



Utrecht University

Master's Thesis

**The Effectiveness of Israel's Securitization Narrative on its
Impunity in the Context of UN Resolutions Violations**

Keywords:

securitization, Israel, Palestine, UN resolutions, terrorism

Hanan Nanić

6159192

Utrecht University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of History
and Art History

June 25, 2018

Thesis Supervisor: prof.dr. Bob de Graaff

Abstract

The influence of the Israeli securitization narrative on its impunity for violating UN resolutions is the fundamental idea of the paper. It is argued that the internal case of securitization in Israel, manifested through the permanent state of emergency and the omnipresence of existential threats influences the self-proclaimed endangered position of Israel. This case is examined on the matter of violated UN resolutions regarding the Israeli infringement of law, their binding strength and the lack of sanctions for their violations. The analysis focuses on Benjamin Netanyahu, the current Prime Minister of Israel's international discourse, which, in combination with the securitization theory, helps understand this aspect of the conflict. This paper suggests that securitization in Israel is manifested as a state, rather than a process, which differs from the postulates established by the securitization theory, and therefore enables unsanctioned abuses of human rights and UN resolutions. Securitization theory helps explain the nature of Israeli politics aimed at Palestinians and consequently at the international community, which, combined with the discourse analysis, shows that it is likely that Israel is successful at influencing its impunity for serious breaches of human rights and the international humanitarian law.

Contents

1. Introduction: How to Discuss Israel’s Impunity?	1
2. Theory, Historiography and Methodology	7
2.1. Theoretical Background	7
2.2. Historiography and Academic Debate regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict	11
2.3. Methodology and Sources	12
3. Historical Overview of the Conflict and Israeli Violations of UN Resolutions	16
3.1. Genesis of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	16
3.2. The Impunity for the Violation of the UN Resolutions.....	22
4. Securitization in a Securitized Country	30
4.1. Israeli National Security	30
4.2. Securitization.....	37
5. Discourse analysis: Benjamin Netanyahu’s Securitization Narrative	42
5.1. Methodology	42
5.2. Historical and political context of the speeches	45
5.3. Speeches Analysis	47
5.3.1. <i>North American Audience</i>	47
5.3.2. <i>Context: Gaza Wars</i>	48
5.3.3. <i>Context: Iran</i>	50
5.3.4. <i>Context: Israel-Palestine</i>	51
5.4. Speech Analysis: Final Remarks	52
6. Conclusion	56
7. Epilogue	62
8. Bibliography	65
8.1. Primary Sources	65
8.1.1. <i>Documents</i>	65
8.1.2. <i>Speeches</i>	65
8.2. Literature	68
8.3. Internet Sources.....	70
9. Appendices	74

Preface

I would like to thank my supervisor Bob de Graaff for his continuous guidance, advice and understanding throughout the process of writing my master thesis.

I would also like to thank my family and my soulmate, as this would not have been possible without their love, support and help. Additionally, I'd like to extend my thanks to all the friends and colleagues who helped either by proofreading or just by being there for me in the past months.

1. Introduction: How to Discuss Israel's Impunity?

One specific quote from Yasser Arafat's 1974 UN General Assembly Speech, one of the most prominent Palestinian representatives over the course of history, can illustrate the state of uncertainty in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: "I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Don't let the olive branch fall from my hand".¹ This quote, although said in different times and circumstances, can still explain the nature of the conflict, where peace and war are hanging by the thread, and where terrorism can be understood very differently depending on the perspective of the observer. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, being one of the longest ongoing contemporary conflicts in the world has from its very beginning been characterized by questions of ethnicity and nationality, sovereignty and right to self-determination, terrorism and security. Finally, over the years, these notions clashed and resulted in conflicts and wars.

December 6th, 2017 marked the day when US president Donald Trump overturned a long-standing US foreign policy, recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. This event, followed by the May 2018 US Embassy opening in Jerusalem is staggering, if we consider the fact that the status of Jerusalem has been regulated by the UN General Assembly's 1947 Resolution 181, also known as the Partition Plan. The 1947 document postulates that Palestine, with its borders at the time, will be constituted (which it was) into an independent Arab state, an independent Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem as *corpus separatum*.² President Trump's move is problematic due to its interference with the fundamentals of the creation of both contemporary Palestine and Israel, which will be

¹ United Nations Department of Public Information, *The question of Palestine and the United Nations*, (New York: United Nations, 2008), 24.

² UNSCOP PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION, in: Smith, 209.

Corpus separatum is a Latin phrase which refers to an entity which is appointed with a special legal and political status distinct from its environment, but it is at the same time not independent or sovereign.

assessed in the later stages of this paper. The event of recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital, followed by the embassy opening triggered a discussion on the importance of UN resolutions dedicated to Israel and Palestine, and the repeated inability and unwillingness of Israeli governments to respect them. This of course points equally to the response of the international community assembled in the United Nations, as crucial resolutions aimed at sustaining peace and protection of human rights come as decisions made by this international body itself. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has all the historical and contemporary elements to it, and the conflict resolution seems to be just a matter of discussion.

In recent years, the nature of the conflict has focused on the Israeli-built illegal settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories; Jerusalem being especially problematic as both Israeli and Palestinian capital; the problems deriving from the wall separation; and finally the matter of terrorism and security, in which case Palestinian representatives (in this case Hamas) are perceived as terrorists by the Israeli government which resulted in a serious development of a securitization narrative, policies and actions toward both Palestinian civilians and their representatives.

It seems as if the state of Israel has remained immune for the majority, if not all of the UN resolutions condemning its actions. This immunity or impunity needs an explanation, and one possibility arose as an idea for research while writing an essay on Israeli violations of UN resolutions – that the explanation could be found in the strength of the Israeli security narrative, which is in fact a case of securitization.

This paper will therefore aim at answering the following research question: why has the Israeli securitization narrative been so effective in bolstering a historical impunity for violating UN resolutions? In this paper securitization will be viewed as both a narrative

and a set of policies that are in their essence and detail aimed at terrorism and counter-terrorism, in which case it is of extreme importance to note that Palestinian representatives, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Fatah and Hamas, have all institutionally been labelled as terrorists by the Israeli government.³ The concept of labelling Palestinian political representatives as terrorists has helped in forming a cleavage through which Israeli politics managed to develop the securitization narrative, since the complete political establishment of Palestine had to be securitized. Furthermore, on the notion of the narrative being effective with the international community, the research question is aimed at the response of the international community to what this paper views as a relevant factor to the conflict and this question – violation of United Nations resolutions. As the PLO was labelled internationally as a terrorist organization until 1993 while being the sole representation of Palestinians, international failure in non-accepting the outcome of the 2006 Gaza elections due to the victory of Hamas, has to be discussed as a spark that after the global outcry because of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US opened a new era of Israel legitimizing its violence against Palestinians because of its fight against terrorism (as Hamas has been labelled as a terror organization).⁴ In essence, as we will see, the Israeli securitization narrative which made it possible to withstand the UN resolutions, has been based on the idea that the Palestinian opponents are terrorists, with whom the Israeli government cannot and should not negotiate.

Therefore, the hypothesis of this paper claims that the effectiveness of the Israeli securitization narrative on the international level in the context of violations of UN resolutions is rooted in its effectiveness on the domestic level.

³ Jerome Slater, "Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Middle East Policy* 22, no. 3 (2015): 82.

⁴ Toi Staff, "Tony Blair laments boycotting Hamas after 2006 PA election," *The Times of Israel*, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/tony-blair-bemoans-boycotting-hamas-after-2006-pa-election/>. Accessed on: March 20, 2018.

Violations of United Nations resolutions are taken as an example of how the securitization narrative works in practice, as this paper argues that Israel remains unpunished for these violations due to the strength of its justification apparatus embodied in securitization.

Over the past decades, there has been a significant number of UN resolutions aimed at Israel, and what is even more significant to this paper – Israeli governments have repeatedly violated these resolutions.⁵ In addition to that, outbreaks of violence, illegal settlements in Palestinian territories, discrimination and an ongoing blockade of the Gaza Strip, along with wars in which the Palestinian side is left with hundreds of civilian deaths, while the Israeli one has much more army than civilian losses – are events which illustrate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, the question of Israel’s impunity and occasional condemnation by the international community is important because it is not new – debates on Israel’s impunity in the international community have been present for decades, depending on the focus, which is today based on the role of instruments of international law, more specifically the International Criminal Court (ICC).⁶

The notion of violation of UN resolutions and impunity for these acts, in combination with Israel’s securitization, is a critical debate relevant to one of the longest ongoing conflict in the world because of serious breaches of human rights that the UN resolutions are aimed at protecting. This is also a crucial debate because it is in the realm of a fast-developing field of security, especially since it is related to one of the most wide-spread international issues – terrorism.

⁵ Chloe Farand, “Israel has ignored resolution to stop settlements in Palestinian territories, UN says,” *The Independent*, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-un-resolution-security-council-settlements-palestinian-territories-a7649571.html>. Accessed on: December 15, 2017.

⁶ Ali Omid, “Why Israel’s Impunity Goes Unpunished by International Authorities,” *Foreign Policy Journal*, <https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/08/11/why-israels-impunity-goes-unpunished-by-international-authorities/>. Accessed on: December 11, 2017.

My personal drive for writing about this topic is rooted in the events that occurred ten years ago, which resulted in the blockade of Gaza and a human rights crisis. Since then, I have actively been researching, following on the news related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and writing about the topic either in essays or newspapers. Having written an essay on violations of UN Resolutions by Israel during my master's degree course on the conflict, I have come across a dilemma – why are the UN resolutions not effective and why does Israel seem to be immune when violating them? As an outcome of my personal reflection I identified securitization as a possible angle from which this problem may be viewed, and since I have never come across similar research, decided to engage with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from this perspective. Coming from the post-conflict society of Croatia with a recent war history, I feel I have a larger than usual responsibility to personally contribute to the aim of shedding light on the most important aspects of the longest conflict in the modern world. This is especially due to its serious consequences for the basis of world order, human rights violations, disrespect of international law and organizations, principles of multilateral cooperation, restraint of unnecessary use of force in conflict solution and countless civilian casualties.

In order to engage in this debate and answer the questions and dilemmas presented above, this paper will focus on both primary and secondary sources. Therefore, UN and UNSC Resolutions related to Israel and Palestine will be assessed, namely resolutions 181, 242, 338 and 2334. This will be done by analysing the four resolutions in their historical and political context, with their influence on the *status quo*. Finally, after establishing the relevance of these resolutions, this paper will analyse the repercussions of Israeli violations of the resolutions on the current political situation and lay a basis for the debate on how such grave breaches are still being 'justified' due to the strength of the securitization narrative.

Secondary sources, i.e. articles and books on securitization in Israel, violations of UN resolutions, the history of the conflict, Israel's justification and escaping from consequences of its discriminatory policies, as well as the international stance on this relationship will also be examined. Since part of the research is based on theories, academic debates on securitization in the modern era and lack of interventionism in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be embedded in this research through engaging with existing research regarding these concepts. Whereas most part of this thesis will be based upon generally available secondary literature and published sources, the part about the Israeli international discourse is based upon original research, using primary sources: speeches by the Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu.

Finally, the structure of this paper will be as follows. The first chapter of this paper will be dedicated to historiography and methodology; the second chapter will focus on the brief historical overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the importance of UN resolutions and the matter of their violations; the third chapter will address the main securitization narrative of Israel; while the fourth chapter will assess and present the findings of a conducted discourse analysis. The concluding chapter will cover all the analyses of the topic and bring a conclusion based on the research question and the hypothesis set in the introduction.

2. Theory, Historiography and Methodology

2.1. Theoretical Background

Securitization is a concept that emerged at the end of the Cold War and in the dawn of the war on terror.⁷ The Copenhagen School's definition of securitization, which is one of the most cited definitions, is the following: "when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is 'normal politics', we have a case of securitization".⁸ With new global security issues and challenges, scholarship directed more thought towards a more coherent theoretical approach to security studies. Some even call it one of the most fruitful theories in the International Relations literature, due to its ability to generate studies on different empirical and theoretical issues.⁹ It was developed by Ole Wæver and is probably the most prominent concept of the Copenhagen School.¹⁰ The Copenhagen School is a group of theorists which is often referred to as anti-traditional, in contrast to traditional theories of IR like realism and liberalism. This can be observed in the three main conceptual tools of analysis that the School uses: sectors of security, regional security complex and securitization theory.¹¹ The most relevant work by the Copenhagen School is *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. The reason for using securitization for this research lies in the theory's focus on existential threats

⁷ Scott D. Watson, "Framing' the Copenhagen School: Integrating the literature on threat construction," *Millennium* 40, no. 2 (2012): 282.

⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: a new framework for analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 24-25. See also: Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 491.

⁹ Amir Lupovici, "The limits of securitization theory: Observational criticism and the curious absence of Israel," *International Studies Review* 16, no. 3 (2014): 390.

¹⁰ A school of security studies/academic thoughts that emphasizes social elements and aspects of security.

¹¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: a new framework for analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 21.

that justify the use of extraordinary measures, as Scott Watson argues in his article on framing the Copenhagen School.¹²

Simultaneously, securitization was chosen due to the presence of an existential threats and measures paradigm in Israel, which made this choice even more reasonable. This paper will analyse this in relation to Israel's strategic narrative, since securitization theory is defined in terms of an existential threat of terrorism which justifies the use of extraordinary measures, varying from extreme policies to breaches and violations of UN resolutions.

As Thierry Balzacq points out, securitization theory approaches analyses of politics by looking at how the security character of public problems is established; the assurances of these actions that result from the acceptance by the community that the perceived issue or problem is a threat are fixed and the feasibility of a policy is established.¹³

This is in line with the paper's research question which aims to find out how and why the security narrative of Israel gives it impunity and freedom of sanctions in the international community embodied in the UN. This Israeli defiance of judgments from the international community has resulted in the aforementioned emergency measures and justifying actions, such as heavy check-point controls for Palestinians, wall separation and difficult accessibility both between Palestinian territories and between Palestine and Israel.¹⁴

Finally, as the concept of audience is of great importance for this paper, it is important to address core concepts of the securitization theory – the securitizing actor (e.g. the political

¹² Scott D. Watson, "'Framing' the Copenhagen School: Integrating the literature on threat construction," *Millennium* 40, no. 2 (2012): 282.

¹³ Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka. "Securitization revisited: theory and cases," *International Relations* 30, no. 4 (2016): 495.

¹⁴ "Checkpoints. Israel's military checkpoints: 'We live a life of injustice'". *Al Jazeera*, <https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2018/commuting-through-israeli-checkpoints/index.html>. Accessed on: June 8, 2018.

authority presenting an issue as a threat), the referent subject (e.g. the threatening body), the audience (the approving entity necessary to consult when defining a threat), the context and the adoption of distinctive policies ('exceptional' or not).¹⁵ Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka evaluate the achievements of securitization theory, established by the Copenhagen School, which is important because it shows the development of the theory throughout the years which we can use to see how it is applicable in both contemporary times and the case of Israel and Palestine.¹⁶

Since the Copenhagen School's pioneering work, securitization theory has developed over the years, resulting in a profound literature focused on the ever-changing processes of international politics. Scholars discussing security and securitization have expanded the main concepts that the founders of this theory have established. In the last years, research on the concept of securitization has expanded. Scott Watson argues that framing and securitization are in a similar context, which is relevant in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and especially for this thesis, as securitization is the framing of a strategic narrative in Israeli politics through their policies.¹⁷

Especially interesting is the issue of the morality of securitization, which two authors have paid special attention to. First, Paul Roe writes on the normative debate that exists on the topic of securitization, concerning normal versus extraordinary politics, showing differences between positive and negative security, which is useful in contextualizing the context of the Israeli securitization narrative because it can help clarify the nature of the

¹⁵ Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka. "Securitization revisited: theory and cases," *International Relations* 30, no. 4 (2016): 495.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Scott D. Watson, "'Framing' the Copenhagen School: Integrating the literature on threat construction," *Millennium* 40, no. 2 (2012): 284.

