



Universiteit Utrecht

Governance for Sustainable Development in the Post-Peace Agreement Era in Colombia - A Comparative Study of Colombian Diaspora in France and the Netherlands



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Handed in: July 4, 2018

Executive Summary

This research analyzed the as of yet unclear governance role of Colombian migrants living in France and the Netherlands. The study's approach is in reference to the recently signed 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and leftist guerrilla group FARC-EP. One of the main goals was to analyze whether the peace agreement has galvanized transnational political activism. Furthermore, one of the central pillars of the agreement is comprehensive rural reform. The focus is to better understand how, if at all, does the Colombian migrant community support this fundamental element of the agreement. The issue of rural land distribution lies at the heart of the conflict, and its resolution is paramount in order to achieve sustainable peace, and in turn achieve sustainable development. The study found that Colombian migrants in both France and the Netherlands have low transnational political engagement. Furthermore, the peace agreement was found to not be an event which reinvigorated a sense of diaspora, and in turn transnational political engagement. Through in-depth semi-structured interviews, the issue of comprehensive rural land reform was found to be the most salient issue in which interviewee respondents felt the peace agreement addressed. However, there was overwhelming consensus among respondents about the complexity and sensitivity of this issue, which reduces its importance when it comes to voting and future plans for upholding the peace process. Though extremely important, many other issues plaguing Colombian society need to be addressed before rural land reform can be viably and sustainably implemented. In summary, this research substantiates existing literature that has found Colombian migrant communities to be fragmented and disengaged when it comes to transnational political activism.

Acknowledgements

First I would like to thank all the incredibly friendly and helpful Colombians in France and the Netherlands who went out of their way to help me with data collection. This research was greatly bolstered by Colombian respondents' enthusiasm, as well as gratitude for taking an interest in the political situation of their home country. This visible and palpable passion for peace made this research experience enjoyable and fulfilling.

I would also like to thank my supervisor Dr. Giuseppe Feola for all his hard work and answering the millions of questions that I had throughout this research and writing process.

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List of Abbreviations

AUC	United Self-Defense Forces (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia)
CGN	<i>Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera</i>
CRR	Comprehensive Rural Reform
ELN	National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FARC-EP	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia- People's Army
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WWII	World War Two

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1. Introduction

“Sustainable development and sustaining peace: Two sides of the same coin” reads the title of an article published July 2017 and written by Magdy Martínez-Solimán, UN assistant secretary-general and director of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Bureau for Policy and Programme support and Oscar Fernández-Taranco, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support. The article highlights the concept of *sustainable peace* that has been endorsed by the UN general assembly and security council and calls for the United Nations to stand behind it as the fundamental principle of the 21st century. The importance of this article is breaking with the past mentality for solving issues related to conflict and sustainable development in a step by step piecemeal program. Narrow policies focusing on one aspect at a time, for example economic growth, has proven to be insufficient in increasing welfare and supporting a peace process. A holistic and comprehensive long-term agenda that is inclusive, just, and equal is essential for tempering cycles of lapse and relapse of violent conflict, prone to countries that experience long-term conflict. Many countries with this history have chosen the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a framework designed at tackling 17 major world issues in a comprehensive and integrative manner, as their solution. One of these countries is Colombia, “one of the masterminds of the SDGs, considers them an integral tool in its peacebuilding process.” (Martínez-Solimán & Fernández-Taranco, 2017).

In November 2016, an historical peace agreement was signed between the Colombian government and the leftist guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP). This peace agreement formally ended Latin America’s longest running conflict, and one of the world’s oldest conflicts (Europarl, 2016). Insofar as a similar peace agreement has rarely been achieved before, and furthermore ended an incredibly complex internal armed conflict, many states, international organizations, and academics around the world are observing closely how the peace process will unfold and what can be learned to build peace in other countries worldwide (Maldonado, 2017).

One of the core pillars of the peace agreement agenda is Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR) (Reforma Rural Integral). This pillar includes 15 central principles. Of particular significance for sustainable development are: (1) Structural transformation through fairness, equality and democracy (2) Comprehensive development of rural areas (3) Equality and a Gender based approach (4) Well-being and quality of life, ultimate objective is the eradication of poverty (5) Sustainable development, development that is both environmentally and socially sustainable (Peace Agreement, 2016). The aim of this pillar is to rectify the deep seated roots of the conflict, which were born out of extreme inequality, marginalisation, and lack of access to land for rural peasant farmers (*campesinos*) (Peace Agreement, 2016). Those conditions have not improved, but rather worsened, during the over fifty years armed conflict. For example, Colombia’s land inequality is still high and currently ranks among the most unequal countries in Latin America, with a Gini coefficient of 53.5 in 2017 (UNDP, 2018). Furthermore, the development gap between urban areas has been steadily growing (Parra-Peña, & Acosta, 2013).

There are many challenges facing the full implementation of the peace agreement. The first challenge entails the threat to well institutionalised and powerful interests. The empowerment and participatory inclusion of the poor necessarily includes a shift in power relations and a divergence in interests. There is a deep polarity of opinions in reference to signing the peace agreement, which represents one of the major challenges going forward (Carasik, 2016). The first real test of this reality was witnessed in the congressional and presidential primary elections in March 2018. Former president and current centre-right senator Álvaro Uribe and his Centro Democrático (Democratic Center) party won big, gaining more seats than any other party in the senate and has the second highest seats in the Chamber of Representatives. What's more, Santos's U Party performed extremely poorly and part of his unpopularity stems from the signing of the peace agreement (LA Times, 2018). This polarization most importantly manifested in the second run off of the presidential elections on June 17, 2018, where leftist candidate Gustavo Petro was defeated by Uribe's protégé Iván Duque with 53.98% of the vote. Petro ran a campaign that focused on issues of high inequality and land reform to benefit poor rural communities (lemonde, 2018). Duque vowed if elected, he will pass constitutional reforms to reverse key aspects of the peace deal, one of which allows FARC political participation (Al Jazeera, 2018).

The second critical challenge comes from expert warnings that emerging criminal organisations known collectively as BACRIM, who are vying for control of territories evacuated by FARC-EP, potentially pose the biggest threat to the achievement of peace (Europarl, 2016; Palabras al Margen, 2018). With continued violence, there is evidence of systematic targeting and killing of social, environmental and indigenous leaders, as well as ex-FARC-EP combatants and a resurgence of paramilitaries (Colombia Peace Org, 2018; Oxfam, 2017; The World Factbook, 2018). These developments are deeply concerning, as a peace agreement with one guerrilla group may lead to the emergence of new and more diversified armed guerrilla groups (The Guardian, 2018). Moreover, it is critical to understand that the lion's share of violence does not come from the conflict itself, but from organized crime, domestic violence and petty crime (Nussio, 2016).

The third critical challenge stems from Colombia's notorious history for passing corrupt land distribution and economic development policies that further exacerbate unequal power relations. Vested interests working within corrupt institutions that enjoy 'legal' land grabbing mechanisms have worked in concert to impede legitimate and redistributive policies (Grajales, 2013).

Given the above challenges, it is vital at this time that all governance actors work together to promote the implementation of the peace deal and put sustained political pressure for CRR to come to fruition (Martínez-Solimán & Fernández-Taranco, 2017).

The sustained involvement of the international community is one of the factors that is recognized to potentially facilitate the successful implementation of the peace agreement (Europarl, 2016; Oxfam, 2017). Throughout the peace negotiations, the international community that includes governmental and non-governmental international actors, - especially the United States (US), European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and its affiliated Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) - has been heavily involved, sending international advisors, experts, and financial assistance (EuroParl, 2016; Maldonado, 2017). They continue to play an important role in the ongoing transition process. This research focuses on the role of the Colombian diaspora, thus far an under-researched actor. Diaspora is defined using Vertovec's definition as "an imagined community living away from a professed place of origin" (Vertovec 2009, p. 5) It is a hybridized sense of identity that is constantly in flux (Délano, 2014). This imagined community possesses a hybridized sense of citizenship and identity, whilst maintaining consistent direct and indirect interactions with their home state. In sum, these individuals do not share the same territorial boundaries but do share the same social networks (Tigau, 2010).

Importantly, the role of the Colombian diaspora in the peace talks and peace negotiations has remained ambiguous. The vast majority appeared disengaged, specifically in reference to low voter turnout. However, there remains a loud minority that participates in political activities such as protests, sit ins, and signing petitions (Democracy Earth, 2016). For example, one such petition includes over three hundred signatories of human rights campaigners, intellectuals, academics, and cultural professionals from around the world that have produced a joint declaration asking for the international community to support the proper monitoring and implementation of the peace agreement (Palabras al Margen, 2018). The ambiguous role of the diaspora is therefore unclear, and yet often overlooked as a governance actor. This is surprising given that the peace agreement also casts new light on Colombia and Colombians abroad, which have suffered from a general negative perception. This agreement potentially opens up a radically different (peaceful) future for Colombia. The diaspora may benefit directly from this change of representation and take advantage of this opportune moment in history. One could therefore surmise that Colombians abroad would be supportive of this peace agreement. On the other hand, migrants also reproduce those same divergent perceptions of the peace agreement that exist at home (Bauböck, 2003; SFNS, 2016). Therefore, it is unclear which factors contribute to the overall unknown role of the Colombian diaspora.

1.1 Research Gap

This study aims to understand the role of the Colombian diaspora in supporting this peace agreement signed by the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP group. While it is agreed that the peace process will need support of a broad range of national and international actors, there is no research yet about the role of the Colombian diaspora in the peace building in Colombia. There are few empirical studies that have researched the governance role of diasporas, which migrants are more likely to develop a diasporic identity, and which environments are most conducive for diaspora identity development. Second, there is a theoretical gap in conceptualizing transnationalism, the diaspora and its role in international politics. Knowledge about the strength of transnationalism, mechanisms which support or impede its functioning and its influence are still unclear (Waldinger, 2008). By studying the Colombian case, this research will be able to improve our understanding of both these issues. Furthermore, the majority of earlier research on Colombian diaspora political practices is based in the United States, as this country has one of the largest and most politically mobilised

Colombian diaspora communities (Bermudez, 2010). The diaspora in America is much older and well established, whereas migration from Colombia to Europe is a more recent phenomenon, thus providing a new context for study (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Bermudez, 2010; Torres et al., 2014). Moreover, there are few comparative studies analysing how receiving countries shape transnational political networks and activities (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Comparative studies are important for understanding factors such as state relations and motivations for either encouraging or impeding linkages. Additionally, they illuminate where engagement stems from, i.e. personal convictions, NGO and civil society organizational incentives or state policies. These studies also help to elucidate which variables explain similarities and differences across cases (Délano & Gamlen, 2013).

1.2 Research Objective

The objective of this research is to understand what role, if any, does the Colombian diaspora in France and the Netherlands play in governing sustainable rural development within the context of the peace process. These countries have been selected to compare different structural and institutional environments, namely multiculturalism or assimilation policies, socio-cultural backgrounds, and diaspora size. All three variables have empirically shown to influence diaspora activism and mobilisation (Bermudez, 2010; Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Torres et al., 2014;).

Ultimately, by understanding the role of the Colombian diaspora, within the context of the peace process, this research aims to contribute knowledge on how to strengthen translocal activities that subsequently have an impact on governing sustainable CRR in Colombia. In doing so, the end goal is to reach greater accountability and transparency for the peace agreements' implementation. This study is significant, as a peace agreement has never been negotiated between these two parties. Whether its implementation will be comprehensive and successful is highly dependent on meaningful engagement and active citizen participation.

1.3 Research Questions

Central Research Questions: Are Colombian migrants living in France and the Netherlands transnationally politically active? Who engages in these activities and who does not? Which factors influence engagement?

Sub questions:

- 1) Is there a cohesive and mobilized Colombian community? Why or why not?
- 2) In what way does the diaspora identify themselves? Has the peace agreement galvanized a sense of diaspora?
- 3) Why does the diaspora engage in the peace process? What do they identify as the foundational issue?
- 4) How does the diaspora engage?
- 5) Why (if at all) is the diaspora choosing to engage in transnational political activities with respect to the peace process? And why not, if they do not?

1.5 Relation to Master's Program

The main goals of the CRR are also central goals found within the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the UN. Specifically goal (1) no poverty, (5) gender equality, (8) decent work and economic growth, (10) reduced inequalities, (11) sustainable cities and communities, (16) peace, justice and strong institutions, and perhaps the most relevant for this research is goal (17) partnerships for goals. The last goal explicitly states that sustainable development requires cooperation, coherent policies, an enabling environment for sustainable development at all levels by all actors, and a reinvigorated Global Partnership for Sustainable Development. All seventeen goals are integrated and indivisible, which balance all three dimensions of sustainable development: economic, social, and environmental (UN, 2017). This research aims to add knowledge about the role of one of these essential global governance actors, the diaspora.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Concept of Migrant Transnationalism

Transnationalism as a central field of international migration studies began to emerge in the late 1990s. In the most simplistic of terms, transnationalism refers to linkages between people living in two nation-states. This encompasses the individual, group, network, and institutional levels. Linkages can be political, economic, social, ideational and symbolic (Guarnizo et al., 1999). The reason for maintaining linkages can vary, i.e. professional, patriotic, militant, etc. (Tigau, 2010). Vertovec adds that these links in turn interact with everyday practices that create a fluidity in constructed livelihood practices. In most of the sociological literature, transnationalism is understood as a public venue where political engagement occurs and transcends state borders (Vertovec, 1999). Early studies predominantly took place in the United States, analyzing the labour market experiences of migrant communities of Central and South American origin (Glick-Schiller et al., 1992; Portes et al., 1999).

There still remains scholarly debate about which theories and factors accurately explain the escalation and diffusion of transnationalism and transnational activities around the globe. One such explanation posits that the major driving force for the resurgence of interest for transnational studies is the incredibly widespread usage of technology and telecommunications (Guarnizo et al., 1999; Vertovec, 1999). The speed and ease of maintaining sustained interactions and transmitting information with home countries has never been cheaper and easier. The use of the web, social media, and virtual social networks has become the primary and universally used mechanism by migrant communities to communicate and express identities and opinions (Tigau, 2010).

Conversely, some scholars look at the broader global political-economic structure of the world as the driving force of the emerging increase in transnational activities. Larner (2000) refers to this using the concept of “neoliberal governmentality”. She posits that globalization and the spread of neoliberal policies penetrate all corners of this planet and with them carry a hegemonic conception of diaspora. These policies see diaspora communities as objects of government, which explains why we are witnessing a widespread emergence of sending country policies aimed at harnessing material, ideational, social, cultural, and economic benefits (Délano & Gamlen, 2013; Larner, 2000). Following this theoretical approach, it is neoliberalist policies that have given rise to the emergence of ‘transnational communities’ (Gamlen, 2013).

A third academic perspective sees this phenomenon as the result of international policy diffusion (Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Délano, 2014). This theory looks at the increasingly important role of international forums and organizations that promote the diaspora-development nexus, for instance the Global Forum on Migration and Development (see Gamlen et al., 2013). With increased connectivity and promotion of diaspora rights, the normative perceptions of diaspora rights change, and therefore disseminate throughout all diaspora communities.

Theories of diffusion are often overlooked, and Délano and Gamlen (2014) argue that this is an important avenue for future research about state-diaspora relations.

2.2 'Transnational Political Activities' And Colombian Government Initiatives

The majority of scholars define transnational political activities by differentiating between regular and sporadic participation. This research uses Østergaard-Nielsen's definition of 'broad' and 'narrow'(or core) transnational political activities. 'Broad' activities include occasional participation in meetings or events, whereas 'narrow' activities include actual membership of political parties or hometown associations. The more institutionalized an activity is, the more narrow is its classification. She defines all transnational political activities as 'various forms of direct cross border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees, as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country' (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003, p. 4). Bauböck argues that this is still too narrow of a definition and should include the influence of migration on political institutions, and how they conceptualize membership (Bauböck, 2003). Nevertheless, this definition was chosen because it takes into account the different nature of activities and their frequencies, which better scrutinizes their significance at the individual and group levels. Østergaard-Nielsen further differentiates activities between direct and indirect participation. Direct transnational activities include participation in home state politics, i.e. voting, supporting political parties either monetarily or volunteering for campaigns, and being publicly vocal in the press in support of political campaigns. Indirect participation refers to engagement with host country political institutions, as well as international organizations such as affiliation with civic society organizations, national and international NGOs, charity organizations, and sponsoring projects (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

In terms of direct transnational political activities, each host country has its own laws, policies and initiatives that determine which activities are allowed. Depending on the country, migrants living abroad are seen in various different lights. Many sending states view migrants as potential advocates for 'national interests' and a lucrative source of income, skill development and capacity for political lobbying (Bauböck, 2003; Délano, 2014; Gamlen, 2013; Tigau, 2010). The Colombian government has been actively seeking to create linkages with Colombian migrants. Since 1961, Colombians living abroad have had the right to vote in presidential elections. In 1991, the Colombian government approved dual citizenship, an outcome born out of grass-roots pressure of migrants living in the United States. This same year, political representation of Colombians living abroad in the national congress was approved (Guarnizo et al., 1999). In 1997, congressional voting for migrants was approved. These rights have largely been influenced by migrants in an effort to increase democracy and the Colombian state responded in an effort to increase its legitimacy (Torres et al., 2014). In 2003 the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Relations launched the program "Colombia Unites Us" with the aim of promoting links between the diaspora, their families, and regions of origin. This was done in order to hopefully improve Colombia's image abroad and consequently have a positive influence on the host government's policies towards Colombia (Tigau, 2010). There is also the increasing importance

and weight of remittances on the Colombian economy. Since the early 1990s, the Colombian government has introduced several institutional and political reforms to incorporate migrants, thus tapping into this potential flow of money that is extremely beneficial for Colombia's development. Unfortunately, incentives set up by the Colombian government are not readily utilized by the migrant communities (Guarnizo et al., 1999). It is important to note that even though these incentives are not regularly used, these policies and laws in place do give migrant communities an empowered position in domestic politics as a governance actor. Unlike many other cases, where perhaps engagement is restricted, Colombian migrants are in a privileged position to utilize their situation and have it matter. This research aims to improve knowledge about why Colombian migrants are choosing not to engage in these initiatives.

Furthermore, there is a gap in knowledge about the influence of transnational politics in conflict resolution (Torres et al., 2014). Zunzer (2004) argues that migrant communities can make a positive influence by providing a more neutral position, new expertise and knowledge, support civil society organizations in the home country, and lobby foreign governments and the international community (Zunzer, 2004). The global proliferation of grassroots transnational activism represents a novel and significant phenomenon that has yet to receive adequate attention in sociological research (Guarnizo et al., 2003). This research aims at contributing to our understanding about the interplay between transnational political activities and conflict resolution.

There is a recent resurgence in optimism about the potential relationship between migration and development through state-diaspora linkages (De Hass, 2010; Faist, 2008; Gamlen, 2014; Skeldon, 2008; Spaan et al., 2005). The most obvious and direct way is by sending remittances. Today, Colombia is among the top remittance receiving countries in Latin America. In 2015, it received approximately \$4.6 billion dollars (MPI, 2017). Money from abroad is also invested directly into the home economy, as well as donated as political contributions. (Roberts et al., 1999). Moreover, the social, cultural, political and ideational links create a sort of transnationalist citizenship (Guarnizo et al., 1999) that has the potential to transform norms and values towards more progressive and universally acknowledged ideals that are constructive for sustainable peace and development. Guarnizo (2008) argues that Colombian migration has evolved to acquire a truly 'global character' as a result of many Colombian initiatives, the incredible dependence on remittances, and the expanding destinations of migrant communities. This optimistic view however is not shared by all scholars. Many recent studies argue that engaging migrant communities is a futile effort to relieve economic dependence by appealing to investments of the migrant elites classes (Larner, 2007; Mullings, 2011).

2.3 Patterns of Migrant Transnational Political Engagement

There is continuing debate in existing literature about which factors and variables lead to discrepancies and certain patterns of engagement. One such variable is gender. Jones-Correa (1998) found that Latin American men in the US were more likely to engage in transnational political activities in comparison to women who were more concerned with integrating into American society. Studies by Mahler (1999) and Mahler and Pessar (2001) found that gender

plays a role in migrant mobility in the host country. Men were found to experience occupational downward mobility, while women have had the opposite experience and became more empowered. Often for the first time they join the paid labor force, which in turn affects how they perceive themselves in their home environment and their position in society. With this, women better integrated into their host countries and lost transnational ties, while men held onto transnational linkages in an effort to maintain their prior higher status (Mahler, 1999; Mahler & Pessar, 2001). Conservely Guarnizo, Portes and Haller (2003) found gender to be insignificant. Insofar as the influence of the variable 'gender' on transnational political engagement is yet to be settled, it has been included in this research to increase our knowledge about its influence.

