



The Rape of Okinawa: Sexual Violence and Popular Protest in the Shadow of the US Military




Figure 1: An Okinawan man protests in Naha, June 2016. (Source: Associated Press, December 22nd 2016.)

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Abstract

This thesis explores the relationship between the policymakers of the US-Japan security alliance and feminist anti-base protestors in Okinawa. In particular, it considers how a particularly violent rape, committed by three US personnel in 1995, sparked a wave of anti-base protest that was predominantly led by women's groups. The interaction between protestors and policymakers in the weeks and months afterwards created a crisis in Okinawa that threatened the entire US-Japan alliance, and led to significant changes being implemented in the US base network in Okinawa. Despite these changes, the situation in Okinawa remained tense. This highlights the issue at the centre of the crisis, that the two sides did not share any common ground in their understandings of the cause of the rape or potential solutions. Subsequent rapes, committed in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2012 and 2016, demonstrated to anti-base protestors that alliance policymakers had not addressed the fundamental problems with the US bases in Okinawa, while increasingly radical demands from protestors asked more than policymakers were willing to concede to. This thesis will therefore explore two key moments in this ongoing crisis, as well as two of the primary reasons why a lack of common ground continues to exist, in order to ascertain why a solution has remained elusive, and whether the actions of either side have had a bearing on the behaviour of the other.

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Introduction

“Our anger is past its limit.”¹

In June 2016, 65,000 Okinawans rallied in downtown Naha to protest the rape and murder of a local woman by a former US Marine.² They demanded the US government “pull out the Marines” and end the US military presence in their prefecture.³ While a protest of this size, against such an atrocious crime, seems like a unique occurrence this is unfortunately not the case in Okinawa. In September 1995, the kidnap and rape of a 12-year-old girl by three American servicemen sparked off the largest protests seen in Okinawa in decades.⁴ In this instance, 85,000 marched in Naha, demanding an end to the US military presence and calling for the immediate removal of all US military bases and personnel.⁵

The 1995 protests, while specifically directed against the rape, were the culmination of fifty years of what many Okinawans would consider to be a protracted American “occupation”.⁶ The 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty allowed for the permanent presence of US troops on Japanese military bases, something which had been a fact of life for many communities since 1945.⁷ While this treaty officially restored Japan to the status of a full-fledged sovereign power, it was not until 1960 when the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security finally erased the majority of the inequalities, placing

¹ Roshni Kapur, ‘After Murder, Mass Protests in Okinawa Against US Bases’, *The Diplomat*, June 22nd 2016, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/after-murder-mass-protests-in-okinawa-against-us-bases/> (accessed March 20th 2018).

² Kenneth Franklin Shinzato left the US Marines in 2014 after marrying an Okinawan woman and changing his family name from ‘Gadson’ to ‘Shinzato’. He then worked as a civilian contractor on Kadena Airbase. As an American citizen, he was still technically covered by the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement when he committed his crime. His legal status, and the ways in which US policymakers dealt with this, is explored in further detail in Chapter IV. Ibid.; The Mainichi, ‘U.S. Base Worker Suspect Silent 1 Week After Body of Okinawa Woman Found’, *The Mainichi*, May 26th 2016, <http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160526/p2a/00m/0na/014000c>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³ Justin McCurry, ‘Thousands protest at US bases on Okinawa after Japanese woman’s murder’, *The Guardian*, June 19th 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/19/thousands-protest-at-us-bases-on-okinawa-after-japanese-womans>, (accessed March 20th 2018).

⁴ Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 67; Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*, (New York: Owl Books, 2001), p. 52.

⁵ This protest was known as the ‘People’s Rally’. Masamichi Sebastian Inoue, John Purves and Mark Selden, ‘Okinawa Citizens, US Bases and the Security of Asia’, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 33.6 (1998) p. 264; Denny Roy, *The Pacific War and its Political Legacies*, (Westport: Praeger, 2009), p. 191; Yuko Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and its Limits*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015) p. 66; Beina Xu, ‘The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance’, *Council on Foreign Relations*, July 1st 2014, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance>, (accessed March 23rd 2018).

⁶ Joseph Cerson, ‘Architecture of US Asia-Pacific Hegemony’, *Peace Review*, 11.3 (1999) p. 401; Gavan McCormack, ‘The Travails of a Client State: An Okinawan Angle on the 50th Anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty’, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 8.10.3 (2010), p. 8.

⁷ Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945-2009: The Quest for a Proactive Policy*, (Boston: Brill, 2010) p. 55; Roy, *The Pacific War and its Political Legacies*, p. 180.

Japan on an equal footing with the US.⁸ Despite the improvements made in 1960, one change which was not adopted was the return of Okinawa to Japanese administration. This tiny prefecture, which comprises only 0.6% of Japan's entire area, was the scene of one of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific campaign, and the first area in Japan to be occupied by the US after the war.⁹ Its continued occupation by the US military, even after Japanese statehood was restored, can be explained by its strategic location between Japan, the Korean peninsula, Taiwan and China.¹⁰ Its importance was further cemented for the American government during the Korean and Vietnam wars, when Okinawan bases served as ideal staging posts for US troops.¹¹

Perhaps ironically, it was the Vietnam War, a protracted conflict in which the US intervened militarily from 1964, which began the process of transferring Okinawa back to Japanese control.¹² The American decision to run Okinawa with a "free hand" had sparked off a powerful anti-base movement and this, combined with the financial toll Vietnam took on the US, convinced American policymakers it was time to return Okinawa to Japan.¹³

A Brief History of Protest, Okinawa and Japan

The reversion of Okinawa back to Japanese control was influenced, to a large extent, by a wave of popular protest in the prefecture, which crested in the late 1960s.¹⁴ Analysts argue that Okinawa experienced three major waves of protest in the twentieth century. These occurred in the period after the Treaty of San Francisco and Japanese independence, from roughly 1951; the mid-1960s until Okinawan reversion in 1972, when furore over the Vietnam War and the possible presence

⁸ Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-2009*, p. 56.

⁹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'Pacific War - The War Against Japan, 1945', *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pacific-War/The-war-against-Japan-1945#ref1245260> (accessed May 10th 2018).

¹⁰ Roy, *The Pacific War and its Political Legacies*, p. 188; Gwyn Kirk, Martha Matsuoka and Margo Okazawa-Rey, 'Women and Children, Militarism and Human Rights: International Women's Working Conference', *Off Our Backs*, 27.9 (1997) p. 9; Suzuyo Takazato, 'Report from Okinawa: Long-Term US Military Presence', *Canadian Woman Studies*, 19.4 (2000), p. 42.

¹¹ Inoue, Purves and Selden, 'Okinawa Citizens, US Bases and the Security of Asia', p. 264; Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 39.

¹² The war eventually ended in 1975, when the fall of South Vietnam, combined with increased costs and decreased support at home, led the US to withdraw: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'Vietnam War: The United States Enters the Conflict', *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Vietnam-War/The-United-States-enters-the-war>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

¹³ George R. Packard, 'The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50: Still a Grand Bargain?', *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2010, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2010-03-01/united-states-japan-security-treaty-50>, (accessed March 23rd 2018); Sheila A. Smith, 'Working Paper No. 7 For the Conference on Power and Prosperity: Linkages Between Security and Economics In US-Japanese Relations Since 1960: "Do Domestic Politics Matter?: The Case of US Military Bases in Japan"', *National Security Archive*, March 14th-16th 1997, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/japan/ssmithhttp.htm>, (accessed March 23rd 2018); Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 39; Roy, *The Pacific War and its Political Legacies*, p. 189; Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-2009*, p. 69.

¹⁴ Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, p. 67.

of US nuclear weapons in Okinawa reached its height; and then from 1995, when militarised sexual violence became a serious concern.¹⁵

The first major wave of protest lasted until approximately 1957 and was directed against the lack of democracy under the US administration.¹⁶ While this did not have a significant impact on the situation in Okinawa, it does mirror a similar wave of protest (the Anpo protests) which occurred in Tokyo after the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, in spring 1960. These protests, which came in the wake of the Treaty being pushed through the Diet by Prime Minister Kishi, had a diverse range of aims and grievances. These included concerns that maintaining US bases and personnel in Japan would drag the country into an American war, something which went directly against its pacifist constitution.¹⁷ Despite these protests, the treaty was eventually passed, and Kishi's resignation calmed the situation in Tokyo.¹⁸

For Okinawa, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security changed little. That it had passed without the inclusion of provisions for Okinawa did, however, highlight the continued differences between it and the rest of Japan. This, arguably, fanned the second wave of protest in the mid-1960s. Okinawan protestors fervently believed that the Japanese government had sacrificed Okinawa in return for a strengthened alliance with the US.¹⁹ The stark underdevelopment of the prefecture, in contrast to the economic boom that was occurring in mainland Japan, contributed to Okinawans' frustrations.²⁰ Reversion, when it came in 1972, brought a return to Japanese administration but not the removal of the US military. Although the actions of Okinawan protestors convinced the US to return the prefecture, in reality very little changed in the way the Americans behaved in Okinawa.²¹ The second wave of Okinawan protest had, therefore, brought only limited success.

While Okinawan protestors remained quiet for the next two decades, they were by no means satisfied. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Okinawa continued to be Japan's poorest prefecture and bore the burden of hosting 75% of all US military bases in Japan.²² Although 1995 was the first mass

¹⁵ Johnson, *Blowback*, pp. 39, 52; Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, pp. 65-67.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 52; *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-2009*, p. 60; Packard, 'The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50: Still a Grand Bargain?'

¹⁸ Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 160.

¹⁹ Cynthia Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) p. 112; Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 38; Suzuyo Takazato and Kutzawa Kiyomi, 'The Base and the Military: Structural Violence against Women', *Review of Japanese Culture and Society*, 11/12 (1999/2000), p. 73.

²⁰ Packard, 'The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50'; Makoto Iokibe and Takuya Sasaki, 'The 1960s: Japan's Economic Rise and the Maturing of the Partnership' in Makoto Iokibe and Tosh Minohara, (eds.), *The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 154.

²¹ Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 39.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 40; Kirk, Matsuoka and Okazawa-Rey, 'Women and Children, Militarism and Human Rights', p. 9; Koji Murata, 'The 1990s: From a Drifting Relationship to a Redefinition of the Alliance', in Makoto Iokibe and Tosh

mobilisation of Okinawan protestors against acts of sexual violence, it was by no means the first such act committed by US military personnel. From 1972 to 1995, approximately 4,700 crimes were committed by US personnel stationed in Okinawa,²³ including many “heinous crimes”.²⁴ In fact, in the period 1992-1994, Okinawa had the highest rates of sexual assault by US personnel of any American base worldwide.²⁵ The 1995 rape was therefore the tipping point that set off the third wave of Okinawan protest.²⁶ For many Okinawans, it proved that the American presence was still imperialist in nature, and US arguments that their personnel committed relatively few crimes did nothing to appease protestors who resented their continued “occupation”.²⁷ Prior to 1972, the US military had behaved as they wished in Okinawa and this case demonstrated to many that, despite reversion, they had continued to do so.

Okinawa has a long history of protest with a series of flash points. 1995 and 2016 were unique, as they are the two moments of mass mobilisation, sparked by a rape, committed by US military personnel. They are also the two instances of protest that have been led, almost exclusively, by a feminist anti-base group. In 1995, 71 Okinawan women attended the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing (the Beijing Conference).²⁸ These women had attended the conference in order to “make connections with other Asian women and... share their experiences of living with US bases for many years”.²⁹ They included among their number Suzuyo Takazato, a prominent anti-base activist and women’s councillor, and Keiko Itokazu, a prominent local politician.³⁰ It was pure coincidence that the Beijing Conference took place in September 1995, and that these women returned

Minohara, (eds.), *The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 225.

²³ An article published by the Okinawa Times in October 1995 lists the most serious crimes recorded in this period: The Okinawa Times, ‘List of Main Crimes Committed and Incidents Concerning the U.S. Military on Okinawa - Excerpts: 12th October 1995’, *Okinawa Peace Network of Los Angeles*, 2005, http://www.uchinanchu.org/history/list_of_crimes.htm (accessed May 10th 2018).

²⁴ “Heinous crimes” were defined after 1995 to be the crimes of rape and murder: Chalmers Johnson, ‘Three Rapes: The Status of Forces Agreement and Okinawa’, *Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 97*, January 2004, <http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp97.html>, (accessed March 23rd 2018).

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, p. 67.

²⁷ Gwyn Kirk and Carolyn Bowen Francis, ‘Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military Policy and Practice in East Asia’, *Berkley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice*, 15.1 (2000), p. 248; Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

²⁸ Gwyn Kirk and Margo Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security: Women Oppose US Militarism in East Asia’, in Marguerite R. Waller, and Jennifer Rycenga (eds.), *Frontline Feminisms: Women, War and Resistance*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005) p. 157

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 246; Kimi Sorihashi, ‘Interview: Why is There No End to Sexual Violence by U.S. Military Personnel in Okinawa?’ *The Mainichi*, September 15th 2016, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160915/p2a/00m/0na/017000c>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Ayano Ginoza, Michiko Hase and Gwyn Kirk, ‘Resisting US Bases in Okinawa’, *Foreign Policy in Focus*, October 22nd 2014, <http://fpif.org/resisting-u-s-bases-okinawa/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

to an Okinawa shocked by, but unsure of how to react to, the rape of a child by three US personnel.³¹ Their experiences in Beijing prompted them to organise the protest movement that grew up in the days and weeks after the rape. Through this activism they also formed the specifically feminist anti-base group; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV).³² OWAAMV have been prominent leaders of the anti-base movement since 1995, and their continued activism has inspired the research question of this thesis: *How have the feminist protests against the US bases in Okinawa, prompted by repeated acts of sexual violence by US servicemen, impacted the US-Japan security relationship?*

The 'US-Japan Security Relationship' is a term which is almost all-encompassing, and can be used to refer to nearly everything about the alliance, from the physical presence of US personnel in Okinawa, to bilateral cooperation in technological development, regional and domestic crisis management, trade and economic cooperation, and the quest for peace in the Middle East.³³ It is therefore both impossible and unnecessary for this study to cover every single aspect of the security relationship. While many aspects are important, the focus here will be on just one. This is the presence of US military personnel and bases in Okinawa, against which the women of OWAAMV have protested. The maintenance of US bases and troops in Okinawa is managed by the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) a policymaking body comprised of the US Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, and their Japanese counterparts.³⁴

This thesis will study these two bodies, OWAAMV and the SCC, and aims to compare their stances and arguments across time, in order to answer a number of interrelated questions. Specifically:

³¹ Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, p. 67.

³² Johnson, 'Three Rapes'; Takazato, 'Report from Okinawa', p. 46.

³³ Sheila A. Smith, *Japan's New Politics and the US-Japanese Alliance*, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014), p. 18; Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton, 'Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century', *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, April 17th 1996, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018), pp. 1, 4, 5.

³⁴ At various points the SCC has also included the US Ambassador to Japan (generally standing in for the Secretary of State). More often than not, the SCC follows the above-mentioned composition. Examples of an SCC including the Secretary of State include: Secretary of State Albright, Secretary of Defense Cohen, Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono, Minister of State for Defense Torashima, 'Joint Statement, Security Consultative Committee', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, September 11th 2000, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/joint0009.html> (accessed May 10th 2018); Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso, Minister of State for Defense Nukaga, 'United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document: Joint Statement', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 1st 2006, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0605.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, Minister for Foreign Affairs Okada, Minister of Defense Kitazawa, 'Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 28th 2010, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint1005.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018). In 1996, for example, Ambassador Walter Mondale served on the SCC in place of the Secretary of State: Secretary of Defense Perry, Ambassador Mondale, Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikeda, Minister of Defense Kyuma, 'Joint Announcement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee', *Ministry of Defense of Japan*, December 2nd 1996, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/pdf/js19961202_e.pdf, (accessed May 10th 2018).

why has the situation on Okinawa remained unresolved? What are the primary reasons for this lack of a resolution? In what ways have feminist anti-base activists been able to influence the decisions of policymakers? And how might this translate into future policy decisions and anti-base activism?

The starting point for this study is 1995, when the targeted, and well-organised, activism of OWAAMV created a crisis in the US-Japan security alliance. This, in turn, led to significant changes in the US approach to Okinawa.³⁵ The situation in 1995, and anti-base protest in Okinawa, has, however, been explored in some depth before. Therefore, it is important to first briefly outline the existing historiography on this topic, to highlight the analytical space in which this study situates itself. The methodological approach to the sources will then be elaborated upon, before the focus on feminist-based protests through the lens of human security theory is finally explained.



Figure 2: This map shows the strategic position of Okinawa (labelled under the Ryukyu Islands) between Japan, China, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. (Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018.)

³⁵ This will be explored in more detail in Chapter II.

Historiography

The existing historiography is generally divided into two distinct camps, those analysts who focus on the US-Japan security relationship, and those who study the anti-base movement itself. Analysts of the security relationship address a range of different issues, from historiographical studies of how maintaining the alliance after 1960 enabled an economic boom in Japan, to more contemporary studies of how the two states have worked together to challenge regional threats, such as Chinese aggression and North Korean nuclearisation.³⁶ Despite this range of topics, the majority of analysts consider the maintenance of US troops in Okinawa as vital to the continued efficiency of the relationship, and many consider the “Okinawa issue” to be resolvable by the two governments.³⁷ When writing on Okinawa these analysts tend to focus on 1995, as they consider it to be a turning point in relations.

Denny Roy and Chalmers Johnson are two examples of analysts who consider the issue in this way. Both argue that the 1995 rape, and slow government reactions to it, led to a dip in public support for the alliance and forced the two governments to reconsider their approach to Okinawa.³⁸ Many other analysts support this position, and consider 1995 to be a key moment in the relationship, much like the Anpo protests of 1960, when the security alliance and protests against it forced the two governments into action.³⁹ Johnson is unique in the security alliance perspective, as he criticises the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the US and Japanese governments as the root of the Okinawa crisis.⁴⁰ In this way, his analysis is representative of authors in the anti-base perspective, who consider the SOFA to be central to the issue of crimes committed by US troops.⁴¹ Johnson’s position, however, is not representative of the majority of analysts writing from the security alliance perspective. For them, the problem is not in the agreements between the US and Japan, or in the US military institution, it is within Okinawa itself.⁴²

³⁶ Iokibe and Sasaki, ‘The 1960s’, p. 154; Xu, ‘The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance’; Packard, ‘The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50’; Tim Shorrock, ‘Okinawa and the US Military in Northeast Asia’, *Foreign Policy in Focus*, October 12th 2005, http://fpif.org/okinawa_and_the_us_military_in_northeast_asia/ (accessed March 23rd 2018).

³⁷ The “Okinawa Issue” is a phrase used by Sheila Smith to describe how the situation on Okinawa has been corrosive as “it has focused our attention on this one particular base, when the real challenge for the alliance has been to come up with a broader framework for the sustainability of US forces in Japan.”: Sheila Smith, quoted in Xu, ‘The US-Japan Security Alliance’.

³⁸ Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 59; Roy, *The Pacific War and its Political Legacies*, pp. 185, 191-192.

³⁹ The Anpo protests of 1960 are important to mention here as they are the first, and most notable, example of public protests against the alliance and were motivated, in part, by the continued presence of US forces in Okinawa: Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 148. Examples of analysts who support the position of Roy and Johnson include: Murata, ‘The 1990s’, pp. 225-227; Xu, ‘The US-Japan Security Alliance’; Smith, ‘Do Domestic Politics Matter?’.

⁴⁰ Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*; Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, pp. 160-161.

⁴² Xu, ‘The US-Japan Security Alliance’; Smith, ‘Do Domestic Politics Matter?’; Frank Mondelli, ‘Can Recent Social Unrest be Resolved in Okinawa’s Base Problem?’, *Council on Foreign Relations*, March 18th 2015,

For the majority of analysts, protests on Okinawa are not prompted by the US military or US bases, but by issues of Okinawan identity and lingering resentment over the island's treatment by Tokyo. Sheila Smith gives an example of this when she argues that "it is the unique history of Okinawa... that has the strongest bearing on contemporary politics surrounding the US bases".⁴³ H.D.P. Envall and Kerri Ng also put forth this argument, while Beina Xu similarly states that much of the protest on Okinawa is motivated by its perceived abandonment by Tokyo, and the poverty it suffers in comparison to other prefectures.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the majority of these analysts consider the anti-base protestors in Okinawa to be a homogenous group, motivated by similar concerns. In so doing they refer to them as the "Okinawa resistance", erasing the identities of individual groups and activists.⁴⁵

As can therefore be seen, those authors who write from the security alliance perspective do analyse the Okinawan resistance and its motivations, but do not generally consider the individual groups or their frustrations. Chalmers Johnson is perhaps unique, as he uses his criticism of the SOFA to study both the individual resistance of OWAAMV and the issues that drive their activism.⁴⁶ Even so, he is not representative of these authors. Therefore, an approach which views protestors and protest groups as distinct, and analyses their individual motivations, also needs to be considered.

The second perspective is that of the anti-base movements. There are a number of movements in Okinawa protesting a variety of issues, from the very presence of US bases, to issues of environmental degradation, noise pollution, land ownership and the impact of military accidents.⁴⁷ Many authors, such as Andrew Yeo and Yuko Kawato, consider the full spectrum of Okinawan protest, and analyse the diverse aims, goals, and methods of the different groups.⁴⁸ Both these authors also explore how these protest groups interacted with policymakers in Okinawa, Tokyo and

<https://www.cfr.org/blog/frank-mondelli-can-recent-social-unrest-be-resolved-okinawas-base-problem>, (accessed March 23rd 2018); H. D. P. Envall and Kerri Ng, 'Okinawa, the US-Japan Alliance, and Asia-Pacific Security', *ANU-MASI Policy Background Paper*, No. 11, May 24th (2013), pp. 1, 4.

⁴³ Smith, 'Do Domestic Politics Matter?'.

⁴⁴ Envall and Ng, 'Okinawa, the US-Japan Alliance, and Asia-Pacific Security', p. 6; Xu, 'The US-Japan Security Alliance'.

⁴⁵ Mondelli, 'Can Recent Social Unrest be Resolved in Okinawa's Base Problem?'; Smith, 'Do Domestic Politics Matter?'; McCormack, 'The Travails of a Client State', p. 4.

⁴⁶ Johnson, 'Three Rapes'.

⁴⁷ Kim D. Reimann, 'Security Issues and New Transnational Peace-Related Movements in East Asia, the 1990s and 2000s', *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 13.2 (2008), pp. 83-85; Andrew Yeo, 'Not in Anyone's Backyard: The Emergence and Identity of a Transnational Anti-Base Network', *International Studies Quarterly*, 53.3 (2009), pp. 574, 583; Ginoza, Hase, and Kirk, 'Resisting US Bases in Okinawa'; Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, p. 67.

⁴⁸ Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, pp. 65-97; Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, pp. 63-85, 149-177.

Washington in 1995.⁴⁹ While their focus is much closer to that of this thesis, they study many different protest groups, and do not focus on feminist groups in particular. Further, neither author embarks on an in-depth comparison between protestors and policymakers across time.

Much like the authors in the security alliance perspective, analysts in the anti-base perspective consider 1995 to be the turning point in the situation on Okinawa, and argue that the rape motivated women opposing the US military to unite, and openly protest, for the first time.⁵⁰ For Yoko Fukumura and Martha Matsuoka, 1995 was the first time many Okinawans had seen the US military presence itself as an act of violence against women and children.⁵¹ This argument, that American militarism is a direct threat to the security of women and children, is one taken up by many authors who analyse the feminist anti-base movement in Okinawa.⁵² These analysts take as their starting point the concept of human security. For OWAAMV, the exposure to ideas of human security was one tangible outcome of their participation in the 1995 Beijing Conference, and they adopted many of its themes in their writings and protests.⁵³

Further, these analysts do not consider this issue as isolated to Okinawa. They criticise those authors who see each act of sexual violence as simply a regrettable incident, and argue “the many acts of violence committed by US military personnel against local women and children... happen far too often to be overlooked or accepted as random occurrences or aberrations”.⁵⁴ They instead consider each rape, or assault, to be part of a wider spectrum of “structural, imperial violence that is the [US] military’s prime objective”.⁵⁵ They therefore argue that sexual violence is in fact symptomatic of the presence of US militarism, and a result of the American desire for dominance.⁵⁶ For these analysts, the transnational anti-base movement is as important to study as the situation on Okinawa. Kim D.

⁴⁹ Ibid.; Ibid.