Israeli narrative and how it is built.¹⁸ Second, Rita Floyd in her article “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory” aims to render securitization morally right and legitimate, by proposing a revision of securitization theory that specifies three criteria that, if actualized simultaneously, will make securitization morally right: there has to be an objective existential threat, the referent object of security is morally legitimate, and the security response is appropriate to the threat in question.¹⁹

In this paper specifically the referent subject is that which is threatening, in this case the Palestinians (either in general or their militant individuals). The referent object is the one that is being threatened, which is in this case the Israeli population and state (because of the threat posed by the Palestinians), and finally, securitizing is the activity that those holding political power do to protect the referent object from the referent subject. Balzacq clarifies the distinction between exceptional and normal politics better than the Copenhagen School has done, which is why I will use his more detailed and grasping definition of securitization, which in my opinion will be more useful for the topic of this thesis:

“Securitization is an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilised by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the

¹⁸ Paul Roe, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” *Security Dialogue* 43, no. 3 (2012): 249.

¹⁹ Rita Floyd, “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory,” *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 427-439.

securitizing actor's reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customised policy must be immediately undertaken to block it.”²⁰

In addition to that, as Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka note in the 2016 article “Securitization revisited: Theory and cases”, the main idea of securitization is that a problem is given sufficient saliency in order to win the audience. The audience then enables those who are authorized (e.g. the government) to proceed with managing the issue by using means they decide as most appropriate. In other words, securitization combines the politics of threat design with that of threat management.²¹

2.2. Historiography and Academic Debate regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Having established the relevance of the securitization theory for the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and bearing in mind that it focuses on the Israeli notion of security, this paper will argue that Israel's numerous violations of UN resolutions are unsanctioned because Israel legitimizes its policies through a securitization narrative. The fact that there has never been significant action or humanitarian/military intervention in the cases of the Gaza wars (e.g. 2009 Israeli offensive and blockade or 2014 war), neither a solid fight against impunity, is staggering. For example, Jeff Halper, an American-Israeli anthropologist, author, lecturer, political activist and founder of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, elaborates on the way in which Israel's war on the

²⁰ Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka. “Securitization revisited: theory and cases,” *International Relations* 30, no. 4 (2016): 495.

²¹ *Ibid.*

Palestinians has become a model for a global war against terror, examining Israel's security policies and the notion of world pacification.²²

Amir Lupovici, associate professor at the department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, puts it simply: “with the exception of a few comprehensive studies of securitization processes in Israel (e.g. Newman 2009, Coskun 2011, Abulof 2013) this scholarship has not penetrated to studies on Israel's security, remaining marginal and anecdotal.”²³ This is important as Israel has only on a few occasions been used as a case study for studying securitization, while a handful of authors note that it is a significant omission within the securitization theory.²⁴ The need for writing about securitization in Israel was motivated by the fact that insecurity in Israel is routinized, which makes the state of emergency the normal politics in Israel, has also been detected by other authors.²⁵ Using a sociological approach, Ronnie Olesker, in *Israel's Societal Security Dilemma and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process*, notes that through the moves and policies towards Palestinian Israelis challenge their identity through discursive, but also bureaucratic and legal actions.²⁶

2.3. Methodology and Sources

In order to engage in this debate and answer the questions and dilemmas presented above, this paper will focus on: Resolutions 181, 242, 338 and 2334. These four resolutions will be analysed in their historical and political context and by establishing their influence on

²² Jeff Halper, *War against the people: Israel, the Palestinians and global pacification* (London: PlutoPress, 2015).

²³ Amir Lupovici, “The limits of securitization theory: Observational criticism and the curious absence of Israel,” *International Studies Review* 16, no. 3 (2014): 390.

²⁴ Such as Zeitoun (2007), Michael (2009), Leibovich (2010), Barak and Sheffer (2013) and Coskun (2010) in: Lupovici (2014).

²⁵ Amir Lupovici, “The limits of securitization theory: Observational criticism and the curious absence of Israel,” *International Studies Review* 16, no. 3 (2014): 391.

²⁶ Ronnie Olesker, “Israel's societal security dilemma and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 17, no. 4 (2011): 382-401.

the status quo. The resolutions will be examined on the basis of two categorizations: 1) whether they were passed by the UN General Assembly or the Security Council and 2) whether they are under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This is important because of the impact the resolutions have depending on whether they are passed under UNGA or UNSC and under which chapter they are passed. Finally, after establishing the relevance of these resolutions, this paper will analyse the consequences of Israeli violations of the resolutions on the current political situation and lay a basis for the debate on how such grave breaches are still justified due to the strength of Israel's official security narrative.

Dalia Gavriely-Nuri, from the Hadassah College Jerusalem and Bar-Ilan University in Israel, has written an article "The idiosyncratic language of Israeli 'peace': A Cultural Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CCDA)", and her framework will be applied to this research's methodology.²⁷ While Gavriely-Nuri focuses on peace discourse, for the purpose of my research, her framework will be modified by emphasising the national security discourse instead. What is interesting in Gavriely-Nuri's research is that her discourse analysis revealed the construction of the Israeli speaker's positive self-image as a peace-seeker together with delegitimization of rivals and the facilitation of public acceptance of strategically problematic actions, primarily use of military violence, by their presentation as part of the peace discourse.²⁸ This makes discourse analysis and the author's framework even more plausible to use as inspiration for this paper's research about the security narrative in Israel and its strength in the international context.

²⁷ Dalia Gavriely-Nuri, "The idiosyncratic language of Israeli 'peace': A cultural approach to critical discourse analysis (CCDA)," *Discourse & Society* 21, no. 5 (2010): 565-585.

²⁸ Dalia Gavriely-Nuri, "The idiosyncratic language of Israeli 'peace': A cultural approach to critical discourse analysis (CCDA)," *Discourse & Society* 21, no. 5 (2010): 565.

In order to conduct a discourse analysis of the Israeli securitization narrative, I used media speeches by Benjamin Netanyahu, the current Prime Minister of Israel, who has been holding this position since 2009. In addition to the representative relevance of Netanyahu as the Israeli power-holder, he previously held the same position in 1996-1999; he is a member of the Knesset (Israeli Parliament); Chairman of the ruling Likud party; Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) veteran and previous Israeli ambassador to the United Nations (1984-1988).²⁹ Finally, speaking at the Economic Club in Washington in March 2018, when asked what he wanted his legacy to be, Netanyahu said he wished to be remembered as a “Defender of Israel. Liberator of its economy”, which is another indicator of the securitization narrative existing in Israel – towards the inside, but more importantly for this thesis, also towards the outside.³⁰

Narratives or discourses can be defined as stories about social reality. “These stories are stated in relational terms and give a representation of what is considered the ‘social truth’.”³¹ Simply put by Demmers – ‘discourse is action’. In addition to that, a discursive approach to violent conflict places the story at the core of the analysis.

“It aims to give an explicit and systematic description of discourses within their specific historical and power context. It focuses on the dialectical formation and contestation of ‘collective narratives’. From this perspective conflict is a time at which the language of the everyday

²⁹ BBC.com. “Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu: Commando turned PM”. *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18008697>. Accessed on: April 12, 2018.

³⁰ Eric Cortelessa, “Netanyahu issues election threat, muses over his legacy”. *The Times of Israel*, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-says-he-wants-to-be-remembered-for-liberating-economy/>. Accessed on: May 10, 2018.

³¹ Jolle Demmers, *Theories of violent conflict: An introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 125.

becomes “a discourse of exclusionist protection against a constructed enemy, who is deserving of any violence perpetrated against it”.³²

For the purpose of discourse analysis, I collected speeches made by Benjamin Netanyahu, and researched the appearance and use of keywords defined prior to this research. First, Israeli government’s website has a collection of speeches, which are also available on news portals and social media.³³ Second, in order to detect the securitization narrative directed at the international community I searched for keywords associated with national security, such as: *defence, terrorism, threat, violence, security, enemies* etc.

As has been shown, some scholars have grasped the topic of securitization in Israel (or pointed out that there should be more research on the topic). Nevertheless, the relation between Israel’s securitization narrative, impunity and UN resolutions is yet to be researched and discussed. Before introducing the topic of UN resolutions in-depth, it is necessary to lay out a brief historical overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – with a special focus on its consequences on the research question regarding the main securitization narrative.

³² Jabri (1996) in: Demmers, Jolle. *Theories of violent conflict: An introduction*. Routledge, 2017.

³³ Benjamin Netanyahu’s Speeches.

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/default.aspx>. Accessed on: May 2, 2018.

3. Historical Overview of the Conflict and Israeli Violations of UN Resolutions

Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is impossible without considering the historical perspective. Historical events have immensely influenced the conflict and, more specifically, the importance of security in Israel that is the focal point of this thesis. Therefore, this chapter will firstly provide a brief overview of the conflict through historical events which influenced the *status quo*. This overview will, unless indicated differently, be based on two outstanding recent publications, i.e. *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents* by Charles D. Smith (2016) which is one of the most substantial and least biased books on the conflict, especially due to the number of historical documents it contains, and *Bliski istok (Middle East)* by Mirjana Kasapović (2016), which is the first text-book about the Middle East published in Croatian, with a comprehensible historical and contemporary overview included in two chapters on Israel and Palestine. Secondly, the issue of Israel's impunity for the violation of UN resolutions will be analysed from the perspective of the current territorial reality in Israel and Palestine. This will lay ground for the main analysis on the strength of the Israeli securitization narrative.

3.1. Genesis of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The outlook of the Middle East political map was one of the most important geopolitical questions of the first decade of the 20th century. The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the ensuing British-French distribution of interests in the Middle East greatly influenced regional political changes.³⁴ These included the organization and agreements for the post World War I geography of the Middle East; the creation of new nations and states,

³⁴ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017), 53.

including the state of Israel. In the context of Israel, some of the important documents and agreements from this period are the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), the Balfour Declaration (1917) and the Red Line Agreement (1920).³⁵

The idea about a national state of the Jews dates back to the end of the nineteenth century. It was proclaimed by Theodor Herzl in 1897 in his pamphlet *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State) at the First Zionist Congress, as a reaction to the then last Jewish pogrom by the Russian Empire.³⁶ Until 1917, the most influential interests in the Middle East were European, which played a major role during the Great War. In 1917, Lord Alfred Balfour, British Foreign Minister, wrote a letter to Lord Rothschild, then president of the World Jewish Congress, in which he proclaimed that his government had nothing against the establishment of a Jewish state on the territory of Palestine.³⁷ Balfour's Declaration is widely viewed as the founding document which ensured the path for the creation of Israel.³⁸

At the same time (during the Great War), in exchange for the Arab support to The Triple Entente, the three sons of Shareef Hussein of Mecca were promised authority over three newly formed states (Iraq, Syria and Transjordan).³⁹ However, the territory of Cis-Jordan (Palestine) was not included in the newly formed states after the end of the Great War. After the Versailles Treaties in 1919, Palestine became a British mandate territory until a

³⁵ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017), 59.

³⁶ Boris Havel in: Mirjana Kasapović, *Bliski istok: politika i povijest*. (Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016), 112.

³⁷ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017), 67.

³⁸ See i.e. Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017), Stork, J. „Understanding the Balfour Declaration“ 1972, Khalidi, W. „Palestine and Palestine Studies One Century after World War I and the Balfour Declaration“ 2014.

³⁹ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017), 54.

political solution would be reached.⁴⁰ Since then until the end of the British mandate administration in 1947, European Jews settled in Palestine, which was opposed by the Palestinians since 1920 under the leadership of Hajj Emin El Hussein, Jerusalem Mufti.⁴¹ Following the beginning of Hitler's persecutions in Nazi Germany the Jewish migration to Palestine intensified.

After the Second World War, which brought the Holocaust upon the Jewish population in the Third Reich, the newly-formed United Nations were faced with deciding Palestine's fate after the expiration of the British mandate. In 1947, the UN General Assembly – despite the opposition of neighbouring Arab states – declared in a resolution the establishment of two states (Arab and Jewish) on the territory of Palestine, which separated Jerusalem in two parts with international administration of the sacred places for Judaism, Christianity and Islam.⁴²

What followed could be defined as the start of the actual conflict (although its beginning was set significantly earlier). Due to the Arab opposition to the UN Resolution, the leader of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish community in Palestine, David Ben-Gurion – with the help of a paramilitary organization *Haganah* – occupied the Jewish territories set by the UN Resolution, but also parts of the territory planned for the Arab-Palestinian state and proclaimed the independence of the state of Israel.⁴³ This was a *casus belli* for the neighbouring Arab states, which launched an offensive on Israel – beginning the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948.⁴⁴ The War ended with Israel's victory and the

⁴⁰ Mirjana Kasapović, *Bliski istok: politika i povijest*. (Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016), 266.

⁴¹ Boris Havel in: Mirjana Kasapović, *Bliski istok: politika i povijest*. (Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016), 118.

⁴² UNSCOP PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION, in: Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*, 209.

⁴³ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017), 181.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 197.

preservation of all the territories it occupied; the territory west of Jordan river was taken by the state of Jordan (former Transjordan) and the territory of Gaza was taken by Egypt.⁴⁵ It is important to note that both territories (today known as the West Bank and Gaza Strip) were at the time only temporary in this condition, as they were considered to be part of the Palestinian national territory in all further political and warfare events. One of the most important consequences of the War – which is until today a stumbling block for negotiations – are Palestinian refugees. The exile that followed the War is called *Nakba* by the Palestinians, as 650,000 to a million Palestinians were expelled to neighbouring countries where, till today, many of them have been living in refugee camps and ghettos for generations.⁴⁶

To illustrate the presence of conflicts in the Israeli-Palestinian history, which has gravely influenced the *status quo*, it is important to further mention the 1967 war, also known as the Six-Day War. That year, leaders of Egypt and Syria – most likely due to inner political reasons – started a propaganda campaign for a war against Israel and final complete liberation of all Palestinian territories. The War started in June 1967 and ended after six days – with total Israeli victory, which resulted in the Israeli occupation of Sinai (Egypt), the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Palestine), Gaza (Palestine) and the Golan Heights (Syria).⁴⁷ It is also important to add that this occupation led to a new wave of Palestinian refugees towards Jordan (along with military and political factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization), which eventually induced a conflict with the Jordanian government and the expulsion of part of Palestinians to Lebanon in 1970.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Mirjana Kasapović, *Bliski istok: politika i povijest*. (Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016), 272.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 272.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 272.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 273.

In 1973, the leaders of Egypt and Jordan decided to retrieve the occupied territories from 1967, and they launched the Yom Kippur War – which started with great successes for the Arab side, demonstrating their power to Israel, but ended with no real territorial difference from the situation before the war.⁴⁹ The war did however bring back the issue to the international diplomatic agenda. At the end of 1970s Egypt and Israel agreed to start bilateral negotiations. Negotiations resulted in the Camp David agreement in 1979, which stipulated Israel's gradual return of the Sinai territory to Egypt, but also provoked a rage from other Arab countries, suspension of Egypt from the Arab League and the establishment of a precedent partial agreement of Israel with each Arab state, which significantly reduced Palestinian prospects because their problem ceased to be a common Arab cause.⁵⁰ It is also worth mentioning the Lebanon Civil War (1975-1990), in which Israel participated and which deepened the tension-like relation between these neighbouring countries.⁵¹

Following these events, it is also important to refer to the First Palestinian Intifada, an upheaval in occupied territories that started in 1987 demanding freedom for Palestinians through demonstrations. Stimulated by the *Intifada* and the establishment of *Hamas* in 1987 (a radical Palestinian movement, which does not acknowledge the existence of Israel) – the international community, under United States guidance, began longstanding negotiations on the solution of the Palestinian issue and the conflict with the surviving leadership of the PLO in exile.⁵² This process ended in 1993 with the Oslo Agreement, which provides for the establishment of limited Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank

⁴⁹ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017), 320.

