Return of the South Sudanese to Khartoum

(re)Claiming Their Right to the City as Urban Refugees

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UTRECHT UNIVERSITY | MSC INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

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II. List of Abbreviations

CPA-Comprehensive Peace Agreement
COR-Commission on Refugees
IDP-Internally Displaced Persons
IGO-Intergovernmental Agency
NGO-Non-Governmental Agency
HAC-Humanitarian Aid Commission
NCP-National Congress Party
SDG-Sudanese Pound
SPLA-Southern Peoples Liberation Army
SPLM-Southern Peoples Liberation Movement
UNHCR-United Nations High Commission on Refugees
UNHCOHR-United Nations High Commission on Human Rights

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IV.   Abstract

In 2011 South Sudan officially seceded from Sudan, after decades of conflict. Due to this prior conflict many Southern Sudanese sought refuge in the more stable northern cities particularly Khartoum. With secession occurring thousands of South Sudanese began to depart the city to return to the city that had seen rapid development years prior to secession. The South Sudanese who left Khartoum hoped that this secession would lead to better and safer livelihoods, where they would no longer be politically and economically marginalized. However, this hope did not last long, as the South Sudanese Civil War broke out in 2013. This was the cause of a new wave of South Sudanese returning to Sudan and Khartoum however in a much different circumstance as refugees from a foreign country. The South Sudanese who have returned to Khartoum, face much greater struggles as they are a subset of the urban-poor, as urban refugees. Because of the South Sudanese returning as urban refugees, they are granted even less access to urban amenities and urban rights than before secession. However, there are efforts of the South Sudanese in reclaiming their urban rights and access to the city. This reclamation ultimately improves their livelihoods and creates dynamics that promote more inclusivity within the city. This reclamation of their right to the city, will be investigated, by looking at the South Sudanese population living in greater Khartoum (1) Individual Rights, (2) Household Rights, (3) Neighborhood and City Rights. Furthermore, this will be further explained by how the South Sudanese legal experience, experience with the social dynamics of the city, and finally their experience with the Urban Land Nexus.

V. Introduction

For the majority of Sudanese history, there has almost always been constant conflict. This conflict has primarily been played out in the rural communities. These areas are where the Sudanese government's power is not prevalent, and where populations that are politically and economically marginalized are dominant (Gisselquist & Prunier, 2003). The most relevant of these conflicts in the context of this research has occurred in what is now the country of South Sudan, which was created following a peace agreement with the Khartoum government as well as a 2011 referendum on secession. Many of the Southern Sudanese during this prolonged conflict have had their livelihoods endangered and have been forced to remove themselves from the conflict areas, which led them to relocate as IDPs prior to 2011, and now as refugees. Many of these southern residents that have been forcefully displaced, seek out assistance from UNHCR and the UNOHCHR, and their many tent villages. However, many of these displaced people are attracted like others by the attraction and pull factor of cities as it offers the promise of improved livelihoods. This promise along with Khartoum's stability has caused the city to have a rapidly growing population of Southern Sudanese urban IDPs prior to secession, and urban refugees following secessoin.

In January of 2011, South Sudan ultimately declared its independence through a referendum that overwhelmingly favored secession (Rolandsen et al, 2015). This created a new multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state, which had the capability of becoming a new home for thousands of displaced southerners (Williamson, 2011). Along with this new-found independence, many of the Southern Sudanese that resided in Khartoum left the city in even greater numbers than following the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement), to their new country and homeland (Schultz, 2014). Many Southern Sudanese living in Khartoum saw this move as a way to vastly improve their livelihoods, and to no longer be marginalized as they once were.

Following independence, leadership in South Sudan was segmented and weak. This eventually turned into conflict within the Southern People's Liberation Movement (the governing party of South Sudan following independence) and devolved into what is now the ongoing South Sudanese Civil War (Rolandsen et al, 2015). This created a situation where the newly returned South Sudanese, have returned to a situation where they must seek refuge, thus many returned to Khartoum. Although prior to the secession, these South Sudanese did not have the same status as

certain classes in Khartoum, they still had basic rights, and had greater access to improve their livelihoods. However, since the secession, the South Sudanese are left with fewer urban rights and have an even more limited capability to shape the city. Furthermore, it must be recognized that this population faces elevated vulnerabilities than before as urban refugees rather than IDPs living in urban areas. As urban refugees, they often forfeit protections guaranteed by the UNHCR, and experience xenophobic attitudes from locals, furthermore urban refugees lack legal grounds within the host country (Jacobsen, 2006). This in contrast to their position prior to secession where they retained many of their legal rights, as well as were granted protection by multiple UN organizations as well as the country where the conflict is occurring. It must be explored how this population, seeks to regain their right to the city, and by doing so advance their coping capability to counter the vulnerabilities that they now face within Khartoum.

The numbers of displaced people that exists in Sudan is massive. From the Second Sudanese war alone, there are more than 3.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Additionally, there are over 812,000 South Sudanese who are registered refugees or asylum seekers, from the most recent South Sudanese Civil War that are residing in Sudan (UNHCR, 2017). Most of this specific displaced population noted by the UNHCR from the South

Figure 1
Distribution of South Sudanese
Refugees by State

Sudanese Civil War, is currently residing or has resided at one point in time within UNHCR camps located throughout the Sudanese states that share a border with South Sudan. However, as we can see in figure 1, the largest concentration of South Sudanese refugees is within Khartoum State. Within Khartoum, this number can even be greater as many of these refugees are undocumented and are living in the periphery of Khartoum as they are essentially a hidden populous of the urban poor as urban refugees.

The South Sudanese residents of Khartoum, who are the focus of this research are not identified as refugees in the conventional sense; but instead as individuals who have went through the legal process of applying for asylum and refuge. But are residing within Khartoum as "urban refugees", who are in a sense "hidden" from institutional powers including IGOs, NGOs and the Sudanese Government. These South Sudanese who have returned to Khartoum formerly lived and made their livelihoods in the city prior to the secession of South Sudan. This group like other urban refugees who can be distinguished as being hidden due to the fact, that they are often not registered with the UNHCR, and therefore not identified as refugees, and are not protected by any IGOs, such as the UNHCR.

This group is part of the lowest echelon of society and is often treated as such within the city. This group of urban refugees share the same struggles as newly arrived economic migrants and other refugees; however, a main distinction is that the South Sudanese often have had prior experience with the city before their most recent arrival. The legal ambiguity of these residents, as well as the social dynamics of the community affects how these South Sudanese access various urban assets and amenities which have a great impact on their livelihoods. These South Sudanese ultimately have little right to the city. In theory all residents of the city should be able to claim their right to the city and be able to participate in the decision-making processes that shape the city, as well as being able to access the public amenities found commonly within the urban space. This inability for the South Sudanese to properly claim their "Right to the City" becomes a major overarching issue, as certain urban amenities that could improve their livelihoods become difficult to access and development becomes non-inclusive. It is important to understand in what ways are these South Sudanese residents are attempting to reclaim their right to the city, and to what extent are they able to engage and participate in urban development planning. The objective of this research is:

"To analyze how South Sudanese reintegrate themselves in the urban space of Khartoum and claim their "Right to the City" in first class neighborhoods."

This research is meant to fill the gap on the actions of the urban refugees in claiming a right to the city, or in this rare case, "reclaim". With these residents having already once been able to claim their right to the city under different legal means, and the fact that now they must reclaim their accesses to the city assets adds a uniqueness to this research, that must be investigated. Furthermore, this research will further explain the relationship between urban refugees and how they interact with the urban land nexus, which is the interaction and usages of land within the urban sphere. Finally, the little research that has been done in Khartoum focusing on South Sudanese post secession, does not focus on how there is an effort of South Sudanese claiming their right to the city in the sense that David Harvey and another urban sociologist have described. Furthermore, this research sets itself further apart from other research by focusing on more affluent first-class neighborhoods, rather than peripheral neighborhoods. Within this research there has been an exploration in how this hidden population interacts within the city and improves their livelihoods. This research seeks to answer the main question of

"How do the South Sudanese in Khartoum, reclaim their "Right to the City", and gain access to urban amenities that improve and sustain their livelihoods"

To answer this main research question, the following sub questions must be further answered:
a) *How does the legal context, and status of being an urban refugee affect the South Sudanese residing within Khartoum?*
b) *How do these South Sudanese use the knowledge of the city to gain access to the urban assets and services found within the city, that can improve their livelihoods?*
c) *How do the South Sudanese interact with the urban land nexus, to shape the development of Khartoum?*
d) *How has the experiences of the South Sudanese changed in the context of the "right to the city" following secession?*

This research also serves both academic relevance, as well as developmental relevance. Academic work on urban refugees, commonly highlights the hidden nature of these urban residents, as well as critiques the failures of the UNHCR to properly protect them. However, there is very limited literature of how urban refugees interact within the city, particularly in the discussion of improvement in livelihoods and urban rights. This research furthers the discussion of how urbanites deserve a right to the city and should have an input in how the city is shaped. Khartoum also serves as a unique case study as it historically has had an extremely high number of both IDPs, and refugees. Additionally, a new phenomenon that is affecting the city is the South Sudanese are returning to Khartoum, not as IDPs as they once were but as refugees. This research's purpose to expand thought and discussion about how resettlement occurs particularly with displaced persons and fills the research gap on how urban refugees attempt to (re)claim certain urban rights.

The issues' pertaining to urban refugees has extreme importance regarding human development. As the city of Khartoum is not only a host to South Sudanese and IDPs from South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur, but also houses refugees from Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Syria. Thus, the challenges that these South Sudanese face, are often not limited to this group but to a large broad portion of the population living in Khartoum. These groups face many challenges and risks that limit their livelihoods, and wellbeing. By analyzing the urban sphere, we can distinguish specific vulnerabilities that urban refugees face. This will be done through a right to the city scope, in distinguishing how these urban refugees are able to claim basic urban rights and are able to improve their livelihoods through more inclusive growth.

This thesis is structured in a manner that introduces the theoretical concepts followed by a geographical and historical context, and a discussion on the methodology. This thesis will then focus on each sub question individually, answering each one from a qualitative point of view. This thesis will then synthesize the answers from the sub questions to answer the main research question and conclude with a discussion.

VI.   Theoretical Framework

The subject of this research is to analyze how the South Sudanese population, of Khartoum engage in reclaiming there right to the city in basic regards of the urban land nexus, infrastructure and public works, all of which fundamentally shape the city as well as their own livelihoods. This theoretical overview has been based on relevant literature that introduces the concept of the right to the city specifically in the context of a developing state, as well as how in involves urban refugees. The right to the city coined by French philosopher Henri Lefebvre, and later elaborated by scholars such as David Harvey, calls for urban residents of the city to participate in the decision-making process that shapes the development and transformation of urban space in which they reside within. This right to the city will be further analyzed to a specific population, which has extremely limited rights. The South Sudanese community within Khartoum can be classified as urban refugees, and are part of a hidden population, that is further alienated within society. This theoretical framework chapter is the academic background within which this research is embedded.

A.   Right to the City in Theory

In 1968, the French sociologist and philosopher Henri Lefebvre advocated and made the call for more cities to be inclusive and self-governing, this has resonated among urban social movements as well as urban academia all over the world. In his work, Le Droit á la Ville ("Right to the City") encouraged a new kind of human right for citizens to produce urban life on their own terms, stating that urban residents should act in a primary role in any decision shaping shared urban space, including within the urban land nexus (Lefebvre 1996 [1968]). Lefebvre saw urban inhabitants as the key to political inclusion which are granted various forms of urban rights. These urban rights can be as basic as representation, to more complex ones such as deciding how the city will be shaped. This concept that the residents of the city should have a voice in how urban space is organized and constructed is the principal idea that encompasses the other approaches that are within the field of modern urban theory that will be used within this research.

It must be recognized specifically in the case of Sudan, to clarify the phrase and idea of the "right to the city". Marcuse (2014), identifies no less than 6 different readings of Lefebevre's original work with different perspectives. Some of these perspectives can be observed as being quite radical, going as far as calling for a revolution of the urbanite. In the context of Khartoum,

it is important to make clear, that this perspective will not be applied in this research given the conservative nature of Sudan. Rather, this research will consider the right to the city as an inclusion of the urbanite and the granting of various "urban rights" (Marcuse, 2010, Ologheln 2013, &Pietrese 2010). These urban rights that will be discussed in the research will see the right to the city, as a concept and of a moral right, rather than an enforceable legal claim that could be disputed in court. The urban rights that will be analyzed and discussed within this research will be seen as individual rights, household rights, and finally neighborhood and city scale entitlements. This approach clearly evaluates the multiple levels of urban rights available to the South Sudanese, and all have major impact on the South Sudanese livelihoods.

Individual rights are the most basic of the urban rights, since they are the bedrock to the right to legal existence itself, however in multiple cases they are denied to urban refugees for various reasons (O'Logheln, 2013 & Parnell, 2010). Household rights, refer to the infrastructural services available to the inhabitant. These include having access to clean water, access to electricity, as well as waste services. This right, can mostly be observed as strengthening the urbanites physical capital, and has a major impact on the resident's livelihoods. Finally, neighborhood and city scale entitlements, refers to the ability of the urban inhabitant to shape the urban land nexus. This is the most complex urban right, as well as the right that is the most prevalent in discussing the urban planning and the right to the city. To receive both household rights, as well as the opportunity to shape the urban nexus, it is dependent on the individual rights. As for any institution, it is imperative to be able to recognize a population legally before distributing resources to them. Therefore, it is critical to look at the legality of these urban refugees and their individual rights, within the context of Khartoum.

Urban space is constantly under the usage of urbanites; however, it must also be recognized that urban space under a free market is never permanently fixed. This constant change is usually embedded within the urban land nexus and is constantly being reshaped through a combination and ongoing clash of social forces involving the residents of the city that are oriented towards everyday use, as well as value exchange profits (Brenner et al., 2009). With an emphasis on the social forces in play, it is important that the residents of the city can have a right as well as a desire for a choice in how the land will be utilized and configured. This inclusion of urbanites, counterbalances the growing power of capital, and is used as a check for that power, through inclusive and democratic strategies (Purcell, 2002). The right to the city in

many of its forms can be interpreted as the struggle for rights of urban residents being able to mold the urban sphere, against the property rights of the land-owning elites (O'Loghlen, 2016).

	Urban Rights	Experiences	Examples
1st Generation	Individual rights	Legal Context	Documentation, representation
2nd Generation	Household scale rights	Social Dynamics/ Informality	Housing, Clean Water, Sewage, Employment
3rd Generation	Neighborhood and City scale rights	Urban Land Nexus	Public Spaces, Urban Infrastructure Networks

Table 1
(Redesigned Guerrini, 2018)
(Based on Parnell & Pieterse, 2010)

This struggle can be overcome, by political representation, as well as democratic deepening that can further affirm the basic human rights as well as the right to the city, freedom of movement, and basic economic opportunities for urban residents (Parnell & Pieterse, 2010). In developing countries, sub-national policies and actions often ignore the chronically poor, particularly those that live within cities. Master planning, within global south cities, often ignores the poor, and in some cases, are used for further domination by a more powerful group (Watson, 2009). Thus, once there is greater inclusion of the urban poor, grassroots institutions can be shaped, and community institutions strengthened that have a pro-poor perspective. These institutions are then able to combat poverty and provide services that benefit the greater public good rather than follow static master plans that often benefit the group that already has power.