⁵⁰ Kirk and Okazawa-Rey outline 3 organisations, as well as OWAAMV, established on Okinawa in direct reaction to the events of 1995: Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 157. Other authors who take this analytical position include: Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, pp. 236, 255; Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-Base Movements*, p. 67; Inoue, Purves, and Selden, ‘Okinawa Citizens, US Bases and the Security of Asia’, pp. 264, 266.

⁵¹ Yoko Fukumura and Martha Matsuoka, ‘Redefining Security: Okinawa Women’s Resistance to US Militarism’ in Janice A. Radway, Kevin Gaines, Barry Shank, and Penny von Eschen, (eds.), *American Studies, An Anthology*, (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 51.

⁵² For example: Takazato, ‘Report from Okinawa’ p. 43; Takazato and Kiyomi, ‘The Base and the Military’, p. 66; Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, p. 82; Ginoza, Hase and Kirk, ‘Resisting US Bases in Okinawa’; Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 239

⁵³ Takazato, ‘Report from Okinawa’, pp. 45-46; Betty A. Reardon, ‘Gender and Global Security: A Feminist Challenge to the United Nations and Peace Research’, *Journal of International Cooperation Studies* 6.1, (1998), pp. 30, 40; Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 157.

⁵⁴ Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 246.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 239; Elizabeth Mesok, ‘Sexual Violence and the US Military: Feminism, US Empire and the Failure of Liberal Equality’, *Feminist Studies*, 42.1 (2016), p. 45; Takazato, ‘Report from Okinawa’, p. 43; Takazato and Kiyomi, ‘The Base and the Military’, p. 66.

⁵⁶ Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 159.

Reimann, for example, embarks on a study of anti-base movements across the Asia-Pacific and argues that, by working together, and highlighting the undemocratic nature of the US military presence throughout the region, these movements challenge the American portrayal of itself as “a self-claimed champion of democracy”.⁵⁷

Analysts in the anti-base perspective therefore represent a critical challenge to those authors who write from the security alliance perspective. However, the positioning of anti-base authors is also problematic. Many, such as Gwyn Kirk, Suzuyo Takazato and Margo Okazawa-Rey⁵⁸ have been actively involved in the anti-base movement in Okinawa and, for them, the only solution is the complete removal of US troops from Okinawa.⁵⁹ This outcome has always seemed unlikely, not least because Japan benefits in many ways from the security alliance.⁶⁰ It is therefore questionable whether their emotional attachment to the issue makes them incapable of viewing the situation from an analytical distance.

This research seeks to bridge the gap between these two positions and argue that it is impossible to divorce the “Okinawa issue” from the security relationship. Through this it will then attempt to carve a third way in the historiography, putting the feminist anti-base activists and alliance policymakers on an equal footing, and questioning how each is influenced by the actions of the other.

Methodology

The aim of this analysis is to be comparative across time, charting the decisions, motivations and ideas of alliance policymakers and feminist anti-base activists from 1995 to 2016. In order to achieve this, it will compare the language each side uses in discussing the cause of these crimes and proposing solutions to them. Although it will consider the period 1997-2015, the main focus will be the years 1995-1996 and 2016, as these represent the two flash points of Okinawan resistance against military rapes. The intervening years will be utilised to consider whether there have been any long-term developments, or if each crisis alone sparked change.

⁵⁷ Reimann, ‘Security Issues and New Transnational Peace-Related Movements in East Asia’, p. 78; Elizabeth Mesok makes a similar argument about the US military’s conception of itself, although she does not study transnational anti-base movements but the violent intrinsic nature of the US military and its foreign operations: Mesok, ‘Sexual Violence and the US Military’, p. 45.

⁵⁸ Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 246; Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 157; Kirk, Matsuoka and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Women and Children, Militarism and Human Rights’, p. 8.

⁵⁹ Analysts who argue this include: Takazato, ‘Report from Okinawa’, p. 47; Takazato and Kiyomi, ‘The Base and the Military’, p. 66; Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 229.

⁶⁰ One of the myriad ways in which Japan benefits from the alliance is its ability, across time, to maintain relatively low levels of defence spending. Both Roy and Packard argue that the presence of a large US military force in Okinawa allowed the Japanese government to keep their defence spending below 1% of GDP, allowing for massive and rapid economic growth, particularly in the immediate post-war period: Roy, *The Pacific War and its Political Legacies*, p. 181; Packard, ‘The United States-Japanese Security Relationship at 50’, p. 97.

Chapter I will conduct an in-depth study of the situation in 1995. It will analyse SCC documents, and the April 1996 summit between Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton, to determine how policymakers conceptualised the crisis that arose from the rape, and how they approached its resolution. It will also use this in-depth source analysis to determine how the SCC reacted to the demands of protestors, and whether or not the steps they took were in line with what protestors were actually demanding. It will then conduct the same in-depth analysis of documents published by OWAAMV, in order to ascertain how they conceptualised the crisis, and what they considered to be an acceptable solution to it. This initial study intends to demonstrate that the gulf between the two sides was so great that there was no common ground, or space to compromise, within it. Finally, this chapter will briefly consider the lessons both sides took from 1995. This is significant as these influenced the way they reacted to later crises. Crucially, the fact that these lessons, to a certain extent, contradicted each other ensured that the lack of common ground persisted and, arguably, set the stage for a long-running stalemate.

Chapter II will focus on the role played by the US-Japan SOFA as one of the primary reasons for this lack of common ground. While US policymakers have been reluctant to significantly revise the document, arguing it plays a key role in maintaining the US presence in Okinawa, anti-base protestors have repeatedly challenged what this agreement means in practice. These activists call into question the legal protections it offers to US military personnel accused of crimes, and argue that it ensures American extraterritoriality is preserved, and Japanese sovereignty is undermined. In particular, this chapter considers how the SOFA has been used by both sides to raise the issue of human rights. While US policymakers argue that the agreement is vital to ensure the human rights of their personnel are protected, activists argue it undermines the rights of Okinawans as the protection it offers US personnel encourages them to act with impunity.⁶¹ This chapter will consider how this debate began, in the wake of 1995, before studying how it has developed over time, and identifying moments where the SOFA has become a controversial point of dispute between the two sides, particularly in the period 2000-2008. Finally, it will consider how shared concerns, that originated in this human rights discourse, led to the formation of a transnational, feminist, anti-base network in the Asia-Pacific region.

Chapter III will explore ideas of security in detail. It will compare SCC and OWAAMV documents, to determine how their ideas of security are conceptualised through the language they use and the themes they invoke. In particular, this chapter focuses on the period from 2009, when President Obama entered into office. The justification for this is that the Obama administration introduced an “Asia Rebalance” policy, which was presented as a refocusing of the American

⁶¹ Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 44; Kawato, *Protests Against US Base Policy in Asia*, pp. 65, 67-68.

relationship with its Asian allies for the twenty-first century. The two conceptions of security help to explain the diverse ways in which each side reacts to individual incidents, which this chapter looks at through the frame of steps taken by the US military to tackle the issue of sexual violence. The impact of ideas of security is not isolated to Okinawa, and so this chapter will continue to explore the transnational aspect of the protestor-policymaker relationship, questioning how theories of security allowed diverse national feminist anti-base groups to come together. It will finally conclude that the two ideas of security help to explain why a lack of common ground exists between the two sides.

Finally, Chapter IV focuses on the situation in 2016. The reasons why this deserves its own chapter are twofold. Firstly, the rape and murder of Rina Shimabukuro was arguably the most serious crime committed by a US citizen since 1995, and the protests which followed it the most substantial since the 'People's Rally' of October 1995. Secondly, the seriousness of the crime and the significance of the protests demonstrate one of the key arguments of this thesis, that the lack of common ground between policymakers and protestors led to a continued stalemate between the two sides. This continuity can be seen through both the similarities between the crimes, and the responses from policymakers and protestors. This chapter will further explore the reasons why the crisis in Okinawa persisted, including the fact that protestors regularly demanded more than alliance officials were willing to concede. However, there were indications in 2016 that changes had been enacted, and this chapter will further explore these in order to question in what ways protestors had impacted the security relationship. Lastly, the ways in which the media reported the situation in 2016, in contrast to the reportage of previous incidents, will be explored, in order to ask whether increased publicity influenced the situation.

This thesis will reach several conclusions. First, by and large, the situation in Okinawa has not changed appreciably in the period 1995 to 2016. The reason for this, it will demonstrate, is that the positions of anti-base protestors and alliance policymakers are so diverse from each other as to be practically irreconcilable. In regard to the broader research question, this thesis will conclude that while the situation in Okinawa does still seem bleak, the actions of OWAAMV have, in small ways, influenced the behaviour and decisions taken by the SCC.

Human Security, Feminist Activism and the US-Japan Security Alliance: A Theoretical Framework

“National security policy cannot be made in towns and villages.”⁶²

Security theories are at the heart of many of the debates within this thesis, and therefore a brief overview of how security is conceptualised is first necessary. While policymakers forward the theory of militarised security, anti-base activists believe in the merits of human security. For militarised security, the main referent object is the state, and the best way to protect the state is through the use of the military.⁶³ Therefore, for the policymakers who preside over the US-Japan security alliance, the presence of the US military in Okinawa is key to maintaining security, peace, and stability in the region against the spectre of external threats.⁶⁴

Human security first came to prominence in the field of security theory in the 1990s, with the work of various commissions and the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report.⁶⁵ Whereas the military had previously been seen as the primary guarantor of security, and the aim of security provision had been the protection of states from external threats, this new theory argued that people should be the referent object of security, and their safety could not be guaranteed by the military. In short “human security means protecting people’s vital freedoms”, including protecting the environment within which people live, their health, democratic freedoms and their own personal security.⁶⁶ The UNDP report listed seven key components to human security; economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, political security, personal security, and community security.⁶⁷ With such a focus on the protection of human beings,

⁶² Lieutenant General Keith J. Stadler, quoted in Blaine Harden, ‘Mayor’s Election in Okinawa is Setback for US Air Base Move’, *The Washington Post*, January 25th 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/24/AR2010012401450.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

⁶³ Monica den Boer and Jaap de Wilde, ‘Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Human Security’, in Monica den Boer and Jaap de Wilde (eds.), *The Viability of Human Security* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), p. 10.

⁶⁴ As previously mentioned, these threats include Chinese aggression and North Korean nuclearisation (see p. 9): Roy, *The Pacific War and its Political Legacies*, p. 185; Ash Carter, ‘The Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Security: Building a Principled Security Network’, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December (2016), pp. 71, 73; Ambassador Susan Rice, ‘Explaining President Obama’s Rebalance Strategy’, *Medium*, September 5th 2016, <https://medium.com/@ObamaWhiteHouse/explaining-president-obamas-rebalance-strategy-eb5f0e81f870>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

⁶⁵ Amitav Acharya, ‘Human Security: East versus West’, *International Journal*, 56.3 (2001), p. 444; den Boer and de Wilde, ‘Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Human Security’, p. 10; Vivienne Taylor, ‘From State Security to Human Security and Gender Justice’, *Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity*, No. 59: Women in War (2004), p. 66.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 445; *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 445.

human security has been inextricably linked with human rights and, specifically for this study, women's rights.⁶⁸

From the meeting of over 30,000 activists at the 1995 Beijing Conference the 'Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action' were formulated, the first specifically feminist conception of human security.⁶⁹ The 'Beijing Declaration' states that "women's rights are human rights; [and] local, national, regional and global peace is attainable and is inextricably linked with the advancement of women, who are a fundamental force for leadership, conflict resolution and the promotion of lasting peace at all levels".⁷⁰ The 'Platform for Action' built on these assertions and, along with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, formally designated the protection of women from militarised violence as a fundamental human right.⁷¹ From this basis, feminist activists have built on the ideas of human security, arguing that militarised violence against women is the product of unequal power relations, and while men hold a monopoly on power; through making policy decisions, conducting diplomacy, and deploying militaries, it will never end.⁷²

Betty Reardon argues that women suffer as much from the threat of violence as they do from the physical act of violence, and by living in this constant state of fear they can never achieve complete personal security.⁷³ From this perspective, the idea of militarised security is a misnomer, as women, by and large, do not need to be protected from external threats but from those that come from within their own communities. Cynthia Enloe builds on Reardon's position, and contends that even the presence of a friendly military leads to insecurity for women. She argues that, for the US military, basing decisions are not made by considering the potential benefits to the local community but on the answer to the question "How well does this proposed rule or practice serve the military's priorities?"⁷⁴ Mesok argues that the military's priorities are not, in fact, to bring peace, but to ensure their own dominance, which they achieve through systemic violence, including sexual assault.⁷⁵ Therefore, these women do not believe that the US military can ever live peacefully with host communities,

⁶⁸ Jaap de Wilde, 'Speaking or Doing Human Security?', in Monica den Boer and Jaap de Wilde (eds.), *The Viability of Human Security*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), p. 236.

⁶⁹ Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, 'Demilitarizing Security', p. 157.

⁷⁰ United Nations, 'Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action', *the Fourth World Conference on Women*, October 27th 1995, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dde04324.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018), Articles XIV, XVIII, p. 3.

⁷¹ This Security Council Resolution was passed in October 2000. Betty A. Reardon, *Key Texts in Gender and Peace*, (New York: SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice, Volume 27, 2015), p. 95.

⁷² Radhika Coomaraswamy, 'Human Security and Gender Violence' *Economic and Political Weekly*, 40.44/45 (2005) p. 4729.

⁷³ Reardon, *Key Texts in Gender and Peace*, p. 113; Reardon, 'Gender and Global Security', p. 38.

⁷⁴ Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), p. 137.

⁷⁵ Mesok, 'Sexual Violence and the US Military', p. 45.

because every decision they take is “aimed at threatening, dominating, and conquering others”.⁷⁶ As such, the military imprints “the mentality of violence into individual human beings through training, exercises, and real war”.⁷⁷ A feminist-centred human security policy therefore sees the eradication of militarism, and the promotion of peace, as vital before genuine security can be achieved. Peace and justice have not, historically, been mutually exclusive but these analysts argue that, just because this has been true previously, does not mean it should continue to be so into the future. In other words, human security is not, and should not be, a “zero sum game” where one group gains at the expense of another.⁷⁸

Two very different conceptions of security are therefore utilised by feminist anti-base protestors and the policymakers of the US-Japan security alliance. By viewing the international security environment through these two theoretical frames, the two sides do not just come out with different ideas of what security should aim to protect, they also have very different understandings of how this protection can best be achieved. Arguably, it is this disparity that is at the heart of the stalemate in the Okinawa situation. In other words, the two sides lack common ground in part because they have very different ideas of what security is, and what it should be deployed to protect. Stemming from this is also a dissimilitude in ideas, relating to how the problem of sexual assault committed by US military personnel should be dealt with. It is these issues that will be explored in greater detail in the following chapters.

⁷⁶ Suzuyo Takazato, quoted in Ichiyo Muto, ‘Redefine and Practice Our Peace, Our Security, If They Do Theirs’, *Social Justice*, 27.4 (2000) p. 140.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Reardon, ‘Gender and Global Security’, p. 37.

Chapter I: The 1995 Rape

“I had taken the bases for granted till I came to know how frightening they are, but the fact that I have been ignorant frightens me more.”⁷⁹

On September 4th 1995, two US Marines and one US Sailor, stationed at Camp Hansen in Okinawa, kidnapped and raped a 12-year-old girl as she was walking home from a local shopping mall.⁸⁰ In the days that followed, outrage grew across Okinawa, fed by the knowledge that the three suspects had set out that evening with the primary purpose of finding a woman to rape, and had rented a car and purchased duct tape for that very purpose.⁸¹ Despite the obviously distressing nature of the crime, US officials appeared, at least, to approach it with indifference. Arrest warrants were issued on September 8th, but US authorities refused to hand the three suspects over.⁸² As this stalemate continued, reports began to emerge that the suspects were being allowed to roam free on base, and were spending their time “lolling around the pool at Camp Hansen eating hamburgers”.⁸³ Responding to mounting pressure from these revelations, military authorities finally transferred the suspects on September 29th, but by this point it was too late to contain the anger felt by Okinawans.⁸⁴ In October, 85,000 took part in the Naha ‘People’s Rally’, protesting against the rape and how US military authorities had dealt with it, and calling for the removal of all US bases and personnel from Okinawa.⁸⁵

Considering the strong reaction to the delay in transferring the suspects, there was a surprising lack of public response to the actual handover. If Okinawan’s primary concern was that the suspects

⁷⁹ This is the comment of an Okinawan high school girl, recorded by her teacher in the aftermath of the 1995 rape: Enloe, *Maneuvers*, p. 113.

⁸⁰ Johnson, *Blowback*, pp. 34, 43; Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa: Effects of Long-Term Military Presence’, *Genuine Security*, 1997 (updated 2007), <http://www.genuinesecurity.org/partners/report/Okinawa.pdf> (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 2.

⁸¹ Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa’, p. 2. In a deposition to his lawyer one of the suspects admitted that they had decided to find a woman to rape because they did not have the money to hire a prostitute: Teresa Watanabe, ‘Okinawa Rape Suspect's Lawyer Gives Dark Account: Japan: Attorney of accused Marine says co-defendant admitted assaulting 12-year-old girl 'just for fun.'’, *The LA Times*, October 28th 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-10-28/news/mn-62075_1_japanese-girl, (accessed May 10th 2018).

⁸² Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 43; Fukumura and Matsuoka, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 51.

⁸³ There is no indication in the sources, or literature, as to where this information came from. However, it can be presumed that these leaks originated from someone sympathetic to the protestors cause. That the US military did not openly deny them, and that this information prompted the US to transfer the suspects into Japanese custody, suggests it was more than just rumours designed to stoke tensions. Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 68; Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

⁸⁴ Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 43; Fukumura and Matsuoka, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 51.

⁸⁵ Takazato, ‘Report from Okinawa’, p. 46; Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, p. 68; Xu, ‘The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance’; Fukumura and Matsuoka, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 50.

were not being brought to justice, it would be reasonable to expect that handing them over would have satisfied protestors and diffused the situation. That this did not happen suggests that the anger felt by Okinawans was directed against something more than just the US military's refusal to transfer the three suspects. Both the role played by the SOFA in the US decision to retain custody of the suspects,⁸⁶ and previous crimes which had gone largely unaddressed, likely contributed to this anger.⁸⁷ It is therefore arguable that all these factors contributed to the crisis that gripped Okinawa in 1995.

From the perspective of the security alliance, "the rape was a political bombshell that shocked both sides of the Pacific".⁸⁸ It led policymakers to realise that, if they didn't take control of the situation, the future of the alliance itself might be in danger.⁸⁹ To achieve this, the SCC established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to recommend ways to salvage the situation.⁹⁰ For these policymakers, demonstrating their remorse through affirmative action offered an acceptable, and achievable, resolution to the crisis.

For activists, and feminist anti-base activists in particular, the rape and the official response to it offered an opportunity to launch a renewed campaign of protest against the US military presence and participating in the Beijing Conference had given the women of OWAAMV the knowledge and skills necessary to do this. The particularly heinous nature of the rape provided the ideal circumstances in which to present this challenge. These women were a central force in the organising of the 'People's Rally', but, unlike other participants, their protest was not just against the rape and the US military's response. It was against the very presence of US military bases and personnel in Okinawa.⁹¹

The period immediately following the rape therefore marks a time of great change in how the "Okinawa issue" was perceived by both sides. This chapter will consider these changed perceptions to address a number of points. First, it will study documents published by the SACO, and the final

⁸⁶ Hilary E. MacGregor, 'Rape Case Furor Provokes Legal Review by U.S., Japan: Diplomacy: Tokyo wants custody of three GIs accused of assaulting a Japanese girl, 12', *The LA Times*, September 22nd 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-09-22/news/mn-48701_1_japanese-police, (accessed May 10th 2018). The role played by the SOFA will be explored in more detail in Chapter II.

⁸⁷ Prior to 1995 the US military were recorded as having committed a range of high-profile crimes in Okinawa, including murders, rapes, robberies, drunk and disorderly behaviour and traffic violations. Many analysts highlight how these incidents had hardened local feeling against the US military bases, and that the 1995 was the final straw: Kirk and Francis, 'Redefining Security', pp. 247-248; Roy, *The Pacific War and its Political Legacies*, pp. 182, 191; Xu, 'The US-Japan Security Alliance'; Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, p. 82; Inoue, Purves and Selden, 'Okinawa Citizens, US Bases and the Security of Asia', p. 264.

⁸⁸ Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 76.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikeda, Minister of State for Defense Usui, Secretary of Defense Perry, and Ambassador to Japan Mondale, 'The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report', *The Special Action Committee on Okinawa*, April 15th 1996, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/seco.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 1.

⁹¹ Takazato, 'Report from Okinawa', p. 46.

statement of the April 1996 Summit between President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto, to question just how much of a crisis the rape and subsequent protests caused, as well as how policymakers approached a solution to this crisis. The publications of OWAAMV will then be studied, to consider how their activism developed in the wake of the rape, and what they considered to be an acceptable solution. Finally, it will consider what both sides learnt from 1995, and how this impacted their future decisions and behaviours. This chapter seeks to outline what exactly made the situation in 1995 unique, in order to determine why it has been so influential on both sides, and how it set the stage for a conflict which would continue into the present day.

The Security Consultative Committee and SACO, 1995-1996

In order to tackle the crisis in Okinawa the SCC, in November 1995, established the SACO with two central goals. These were to “reduce the burden [of the US military presence] on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-US alliance”.⁹² This was the first time that the SCC had explicitly acted to improve their relationship with the Okinawan communities who lived alongside the US bases. This decision was arguably taken as the size, and ferocity, of the anti-base protests made policymakers realise that, without local support, the future of the security alliance itself could be under threat.⁹³ The importance of this concern is highlighted by the SACO ‘Interim Report’ and ‘Final Report’, both of which repeatedly mention the desire of the SCC to strengthen the security alliance, through mitigating the impact of the bases on the people of Okinawa.⁹⁴

At the ‘People’s Rally’, protestors made specific demands against the security alliance and the US base network in Okinawa. This included a reduction in the number of US bases, the revision of the SOFA, and the adoption of policies that would respect the constitutional right of Okinawans to live in peace.⁹⁵ In its ‘Final Report’, the SACO attempted to deliver on some of these demands. One

⁹² Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikeda, Minister of State for Defense Kyuma, Secretary of Defense Perry, and Ambassador Mondale, ‘The SACO Final Report’, *The Special Action Committee on Okinawa*, December 2nd 1996, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html>, (accessed March 23rd 2018), p. 1.

⁹³ Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 76; No SCC documents are available for the period before September 1995, except for the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and related agreements. All other governmental documents relating to the US military presence in Asia do not mention the importance of the agreement of the Okinawan people for the existence of bases, demonstrating that this is a substantial change in outlook for the SCC and the two governments. All SCC documents used were located on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Japan Ministry of Defense: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, March 14th 2018, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/index.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Ministry of Defense of Japan, ‘Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (two-plus-two) and Alliance’, *Ministry of Defense of Japan*, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/index.html, (accessed May 10th 2018).

⁹⁴ It occurs three times in the introduction to the Interim Report and six times in the Final Report: Ikeda, Usui, Perry and Mondale, ‘The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report’, p. 1; Ikeda, Kyuma, Perry and Mondale, ‘The SACO Final Report’, p. 1.

⁹⁵ Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, pp. 65-66.

way in which they did this was by promising the return of the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma (MCAS Futenma) to Okinawan ownership. MCAS Futenma, located in the middle of the crowded city of Ginowan, was considered by Okinawan residents to be one of the most dangerous US bases, thanks to its close proximity to many schools, hospitals, and residential areas.⁹⁶ By promising to return such a controversial installation, the SACO therefore demonstrated both their commitment to reducing the impact of the US presence in Okinawa, and their understanding of the significance of the rape and protests. This demonstrates that the two governments realised they had to do “something big” to illustrate their commitment to solving the crisis in Okinawa.⁹⁷

The severity of the crisis, and the desire of the US and Japanese governments to show that they were acting to resolve it, is further reflected in the April 1996 meeting of Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton. In the ‘Joint Declaration’ released after the meeting, the two leaders emphasise that “the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the smooth stationing of US forces in Japan, which is the core element of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements”.⁹⁸ This mirrors the sentiments implicit in the SACO reports, that the continued stationing of US troops in Okinawa is reliant on the support of local communities. While the statement does not mention the crisis itself, the proclamation that “the Prime Minister and the President reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce US facilities and areas [in Okinawa]” demonstrates that they were aware of the situation, and were acting, in part, to remedy it.⁹⁹ Although it is left unsaid, it can be presumed that consolidating, realigning and reducing US facilities and areas will help to secure this “broad support and understanding”. That this issue was being addressed by the two heads of state further demonstrates how serious the crisis was, especially considering that the Okinawan bases are just one aspect of a multi-faceted, and otherwise relatively successful, alliance.