A second factor that is yet to be well established is the effect of integration on transnational linkages and engagement. Jones-Correa (1998) Guarnizo and Smith (1998) and Landolt (2001) found that poor integration and loss of occupational mobility leads to loss of status, which leads migrants to compensate by maintaining links with their home country. However, more recent literature by Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller (2003) found the opposite, where migrants that have attained a high status job and experienced smooth integration are more likely to participate in transnational political activities. This holds true for both narrow and broad transnational political activities. Portes (2002) substantiates these findings, discovering that migrants with better economic and legal status are most transnationally politically active. Waldinger (2008) found that as Latin American migrants socially and politically integrate into American society, their ties and material support of their home country decreases. There is growing empirical evidence that integration and transnational political engagement are not incompatible processes (Portes et al., 2008; Smith, 2005).

Waldinger (2008) researched the cross border exchanges of Latin American migrants living in the United States. His study found that the majority of respondents do not send back remittances to their home country. In terms of transnational political participation, the data shows that this is at best a phenomenon in its beginning stages within a marginal proportion of migrant communities. Furthermore, the vast majority of respondents feel a sense of attachment to their home country, but this is more so a symbolic identity and not representative of future plans to return back home. Of all transborder activities tested, voting is the least engaged in activity and showed to decline overtime (Waldinger, 2008).

From the individual level perspective, scholars continue to debate which elements stimulate engagement. The three main theories are (1) Individual motivations which is argued by classical theories of individualism (2) embeddedness into host country civic society and (3) social network theory (Guarnizo et al., 2003).

2.4 Migrant Transnationalism Relevance to Global Governance

Consensus about the role and power of migrant communities as a global governance actor is yet to be settled in the academic community. A debate exists between scholars who argue that the dominant role of the nation-state continues to be the principal actor (Waldinger, 2008) and

scholars who argue that the ever increasing power of globalization is changing the global power structure and meaningfully undercutting the salience of the state (Castells, 2008; Vertovec, 2001). What is universally known, is that the world we live in today is marked by the spread and significance of globalization (Giddens & Hutton, 2000; Held et al., 1999; Held & McGrew, 2007). “Not everything and everyone is globalized, but the global networks and the structure of the planet affect everything and everyone” (Castells, 2008, p. 81). Manuel Castells outlines what he calls ‘the new public sphere’, where people come together as citizens and discuss their views in an effort to influence political institutions as a global civil society. It involves the interactions between citizens, civil society and the state. This communication is essential for the proper functioning of democracy, insofar as it facilitates accountability between the state and its constituents (Castells, 2008). The public sphere includes the media and socio spatial sites, and acts as a cultural/informational repository. At the heart of these networks is the use of new technologies (Castells, 1996). The significance of this public sphere lies with its enabling of public debate, that in turn creates discourses which influence state decisions (Stewart, 2001). Gupta and Ferguson (1992) contend that ‘Something like a transnational public sphere has certainly rendered any strictly bounded sense of community or locality obsolete.....’ (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992, p. 9).

Castells further argues that the new public sphere has the ability to transform the structures of the home state. The incorporation of migrants in host country politics and democracy has the potential to spread to home country regional politics and enhance regional democratic mechanisms. Bauböck argues that migration affects the conception of citizenship among the native populations of both countries (Bauböck, 2003). It is here where the migrant community, as citizens and part of civil society organizations, have the potential to be influential global governance actors. The role of migrant communities is therefore one of political activism, as well as creating channels of influence. Bermúdez argues that the key role of diaspora communities is to strengthen the international support for their home countries (Bermúdez, 2011).

Though there is an ever growing scholarly interest within the field of transnationalism and migration, scholars do not underplay the still dominant role of the state and its ability to control, restrict or spur transnationalist practices (Bauböck, 2003; Koopmans & Statham, 2003; Portes et al., 1999; Portes, 200). Waldinger posits that in fact it is the host country’s policies that are predominant, as they can restrict travel and engagement with the home country, which is most important when understanding and analyzing transnational activism (Waldinger, 2008).

Evans (2000) has highlighted the great opportunity and ability of migrants having the freedom to criticize, as well as shed light on the human rights abuses perpetrated in their home countries. Many countries suffering from great injustices have restricted freedom of speech and free press. Therefore being abroad empowers migrants to become active global governance actors with the economic and political potential to influence the foreign policies of nation states, international organisations, NGOs, and improve the functioning of democracy of home countries (Evans, 2000). In conclusion, the degree of influence of migrant communities as a governance actor is still up for debate.

2.5 “Transnational Communities”

The existence of transnational activities and practices of migrants has always been acknowledged by the academic community. However, its degree, importance and novelty is still up for debate (Vertovec, 2001). Faist (2000) defines transnational communities as “strongly embedded in at least two countries and enduring” (Faist, 2000). Many scholars trumpet the manifestation of a new particular class of ‘transnational communities’ and ‘transmigrants’ (see Glick Schiller et al., 1992; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Portes et al., 1999; Levitt et al., 2003), while others posit a more sceptical view (See Guarnizo & Portes, 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Waldinger, 1998, 2008). Waldinger argues that transnationalism as a state of being does not exist and the use of the term ‘transmigrants’ denoting a new and distinctive class from previous migrant activities is not justified and empirically does not exist (Waldinger, 2008). Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt defend the contemporary use of the term ‘transnationalism’ by citing the unprecedented frequency and scale. However in his recent work, Portes (2002) argues that the original hype over transnational activities by immigrant communities has led to an overall exaggeration of their scope. Though they have provided a new perspective and novel hypotheses about patterns of settlement and integration, a comparative study of Colombian, Salvadoran and Dominican migrants in the US found that the actual percentage of migrants who regularly engage in transnational political activities is approximately 18%, and in most cases the figure is less (Portes, 2002). These findings, in conjunction with research done by Guarnizo, Portes and Haller (2003), whose study found transnational political activism to be linked to migrants who are “well-connected migrants who remain normatively attached to their home communities by kin and friendship ties” (p.1232) and that the actual proportion of migrants that partake in transnational political activities was very small, has led to the creation of the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis (4): A small minority of Colombian migrants in France and the Netherlands, with higher education and high-class status, participate in ‘narrow’ transnational political activities.¹

Levitt and Jaworsky (2007) argue that the innovativeness of the term ‘transnational communities’ has led to an overuse when talking about migration and that transnational activities vary greatly. However, they find that the percentage of migrants galvanized to engage in transnational activities by either economic downturns, elections, life-cycle events, and climate disasters is much greater. They argue that the combination of these activities has the potential to create a marked impact on home country economics, values, and practices of entire regions (Kyle, 2000; Levitt et al., 2003). Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) has similar findings, arguing that migrants who engage on a regular basis are few and far between compared to the majority who occasionally will participate; and are often mobilized due to a specific event or person (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). From this literature, it can be hypothesized that the 2016 peace agreement was a significant event that would invigorate transnational political engagement. It

¹ Hypotheses are arranged in reverse order, as the research findings answer them in consecutive order.

² Google translated from the Spanish text of the article.

³ “But, but you know that the people for example, but you know something, because the mass media, they have created a narrative very... very closed (also about?) the armed conflict, and they have always

has not been formulated as an official hypothesis, but rather encompasses the reasoning and approach for this research. Research conducted by Galeano Rodriguez (2018) found that the already existing extreme political polarization within the Colombian culture was exacerbated by the 2016 peace agreement. This study hopes to improve our knowledge about the influence of this event by adding to these findings.

Recent literature has modified its understanding of migrant transnationalism as taking place within fluid social spaces. As migrants adapt, integrate or experience the opposite, their social space and linkages are continuously being reworked (Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2004; Pries, 2005; Smith, 2005).

Portes (2002), though critical of the scope of migrant transitional activities, posits that there are three main reasons why immigrant transnationalism warrants careful attention: (1) though currently limited, there is expected future growth due to global capitalism and its continuous demand for immigrant labour, (2) it can alter the process of integration for second generation immigrants who hold onto certain values and 'cultural bridges', and (3) its influence on country of origin development that includes economic prosperity, democratization, and cultural transformations (Portes, 2002). As these developments simultaneously advance, potential major changes in both home and host countries can occur. All things considered with the flourishing literature on this subject, debate remains about the novelty of these transnational networks (Vertovec, 2001).

2.6 Colombian Migration History

Colombia's migration history is recent and largely tied to its volatile history of recurrent episodes of violent conflict. Throughout the 1980s, Colombia experienced a deteriorating political crisis and economic recession, while simultaneously dealing with the expansion of the drug trade. This continued on in the late 1990s where violence, insecurity, and economic instability reached a peak and worsened specifically in 1997 with the rise of paramilitaries (Restrepo et al., 2003). This consequently led to mass migration to neighbouring countries, as well as new European destinations that had previously not been primary host countries. These new destinations emerged as they were economically more assuring (Bermúdez, 2010). Countries such as Spain and surrounding Western European countries, the United States, and Costa Rica received an unprecedented wave of Latin American migrants, eventually forming well established migrant networks (Bermúdez, 2011; Collier, 2004). Distinct from previous migration flows, which encompassed mostly lower working-class people in search of better economic opportunities, this wave included middle and upper-middle class well educated people with high social capital (Collier, 2004; Galeano Rodriguez, 2018). The combination of a different class of Colombian migrants, with different reasons for migration, and new countries of destination presents an all together new context for research and theoretical perspective (Bermúdez, 2010). Furthermore, recent studies have found more and more Colombians are choosing to migrate to Europe to study or join their loved ones. Colombians choosing to study abroad, for its own sake and as a precursor to permanent settlement, has grown exponentially over the last few years (Blinder,

2013; Hawthorne, 2008). How does this wave of Colombians integrate into these relatively new host countries and what impact does it have, if at all, on their transnational political activities?

2.7 Colombian Transnational Political Activism

Research on Colombian migration began in the late 1990s with studies conducted by Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, Arturo Ignacio Sánchez, Elizabeth M. Roach, and Luz Marina Diaz. These initial studies illuminated migrant fragmentation and some of their causes. Their findings illuminated a deep mistrust amongst each other as the root cause. Other scholars found that drug-trafficking stigma and an exported sense of regional division also contributed to fragmentation (Valderrama-Echavarria, 2014). Collier (2004) conducted research about middle and upper-middle class Colombian migrants who are moving to South Florida and choosing to return back to Colombia after only a year or two. One of the study's' main findings was that Colombians living in South Florida lacked an identity with Colombian political parties and a larger Colombian nation. Migrants chose to settle down in different neighbourhoods along their social class lines. This is explained by previous research done by Casey (2002) who found that Colombian 'bonding' social capital results in small closed social networks (Casey, 2002). Collier expands on the underlying reason for this type of settling as the result of suffering from extreme inequality and a prolonged civil armed conflict, which has led to widespread violence and petty crime, exacerbating segregation of classes, fear and distrust (hate). Bermúdez (2011) found that in both Spain and the UK, Colombian civil society organizations turned their focus to helping those abroad rather than at home due to widespread disillusionment and pessimism about the neverending conflict.

Valderrama-Echavarria (2014) studied Colombian migrants living in the US state of Idaho and found factors such as fear, distrust, isolation and shame that accounted for fragmentation in the Colombian diaspora community. He argues that these issues are naturally born out of a society that has suffered through a history of long-term domestic violent conflict. This fragmentation has consequently resulted in an overall politically apathetic community (Valderrama-Echavarria, 2014). Galeano Rodriguez (2018) researched which factors were creating fragmentation and hindering social cohesion in the Dutch Colombian migrant community. His research found that "Among the most recurrent and worrisome cleavages that are identified within the Colombian population and reflect an inequitable society, with dramatic social gaps and even more forceful abroad, is the notorious classism that survives in Colombia"(Galeano Rodriguez, 2018).² His study found that going abroad to the Netherlands changed the nature of this classism into two broad categories: those who migrated to develop their professional careers and the "other" economic refugee whose profession is considered of a lower status (Galeano Rodriguez, 2018). Moreover, he found that drug trafficking stigma was pervasive and created an environment of mutual suspicion and distrust. The findings of these studies led to the creation of the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis (3): A deep rooted fragmented Colombian identity hinders the mobilization of 'narrow' transnational political activities of migrants living in France and the Netherlands.

² Google translated from the Spanish text of the article.

Guarnizo, Portes and Haller (2003) researched Latin American migrants living in the United States. Their results found Colombians to be the least connected to home country politics among the three countries of study (El Salvador, Dominican Republic and Colombia). Factors leading to this pervasive disconnect included institutionalized corruption, persistent instability and widespread violence. Bermúdez (2016) highlights that the majority of Colombian migrants living in the UK, Spain and Belgium are not interested in participating in transnational political activities, or find that is too difficult to become meaningfully engaged. What was found however, is that the majority do stay informed about what is going on in Colombia, including political news stories. In most cases this does not translate into active transnational political participation for several reasons: political dissatisfaction, mistrust of formal and informal political initiatives, and lack of knowledge and other resources. These findings contradict earlier studies that found that when migrants experience downward social mobility in their host countries, transnational engagement goes up (Jones-Correa, 1998; Guarnizo & Smith, 1998; Landolt, 2001). The findings of these studies led to the creation of the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis (2): A pervasive sense of disillusionment with Colombian state authority and legitimacy hinders transnational political activities of migrants living in France and the Netherlands.

Another main finding from research done by Guarnizo, Portes and Haller (2003) was that increased length in the US actually increases the interest and involvement of Colombian migrants in home country politics. The findings of this study led to the creation of the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis (1): As years abroad increase, levels of transnational political activism of migrants living in France and the Netherlands increases.

Furthermore, Guarnizo, Portes and Haller (2003) found migrants that were transnationally active followed a bimodal pattern of high education and rural origin. The study also found that Colombian migrants whose families are expecting them to come back to Colombia are significantly more likely to maintain transnational political linkages over time in comparison with those who are not expected to return. Gender was found to be an insignificant factor. In summary, their study found that Colombia has a dominant political culture of disengagement (Guarnizo et al., 2003).

Some more recent studies by Bermúdez (2010, 2011, 2016) analyzed Colombian diaspora communities living in Spain and the UK (2010, 2011) and expanded her ongoing research to also include the Colombia diaspora community in Belgium (2016). Bermúdez (2011) major findings include: migrants who left for security reasons were mostly active in left-wing politics, and in general were the most active abroad in transnational political activities directly related to the conflict. The remaining groups were found to be generally inactive. The comparison of these two countries resulted in several important findings. Levels of political activism with both host and home country was stronger in Spain. This is partly due to historical ties, size, and

characteristics of the communities. Other variables found to be significant were the structural and institutional environments (Bermúdez, 2010; 2011).

Bermúdez (2016) found that the majority of her respondents in the UK, Spain and Belgium decided to migrate for labor or economic reasons. She found that especially for women, escaping abusive relationships is a contributing factor. Overall, her findings highlight that there is a gendered difference in terms of reasons for migration for labor migrants. Of the three host countries, the majority of Colombian migrants who chose to migrate to study live in London. Bermúdez found that students mostly do not consider themselves migrants, as their original intentions are to return back home. However, the IOM highlights that 'student migration from developing countries can become a back door for permanent migration, and therefore, a potential source of "brain drain"' (2006, p.9). Furthermore, women are more likely to find a relationship and decide to stay. In terms of maintaining transnational ties, her research found that respondents maintained strong linkages with the home country, as well as friends and family living abroad in other countries. They cite the use of new technologies that has made maintaining communication much easier. The majority of respondents said they send remittances more or less regularly, and that mostly women migrants tend to bear the brunt of being the remittance senders in the family. The study's main conclusions found that transnational political activities are engaged in differently depending on the type of migration. Furthermore, the relationship between integration and engagement is complex. Some exclusively focus on either home state engagement or host state state engagement, while others blend and alternate between both. Gender differences are less obvious but nonetheless important. Bermúdez stresses that this variable should be considered at the same time as class, race, and ethnicity. For migrant transnational and diaspora politics, 'Factors such as type of migration, migrant legal and socioeconomic status, levels of education and stage in the life cycle' were found to be critical variables (Bermúdez, 2016, p. 238). In terms of conflict resolution, some respondents believed that the diaspora could or should play a role (Bermúdez, 2016).

Torres, Chorda and Mena (2014) found that Colombians in general take up particular forms of transnational political activism as a response to: their worsening socio-political environment, the increasing importance of remittances, as well as the important political role migrants play. This especially pertains to migrants who are able to forcefully speak out against the human rights violations taking place in Colombia. In reference to these issues, particular strategies are chosen to try and increase effectiveness of influence.

3. Methodology and Data Collection

The literature review above has highlighted the following major themes: gender, class, origin, education, ethnic background, ideology, years abroad and level of integration. In correspondence to these themes, an analytical framework has been created. This section lays out the operationalization for answering the central and sub research questions.




Figure 1. Depicts the analytical framework.

3.1 Methodology

To answer the research questions, a mix of qualitative and quantitative data is needed, and has previously been proven to be useful for this specific type of research (Bermudez, 2016). Quantitative data is needed to measure the first central research question ‘how’ and the second central research question ‘who’ that is specifically looking at levels and types of transnational political engagement. This research method has been chosen because it is particularly useful for collecting data where breadth is more important than depth. Surveys were selected as the method for data collection insofar as they capture a holistic representation of the phenomenon, using pre-set questions that are easily quantifiable (Verschuren, 2010). Furthermore, the subject matter is extremely sensitive, which allows respondents to anonymously provide any information

they feel comfortable with in the privacy of their own space. The survey in English can be found in the Appendix E. It was also translated into French and Spanish to accommodate migrants who do not speak English and increase the response rate. Qualitative data is needed to further understand the motivations and factors behind the choice to engage in certain activities, answering the third central research question 'why'. The qualitative data method chosen for this study is semi-structured interviews. This means that a predetermined list of questions was made, but follow up and probing questions for each interview were used when appropriate. This is useful to first, have a structured interview to collect the needed information to answer aspects of the research question. Second, interviewees may have drastically different backgrounds that require more precise questions to get a better understanding of their thoughts, opinions and background stories.

To analyze the data for the first two central research questions, SPSS software was used to conduct descriptive statistical analyses to determine which individuals are most likely to engage in transnational political activities. To analyze the interview data for the third central research question, interviews were recorded using an audio recording device and subsequently transcribed and uploaded onto NVIVO software for coding. Analysis of this data requires an interpretive and naturalistic approach, giving the researcher discretion in interpreting the meanings of the phenomena observed (Denzin and Lincoln, 2012, p. 6-7). To analyze the raw interview data; open, structural and value coding was used in order to be able to observe emerging overarching patterns that are not instantly clear from initial labelling of large portions of text (Boeije, 2010). While coding, emerging patterns and repeated themes within the data that appeared more than twice were created (Saldaña, 2015). Following initial open coding, structural coding was used to merge codes into overarching themes that were then again analyzed for core themes. These include: their history with political activism, their perceptions of migrant's roles as political actors, the importance of the international community in the peace process, their experience living abroad, the potential impact migration has had on their identity, and their future political engagement plans. Furthermore, codes that were not relevant were later deleted, as they did not add value or understanding in answering the research questions. The research project specifically wants to uncover whether CRR is valued and supported by migrants and whether it is an issue they plan to actively support in the future. Open-ended and broad questions about the peace agreement and its many chapters allowed interviewees to speak freely about what they value as the most significant aspect(s) that the peace agreement addressed. Coding was done while simultaneously reviewing personal memos about each interview. The final list of 'main themes' provided in this study was decided on while keeping in mind Harding's (2013) advice, where he acknowledges that his judgment is subjective but nonetheless advises that codes shared by at least $\frac{1}{4}$ of respondents is worth consideration (Saldaña, 2015). The main themes included in this study were chosen if at least roughly $\frac{1}{3}$, or 5 of 13, of respondents referenced it. This was chosen insofar as the number of respondents was low, therefore a higher proportion was chosen in an effort to increase validity.

Two case studies, France and the Netherlands, have been selected for a comparative study. This type of study has been chosen, as it helps to better test which variables (factors) are influential in promoting or hindering transnational political activities. Comparative studies are

uniquely able to answer questions about what motivates engagement: is it host-state policies, the type of diaspora community, social organizations, or individual attributes? (Délano & Gamlen, 2014).

3.2 Data Collection

This section first details the avenues explored for collecting survey data, followed by the methodology of choosing interview respondents. To collect survey data from a varied group of Colombian migrants in both countries, a primary avenue using internet websites such as Facebook groups, travel sites, and social networking sites were contacted to try and post the link to the survey. At the same time the Colombian consulate, aid agencies for new migrants, and research institutes were contacted in an effort to learn more about Colombian groups or events that would broaden the research scope. For instance, I contacted Holland House Colombia, which is a private-public non-profit organization that is supported by businesses and government agencies of both the Netherlands and Colombia. They connected me to the the Netherlands Alumni Association Colombia (NAAC) LinkedIn group, where I contacted them to see if I can post on their page. The initial stages of data collection also included reaching out to Colombian students in France and the Netherlands who then shared their contacts of Colombian migrants via Email and Facebook messages. Some students were willing to post the survey on their personal Facebook pages as well. These contacts additionally provided information about Colombian organizations, groups, events, research institutes, talks, etc. The fundamental goal was to reach out to the broader Colombian communities outside of student groups and networks in a quick and efficient way.

