be one of Britain's key commercial interests.[153] Between 1973 and 1978, weapon deals worth 1,800 million £ were signed between the two countries and Iran became Britain's most valued arms market. In general, Iran's contracts amounted to thousands of jobs in Britain.[154] On top of this, Iran provided loans to the United Kingdom which further cemented the importance of their ties. Anthony Parson, the British ambassador in Iran from 1974 until 1979 summed up the importance of Iran the following way: "Pahlavi Iran in the Shah's last years was more attractive materially and more important politically to Western Europe than at any previous period in modern history with the possible exception of World War II."[155]

[149] Borjian, Maryam: Bridge or Wall? English Language in Iran. In: New perspectives on UK-Iran cultural relations. Ed.: British Council. London, 2015. P.204.
[150] Kermani, Reza: Higher Education in Iran, and UK-Iran cooperation. In: New perspectives on UK-Iran cultural relations. Ed.: N. Wadham Smith (ed.). London, The British Council, 2015. P. 267.
[151] Posnett, Edward: Treating His Imperial's Majesty's Warts: British Policy towards Iran 1977-79. In: Iranian Studies, Vol. 45/Nr. 1, 2012, P.120.
[152] Smith, Richard: 'Paying Our Way in the World': The FCO, Export Promotion and Iran in the 1970s. In: The Foreign Office, Commerce and British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century by John Fisher, Effie Pedaliu and Richard Smith. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. P. 490. P.487-505.
[153] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p. 71.
[154] Posnett 2012, op. cit., p. 121.
[155] Castiglioni, Claudia: The EEC and Iran: From the revolution of 1979 to the Launch of the Critical dialogue in 1992. In: Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 21/Nr. 1, 2015. P. 73.

The Islamic revolution in 1979 thus resulted in Britain adopting a wary stance, for national interests were suddenly put at stake. The revolution had come as a surprise to Britain, as a report on the British policy on Iran 1974-1978 commissioned by then Foreign Secretary, Lord Owen revealed that "There are a number of possible reasons for the Embassy's failure as opposition developed to warn the FCO earlier of the seriousness of the threat to the regime"[156]. Furthermore, the text manifested "it was not until early September that they became concerned that there was a serious threat to the Shah's regime".[157] With the political change in Iran underway, many questions about Britain's oil supply, weapons deals, security questions and commercial ties remained open. Therefore, Britain conceived together with the other European capitals, the latter of which also shared similar interests in Iran, a "wait and see"-policy towards the uncertain situation in Teheran.[158]

However, the revolution had already an impact on the relations between the two countries, as the British Council was shut down and all foreign teachers were expelled from Iran in order to complete its 'cultural revolution'.[159] The seizure of the U.S. embassy in Teheran and the ensuing seizure of hostages put this approach under pressure. As already mentioned before, the U.S. enacted an oil embargo against Iran, froze assets and later issued sanctions. Due to the many interests in Iran, Britain and the other members of EEC remained united and did not initially partake in the U.S. policy against Iran. The economic damage would have been too grave, as thousands of British jobs were subject to the relations with Teheran. Britain's cautious approach towards Iran was on display when the parliamentarian, John Townend, asked Margaret Thatcher on the 20th November 1979 in the House of Commons if Britain would offer the Shah asylum. Thatcher replied that the situation "is grievous for the American hostages" and that Britain "has great sympathy for President Carter", but "it would be unwise for us to go further than that".[160] However, the systemic pressures from the U.S. were simply overwhelming and did not allow the

[156] Browne, N.: British Policy on Iran 1974-1978, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, p.27: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120308154756/http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/iran-document-british-policy-on-iran, used on the 22.06.2018.
[157] Browne, N.: British Policy on Iran 1974-1978, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, p.27: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120308154756/http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/iran-document-british-policy-on-iran, used on the 22.06.2018.
[158] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p.75.
[159] Borjian, 2015, op. cit., p.207.
[160] Margaret Thatcher Foundation: House of commons PQ, 20 November 1979. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104173, Used on the 27.06.2018.