A number of analysts argue that, during the summit, Prime Minister Hashimoto demanded the return of MCAS Futenma, and President Clinton agreed, as it was an efficient way to satisfy protestors and maintain the integrity of the security alliance.¹⁰⁰ However, the fact that the reference to Okinawa in the Hashimoto-Clinton ‘Joint Declaration’ doesn’t occur until page four, after five articles

⁹⁶ Shannon Tiezzi, ‘Beyond Futenma: Okinawa and the US Base Conundrum’, *The Diplomat*, November 4th 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/beyond-futenma-okinawa-and-the-us-base-conundrum/>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 47.

⁹⁷ Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 77.

⁹⁸ This is a sentiment that features twice in the statement: Hashimoto and Clinton, ‘Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security’, pp. 1, 4.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Inoue, Purves and Selden, ‘Okinawa Citizens, US Bases and the Security of Asia’ p. 264; Murata, ‘The 1990s’, p. 227; Xu, ‘The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance’.

reaffirming the commitment of both sides to the security alliance, suggests that the situation was not perhaps as important to the summit as analysts attest. Although it could be argued that, by including the only reference to the Okinawa situation towards the end of the ‘Joint Declaration’, the two governments were purposefully playing down its severity. This meeting between the two heads of state has been described as the “most significant” of the post-Cold War era, and a reason for this could be that the Okinawa rape was the most significant crisis to befall the alliance in decades.¹⁰¹

What is missing from these three documents is any mention of reducing the number of US personnel in Okinawa. This is significant as it was one of the key demands of protestors.¹⁰² Its omission is all the more surprising, considering that the SACO was established in response to the uproar after a rape committed by three US personnel.¹⁰³ Although this could merely be considered an oversight, which would lead to the conclusion that US personnel were implicitly included, it could also be seen as an attempt to amend basing strategy and military activities without physically removing any personnel from Okinawa. US military personnel are mentioned twice in the introduction to the ‘Final Report’, but any changes to their numbers or composition are absent. Instead it is stated that “operational procedures” will be adjusted, and that the SACO is committed to “reduc[ing] the *impact of the activities* of US forces on communities in Okinawa.”¹⁰⁴ Similarly, in Article IV(b) of the Hashimoto-Clinton ‘Joint Declaration’ the two leaders agree “that continued US military presence is... essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region... [which] requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel”.¹⁰⁵ This decision is in line with the 1995 ‘United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region’, which commits to maintaining the forward presence of the US military in the region, including in Okinawa.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ Secretary of Defense Perry, quoted in: Cerson, ‘Architecture of US Asia-Pacific Hegemony’, p. 402.

¹⁰² Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 66.

¹⁰³ The status of US military personnel, the civilian component and their dependents is mentioned explicitly in eleven of the twenty-eight articles of the Status of Forces Agreement and yet they do not occur once in the SOFA related section of the SACO report: Nobusuke Kishi, Aiichiro Fujiyama, Mitsujiro Ishii, Tadashi Adachi, Koichiro Asakai, Christian A. Herter, Douglas McArthur, and J. Graham Parsons, ‘Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, January 19th 1960, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>, (accessed March 23rd 2018); Ikeda, Kyuma, Perry and Mondale, ‘The SACO Final Report’, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰⁴ Emphasis my own: Ikeda, Kyuma, Perry and Mondale, ‘The SACO Final Report’, p. 1. OWAAMV made a similar argument in 1997, stating that “because facilities will be moved to other locations, the SACO proposals represent a modernisation and build-up of US military facilities in Okinawa”: Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa’, p. 8.

¹⁰⁵ Hashimoto and Clinton, ‘Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security’, p. 3.

¹⁰⁶ Like the Hashimoto-Clinton Joint Declaration, this document commits to maintaining 100,000 troops in the Asia-Pacific: William J. Perry, ‘United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region’, *Department of Defense: Office of International Security Affairs*, February 1995, <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19950227.O1E.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 3.

Seen from the perspective of the security alliance, dealing with the crisis that arose from the 1995 rape required two considerations. While it was important to address the concerns of Okinawans, in order to ensure they continued to support the security alliance, this was not to atone for the rape but to ensure that the alliance itself survived this particular crisis. Reacting to the demands of protestors was therefore not done in consideration of this particular crime, but as an attempt to mitigate the anger of Okinawans, so that local support for the US military presence would return. While the SACO reports only briefly mention the importance of maintaining the alliance, the Hashimoto-Clinton ‘Joint Declaration’ is far more explicit in these aims. Reinforcing the alliance was also a key goal of the Clinton Administration, so the fact that it was central to these documents is perhaps unsurprising.

In contrast, feminist anti-base protestors considered the problem, exemplified by the September rape, as something that could not be solved by reducing and consolidating US bases. While the SCC considered the rape to be a “singular tragedy”, that could be atoned for through the SACO recommendations, these protestors saw it as indicative of a much larger and more systemic problem within the US military. The anger that came in its wake therefore offered an opportunity for them to present their arguments.¹⁰⁷



Figure 3: The densely populated city of Ginowan surrounds MCAS Futenma (Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government, 2016.)

¹⁰⁷ Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 35.

Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence and the Okinawa Protests, 1995-1996

The solution to the rape conceptualised by OWAAMV was fundamentally different to that of the SCC and highlights the central issue that permeated the crisis; that the two sides lacked any common ground. For policymakers and US military officials, the rape of a school girl was a “tragedy”, committed by a few “bad apples”, and unrepresentative of the behaviour of “99.99%” of US personnel in Okinawa.¹⁰⁸ For feminist anti-base activists, however, this was just one in a long line of sexual assaults committed by the US military, and another example of why US bases should be removed from Okinawa. Suzuyo Takazato presented this position at a press conference on September 11th 1995, when she argued that “the rape of this young schoolgirl is a violation of the human rights of all the women of Okinawa”.¹⁰⁹

A previous incident, the rape and murder of a 19-year-old woman in 1993, led to similar activism by women’s groups, but resulted in barely any attention from the wider populace or alliance officials.¹¹⁰ The circumstances of the 1995 rape, alongside the authoritative leadership of OWAAMV, ensured that this situation was not repeated.¹¹¹ The impact of OWAAMV’s leadership can be seen in the fact that, initially, the media and traditional anti-base groups remained silent. They feared bringing shame on the victim and were unsure of how to effectively protest such a terrible crime.¹¹² It was women’s organisations, and OWAAMV in particular, who eventually led the wave of protest, organising demonstrations and sit-ins, holding press conferences, and writing letters.¹¹³

Throughout these activities, OWAAMV repeatedly framed the rape, and similar acts of sexual violence, using the language of dominance and exploitation, demonstrating how it was systemic within the military system and not simply the act of “a few bad apples”.¹¹⁴ This framing was arguably used to elicit an emotional response, and situate the violence of the US military within people’s lives, by highlighting the random nature of such acts. This was achieved through the contrasts drawn between the perpetrators and their victim in various statements.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 35, 41; Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 159.

¹⁰⁹ Suzuyo Takazato, quoted in Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 68.

¹¹⁰ Many of the women who protested in 1993 were involved in the founding of OWAAMV in 1995. Enloe, *Maneuvers*, p. 113; Rick Mercier, ‘Way Off Base: The Shameful History of Military Rape in Okinawa’, *On the Issues Magazine*, winter (1997), http://www.ontheissuesmagazine.com/1997winter/w97_Mercier.php, (accessed May 10th 2018).

¹¹¹ The women of OWAAMV later argued that the 1995 rape was so much more controversial in part because “the victim pressed charges... [and] the age of the victim made it very clear that such violence claims victims without distinction”: Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa’, p. 2.

¹¹² Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, p. 67; Gwyn Kirk and John Feffer, ‘Gender and US Bases in the Asia-Pacific’, *Foreign Policy in Focus*, March 14th 2008, http://fpif.org/gender_and_us_bases_in_asia-pacific/ (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 2.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 67.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.; Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

In September 1995 they wrote a letter of protest, where they highlighted the “terror” felt by the victim, and how it was a “gross violation of [her] human rights”.¹¹⁵ Employing personal language such as this starkly contrasts the victim to her attackers. She is mentioned seven times and described as a “young... elementary school girl”.¹¹⁶ Conversely, her attackers, who are only referred to twice are “three US military personnel” without identities or individual agency.¹¹⁷ In this way the letter captures the fear and suffering felt by a young girl, while simultaneously dehumanising those who attacked her.

Like the SCC, OWAAMV continued their campaign into 1996. In February, thirteen women embarked on a ‘Peace Caravan’ to the US, where they visited activists, students and lawmakers.¹¹⁸ Its aim was to raise awareness of US militarisation and military violence in Okinawa.¹¹⁹ In the press release for the ‘Peace Caravan’, the 1995 rape is identified as a key motivator, as it “makes us realise that we must change the situation of living side-by-side with military bases and military personnel in an atmosphere of constant fear and tension.”¹²⁰

It is clear throughout the publications of OWAAMV that, for these women, the rape was not just a singular tragedy that could be remedied, and prevented from reoccurring, by the relocation of some bases. Unlike alliance policymakers, who considered the presence of the US military as vital to the security and prosperity of Japan, OWAAMV considered it as unwanted, and akin to a foreign occupation.¹²¹ From this perspective, they viewed the 1995 rape as an example of the systematic

¹¹⁵ The letter was addressed to President Clinton, Prime Minister Murayama, Aloysius O’Neill, the US Consul to Okinawa, and Wayne Rollings, the Commander of the US Forces in Okinawa: The Participants in the Children’s - Women - Citizens’ Rally on Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women, ‘The Declaration of the “Children - Women - Citizens’ Rally of Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women”’, in Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, *Okinawa Women’s America Peace Caravan (February 3-17 1996)*, September 28th 1995, http://bcw.barnard.edu/archive/militarism/okinawa_womens_american_peace_caravan.pdf (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 7; Keiko Itokazu and Suzuyo Takazato, ‘Dear Friends of Women’, in Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, *Okinawa Women’s America Peace Caravan (February 3-17 1996)*, February 1996, http://bcw.barnard.edu/archive/militarism/okinawa_womens_american_peace_caravan.pdf (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 6. This rally became known as the Okinawan Citizen’s Rally, or the ‘People’s Rally’.

¹¹⁶ The Participants in the Children’s - Women - Citizens’ Rally on Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women, ‘The Declaration of the “Children - Women - Citizens’ Rally of Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women”’, pp. 7-8.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹¹⁸ The ‘Peace Caravan’ visited San Francisco, Washington D.C., New York and Honolulu over a two-week period: Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘America Peace Caravan: Schedule’, in Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, *Okinawa Women’s America Peace Caravan (February 3-17 1996)*, January 30th 1996, http://bcw.barnard.edu/archive/militarism/okinawa_womens_american_peace_caravan.pdf (accessed May 10th 2018), pp. 4-5.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ Suzuyo Takazato and Keiko Itokazu, ‘America Peace Caravan’, in Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, *Okinawa Women’s America Peace Caravan (February 3-17 1996)*, January 1996, http://bcw.barnard.edu/archive/militarism/okinawa_womens_american_peace_caravan.pdf (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 1.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*; Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 160.

violence of the US military and used their activism to emphasise this.¹²² By taking this position the women of OWAAMV left little room for compromise with the policymakers of the SCC, as they shared no common ground on the issue.

Where the SCC established the SACO to recommend ways to reduce the impact of the US military presence on Okinawa, OWAAMV established a number of organisations to work with the victims of militarised sexual violence and educate young people on the dangers of the US military.¹²³ The public nature of both the rape and the reaction against it introduced, for the first time, the idea that the US military could be both threatening and dangerous. This was a fact known by many young Okinawans but ignored, because the US military and its GIs were “cool” and, if a sexual assault was committed, no-one talked about it as it was considered “a private matter”.¹²⁴ The public discussion of the rape therefore allowed OWAAMV the space to establish a number of organisations to work with, and educate, young people.¹²⁵

As well as educating young Okinawans, OWAAMV worked to inform the wider Okinawan population about the dangers of the US military. Previously, the predominantly male anti-base network had side-lined women’s voices because, in their eyes, the issue of violence against women was not political but merely “normal male violence towards women”.¹²⁶ The attack on such a young girl gave OWAAMV a frame through which to present their argument.¹²⁷ Their success in this is demonstrated through the result of a prefecture-wide referendum held in September 1996, which asked: “do you support the continued presence of the US military on Okinawa?”.¹²⁸ In the build-up to the vote, OWAAMV rallied citizens to their cause by invoking memories of the 1995 rape, and asking voters to consider “whose security is being served by the presence of [US] security forces if women and children are harassed and attacked by the military?”.¹²⁹ That this was the first prefecture-wide referendum in Japanese history, and was prompted by the rape and its aftermath, was in itself significant. That ninety percent of voters cast ‘no’ ballots sent the clearest message to policymakers

¹²² For example, in the ‘Peace Caravan’ press release they stated that: “these crimes of sexual violence must be seen not merely as crimes committed by individual soldiers, but as crimes produced by the military system”. Ibid.

¹²³ Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 161.

¹²⁴ Analysts also consider ‘privacy’ to be an issue, and believe that the Japanese culture and legal system sees rape as shameful, and lacks the appropriate mechanisms for correctly dealing with sexual assault: Hisako Motoyama, ‘Not a “Yankees-Go-Home” Solution to the Sexual Violence of the US Military’, *Off Our Backs*, 38.1 (2008), p. 26; Takazato, ‘Report from Okinawa’, p. 46; Inoue, Purves and Selden, ‘Okinawa Citizens, US Bases and the Security of Asia’, p. 264; Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, p. 67.

¹²⁵ These included ‘Young Voice’ and ‘De-Activating our Violent Establishment (DOVE)’: Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 161.

¹²⁶ Enloe, *Maneuvers*, pp. 120, 122.

¹²⁷ Takazato and Kiyomi, ‘The Base and the Military’, p. 66.

¹²⁸ Fukumura and Matsuoka, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 51.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

about the US military presence.¹³⁰ It also highlights that, for the first time, the wider Okinawan public had considered violence against women and children as a central issue.¹³¹

By comparing the ways in which both sides reacted to the crisis, the discord between these two positions can therefore be better understood. While the policymakers of the SCC considered the return of key pieces of land, and minor operational changes, to be sufficient to demonstrate their remorse, and address Okinawan concerns, OWAAMV considered this to be missing the point of their protest. For them “the return of the land by itself does little to solve the problems. . . We want to see a reduction of the functions of the bases, not the size of the land”.¹³² In previous years, the framing of feminist activists had not gained traction within the Okinawan anti-base movement because sexual violence had not been considered as a base issue, but just an unfortunate fact of life. The brutal rape of such a young girl, and the way in which it was handled by the US military, allowed the women of OWAAMV to successfully frame their arguments to the wider Okinawan population, and prevented the rape from being forgotten. Arguably, this is the central reason why this wave of protest did not come to an end with the release of the SACO ‘Final Report’.

The Lessons of 1995

The events of 1995 had a significant impact on both sides in the years that followed, and it is therefore important to determine what each side learnt from it. The lessons learnt by the governmental side can be neatly summed up by a statement, made in Article VI of the Hashimoto-Clinton ‘Joint Declaration’: “The Prime Minister and the President recognised that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the smooth stationing of US forces in Japan, which is the core element of the Japan-US security arrangements”.¹³³ This is arguably a realisation that the SCC and the two governments came to during the course of the furore over the rape.

Prior to September 1995, the US government had not considered the assent of host communities to be significant to its Japanese basing strategy. This is reflected in the ‘United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region’ which, across fifteen pages, does not mention host

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Previously anti-base sentiment had been directed towards issues such as environmental degradation, noise pollution and land appropriation. The women of OWAAMV ensured that violations of women’s rights also became a key motivator for anti-base protests from this point onwards. Ibid; Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, p. 68.

¹³² Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-US Base Protests*, p. 82.

¹³³ Hashimoto and Clinton, ‘Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security’, p. 4.

communities or the importance of their support for the maintenance of US bases.¹³⁴ The SACO 'Final Report', however, appeared to make host communities central to the future of the US military presence in Okinawa, by committing to "seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements", presumably to ensure these agreements had local support.¹³⁵ Similarly, the Hashimoto-Clinton 'Joint Declaration' asserts that the support of host communities is essential to the maintenance of the US-Japan security alliance.¹³⁶ In the context of the mass protests of 1995, and the crisis that these caused in the relationship, this change in attitude can be attributed to the realisation that greater public engagement with host communities was necessary, in order to maintain bases and the forward deployment of troops. Therefore, it is arguable that the two governments learnt that the support of host communities in Okinawa was vital to sustaining the security relationship into the future.

OWAAMV, on the other hand, learnt that their actions could have an impact on the security alliance. The explicit linkage made by SACO, between reducing the burden in Okinawa and strengthening the security alliance, arguably demonstrated to OWAAMV that their actions had the potential to impact the security relationship. The September 1995 rape was not the first act of sexual violence committed by US personnel, but it was the first that elicited an emergency summit between the two heads of state, and the formation of a special committee to deal with Okinawan basing issues. The specific details of the rape allowed these women to frame their anti-base struggle in a new way, which drew not just the Okinawan people but local media and politicians into their protest.¹³⁷ This led to some significant events, for example the decision of the Okinawan governor, Masahide Ota, to refuse to renew land-leases for the US bases, and the framing of the 1996 referendum.¹³⁸ Therefore, it could be claimed that the activities of these women inspired others to protest against the US military presence, directly influencing the formation of the SACO, and the 1996 Hashimoto-Clinton Summit, and demonstrating to the women of OWAAMV the potential weight of their actions.

In many ways, the events of 1995 set the stage for a conflict that would continue into the present day. The SCC took away from the crisis the realisation that, without at least some local support, it would be impossible to maintain the US military presence in Okinawa. Conversely, OWAAMV learnt that, by presenting the bases as threatening to women and girls, they could achieve concessions from policymakers.

¹³⁴ This document does mention how important the support of the American people is for successfully implementing security policies. Presumably this is because US popular opinion was necessary for the government to remain in power, something they did not have to worry about when it came to communities in the Asia-Pacific: Perry, 'United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region', p. 1.

¹³⁵ Ikeda, Kyuma, Perry and Mondale, 'The SACO Final Report', p. 3.

¹³⁶ Hashimoto and Clinton, 'Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security', p. 4.

¹³⁷ Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 67; Takazato, 'Report from Okinawa', p. 46.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

One aspect of the dissonance between the two sides that has been left unexplored by this chapter is the role played by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the document which governs all US military personnel stationed in Japan. Although it was originally designed to ensure that the US military retained its right to use Japanese bases and could do so without the need to adapt its practices to local customs, the SOFA is considered by many to be a symbol of the fundamental inequalities inherent in the US-Japan alliance. It is also one aspect of the crisis in 1995 that has persisted into the present day. While alliance officials believe that the SOFA is vital to maintaining US bases in Japan, OWAAMV, and many other anti-base groups, consider it to be a hangover of American imperialism that allows US personnel to commit crimes with impunity.

Chapter II: The Status of Forces Agreement, A Violation of Human Rights?

*“Our human rights have repeatedly been violated. This is not Japan.”*¹³⁹

One of the most contentious aspects of the US-Japan security alliance, in the wake of 1995, was the role played by the SOFA. Originally signed by the US and Japan under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the SOFA has become increasingly controversial in the decades since, thanks to the ways in which it protects US personnel accused of crimes.¹⁴⁰ In particular, the SOFA ensures that US military personnel serving in Japan are subject to the laws of the US, and not those of Japan.¹⁴¹ Anti-base activists have repeatedly argued that, by protecting US personnel from the Japanese legal system, the SOFA represents a form of American extraterritoriality.¹⁴² Extraterritoriality originated in British imperial practices in nineteenth century China. At this time, unequal treaties between the British and the Chinese ensured “the ‘right’ of a foreigner charged with a crime to be turned over for trial to his own diplomatic representatives in accordance with his national law, not to a Chinese court in accordance with Chinese law”.¹⁴³

By claiming that the SOFA protects both American imperialism and its extraterritorial rights, activists imply that the agreement allows US personnel to behave as they wish, without repercussions.¹⁴⁴ They also argue that, although the SOFA is presented as necessary to maintain the US military presence, it is actually a means for the US to remain dominant, much as they had before reversion in 1972. For many Okinawans, a return to Japanese administration was supposed to end their post-war occupation, a period in which “there was no legal recourse” for crimes committed by US personnel.¹⁴⁵ Instead, they believe that this “occupation” has continued, because the SOFA “is

¹³⁹ Hiroko Oshiro, quoted in Michael Penn, ‘Voices of Okinawa: Standing Against a US Military Base’, *Al Jazeera*, October 4th 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/voices-okinawa-standing-military-base-151004072152389.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

¹⁴⁰ Kishi, Fujiyama, Ishii, Adachi, Asakai, Herter, McArthur and Parsons, ‘Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan’; Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, pp. 250, 270; Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

¹⁴¹ Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 250; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Protests & Campaigns Against US Military Presence’, *International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, October 2015, <http://iwnam.org/2015/10/07/protests-campaigns-against-us-military-presence/>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Al Jazeera, ‘Okinawa Legislators Protest Alleged US Rape’, *Al Jazeera*, October 22nd 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/10/20121022282736909598.html>, (accessed January 10th 2018).

¹⁴² Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Turan Kayaoglu, ‘The Extension of Westphalian Sovereignty: State Building and the Abolition of Extraterritoriality’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 51.3 (2007) p. 650.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 248; Cerson, ‘Architecture of US Asia-Pacific Hegemony’, p. 400; Johnson, *Blowback*, pp. 37, 50.

¹⁴⁵ Hiroko Oshiro, quoted in Penn, ‘Voices of Okinawa’.

above Japanese law”.¹⁴⁶ This is particularly significant as, protestors contend, the SOFA allows US personnel to violate the human rights of Okinawans.¹⁴⁷ This argument has gained traction through the controversial role the SOFA has played in many rape cases.

While the US holds similar agreements with every country that hosts military bases these inequalities, which allow the US military to circumvent national legal systems, exist only in the agreements signed with Asian states, particularly Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.¹⁴⁸ They do not, for instance, exist in the agreements between the US and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies. For example, the US-German SOFA guarantees that German police officers will be on duty inside US bases at all times, while the Italian military administers all US bases in Italy.¹⁴⁹ Gwyn Kirk and John Feffer argue that these imbalances “are rooted in histories of annexation, colonisation, exploitation, and war”, and that sexual assaults committed by US personnel in these states are ignored because of the power dynamics of dominance and subordination that exist between the US and its host nations.¹⁵⁰

This chapter will explore these debates over the SOFA in more detail, to question how these two competing understandings of what the agreement is, and the role it plays in these cases, have contributed to the conflict between the two sides. Firstly, it will consider how, in the eyes of many protestors, these agreements represent an extension of Western extraterritoriality, which impacts on host nation sovereignty and ensures that unequal relations continue. It will then explore how this debate over the SOFA has continued over time and, in particular, how each side has used it to raise the issue of human rights. While US policymakers argue that the SOFA is vital for protecting the human rights of military personnel, who are not adequately protected under the Japanese legal system, protestors argue that it undermines the human rights of Okinawans, and particularly women and girls, by preventing prosecutions. While this anti-SOFA message began with OWAAMV, over the years it has disseminated into the rest of Okinawan society. Finally, this chapter will consider how shared concerns over the protections offered by these agreements led to the formation of a transnational, feminist, anti-base network; the International Women’s Network Against Militarism (IWNAM).

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.; Takazato, quoted in Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 68.

¹⁴⁸ While South Korea signed a SOFA with the US after the Korean War, the Philippines and the US have a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) as there are no permanent US bases in the Philippines: Cornwell and Wells, ‘Deploying Insecurity’, pp. 409-412.

¹⁴⁹ Hojin Fukunaga and Takayasu Endo, ‘Japan-US SOFA wildly different from US agreements with Germany, Italy: Okinawa Pref.’, *The Mainichi*, April 22nd 2018, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180422/p2a/00m/0na/005000c>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

¹⁵⁰ Kirk and Feffer, ‘Gender and US Bases in the Asia-Pacific’, p. 1.