⁵⁰ Boris Havel in: Mirjana Kasapović, *Bliski istok: politika i povijest*. (Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016), 135.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017), 399.

and Gaza, in the perspective of providing insurances and guarantees and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.⁵³ The Oslo Process was never completed due to the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by Jewish radicals in 1995, who was the first to accept the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state, before signing one of the final documents which was supposed to define Jerusalem's status and the construction of illegal Jewish settlements (especially in the West Bank).

The repercussions were grave. After Rabin's assassination, the right-wing Likud party came into power, through whose governance the illegal settlements were continued on a larger scale.⁵⁴ This event contributed to the radicalisation of some Palestinians, especially Hamas, and ultimately to the Israeli government building the wall on the West Bank for security, which substantially reduces the West Bank's territory and basically shuts down communication within the Palestinian Authority.⁵⁵

In 2000, the right-wingers and Jewish religious radicals led by Ariel Sharon organized a provocative march on the Mount Temple or Masjid ul-Aqsa, which triggered the second Palestinian intifada, with less significant results despite the ongoing negotiations.⁵⁶ After Hamas' 2006 electoral victory in Gaza, once again because of alleged insecurity, Israel, in co-operation with Egyptian authorities, introduced a complete blockade of Gaza, that led to one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world, thus further radicalizing part of the Palestinian political scene.⁵⁷

⁵³ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017), 435.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 453.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 493.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 513.

Finally, one should mention the conflicts with Gaza and Hamas. At the time of writing of this thesis, Gazans have been protesting since March 2018 – demanding the right of return for Palestinian refugees and the end of the blockade.⁵⁸ From 2006, Israel launched four military offensives in the Gaza Strip, 'Summer Rains' 2006, 'Cast Lead' 2008-2009, 'Pillar of Defence' 2012, and 'Protective Edge' 2014.⁵⁹ It is important to stress that the Gaza 'episodes' are interlinked with the existence and political actions of Hamas, which has been in power in Gaza since 2006, after it was democratically elected.⁶⁰ Hamas is supposed to be a Palestinian national movement and a representative body, but it denies Israel's right to existence. Part of Hamas' strategies includes firing rockets into Israel (the Gaza Strip borders with Israel), which is often taken as a justification for Israeli attacks and for the continuation of conflicts.⁶¹

3.2. The Impunity for the Violation of the UN Resolutions

The international community's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial to understanding the conflict, as it has existed prior to the creation of the state of Israel. Moreover, the United Nations as a representative of the international community has been engaged with Israel and Palestine through a significant number of both General Assembly and Security Council's Resolutions – starting with the already mentioned UN General Assembly's Resolution 181 known as the Partition Plan.⁶² This paper will examine the texts and the importance of four very significant resolutions – 181, 242, 338 and 2334 – as part of the answer to the research question regarding the significance of the impunity for their violations as a result of the strength of the Israeli securitization narrative.

⁵⁸ "Gaza protests: All the latest updates," *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/gaza-protest-latest-updates-180406092506561.html>. Accessed on: May 20, 2018.

⁵⁹ Mirjana Kasapović, *Bliski istok: politika i povijest*. (Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016), 280.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 290.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 290.

⁶² November 29, 1947.

Specifically, the Resolution 2334 will be examined, to see how the “new reality” in the relations between the two states has been developing, especially in the most recent context of Jerusalem being recognized as Israel’s capital by the United States of America and the placement of the US Embassy in Jerusalem, on May 14th, 2018.⁶³

As previously mentioned, the main four UN resolutions in questions are: Resolution 181, known as the 1947 ‘UN Partition Plan for Palestine’; the 1967 United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War; the 1973 UNSC Resolution 338, calling for ceasefire in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the UNSC Resolution 2334 of 2016 on illegal settlements. The four discussed resolutions are chosen due to their relevance for the historical context and the *status quo*. Nonetheless, there have been hundreds of resolutions drafted and adopted regarding this conflict by the General Assembly, Security Council and the Human Rights Council from 1947 until 2018. While the UN Security Council’s resolutions have legally binding powers, those made by the General Assembly are more of an indicator of the international stance on these issues, adding more to condemnation than to sanctioning.

UNSCOP’s (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) *Plan of Partition with Economic Union*,⁶⁴ became the basis of the Resolution 181, also known as the Partition Plan.⁶⁵ The 1947 text reads that Palestine, with its borders at the time, will be constituted into: 1) an independent Arab state; 2) an independent Jewish State and 3) the City of Jerusalem (as *corpus separatum*).⁶⁶ It was adopted on 29th November 1947 by the UN

⁶³ This fragment chapter is based on the author’s research and essay written in 2017, for the course *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Never-Ending Tragedy?* within the MA ‘International Relations in Historical Perspective.

⁶⁴ United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.

⁶⁵ UNSCOP PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION, Resolution 181(II), November 29th, 1947.

⁶⁶ UNSCOP PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION, in: Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2017), 209.

General Assembly, under the premise of two active nationalisms at the time – Zionism (Jewish nationalism) and Palestinian nationalism, at the same time calling for an Economic Union between the two planned countries. While this resolution is the one dividing territories between the two nations, its significance lies in the fact it provides international legitimacy for the right to self-determination and sovereignty for both Palestinians and Jews. Therefore, the Palestine Liberation Organization published in 1988 the Palestinian Declaration of Independence dependant on Resolution 181, just like the Palestinian application for membership at the UNESCO was backed by this Resolution.⁶⁷ This resolution is the basis for so called “two-state solution”.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted unanimously on 22nd of November 1967, after the Six-Day War, and is one of the most broadly accepted resolutions in the conflict between Arabs and Israelis.⁶⁸ It served as basis for a number of negotiations and Peace Treaties between the neighbouring countries. Resolution 242 was based on two principles: 1) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied territories in the most recent conflict – West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, Sinai, Golan Heights;⁶⁹ 2) the “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force”.⁷⁰ Israel supported the resolution as it

⁶⁷ “Request for the admission of the State of Palestine to UNESCO as a Member State,” UNESCO, May 12, 1989., 4

⁶⁸ Zena Tahhan, “Israel’s settlements: 50 years of land theft explained,” *Al Jazeera*, <https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2017/50-years-illegal-settlements/index.html>. Accessed on: June 10, 2018.

⁶⁹ Although Israel declared its independence on a territory larger than assigned by the Partition Plan/Resolution 181, the first Arab-Israeli War from 1948 ended with Israeli occupation of West Bank and East Jerusalem by Jordan, and of Gaza by Egypt. Sinai was occupied as a recognized Egyptian territory and the Golan heights as a recognized Syrian territory.

⁷⁰ United Nations Department of Public Information, *The question of Palestine and the United Nations* (New York: United Nations, 2008), 16.

required the Arab states to recognize Israel's right to existence; Egypt, Jordan and Syria accepted the resolution due to its clause requiring Israel to withdraw from the 1967 occupied territories; the PLO denied to recognize the resolution until 1988, as, in their opinion, the reference to Palestine was insufficient.⁷¹ Nevertheless, this resolution remains one of the most important as it has been used as an approach for diplomatic attempts to end Arab-Israeli clashes. Other important elements of the resolution were the recognition of the refugee issue and its call for the achievement of its just settlement, which was opposed by the Palestinians (i.e. that their cause and involvement were solely limited to the issue of refugees).⁷²

The UN Security Council Resolution 338, which followed the War of 1973 between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic – was calling for ceasefire while reaffirming and reintroducing the fundamentals of the 242 Resolution. This resolution is relevant as it was built upon through the following years and led to the UNEF II (United Nations Emergency Force), the 1973 Geneva peace conference, and the UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force), which has continued its work to present day.⁷³

The most recent of the four resolutions is the UNSC Resolution 2334, adopted on 23rd December 2016 (14 votes in favour, with the United States abstained from vote). It is significant as it tackles one of the most crucial ongoing issues: Israeli illegal settlements in Palestinian territories that have been occupied since 1967 (including East Jerusalem, which was at the time of the vote extremely significant due to the special status of the city and claims by both Israelis and Palestinians for Jerusalem as their capital). It explicitly

⁷¹ "United Nations Resolution 242," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Resolution-242> accessed on: December 12, 2017.

⁷² United Nations Department of Public Information, *The question of Palestine and the United Nations* (New York: United Nations, 2008), 16.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 19.

states that settlement activities by Israel constitute a “flagrant violation” of international law – and has no legal validity. In addition to that, the resolution demands Israel to stop these activities and fulfil its obligations as an occupying power, deriving from the Fourth Geneva Convention.⁷⁴ The resolution text *condemns* all acts of violence against civilians, and as it is stated – including acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction – *expresses* concern for the danger of the continuation of settlements for the two-state solution, demands the freezing of all settlement activity and finally reaffirms the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.⁷⁵ This resolution adds to the topic of this paper – as it is notable that the UNSC is trying to prevent the fast approach to the one-state reality, as the two-state plan has never truly been implemented. More importantly, the two-state concept has been violated by Israel on namely two levels – the 1967 occupation and the continuing activity of illegal settlements in occupied territories. Although the settlement issue is not the main obstacle to peace, it is the most concrete result of the deteriorating status quo.⁷⁶

While the United Nations resolutions on the Israeli-Conflict, whether they are addressing both sides or one in particular, do carry a certain load and gravity – it is very important to dissect to what extent they are binding and are able to press, in this case, Israel. Therefore, it is relevant to discuss which resolutions are binding, in order to address impunity and lack of effective sanctions in this conflict. It is with that notion important to understand to what rules different UN resolutions answer to and what their binding nature means.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334, S/RES/2334 (December 23, 2016), available from [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2334\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2334(2016)), 2.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷⁶ Nathan Sachs, “What’s new and what’s not in the U.N. resolution on Israeli settlements,” *The Brookings Institution*, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/12/26/whats-new-and-whats-not-in-the-u-n-resolution-on-israeli-settlements/>. Accessed on: December 15, 2017.

⁷⁷ “Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations provides the framework within which the Security Council may take enforcement action. It allows the Council to determine the existence of any threat to the

When examining United Nations Security Council resolutions, in addition to their content, one must locate under which Chapter of the UN Charter these resolutions are adopted. In this light, the resolutions whose scope is comprised in Chapter VII of the UN Charter are binding, allowing the Security Council to take enforcement and implementation action. Nevertheless: 1) Resolution 181, adopted by the UN General Assembly was not adopted under the Chapter VII; 2) Resolution 242 was adopted under Chapter VI; 3) concerning Resolution 338, there is a controversy as it is nowhere stated whether it refers to VI or VII; 4) Resolution 2334 was adopted under the non-binding Chapter VI. Concerning the Resolution 2334, as it was not adopted under Chapter VII, it is not legally binding and therefore does not create additional legal duties on Israel, nor does it demand UN member states to sanction Israel as a response to the settlement activity.⁷⁸

Chapter VI entails the role of the UNSC as a facilitator which supports the parties in resolving their conflict through peaceful means of their choice. The previously mentioned resolutions are recommendations, legally non-binding. In the case of Israel, all resolutions were adopted under Chapter VI, while Chapter VII resolutions are passed only if there is an imminent threat to international peace.⁷⁹ Recommendations, just like decisions – can be considered as comprised into the definition of resolution. Unlike its recommendations, the UNSC decisions are binding. However, the International Court of Justice has not yet

peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and to make recommendations or to resort to non-military and military action to maintain or restore international peace and security.” <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml> Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (Chapter VII).

⁷⁸ “The practice of the Security Council aimed at promoting and implementing recommendations and methods or procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes within the framework of Articles 33-38 of Chapter VI and Articles 11 and 99 of the Charter of the United Nations. Overall, Chapter VI of the Charter contains various provisions according to which the Security Council may make recommendations to the parties to a dispute or situation.” <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/settlements.shtml> Pacific Settlements of Disputes (Chapter VI).

⁷⁹ Gerald Adler, “Israel and Iraq: UN Double Standards – UN Charter Article 25 and Chapters VI and VII,” (2003): 1-19.

concluded whether this power would enable decisions to prevail over primary international law sources.⁸⁰

Therefore, while Israel is continuously defying UN resolutions, and there has been certain condemnation, the problem seems to lie much deeper. It arises from the fact that no resolution addressed to Israel's infringements has ever been adopted under Chapter VII. Had at least one been, the recognition of Israeli mistreatment of Palestinians would have been officially acknowledged by the international community. This way, condemnation could have resulted in concrete actions with possibly effective results in the conflict resolution, the issue of Israel's impunity and their upper-hand in relation to Palestine would deteriorate, working towards balancing and respecting decisions on both sides. This can be illustrated with many examples: had UN resolutions 242 or 338 been adopted under Chapter VII instead VI, the occupation of Palestinian territories from 1967 might have been changed due to direct, perhaps on-ground involvement by the international community. Furthermore, had the UN Resolution 2334, concerning a long-lasting issue of illegal settlements built since the occupation and in occupied territories, been adopted under Chapter VII, there would have been an intervention which would possibly have influenced the situation, avoiding major conflicts and deaths in both the West Bank, and especially in the occupied Gaza. Since all the aforementioned resolutions are non-binding, there is little manoeuvring left for the international community to truly address issues that are already recognized by UN member states.

Evidently, there are a series of issues: a) an international community not acting firm enough in relation to Israel through its representative bodies in the United Nations and b) Israel's violation of these resolutions, with a reminder that there have never been

⁸⁰ Marko Divac Öberg, "The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ," *European Journal of International Law* 16, no. 5 (2005): 884.

sanctions launched by the United Nations towards Israel, even though this would have been possible even with non-binding resolutions. Israeli policies and actions have been violating the majority of UN resolutions, including the founding one, which is also important to Israel – the Partition Plan/Resolution 181. These violations are evident through their declaration of independence, widening of territories through the years, occupation from 1967 and illegal settlements. Exactly these issues are tackled and addressed by the discussed resolutions 181, 242, 338 and 2334, yet they are all non-binding, Israel has repeatedly violated them – even officially denouncing them, without any reaction by the United Nations, either in terms of stronger implementation of their resolutions, sanctions or any others means. Violations of resolutions crucial to the existence of the Partition Plan and the Two-state solution, without any doubt, damage these projects and are fast approaching a “new reality” or the One-state solution.

4. Securitization in a Securitized Country

This section will focus on the scholarly work concerning the notions of: a) Israeli National Security and b) Securitization. The first section will consider the national security strategy and policies in general, while the second will focus on detecting securitization in Israel and linking it to certain policies and political actions. Finally, it will elaborate on what conclusions can be made about the Israeli type of securitization – with a possibility that it is a transformed version of what securitization theory considers as securitization.

4.1. Israeli National Security

The first extremely important notion to be mentioned in regard to Israeli national security is that Israel does not have a formal national security strategy or defence doctrine – regardless of its primary relevance to Israeli politics.⁸¹ Superficially there seem to have been two exceptions to this observation: the so-called Iron Wall-doctrine and the 2015 IDF Strategy. The Iron-Wall-doctrine was the basis for the only existing strategy published in the 1950s by then PM David Ben-Gurion. The ‘Iron Wall’ doctrine is an idea that was developed by Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky in 1925, which proclaimed that the only sustainable way for Israel to survive was to create a wall which ‘[...] would be so strong that Arab enemies trying to break through it would experience a long series of devastating defeats, through projecting an image of Israeli invincibility and retaliatory might’.⁸² Ben-Gurion embraced this idea and based his national security ‘doctrine’ on Jabotinsky’s ideas, but even this one was never fully adopted despite many failed attempts

⁸¹ Charles D. Freilich, *Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 6.