From this preliminary reaching out, I was added to three Facebook groups for Colombians living in Paris and unfortunately accepted to only one Facebook group for Colombians living in the Netherlands. I was able to post the link for the survey on these group pages, which each have over 1,000 members. Furthermore, scanning through the group's posts, it was clear that there is a diversity of political opinions. This channel turned out to be most effective for French survey respondents that have lived abroad for an extended period of time and represented quite a diversity of backgrounds. Unfortunately, very minimal responses came in thereafter with follow up posts.

I had also reached out to the CEDLA: Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation in Amsterdam. I was connected to the CEDLA Colombian students network, where the chairperson shared the survey link with their group. Furthermore, I attended a talk they held about the current situation in Colombia. This attracted a broad audience of Colombians living in the Netherlands, in particular students. This personal contact turned out to be the most successful in terms of willing participants for interviews. Of course there is a bias, as Colombians attending shows that they are actively engaged.

Furthermore, an internet search for Colombian restaurants and businesses in the Netherlands and Paris was conducted. For the Netherlands, the three cities explored were Utrecht, Amsterdam and the Hague. Rotterdam was not included, as there were no restaurants or

businesses found online. This was done in the hopes of being able to leave survey flyers in these places of business with an explanation and link to the survey. This was done in order to contact a diversity of respondents, and specifically not necessarily politically engaged to diversify potential respondents. Unfortunately this turned out to be a fruitless approach. Therefore, from the preliminary stages of contact, snowball sampling took place mostly through student contacts. I was connected to friends, family, coworkers, and colleagues. Additionally I spoke to a Colombian researcher living in Amsterdam who shared the survey link with personal contacts and networks. This was extremely helpful and brought in a sizable number of survey respondents who are older and have lived abroad for an extended period of time. Unfortunately this was right at the end of the data collection period, which did not give me time to contact respondents willing to give an interview.

Data collection for France included several trips to Paris, to leave flyers at several Colombian restaurants and two university libraries. Unfortunately this original approach for data collection was not working and new avenues were looked into. Furthermore, I attended a talk at the institute of Latin American Studies at the (University of Sorbonne Nouvelle-Paris 3), which focused on the current state of the 2016 peace agreement implementation. From this event, two interviews were held. Of significance from attending this event was getting in contact with a currently enrolled student at this research institute who added me to several of her programs' Facebook group pages. Furthermore, I was told about Teje Paris, which is an association for young and engaged Colombians where I was able to post the survey link. Through this channel I received a decent amount of survey respondents, which accounts for the large portion of young and newly arrived migrants.

The final course of action for data collection was to stand outside voting stations for the first round of presidential elections. On May 21st, 2018 I went to Paris and stood outside the Colombian consulate to hand out survey flyers. This date was chosen, as it was a holiday and it was expected that many Colombians would take that day to vote, thus increasing the response rate. This was the most successful avenue for contacting Colombian migrants in France, both in terms of survey numbers and diversity. May 26th and 27th I was outside of the Colombian consulate in Amsterdam, as these two days were on the weekend when the majority of Colombians were expected to vote, again potentially increasing response rate. This was the most successful avenue for engaging with Colombian migrants in the Netherlands. Through brief conversations I was informed about other university's Colombian student group pages, which also turned out to be quite a successful channel. An increased diversity of respondents came as a result of this avenue of data collection. Most notably age groups, as the many Colombian students at both talks were relatively young.

As these survey responses came in quite late, in reference to the scheduled data collection period, an effort was made to contact selective respondents willing to give an interview that would diversify the existing backgrounds of interviewees. When selecting interview respondents, there was a conscious effort to follow the research framework in order to gather pertinent information for answering the central research questions. Specifically, the conceptual design was referenced in order to optimize a varied sample in terms of gender, age, origin, political

ideology, and level of engagement In particular, respondents that were not students were targeted, as they comprise the vast majority of given interviews, an inevitable and expected result of the snowball method.

4. The Case of Colombia

4.1 History of The Colombian Political Economy

The current structure of Colombia's political economy is heavily based on their history of Spanish colonial rule, which installed a political power structure that served the interests of an institutionalized elite class and exploited the rest of the poor rural populations. This inequality has produced and then further exacerbated the internal armed conflict. A small handful of families were left in positions of power and ownership of massive tracts of land. By the early 1900s, there had formed an entrenched elite agricultural class that controlled the political apparatus and enacted policies serving their own interests. This gave impetus to the creation of a new socialist movement and political party outside of the dominant two party system (Liberal and Conservative), neither of which represented the voice of the rural poor. During this period, leftist mobilizations and strikes against multinational corporations by poor farm workers emerged (Hylton, 2006). Indigenous peasant rebellion first began in 1914, followed by the rise of organised labour in 1925, which protested the capitalist enclaves of the oil and banana industries. This took place within the broader context of the greatly expanding coffee industry that emerged in the department of Antioquia. To many, this growth represented the epitome of progress and success, which earned broad support throughout the upper classes of Colombian society. The growth and power of the coffee industry and its elitist owners gave origin to a conservative political economy that prioritized strong security, order, and class distinction (social fragmentation). Part of its widespread support comes from the Catholic church that promotes a conservative ideology and corresponding policies. This is one of the major reasons why Colombia stands out as a conservative anomaly amongst the rest of Latin America, where social democracy prevailed (Hylton, 2006).

It is in this coffee region, known as the coffee axis, where peasants rose up in 1928 and began taking over land. Here, the export proletariat staged its largest strikes to date. Therefore, it was coffee capitalism under conservative rule which set the conditions for violent resistance (Hylton, 2006). Throughout the proceeding decades, clashes continued between the large landowners and smallholder peasants. What emerged was an institutionalized impunity for government-sanctioned political violence that protected the elites. The interplay of these developments led to the complete marginalization of the rural poor communities, which created a positive-sum political economy that made war beneficial (Richani, 1997).

The economic policies implemented throughout Colombia's history follow a neoliberal agenda. Policies include market liberalization, reduced tariffs, decreasing government spending, and prioritizing the role of the private sector. These policies exposed smallholder peasants to international competition, with which they could not compete with. Moreover, those able to produce cash crops for export were vulnerable to international prices. As coffee prices dropped significantly, many peasants were pushed into growing illicit crops just to sustain their livelihoods. Large-scale agri-business development for export was prioritized, supported, and subsidized by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International

Monetary Fund (IMF). This exemplifies the multi-scale nature of this conflict, where the international community and the effects of globalization have played a major role in how Colombia's political economy has developed. To properly understand the conflict, you have to go beyond Colombia's national borders and look at the greater global economic system and especially the hegemonic imperial interests of the United States.

At the national level, government rhetoric from both major political parties has unrelentingly and over a long period of time carried out smear campaigns against social leaders by portraying them solely as guerrilla terrorists. It is clear that persistent economic development policies implemented by both dominant parties manifested and sustained the conflict. What is currently going on in Colombia today, is the continuation of this conservative economic ideology and extreme class fragmentation. This social stratification among classes creates 'collective identities' upon which groups mobilize and differentiate from each other (Thomson, 2011). This political economic context sets the foundation for Thomson's (2011) argument that, contrary to popular belief that conflict impedes development (Perez 1998, 2002), capitalist development may be the real obstacle to sustainable development.

4.2 Origin Of The Colombian Conflict

The Colombian domestic armed conflict stems from extreme inequality, poverty, and political participatory exclusion in reference to peasant land rights and their affiliation to leftist/socialist political parties. Tensions between the elite large landowning class and the rural poor were increasing with expanding industrial agricultural development. The political establishment has historically implemented neoliberal policies that greatly negatively affected the subsistence livelihoods of the peasantry. There were no safeguards for the majority of small-holder farmers that produced food for domestic consumption. These farmers were slowly displaced and excluded, as policies that favoured large-scale monocropping of cash crops for export took over. It was precisely regions with high capitalist development that were most violent, creating a political economy of violence (Richani, 1997). At the same time, this caused extreme inflation in food prices, further worsening the conditions of the peasantry and their grievances (Richani, 1997). The global food regime not only undermines food security, but has also proven to undermine efforts at environmental protection (Thomson, 2011).

Despair and disillusionment was growing up until a man named Jorge Eliécer Gaitán joined the Liberal party as the first ever populist politician. He first served as education minister and labour minister before his run for presidency. Gaitán was well known for reforming Colombia towards better democracy, supporting the peasantry, and focusing on solving Colombia's major societal problems. After his assassination in 1948, the country broke out into civil war known as *La Violencia* (1948 to 1958) (Hylton, 2006). The peasantry fought the agribusiness elites for power and control of land, an issue that had always been ignored by both major political parties (Valderrama-Echavarría, 2014). In an effort to stop the violence and bring peace to Colombia, both major parties formed the National Front (*El Frente Nacional*), an agreement to consecutively rotate political power among themselves. This lasted from 1958 to 1974 (Valderrama-Echavarría, 2014). Though the violence had ceased, the National Front

consolidated political exclusion of minority voices and political parties. This political exclusion is a key factor as to why the rural peasantry took up arms as a Marxist guerrilla group in 1964. Therefore, at the heart of this conflict is a contest for political power. The more the government tried to brutally suppress this challenge to their power, the more consolidated the opposition became. Further, this period in Colombian history severely undercut any trust in the government's ability to solve societal issues (Valderrama-Echavarria, 2014). Even after the National Front was dissolved, throughout the late 1980s and 1990s the United Self-Defense Forces (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), a paramilitary and drug-trafficking group led by the Uribe government, plunged Colombia into a violent purge of all parties linked to the guerrilla insurgency. It is also salient to mention that the AUC was under the auspices of Plan Colombia, the American foreign aid and military initiative to combat the drug cartels (Hylton & Tauss, 2016). Part of Colombia's long history with political oppression is linked to US counterinsurgency policies (Thomson, 2011). US involvement and especially links to the AUC again underscore the important understanding that all parties to the conflict - Colombian military, paramilitaries, and guerrillas - have committed atrocities, some backed with US support. Going forward throughout the peace process, these interests remain. How does the Colombian diaspora in France and the Netherlands take into account this history, these interests, and their role in building peace?

4.3 History of Rural Land Reform

Land distribution has been a major issue in Colombia since its independence in the 19th century (Richani, 1997). Rural land reform in Colombia has been historically ineffective for several reasons. First, policies since the 1800s have been implemented in a partial manner. There has never been a full-scale national CRR, therefore certain regions and municipalities improved over others. Research conducted by Albertus and Kaplan (2013) found empirical evidence in support of Gurr's (1971) theory of "relative deprivation". This theory argues that privileging certain groups or regions over others exacerbates existing grievances, which galvanizes more resentment, that leads to violence. Second, rural land reform policies have been implemented in a strategically limited fashion due to heavy influence and lobbying of powerful landowners. Land reform has been part of the political agenda since independence, yet negligible changes have occurred, while many *latifundia* (great estates) have actually increased in size (Faguet et al., 2015; Richani, 1997). In regions of critical economic interest, distribution of land did not take place and instead paramilitaries were created in order to protect territory from guerrilla attacks. Agricultural policies implemented by successive governments have always favored the *latifundia* because it has been institutionalized to protect the elites, therefore these *latifundia* have never been affected (Faguet et al., 2015; Grajales, 2013). This system of highly concentrated land originated from Spanish colonization. During agrarian frontier expansion the system of *encomiendas* was established. *Encomiendas* were granted by the Spanish crown to certain colonizers, giving them land rights and rights to use the labour of indigenous populations in order to extract goods and taxes. At the same time, the crown established indigenous reservations which gave rise in certain regions to small estates known as *minifundios* (Faguet et al., 2015). In summary, empirical evidence shows that government corruption and support of the agricultural elites and paramilitaries led to an increase in violence and prolonged conflict. This is

why regions with some rural reform experience more violence than those without rural land reform policies (Albertus & Kaplan, 2013). This furthermore exemplifies the deeply entrenched nature of the political institutions supporting this model of land distribution, making it incredibly difficult to fight the long-established and protected elite interests within Colombian society. As the better share of studies have found, the livelihoods of Colombian peasants have gradually been deteriorating since the 1980s and the government has done little to alleviate their grievances. This has without a doubt contributed to the increased rates of peasants shift to the illicit market and consequently expanding the guerrilla movement (Richani, 1997; Thomson, 2011).

In the 1960s, a sizable portion of public land was transferred to private smallholders under the 1961 Land Reform Act, notably side stepping the *latifundia*. It was not until the 1990s, following amendments to the 1991 Constitution, where new land reform laws were introduced. These rural land reform policies have been characterized by Market-Led Agrarian Reform (MLAR). Since its implementation it has produced dismal results, as farm subsidies and protection from global competition were removed. Poor families were excluded, as they lacked both financial and political power. The salient issue of an imbalance of power relations between large well-connected landed elites and the poor landless peasants is one of the fundamental long-standing issues negating affective and just CRR (Borras, 2003). Insofar as neoliberal market-oriented policies have been implemented throughout Colombia's history and supported by a sizable majority of Colombian citizens, as evidenced by voting patterns, this research looks to see what model of CRR the Colombian diaspora in France and the Netherlands hopes to see implemented throughout the peace process.

4.4 Destructive Agrarian Policies

Throughout Colombia's independent history, agrarian policies have played a dominant role in land accumulation (Thomson, 2011). This is mainly due to agribusiness being one of the five major sectors of the economy (Feola, 2015). It is crucial to have a comprehensive knowledge of these agricultural policies and the many actors (stakeholders) involved to accurately understand why rural land reform has stalled and conflict to protect this accumulation has persisted. From the governance perspective, the three most salient actors are the state, communities, and corporations (de Castro, 2017). A multi-scale analytical lens is imperative to understand the various interests involved in pushing this model of agricultural development. Borras and Franco (2012) argue that issues pertaining to land grabbing need to be evaluated by looking at who are the producers, how they produce, and for which market they produce it for. It is therefore important to appreciate the weight of involved interests in order to create pragmatic policy solutions.

This trend of government subsidized agribusiness development continued and intensified throughout the 1990s. The state discourse of prioritizing 'development' has empirically led to increased marginalization and in actuality provided a sense of legitimacy to violence in critical economic regions. What is often missed in the literature is the power of narratives in framing problems and their respective solutions. Therefore, it is not just a power struggle between

actors, but also a power struggle between narratives as guiding principles. For instance, how indigenous communities will frame the problem vs. rural populations. This can be framed as market-based vs. livelihood oriented narratives. From the market-based narrative the problems facing rural communities are low technology, limited investment, inefficient market, inefficient institutions, and weak government. However from the livelihood-oriented narrative issues such as inequality, exclusion of local communities, asymmetric power relations, neoliberal policies, consumption pattern, and lack of local accountability are the fundamental issues that need to be addressed (de Castro, 2017). This disconnect flows into the conflict of interests between the redistribution of land and need for economic development as a component of the issue of CRR. This short history of Colombia's rural agrarian land reform illustrates that redistribution has never been a policy priority, and in fact has repeatedly been undermined and exploited by government policies and programs. The existing government institutions with an elite power network working within them must be dismantled and reformed in order to break from the past and usher in a system of equal access and distribution (Oxfam, 2017).

The foundational problem as to why violence has persisted in Colombia since the 1940s has been the failure of the state to justly arbitrate and resolve the agrarian question (Richani, 1997). Moving forward through the peace process, policies that focus on reducing inequality are paramount, so that the fundamental cause of the conflict can be delegitimized forever in order to create a lasting peace (Oxfam, 2017). Feola (2015) puts forth an argument for future agrarian development policies that integrate the multiple stressors affecting agricultural production: climate change, trade liberalization, and violent conflict. This is needed in order to take into account inevitable trade offs between the three policy issues, and find a comprehensive solution.

4.5 Recent Developments

In the past decade Colombia has experienced widespread rural protests by marginalized peasant farmers, indigenous communities and Afro-Colombian communities. The over 40 free trade agreements Colombia has signed have provoked extreme anger over increasing degenerative living standards. In August and September of 2013, mass protests in rural regions broke out and eventually spread to urban centers, becoming a nationwide strike. The protests started out in deeply impoverished departments where poor *campesinos*, whose livelihoods depend on their smallholder production of produce, are unable to compete with the low prices of imported foods. Then again in June of 2016, mass protests erupted against the government's' agricultural policies and failure to implement policy promises from the previous protests. These manifestations clearly demonstrate the discontent and failure of the current development model, requiring a new approach to agricultural sustainable development (Feola, 2015; Vieira & Martinez, 2013). It is significant to mention that none of these 40 free trade agreements were discussed during the peace negotiations (Hylton & Taus, 2016).

Additionally, congress has not passed the specific legislation for CRR and its implementation is now highly unlikely with the election of right-wing president elect Iván Duque. Furthermore, there is an alarming increase in targeted killings of human rights defenders, indigenous leaders,

social leaders and ex-combatants (Oxfam, 2017). The incumbent and incoming governments have publicly denied the systematic nature of these killings and claim that paramilitaries do not exist, ostensibly ignoring dangerous realities that threaten the possibility of comprehensively implementing what was negotiated in the peace agreement (Palabras al Margen, 2018).

The most important recent event was the first presidential elections since the peace agreement was signed in 2016. On June 17th, 2018, the second round of presidential elections were held and right-wing candidate Iván Duque beat out his leftist opponent Gustavo Petro. The French voter turnout was low with 5,072 votes out of 18,524 eligible, 27.38%. Of those votes, 63.08% were for Petro and 31.43% for Duque. Voter turnout for the Netherlands was extremely low with 1,098 ballots cast out of 10,019 eligible, 10.95%. Of those votes, 54.79% were for Petro and 40.82% for Duque (Registraduria, 2018). From these statistics we see a few interesting results. First is that French migrants turned out to vote in much higher numbers than the Dutch. Second, both countries show a majority vote for Petro. Notably the French results show a very strong turnout for Petro. In general, both statistics show that Colombians living abroad can play an important role in supporting left policies that support not just the peace agreement in this instance, but future support for an all-together shift in Colombian politics away from the Conservative status-quo.

4.6 Conclusion

The signing of the 2016 peace agreement was without question an historic moment in Colombian history. Despite ending the conflict, huge gaps were left in negotiations in reference to fundamental issues affecting CRR and rural community livelihoods. Contrary to previous talks held in the late 1990s, this round of negotiations did not include any significant changes to the political economy. Over the past two decades, Colombia experienced an economic opening where sweeping neoliberal policy reforms were implemented, along with the necessary institutional and legal restructuring to facilitate the elite class interests (Hylton & Tauss, 2016). The share of smallholder agricultural production for domestic consumption continues to decline with no meaningful challenges to the economic development plan that's already well on its way. The future is still unknown, but the case of Colombia looks like it continues on with business as usual.

5. Comparative Case Studies: France and the Netherlands

5.1 French History Of Migration Policy

'French nationhood is constituted by political unity, it is centrally expressed in the striving of cultural unity'. Rogers Brubaker (1992, p.1)

The French republican tradition has a history of upholding values such as equality, universalism, and secularism. This value and belief system has had a profound influence on how the native French population views immigrant integration, and particularly emphasizes the need for assimilation (Hollifield, 1994). French culture is characterized by the idea that minorities, and celebrating their differences, is not part of the French identity, rather minorities assimilate and disappear. Therefore, there isn't a need for distinct policies towards minority groups (Geddes, 2003). Any individual differences such as religion, certain cultural practices, and different languages are confined to the private sphere. Following a period of mass immigration post WWII, by the 1980s there was widespread criticism and debate about immigrants' abilities to assimilate, in particular that of Muslim communities. A characterization of immigrants as either 'good' or 'bad' was created in reference to perceived assimilability (Geddes, 2003). The issue became politicized first by the communist party, which warned that migration poses a threat to the French working class. However, it was the far-right National Front (FN) party that made the issue of immigration their party's platform. At its outset, the party was supported by a marginal proportion of the population. Overtime it increasingly gained voters and shocked the world in 2002, when their presidential candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen advanced to the second round of the presidential elections. Though he was defeated by Jacques Chirac, a clear sign and dangerous shift in French politics had occurred. The rhetoric used by Jean-Marie Le Pen was xenophobic, derogatory and nationalistic, labelling and depicting all immigrants as a threat to the French identity, as criminals, and lazy people living off of the French state. Other important factors played into Le Pen's advancement to the second round, such as left-wing fragmentation, high levels of abstention, and the fact that only 14% of the population said that they voted based on the importance of the migration issue (Marthaler, 2008). Nonetheless, moderate parties saw a notable shift in voter opinions on the immigration issue and in an effort to gain back voters who supported the FN, repositioned their stance on immigration by hardening their rhetoric and reconfigured the issue as one of law and order (Marthaler, 2008). This shift in the tide led up to drastic changes in France's institutional and legal structures under the authority of Nicolas Sarkozy. Under Chirac he was appointed the Minister of Interior and then ran his own presidential campaign in 2007. Throughout this period, Sarkozy made a notable change in France's migration policies towards the right. A new ministry of immigration was created, which consolidated the shift from a previously tacit understanding of migrants own identity in French society to now explicitly reinforcing that French values must be learned and respected (Marthaler, 2008).