Extraterritoriality and the Problem of Sovereignty

In theory, SOFAs are designed “to strike a balance between the jurisdictional rights and demands of the sending and receiving states”.¹⁵¹ In practice, however, “they are generally the only law governing the actions of the US military personnel stationed in foreign countries”.¹⁵² Through providing the “only law” applicable to US personnel, SOFAs act as a modern-day extension of American extraterritoriality.¹⁵³

That the US maintains extraterritorial rights is no accident. Arguably, through negotiating the specific terms of these agreements, the US ensured their personnel would remain immune from local laws and could act, to a certain extent, without consequences.¹⁵⁴ The US were able to gain these favourable terms with the governments of Japan, South Korea and the Philippines thanks to the complex geopolitics of the Cold War, and the unequal power dynamics these ensured.¹⁵⁵ In Japan, the SOFA was signed alongside the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and agreed to by the Japanese government in return for the removal of many inequalities from the original Security Treaty.¹⁵⁶ In South Korea, the SOFA came in the decade after the Korean War, and accompanied a Security Treaty which guaranteed that the US would provide protection from North Korea and China.¹⁵⁷ In the Philippines, even though the presence of US bases was rejected by a Senate vote in 1991, the 1999 ratification of a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) brought back many of the inequalities inherent in the post-war Military Bases Agreement.¹⁵⁸

Alongside these power dynamics, it has been argued that the inequalities in these Asian agreements originated in a particularly racist view of the region held by some US policymakers.¹⁵⁹ This racism is constructed around views of the East as an “alien society”, with little respect for human rights.¹⁶⁰ It manifests itself through the claims, made by US military, that if they surrender suspects to local law enforcement their human rights will be threatened, as “Eastern” legal systems do not conform to US standards. This also ensures that the human rights of its personnel are privileged above

¹⁵¹ Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 254.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 250.

¹⁵³ Kayaoglu, ‘The Extension of Westphalian Sovereignty’, p. 650.

¹⁵⁴ Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

¹⁵⁵ Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 251; Cornwell and Wells, ‘Deploying Insecurity’, p. 409.

¹⁵⁶ Packard, ‘The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50’; Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

¹⁵⁷ International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘South Korea’, *International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, May 10th 2015, <http://iwnam.org/2015/05/10/korea/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

¹⁵⁸ Kirk and Feffer, ‘Gender and US Bases in the Asia-Pacific’, p. 1; International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Philippines’, *International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, May 10th 2015, <http://iwnam.org/2015/05/10/philippines/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

¹⁵⁹ Cornwell and Wells, ‘Deploying Insecurity’, p. 409.

¹⁶⁰ Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

those of the local victims of these crimes.¹⁶¹ Although the US military argues its internal justice mechanisms are sufficient to punish crimes, the lack of transparency in these systems leads many protestors to question how seriously they take their commitment to abide by the laws of host nations.¹⁶²

Extraterritoriality is an issue because of its historical connotations. For Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, memories of Western imperialist practices are still fresh and, by ensuring that US personnel are not subject to local laws, these agreements remind citizens of living under occupation.¹⁶³ Specifically, extraterritorial practices ensure that these states remain unequal to the US, even if, in many ways, they have risen to become equally powerful.¹⁶⁴ They also ensure that host nations, by and large, shoulder the costs of the US military presence, including the social costs of dealing with the aftermath of sexual violence.¹⁶⁵ Protestors have therefore repeatedly called for a revision of the SOFA, so that US personnel can be held accountable to local laws and the US military can be made to acknowledge the damage wrought by the US military presence.¹⁶⁶

As well as issues of extraterritoriality, anti-base protestors argue that Status of Forces and Visiting Forces Agreements impact the sovereignty of host nations. While sovereignty is a complex concept to define, in this context it is most effectively conceptualised as the right and the ability of a state to control the people, institutions and resources within its borders and the consent of the people to live under this control.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, by circumventing local laws these agreements threaten the ability of host governments to exercise control within their own territory. This would perhaps matter less if Status of Forces and Visiting Forces Agreements reinforced local laws, but the visibility and volume of controversies surrounding them ensures that the erosion of sovereignty remains a key

¹⁶¹ Ibid.; Penn, 'Voices of Okinawa'; Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 68.

¹⁶² Al Jazeera, 'Okinawa Legislators Protest Alleged US Rape'; Johnson, *Blowback*, pp. 42, 44; Mesok, 'Sexual Violence and the US Military', pp. 62-63; Kirk and Francis, 'Redefining Security', p. 255; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, 'Protests & Campaigns Against US Military Presence'; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, 'Okinawa', p. 6.

¹⁶³ Penn, 'Voices of Okinawa'; Cerson, 'Architecture of US Asia-Pacific Hegemony', p. 401; Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, 'Demilitarizing Security', p. 160.

¹⁶⁴ For example, the economies of Japan and South Korea grew exponentially in the last decades of the twentieth century: Kirk and Feffer, 'Gender and US Bases in the Asia-Pacific', p. 5; Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, 'Demilitarizing Security', p. 161; Cornwell and Wells, 'Deploying Insecurity', p. 409.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.; Ibid., p. 160; Ibid., p. 413.

¹⁶⁶ Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, pp. 66-68; Annie Isabel Fukushima and Gwyn Kirk, 'Military Sexual Violence: From Frontline to Fenceline', *Foreign Policy in Focus*, June 17th 2013, http://fpif.org/military_sexual_violence_from_frontline_to_fenceline/, (accessed May 10th 2018); Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, 'Protests & Campaigns Against US Military Presence'.

¹⁶⁷ Samuel M. Makinda, 'Security and Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific', *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 23.3 (2004), p. 407.

issue.¹⁶⁸ While, in theory, the signing of treaties is a legitimate way for one state to impact on the sovereignty of another, the lack of popular consent for these kinds of agreements ensures that domestic legitimacy is absent.¹⁶⁹ It is not only those communities that live with US bases that reject these agreements, throughout Japan many policymakers and legal experts also challenge the fine print in the SOFA.¹⁷⁰ With this popular opposition, the ways in which the SOFA was invoked in the wake of the 1995 rape inevitably led to a rise in popular protest over it, which has not abated since.

The SOFA as an “Unequal Treaty”, 1995-1996

After the 1995 rape, activists argued that the inequalities present in the SOFA, which initially hindered the progress of the case, provided a compelling reason for its revision. Their position was based on a number of factors which came to light in September 1995. Initially, the US military were reluctant to transfer the suspects into Japanese custody. According to Article XVII of the SOFA; “the custody of an accused member of the United States armed forces... shall, if he is in the hands of the United States, remain with the United States until he is charged by Japan”.¹⁷¹ When the arrest warrant was issued, the three suspects were already back on base and the US military therefore argued that they had the right to retain custody until they were indicted in court.¹⁷² Although it was not uncommon for the US military to invoke this clause, the massive outcry it caused, particularly in light of reports that the three suspects were living freely within the base, convinced them to capitulate.¹⁷³

This was not the only controversial aspect of the SOFA. Article XVII(9) outlines what a suspect is entitled to while in Japanese custody, and through arguing for this clause to be honoured the US military further angered Okinawan protestors. This includes “a prompt and speedy trial... to

¹⁶⁸ Examples of when this argument has been invoked across the Asia-Pacific include: Yeo, ‘Not in Anyone’s Backyard’, p. 574; Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 65; Kirk and Feffer, ‘Gender and US Bases in the Asia-Pacific’, pp.1-5; Fukushima and Kirk, ‘Military Sexual Violence’.

¹⁶⁹ Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 7-8; Beetham argues that legitimacy can be ensured if the political class of the dominant power, and the political class of the subordinate power, freely enter into an agreement that violates sovereignty: David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 12, 19.

¹⁷⁰ Examples of this include the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives who, in 2001, voted unanimously for a revision of the SOFA; the Japan Federation of Bar Associations which published a point of opinion on possible SOFA revisions in 2014, and the Democratic Party of Japan who, in 2009, campaigned on a platform that included a comprehensive SOFA revision plan: Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Japan Federation of Bar Associations, ‘Opinion with Respect to the Status of Forces Agreement between Japan and the United States’, *Japan Federation of Bar Associations*, February 20th 2014, https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/opinionpapers/20140220_2.html, (accessed May 10th 2018); Smith, *Japan’s New Politics and the US-Japanese Alliance*, p. 9.

¹⁷¹ Kishi, Fujiyama, Ishii, Adachi, Asakai, Herter, McArthur and Parsons, ‘Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan’, Article XVII(5)(c), p. 12.

¹⁷² Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

¹⁷³ Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa’, p. 6; Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 255; Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

have legal representation of his own choice for his defence... to have the services of a competent interpreter... [and] to communicate with a representative of the Government of the United States".¹⁷⁴ The differences between the Japanese and American legal systems mean that many of these are not guaranteed to suspects in Japanese custody. For example, in Japan trials may take up to a year, and it is uncommon to have legal representation, or contact with other officials, during the period of questioning.¹⁷⁵ Further, the US could easily argue that any translator provided by the Japanese authorities is not "competent" in their eyes.¹⁷⁶ These stipulations effectively nullify the aspects of Article XVII that give legal jurisdiction to Japan, and are regularly used by the US military to argue that handing a suspect over to local authorities before they are indicted would be a violation of their human rights.¹⁷⁷

Invoking the SOFA in this way did little to improve relations between the US military and the Okinawan people. In particular, OWAAMV argued that the fundamental problem with the SOFA was its inability to "protect the human rights of women and children", and that, because of this, it needed fundamental revisions that would properly take into account the damage done by the US military to host communities.¹⁷⁸ They maintained this position throughout 1995 and 1996, as they repeatedly called for substantial revisions which would ensure these rights, and sufficiently punish those personnel who commit acts of sexual violence.¹⁷⁹ The severity of the rape, and the apparent reluctance of US military authorities to act to remedy it, helped this anti-SOFA message translate into the rest of Okinawan society. That it was a key demand in the 'People's Rally' highlights how

¹⁷⁴ Kishi, Fujiyama, Ishii, Adachi, Asakai, Herter, McArthur and Parsons, 'Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan', Article XVII(9)(a), (9)(e), (9)(f), (9)(g), p. 12.

¹⁷⁵ Watanabe, 'Okinawa Rape Suspect's Lawyer Gives Dark Account'; Johnson, 'Three Rapes'.

¹⁷⁶ This was an argument they used in 2001 when they refused to transfer a suspect, who was a member of the US air force, into Japanese custody: Doug Struck, 'Airman Handed Over to Japan', *The Washington Post*, July 7th 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/07/07/airman-handed-over-to-japan/8332ac05-6abb-47db-9bfd-664d0a8bd5cf/?utm_term=.ca4f2011e0e4, (accessed May 10th 2018); Thom Shanker, 'US and Japan Discuss Transfer of American Rape Suspect', *The New York Times*, July 6th 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/06/world/us-and-japan-discuss-transfer-of-american-rape-suspect.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

¹⁷⁷ Johnson, 'Three Rapes'.

¹⁷⁸ East Asia-US Women's Network Against Militarism, 'Final Statement: Women and Children, Militarism and Human Rights: International Women's Working Conference, Naha City, Okinawa, May 1-4 1997', published in: Gwyn Kirk and Margo Okazawa-Rey, 'Making Connections: Building an East Asia-US Women's Network Against US Militarism', in Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (eds.), *The Women and War Reader*, (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 17-19; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, 'Okinawa', p. 6; Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 68.

¹⁷⁹ Examples include: Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, 'America Peace Caravan: Appeal', in Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, *Okinawa Women's America Peace Caravan (February 3-17 1996)*, January 1996, http://bcw.barnard.edu/archive/militarism/okinawa_womens_american_peace_caravan.pdf (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 11; The Participants in the Children's - Women - Citizens' Rally on Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women, 'The Declaration of the "Children - Women - Citizens' Rally of Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women"', pp. 7-8; Takazato and Itokazu, 'Dear Friends of Women', p. 6; Takazato and Itokazu, 'America Peace Caravan', pp. 1-2.

successful this framing of the SOFA as an “unequal treaty” was.¹⁸⁰ By the time the US military conceded to popular pressure it was too late to turn back the tide of anti-SOFA sentiment. In November, the Okinawa Prefectural Government petitioned the Japanese government for a revision of the SOFA, demanding, amongst other things, that suspects be automatically remanded in Japanese custody.¹⁸¹

The SCC did react to these pressures to some extent, but the changes to the SOFA agreed in April 1996 were not the radical “reappraisal” hoped for by OWAAMV.¹⁸² They instead decided to adjust the implementation procedures of the SOFA. Specifically, the US government agreed to give “sympathetic consideration” to requests for suspects to be transferred into Japanese custody, prior to indictment, if a particularly “heinous crime” had been committed.¹⁸³ The terms used in this amendment were incredibly vague, which many activists argued left much room for interpretation.¹⁸⁴ However, the broad nature of these terms could be seen as ensuring that the widest range of misbehaviours were incorporated into the amendment. Nevertheless, this agreement represented a distinct break with traditional US foreign policy as, even in Europe, crimes committed by US personnel tended to be dealt with almost exclusively by US military courts.¹⁸⁵

The fact that this agreement was even reached is significant and demonstrates the severity of the crisis that engulfed the relationship in 1995-1996. Despite this, anti-base protestors remained unsatisfied. The fundamental inequalities inherent within the SOFA remained unchanged, with the SCC preferring to implement a compromise agreement that would “resolve [the] case to Okinawa’s satisfaction as quickly as possible”.¹⁸⁶ That this solution was not to Okinawa’s satisfaction represents another point of discord between OWAAMV and the policymakers of the SCC.

Anti-SOFA Protests Across Time

In subsequent rape cases, the US military remained resistant to transferring suspects into Japanese custody.¹⁸⁷ In every case, OWAAMV launched protests and employed a rhetoric similar to the one they used in 1995. Even though the protests in 1995 had not led to a substantial review of the

¹⁸⁰ Kirk and Francis, *Redefining Security*, p.251; Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 68.

¹⁸¹ Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa’, p. 6.

¹⁸² The Participants in the Children’s - Women - Citizens’ Rally on Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women, ‘The Declaration of the “Children - Women - Citizens’ Rally of Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women”’, p. 8.

¹⁸³ Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 44; Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 67.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 44; Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 76.

¹⁸⁶ Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 77.

¹⁸⁷ Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

SOFA, the 1996 amendment represented a relative success for OWAAMV, and this encouraged them to continue protesting against the SOFA.

In July 2000, a US Marine was arrested for assaulting a 14-year-old girl. This case was particularly challenging for the US and Japanese governments, as it occurred weeks before the G8 Summit was to be held in Okinawa.¹⁸⁸ Although protests were not specifically directed against the SOFA, the timing meant that US military authorities were keen to concede to Okinawan demands, in order to prevent the simmering resentment from boiling over.¹⁸⁹ This case also led the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly to pass an unanimous vote, in January 2001, demanding a complete withdrawal of the US military from Okinawa.¹⁹⁰ They framed their case through the language of human rights, arguing that “the US-Japan Security Treaty guarantees the security of the nation by ignoring the security of the people”.¹⁹¹ By directly invoking human rights in this way, the position of the Prefectural Assembly closely resembled that adopted by OWAAMV in 1995, demonstrating the ways in which their arguments had entered into popular consciousness.

The 2001 rape of a local woman by a US Airman saw renewed protests against the SOFA. In an attempt to try and avert a crisis, after four days of mounting pressure, the US military reluctantly agreed to transfer the suspect into Japanese custody.¹⁹² This delay convinced Okinawans that the US military was still using the SOFA in an attempt to circumvent the law and undermine human rights. In response, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the attack, anti-base groups called for a revision of the SOFA, and OWAAMV held a rally outside Kadena Air Base, where the suspect was stationed.¹⁹³ That the actions of protestors were so effective is reflected in the change of heart US officials appeared to have in the four days between the arrest warrant being issued and the suspect being transferred. While they initially insisted that various conditions needed to be

¹⁸⁸ Doug Struck, ‘U.S. Apologizes for Incident in Okinawa’, *The Washington Post*, July 11th 2000, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/07/11/us-apologizes-for-incident-in-okinawa/eaefb48-fbfc-4d57-a681-944ca42001fe/?utm_term=.16e49432577f, (accessed May 10th 2018); Christine Cunanan, ‘Japan-U.S. Sexual Assault Case Mars Ties Before G8 Summit’, *Inter Press Service News Agency*, July 10th 2000, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2000/07/japan-us-sexual-assault-case-mars-ties-before-g-8-summit/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

¹⁸⁹ Chalmers Johnson, ‘Okinawa Between the United States and Japan’, *Japan Policy Research Institute Occasional Paper No. 24*, January 2002, <http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op24.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Ibid. (<— Cunanan)

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.; Kiroku Hanai, ‘Time to Revise Unequal SOFA’, *The Japan Times*, December 22nd 2003, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2003/12/22/commentary/time-to-revise-unequal-sofa/#.WvK4yC-Q2u4>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Indianapolis Star, ‘US Hands over Rape Suspect to the Japanese’, *Indianapolis Star*, July 7th 2001 <https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/107628637/>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Shanker, ‘US and Japan Discuss Transfer of American Rape Suspect’.

¹⁹³ Indianapolis Star, ‘US Hands over Rape Suspect to the Japanese’; BBC News, ‘Japan Detains US Rape Suspect’, *BBC*, July 7th 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1427778.stm>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Staff and Agencies, ‘US Rape Suspect Charged in Okinawa’, *The Guardian*, July 19th 2001, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jul/19/japan>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

met, they eventually conceded to Okinawan demands and transferred the suspect without conditions.¹⁹⁴ Although they did not provide a reason for this decision, it is likely that the increased protests, and the threat they posed to the future of the security alliance, played a role.¹⁹⁵

Two further cases, the attempted rape of an Okinawan woman by a US Marine Corps Major, and the rape and assault of a 19-year-old woman by a Marine Lance Corporal, in November 2002 and May 2003 sparked anti-SOFA protests which were again framed through the language of human rights.¹⁹⁶ These incidents angered Okinawans to such an extent that, in June 2003, Governor Inamine undertook a “pilgrimage” to 13 other prefectures hosting US bases to formally ask them to support Okinawa’s calls for SOFA revision.¹⁹⁷ That the prefectures unanimously agreed demonstrates both how damaging the SOFA was to host communities and how OWAAMV’s anti-SOFA arguments had successfully disseminated into Okinawan anti-base discourse.¹⁹⁸ This also represents the first tangible moment where this anti-SOFA sentiment translated into the rest of Japanese society. Until 2003, the protests against the SOFA had been confined to Okinawa, meaning that it was relatively easy for the US and Japanese governments to minimise their impact. With Inamine’s “pilgrimage”, wider Japanese society began to call for the SOFA to be revised.

The 2008 rape of a 14-year-old girl by a US Marine prompted OWAAMV to write a letter of protest to US military and governmental officials.¹⁹⁹ Although this letter does not explicitly call for a revision of the SOFA, it does demand “strict punishment of the perpetrator, tighter discipline and control over soldiers living in off-base housings”, all circumstances out of Japanese control because of the SOFA.²⁰⁰ At the same time, three other women's groups released a statement more explicitly linking the rape with the “unequal US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement”.²⁰¹ It argues that the

¹⁹⁴ Staff and Agencies, ‘US Rape Suspect Charged in Okinawa’; Shanker, ‘US and Japan Discuss Transfer of American Rape Suspect’.

¹⁹⁵ Struck, ‘Airman Handed Over to Japan’.

¹⁹⁶ Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ This letter was addressed to US President George Bush; Kevin Maher, the US Consul General in Naha; and Lieutenant General Richard C. Zilmer, the US Military’s Okinawa Area Coordinator: Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence Statement Regarding Alleged Rape of Japanese Girl by US Marine’, *Feminist Peace Network*, February 13th 2008, <http://www.feministpeacenetwerk.org/2008/02/14/okinawa-women-act-against-military-violence-statement-regarding-alleged-rape-of-japanese-girl-by-us-marine/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ This statement was released by the Asia-Japan Women’s Resource Center, Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace and Femin Women’s Democratic Club: Asia-Japan Women’s Resource Center, Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace and Femin Women’s Democratic Club, ‘We Protest Against Yet Another Case of Sexual Abuse Committed by a US Marine! We Demand a Fair Investigation and Punishment of the Perpetrator, and Fundamental Resolutions to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls’, *Feminist Peace Network*, February 14th 2008, <http://www.feministpeacenetwerk.org/2008/02/14/action-alert-add-your-name-to-statement-on-okinawa-rape/#more-679>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

provisions which ensure “many perpetrators receive no or little punishment” mean that no-one has taken the measures necessary to ensure that similar crimes do not recur.²⁰² This is a criticism that was being echoed across Okinawa.²⁰³ The victim in this case did not press charges, meaning that the US and Japan were not forced to revisit the SOFA. Nevertheless, this case reinforced for Okinawan protestors the fundamental inequalities inherent in the agreement and highlighted the reasons why it needed to be revised.

The SOFA, and its role in addressing these crimes, therefore represents a point of dispute between alliance policymakers and anti-base protestors. While policymakers continued to argue that the SOFA did not impede the punishment of crimes, anti-base protestors believed that the US used the agreement to ensure that their personnel could act with impunity. Similar sexual assaults galvanised protestors in the Philippines and South Korea, and the shared experience of suffering from these led to the foundation of a transnational, feminist, anti-base movement.

The Transnationalisation of Anti-Base and Anti-SOFA Protests

In 1997, the East Asia-US Women’s Network Against Militarism was founded by a group of female activists, teachers and students from the US, Okinawa, mainland Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. Its formation was in direct reaction to the 1995 rape, with the purpose of “shar[ing] information about the negative effects of the US military... especially on women, children, and the environment”.²⁰⁴ The groups who founded this transnational network had been prompted to form their own, national, anti-base groups by circumstances similar to those experienced by OWAAMV in 1995.

In South Korea this was the murder, in October 1992, of Yoon Kum E, a woman who worked in a bar serving US troops.²⁰⁵ This galvanised a group of feminists, human rights activists, students and labour activists to protest together in Seoul and, in 1993, they founded the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by US Troops.²⁰⁶ Like OWAAMV, the National Campaign’s activism was motivated by a number of factors, including US military crimes, “the Korean government’s

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Kaho Shimizu, ‘Okinawa Rape Case Sparks Resentment’, *The Japan Times*, February 13th 2008, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/02/13/national/okinawa-rape-case-sparks-resentment/#.WvLMCy-Q3q0>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

²⁰⁴ Gwyn Kirk and Margo Okazawa-Rey, ‘East Asia-U.S.-Puerto Rico Women’s Network Against Militarism’, *Asia Journal*, November 8th 2003, <http://www.peoplepower21.org/38542>, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 1; Women for Genuine Security, ‘Women Resisting Militarism and Creating a Culture of Life, San Francisco Bay Area: Conference Report’, *International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, September 11th-15th 2007, http://iwnam.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/13_Conference-Statement-WGS2007PressReleaseCompiledWITHFACTSHEETS.pdf, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 1.

²⁰⁵ Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 159.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

submission to the US, and the unequal nature of the SOFA”.²⁰⁷ These women also worked hard to expose the high crime rate of US military personnel in South Korea. Soon after their foundation, the National Campaign released statistics on US military crimes committed in 1991-1992. These revealed that, despite over 2,700 crimes being recorded in this period, only 31 suspects were ever prosecuted.²⁰⁸

In the Philippines, repeated crimes of sexual violence led to the formation of many feminist anti-base groups throughout the 1980s, who successfully protested against the US-Philippine military alliance in 1989.²⁰⁹ Although these efforts were undone with the ratification of the VFA, the volume of popular opposition to the alliance demonstrated how fervently the people were against the US military’s return.²¹⁰ Despite the fact that the US no longer had permanent military bases in the Philippines, one particularly violent crime served to emphasise the ways in which the VFA continued to undermine sovereignty and violate human rights.²¹¹

In 2006, a US Marine was sentenced to forty years in prison for raping a Filipino woman, with the judge specifically requesting that his sentence be served in Manila.²¹² Despite this, the US military requested his transfer to the US Embassy, arguing the VFA stipulated that the US should retain custody of suspects during any appeals process.²¹³ This angered local activists, who considered it another example of American extraterritoriality, and proof that the VFA allowed the US military to circumvent local laws and undermine human rights.²¹⁴ Further cases of sexual assault that never came before local courts serve to demonstrate that this was not a unique incident.²¹⁵ With so many shared experiences, the foundation of a transnational anti-base network made sense for the Japanese, South Korean, Filipino and American women who formed the East Asia-US Women’s Network Against Militarism. That it has expanded over the years to include women from Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Guam further demonstrates that US militarised violence is not an isolated incident.²¹⁶

²⁰⁷Ibid., p. 161.

²⁰⁸ Cornwell and Wells, ‘Deploying Insecurity’, p. 411.

²⁰⁹ Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, pp. 161-162; WeDpro, ‘Brief History’, *WeDpro*, 2018, <http://wedprophils.org/about-us/history/>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, p. 170.

²¹⁰ Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 166.

²¹¹ Mesok, ‘Sexual Violence and the US Military’, pp. 62-63.

