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The Transformation of Political Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia

The Darul Islam & Jema'ah Islamiyah through Terrorism Theory

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Master Thesis

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Abstract

This master thesis explores the utility of terrorism theory in explaining the transformation of Islamic terrorism in Indonesia. In doing so, it focuses on two terrorist movements: the Darul Islam (DI) and the Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI), and four theories on terrorism that were formulated by the academics David Rapoport (2004), Louise Richardson (2007), Randall D. Law (2016) and Alex P. Schmid (2011). By (1) presenting an historical overview of Islamic terrorism in Indonesia, (2) analysing the narratives of the DI and JI and (3) testing the models of these scholars with the Indonesian case, this master thesis explores the following question: to what extent could the transformation of the DI to the JI be explained through common academic models of terrorism research?

The terrorist tactics from the DI and JI are clarified by Rapoport's, Law's, Richardon's and Schmid's academic models on terrorism. Rapoport's theory provides an explanation for the transformation of Indonesian terrorism. Law's theory provides clarity with his alternative to 'religious terrorism': 'jihadi terrorism'. Richardson' theory illustrates what leads individuals to join a terrorist movement and what the DI and JI exactly aim to achieve through their terrorist attacks. Schmid furthermore provides a scheme to test these theories. His book *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* functions as an overarching theoretical framework for this thesis.

However, the case study of terrorism in Indonesia illustrates that even though terrorism theory is helpful in explaining certain aspects of terrorism, terrorism theory remains of limited value to understand the involute nature of complex terrorist movements and the transformation of and connections between such movements. The historical analysis of the transformation of terrorism in Indonesia and the analysis of the narratives of Indonesian terrorists that this thesis provides, illustrate how terrorism theory fails to grasp important aspects of the phenomenon.

Furthermore, this thesis illustrates how general theories on violence, in specific the analysis of narratives as described by Jolle Demmers (2012) and the theory of a civil war within Islam by David Kilcullen (2009), could fill the academic gap in terrorism theory. Both theories explain what terrorism theory often neglects: other factors that - in combination with the factors Richardson, Rapoport, Law and Schmid present - might lead to terrorism. Therefore, this thesis argues for the merging of general theories on violence and terrorism theory in order to thoroughly understand complicated movements.

Keywords: terrorism, Indonesia, Islam, Political Islam, Darul Islam, Jema'ah Islamiyah, Islamic State, terrorism theory, religious terrorism, anticolonial terrorism, decolonisation, independence.

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Emma Keizer
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Contents

Introduction

Islamic terrorism is one of the most discussed phenomena around the world. Over the past two decades, various Islamic terrorist movements have embraced the ideology of the Political Islam and have been committing actions of violence in the name of Islam. Islamic terrorist movements have been posing a threat to the security of many different countries and regions. Currently, such movements are even seen as one of the most dangerous threats to Western societies in general.[1]

Countless scholars have written about the roots of Islamic terrorism in the Middle East, the rise and decline of Al-Qaeda and the rise and decline of the Islamic State (ISIS). However, the biggest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia, is often overlooked in terrorism research. Even though Islamic terrorism has been and still is posing a huge threat to the Indonesian society and the security of Southeast Asia in general, most scholars only focus on Middle Eastern countries when addressing violent Islamic extremism.[2] Despite the fact that the proponents of the radical Islam in Indonesia are just a minority, their use of violence for religious purposes caused great damage in the country.[3]

This master thesis will focus on the changing nature of Islamic terrorism in Indonesia. In doing so, it will focus on two terrorist movements: the *Darul Islam* (DI) and the *Jema'ah Islamiyah* (JI).[4] The words *Darul Islam* are mostly used to describe the post-1945 organisations that tried to realise the ideal of a *Negara Islam Indonesia*[5] (an Islamic State of Indonesia).[6] The roots of the DI, however, lay in 1942 with the Islamic mystic Sukarmadji Meridian Kartosuwiryo.[7] The DI was the first movement in Indonesia to express Islam

[1] Emmanuel Karagiannis, *The New Political Islam: Human Rights, Democracy, and Justice* (Philadelphia 2017), p. ix; Martin van Creveld, 'Technology and War II. From Nuclear Stalemate to Terrorism' in: Charles Townshend (ed.), *The Oxford History of Modern War* (Oxford 2005), p. 341 - 364, there p. 359.
[2] Tion Kwa, 'Terrorism overlooked', *The Washington Post* (version 26 November 2004), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2004/11/26/terrorism-overlooked/f17a86e6-981f-43d3-b749-ae38819fea12/?utm_term=.f787262a9c15 (22 January 2018).
[3] Indonesia Briefing International Crisis Group, 'Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: the Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia', (version 8 August 2002), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/al-qaeda-southeast-asia-case-ngruki-network-indonesia (20 January 2018).
[4] See Appendix III for a list of abbreviations.
[5] See Appendix V for a glossary with non-English terms and more.
[6] The name *Darul Islam* comes from the Arabic dār al-Islām and literally means the "house" of Islam, referring to the Islamic part of the world where the Islamic faith and the observance of Islamic law and regulations are obligatory. The DI is then also known as the NII. - C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam. The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (Leiden 1981), p. 10- 11.
[7] See Appendix I for a general timeline of all historical events that are important for this research & see Appendix IV for a list of people mentioned in this research.

violently. In the beginning, it was mostly active in West-Java, where it fought alongside the Indonesian Republicans against the Dutch colonial power.[8] After the formal independence of Indonesia in December 1949, the DI continued to develop itself in the form of full-time warriors, fighting the Republic regime. In this fight only, the DI caused the death of over 23.000 Indonesians.[9] Eventually, the Indonesian government launched a large offensive against the DI in 1956 that severely weakened the movement. By 1962, there were only some pockets of DI-resistance left in West-Java and South Sulawesi.[10] In September of that year, Kartosuwiryo was executed by firing squad.[11]

Forty years later, on 12 October 2002, a young Muslim called Muhammad Iqbal blew himself up along with hundreds of others at the Sari Night Club on the island of Bali. In advance, he stated: 'I am a child of the DI (…) who is ready to sacrifice myself [sic] for Islam.'[12] Iqbal was part of Southeast Asia's first transnational Islamist terrorist movement: the Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI). The JI was formally established on the 1st of January 1993 and has been striving for the revival of the Islam in Indonesia in its 'pure form' ever since.[13] The JI is a splinter group of the DI and was set up by DI-fugitives in Malaysia who had strong links with Al Qaeda.[14] The JI's main goal is not to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia only, but a Southeast Asian Islamic state spreading across Indonesia, Malaysia, the Southern Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. It is mainly active in Indonesia: the JI strongly rejects the Westernisation of Indonesia and the influx of tourists to the country and therefore targets Western objectives. Among others, the JI was responsible for the bombings of 11 churches in Indonesia on the 24th of December 2000, two Bali bombings (in 2002 and 2005), the bombing of the Jakarta Marriott Hotel in 2003 and the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004.[15] It therewith caused the death of over 250 people and left many more

[8] Hendrik Schulte Nordholt, *Indonesië na Soeharto: Reformasi en Restauratie* (Amsterdam 1953), p. 165.
[9] Schulte Nordholt, *Indonesië na Soeharto,* p. 165.
[10] Andrea HP., 'The History of Darul Islam (DI) and Kartosuwiryo' (2005), https://www.academia.edu/8303411/The_History_of_Darul_Islam_DI_and_Kartosuwiryo (18 January 2018), p. 3 – 5.
[11] Quinton Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah', *Indonesia*, No. 89 (April 2010), p. 1- 36, there, p. 1.
[12] Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia', p. 1 - 2.
[13] Commonwealth of Australia, 'Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)' (2018), *Australian National Security* https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/JemaahIslamiyahJI.aspx (21 January 2018).
[14] Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, 'Imam Samura's Justification for Bali Bombing', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 30 (2007), p. 1033 - 1056, there p. 1035.
[15] Commonwealth of Australia, 'Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)' (2018), *Australian National Security* https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/JemaahIslamiyahJI.aspx (21 January 2018).

critically injured.

Problem statement

The ideology of Islamic terrorists in Indonesia seems strongly focused on Islam and on striving for an independent state. Therefore, the question whether the DI and the JI are religious or secessionist movements is pressing. Scholars indeed continually debate the degree to which the DI and the JI were driven by religious or secessionist motivations.[16]

According to Islamic scholar B.J. Boland, the DI in its later stage was more of a quasi-ideological guerrilla organisation than a religious movement.[17] He argues that the rise of the DI should be explained as a result of 'a mixture of religious and non-religious factors, an ideological background plus all sorts of political circumstances and personal interests.' Kees van Dijk, emeritus Professor of the History of Modern Islam in Indonesia, claims that the religious focus of the DI was different throughout different regions in Indonesia.[18] He notes that the DI's appeal did not necessarily seem religious: in all areas where they rose, social processes that evoked disorder and revolutions had been underway already.[19] The same could be argued for the circumstances under which the JI arose. Sociologist David Kilcullen indeed argues that the theological content of the JI's ideology does not seem to be their primary driver'.[20]

In general, the DI and JI do not seem to fit in the most common academic models of addressing terrorism. As the term 'religious terrorism' prevails in the academic field, current academic models of terrorism research seem insufficient in explaining cases like the Indonesian one. Describing the DI and JI as religious movements neglects their complexity with their focus on establishing Islamic states. Furthermore, their fight against 'the West', whether that is against the Dutch or against the wider Western community, is neglected.

Indeed, there are many different types of religious terrorist movements. Political scientist Louise Richardson argues that for some movements, religion is just a badge of

[16] Greg Fealy; Sally White, *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore 2008), p. 185.
irnaturalOther academic sources on this debate: B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (Leiden 1971), p. 57 - 65; B. Effendy, 'Islam and the State in Indonesia' (Singapore 2003), p. 35; 37; 51; Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat (the Islamic Sharia Movement : Reproduksi Salafiyah ideologies di Indonesia* (Jakarta 2007), p. 244 – 261; Van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam*, p. 2.
[17] Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, p. 62.
[18] Van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam*, p. 485.
[19] Idem, p. 485.
[20] David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla. Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York 2009), p. xxvii.

ethnic identity that serves to solidify alliances and visions and to identify enemies and friends. In other cases, religion appears to provide a full objective for the terrorist movement and plays a role similar to a political ideology, providing an all-encompassing belief system that legitimates their actions.[21] Depicting all terrorist movements with any sort of religious character as 'religious terrorism' neglects the complexity of the violent side of the Political Islam.

Furthermore, both the DI and the JI seem to have altered their goals multiple times, variating from fighting for independence to spreading the traditional form of the Islam, establishing an Islamic state and fighting 'the West'. Next to that, many Indonesians from the same families and even the same individuals were involved in both the DI and the JI, despite the differences between both movements.[22]

This thesis will focus on the puzzling case of Islamic terrorism in Indonesia. Its main aim will be to explore the following question: to what extent could the transformation of the DI to the JI be explained through common academic models of terrorism research?

Theoretical framework

To illustrate the problem the Indonesian case is posing when addressed through academic models on terrorism, this thesis will make use of the highly influential works of scholars David Rapoport (2004),[23] Louise Richardson (2007)[24] and Randall D. Law (2016).[25] Additionally, this thesis will build on *the Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, written by academic Alex P. Schmid (2011) to further illustrate terrorism theory in the academic field. Rapoport and Law address terrorism from a historical viewpoint, whereas Richardson approaches it from a more constructivist appeal. Schmid, on the other hand, does not offer one approach to terrorism but attempts to come to an academic consensus in approaching terrorism and illustrates different theories within the academic field.