B.   Right to the City and Urban Planning

The urban land nexus is the interaction and usages of land as well as the social and economic activities of actors that come together in an urban environment (Scott, 2015). The factor of land is important in understanding the urban dynamics particularly within the global south. The importance of land is vital within cities, as land investment can cause a change of

land usage and adds a complexity for urban dwellers to demand their right to the city (Steel et al., 2017). Change in land use is often a major characteristic for the visions of future African cities, from international developers. These visions often reflect the images of Dubai, Singapore, or Shanghai with large towering glass facade buildings, and landscaped freeways, as the urban land nexus changes to reflect a developed city. These projects, however, often have no regard to the fact that a bulk of the population in Africa is extremely poor and living in informal settlements which of whom would not benefit from these property investments (Watson, 2014). Within Khartoum, the projects can be seen as being implemented, within the neighborhoods where these poor informal settlements already exist. These projects can only be done with massive land use change and are driven by neo-liberalist attitudes of policy makers. Although these projects can increase the income and financial flows into the city, it does not translate to inclusive growth, as it causes displacement for many residents. For these projects to be inclusive they must actively allow for residents to voice their opinion in how to shape the urban land nexus.

Critical urban theory is an approach to urbanism which recognizes that the urban sphere has been heavily influenced by market driven and market-oriented factors and rejects these and favors a more democratic realization of the city (Brenner, 2009). These market driven factors have created an environment where there is deep socio-economic segregation, which is further strengthened over time, and policy making. This has created an environment where the most marginalized and the most insecure members of the working class are having less and less access to the city (Marcuse, 2010). This approach shares many of the concepts that are core to the idea of right to the city, but with a larger focus on socio-economic segregation, led by the political and economic leaders.

The discussion of land commodification and land use change that is enabled by public policies, and infrastructure projects, further makes the distinction of who benefits from the increase of land prices (Smolka, 2013). The group that more often than not fails to benefit from development and is excluded from it often constitutes part of the lower working classes. Particularly in the global south, individuals who are excluded tend to work within the informal sector of the economy, further complicating the relationship between them and policy makers. This process of land commodification often develops into forms of urban splintering where distinct socio-spatial segregation patterns emerge, and which are reinforced by policies, and the land-owning elites (Graham & Marvin, 2001). This approach of critical urban theory emphasizes

the inability for lower members of urban society both in the developing world as well as in less developed countries to have complete access in deciding how the city can be governed on an institutional level, due to the neoliberal policies that are in place.

Due to urban splintering, and socio-spatial segregation, often the disadvantaged group becomes clustered and is more able to assemble. Assemblage as a theory has been interpreted, evaluated, and understood in a myriad of ways, and is one of the newest concepts related to urban theory. However, it pertains to the notions of how urbanites come together in relation to the notion of networks, emergence, and indeterminacy (Anderson & McFarlane, 2011). This, assemblage is dependent not only on the actual urbanites, but also the built environment, such as the infrastructure within the urban system (Kamalipour & Peimani, 2015). When applied directly to the urbanite we can observe a focus on agency particularly through the distribution of actor networks and how they can become key in the ideology of critical urbanism as well as the right to the city (McFarlane, 2011). By recognizing the actor networks present, one can acknowledge that there can be a greater drive, and assemblage of urban residents that eventually are able to make an argument for the right to the city. In the global south, although cities are fragmented, there still remains splintering that dissects the urban public space upon lines of inequality and exclusion (McFarlane, 2011). Thus, encouraging assemblage, and through assemblage of grassroots encouraging pro-poor policies and movements that support a greater distribution of urban services to all urban residents. Additionally, for those of whom which contradict the socio-spatial segregation policies tend to be more alienated as they lack the social networks that could be available to them otherwise.

C.   Right to the City in Practice: Global South Context

Within the global north, and most of urban literature, one can distinguish that cities are embedded in neoliberal policies. However, it is important to realize that the cities in the global south are quite different. Cities in the global south are complex, and cannot only be based on the neoliberal perspective, but rather a wide arrange of views, and even a "post-neoliberal" perspective that evolve into ideologies such as the "right to the city" (Parnell & Robinson, 2012). It must be further noted that, not all urban theories are applicable, as there exist a geographical division of urban studies between the developed countries, and less developed countries (Pieterse, 2010). The main distinction, is that mainstream urban theory presents cities as places where people reject the rural and peasant lifestyles for modernity and free markets. However, in

the now booming cities of the global south, urbanites retain their connections to their traditional culture, that underpin free market economic policies, thus the most applicable theories must be critical, as well as actor oriented (Robinson, 2004).

This actor-oriented approach highlights the agency of the urbanite that often leads to informality and weak institutions that define the Global South. In cities including Nairobi, Lagos, Khartoum, and Cairo, although there are master plans that are created, none of them are accomplished due to the lack of flexibility that is a necessity for these rapidly growing cities (Jacobsen, 2006). These master plans although mildly enforced further consolidate the lack of distribution of resources, particularly household services such as waste infrastructure and electricity. All the urban theories and approaches applied within this research are contemporary, critical, and are oriented towards the impact that the urban sphere has on the urbanite and their agency. The most important aspect of these theories that are discussed is that they do not offer neoliberal policies as a solution to the disenfranchised urban population, but even see neoliberalist policies as problematic for global south cities and support pro-poor policies and democratization of public goods within the urban sphere. Furthermore, these theories that will be discussed although focused on the lower economic classes in the urban area; they can further be applied towards any underprivileged group including urban refugees within the global south.

D.   Right to the city, and the Lowest Echelon-Urban Refugees

The idea of right to the city, in its original sense corresponds to all residents of the city; this upends the prerequisite of owning land as well as even being legal citizens of the city. Thus, this idea of urban rights is applicable to the lowest echelon of society. It includes the urban poor population; however, this research is interested in a subset of that population, urban refugees. Urban refugees similar to the urban poor in general, are extremely vulnerable which threatens their livelihoods. Urban refugees can be defined as being a part of a displaced population, which has settled within an urban environment, rather than rural placement, or within refugee camps located in the urban environment operated through the United Nations or host governments (Fabos & Kibreab, 2007). In the case of Khartoum, there are over 285,000 official refugees, residing in Khartoum state (UNHCR Sudan, 2018). Although many are not residing strictly in an urban environment, they are residing within close proximity, and can easily commute to the city. Many of these refugees are following the recurrent pattern of "hiding" in the periphery of the

cities, or being purposely resettled outside the city, in squatter settlements, or open areas (Which are refugee camps managed by the Sudanese Government within greater Khartoum).

Urban refugees are not a new phenomenon, as traditionally people seen as seeking refuge often are from rural origin and have resettled and found sanctuary in urban environments (Marfleet, 2007). Urban refugees despite their high population are often forgotten people and are largely unseen by both host-governments as well as policy makers from IGOs (Human Rights Watch, 2002). In general, refugee law is often the exception to domestic immigration law; due to how there are easements on visa requirements. However, in the case of Africa, including Sudan, refugee laws are instruments of exclusion and segregation that perpetuate differences between insiders and outsiders, where citizenship is the key distinction (Fabos & Kibreab, 2007). This can be seen, with the refugee policies and laws of Sub-Saharan countries, which force virtually all refugees to live in camps, rather than allowing refugees to "settle spontaneously" in urban or peri-urban locations (Sommers, 2000). By settling refugees in camps, outside the urban core areas the refugees are segregated from the population, and the camps can further be used as an instrument in preventing integration and directed towards orienting refugees to return to their home country once the conflict is resolved. However, this strategy to limit integration, is defeated once refugees settle in an urban area (Campbell, 2006), thus the reasoning why urban refugees are further ostracized by policy makers, and urban communities.

The applicants who have been denied refugee status and are unable to return to their home country often "hide" within cities, and live on the fringes of society, to avoid deportation (Grabska, 2006). Once embedded within the urban sphere, these urban refugees are a part of a larger group, not just as foreign-born migrants, but also become a subset of the national urban poor (O'Loghlen, 2016). Urban refugees are further pulled towards cities as they can see an opportunity of a possible support to incease their livelihoods. Furthermore, there is a growing negative perception of refugee camps, as they are places of poor living conditions, insufficient food rations, as well as a great prevalence of illnesses and diseases (Ohta & Gebre, 2005). With urbanization rates on the rise, the proportion of displaced people dwelling within cities, is also on the rise and becoming more prevalent in urban society (Jacobsen, 2006). It is important to note that these urban refugees although are growing in numbers, still have few rights, and are unable to collectively interact with the city where they reside in a formal manner.

E.   Right to the City and Physical Capital

The right to the city, can also be interpreted as a way to improve one's livelihood within the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (see Figure 2). Within a vulnerability context, one of the critical trends that challenge one's livelihoods includes critical trends. These trends include governance and economic trends which are directly linked to the right to the city debate, as they are shaped by institutional structures, which are changed via the philosophy of claiming the right to the city. By claiming the right to the city, a group can better guide certain urban policies towards a more inclusive manner. By claiming a right to the city, a group can begin to have a greater say in land governance issues, as well as basic household rights. Both of which can drastically improve their capitals particularly their physical capital.

It is important to note that by claiming the right to the city, to upend the disadvantageous economic and governance trends that favor a better off party, the main changes will be within the physical capital aspects, of the livelihoods framework. By accessing certain assets of the city, particularly in the third generation of urban rights, one can drastically improve the livability of the city. This can be done by shaping public transport infrastructure, roads, sidewalks, buildings, and public spaces, as well as land use.

Figure 2 Sustainable livelihoods framework

Furthermore, the physical capital improvements that can occur through claiming the right to the city can affect the household level of urban rights. As by claiming the right to the city, one can improve the water supply and sanitation, basic energy, as well as communications, that are often delivered by the municipal infrastructure networks.

F.   Conceptual Model

The conceptual model is built primarily upon the theoretical framework within the concept of the displacement of the South Sudanese. The main urban rights that are different levels of the concept of "the right to the city" and are directly linked to the experiences of the South Sudanese. From this approach, one can analyze the experiences of the South Sudanese, in both the context of prior to secession and following secession. There are three overarching experiences by the South Sudanese urban refugee community in Khartoum, relevant to the research and the right to the city debate, as they correlate to each generational urban right. These three experiences (1) legal experience, (2) social dynamics, and (3) experience with the urban land nexus each gives insights and explanations of what extent South Sudanese can claim their right to the city. Whereas the legal experience of the South Sudanese defines the individual rights available. The social dynamics mold how the South Sudanese population are able to create and claim services on a household level. Finally, the Urban Land Nexus interactions, being focused on a macro scale of land use, defines how the South Sudanese are able to shape their environment on a larger macro scale, by voicing opinions on public transportation, large scale infrastructure projects, and public land usage. These 3 urban rights, and the experiences that create these rights identify in what ways the South Sudanese Urban refugees that have settled in Khartoum, are able to reclaim there "right to the city". This framework explains that there is a relationship between the urban rights, and the experiences of the South Sudanese, which will be further explained in the following chapters. This Conceptual model will further explain, and answer the main research question, of how the South Sudanese are able to reclaim their right to the city, as it is broken down to a level of analysis that can be easily completed.

Figure 3 Conceptual Model (Guerrini, 2018)

G.   Summary

In this specific case of Khartoum, this concept of right to the city will be applied to the South Sudanese living within the city as urban refugees, that have been displaced by the ongoing conflict in their country of South Sudan. These urban rights, are embedded in the democratic ideology and a will to include South Sudanese. Thus, these urban rights that are granted to all the residents of a city, in theory give them a right to the city. However, this potential ability is dependent on the legality situation, and the capability to democratize. With these urban rights, assuming there is no issues of legality, the residents have access to basic urban household services for example clean water, and can have a say in how the built environment of the city is shaped and created. This provocation of democratic values, one must further look at the agency of these urban refugees, as seeing their livelihoods, and how it is specifically shaped.

VII.   Thematic and Geographic Context

To study the South Sudanese population in Khartoum, it is important to analyze the context in which this case occurs. Both the Sudanese and South Sudanese contexts play an important role for the situation in Khartoum, when looking at the relationship between these two countries. This chapter will first describe Sudan as a country, its capital Khartoum, and its relationship with South Sudan, which is one of the defining pull factors in attracting these urban refugees. Then this chapter will give a background to the conflict in South Sudan, which is the reasoning for the forced displacement. This chapter will conclude with policies on urban refugees, both international policy mainly implementation from UNHCR the main UN organization tasked with protecting refugees as well as policies specific to Sudan. These topics are of importance to the situation regarding South Sudanese residing within Khartoum and gives insights into the motivations for the South Sudanese to reclaim urban rights that they lost during secession.

A.   Historical Context of Conflict in Sudan

Sudan is a complex country, where in the 20th century, it has been defined by conflict between a strong North-South divide (see figure 4), that has been reinforced by political underdevelopment, as well as racial and cultural antagonism (Johnson, 2011). This antagonism is further supported by the authoritative nature of the Sudanese Government, which asserts their dominance over the other states. Prior to 2011, Sudan's northern two-thirds of the country was dominated by the Sahara Desert, and the majority in this region and are culturally similar to the middle eastern realm. While the southern third of Sudan can be identified as being more Sub-Saharan African in nature, having arable land, and a multi-ethnic population that often practiced some form of tribalism or Christianity (Williamson, 2011). These basic cultural cleavages and differences between the north and the south have been historically reinforced by the Mahdist State, and later the British. The Mahdist State (1883-1898) which can be viewed as the first Sudanese state (Vezzadini, 2015), led multiple incursions into the south exclusively for plunder, under the banner of Dar al-Harb (Abode of War), creating a historical disdain towards the Arabic North (Johnson, 2011). Following Mahdist rule, the British and Egyptians, began to govern the entirety of Sudan, creating a physical divider between the North and South. This was done by

creating closed districts in the South, limiting migration between the two regions with the Passports and Permits ordinance, and encouraging English as the working language rather than Arabic (Collins, 2008).

Sudanese Modern History
A story of Inner Conflict

1956	1955-1972	1986-2005	2011	2013-Ongoing
Sudanese Independence	**First Sudanese Civil War**	**Second Sudanese Civil War**	**South Sudanese Secession**	**South Sudanese Civil War**
British and Egyptian Governments recognize the Independence of Sudan	*Addis Ababa Agreement was signed. Laid foundation for Second Sudanese Civil War.*	*Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed. Displaced more than 3.2 million Sudanese. Many sought refuge in Khartoum*	*Outcome of Comprehensive Peace Agreement; South Sudan voted 98.83% in favor for secession from Sudan*	*Conflict between two competing factions SPLM&SPLM-IO, has sparked a refugee crisis and a return of South Sudanese to Khartoum*

(Guerrini, 2018)

Once decolonization occurred, the divide that the British created was abruptly gone, and the North began to once again exert their power and influence.