⁸² Ian S. Lustick, “Abandoning the Iron Wall: Israel and ‘the Middle Eastern muck’,” *Middle East Policy* 15, no. 3 (2008): 31.

at updating it or formulating a real national security strategy.⁸³ Therefore, it cannot be called a real national security doctrine. The Iron Wall doctrine was in power since the late 1920s until its abolishment in the late 1990s, with the perception of Israel transforming from an indestructible (Iron Wall goal) to a threatened and insecure state in constant danger.⁸⁴ Moreover, the change in the perception of Israel is the result of the past fifteen years, in which Israeli politics have been stressing the threats and the grave insecurity of Israel, which put Israel in a defensive position which requires offensive and defensive measures. The change that has occurred in the last fifteen years of Israeli security doctrine is also linked to the international audience and its resonance with its political actions. Specifically, this doctrine is ‘more successful’ internationally because the resonance with an international audience of Israel's equation of threats with terrorism was made (more) possible by the attacks of 9/11, which changed the international security discourse. Although terrorism has been one of the most significant threats defined by Israeli politics ever since the establishment of the state, the stance towards terrorism has changed especially after 2001 – which is also the moment in which the Israeli security discourse altered significantly, as was just shown. A good illustration of this, in addition to the final chapter and Netanyahu’s security discourse, is the vision of a former head of Mossad, Efraim Halevy. His vision of the period until the 2030’s places Israel fighting in the front lines in a ‘Third World War against radical Islam’ which, as he sees it, began with the 1998 bombings in Africa of two U.S. embassies, continued through 9/11, and ‘there is no end in sight’.⁸⁵

⁸³ Charles D. Freilich, *Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 6.

⁸⁴ Ian S. Lustick, “Abandoning the Iron Wall: Israel and ‘the Middle Eastern muck’,” *Middle East Policy* 15, no. 3 (2008): 50.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

The second possible exception of Israel having a national security doctrine is the 2015 IDF Strategy. However, this could neither be viewed as a security strategy type of document due to its military nature. As a national security strategy is supposed to outline security goals and priorities (and consequently threats), a defence strategy – IDF Strategy – should outline the ways in which national security strategy would apply to the military. The problem is the fact that the fundamental level is missing in Israel, as the military should not formulate the only existing strategy, but only translate the national security language into the military one – not the other way around.⁸⁶ Additionally, there are many security policy papers, but they are all topic-based and *ad hoc*.⁸⁷

As was already mentioned in the historiographical chapter, for a country this heavily occupied with national security and defence, it is staggering how little studies have been conducted about this topic. This is in line with the absence of a national security strategy, and the unwillingness to finally formulate one. There is certainly some truth in what Charles D. Freilich says regarding the reason for this in his 2018 book *Israeli National Security*: the process conflicts with the political needs in which Israeli policymakers do not want to be bound by a process that requires them to present a systematic analysis of Israel's objectives and the optimal means for achieving them. This very moment may point to some explanations for Israeli policies.⁸⁸ Specifically, the lack of a strategy document reflects the awareness of the international audience, because in the absence of a tangible doctrine it can be easily manipulated or lead into accepting the existential threats proclaimed by the Israeli politics. Similarly, this lack obstructs a system of checks

⁸⁶ Aaron Mehta, "National Military Strategy update in the works – most of which will again be classified," *Defense News*, <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/01/16/national-military-strategy-update-in-the-works-most-of-which-will-again-be-classified/>. Accessed on: June 9, 2018.

⁸⁷ Charles D. Freilich, *Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 6.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

and balances, an expert group work or the need for Knesset approval. Accordingly, the international community relies on *ad hoc* defined threats and accepts them and the Israeli reactive actions under the immense influence of the current securitization narrative. Here another problem regarding the legitimacy of Israeli security policies emerges: a national security strategy usually defines threats, issues, goals and a blueprint for security policies; none of this is defined in Israel since a national security strategy does not exist and it therefore cannot delineate its set concerns, planned strategy and policies on a strategic level.

The inexistence of a national security strategy and the freedom to define existential threats at all times has implications for this research project, as there are no documents that can be used to point directly at Israel planning any violations of international humanitarian law, human rights or UN resolutions, but instead shows that this cleavage opens a manoeuvre space for Israeli politics to a) act on spot regarding all security matters and b) legitimize these policies internationally as a response to whichever existential threats were addressed through them. Finally, a national security strategy encompasses the ways in which states link their politico-military objectives with capabilities at their disposal to promote security. They must identify and prioritize the threats most likely to pose the greatest dangers to them and devise the best political, military and economic means of remedying them, given the resources.⁸⁹ This definition of national security strategy by Art and Posen shows several things. As will be shown in the discourse analysis, it implies that Israeli policymakers identify and prioritize certain threats more or less in accordance with their own preferences. However, it is questionable whether these ‘threats’ are the greatest dangers to the state of Israel, or if they are, at least to some extent, allowing Israeli

⁸⁹ Charles D. Freilich, *Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 9.

policies towards Palestinians to go under the radar and repeatedly remain unpunished for the violations of UN resolutions, breaches of international law or excessive use of force against civilians by the international community.

As there is no national security strategy or no standardized doctrine to focus on, Freilich lists offensive and defensive measures for counterterrorism which Israel conducts. The offensive measures are: ongoing counterterrorism operations, interdiction of arms transfers to terrorist organizations, blockade and embargo, third-party pressure and targeted killings.⁹⁰ If we take into account that even Freilich, who is a former Israeli national security adviser and professor at American universities, cannot come up with more than this as ‘national security strategy’,⁹¹ it is no wonder that this type of classification and its explanation, which could be open to criticism, has an effect on the international community as seemingly legitimate actions conducted by Israel for the purposes of counterterrorism. Under the offensive measure of ongoing counterterrorism operations, Freilich includes e.g. ‘Operation Protective Edge 2014’ (Gaza War), which is nevertheless difficult to understand as a measure for counterterrorism as this is, like other Gaza offensives, a war in which this time more than a thousand civilians were killed.⁹² The Israeli counterterrorism narrative almost always seems to stop short of dealing with the consequences of these policies. When survival is perceived to be at stake, military options which eliminate the threat can be discussed and implemented with no attention to

⁹⁰ Charles D. Freilich, *Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 209.

⁹¹ About: Charles Freilich. <http://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/charles-freilich.html>. Accessed on: June 2, 2018.

⁹² “Key figures on the 2014 hostilities: Data featured in the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict”. *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Occupied Palestinian Territory*, <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/key-figures-2014-hostilities>. Accessed on: June 3, 2018.

their long-term consequences for peace in the region.⁹³ Another example Freilich offers is that of airstrikes ‘to prevent the transfer of Iranian weapons to Hamas, interdictions of ships sailing reportedly carrying Iranian missiles for Hamas and air-strikes on Syria in recent years to *prevent transfer of possibly even chemical weapons to Hezbollah*’.⁹⁴ The third measure he mentions is blockade and embargo (of Gaza), which he explains along the lines of Israeli politics’ justification: designed for prevention of transferring weapons and materials for building storehouses and bunkers. Again, this blockade has been effective since 2007 and has been condemned on various occasions by many organizations,⁹⁵ such as the UN and Amnesty International, without any firm changes in Israel’s policies.⁹⁶ Indeed, Israel has the right to defend itself against terrorism, but imposing a blockade and embargo for a decade, which does not result in complete safety of Israeli citizens, as Hamas still fires rockets in tumultuous times, is a transformation of a primary justification into a continuous human rights violation. The problem is that, even though it was labelled as illegal by international expert groups, there is no international UN-inspired reaction.⁹⁷

Freilich defines security fences as defensive measures. They exist along the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and Egypt, and they are spreading on the border with Jordan too.⁹⁸

⁹³ Ian S. Lustick, “Abandoning the Iron Wall: Israel and ‘the Middle Eastern muck’,” *Middle East Policy* 15, no. 3 (2008): 49.

⁹⁴ Charles D. Freilich, *Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 209.

⁹⁵ “UN says illegal Gaza blockade must be lifted,” *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/gaza-precipice-as-israel-presses-attacks-2014731143129689385.html>. Accessed on: June 2, 2018.

⁹⁶ “Gaza Blockade: ‘collective punishment’ condemned,” *Amnesty International*, <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/gaza-blockade-collective-punishment-condemned>. Accessed on: June 7, 2018.

⁹⁷ “UN Independent Panel Rules Israel Blockade of Gaza Illegal,” *Haaretz*, <https://www.haaretz.com/1.5174177>. Accessed on: May 29, 2018.

⁹⁸ Charles D. Freilich, *Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 209.

The security fence/Wall was already addressed earlier, but it is now evident that it is considered a defensive measure by scholars and the Israeli national security cadre, regardless of its repercussions on the shrinking of Palestinian territory. Other defensive measures are security zones (e.g. within Gaza Strip), roadblocks and checkpoints (which Freilich defines as impeding terrorists' freedom of movement and provide Israel with more time for interdiction efforts, but he fails to mention that institutional discrimination of Palestinians is present at checkpoints, blocking or slowing down development in the Palestinian populated areas)⁹⁹ and Israeli border patrols. The final defensive measure Freilich mentions consists of arrests and administrative detentions, which include travel restrictions, deportations, closures of public institutions and denials of work permits.¹⁰⁰ The justifying moment seems to be that these measures were '[...] designed to keep terrorists, or possible terrorist recruits, off the streets'. Furthermore, pressure has been applied on the civilian populations to cease violence by suspending electricity and telephone services, delaying monetary transfers to the Palestinian Authority, etc.¹⁰¹

To sum up, targeted arrests, detentions, or even killings (offensive measure) should be understandable if they target (possible) terrorists. And again, Israel is constantly condemned for these actions, but with no measures taken to punish it or prevent similar actions in the future.¹⁰² This will be evident in Netanyahu's discourse of presenting/illustrating threats Israel is facing, which seems to resonate with an international community that is not able (and often not willing) to recognize when

⁹⁹ "HRW Report. Separate and Unequal: Israel's Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories," *Human Rights Watch*, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/12/19/separate-and-unequal/israels-discriminatory-treatment-palestinians-occupied>. Accessed on: June 7, 2018.

¹⁰⁰ Charles D. Freilich, *Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 210.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 210.

¹⁰² Rebecca Ratcliffe, "Gaza's health system close to collapse as electricity crisis threatens total blackout," *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jan/03/gaza-health-system-collapse-electricity-crisis-threatens-total-blackout>. Accessed on: June 10, 2018.

justified security policies cross into the sphere of mistreatment and violations of human rights and the resolutions which this same community passed.

4.2. Securitization

Regarding the Israeli process of securitization, a few more notions ought to be presented. The following section will, in order to grasp the complete circle of both domestic and international securitization, look at three concepts: the indefinite state of emergency in Israel, existential threats and the results of securitization manifested in policies aimed at Palestinians. All this is part of the circle in which a certain group is portrayed as an existential threat, both to the Israeli and international audience, which is then followed by certain actions. Before turning to discourse analysis, which treats the problem of Israeli non-compliance with UN resolutions in real-life, we will try to understand whether securitization exists, and whether this process is identifiable as a process of securitization or as something different.

First, regarding the infinite state of emergency, it must be noted that Israel is a country with a permanent and deep perception of insecurity in which the state of emergency is already deeply rooted.¹⁰³ As a result, some argue that insecurity is therefore routinized, is integral to the Israeli identity and that it is fundamentally the normal politics.¹⁰⁴ The element of normality in the realm of Israeli insecurity is especially explicit and present primarily in relation to the Palestinians. The ‘problem’ of the infinite emergency is that it is also a legal state of emergency, which grants the government extensive powers declared at the establishment of the state, which have never been revoked.¹⁰⁵ This state of rooted fear based on continuous accentuation of threats, can have, and has had, severe impacts

¹⁰³ Amir Lupovici, “The limits of securitization theory: Observational criticism and the curious absence of Israel,” *International Studies Review* 16, no. 3 (2014): 401.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 402.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 403.

primarily on the Israeli population/audience, but also on the international community. Accordingly, the latter has lately been taking these emphases with caution, as could be noted in the vote distribution in UNGA and UNSC, especially regarding the 2018 Gaza protests in which the IDF killed more than 100 civilians. The United States was the only no-vote on the measure, which, due to its veto power, was enough to defeat the resolution demanding protection of Palestinians and condemnation of Israel proposed to the UNSC by Kuwait. Ten members voted in favour and four abstained.¹⁰⁶ The US then proposed a resolution condemning Hamas for the Gaza violence, in which it was the sole yes vote, while three UNSC members voted against and eleven abstained.¹⁰⁷

The rootedness of fear and threats can be understood as a sensibility towards systemic crisis in every-day life, which is constructed through securitization policies such as the construction of the security fence/wall, checkpoint controls or Gaza offensives which are said to prevent or react to terrorism.¹⁰⁸ Long-lasting securitization processes can empower narrators, who securitize social issues by connecting them directly or indirectly to security issues.¹⁰⁹ As a result, not only are social issues securitized in this process, but certain issues can be additionally securitized through their framing as even more dangerous or urgent dangers. Even though this will be clarified in the discourse analysis, an example can here be referred to: in his discourse, Netanyahu frequently frames the threat posed by Iran as something that needs to be reacted to urgently. Consequently, this postulated threat

¹⁰⁶ “UN Security Council rejects US draft resolution on Gaza”. *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/vetoes-uns-resolutions-protection-palestinians-180601201831238.html>. Accessed on: June 6, 2018.

¹⁰⁷ Rick Gladstone, “U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution on Gaza, Fails to Win Second Vote on its Own Measure,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/world/middleeast/gaza-israel-palestinians-.html>. Accessed on: June 10, 2018.

¹⁰⁸ Matan Shapiro and Nurit Bird-David, “Routinergency: Domestic securitization in contemporary Israel,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 35, no. 4 (2017): 650.

¹⁰⁹ Amir Lupovici, “The limits of securitization theory: Observational criticism and the curious absence of Israel,” *International Studies Review* 16, no. 3 (2014): 405.

legitimizes ‘unlimited space and time horizon for military state action’.¹¹⁰ Maintaining a permanent state of emergency can in fact be seen as the Israeli *insurance*: it ensures Israeli impunity in the international community because the permanent state of emergency basically defines a state of war, which encompasses different means of conflict than would otherwise be accepted in peace times. Additionally, it is also not a symmetrical war, but a just war needed to defend the sole existence of Israel and Jewry.

Second, framing an issue as an existential threat is part of the previously addressed process. As Ajzenstadt and Barak explain, control agents and the media present a specific entity or population as threatening to the existence of Israel, which causes the Israeli government to subject an entire group to certain conditions. For example, this process was also evident in the approval by the Israeli High Court of Justice of the necessity of erecting the security fence.¹¹¹

Third, the constant state of emergency characterized by existential threats consequently subjects the general Palestinian population to policies aimed at terrorists because these measures are administered in the name of national security, which equates threats with terrorism. It is done at the expense of those not involved in (for example) terrorism, since the entire group is classified as ‘risky others’ and then a security fence is built to prevent the entrance of the general Palestinian population to Israel.¹¹² The concept of classifying the whole group as perilous is one of the fundamentals of this issue: certain justified security policies are, instead of being selective, imposed on the whole group, which violate their human rights, but they resonate with the international community due to the threat discourse which manages to emphasize the need for these policies, regardless of their

¹¹⁰ Matan Shapiro and Nurit Bird-David, “Routinergency: Domestic securitization in contemporary Israel,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 35, no. 4 (2017): 651.

¹¹¹ Mimi Ajzenstadt and Ariel Barak, “Terrorism and risk management: The Israeli case,” *Punishment & Society* 10, no. 4 (2008): 369.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 368.

fierce impact on a non-threatening majority. Moreover, the problem seems to lie in the law-making following the practices of military actions even in peaceful times. Therefore, securitization allows the political actor to legitimize antidemocratic practices even without resorting to emergency legislation.¹¹³ Consequently, this shows the effectiveness of a discourse that succeeds in legitimizing antidemocratic actions at all times, as long as the threat perception is justified. Therefore, since there is no strategy and these actions are almost always determined by individual politicians, the need to analyse the discourse of the most important political figure in Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, appears clear.

The following combination of different factors in Israeli politics raises the question of how securitization in Israel comes about. The securitization puzzle includes: the permanent state of emergency, which is justified by the constant re-definition of existential threats and is therefore executed in the form of problematic actions towards Palestinians, while at the same time, a country which evolves around security, does not have a national security strategy.