Contrary to official political narratives, the French populace is ostensibly equally split on how to solve the migration issue. Tiberj (2007) found that the French population is comprised along these lines: 'multiculturalists' (10 %), 'republicans' (36%) and 'assimilationists' 46%. 'Multiculturalists' and 'republicans' are in favour of ameliorating public provisions and services in order to improve migrant integration, while 'assimilationists' wholly lay blame with migrants simply refusing to accept the French identity (Marthaler, 2008). It is interesting to note that French membership in the EU has actually imposed much less generous immigration policies, which was easily supported by Sarkozy, as it was used as a scape reasoning for his hardline stance on migration (Luedtke, 2011).

Benson (2002) analyzed France's immigration news coverage and its influence in publically framing this issue between the years 1973 and 1991. He found that media coverage throughout this period focused heavily on immigration. Its importance in framing the dominant public discourse was initially quite inconspicuous and gradually increased. The narrative started out as favorable and focused on migrant social suffering. This radically changed by 1991, where the media turned its focus on events and crises involving immigrant violence and crime. In the end, the role of the media in shaping public policy debates drastically increased. This is important to note, as major media outlets often have their own agendas and narratives to promote. It is important to remember the discrepancies between public opinion, official policy, and media when understanding issues like migration.

In terms of Colombian migration to France, France is among the top destination countries for highly qualified Colombian migrants (MPI, 2017). The Colombian immigrant population currently living in France is 111,577 (Insee, 2014).

5.2 Dutch History Of Migration Policy




Figure 2. Depicts the history of Dutch inflows and outflows of foreign nationals. Retrieved from Dustmann (1996).

Dutch culture is renowned for its multiculturalism and progressive social views (Vink, 2007). However, many scholars argue that this perception is overly cheerful and idealistic, as history and statistics show that the realities of minority communities are and were far from equal to that of the ethnically Dutch communities. Moreover, Pennings (2005) posits that the term 'multicultural' was used more so as to describe the ethnically changing Dutch population, rather than the normative connotation we ascribe to it today (Pennings, 2005). Similar to many Western European countries, immigration policy began to rise on Dutch political agendas following WWII. Immigration policy throughout this period is best characterized by a transition from a relatively naive accommodation policy, to an increasingly more demanding and integrative policy where 'multiculturalism' had begun to be viewed as outdated (Vink, 2007). Up until the 1980s, it was universally assumed that the incoming waves of migrants would be returning home at some point. After finally publicly recognizing that the vast majority of these migrants would be staying in the Netherlands, the Dutch government started to formulate a coherent policy to promote immigrant integration (Koopmans & Statham, 2014). Support for integration came from both the left and right wing, as this time period was largely defined as having a positive outlook on immigrants and respecting the hard work they've put into the country (Pennings, 2005). Prior to this watershed moment, migration discourse and policy

followed what is known as 'pillarization'. This concept refers to civic prosperity that entails a diversity of communities working alongside one another and building their livelihoods up. This concept prioritizes the respect for other cultures and identities, while at the same time encouraging their growth as equal pillars within society. This civic paradigm, in conjunction with widespread dissatisfaction and apology for past atrocities committed by the Dutch state in WWII, led to a dominant discourse in both society and politics of openness and inclusion for migrants. Reports of the numbers of Dutch Jews murdered in WWII was shocked the Dutch people, which led to a collective shame. This was compounded by exposed atrocities committed by Dutch military forces in the Colonial war against Indonesian nationalists (Pennings, 2005). To support ethnic minorities, substantial public support was given towards preserving their identities. This included subsidizing ethnic organizations, newspapers and broadcasting facilities (Koopmans & Statham, 2014). Furthermore, comprehensive multicultural policies were enacted. For instance, in 1983 a new anti-discrimination policy was underlined in article 1 of the new Dutch constitution. "All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in all circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted." (Vink, 2007, p. 341). The 1980s was a period of compassion for migrant communities and families, which espoused the issue of morality in politics when dealing and speaking about the ostensibly abrupt reality that Dutch demography has drastically changed. In an effort to protect migrants from political and social tensions, the issue was purposefully depoliticized (Pennings, 2005).

Overtime a disparity emerged between political discourses and public opinions. In the 1990s, the heartened feeling for open migration policy started to erode among native Dutch citizens, as the realities and consequences of minority community exclusion became public knowledge. The truth was that migrant communities had fallen behind and were experiencing poor living conditions, low educational attainment, and low employment levels. In 1997 a marked return to the doctrine of one nationality was established in the public sphere (Vink, 2007). However, the political sphere and discourses did not immediately mirror these changes. Public acknowledgement by virtually all Dutch political parties, save for the extreme left and rights parties, was delayed substantially. It was still widely seen as politically 'incorrect' to even question migrant's position within Dutch society, creating a sort of fake championing of 'multiculturalism' without critically analyzing potential future issues (Vink, 2007). Not until 1991 when Frits Bolkestein, the leader of the right-wing liberal party VVD, broke with tradition and culturally critiqued Islam (Pennings, 2005). From 1992 onwards, successive policies were implemented which began tightening up immigration and encompassed a shifting stance towards migrant individual responsibility for integration. By the early 2000s, public debates and criticism of previous Dutch multiculturalism policies became commonplace. A string of horrific incidents which include the murders of Pim Fortuyn, a politician critical of multiculturalism and migration and Dutch film director Theo van Gogh, who produced a film critical of the suppression of women in Islam, sparked sensitive and polarizing debates in the Netherlands (Engbersen et al., 2007). It is at this point that many believe that a dramatic switch in public opinion took place. In reality, critical debates started as far back as the 1990s. Therefore, an accurate understanding of Dutch migration history, as well political and public discourses, shows that the Netherlands has not always been an overwhelmingly 'multiculturalist' society

and that as a matter of fact, over the past three decades migration and integration policies have shifted dramatically (Engbersen et al., 2007). Pennings (2005) argues that if anyone wants to understand the seemingly sudden 'pessimistic turn', needs to take into consideration two things: (1) timing of the strong normative political correctness caused by the cultural revolution in the 1960s and (2) guilding feelings about mass deportations of Jews and Dutch war crimes.

Roggeband and Vliegthart (2007) researched the role of the Dutch media in framing the issue of Islam and migration in comparison to frames used in the political realm. Their study found that media narratives are much more hegemonic and threatening in comparison to the more pluralistic stances witnessed in parliamentary debates.

In terms of literature about migration and integration, Levitt & Jaworsky (2007) found that migrant groups living in the Netherlands, that were considered poorly integrated, were not notably more transnationally active than those groups that are well integrated.

5.3 Key Points Of Comparison and Similarity Between The Two Case Studies

In contrast to countries like Canada, Australia and the United States, European countries never perceived themselves as immigrant countries. The recent waves of migration in most European countries has been characterized and dealt with by their own contextually distinct political, social and economic backgrounds. There are many salient differences between the histories of French and Dutch migration policies, and their respective socio-cultural backgrounds. The most notable difference is that when mass waves of immigration occurred post WWII, Dutch policies acknowledged that a new face of the country had taken place, whereas French policies always focused on protecting and defending the original 'face' of the French people. Another major difference is that the Netherlands experienced a post WWII cultural revolution, characterized by empathy and morality for past atrocities, whereas France never did. Moreover, arguably the biggest aspect related to current migration issues is the role of Islam. The debates on whether Muslim ideology is compatible with Western ideology and values has been a topic of debate in France for some decades now. Conversely, even with the rise of Dutch politician Geert Wilders and his New Freedom Party, that takes an extreme stance against Muslim immigration, the consensus of the political establishment has been to largely repudiate this narrative (Vink, 2007).

One important similarity is the recent convergence in policies and discourses in both countries towards much more restricted policies. Joppke (2007) argues that the supposedly accommodating multicultural Netherlands is now pushing migrants to accept 'Dutch norms and values' with civic integration policies that are "only an inch (but still an inch!) away from the cultural assimilation that had been attributed to the French" (Joppke, 2007, p.2). Both countries have a media that exacerbates the issue, using fear mongering rhetoric that does not wholly align with public and political opinion. In sum, there is a clear convergence in immigration policies between the two case studies, but some conspicuous discrepancies remain in which remnants of Dutch multiculturalism can be seen.

6. Research Results

The following chapter presents the study's data. The results are used to answer the central and sub research questions, as well as the hypotheses.

6.1 Survey Participant Profiles

Country	Number of Surveys Completed
France	60
The Netherlands	71

Table 1. Presents the final count of surveys completed for each case.

The following variables have been calculated in order to analyze whether there are any significant discrepancies between respondents of each country.

Gender Distribution

Gender * Country Crosstabulation

		Country			
		French	Dutch	Total	
Gender	Female	Count	34	37	71
		% of Total	26,0%	28,2%	54,2%
	Male	Count	26	33	59
		% of Total	19,8%	25,2%	45,0%
	Other	Count	0	1	1
		% of Total	0,0%	0,8%	0,8%
Total	Count	60	71	131	
	% of Total	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%	

Table 2. Gender Distribution

Table 2. presents the Female to Male ratio of respondents for each country. We see that Female respondents are roughly equally distributed between cases. Male respondents for Dutch surveys are slightly higher by 5.4%. Only 1 (0.8%) respondent out of 131 chose to identify their gender as other, and therefore this sample will be excluded from further analysis. Therefore, what is seen is that gender is not significantly varied between cases.

Age Distribution

Age * Country Crosstabulation

		Country			
		French	Dutch	Total	
Age	<18	Count	1	0	1
		% of Total	0,8%	0,0%	0,8%
18 to 24	Count	29	5	34	
	% of Total	22,1%	3,8%	26,0%	
25 to 44	Count	26	58	84	
	% of Total	19,8%	44,3%	64,1%	
45 to 64	Count	2	8	10	
	% of Total	1,5%	6,1%	7,6%	
65 or older	Count	2	0	2	
	% of Total	1,5%	0,0%	1,5%	
Total	Count	60	71	131	
	% of Total	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%	

Table 3. Age Distribution

Analyzing Table 3. we see that the majority of French respondents are almost equally distributed between the ages of 18 to 24 and 25 to 44. This is quite different in comparison with Dutch responds, where the the vast majority are between the ages 25-44. From these proportions, we can see that French respondents are slightly younger than Dutch respondents.

Years Abroad




Chart 1. Years Abroad.

Analyzing Chart 1., the first thing to notice is that the overwhelming majority of French respondents have been abroad for less than a year. The exact statistics and percentages are found in Appendix C. Taken from that table are exact figures needed for analyzing the above chart. Of the total 25 respondents from both countries that have been abroad for less than a year, 72% are French and 28% Dutch. Next observing respondents for 1 year abroad, of the total 12 respondents of each country, 83.3% are French and 16.7% Dutch. For this analysis what is important to note is that 28 of 60 total French respondents, or 46.7% have been abroad for up to 1 year. The second noticeable case difference is at 2 years abroad. Of the total 21 respondents, 33.3% are French and 66.7% Dutch. Further obvious differences show that Dutch respondents represent much higher proportions in the years 5, 7 8 and 10. At 8 years abroad, out of the 8 respondents 100% are Dutch and at 10 years abroad, out of 7 respondents 6 are Dutch, or 85.7%.

A general observation of the chart shows that as years abroad increase, numbers of respondents decreases. Total of respondents 10 years abroad and over is 29 of 131, just 22.1%. And of these 29 respondents 19 are Dutch, or 65.5%. Combining these observations we see that there is a relatively significant difference in years abroad between both cases. French

respondents have been abroad for a much shorter period of time compared to Dutch respondents.

Political Participation

A proxy variable has been created to represent the general level of transnational political engagement. Each survey respondent was given a score of 0 to 12, in accordance with how many activities they checked in which they engage in. Frequency was excluded insofar as it would add a second layer of arbitrary measurement. Counting all activities as equal is already simplifying the data, not taking into account for instance whether some activities are more active rather than passive. A second step of analysis later on factors in frequency to exact the findings.




Chart 2. Crosstabulation of country and political participation.

The range is 12 which is very high, and looking at the data frequency, this is not representative of the variability within the data set and is skewed due to a few outlier numbers. Therefore, the mean is accepted as representative of the sample.

These results suggest that political participation among Colombian migrants in France and the Netherlands is moderate. The mean for France is 5 activities and 5.9 for the Netherlands. From these preliminary results, we can say that Colombian migrants living in the Netherlands are slightly more transnationally political active in comparison to Colombian migrants living in France.

Hypothesis (1): As years abroad increase, levels of transnational political activism of migrants living in France and the Netherlands increases.

To test this relationship, the Spearman's correlation variable has been selected, as data is unevenly distributed.

Correlations

			Years Abroad	Political Participation
Spearman's rho	Years Abroad	Correlation Coefficient	1,000	,213*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	,015
		N	131	131
	Political Participation	Correlation Coefficient	,213*	1,000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,015	.
		N	131	131

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The results show a correlation coefficient of 0.213, which is a small correlation. Depending on sample size, this correlation can be significant or insignificant. Therefore, we look at the P value which says that the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. The Sig (2-tailed) result of 0.15 is greater, indicating that this is not a significant correlation.

Therefore Hypothesis (1) has not been proven.

6.2 Interview Participant Profiles

Below two tables have been created. One contains each interviewee's basic information and the second shows the main themes brought up in their interview. This allows the reader to get a better sense of which migrants are political active and why, and the takeaway home messages from each interview. Identification references have been created, N represents a Colombian interviewee living in the Netherlands, and F represents a Colombian interviewee living in France.

Identification	Gender	Age	Years Abroad	Origin	Education	Voted for Peace
N1.	Male	25-44	2	Bogotá	Masters	Yes
N2.	Female	25-44	0	Bogotá	Masters	Yes
N3.	Male	18-24	17	Bogotá	High School	Yes
N4.	Male	25-44	8	Barranquilla	PhD	Yes
N5.	Male	25-44	8	Tunja	PhD	No
N6.	Female	25-44	30	Cali	Unknown	No
N7.	Female	25-44	0	Bogotá	Masters	Yes
N8.	Female	25-44	8	Bogotá	Masters	No
N9.	Male	45-64	16	Bogotá	PhD	No
F1.	Male	25-44	0	Bogotá	Masters	Yes
F2.	Male	25-44	5	Bogotá	Bachelors	Yes
F3.	Male	25-44	0	Bogotá	Licence	Yes
F4.	Female	25-44	0	Cali	Bachelors	Yes

Table 4. Basic data of all interviewees.

Identification	Transnational Political Activities - Main Themes
N1.	Uribe Continues To Have Enormous Political Power, Despite Many Issues The Peace Agreement Must Be Supported, International Community Plays A Very Important Role, Dissatisfaction With Embassy
N2.	Cultural Transformation From Violence As The Solution Is Needed, Significance of Peace Deal Is Ending The Conflict, Significance Of Peace Deal Is CRR, Reason for Migration Is Important Indicator Of Activism
N3.	Hard Integration Into Dutch Society, Fragmented Colombian Community, Ethnic Discrimination, Working Towards A Communist Future, Cosmopolitan Identity
N4.	Fragmented Colombian Community, Uribe Creates Polarization, Uribe Continues To Have Enormous Political Power, Cultural Transformation From Violence As The Solution Is Needed, Effect Of Classism, Despite Many Issues The Peace Agreement Is Positive And Must Be Supported
N5.	Colonialism Explains Many Issues of Current Political System, Fragmented Colombian Community, Politically Active Because Of Public Education, Cities Completely Unaware of Rural Communities Realities, Cultural Transformation From Violence As The Solution Is Needed, CRR Extremely Complex, Cultural Reflexivity Is Needed
N6.	Well Integrated Into Dutch Society, Personally Affected By Conflict, Fragmented Colombian Community, Political Identity Extremely Polarizing, Against Peace Because FARC Must Be Prosecuted, FARC Not Sincere About Peace
N7.	Peace Agreement Extremely Well Written And Could Be The Solution To Major Issues, Future Support Includes Passive Political Activism, No Specific Issue Peace Is A Holistic Process, CRR Extremely Complex, Never Thought Of Colombians Abroad As Important, Never Thought About The Role Of The International Community, Politically Active
N8.	Peace Agreement Awakened A Sense Of Political Importance In Migrants, Fear Of Change, Colombia Has Never Had More Than Two Parties, Strong Tradition For Religious Conservatism, Cities Completely Unaware Of Rural Community Realities, Support For Environmental Sustainable Development, Significance Of Peace Deal Is CRR, Work Experience With Affected Communities Galvanized Political Activism
N9.	Uribe Continues To Have Enormous Political Power, Uribe Crimes Overridden With Effectiveness To Weaken FARC, Colombia's History Has Made People Easy To Manipulate, Strong Tradition For Religious Conservatism, Effect Of Classism, Fragmented Colombian Community
F1.	Grass-Roots Movements Are Key Actors For Supporting Peace In Colombia, Work Experience With Affected Communities Galvanized Political Activism, Unity In Cultural Expressions, No Cultural Memory Of Colombian History, Regionalism Important For Political Identity, Despite Many Issues The Peace Agreement Is Positive And Must Be Supported
F2.	Colombia Is Two Distinct Countries - The Ultra Rich And The Ultra Poor, Weak Colombian Identity, Significance Of Peace Deal Is Transitional Justice, Deeply Emotional When Referendum Was Rejected, Migrants Have An Ethical

	Responsibility To Engage Politically, Active Support For The Peace Agreement And Implementation, Fragmented Colombian Community
F3.	Politically Engaged Because Of Public University Education, Peace Agreement Significant For Supporting Political Participation, French Not From Paris More Open, Significance Of Peace Deal Is CRR, Future Support Includes Passive Political Activism, Unintentionally Knows Many Colombians, Going Abroad Changed My Perspective Of Colombian Migrants - Now See Importance
F4.	Lack Of Critical Thinking, International Community Plays A Very Important Role, Politically Engaged Because Of Public University Education, Significance Of Peace Deal Is FARC Reintegration Into Society, Corrupt Media Influence, Push Narrative That Guerrilla's Are Enemies And Colombia's Only Problem, CRR Extremely Complex

Table 5. Main themes of each interviewee.

The following table showcases the core themes found throughout all of the interviews from both case studies. The number of sources and references indicate frequency and density.

	Major Themes	Sources	References
1.	Fragmented Colombian Community	10	76
2.	Despite Many Issues The Peace Agreement Is Positive And Must Be Supported	10	32
3.	Politically Engaged Because Of Pubic University Education	9	22
4.	Cities Completely Unaware Of Rural Communities' Realities	9	22
5.	Future Support Includes Passive Political Activism	8	20
6.	Cultural Transformation From Violence As The Solution Is Needed	7	43
7.	Corrupt Media Influence	7	27
8.	Lack Of Critical Thinking	7	16
9.	International Community Has An Unimportant Role	7	16
10.	Significance Of Peace Deal Is CRR	7	15
11.	Returning Back To Colombia To Reinvest In The Country	7	10
12.	Strong Tradition For Religious Conservatism	6	24
13.	International Community Plays A Very Important Role	6	19
14.	Major Issue In Colombian Society Is Poor Education	6	13
15.	Active Support For The Peace Agreement And Implementation	6	11
16.	Differentiated Reception - Integrated Into International Groups Rather Than Native	6	9
17.	Significance of Peace Deal Is Ending The Conflict	6	7
18.	CRR Extremely Complex	5	29
19.	Uribe Continues To Have Enormous Political Power	5	17
20.	Gap Between Old Generations That Don't Want Change And New Generations Pushing For Change	5	12
21.	End Of Conflict Brings Root Issues To Surface	5	11
22.	Migrants Have An Ethical Responsibility To Engage Politically	5	8

Table 6. Major themes.