²¹² Kirk and Feffer, ‘Gender and US Bases in the Asia-Pacific’, p. 1; Carlos Conde, ‘US Marine Guilty in Philippine Rape Case’, *The New York Times*, December 4th 2006, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/04/world/asia/04end-philippines.html> (accessed May 7th 2018).

²¹³ Conde, ‘US Marine Guilty in Philippine Rape Case’.

²¹⁴ Kirk and Feffer, ‘Gender and US Bases in the Asia-Pacific’, p. 1.

²¹⁵ For example, the grassroots network GABRIELA documented over 2000 cases of sexual assault in the period 1945-2011 that never came before local courts: Mesok, ‘Sexual Violence and the US Military’, p. 63.

²¹⁶ In 2000 the network expanded to include women from Puerto Rico, becoming the East Asia-US-Puerto Rico Women’s Network Against Militarism. In 2007, after women from Hawaii and Guam joined the Network’s meetings, it expanded again to become the International Women’s Network Against Militarism: International Women’s Network

In 1997, after their first meeting, the Network released a ‘Final Statement’ that emphasised how their coming together allowed them “to see the many striking similarities in our various situations”.²¹⁷ This included the prevalence of militarised sexual violence and the tolerance of human rights violations encoded into official agreements between the US and host governments.²¹⁸ Further, the Network argues that these agreements ensure that US military personnel who commit crimes rarely end up being punished in national courts. In their eyes, this encourages a culture of violence and crime, as there are often few visible repercussions for this kind of behaviour.²¹⁹ The demands of the Network have remained consistent over time, and mirror those of OWAAMV, demonstrating how they consider the situation to have remained unchanged. These include the significant revision of Status of Forces and Visiting Forces Agreements, the implementation of adequate human rights protections, and that “the US government ceases circumventing constitutional provisions and national laws in imposing their continued military access of presence”.²²⁰

In both Okinawa and the wider Asia-Pacific this anti-SOFA message had therefore become a tangible part of anti-base protests. While it did not replace the anti-crime message that protestors had initially adopted in September 1995, it did gain prominence and, arguably, marked a point of no return for the policymaker-protestor relationship. While the US have proven open to meeting some demands, for example the realignment of bases and the “sympathetic consideration” of requests for custody in Japan, they have remained completely resistant to calls to revise any SOFAs or VFAs. This, arguably, demonstrates that it is something they are not, and probably will never be, willing to concede to. It therefore seems unlikely that policymakers and protestors will ever agree to reach common ground

Against Militarism, ‘Our Journey’, *International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, 2017, <http://iwnam.org/about/our-journey/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

²¹⁷ East Asia-US Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement: Women and Children, Militarism and Human Rights’, p. 1.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Fukushima and Kirk, ‘Military Sexual Violence’; Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 160.

²²⁰ This specific demand was made in both 1997 and 2000 while, in 2002, 2009, 2012 and 2017 they made similar demands for SOFAs and VFAs to be rescinded, human rights to be upheld and national laws to be respected: Ibid., pp. 1-2; Women for Genuine Security, ‘Women Resisting Militarism and Creating a Culture of Life’, p. 4; International Women’s Summit, ‘Final Statement of the International Women’s Summit to Redefine Security’, *Development Bulletin*, no. 53 (2000), p. 97; East Asia-US-Puerto Rico Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement, Seoul, Korea’, *International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, August 15th-19th 2002, http://iwnam.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/9_KoreanStatement2002east_asian_women.pdf, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 2; International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Conference Statement, Guam’, *International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, September 27th 2009, http://iwnam.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/15_Conference-Statement-Guam-2009.pdf, (accessed May 10th 2018), pp. 1-2; International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Declaration, 8th Gathering: “Forging Nets for Demilitarization and Genuine Security, Puerto Rico and Vieques”’, *International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, February 19th-25th 2012, http://iwnam.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/16_International-Womens-Network-Against-Militarism-8th-Gathering-Forging-Nets-for-Demilitarization-and-Genuine-Security.pdf, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 3; International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement from Okinawa Gathering: “Challenging Militarism and Creating a Sustainable Future”’, June 22nd-26th 2017, *International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, June 26th 2017, <http://iwnam.org/2017/08/22/final-statement-from-okinawa-gathering-june-2017/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

on the role played by the SOFA in the prosecution of crimes and the question of whose human rights should be privileged, particularly as this anti-SOFA message has also been adopted by politicians and lawmakers both within and outside of Okinawa.

Throughout these debates the theme of human rights has remained prominent. OWAAMV's focus on human rights arguably originates in their belief in human security, and their conviction that security policies should protect people's fundamental human rights. Conversely, alliance policymakers remain committed to the idea of militarised security and the protection of the state above all else. That these two conceptions of security are so different points to another reason why this discord between the two sides has remained so pervasive.

Chapter III: The Military or the People? Security Theories and their Implications

*“We stand in solidarity with women worldwide who share similar struggles and vision and declare, ‘We shall not be moved!’”*²²¹

For security alliance policymakers, and OWAAMV, the problem of sexual violence committed by US military personnel has very different causes and very different solutions. While policymakers see each crime as the actions of “a few bad apples”, feminist protestors conceptualise it differently, and consider violence against women to be “an integral part of US military attitudes, training and culture”.²²² These are two competing positions that come from two very different understandings of what constitutes true, or “genuine”, security.²²³ While policymakers consider the main referent object of security to be the state, and see the military as the guarantor of security, feminist anti-base protestors believe security should be focussed on protecting people and their fundamental human rights.²²⁴ These two different perspectives on what security is, and what it should guarantee, and to whom, provide a compelling reason for the lack of common ground between policymakers and protestors in the period 1995-2016.

Many comparisons can be drawn between the disparities in the two conceptions of security and the disparities between the two understandings of the Status of Forces Agreement. For the US government, the SOFA guarantees that military personnel stationed abroad will be accorded the same legal protections as they would if they were based at home. In contrast, for feminist anti-base protestors, the SOFA legitimises military privilege and undermines the human rights of indigenous women and children. Similarly, for policymakers militarised security is the only way to guarantee the long-term protection of the state, which justifies the continued US military presence across the Asia-Pacific. For feminist anti-base protestors, however, militarised security is a contradiction in terms and, while it might theoretically protect the state, it also jeopardises the security of the people who live within it.

²²¹ International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement from Okinawa Gathering’.

²²² Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 159.

²²³ “Genuine security” is a term widely used by feminist anti-base protestors to describe security policies that privilege fundamental human rights and their protection. These groups also use the term ‘true security’ to describe the same thing and, therefore, the two will be used interchangeably in this chapter: Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘East Asia-U.S.-Puerto Rico Women’s Network Against Militarism’, p. 1; Reardon, ‘Gender and Global Security’, p. 30; Ellen-Rae Cachola, Gwyn Kirk, Lisa Natividad, and Maria Reinat Pumarejo, ‘Women Working Across Borders for Peace and Genuine Security’, *Peace Review*, 22.2 (2010), pp. 164, 168, 169.

²²⁴ For a fuller overview of the two different schools of security theory, militarised security and human security, see the ‘Theoretical Framework’.

These two differing ideas of security have remained consistent over time and can be seen through the language used in the documents produced by each side. This chapter will therefore begin by analysing the documents produced by the SCC and OWAAMV, to question how both sides conceptualise true security. This is particularly relevant for the SCC after 2009, when President Obama entered into office. One of the central pillars of Obama's foreign policy was the "Asia Rebalance", which, this chapter will argue, was actually a continuation of policies that had been in place since the 1990s. This chapter will conclude by comparing how each side attempts to address the issue of militarised sexual violence. In particular, it will consider the way in which the US military has tried to deal with the problem on both the micro-level, by punishing individual acts and enforcing discipline, and the macro-level, by proposing that the US Marines be realigned from Okinawa to Guam. That OWAAMV considers these measures to be inadequate reflects how their understanding of human security informs their approach to the problem of militarised sexual violence.

The "Asia Rebalance" and Policymakers Conceptions of "Genuine" Security

In November 2011, President Obama officially announced his administration's new foreign policy strategy, dubbed the "Asia Rebalance".²²⁵ After a decade of protracted conflict in the Middle East, it "sought to reenergise the United States' economic, diplomatic, and military engagement" in Asia.²²⁶ Despite it being presented as a new approach it was, in many ways, a continuation of the policies of previous administrations. At the height of the Cold War, Okinawa hosted 145 US bases, with 50,000 troops forward-deployed across Japan.²²⁷ Despite plans to withdraw US troops after 1989 this forward deployment continued, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and was justified as vital to maintaining "broad regional stability... security and prosperity".²²⁸ In his 2011 speech, President

²²⁵ President Barack Obama, 'Remarks by President Barack Obama to the Australian Parliament', *The White House: President Barack Obama*, November 17th 2011, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Victor Cha, 'The Unfinished Legacy of Obama's Pivot to Asia', *Foreign Policy*, September 6th 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/06/the-unfinished-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

²²⁶ The "Asia Rebalance" strategy was finalised in January 2012 with the 'Defense Strategy Review': Sheila A. Smith, 'A Strategy for the US-Japan Alliance', *Council on Foreign Relations*, April 25th 2012, <https://www.cfr.org/report/strategy-us-japan-alliance>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Kurt Campbell and Brian Andrews, 'Explaining the US 'Pivot' to Asia', *The Asia Group: Chatham House*, August 2013, https://kritisches-netzwerk.de/sites/default/files/explaining_the_us_pivot_to_asia_-_kurt_campbell_and_brian_andrews_-_the_asia_group_-_august_2013_-_9_pages_0.pdf (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 2; Carter, 'The Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Security', p. 66.

²²⁷ Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, p. 136; Enloe, *Maneuvers*, p. 112; Celine Pajon, 'Understanding the Issue of US Military Bases in Okinawa', *Centre for Asian Studies*, June 2010, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/understanding_the_issue_of_u.s._military_bases_in_okinawa.pdf, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 8.

²²⁸ Shorrocks, 'Okinawa and the US Military in Northeast Asia'; Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 75; Perry, 'United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region', p. 2.

Obama used startlingly similar language, stating his belief that a strong US military presence would “advance security, prosperity and human dignity across the Asia-Pacific... which is the foundation of peace and prosperity”.²²⁹ The “Asia Rebalance” was therefore not so much a new, Asia-focussed strategy, but rather the broad continuation of policies that had been adopted under previous presidents.

This continued reliance on the US military to provide peace and security is demonstrated through the language used in SCC documents published after 2009.²³⁰ That the same ideas and justifications were used in their earlier publications highlights the extent to which the Obama administration’s approach was a continuation of pre-existing policies. It also hints at why a stalemate has continued around the US bases in Okinawa. In 2015, the SCC published the new ‘Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation’, updated for the first time since 1997.²³¹ While these updated Guidelines were presented as significantly redesigned to “promote a more balanced and effective Alliance”, much of the document actually remained unchanged from 1997.²³² Both sets of Guidelines commit to maintaining the peace and security of Japan and the region, and highlight the role of bilateral defence cooperation in achieving this.²³³ Both also guarantee the continued forward deployment of “combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific”.²³⁴

This emphasis on the importance of maintaining combat ready forces in Japan is demonstrated by the regularity with which it’s mentioned throughout SCC documents.²³⁵ Of the fourteen released

²²⁹ President Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama to the Australian Parliament’. Similar sentiments were expressed in 1995 in the ‘United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region’. This document spoke of the need to maintain the “presence of substantial United States forces” because “security is like oxygen: you do not tend to notice it until you begin to lose it”: Perry, ‘United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region’, p. 2.

²³⁰ The study of the Obama administration’s policies will cover the period 2009-2016. Although the Asia Rebalance strategy wasn’t announced until 2011, President Obama entered office in January 2009. Therefore, beginning this analysis at the start of his tenure makes sense, as it is likely that the administration was keen to move towards this policy, and made steps in its direction, before it was officially announced.

²³¹ Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida, Minister of Defense Nakatani, Secretary of State Kerry, Secretary of Defense Carter, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: A Stronger Alliance for a Dynamic Security Environment, The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, April 27th 2015, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078186.pdf>, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 2.

²³² The most obvious differences between the two documents are those provisions in the 2015 guidelines for cooperation in cybersecurity and coordinated responses to a potential refugee crisis in the region. Once these specificities are discounted, the two, particularly in their ‘Aims’ and ‘Basic Principles’, are remarkably similar: *Ibid.*, p. 1; Security Consultative Committee, ‘Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Joint Statement, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee’, *Ministry of Defense of Japan*, September 23rd 1997, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/dp04.html, (accessed May 10th 2018), pp. 1-13; Security Consultative Committee, ‘The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, April 27th 2015, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf>, (accessed May 10th 2018), pp.1-23; Carter, ‘The Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Security’, p. 69.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 1; *Ibid.*, p. 1.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3; *Ibid.*

²³⁵ All the documents referred to can be found on the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan and the Ministry of Defense Japan. Tactical plans, maps and the exchange of notes are not included in this analysis as they were all published alongside other documents. It instead refers to press releases, joint statements and agreements published by the SCC: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2+2)’, *Ministry of Foreign*

between 2009 and 2016, six explicitly mention the importance of a “robust US military presence in Japan... including in Okinawa”, while a further three highlight the US commitment to maintaining “the defense of Japan and the peace and security of the region, including through the full range of US military capabilities”.²³⁶ This was also an important consideration for previous US administrations, further demonstrating the extent to which Obama continued the policies of his predecessors. Despite the crisis in 1995, and the calls for the removal of all US troops and bases in its wake, all three SCC documents published in 1996 emphasised the importance of combat ready troops remaining in Okinawa.²³⁷ From 1997 to 2009 it was reiterated in a further six documents, out of a total of twelve published in this period.²³⁸ Therefore, maintaining combat ready troops in Okinawa continued to be

Affairs of Japan, August 17th 2017, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/index.html> (accessed May 23rd 2018); Ministry of Defense of Japan, ‘Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (two-plus-two) and Alliance’.

²³⁶ Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Panetta, Minister for Foreign Affairs Gamba, Minister of Defense Tanaka, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, April 27th 2012, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/pdfs/joint_120427_en.pdf, (accessed May 23rd 2018), p. 1. This exact wording is used only in the 2012 Joint Statement but the importance of a US military presence in Japan, including in Okinawa, also features in the following documents: Minister for Foreign Affairs Okada, Minister of Defense Kitazawa, Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, ‘Joint Statement of The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Marking the 50 Anniversary of the Signing of The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, January 19th 2010, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/joint1001.html>, (accessed May 23rd 2018); Clinton, Gates, Okada, Kitazawa, ‘Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee’; Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsumoto, Minister of Defense Kitazawa, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Progress on the Realignment of US Forces in Japan’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, June 21st 2011, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_02.pdf, (accessed May 23rd 2018); Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida, Minister of Defense Onodera, Secretary of State Kerry, Secretary of Defense Hagel, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, October 3rd 2013, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000016028.pdf>, (accessed May 23rd 2018); Security Consultative Committee, ‘The United States-Japan Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status, Including the Civilian Component’, *Ministry of Defense of Japan*, July 5th 2016, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20160705_e.html, (accessed May 23rd 2018). The comment on maintaining full military capabilities occurs in the following documents: Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsumoto, Minister of Defense Kitazawa, ‘Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, June 21st 2011, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf, (accessed May 23rd 2018); Kishida, Nakatani, Kerry, Carter, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: A Stronger Alliance for a Dynamic Security Environment’.

²³⁷ Ikeda, Usui, Perry, and Mondale, ‘The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report’, p. 1; Ikeda, Usui, Perry, and Mondale, ‘The SACO Final Report’, p. 2; Perry, Mondale, Ikeda, Kyuma, ‘Joint Announcement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee’ p. 1; This fact was also mentioned in: Hashimoto and Clinton, ‘Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security’, pp. 2-3.

²³⁸ The documents it featured in were published in 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2007: Security Consultative Committee, ‘Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation’; Albright, Cohen, Kono, Torashima, ‘Joint Statement, Security Consultative Committee’; Security Consultative Committee, ‘Joint Statement, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, December 16th 2002, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0212.html>, (accessed May 23rd 2018); Security Consultative Committee, ‘Joint Statement, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, February 19th 2005, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/pdfs/joint0502.pdf>, (accessed May 23rd 2018); Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs Machimura, Minister of State for Defense Ohno, ‘U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, October 29th 2005, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/pdfs/doc0510.pdf>, (accessed May 23rd 2018); Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso,

a central tenet of both the US-Japan security alliance and the broader US presence in the Asia-Pacific region from 1995 to 2016. That it remained so significant demonstrates the centrality of the US military to the government's conception of security.

As well as maintaining the forward deployment of military personnel, the Obama administration presented the presence of US bases in Okinawa as key to ensuring the security of both Japan and the wider region. This is most clearly demonstrated through the debates surrounding the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). As part of the SACO 'Final Report', the SCC recommended that MCAS Futenma be closed, and the land returned to the Okinawan people in order to reduce the burden of the US presence.²³⁹ Despite this, in 1997, it was announced that a replacement facility was to be built at Henoko Bay, in northern Okinawa, and the personnel from Futenma relocated to this new base. The exact location of the FRF was decided by the SCC in 2005, after they recognised that the original SACO plan had come up against extensive problems in the intervening period.²⁴⁰ Protests against the construction of this facility were frequent, but the US government remained wedded to the FRF policy as a way to both fulfil the commitments of the SACO report, and maintain the presence of the US Marines in Okinawa.²⁴¹

US policy towards Japan and the Asia-Pacific therefore remained largely consistent after 1995. One explanation for this could be that, in the eyes of policymakers, the regional situation did not change significantly in this time. In 1995, the US justified its continued military presence in Japan and South Korea with lessons learned from past conflicts, that: "Asian tensions have the potential to

Minister of State for Defense Kyuma, 'Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 1st 2007, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/pdfs/joint0705.pdf>, (accessed May 23rd 2018).

²³⁹ Security Consultative Committee, 'The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, December 2nd 1996, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco2.html>, (accessed May 23rd 2018); Ikeda, Usui, Perry, and Mondale, 'The SACO Final Report', p. 2.

²⁴⁰ Rice, Rumsfeld, Machimura, and Ohno, 'U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future', p. 11; Reimann, 'Security Issues and New Transnational Peace-Related Movements in East Asia', p. 70; Inoue, Purves and Selden, 'Okinawa Citizens, US Bases and the Security of Asia', p. 264.

²⁴¹ Okinawan resistance to the FRF is covered by a number of news reports and secondary literature, including: Penn, 'Voices of Okinawa'; McCurry, 'Thousands protest at US bases on Okinawa after Japanese woman's murder'; Martin Fackler, 'Shinzo Abe Faces Growing Wrath of Okinawans Over US Base', *The New York Times*, July 3rd 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/05/world/asia/shinzo-abe-faces-growing-wrath-of-okinawans-over-us-base.html>, (accessed May 23rd 2018); Eric Johnston, 'Opposition to Futenma Move Won't Go Away', *The Japan Times*, October 19th 2009, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/10/19/news/opposition-to-futenma-move-wont-go-away/#.WmDosSOZN-V>, (accessed May 23rd 2018); Harden, 'Mayor's Election in Okinawa is Setback for US Air Base Move'; Packard, 'The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50'; Envall and Ng, 'Okinawa, the US-Japan Alliance, and Asia-Pacific Security', p. 4; Pajon, 'Understanding the Issue of US Military Bases in Okinawa', p. 19; Gwyn Kirk and Christine Ahn, 'Democracy Thwarts US Base Plans', *Foreign Policy in Focus*, February 10th 2010, http://fpif.org/democracy_thwarts_us_base_plans/, (accessed May 23rd 2018); Lisa Natividad and Gwyn Kirk, 'Fortress Guam: Resistance to US Military Mega-Buildup', *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 8.19.1 (2010), p. 3; Inoue, Purves and Selden, 'Okinawa Citizens, US Bases and the Security of Asia', p. 264.

erupt in conflict, with dire consequences for global security”.²⁴² Many of these tensions were still present when Obama took office, and the fear of them can be seen in the language used in official documents.²⁴³ For example, President Obama determined that “Asia will largely define whether the century ahead will be marked by conflict or cooperation”.²⁴⁴ The SCC also believed that increased bilateral cooperation was necessary against any “persistent or emerging [regional] threats”.²⁴⁵ Therefore, for these policymakers, “bases equals peace”, a fact borne out by the persistence of relative peace in the region.²⁴⁶ However, by continuing the policies of previous administrations, albeit under a different name, the Obama administration also ensured that anti-base protests continued.²⁴⁷ For protestors the US military presence brought not “peace, stability and... prosperity”, but rather uncertainty and violence.²⁴⁸ These very different experiences of the US military presence significantly influenced the two sides’ understanding of what constitutes “genuine” security, and points to why any common ground remained elusive.

Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence and Activists Conceptions of “Genuine” Security

In 2015, OWAAMV released a list of their current protests, campaigns, and demands against the US military. This included the demand for “‘No Relocation’ of military facilities, installations, or training within Okinawa or in other parts of the world.... [and] the withdrawal of the US Marines”, as well as campaigns against all forms of violence committed by the US military.²⁴⁹ Much like the “Asia Rebalance”, this was broadly a continuation of policies they had adopted in 1995 and reflected their understanding of what constitutes “genuine” security. This position is shared by the IWNAM

²⁴² Perry, ‘United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region’, pp. 2-3.

²⁴³ Clinton, Gates, Matsumoto, Kitazawa, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Progress on the Realignment of US Forces in Japan’, pp. 3-4; Shorrock, ‘Okinawa and the US Military in Northeast Asia’; Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, p. 171; Roy, *The Pacific War and its Political Legacies*, p. 185; Cha, ‘The Unfinished Legacy of Obama’s Pivot to Asia’; Campbell and Andrews, ‘Explaining the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia’, p. 4; Carter, ‘The Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Security’, p. 73; Rice, ‘Explaining President Obama’s Rebalance Strategy’; Scott A. Snyder, ‘Obama’s Rebalance to Asia in his own words: Where does it stand?’, *Council on Foreign Relations*, November 24th 2014, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/obamas-rebalance-asia-his-own-words-where-does-it-stand>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

²⁴⁴ Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama to the Australian Parliament’.

²⁴⁵ Security Consultative Committee, ‘The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation’, p. 3.

²⁴⁶ Although Chinese aggression and North Korean nuclearisation were concerning for US officials, in contrast to the previous four decades, when three major wars had raged across the region and the spread of communism remained a persistent threat, the period after 1989 was one of relative peace in the Asia-Pacific. Muto, ‘Redefine and Practice Our Peace, Our Security, If They Do Theirs’, p. 133; Shorrock, ‘Okinawa and the US Military in Northeast Asia’.

²⁴⁷ Rice, ‘Explaining President Obama’s Rebalance Strategy’; Mike Green, ‘The Legacy of Obama’s “Pivot” to Asia’, *Foreign Policy*, September 3rd 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/03/the-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

²⁴⁸ Clinton, Gates, Matsumoto, Kitazawa, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Progress on the Realignment of US Forces in Japan’, p. 1.

²⁴⁹ Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Protests & Campaigns Against US Military Presence’.

who, during the Obama period, intensified their campaign against the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific.²⁵⁰

Both OWAAMV and the IWNAM have consistently maintained their belief that the US military is an intrinsically violent institution, which “is a threat to our security, not a protection”.²⁵¹ This framing is drawn directly from theories of human security and helps to explain why the positions of the network’s participants, who are from different backgrounds, have remained so consistent over time and space. Although the women involved in the Network have very different life experiences, they were brought together by the shared experience of living alongside the US military.²⁵²

The publications and statements of both groups demonstrate the ways in which they think true security is best served, and it is in stark contrast to the position of policymakers. Unlike the SCC, they do not believe that military bases and personnel ensure security and prosperity. Instead, they argue, true security requires four key conditions be met: that the environment is able to sustain human and natural life; that people’s basic needs are fulfilled; that people’s fundamental human dignity is respected; and that people, and the environment, are protected from all avoidable harm.²⁵³ Specifically, both groups criticise the US military’s ability to fulfil these conditions. In 2012, OWAAMV, in reaction to another sexual assault, asked “why is the provision of a safe living environment for women and children not treated seriously?”²⁵⁴ Similarly, in 2013, the IWNAM launched a two-year campaign against the “Asia Rebalance”, arguing that it was a campaign of increased militarisation, that would result in the increased exploitation of local women.²⁵⁵ For these groups, the presence of the US military does not bring peace, security and prosperity. Instead, it

²⁵⁰ International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Campaigns/ The Asia Pacific Pivot’, *The International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, November 2013, <http://iwnam.org/what-we-do/campaignsthe-asia-pacific-pivot/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

²⁵¹ East Asia-US Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement: Women and Children, Militarism and Human Rights’, p. 17. OWAAMV have made similar statements throughout the years, for example in their September 1995 letter declaring their intention to protest the rape: The Participants in the Children’s - Women - Citizens’ Rally on Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women, ‘The Declaration of the “Children - Women - Citizens’ Rally of Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women”’, p. 7.