According to Rapoport, terrorism comes and goes in waves that are each driven by a different energy. He distinguishes four waves of terrorism that would all last about a generation: the Anarchist wave (1881 - 1919), the Anticolonial wave (1920 - 1960), the New Left wave (1960 - 2000) and the Religious wave (1979 - supposedly 2025).[26] However, the

[21] Richardson, *What terrorists want,* p. 62 - 63.
[22] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla,* p. xxvi.
[23] David Rapoport, 'The four waves of modern terrorism', in: A.K. Cronin; J.M. Ludes (eds.), *Attacking terrorism. Elements of a grand* strategy (Washington 2004), p. 46 - 73.
[24] Louise Richardson, *What terrorists want. Understanding the enemy, containing the threat'* (New York 2006).
[25] Randall D. Law, *Terrorism. A History* (Cambridge 2016).
[26] Rapoport estimates that his 'religious wave' will come to an end in 2025. This thesis will elaborate

historical focus in Rapoport's theory seems insufficient in describing movements such as the DI and JI. By depicting the DI as an anticolonial terrorist movement (even if it is justified in a certain period), their religious ideology is neglected. Next to that, by depicting the DI as a religious terrorist movement, their struggle for independence as a core feature is neglected. Furthermore, by depicting the JI as a religious terrorist movement, their struggle for a state and fight against the West as a core feature is neglected.

Other scholars use the term ethno-nationalist terrorism for terrorists like these, a choice that seems to solve the issues with Rapoport's theory. One of these scholars is Law, who goes into categorising terrorism with a strong focus on the historical development of terrorism too. Law aims to construct trends in terrorism throughout history, by making a distinction between terrorism in the Ancient world, terrorism in the Middle Ages, terrorism in the Early Modern Era, revolutionary terrorism, racial terrorism, ethno-nationalist terrorism, state terrorism, decolonisation terrorism, Leftist terrorism, international terrorism and jihadist terrorism. However, describing the DI and JI as ethno-nationalist movements 'fighting for independence or autonomy within a larger state's 'home' borders' seems insufficient as well: this seems a description of a separatist insurgency, which would neglect the religious character of the DI and JI. Furthermore, the JI does not fit in this typology since it is not per definition separatist as it does not attempt to separate a part of Indonesia as an Islamic state, but wants to create an Islamic state throughout Southeast Asia. Additionally, as Rapoport's theory and the similarities between the DI and JI already illustrate, the distinction between some kinds of terrorism and insurgencies is rather vague.

This raises the question whether it is helpful to categorise terrorism *at all*. It seems like the existing academic models for better understanding terrorism cannot fully explain the violent side of the political Islam in Indonesia. Each theory is neglecting crucial aspects of radical Islamic movements and it seems very difficult to separate religious from political motives.[27]

The categorisation of terrorism is indeed fraught with challenges. Questions such as 'are the distinctions between different terrorist movements practical or theoretical?' and 'what is the best way to approach and test the utility of such classifications?' are highly contested.[28]

Furthermore, it remains unclear what terrorism out of the corner of the political Islam actually focuses on and aims at. Richardson might however be more helpful in gaining

on these waves in the following chapter.
[27] Richardson, *What terrorists want,* p. 62 - 63.

insight on what the main focus of the DI and JI is. In her book, *What terrorists want. Understanding the enemy, containing the threat,* she aims to provide more understanding about the motives of terrorists by identifying commonalities in what terrorists aim to achieve. Analysing these commonalities in every individual case, as will be done in the fourth chapter of this research, identifies what terrorists exactly aim at and what leads them in their struggle. Applying such an analysis on the DI and JI could provide insights about what kind of terrorist movements they are. However, this focus could neglect historical factors that influenced terrorist movements and potentially fails to address the actual tactics used by terrorists.

Academic Relevance

The Indonesia case illustrates that there is an academic gap in addressing terrorism. Conclusions seem to be drawn rather fast and the theories seem to generalise all religious terrorist movements as *one* phenomenon. This thesis aims to provide insights on the current way of analysing terrorism, or more specific, the violent side of the Political Islam. In doing so, it will not only illustrate the limits of terrorism theory, but also address its added value and the benefits it provides that help creating a better understanding about terrorism. Furthermore, the case study of Indonesia serves as an example of how the violent side of the Political Islam has undergone a transformation and how this development could best be interpreted. Generating deeper insights into this academic debate through the Indonesian case study might help to create a better understanding of Political Islamic terrorist movements in general. Moreover, a better understanding of the complex and diverse character of terrorist organisations could facilitate in counter-terrorism efforts.

Sources and Method

The first chapter of this thesis focuses on the phenomenon of terrorism in the academic field. First, the definition of 'terrorism' will be analysed. What is precisely understood as terrorism in the academic field? After that, the aforementioned academic standard models of terrorism research (Rapoport[29], Richardson[30] and Law[31]) will be analysed. Herewith, Schmid's *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* will be used to further explore

[28] Alex P. Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London 2011), p. 158.
[29] David Rapoport, 'The four waves of modern terrorism', in: A.K. Cronin & J.M. Ludes (eds.), *Attacking terrorism. Elements of a grand* strategy (Washington 2004), p. 46 - 73.
[30] Louise Richardson, *What terrorists want. Understanding the enemy, containing the threat'* (New York 2006).
[31] Randall D. Law, *Terrorism. A History* (Cambridge 2016).

terrorism theory in the academic field.

The second chapter provides an introduction to the case study. A general overview of terrorism in Indonesia will be presented, with a focus on the DI and the JI. Thereby, the transformation of terrorism in Indonesia will be analysed.

The third chapter analyses the characteristics of the DI and the JI. What tactics do the different movements use and how do these movements explain and legitimise their tactics? According to Richardson, the key to understanding terrorist movements is understanding the nature of the group you confront.[32] In order to comprehend the nature of the DI and JI, this thesis will analyse the narratives that they used: the stories they created, upheld and communicated to others to make sense of the world around them.[33] The technique of distracting narratives of violent movements originates from studies on violent conflict, explained by academic Jolle Demmers in her book *Theories on Violent Conflict*. This approach seems to provide a tool to illustrate the nature of the DI and JI and to extract all the information needed about the DI and JI to analyse these movements through terrorism theory.

Different official statements and secondary literature on the motivations of the DI and JI will be compared. These statements will provide thorough insights into the narratives of the DI and JI: *what* motivated these movements and *why* did they choose their violent tactics? Unfortunately, primary sources of the DI are scarce. Official pamphlets that the movement spread during the decolonisation war are not available in the Netherlands. However, the narrative its founder Kartosuwiryo communicated is available in secondary literature and a small number of primary sources. His narrative will be the focal point for illustrating the narrative of the DI. JI-members have published countless manifests after their terrorist attacks. This thesis will focus on one of these narratives: that of the mastermind behind the 2002 Bali Bombings, Imam Samudra, as explained in his book *Aku melawan teroris* (I oppose terrorism).[34] Both Kartosuwiryo and Samudra were seen as key members of the movements they represent; their narratives perfectly represent the ideological bases of their movements.

The fourth chapter analyses the distinguished narratives through the aforementioned standard models of terrorism research. A comparison of the DI- and JI's narratives with

[32] Richardson, *What terrorists want,* p. xxi.
[33] J. Demmers, 'Telling Each Other Apart. A discursive approach to violent conflict' in: J. Demmers, *Theories on Violent Conflict* (New York 2012), p. 124 - 145, there p. 115.
[34] The terrorism Imam Samurdra claims to oppose, is the terrorism of 'America and its allies' against the Muslim world. The third chapter of this thesis will elaborate on this view.

academic models on terrorism will illustrate the wider issues the most common academic terrorism models pose when addressing the violent side of the Political Islam as religious terrorism. Thereby, the question to what extent the transformation of the DI to the JI could be explained through the current models of terrorism research, will be answered.

An important note that must be made is that the utility of theories on terrorism is dependent upon the needs of the user.[35] Consequently, certain information about terrorist movements could be formulated in a way that it exactly fits within certain models or theories. However, through addressing the theories of four different scholars and through extensively analysing the history as well as the narratives of the DI and JI, this thesis will exclude the risk of framing information about these movements for the sole purpose of making these movements fit in one academic model on terrorism.

Conceptual framework

Political Islam

This thesis will follow the definition of the Political Islam provided by political scientist Gilian Denoeux as 'a form of instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups and organs' that 'provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future' of which the foundations 'rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition'.[36]

Jihad

Historian Michael K. Knapp's definition of *jihad* will be borrowed throughout this thesis. Knapp describes *jihad* as a 'struggle' or 'striving' in the Way of God or to work for a noble cause with determination.[37] Both the DI and the JI could be categorised as *jihadi* movements: they follow the ideology of pursuing jihad to achieve their goals.

However, it is important to note that jihad does not literally mean 'fight', but that it could also refer to a symbolic- or inner struggle. Furthermore, it does not simply mean 'holy war'. It only got this religious and military connotation in modern times, in particular after 9/11.[38] This thesis will mostly use the word *jihad* in its limited sense, where it denotes an armed struggle by radical Islamists, or a holy war.

[35] Schmid, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism research*, p. 159.
[36] Mohammed Ayoob, 'Political Islam: Image', *World Policy Journal*, vol. 21, no. 3 (Fall 2004), p. 1 - 14, there p. 1.
[37] Michael G. Knapp, 'The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam', *Parameters (*spring 2003), p. 82 - 94, there p. 82.
[38] Ibidem.

Chapter 1. Terrorism in the academic field

Richardson, Rapoport, Law and Schmid all take different approaches towards terrorism. Richardson approaches terrorism from a constructivist view, focusing on the appeal of terrorist groups and the ideas that form the basis of these groups. Rapoport and Law address terrorism from a historical viewpoint. Rapoport theorises the phenomenon in different time frames, while Law is merely analysing historical facts. Schmid, in turn, does not really offer his own approach to terrorism. Instead, he attempts to come to an academic consensus in approaching terrorism and explores different theories.

Before elaborating on the debate about different models of terrorism analysis, it should be clear that terrorism is a highly contested phenomenon. Definitions of 'terrorism' have been proposed by many. Political scientist Jeffrey Simon reported that at least 212 different definitions of terrorism exist, of which governments and other institutions use 90.[39] Furthermore, the word terrorism is often used in mutually exclusive ways: on the one hand, it is used as an 'objective' analytical descriptor, but on the other hand, it is used normatively as a moral judgment against terrorist violence as being inherently wrong.[40]

Practitioners of critical terrorism studies indeed note that labelling movements as 'terrorist movements' is a highly political practice.[41] The famous saying 'one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist' illustrates the point. However, according to Richardson, the freedom for which these 'terrorists' fight is often an abstract concept. To suggest that a freedom fighter is not a terrorist because (s)he is fighting the right fight is confusing means and ends. When a terrorist claims to be a freedom fighter, it does not mean that we should concede this point to them.[42] It is important to be aware of the political context in which an attack takes place, because this context could affect our normative evaluation of the act.[43] To illustrate, an attack by radical Islamists in the United States would in the West be depicted as an act of terrorism immediately, while the bombing of Middle Eastern targets by the United States' government is mostly not. Richardson stresses this: 'a terrorist is a terrorist, no matter whether or not you like the goal (s)he is trying to achieve, no matter whether or not you like the government (s)he is trying to change.'[44] What then, does determine whether a movement is a terrorist movement?

[39] Jeffrey D. Simon, *The Terrorist Trap* (Bloomington 1994), p. 384.
[40] Law, *Terrorism,* p. 2 - 3.
[41] Idem, p. 6.
[42] Richardson, *What terrorists want*, p. 8 - 9.
[43] Idem, p. 7 - 8.
[44] Richardson, *What terrorists want*, p. 10.