United Kingdom to act out. Policies in regard to Iran could not be too different compared to the general approach by the U.S.[161]

This is highlighted in a call between Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Schmidt on the 15th January 1980 when Thatcher suggested that: "the Foreign Office tries to be considerate with Iran, but it is not possible for the government due to political reasons."[162] Therefore, the British, together with their European partners, joined the sanctions in April 1980 in order to ensure the release of the hostages. Additionally, in April 1980, the diplomatic relations between Britain and Iran were spiralling downwards because the British Ambassador, Sir John Graham, was released from the Islamic Republic. In autumn, the embassy was closed and put under Swedish protection.[163] Previously, the British Embassy had already been attacked between 1978 and 1979. During these incidents, no staff of the British Embassy was hurt, and the perpetrators were more interested in gathering information and damaging the embassy.[164] As it became clear that the moderate forces in Iran lost out against Khomeini and his fundamental Islamism, Britain realised that it had lost an important ally in the region. The internal British report also mirrored this new reality. It stated that Iran was no longer one of the "most important customers for civil and military exports"[165] and "the privileged access of Western oil companies to Iranian oil has further been eroded"[166]. Furthermore, Western prestige was depleted, and the Soviet Union had more opportunities to advance its interests. Lastly, the new regime was distrustful or even hostile towards the West and tended to prefer radical Islamic states for its partnerships.[167]

[161] Halliday 1994, op. cit., p. 312.
[162] Institut für Zeitgeschichte: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1980. Ed.: Horst Möller. München, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011. P. 82.
[163] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p.82.
[164] Arbuthnott, Hugh et al.: British Missions Around the Gulf, 1575-2005: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman. Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2008. P. 46-49.
[165] Browne, N.: British Policy on Iran 1974-1978, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, p.65: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120308154756/http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/iran-document-british-policy-on-iran, used on the 22.06.2018.
[166] Browne, N.: British Policy on Iran 1974-1978, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, p.65: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120308154756/http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/iran-document-british-policy-on-iran, used on the 22.06.2018.
[167] Browne, N.: British Policy on Iran 1974-1978, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, p.65: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120308154756/http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/iran-document-british-policy-on-iran, used on the 22.06.2018.

Britain tried to maintain some relations with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, but the conflict also heralded a delay of normalizing relations.[168] London remained an economic partner of the Islamic Republic and Britain was an important supplier of arms for Iran during the conflict. Officially, Britain took a stance of impartiality as the Memorandum of Evidence to Selection Committee from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) showed: "In our bilateral dealings with Iran and Iraq over the conflict our policy throughout has been one of strict impartiality".[169] Although, the Minister of State admitted to Britain's efforts in being impartial "facts have increasingly driven us to make statements critical of Iran"[170], because it is responsible "at the moment for the main impetus in continuing the war".[171] On top of this, British private companies exported arms to Iraq and Iran and consequently defied parliamentary control and international law.[172]

During the war, Britain exported arms worth 180 million $ to Iran and was therefore the biggest arms supplier from the European community for the Islamic Republic. However, the United Kingdom also exported arms to Iraq, albeit to a lesser extend with only 16 million $. As a member of the Security Council, Britain was seen by Iran as having connived Iraq's aggression, because London did not demand a withdrawal or cease-fire from Iraq at the beginning of the war. This involvement with Iraq, the military presence of Britain in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and the backing by Iran of Shi'i radicals in Bahrain and Lebanon were factors that put strains on the relationship between the two states during the 80s.[173] Moreover, the occupation of the Iranian embassy in London in April 1980 by Iranian separatists and a violent demonstration by Iranian students outside the American embassy in London further soured the mood, as these events led to demonstrations against the British embassy in Teheran and eventually to its closure.[174]

[168] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p. 81.
[169] Gray, Christine: The British Position with Regard to the Gulf Conflict (Iran-Iraq): Part 2. In: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 40/No. 2, 1991. P. 464.
[170] Gray, Christine: The British Position with Regard to the Gulf Conflict (Iran-Iraq): Part 2. In: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 40/No. 2, 1991. P. 466.
[171] Gray, Christine: The British Position with Regard to the Gulf Conflict (Iran-Iraq): Part 2. In: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 40/No. 2, 1991. P. 466.
[172] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p. 83.
[173] Halliday 1994, op. cit., p. 312.
[174] Change Institute: The Iranian Muslim Community in England. Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities. London, Communities and Local Government, 2009. P. 22