²⁵² Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 157; Cachola, Kirk, Natividad, and Pumarejo, ‘Women Working Across Borders for Peace and Genuine Security’, p. 165.

²⁵³ These are beliefs they have held since the 1990s and are regularly present throughout their publications. For example: International Women’s Summit, ‘Final Statement of the International Women’s Summit to Redefine Security’, p. 96; Fukumura and Matsuoka, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 49; East Asia-US Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement: Women and Children, Militarism and Human Rights: International Women’s Working Conference’, p. 1; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa’, pp. 1-2, 4-5, 9; Takazato and Itokazu, ‘America Peace Caravan’, p. 1.

²⁵⁴ Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Statement of Protest Against the Sexual Assault on an Okinawan Woman by a US Marine Corps Serviceman, and Demand for Withdrawal of US Military Forces’, *Vancouver Rape Relief and Women’s Shelter*, August 20th 2012, <http://www.rapereliefshelter.bc.ca/learn/resources/okinawa-women-act-against-military-violence-statement-protest-against-sexual-assault>, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 1.

²⁵⁵ International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Campaigns/ The Asia Pacific Pivot’.

irreparably damages the communities who must live alongside the bases.²⁵⁶ Therefore, the only solution they see is a radical new approach to security that privileges fundamental human rights above all else.

As part of the “Asia Rebalance”, the Obama administration recommitted itself to maintaining a politically sustainable presence in the Asia-Pacific in order to help “sustain a rules-based order that reflects economic openness, peaceful dispute resolution, and respect for universal human rights.”²⁵⁷ In this way, the rebalance policy appears to share some common ground with the position of the IWNAM, particularly in its desire to ensure “respect for universal human rights”.²⁵⁸ However, it seems that the American focus on the promotion of human rights was both a subordinate part of the rebalance strategy, and directed primarily at those Asian states with poor human rights records.²⁵⁹ In contrast, the IWNAM believes that the US commitment to maintaining a military presence in the region demonstrates that they misunderstand how human rights should be respected. In their eyes, the current system “depends on deep-seated attitudes and relationships characterised by greed, fear, domination, and the objectification of ‘others’” which can never ensure the protection of human rights.²⁶⁰

While the IWNAM focusses its efforts primarily on underlining the diverse ways in which the US military presence is destructive, OWAAMV also work to demonstrate how every individual act of sexual violence is the result of the systemic violence of the military system.²⁶¹ For example, after the 2012 rape they released a statement highlighting their belief “that armies are organisations of structural violence, not providing true security either at the local or inter-state level”.²⁶² Suzuyo Takazato has reiterated this position throughout the years, demonstrating its centrality to the activism of OWAAMV.²⁶³

²⁵⁶ Ibid.; International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Declaration, 8th Gathering’, pp. 1-2.

²⁵⁷ Rice, ‘Explaining President Obama’s Rebalance Strategy’; Snyder, ‘Obama’s Rebalance to Asia in his own words’; Campbell and Andrews, ‘Explaining the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia’, p. 7; Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama to the Australian Parliament’; Clinton, Gates, Matsumoto, Kitazawa, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Progress on the Realignment of US Forces in Japan’, p. 1.

²⁵⁸ Campbell and Andrews, ‘Explaining the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia’ p. 7.

²⁵⁹ Rice, ‘Explaining President Obama’s Rebalance Strategy’; Snyder, ‘Obama’s Rebalance to Asia in his own words’; Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament’.

²⁶⁰ International Women’s Summit, ‘Final Statement of the International Women’s Summit to Redefine Security’, p. 96.

²⁶¹ They first made this position clear in 1995 when they declared this violence “constitutes the violence of the military system itself, violence that will continue to exist as long as military bases and military personnel remain in Okinawa”: The Participants in the Children’s - Women - Citizens’ Rally on Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women, ‘The Declaration of the “Children - Women - Citizens’ Rally of Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women”’, p. 7.

²⁶² Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Statement of protest against the sexual assault on an Okinawan woman by a US Marine Corps serviceman’, p. 1.

²⁶³ Examples include her statement in 1996 “that militaries train people to become violent, and that military prostitution and other types of sexual violence would continue as long as bases remained” (as quoted in Kawato); her testimony to the Asian Tribunal on Women’s Human Rights in 1999 (as quoted in Cornwell and Wells); her statement that “peace

It is then easy to see, from the perspective of OWAAMV, why the SCC's efforts to consolidate and realign the US bases in Okinawa are inadequate. While this solution returns land to the people of Okinawa and removes the US military from the most heavily populated areas, it does not address the threat that these women believe the US military poses. This then highlights another point of discord between protestors and policymakers. While policymakers see the US military presence as vital for maintaining regional peace and security, activists believe that, while the US military are stationed in Okinawa, acts of sexual violence will continue to be committed, because of the ways in which the military are trained, meaning local communities will never be truly safe.

Further, OWAAMV argue that realigning US forces does not demilitarise the locations where they are present, something that has been demonstrated through the clashes over the FRF construction at Henoko Bay. Henoko has become a key battleground between the two sides, that arguably incorporates all the human security concerns of protestors, and all the realignment hopes of policymakers. While the Japanese and US governments assert that the construction of this facility will ensure continued peace and security, protestors question this.²⁶⁴ Through the frame of human security they argue that, not only will the environmental destruction that accompanies base construction irreparably damage local communities, but the increased fear of living alongside an enlarged military base will further violate human rights.²⁶⁵ This is a position held throughout much of Okinawan society, and demonstrated through the visible protests against the base construction. A 2009 prefecture-wide poll revealed that 52% of residents favoured reducing the number of US bases, while the 2014 election of Governor Onaga was widely considered to be a resounding rejection of plans to construct the Henoko Bay facility.²⁶⁶

The different understandings of what constitutes true security held by policymakers and feminist anti-base protestors do not, therefore, only express themselves in the documents and statements each makes. Instead, they are present through every action and decision taken, and even in the ways in which the two sides interact with each other.

and the army cannot coexist" taken from 'The Base and the Military: Structural Violence Against Women' by Takazato and Kiyomi in 2000, and two interviews from 2016, one featured in *Al Jazeera* and the other in *The Japan Times*, where she argued that there is an undeniable connection between sexual violence and the true nature of the armed forces: Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 68; Cornwell and Wells, 'Deploying Insecurity', p. 411; Takazato and Kiyomi, 'The Base and the Military', p. 66; John Mitchell, 'The Peacemakers of Okinawa', *The Japan Times*, June 11th 2016, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/11/national/the-peacemakers-of-okinawa/#.WibFW7aZOu4s>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Sorihashi, 'Interview'.

²⁶⁴ Penn, 'Voices of Okinawa'; Rice, Rumsfeld, Machimura, Ohno, 'U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future', pp. 1-3, 10. While this point is not explicitly stated in later SCC documents it is hinted at when the FRF is discussed. For example: Kishida, Onodera, Kerry, Hagel, 'Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities', p. 8.

²⁶⁵ Penn, 'Voices of Okinawa'.

²⁶⁶ Eric Johnston, 'As Okinawa Votes, Futenma Base Looms', *The Japan Times*, November 5th 2014, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/15/national/politics-diplomacy/okinawa-voters-prepare-pick-new-governor-futenma-base-shadow/#.WvMcBS-Q3-Y>, (accessed May 10th 2018).



Figure 4: A map of the US bases, installations and facilities in Okinawa, correct as of April 2018. Futenma is located towards the bottom left, in a particularly congested area, whereas the proposed Henoko Bay facility would be further North and form part of Camp Schwab. (Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government, April 2018.)

Addressing Sexual Violence, The Problem with Punishments

By conceptualising security in two different ways, SCC policymakers and feminist anti-base protestors have left very little space for any common ground in their understandings of the situation in Okinawa. These two different ideas of security also help to ensure that the two sides approach the question of how to deal with instances of sexual assault very differently. As previously mentioned, the women of OWAAMV see each act of sexual violence as a symptom of a military system that encourages violence as a form of domination and control.²⁶⁷ When the problem is the entire military system there is only one solution, the closure of all “military bases, installations and joint operations”.²⁶⁸ This is very finalistic, and something that seems unlikely to be realised, not least

²⁶⁷ Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 34; Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, ‘Demilitarizing Security’, p. 159; Sorihashi, ‘Interview’; Mesok, ‘Sexual Violence and the US Military’, p. 45.

²⁶⁸ International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement from Okinawa Gathering’; Similar demands have been made by OWAAMV and the IWNAM across time. For example: The Participants in the Children’s - Women - Citizens’ Rally on Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women, ‘The Declaration of the “Children - Women - Citizens’ Rally of Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women”’, p. 8; International Women’s Summit, ‘Final Statement of the International Women’s Summit to Redefine Security’, p. 98; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa’, p. 9; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Statement of protest against the sexual assault on an Okinawan woman by a US Marine Corps serviceman’.

because one of the central pillars of the US government's Asia strategy has been the maintenance of bases, and forward deployed troops, in Okinawa. Instead, the US military has attempted to address the problem in two ways; firstly, with individual punishments and apologies and, secondly, through the proposed relocation of the US Marines from Okinawa to Guam. While the first solution is the more obvious the second is, arguably, more radical, and its development reflects particular changes that occurred in Japan after 2009.

In the wake of the 1995 rape, Colonel A.J. Cunningham, the head legal counsel for the US forces in Japan, commented that the US military prefers to try its own people "so we can hold [them] up as a model".²⁶⁹ Generally, the court-martial system is the US military's preferred way to deal with crimes committed by its personnel, it is utilised not only in the Asia-Pacific but also on US bases located in Europe.²⁷⁰ This suggests that the US military believes it has a sophisticated internal justice system, capable of punishing crimes. However, various press investigations have brought this into question, particularly in cases of sexual assault. In 1995, the *Dayton Daily News* conducted an investigation into how many personnel had been brought to justice by the US military for the crime of rape. They found that, in the period 1988-1995, 169 courts-martial had been brought by the US Navy and US Marines against individuals stationed in Okinawa.²⁷¹ In the same period, Okinawa registered the highest number of courts-martial for sexual assault of any US bases worldwide.²⁷² While this suggests that the US military's internal justice system was effective, the investigation also revealed that commanders had allowed hundreds of these convicted personnel to walk free without any punishment.²⁷³

A similar study, conducted by the *Associated Press* in 2014, revealed that, even after 1995, these practices were still continuing. Through studying 703 courts-martial for sexual assault in the period 2005-2013, they discovered that only 244 had resulted in punishment and that, out of these, only one-third led to prison sentences. Further, this number represented only twenty-four percent of all reported sexual assaults in the period.²⁷⁴ This trend is, arguably, largely down to the power US

²⁶⁹ Watanabe, 'Okinawa Rape Suspect's Lawyer Gives Dark Account'. There is further evidence of the US military preferring to bring its own personnel before a military court, including in 2000 and 2008: BBC News, 'Okinawa Curfew After Sex Charges', *BBC*, July 7th 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/823365.stm> (accessed May 10th 2018); Motoyama, 'Not a "Yankees-Go-Home" Solution to the Sexual Violence of the US Military', p. 26.

²⁷⁰ Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 44.

²⁷¹ There are, however, no numbers available for the US army on this matter. Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 41; Shorrock, 'Okinawa and the US Military in Northeast Asia'.

²⁷² 169 courts-martial were registered in this period: *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*; Johnson, *Three Rapes*.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

²⁷⁴ This report does not differentiate between sexual violence committed against civilians and sexual violence committed against members of the US military. Nevertheless, the investigation serves to adequately question how successful the US military are at prosecuting their own personnel: Associated Press, 'Sexual Assaults by US Military in Japan Unlikely to end in Prison', *The Guardian*, February 9th 2014,

military commanders have over the court-martial system, and in deciding whether prosecutions should even go ahead.²⁷⁵ Far from the US military holding their personnel accountable, then, these two examples demonstrate that OWAAMV have a strong case in arguing that the US military's justice system does not prioritise the safety and security of women.²⁷⁶

As was highlighted in the previous chapter, after 1995 a number of high profile rape and sexual assault cases also went to trial in Okinawa. In each of these cases the US military, and often the US government, was quick to issue an apology and propose a series of curfews and drinking bans, in order to crack down on bad behaviour. These apologies and curfews were widely publicised in Japanese and western media outlets, which serves to emphasise that the US military was dealing with the problem of sexual violence. The most notable example is 1995, when the trial of the three suspects featured across many media outlets,²⁷⁷ and the heads of the US military in Okinawa, as well as leading politicians and President Clinton, apologised.²⁷⁸ Similarly, in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2012, the suspects were tried in Japanese courts and, in all of these cases, official apologies from high ranking members of the US military were issued.²⁷⁹ Therefore, in every case that has gone to trial in Japan, the US military has been keen to express their remorse as quickly as possible.²⁸⁰

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/09/sexual-assaults-us-military-japan-prison-unlikely>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, p. 137.

²⁷⁷ Johnson, *Blowback*, pp. 241-242; The New York Times, 'US and Japan to Discuss Base Reductions', *The New York Times*, November 1st 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/01/world/us-and-japan-to-discuss-base-reductions.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018); May Lee, 'Marine Testifies He Didn't Rape Girl', *CNN*, December 11th 1995, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9512/japan_rape/, (accessed May 10th 2018); Andrew Pollack, 'One Pleads Guilty to Okinawa Rape; 2 Others Admit Role', *The New York Times*, November 8th 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/08/world/one-pleads-guilty-to-okinawa-rape-2-others-admit-role.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Watanabe, 'Okinawa Rape Suspect's Lawyer Gives Dark Account'.

²⁷⁸ Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 72; Roy, *The Pacific War and its Political Legacies*, p. 191.

²⁷⁹ BBC News, 'Okinawa Marine Charged', *BBC*, August 4th 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/865813.stm>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Shanker, 'US and Japan Discuss Transfer of American Rape Suspect'; BBC News, 'US Serviceman Arrested in Okinawa', *BBC*, July 4th 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4647737.stm>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Justin McCurry, 'Two US Sailors Accused of Okinawa Rape', *The Guardian*, October 17th 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/17/us-sailors-accused-okinawa-rape>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Johnson, 'Three Rapes'.

²⁸⁰ Further examples of curfews, drinking bans, and official apologies include: Johnson, *Blowback*, p. 40; Johnson, 'Three Rapes'; BBC News, 'Okinawa Curfew After Sex Charges'; Justin McCurry, 'US Sorry for Rape Case in Okinawa', *The Guardian*, July 4th 2001, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jul/04/japan.justinmccurry>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Justin McCurry, 'Rice Says Sorry for US Troop Behaviour on Okinawa as Crimes Shake Alliance with Japan', *The Guardian*, February 28th 2008, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/28/japan.usa>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Martin Fackler, 'Japan Sentences Two US Sailors to Prison for Rape on Okinawa', *The New York Times*, March 1st 2013, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/world/asia/japanese-court-convicts-2-us-sailors-in-okinawa-rape.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Associated Press, 'US Commander in Japan Apologises for Rape Case', *USA Today*, October 19th 2012, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/10/19/military-japan-rape-okinawa/1643329/>, (accessed May 10th 2018)

While the US military believes that, by taking these steps, they demonstrate their commitment to addressing the problem of sexual violence, the sheer volume of rape and sexual assault cases in Okinawa simply serves to reinforce the arguments of OWAAMV. Further, these examples barely scratch the surface of the much larger problem of sexual assault in Okinawa. In 2016, the Okinawa Prefectural Government reported that, in the period 1972-2016, US military members, civilian personnel and their dependents committed 5,986 crimes, of which 574 were classified as the “heinous crimes” of rape and murder.²⁸¹ In 2016, Suzuyo Takazato elaborated on these numbers, stating that OWAAMV had compiled evidence of 129 rapes committed by US personnel between 1972 and 2015.²⁸² With evidence such as this, it is perhaps unsurprising that feminist anti-base activists are regularly drawn to ask both why Okinawa should continue to shoulder the burden of the US military, and “whose security does a military base protect?”²⁸³

Addressing Sexual Violence, The Promise of Marine Relocation

In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a surprising victory in the national elections, ending decades of rule by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).²⁸⁴ The DPJ had campaigned against the presence of US military bases in Okinawa and, with their election, political momentum against the bases grew.²⁸⁵ While the DPJ government collapsed in 2011, signalling the return to power of the LDP, this anti-base momentum appears to have grown to such an extent that the US were encouraged to realise their promise of relocating the Marines to Guam.

After 1995, the SCC agreed to move a substantial number of US Marines, who make up the majority of American forces in Okinawa, out of the prefecture.²⁸⁶ In 2006, the relocation of 8,000 personnel to Guam was agreed, but was contingent on the construction of the FRF.²⁸⁷ This is a

²⁸¹ Okinawa Prefectural Government: Washington DC Office, ‘U.S. Military Base Issues in Okinawa’, *Okinawa Prefectural Government*, 2016, <http://dc-office.org/basedata>, (accessed 23rd March 2018).

²⁸² These numbers do not include sexual assaults that did not culminate in rape: Sorihashi, ‘Interview’; Suzuyo Takazato, Emma Dalton and Steve Rabson, ‘Okinawan Women Demand U.S. Forces Out After Another Rape and Murder: Suspect an Ex-Marine and U.S. Military Employee’, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 14.11 (2016), <http://apjif.org/2016/11/Takazato.html>, (accessed March 23rd 2018); Roy, *The Pacific War and its Political Legacies*, p. 191; Kirk and Feffer, ‘Gender and US Bases in the Asia-Pacific’, p. 2.

²⁸³ Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, p. 336; Penn, ‘Voices of Okinawa’.

²⁸⁴ Natividad and Kirk, ‘Fortress Guam’, p. 3; McCormack, ‘The Travails of a Client State’, p. 4.

²⁸⁵ Kirk and Ahn, ‘Democracy Thwarts US Base Plans’.

²⁸⁶ Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Fackler, ‘Shinzo Abe Faces Growing Wrath of Okinawans over US Base’.

²⁸⁷ Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso, Minister of State for Defense Nukaga, ‘United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, May 1st 2006, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/sc/pdfs/doc0605.pdf>, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 1; Hirofumi Nakasone and Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and their Dependents

position that remained consistent until 2012 when, in a ‘Joint Statement’, the SCC announced its intention to “delink... the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel from Okinawa to Guam... from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility”.²⁸⁸ There is no indication in any SCC documents as to why this change of position occurred, but a compelling argument is that increased anti-base sentiment, encouraged by the DPJ election, pressured policymakers into conceding to the relocation without first building the FRF. In both 2012 and 2013, the SCC stated that it had decided to delink Marine relocation from the FRF in order to “reduce the burden” of the US military presence on Okinawa.²⁸⁹ However, reducing the burden has been a consistent rationale for the realignment of US troops since 1995, so it is unlikely that this alone prompted a shift in attitude.²⁹⁰ It therefore seems reasonable to assume that increased activism in Okinawa, encouraged by OWAAMV, contributed to this decision. This argument is compelling, as OWAAMV have been vocal critics of the Marines, contending that their relative youth and short deployments make them particularly likely to commit crimes of sexual violence.²⁹¹

The two ideas of security are therefore visible in both the publications of each side and the ways in which they attempt to deal with crimes of sexual violence. OWAAMV’s belief that gendered violence is an intrinsic part of the military system leads them to argue that the only way to prevent these crimes is to remove all US bases and troops from Okinawa. They support this position with concepts taken from human security; that true peace and stability cannot be obtained until the environment is protected, and human rights are respected. They further argue that the US military has proven it cannot provide these protections. Alliance policymakers consider the military to be vital for

from Okinawa to Guam’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, February 2009, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/agree0902.pdf>, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 2; Natividad and Kirk, ‘Fortress Guam’, p. 3.

²⁸⁸ Clinton, Panetta, Gemba, Tanaka, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee’, p. 1.

²⁸⁹ The 2012 ‘Joint Statement’ declares these adjustments are to help “mitigate the impact of US forces on local communities”, while the 2013 ‘Protocol’ states that this decision has been taken in recognition of “the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be completed as soon as possible”: Ibid., p. 1; Fumio Kishida, Itsunori Onodera, John F. Kerry, Chuck Hagel, ‘Protocol Amending the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, October 2013, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000016483.pdf>, (accessed May 10th 2018), p. 2.

²⁹⁰ Examples include: Ikeda, Usui, Perry, and Mondale, ‘The SACO Final Report’, Rice, Rumsfeld, Aso, Nukaga, ‘United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation’; Security Consultative Committee, ‘Joint Statement, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee’; Okada, Kitazawa, Clinton, Gates, ‘Joint Statement of The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Marking the 50 Anniversary of the Signing of The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’; Clinton, Gates, Okada, Kitazawa, ‘Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee’.

²⁹¹ In general, US Marines are aged between 18-25 and spend six months or less based in Okinawa, where they live far more comfortably than they would on base in the US, which leads to considerably worse behaviour; Pajon, ‘Understanding the Issue of US Military Bases in Okinawa’, p. 17; Kirk and Francis, ‘Redefining Security’, p. 239; Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa’, p. 9. Examples of rapes committed by US Marines include: Watanabe, ‘Okinawa Rape Suspects Lawyer Gives Dark Account’; BBC, ‘Okinawa Marine Charged’; McCurry, ‘Rice Says Sorry for US Troop Behaviour on Okinawa as Crimes Shake Alliance with Japan’.

ensuring that peace and security are maintained. They have therefore attempted to address the issue through punishing individual crimes, imposing curfews and drinking bans, and proposing the relocation of the US Marines to Guam.²⁹² It is impossible to know for sure whether the relocation of the Marines was proposed to deal with the issue of sexual violence, or to improve relations with Okinawans but, whatever the reason, this solution does demonstrate that the SCC are open to addressing the concerns of protestors, at least to a certain extent.

²⁹² It is worth noting that, as of 2011, there were over 36,000 US military personnel stationed in Okinawa. While the relocation of 8,000 Marines is therefore still significant it is not the radical realignment of troops OWAAMV has called for: Okinawa Prefectural Government: Washington DC Office, 'U.S. Military Base Issues in Okinawa'.

Chapter IV: Is it 2016 or 1995?

“As long as there are US military bases this kind of incident will continue to happen”²⁹³

On March 13th 2016 a US sailor, stationed at Camp Schwab, raped a woman as she slept in the lobby of a Naha hotel.²⁹⁴ In the days that followed, outrage grew across Okinawa, fed by the knowledge that the sailor in question had evaded a curfew specifically in place to crack down on off-base crime.²⁹⁵ As with every other sexual assault, events began to develop in its wake. Despite swift apologies from both Joel Ehrendreich, the US Consul General in Naha, and Colonel Brady Crosier, Okinawa Area Field Office Chief, protests broke out across the prefecture.²⁹⁶ This rape, like those that came before it, acted as a touch paper to Okinawans who had already endured a year-long face off with US military authorities over the construction of the FRF.²⁹⁷ It was almost the last straw for a community who had suffered, for over seventy years, from the US military presence. Many believed, if something similar were to happen again, “it will cause an eruption in popular sentiment”.²⁹⁸

That eruption came in May 2016, with the rape and murder of twenty-year-old Rina Shimabukuro.²⁹⁹ Shimabukuro disappeared on the night of April 28th and, three weeks later, her body was discovered.³⁰⁰ Her assailant was Kenneth Franklin Shinzato, a former US Marine and civilian contractor at Kadena Air Base.³⁰¹ After his arrest, Shinzato denied that he intended to kill her, stating that his goal was only “to render the woman unconscious so that he could rape her”.³⁰² The brutality

²⁹³ Chihiro Uchimura, quoted in McCurry, ‘Thousands protest at US bases on Okinawa after Japanese woman’s murder’.

²⁹⁴ Ryukyu Shimpo, ‘Anger Spreads in Response to Alleged Rape by US Soldier’, *Ryukyu Shimpo*, March 16th 2016, <http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2016/03/24/24710/>, (accessed May 10th 2018); BBC News, ‘US Sailor in Okinawa Arrested Over Alleged Rape’, *BBC*, March 14th 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35800435>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ OWAAMV held a press conference, released a statement of protest and planned a rally against the US military while the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly drafted a protest resolution against the repeated acts of violence committed by the US military: Ibid; Ryukyu Shimpo, ‘Protestors Numbering 2,500 Request Ban on US Military Personnel Staying at Lodging Off Base’, *Ryukyu Shimpo*, March 22nd 2016, <http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2016/03/26/24723/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

²⁹⁷ Mitchell, ‘The Peacemakers of Okinawa’.