1.1 The quest for a definition of terrorism

Schmid attempted to formulate an academic consensus definition of terrorism on the basis of more than a hundred academic and official definitions.[45] In 2011, he introduced an academic consensus definition that describes terrorism as (1) 'a *doctrine* about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence' and (2) 'a conspiratorial *practice* of calculated demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties'.[46]

Richardson defines terrorism as the act of 'deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes'.[47] She stresses that the victims of terrorist violence are mostly not the same as the audience and that the main goal of terrorist attacks is to send a message, mostly with symbolic significance.[48]

Rapoport follows these lines, defining terrorism as 'the use of violence to provoke consciousness, to evoke certain feelings of sympathy and revulsion.'[49]

Law too argues terrorism to be a *strategy* that makes use of certain *tactics*. Even though terrorist acts mostly overshadow their goal, he considers terrorism a means to an end.[50] Additionally, he stresses the importance of the reaction to terrorist acts by stating that today, the media provides the oxygen without which terrorists cannot survive.[51] Without public attention for their deeds, the message of terrorists will not get the desired attention.

Based on the above, a movement is considered a terrorist movement when it employs *terrorist tactics* that have the aim to send a symbolic message.[52] Furthermore, even though Law and Rapoport do not explicitly mention this in their definition but only describe

[45] They gathered over a hundred academic and official definitions of terrorism and examined them to identify the main components. - Alex P. Schmid; Albert Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (Amsterdam 1988).
[46] Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism research,* p. 86; This definition was however a revised consensus definition: Schmid introduced consensus definitions in 1983 and 1988 as well. This could indicate that this debate will not come to its end soon and that the 2011 academic consensus will be revised as well. - Idem, p. 61.
[47] Richardson, *What terrorists want*, p. 4.
[48] Idem, p. 4.
[49] David C. Rapoport, 'The Government Is Up in the Air over Combating Terrorism', *National Journal* 9 (26 November 1977), p. 1853–1856.
[50] Law, *Terrorism*, p. 3.
[51] Idem, p. 4.
[52] The academic discussion about whether states could use terrorist tactics is large. Some scholars argue that there is no such thing as 'state terrorism', while others argue the opposite. This discussion will not be addressed within this research. For more information on this matter, the following article could be addressed: R. Blakeley, 'Bringing the state back into terrorism studies' *European Political Science* 6 (2007), p. 228 - 235.

movements that meet this condition in their works, terrorism is always politically motivated. This indicates that what theorists are trying to describe as religious (Islamic) terrorism *is* terrorism out of the corner of the Political Islam.

However, it is contested whether a fixed definition of terrorism is useful in the first place. Schmid argues that the presence of an international legal consensus in itself is no guarantee that the international community can effectively ban terrorism.[53] Richardson argues furthermore that since there are so many forms of terrorism, practiced by many different actors for many different reasons, any attempt to reduce all of them to one simplified notion of terrorism will only cloud our understanding.[54] Defining terrorism on the basis of tactics and deeds seems insufficient to really understand the motives and natures of terrorist movements.

1.2 Terrorism theory and typology

The same discussion is pressing among academics about whether it is useful to make up theories on how to address terrorism and whether it is helpful to categorise different types of terrorism. Schmid, for instance, argues that typologies as theoretical constructs are mostly fallible and testable.[55] Traditional terrorism scholars (such as Schmid and Rapoport)[56] believe that there are strict lines along which violence could be identified as terrorism. Schmid argues that the benefits of distinguishing such categories are that they provide great conceptual clarity and that they enable inaccuracies in conceptual approach to surface.[57] However, practitioners of critical terrorism studies (such as Richardson and Law) consider categorising movements, just as depicting movements as terrorist movements, as a political act.[58]

1.2.1 Richardson: Revenge, Renown and Reaction

Richardson formulated a model that is known as the model of the three R's, based on secondary motives that would characterise all terrorists: terrorists (1) seek *revenge,* (2) want to be *renown* and (3) are trying to provoke a *reaction*. First, Richardson argues that terrorists generally have the desire to seek revenge. They do so by joining a terrorist movement, wherein they share a feeling of being a victim or being (collectively) humiliated. Within

[53] Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism research,* p. 87.
[54] Richardson, *What terrorists want*, p. 11.
[55] Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism research,* p. 159.
[56] Poowin Bunyavejchewin, 'The Orthodox and the Critical Approach toward Terrorism: An overview', *Ritsumeikan Center for Asia Pacific Studies (RCAPS)*, Working Paper No. 10-3 (December 2010), p. 1- 2.
[57] Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism research,* p. 159.
[58] Law, *Terrorism*, p. 6.

such a movement, the means of vengeance for the grievances that person has, are countless.[59] Second, terrorists want to get renown: they want attention to their cause as a means of seeking glory for themselves as well as for their cause in an effort to redress their perceived humiliation after their perceived suffering.[60] Third, terrorists seek to provoke a reaction. Their deeds, through which they show their existence and presumed strength, are the way in which they communicate to the world: a phenomenon that is better known as *propaganda by the deed*. However, ironically, terrorists always get a reaction. Not reacting is hardly an option, especially for democratic countries that know free press. Richardson however argues that terrorists mostly have overoptimistic expectations of those reactions, such as the withdrawal of American forces from the Middle East or the collapse of capitalism.[61]

1.2.2 Rapoport's theory of terrorism in waves

Rapoport does not go into the aspects of terrorism that Richardson addresses. Instead, he focuses on the historical development of terrorism and distinguishes parallels herein. According to Rapoport, terrorism comes and goes in waves. He depicts a movement to be part of a wave when similar activities occur in different countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participant's groups' characteristics and mutual relationship. Rapoport herewith does acknowledge that certain terrorist organisations are exceptions to this as they would be 'linked to a particular time and country'. Furthermore, he recognises that certain movements could transcend a wave, something that reflects the new wave's influence.[62] He distinguishes four waves of terrorism: (1) the Anarchist wave (1881 - 1919), containing among others the terrorist attacks during the French Revolution and the murder on Franz Ferdinand that indirectly set in motion the First World War, (2) the Anticolonial wave (1920 - 1960) that contains movements like the AFLN in French-Algeria or insurgencies in the Dutch Indies, (3) the New Left wave (1960 - 2000) among which the German Red Army Faction and the Irish IRA and (4) the Religious wave (1979 - 2025) containing movements like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. However, Rapoport stresses that the religious wave was not about Islam only: he also mentions Jewish-, Buddhist-, Hindu- and Christian terrorism.[63]

[59] Richardson, *What terrorists want*, p. 90.
[60] Idem, p. 94.
[61] Idem, p. 98.
[62] Rapoport, 'The four waves of modern terrorism', p. 47 – 48.
[63] Idem, p. 61.

1.2.3 Law's three-way approach

Law distinguishes three different ways to explore terrorism: (1) as a set of tactics, (2) as an act of symbolic and provocative violence by the few with the goal of swaying the behaviour of the many and (3) as a social construct, meaning that terrorism is a word that frames another one's goals or methods illegitimate within a particular culture, history and perception.[64] It makes sense that one could explain every terrorist movement through at least one of these ways.

Furthermore, Law categorises terrorism on the basis of trends he identifies throughout history: terrorism in the Ancient world, terrorism in the Middle Ages, terrorism in the Early Modern Era, revolutionary terrorism, racial terrorism, ethno-nationalist terrorism, state terrorism, decolonisation terrorism, Leftist terrorism, international terrorism and jihadist terrorism. In his book *Terrorism. A History*, Law presents these forms of terrorism in chronological order. Law, as opposed to Rapoport, does make a distinction between (1) groups fighting for an end to their colonial status and (2) organisations fighting for independence or autonomy within a larger state's 'home' borders.[65]

1.2.4 Schmid's Handbook of Terrorism Research

Schmid provides us with criteria, formulated by IR-theorist Earl Conteh-Morgan, that can be used to test the usefulness of terrorism theory. According to Conteh-Morgan, the requirements for theories being useful are:

1. It must be comprehensive or applicable to various situations, and must include relevant variables.
2. It must be cohesive, with all its segments strongly linked to each other with identical variables in its separate paths.
3. It must be empirical and applicable to concrete situations.
4. As a result of the third requirement, a theory must have the greatest validity of empirical evidence to support or enhance its explanatory power.
5. It must be parsimonious, or be able to explain the problem or event with as little complexity as possible.
6. It must be open to verification.
7. Finally, it must be clear and casual in the relationship between and among variables, and in terms of considering and linking units or factors at multiple levels of analysis.[2]

Figure 1: Earl Conteh-Morgan's requirements for an adequate terrorism theory [66]

In chapter 4, this thesis will examine to what extent the models of Richardson, Rapoport and Law are useful theories for addressing terrorism on the basis of these criteria.

[64] Law, *Terrorism*, p. 3.
[65] Idem, chapter 11.
[66] Idem, p. 201.

1.3 On 'Religious Terrorism'

All four scholars elaborate on terrorism by radical Islamists as well. Schmid describes religious terrorism as 'performed for the alleged defence of a religious community or the creation or expansion of a theocratic regime. The goal is sometimes a restoration of an ideal situation that allegedly existed in some golden past'.[67] In fact, all scholars point to the 'glorious' past of the Islam. Law describes how the ancient Islamic empires in the Middle East were militarily, intellectually and culturally further developed than their European contemporaries. However, beginning in the late eighteenth century, core Islamic territories began to fade compared to European powers, mainly because of Europe's technological and bureaucratic advances.[68] The influence of Islamic empires started to decline, starting with the fall of the Ottoman empire. The more recent revolution in Iran in 1978-1979, the war in Lebanon and the wars in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and the United States further evoked a communal feeling of humiliation among radical Islamists. Law describes how these events led radicals to raise arms and conduct terrorist attacks as a way to fight back.[69]

Richardson further elaborates on how this 'glorious past' is used to reinforce the argument that the Islam is nowadays being suppressed by 'the West'. By invoking the glorious past of Islam, radical Islamists express their perceived humiliation and invoke the idea of a glorious future, assured by Allah himself.[70] Richardson argues that because Muslims never experienced a Reformation like the Christians that led to the separation between religion and state, they are ordered to bring the behaviour of the rest of the world in line with the moral perceptions of the Islam. Following this logic, it is easy to argue for Islamic terrorists that all problems they are facing in their home country are due to 'foreign' ideologies like Capitalism that threaten the core values of Islam.

However, Richardson stresses that Islam only leads to terrorism in combination with political and social problems that could be blamed on other entities.[71] The assumption that religion and in particular Islam forms one of the root causes of modern terrorism is an oversimplification. After all, most religions have produced terrorist groups and many terrorists are and have been atheist.[72] Richardson therewith does acknowledge there has been a growth in the number of terrorist groups with Islamic motives in the last thirty years.[73] She

[67] Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism research,* p. 681.
[68] Law, *Terrorism*, p. 273.
[69] Idem, p. 272 - 304.
[70] Richardson, *What terrorists want*, p. 66 - 67.
[71] Idem, p. 68.
[72] Idem, p. 61.
[73] Idem, p. 61.

and Schmid both explain this by arguing that religion leads to more absolutist and transnational threats as it has the ability to convince and mobilise terrorists in the name of God himself.[74] An explanation of this absoluteness could be one of the central tenets of Islam that is *tahwid* (oneness of God). Because of this belief, the Islamic 'political ideal' has always centred around the belief that God alone is the source of all authority.[75]

Rapoport elaborates on how and why this construction currently seems so dangerous. He argues that religion has a vastly different significance nowadays as it supplies justifications and organises principles for a state.[76] This indicates that addressing movements such as the DI and JI as Political Islamic movements that use terrorist attacks, could be more helpful than addressing them as religious terrorist movements.