Figure 4
Time Table of Sudanese Conflict
(Guerrini, 2018)

This exertion of power created discontent in the south, that eventually became the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), and the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) (Gisselquist & Prunier, 2003). During the two Civil Wars that lasted 39 years combined, Khartoum was relatively stable as most of the conflict was along the southern provinces, and government control was strong within the capital. This stability attracted both internally displaced persons as well as individuals who seek better economic success from across all areas of the country including the Southern Provinces during the Second Sudanese Civil War (Grabska, 2006). The Southern Sudanese residents that settled within Khartoum had access to many of the urban programs within the city and were able to make a living within the city, and even had the ability to shape the urban land nexus and the urban sphere itself.

B.   Sudan

Sudan is in the Eastern Sahel region of Africa bordering the countries of Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, Chad, and Libya (See Figure 5). The environment can be characterized as being mostly flat, with very few geographic features as well as being dominated by the desert in the north. Most of the population can be found within Greater Khartoum, areas between the Blue and White Nile rivers, and throughout the Southern fringe of the country, where it is not as arid, and droughts are not as prone (CIA Factbook, 2018).

Figure 5
Map of Sudan and South Sudan

Sudan prior to 2011 was the largest African country and was rich in natural resources. Most prevalent of these resources are gold and oil. However, due to protracted social conflict, civil war and the secession, the country has experienced multiple economic issues. The country failing to have a strong infrastructure, along with the constant social conflicts has kept 4.65% of the total population below the official poverty line (United Nations Human Settlements Program, 2016). The Sudanese economy has a gross domestic product of 95.584 Billion USD in 2016 and

is expected to grow at an average 4% over the next three years (World Bank Data, 2018). The GDP per capita, is 2084.2 USD in 2014 (UN Data, 2017).

Khartoum as a point of focus has been able to remain stable during the multiple conflicts that have occurred in the country and was a point of economic prosperity within the country before secession. Khartoum, is a relatively young city being established as an outpost for the Egyptian army in 1821, at the confluence of the Blue and White Nile.. Greater Khartoum, which consist of Omdurman, Khartoum, and Khartoum North has exploded regarding population, as the latest census in 2009, put the city at 5,428,000 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Although some estimates show the city upwards to seven million residents. Greater Khartoum's, growing population has stressed its insufficient networked infrastructures, limiting the physical assets of the residents, and is facing incoherent sprawl. Khartoum, is Sudan's primate city, and a symbol of urban life, which further attract residents from both rural areas and small urban areas.

Although Sudan has a low GINI coefficient within the city of Khartoum one can observe multiple pockets of wealth, and even a growing number of gated communities, while slums are evident around the periphery of the city (Elhadary & Ali, 2017). Thus, it becomes almost of a patchwork of urban poverty and wealth (Pauntulaino, et al, 2011). This patchwork can be recognized even on the micro scale, as the first-class neighborhoods have low income dwellings made up of sheet metal residing next to expensive villas. Employment within Khartoum is dependent on the ingenuity of small entrepreneurs, most of which can be identified as being a part of the informal-sector (Post, 1995). This reliance on the informal sector has no geographic boundaries, as there are kiosks selling tea or cigarettes scattered throughout, stretching from the center of Khartoum in Souk Arabi to the peripheral squatter areas cutting through first class and second-class neighborhoods. Estimates suggest that the informal sector accounts for around 45% of the labor force in Khartoum and seems to be on the increase (Pauntulaino et al., 2011). Within this informal sector are prohibited activities such as the production of alcohol, or prostitution (banned by sharia law), as well as non-illegal activities such as driving a rickshaw, being a blacksmith, or having a coffee/tea kiosk in front of busy streets. It is further seen that many South Sudanese living within the city have involved themselves in the informal sector by selling goods or services in much wealthier neighborhoods such as al-Amarat, Khartoum II, al-Riyadh, and Buri (Grabska, 2016). Additionally, within Khartoum, many of the urban poor lack proper legal means to own land through plot allocation, and for the few that are able to, lack the

financial capital to actually purchase the property. This land allocation process is costly, cumbersome, and unclear for many of the urban poor. Thus, the creation of informal settlements, both within the core of the city, on a micro scale in the centrally located neighborhoods, and around the periphery on a macro scale such as in Mayo (Pauntulaino et al., 2011).

The First-Class neighborhoods, that are the focus of this research are extremely expensive and sought after. Many of the housing in both Khartoum II and al-Amarat are targeted for wealthy Sudanese, or expats who favor living near to the airport and their place of work. Khartoum II, is flanked by the Central Business District and the main market (Souk Arabi) to the North, the International Airport to the East, and al-Amarat to the South. This has made Khartoum II one of the most sought places to live within Khartoum and has the highest land value price, filled with old villa's and an occasional low-rise construction site. al-Amarat like Khartoum II, as it is a highly sought out location to live, there is much more development occurring in this neighborhood, and much more change in the urban landscape (UN-Habitat, 2014).

C.   Situation in South Sudan

In 2005, a peace agreement was created between the Sudanese government, the NCP led by President Bashir and the SPLM (Southern People's Liberation Movement). This peace agreement finally ended the conflict between the Arabic north, and the more animist based south that has been on and off again since 1955. This peace agreement eventually paved the path to the 2011 referendum and the independence of South Sudan (Gisselquist & Prunier, 2003). Following independence, on the 16th of December in 2013, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir, announced that there was an attempted coup led by recently removed Vice President Machar. The Kiir and Machar administration was a power sharing agreement between the two most dominant ethnic groups; Neurs and Dinkas (Johnson, 2014). Once the coup was announced the country collapsed into civil war between ethnic lines, and most visibly between divisions within the SPLA, the militant branch of the SPLM as well as the military of South Sudan.

Although there have been attempts to stem the fighting, clashes continue in Juba, with fighting occurring in all three regions of the country. Both sides of the conflict have committed abuses that can qualify as war crimes, thus causing a massive displacement of people. Since the start of the conflict, almost two million people have been internally displaced, and a further two million have become refugees fleeing into neighboring countries (UNHCR, 2017). The situation

in South Sudan is continuously deteriorating, with famine being declared in the most heavily conflict afflicted areas due to accessibility issues. Sudan has agreed to open humanitarian aid corridors to South Sudan, however, there is still ongoing conflict in Darfur, and Southern Kordofan, which are all border states. Thus, many of the South Sudanese refugees have turned South to Uganda, or are traveling to Khartoum via White Nile State, the only border state that is relatively peaceful in Sudan. Ultimately South Sudan continues to further deteriorate as the conflict continues, and more and more South Sudanese are once again seeking refuge abroad.

D.   Urban Refugee Policy

Urban refugees have always been prevalent, as displaced populations often accumulated in urban areas seeking refuge (Marfleet, 2007). In the past few decades, however, this pattern has begun to become more prevalent as cities become more important as economic and population centers particularly in the global south. Drafting policies for urban refugees has always been an issue, and for the first 45 years of its existence, the UNHCR, the chief UN agency in charge of protecting all refugees, did not have a clear policy on the issue (Jacobson, 2006). In most Sub-Saharan African countries, the host government requires assistance to refugees only in camps and does not approve of refugees having irregular movements", which can be described as movements towards urban areas. These limiting policies by host governments are often driven by xenophobic attitudes and fears that these refugees are a drain on resources, as they are not self-reliant (Campbell, 2006). With government policies that limit the UNHCR urban refugees become vulnerable via their legal status and face a higher disability in claiming basic individual rights. In the case of Khartoum, there are prevalent IDP camps that were meant to be temporary, on the outskirts of the city. These IDP camps, in Khartoum housed a large number of South Sudanese during the Civil War, in peri-urban areas, in particularly Mandela (also commonly referred to as Mayo Farms located 18 KM south of Khartoum Center), Jebel Awlia (24 KM South of Khartoum Center) and Wad El Bashir (17 KM West of Khartoum Center) housed more than 200,000 IDPs, as well as thousands of squatters at its peak (Abdalla, 2014 & Pauntulaino et al, 2011). Although many IDPs and now refugees have resided in these designated areas in the periphery, there are many who have resettled within the core of the city such as al-Amarat and Khartoum II, which is where this research is focused upon.

1.   UNHCR Policy

The UNHCR policy on refugees changed dramatically from there 1997 policy in 2009. The 1997 policy discouraged refugees from settling in urban areas citing irregular movements and was suspicious of their motivations as well as citing heavy expenses of tracking them (Crisp, 2017). The more recent 2009 policy asserts that "urban areas are a legitimate place for refugees to reside and to enjoy their rights" (UNHCR, 2009). Although the new policy seems to create a protection, for urban refugees and even make it to where refugees are no longer limited to refugee camps, it is hardly accurate in practice. In countries that have strict policy towards refugees, the UNHCR has not stepped in to stop or intervene at any level to limit these policies. Furthermore, since this has been a dramatic shift in policy, the UNHCR has lacked the infrastructural capacity to implement this new policy. Regarding the crisis that is happening in Sudan, the UNHCR has mostly been focusing on the refugee flow and registering the new South Sudanese at specific entry points in the states of White Nile and West Darfur. Then transporting the refugees are taken to a refugee camp where further refugee registration takes place such as names and biometric data. The UNHCR although supports urban refugees in Sudan, they still are limited by the nature of the host government, which has caused their efforts to be limited.

2.   Sudanese Policy

The Sudanese policy for both IDPs and other refugees focuses on returning home following a final solution of peace. This can be seen following the referendum, where there was a massive exodus of South Sudanese from the city of Khartoum, with the returning infrastructure being over capacity, and a new "squatter like settlement" were created in the transport locations, such as Soba. The main goal of Sudan was to return the displaced population (both IDPs and refugees), as quickly as possible to further inhibit the inclusion of displaced peoples. This policy mirrors the policies of other African policies that support refugee camps near small border towns rather than large population hubs, and to return displaced people with haste.

Regarding refugees from the South Sudanese Civil War in Khartoum State, are being settled in locations outside Khartoum, beyond the periphery neighborhoods, called "open areas". These "open areas" operate like refugee camps, however the government has been reluctant to call these sites a camp and are under management of HAC (Humanitarian Aid Commission), rather than COR (Commission on Refugees). Currently there are over 285,000 refugees registered with the UNHCR living within Khartoum, with many being from the Second Sudanese Civil War, rather than the South Sudanese Civil War (UNHCR Sudan, 2018). The Sudanese

government's approach to refugees settling in Khartoum state has been very mixed. On one hand it is logistically simpler to have these refugees reside so close to the capital, however on the other hand, there is a great fear that an influx in the South Sudanese population in Khartoum could put a drain on the resources of the capital city. Furthermore, there is a concern that this most recent group of South Sudanese refugees, may become mixed with the South Sudanese population that was unable to relocate and become more organized (Bartlett, 2018). By placing the newest arrivals of South Sudanese in these "open areas", the Sudanese government avoids both issues. Additionally, under the management of HAC rather than COR a situation has been created that makes it difficult for NGOs, and UN agencies to access these sites.

E.   Summary

As one can see, the situation in Sudan is complex, and has a huge role in the lives of the South Sudanese living in Khartoum. The historical events of these two states (South Sudan and Sudan), have molded the political system into an environment in which South Sudanese are marginalized. This marginalization, has led to continued mistrust into today between the South Sudanese and the Sudanese government, even once they became refugees following the outbreak of the South Sudanese Civil War in 2013. Additionally, this marginalization can also be seen with the Sudanese policies towards urban refugees, of placing them in open areas that are located far beyond the city limits of Khartoum and impacting the UNHCRs role in assisting urban refugees.

VIII. Methodology

This research has taken place during a 13-week period that began in mid-February, and lasted until mid-May 2018, ending at the beginning of Ramadan. This research will take place within the first-class neighborhoods, of Khartoum that are located directly west of Khartoum International Airport, specifically the neighborhoods of al-Amarat

Figure 6
Green-Urban Center of Khartoum
Red-Khartoum II
Blue-Al-Amarat

and Khartoum II. The specific research area, as well as the traditional urban core of the city has been defined by figure 6 The case of first class neighborhoods was chosen, as there are more urban amenities available, than locations in second class neighborhoods as well as third class neighborhoods. These first-class neighborhoods have experienced massive change in the urban land nexus in the last decade along with other portions of Khartoum as the urban development financed by oil revenue ceased with the 2011 South Sudanese Secession. Furthermore, these two neighborhoods and have a measurable South Sudanese community residing in the area as these neighborhoods offer highly attractive urban amenities. Many of these South Sudanese, are living in dwellings on a micro-scale, often within unfinished development sites.

To gather data for this research and answer the research questions there will be an application of qualitative methods to understand the experiences of the South Sudanese in the

right to the city, and how this affects their own livelihoods. This thesis draws most of its data from 28 semi-structured interviews that were conducted beginning in the fourth week of the research until the final week of the research. These interviews were meant to be more of a dialogue, thus the guidelines of the interviews were more or less topic checklist rather than direct questions, and were constantly changing to adapt on new data and info drawn from the previous interviews (See appendix). These interviews mostly consisted of South Sudanese who have returned to Khartoum after becoming displaced once again from the conflict that has occurred in South Sudan. There were however some respondents that although were South Sudanese, remained in Khartoum following the CPA and the referendum. These interviews included both men and women, from various backgrounds, ethnicities, and age groups. With the common denominator, of identifying as being South Sudanese. Some respondents of these interviews were decided, via a snowball approach. However, the many respondents interviewed were found by locating unfinished construction sites and discussing with locals if there were South Sudanese residing in these buildings, and eventually contacting the residents of these buildings for questioning. These interviews assisted in answering what the South Sudanese believed what there right to the city is, as well as their prior experiences that relate to the right to the city.

To understand the social dynamics of the community that affect the South Sudanese, the research additionally includes seven interviews with non-South Sudanese residents. These respondents were chosen, with a pre-requisite that they live in Amarat or Khartoum II, as well as they are having regular interactions within South Sudanese residing in the same neighborhood where they reside. These interviews gave an insight into how the community views the South Sudanese community as well as it gave an insight into any negative views about the South Sudanese who live in Khartoum, particularly those that live within the first-class neighborhoods.

In addition, another dynamic, was that there were other refugees that reside in first class neighborhoods were interviewed: two Ethiopian refugees, two Eritrean refugees, and one Syrian refugee. This dynamic helps reveal the differences and the uniqueness of the South Sudanese case. Furthermore, it highlights how secession in many ways has disaffected them, to where they are worse off in a sense than other urban refugees. This research also included two expert interviews, one with the OIM, and the other with the US State Department's Bureau for Populations, Refugees, and Migration. These two interviews were conducted to fill in the knowledge gap on the field policies for the refugees fleeing from Sudan. It should also be noted

that during the time of this research, the UNHCR office as well as UN-Habitat in Khartoum was unavailable, for an expert interview, but provided the research with valuable reports and data.

Furthermore, to gain a greater understanding of the situation of South Sudanese residents within Khartoum, there were multiple entries into a field journal that was maintained during the time of the research. Many of these entries were from participant observation, that occurred in the field visits to the periphery neighborhoods. To gain a certain level of rapport, when visiting these field visits were accompanied with individual South Sudanese who partook in the research from first-class neighborhoods. These fieldwork notes were prevalent in understanding the South Sudanese livelihood situation, and their linkages to the "urban environment". These notes that were taken, are not linked with any specific interview, individual, or situation, but derived from multiple discussions with residents, and basic inquiries that occurred in an informal setting.