Nonetheless, Britain was, together with Italy and West Germany, one of the countries that tried to sustain its economic relations with Iran. The Islamic Republic was still in demand of European imports and Europe always was in need for oil. Therefore, during the conflict, British companies remained in contact with some Iranian sectors, similar to West Germany.[175] The trade between the two nations fluctuated heavily between the outbreak of the Islamic revolution and the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Goods worth 952 million $ were exported to Iran in 1983, but also dropped to only 440 million $ in 1988.[176] Meanwhile, Iran's exports to Britain also fluctuated a lot in the 1980s. In 1985, Iran exported goods worth only 72,7 million $, but three years later, the Islamic Republic exported goods worth 769 million $ to Britain.[177] Despite these fluctuations, it proves that both states continued to trade. Mr. Eldon Griffith, the chairman of the British-Iranian parliamentary group in the House of Commons, who also happened to have a directorship in a large British engineering group and aided British banking and transport enterprises in Iran, illustrated in 1980 that he regretted the sanctions and was sceptical of their success. Nevertheless, Griffith also supported the sanctions due to the hostage situation and to support the U.S.[178] In the following years, Britain continued trade missions to Iran, the Birmingham Chamber of Industry and Commerce made a visit in 1983 for example, which shows that the British industrial and commercial sectors were engaged in maintaining the relations.[179] At the beginning of Thatcher's mandate as Prime Minister, she tried to restructure the British economy, because the nation had economic troubles in the 1970s. However, as repercussion of these reforms, the unemployment surged from one million in 1979 to three million by 1983.[180] The dire situation of the United Kingdom during the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, meant that it was in the interest of

[175] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p. 85.
[176] UK Data Service: Trade Statistics of the United Kingdom: http://stats.ukdataservice.ac.uk/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DOTS#, used on the 24.07.2018.
[177] UK Data Service: Trade Statistics of Iran: http://stats.ukdataservice.ac.uk/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DOTS#, used on the 24-07.2018.
[178] UK Parliament: Hansard of the British Parliament, 13 May 1980, Colum 1104: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1980-05-13/debates/b7ab845c-a13b-4928-a548-3db1e1f84c48/PowersWithRespectToCertainContractsRelatingToOrConnectedWithIran?highlight=iran%20business#contribution-d45a8a9b-e1c3-4f95-bb14-48a9e8ae8046, used on the 02.08.2018.
[179] UK Parliament: British Trade Mission, 1982-1983, Volume 46, Column 27.: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1983-07-18/debates/793fbbdd-33af-4bf4-9b00-44fe783d5cc0/TradeMissions?highlight=iran%20commerce#contribution-fcd4c000-2b42-40a1-8dfc-1bc6ad0d05b7, used on the 02.08.2018.
[180] Blair, Alasdair: Britain and the World since 1945. Abington, Routledge, 2015. P. 94.

the government to uphold economic relations with Teheran, which gave domestic economic actors leverage.

As already mentioned, the U.S. had been seeking a larger presence in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and had therefore asked its European allies for more commitment.[181] At the beginning, European states refrained from any action in the gulf and Thatcher even asked Reagan that he should not to bring the topic up in the G7 summit, as he would not garner a majority.[182] However, in the end, Britain did send a fleet because the U.S. were not prepared to counter mines and the operation took place under the structure of the Western European Union (WEU). In total, three destroyers, four minesweepers and two logistical ships from the Royal Navy participated in the mission.[183] Britain justified its presence in the Persian Gulf by claiming that it was its right to protect the British Flag and British owned ships in international waters. [184] During the conflict, Britain also was the closest ally of the U.S. and continued to defend the superpower's stance. The U.S. took for example action against Iranian gunboats, after a U.S. frigate had been damaged by a mine, and Britain defended the action of the U.S. On top of this, in 1988, the U.S. shot down an Iranian Airbus and 290 persons were killed. The U.S. justified the action by claiming that the captain of the USS Vincennes had thought that an Iranian military aircraft was approaching and had thus acted in self-defence.[185] Shortly after the incident, the British government released a written statement: "We understand that, in the course of an engagement following an Iranian attack on U.S. forces, warnings were given to an unidentified aircraft apparently closing with a U.S. warship, but these warning received no response. We fully accept the right of forces engaged in such hostilities to defend themselves."[186]

Domestically, the British Press had different opinions about the conflict and was not acting united. Following neoclassical realist logic, the ability of the British press to influence the foreign policy of the United Kingdom was thus limited. An example is the UN Security Council resolution 598 where the Guardian was critical of the U.S. and was in favour of a peaceful approach.