Overlap between some themes does exist but has been strategically left separate, as they represent in themselves important themes that have discrepant meanings for explaining issues and/or reasoning for certain Colombian societal circumstances. The first important ones to mention are the themes 'Lack of critical thinking', 'Corrupt media influence', and 'Major issue in Colombian society is poor education.' These themes are all interrelated, however the education system in Colombia is one of the main political platforms in which major party candidates run on, and one that is a deciding voter factor. The fact that this issue of education was brought up by nearly half of all interview respondents, 6 of 13, furthermore shows its importance. This issue is also a major contributor for a public that lacks critical thinking, which is also hampered by the extremely corrupt media that promulgates one polarizing narrative. Critical thinking is furthermore a major theme in itself insofar as it is part of a cultural way of thinking, where you are taught in Colombia not to think about things too much or retrospectively analyze, but to just forget and move forward. This important aspect that flows into the issue of 'lack of critical thinking' outside of education warrants its separation. Furthermore, the major theme of 'corrupt media influence' also has aspects of institutionalized power that fall into the themes 'Despite Many Issues The Peace Agreement Is Positive And Must Be Supported' and 'Uribe Continues To Have Enormous Political Power'. The overarching issue of oligarchic power and its many ways of protecting its interests includes controlling the media. Nonetheless, the theme has been selected in response to interview respondents who highlighted this issue in particular as a fundamental reason for creating polarization in Colombian society, misunderstanding, fear and hate of the left. Its effects are so pernicious to a healthy functioning society that this issue in particular needs to be mentioned in order to properly understand the culture and functioning of Colombian society.

This table has been created in order to ensure that there are no extreme discrepancies between survey response variables and interview response variables.

	Survey	Interview
1. Number of Respondents	131	13
2. French Respondents	60 (45.8%)	4 (30.8%)
3. Dutch Respondents	71 (54.2%)	9 (69.2%)
3. Gender	F (54.2%) M (45%) O (0.8%)	F (38.5%) M (61.5%)
4. Age	<18 (0.8%), 18 to 24 (26%), 25-44 (64.1%), 45-64 (7.6%), 65 or older (1.5%)	18-24 (11%), 25-44 (84.6%)
5. Years Abroad (Mean)	6.174	7.23
6. Education Level	B (42%) M (44.3%) PhD (6.1%)	B (15.4%) M (38.5%) PhD (23.1%)

Table 7. Quantitative and qualitative data comparison.

*Gender: F= Female, M= Male, O= Other.

*Education Level: B= Bachelors, M= Masters, PhD= PhD

Table 7. shows that there is a significant difference in a few variables. The % of Dutch interviews is quite a bit higher, as well as the % Male interviewees. Furthermore, the age group is slightly higher and the proportion of interviewees with a PhD degree is significantly higher than that of survey respondents. This information is critical to keep in mind going forward in answering the research questions and hypotheses.

6.3 Central Research Question 1:

Are Colombian migrants living in France and the Netherlands transnationally politically active?

A country comparison has been calculated with all transnational political activities. Red font has been used to highlight the activities where a frequency higher than rare is included in order to reach the 80% respondent threshold.

Campaigns	Largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 91 (69.5%) respondents, 49.5% French and 50.5% Dutch. Second largest proportion is <i>rare</i> with 19 (14.5%) respondents, 52.6% French and 47.4% Dutch.
Voting	Largest proportion is <i>very often</i> with 45 (34.4%) respondents, 37.8% French and 62.2% Dutch. Second largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 34 (26%) respondents, 61.8% French and 38.2% Dutch. Third largest proportion is <i>rare</i> with 22 (16.8%) respondents, 45.5% French and 54.4% Dutch. Fourth largest proportion is <i>often</i> 11 (8.4%) respondents, 36.4% French and 63.6% Dutch.
Remittances	Largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 82 (62.6%) respondents, 59.8% French and 40.2% Dutch. Second and third largest proportions are tied with <i>rare</i> with 15 (11.5%) respondents, 33.3% French and 66.7% Dutch and <i>often</i> with 15 (6.9%) respondents, 13.3% French and 86.7% Dutch.
Lobbying	Largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 99 (75.6%) respondents, 48.5% French and 51.5% Dutch. Second largest proportion is <i>rare</i> with 13 (9.9%) respondents, 46.2% French and 53.8% Dutch.
Running for Office	Largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 116 (88.5%) respondents, 44% French and 56% Dutch. Second largest proportion is <i>rare</i> with 7 (5.3%) respondents, 57.1% French and 42.9% Dutch.
Attending meetings	Largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 81 (61.8%) of respondents, 48.1% French and 51.9% Dutch. Second largest proportion is <i>rare</i> with 23 (17.6%) of respondents, 39.1% French and 60.9% Dutch.
Civil Society Organization Affiliation	Largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 96 (73.3%) respondents, 44.8% French and 55.2% Dutch. Second largest proportion is <i>rare</i> with 15 (11.5%) respondents, 53.3% French and 46.7% Dutch.
Giving talks	Largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 90 (68.7%) respondents, 50% French and

	50% Dutch. Second largest proportion is <i>rare</i> with 20 (15.3%) respondents, 25% French and 75% Dutch.
Donations to civil society organizations	Largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 84 (64.1%) of respondents, 52.4% French and 47.6% Dutch. Second largest proportion is <i>rare</i> with 26 (19.8%) respondents, 38.5% French and 61.5% Dutch.
Signing petitions	Largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 46 (35.1%) respondents, 58.7% French and 41.3% Dutch. The second largest proportion is <i>rare</i> with 35 (26.7%) of respondents, 42.9% French and 51.7% Dutch. The third largest proportion is <i>sometimes</i> with 28 (21.4%) of respondents, 35.7% French and 64.3% Dutch.
Handing out leaflets	Largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 111 (84.7%) respondents, 45.9% French and 54.1% Dutch. Second largest proportion is <i>rare</i> with 12 (9.2%) respondents, 50% French and 50% Dutch.
Social media	Largest proportion is <i>never</i> with 35 (26.7%) respondents, 62.9% French and 37.1% Dutch. Second largest proportion is <i>sometimes</i> with 32 (24.4%) respondents, 37.5% French and 62.5% Dutch. Third largest proportion is <i>very often</i> with 23 (17.6%) respondents, 39.1% French and 60.9% Dutch. Fourth largest proportion is <i>rare</i> with 21(16%) respondents, 38.1% French and 61.9% Dutch.

Table 8. Transnational Political Activity Frequencies.

These results indicate that voting, posting on social media, signing petitions and sending remittances are engaged in at least sometimes. Voting is distinguished from all other activities, as the most frequently engaged in, with the highest proportion of respondents falling into the category *very often*. Furthermore, variability is much more dispersed, therefore the activity has a higher proportion of migrants engaging in various degrees. Country distribution is very unequal, as Dutch respondents represent a much higher proportion compared to French respondents.

The second most frequently engaged in activity is posting on social media. This is the only activity where the second largest proportion of respondents was not the frequency *rare* but *sometimes*. This proportion represents almost a quarter of total respondents, which is relatively significant. What is more, the third largest proportion, which is 17.6%, engages *very often*. Again variability is more dispersed and country distribution is quite unequal. Dutch respondents compromise a much larger share in both frequencies of *sometimes* and *very often*.

The third most frequently engaged in activity is signing petitions with a little over 20% of respondents engaging *sometimes*. Again, Dutch respondents represent a much larger share than the French.

The fourth most engaged in activity is sending remittances. Only about 7% of respondents engage *sometimes* and following the above pattern, Dutch respondents overwhelmingly comprise this proportion.

The remaining activities, which are: Campaigns, lobbying, running for office, attending meetings, civil society organization affiliation, giving talks, donations to civil society organizations and handing out leaflets all have at least 60% of respondents never engaging. The least engaged in activities are lobbying, running for office, civil society organization affiliation, and handing out leaflets with over 75% of respondents never engaging.

In conclusion, Colombian migrant transnational in France and the Netherlands was found to be low. Colombian migrants living in the Netherlands are substantially more engaged, averaging around 25% higher participation in voting, posting on social media and signing petitions. For remittances, this discrepancy jumps to 73%.

Hypothesis (2): A pervasive sense of disillusionment with Colombian state authority and legitimacy hinders transnational political activities of migrants living in France and the Netherlands.

In order to test Hypothesis 2, it is necessary to analyze what interviewee respondents said about their political activism and which factors affect their engagement/disengagement. Throughout the interviews, questions were asked about the individual's history of political activism, underlying reasons explaining their behaviour, general perceptions, and future plans. Questions were also asked about the 2016 peace agreement to see whether it had galvanized political activism, insofar as it presents a break from the past.

Dutch Interviews

	History	Reasoning	2016 Peace Agreement
1.	Actively politically engaged.	Personal characteristics.	Historic moment, incredibly important to protect, no explicit statement of change in activism.
2.	Actively politically engaged.	Education and career in transitional justice.	One of the main reasons for going and doing a Masters.
3.	Actively politically engaged.	Shocked by the state of Colombia in comparison to the Netherlands.	Didn't change much, became extremely political shortly before.
4.	Not active, just spoke with friends.	Not explicitly stated.	Became politically active because of it.
5.	Very actively politically engaged.	Education and rural surroundings.	Not explicitly stated.
6.	Not active, just has a big opinion.	Not explicitly stated.	Totally against it, just shares opinions online.
7.	Not active, just talked about it.	Not explicitly stated.	Became politically active because of it, unique opportunity.
8.	Not active.	Didn't care, it's always the same.	Became politically active because of it, unique opportunity.
9.	Actively politically engaged.	Career and research.	Not explicitly stated.

Table 9. History of political activism of Dutch interviews.

French Interviews

	History	Reasoning	2016 Peace Agreement
1.	Actively politically engaged.	Public University environment .	Continuation of active engagement in specific referendum activities.
2.	Actively politically engaged.	Not explicitly stated.	Less engaged abroad because it's more complicated.
3.	Moderate political engagement.	Not explicitly stated.	Didn't change but gave a new horizon, doesn't know much about the agreement itself.
4.	Actively politically engaged.	Public University environment.	Became more politically active because of it, unique opportunity.

Table 10. History of political activism of French interviewees.

Analyzing Tables 9 and 10, we see that in total 4 respondents were moved to become more politically active because of the unique opportunity of the peace agreement. However only 1

responden twas truly moved from disillusionment and disengagement to active political engagement.

“...So umm... so that’s why now I’m more politically involved because I understand more and I really see why this can be different and that’s why I was never involved before. Because to me, it was a little bit always the same. Yeah...” (Dutch Interview 9, 2018).

These results, which are specifically analyzing a pervasive sense of disillusionment, show that the vast majority of respondents (11) were not disillusioned prior to the peace agreement. Dutch Interviewee 6 is not being counted, as she did not provide sufficient information about her history of political activism.

Survey Responses

Political Activity	Number of Respondents who became activity due to the peace agreement (% of total respondents)
Campaigns	2 (1.5%)
Remittances	1 (0.76%)
Running For Office	2 (1.5%)
Voting	3 (2.29%)
Lobbying	2 (1.5%)
Civil Society Organization	1 (0.76%)
Giving Talks	1 (0.76%)
Signing Petitions	3 (2.29%)
Leaflets	1 (0.76%)
Social Media	1 (0.76%)
Donations To Civil Society Organizations	0
Attending Meetings	0

Tabel 11. Transnational political activities galvanized due to the 2016 peace agreement.

Of 131 responses, 19 (14.5%) chose at least one activity in which they started to participate in because of the 2016 peace agreement. This is significantly lower than the 31% of interviewees. Therefore, interviewees’ perspectives of the peace agreement can be assumed to be more positive and more engaged than the average survey respondent.

Further analyzing the qualitative data, many main themes brought up by respondents explain their views as to why the general Colombian population does not find the 2016 peace agreement important enough for them to become engaged in its support and/or implementation.

“Cities Completely Unaware Of Rural Communities Realities” is a theme that was used to describe the low voter turnout for the referendum. This theme was sourced from 9 respondents and referenced 22 times. Interviewees describe people living in the cities as completely detached from rural realities, what they know of the conflict is what they see on the television. Three respondents became politically active only after work experience took them into the rural regions where they came face to face with the consequences of the conflict. This is an important theme for future sustainable development, first building a common understanding of the conflict could bring a major shift in everyday discourse and voting.

“...I think that’s why people were so hesitant in the city with the plebiscite for instance. Because I think people didn’t have like, more objective eyes to see how the peace agreement will bring like real change. Not to them! This is not for the city, it’s for people who is actually in the countryside. You know the people who, sorry, had to flee had to you know like, who lost their families. The women who lost their kids, their boys and their husbands.” (Dutch Interview 9, 2018).

A second major theme that is a factor is “Corrupt Media Influence” that was sourced from 7 respondents and referenced 27 times. The power of the media pushing an anti-left narrative and using polarizing rhetoric, specifically in reference to the guerrillas, has had an enormous detrimental influence on how the general population perceives the conflict. This issue is tied to the institutionalized elite class that controls the government, media, and *latifundios*. In essence what they have been able to create is a common enemy in which the people rally behind and blame for all of Colombia's issues.

“Mais, mais tu sais que les gens par exemple, mais tu sais quelque chose, parce que les masse médias, ils ont construit une récit très... très fermé (aussi de ?) de conflit armé et ils ont dit tout le temps, l’ennemi c’est les guérillas, les problèmes de pays c’est les FARC, il n’existe pas d’autres choses. Tout le temps ils disent comme ça, les guérillas c’est le problème.” (French Interview 1, 2018).³

The last major theme is “Lack of critical thinking” that was sourced from 7 respondents and referenced 15 times. This theme is also many-sided and complex. Issues such as emotionally based convictions that are hard to change using reason, the huge amount of people who did not read the agreement but voted, and the effects of poverty. Living in a sense of survival mode does not give you the time to sit back and reflect critically, when you are concerned about food and shelter. In this life situation, people look for the easiest and fastest solution to their problems.

³ “But, but you know that the people for example, but you know something, because the mass media, they have created a narrative very... very closed (also about?) the armed conflict, and they have always said that the enemy are the guerrillas, the problems of the country are the FARC, there is nothing else that exists. All the time they say this, the guerrillas are the problem” (French Interview 1, 2018).

“They don’t have time, many many working people don’t have time to getting critically to what’s happening so they just go on what their emotions, looking for a solution and many times it’s the right wing parties that are very clear with their solution.” (Dutch Interview 3, 2018).

Many respondents also spoke at length describing their opinions of what has to happen in order to see a societal change in Colombia. They stressed the importance of understanding context and history that has created a certain culture that has lived violence, understands violence, and essentially cannot understand itself as a non-violent country. This leads to the theme “Cultural Transformation From Violence As The Solution Is Needed” which was sourced from 7 respondents and referenced 43 times. It has a sub theme called “Cultural Reflexivity Is Needed” which was sourced from 3 respondents and referenced 12 times. This is quite a complex theme, with many interacting variables that in the end have created in Colombia a culture that does not reflect on the past, does not value a diversity of opinions and perspectives, and has learned a hardened sense of living where ‘an eye for an eye’ is the justified solution to wrong doing.

“I think that there is another part that we are not really... ugh or the state or government is not really taking into consideration. And that is that you need to work with these generations that were raised with the conflict, the conflict was part of...for us violence was the answer. You know? So... if ah I don’t know if there was a problem or the state was not present in some parts so, um.. an armed group just came there and imposed the law. And the people at some point, or not understood so that that was the only possibility.” (Dutch Interview 4, 2018).

Many factors such as prolonged conflict and poverty add to this culture. In order to heal and move forward, reflexivity is needed at both the individual and societal levels.

“We actually, the way we learned to deal with the life is that, if something happens to you, you close it and you carry on. And we have different popular says (sayings) about that, right. ni passo atrás, ni paraxi impulso ? You are always moving forward, so that’s our cultural understanding of life in which thinking or reflexivity is not available.”(Dutch Interview 5, 2018).

The second aspect of Hypothesis 2 looks at state authority and legitimacy, i.e. corruption. This section outlines how interviewees perceive issues of long term corruption, their personal opinions about it, and their future political plans. All interviewees spoke about corruption in various forms, as well as systemic issues plaguing Colombian society. Despite all these problems, interviewees overwhelmingly spoke about the need for change and having a rational optimistic expectation for the future. They know that change does not come over night and that there is an extraordinary amount of work that needs to be done. However, there is hope and optimism for the future. These sentiments have been aggregated into the second highest ranked theme “Despite Many Issues The Peace Agreement Is Positive And Must Be Supported”, mentioned by 10 respondents and referenced 32 times.

“And that was it. But since I, I have this educational background in law ah and my social lives is, surrounded by people who is engaged with politics I have been study and now I am more involved in that sense. That doesn’t mean that I want to get involved in the political life in

Colombia because I think it's super corrupt and difficult, so yeah that's something that I really don't want to know. But, yeah I try to, try to get more education about it and to read more and to ah vote for people who can bring change and development to the country." (Dutch Interview 2, 2018)

"We cannot change everything in just one moment you know and we still have to deal with a lot of things. You know there are some small guerrilla groups still, there are a lot of drug groups you know what would be called terrorist groups or something like that but yeah they have business just from cocaine and they are fighting with other groups to have, to control over the places where the cocaine is planted or something like that. So we need to deal with it, so there are many reasons ah many things to do but I am still positive." (Dutch Interview 4, 2018).

The results of this research have disproved Hypothesis 2.

In conclusion, Colombian migrants living in France and the Netherlands do not feel a pervasive sense of disillusionment that hinders transnational political activism. Moreover, the peace agreement was not a significant event in which transnational political activism was galvanized.

Hypothesis (3): A deep rooted fragmented Colombian identity hinders the mobilization of 'narrow' transnational political activities of migrants living in France and the Netherlands.

The quantitative part of Hypothesis 3 has been proven. 'Narrow' transnational political activities include campaigns, lobbying, running for office, and civil society organization affiliation. The proportion of respondents who engage in these activities on a regular basis is marginal, as has been proven answering central research question 1.

Further analysis has been done to see whether factors such as age, gender and years abroad have an influence on engagement with 'narrow' transnational activities. Tables have been created to show the proportion of respondents of each variable's categorization that are at least rarely engaged.

Age And 'Narrow' Political Activity

Age Group	% of Total Respondents	Campaigns	Lobbying	Running For Office	Civil Society Organizations
<18	0.8%(1)	0%(0)	0%(0)	0%(0)	0%(0)
18 -24	26.2%(34)	7.7%(3)	14.3%(4)	27.3%(3)	15.63%(5)
25-44	64.1%(84)	76.9%(30)	67.9%(19)	45.5%(5)	68.75%(22)
46-64	7.6%(10)	12.8%(5)	14.3%(4)	27.3%(3)	12.5%(4)
65 or older	1.5%(2)	2.6%(1)	3.6%(1)	0%(0)	3.1%(1)

Table 12. 'Narrow' political activities by age group.

Table 12. shows that the most active age group for 'narrow' political activities is 25 - 44.

Gender And 'Narrow' Political Activity

Gender	% of Total Respondents	Campaigns	Lobbying	Running for Office	Civil Society Organizations
Female	54.2%(71)	41%(16)	32.1%(9)	36.4%(4)	40.6%(13)
Male	45%(59)	56.4%(22)	67.9%(19)	63.6%(7)	59.4%(19)

Table 13. 'Narrow' political activities by gender.

Table 13. shows that Males are more active than females in 'narrow' transnational political activities.

Years Abroad And 'Narrow' Political Activity

Years Abroad	% of Total Respondents	Campaigns	Lobbying	Running for Office	Civil Society Organizations
0-2	45%(59)	38.5%(15)	32.1%(9)	36.4%(4)	37.5%(12)
3-5	16%(21)	12.8%(5)	17.9%(5)	27.3%(3)	18.8%(6)
6-10	22.1%(29)	23.1%(9)	17.9%(5)	0%(0)	21.9%(7)
11-20	10.7%(14)	15.4%(6)	14.3%(4)	9.1%(1)	9.4%(3)
21 and over	6.1%(8)	5.1%(4)	17.9%(5)	27.3%(3)	12.5%(4)

Table 14. 'Narrow' political activities by years abroad grouped.

Analyzing Table 14. we see that respondents abroad between 0-2 years have the highest proportion of engagement in 'narrow' transnational political activities.

These results show that of the marginal percentage of respondents who participate in 'narrow' transnational political activities, the most engaged are male, between the ages of 25-44, and have been abroad for 0-2 years.

To test the qualitative aspect of Hypothesis 3, major themes are presented to test whether a fragmented Colombian identity exists.

The main theme "Fragmented Colombian Community" was expressed in 10 interviews and referenced 79 times. This theme is the highest ranked theme from all the interviews and it was expressed with many important sub themes. These include: culture of being taken advantage of, distrust, drug-trafficking stigma, effect of classism, ethnic discrimination, extreme inequality, lack of community events, political identity extremely polarizing, prolonged conflict affects collective thinking, Uribe creates polarization, and weak Colombian identity. Of these subgroups, 8 respondents spoke about the effects of extreme inequality as the root cause for a fragmented society. One quote has been selected by a Dutch interviewee who is 43 years old and has been living in the Netherlands for 30 years. As many interviews were conducted with students having been abroad for only a short period of time, this gives a perspective of the naturalized Colombian community in the Netherlands.