For these reasons, two possible answers to the securitization puzzle arise. First, due to the permanent state of emergency and the demand for defence, from an Israeli perspective, there seems to be no need for a national security strategy. This means that in this proven permanent state, on each occasion, the reason for emergency must be given a certain shape, in accordance with time, context and interests. However, perplexity arises when we must acknowledge that the definition of existential threats in an emergency environment is, in fact, securitization. More specifically, the situation in Israel that has been described is securitization. So, how is it possible that we talk about securitization now, if it has existed already for decades?

¹¹³ Ronnie Olesker, "Israel's societal security dilemma and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 17, no. 4 (2011): 387.

This problem leads to the second option: if security is already a top priority, or in other words, if Israel is already deeply securitized, can it be even more securitized? Based on the fundamentals of the securitization theory, which hypothesizes that securitization is a process,¹¹⁴ the answer could be negative, as, if it already exists, securitization is no longer possible. It could also be said that in Israel, securitization is not a **process** like the one defined by securitization theory. Due to the nature of its longevity, consistency, regularity and magnitude, securitization in Israel is not a process, but a **state**, a mode of being. It is a state because a state of emergency is not based on issues that suddenly appear; Israel is in a permanent state of emergency, which requires repetitive re-definition of existential threats – and it has been like that since the establishment of Israel (longevity), through offensive and defensive measures which are incremental to the fight against Palestinian (or any other) terrorism ever since the establishment of Israel, regardless of different governments (consistency and regularity) and the repercussions of these actions mainly on the Palestinian civilian population and the still ongoing conflict (magnitude). Therefore, this securitized state is symbolized by fragmented but interlinked processes of securitization within the realm of an already existing state of securitization, processes which are in accordance with the historical and current political context. For these reasons, Netanyahu's discourse on the international stage presents itself as an excellent opportunity to study this process of continuous (re-)securitization within securitization. This will be the essence of the next chapter.

¹¹⁴ Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," *European journal of international relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 563.

5. Discourse analysis: Benjamin Netanyahu's Securitization Narrative

As it was introduced in the first chapter, this chapter will provide the results of a conducted discourse analysis and the author's conclusions. More specifically, the discourse analysis will build on the claim that – due to the permanent state of emergency – securitization in Israel is, indeed, rather a state than a process. As was announced earlier, the following discourse analysis is viewed as actual proof for arguments made in the previous chapter and all relevant statements made throughout previous chapters.

5.1. Methodology

Discourse analysis was conducted on a selection of speeches of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel since 2009, who has been active in Israeli politics for decades, and prior to that in the military. Discourse analysis was used because this thesis is researching the resonance of the link between the Israeli security policies and violations of UN resolutions with the international community related to its impunity. Therefore, as Netanyahu is a relatively frequent and above all authoritative speaker on topics of Israel and the Middle East, it was a logical option to choose the Israeli PM in office the longest to understand the main narrative.

Prior to the analysis, I researched Netanyahu's international and Israeli public speeches and opted for seventeen speeches within the time span 2009-2018. The list of the speeches I chose can be seen in Table 1. Initially 17 speeches were selected for the discourse analysis, but due to low scores in most of the keyword categories, three speeches were removed from further analysis as their relevance for this research compared to the other

14 speeches was minor or inexistent.¹¹⁵ The ones I did choose were relevant because they all have an international character: two speeches were made in Israel but to an international audience, six of them are Netanyahu's speeches before the UN General Assembly, five of them are aimed at North-American or United States audiences and one speech is aimed at a European Union audience.¹¹⁶ Mentioning audience is important when discussing securitization in front of an international audience, which is why these specific speeches were chosen.

Since the focus of this discourse analysis was to detect securitization in Israel, in which an issue is detected, presented and described as a threat to an audience which must approve of it for security policies to be put in motion, and due to the nature of the conflict, a total of 12 keyword categories were established. The main keywords are: *Threat, Palestine, Gaza, Iran, United Nations, Peace, War, Security, Terrorism, Democratic and/or Political Exceptionalism of Israel, Enemy, Weapons*, as can be seen in Table 2. These keywords were chosen due to the securitization theory's focus on the concepts of *Threat* and *Security*. *War, Terrorism, Enemy* and *Weapons* were chosen as it was supposed similar wording would be used in order to illustrate the threat and justify the need for securitization. *Palestine* and *Gaza* were established as keywords expected to appear due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and *Iran* was chosen due to the known animosity between Israel and Iran. Finally, *Peace* and *Democratic Exceptionalism* were selected as these words were noticed as keywords in Benjamin Netanyahu's speeches, prior to the discourse analysis. The reasoning behind some categories containing more than one word is because: 1) prior to the coding process it was expected that certain

¹¹⁵ These speeches are: Netanyahu's 2016 address regarding the Israel-Turkey political deal; his remarks on a UNESCO decision regarding the Old City of Jerusalem (2016) and a 2017 speech at the memorial for the soldiers who died in the 2014 operation Protective Edge (Gaza).

¹¹⁶ Further specifications can be found in Table 1.

synonyms will be used, 2) throughout the coding process more synonyms or words with similar meaning occurred to be used in the same manner and context and were therefore included in the categories.¹¹⁷ Once the categories and their matching identification tools were established, the process of detecting these keywords in all the speeches began. The results were counted multiple times and were coded and updated accordingly to the database. The coding was done in four ways, which is represented in tables 3 to 6. Table 3 shows the number of times each keyword category appeared in each speech, which is added up in the last column to show how many times all the categories appeared per speech. All numbers are shown in absolute numbers form. This table is important because it shows how many times these keywords appeared – which is an indicator when looking at different speeches (and their audience, time and political context) comparatively between the keywords.

Table 4 shows the percentages of each keyword category in comparison to all keywords per speech. It is an additional perspective to understanding the discourse through the determined keywords and offers an insight into understanding when certain words are used more depending on a context.

The use of Table 5 is to show what percentage keywords take in the total speech word count, to be able to compare the speech lengths and the appearance of keywords in them.

Finally, Table 6 shows the overall ranking among keyword categories based on the sum

¹¹⁷ Keyword categories: Threat (threat, danger, risk, peril); Palestine (Palestine, West Bank); Gaza (Gaza, Hamas); Iran (Iran); United Nations (UN, UNESCO, UNHRC); Peace (peace, reconciliation, tranquillity); War (war, battle, conflict, aggression, attack, offensive, destruction, shoot, fight, hit, fire, conquer, annihilation, confront, kill, violence, assault, murder, slaughter, massacre, execute, explode); Security (Security, safety, protection, defence, stability/instability, safeguard); Terrorism (Terrorism, militant Islam, Islamist, radical Islam, fundamentalism, radicalism, fanaticism, ISIS, Hezbollah, extremism, Jihad); Democratic and/or Political Exceptionalism Of Israel (sentences explicitly talking about the exceptionalism of Israel in its geographical environment); Enemy (enemy, foe, hostile, hatred); Weapons (Weapons, missiles, rockets, arms/armed, ammunition, bomb, arsenal, rifle, explosive). More detailed in Table 2.

of all appearances of each category throughout 14 speeches, which is an indicator of the keywords that are the fundamentals of Netanyahu's speeches.

The structure of the upcoming analysis is based on Tables 7 to 10: North-American audience (Table 7), Context: Gaza Wars (Table 8), Context: Iran (Table 9) and Context: Israel-Palestine (Table 10). The quantitative analysis for these groups is based on the highlighted cells in these tables which signal the top 30% used keywords per speech. This setup of four perspectives encompasses all 14 analysed speeches. The complete database can be found in the Tables in the Annex, and the following section will focus on the interpretation of the coding process, qualitative analysis and deriving conclusions from the data.

5.2. Historical and political context of the speeches

Since the selected speeches are relevant due to their audience, it is of importance to explain why the historical context in which they were made is also crucial to their selection and moreover to the research question of this thesis.

The 2009 Bar-Ilan University speech held a few months after Netanyahu took the PM's office is important because it was the first time he endorsed a "demilitarized Palestinian state" under Israeli military surveillance for which he received negative reactions by his right-wing party Likud, the Palestinians and the Arab world. The 2009 UN General Assembly (UNGA) speech was a direct reaction to then Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's speech, and a reaction to the condemnation Israel had received about the 2008-2009 Gaza War for the 1500 Palestinian civilian casualties. The 2011 US Congress speech was made amidst the Arab Spring and the 'Iranian Threat'. The same year Netanyahu held another UNGA speech as a reaction to the bid made by the President of the Palestinian National Authority for UN recognition of a unilateral declaration of a

Palestinian state, which would exist in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and with East Jerusalem as the capital.

The speeches from 2014 were all made in the context of the 2014 Gaza War known as Operation Protective Edge in which 2000 Gazans were killed, and which was followed by the rise of violence between the two ethnicities in Israel – these speeches are the Counter-Terrorism International Conference in Israel, a UNGA speech and a video message to the Jewish Federations of North America.

The 2015 UNGA address was held following months of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but moreover in the context of the Iran Nuclear Deal achieved a few months before. In 2016, Netanyahu addressed the AIPAC through a video message, which was made in a relatively neutral context, although he used the context of Iran's geopolitical position and the United Nations stance towards Israel. The same topic of the UN position, although in the context of UN resolutions and UNESCO decisions regarding Palestine and Israel, was the political backdrop of his 2016 UNGA speech. In 2017 – the UNGA speech and the EU Foreign Ministers meeting occurred in the context of Donald Trump administration's support for Israel and Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The last two sources stem from March 2018 – a speech to the AIPAC and an interview at the Economic Club in Washington were delivered in the context of the opening of the US Embassy in Jerusalem, and the US policy change regarding the Iran Nuclear Deal. All speeches – except the video messages to the Jewish Federations of North America and the AIPAC – were delivered as speeches in front of live audiences.

5.3. Speeches Analysis

5.3.1. *North American Audience*

It was important to focus on the discourse in front of the American audience due to the ‘special relationship and alliance’ as Netanyahu calls it, between Israel and the US; the role of the US international political support to Israel, which can be seen in both historical and recent veto power use by the US in the UN Security Council regarding resolutions aimed at Israel.¹¹⁸

The main findings in this case are as follows. When Benjamin Netanyahu’s audience is Northern American¹¹⁹, certain categories scored significantly higher than others (see Table 7). Mostly used categories were words relating to: *Iran, Peace, War, Palestine, Terrorism, Security, Weapons*. Since the speeches in front of this audience span from 2011 to 2018, we can conclude that there is a certain consistency in Netanyahu’s narrative – as *war* and *terrorism* are continuously presented as the gravest threats both Israel and the world are facing. Also, although the category of *Democracy* (Democratic exceptionalism) did not score as much as other categories, this category which was introduced to track its consistency in the pattern of all international Netanyahu speeches, was mentioned at least once in 4 out of 5 North American audience speeches, and it appeared 7 times in Netanyahu’s 2011 UN Congress speech. When the audience was North American, Netanyahu emphasized the importance of protecting Israel and its democracy, especially stressing the uniqueness of Israeli democracy in the Middle East. Iran and Palestine were used in negative terms, as perpetrators against Israel, and the only

¹¹⁸ Middle East Eye Staff “The 43 times US has used veto power against UN resolutions on Israel,” *Middle East Eye*, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/42-times-us-has-used-its-veto-power-against-un-resolutions-israel-942194703>. Accessed on: June 6, 2018.

¹¹⁹ AIPAC speeches 2016 and 2018, 2011 US Congress Speech, 2014 Jewish Federations of Northern America and 2018 Economic Club Washington.

positive mention of these two categories is in the sense that there are some Iranians and Palestinians who do not condone their leaderships' policies, yet this is rare. *Weapons* are usually mentioned in the context of describing the attacks on Israel or attacks by Iran, ISIS, Hezbollah or 'Militant Islamists' in the Middle East – which adds to the complete picture of threat that demands security policies and military action for Israel's defence.

In front of the specific North-American audience, Netanyahu states that *Iran* is the original threat and danger, which finances *terrorism*, *violence* and *weapons* conducted and used by the *Palestinians* (either in Gaza or the West Bank), which means Israel needs *security*, in order to achieve what it wants most of all – *peace*. We can conclude that a lot of the speech content is focused on presenting the dangers of the war/conflict situation in combination with terrorism and 'terror proxies' aimed both at Israel and the world. Peace is the main ideal which cannot be accomplished if Israel cannot defend itself and secure its territory from threats. The following sections will show that Netanyahu has applied this line of reasoning in the contexts of the Gaza Wars, Iran and Israel-Palestine.

5.3.2. *Context: Gaza Wars*

The speeches that were made in the period prior to or after the Gaza wars in 2009 and 2014 are another angle for understanding the discourse.¹²⁰ The keywords that scored the highest are: *war*, *terrorism*, *weapons*, *Gaza*, *peace*, *Iran* and *United Nations* (see Table 8) – only *war* and *terrorism* appeared in all three speeches. Although the 2009 UNGA speech was made almost one year after the 2008-2009 Gaza War, Netanyahu did not focus on Gaza itself as much (only 9 times) but instead on the role of the UN in deepening the conflict and working against the interests of Israel, explaining the importance of wars, conflicts and violence on one side, and of terrorism and all affiliated words (such as

¹²⁰ The 2009 UNGA Speech, the 2014 Counter-Terrorism Conference and the 2014 UNGA Speech.

Militant Islam, ISIS, Hezbollah) on the other. This speech is in a great sense a condemnation and calling out on the actions of the UN, precisely the resolutions aimed at Israel – the UN was mentioned the same amount of times as all terrorism affiliated keywords. This speech is a fine example of the 2009 discourse, in which Iran still did not play one of the key roles and when Netanyahu focused on illustrating the political context of war and terrorism to show the necessity of its resolution in order to achieve peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The 2009 Bar-Ilan speech had one of the highest uses of any keywords in all the analysed speeches – the word *peace* 48 times, compared to the use of *Palestine* 35 times, and *war* 25 times. *Security* and affiliated keywords were used 11 times, which shows how Netanyahu’s speeches focus on the repetition of the keywords that show the active nature of the conflict and showing who is right and what is the truth. On the other hand, the two 2014 speeches scored the highest in the categories of *war*, *terrorism* and *weapons*, with both speeches held just two months after the 2014 Gaza War. It is worth noting that the 2014 UNGA speech marks the beginning of Netanyahu’s focus on Iran in his international addresses, *Iran* scored 25, and *Gaza* scored 31 mentions.

My conclusions for this speech is that Netanyahu rarely responds to allegations or condemnations from a defensive position, but instead performs from an offensive one, in which he rarely addresses for example what was done to Gazans in the 2014 war, but instead focuses on what Hamas does; on the danger Iran poses to both Israel and the international community; condemns the UN for its alleged bias toward Israel and heavily stresses on the violence, war, conflict, terrorism and terror groups and their means of conflict through weapons. We could say that the fact that Netanyahu basically never addressed the accusations and condemnations of Israel too explicitly or directly, and that when he does, he never defends his positions but rather accuses others is another layer of his discourse. If it is solid, ideology does not need explicit wording, which is

understandable when talking about the category of *security* – Netanyahu, being the good speaker he is, does not need to focus greatly on security and security policies themselves – he simply has been repeating for ten years the threats Israel is facing in order for the authorization of the Israeli securitization to be effective. This can be illustrated by *security* scoring only an average of 15 in all three speeches. Instead, Netanyahu focused on the threats and attacks Israel was facing. This explains the extensive use of what Netanyahu describes as the danger Israel is facing daily – terrorism, war and weapons fired at Israel (or supplied to Gaza and Hamas by Iran). In addition to that, the 2009 Bar-Ilan speech contained the discussed pattern of placing peace, Palestine and keywords related to war and conflict into the same equation with Israel being attacked with the need to defend.