Finally, there was extensive literature that was analyzed, as well as the usage of secondary data. These documents were often from CEDEJ, UNHCR, OIM, as well as UN HABITAT. These reports and documents gave a useful perception towards the policy on the South Sudanese population residing within Khartoum, as well as the actual reality of the South Sudanese that has been observed thus far by other researchers.

A.   Reflection on limitations

Although Listed below are specific challenges that I as a researcher experienced while collecting data in Khartoum. These limitations affected my research and must be addressed as it introduced important biases to the research at large.

1.   **Time**. The fieldwork period to collect data, as well as build rapport with the local community was limited to 14 weeks. Much of this time was spent building rapport and building a network, for the research. This left in total only 9 weeks for data collection, which is the reasoning to why the research was focused on one specific area in Khartoum where this unique resettlement pattern is occurring. Furthermore, I am restricted from extending my research as the holy time of Ramadan begins on my 14th week, when conditions for research is less than desirable.

2.   **Spatial Bias**. Within my research I am focusing on two geographic areas within greater Khartoum. Although I was able to have interviews in first class neighborhoods outside of Khartoum II, and al-Amarat, all of my interviews in first class neighborhoods were within Khartoum and did not include any specific first-class neighborhoods in Bahri or Omdurman.

Additionally, although there were field visits to the peripheral neighborhoods, I was unable to continue my research in the open areas located further away from Khartoum. This is where many South Sudanese refugees are residing, thus my understanding of the conditions of the open areas was restricted mostly by characterizations from my interviews. Finally, Greater Khartoum is a massive and dynamic urban conglomerate that continues to grow and change. With this being noted, this research is not meant to be a comprehensive study for the entirety of Greater Khartoum, but specifically the first-class neighborhoods belonging in this study.

3. **Language**. Due to the multiculturalism of the South Sudanese, it can be expected that the native language would differ by household. The official language in South Sudan is English, and the official languages in Sudan are English and Arabic. However, there are over 60 indigenous languages in South Sudan which include Bari, Dinka, Nuer, and Arabic, while English is often spoken by government officials. Knowing that Arabic is the most common language in Khartoum and is the working language for most South Sudanese who reside in Khartoum, it was decided that Arabic will be the language used in all field interviews. Therefore, within the research two Arabic translators were used, for most interviews that were conducted in the field. This usage of an Arabic translators however could lead to technical problems due to lack of understanding of the context, as well as miscommunication could have occurred during the research. This usage of an Arabic translators although most practical introduced another bias, as Arabic was often not the primary language used by this population, but only a language used on the streets and interacting with "northerners". The usage of having an Arabic translator could have inhibited the research as having an Arabic presence in the interview may have impacted the responses by the South Sudanese. This situation is most evident in the questions directed towards legality, and individual rights, as those responses were most critical of the government, which has often supported Arabization efforts (Ayers, 2010). Using Arabic, as well as the special sensitivity of the topic, caused most of the respondents to be reluctant of being recorded, which brings about an ethical issue as well as an issue of data collection as a whole.

B. Ethical Reflection

During my time researching, I came across multiple situations that brought up the importance of maintaining strong ethical guidelines. With Urban refugees being an extremely vulnerable group, it was vital for me to ensure that all interviews conducted will be completely anonymous, as well as respecting any wish that occurred during the time with the respondent,

such as omitting certain details from my research. Furthermore, I had to be cautious in the peripheral neighborhoods, when I made field visits to limit my presence, and to always be with a local resident. This was most necessary when I was stopped by an officer, who questioned myself, my translator, and my respondent who was bringing me to one of the peripheral neighborhoods on our business in that specific neighborhood. In this exact situation, I had to state that I was a student, and was visiting this specific neighborhood with my South Sudanese friend. I further did not state the complete nature of my research but defined it as work pertaining to the urban land nexus in the neighborhoods of Khartoum II, and al-Amarat. This was done rather than alluding to urban rights, and the right to the city of the South Sudanese. This acknowledgement of limiting my presence, although was difficult was vital for maintaining safety for my respondents.

During my research, I had multiple instances, where the respondents to the interviews refused to be recorded, and in two cases the respondent refused to continue an interview. In both cases as a researcher I ended the interview or did not record the conversation that partook, without inquiring. Few of the respondents that did not want to be recorded, still wanted to partake in the research with the prerequisite that they would not be audio recorded, but accepted notes to be taken. The disapproval of audio recording is partially due to because of the fear for backlash from the government, and how it can be traced back to the respondent as an individual. As the research progressed, and I began to expand my research, to the peripheral neighborhoods, it became even more prevalent to guarantee anonymity, and to continue strong relationships not only with the South Sudanese that I met in the periphery but also with the South Sudanese who allowed me to accompany them to the periphery area.

To follow guidelines, and to make sure the respondents did not introduce any bias, no gifts were given, as well as no money. This decision to not give out any financial compensation, resulted in a few potential respondents in refusing to participate in the research. However, this solicitation of reimbursement, and refusal to participate decreased in frequency after building rapport, and being in the field these situations decreased, particularly after introducing ourselves as researchers who have been told of their presence from other South Sudanese.

IX.   South Sudanese and Individual Urban Rights

The most basic of Urban rights, are individual rights. This level of rights is most important to the South Sudanese in their right to reclaim the city, as it defines their rights for fundamental existence and right to reside within Sudan. The goal of this chapter will be to answer the first sub question introduced in this thesis. This will be done by providing empirical data regarding the legality of the South Sudanese living within Khartoum and focus upon the organizations that have been tasked with protecting them as refugees. This chapter will also discuss the challenges that stem from lack of documentation. Finally, this chapter will focus on the representation (or lack of) that is available to the South Sudanese, whom they can contact to represent them in various legal matters. This chapter will also compare and evaluate the individual rights of the South Sudanese prior to secession, and post secession.

A.   Individual Rights and Legality

The legality of the South Sudanese is vital to access that the South Sudanese individual rights in Sudan. Many South Sudanese residing currently in Sudan have crossed into Sudan, illegally and are therefore residing in Sudan illegally. Due to the conflict in the South, they must go to entry points across the South Sudan-Sudan Border, to claim refugee status. Most South Sudanese entering Sudan, enter by foot mostly in the Darfur region, or the White Nile State, where they can receive documentation from the UNHCR with relative ease. However, it should also be recognized that this is not the case for all situations. In multiple cases South Sudanese are unable to register and are technically illegally residing in Sudan, or do not complete their registration and are then at a disadvantage.

Many cases of South Sudanese who are illegally residing are linked to the South Kordofan-Jonglei border. With their being a large population of Dinka people in both Jonglei (South Sudan), and in South Kordofan, many South Sudanese Dinka sought refuge by going to any acquaintance or extended family to South Kordofan. Following their displacement to South Kordofan, the movement trajectory of the South Sudanese continues further to Khartoum. Currently, due to the ongoing conflict in South Kordofan, the UNHCR who is tasked with registering refugees at entry points along South Sudan and Sudan, are unable to continue operations to the same extent as the other Stretches of the border. One South Sudanese woman who entered Sudan via South Kordofan by foot noted, that they did not pass any representatives

from the UN and only saw uniformed Sudanese officials once they were deeper into Kordofan[1]. With many refugees taking this similar path, they never have any interaction with the agencies and organizations that are tasked in assisting them and have technically illegally crossed the border. Thus, until they apply for asylum and register with the UNHCR, these South Sudanese, are technically residing illegally within Sudan.

Another complicating factor for South Sudanese legality is the fact that many South Sudanese who enter Sudan also often do not finish their registration process. At first contact when South Sudanese cross the border into Sudan in the areas of Blue Nile, and West Darfur, the refugees receive a basic card, and then are given the option to proceed by foot or be transported by the Sudanese government to a refugee camp. Due to the negative attitude towards refugee camps, many South Sudanese chose to bypass the camp, only after the first level of registration is completed, which only gives the number of members in the household and is only given a basic identity card that identifies the holder as a refugee. Only in the second level of registration, is greater identification and documentation is given after registering names, biometric data, and other specific data (Bartlett, 2018). Although the refugee ID card given by the UNHCR once the first level of registration is complete, it is not always seen as proper identification for various situations. One South Sudanese man before finding a job in the construction sector, was denied employment as the employer did not recognize the ID card as credible[2]. This could have been an excuse to deny employment but can also be a case where the proper documentation from the first level of registration, was not deemed reliable enough.

For many of the South Sudanese displaced people who have relocated to Khartoum, have had some experience with the IDP camps that were present in Sudan prior to secession. These IDP camps many of which were located outside Khartoum include Mayo, Dar El-Salam in Jebel Awlia, Wad El-Bashir and Dar El-Salam in Omdurman (Pauntulaino, et al, 2011,). The experiences that the South Sudanese had in these IDP camps often shaped their perceptions, and decisions into avoiding the refugee camps located in Sudan once the South Sudanese Civil War broke out. One South Sudanese male in his 40s who spent a little over half a year in the IDP camp, Dar El-Salam prior to the Comprehensive peace agreement stated that, Dar El-Salam had

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[1] Field Interview #8-South Sudanese al-Amarat; March 18th, 2018
[2] Field interview #24-South Sudanese Khartoum II; April 17th, 2018

very little opportunities, and his experience, although was not terrible influenced him in avoiding the refugee camp after entering Sudan via White Nile and not finishing his registration process.[3]

Furthermore, the negative experiences of the South Sudanese with the government of Sudan has caused them to be reluctant to seek assistance and even be acknowledged by the government of Sudan. Many South Sudanese are even reluctant to register with the UNHCR, as it makes their presence known by the Sudanese government. This fear of the South Sudanese stems from both the conflict between the South and the central state, as well as the harassment that they have experienced both as IDPs and refugees. The residents who are living in the first-class neighborhoods, who partook in the research reported that they faced no harassment from the police, while living in the first-class neighborhoods and feel safer from harassment by the government in these neighborhoods as well. While visiting the peripheral neighborhoods particularly in Mayo, the former IDP camp, there was a much greater government presence with uniformed officials than what was observed in both Khartoum II, and al-Amarat. This presence reinforces the idea that the South Sudanese are safer from police harassment in the first-class neighborhoods. Although it should be noted that without harassment there is an overwhelming continued fear of the government, and ultimately being forced to return to South Sudan or being relocated. One respondent simply responded, "Of course I fear them, and having to leave", but has yet to have a negative interaction with government officials while living in Khartoum II[4]. Thus, by moving to the first-class neighborhoods, the South Sudanese are less vulnerable to having harmful relations that could impact their legal situation.

B.   Effect of lacking documentation on South Sudanese

According to the official policy of Sudan, South Sudanese are supposed to be granted the Four Freedoms which include freedom of movement, residence, ownership, and employment (Bartlett, 2018). This is based on the idea of welcoming the South Sudanese as brothers and sisters. However, these freedoms can only be granted with proper documentation. With many South Sudanese avoiding registering, this group often lacks this needed documentation and are in a state of legal ambiguity. This affects their aspects further in the future, particularly depending on how drawn out the South Sudanese Civil War may be. With the war lasting longer, the need for being able to legally reside in the country and receiving employment grows.

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[3] Field Interview #15-South Sudanese, al-Amarat; March 23rd, 2018
[4] Field interview #6-South Sudanese, Khartoum II; March 14th, 2018

The most prevalent of the four freedoms that is infringed upon without having proper documentation is employment. This causes the South Sudanese living in Khartoum to be economically at fault, as well as being forced into the informal sector. Additionally, many South Sudanese have said that they often must bargain with the employer settling with lower wages due to their situation of having insufficient documentation. Many of the South Sudanese who partook in the research that did not have proper documentation described looking for income as being difficult and often having to be reliant on their social networks and the informal sector of the economy to find work, in some cases even participating in illicit activities. These activities are more common with women in the peripheral neighborhoods and include brewing alcohol and prostitution (Pauntulaino, et al, 2011). Furthermore, the South Sudanese living in Khartoum, are often restricted to the guidelines set by their employer of either low wages or heavy workloads, and have no method of challenging them, given they have no legal standing. In one specific example in al-Amarat a household who lives in a stalled construction site, as a guardian (A person or household who lives in an unfinished construction site and receives wages and accommodation for protecting the building and building materials from vandalism and theft) is only given their wages when the landowner "checks-in"[5], once every few months thus the income in this situation, is not a constant, as well as the wages fluctuating as it is what the landowner deems as necessary. This specific household although is dissatisfied does not contest this situation, as they fear losing the income from being guardians, as well as being evicted and having an interaction with the police.

Furthermore, lacking documentation, has led to issues with both residency and ownership. Prior to the secession, the Southern Sudanese can own their own residences within Khartoum, thus many of them that did not leave in 2011 remain in their old residences which they own. However, the South Sudanese both those who have left and those who have stayed face challenges in land ownership and fears of eviction. Currently with the refugee camps near Khartoum being located far away from the urban core, this has forced many of the South Sudanese to either squat in the periphery, squat closer to the city center and have a higher risk of eviction, or to make living arrangements as guardians closer to the city center. The South Sudanese without documentation living in Khartoum will more than likely settle in the peripheral neighborhoods in particularly squatter settlements, as they are not capable of owning land

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[5] Field Interview #3-South Sudanese-Al Amarat; March 8th, 2018

without proper documentation. However, for those of whom that reside in the first-class neighborhoods, often as guardians, are residing within the development often based on oral agreements with the landowner. Thus, they face a heavy burden of being evicted with inefficient warning, as well as fearing being unable to find housing again once the construction is completed. Hence only by embedding themselves in, the informal housing sector, are the South Sudanese capable of overcoming the struggle of being homeless.

C.   Individual Rights and limitations of representation

The South Sudanese living in Khartoum are often represented in theory in some form of way whether it be by the formal Popular Committees, Native Administrations which were much more popular prior to secession, and the UNHCR. Almost all South Sudanese living in the first-class neighborhoods are not involved in the political scene, as they are unable to vote given their political situation. For those of whom that live in Khartoum II, and al-Amarat, have very little knowledge their local popular committee, and what projects they have been involved with. Popular Committees are the basic forms of representation and serve multiple roles in the community level with their most important role being to raise local issues with the government (Pauntulaino, 2011). The South Sudanese living in both these two neighborhoods have little care about these Popular Committees, and often have neglected voicing their opinions towards the Popular Committee as they see them as an extension of the government and does not care about their issues. This lack of representation is key in recognizing how the South Sudanese are lacking a certain right to the city, as these Popular Committees are tasked with community issues including access to urban amenities and urban infrastructure networks.

Native Administrations which were popular in IDP areas prior to secession, are often the best form of representation for the South Sudanese. These Native Administrations are commonly made from IDP groups and are separate from the government. The leaders of the Native Administrations, and have many similar functions as the Popular Committees, however are less likely to be politicized. One South Sudanese man living in al-Riyadh who formerly lived in Mayo, thought of the Native Administration, as leaders who can be trusted with, and care about the wellness of the community[6]. One main issue with Native Administrations is that they are frequently in conflict with local government administrators, and the Sudanese government is

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[6] Field Interview #19-South Sudanese, al-Riyadh; April 12th, 2018

unable to give them authority that they once had in their area of origin (Pauntulaino, 2011). Furthermore, the Native Administrations as their main purpose being to represent IDPs, their presence is almost-nonexistent in the first-class neighborhoods, where this research takes place. Thus, the South Sudanese in this neighborhood are limited to only the popular committees rather than the Native Administrations.