"...So that is, the Colombian people they are very devised you know?... It's ah but I think because there are a lot of rich and poor and the contrast is really big so you you, I don't think people is gonna change." (Dutch Interview 6, 2018).

Most interviewees spoke about the Colombian identity in Colombia being fragmented. Where appropriate, a follow up question asked whether this pattern of fragmentation has been exported abroad. A Colombian Dutch interviewee who has moved to the Netherlands for study, has been here for almost 4 years, and integrated into the Colombian society by joining a folklore dance group, gave this response when asked about cohesiveness.

" Ahhh...not really. Not really, I... I think that we keep many things from our culture and it's to make judgments of people and make decisions. I mean... we are like I don't know this guy looks like this so I rather not talk, get in touch with him EVEN if I don't know the guy.... Yeah that's (our core?) and this is... this is one of the social effects of the imbalance, the economical imbalance in the country. You know, now it's less but I think 65% of the population lives more or less in poverty and from this 65% around 10% live in really low level of poverty. It has improved compared like 10 or 15 years ago, but because this difference it's also imposed but in many ways you know. It's this social discrimination, if you dress like this it's probably because you are really poor and then if you're poor then you're a thief or something like that, you know? It's just an automatic social discrimination so... and the people still do it here." (Dutch Interview 4, 2018).

What is notable in this response is that the interviewee describes the effects of inequality as imposed in many ways. This highlights the pervasiveness of inequality and its influence on how Colombians interact with each other in a myriad of circumstances.

The second most sourced sub theme is “Political Identity Extremely Polarizing” which is sourced from 5 interviews and referenced 10 times. This is explained as a cultural issue where different ideas and opinions are not taught to be respected. It can be said that politics in general is an emotional subject in all cultures. However, interviewees expressed how political confrontations can be extremely heated and could turn violent. A Colombian French interviewee who has been abroad for less than a year explains this volatile political culture and its appropriation and manifestations in France.

“Mais il y a aussi un discours très de confrontations tout le temps, des polarisations en Colombie. Et ici, (en temps ?) de Colombiens... plus tôt c'est moins évident mais il y a quand même il y a des confrontations sûr tout dans les domaines politiques il y a des confrontations, le pouvoir sur les Facebooks... il y a quelques questions, il y a quelques personnes qui partages ugh des nouvelles politique ou quelque chose comme ça et les autres personnes ils commencent à discuter un petit peu sur les Facebooks. Mais quand même, je crois que le plus important pour la diaspora Colombien ici c'est les expressions culturelles, ça peut-être ça approche plus les personnes parce que dans les domaines mêmes politiques il y a beaucoup des divisions.” (French Interview 1, 2018).

The qualitative data results show that there is indeed a deep rooted fragmented community.

In conclusion, a deep rooted fragmented Colombian society in both France and the Netherlands was confirmed. Though the original hypothesis used the word ‘identity’, the meanings can be understood as the same insofar as deep seated fragmentation results in group identities. Insofar as ‘narrow’ transnational political activities are institutionalized and require regularized commitment, its assumed that a strong and cohesive community is a prerequisite to ‘narrow’ transnational political engagement. Therefore, it is assumed that this fragmentation is one of the main reasons for low ‘narrow’ transnational political activism.

6.4 Central Research Question 2:

Who engages in transnational political activities? and who does not?

Respondents that do not at least engage in one transnational political activity have been excluded. This results in 122 survey respondents. Based off of the data presented in the analysis of transnational political engagement, factors such as gender, age, and years abroad are applied to activities that were found to be at least sometimes engaged in in a meaningful proportion, i.e. voting, posting on social media, signing petitions, and sending remittances.

Gender

Voting

	Female	Male
Very Often	44.4% (20)	53.3% (24)
Never	67.6% (16)	32.4% (9)
Rare	54.5% (12)	45.5% (10)
Often	54.5%(6)	45.5%(5)

Remittances

	Female	Male
Never	59.8% (49)	40.2% (33)
Rare	46.7% (7)	53.3% (8)
Often	53.3% (2)	40% (4)

Signing Petitions

	Female	Male
Never	47.8% (22)	52.2%(24)
Rare	62.9% (22)	37.1% (13)
Sometimes	57.1% (16)	42.9% (12)

Social Media

	Female	Male
Never	54.3% (19)	45.7% (16)
Sometimes	65.6% (21)	34.4% (11)
Very Often	39.1% (9)	60.9% (14)
Rare	47.6% (10)	47.6% (10)

Table 15. Engaged in transnational political activities by gender.

Analyzing Table 15. above, gender is not found to be a significant factor. One thing that is slightly notable is for the activity 'signing petitions' the frequencies of *rare* and *sometimes* are moderately more represented by females.

Age

Voting

	<18	18 to 24	25 to 44	45 to 64	65 or older
Very Often	0% (0)	17.8% (8)	75.6% (34)	4.4% (2)	2.2% (1)
Never	2.9% (1)	35.3% (12)	52.9% (18)	8.8% (3)	0% (0)
Rare	0% (0)	45.5% (10)	54.5% (12)	0% (0)	0% (0)
Often	0% (0)	9.1% (1)	81.8% (9)	0% (0)	9.1% (1)

Remittances

	<18	18 to 24	25 to 44	45 to 64	65 or older
Never	1.2% (1)	40.2% (33)	52.4% (43)	3.7% (3)	2.4% (2)
Rare	0% (0)	6.7% (1)	80% (12)	13.3% (2)	0% (0)
Often	0% (0)	0% (0)	80% (12)	20% (3)	0% (0)

Signing Petitions

	<18	18 to 24	25 to 44	45 to 64	65 or older
Never	2.2% (1)	37% (17)	54.3% (25)	4.3% (2)	2.2% (1)
Rare	0% (0)	25.7% (9)	65.7% (23)	8.6% (3)	0% (0)
Sometimes	0% (0)	25% (7)	71.4% (20)	3.6% (1)	0% (0)

Social Media

	<18	18 to 24	25 to 44	45 to 64	65 or older
Never	0% (0)	28.6% (10)	62.9% (22)	2.9% (1)	5.7% (2)
Sometimes	0% (0)	31.3% (10)	59.4% (19)	9.4% (3)	0% (0)
Very Often	4.3% (1)	21.7% (5)	60.9% (14)	13% (3)	0% (0)
Rare	0% (0)	28.6% (8)	66.7% (14)	4.8% (1)	0% (0)

Table 16. Engaged in transnational political activities by age group.

Analyzing Table 16., it is clear that the age group 25 to 44 is the most engaged.

Years Abroad

Voting

	0-2	3-5	6-10	11-20	21 and over
Very Often	46.7% (21)	20% (9)	22.2% (10)	7.7% (3)	4.4% (2)
Never	47.1% (16)	8.8% (3)	20.6% (7)	17.6% (6)	5.9% (2)
Rare	50% (11)	18.2% (4)	22.7% (5)	9.1% (2)	0% (0)
Often	36.4% (4)	27.3% (3)	18.2% (2)	0% (0)	18.2% (2)

Remittances

	0-2	3-5	6-10	11-20	21 and over
Never	58.5% (48)	15.9% (13)	13.4% (11)	7.36% (6)	4.9% (4)
Rare	13.3% (2)	20% (3)	33.3% (5)	26.7% (4)	6.7% (1)
Often	20% (3)	20% (3)	33.3% (5)	6.7% (1)	20% (3)

Signing Petitions

	0-2	3-5	6-10	11-20	21 and over
Never	56.5% (26)	6.5% (3)	23.9% (11)	6.5% (3)	6.5% (3)
Rare	37.1% (13)	25.7% (9)	22.9% (8)	8.6% (3)	5.7% (2)
Sometimes	46.4% (13)	17.9% (5)	21.4% (6)	10.7% (3)	3.6% (1)

Social Media

	0-2	3-5	6-10	11-20	21 and over
Never	37.1% (13)	14.3% (5)	31.4% (11)	8.6% (3)	8.6% (3)
Sometimes	43.8% (14)	18.8% (6)	25% (8)	9.4% (3)	3.1% (1)
Very Often	56.5% (13)	8.7% (2)	17.4% (4)	8.7% (2)	8.7% (2)
Rare	52.4% (11)	23.8% (5)	4.8% (1)	14.3% (3)	4.8% (1)

Table 17. Engaged in transnational political activities by years abroad.

Analyzing Table 17., the majority of respondents that vote have been abroad between 0 - 2 years. Remittances do not show any distinct patterns. Signing petitions is also an activity mostly engaged by those who have been abroad between 0 - 2 years. Finally, analyzing social media

engagement, a pattern can be seen where the majority of respondents fall between the years 0 - 2. In summary, the results show that engagement is highest among migrants abroad between 0 - 2 years, except for remittances that are more evenly distributed between the years 0 - 10. One thing that also stands out when looking at these tables, is the category 11 – 20 years abroad, which scores very low across the board.

In conclusion, the results for the second central research question show that migrants who engage are those who are between the ages 25-44 and have been abroad for up to 2 years. Gender was found to be an insignificant factor.

Disengaged Migrant Profiles

In total 9 survey respondents do not engage in any political activities.

France

	Gender	Age	Years Abroad	Education	Origin	Ethnicity
1.	Female	25-44	12	Masters	Bogotá (Cundinamarca)	Mestizo
2.	Female	25-44	9	Bachelors	Peru (Lalibertard)	Indigenous
3.	Female	25-44	18	PhD	Bogotá (Cundinamarca)	Mestizo
4.	Female	18-24	10	Bachelors	Bogotá (Cundinamarca)	Mestizo
5.	Female	45-64	30	Masters	Socorro (Santander)	Mestizo
6.	Female	25-44	0	Licence	Bogotá (Cundinamarca)	Mestizo
7.	Female	18-24	0	Bachelors	Bucaramanga (Santander)	Mestizo

Table 18. Disengaged French survey respondents.

The Netherlands

	Gender	Age	Years Abroad	Education	Origin	Ethnicity
1.	Male	25-44	10	PhD	Florencia (Caquetá)	Mestizo
2.	Male	25-44	8	Masters	Bogotá (Cundinamarca)	Mestizo

Table 19. Disengaged Dutch survey respondents.

Analyzing these two tables, a pattern of female migrants (78%) between the ages of 25-44 (67%), who have been abroad for a relatively long period of time (over five years and most likely settled into their new life), are highly educated (100%), have an urban background, and are ethnically Mestizo (89%). This sample is very small, therefore these results cannot be generalized for either communities. What is significant is that 78% are female, whereas gender was not found to be a significant factor for engaged respondents.

6.5 Central Research Question 3:

Which factors influence engagement?

As the main focus of this study is the 2016 peace agreement and analyzing whether Colombian migrants living in France and the Netherlands played a role in it's support and implementation, an in-depth understanding of migrant opinions of the 2016 peace agreement was explored. Interviewee perceptions of themselves, their role, and their reasons for engagement was asked in the interviews. It is first important to note the theme "Returning Back To Colombia To Reinvest In The Country" which was sourced from 7 respondents and referenced 10 times. Of 13 interviews, 9 have gone abroad to study and 1 to gain work experience. Of these 10, 7 were certain at the time of the interview of going back to Colombia, insofar as their intentions for going abroad were to increase their capacity to bring change to Colombia.

"So...yeah it's quite difficult but then my personal opinion is that well, Colombia is not going to change if we all stay abroad and don't come back and try to make an effort to change the things there. So it's going to be difficult in my opinion ah, it's...we need a lot of generations to really improve our academic system or social um conditions. But still I think we need to do it, we need to try and that way well, from small changes we will see at the end a big change but otherwise it's difficult. So that's why I always think to come back to Colombia." (French Interview 4, 2018).

"So, I feel proud and I feel happy to see other people, other lawyers that are studying abroad and they are having the capacity and the knowledge that we need in order to go back to our country and work for I don't know the judicial system or truth commissions, or seek for reparation." (Dutch Interview 2, 2018).

"Ehhh yes, actually when I start to study that was always like my, one of my goals to go back to Colombia because there are many things to do, and especially when it is related to education so if I can do something about it...I would love to." (Dutch Interview 4, 2018).

Three quotes have been chosen to really highlight the intentions and passion of Colombian migrant student opinions gathered in this study. It is critical to make clear that these opinions represent a very specific group of migrants that have gone abroad as part of their already existent political activism in their home country of Colombia.

The following factors are on a more personal scale, which looks more in-depth as to why political activism is something the interviewee finds important and chooses to engage.

The theme “Politically Engaged Because Of Public University Education” is the most cited factor, sourced from 9 interviews and referenced 22 times. This factor was brought up in the interviews unprompted when asked about personal backgrounds and history with political activism. Prior to conducting this research, the variable ‘public education’ was not found in the literature. Interviewees explained that due to high costs of private university, many Colombian students only have the option of going to public university. This diversity of student origin is a factor which produces an atmosphere critical of politics and necessarily comprises a diversity of opinions. Many interviewees mentioned that this is historically the case, as leftist movements have notoriously come out of public universities. A French interviewee explains his experience at a public university and its influence on him.

“Mais après quand j’ai commencé à étudier à l’université, je m’engagé beaucoup à propos de conflit armé, de victimes, de conflit armé bon de il y a, dans l’université il y a un endroit plus différent pour discuter pour connaître les situations politiques du pays.” (French Interview 1, 2018).⁴

The second most cited factor influencing engagement is categorized under the theme “Politically Active Because Of Personal Characteristic”, sourced from 4 interviews and referenced 5 times. This theme has been cited significantly less in reference to the first one, but nonetheless presents a more holistic understanding of interview results. Within this theme, characteristics such as personal proclivities for careers related to conflict, and individual reasons and intentions for migration, are included.

A main part of this research also aimed to understand if migrants supported the peace agreement, which issues did they find important within the agreement, and how important is it for them to see the implementation of this specific chapter of the agreement.

The theme “Significance Of Peace Deal Is CRR” is the most frequently mentioned foundational issue, sourced from 7 respondents and referenced 15 times. Many responses were qualified with more than just the importance of land redistribution. Issues pertaining to CRR such as *campesino* empowerment, equal development among urban and rural regions, improvement of public services such as healthcare, education, and land productivity support were included. This main theme corresponds to the theme “CRR Extremely Complex”, sourced from 5 respondents and referenced 29 times. Therefore the majority of respondents who spoke about the issue of CRR also spoke at length about the complexity of actually implementing it.

“And people is trying to just go back because like in 2006 I guess there was the law and justice stuff, like the first, there were several laws that tried to just um how do you say that? Tried to... just give a second chance to the people affected by the conflict in that time. So there was like several institutions and agencies, one of this is like ummm eh Unidad de Tierras or land agency and they tried to just GO and give back to the people the land that was like take off. But several

⁴ “ But after when I started to study at university, I engaged in a lot about the armed conflict, victims, the armed conflict well there is, in the university there is a context that is much different for discussions to know the political situations of the country” (French Interview 1, 2018).

people that has tried to just go back to home has been AGAIN displaced because more, not more but several of that kind of land are also used for illegal bands or I... also this is another problem that it is, there is also a drug trafficking issue and they also affects the lands redistribution so, yeah.” (Dutch Interview 7, 2018).

The second most frequently mentioned issue was the theme “Significance Of Peace Deal is Ending The Conflict” sourced from 6 respondents and referenced 7 times. It is not surprising that actually ending this long-term conflict itself and finally having peace was extremely important.

Another one of the main goals of this research was to understand the aspect of identity and whether the peace agreement had galvanized a sense of diaspora, or put more precisely, invigorated a sense of Colombian community. 6 of the interviewees were Colombian students having been abroad for only a short period of time, and therefore it did not make sense to ask about their identities. Of the 7 interviewees that had been abroad for at least four years, the theme “cosmopolitan identity” was sourced in 4 interviews and referenced 12 times. Of the other 3 interviewees, 2 felt strongly Colombian and 1 did not specify. As “cosmopolitan identity” was the major theme, a quote is provided that elaborates one interviewees’ experience of going abroad and its impact on his identity.

“Ah...no. And the reason for that is that um, at some point when I was living in Colombia I was absolutely yeah Colombian in many cultural senses, but since I left and I’ve been living in different places and I have been connected to different people from different parts of the world, my identity and the way I perceive myself has also changed. So I’m not looking for people that have the same origin in terms of geographical terms, I’m looking for people that I connect in intellectual or love or friendship ways...”(Dutch Interview 5, 2018).

In conclusion, this study found that the most influential factors for transnational political activism are having prior attendance at a Colombian public university and individual personal characteristics. In terms of engagement with the peace process, the issues of CRR and ending the conflict were found to be most significant.

Hypothesis (4): A small minority of Colombian migrants in France and the Netherlands, with higher education and high-class status, participate in ‘narrow’ transnational political activities.

Hypothesis 4 cannot be tested using the study’s results, as all but one respondent had completed a Bachelor’s degree or higher. Furthermore, a question about status was not included in the survey.

7. Discussion

The results for the first central research question found that Colombian migrants living in France and the Netherlands have low transnational political engagement. These findings confirm existing knowledge found in the existing body of literature that has found Colombian communities abroad to be politically apathetic and disengaged (Bouvier, 2007; Guarnizo & Díaz, 1999; Guarnizo et al., 1999, 2003; Jones-Correa, 1998; Guarnizo et al., 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Portes, 2002; Portes et al., 2008; Waldinger, 2008). The findings of this research further substantiate the argument that a new class of ‘transmigrants’ does not exist.

The tested influence of the factor ‘years abroad’ was answered in Hypothese (1), which hypothesized that migrants who were abroad for longer engaged more than those who recently arrived. This was not proven and in fact the opposite was found, where migrants who have been abroad for only a very short period of time, 0 to 2 years, were most active. However, this can largely be explained by the specific group of respondents. As the snowball sampling method was used from original Colombian student contacts, it is pretty well assumed that the majority of these respondents have gone abroad to study instead of experiencing a permanent move. As found in the literature (Bermúdez Torres 2006; Sokefeld 2006) relocating your entire life requires a lot more effort and time to settle down and sort out urgent matters, which prevents engagement in the initial period of migration. Therefore, these conclusions do not add or disprove findings in the literature, and are more suited in understanding particularly how do Colombian students abroad engage during their short period out of the country.

Hypothesis (2), which hypothesized that a sense of disillusionment with the Colombian state and authority was a major reason for migrant disengagement. This was not proven, and in fact the opposite was found. Colombian migrants spoke at length about the many issues Colombia deals with, including widespread government corruption, the mass media, and the institutionalized power concentrated in the hands of a few families. Nevertheless, these respondents were not disillusioned but felt the need to be part of an incremental yet important change to improve the country. Another aspect related to hypothesis (2) and formulated as a subquestion, was to see whether the 2016 peace agreement had galvanized political engagement, as research by Bermúdez (2016) found that Colombian migrants living in London became more active with civil society organizations connected to peace building. The findings of this research do not substantiate her findings. Rather, they showed marginal changes in engagement as a result of the peace agreement. Therefore, it is recommended that further research is conducted to better understand the influence of the peace agreement on Colombian diaspora transnational political engagement.

Both aspects of hypothesis (3) were proven, which hypothesized that a deeply fragmented Colombian community hindered ‘narrow’ transnational political engagement. This finding therefore substantiates existing research about fragmentation (Bermúdez 2016; Collier, 2004; Galeano Rodriguez 2018; Valderrama-Echavarría, 2014) and low engagement in ‘narrow’ political activities (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The existing body of literature explains that one of

the major factors leading to low political engagement is due to a fragmented society, which suffers from divisions of deep mistrust, polarized political opinions, and stigma of the drug trade (Bermúdez, 2010, 2011, 2016; Galeano Rodriguez, 2018; Valderrama-Echavarría 2014). What knowledge these findings do add to existing research is that within mostly the spheres of rather young Colombian students abroad, the specific variable causing fragmentation is extreme inequality (8 respondents), substantiating research done by Collier (2004). This issue is exported abroad amongst Colombian students, and is a conspicuous aspect that defines their identity. This is quite expected considering that deep inequality creates extremely different livelihoods that become separate in almost every respect.

The second central research question looked at who engages and who does not. The results of this study found that gender is an insignificant factor, substantiating findings of Guarnizo, Portes and Haller (2003). Bermúdez (2016) found that women disproportionately sent more remittances back home in comparison to men, which was not found in this study. As Bermúdez (2016) stressed that class, race, and ethnicity should be considered simultaneously as gender, future research specifically looking at gender and these factors will better scrutinize the influence of this variable. The age group of 25-44 was the most engaged. The variable of age is not included in the current body of literature and deserves future research attention in order to test the validity of this study's findings. Origin was not tested, as a fair amount of ambiguity would be involved in demarcating urban versus rural origins. However, of the top 6 largest cities in Colombia, with over 1 million inhabitants, 100 (76%) respondents originated from these cities. These cities include: Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Bucaramanga (Worldatlas, 2017). What can be said from these results, is that Colombian migrants coming from major urban cities have low transnational politically engaged.