5.3.3. *Context: Iran*

Iran entered Netanyahu’s discourse as one of the main issues in his 2011 UNGA Speech, and it is the first of the selected speeches within the Iranian context (see Table 9).¹²¹ Analysing Netanyahu’s discourse from this angle is enlightening, as Table 9 shows extensive use of the keywords *Iran* and *war*, followed by *peace*, *Palestine*, *terrorism* (especially Militant Islam, radical Islam etc), *security*, *weapons*, *UN* and *Gaza*.¹²² However, when looking at how many times each category scored per speech in percentages (Table 4) we can see slightly different results.¹²³ When compared to other keywords, (except in the 2009 UNGA, 2016 AIPAC and UNGA 2016) the *Iran* category consistently scored between 22% and 33%, higher than *war*. The *UN* was mentioned in

¹²¹ The other Iranian context speeches are: the 2014 Jewish Federations speech, the 2015 UNGA, 2016 AIPAC, the 2016 UNGA, the 2017 UNGA, 2018 AIPAC and the 2018 Economic Club.

¹²² all these keywords scored in the top 30% of use, making these speeches very diverse in topics because 9/12 categories were used this much, and because these are the keywords following the pattern of Netanyahu’s discourse in which the basis is Iran’s threat).

¹²³ The keywords related to *war* scored the minimum of approx. 10% and maximum 21% in all 8 speeches where the context was Iran. In addition to that, keywords from the category of *terrorism* appeared minimum 6% and maximum 15% among the total of all keywords per speech.

all speeches except for the Economic Club interview, with the highest scores in the 2016 AIPAC and UNGA, where the latter was blamed for inaction regarding Iran, which endangers the situation in the Middle East by producing violence and destruction, as well as financing terrorism. *Peace* scored the highest of all speeches in the 2011 UNGA, where it was mentioned approx. the same amount of times as *Palestine*. *Peace* was also among the top 30% in the 2014 speech to the Jewish Federations and the 2018 AIPAC where it scored approx. the same percentage of mentions per speech as the *war* category. Finally, notions of *peace* were mostly used in the speeches to the Jewish Federations and the 2015 UNGA, while *security* was mostly used in the UNGA speeches of 2011 and 2015.¹²⁴ This angle offered a build-up to the existing pattern in which Iran is the source of danger for both the Middle East and the world, but it also showed which keywords are used mostly when Iran is the main topic, which is by far using *Iran* with a negative connotation, and almost the same amount of using *war/violence/conflict/destruction* along within this category. The use of the words *Palestine* and *terrorism* in this context is, in this conclusion, a confirmation of the threat ideology which is the basis for Netanyahu's discourse.

5.3.4. Context: Israel-Palestine

When the political context was related to Israel and Palestine, the discourse remained similar, although it is worth noting some things. *Peace* was the category used the most in these speeches (total 158 mentions), which is understandable as Netanyahu, when he talks about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, stresses peace and resolution greatly which occurred with previous speeches too. The other categories that scored high, are *war* and related keywords (total 139 mentions), *Iran* (133), *Palestine* (117), *terrorism* (80), *security* (66)

¹²⁴ When the historical context at the time was Abbas' UN bid for a Palestinian state in 2009 and months of violence between Israel and Palestine in 2015 after the war.

and *weapons* (64). The detected category of highlighting Israel's democratic exceptionalism has appeared in all speeches except for Bar-Ilan, for which the main audiences were Israel and Arab countries. The keyword *enemy* (hate) appeared in most of these speeches, but, like in every other quantitative analysis, never scored as high as the top 30%, as Netanyahu is careful not to produce incitement speech explicitly, but rather highlights the existing 'hate' towards Israel, illustrating it through all examples of war and violence through the help of terrorism. Finally, it is interesting to point out something that was put to my attention through reading another discourse analysis of Netanyahu – when speaking of Iran, he mostly uses 'Iran' in connection with the state of Iran.¹²⁵ On the other hand (and I checked my data after acquiring this information) when speaking of Palestine, he uses 'Palestinian' much more often, and adds this to 'leadership' or 'people' or simply Palestinians. This also adds to the discourse through which it is evident that Netanyahu's opinion of a Palestinian state is demeaning and definitely serves its purpose in the international image of the conflict.

5.4.Speech Analysis: Final Remarks

In addition to the previous section of quantitative analysis and my qualitative conclusions on the spot, this section will focus on deducing final conclusions about the discourse of Benjamin Netanyahu. As it can be seen in Table 6, the keyword category of *war* has by far been used the most in Netanyahu's speeches, followed by *peace*, *Iran*, *terrorism* and *Palestine* with similar numbers. From reading the speeches multiple times, searching for keywords and trying to understand the discourse, several things catch the eye.

¹²⁵ Arif Firmansah, "Interpersonal Meaning in Netanyahu's Speech," *English Review: Journal of English Education* 4, no. 1 (2015): 107.

First, as was already mentioned, I concluded that there is a certain pattern that exists in most of the speeches (independent of the context). This pattern encompasses Iran as the source of danger (both for Israel and the world) which supports and finances Hezbollah in Lebanon, terrorism and militant Islam in the Middle East and Hamas in Gaza – all with their final goal to annihilate Israel. Netanyahu calls Hamas and Hezbollah ‘terror proxies of Iran’ and stressed throughout the speeches that the greatest threat to humanity is the combination of these dangers with nuclear weapons. Militant Islam is the root of Iranian politics, which then spreads it regionally and internationally.¹²⁶ Presenting these threats extensively throughout the years amounts to what I already mentioned previously – ideology or what could be referred to as a state of silent securitization. In addition to that, we can conclude – on the lines of securitization theory – that the threats Netanyahu illustrates are definitely existential threats. Netanyahu does not have to explicitly address security needs, but rather presents threats and dangers for Israel (strengthening his argument when he puts it in international context) through examples, which are (already) securitized in Israel. Nevertheless, *security/defence/protect* are all strategically positioned within his speeches – usually after threat illustrations. Finally, although security does not score the highest throughout his speeches, it is in fact repeatedly presented as the fundamental requirement for the Israeli existence.

Second, *peace*, as the second most used word in all the speeches, is usually positioned after presenting the threats, violence and dangers for Israel by either Iran or Palestinians, and before or at the same time as *security*. Netanyahu focuses on peace to a great extent, which is part of the previously mentioned pattern in which there is an equation – *Israel only wants peace for the Jews and the Palestinians but has to survive the attacks and*

¹²⁶ Due to Netanyahu defining Hezbollah as a terrorist, militant Islamist group, Hezbollah was added to the keyword category of terrorism.

defend itself from further dangers. Through this, Israel is placed within the peace narrative, although it is not delivered through a peaceful language. This is another angle for understanding his international appearances and the Israel security ideology, where the other side is completely blamed for the failure of peace (which does not mean that Palestinians also don't hold guilt for this, but it is in my opinion an asymmetric relationship and guilt is not divided equally).

Third, Netanyahu does not always reflect on the UN, but when he does, it is mostly negatively, where he never defends against the condemnations or accusations for Israeli abuse of power and violence in Palestine and Israel, but rather condemns the UN for their alleged ('unfair') bias against Israel and switches the focus towards Iran. The focus shifting to Iran could also be interpreted as moral relativism in dealing with accusations of Israel's human rights violations. Moreover, it could be another reason for Israel's impunity in the international community. This is because Netanyahu quite successfully diminishes the weight and importance of Israel's guilt by 1) ignoring it and 2) shifting the attention to 'even worse' deeds that stem from militant Islam and, consequently, Iran. In addition to that, the previously mentioned pattern is urged to act upon in many speeches. This urgency is often linked to a notion present in many speeches which is a short lecture on Jewish history of suffering, Holocaust and anti-Semitism, which is then again linked to Iran and Hamas – which can be understood from his presentation as the new danger for the Jews of the same extent as the Holocaust. It should be noted that the notion of Jewish victimhood, and the continuation of a new Holocaust is often placed within the hostile surrounding Netanyahu stresses on – making sure that his international audience is able to link what Nazi Germany did to the Jews with a similar threat militant Islam and Iran pose to Israel and Jews.

Fourth, the majority of Netanyahu's international speeches contain one or two jokes, simple and understandable language with lots of thought put into the formulation of sentences, questions to the audience, democratic exceptionalism of Israel in the Middle Eastern and international context, and finally great stress on the technological/economical advantage and development of Israel. The strength of his rhetoric somewhat fails in the moments in which he, although he stresses on constant compromising by Israel throughout history and Palestinian unwillingness to compromise on the other side, insists on non-return of Palestinian refugees (from today's Israeli territory).

6. Conclusion

The starting point of this master thesis was to examine Israeli impunity regarding all breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses of Palestinians, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The chosen example of these issues were Israeli violations of UN resolutions due to their repetitive character, the fact they were issued by one political body and because Israeli politics have been disregarding dozens of these resolutions in the past decades, adding another element to the longest contemporary conflict.

Although security has primary relevance to Israeli politics, not many authors have written about securitization in Israel. In light of this and due to its diverse applicability, the securitization theory was chosen as a theoretical focal point of this thesis. Moreover, the securitization theory was combined with discourse analysis in the attempt to find a correlation between Israel's impunity and its securitization narrative.

The brief, yet comprehensive historical overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provided this thesis with an insight into the geopolitical constellation of primarily Israel, but also of Palestine, neighbouring Arab countries and the international community. Due to the importance of the international community in this conflict, the four chosen UN resolutions, which have both a historical and contemporary significance, were viewed from the perspective of their meaning and connotation. Moreover, they were also viewed from the perspective of whether they carry weight in terms of their binding character. On one side, the problem lies in Israel's repetitive violation of UN resolutions with its policies and actions towards Palestinians, and consequently its impunity for these violations. However, the root problem seems to be the fact that none of the examined resolutions are binding, as they were not passed under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The idea that

none of the resolutions passed in relation to Israel are binding, and that they are merely recommendations, is telling. Therefore, the problem lies in the United Nations itself which is not able to produce a binding resolution towards Israel, based on which it could expect results, or in the case of violation, be able to intervene in human rights breaches. For these reasons, it was of even greater importance to analyse the concept of securitization in Israel and how it is aimed at the international community.

Israel is a country which does not have a national security strategy, and its long-lasting Iron Wall doctrine has been abolished at the turn of the century. In this way, Israel has changed its own self-perception from an invincible to a threatened and insecure state in constant state of emergency due to the danger it faces. It is important to note that the lack of a strategy documentation reflects the awareness of the international audience, because in the absence of a tangible doctrine it can be easily manipulated or lead into accepting the existential threats proclaimed by the Israeli politics. Moreover, this gap enables the legitimization of Israeli policies when they are established as a response to defined existential threats. The securitization puzzle in Israel, as it was defined in the third chapter, includes the permanent state of emergency justified by the constant re-definition of existential threats. Two options were presented as possible answers to this puzzle. First, that securitization in Israel exists, but a problem arises in acknowledging the existence of securitization, when discussing it now. Therefore, the second option in fact answered this and the research question because it serves as the explanation of how the Israeli securitization narrative is effective in the international community – securitization is not a process, but a state. The state of emergency, through its longevity, consistency, regularity and magnitude, requires constant re-definition of existential threats – forming a specific form of securitization which is a permanent state of securitization.

Discourse analysis showed a certain pattern in most of Netanyahu's speeches. He presents Iran as the source of danger for Israel and the world, as it supports 'terror proxies' such as Hezbollah, militant Islam groups and Hamas – with the final prospect of annihilating Israel. Netanyahu's narrative is focused on existential threats and he pays immense attention to the dangers Israel is facing, which is followed by strategic and infrequent stressing of security and defence. His narrative from 2009 to 2018 shows the previously discussed abolishment of Iron Wall doctrine – ever since 9/11, Israel is portrayed as vulnerable, under attack and in imminent danger posed by terrorism. The positioning of Israel within the peace narrative in front of an international audience, is a clever move in the context of the thesis' topic – it is another dimension of elevating Israel above human rights breaches and violations of international law – because it supposedly only wants peace. Finally, the assessed speeches show Netanyahu's ventures of condemning the United Nations, mostly when Israel is condemned. He then alters the focus to Iran and condemns the UN for their bias towards Israel.

The research question was aimed at finding out why the Israeli securitization narrative has been so effective in maintaining a historical impunity for violating UN resolutions, and viewed securitization as both a narrative and a set of policies. Consequently, the hypothesis stated that the effectiveness of the Israeli securitization narrative on the international level in the context of violations of UN resolutions is rooted in its effectiveness on the domestic level.

The research question was answered on two levels. The first dimension of the answer is related to the nature of UN resolutions. The main problem regarding these resolutions, which enables their methodical uninterrupted violations, is that they are not binding when it comes to Israel. This means they have no effect on Israel's policies. Nevertheless, the invariable position of the UN bodies regarding not changing this crucial problem is

interlinked with the lack of any firmer reaction when it comes to Israel violating its resolutions, even if they are only recommendations. The second dimension concerns the Israeli domestic and foreign securitization. The existence of securitization in Israel – which depends on the definition of existential threats that are followed by emergency measures materialized in security policies – is evident. However, the puzzle that occurred in discussion was how is it possible to discuss securitization in Israel, if it is already securitized? The answer to this crucial question is, in fact, the basis for the answer to the research question. Due to the permanent state of emergency and re-definition of existential threats, Israel is in a constant state of securitization. Therefore, this indefinite state of securitization enables repetitive approvals for existential threats and consequently the emergency state facilitates a) the Israeli securitization narrative entrenched in the need to defend and consequently b) the weakness of documents condemning Israel for its security justified actions. Although it is not possible to prove exact correlation between the securitization narrative and the concepts of a) its influence on the nature of UN resolutions and b) violations of these resolutions, evidence does point in that direction. This is especially due to the state of securitization in Israel, which is a facilitator of different policies and which, at least to some extent, when presented internationally, has an influence on the audience. Although discourse analysis may not be the most exact tool for receiving exact results, it does provide an insight into actual politics, rather than simply focusing on theory. For these reasons, a shortcoming of this thesis – the effort to prove something abstract through the means of interpretation of concrete texts – is also its greatest strength, as discourse analysis and securitization theory were fused into an interdisciplinary approach.

In my opinion, this research raises many further questions. First, further research should focus on the concept of UN resolutions, especially on the use of veto power, namely by

the US when it comes to protecting Israel as part of their exclusive relationship. In order to avoid this use of veto, resolutions are mitigated, which questions their actual purpose. Therefore, further research should closely focus on the possible consequences of veto abolishment and an increase of the number of permanent members in the UNSC.

Second, it should be further researched how the change in the Israeli self-perception, from the Iron Wall to a threatened and endangered state, was influenced by the international impact of 9/11 and how the new stance influences the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Third, discourse analysis should be used as a tool in further research regarding the future of Israel and Palestine. This is because Netanyahu makes it clear that Palestinian refugees will not be resettled in Israel, and that the future Palestinian state will not include Jews not living in Israel – which means that all Jewish populated illegal settlements are planned to be annexed by Israel.

Finally, regarding the future of the conflict, it is worth paying attention to efforts from within Israel, which are confronting Israeli discriminatory and violent policies towards Palestinians, but more importantly are aimed at changing the political constellation in Israel from the one that is the root of these breaches of human rights. Some of these groups include Commanders for Israel's Security (senior security officials initiative)¹²⁷, Breaking the Silence (an organization of Israeli veterans who served in the IDF since 2000)¹²⁸, various NGOs, activists, or documentary initiatives such as the movie and book *The Gatekeepers* by Dror Moreh, who interviewed six former directors of the secretive internal security service Shin Bet.¹²⁹ These former officials reflected on the controversies connected to the Occupation until the present moment. These efforts show that, in spite

¹²⁷ Commanders for Israel's Security. <http://en.cis.org.il/>. Accessed on: June 7, 2018.

¹²⁸ Breaking the Silence. <http://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/>. Accessed on: June 7, 2018.

¹²⁹ The Gatekeepers. <http://www.thegatekeepersfilm.com/>. Accessed on: June 5, 2018.

of the strength of the dominant Israeli narrative and the rootedness of securitization in Israel, there certainly exists some opposition and this opposition offers a different approach to a possible solution, clashing with the general securitization narrative. If this assumption could be verified, it could mean that the Israeli defiance against the international community is less solid than it appears to be at first glance.