Ideally what should be the organization that represents and protects the South Sudanese the most is the UNHCR. However, as noted in previous portions of the chapter, the South Sudanese often lack documentation, which results in the UNHCR being unable to protect them, in various legal situations. However, in the cases of where they do have documentation and are registered, the UNHCR as well as other international organizations can assist South Sudanese in situations that could have a major impact on their livelihoods, such as eviction and deportation by the Sudanese government. The UNHCR thus represents the South Sudanese directly in issues with the host government protecting them in legal matters.

D.   South Sudanese Legal Experiences Prior to Secession

Prior to secession, the Southern Sudanese were viewed as Sudanese, and were treated as such. One Khartoum local remarked that the idea of "Sudan" comes directly from the south (referencing the Sudd region in South Sudan), and that him being as Arabic is not truly "Sudanese"[7]. Although the South Sudanese did face some forms of marginalization (economic and political), they were individuals capable of being included in the political environment. Furthermore, the Southern Sudanese in Sudan did not face the same hardships of not having proper documentation as they do currently being refugees. Instead they experienced situations like those from South Kordofan, and Darfur, as they were recognized as IDPs. Due to not needing documentation, the South Sudanese living in Khartoum were able to have all of the four freedoms of movement, residence, ownership and employment with little issues. Additionally, the Southern Sudanese living in Khartoum did however experience varying levels of harassment from government officials and faced many situations that could be viewed as human rights abuses such as forcibly displacing the Southern Sudanese, in relocation schemes. There also seemed to be relevant animosity towards the Southern Sudanese from the government, due to the Second Sudanese Civil War.

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[7] Field Interview #2-Sudanese, al-Amarat; March 12th, 2018

Due to the authoritarian nature of Sudan, the Southern Sudanese were never well represented however, they did have limited representation, particularly in local levels. This led to the Southern Sudanese having a prevalent role in Native Administrations, as well as being capable to an extent of voicing their opinions to the local Popular Committee. Native Administrations also had much more authority prior to secession, particularly in neighborhoods that had a significant population of Southern Sudanese. Due to how South Sudanese were seen as Sudanese, the Native Administrations although conflicted with local authorities they were more respected and were granted the capability to settle many civil disputes. The Native Administrations were also a way to better represent the South Sudanese, as they acted as an intermediary between the Southern Sudanese, the Popular Committee, and even the locality. Furthermore, as the Southern Sudanese were recognized as IDPs prior to secession, they legally were under the protection of the Sudanese government, but also received assistance and protection from the United Nations OHCHR, as well as the UNHCR. This inclusivity of the political sphere emulated in the 2011 referendum on South Sudanese Secession.

The Southern Sudanese were previously able to own land, often which was given to them by the Sudanese government as IDPs through (Pauntulaino, et al, 2011). This land often located in the rural periphery soon became the peripheral neighborhoods that became centers for Southern Sudanese. However even though this land in many cases were owned by the Southern Sudanese, there was major issues pertaining to land ownership, as many squatters also settled in these peripheral areas. Throughout the early 2000s leading up to the secession of South Sudan, the government of Sudan razed sizable portions of these neighborhoods (Pauntulaino, et al, 2011). The government of Sudan defended their actions citing much of the land was being settled on illegally, and that it impeded urban development. However, by razing these neighborhoods, and essentially destroying the neighborhoods ignoring the Southern Sudanese and other members of the urban poor land-ownership rights. According to one South Sudanese household they felt that although they were compensated with land they were improperly compensated[8]. This fear of having their dwelling being razed by the government, with no guarantee of compensation was cited in one interview as being one of the reasons why a family from South Kordofan chose to live in an unfinished villa in al-Amarat, rather than in Soba where they previously resided[9].

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[8] Field Interview #13-South Sudanese, al-Amarat; March 23rd, 2018
[9] Field Interview #1-South Kordofan, al-Amarat; April 17th, 2018

The Southern Sudanese also received harassment before secession occurred, particularly before the CPA was signed. This harassment included impromptu questioning from police, as well as being targeted while residing in the camp. According to one man he was often questioned by police while living in Wad-El Bashir, particularly when he was alone. These questions often included if he had been drinking or questioned his loyalty towards the government[10]. Furthermore, there were invasions of the private life, particularly in IDP camps. Within the IDP camps there have been multiple attempts to convert Southern Sudanese from both Christianity and animalist related religions to Islam (Abdallah, 2013). Additionally, throughout Khartoum there are many undercover police who often, spend time observing individuals in the Southern Sudanese community, as both Southern Sudanese and other disadvantaged groups have made note that they often feel as if they are being watched.

E.   South Sudanese Legal Experiences following Secession

Secession, has caused a major shift in the legality of the South Sudanese. Many of the South Sudanese residing in Sudan, have been in the country for multiple years, and are no longer facing the same level as harassment from the government as they experienced prior to 2005 during the Second Sudanese Civil War. However, following 2011, many South Sudanese have been placed in a form of legal uncertainty, and have experienced multiple issues regarding their legality. For those who have left Sudan after the CPA to South Sudan and ultimately returned following outbreak of the 2013 Civil war, must take multiple steps as citizens from another country to claim their basic individual rights of employment, residency, ownership, and movement (which they often fail to do). This claim to basic individual rights is the largest determining factor for South Sudanese being able to claim their right to the city. Additionally, many South Sudanese have become unable to vote, and are further alienated in their forms of representation. While those that did not leave, and still claim Sudanese citizenship often feel uncomfortable voicing their opinion and choose not to.

One important aspect that has affected South Sudanese and other IDPs as of recent years is the forceful eviction and the razing of large tracts of periphery neighborhoods, like prior secession. This has affected both squatters, and residents who have owned the land. This demolition of plots has affected many South Sudanese along with other Sudanese residents that

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[10] Field Visit #1-Mayo; April 11th, 2018

are a part of the lowest level of society that reside in these neighborhoods. These destruction of sites, continue and are an ongoing phenomenon that is adversely affecting South Sudanese who are attempting to return to their neighborhoods that they once lived in before. Although, these are technically relocation schemes and the evicted household can receive new land as compensation, they must have proper documentation which can be an expensive and long process. Furthermore, due to poor planning in relocating the many South Sudanese back to South Sudan, many points of departure became squatter settlements almost overnight and where many Southerners were stranded once conflict broke out again in 2013 (Bartlett, 2018). These specific sites such as Soba have been razed recently and has specific harmful effects towards the South Sudanese. This razing of South Sudanese neighborhoods, is a basic example of destroying property belonging to the squatters that were present on the land.

With many South Sudanese lacking proper documentation, they are now facing many situations that they did not fear prior to secession as IDPs. The largest of these fears is being deported or being in a situation where they are forced by the government to be moved into refugee camps. These fears are not based in experience by the South Sudanese but are still relevant fears that this population group holds. Many South Sudanese attempt to avoid the camps as well as the "open areas" (which are housing thousands of South Sudanese who have come to Greater Khartoum for the first time (Bartlett, 2018 & UNHCR Flash Update, 2018)) as much as possible. These views are shaped by their own personal experiences as well as experiences than they have learned about which can be summed up as a chaotic crowded environment with poor sanitation, little opportunity for upwards mobility, lack of safety, and unclear good distribution, with a greater reliance on others. This contrast with the IDP camps from the Sudanese Civil war, where they were often given plots of land, and were granted more self-reliance. Furthermore, there are no official refugee camps in Greater Khartoum only "open areas", which have many restrictions, thus limiting the South Sudanese freedom of mobility. The South Sudanese have little capability to access the urban amenities found within Khartoum, as well as not being able to improve their livelihoods while in the "open areas". However, by moving into first-class and peripheral neighborhoods the South Sudanese are more capable of accessing the urban amenities that are out of reach in the "open areas"

Also, the South Sudanese have lost almost all representation and ways to voice their opinions that they once had prior to secession. The same South Sudanese man from al-Riyadh

who spoke about Native Administrations remarked that now they (Native Administrations) only exist informally now[11]. This is due in part to how having the Native Administrations in the current environment would be illegitimate as it recognizes a governing body that would primarily comprise of foreigners. These Native Administrations still exist in some communities to deal with the IDP population from Darfur, and South Kordofan, however their purpose does not focus on the South Sudanese community in an official manner, thus reducing the main form of representation that the South Sudanese have. South Sudanese who remained in Khartoum and retained their Sudanese citizenship still have the right to vote, and can share their opinions, however often do not engage in the political sphere. As one South Sudanese woman remarked, "we can't tell them what our family would like or need because they simply don't care".[12]

F.   Summary

As one can see, the struggle for the South Sudanese to reclaim their right to the city is fully embedded in their individual rights. Given the status of South Sudanese it is extremely difficult to claim their right to reside in Khartoum as many lack their documentation. However, it should be noted that the lack of documentation is often blamed as their being evident fear of the government and being housed in UNHCR camps as well as the South Sudanese taking paths that cross areas where the UNHCR is not established. This lack of documentation, not only affects their right to reside, but further limits their other four freedoms including ownership, movement, and employment. Finally, the South Sudanese have very little governmental and legal representation, which would normally aid them in their legal experiences. Finally, as one can see the South Sudanese have had many challenges both prior to secession and following secession. However, the legal challenges stemming from the lack of proper documentation creates an environment to where their legal situation post secession is even more difficult in attempting to reclaim their right to the city.

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[11] Field Interview #19-South Sudanese, al-Riyadh; April 12th, 2018
[12] Field Interview #23-South Sudanese, al-Amarat, April 17th, 2018

X.   South Sudanese and Household Services

The Household Services available to South Sudanese is dependent on where they live and what is available in the community. The first-class neighborhoods of Khartoum II, and al-Amarat, often attracts the greatest urban amenities which are accessible in some way to most residents, even the South Sudanese and remainder of the urban poor. To truly understand the situation at hand, it is first vital to understand the difference between these two neighborhoods, and where the South Sudanese would normally be residing (peripheral neighborhoods, and "open areas"). Thus, the agency of the South Sudanese moving to the first-class neighborhoods, is a unique situation, where a displaced group is capable of improving their livelihoods and being able to access urban amenities including basic utilities, as well as the job market that has a close proximity to the urban core. This chapter will also look at the social dynamics of the South Sudanese which helps define their settlement pattern and gives insight towards how they improve their livelihoods both prior to secession and following secession.

A.   Peripheral Neighborhoods

Currently there are nine "open areas" within Khartoum State. These open areas are in all aspects except in name a makeshift refugee camp ran by HAC (Humanitarian Aid Commission) rather than COR (Commission on Refugees). These areas were created for the South Sudanese refugees after the outbreak of war in 2013. These sites are located in three distinct clusters far outside the urban core of Khartoum. The largest of these open areas is Naivasha, located due west of Omdurman in the locality of Ombada. While the second largest site is Bantiu located in Jebel Awlya (UNHCR Flash Update, 2018). The most important issue that succumbs to residents is the large distance that separates these camps to the center of Khartoum. For one Khartoum II resident whose family lives in Naivasha it takes over three hours and 20 SDG just to go home by public transport (Minibus)[13]. Other issues that arise from these open areas are similar to the issues that can be found in refugee camps such as disease, crime, and lack (as well as mismanagement) of resources (Bartlett, 2018).

Prior to the South Sudanese Civil War, during the Second Sudanese Civil War, most refugees that came to Khartoum settled in the immediate periphery along with other displaced people and urban poor. These communities such as Wad El-Bashir, al-Tilal, Soba, and Mayo are

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[13] Field interview #16-South Sudanese, Khartoum II; April 4th, 2018

much more established in a sense from the open areas but face major threats nonetheless. These areas have direct linkages to the urban core of the city particularly Soba and Mayo (Figure 7), which are due south of Khartoum, and can easily get on a mini bus and be in Khartoum with ease. However, these areas are still undeveloped particularly when it comes to the city as a whole. These neighborhoods often suffer from a lack of integration within the networked infrastructure system found within Khartoum. This leads to frequent power cuts, (assuming the household has electrical), as well as not having water and sewage hookups within the household.

The first-class neighborhoods in Khartoum, although lacking in amenities found in western cities, or even wealthier African neighborhoods, are much more established and offer the greatest amenities in Khartoum. In both Khartoum II, and al-Amarat's case, they are located within walking distance to the city center, as well as having a flourishing local economy, that is funded by the wealthy Sudanese elites, as well as the expats that work for foreign governments and NGOs. Furthermore, almost all the household is these two neighborhoods as well as other first-class neighborhoods are much more connected to the infrastructure network present in Khartoum, thus supplying most households with the basic amenities. Additionally, the best schools and health care that is available in Khartoum are located in or nearby the first-class neighborhoods.

Figure 7 Map of Squatter Settlements and IDP camps in Greater Khartoum
Source: Interagency Report, 2004

B.   Desire to Improve Physical Capital

The neighborhoods of Khartoum II, and al-Amarat are extremely desirable not just for the wealthy individuals of Khartoum, but for all residents, as they are highly regarded and are geographically located next to key locations within the city. This attracts many from the periphery, particularly South Sudanese urban refugees who already have knowledge of the city. However due to the high cost of living within these first-class neighborhoods, the South Sudanese (who as previously stated are restricted to informal work, and lower wages) are in most cases unable to afford to pay the rent in these neighborhoods. The individuals who have the opportunity to live in these neighborhoods have often resorted to squatting in undeveloped areas found within the neighborhoods or have made an agreement with a landowner to where they

become a guardian for unfinished construction sites. Thus, one can classify the South Sudanese dwellings into four different strata; (A) Squatter dwellings in undeveloped land, (B) Dwellings installed unfinished construction sites, (C) Dwellings in ongoing construction sites, (D) Dwellings in expedited construction sites. This categorization is based upon the dwellings, which have a large impact on the physical capital available to the construction sites, as well as having a large impact on the livelihoods of the South Sudanese.

A. Squatter Dwelling in undeveloped land- The least common dwelling in the first-class neighborhoods. The residents of these squatter dwellings are often individuals, and often service the wealthier residents of the neighborhood. These settlements are not very developed, and often are temporary, until the residents find a better location to squat, or are forced out. These dwellings are often made from cardboard, or tin, and have few amenities.

B. Dwellings installed unfinished development sites- The second least common dwelling in first class neighborhoods. These sites are caused primarily by the stagnation of the economy following the secession of South Sudan, as well as because of the inflation of goods and labor costs. In most of these cases, the household begins to squat in the unfinished construction sites, until the landowner comes to the property and discovers the residents. These residents are either then evicted or in most cases allowed to stay on the property as a guardian for the materials that remain at the site. These dwellings are often the most developed and are lived in by the household for multiple years. These dwellings make use of excess materials, and the construction that has already been completed thus far. These dwellings, are constructed with either cinder blocks, cardboard cartons, or a mixture of both.