Furthermore, the number of terrorist groups in Rapoport's fourth (religious) wave declined dramatically, which he explains by the fact that these terrorist movements are more transnational. Major groups in the Middle East (and in Indonesia) have persisted for two decades and are still functioning.[77] This would explain why the DI seems to have transcended from the third to the fourth wave and why the ideology of the JI seems so durable, even though several key members of the movement have been captured and assassinated. However, in lines with Rapoport's argument that every wave lasts about a generation, movements persisting for two decades (such as Al Qaeda and the JI) do not prove the strength of a wave (yet).

Scholar	Approach	Definition	Theory
Louise Richardson	Constructivist	The act of 'deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes'. The means employed and not the ends pursued, nor the political context in which a group operates determines whether a movements is a terrorist movement or not.	**Three R model:** terrorists (1) seek *revenge*, (2) want to be *renown* and (3) are trying to provoke a *reaction*.
David C. Rapoport	Historical	'The use of violence to provoke consciousness, to evoke certain feelings of sympathy and revulsion.'	**Terrorism in waves:** 1. The Anarchist wave (1881 – 1919); 2. The Anticolonial wave (1920 – 1960); 3. The New Left wave (1960 – 2000); 4. The Religious wave (1979 – 2025).

[74] Richardson, *What terrorists want*, p. 68; Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism research,* p. 681.
[75] Law, *Terrorism*, p. 272.
[76] Rapoport, 'The four waves of modern terrorism', p. 63.
[77] Idem, p. 63.

Randall D. Law	Historical	'(1) a set of tactics, (2) an act of symbolic and provocative violence by the few with the goal of swaying the behaviour of the many and (3) a social construct'	**Historical categories of terrorism:** terrorism in the Ancient world, terrorism in the Middle Ages, terrorism in the Early Modern Era, revolutionary terrorism, racial terrorism, ethno-nationalist terrorism, state terrorism, decolonisation terrorism, Leftist terrorism, international terrorism and jihadist terrorism.
Alex P. Schmid	Overarching (academic)	(1) 'A *doctrine* about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence' and (2) 'a conspirational *practice* of calculated demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties'.	**Criteria to test the usefulness of terrorism theories (Eearl Conteh-Morgan)**

Figure 2: Schematical overview of the four scholars

To what extent Richardson's three R's, Rapoport's theory of terrorism in waves or Law's three-way approach are helpful to understand the DI and JI better, will be analysed in the following chapters. However, as argued by Schmid, all relevant aspects of the phenomenon need to be properly considered in order to thoroughly understand (DI- and JI-) terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.[78] The following chapter will elaborate on the historical development of DI -and JI-terrorism in Indonesia.

[78] Alex P. Schmid, 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism and Political Violence' *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16:1 (2004), p. 197 - 221, there p. 214.

Chapter 2. Terrorism and the Political Islam in Indonesia

An introduction to the case of the DI and JI

To gain insights into the transformation of religious terrorism in Indonesia, it is essential to analyse the long-term development of terrorism in the country. Militant Islamic movements have been part of Indonesian history for a long time.[79] Already during the early 16th century, Muslims in the province of Aceh (North-Sumatra) successfully challenged the Portuguese. They continued this struggle when the Dutch formally settled in Indonesia in 1800. Their resistance was based upon an indigenous tradition resting on a collection of works known as the *hikayat prang sari* (the Story of the Holy War) which describes the aggressions of the Dutch and the theology of jihad, and which glorifies martyrdom and martyr's rewards in paradise.[80] In 1873, their struggle climaxed during the infamous Aceh War.[81] After 30 years of war, the Acehnese were defeated by the Dutch.

After the war, the Acehnese chief-leaders were unable to re-organise sustained resistance against the Dutch occupation. Therefore, the *ulama* (Muslim scholars[82]) took over the battle against the Dutch and transferred it to a large-scale jihad. Unifying the population on the basis of religion seemed effective but was eventually unable to sustain resistance to the modern Dutch army. Thereon, the Acehnese made a transfer to a 'private' form of jihad. Resistance to colonial rule was now focused around the so-called *Aceh moorden* (Acehnese murders), that is the slaying of unbelieving Europeans by the Acehnese as a private form of 'fighting in the way of God'.[83] The Acehnese murders could be seen as the first form of terrorism by Muslims in Indonesia: they were aimed at provoking the Dutch into a reaction, that was to end their colonial rule. However, this form of terrorism does not appear solely religious. Rather, it seems political, based on the struggle against foreign domination, motivated by nationalist feelings.

It was not until the Islamic mystic Sekarmadji Meridian Kartosuwiryo (1905 - 1962) became politically active in the archipelago, that radical Islam started to attract support. At

[79] Solahudin; Dave McRae (translation), *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jem'ah Islamiyah* (Ithaca 2013), p. XV.
[80] Stephen Frederic Dale, 'Religious suicide in islamic Asia. Anti colonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia and the Phillipines' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 32, no. 1 (March 1988),p. 37 - 59, there p. 51.
[81] Dale, 'Religious suicide in Islamic Asia. Anticolonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia and the Phillipines', p. 50
[82] Henk Driessen, *In het huis van de Islam* (Amsterdam 1997), Chapter 1.
[83] Dale, 'Religious suicide in Islamic Asia. Anticolonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia and the Phillipines', p. 49 - 50

the age of 22, Kartosuwiryo started to engage in Islamic politics, becoming a member of the *Jong Islamieten Bond* (Association of Young Muslims) and later on of the *Party Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (PSII). By 1935, Kartosuwiryo was actively advocating the establishment of an Islamic state as the main goal of the PSII.[84] However, his influence remained limited.

2.1 The Darul Islam (1942 - 1962)

The Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies (May 1942) changed the influence of Kartosuwiryo's thoughts. Slowly, his ideology started taking the shape of the *Darul Islam* movement. At first, the Japanese seemed willing to make concessions to Muslim demands. Japan relied on Islamic leaders to mobilise the Indonesian population, which spread the influence of Islam in society.[85] In 1943, the Japanese facilitated the founding of the political party *Masyumi* in an attempt to control Islam in Indonesia.[86] Kartosuwiryo was strongly involved in Masyumi. However, by the end of 1944, the Japanese concessions to the Indonesian Muslims were completely paralleled by increasing support to the 'secular' Indonesian nationalists.[87] On the 17th of August, 1945, two of these nationalists, Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta, declared the Republic of Indonesia. Several scholars suggest that Kartosuwiryo himself already proclaimed an Islamic state a few days earlier, but he retracted this after the declaration of Sukarno and Hatta.[88]

After the formal declaration of the Republic, a power vacuum occurred. The rather unexpected surrender of Japan left Indonesia in chaos: the Dutch wanted to restore their colonial rule, but their troops were only to arrive a year later, and the new Republic government still had to start building up a complete civil and military apparatus.[89] As a result, isolated outbursts of popular discontent after years of exploitation by foreign powers led to an outbreak violence.

In April 1946, the Dutch troops arrived in Indonesia. They struck back against the Republican government and various guerrilla movements that were active and thereby reinforced the chaos: on the one hand, there was the national struggle of Sukarno against the Dutch, but on the other hand there was the local struggle of different guerrilla movements

[84] C.A.O. Nieuwenhujze, *Aspects of Islam in Postcolonial Indonesia* (Den Haag, 1958), p. 168.
[85] Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, p. 16.
[86] Idem, p. 44; E. Elson; Chiara Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting? An account of Dutch–Republican–Islamic forces interaction in West-Java, 1945–49', J*ournal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 42 (3) (October 2011), p. 458–486, there p. 465 - 466.
[87] Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia,* p. 8.
[88] Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia', p. 4.
[89] Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, p. 15.

and militias in the rural areas, who were also attacked by the Dutch.[90] Kartosuwiryo's Masyumi was one of the guerrillas that were active in West-Java. However, according to Van Dijk, the Masyumi units were nothing more than one of 'many guerrilla movements fighting alongside the official Republican Army (the *Tentara National Indonesia* (TNI)) against the Dutch', seeing themselves as the 'Republic's second army'.[91] In fact, many of the guerrillas at the time included an Islamic component, but they *all* lacked a national framework.[92] Kartosuwiryo knew he would eventually have to unite these guerrillas. Ideological radicalism became his primary weapon and goal, advocating Muslim guerrillas to fight under the name of the *Darul Islam.*[93] However, the Masyumi leadership strongly disapproved Kartosuwiryo's violent tactics.[94] He nevertheless continued to fight, attempting to speed up the process of decolonisation with frequent terrorist attacks. In commemorative books of Dutch-Indies veterans, the DI is often described as one of the most threatening groups to the Dutch establishment in Indonesia.[95]

At the beginning of the decolonisation war (1945), both the DI and the Republican leaders had tried to ignore their differing ideas about the basis of the Indonesian state and focused on the struggle against their common enemy: the Dutch.[96] However, by 1947, Kartosuwiryo's support for the Republicans began to fade. According to scholars R.E. Elson and Chiara Formichi, this was probably due to the fact that the Republicans continued to focus on diplomacy, which Kartosuwiryo considered to be highly unsuccessful.[97] Kartosuwiryo therefore officially called for a holy war against the Dutch after the first big Dutch military offensive in July 1947, Operation Product (or the First Police Action).[98] Furthermore, the choice of Sukarno to employ a separation of church and government started to offend more and more DI-members.[99] By the end of 1947, Kartosuwiryo and his followers were openly challenging the Republic, politically and militarily. They argued that the Indonesians no longer recognised Republican authority. Elson and Formichi indeed

[90] Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, p. 64.
[91] Idem, p. 77.
[92] Idem, p. 17.
[93] John M. MacDougall, 'Sisyphus's Stone in Fragments: Darul Islam from the 1980s to the Present', *Asia Research Paper*, working paper no. 176 (November 2014), p. 3.
[94] Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?', p. 468.
[95] Emma Keizer, *Oorlog in Indonesië. Dekolonisatie in gedenkboeken van Indië-veteranen* (Arnhem 2017), p. 88.
[96] Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, p. 18.
[97] Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?', p. 466.
[98] Translation from: 'Operatie Product' and 'de Eerste Politionele Actie' - Andrea HP., 'The History of Darul Islam (DI) and Kartosuwiryo', p. 3 – 4.
[99] Angel Rabasa; John Haseman, *The military and democracy in Indonesia. Challenges, politics and*

reported that the civilians trusted Kartosuwiryo's militias more than the Republican troops.[100]

On 17 January 1948, the Renville Treaty between the Republic and the Netherlands was signed. The agreement ceded West-Java to the Dutch, which the Republicans saw as a temporary strategic withdrawal. The DI however saw it as a betrayal of the revolution. Kartosuwiryo ordered all of the troops under his control to stay in West-Java: around 4000 Muslim troops did.[101] Kartosuwiryo used the opportunity of West-Java being in Dutch hands to build up a civil and military administration as a prelude to the proclamation of his Islamic state.[102] The next month, a meeting was held with 160 different Muslim fighters in order to set up a collective Muslim reaction and strategy.[103] In the meeting, Kartosuwiryo created the *Majelis Umat Islam* (Council of the Islamic Community), a provisional council that would coordinate the efforts of Muslims in West-Java.[104] Furthermore, the various Islamic militias in West-Java were finally merged to a united and structured army, the *Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII)*: the official army of the DI that would realise the final goal of an Islamic State.[105] Kartosuwiryo himself was established as the *Imam* of the DI-community in West-Java.