Word count: 16190

7. Epilogue

Two months into writing my thesis, on March 30, 2018, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict escalated once again. That day marked the beginning of a campaign of protests in the Gaza Strip, adjacent to the Gaza-Israel border. It was called the “Great March of Return”. The main aim of the protests was the demand for the return of Palestinian refugees and their descendants into what is today Israel, from which they were expelled from in 1948. The protests had two additional aims: to highlight both the Gaza Strip blockade and the opening of the US Embassy in Israel in Jerusalem.

Violence throughout the days of the protests culminated in the deadliest days of the conflict, since the 2014 Gaza War, in total 129 Gazans were killed by the IDF, and 13,000 were wounded. I did not foresee such a turn of events during the first phase of writing and therefore, after much consideration, I felt it best to include these events in the epilogue rather than in the main body of the text. In order to stay objective and not compromise the quality of my thesis, I was determined to express my personal opinion based on these events at the end of the project. Upon the thesis finalization, I want to reflect on the ongoing situation, especially since I can now say that I understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through new lenses.

Throughout the course of the protests, the IDF used live ammunition and rubber bullets against the protesters, leaving many wounded, and brutally killing 129 civilians, of whom many were still children.¹³⁰ Although the Israeli government and the IDF claimed that the protests were organized by Hamas, and were therefore a danger to Israel, the organizers made it clear from the beginning these were organized by NGOs and were therefore not

¹³⁰ “Gaza protests: All the latest updates,” *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/gaza-protest-latest-updates-180406092506561.html?xif=>. Accessed on: June 23, 2018.

to be affiliated with Hamas. The notion of labelling the protestors as terrorist and as orchestrated by Hamas is along the same line of what has been shown in this thesis: Israel justifies the violence it conducts against Palestinians by attempting to show that it is fighting the terrorist. However, it seems that this time, the securitization narrative was not as successful as it was in the past decade. In fact, even though the international community has not intervened to cease the violence, it has shown its commitment to condemn the Israeli slaughter of civilians. Be it through addresses by politicians from Turkey, the EU, the UK or Iran, or through heightened discussions in the UN General Assembly and Security Council.¹³¹

In order to grasp the context of the protests, it must be made clear that the climax of the violence (including the death toll) occurred amidst the US Embassy opening in Jerusalem. While Netanyahu and the Israeli political elite enjoyed the event, the death toll in Gaza kept rising, and 60 Gazans were killed on that same day.¹³² However, it is worth noting, especially in the context of the concept of Israel's impunity, that the international community has made its condemning stance towards the US Embassy opening clear. a significant number of world delegations did not make an appearance at the event, sending a strong message. This could mean, especially when added to the strong condemnations by world leaders following the bloodshed on the Gaza border, that perhaps, Israel no longer withstands world opinion. In contrast, it shows even more the unconditional support of the US, either through support embodied in diplomatic moves such as the

¹³¹ "World leaders react to US embassy relocation to Jerusalem," *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/world-leaders-react-embassy-relocation-jerusalem-180514142652207.html>. Accessed on June 23, 2018.

¹³² Samuel Osborne, Chloe Farand, "Gaza: UN to launch war crimes investigation into Israeli forces' shooting of protesters," *The Independent*, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/gaza-killings-israel-hamas-un-war-crimes-investigate-border-deaths-sniper-a8357981.html>. Accessed on: June 23, 2018.

embassy opening, or the extensive use of veto power. Finally, it sheds light on the nature of Israel's impunity and its possible future decline.

On one hand, if we can say that the international community is starting to reject the Israeli securitization narrative, and on the other hand if it is now clear that the US is the international actor sustaining Israel's actions – Israel's position is revealed more than ever. This can best be illustrated with the voting on UNSC resolutions in June. The international community showed unity in condemning Israel's use of force and deaths of Gazans, while the US stood alone in attempting to blame Hamas for its terrorism, not even acknowledging the killings.

Does this change in the international approach to Israeli crimes open the door for a possible change of the dominant Israeli narrative? If finally Israel's securitization narrative and the position of a victim would no longer work for the international community, the path to conflict resolution may open.

8. Bibliography

8.1. Primary Sources

8.1.1. *Documents*

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181, A/RES/181(II) (November 29, 1947), available from [https://undocs.org/A/RES/181\(II\)](https://undocs.org/A/RES/181(II)).

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, S/RES/242 (November 22, 1967), available from [https://undocs.org/S/RES/242\(1967\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/242(1967)).

United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, S/RES/338 (October 22, 1973), available from [https://undocs.org/S/RES/338\(1973\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/338(1973)).

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334, S/RES/2334 (December 23, 2016), available from [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2334\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2334(2016)).

“Request for the admission of the State of Palestine to UNESCO as a Member State” (PDF). UNESCO. May 12, 1989.

8.1.2. *Speeches*

Benjamin Netanyahu’s AIPAC Speech (March 22, 2016).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6EPe5WrgJD0>

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechAIPAC220316.aspx>. Accessed on: May 19, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu’s AIPAC Speech (March 6, 2018).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EwZAmsmXy6w>

http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speech_aipac060318.aspx Accessed on: May 19, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu’s Bar-Ilan University Speech (June 14, 2009).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NY6fGMC0VtQ>

<https://www.haaretz.com/1.5064276> Accessed on: May 18, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's International Institute for Counter-Terrorism's 14th International Conference on Counter-Terrorism Speech (September 11, 2014).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQiIEocr0XI>

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechherzconf110914.aspx>. Accessed on: May 20, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's Economic Club Washington Appearance (March 7, 2018).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bcqAW-NHJ6M>

https://www.economicclub.org/sites/default/files/transcripts/Benjamin_Netanyahu_Edited_Transcript.pdf Accessed on: May 19, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's Israel-Turkey Speech (June 27, 2016).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zY9dFj8JSeA>

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechTurkeytreaty270616.aspx>. Accessed on: May 20, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's Jewish Federations of North America Speech (November 11,

2018). <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b2XmBUGZak4>

<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2014/Pages/PM-Netanyahu-addresses-Jewish-Federations-of-North-America-11-Nov-2014.aspx?ViewMode=Print>
Accessed on: May 20, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's Meeting of EU Foreign Ministers' Speech (December 11, 2017).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YPnFDDwL9GE>

http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speech_Brussels111217.aspx. Accessed on: May 20, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's Memorial Operation Protective Edge Speech (July 13, 2017).

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechEitan130717.aspx>. Accessed on: May 20, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's UN General Assembly Speech (September 24, 2009).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8LIEPxnbc>

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechUN240909.aspx>. Accessed on: May 21, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's UN General Assembly Speech (September 23, 2011).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVWa6wKYjD8>

<https://www.haaretz.com/1.5182294>. Accessed on: May 21, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's UN General Assembly Speech (September 29, 2014).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KX3NFuBO_6Y

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechUN290914.aspx>. Accessed on: May 21, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's UN General Assembly Speech (October 1, 2015).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MQp8XZc8bv0>

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechUN011015.aspx>. Accessed on: May 21, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's UN General Assembly Speech (September 22, 2016).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6sasvzNqWY&t=17s>

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechUN220916.aspx>. Accessed on: May 21, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's UN General Assembly Speech (September 19, 2017).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n3Uv9t4PBJo>

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechun190917.aspx>. Accessed on: May 21, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's UNESCO Decision Speech (October 26, 2016).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8uqwsb1TjQs>

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechHerzelia261016.aspx>. Accessed on: May 21, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's US Congress Speech (May 24, 2011).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4H3Kyt1iGEE>

<https://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Text-of-PM-Binyamin-Netanyahus-speech-to-the-US-Congress>. Accessed on: May 21, 2018.

8.2. Literature

- Adler, Gerald. "Israel and Iraq: UN Double Standards – UN Charter Article 25 and Chapters VI and VII" (2003): 1-19.
- Ajzenstadt, Mimi, and Barak, Ariel. "Terrorism and risk management: The Israeli case." *Punishment & Society* 10, no. 4 (2008): 355-374.
- Balzacq, Thierry, Léonard, Sarah and Ruzicka, Jan. "Securitization revisited: theory and cases." *International Relations* 30, no. 4 (2016): 494-531.
- Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole and De Wilde, Jaap. *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
- Demmers, Jolle. *Theories of violent conflict: An introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Floyd, Rita. "Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 427-439.
- Firmansah, Arif. "Interpersonal Meaning in Netanyahu's Speech." *English Review: Journal of English Education* 4, no. 1 (2015): 103-110.
- Freilich, Charles D. *Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Gavriely-Nuri, Dalia. "The idiosyncratic language of Israeli 'peace': A cultural approach to critical discourse analysis (CCDA)." *Discourse & Society* 21, no. 5 (2010): 565-585.
- Halper, Jeff. *War against the people: Israel, the Palestinians and global pacification*. London: PlutoPress, 2015.
- Karmi-Ayyoub, Salma. "Palestinian Membership of the International Criminal Court." *Aljezeera Centre for Studies*, (2015): 1-9.

- Kasapović, Mirjana. *Bliski istok: politika i povijest*. Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016.
- Khalidi, Walid. "Palestine and Palestine Studies: One Century after World War I and the Balfour Declaration." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 44, no. 1 (2014): 137-147.
- Lupovici, Amir. "The limits of securitization theory: Observational criticism and the curious absence of Israel." *International Studies Review* 16, no. 3 (2014): 390-410.
- Lustick, Ian S. "Abandoning the Iron Wall: Israel and 'the Middle Eastern muck'." *Middle East Policy* 15, no. 3 (2008): 30-56.
- McDonald, Matt. "Securitization and the Construction of Security." *European journal of international relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 563-587.
- Olesker, Ronnie. "Israel's societal security dilemma and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 17, no. 4 (2011): 382-401.
- Öberg, Marko Divac. "The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ." *European Journal of International Law* 16, no. 5 (2005): 879-906.
- Roe, Paul. "Is securitization a 'negative' concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics." *Security Dialogue* 43, no. 3 (2012): 249-266.
- Shapiro, Matan, and Nurit Bird-David. "Routinergency: Domestic securitization in contemporary Israel." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 35, no. 4 (2017): 637-655.
- Slater, Jerome. "Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *Middle East Policy* 22, no. 3 (2015): 79-99.
- Smith, C.D. *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents*. Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017.

Stork, Joe. "Understanding the Balfour Declaration." *MERIP Reports* 13 (1972): 9-13.

United Nations Department of Public Information, *The question of Palestine and the United Nations*. New York: United Nations, 2008

Watson, Scott D. "'Framing' the Copenhagen School: Integrating the literature on threat construction." *Millennium* 40, no. 2 (2012): 279-301.

8.3. Internet Sources

About: Charles Freilich. <http://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/charles-freilich.html>.

Accessed on: June 2, 2018.

BBC.com. "Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu: Commando turned PM". *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18008697>. Accessed on: April 12, 2018.

Benjamin Netanyahu's Speeches.

<http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/default.aspx>.

Accessed on: May 2, 2018.

Breaking the Silence. <http://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/>. Accessed on: June 7, 2018.

"Checkpoints. Israel's military checkpoints: 'We live a life of injustice'". *Al Jazeera*, <https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2018/commuting-through-israeli-checkpoints/index.html> Accessed on: June 8, 2018.

Commanders for Israel's Security. <http://en.cis.org.il/>. Accessed on: June 7, 2018.

Cortelessa, Eric. "Netanyahu issues election threat, muses over his legacy". *The Times of Israel*. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-says-he-wants-to-be-remembered-for-liberating-economy/>. Accessed on: May 10, 2018.

Farand, Chloe. "Israel has ignored resolution to stop settlements in Palestinian territories, UN says". *The Independent*, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-un-resolution-security-council-settlements-palestinian-territories-a7649571.html>. Accessed on: December 15, 2017.

“Gaza Blockade: ‘collective punishment’ condemned”. *Amnesty International*, <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/gaza-blockade-collective-punishment-condemned>. Accessed on: June 7, 2018.

“Gaza protests: All the latest updates”. *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/gaza-protest-latest-updates-180406092506561.html>. Accessed on: May 20, 2018.

Gladstone, Rick. “U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution on Gaza, Fails to Win Second Vote on its Own Measure”. *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/world/middleeast/gaza-israel-palestinians-.html> Accessed on: June 10, 2018.

“HRW Report. Separate and Unequal: Israel’s Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories”. *Human Rights Watch*, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/12/19/separate-and-unequal/israels-discriminatory-treatment-palestinians-occupied>. Accessed on: June 7, 2018.

Jeffery, Simon. “Key UN resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”. *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/22/israel2>. Accessed on: December 12, 2017.

“Key figures on the 2014 hostilities: Data featured in the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict”. *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Occupied Palestinian Territory*, <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/key-figures-2014-hostilities>. Accessed on: June 3, 2018.

Mehta, Aaron. “National Military Strategy update in the works – most of which will again be classified”. *Defense News*, <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/01/16/national-military-strategy-update-in-the-works-most-of-which-will-again-be-classified/>. Accessed on: June 9, 2018.

Middle East Eye Staff. “The 43 times US has used veto power against UN resolutions on Israel”. *Middle East Eye*, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/42-times-us-has>

used-its-veto-power-against-un-resolutions-israel-942194703. Accessed on: June 6, 2018.

Omidi, Ali. “Why Israel’s Impunity Goes Unpunished by International Authorities”. *Foreign Policy Journal*, <https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/08/11/why-israels-impunity-goes-unpunished-by-international-authorities/>. Accessed on: December 11, 2017.

Osborne, Samuel and Farand, Chloe. “Gaza: UN to launch war crimes investigation into Israeli forces’ shooting of protesters,” *The Independent*, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/gaza-killings-israel-hamas-un-war-crimes-investigate-border-deaths-sniper-a8357981.html>. Accessed on: June 23, 2018.

Pacific Settlements of Disputes (Chapter VI). *United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/settlements.shtml> Accessed on: December 10, 2017.

Ratcliffe, Rebecca. “Gaza Gaza's health system close to collapse as electricity crisis threatens total blackout”. *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jan/03/gaza-health-system-collapse-electricity-crisis-threatens-total-blackout>. Accessed on: June 10, 2018.

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (Chapter VII). *United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml> . Accessed on: December 10, 2017.

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression (Chapter VII): <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml>. Accessed on: December 17, 2017.

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Pacific Settlements of Disputes (Chapter VI): <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/settlements.shtml>. Accessed on: December 17, 2017.

Sachs, Nathan. “What’s new and what’s not in the U.N. resolution on Israeli settlements”. *The Brookings Institution*,

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/12/26/whats-new-and-whats-not-in-the-u-n-resolution-on-israeli-settlements/>. Accessed on: December 15, 2017.

Staff, Toi. “Tony Blair laments boycotting Hamas after 2006 PA election”. *The Times of Israel*, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/tony-blair-bemoans-boycotting-hamas-after-2006-pa-election/>. Accessed on: March 20, 2018.

Tahhan, Zena. “Israel’s settlements: 50 years of land theft explained”. *Al Jazeera*, <https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2017/50-years-illegal-settlements/index.html>. Accessed on: June 10, 2018.

The Gatekeepers. <http://www.thegatekeepersfilm.com/>. Accessed on: June 5, 2018.

“United Nations Resolution 242”. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Resolution-242> accessed on: December 12, 2017.

“UN Independent Panel Rules Israel Blockade of Gaza Illegal”. *Haaretz*, <https://www.haaretz.com/1.5174177>. Accessed on: May 29, 2018.

“UN says illegal Gaza blockade must be lifted”. *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/gaza-precipice-as-israel-presses-attacks-2014731143129689385.html>. Accessed on: June 2, 2018.

“UN Security Council rejects US draft resolution on Gaza”. *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/vetoes-unsc-resolution-protection-palestinians-180601201831238.html>. Accessed on: June 6, 2018.

“UN Security Council to weigh resolution on Jerusalem”. *Al Jazeera*, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/security-council-weigh-resolution-jerusalem-171217191838743.html>. Accessed on: December 18, 2017.

“World leaders react to US embassy relocation to Jerusalem,” *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/world-leaders-react-embassy-relocation-jerusalem-180514142652207.html>. Accessed on June 23, 2018.