C. Dwellings in ongoing Construction sites. The most common dwelling of South Sudanese in first class neighborhoods. This dwelling often houses a family who works with the construction of the building. This site, is often temporary, but fairly developed, and houses a household or young male workers for more than a year, while the building becomes completed. Depending on the stage of the construction, residents may have their own finished rooms within the site (often located in the rear of the building), or they have a simple dwelling located directly outside of the building. These buildings are made often of tents with large sheets of fabric, or shacks made with aluminum siding.

D. Dwellings in expedited construction sites- The second most common dwelling of South Sudanese in first class neighborhoods. This dwelling is temporary, and houses mostly single male workers rather than families. These dwellings are extremely simple, and due to the fast pace of the construction, can house the residents for up to a year, but is some cases less depending on the size of the construction project. These sites, are often exposed to the environment, and can be as simple as a cot with mosquito netting, rather than an actual residence.

The South Sudanese living in these sites, often formerly lived in the periphery and commuted to the first-class neighborhoods or the center of the city. Now that they have moved to the first-class neighborhoods, they have greater access to employment that can be found in the area. Furthermore, in most of these cases these households are now receiving an increase in their income from the landowner as they are a guardian for the building.

C.   Basic Utility Availability

The advantages of living in the first-class neighborhoods cannot be stressed enough in realizing the increase in livelihoods for the South Sudanese. In almost all cases of networked infrastructure, services are much better delivered in the research neighborhoods rather than peripheral neighborhoods. During all field visits to the peripheral area's there were power cuts that occurred, often lasting for multiple hours. This said, although power cuts did occur in Khartoum II, and al-Amarat, many of them lasted for less than a few hours, and were not a daily occurrence. However according to some respondents, the situation in Khartoum II is much better, and that the power cuts in areas such as Ombada and al-Tilal could last for nearly a full day[1415].

In understanding how, the South Sudanese receive specific urban amenities linked to utility infrastructure it is important to make note of the different living situations of the South Sudanese, as each type of dwelling is distinctly different. All three of the basic utilities that are provided in Khartoum (Electricity, Water, and Sewage) are all urban amenities that can be accessed much more easily in the first-class neighborhoods. This in contrast to the secondary neighborhoods, and the peripheral third-class neighborhoods, which in many cases are difficult to access, unreliable, and even non-existent.

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[14] Field Visit #2-al-Tilal; April 18th 2018
[15] Field Visit #3-Ombada; April 20th, 2018

Regarding accessing electricity, the South Sudanese in Khartoum II and al-Amarat vary greatly depending on their style of dwelling. (A) The squatters living on undeveloped land, often do not have any electrical access. In the case where they are able to access it, it is often from siphoning the electricity from their neighbors, in many cases the latter is not fully aware that they are being taken advantage of. For the (B) South Sudanese who are living in stalled developed sites it further depends on the phase in which construction halted. In many cases that were most profoundly recognized in al-Amarat residents of the unfinished construction projects that halted later in their construction were fully hooked up to the networked infrastructure that was present. In this case the residents are actually paying for the electricity often directly through the utility company. However, in other cases where construction halted earlier in the construction period, networked utilities were not set up, forcing the residents to resort to similar situations as squatters who live in undeveloped land. In both of these cases the electricity was much more consistent than when living in the peripheral neighborhoods, one resident in al-Amarat made the comparison that "Here (al-Amarat), we may have a cut in power once a week, but in Soba it was a daily occurrence"[16]. For (C, D) the South Sudanese who live in the construction sites both under expedited speed, and regular speed often have electricity directly from the construction site. This electricity is often paid for by the landowner, and the electricity's primary purpose is to aid in construction, however the landowners allow usage to the workers who are "guarding" the site and the construction materials. For the workers who are residing in normal construction sites, in many cases are able to have small electrical appliances, often television sets and even in some rare cases large appliances such as refrigerators. In comparison for those who are residing in expedited construction sites lack these appliances and conservatively use the electricity that is provided for them.

Access to clean water is essential for the residents of Khartoum. Where temperatures can rise to be above 40 degrees Celsius normally, access to water is essential. Outside of first-class neighborhoods, it is common for the neighborhoods to be reliant on vehicles that transport tanks of water to a central point. Then it is often the duty of women and children to transport the water from the tanks to the dwelling. Within the first-class neighborhoods of Khartoum, water on tap however can easily be found, and are delivered directly to their homes. For squatters who are residing in undeveloped land do not have access to water directly to their site. In this case, the

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[16] Field Interview #26-South Sudanese; al-Amarat; April 24th, 2018

South Sudanese squatters must be reliant on their neighbors or nearby community buildings such as a mosque or Coptic church. For these cases, it is often the burden for the woman to get water from their neighbors and bring it to the dwelling. For the South Sudanese living in stalled development sites, have different methods to access water depending on how developed the building was when it became stalled. Similar to how the South Sudanese access electricity, those of whom are connected to the water infrastructure use it similar to any other finished building, whereas in the cases where the site is not linked, are reliant on their neighbors. Within the dwellings where they must fetch water, they often do it by filling a 15-25-liter cooler multiple times a day. The residents who are residing in the construction sites all have access to water. These sites often have one or two spigots per location, where they can access water with no limitations.

Finally, regarding sewage, is where the South Sudanese have the most dramatic change from living in the peripheral neighborhoods. Whereas in the vast expansive squatter areas surrounding Khartoum must be innovative in ways of disposing human waste, often resorting to methods such as pit latrines. Within the first-class neighborhoods, it is often much more developed. For those of who are squatting in open areas who have the worst-off living conditions, methods similar to the squatter areas as they are not hooked into the sewer infrastructure network. Whereas the people who are living in unfinished stalled developments almost universally have some form of human waste system inside the dwelling. Regarding the South Sudanese who are living in ongoing construction sites, one of the first rooms finished are bathrooms located on the ground level located farthest away from the entrance. This almost universally gives South Sudanese access to toilets for those who are in the living conditions classified in cases C and D. The only exception is during the breaking ground stage, and in this case, that was observed in this research, neighbors often lent the "guardian" usage of the toilet as well as a key to access the bathroom at any time, due to an agreement between the neighbor and the site manager.

D.   Job Market & Proximity to Urban Core

The fact that these neighborhoods of al-Amarat, and Khartoum II are so close to the core of Khartoum is very important in distinguishing the urban amenities such as employment, healthcare and schooling that are present. This proximity has caused Khartoum II, and al-Amarat

to be some of the most sought after real estate, and a focus to have well developed infrastructure and urban services delivered to these neighborhoods. This has resulted with high land values and ongoing land developments, which can also be seen in the other first-class neighborhoods of Khartoum. These developments are most recognizable in in al-Amarat along both 15th street and Africa Street. Along both of these streets one can find many medium rise buildings, many of which with modern glass facades (See figure 8). These neighborhoods are thus causing an affluent localized economy and job market which attracts those from all around the capital. This job market includes those in the formal sector as well as the informal sector, which can be seen in Figure 9. This shows the tea kiosks that are open in Khartoum II neighborhood on Wednesdays.

Figure 8
15th Street al-Amarat

In Khartoum II, and al-Amarat, there are many workers who commute to the neighborhood particularly South Sudanese who work in construction or sell tea on the side of the

road. Both these neighborhoods along with other first-class neighborhoods, are locations where there are not only jobs available to the common worker, but also pay higher wages. According to those who have taken part in the research were primarily

Figure 9
Tea Kiosks located in Khartoum II

attracted to Khartoum II and al-Amarat, due to how they receive higher wages than if they were to work outside of the first-class neighborhoods. This however causes many of the South Sudanese who reside in peripheral neighborhoods to commute particularly those living west of Omdurman, and in Soba and Mayo. One head of household when asked why he moved his family to Khartoum II responded "I was originally commuting from Soba to Khartoum II, and my wife sells tea near Souk al-Arabi once I had the opportunity to stay here, I moved my family with me, and now we no longer have to take the bus every day to come here"[17]. This pattern of commuting to either Khartoum II, al-Amarat, or the city center and eventually moving to one of these areas is extremely common. One of the most important parts of the pattern is that prior to moving to the first-class neighborhoods, there have been linkages already created between the South Sudanese and these specific locales. Many of these linkages were made prior to secession, but in many cases, they are entirely new connections made within the last year. In addition to the employment South Sudanese adults, many South Sudanese children are also able to do minimal work rather than attend school. Often the cost of sending a child to school is unaffordable to the South Sudanese living in the first-class neighborhoods, thus are given minimal work assisting the adults in the household instead of being sent to school.

E.   South Sudanese Social Dynamic Experiences Prior to Secession

Prior to secession, in between the years of 1980 and 2000, Khartoum experienced what seems like exponential population growth. In between the years of 1983 and 1993 Greater Khartoum population of 1.34 million, more than doubled 2.918 million. This was an annual growth rate of 6.6% (UN Data, 2017). This rapid growing population was made up of not only Arabic speaking northerners that historically has made up the population of Khartoum, but now included a large population of Sudanese from across the country including the South, Darfur, and the Eastern states, as well as an increasing number of foreigners mostly from the Horn of Africa (Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees). This rapid growth has created environments particularly in demographically diverse areas outside the center that became safe havens for these new urban dwellers.

Furthermore, although there was an ongoing conflict in the South since the 1950s, ever since oil was found in the region, Sudan and Khartoum in particularly began to see economic

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[17] Field Interview #5-South Sudanese, Khartoum II; March 14th, 2018

growth due to an increase in national revenue. One Sudanese man credited the growth of Sudan to the south, and made recognized, that without the Southerners, Sudan would be much worse off. This economic growth also sparked a large building boom.[18] This boom has caused many of the Southern Sudanese to come to the first-class neighborhoods, to work in construction, and similar to today began to work as guardians. These Southern Sudanese due to their legal status had a much greater stance in arguing for living wages and could find work much more easily with the economy growing at a steady rate. This resulted them in not being taken advantage by the landowner, or any employer. This also brought many Southern Sudanese into the first-class neighborhoods and the city center from peripheral neighborhoods which continues to this day. This commuting to these first-class neighborhoods, was also cause for some of the first Southern Sudanese to move towards the city center and the first-class neighborhoods.

Although many Southern Sudanese living within Khartoum were embedded in the informal sector of the economy, they were less reliant on it. As prior to secession the South Sudanese who were displaced were legally capable of working in Khartoum. Although as internally displaced persons, they often did relocate to the IDP camps of Wad El Bashir, Dar Es Salaam, and Mayo, they can access the urban amenities particularly employment much easier. One South Sudanese man who did not return to Khartoum and has been a guardian for a stalled building since the late 2000s, remarked that if he would have left and attempted to return to the south, he would be worse off, as he would have had to find both a job and housing in al-Amarat in a different environment.[19]

F.   South Sudanese Social Dynamic Experiences Following Secession

The Social Dynamics for the South Sudanese have dramatically changed, in many ways since secession, however in some ways they have stayed similar. The South Sudanese living in Sudan, feel much more alienated, and are becoming even more so reliant on the informal sector. The South Sudanese continue to face Xenophobic attitudes, but now in a different manner. Do to such a prolonged stay for some residents, they do not face any issues with their immediate neighbors, but more or less in public spaces, and their places of work. However particularly ones who left, and have now returned to Khartoum, are experiencing an increase in harassment particularly from local Sudanese residents.

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[18] Interview #4-Sudanese-Khartoum II; April 14th, 2018
[19] Interview #2-South Sudanese-al-Amarat; March 8th, 2018

The informal sector is one of the most dominant economic aspects of Khartoum particularly following secession. Most of the South Sudanese living both within the first-class neighborhoods, and outside the urban core in the peripheral neighborhoods are linked to the informal sector. For the residents of the first-class neighborhoods the men often work in the construction sector, and often sell cigarettes or phone credits on the side of the road for extra income, while women often do housework for their wealthier neighborhoods or sell tea. The resident South Sudanese must further compete against commuters who commute to these neighborhoods in mass. For most households, the main income comes directly from male who works in the construction sector. In the cases where the South Sudanese families are residing within unfinished construction sites, both ongoing and stalled, receive a small stipend as well as accommodations in the first-class neighborhood. These stipends are often set and unreliable and are based on fully informal agreements. With inflation occurring, in Sudan in the most recent years, these guardians have been taken advantage of as they are receiving the same wages as a few years ago, with no way of legal assistance due to the informality of their work. The women who work in the first-class neighborhoods, similar to the guardians are also taken advantage of. The women who work at selling tea on the side of the road must pay a fee to set up their kiosk to what can be described as a broker who makes deals with the landowner where the kiosk is set up. This fee depending on the location can be up to a quarter of their daily earnings and have no bargaining grounds. Furthermore, they often must work 6 days a week, with their only day off being Friday and work long hours in temperatures that are often hotter than 40 degrees Celsius.

The South Sudanese living in first class neighborhoods, indicated in this research that they have experienced an increase in xenophobic attitudes from locals. This animosity is partially stemmed from the most recent economic downturn Sudan has begun to experience following secession. Sudan effectively has lost much of its oil revenue, and their revenue they were expected to receive from transporting oil through the country has been lost due to the conflict in the South. It must be noted that the immediate neighbors who they interact with on a more regular basis do not exert these attitudes, but the South Sudanese do experience these attitudes with locals who they don't interact with on a regular basis. Many Sudanese, blame the southerners for their newly founded economic hardships, and often divert them to the Southerners in forms of harassment. Women in particular have faced major harassment, often while working in the households in these first-class neighborhoods. These harassments include

inquiries of why they came back, as well as discriminating comments towards how they should not be allowed back. One South Sudanese woman who works in the villas within Khartoum II, and al-Amarat describes herself as facing hostility while she works and is often dubbed as a "wife of a traitor" and "unwelcome woman"[20]. This level of harassment along with the lack of inclusivity has in many ways led to life being much more solemn in the first-class neighborhoods for the South Sudanese.

Additionally, the South Sudanese in the informal sector are given tedious work and are unable to argue for better conditions. For example, those who sell tea or work in construction are forced to work long hours and multiple days a week, often only having one day off a week. The South Sudanese who work as guardians are restricted to their dwellings. Furthermore, with them working multiple days a week, it is difficult for them to return to the peripheral neighborhoods, which is often where they meet up with their family. This has led to many South Sudanese, who admit that they are better off living closer to the urban core yet are dissatisfied with their living situation. One South Sudanese man working as a guardian, stated that he felt like he was living in a cage[21], as he was only able to see his family on Friday (the Islamic weekly day of worship and gathering) . The South Sudanese particularly those who are new arrivals or are working on the construction sites, lack the social networks to meet up with other, South Sudanese living in the first-class neighborhoods. Some participants in the research wanted to return to the peripheral neighborhoods, or open area sites, while others wanted to bring more members of their families closer. Either way there was always a constant that centered on missing their own community that they once had. This feeling of isolation and alienation from their local community, is one of the biggest regrets of the South Sudanese relocating to the first-class neighborhoods, and in an abstract sense, the biggest drawback of their attempt in reclaiming the city.

For the South Sudanese residing in the first-class neighborhoods, often feel as if they are alienated both from the Arabic residents living in the same neighborhoods, as well as being alienated from the South Sudanese living in the entirety of Khartoum. The locals living in the first-class neighborhoods, were always described as being civil, however the cultural differences between the South Sudanese and the other residents of the first-class neighborhoods is extremely relevant in the interactions between the two groups melding. According to most South Sudanese,

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[20] Field Interview #17-South Sudanese, Khartoum II; April 4th, 2018
[21] Field interview #28-South Sudanese, Khartoum II; April 24th, 2018

they often only speak to their immediate neighbors, and only do it when it is required of them. Furthermore, this group is not connected with other South Sudanese who reside in the first-class neighborhoods, except at work. Thus, after work, they are mostly isolated to their household, and engage in little social activities.