The third central research question looked at factors affecting engagement. This study found that the most significant factor was 'Politically Engaged Because of Public University Education'. This is a novel finding and a very significant one due to the proportion of interviewees who mentioned it, and the sheer volume of references that serve as a proxy indicator for how strongly an interviewee feels about the subject. As most literature focuses on testing education from a standpoint of level of attainment (Guarnizo et al., 2003; Torres et al., 2014) the differentiation between public and private university is not yet a factor tested within the literature. Due to many factors such as unequal access for rich and poor, the difference in education is salient and therefore it is within reason that this variable results in different engagement levels abroad. It is highly recommended that future research about transnational political activism tests the variable education using the differentiation 'public or private' university. The second most cited factor is 'Returning Back To Colombia To Reinvest In The Country' which substantiates the findings from Guarnizo Portes and Haller (2003), who found that migrants who are expected to return to Colombia are significantly more likely to maintain transnational political linkages. It is important to note that this was true at the time and as Bermúdez (2016) and Galeano Rodriguez (2018) found, students often migrate with the intention of going back home but many end up staying. This is true in particular with women who find relationships. In summary, these two factors are part of the wider theoretical debate about whether mobilization happens because of individual characteristics, contextual embeddedness, or social network theory (Guarnizo et al.,

2003). Part of this study looked at aspects related to social network theory that focuses on the “political contexts, resources that are available, and cultural aspects such as identity and values and beliefs that have an influence on people becoming involved in social movements” (Lodder, 2017, p.15). Insofar as the study of transnationalism is relatively new, this theoretical debate is still very much unsettled. The findings of this research support the classical theories of the roles of individual factors, as well social network theory. The two main factors of ‘public university education’ and ‘returning back to Colombia to reinvest’ give support to both and are not mutually exclusive, although more weight must be given to the individual characteristic. This factor of public education gives rise to specific values and beliefs that support becoming transnationally politically engaged. Future research is needed to confirm these initial findings.

Another important factor affecting level of engagement is the sub theme ‘Land Reform Extremely Sensitive Topic’. This has been highlighted because many interviewees spoke about what they theoretically would like to see happen in rural regions, but know that this is an extremely tough subject to even discuss. There are mentions of looking at the recent string of murders of social and environmental leaders that show the dark realities attached to the issue of land reappropriation. The money and power involved makes this subject incredibly controversial for any politician to attack head on.

“I think that has to be changed but unfortunately after the ahh...the agreement, the leader, the social leaders that are working on this part have been killed, you know? And that shows how difficult or how sensitive is this topic.” (Dutch Interview 4, 2018).

This sub theme is very important to qualify the main theme ‘CRR Extremely Complex’ because even though the issue of CRR was mentioned as the most important, when it comes time to talk about the conflict and political leanings, it almost seems like interviewees know that this subject at this time is simply out of bounds. Therefore, there is definitely an awareness of the root issues, but in reality going up against these powerful interests is almost impossible and having this understanding, from my perspective from sitting with the interviewees, turned them off from making this issue a politically determinant factor. Other issues are prioritized simply because they are seen as more attainable and incremental changes are at least possible.

The findings of this research support Bermúdez (2016) findings that migrants are mostly keeping themselves informed about politics in Colombia, without actively getting involved. 8 interview respondents referenced the major theme of ‘Future Support Includes Passive Political Activism’. When respondents were asked how they plan to continue their support for the peace process, the majority started off by stating that they will stay up to date and informed about what is going on, speaking with their friends and family, and continuing to keep the subject alive. Furthermore, interview results from this study found that 7 respondents said that ‘The International Community Has An Unimportant Role’. This major theme has one sub theme that was referenced by 6 respondents who said they ‘Never Thought About Colombians Abroad As Important’. This indicates that there is an issue of perception, where their role and power being abroad is not harnessed because it is seen as unimportant. Bermúdez (2016) found that some respondents believed the diaspora should play a role. This can partly explain why all these

initiatives and programs the Colombian government has created are not utilized by migrant communities. This aspect about migrants perceptions of themselves and their potential influence as communities abroad has only been explored by one study. This factor definitely deserves more attention in future research to corroborate findings in Bermúdez (2016) and this study.

The major theme of “Cultural Transformation from Violence As The Solution Is Needed” is not an aspect discussed in the literature. In fact, issues such as societal trauma, or cultural behaviours born out of an environment of long-term conflict that obstruct cohesion and dialogue, are not factors that are researched. The literature focuses more on surface factors that contribute to disengagement and disillusionment with the Colombian state and factors causing fragmentation. However, major underlying factors affecting a strong Colombian identity and how to resolve this issue to increase migrant engagement, is not currently part of literature researching Colombian transnational political engagement. This study’s findings show that these issues are certainly important for Colombian migrants living in France and the Netherlands. Solving this issue is fundamental for solving extreme polarization, which is needed to foster community building. If Colombians start to practice individual and social reflexivity, their perspective and understanding of Colombia will start to change from overly simplified views of good versus evil, that widely characterizes Colombian society today.

Finally, the approach for this entire study was to compare the two case studies of France and the Netherlands and to see whether a difference exists between an assimilationist host country and a multiculturalist host country. Without being able to make any causal claims, the results of this study did in fact follow this line of reasoning and found that Colombian migrants living in the Netherlands are significantly more engaged than in France. This is however contradicted by the voting statistics that showed that 16.43% more Colombian migrants voted in France than Colombian migrants living in the Netherlands. However, in overall engagement of all 12 tested political activities, Dutch migrants were notably more engaged. It is interesting to note that, although this is anecdotal evidence, two Colombian migrants outside of the Colombian consulate in Paris, who each had lived in France for over 10 years, spoke of the need to assimilate into French society as a sign of respect. Unfortunately, no Colombian migrants permanently living in France gave an interview where these perceptions and sentiments could have been corroborated.

In terms of the potential influence diaspora transnational political activity can have on home country conflict resolution, Zunzar (2004) argues that diaspora communities can have a neutralizing impact. Though not actually part of this study, the results of the first round of presidential elections showed Fajardo with 23.73% of the vote, just defeated by Petro to go to the second round. However, the results from France and the Netherlands show that Fajardo was their clear choice with 50.79% and 58.57% respectively (Registraduria, 2018). What can be surmised from these results is that both communities favored the more neutral candidate that avoided polarizing rhetoric and instead focused on uniting the country and improving education. With this knowledge, the potential moderating influence of these migrant communities by continuing to participate in other transnational political activities, especially lobbying and

supporting civil society organizations, could have a mitigating influence on conflict resolution in Colombia.

8. Conclusions

This study set out to understand what role, if any, does the Colombian diaspora in France and the Netherlands play in governing sustainable rural development within the context of the 2016 peace agreement and peace process. Two case studies were chosen in order to test whether host country context influences engagement. The study was guided by three central research questions:

Central Research Questions: Are Colombian migrants living in France and the Netherlands transnationally politically active? Who engages in these activities and who does not? Which factors influence engagement?

A mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods were used in order to answer these questions. Specifically surveys and in-depth semi-structured interviews were held with respondents. The main findings for each question is as follows;

Central Research Question 1 found that Colombian migrants living in France and the Netherlands have low transnational political engagement. Of the 12 tested activities, only voting, signing petitions, posting on social media, and sending remittances are engaged in at least sometimes by a moderate portion of the migrant population. Comparing the two case studies, Dutch Colombian migrants are found to be significantly more engaged than Colombian migrants living in France. Roughly 25% more Colombian Dutch respondents engage in each of these activities, excluding the activity of sending remittances with a difference of over 70%. Possible influential variables such as age, gender and years abroad were analyzed to ensure that major discrepancies between the two cases do not exist, which would have led to an overly skewed comparison. Age and years abroad were found to be notably different. Colombian French respondents are slightly younger and have been abroad for a significantly shorter period of time. This can be a major contributing factor for why results for remittances are so divergent, as a major proportion of French respondents are most likely students and are not working.

The main findings for Central Research Question 2 found that migrants who have been abroad between 0-2 years and between the ages 25-44 were found to be the most engaged. Gender was found to be an insignificant variable. Of the 131 survey, 9 respondents were completely disengaged.

The main finding for Central Research Question 3 found that the most significant factor influencing engagement is having prior education at a public university. This aspect of education is yet to be analyzed in the existing body of literature.

Furthermore, 4 hypotheses were tested. The most significant findings from these hypotheses are that the Colombian communities in both case studies are deeply fragmented. However,

unlike many other studies, the issue of disillusionment with the Colombian state was not found to be significant. The opposite was found, where respondents spoke rationally and optimistically about what can be achieved in the future. These are opinions of interviewees who were all transnationally political engaged and therefore do not represent the vast majority of survey respondents who hardly engage.

This study found that the peace agreement had very little impact on engagement. To conclude, these results first and foremost lack generalizability due to limitations of the snowball method that resulted in a mostly student demographic having been abroad for a limited period of time. Therefore, in particular reference to central research question 3 about influential factors for engagement, these results must be considered in reference to the young and engaged student communities primarily living in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, these results present some interesting and important findings. Of particular significance is that the peace agreement and peace process did not lead to an inspired mobilization and subsequent engagement in transnational political activism. Not only did Colombia finally end a 52 year long civil conflict, but the world also experienced the end of its longest ever running domestic armed conflict. This achievement is so monumental for all human beings, but as the UNDP makes clear, in order for sustainable peace to be achieved 'the journey must always be led by its own people' (Martínez-Solimán & Fernández-Taranco, 2017).

9. Limitations and Recommendations

The results of this study come with several important limitations. One of the most salient limitations stems from the reality that migrants who have a proclivity towards transnational political activities are the ones that are most willing to first of all take the time to fill out a survey on the subject, and second to take time out of their life to give an interview. This subject to them is important and therefore they are willing and happy to share their opinions. Those who are politically disengaged and/or removed from the Colombian community are harder to reach and furthermore are less inclined to take time out of their lives to participate in a study about a subject that they are not passionate about.

A further limitation of generalizability is in the number of respondents for both surveys and interviews. The data is sufficient for an analysis, but not large enough to make any general statements about Colombian migrant communities in France or the Netherlands. Especially the qualitative data must be understood as being representative of a very specific group of Colombian migrants, i.e. students abroad for only a short period of time and are expected to return back to Colombia and are active in their academic communities, which often host talks, seminars, documentary viewings and other political events. Their perceptions in regards to Colombian culture and general social and political viewpoints could be shared with other Colombian groups, but this has not been proven. Furthermore, this group differs greatly from much of the literature that focuses on groups such as refugees, undocumented migrants, and economic and labor migrants. Therefore, comparing the qualitative data results to literature must be cautiously interpreted. However, survey data is more representative of the general migrant populations due to quantity, as well as diversity.

Other minor limitations, or rather pertinent information to keep in mind, is that coding of qualitative analyses requires individual interpretation. It is impossible to claim full neutrality as human beings naturally have their own set of values and opinions that filter into their perceptions. However Madden (2010) argues that this type of analysis in actuality increases value to the data and enriches the research story, rather than diminishing it or distorting it. Identifying patterns and discrepancies provides a way to understand why this phenomenon has come to fruition in the first place and gives it meaning (Saldaña, 2015). Another factor to keep in mind, as Shaw (2010) highlights, is that the opinions gathered from transcripts reflect the individual's feelings and perceptions at that moment in time, called situated embeddedness "to understand people's experiences at a particular point in history, a particular time in their life, in [their] social, cultural, political and economic context" (Saldaña, 2016 p. 178). People's opinions grow and evolve and particularly for research about diaspora engagement, as has been shown in these results, the experience of living abroad has an impact on identity and perceptions. Therefore, it is important to note that these results reflect a particular time frame and context.

As of yet, there is no empirical evidence that proves that economic or political transnationalism is passed down intergenerationally. In fact, research conducted in the United States shows a significant drop in transnationalism of second-generation immigrants due to rapid acculturation (Portes, 2002). This is an important part of diaspora building and it is recommended that future

research be done to investigate whether Colombians abroad put focus on instilling a Colombian identity in their children.

Additionally, there are limitations in the structuring of this research, i.e. the choice to use country cases. These contexts are defined at the national scale and research has shown culture and history are significant factors for migrant embeddedness (Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007). However, there are studies that have shown that developments and factors going on at the global, as well as local scales, also play a role in influencing the transnational social arenas where ideas, values, opinions, norms and economic capital are exchanged. For instance, scholars of migrant research in Europe have found that the relation between size and significance of a city matter. These are important factors for the creation of transnational social spaces. Therefore, place-specific contexts for transnational social activities matter (Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007). Global and local scales have not been included, which is an important limitation to this study's findings. Feelings of integration vary greatly within a national context. Be that as it may, the national scale remains significant and many scholars argue that though transnationalism is on the rise, the power and influence of "state policies, philosophies of integration, citizenship regimes, and cultural context matter." (Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007).

Délano and Gamlen (2014) highlight the need for future research to include a differentiation between groups included in policies and those excluded, and how does that influence their engagement with transnational activities. There are hierarchies found within all groups. This aspect has not been included in this research, but due to extreme classism it would be interesting to test transnational political activism using this framework.

All in all, this research is meaningful because even though current research shows that the proportion of migrants participating in regular transnational political activism is low, the spread of globalization and the use of cheap communication technologies and transportation is making it easier and easier (Portes, 2002). Future generations will be elevated to more easily continue links on a regular basis, which will certainly have an impact on state relations, how we view citizenship identity, and the concept of democracy (Levitt & Khgram, 2008). Therefore this is a quickly evolving phenomenon and its impact is as of yet unknown.

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Appendix

Appendix A. Transnational Political Activity Frequencies

Campaigns * Country Crosstabulation

		Country			
			French	Dutch	Total
Campaigns	Not selected	Count	0	1	1
		% within Campaigns	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Never	Count	45	46	91
		% within Campaigns	49,5%	50,5%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	10	9	19
		% within Campaigns	52,6%	47,4%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	1	5	6
		% within Campaigns	16,7%	83,3%	100,0%
	Often	Count	4	5	9
		% within Campaigns	44,4%	55,6%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	0	3	3
		% within Campaigns	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Peace agreement only	Count	0	2	2
		% within Campaigns	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Total		Count	60	71	131
		% within Campaigns	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%

Voting * Country Crosstabulation

		Country			
			French	Dutch	Total
Voting	Never	Count	21	13	34
		% within Voting	61,8%	38,2%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	10	12	22
		% within Voting	45,5%	54,5%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	3	3	6
		% within Voting	50,0%	50,0%	100,0%
	Often	Count	4	7	11
		% within Voting	36,4%	63,6%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	17	28	45
		% within Voting	37,8%	62,2%	100,0%
	Peace agreement only	Count	4	6	10
		% within Voting	40,0%	60,0%	100,0%
	Very often since peace agreement	Count	1	2	3
		% within Voting	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
Total		Count	60	71	131
		% within Voting	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%

Remittances * Country Crosstabulation

			Country		Total
			French	Dutch	
Remittances	Not selected	Count	0	3	3
		% within Remittances	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Never	Count	49	33	82
		% within Remittances	59,8%	40,2%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	5	10	15
		% within Remittances	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	2	7	9
		% within Remittances	22,2%	77,8%	100,0%
	Often	Count	2	13	15
		% within Remittances	13,3%	86,7%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	2	4	6
		% within Remittances	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
	Peace agreement only	Count	0	1	1
		% within Remittances	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Total	Count	60	71	131
		% within Remittances	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%

Lobbying * Country Crosstabulation

			Country		Total
			French	Dutch	
Lobbying	Not selected	Count	2	2	4
		% within Lobbying	50,0%	50,0%	100,0%
	Never	Count	48	51	99
		% within Lobbying	48,5%	51,5%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	6	7	13
		% within Lobbying	46,2%	53,8%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	1	5	6
		% within Lobbying	16,7%	83,3%	100,0%
	Often	Count	2	2	4
		% within Lobbying	50,0%	50,0%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	0	3	3
		% within Lobbying	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Peace agreement only	Count	1	1	2
		% within Lobbying	50,0%	50,0%	100,0%
	Total	Count	60	71	131
		% within Lobbying	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%

Running for Office * Country Crosstabulation

		Country		Total	
		French	Dutch		
Running for Office	Not selected	Count	3	1	4
		% within Running for Office	75,0%	25,0%	100,0%
	Never	Count	51	65	116
		% within Running for Office	44,0%	56,0%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	4	3	7
		% within Running for Office	57,1%	42,9%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	0	2	2
		% within Running for Office	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	2	0	2
		% within Running for Office	100,0%	0,0%	100,0%
	Total	Count	60	71	131
		% within Running for Office	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%

Attending Meetings * Country Crosstabulation

		Country		Total	
		French	Dutch		
Attending Meetings	Not selected	Count	2	1	3
		% within Attending Meetings	66,7%	33,3%	100,0%
	Never	Count	39	42	81
		% within Attending Meetings	48,1%	51,9%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	9	14	23
		% within Attending Meetings	39,1%	60,9%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	7	8	15
		% within Attending Meetings	46,7%	53,3%	100,0%
	Often	Count	1	2	3
		% within Attending Meetings	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	2	4	6
		% within Attending Meetings	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
	Total	Count	60	71	131
		% within Attending Meetings	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%

Civil Society Organizations * Country Crosstabulation

			Country		Total
			French	Dutch	
Civil Society Organizations	Not selected	Count	1	2	3
		% within Civil Society Organizations	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
	Never	Count	43	53	96
		% within Civil Society Organizations	44,8%	55,2%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	8	7	15
		% within Civil Society Organizations	53,3%	46,7%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	2	5	7
		% within Civil Society Organizations	28,6%	71,4%	100,0%
	Often	Count	3	1	4
		% within Civil Society Organizations	75,0%	25,0%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	2	3	5
		% within Civil Society Organizations	40,0%	60,0%	100,0%
	Peace agreement only	Count	1	0	1
		% within Civil Society Organizations	100,0%	0,0%	100,0%
Total	Count	60	71	131	
	% within Civil Society Organizations	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%	

Giving Talks * Country Crosstabulation

			Country		Total
			French	Dutch	
Giving Talks	Not selected	Count	1	2	3
		% within Giving Talks	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
	Never	Count	45	45	90
		% within Giving Talks	50,0%	50,0%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	5	15	20
		% within Giving Talks	25,0%	75,0%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	3	6	9
		% within Giving Talks	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
	Often	Count	2	1	3
		% within Giving Talks	66,7%	33,3%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	3	2	5
		% within Giving Talks	60,0%	40,0%	100,0%
	Peace agreement only	Count	1	0	1
		% within Giving Talks	100,0%	0,0%	100,0%
Total	Count	60	71	131	
	% within Giving Talks	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%	

Donations To Civ Soc Orgs In Colombia * Country Crosstabulation

			Country		Total
			French	Dutch	
Donations To Civ Soc Orgs In Colombia	Not selected	Count	2	1	3
		% within Donations To Civ Soc Orgs In Colombia	66,7%	33,3%	100,0%
	Never	Count	44	40	84
		% within Donations To Civ Soc Orgs In Colombia	52,4%	47,6%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	10	16	26
		% within Donations To Civ Soc Orgs In Colombia	38,5%	61,5%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	4	8	12
		% within Donations To Civ Soc Orgs In Colombia	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
	Often	Count	0	5	5
		% within Donations To Civ Soc Orgs In Colombia	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	0	1	1
		% within Donations To Civ Soc Orgs In Colombia	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Total	Count	60	71	131
		% within Donations To Civ Soc Orgs In Colombia	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%

Signing Petitions * Country Crosstabulation

			Country		Total
			French	Dutch	
Signing Petitions	Not selected	Count	0	2	2
		% within Signing Petitions	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Never	Count	27	19	46
		% within Signing Petitions	58,7%	41,3%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	15	20	35
		% within Signing Petitions	42,9%	57,1%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	10	18	28
		% within Signing Petitions	35,7%	64,3%	100,0%
	Often	Count	4	6	10
		% within Signing Petitions	40,0%	60,0%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	4	3	7
		% within Signing Petitions	57,1%	42,9%	100,0%
	Peace agreement only	Count	0	3	3
		% within Signing Petitions	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Total	Count	60	71	131
		% within Signing Petitions	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%

Leaflets * Country Crosstabulation

		Country		Total	
		French	Dutch		
Leaflets	Not selected	Count	1	3	4
		% within Leaflets	25,0%	75,0%	100,0%
	Never	Count	51	60	111
		% within Leaflets	45,9%	54,1%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	6	6	12
		% within Leaflets	50,0%	50,0%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	0	1	1
		% within Leaflets	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Often	Count	1	0	1
		% within Leaflets	100,0%	0,0%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	1	0	1
		% within Leaflets	100,0%	0,0%	100,0%
	Peace agreement only	Count	0	1	1
		% within Leaflets	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Total		Count	60	71	131
		% within Leaflets	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%

Social Media * Country Crosstabulation

		Country		Total	
		French	Dutch		
Social Media	Not selected	Count	0	1	1
		% within Social Media	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Never	Count	22	13	35
		% within Social Media	62,9%	37,1%	100,0%
	Rare	Count	8	13	21
		% within Social Media	38,1%	61,9%	100,0%
	Sometimes	Count	12	20	32
		% within Social Media	37,5%	62,5%	100,0%
	Often	Count	7	9	16
		% within Social Media	43,8%	56,3%	100,0%
	Very often	Count	9	14	23
		% within Social Media	39,1%	60,9%	100,0%
	Peace agreement only	Count	1	1	2
		% within Social Media	50,0%	50,0%	100,0%
	Very Often because of the peace agreement	Count	1	0	1
		% within Social Media	100,0%	0,0%	100,0%
Total		Count	60	71	131
		% within Social Media	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%

Appendix B. Proxy Indicator For Political Participation.