9. Appendices

Table 1.

SPEECH	TIME
1. Bar-Ilan University 2009	14/06/2009
2. UN General Assembly 2009	24/09/2009
3. US Congress 2011	24/05/2011
4. UN General Assembly 2011	23/09/2011
5. Counter-Terrorism 2014	11/09/2014
6. UN General Assembly 2014	29/09/2014
7. Jewish Federations 2014	11/11/2014
8. UN General Assembly 2015	01/10/2015
9. AIPAC 2016	22/03/2016
10. Israel-Turkey Deal 2016	27/06/2016
11. UN General Assembly 2016	22/09/2016
12. UNESCO Decision 2016	26/10/2016
13. Protective Edge 2017	13/07/2017
14. UN General Assembly 2017	19/09/2017
15. EU Foreign Ministers 2017	11/12/2017
16. AIPAC 2018	06/03/2018
17. Economic Club 2018	07/03/2018

Table 2.

KEYWORDS	COLOUR
a) Threat, Danger, Risk, Peril	Yellow
b) Palestine/West Bank	Orange
c) Hamas/Gaza	Pink
d) Iran	Purple
e) United Nations, UNESCO, UNHRC	Green Pen
f) Peace, Peaceful, Reconciliation, Tranquillity	Blue
g) War, Battle, Conflict, Aggression, Attack, Offensive, Destruction, Shoot, Fight, Hit, Fire, Conquer, Annihilation, Confront, Kill, Violence, Assault, Murder, Slaughter, Massacre, Execute, Explode	Light Green
h) Security, Safety, Protection, Defence, Stability/Instability, Safeguard	Bright Green
i) Terrorism, Militant Islam, Islamist, Radical Islam, Fundamentalism, Radicalism, Fanaticism, ISIS, Hezbollah, Extremism, Jihad	Black Pen
j) Democratic and/or Political Exceptionalism of Israel	Blue Pen
k) Enemy, Foe, Hostile, Hatred	Purple Pen
l) Weapons, Missiles, Rockets, Arms/Armed, Ammunition, Bomb, Arsenal, Rifle, Explosive	Pink Pen

Table 3.

Table 3. ABSOLUTE NUMBERS															
SPEECH	TIME	AUDIENCE	THREAT	PALESTINE	GAZA	IRAN	UNITED NATIONS	PEACE	WAR	SECURITY	TERRORISM	DEMOCRACY	ENEMY	WEAPONS	ALL KEYWORDS PER SPEECH
1. Bar-Ilan University	14/06/2009	Israel/Arab countries	4	35	10	4	0	48	25	11	6	0	5	10	158
2. UN General Assembly	24/09/2009	International	8	9	9	9	18	27	27	10	18	1	2	17	155
3. US Congress	24/05/2011	American	6	35	8	12	5	48	24	21	14	7	1	15	196
4. UN General Assembly	23/09/2011	International	6	43	14	9	8	46	21	19	16	1	0	11	194
5. Counter-Terrorism	11/09/2014	International/Israeli	8	0	9	12	0	2	52	8	35	0	5	23	154
6. UN General Assembly	29/09/2014	International	15	16	31	25	9	17	44	18	54	1	3	34	267
7. Jewish Federations	11/11/2014	US/Canada/International/Jewish	6	19	4	34	3	19	24	7	17	1	3	14	151
8. UN General Assembly	01/10/2015	International	13	14	2	65	12	20	49	16	25	4	5	26	251
9. AIPAC	22/03/2016	American/Jewish	1	16	3	12	13	9	23	12	14	2	4	4	113
10. UN General Assembly	22/09/2016	International	4	26	12	12	33	22	43	10	26	4	9	9	210
11. UN General Assembly	19/09/2017	International	7	2	0	34	11	6	13	6	6	3	2	12	102
12. EU Foreign Ministers	11/12/2017	EU/International	1	3	0	1	2	12	8	7	8	1	0	0	43
13. AIPAC	06/03/2018	American/Jewish	2	3	1	20	1	13	12	6	8	1	1	3	71
14. Economic Club	07/03/2018	American/International	4	13	8	21	0	8	9	10	14	0	1	5	93

This table shows the following: 1) the number of appearances of each keyword category per speech 2) the sum of all keyword categories that appeared in one speech.

Table 4.

Table 4. PERCENTAGES AMONG KEYWORDS																
SPEECH	TIME	AUDIENCE	THREAT	PALESTINE	GAZA	IRAN	UNITED NATIONS	PEACE	WAR	SECURITY	TERRORISM	DEMOCRACY	ENEMY	WEAPONS	OVERALL %	
1. Bar-Ilan University	14/06/2009	Israel/Arab countries	2.53%	22.15%	6.33%	2.53%	0.00%	30.38%	15.82%	6.96%	3.80%	0.00%	3.16%	6.33%	100%	
2. UN General Assembly	24/09/2009	International	5.16%	5.81%	5.81%	5.81%	11.61%	17.42%	17.42%	6.45%	11.61%	0.65%	1.29%	10.97%	100%	
3. US Congress	24/05/2011	American	3.06%	17.86%	4.08%	6.12%	2.55%	24.49%	12.24%	10.71%	7.14%	3.57%	0.51%	7.65%	100%	
4. UN General Assembly	23/09/2011	International	3.09%	22.16%	7.22%	4.64%	4.12%	23.71%	10.82%	9.79%	8.25%	0.52%	0.00%	5.67%	100%	
5. Counter-Terrorism	11/09/2014	International/Israeli	5.19%	0.00%	5.84%	7.79%	0.00%	1.30%	33.77%	5.19%	22.73%	0.00%	3.25%	14.94%	100%	
6. UN General Assembly	29/09/2014	International	5.62%	5.99%	11.61%	9.36%	3.37%	6.37%	16.48%	6.74%	20.22%	0.37%	1.12%	12.73%	100%	
7. Jewish Federations	11/11/2014	US/Canada/International/Jewish	3.97%	12.58%	2.65%	22.52%	1.99%	12.58%	15.89%	4.64%	11.26%	0.66%	1.99%	9.27%	100%	
8. UN General Assembly	01/10/2015	International	5.18%	5.58%	0.80%	25.90%	4.78%	7.97%	19.52%	6.37%	9.96%	1.59%	1.99%	10.36%	100%	
9. AIPAC	22/03/2016	American/Jewish	0.88%	14.16%	2.65%	10.62%	11.50%	7.96%	20.35%	10.62%	12.39%	1.77%	3.54%	3.54%	100%	
10. UN General Assembly	22/09/2016	International	1.90%	12.38%	5.71%	5.71%	15.71%	10.48%	20.48%	4.76%	12.38%	1.90%	4.29%	4.29%	100%	
11. UN General Assembly	19/09/2017	International	6.86%	1.96%	0.00%	33.33%	10.78%	5.88%	12.75%	5.88%	5.88%	2.94%	1.96%	11.76%	100%	
12. EU Foreign Ministers	11/12/2017	EU/International	2.33%	6.98%	0.00%	2.33%	4.65%	27.91%	18.60%	16.28%	18.60%	2.33%	0.00%	0.00%	100%	
13. AIPAC	06/03/2018	American/Jewish	2.82%	4.23%	1.41%	28.17%	1.41%	18.31%	16.90%	8.45%	11.27%	1.41%	1.41%	4.23%	100%	
14. Economic Club	07/03/2018	American/International	4.30%	13.98%	8.60%	22.58%	0.00%	8.60%	9.68%	10.75%	15.05%	0.00%	1.08%	5.38%	100%	

This table shows the following: 1) the percentage of keyword category appearances among the total of keyword categories shown in the previous table (per speech) 2) the overall of 100% which is 'all keywords per speech' from the previous table.

Table 5.

Table 5. PERCENTAGE AMONG TOTAL WORD COUNT															
SPEECH	TIME	AUDIENCE	THREAT	PALESTINE	GAZA	IRAN	UNITED NATIONS	PEACE	WAR	SECURITY	TERRORISM	DEMOCRACY	ENEMY	WEAPONS	SPEECH WORD COUNT
1. Bar-Ilan University	14/06/2009	Israel/Arab countries	0.13 %	1.15%	0.33 %	0.13 %	0.00%	1.58 %	0.82 %	0.36%	0.20%	0.00%	0.16%	0.33%	3040
2. UN General Assembly	24/09/2009	International	0.30 %	0.33%	0.33 %	0.33 %	0.67%	1.00 %	1.00 %	0.37%	0.67%	0.04%	0.07%	0.63%	2687
3. US Congress	24/05/2011	American	0.17 %	1.01%	0.23 %	0.35 %	0.14%	1.39 %	0.69 %	0.61%	0.40%	0.20%	0.03%	0.43%	3457
4. UN General Assembly	23/09/2011	International	0.16 %	1.18%	0.38 %	0.25 %	0.22%	1.26 %	0.58 %	0.52%	0.44%	0.03%	0.00%	0.30%	3647
5. Counter-Terrorism	11/09/2014	International/Israeli	0.29 %	0.00%	0.33 %	0.43 %	0.00%	0.07 %	1.88 %	0.29%	1.27%	0.00%	0.18%	0.83%	2759
6. UN General Assembly	29/09/2014	International	0.42 %	0.45%	0.88 %	0.71 %	0.25%	0.48 %	1.25 %	0.51%	1.53%	0.03%	0.08%	0.96%	3533
7. Jewish Federations	11/11/2014	US/Canada/International/Jewish	0.30 %	0.94%	0.20 %	1.69 %	0.15%	0.94 %	1.19 %	0.35%	0.84%	0.05%	0.15%	0.69%	2015
8. UN General Assembly	01/10/2015	International	0.35 %	0.38%	0.05 %	1.75 %	0.32%	0.54 %	1.32 %	0.43%	0.67%	0.11%	0.13%	0.70%	3715
9. AIPAC	22/03/2016	American/Jewish	0.05 %	0.85%	0.16 %	0.64 %	0.69%	0.48 %	1.23 %	0.64%	0.75%	0.11%	0.21%	0.21%	1872
10. UN General Assembly	22/09/2016	International	0.10 %	0.65%	0.30 %	0.30 %	0.82%	0.55 %	1.07 %	0.25%	0.65%	0.10%	0.22%	0.22%	4011
11. UN General Assembly	19/09/2017	International	0.29 %	0.08%	0.00 %	1.38 %	0.45%	0.24 %	0.53 %	0.24%	0.24%	0.12%	0.08%	0.49%	2455
12. EU Foreign Ministers	11/12/2017	EU/International	0.05 %	0.15%	0.00 %	0.05 %	0.10%	0.60 %	0.40 %	0.35%	0.40%	0.05%	0.00%	0.00%	2015
13. AIPAC	06/03/2018	American/Jewish	0.06 %	0.10%	0.03 %	0.63 %	0.03%	0.41 %	0.38 %	0.19%	0.25%	0.03%	0.03%	0.10%	3153
14. Economic Club	07/03/2018	American/International	0.07 %	0.23%	0.14 %	0.37 %	0.00%	0.14 %	0.16 %	0.18%	0.25%	0.00%	0.02%	0.09%	5679

This table shows the following: 1) the percentage of keyword category appearances among the total speech word count 2) each speech word count shown in this table.

Table 6.

Table 6. OVERALL RANKING KEYWORDS		
KEYWORD CATEGORY	RANK	OVERALL NUMBER
WAR	1	374
PEACE	2	297
IRAN	3	270
TERRORISM	4	261
PALESTINE	5	234
WEAPONS	6	183
SECURITY	7	161
UNITED NATIONS	8	115
GAZA	9	111
THREAT	10	85
ENEMY	11	41
DEMOCRACY	12	26

This table shows the following: 1) overall sums of each keyword category in all 14 speeches 2) ranking of the keyword categories based on its usage in all 14 speeches used for the discourse analysis.

Table 7.

Table 7. North American Audience															
SPEECH	TIME	AUDIENCE	THREAT	PALESTINE	GAZA	IRAN	UNITED NATIONS	PEACE	WAR	SECURITY	TERRORISM	DEMOCRACY	ENEMY	WEAPONS	ALL KEYWORDS PER SPEECH
13. AIPAC	06/03/2018	American/Jewish	2	3	1	20	1	13	12	6	8	1	1	3	71
14. Economic Club	07/03/2018	American/International	4	13	8	21	0	8	9	10	14	0	1	5	93
9. AIPAC	22/03/2016	American/Jewish	1	16	3	12	13	9	23	12	14	2	4	4	113
7. Jewish Federations	11/11/2014	US/Canada/International/Jewish	6	19	4	34	3	19	24	7	17	1	3	14	151
3. US Congress	24/05/2011	American	6	35	8	12	5	48	24	21	14	7	1	15	196
			19	86	24	99	22	97	92	56	67	11	10	41	

Table 8.

Table 8. Context: GAZA WARS															
SPEECH	TIME	AUDIENCE	THREAT	PALESTINE	GAZA	IRAN	UNITED NATIONS	PEACE	WAR	SECURITY	TERRORISM	DEMOCRACY	ENEMY	WEAPONS	ALL KEYWORDS PER SPEECH
1. Bar-Ilan University	14/06/2009	Israel/Arab countries	4	35	10	4	0	48	25	11	6	0	5	10	158
2. UN General Assembly	24/09/2009	International	8	9	9	9	18	27	27	10	18	1	2	17	155
5. Counter-Terrorism	11/09/2014	International/Israeli	8	0	9	12	0	2	52	8	35	0	5	23	154
6. UN General Assembly	29/09/2014	International	15	16	31	25	9	17	44	18	54	1	3	34	267
			35	60	59	50	27	94	148	47	113	2	15	84	

Table 9.

Table 9. Context: IRAN															
SPEECH	TIME	AUDIENCE	THREAT	PALESTINE	GAZA	IRAN	UNITED NATIONS	PEACE	WAR	SECURITY	TERRORISM	DEMOCRACY	ENEMY	WEAPONS	ALL KEYWORDS PER SPEECH
4. UN General Assembly	23/09/2011	International	6	43	14	9	8	46	21	19	16	1	0	11	194
7. Jewish Federations	11/11/2014	US/Canada/International/Jewish	6	19	4	34	3	19	24	7	17	1	3	14	151
8. UN General Assembly	01/10/2015	International	13	14	2	65	12	20	49	16	25	4	5	26	251
9. AIPAC	22/03/2016	American/Jewish	1	16	3	12	13	9	23	12	14	2	4	4	113
10. UN General Assembly	22/09/2016	International	4	26	12	12	33	22	43	10	26	4	9	9	210
11. UN General Assembly	19/09/2017	International	7	2	0	34	11	6	13	6	6	3	2	12	102
13. AIPAC	06/03/2018	American/Jewish	2	3	1	20	1	13	12	6	8	1	1	3	71
14. Economic Club	07/03/2018	American/International	4	13	8	21	0	8	9	10	14	0	1	5	93
			43	136	44	207	81	143	194	86	126	16	25	84	

Table 10.

Table 10. Context: Israel-Palestine															
SPEECH	TIME	AUDIENCE	THREAT	PALESTINE	GAZA	IRAN	UNITED NATIONS	PEACE	WAR	SECURITY	TERRORISM	DEMOCRACY	ENEMY	WEAPONS	ALL KEYWORDS PER SPEECH
1. Bar-Ilan University	14/06/2009	Israel/Arab countries	4	35	10	4	0	48	25	11	6	0	5	10	158
4. UN General Assembly	23/09/2011	International	6	43	14	9	8	46	21	19	16	1	0	11	194
7. Jewish Federations	11/11/2014	US/Canada/International/Jewish	6	19	4	34	3	19	24	7	17	1	3	14	151
8. UN General Assembly	01/10/2015	International	13	14	2	65	12	20	49	16	25	4	5	26	251
12. EU Foreign Ministers	11/12/2017	EU/International	1	3	0	1	2	12	8	7	8	1	0	0	43
13. AIPAC	06/03/2018	American/Jewish	2	3	1	20	1	13	12	6	8	1	1	3	71
			32	117	31	133	26	158	139	66	80	8	14	64	