  The South Sudanese who live in the first-class neighborhoods, are often by themselves, or are limited to their immediate family. Meanwhile, the South Sudanese extended families and close acquaintances live in the peripheral neighborhoods where they once lived. Figure 10 shows the trajectories of four South Sudanese residents and the wide array of linkages to the peripheral neighborhoods. These trajectories further show just how dispersed the South Sudanese social networks are within the localities peripheral neighborhoods. When the South Sudanese are able to go to the periphery they often are only able to go to a single neighborhood for a short period of time. This forces an even greater feeling of isolation for the South Sudanese in first class neighborhoods. Guardians have a large burden in visiting the periphery as they are often required to spend most of their time in the building where they reside.

Figure 10
Movement of South Sudanese in Greater Khartoum; Respondents #23 (Blue), #25 (Green), #26 (Purple), #28 (Red)

G.   Summary

As one can see, the household services available to the South Sudanese are much greater in the first-class neighborhoods of Khartoum II, and al-Amarat than if they were residing in one of the peripheral neighborhoods, or in the open areas where South Sudanese refugees are being currently relocated too. Also, their methods of accessing these household services often vary by the living situations that are present and given their situation as urban refugees must be creative in accessing the urban amenities available to them. It must be noted that the process of relocating to these neighborhoods is one of the best ways of reclaiming their own right to the city, and by embedding themselves in the informal sector to improve their livelihoods. However, this process of relocating has its own downfalls by looking at the social experiences of the South Sudanese. As the South Sudanese are taken advantage of in their employment, face harassment and are alienated from their own community, yet by tolerating these dynamics have greater access to the job market, and greater physical capital available to them.

XI.   South Sudanese and City Scale Entitlements

The most advanced form of urban rights, is the third generation, or Neighborhood and City Scale Rights. This can be measured, by observing how a certain group, in this case the South Sudanese interact with basic urban amenities that deal with land. This can be accessed by their capability to shape and develop new public spaces as well as accessing existing spaces which includes market areas as well as parks. Furthermore, this level of urban rights can be seen by recognizing their opinions, and capability of shaping of existing transportation infrastructure, as it has such an important role in shaping the development of cities. Additionally, the way South Sudanese see the development of Khartoum, and their opinions on the development schemes also indicates their level of Neighborhood and City Scale Rights. The final indicator that will be discussed in this research, is recognizing how the South Sudanese interacts with the existing urban land nexus. This chapter will look at each one of these indicators, along with a focus on the South Sudanese experience with the Urban Land Nexus both prior to secession, and post secession, to access to what extent they are reclaiming their right to the city.

A.   Public Spaces

The South Sudanese in first class neighborhoods although don't feel ostracized by the local residents of Khartoum they do feel extremely alienated as discussed in Chapter X. This can particularly be observed when looking at the public spaces available to the residents of Khartoum. In Khartoum II, and al-Amarat there are a few green spaces available scattered throughout the neighborhood, however The Green Yard which is by far the largest public space in Khartoum is in easy access from both of these neighborhoods. Also, within both of these neighborhoods there are multiple businesses and shops, along with the large Souk Arabi located directly north of Khartoum II. Most South Sudanese, often rarely frequent these public areas, and further do not have much capability to shape these public spaces given their representation on Popular Committees as mentioned in Chapter V. Although by definition these places and locations are in theory open spaces available to the public, however there are many restricting elements that restrict the poorest of the poor and in this case the South Sudanese from accessing these locations.

The "Green Yard", which is located directly South of the International Airport, and wedged between the two wealthiest neighborhoods in Khartoum, al-Riyadh and al-Amarat. This

has a track, as well as a fountain and seating area. Although the South Sudanese that were interviewed whom lived in Amarat, were in walking distance to The Green Yard, not one respondent frequented the area monthly. Many South Sudanese, discussed that they didn't feel like they belonged in the Green Yard, and they felt uncomfortable when going there. One man cited that that it was an unwelcoming environment and cited how there have been large crowds there before, which have led to police disrupting the crowd[22]. Also, this park has a small entrance fee of 5 SDG per person, which is also a limiting factor. This fee made visiting the Green Yard a luxury rather than accessible for all residents particularly given their situation of being economically disadvantaged and having a higher cost of living in the first-class neighborhoods.

Along with the Green Yard there are much smaller parks spread throughout al-Amarat and Khartoum II (See Figure 11 and 12). These small parks can be as small as a single lot, or as large enough to fit a soccer field on. These parks being much smaller than the Green Yard, are used and frequented by the Southerners, however they only visit these sites once or twice a week at the most. These parks although do not have any fees to use, however in the case of the smaller parks, often located in al-Amarat, the parks were often gated off and even locked. Thus, many of these parks are inaccessible to the South Sudanese living in these two neighborhoods.


Figure 11

Parks and Green areas in Khartoum II

Figure 12
Parks and Green
areas in al-
Amarat

The market areas located throughout Khartoum II, and al-Amarat, are much more westernized than what can be found in second and third-class neighborhoods. Khartoum II does have traditional vendors in the main intersection, as well as in various portions of the neighborhood. It is also home to western style supermarkets, that sell goods that are unaffordable to most Sudanese, let alone ones who are economically disadvantaged like the South Sudanese who partook in this research. These western supermarkets can also be found throughout al-Amarat, with few local vendors. These western supermarkets who often cater to expats and economically well-off Sudanese locals, inflate the prices on the local vendor level as well. This high cost of living causes most of the South Sudanese to actually leave Khartoum II, and al-Amarat to go to second class neighborhoods, and third-class neighborhoods to buy most of their goods, as they begin to avoid the market streets of Khartoum II, and al-Amarat. This lack of affordability in their localities has caused many South Sudanese that have moved to the first-class neighborhoods to regret their decision as it is much more expensive to buy common goods in these neighborhoods, and becomes an added effort in shopping as they often must take a minibus to the other neighborhoods, often having to do it on the weekend, as they are preoccupied during the week to make a trip.

Due to the South Sudanese leaving Khartoum II and al-Amarat, for purchasing goods, they also avoid Souk Arabi which is a massive open-air market located in central Khartoum. Instead they often go to the souks that are located closer to the periphery. Often the preference of market is almost always directly linked to either where their extended family is currently residing, or where they came from before moving to Khartoum II, and al-Amarat. These trips are often made over the weekend, where they meet with their extended family, and other acquaintances. For example, a household that has their extended family living near Dar El-Salam

West of Omdurman, have a preference of Souk Omdurman. Furthermore, by going to souks in the peripheral areas they are often in a more South Sudanese community and are then supporting their own community. Furthermore, by doing this the South Sudanese living in the first-class neighborhoods are also maintaining their linkage to the peripheral neighborhoods. By forcing the South Sudanese to leave the neighborhood for reasons of unaffordability stresses two major things of importance; (1) first-class neighborhoods although being accessed by the lowest echelon still have restricting elements to maintain a certain level of exclusivity, and (2) The previous urban-mobility trajectories of South Sudanese have a large impact in their intercity movements and social networks.

B.   Public Transportation Infrastructure

Khartoum as a city is reliant on vehicle transportation, that is heavily reliant on the mini-bus network that connects the core of the city to the peripheral neighborhoods. With Khartoum being a city that is low and sprawling, it puts immense stresses on the road network that is outdated and overcrowded, particularly in and near the city center, where there are many commuting vehicles. Additionally, Khartoum lacks any form of mass transit, which would expectedly reduce the amount of traffic on the roads. The South Sudanese involved in this research, are in particularly disadvantaged. As these two neighborhoods, Khartoum II and al-Amarat, are some of the oldest neighborhoods in Khartoum, were not designed to accommodate for the many vehicles that are currently passing through these two neighborhoods. It should be noted however that these two neighborhoods do have one major advantage that other second-class neighborhoods, and third-class neighborhoods lack, and that is the number of paved roads located in the two neighborhoods. These paved road assist in alleviating traffic, however it only alleviates the traffic that is within the two neighborhoods, rather than roads that link the neighborhood to other parts of the city.

One of the main critiques for most residents in Khartoum, is the road network that is present, and often how it is overcrowded, causing major traffic delays. The South Sudanese living in the first-class neighborhoods, as discussed earlier have strong bonds to the peripheral neighborhoods where they come from. This causes them to make trips on the weekend to their extended family, often bringing back money which they have earned from their wages. South Sudanese Families that have extended families and connections in Omdurman or Bahri face the largest difficulty, of getting to the peripheral neighborhoods. Due to the Niles dividing the city,

bridges connecting the three cities act as bottlenecks. There is a total of 8 bridges that connect Khartoum to the cities on the other side of Niles; 3 bridges connecting Khartoum to Omdurman, 1 bridge connecting Khartoum to Tuti Island, 3 bridges connecting Khartoum to Bahri, and 1 bridge connecting Khartoum to East Nile. These bottlenecks create some of the worst delays in the Khartoum road network, which can create backups lasting for almost one hour. Furthermore, Khartoum International Airport acts as a major hindrance for East-West routes within Khartoum. The airport limits routes between the two wealthiest neighborhoods and restricts the flow of people. At the Southern terminus of the airport there are often traffic issues surrounding Jeif Turn which connects al-Amarat to Riyadh. While at the Northern terminus Buri Rd suffers from the same issues of congestion which connects the Central business district to Buri and Garden City.

Along with road congestion, another one of the major issues for both Sudanese and South Sudanese is the public transportation network. Almost all of the public transport in Khartoum is done by minibus. Not only are some of the minibuses unreliable and slow, they also can be relatively expensive. By going to some of the periphery neighborhoods, it can be more than 20 SDG one way. Although this is not much, it is a significant sum of money especially for individuals who give portions of their earnings to their extended family living in peripheral neighborhoods. Along with public transport being expensive, it is also not efficient and can take a lot of time. Due to how most of the minibuses leave only once full, they can experience massive delays. Furthermore, with minibus speeds being minimal as well as the traffic jams caused by the bottlenecks located throughout Khartoum, getting to some peripheral neighborhoods, can take more than 3 hours. The odds of this happening is even greater if at any time during your trip, you have to change minibuses. This inaccessibility makes it difficult for South Sudanese living in Khartoum II, and al-Amarat to make it to the periphery. However, it should be noted that daily commuters also have this same issue, therefore the South Sudanese by residing in the first-class neighborhoods, are able to access the urban amenities found in the city center much easier. Also do to the large number of commuters, many residents often are restricted to visiting the peripheral neighborhoods on Friday, when the number of commuters rapidly drop off.

These two issues pertaining to both the road network, as well as the public transportation network are both major complaints and criticism towards both the locality and Popular

Committees. The South Sudanese residing in first class neighborhoods in almost all the cases used to be commuters at some point in time and are a part of a group that could greatly benefit from improved transportation network planning. However, no participants have taken part in and know nobody who has partaken in a form of participant planning concerning transportation networks. Furthermore, in two cases there within the research who have had discussions with both the Native Administrations (prior to secession) and Popular Committees, concerning the road network. Both discussions did not lead to a productive outcome, yet it did show that in these specific situations individual South Sudanese were able to voice their opinions concerning the development of public transportation to an actual government entity[23]. The fact that these two individuals were capable of having a discussion with these two governing entities, show that they have the capability to shape the city, to a minimum extent, and in a way making advances in claiming their right to the city.

C.   Capability to Shape the City and Neighborhood

The most advanced urban right, are the third generational rights focused on neighborhood and city rights, the ultimate indicator towards achieving that goal, is if one is capable to shape and change the evolving urban land nexus in a way that is inclusive to the specific group. Overall the South Sudanese have extremely little capability to shape Khartoum, and its current urban development scheme, as a whole to benefit them. However, for the South Sudanese living in the first-class neighborhoods, have the natural advantage to where the city will be naturally shaped to benefit the first-class neighborhoods. in a much more micro-level scale the South Sudanese in Khartoum are making greater inroads in shaping the city. For example, in the peripheral neighborhoods, the South Sudanese along with the rest of the urban poor population, live in poor dwellings, but similar to other urban slum areas across the globe, eventually improve their living conditions. The South Sudanese also are able to shape their local peripheral neighborhoods to a certain extent, due to them having better relations with the Popular Committees, as well as their communities. Additionally, with many of the Southern Sudanese, as well as other IDPs living in the peripheral neighborhood, there is often a tendency to rely heavily on community relations, particularly in the construction of dwellings. Thus, many of the South Sudanese assist their

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[23] Field interview #24-South Sudanese, al-Amarat; April 17th, 2018

neighbors, and by doing so have a greater say in how their immediate vicinity and neighborhood will be shaped.

However, the capability to shape the city, for residents in the first-class neighborhoods is much different. The South Sudanese living in al-Amarat as discussed in chapter IX, do not have good working relationships with the Popular Committee who has some of the largest say regarding urban development within the community. However, given the fact that most South Sudanese living in Khartoum II, and al-Amarat work in some form of construction, they often have key social connections to developers. Although, South Sudanese workers in many of the cases studied are underpaid and work long hours, they still have good relationships with their boss, as well as the land owner. These relationships are key in the goal of being able to shape the city. Furthermore, the South Sudanese relationships with their neighbors can also be extremely important, in shaping the neighborhood.

An advantage that the South Sudanese have by living in the first-class neighborhoods, is the stability of the urban land usage. Almost all developments that occur in these two neighborhoods will be residential, commercial, and mixed use. This is due to the high-income residents, having more vocalization on the development of the city, particularly in regard to the locality level of governance. Thus, many of the industrial level projects, as well as projects that may seem undesirable will most likely occur in second-class or third-class neighborhoods, while land usage in Khartoum II, and al-Amarat will stay relatively the same. Furthermore, they are much less fearful of sudden changes forced by the government, that would completely change the landscape of the neighborhood, as what could be seen in multiple peripheral neighborhoods.

D.   South Sudanese Experience with the Urban Land Nexus Prior to Secession

Prior to secession, Khartoum was seeing massive economic growth, and was developing rapidly, with large development projects being planned with large glass buildings along the Niles such as the Cornithian Hotel, and the GNOPC Headquarters (see figure 13 and figure 14). These

development plans were spurred entirely by the oil found in the south as well as Foreign Investment, which made many individuals think that Khartoum may follow the path similar to the Gulf States. These developments had sparked a new level of land usage and promoted commodification of land. This has also caused a newer building boom in al-Amarat and other first-class neighborhoods. These developments also led to multiple new urban development schemes created by the National Government and by Khartoum state.

Figure 13
Corinthian Hotel (The Egg)

In al-Amarat land was quickly changing, as new villas were being built, commercial and residential low-rises with glass facades, and many new businesses. Due to this commodification of land, it had a much higher demand for workers. One building that is stalled in this neighborhood began construction during this time period, and the guardian who oversees it has been there since it stalled. This guardian has watched over the building for about nine years, and noted, how easy it was to find work in construction during that time, but it was becoming impossible to find housing, as there were more neighborhoods being torn down than being built[24].