[181] Devore, Marc: A convenient framework: the Western European Union in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988 and 1990-1991. In: European Security, Vol. 18/Nr. 2, 2009. P. 231.
[182] Ibid, p. 232.
[183] Devore 2009, op. cit., p.235-236.
[184] Gray 1991, op. cit., p. 464.
[185] Ibid, p. 469-471.
[186] Margaret Thatcher Foundation: Written Statement on destruction of Iranian airbus: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107283, used on the 09.07.2018.

Meanwhile, the Times was more aggressive towards Iran and the Financial Times was uncertain on how to deal with the Islamic Republic.[187] However, this disarray was not surprising, as these newspapers represented different ideological camps and had therefore different views. In general, the British Press was interested in the conflict when a British dimension was involved and saw the Arab-Israeli conflict as a more urgent issue.[188]

Another domestic player, the members of legislature, had at times a different opinion than the executive power. The Labour party opposed the British naval presence in the Persian Gulf and condemned the U-turn of the government's policy in that regard.[189] This fell in line with the radicalization of the Labour Party after their electoral defeat. Michael Foot replaced James Callaghan as leader of the Labour Party and was from the left-wing camp of the party. They were critical of the Conservative's foreign policy approach and derogatory towards transatlantic relations, the European Community and British nuclear deterrence.[190] In 1983, Labour lost the elections by a large margin and Michael Foot was replaced by Neil Kinnock, another leftist of the party. Despite the loss, the general policy on foreign affairs was not changed by the new leadership and they remained hostile towards NATO and the U.S.[191] In the meantime, Margaret Thatcher's government had moved to the right, which reduced Labour's ability to influence the foreign security policy. Additionally, the Conservatives called out Labour for being weak in their foreign policy and were successful with this approach, which further reduced the ability of Labour to influence the foreign policy. Furthermore, electoral defeats caused Labour to have even less leverage. Meanwhile, the Conservative's foreign policy had been popular with the British electorate, as the Falkland war attests for example.[192] Thatcher's foreign policy was also marked by a resurgence of the U.S.-British alliance, which she elaborated upon: "We must never again find ourselves on the opposite side to the United States in a major international crisis affecting Britain's interests."[193] However, Britain did not always comply to the U.S., especially when

[187] Robins, Philip: A Feeling of Disappointment: The British Press and the Gulf Conflict. In: International Affairs, Vol. 64/Nr. 4, 1988. P. 590-591.
[188] Ibid, p. 596.
[189] Robins 1988, op. cit., p. 591.
[190] Vickers, Rhiannon: The Labour Party and the World: Labour's Foreign Policy since 1951. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011. P. 127.
[191] Ibid, p. 132-133.
[192] Ibid, p. 149.
[193] Blair, Alasdair: Britain and the World since 1945. Abington, Routledge, 2015. P. 105.

economic interests were at stake.[194] In general, Thatcher tried to elevate Britain back "to the top table"[195], after decades in decline.[196]

The Iranian diaspora in the United Kingdom could also have been a community which could have theoretically influenced the foreign policy of response of London. Similar to other Western countries, Britain was hit by the mass exodus of Iranians after the Islamic revolution, albeit to a lesser extent than other countries.[197] Furthermore, the Iranian civilian sector already existed in the United Kingdom and consists of secular, religious, business and student organisations.[198] However, most of these organisations were created in the 1990s and they were not well connected to the British government and lacked in knowledge about public structures.[199] Therefore, the impact of the Iranian community, as a domestic actor in the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war was limited.

In the end, Britain cautiously welcomed the acceptance of the UN resolution 598 by Iran on the 18th July 1988. Furthermore, London also welcomed the creation of UNIIMOG (the UN Iraq Iran Military Observers Group) which envisaged to monitor the ceasefire process between Iraq and Iran. Additionally, Britain, the Netherlands and Belgium cleared a shipping path from mines in the Strait of Hormuz after the end of the conflict. Lastly, Britain restored full diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran on the 10th November 1988 and showed that London was keen in bettering their relations. However, due to an interference by Iran in the internal affairs of Britain, the diplomatic relations were already severed again on the 7th March 1989.[200]

[194] Blair 2015, op. cit., p. 106.
[195] Blair, Alasdair: Britain and the World since 1945. Abington, Routledge, 2015. P. 95.
[196] Ibid, p. 95.
[197] Change Institute: The Iranian Muslim Community in England. Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities. London, Communities and Local Government, 2009. P.23-24.
[198] Change Institute 2009, op. cit., p. 47-50.
[199] Ibid, p. 10.
[200] Gray 1991, op. cit., p. 471-472.