By the end of 1948, the Dutch reported that all regions in West-Java were ruled by 'the army of the Negara Islam Indonesia' (the TII of the DI).[106] Indeed, the TII and DI enjoyed most popular support in West-Java. Local villagers became the number one source for the arms of the DI. According to Elson and Formichi, these successes were a consequence of the ruthlessness with which the DI and its army fought against the local

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power (Santa Monica 2002), p. 8 – 9.
[100] Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia', p. 4.
[101] Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 470.
[102] Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam,* p. 20.
[103] Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 470; Holk H. Dengel, *Darul Islam: Kartosuwirjos Kampf um einen islamischen Staat Indonesien* (Wiesbaden 1986), p. 65 - 66.
[104] Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 470 - 471.
[105] Chiara Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation* (Leiden 2012), p. 116
[106] Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst (hereafter: CMI), 'Signalement no. 69' (4 Dec. 1948), Rapportage Indonesië, no. 176, Dutch National Archive (The Hague), hereafter: NA. Also see: Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng, Garoet, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis, Soemedang, Cheribon, Koeningan, Indramajoe, Madjalengka, Poerwakarta, Soekaboemi, Tjiandjoer en Buitenzorg over de maand November 1948', *Proc.-Gen. Hooggerechtshof Ned.-Ind., 'Politiek-politionele verslagen West-Java met enige bijlagen, 1947 – 1949,* NA; ''Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng, Groet, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis, Soemendang, Cheribon, Koeningan, Indramajoe, Madjalengka, Poerwakarta en Soekaboemi over de maand December 1948', *Proc.-Gen. Hooggerechtshof Ned.-Ind., 'Politiek-politionele verslagen West-Java met enige bijlagen, 1947 – 1949, NA*; Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 471.

villagers, who obeyed the DI's demands in fear.[107] According to historian Stef Scagliola, the uneducated peasant population of Indonesia was the primary target of the DI.[108] The DI was known among the Dutch for its ruthless terrorist tactics as well: 'sabotage of telephone connections, destruction of bridges, erection of barricades (…) kampung burnings, murders, kidnappings and intimidations.'[109] In accordance to the previous chapter, these attacks could be categorised as terrorist acts with the sole purpose of intimidating the Indonesian peoples to fight against the Dutch (and the Republicans) for a new, Islamic political environment.

The DI continued preparing detailed Islamic regulations to govern the Islamic State. By late August 1948, the constitution of the Islamic State of Indonesia was drawn.[110] The Republic still made no efforts to halt the influence of the DI. According to Elson and Formichi, this most likely was a result of Kartosuwiryo's diplomatic manoeuvring: his communications would have been intended to be vague and misleading in an attempt to maintain Republic support for his anti-Dutch efforts in West-Java.[111]

In December 1948, the second military offensive of the Dutch (Operation Crow/the Second Police Action) was launched.[112] Kartosuwiryo saw the Dutch forces overrun Central Java and seize the revolutionary capital of Yogyakarta, thereby capturing Sukarno and Hatta. He was quick to respond and proclaimed a *jihad* against the Dutch and the Republicans 'until the Islamic Revolution is ended and the Islamic State exists completely in the whole of Indonesia'.[113]

On 7 May 1949, the negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic led to the Roem–Van Royen agreement (*van Roijen-Roem-verklaring*), establishing that (1) the Republican forces would end their guerrilla activities, (2) the Republic government would agree upon a conference in the Hague, (3) the authority of the Republicans on Yogyakarta[114] would be restored and (4) the termination of all hostilities by the Dutch armed forces as well

[107] Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 471.
[108] Stef Scagliola, 'The Silences and Myths of a 'Dirty War': Coming to Terms with the Dutch–Indonesian Decolonisation War (1945–1949)' *European Review of History: Revue erupoéene d'histoire*, vol. 14, is. 2 (2007), p. 235 - 262, p. 240.
[109] 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng, Groet, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis, Soemendang, Cheribon, Koeningan, Indramajoe, Madjalengka, Poerwakarta en Soekaboemi over de maanden November en December 1947', *Proc.-Gen. Hooggerechtshof Ned.-Ind., 'Politiek-politionele verslagen West-Java met enige bijlagen, 1947 – 1949,* NA, cited in: Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 472.
[110] Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 473 - 474.
[111] Dengel, *Darul Islam,* p. 81; Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 474
[112] Translation from: 'Operatie Kraai' and 'de Tweede Politionele Actie'
[113] Quoted in: Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 476; Schulte Nordholt, *Indonesië na Soeharto,* p. 165.
[114] Yogyakarta was the center of Republican power.

as the release of all prisoners of war.[115]

When the TNI finally returned to West-Java (Spring 1949), they were confronted by a population that felt let down by the Republic government.[116] It then also became clear that the Republic would take part in the promised conference in the Hague, the Round Table Conference (*Ronde Tafel Conferentie,* RTC*)*. This news led the DI, arguing that the RTC would be a colonial conference, to formally break with the Republic.[117] On the 7th of August 1949, in the midst of all, Kartosuwiryo finally proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII)).[118]

The RTC led to the eventual transfer of sovereignty to a Republic of the United States of Indonesia (*Republic Indonesia Serikat* (RIS)), making the Republic itself, along with a several other states in Indonesia, part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The agreement further increased Kartowuwiryo's view that the Republic had failed and 'sold' its sovereignty to the Dutch.[119] Spread amongst his followers, this view led to further growth of his influence.[120] In 1949, violence from all sides increased sharply.[121] The result was a triangular warfare, with the DI and the Republican forces fighting each other and the Dutch.[122] By October 1949, the Dutch estimated the size of the DI-army at 12,000–15,000 men. Attacks on traffic by the DI and other guerrillas were an everyday occasion.[123]

When the Dutch finally transferred Indonesia's sovereignty to the Republicans in December 1949, Kartosuwiryo refused to disband his TII. Clearly, the DI believed that there was no sufficient channel in the Indonesian political system for Islamic groups. Furthermore, the Republic government failed to acknowledge the DI-efforts made in the decolonisation war.[124] Many elements of the TNI deserted and joined the DI.[125] The period

[115] Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 481 - 482.
[116] Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, p. 20.
[117] Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 482.
[118] Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, p. 1.; Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia, p. 4.
[119] Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 481 - 482.
[120] Idem, p. 481 - 482.
[121] NEFIS/CMI, *Het Archief van de Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, de Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service en de Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst in Nederlands-Indië*, NA, Archive number 2.10.14, inventory numbers 622 - 1418.
[122] Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia, p. 4.
[123] NEFIS/CMI, *Het Archief van de Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, de Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service en de Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst in Nederlands-Indië*, NA, Archive number 2.10.14, inventory numbers 7231 - 7235.
[124] Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior* (Los Angeles 1980), p. 12.
[125] Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion*, p. 12.

from 1949 to 1962 became known as the *Darul Islam Rebellion*.[126] In January 1950, the DI collaborated with the infamous Dutch Indies army captain Raymond Westerling[127] in order to bring the Republic government to fall.[128] After all, the Dutch did not form a significant threat to the DI any longer. Even though this attack failed, the efforts of the DI paid off quickly: mainly students and the middle class began pleading with the DI for the reformation of Indonesia into an Islamic state.[129] The relationship between the Republic government and the DI further deteriorated when a unitary state (that would not be part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) was declared by the Republicans on the 17th of August in 1950. The proclamation was a heavy blow to the DI, who still aspired to establish an Islamic state with its authority recognised within the federal structure.[130] With the proclamation of the unitary state, Sukarno depicted the DI as a major threat to his nation.

As an Islamic insurgency, the DI fought its first major revolt against the Indonesian government in the 1950s in West-Java, inspiring other revolts in Aceh and South Sulawesi.[131] Soon, their activity further spread to parts of Central Java and South Kalimantan. In all of these areas, different DI-movements were active that had a common blueprint for the Islamic State of Indonesia.[132] Slowly, the DI developed itself in the form of fulltime warriors. In Aceh, the DI for instance fought for the implementation of the Sharia Law, in the process causing the deaths of about 23.000 people.[133] Furthermore, the DI attempted to assassinate the Republic's leader Sukarno a several times, in vain.[134]

Eventually, in 1956, the Indonesian government decided to launch a large-scale offensive against the DI. Soon, all DI-leaders were either captured or killed, which severely weakened the movement. In 1957 the government took back full control over Aceh and by 1962, there were only pockets of DI-resistance left in West-Java and South Sulawesi.[135] The capture and execution of Kartosuwiryo in June 1962 further weakened the movement. On the first of August 1962, thirty-two DI-members finally signed a joint declaration in which they renounced the movement and pledged allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia.[136] The

[126] Boland, *The struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, p. 62.
[127] A Dutch Military officer, nicknamed 'the Turk', who became infamous for his ruthless tactics that caused a massacre in Sulawesi during the decolonisation war.
[128] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, p. 6.
[129] Schulte Nordholt, *Indonesië na Soeharto,* p. 165 & 168 – 169.
[130] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, p.. 153 - 154.
[131] Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p. 3.
[132] Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, p. 1.
[133] Schulte Nordholt, *Indonesië na Soeharto,* p. 165
[134] Boland, *The struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, p. 62.
[135] Andrea HP., 'The History of Darul Islam (DI) and Kartosuwiryo', p. 3 – 5.
[136] Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia, p. 6.

DI had officially lost its power and ceased to exist.

2.2 Transformation from traditional to modern radical Islam: the revival of the DI

Even after the DI was dissolved and most of its members were dead, captured or disbanded, many Indonesians continued to support its ideology. When Suharto became the president of the Republic of Indonesia in 1966, the DI was reactivated by general Ali Moertopo embodied in the terrorist movement *Komando Jihad*. Komando Jihad is known for their hijacking of a Garuda airplane from Palembang to Medan and their attack on a police station near Bandung, both in 1981.[137] However, the movement was disarmed by the Indonesian Republic government's counterterrorism activities a year later. About 185 people accused of sharing Kartosuwiryo's ideas were arrested, among whom the founding fathers of the later to be established JI.[138]

This 'DI-revival' was initially set in motion by one of the arrested: Abdullah Sungkar. Sungkar strongly opposed Suharto's New Order regime. Through his formidable leadership, he succeeded in transforming a large section of the history-obsessed, backward-looking DI-community into a forward-looking, modern revolutionary movement.

2.3 The Jema'ah Islamiyah (1993 - now)

Sungkar's influence culminated in the growth of the DI offshoot that manifested itself in the Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI), which would become Southeast Asia's only transnational terrorist organisation. Scholar Quinton Temby states that Sungkar may have had the capacity to build up the JI on his own, but that it was his access to the revived DI-network that gave him the institutional base to generate the JI.[139] Most of the people trialled for sharing Kartosuwiryo's ideals, among them Sungkar, fled to Malaysia after serving their sentences in order to avoid being arrested again. In Malaysia, they managed to gain support from Islamic locals and other internationals for their DI-causes. This led to the setup of the JI in 1993 in Malaysia.

The JI willingly employs violent means to establish an Islamic State embracing not only Indonesia but also Malaysia, the Philippines and the Islamic regions of Southern Thailand.[140] It is a highly internationalist network, that is known to have close links to Al-

[137] In 1967, Muhammad Suharto followed up President Sukarno, therewith becoming the second president of the Republic Indonesia. His regime is known as the 'New Order' regime. - R.B. Cribb; Audrey Kahin, *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia* (2004), p. 218.
[138] Cribb; Kahin, *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia* (Lanham 2004), p. 218.
[139] Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia, p. 36
[140] Cribb; Kahin, *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*, p. 200.