Figure 14
GNPOC Headquarters

The urban development plans often involved replanning massive areas, that had the capability of attracting foreign investment, ease congestion in the city center, while at the same time increasing a government presence in the peripheral areas (Pauntulaino, et al, 2011). Another key aspect of this plan was to separate ethnic clusters. Thus, many of the Southern Sudanese communities located on the edge of Khartoum, were planned to be removed, and replaced with popular housing (Pauntulaino, et al, 2011). For those that were displaced from the replanning process in theory were supposed to receive compensation, however many did not for various reasons. One individual from South Kordofan

[24] Field Interview #2-South Sudanese, Al-Amarat; March 8th, 2018

who lived in a portion of Wad El-Bashir prior to eviction did not receive a plot of land, as he did not have the proper documents which he lost when he left. His uncle however did have proper documentation to be eligible of receiving a plot of land and a title from the government, and was forced to relocate there, before ultimately relocating to a squatter settlement located near Haj Yousif[25]. Although this resettlement scheme did attempt to create a popular housing plan, in many ways it failed, most predominantly by it not being a pro-poor policy thus neglecting a large portion of the population of Khartoum. One of the main reasonings for this new land governance plan, was to alleviate congestion in the city center, it ultimately made it more difficult for the urban poor to access the city center, as they were relocated further away from the city center (UN-Habitat, 2014). While at the same time, the wealthiest residents who resided in the neighborhoods closest to the city center, Garden City, Khartoum II, al-Amarat, al-Riyadh, and Buri, were almost completely unaffected by this massive urban strategy plan. As noted al-Amarat had many residential construction sites being built contradicting the idea of easing congestion close to the city center. This urban development strategy has arguably been one of the greatest impact on the Southern Sudanese experience with the Urban Land Nexus. This impact has been negative, and has made this displaced group even more vulnerable, as many have become homeless, forcibly evicted, and lost property that is there. This also reflects that the Southern Sudanese living in Khartoum prior to secession, had almost no capability to shape the city in a way that would benefit themselves.

E.   South Sudanese Experience with the Urban Land Nexus Following Secession

Following the 2011 secession, the Urban Land Nexus within Khartoum has experienced extreme fluctuation. Immediately after the secession, Sudan spiraled deeper into recession, as it seemed their oil revenue which brought them wealth a decade earlier seemed to disappear. Additionally, between the years of 2011 and 2013 rather than there being a pull towards Khartoum, there was beginning to be an exodus of South Sudanese returning to the South. This pattern however ultimately ended in 2013 with a breakout of the South Sudanese Civil War, as Khartoum saw a return of South Sudanese.

In 2010 leading up to secession, Sudan was feeling the effects of the economic downturn that had affected the world the two years prior. However, in 2011 when South Sudan

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[25] Field Interview #4-South Kordofan, Khartoum II; April 17th, 2018

declared independence with the secession vote, the economy in Sudan took an immense hit. Multiple construction projects throughout Khartoum began to lose their funding and became stalled empty concrete shells that used to be vibrant construction sites. These ultimately became residences to many of the South Sudanese that opted to stay in Khartoum, who at first attempted to squat in these sites (See figure 15). Ultimately these South Sudanese squatters became guardians and help protect building materials that are stored, for newer construction sites. Although construction on smaller scales has increased, the construction market in Khartoum remains stagnated in comparison to the experiences prior to secession, thus bringing land usage change, to various neighborhoods in Khartoum.

Figure 15
Stalled construction site in al-Amarat, that housed squatters turned guardians.

In 2011 following the secession vote, hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese were attempting to return to their newly founded country. The Sudanese Government, as well as the international organizations who were assisting in the relocation of southerners to their new country. This goes into the idea of waithood in discussion of refugees, as they were residing in Khartoum it was seen as a place where they could wait until moving forward to a better place or home which was South Sudan. Around multiple departure locations, where government agencies attempted to prepare the South Sudanese in returning, there became a back-up, as there was not adequate support and logistics to support this massive migration of people back to South Sudan. This caused many South Sudanese to temporarily resettle near the departure locations, such as in Soba-Kongor, which eventually turned into permanent squatter settlements, as they remained near these departure points until Civil War in the South broke out (UNOCHA, 2013). While many of the South Sudanese were attempting to leave Khartoum, they left their former dwellings scattered throughout the peripheral ring of Khartoum. In most cases these dwellings were destroyed by the Sudanese government, or were taken over by another squatter.

Following the outbreak of Civil War, many South Sudanese returned to Khartoum. In some situations, they were able to return to their old neighborhood, or were capable of living with a family member, before using their social networks to find more permanent living conditions. However, in most situations, they were forced to essentially start over again with a major difference in their legal situation. In some cases, the South Sudanese continued to have good social connections after leaving Khartoum and were able to find work in the city center, or a shelter in one of the lower-class neighborhoods. However, many were without these connections, and lacked proper documentation thus either settling in the squatter neighborhoods or moving to an "open area" to be able to receive assistance from international agencies.

F.   Summary

As one can see, particularly when looking at the South Sudanese living in Khartoum are very restricted in being capable of shaping the city. The South Sudanese are often excluded from public spaces in first class neighborhoods, as going to the Green Yard is seen as a luxury and being unable to afford the artificially inflated goods at the western style supermarkets. They also experience the massive traffic and inefficient public transport, and although they voice their opinions it is often ineffective in causing legitimate change in the established infrastructure networks. Also, we can see that the development projects established in Khartoum are not meant to support the urban poor, and that the Southerners who took part in this research did not see the individual direct benefits of the project. Furthermore, the South Sudanese population as a whole, is incapable of shaping the city and land usage to benefit them, however those that reside in the first-class neighborhoods benefit from the policies of their neighbors. Finally, it can be concluded that the South Sudanese experience with the urban land nexus, has caused both massive displacement from forced evictions, but at the same time was capable of establishing entry points via construction sites, and stalled developments to first class neighborhoods. This entry point has ultimately given certain South Sudanese to be able to access urban amenities available to them, and the capability to reclaim their right to the city.

XII. Discussion and Conclusion

A. Reclamation of the City and Improved Livelihoods

The capability for the South Sudanese to reclaim the city by choosing to reside in first class neighborhoods is a remarkable feat, that should be recognized. By moving into the urban core and taking advantage of the current state of the urban land nexus in Khartoum, the South Sudanese are capable of claiming multiple urban amenities that are not as common in the peripheral neighborhoods and open areas and improving their financial capital and greatly improving their physical capital available to them. Because of the South Sudanese secession, and the downturn in the Sudanese economy, the South Sudanese are able to move into these first-class neighborhoods, as guardians of the unfinished construction sites. Furthermore, due to secession, many South Sudanese that lack documentation is more vulnerable as they risk lack of representation, unemployment, arrest, eviction, and deportation. Given this situation, and the negative outlook brought about by secession, it is important for the South Sudanese take advantage of the land developments (or lack of developments) in Khartoum II, and al-Amarat.

The most important amenity that is available to all first-class residents is the employment opportunities. Although many of the South Sudanese who partook in this research were employed in the informal sector, they were employed, and are not even needing to commute, as they would most likely have to do if they lived in the peripheral neighborhoods. With many South Sudanese not pleased with the road network, as well as the public transportation system within Khartoum, living closer to their worksite both increases their financial capital that would normally be spent on transportation, as well as saves the South Sudanese from the intense traffic found within Khartoum. Those South Sudanese who are working as guardians, with their entire household benefit the most. In this situation, the households are earning wages both from their employment during the day, as well as from acting as guardians. Furthermore, the guardians are given accommodation which would normally be a large part of their income, and thus can spend their increasing financial capital more effectively.

Most noticeably the South Sudanese can improve their physical capital by reclaiming their right to the city, by moving to these neighborhoods. As noted, the basic utilities available in the first-class neighborhoods is much more common than in the peripheral neighborhoods. For example, electricity is hooked up to almost all South Sudanese dwellings in the first-class

neighborhoods, and is much more reliable than in the periphery, as there may be a power cut, once a week, rather than a daily occurrence. Additionally, the first-class neighborhoods amenities that are for the public good are much greater than what would be found elsewhere For example in al-Amarat one is much more connected to the road network, and even has more paved roads and sidewalks which are hard to find in second-class neighborhoods, (See figure 16) and practically do not exist within the peripheral neighborhoods. It should be noted that the South Sudanese are unable to personally shape these neighborhoods given the political nature of Popular Committees and lack of Native Administrations in first-class neighborhoods. However, by living in the first-class neighborhoods their physical capital continues to improve as these neighborhoods, are a focus for continuous positive urban developments.

Figure 16:
Birds eye view of Al-Deim (Second Class Neighborhood), and Al-Amarat (First Class Neighborhood)
Source: Google Earth   Altered by Guerrini, 2018

Thus, by moving into the first-class neighborhoods, the South Sudanese are capable of reclaiming their right to the city to an extent, by accessing basic urban amenities and assets that would normally be unavailable to them. This allows them to improve their financial capital, and physical capital. It is important to note, that they are improving their financial capital disregarding their lack of documentation and inability to find formal work. Furthermore, the

South Sudanese are able to improve their physical capital available to them in the first-class neighborhoods without being able to directly shape the city

B.   Conclusions and Recommendations

As one can see, the 2011 secession of South Sudan has had a largely negative effect for the South Sudanese. Although many South Sudanese did leave Khartoum following 2011 as we have seen with this research many have returned to much more bleak conditions than before as urban refugees. However, the South Sudanese who have returned are making efforts in reclaiming their right to the city. This is most predominantly achieved through the action of relocating to first class neighborhoods, rather than residing in the open spaces or the peripheral neighborhoods. They are accomplishing this by taking advantage of the urban land nexus and moving into unfinished development sites in the first-class neighborhoods. By relocating, the South Sudanese can access greater urban amenities on the household level including better jobs, and utilities. Additionally, by relocating the South Sudanese living in the first-class neighborhoods are at a much less risk of being forced evictions by the government and having their residences be razed, which has been experienced in the peripheral neighborhoods. However, it should be noted, by moving to these first-class neighborhoods, the South Sudanese are still unable to fully reclaim their right to the city, to the extent as wealthier Sudanese citizens. This can be seen as they have very limited capability to shape the city, and their legality is in constant question.

This research further shows how disadvantaged urban refugees are in accessing urban amenities. This is seen as the South Sudanese in Khartoum, lack the four freedoms, due in part to their lack of proper documentation. This lack of urban rights can be seen in multiple cases where urban refugees are found such as in Nairobi where under normal circumstances they are confined to refugee camps (Campbell, 2006), or Cairo where they do not receive as much support from the UNHCR (Grabska, 2006) particularly in cases where they must seek refuge in a formerly hostile area. However, this research also reveals the adaptation techniques of the South Sudanese, and capability to improve their livelihood situation, which could be applied in other cases. An additional take away from this research is that the urban poor particularly the urban refugee population in Khartoum have very little capability in shaping the city. This is partially a result from their lack of documentation and status of legal ambiguity, but as we recognized before, this population lacked the capability to shape the city as citizens. Thus although the South Sudanese

are reclaiming their right to the city and various urban rights, it has yet to be fully claimed to the extent as advocates such as Lefebvre, Harvey, and Marcuse would recognize.

Although this research has answered the research questions presented in the introduction, there are many ways in which this research can be improved. Thus, my recommendations for further research within this topic is as follows. One of the most prevalent ways it could be improved is elaborating this study into an ethnographic approach, which requires an extensive amount of time in the field. One of the main struggles of this research was the lack of rapport between myself, my translator, and my respondents. Given that this group has faced many struggles as being a displaced population, and having a mistrust of the Sudanese government, building a credible level of trust takes a large amount of time that would be encouraged by having an ethnographic approach. By having a more ethnographic approach, one would be able to create much stronger bonds with the respondents and could lead to further elaboration of the living situation of the South Sudanese. Another improvement in this research would be to gain access to the "open areas" located surrounding Khartoum and having field interviews with the South Sudanese refugees residing in those specific sites. Given my position, I was unable to access these sites, which could have added a new dimension to this research that would be beyond first class neighborhoods, and peripheral neighborhoods.

XIII. Reference List

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XIV. Appendix

Question Checklist for Semi-Structured Field interview: 1-4

Confirmation and Consent	
Consider yourself South Sudanese or Sudanese	
Reasoning for Khartoum	
Income	
Effect of documentation	
Construction of home/Claim area	
Relationship with landowner	
Capability for basic utilities	
Are you able to use public spaces in Khartoum	
Do you see the city being able to benefit you	
Do you see Khartoum as Inclusive	
What are your thoughts on the future growth of the city	

Question Checklist for Semi-Structured Field Interviews 5-9

Confirmation and Consent	
How do you receive documentation	
Reasoning for Khartoum and Amarat	
Income	
What are your interactions with South Sudanese	
public areas-such as the Green yard, or family park	
What is your relationship with your neighbors in these First-class neighborhoods	
community leaders you're associated with	
experience with the UNHCR	
Desire for returning, previous desire for secession	
How have things changed since secession	
Have you faced harassment, or limited by being South Sudanese	
Relationship with the peripheral neighborhoods	

Question Checklist for Semi-Structured Field Interviews 10-14

Confirmation and Consent	
Livelihood/Employment	
Why did you come to Khartoum	
Describe livelihood prior to moving to Amarat	
Correlation between construction sector and Amarat	
Relationship with the landowner	
What will you do once the construction is finished/restarts	
What is your relationship with neighbors	
integrated into neighborhood	
relationships with the South Sudanese community	
Attitude towards inequality within the city	
thoughts on the South Sudanese commuters	
How do you see yourself part of the community? Do you feel isolated?	

Question Checklist for Semi-Structured Field Interviews 15-18

Confirmation and Consent	
How has having/not having documentation affected you	
Why did you come to Khartoum	
rights prior to secession	
additional harassment from Sudanese following secession	
consider Khartoum Home, or the South Home?	
Livelihood in Khartoum prior to secession	
experience in the neighborhood you were living in then	
Thoughts of living in refugee camps or squatter settlements	
thoughts on the South Sudanese commuters	
Livelihoods post-Southern civil war	
Desire of moving onwards away from Khartoum	

Question Checklist for Semi-Structured Field Interviews 19-23

Confirmation and Consent	
What brought you to these neighborhoods	
Relationship with Native Administrations/Popular Committees	
Fear of government	
Life in peripheral neighborhoods	
Extended family locations	
Path Trajectory within Khartoum	
Experience in first-class neighborhoods	
Kind of social networks developed	
Harassment experienced	
Timeline and trajectory during peace period	
Livelihood improvements in first class neighborhood	

Question Checklist for Semi-Structured Field Interviews 25-28

Confirmation and Consent	
Path Trajectory within Khartoum	
Opinions on inclusive development	
Experience with construction sector	
Incomes, and harassment at work	
Thoughts on open area's and peripheral neighborhoods	
Thoughts on local governance	
Opinion on neighborhood integration	
Relationship with UNHCR/relation with Sudanese govt	
Vision of Khartoum II and al-Amarat development	
Livelihoods in neighborhoods where once lived	
Livelihoods post-Southern civil war	