5.3 Comparison and classification of the British and West German reactions

Prior to the Islamic revolution, West Germany and Britain had both close relations with Iran. These relations were not only commercial, but they had also political and cultural ties with Teheran. The revolution was unexpected for both countries and put these good connections with Iran into question, as a report on the British policy in Iran by the British government illustrates: "The French and Germans also did no better than the British. […] The Germans closely followed American assessments and did not question them"[201]. The theoretical framework by Ripsman and his colleagues, which was provided in the theoretical part, will be used to make the comparison between the reaction of West Germany and Britain to the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. On top of this, the framework will not only compare the two reactions, but also determine to which world Britain and West Germany belonged. The theory lent itself to showcasing that the two worlds that come into play for the reaction of Britain and West Germany are World 1 and World 2.

The West German foreign policy response to the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war would be best suited in World 2. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the loss of a strategic partner with the abdication of the Shah, a new oil crisis due to the revolution and the Iran-Iraq war as well as pressure from the U.S. to follow them on their actions against the new regime were all clear constraints from the international system that West Germany was faced with in the aftermath of the revolution. However, it was more difficult to form a clear foreign policy response. A tough approach against Iran and sanctions were not seen as favourable in Bonn, but it was a stance that was pushed by the U.S. Domestically, most major players were in favour of a softer approach towards Iran, as can be seen at the reaction of the West German economic community. The domestic reaction also fell in line with the FRG trying to be militarily abstinent, having a restraining foreign policy and not trying to play the game of power politics after its crimes of the Second World War.[202] West Germany tried to act in domains where it was not bound by its past,

[201]Browne, N.: British Policy on Iran 1974-1978, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, p. 32: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120308154756/http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/iran-document-british-policy-on-iran, used on the 22.06.2018.
[202] Schwelling 200, op. cit., p.102-103.

such as the economy and diplomacy.[203] This approach was shared and respected by all the major domestic West German actors and the FRG tried to apply it during the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. Therefore, Bonn did adopt a "wait and see"-policy together with the other ECC members, including Britain, after the Islamic revolution in order to protect their interests.[204] Although West Germany did comply to the U.S. sanctions at one point, Bonn tried to maintain commercial relations with Iran and did not abide to every U.S. demand, as the FRG did for example not send any ships into the Persian Gulf, due to domestic constraints. In general, West Germany maintained better relations with Iran during the Iran-Iraq conflict than other Western countries. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FRG's foreign minister, was for example the first Western foreign minister to visit post-revolutionary Iran. Therefore, World 2 would best describe the German foreign policy response. The FRG picked its foreign policy response due to domestic factors and managed withstand some of the pressures from the international system, as they were the Western state having the best relations with the Islamic Republic.

Likewise, the United Kingdom's reaction was also well suited for World 2. They faced the same incentives and constraints from the international system as West Germany. Britain was also dependent on Iranian oil, worried by the Soviet invasion and pressured by the U.S. In theory, Britain did not have an optimal response and was split between its commercial interests in Iran and its close ties with the U.S. In the end, Britain was more in line with the foreign policy response of the U.S. However, similar to the FRG, Britain was interested in maintaining relations with Iran, as many jobs were tied to it. Domestically, actors of the British economy were interested in good relations with Iran on these grounds because the Islamic Republic was one of its larger trading partners. As already mentioned, Britain, together with West Germany and the other states of EEC, adopted a "wait and see"-policy towards Iran, but had to join the U.S. sanctions later on.[205] During the Iran-Iraq war, the foreign policy of Margaret Thatcher was more active than West Germany's, as can be seen in the Falkland war. The United Kingdom was less afraid to show military power and had a more traditional foreign policy. Britain was also closer to the U.S. in the Iran-Iraq war than West Germany. An example was the British naval presence in the Persian Gulf in 1987.