Political Participation * Country Crosstabulation

		Country		Total	
		French	Dutch		
Political Participation	0	Count	7	2	9
		% of Total	5,3%	1,5%	6,9%
	1	Count	7	2	9
		% of Total	5,3%	1,5%	6,9%
	2	Count	8	7	15
		% of Total	6,1%	5,3%	11,5%
	3	Count	8	11	19
		% of Total	6,1%	8,4%	14,5%
	4	Count	10	11	21
		% of Total	7,6%	8,4%	16,0%
	5	Count	6	13	19
		% of Total	4,6%	9,9%	14,5%
	6	Count	6	10	16
		% of Total	4,6%	7,6%	12,2%
	7	Count	1	4	5
		% of Total	0,8%	3,1%	3,8%
	8	Count	3	3	6
		% of Total	2,3%	2,3%	4,6%
	9	Count	3	3	6
		% of Total	2,3%	2,3%	4,6%
	10	Count	0	4	4
		% of Total	0,0%	3,1%	3,1%
	12	Count	1	1	2
		% of Total	0,8%	0,8%	1,5%
Total		Count	60	71	131
		% of Total	45,8%	54,2%	100,0%

Appendix C. Data For Years Abroad.

Years Abroad * Country Crosstabulation

		Country			
		French	Dutch	Total	
Years Abroad	,0	Count	18	7	25
		% within Years Abroad	72,0%	28,0%	100,0%
1,0		Count	10	2	12
		% within Years Abroad	83,3%	16,7%	100,0%
1,8		Count	0	1	1
		% within Years Abroad	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
2,0		Count	7	14	21
		% within Years Abroad	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
3,0		Count	4	5	9
		% within Years Abroad	44,4%	55,6%	100,0%
3,5		Count	0	1	1
		% within Years Abroad	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
4,0		Count	3	2	5
		% within Years Abroad	60,0%	40,0%	100,0%
5,0		Count	2	4	6
		% within Years Abroad	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
6,0		Count	3	3	6
		% within Years Abroad	50,0%	50,0%	100,0%
7,0		Count	1	5	6
		% within Years Abroad	16,7%	83,3%	100,0%
8,0		Count	0	8	8
		% within Years Abroad	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
9,0		Count	1	0	1
		% within Years Abroad	100,0%	0,0%	100,0%

Appendix D. Copy Of English Version Of Survey.

Copy of Colombian Migrants

Colombian Migrant Engagement With The 2016 Peace Process.

Dear participant,

This survey has been created in order to collect data for a Sustainable Development Masters thesis research project at Utrecht University. The aim of this research is to better understand which Colombian migrants participates in transnational political activities. This study particularly looks to understand how involved Colombian migrants are in the 2016 peace process and which factors motivate participation. Information gathered from this research will be added to existing knowledge about Colombian diaspora transnational linkages, as well as community relations in the host country.

All data collected will remain confidential and anonymous. Documents will be stored in a secure folder and remain with the researcher at all times Your contribution is greatly appreciated.

Best Wishes,

Olena Wrzesnewskyj-Cottrell
Sustainable Development Masters Student
Utrecht University
The Netherlands

1. How do you identify your Gender?

- Male
 Female
 Other

2. What is your age?

- <18
 18 to 24
 25 to 44
 45 to 64
 65 or older

3. How many years have you been abroad? (Please write 0 if less than 1 year)

4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

5. What region are you originally from in Colombia?

City

Department

6. What is your ethnic background?

- Mestizo and White
- Indigenous
- Afro-Colombian
- Romani
- Other (please specify)

7. Did you vote in the 2016 peace agreement referendum?

- Yes
- No

8. Do you participate in transnational political activities? Please indicate your frequency.

Transnational political activities encompass forms of political participation or social activism that Colombians living abroad conduct in relation to Colombia.

When choosing to categorize your activity durability, if your engagement has been initiated by the peace agreement, please check both "peace agreement" as well as your corresponding durability classification (never, rare, sometimes, etc.)

Below, each transnational political activity is outlined.

1. Transnational election campaigns - working for, volunteering, helping out just once with election campaigns taking place abroad for Colombian elections.
2. Voting - refers to both congressional and presidential elections in Colombia (does not include voting for the 2016 peace referendum).
3. Sending Remittances - sending money back home.
4. Lobbying - actively putting pressure on host country government in an effort to influence policies towards Colombia.
5. Running for Office - running as a Colombian congressional candidate.
6. Attending Meetings - refers broadly to any gatherings where Colombian politics, economics, social issues, etc. are the topic of discussion.

7. Civil society organization affiliation - participating in and being a member of a civil society organization with a goal of helping Colombian citizens politically, economically, socially, etc.
8. Giving Talks - refers to speaking to any crowd size about topics pertaining to Colombian politics, social movements, economic developments, etc.
9. Signing petitions - the signing of petitions in reference to the 2016 peace agreement and peace process.
10. Handing out leaflets - refers to handing out information to the Colombian diaspora (or everyone??).
11. Social Media - actively engaging with other Colombian citizens and migrants by sharing articles, studies, petitions, information in general pertaining to the 2016 peace agreement, peace process and exchanging your opinions and identity with others using social networking sites (Twitter, Facebook, etc.).

	Never (have never participated)	Rare (once or twice a year)	Sometimes (every couple of months)	Often (at least monthly engagement)	Very Often (committed in your daily life routine)	Peace Agreement 2016 (Only motivated since the peace agreement)
Transnational election campaigns	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Voting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sending Remittances	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Lobbying	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Running for Office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Attending Meetings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Civil society organization affiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Giving talks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Giving donations to Colombian non-governmental organizations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Signing petitions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Handing out leaflets	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social Media	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other (please specify)

9. Are you willing to give an interview?

Interviews are conducted in order to better understand, from a personal standpoint, why migrants are choosing to be active in Colombian politics and their specific opinions about the peace agreement.

The interview should last approximately half an hour.

If you are willing to be interviewed, please provide a phone number and an email address at which I can contact you to arrange the interview

Yes (Please provide your telephone number or email below)

No

Contact Information

10. Would you like to make any additional comments about your political activities in relation to Colombia and the peace process? If so, please use the text box below.

Appendix E. Nvivo Codebook.

Codebook For Interviews			
Name	Number Of Sources Coded	Number Of Coding References	Parent Node Name
Despite Many Issues The Peace Agreement Is Positive And Must Be Supported	10	32	
Fragmented Colombian Community	10	78	
Cities Completely Unaware Of Rural Community Realities	9	22	
Politically Active Because Of Public University Education	9	22	
Corrupt Media Influence	8	32	
Future Support Includes Passive Political Activism	8	20	
Extreme Inequality	8	16	Nodes\\Fragmented Colombian Community
Cultural Transformation From Violence As The Solution Is Needed	7	43	
Returning Back To Colombia To Reinvest Into The Country	7	10	
International Community Has An Unimportant Role	7	16	
Lack Of Critical Thinking	7	15	
Significance Of Peace Deal Is CRR	7	15	
Pushes Narrative That Guerrillas Are Enemies and Colombia's Only Problem	7	22	Nodes\\Corrupt Media Influence
Strong Tradition For Religious Conservatism	6	24	
Significance Of Peace Deal Is Ending The Conflict	6	7	
Internatioal Community Plays a Very Important Role	6	19	
Major Issue In Colombian Society Is Poor Education	6	12	
Never Thought About Colombians Abroad As Important	6	9	Nodes\\International Community Has An Unimportant Role
Active Support For The Peace Agreement and Implementation	6	11	
Differentiated Reception - Integrated Into International Groups Rather Than Native	6	9	
End Of Conflict Brings Root Issues To Surface	5	11	
Gap Between Old Generations That Don't Want Change And New Generations Pushing For Change	5	12	
Awareness of CRR Issues	5	6	
Change Comes In Steps	5	7	Nodes\\Despite Many Issues The Peace Agreement Is Positive And Must Be Supported
CRR Extremely Complex	5	29	
Political Identity Extremely Polarizing	5	10	Nodes\\Fragmented Colombian Community
Migrants Have An Ethical Responsibility To Engage Politically	5	8	

Name	Number Of Sources Coded	Number Of Coding References	Parent Node Name
Uribe Continues To Have Enormous Political Power	5	17	
Weak Colombian Identity	4	12	Nodes\Fragmented Colombian Community
Left Ideology	4	4	
Migrated For Studies	4	4	
No Need To Find Colombian Community	4	4	
No Personal Connection To Conflict	4	4	
Politically Active Because Of Personal Characteristic	4	5	
Peace Agreement Galvanized More Political Engagement In Colombians	4	5	
Peace Transition Will Unite Urban-Rural Societies	4	4	
Privileged Upbringing	4	4	
Cosmopolitan Identity	4	12	
Conflict Was Just My Reality	4	6	
Colombian Political Activism Low Due To Disillusionment	4	5	
Colombia Is A Very Complex Country Full Of Contradictions	4	7	
Capitalist Oriented Society	4	7	
Hard Integration Into Dutch Society	4	19	
History Of Political Exclusion And Violence Against Left	4	8	
Effect Of Classism	4	14	Nodes\Fragmented Colombian Community
Dissatisfaction with Colombian Embassy	4	11	
Deeply Emotional When Referendum Was Rejected	4	4	
Drug-Trafficking Stigma	3	3	Nodes\Fragmented Colombian Community
Economic Model Not Main Problem, It Is The Products	3	5	
Family History of Liberal-Conservative Violence	3	8	
Fear Of Socialism	3	6	
French Not From Paris More Open	3	3	
Hard Integration Into French Society	3	8	
Centre-Left Ideology	3	10	
Cities Insulate Violence	3	3	Nodes\Cities Completely Unaware Of Rural Community Realities
Colombia Is Two Distinct Countries - The Ultra Rich And Ultra Poor	3	4	
Colombian Students Form Their Own Bubbles And Are Not Part Of The Greater Community	3	5	

Name	Number Of Sources Coded	Number Of Coding References	Parent Node Name
Cultural Reflexivity Is Needed	3	12	Nodes\Cultural Transformation From Violence As The Solution Is Needed
Poverty Impedes Critical Thinking	3	4	Nodes\Lack Of Critical Thinking
Revealing The Truth	3	3	Nodes\Significance Of the Peace Deal Is Transitional Justice
People In Cities Are Just Concerned About Their Livelihoods	3	4	Nodes\Cities Completely Unaware Of Rural Community Realities
No Cultural Memory Of Colombian History	3	10	
Politically Active Because Of Patriotism	3	6	
Migrant Students Very Politically Active	3	3	
Most Important Thing I will Do Is Vote	3	3	Nodes\Active Support For The Peace Agreement and Implementation
Need To Switch To Agricultural Production Rather Than Nonrenewables	3	3	Nodes\Economic Model Not Main Problem, It Is The Products
Land Reform Extremely Sensitive Topic	3	4	Nodes\CRR Extremely Complex
Institutionalized Political Elite Adds A Power Dynamic To Conflict	3	7	
US Interference In Domestic Affairs	3	5	
Stays Engaged Because Of Family Ties	3	3	
Work Experience With Affected Communities Galvanized Political Activism	3	9	
Unintentionally Know Many Colombians	3	5	
Support For Environmental Sustainable Development	3	6	
Reason For Migration Is Important Indicator Of Activism	3	5	
Significance Of the Peace Deal Is Transitional Justice	3	5	
Previously Disengaged Due To Disillusionment	2	2	
State Corruption Must Be Solved Before Sustainable Development Can Be Implemented	2	10	
Significance of Peace Deal Is FARC Reintegration Into Society	2	2	
Role Of Migrants To Change Bad International Reputation	2	4	
Those More Affected By Conflict At A Young Age Want Prosecution	2	3	
Unity in Cultural Expressions	2	10	
Unknown Whether Staying Abroad	2	2	
Uribe Creates Polarization	2	7	Nodes\Fragmented Colombian Community
Uribe Crimes Overridden With Effectiveness To Weaken FARC	2	3	Nodes\Uribe Continues To Have Enormous Political Power
Well Integrated Into Colombian Migrant Community	2	2	

Name	Number Of Sources Coded	Number Of Coding References	Parent Node Name
Need for Equal Development Between Cities and Rural Regions	2	3	
No Specific Issue For Supporting Peace Agreement, It's A Holistic Process	2	4	
No Specific Plan For Future Support	2	3	
No Tradition For Respecting Other Opinions	2	4	
Politically Active At Home Not Abroad	2	2	
Peace Agreement Significant For Supporting Political Participation	2	2	
Peace Agreement Has Created Social Unity In The Younger Generation	2	3	
Personal Ideology Influenced By Social Group	2	3	
Personally Affected By Conflict	2	9	
Polarization More Acute In Colombia Than Abroad	2	2	
Rich Don't Want To Go Back To Colombia Because Of Chaotic Dishonest Society	2	4	
Politically Active Due To Peace Agreement	2	2	
Politically Active In Support Of Public Services	2	2	
Culture Marks The Path We Follow Abroad	2	3	
Conflict Continues, It's Just Peace With One Armed Group	2	2	
Corruption In Embassies	2	2	Nodes\\Dissatisfaction with Colombian Embassy
Colombians Find Happiness Among Obscurity	2	2	
Colombia's History Had Made People Easy To Manipulate	2	7	
Colombia's Ruling Political Structure Pro-Multinational Development	2	3	
Colonialism Explains Many Issues Of Current Political System	2	8	
Colombian Migrants Should Play A Bigger Role	2	3	
Against Neoliberal Economic Model	2	4	
General Population Does Not Know Difference Between Left and Right	2	2	Nodes\\Major Issue In Colombian Society Is Poor Education
Going Abroad Changed My Perspective Of Colombian Migrants - Now See Importance	2	4	
Future Support Of Peace Through Academic Research	2	4	
Distrust	2	8	Nodes\\Fragmented Colombian Community
Embassy and Consulate Play A Major Role In Continuing Engagement Abroad	2	6	
Emergence Of Protestant Church Pushing Against LGBT Rights	2	3	Nodes\\Strong Tradition For Religious Conservatism

Name	Number Of Sources Coded	Number Of Coding References	Parent Node Name
Engaged To Solve Inequality	2	3	
Education Does Not Teach History	2	2	Nodes\Major Issue In Colombian Society Is Poor Education
Deep Emotional Connection To Colombia	2	2	Nodes\Politically Active Because Of Patriotism
Distance Breaks Links	1	1	Nodes\Politically Active At Home Not Abroad
Ethnic Discrimination	1	3	Nodes\Fragmented Colombian Community\Extreme Inequality
Explanation For Why People Continue To Vote The Same Way	1	1	Nodes\No Cultural Memory Of Colombian History
FARC Not Sincere About Peace	1	5	Nodes\Against Peace Because FARC Must Be Prosecuted
Fear of Change	1	2	Nodes\Strong Tradition For Religious Conservatism
Future Support Entails Working Towards A Communist Future	1	2	
Government Lacks Future Economic Vision	1	4	
Grass-Roots Movements Are Key Actors Supporting Peace In Colombia	1	4	
Going Abroad Changed Identity	1	2	
Influence Rests With Older Generations	1	1	Nodes\Strong Tradition For Religious Conservatism\Power Of Catholic Church
Against Peace Because FARC Must Be Prosecuted	1	19	
Both Left And Right Politics Have Made Big Mistakes In Peace Process	1	3	
Both Sides See Only The Good In Their Side, Black And White	1	1	Nodes\Fragmented Colombian Community\Political Identity Extremely Polarizing
Colombian Student Community Disengaged In Paris	1	2	
Colombian Identity	1	1	
Colombian Identity But Does Not Share Same Ideals	1	1	
Colombian Migrants In The Netherlands Lost True Colombian Culture	1	2	
Comes From A Lower-Middle Class Family	1	1	
Colombians Are Ignorant Of Their Reality	1	3	
Connects With Dutch Values	1	1	Nodes\Well Integrated Into Dutch Society
Culture Of Being Taken Advantage Of	1	2	Nodes\Fragmented Colombian Community
Politically Active To Build Dialogue And To Value A Plurality Of Opinions	1	1	
Politically Active To Improve Image	1	2	
Politically Active To Solve Fragmentation Of Community	1	1	
Poor Colombians Who Had Nothing In Colombia Feel Their Identity Is Dutch	1	2	

Name	Number Of Sources Coded	Number Of Coding References	Parent Node Name
Positive Global Impact Of This Peace Agreement	1	1	
Politically Active Due To Culture Shock Between The Netherlands And Colombia	1	1	
Politically Active Because Of Specific University Courses	1	2	
Politically Active Because We Owe Campesinos This Opportunity	1	1	
Rich Rural Background	1	1	
Right-Wing Ideology	1	1	
Power Of Catholic Church	1	3	Nodes\Strong Tradition For Religious Conservatism
Prolonged Conflict Impedes Collective Thinking	1	1	Nodes\Fragmented Colombian Community
Political Engagement Not Priority	1	2	
Peace Agreement Implementation Is Lacking Political Will	1	2	
No Dialogue Until They Take Responsibility	1	2	Nodes\Against Peace Because FARC Must Be Prosecuted\FARC Not Sincere About Peace
Peace Deal Is A Change From The Usual	1	1	Nodes\Work Experience With Affected Communities Galvanized Political Activism
Political Ideology Influenced By Family	1	1	
Politically Active Because Embassies Are Failing	1	2	
Peace Agreement Awakened A Sense Of Political Importance In Migrants	1	3	
Peace Agreement Deteriorating In Credibility Due To Poor Implementation	1	1	
Peace Agreement Didn't Change Engagment But Gave Me Hope	1	1	
Peace Agreement Extremely Well Written And Could Be The Solution To Major Issues	1	1	Nodes\No Specific Issue For Supporting Peace Agreement, It's A Holistic Process
Most People Don't See This As An Historic Moment	1	2	Nodes\No Cultural Memory Of Colombian History
Migrants Evolve When They Are Abroad	1	1	
Military Is A Major Political Actor	1	5	
Mixed Feelings about Identifying as a Migrant	1	1	
Lack Of Community Events	1	1	Nodes\Fragmented Colombian Community
Lacking Needed Political Infrastructure For Implementation	1	1	
Migrated At Young Age	1	1	
Migrated Because Of Spouse	1	1	
Migrated For Career Experience	1	1	
Majority Of Colombian Refugees Are Poor, Rural And Left-Wing	1	2	

Name	Number Of Sources Coded	Number Of Coding References	Parent Node Name
Many Colombians Come To The Netherlands Because Of Lax Policing Of Papers	1	1	
Many Students Don't Go Back Because Of Low Job Opportunities And Pay	1	1	
Mentality Of Violence Is Met With Violence	1	1	Nodes\Against Peace Because FARC Must Be Prosecuted
Well Integrated Into Dutch Society	1	2	
Well Integrated Into French Society	1	1	
Use of Social Media To Mobilize Protests	1	1	
We Take Pride In This Which Makes Us Feel Colombian	1	1	Nodes\Unity in Cultural Expressions
Undefined Identity	1	1	
The Netherlands Shifted To An Assimilationist Society	1	1	
Role Of Migrants Who Escape Violence Is Unexplored	1	1	Nodes\Reason For Migration Is Important Indicator Of Activism
Rural Communities Uninformed About Their Reality	1	2	
Rural Origin	1	2	
Significance Of Peace Agreement Is Women's Issue	1	2	
Significance Of Peace Deal Is Shifting Budget To Invest In Education	1	2	
Studying Abroad Has Brought Out A Latin American Identity	1	1	
Social Capital From Abroad Is Important For Change In Colombia	1	1	
Regionalism Important For Political Identity	1	3	