Qaeda[141] and that targets Western objectives as well. The JI also had strong connections to ISIS in the past.[142] These connections are nowadays contested, as some scholars have reported a fallout between the two movements.[143]

A factor that reinforced the growth of JI-support, was the emancipation of the Indonesian Muslim middle class in the 90s, that went hand in hand with an increasingly negative view of 'the West'.[144] This negative image was based on Indonesia's view on conflicts elsewhere in the world, such as the Palestinian conflict and the American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Many JI-warriors fought in Afghanistan before continuing their jihad in Indonesia. This did not only provide JI-members with excellent military training but also strengthened the spirit of Islamic brotherhood within the movement. Next to that, it was probably here that the JI came into contact with the leaders of Al Qaeda and other, similar groups that came to the defence of the Islam in Afghanistan. According to scholar Mahfuh Bin Haji Halimi, the Mujahidin's victory in Afghanistan over the Russians in 1989 gave JI-members confidence and a feeling of being able to gain similar victories in Asia.[145] After 9/11, Indonesian Muslims further developed a powerful enemy image of the West. US-President Bush's statement that 'you are either with us or with the terrorists' made Indonesian radicals believe there was no in between.[146] They started blaming 'the West' for the economic crisis in Indonesia in 1997 and 1998, believed the 'Christians' stoked up East-Timor to fight for independence and believed that these 'Christians' were guilty of the rebellions in the Mollucans.[147]

In Indonesia, the JI was responsible for, among others, the 2000 Christmas attacks, the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 Marriott bombings in Jakarta, the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta and the 2005 Bali bombings.[148] Today, the movement is still forming a threat to Indonesian security and the security of Southeast Asia.

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[141] John C. Baker, 'Jemaah Islamiyah' in: Brian A. Jackson; John C. Baker (red.), *Aptitude for Destruction (Volume 2)* (Santa Monica 2005), p. 57.
[142] Counterextremism Project, 'Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)' (version 2018) https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/jemaah-islamiyah-ji (18 May 2018).
[143] Joseph Chinyong Liow, 'Isis Reaches Indonesia. The Terrorist Group's Prospects in Southeast Asia', *Foreign Affairs* (8 Februari 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/indonesia/2016-02-08/isis-reaches-indonesia (18 May 2018).
[144] Schulte Nordholt, *Indonesië na Soeharto,* p. 170 – 171.
[145] Mahfun Bin Jaji Halimi 'Al-Jama' Ah Al-Islamiyyah's (JI) Ideology: Applying Strategic Thoughts in Countering the Ushulul Manhaj Al-Har', (Master dissertation Strategic Studies, Singapore 2007), p. 9 - 10.
[146] Schulte Nordholt, *Indonesië na Soeharto,* 170 – 171.
[147] Ibidem.
[148] Baker, 'Jemaah Islamiyah', p. 67.

Recently, however, a family that was connected to another newly established terrorist group has been carrying out terrorist attacks in Surabaya (Java) and Riau (Sumatra).[149] The movement, a JI-offshoot, is called Jema'ah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), was founded in 2008 and has pledged allegiance to ISIS.[150] Its existence indicates the ever-growing influence of the JI-ideology - and the DI ideology in Indonesia.

2.4 General remarks

Surprisingly, Indonesians generally have the impression that the 2000 Christmas attacks of the JI were the first terrorist attacks in the country. It seemed difficult for Indonesians to comprehend the connection between religion and violence in their own country. It was not until the 2002 Bali bombings that the Indonesian government broke the taboo on religious terrorism and openly spoke about terrorist activity in Indonesia.[151]

The lack of awareness of terrorism in Indonesia indicates that the DI and the JI were most likely also not seen as typical 'religious terrorist movements'. This can possibly be explained by the fact that Indonesians saw terrorist activity as a political insurgency or nationalist movement that tried to transform the already predominantly Muslim country into an Islamic state. This again indicates that it might be better to address such terrorism as terrorism by political Islamists instead of 'religious terrorism'. Furthermore, the lack of awareness of terrorism in Indonesia raises the question how the deeds of these movements were formulated and spread across their constituency. In order to illustrate this message, the following chapter will analyse the narratives of the DI and JI.

[149] Annemarie Kas, 'Wat bezielde aanslagplegers in Surabaya om hun kinderen erbij te betrekken?' *NRC* (18 May 2018), https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/05/18/jihad-voor-het-hele-gezin-a1603479, 21 May 2018; Joe Cochrane; Hannah Beech, 'Indonesia Sword Attack on Police Follows String of Deadly Bombings' (16 May 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/world/asia/indonesia-swords-terrorism-sumatra.html, 21 May 2018.
[150] Arjen van der Ziel, 'Terreur IS-gezinnen schokt Indonesië' *Trouw* (Tuesday 18 May 2018).
[151] Dirk Vlasbom, 'Bus naar de Hel' *het NRC* (version 20 september 2015), http://vorige.nrc.nl/buitenland/de_ wereldterrorist/article1622430.ece (15 mei 2004).

Chapter 3. The narratives of the Indonesian political Islam

3.1 Kartosuwiryo's Darul Islam

The narrative of the DI's leader Kartosuwiryo is illustrative of the ideology and narrative of the DI in general and gives an excellent insight into the exact goals of the DI and on how they aimed to achieve these goals.

Kartosuwiryo was the son of a government official employed in the Central Java opium service. He was hence brought up with European privileges. He never formally studied Islamic religious studies or Arabic language but went to the Netherlands Indies Medical School to study medicine, given in the Dutch language.[152] While studying, Kartosuwiryo became an activist in the *Jong Java beweging* (Javanese youth movement).

It was not until Kartosuwiryo suffered a serious illness that he really became involved with Islamic radicalism. On the road to recovery, Kartosuwiryo started studying Islam with the help of traditional Islamic scholars.[153] At the same time, a few members of *Jong Java* became more politically active and separated themselves from the movement. In 1925, Kartosuwiryo joined them in their newly established *Jong Islamieten Bond*.[154]

In 1927, Kartosuwiryo was expelled from his study for the possession of literature with communist and socialist ideas, critical of the Dutch regime.[155] Historian Adrian Vickers reported that Kartosuwiryo was expelled because of his Islamic political activity as well.[156] What is clear, is that Kartosuwiryo had an omnifarious ideological background, which indicates that he was mainly a political activist, rather than a radical Islamist.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, it soon became clear that Kartosuwiryo would not be able to achieve his goals through diplomatic means. In his speech *Haloean Politic Islam*[157] (June 1946), Kartosuwiryo described a new strategy through which the DI would create an Islamic state. According to this strategy, the struggle of the DI should bring about two revolutions: (1) a national revolution and (2) a social revolution. The national revolution represents all the efforts made to fight the foreign oppression in the Archipel, manifested in *al-jihad al-asghar*.[158] The social revolution would be the struggle to deconstruct colonialism

[152] Elson; Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?', p. 460 - 461.
[153] Andrea HP., 'The History of Darul Islam (DI) and Kartosuwiryo', p. 6.
[154] Idem, p. 7.
[155] Andrea HP., 'The History of Darul Islam (DI) and Kartosuwiryo', p. 5.
[156] Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia (*Cambridge 2005), p. 119.
[157] Free translation of: The Political Islamic Flow.
[158] Meaning military struggle/holy war.

from within society and the people's minds, manifested in *al-jihad al-akhbar*.[159] This appeal seems based on religion but mainly aimed at gaining independence and decolonising Indonesia. The dedication with which the *jihad al-asghar* should be carried out became clear in the speech:

> 'An ideologically driven fighter never stops (…) his efforts to reach and achieve his ideology. At some point, he might seem to be running back (…) because the circumstances and the reality of society does not offer more opportunities or space than that - he will be influenced herein by the currents of society and he will strand on the shores of misery, but his heart will still lay within the ideology. Every step and every motion is aimed at the ideology. He lives with his ideology and wants to die while fighting for the goal of the ideology.'[160]

In the last sentence, Kartosuwiryo referred to the concept of martyrdom – a concept that often appeals to young radical Islamists. Already four months earlier, Kartosuwiryo had declared that the duty of *jihad al-asghar* only needed to be pursued by this part of the population: the armed youth.[161]

After the signing of the Renville agreement in January 1948 and the subsequent establishment of the TII/NII, the dedication of DI-members was clear. The Dutch reported in September that year that all DI-members had pleaded:

> 'I will strive for it and I declare that I am fully willing to sacrifice my whole body and soul and all that I possess, which is based on my godliness and trust in God, on behalf of the establishment of the independent "Negara Islam" until the holy law of Islam comes into effect.'[162]

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[159] The inner Jihad, struggle of self-improvement. - Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo, 'Haloean politic Islam', speech on June 1946 (version 8 October 2017) *Empiris Network* http://empiris-online.blogspot.nl/2008/05/haloean-politik-islam.html (5 March 2018).

[160] Free translation of: Seorang ahli perjuangan yang berideologi tidak pernah terhenti --jangankan sengaja menghentikan diri-- dalam usahanya mendekati dan mencapai CITA-CITA-nya. Mungkin pada suatu waktu ia tampak lari "milir-mudik", melompat kekanan dan kekiri, terbang kebarat atau ketimur --karena keadaan dan KENYATAAN masyarakat tidak memberi kemungkinan atau kelapangan lebih daripada itu--, tetapi dalam pada ia terombang-ambing oleh gelombang masyarakat dan terdampar diatas pantai kesengsaraan, maka mata-hatinya tidak pernah lepas dari ideologi. Tiap-tiap langkah dan geraknya selalu diarahkan kepada tercapainya ideologi. Ia hidup dengan ideologinya dan ingin mati pun dalam jalan dan usaha menuju tercapainya ideologi itu. Cited from: Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo, 'Haloean politic Islam', speech on June 1946 (version 8 October 2017) *Empiris Network* http://empiris-online.blogspot.nl/2008/05/haloean-politik-islam.html (5 March 2018).

[161] Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation,* p. 87.

[162] Free translation of: 'Ik zal ernaar streven en ik verklaar mij bereid mijn hele lichaam en ziel en al

This confirms that the concept of martyrdom is highly appealing to those who pledged alliance to the DI.

In September 1948 the DI was reported to have left 'the political or democratic tools and attempts militarily, using terror and intimidation, to establish the Negara Darul Islam' (NII).[163] Even though the TII/NII was set up to 'succeed in taking control of the Republic, and include it within the Islamic State',[164] Kartosuwiryo at the time still made clear that 'the establishment of the 'Darul Islam' should not be seen as a conquest of territory on the Republic but on the Dutch'.[165] He continued to stress that the first step still must be to secure the independence of Indonesia. After that, the DI would start transforming it into an Islamic state.

As aforementioned, the DI's attitude towards the Republic soon changed. When new diplomatic negotiations between the Dutch and the Republicans started, Kartosuwiryo declared:

> 'It will not be long before they sign a new treaty (…) and this third treaty will decide the fate of the State of the Indonesian Republic. In our understanding, at that point the Republic won't be anything more than a 'Puppet State' like those the Dutch have already established a while ago: 'Negara' Indonesia Timur, 'Negara' Kalimantan, 'Negara' Pasoendan, and so forth. Thus, with the use of weapons, the Netherlands will force the Republican government (…) to sign a treaty according to which all the state's instruments will have to be abandoned. (…) There is nothing for the Indonesian Islamic community, especially those living in Republican territory, to do other than to be ready to accept God's gift, to pursue a *jihad* (…) to oppose the enemy of Islam, the enemy of the State, and the enemy of

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wat ik bezit volledig te offeren, welke bereidheid gegrond is op mijn godsvrucht en vertrouwen op God, zulks ten behoeve van de oprichting van de onafhankelijke "Negara Islam" totdat de heilige wet van de Islam van kracht wordt.' Cited from: CMI, NEFIS/CMI publicatie No. 91 (Batavia, 29 september 1948), *Algemene Secretarie van de Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij gedeponeerde Archieven*, NA.

[163] Free translation of: 'Het verschil ligt echter niet in het beginsel zelve, maar in de wijze waarop men tracht dit te verwezenlijken. De Daroel Islam beweging heeft hierbij de politieke, of zo men wil de democratische middelen verlaten en tracht nu gewapenderhand en met behulp van terreur en intimidatie de Negara Daroel Islam te vestigen, in eerste instantie in de PREANGER, en uiteindelijk over geheel Indonesië'. Cited from: NEFIS/CMI publicatie No. 91 (Batavia, 29 september 1948), *Algemene Secretarie van de Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij gedeponeerde Archieven*, NA.