[203] Staack, Michael: Deutschland als Wirtschaftsmacht. In: Handbuch zur deutschen Vergangenheit. Ed.: Schmidt et al., Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007. P.88-89.
[204] Castiglioni, Claudia: The EEC and Iran: From the revolution of 1979 to the Launch of the Critical dialogue in 1992. In: Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 21/Nr. 1, 2015. P. 75.
[205] Castiglioni 2015, op. cit., p. 75.

Despite these strained relations due to several bilateral issues, Britain managed to maintain commercial relations with Iran. In Britain, political actors were more divided than in West Germany, but the opposition had not many ways to influence the foreign policy executive. Other domestic actors were generally divided and did not have much influence, except the British commercial and industrial sectors. All in all, British domestic actors did not influence the foreign policy that greatly and it was more driven by national interest. However, some domestic actors, like the above-mentioned commercial and industrial sectors, managed to influence the foreign policy response. Furthermore, Britain responded appropriately and thus does not adhere to World 1. Therefore, World 2 describes best the British foreign policy response, as the domestic actors not only affected the timing and styling of the foreign policy response, but also its nature.[206]

Ripsman and his colleagues write that neoclassical realism is the most useful in explaining the foreign policy decisions of World 2. Neoclassical realism remains insightful to explain the behaviour in World 1, however only to explain dysfunctional behaviour. Meanwhile, the theory does not provide any useful explanations for World 3 and 4.[207] Therefore, it can be concluded that neoclassical realism was useful to explain the West German and British reaction to the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war.

6. Conclusion

To start, this research project tried to answer the question "To what extent can neoclassical realism explain West German and British relations with Iran after the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war?", as well as the two country-specific sub-questions.

The first chapter explained the historical premises of the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war in order to clear the facts before the theoretical analysis. Major parts of the Iranian population had not been happy with the Shah's regime which led to the revolution. After the Shah's abdication, Khomeini managed to consolidate the power around him and created his theocratic

[206] Ripsman et al. 2009, op. cit., p. 282-283.
[207] Ibid, p. 283.

regime. In general, the new Islamic Republic had a foreign policy that was anti-western and tried to spread its revolutionary ideology throughout the region. This premise also set the mood for the Iran-Iraq war, and shortly after Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. Ultimately, the conflict lasted eight years and brought Iran close to a breakdown.

In the following segment, a look was taken at the theoretical lens. Neoclassical realism was chosen as the adequate theory because it was needed to answer the research question, but also due to the fact that it offered a unique vantage point. Neoclassical realism is based on neorealism, but also takes other factors into account. These give the theory a new perspective as it does not only fixate on systemic pressures. Like neorealism, neoclassical realism considers systemic pressures as the main cause that shapes the behaviour of states in the international system and they both advocate that the international system is anarchic. However, neoclassical realism also takes domestic factors into account, which are discarded by other structuralist theories. Henceforth, domestic factors such as the industrial sector or coalition politics can influence the response of a state to an international threat. Subsequently, a framework was introduced that presented four worlds that each had a different compliance with neoclassical realism. Accordingly, this framework also provided the ability to conclude to what extent neoclassical realism could explain the reactions of West Germany and Britain. The theoretical debate illustrated why neoclassical realism was chosen to explain the research question instead of another theory like neoliberal institutionalism. The specificity of neoclassical realism to include systemic and domestic factors gave this theory an edge in the debate.

In the analytical part, the West German reaction to the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war was first researched. As systemic pressures are the biggest factors that shape the foreign policy response in neoclassical realism, these pressures were first elaborated. For the FRG, a dependence on Iranian oil, the worsening relation of the U.S. with Iran, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union were all systemic factors that shaped the national interest and presented clear information on its constraints and incentives in the international system. A theocratic Iranian regime with no regards to human rights as well as the United States tried to push Bonn to a tougher stance against Teheran. However, West Germany also had many domestic factors that were in favour of maintaining good relations with the Islamic Republic. A changed Germany with new principles in its foreign policy after the Second World War was more set on cooperation and

diplomacy. Bonn tried not to join the power politics, but was more set on a policy of détente, as for example with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, West Germany tried to play a role internationally through its position as an economic powerhouse. Unsurprisingly, West Germany was also the biggest trading partner of the Islamic Republic. Bonn thus had many domestic interests in maintaining these relations, which can also be seen in recent times, as the commercial and industrial sectors have a lot of influence in Germany. Consequently, domestic factors shaped the foreign policy response of West Germany and not only systemic pressures. Therefore, in the theoretical framework, the FRG adhered to the World 2 and was a good case study for neoclassical realism.