²⁹⁸ Ryukyu Shimpo, ‘Anger Spreads in Response to Alleged Rape by US Soldier’.

²⁹⁹ Kentaro Koyama, ‘Ex-U.S. Marine Denies Intending to Kill Woman, 20, in Okinawa’, *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 16th 2017, <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201711160056.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Amane Sugawara, ‘Ex-U.S. Marine Gets Life Sentence for Rape, Murder in Okinawa’, *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 1st 2017, <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201712010051.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

of this case, which fanned the outrage that had been stoked in March, caused an explosion of anger. On June 19th, 65,000 Okinawans protested in Naha, the largest rally in the prefecture since 1995.³⁰³

2016 was, in many ways, similar to 1995. The brutality of Shimabukuro's rape and murder shocked Okinawans in a way reminiscent of 1995, and they came out to protest in numbers not seen in two decades. The ways in which alliance officials and OWAAMV reacted were also very similar. President Obama's involvement in the aftermath of Shimabukuro's rape and murder was similar to that of President Clinton in 1996, although it was accelerated by his already planned visit to Japan for the May G7 Summit.³⁰⁴ Although there was nothing comparable to the SACO established in 2016, the SCC did release a document amending SOFA implementation practices, almost exactly as they had in April 1996. For the women of OWAAMV, 2016 offered a further opportunity to emphasise their message, and the outrage that gripped Okinawa allowed them to translate their demands to wider Japanese society.

The news media played a large role in the 1995 rape, reporting the details of both the crime and the trial, both within and outside of Japan. This allowed both sides to reach much larger audiences than they would otherwise have been able to. However, this was nothing in comparison to the coverage provided in May and June 2016, thanks to the proliferation of online news. The internet allowed details of the Shimabukuro case to spread to an extent that was not previously possible, and it was widely reported both within and outside of Japan. The impact of this dissemination of information could be seen in June 2016, when, to coincide with the Naha rally, thousands of people protested outside the Parliament building in Tokyo.³⁰⁵ While it is questionable as to how widely this news was read, both in Japan and globally, there is little doubt that online reportage added a new dynamic to this situation.³⁰⁶

The analysis in this chapter will mirror the analysis carried out in Chapter I, in order to demonstrate how many similarities existed between 1995 and 2016. In order to achieve this, it will analyse official reactions, and SCC documents, to consider how policymakers reacted to the two rapes. It will then compare the protests of OWAAMV to their actions in 1995, to ask whether or not their activism developed significantly in the intervening period. Finally, it will briefly consider how

³⁰³ Tribune News Services, 'Massive Protest on Okinawa Targets U.S. Military After Killing, Rape of Woman', *The Chicago Tribune*, June 19th 2016, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-okinawa-killing-us-military-20160619-story.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Kapur, 'After Murder, Mass Protests in Okinawa Against US Bases'.

³⁰⁴ Rick Gladstone, 'Okinawa Murder Case Tests U.S.-Japan Ties Before Obama Visit', *The New York Times*, May 26th 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/world/asia/japan-okinawa-murder-obama-visit.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³⁰⁵ Kapur, 'After Murder, Mass Protests in Okinawa Against US Bases'.

³⁰⁶ This chapter utilises English language news media, predominantly from Japan, the US and the UK. Despite this coverage, it is almost impossible to ascertain how many people were reached by the story and its details. What can be said is that the ability for people to access this information was far greater than in earlier rape cases. This is also reflected in the sheer volume of online news sources that are available for this case, in comparison to earlier incidents.

the media, both within and outside of Japan, reported the rapes. Specifically, it will study the ways in which it was able to draw comparisons to 1995 and, subsequently, implicitly highlight the failings of the US military and SCC in attempting to deal with the issue of militarised sexual violence. Despite twenty years of feminist anti-base activism, and some significant policy changes, this chapter will conclude that surprisingly little changed between 1995 and 2016. This, above all, emphasises the fact that a disparity continued to exist between alliance policymakers and anti-base activists, which meant that they were still unable to find any common ground in 2016.

The Security Consultative Committee and Official Reactions to the Two Rapes

In the immediate aftermath of the March rape the US military reacted swiftly, vowing to cooperate fully with the police investigation and expressing their “deepest regret and remorse”.³⁰⁷ There are no reports of the US refusing to transfer the suspect to Japanese authorities, or invoking the SOFA as a reason to not cooperate fully with a request for custody.³⁰⁸ This in itself is quite striking, as there are very few rape incidents that have not resulted in the US invoking the SOFA in some way.³⁰⁹ In fact, the lack of public activity from either the SCC or the US military is particularly significant, especially considering how similar cases have been dealt with. With the exception of a public apology, and a temporary ban on US personnel staying overnight in Naha, it appears that little action was taken.³¹⁰ While many media outlets, and protestors, commented that this rape invoked memories of 1995, US officials appeared to ignore the similarities, commenting that it was an “isolated incident” that the US military and government would take “very, very seriously”.³¹¹ The lack of a response from the Pentagon was noted by more than one news outlet, and any official

³⁰⁷ Kyodo News, ‘Thousands in Okinawa Protest Alleged Rape by US Sailor’, *The Japan Times*, March 22nd 2016, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/22/national/thousands-protest-in-okinawa-over-alleged-rape-of-japanese-tourist-by-u-s-serviceman/#.WleJtSOZP-a>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³⁰⁸ In all the news reports relating to the March rape used in this chapter the SOFA is not brought up.

³⁰⁹ Chapter II outlines the most public instances of when the SOFA has been used in both Japan and elsewhere. The only previous example of the US military handing suspects over immediately, without publicly invoking the SOFA, was in 2012: Martin Fackler, ‘Arrest of 2 U.S. Sailors in Rape Case Threaten to Fan Okinawa’s Anger’ *The New York Times*, October 16th 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/world/asia/2-us-navy-sailors-arrested-in-okinawa-rape.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018); McCurry, ‘Two US Sailors Accused of Okinawa Rape’.

³¹⁰ Euan McKirdy, ‘U.S. Military Personnel’s Movements Restricted Following Rape Accusation in Okinawa’, *CNN*, March 17th 2016, <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/17/asia/okinawa-us-serviceman-rape-restrictions/index.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³¹¹ *Ibid.*; Reuters Staff, ‘U.S. Sailor Arrested in Okinawa for Suspected Rape’, *Reuters*, March 14th 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-okinawa-idUSKCN0WG0EB>, (accessed May 10th 2018). Further examples of when memories of 1995 were invoked in reportage of March 2016 include: Kyodo News, ‘Thousands in Okinawa Protest Alleged Rape by US Sailor’; Justin McCurry, ‘US Sailor Arrested on Okinawa on Suspicion of Rape’, *The Guardian*, March 14th 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/us-sailor-arrested-in-okinawa-on-suspicion-of>, (accessed May 10th 2018); BBC News, ‘US Sailor in Okinawa Arrested over Alleged Rape’; Kirk Spitzer, ‘U.S. Sailor Accused of Rape in Okinawa’, *USA Today*, March 13th 2016, <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/03/13/us-sailor-accused-rape-okinawa/81726526/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

reactions focussed not on the crime itself but on how seriously the US military takes its relationship with the Okinawan people.³¹²

Official reactions to the rape and murder of Rina Shimabukuro were in stark contrast to this. The severity of the crime was demonstrated by Prime Minister Abe, who expressed his “profound resentment” in a rare and impassioned protest to President Obama during their first press conference.³¹³ Obama then publicly conveyed his “sincerest condolences and deepest regrets”, vowing that the US would do everything possible “to prevent a recurrence of crimes of this sort”.³¹⁴ President Obama’s involvement, in many ways, mirrored President Clinton’s in the wake of 1995. First, Obama, like Clinton, quickly issued an official apology.³¹⁵ Second, much like the 1996 Hashimoto-Clinton summit, Obama used the opportunity of his meeting with Prime Minister Abe to reinforce the strength and importance of the alliance between the US and Japan, minimising the focus on the crime and its aftermath.³¹⁶ In fact, it is noticeable how little time Obama spent talking about the rape during their press conference, in contrast to the amount of time dedicated to it by Prime Minister Abe.³¹⁷

Like earlier incidents, the SOFA was a topic of focus for the press conference. Interestingly, Obama commented that the document itself “does not in any way prevent the full prosecution and the need for justice under the Japanese legal system”.³¹⁸ This seems to suggest that, in contrast to earlier

³¹² Reuters Staff, ‘U.S. Sailor Arrested in Okinawa for Suspected Rape’; Ryukyu Shimpo, ‘Anger Spreads in Response to Alleged Rape by US Sailor’.

³¹³ Justin McCurry, ‘Japan ‘Outraged’ After US Airbase Worker Arrested in Murder Case’, *The Guardian*, May 20th 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/19/japan-us-air-base-worker-arrest-murder>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Ayako Mie and Reiji Yoshida, ‘Anger Over Okinawa Murder Grows Despite Obama’s ‘Deep Regret’ Over the Incident’, *The Japan Times*, May 26th 2016, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/26/national/politics-diplomacy/okinawa-murder-clouds-abe-obama-summit-talks/#.WleKhCOZP-Z>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe after Bilateral Meeting’, *The White House: President Barack Obama*, May 25th 2016, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/25/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-after-bilateral-meeting>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³¹⁴ President Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe after Bilateral Meeting’, *The White House: President Barack Obama*, May 25th 2016, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/25/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-after-bilateral-meeting>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Justin McCurry, ‘Obama Expresses Regret Over Alleged Murder by US Base Worker in Japan’, *The Guardian*, May 25th 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/25/barack-obama-murder-japan-military-base-shinzo-abe>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³¹⁵ UPI, ‘Japan Prosecutors Get Rape Case’, *United Press International (UPI)*, September 22nd 1995, <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/09/22/Japan-prosecutors-get-rape-case/5178811742400/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³¹⁶ See Chapter I for a fuller exploration of the Joint Statement released by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton: Hashimoto and Clinton, ‘Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security’; Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe after Bilateral Meeting’.

³¹⁷ President Obama dedicates two sentences in his opening address to the Okinawa case, in contrast to Prime Minister Abe’s nine sentences on the topic. Obama only expands on the Okinawa case when Abe is asked a direct question about the SOFA, and then his statement refers almost exclusively to the ways in which the SOFA has been invoked, with only a brief mention of the rape case itself: Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe after Bilateral Meeting’; Abe, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe after Bilateral Meeting’.

³¹⁸ *Ibid*.

incidents, the US administration believed that the crime should be prosecuted entirely under Japanese law. In this statement, Obama also seems to minimise the protections offered by the SOFA, ignoring those aspects of the document that contradict Japanese legal practices.³¹⁹ Here, then, he appears to be making a concession to those critics who question the legal protections offered by the SOFA, by stating that the SOFA should not stand in the way of a prosecution. This is in direct contrast to 1995, when the SOFA was invoked as a way to circumvent the Japanese legal system.³²⁰ While the SOFA was still important in 2016, the way in which it was used and discussed was clearly very different, suggesting that alliance officials had learnt lessons from earlier cases.

It should also be noted that Shinzato was not a serving Marine at the time the crime was committed but was working as a civilian contractor and was resident in Okinawa.³²¹ While civilian contractors are technically covered by the SOFA they are not afforded the same level of protection as serving personnel.³²² This, therefore, could have contributed to Obama's comments, and the reluctance of the US military to get involved in the case. However, other ways in which alliance officials reacted to the rape demonstrate that they were well aware of the potential for a crisis in Okinawa, even though the suspect was not technically a member of the military. In particular, the willingness of the SCC to address Okinawan concerns quickly and efficiently in this case is represented through the July 2016 SOFA amendment,³²³ the first time this document had been revised since 1996.³²⁴

³¹⁹ See Chapter II for examples of the provisions, contained in Article XVII of the SOFA, that ensure the US military and government can argue their personnel do not receive adequate protections under the Japanese legal system.

³²⁰ In contrast, in 1995 Ambassador Mondale refused to rescind the protections offered by the SOFA but instead suggested that the US military could make the suspects available to the Japanese authorities for questioning, as long as they remained on-base. Growing anger over this position led to the US military eventually handing over the suspects: MacGregor, 'Rape Case Furor Provokes Legal Review by U.S., Japan'.

³²¹ Al Jazeera, 'Ex-US Marine Charged with Rape, Murder of Okinawa Woman', *Al Jazeera*, June 30th 2016, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/marine-charged-rape-murder-okinawa-woman-160630080538403.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Kapur, 'After Murder, Mass Protests in Okinawa Against US Bases'; Sugawara, 'Ex-U.S. Marine Gets Life Sentence for Rape, Murder in Okinawa'; Mie and Yoshida, 'Anger Over Okinawa Murder Grows Despite Obama's 'Deep Regret' Over the Incident'; McCurry, 'Japan 'Outraged' After US Airbase Worker Arrested in Murder Case'.

³²² Kishi, Fujiyama, Ishii, Adachi, Asakai, and Herter, McArthur and Parsons, 'Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan', Article I(b), p. 1.

³²³ This SOFA amendment was published less than three months after the rape and murder of Rina Shimabukuro, demonstrating the urgency with which the SCC approached the crisis: Security Consultative Committee, 'The United States-Japan Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status, Including the Civilian Component', p.1.

³²⁴ In 2008, changes to the SOFA were made, however these related solely to the financial contributions of the Japanese government to the stationing of US personnel in Okinawa, and therefore this amendment cannot be considered comparable to the modifications that happened in 1996 and 2016: Ambassador John Thomas Schieffer and Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura, 'Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning New Special Measures Relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of the United States Armed Forces in Japan', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, January 25th 2008, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/agree0801.pdf>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

Like the 1996 amendment, the 2016 document only agreed to adjust SOFA implementation practices and did not make any changes to the agreement itself. It did, however, address a major concern of protestors, the issue of education. The first page contains a commitment to “enhance training and education processes for all US personnel with SOFA status”, something OWAAMV had called for repeatedly throughout the years.³²⁵ While the US military had previously promised this, in an attempt to decrease the incidence of crime, it had never before been mentioned in an SCC document.³²⁶ From this alone it therefore appears that the SCC were reacting to the demands of protestors and attempting to address the problem of sexual violence in Okinawa.

Other aspects of the 2016 amendment highlight the fact that the SCC was very much dealing with this specific incident, and not the wider problem of sexual assaults committed by US personnel. Firstly, the document focuses on revising what is meant by “the civilian component”.³²⁷ In the original Status of Forces Agreement, the civilian component was defined as “the civilian persons of United States nationality who are in the employ of, serving with, or accompanying the United States armed forces in Japan”.³²⁸ In contrast, the 2016 amendment specifically outlines the “categories of positions eligible for status as members of the civilian component” and specifies that only those with a high degree of technical skill will be eligible to be covered by the SOFA.³²⁹ It also emphasises that anyone with residency status in Japan will not be included.³³⁰ While, in theory, those with residency status in Japan were not covered by the original SOFA, the fact that this was stated highlights the fact that this

³²⁵ Security Consultative Committee, ‘The United States-Japan Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status, Including the Civilian Component’, p. 1. OWAAMV and the IWNAM openly called for this in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2016: The Participants in the Children’s - Women - Citizens’ Rally on Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women, ‘The Declaration of the “Children - Women - Citizens’ Rally of Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women”’; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘America Peace Caravan: Appeal’; East Asia-US Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement: Women and Children, Militarism and Human Rights: International Women’s Working Conference’; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Letter of Demand to Mourn the Victim of the Murder Incident linked to the Former U.S. Marine, to Fully Investigate the Truth, and to Immediately Withdraw U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa: May 20, 2016’, *International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, May 20th 2016, <http://iwnam.org/2016/05/27/letter-of-demand-to-mourn-the-victim-of-the-murder-incident-linked-to-the-former-u-s-marine-to-fully-investigate-the-truth-and-to-immediately-withdraw-u-s-military-forces-in-okinawa/>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³²⁶ Examples of this promise include in 2001, 2008 and 2012: Staff and Agencies, ‘US Rape Suspect Charged in Okinawa’; Struck, ‘Airman Handed Over to Japan’; McCurry, ‘Rice Says Sorry for US Troop Behaviour on Okinawa as Crimes Shake Alliance with Japan’; Associated Press, ‘U.S. Commander in Japan Apologises for Rape Case’.

³²⁷ Security Consultative Committee, ‘The United States-Japan Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status’, p. 1.

³²⁸ Kishi, Fujiyama, Ishii, Adachi, Asakai, and Herter, McArthur and Parsons, ‘Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan’, Article I(b), p. 1.

³²⁹ Security Consultative Committee, ‘The United States-Japan Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status’, pp. 1-2.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

amendment was adopted specifically in response to the Shimabukuro case.³³¹ Therefore, this SOFA amendment would have no impact on the March rape case, where the suspect was serving in the US Navy, or any future cases with suspects who are on active duty. This arguably demonstrates that, as in previous cases, the SCC and US authorities were acting to mitigate the effects of this one particular rape, and not addressing the wider issue of sexual violence committed by US personnel.

Secondly, the aspects of the 2016 amendment that refer to improving training and education procedures focuses only on ensuring that US personnel are educated in their responsibilities, rather than in what behaviour is appropriate. It pledges to improve training “to ensure understanding of SOFA status responsibilities, of potential penalties for misconduct, and of criminal jurisdiction authorities under the SOFA... including those concerning custody”.³³² There is no mention of reducing the incidence of crime, or education programmes concerned with consent and violence. Instead, US personnel are only to be educated on what protections the US military will provide them, if and when they commit crimes. It appears, therefore, that the SCC was attempting to ensure that responsibility was not placed on the US if another serious crime was committed. In the words of Suzuyo Takazato: “It was as if they were saying, ‘We have nothing to do with this’”.³³³

Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence and Activists Reactions to the Two Rapes

Like US officials, the women of OWAAMV reacted swiftly and decisively to the March rape, adopting many of the arguments and techniques they had used in 1995. Two days after the rape, they participated in organising a rally outside the gates of Camp Schwab, attended by thousands of Okinawa residents, including members of the Prefectural Assembly.³³⁴ After protesting, they held a press conference to personally denounce the rape. They used this conference to argue that curfews imposed by the US military were, in reality, doing little to decrease the occurrence of violent crimes, and that attempts by the US government to enforce discipline were inadequate.³³⁵ Following on from the press conference, OWAAMV released a statement which revisited many of the themes they had adopted in previous publications. It called for a drastic revision of the SOFA, and the immediate withdrawal of all US bases and troops from Okinawa. It also highlighted how these crimes cannot be

³³¹ Kishi, Fujiyama, Ishii, Adachi, Asakai, and Herter, McArthur and Parsons, ‘Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan’, Article I(b), p. 1.

³³² Security Consultative Committee, ‘The United States-Japan Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status’, p. 3.

³³³ Takazato, quoted in: Sorihashi, ‘Interview’.

³³⁴ Camp Schwab was the base at which the suspect was stationed: Kyodo News, ‘Thousands in Okinawa Protest Alleged Rape by US Sailor’.

³³⁵ Ryukyu Shimpo, ‘Anger Spreads in Response to Alleged Rape by US Sailor’.

considered as individual acts “but as a form of structural violence perpetrated by the US military troops stationed in Okinawa”.³³⁶ Both these demands, and the way in which they framed acts of sexual violence, appear to have been taken almost verbatim from previous statements and protests. For example, after the 1995 rape OWAAMV argued that “these crimes of sexual violence must not be seen merely as crimes committed by individual soldiers but as crimes produced by the military system”.³³⁷

That the arguments of OWAAMV had remained unchanged is perhaps unsurprising as, in their eyes, very little had changed in the situation in Okinawa since 1995. Acts of sexual violence did not stop with the policies implemented in 1996, and many of OWAAMV’s demands remained unmet. In every statement, released by both OWAAMV and the IWNAM in the period 1995-2016, a drastic revision of the SOFA, and the removal of US troops and bases from Okinawa, is demanded and, in every instance, these demands were ignored.³³⁸ Even the more easily achievable demands; the tighter enforcement of discipline, and enhanced educational programmes to combat sexual violence, appear to remain unfulfilled.³³⁹ Despite the fact that, after every rape, the US military vowed to ensure that a recurrence would not happen, in every instance another attack inevitably occurred, which led the

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Takazato and Itokazu, ‘America Peace Caravan’, p. 1; East Asia-US Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘1997 Meeting: Women and Children, Militarism, and Human Rights, Okinawa, Japan’, *International Women’s Network Against Militarism*, May 1st-4th 1997, <http://iwnam.org/what-we-do/international-meetings/past-meetings-women-and-children-militarism-and-human-rights-okinawa-japan-may-1-4-1997/>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Takazato and Kiyomi, ‘The Base and The Military’, p. 66; American Friends Service Committee, ‘AFSC Okinawa Fact Sheet: Ten Reasons to Oppose Henoko and Deepening Okinawan Militarisation’, *American Friends Service Committee*, December 10th 2015, <https://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civactions.net/files/documents/Okinawa%20Fact%20Sheet%20and%20Draft%20Resolution%20of%20Solidary.pdf>, (accessed May 10th 2018) p. 4; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Statement of Protest Against the Sexual Assault on an Okinawan Woman by a US Marine Corps Serviceman, and Demand for Withdrawal of US Military Forces’, p. 1.

³³⁸ For example: Ibid.; The Participants in the Children’s - Women - Citizens’ Rally on Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women, ‘The Declaration of the “Children - Women - Citizens’ Rally of Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women”’, pp. 7-8; Itokazu and Takazato, ‘Dear Friends of Women’, p. 6; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘America Peace Caravan: Appeal’; East Asia-US Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement: Women and Children, Militarism and Human Rights’; International Women’s Summit, ‘Final Statement of the International Women’s Summit to Redefine Security’, p. 97; East Asia-US-Puerto Rico Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement, Seoul, Korea’; International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Conference Statement, Guam’; International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Declaration, 8th Gathering’; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Letter of Demand to Mourn the Victim of the Murder Incident linked to the Former U.S. Marine’; International Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement from Okinawa Gathering’.

³³⁹ Examples of when they have demanded this include: The Participants in the Children’s - Women - Citizens’ Rally on Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women, ‘The Declaration of the “Children - Women - Citizens’ Rally of Violence and Human Rights Violations Against Girls and Women”’; East Asia-US Women’s Network Against Militarism, ‘Final Statement: Women and Children, Militarism and Human Rights’; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence Statement Regarding Alleged Rape of Japanese Girl By US Marine’; Ryukyu Shimpo, ‘Anger Spreads in Response to Alleged Rape by US Sailor’; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Letter of Demand to Mourn the Victim of the Murder Incident linked to the Former U.S. Marine’.

violations committed by the US military.³⁴⁷ This is another theme that has permeated the activities and publications of OWAAMV across the years. Arguably, their consistent and constant protests highlighting human rights had pushed the issue into the public consciousness, in a way in which it was not present prior to 1995. One demand contained in the May 2016 protests, which had been largely absent from those that came before, was that it was time the US military took full responsibility for the actions of their personnel.³⁴⁸ This specific demand most likely arose from the fact that, as highlighted by many media outlets, Shinzato was a *former* US Marine.³⁴⁹ Therefore, the implicit message contained in the media coverage, and official apologies, was that his behaviour was not the responsibility of the US military, although they were very sorry for the crime. This could also explain why the US military, by and large, did not get involved in the case when it came to his arrest and trial.

In 1995 and 1996, OWAAMV worked hard to educate Okinawans about the danger of US military bases. Their efforts can be considered successful when the sheer number of women's groups active in Okinawa in 2016 is considered. While OWAAMV was one of only three feminist anti-base groups publicly active in 1995, in 2016 sixteen women's organisations were involved in protest action.³⁵⁰ The direct involvement of other activist groups in the 2016 protests further demonstrates the extent to which OWAAMV's message had disseminated into Okinawan society in the intervening period. Many of the groups involved in writing the 2016 'Letter of Demand' were predominantly

³⁴⁷ Ibid.; Kyodo News, 'Massive Rally Planned in Okinawa to Protest Slaying of Woman by US Base Worker', *The Japan Times*, May 22nd 2016, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/22/national/politics-diplomacy/massive-rally-planned-okinawa-protest-alleged-murder-local-woman-u-s-base-worker/#.WleKKyOZP-Z>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³⁴⁸ Ibid.; Takazato, Dalton and Rabson, 'Okinawan Women Demand U.S. Forces Out After Another Rape and Murder'; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, 'Letter of Demand to Mourn the Victim of the Murder Incident linked to the Former U.S. Marine'.