[164] Quoted in: Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation,* p. 116

[165] Free translation of: 'De oprichting van de 'Daroel Islam' moet niet worden gezien als gebiedsverovering op de Republiek, maar op de Nederlanders', cited from: CMI documentnummer 5041 (6 October 1948), NA, p. 5; NEFIS/CMI, 'Algemeen rapport, Verslag over de Daroel-Islam

> God, and last but not least, to establish a State blessed and offered by God, an Islamic State of Indonesia.'[166]

Kartosuwiryo here clearly indicates that diplomatic means were insufficient to achive his goals: *jihad* was his only option left.

When the Republicans returned to West-Java in 1949, Kartosuwiryo spoke about 'an obligation to use violence in relieving' the TNI 'of their weapons, equipment and possessions for the benefit of the N.I.I.'.[167] However, he ordered DI-members not to kill Republicans (as opposed to the Dutch).[168] In the midst of this complex situation, Kartosuwiryo declared the Islamic State of Indonesia:

> 'Praise be to God, at a moment that is vacant, at a moment when there is no authority and no administration responsible (…) thus at a crucial moment (…) the Muslim Community of the Indonesian Nation is so bold as to take a stand and position that is clear and explicit for the entire world: the proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia, 7 August 1949.'[169]

The DI's declaration of the Islamic State appears an opportunistic move: Kartosuwiryo seized the opportunity of 'the crucial moment' to push through his goals. When the Dutch finally recognised Indonesia's independence in December 1949, Kartosuwiryo announced that the struggle for independence was now over, and a *peering sud* (holy war) should now be waged until the Islamic State was established.[170] The transformation of the DI departing from more secessionist goals (fighting for decolonisation and independence) to more religious goals (waging a holy war until the Islamic State is established) seems to lie at the end of the decolonisation war.

When the TNI started small-scale operations against the DI in 1950 that severely weakened the movement, Kartosuwiryo held on to his stance and remained uninterested in dialogue.[171] When Sukarno declared the DI as an official enemy of the state that same year, Kartosuwiryo argued that this statement was a manifestation of Sukarno's weak authority

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beweging, 'Verslag over de tentara Islam Indonesia der 'Daroel Islam' beweging, NA.
[166] Quoted in: Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation,* p. 127 - 128.
[167] Idem, p. 478 - 479.
[168] Idem, p. 478 - 479.
[169] Quoted in: Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia', p. 4 - 5.
[170] Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia', p. 4 - 5.
[171] Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation,* p. 151 - 153

and his decreasing influence on the Indonesian people.[172] On the 17th of February 1951, Kartosuwiryo additionally declared that if the Republic was not ready to recognise his NII, he 'could not be responsible for the fate of the Indonesian state and people, in front of neither the Tribunal of History, nor the Tribunal of God.'[173]

Remarkably, it was not until far in the second half of 1948 that Kartosuwiryo's ideology and the DI's purposes became clear among the Dutch. In August 1948, the Dutch reported that 'even though for a long time we have been aware of the existence of a movement called 'DARUL ISLAM', we have not been able to obtain a clear insight concerning the organisation, its strategy as well as the righteous efforts of this movement.'[174] It was in September that year that the Dutch could report that the DI was based on:

> 'the striving, militarily, for an independent Islamic state, free of socialist and communist influences, free from the Republic in her current form (…) and free of every form of Dutch meddling. (…) Through attempting to keep the population in the grip of its power apparatus, the Negara Darul Islam uses a system, that is reminiscent of the systems used by Hitler and Stalin.'[175]

Maintaining a system such as the systems of infamous dictators sounds more like a well-established Islamic sub-state than a terrorist organisation desperately carrying out attacks to achieve its goals. It does not seem like these tactics were set up to awaken fear amongst the population that would lead them to a revolution. However, the DI's using of terror and intimidation and their statement that they 'could not be responsible for the fate of the Indonesian state and people' does.

Nevertheless, it took the Dutch until October that year to see that the DI was a movement that was based on Islamic ideas, and not on communist ideas.[176] This, together

[172] Quoted in: Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation,* p. 160.
[173] Quoted in: Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, p. 250 - 255.
[174] Free translation of: 'Alhoewel reeds langen tijd op de hoogte zijnde van het bestaan van een beweging zich noemende "DAROEL-ISLAM", was het ons echter nog steeds niet mogelijk geweest een helder inzicht te verkrijgen betreffende de organisatie, werkwijze alsmede het juiste streven van deze beweging. Aan de hand van een aantal authentieke stukken, welke door ons kot geleden ontvangen werden an de I.D. van het 1e mitr. bataljon, zijn wij thans in staat, hierover onderstaand verslag te doen verschijnen.' Cited from: NEFIS/CMI, 'Verslag over de "Daroel-Islam" beweging (18 augustus 1948) and 'Algemeen rapport, Verslag over de Tentara Islam Indonesia der 'Daroel Islam' beweging, NA.
[175] CMI, 'signalement no. 18' (Batavia, 29 September 1948), *Algemene Secretarie van de Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij gedeponeerde archieven'*, NA.
[176] 'In October 1948, the Dutch reported that 'Even though before, due to certain indications, the idea

with Kartosuwiryo's non-Islamic background and earlier socialist and communist sympathies, could indicate that Kartosuwiryo's life represents a general quest to power, a quest that was not necessarily religious. It seems like the Islamic appeal simply yielded most for Kartosuwiryo, which indicates that the DI was mostly an opportunistic nationalist insurgency using terrorist tactics and not a 'religious terrorist movement'. In fact, an official Indonesian government publication stated that Kartosuwiryo was just 'a political adventurer who always dreamed of power just for himself'.[177]

3.2 Imam Samudra and the Jema'ah Islamiyah

Generally, the JI bases its ideology on the so-called *umalid*. According to the *umalid*, individual Muslims need to unite themselves in a group (*jamaah*) in order to achieve the establishment of an Islamic state.[178] The main goal of the *umalid* is formulated as the establishment of a *Daulah* (state) by means of *jihad* (here: armed struggle). Thereby, martyrdom is advocated as the final redemptive move for Allah.[179] When becoming part of the JI, members undergo a *tarbiyyah* (education) through which they further develop their potential to achieve the establishment of an Islamic state before finally establishing the caliphate.[180] The *umalid* hence drives JI-members into being convinced supporters of Islamic rule and practicing *jihad* against the 'enemies' of the Islam (the ones who resist the application of Islamic laws).[181] Here, the narrative of the mastermind behind the 2002 Bali bombings, Imam Samudra, will be analysed. Samudra was a prominent figure within the JI. His narrative and radicalisation path illustrates how the ideological base of the JI manifests

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that the 'Darul Islam is possibly a movement with a communist outlook prevailed, this view must now be abandoned, as documents show that it should be considered to have the religion of Islam at its basis.' Free translation of: 'Hoewel voorheen, door bepaalde aanwijzingen, de gedachte heerste, dat de 'Darul Islam' mogelijk een beweging is met een communistische inslag, moet deze zienswijze thans losgelaten worden, daar uit documenten blijkt, dat het beschouwd kan worden de Islam Godsdienst als basis te hebben.' Cited from: CMI, 'Algemeen rapport, Verslag over de Daroel-Islam beweging' and 'Verslag over de tentara Islam Indonesia der 'Daroel Islam' beweging, NA.

[177] R. Roekomy, Soekotjo S. Aditirto (ed.), *Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Barat* (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan 1953), p. 213 - 218, cited in: Elson; Chiara Formichi, 'Why did Kartosuwiryo start shooting?, p. 458–486 & p. 459

[178] Mahfun Bin Jaji Halimi 'Al-Jama' Ah Al-Islamiyyah's (JI) Ideology: Applying Strategic Thoughts in Countering the Ushulul Manhaj Al-Har', (Master dissertation Strategic Studies, Singapore 2007), p. 15.

[179] Idem, p. 18

[180] The first step of the JI it to make Indonesia into an *Islamic State*. Thereafter, the JI wants to spread this state to further parts of Southeast Asia, making it a *caliphate*. - Mahfun Bin Jaji Halimi 'Al-Jama' Ah Al-Islamiyyah's (JI) Ideology: Applying Strategic Thoughts in Countering the Ushulul Manhaj Al-Har', (Master dissertation Strategic Studies, Singapore 2007), p. 24 - 25.

[181] Idem, p. 25.

in individuals.[182]

In the night of the 12th of October 2002, two bombs exploded on the island of Bali. A car bomb destroyed the Paddy's pub and a suicide bomber targeted the Sari club in the middle of the touristic nightclub area of Kuta. The explosions left over 200 people dead and another 200 critically injured. Among the victims were mostly foreign tourists.[183] After the bombings, thirty-four alleged perpetrators were arrested, all of them members of the JI.[184] Samudra, the 'mastermind' and field commander of the Bali bombings, was one of them. In 2008, he was sentenced to death and executed by firing squad.[185]

Samudra grew up in a small town in West-Java where the DI had been highly active, and religion was highly apparent. His family was part of the ethnic Bantenese stock that is known for seeing themselves as heroic warriors.[186] Samudra was exposed to extremist religious ideas and the idea that one should fight for a better world from a young age. It was however not until Samudra read Abdullah Azzam's book *Allah's Signs in the Afghan Jihad* that his interest in jihad developed. After reading this book, Samudra grew strong hate towards 'infidels'.[187] In 1990, Samudra went to Afghanistan to participate in jihad.[188] When he left Afghanistan, Samudra went to a religious school in Malaysia that was found by members of the JI.[189] Three years later, he returned to Indonesia and supposedly joined the JI.[190] Samudra was believed to be involved in a church bombing in Riau in 2000 and the robbery of a jeweller as a means to finance his final jihadist work: the 2002 Bali

[182] Most of the analysis of Samdura's narrative is taken from an unpublished research paper written for the research seminar 'Terrorism. New perspective on an old phenomenon' as part of the masters International Relations in Historical Perspective. Source: Emma Keizer, 'The Radical Pathway of Imam Samudra: A Quest for Redemption' (1 November 2017) Assignment Research Seminar *Terrorism as Radical Redemption: New Perspectives on an Old Phenomenon*, Looking for the Radical Redemption (Utrecht University).
[183] Brad West, 'Collective memory and crisis: The 2002 Bali Bombing, national heroic archetypes and the counter-narrative of cosmopolitan nationalism' *Journal of Sociology* 44.4 (2008), p. 337 - 353, there p. 339.
[184] National Geographic, 'The Bali Bombings' in: *Seconds from disaster* (season 2, episode 8).
[185] ABC news, Bali Bombers put to death' (version 9 November 2008) http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-11-09/bali-bombers-put-to-death/199260 (2 maart 2018)
[186] Samudra's great-grandfather is for instance being remembered in his birth town as a hero in the area after fighting against the Dutch in the Indonesian decolonisation war. - Kumar Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways: understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia* (London 2009), p. 110.
[187] Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways*, p. 111.
[188] Michael Hitchcock, *Tourism in Southeast Asia: Challenges and New Directions* (Denmark 2008), p. 90.
[189] Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, 'Imam Samudra's Justification for Bali Bombing' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 30 (2007), 1033 - 1056, there p. 1034.
[190] Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways*, p. 112.

bombings.[191]

After Samudra was arrested, he made a series of confessions to the media about why he planned the Bali bombings. Additionally, while awaiting his execution in prison, Samudra wrote the book *Aku melawan teroris* (I oppose/fight terrorism (2004)),[192] which resulted in a mix of a biography, a manifesto and a practical guide to jihad. Samudra used these media outings and his book as a theatre for the spread of his ideas, or in other words, his *narrative*. Samudra was highly successful in spreading this narrative. According to the CNN, his book was highly influential and even became a bestseller in Indonesia.[193]