Afterwards, the British reaction to the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war was analysed with neoclassical realism. Similar to West Germany, Britain had good relations with Iran prior to the revolution and faced the same systemic challenges. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the loss of Iran as an oil supplier and a security partner, combined with the U.S. exerting pressure after the hostage crisis were all factors that formed a clear international threat. On top of this, Britain was seen less favourable by Iran than the FRG due to their past in the region. However, Great Britain wanted to maintain its good commercial relations with Iran and therefore also stemmed itself against the U.S. sanctions in the beginning. As different factors strained the bilateral relationship between Iran and Britain, London positioned itself closer again with its traditional closest ally, the United States. Moreover, Britain had a more traditional foreign policy and shied less away from military action than West Germany, as can be seen in the Falkland War. Domestically, not many actors tried to influence the foreign policy response of Britain and they mostly agreed on the course set by the government. Nonetheless, the British commercial and industrial sectors were in favour of maintaining commercial relations, as many jobs were tied to it and Iran was an important trading partner. Politically, Labour agreed mostly with the Conservative's course, but they radicalized over the years and were for example opposed to British naval presence in the Persian Gulf. However, their electoral results were bad and thus did not have much leverage. All in all, Britain was part of World 2, as they did have clear incentives and constraints from the international system, but still could form their own response to an extent. An optimal response did not exist**.**

In conclusion, the theoretical framework illustrated to what extent neoclassical realism can explain the reaction of the two European states and therefore gave the answer to the research question and the specific sub-questions. Neoclassical realism was suited for the task and the analysis fit into the theoretical framework, as the systemic pressures and domestic factors were considered. The theory granted the tools to attempt the objectives of this research project and to content the argument made. However, a lacking point in the argument were domestic factors, as this part could have been expanded. Henceforth, this research project also had its limitations. At times, the research material on domestic factors was insufficient and somewhat limited the output that domestic factors could have had as an intervening variable. For instance, material on the reaction of the West German or British press was inadequate. Moreover, some files were still confidential, not available online or were simply lacking valuable information, as not everything from the 1980s has been digitalized. A wide array of literature was not always available, as the British and German relations with Iran in the 1980s have not been researched as elaborately compared to other periods of time. These constraints limited the potential that the research question and topic could have had. Nonetheless, the thesis provided valuable insight into the West German and British relations with Iran and more research could be done on the topic. Neoclassical realism is one of many theories and a similar case study would be possible with another one. A case study with constructivism or neorealism would be interesting and would demonstrate which theory is able to provide more insight. Similarly, a case study on other European states, like France and Italy, and their reaction to the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war could be analyzed with neoclassical realism. All in all, Iran is a topic that deserves more research, as it is a recurring hotspot in the international system. The JCPOA has raised tensions in the international sphere and more research is henceforth invaluable to better understand the reasoning and motivations of states. This research project revealed the approach of West Germany and Britain to Iran in the 1980s and can be traced back to the present. Britain and Germany are two key players in maintaining the JCPOA and are eager to engage with the Islamic Republic. After the Islamic revolution, both states were also open in maintaining their relations and kept engaging Iran. Therefore, they differ from the U.S. and the basis of this split was built in the 1980s. Hence, more research into this topic is deserved, as Iran will continue to play an important role on the world stage in the future.

Ultimately, the British and West German reaction to the change in Iran tended to differ from the U.S. The will to better relations with Iran could also be seen in 1989 after Khomeini's

death when the Islamic Republic tried to be more open. In the following decades, this will to engage Iran could be seen again, despite setbacks. On the 7th August 2018, the renewed sanctions of the U.S. against Iran entered into force, after their withdrawal from the JCPOA. The foreign ministers of Britain, Germany and France declared in a joint statement: "We deeply regret the re-imposition of sanctions by the U.S."[208], and it was the latest example of the British and German approach towards the Islamic Republic.

[208] De Carbonnel, Alissa: EU aims to block U.S sanction on Iran. Reuters, 06.08.2018: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-sanctions-eu/eu-deeply-regrets-snapback-of-u-s-sanctions-on-iran-idUSKBN1KR1A9, used on the 06.08.2018.

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