³⁴⁹ Emphasis my own. Articles which mention the fact he was a former Marine include: McCurry, 'Thousands Protest at US Bases on Okinawa After Japanese Woman's Murder'; Koyama, 'Ex-U.S. Marine Denies Intending to Kill Woman, 20, in Okinawa'; Mie and Yoshida, 'Anger over Okinawa Murder Grows Despite Obama's 'Deep Regret' Over the Incident'; Sorihashi, 'Interview'. The role played by the US military in the aftermath of the crime was incredibly minor, especially in comparison to previous cases. The only official to have publicly commented on the crime, other than President Obama, was Ambassador Kennedy, and the only evidence of actions by the US military to atone for it was the imposition of a curfew and drinking ban, and the cancellation of any planned celebrations in Okinawa: McCurry, 'Japan 'Outraged' After US Airbase Worker Arrested in Murder Case'; Al Jazeera, 'Ex-US Marine Charged with Rape, Murder of Okinawa Woman'; Al Jazeera, 'Japan's Okinawa Rallies Against US Military Base', *Al Jazeera*, June 19th 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/japan-okinawa-island-protest-160619050825296.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Jonathan Soble, 'At Okinawa Protest, Thousands Call for Removal of US Bases', *The New York Times*, June 19th 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/20/world/asia/japan-okinawa-protest-united-states-military.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³⁵⁰ Twenty-six organisations in total signed the Letter of Demand, but some of these were not Okinawan groups (two were from Hawaii), and some were not specifically feminist protest groups (for example the Okinawa Senior High School Teacher's Union), and therefore a more accurate number of feminist anti-base groups can be taken from the reports of the May 20th press conference: Ibid.; Takazato, Dalton and Rabson, 'Okinawan Women Demand U.S. Forces Out After Another Rape and Murder'.

active in other ways, from labour unions to peace movements.³⁵¹ There were also non-Okinawan groups involved in the June 2016 protests, including two women's groups from Hawaii and the Korea-Okinawa People's Alliance.³⁵² This represented the coming together of the transnational anti-base network in order to protest against one specific crime, and shows how successfully these movements worked together, and how well they recognised the similarities between their situations.

The International News Media, Bringing Sexual Assault into the Spotlight

The 1995 rape was unique, in part, because of the volume of media coverage it attracted, both in Japan and abroad. In its aftermath, OWAAMV commented that this rape was singularly important because it was reported worldwide, in both Japanese and Western news outlets.³⁵³ The amount of coverage arguably helped to transform it, from just another sexual assault into the “political bombshell” that threatened the entire US-Japan security alliance and led to some meaningful changes in Okinawa. However, the media coverage of the 1995 rape pales in comparison to that of the rape and murder of Rina Shimabukuro.

Multiple online news outlets followed the events of the case, from the moment the body was found, and the suspect arrested, up until the conclusion of the trial, in December 2017. In each report, the details of the case were laid out, and the fact that the suspect was a US citizen, and a former Marine, was highlighted. Many of these reports also commented on the protests taking place in Okinawa, outlining the demands of protestors and their feelings of anger and resentment.³⁵⁴ The

³⁵¹ The co-signees of the letter are: Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, Committee for One-Stop Assistance Center, Rape Emergence Intervention Counselling Center Okinawa (REICO), Group on Gender Issues, Women's Groups Liaison Council, New Japan Women's Association, Okinawa Prefecture Mothers' Congress Liaison Committee, Okinawa Teachers Union, Okinawa Senior High School Teachers Union, SEALDs Ryukyu, Mothers Against War Okinawa, Naha Broccoli, Citizens Group Wankara, Peace Camp Okinawa Preparatory Committee, Project Disagree, Concerned Students in Okinawa Prefecture, the Nago Council against the Construction of the US On-Sea Heliport and for Peace, We Planning, Korea-Okinawa People's Alliance, WILPF Kyoto, Citizen's Study Group on International Law, Yomitan Group against the Strengthen of Torii Military Station and Support Autonomy Regulations, “Start from here, Now”, Hawaii Peace and Justice, HOA: Hawaii Okinawa Alliance: Ibid.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa’, p. 3. Examples of coverage of the 1995 rape include: Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Johnson, *Blowback*, pp. 241-242; Watanabe, ‘Okinawa Rape Suspect's Lawyer Gives Dark Account’; Pollack, ‘One Pleads Guilty to Okinawa Rape; 2 Others Admit Role’; Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘U.S. Apologizes to Japan for Rape of 12-year-old in Okinawa’, *The New York Times*, November 2nd 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/02/world/us-apologizes-to-japan-for-rape-of-12-year-old-in-okinawa.html>, (accessed May 10th 2018); MacGregor, ‘Rape Case Furor Provokes Legal Review by U.S., Japan’; Kevin Sullivan, ‘3 Servicemen Admit Roles in Rape of Okinawan Girl’, *The Washington Post*, November 8th 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/11/08/3-servicemen-admit-roles-in-rape-of-okinawan-girl/66326040-1107-4b68-92dd-09dea388cfac/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.112805d10258, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³⁵⁴ While this list is by no means exhaustive a sample of the news reports which refer to the protests include: Sugawara, ‘Ex-U.S. Marine Gets Life Sentence for Rape, Murder in Okinawa’; Kapur, ‘After Murder, Mass Protests in Okinawa Against US Bases’; Koyama, ‘Ex-U.S. Marine Denies Intending to Kill Woman, 20, in Okinawa’; McCurry, ‘Thousands protest at US bases on Okinawa after Japanese woman's murder’; Al Jazeera, ‘Japan's Okinawa Rallies Against US Military Base’; Soble, ‘At Okinawa Protest, Thousands Call for Removal of US Bases’; Gladstone, ‘Okinawa Murder Case Tests U.S.-Japan Ties Before Obama Visit’; Associated Press, ‘US Military Imposes

volume of media coverage, and the way in which it was framed, made it almost impossible for the US military to deny any involvement in the case, or claim that the suspect was not their responsibility. This is perhaps why, in official statements, they showed only remorse, pledging to ensure that an incident like this did not happen again. Despite the emphasis US officials placed on Shinzato being a former Marine, they still imposed a temporary curfew, and drinking ban, on all personnel and pledged to crack down on discipline.³⁵⁵

The proliferation of online news also helped OWAAMV to demonstrate that neither of the rapes in 2016 was an isolated incident, as the US military claimed.³⁵⁶ Although news coverage of earlier rapes had mentioned other incidents, at no point had it been emphasised so continually across so many different outlets. Every report on the 2016 rapes, whether the topic was the crime itself, Obama's apology, the protests, or the trial of Shinzato, mentions 1995, and how it sparked the anger that is still felt in Okinawa.³⁵⁷ Many of these reports also highlight that, in 1995, the US military pledged to "strengthen troop discipline to prevent such crimes and reduce its footprint on the island".³⁵⁸ Comparing the 2016 rapes to 1995, and to other crimes, makes this promise to crack down on discipline seem somewhat hollow.

The anti-SOFA sentiments of protestors were also prominent in media reports from both 1995 and 2016. In 1995, the local movement against the SOFA was featured heavily in the mainland media, leading many to protest for its revision in Tokyo.³⁵⁹ Again, in 2016, the role played by the SOFA was highlighted by a number of Japanese outlets, which emphasised the unequal nature of the agreement and activists' campaigns for its revision.³⁶⁰ Non-Japanese articles also tended to mention the lack of

Restrictions on Okinawa Troops After Murder', *The Guardian*, May 28th 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/28/us-military-imposes-restrictions-on-okinawa-troops-after>, (accessed May 10th 2018); Kyodo News, 'Former U.S. Base Worker, on Trial for Rape and Murder of Okinawa Woman, Denies Intent to Kill', *The Japan Times*, November 16th 2017, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/11/16/national/crime-legal/former-u-s-base-worker-trial-rape-murder-okinawa-woman-denies-intent-kill/#.WwfiNS-Q3q0>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³⁵⁵ Gladstone, 'Okinawa Murder Case Tests U.S.-Japan Ties Before Obama Visit'; Associated Press, 'US Military Imposes Restrictions on Okinawa Troops After Murder'; Soble, 'At Okinawa Protest, Thousands Call for Removal of US Bases'; Sorihashi, 'Interview'.

³⁵⁶ For example: McKirdy, 'U.S. Military Personnel's Movements Restricted Following Rape Accusation in Okinawa'; Reuters Staff, 'U.S. Sailor Arrested in Okinawa for Suspected Rape'; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, 'Letter of Demand to Mourn the Victim of the Murder Incident linked to the Former U.S. Marine'.

³⁵⁷ Every news report referenced in this chapter mentions the 1995 rape at least once and, each time, the anger of Okinawans is also highlighted.

³⁵⁸ McCurry, 'Japan 'Outraged' After US Airbase Worker Arrested in Murder Case'; Kapur, 'After Murder, Mass Protests in Okinawa Against US Bases'; Al Jazeera, 'Japan's Okinawa Rallies Against US Military Base'; McCurry, 'Obama Expresses Regret Over Alleged Murder by US Base Worker in Japan'; McCurry, 'Thousands Protest at US Bases on Okinawa After Japanese Woman's Murder'; Mitchell, 'The Peacemakers of Okinawa'; Eric Johnston, 'Calls to Revise SOFA in Wake of Okinawa Murder Unlikely to Bear Fruit', *The Japan Times*, June 1st 2016, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/01/reference/calls-revise-sofa-wake-okinawa-murder-unlikely-bear-fruit/#.Wxp7uy97Gu4>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³⁵⁹ Kawato, *Protests Against US Military Base Policy in Asia*, p. 70.

³⁶⁰ Those Japanese articles that discuss anti-SOFA protests include: The Japan Times, 'SOFA-Related Change Falls Short', *The Japan Times*, July 10th 2016, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/07/10/editorials/sofa-related->

accountability that many Okinawans felt was a major issue with the US military presence.³⁶¹ This is another way in which news reports linked these rapes back to the rape of 1995, and undermined the US argument that the SOFA was a vital and unchangeable part of the security alliance.

Finally, the women of OWAAMV featured in many of the news reports from 2016, and this publicity allowed them to more effectively disseminate their arguments. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* ran a piece in June written by Takazato, demanding the removal of the US military, while *The Mainichi* featured an interview with her in the September.³⁶² She also appeared in non-Japanese media outlets, including in an article discussing the wider Okinawan anti-base protests, published by *Al Jazeera*.³⁶³ Statements released by OWAAMV in the wake of the March rape were published in *Ryukyu Shimpo* in both Japanese and English.³⁶⁴ Where previously the women of OWAAMV had to embark on peace caravans to the US, and engage face to face with citizens and lawmakers in order to spread their message, the internet had now made it easier to connect immediately with the wider world.

The events of 2016 reflected those of 1995 in many ways, both in the severity and brutality of the crime committed (at least in Rina Shimabukuro's case), and the ways in which policymakers and OWAAMV reacted. Drawing this comparison between 1995 and 2016 is particularly valuable as it highlights many of reasons why the stalemate between policymakers and anti-base activists remained unresolved. Many of the themes that have occurred in previous chapters, and in previous rape cases, appeared again in 2016, and the fact that they again went unaddressed points to exactly why, in 2016, the "Okinawa issue" seemed no closer to resolution than it was twenty years earlier.

[change-falls-short/#.Wxp7si97Gu4](#), (accessed May 10th 2018); Mie and Yoshida, 'Anger over Okinawa Murder Grows Despite Obama's 'Deep Regret' Over the Incident'; Ryukyu Shimpo, 'Anger Spreads in Response to Alleged Rape by US Soldier'; Tadashi Sano, 'U.S. military crime in Okinawa will continue as long as bases remain: Ex-governor', *The Mainichi*, June 5th 2016, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160604/p2a/00m/0na/019000c>, (accessed May 10th 2018).

³⁶¹ The lack of accountability which, as has been seen, is a key issue related to the SOFA and the protections it offers to US military personnel, is mentioned in a number of western articles, including: Gladstone, 'Okinawa Murder Case Tests U.S.-Japan Ties Before Obama Visit'; Johnston, 'Calls to Revise SOFA in Wake of Okinawa Murder Unlikely to Bear Fruit'; McCurry, 'Obama Expresses Regret Over Alleged Murder by US Base Worker in Japan'.

³⁶² Sorihashi, 'Interview'; Takazato, Dalton and Rabson, 'Okinawan Women Demand U.S. Forces Out After Another Rape and Murder'.

³⁶³ Mitchell, 'The Peacemakers of Okinawa'.

³⁶⁴ Ryukyu Shimpo, 'Anger Spreads in Response to Alleged Rape by US Soldier'; Ryukyu Shimpo, 'Protestors Numbering 2,500 Request Ban on US Military Personnel Staying at Lodging Off Base'.

Conclusion

“The United States deeply regrets this incident.”³⁶⁵

“This won’t happen again.”³⁶⁶

“We believe this type of alleged behaviour is completely unacceptable.”³⁶⁷

“We just regret deeply that this happened.”³⁶⁸

“The United States is appalled by any violent crime that may have occurred or been carried out by any US personnel or US contractors. We consider it inexcusable.”³⁶⁹

This thesis set out to explore the ways in which the activities of anti-base protestors, and particularly the women of OWAAMV, influenced the policymakers of the US-Japan security alliance in the period 1995-2016. In particular, it aimed to ascertain exactly why a lack of common ground between the two sides prevailed throughout this period. The basis for addressing this question comes from 1995, when the SCC established the SACO specifically to address the demands of protestors and in an attempt to salvage the situation in Okinawa. Although it is impossible to say, with any certainty, whether or not the actions of protestors like OWAAMV influenced policymakers in the period after 1995, the fact that they were so clearly influenced by the protests in 1995 presents a compelling starting point from which to explore this question.

The relevance of this study comes from both its subject matter, as outlined above, and its chronological scope. Previous studies of Okinawan protest and the US-Japan security alliance have focussed primarily on 1995, or on a broad spectrum of anti-base protests. Further, while many analysts have studied specifically feminist anti-base groups they rarely consider how these interact with alliance policymakers, while those that do fail to consider the development of this interaction across time. This study is therefore unique, as it has identified incidents of rape committed by the US military in Okinawa, of which there were over 130 documented in the period 1954-2016, as a primary motivator for anti-base protests, and has questioned how these protests have influenced the decisions made by policymakers.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁵ The following five quotes contain a selection of the apologies, expressions of remorse and vows to prevent this sort of crime throughout the years: MacGregor, ‘Rape Case Furor Provokes Legal Review by U.S., Japan’.

³⁶⁶ Struck, ‘U.S. Apologizes for Incident in Okinawa’.

³⁶⁷ BBC News, ‘US Serviceman Arrested in Okinawa’.

³⁶⁸ McCurry, ‘Rice Says Sorry for US Troop Behaviour on Okinawa as Crimes Shake Alliance with Japan’

³⁶⁹ Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe after Bilateral Meeting’.

³⁷⁰ This number is a rough estimation taken from studies conducted by OWAAMV into rapes committed between 1952 and 2012, and between 1972 and 2015: Mesok, ‘Sexual Violence and the US Military’, p. 63; Sorihashi, ‘Interview’; Takazato, Dalton and Rabson, ‘Okinawan Women Demand U.S. Forces Out After Another Rape and Murder’.

Chapter I explored the situation in 1995 in more detail, and compared the reactions of the SCC, and other alliance officials, to those of OWAAMV. In particular, this chapter drew a contrast between how alliance officials and anti-base activists framed the rape, and how this framing was expressed through the language they used. It surmised that the way in which each side approached the aftermath of the rape was completely different, and that these differences established the stalemate that would persist into 2016. Where the SCC and other alliance officials attempted to address the grievances of Okinawans swiftly, with as little fall-out on the actual security alliance as possible, OWAAMV took the opportunity to launch a strong moral challenge against the entire security alliance. They targeted not just the three suspects, but the entire US military presence, and introduced to Okinawans the idea that sexual violence would not end while the US military was stationed in Okinawa. This chapter concluded that the two sides learnt some important lessons from 1995. For the SCC, this was that the assent of host communities is vital for the maintenance of the security alliance, while OWAAMV learnt that their actions could influence the decisions of the SCC. That these lessons were in contradiction to each other ensured that the crisis would not end in 1995 but would continue for as long as the two sides were working at cross-purposes.

Chapter II argued that the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, and the protections it offers to US personnel accused of sexual assault, is one reason why a lack of common ground has persisted. In particular, this chapter considered how the SOFA has been used by both sides, particularly in the period 1995-2008, to address the issue of human rights. US policymakers have defended the agreement throughout each crisis, arguing that it does not prevent justice from being served but ensures that US personnel will receive the same legal rights in Japan as they would at home. Conversely, anti-base protestors argue that the treaty safeguards American extraterritoriality, and by doing so, undermines the human rights of Okinawans who are regularly assaulted by US personnel. The SOFA controversy is not limited to Okinawa, and the existence of similar agreements in South Korea and the Philippines has led to similar anti-base movements emerging in these countries. As such, this chapter also studied how shared concerns over human rights violations, and the role played in these by Status of Forces and Visiting Forces Agreements, have allowed a transnational, feminist, anti-base network to flourish across the Asia-Pacific.

Chapter III explored the differences between policymakers' and protestors' conceptions of "genuine" security and posited this as another compelling reason why a lack of common ground continues to exist. For alliance policymakers, security can only be guaranteed by a strong military presence that deters external threats, justifying the continued forward deployment of US troops across the Asia-Pacific. OWAAMV believe that military security is a misnomer and argue that "genuine" security can only be achieved when people's fundamental human rights are protected. This chapter placed particular focus on the period after 2009, when President Obama entered into office and

launched the “Asia Rebalance”, a radical refocussing of US foreign policy. Through comparing SCC documents released in the period 1995-2008 to those published under Obama, this chapter demonstrated that the rebalance was actually a continuation of policies that had been started by previous presidents. It also revealed that, similarly to its predecessors, the focus of the Obama administration’s Asia policy was still very much on maintaining the US military presence in the region. This chapter continued to argue that the stalemate between alliance policymakers and anti-base protestors persisted because each side continued to support its own version of true security, and that these two concepts are fundamentally opposed. It concluded by considering how the US has attempted to tackle the problem of sexual violence. While individual punishments reflected policymakers’ beliefs that these crimes were individual acts, the proposed relocation of the US Marines to Guam appeared to be a much more radical attempt to address the situation and was prompted by political upset in Tokyo.

Finally, Chapter IV explored the situation in 2016 and argued that the similarities between 2016 and 1995 demonstrate that the lack of common ground persisted over time. The rape and murder of Rina Shimabukuro, and the crisis that unfolded in its wake, demonstrated that neither side had been successful in advancing their position in the intervening period. Much like 1995, in the aftermath of this case OWAAMV held demonstrations and wrote letters, President Obama apologised for the crime, the SCC took steps to address Okinawan concerns, and tens of thousands protested in Naha. The similarities between the two crises demonstrate that, while both sides had learnt much from earlier incidents, neither had been able to use this to advance meaningful change. The decisions taken, and rhetoric used, by both sides in 2016 were startlingly similar to those employed in earlier cases and this highlighted the fact that the two sides had failed to reconcile with each other. The situation in 2016 was also covered extensively by the international, online, news media which allowed both sides to effectively present their arguments to the wider world. This coverage also undermined the position of policymakers to a certain extent, as it highlighted how such crimes happen repeatedly, and how efforts to stop them have proven inadequate.

At its most fundamental level, this thesis presented a crisis in Okinawa that has remained largely unchanged for over twenty years. During this time, OWAAMV demanded a drastic revision of the SOFA, the removal of all US personnel and bases, and for US personnel who commit crimes of sexual violence to be held properly accountable. The piecemeal changes that have been adopted; amendments to SOFA implementation procedures, individual prosecutions, temporary curfews, drinking bans and the proposed relocation of some 8,000 Marines to Guam, have fallen far short of what protestors have been lobbying for. However, thanks to their belief in militarised security, the steps alliance policymakers have taken are what they believe to be necessary to resolve the crisis without jeopardising the wider regional security picture. Viewed through this lens, the reluctance to

withdraw US bases and troops from Okinawa is understandable. They make up a vital component of the forward deployed military presence in the Asia-Pacific, and the location of Okinawa, between Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and China, is strategically ideal. Further, while policymakers have not reacted to many of the protestors demands they have attempted to address each individual rape case. Through utilising the court-marshal system, allowing some cases to go to trial in national courts, and implementing curfews and drinking bans, the US have, in their opinion, made sure that justice is served in every instance. That OWAAMV do not see the situation in this way is thanks in part to their belief that human security, and the protection of human rights, is the only way to guarantee peace and security, and that the US military presence can never achieve this because of the sheer amount of violence and destruction they cause.

Alongside issues of security, the SOFA has become a tangible battleground in the debate over the US military presence in Okinawa. While American policymakers have continually argued that it ensures US personnel are subject to the same legal protections as they would be at home, successive sexual assault cases have demonstrated that the SOFA has not historically acted as an effective basis for prosecutions. The common American defence of the SOFA is that it does not need revising because, if and when a crime occurs, the US will cooperate with Japanese authorities. However, as was explored in this thesis, there have been multiple occasions on which the US military has refused to hand suspects over to Japanese custody, citing the SOFA as justification.³⁷¹

Even when the US military does address individual crimes, OWAAMV argue it is not enough. Their belief in human security leads them to state that the US military is a violent-intrinsic institution and, as such, any rapes or sexual assaults committed are not individual acts, but symptomatic of a military system that promotes violence. Therefore, while the punishments implemented address individual crimes, they do not confront this larger issue. For OWAAMV, the only way to do so would be to remove all US military personnel from Okinawa. This solution seems unlikely, considering how important maintaining US troops and bases in Okinawa is for both the security alliance and Japanese national security. Despite this apparent stalemate, there are some nuances in the “Okinawa issue” which actually suggest that some, admittedly minor, progress has been made.

1995 is one such example of when the actions of protestors influenced alliance policymakers to implement changes in the US military presence in Okinawa. While it is impossible to say, with any certainty, whether or not the actions and demands of protestors after 1995 further influenced the decisions of policymakers, there are moments in time when it appears this occurred. Until 2008,

³⁷¹ It is also worth noting that, while this thesis has focused on acts of sexual assault and rape there are multiple further examples of crimes committed when the SOFA has been invoked to ensure that suspects avoid prosecution. Many are outlined by Chalmers Johnson and Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence: Johnson, *Blowback*, pp. 45-47; Johnson, ‘Three Rapes’; Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, ‘Okinawa’, pp. 6-7.

debates over the SOFA, and the role it played in hindering prosecutions, were central to every rape case. That this was not the case in either 2012 or 2016 suggests that, while US policymakers still did not countenance revising the document, they did appear to take heed of protestors' demands, and tried to avoid making the SOFA a further point of conflict. Similarly, the 2016 SOFA amendment could be considered to be a reaction to activists' demands. While this amendment did not alter the SOFA itself it did, for the first time, address calls for increased education programmes to tackle crimes of sexual violence. Outside of the SOFA, the delinking of the Marine relocation from FRF construction also appears to be a concession to protestors. There is no indication as to why this delinking came in 2012, but mounting activism against the both the FRF and the US Marines seems a likely motivator. Although the protests against the FRF drew a diverse range of anti-base activists, it was OWAAMV who were most fervently against the US Marines being present in Okinawa, and this decision appears to be at least partially influenced by their anti-Marine rhetoric.

These changes are admittedly minor but, considering the way in which the human security discourse of OWAAMV has been adopted by the wider anti-base movement since 1995, it now seems entirely possible that larger and more meaningful changes could come in the future. For example, while the educational programmes implemented in the 2016 SOFA amendment did not focus on addressing bad behaviour, there is every possibility that programmes such as this could be adopted in the future, if the arguments of a strengthened and influential anti-base movement can convince alliance policymakers that it would be beneficial. While it seems unlikely that OWAAMV will achieve their more radical demands in the near future, if they continue to present more moderate demands alongside these it may convince the US military to take further steps to address the more manageable aspects of the "Okinawa issue". The adoption of policies to mitigate the impact of the US military presence does demonstrate that alliance officials are open to change, and the desire of the US military to be "good neighbours" could, one day, lead to a more responsive relationship between the two sides.³⁷²

³⁷² Takazato, Dalton and Rabson, 'Okinawan Women Demand U.S. Forces Out After Another Rape and Murder'.

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