In his book, Samudra stated that he planned the Bali bombings because there were thousands of Muslims around the world oppressed by 'America and its allies' who are 'cruel and sadistic monsters'.[194] Samudra expresses his frustration about the misinterpretation of the JI. Samudra states that the attacks of the JI are falsely connected to poverty, marginalisation, exclusion, backwardness, ignorance and even faithlessness in understanding the Islam. It is for this reason that he decided to write his book; he considered his autobiography to be necessary for people to understand that the JI is fighting the right fight.[195] People should learn about the message the JI carries out through their attacks from the JI themselves, and not from the Indonesian authorities or the police.[196]

According to Samudra, the Americans and their allies were guilty of attacking the Muslim *ummah* (Muslim community) in the following several cases: (1) the trade embargo

[191] Kazi Mahmood, 'Bashir had nothing to do with church bombing: Samudra' *Islam Online* (Version 29 November 2002), http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2002-11/29/article30.shtml (19 October 2017).
[192] With terrorism, Imam Samudra means the 'terror' of America and its allies. This chapter will, later on, elaborate on this view.
[193] Maria Resa, 'Bali bomber to best selling author', *CNN International* (version 12 October 2014) http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/10/12/bali.samudra/ (12 march 2018).
[194] Muhammad Hanif Hassan, *Unlicensed to kill*: *Countering Imam Samudra's Justification for the Bali Bombing* (London 2006) p. 112; Imam Samudra, *Aku melawan teroris* (Solo 2004), p. 108
[195] 'Their jihadi' attacks are considered to be a result of poverty, slums, marginalisation, exclusion, backwardness, ignorance and even the apostasy in understanding the Islam. Then, the reluctance of writing an autobiography will be overshadowed by the obligation to explain of the arguments behind *jihad*-operations like the Bali bombings.' - Free translation of: 'Serangkaian aksi jihad mereka selama ini dianggap terjadi karena faktorkemiskinan, kekumuhan, keterpinggiran, ketertutupan (eksklusif), ketertinggalan,keterbelakangan, ketidaktahuan, kebodohan, bahkan 'kesesatan' dalam memahami dienulislam. Maka berpadulah antara keengganan menulis autobiografi dan kewajibanmemberikan penjelasan dalail (dalil-dalil) syar'i operasi jihad semisal Jihad Bom Balikepada kaum Muslimin', cited from: Samudra, *Aku melawan teroris*, p. 14.
[196] 'The thing that is especially important for me, is that the original manuscript of this book is written in a legal ink on lawful (halal) paper (…) and not in the ink of the police or the state.' Free translation of: 'Alhamdulillah, di atas segalanya, hal yang bagi saya cukup penting dan bermakna ialah bahwa naskah asli buku ini ditulis dengan tinta yang halal, di atas kertas yang halal pula (…) Bukan tinta dan kertas milik polisi atau negara.' Cited from: Samudra, *Aku melawan teroris*, p. 14.

on Iraq in 1991 which led to the death of 1,5 million Iraqi citizens, (2) the American embargo on Afghanistan during the Taliban Rule from 1994 until 2001 which led to the death of thousands of civilians, (3) Israel's attack on Palestinian civilians that was facilitated by the US and (4) America's incredibly military brutality and ruthlessness after 9/11, driven solely by vengeance and hostility.[197] Accordingly, it would only be fair to respond with violence. Samudra justifies his argument by quoting the following Quran verse: 'Thus, if anyone commits aggression against you attack him just as he has attacked you (…)' (2:149).[198]

Additionally, in a blog post on the Istimata (absolute struggle) webpage,[199] Samudra refers to the thousands of Muslims who perished in Afghanistan, Palestine, Bosnia, Sudan, Iraq and Kashmir and argues that there was an 'international conspiracy' going on aimed at Muslims all around the world. He argues that this conspiracy also extended to Indonesia, where he saw the Muslim cleansings in Ambon and Poso as direct effects of 'the Christian crusade'.[200] In his book, Samudra accordingly states that the 'enemies of the Islam' had to experience the pain and horror felt by Muslims in equal measure, ordering Muslims to wage 'war on civilians (…) from the colonising nations is appropriate for the sake of balance and justice. Blood for blood, lives for lives, and (…) civilians for civilians! That is the balance.'[201] The Bali bombings seemed revenge for those who, in Samudra's eyes, had been wronged. The motives of the JI, on the basis of Samudra's narrative, seem truly based on a radical interpretation of the Islamic religion.

In his book, Samudra also explains why he chose the nightclubs in Kuta, Bali as the target of his final jihadi work. He begins this explanation by citing the Quran verse 'and slay them wherever you may come upon them'.[202] According to him, this verse does not specify a place where an attack is legitimate, but it does highlight the importance of the maximisation of the impact of the attack. As the attack was aimed at Western, unbelieving people, he decided that bombing Western nightclubs in the middle of the night (therewith avoiding as much casualty among Indonesian locals as possible) as the best fit. However, he does express regret for the death of locals in the attack and offers his apology to the families of those victims. Therewith, he stated that he 'seeks forgiveness from God' for the 'human

[197] Hassan, *Unlicensed to kill. Countering*, p. 16; Samudra, *Aku melawan teroris*, p. 109.
[198] Cited in: Hassan, *Unlicensed to kill,* 18; Samudra, *Aku melawan teroris*, p. 116 - 119.
[199] This webpage is currently inactive.
[200] Greg Fealy, 'Hating Americans: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Bali Bombings', *IIAS Newsletter* #31 (July 2003), p. 3.
[201] Samudra, *Aku melawan teroris,* p. 315; Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways*, p. 113.
[202] Koran Verse (2:191), quoted in Hassan, *Unlicensed to kill*, p. 19.

error' he made.[203]

Samudra's book additionally shows that he believed that this pathway was the right pathway for every Muslim.[204] He saw Muslims who did not share his end goal of ensuring Islamic domination as enemies as well.[205] Additionally, as Samudra believed his interpretation of the Islam was the only right one, he directly depicted inaction of fellow Muslims as a sin. He carried out his jihad because 'it's the *duty* of a Muslim to avenge, so [sic] the American terrorists and their allies understand that the blood of the Muslim community is not shed for nothing.'[206] Samudra's statement to a journalist confirms this: 'Even if I die, I'll die a martyr. I await the enemy's bullet or spear piercing my breast so that I die a martyr'.[207] Even more, during his trial, Samudra did not even try to avoid his sentence and never showed regret or remorse for his actions. When he was brought back to his cell after his conviction, he yelled in English: 'Go to hell, you infidels' to relatives of victims.[208] This shows that his sacrifice (his eventual death in the name of Allah) was his aim from the beginning. Samudra clearly saw martyrdom as a necessary step in the bigger struggle of waging war against 'the West' until an Islamic State would be established. He most likely saw his inevitable death as proof that he was 'a chosen one' to participate in Allah's fight.

The narrative that Samudra carried out after his *jihad* was infused with religious thoughts. Even though the JI's striving for an Islamic state is a political end, the JI seems a truly religious movement.

3.3 The DI and JI: a comparison

The narrative of the DI could be formulated as: (1) the *ummah* religiously justified their right to live in an Islamic State. (2) The DI had the great task to bring about a national and social revolution in the Indonesian society that would lead to the decolonisation of Indonesia and the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia. The narrative of the JI could be summarised as: (1) The Islam is under attack of 'the West'. Therefore, (2) a jihad against these 'Westerners' should be carried out, leading to (3) the establishment of an Islamic

[203] Hassan, *Unlicensed to kill*, p. 19.
[204] Samudra, *Aku melawan teroris,* p. 324; Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways*, p. 115.
[205] Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways*, p. 115.
[206] Counter Extremism Proect, 'Imam Samudra, Bali Bombing Perpetrator, October 2002' (version October 2002), https://www.counterextremism.com/content/imam-samudra-bali-bombing-perpetrator-october-2002 (22 February 2018).
[207] Fealy, 'Hating Americans, p. 4.
[208] The Guardian, 'Bali bomber sentenced to death' (version 10 September 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/sep/10/australia.indonesia (28 October 2017).

state/caliphate in Southeast Asia where the pure form of Islam revives.

At first sight, these narratives and the tactics of both movements as explained in the previous chapter show similarities. Both the DI and the JI attack citizens in order to provoke a reaction of the governments to which their victims abide and both movements use terrorist methods for these attacks. The JI however considers its struggle a all-out war with foreign countries: 'and slay them wherever you may come upon them',[209] whereas the DI attempted to achieve its goals through diplomacy first but later saw no other option then military fighting the oppressor. Interestingly, again, this could indicate that the DI's transfer to violence was not a matter of their religious ideology but a matter of pragmatic necessity.

Furthermore, the JI focuses solely on fighting a foreign aggressor that would negatively influence the governments and civilians of the countries where they want to establish their Islamic state, while the DI also focuses on provoking a revolution within the society that they want to form the base of their Islamic state. Next to that, the JI has an international scope and makes use of the tools of globalisation, while the DI is orthodox, highly traditionalist and opposed to modernisation.

Additionally, the JI's jihad against 'the West' consisted of terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia solely and the JI has never build up a conventional army in order to fight the governments of the countries where it wants to establish its Islamic state. The struggle of the DI, in contrast, could be explained threefold. First, the DI carried out terrorist attacks (such as murdering, kidnapping, intimidations and setting fire to local villages)[210] during the decolonisation war in order to provoke the national and social revolution within the Indonesian society, which would lead to the Indonesians fighting their Dutch oppressor and the Indonesian minds being decolonised. Second, after the decolonisation war, it continued these practices in order to provoke the Republic government into abiding by their demands. Kartosuwiryo' threat that the DI 'could not be responsible for the fate of the Indonesian state and people'[211] illustrates this. However, third, Kartosuwiryo's narrative and the background history of the DI show us that the DI fought as a conventional nationalist insurgency as well: during the decolonisation war it fought the Dutch with its army through 'the sabotage of

[209] Koran Verse (2:191), quoted in Hassan, *Unlicensed to kill*, p. 19.
[210] 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng, Groet, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis, Soemendang, Cheribon, Koeningan, Indramajoe, Madjalengka, Poerwakarta en Soekaboemi over de maanden November en December 1947', received from: National Archive (NA, the Netherlands), 'Proc.-Gen. Hooggerechtshof Ned.-Ind., 'Politiek-politionele verslagen West-Java met enige bijlagen, 1947 - 1949', archive inventory 2.10.17, inventory number 1081.
[211] Quoted in Boland, *The struggle of Islam*, p. 250 - 255.

telephone connection, destruction of bridges, erection of barricades'[212] and confrontations with the Royal Dutch- and Dutch-Indies army. The threefold character of the DI's struggle illustrates the complexity of the movement. It seems like the DI was, next to being a terrorist movement, also a nationalist insurgency fighting for independence. In the struggle of the JI, such a dichotomy in terrorist tactics and more conventional tactics cannot be found.

Even more, based on the narratives of the both, the DI- and JI's religious character is questionable in the first place. Both narratives seem highly religious, but the history and narrative of Kartosuwiryo show that his struggle was predominantly political. The fact that Kartosuwiryo was only influenced by Islam later in his life could be an indication that he only used the appeal of Islam to achieve his goals. The religious character of the JI is questionable as well, as their religious character could be a strategic way of legitimising their fight against the West. However, the narrative of the JI showed us that the road to achieving the goal of establishing an Islamic state for the JI is infused with religious ideas. Furthermore, the JI's fight against fellow Muslims of whom they think are not properly abiding by the rules of 'the Islam' indicates their religious determination.

[212] 'Beknopt politiek-politioneel verslag van de Regentschappen Bandoeng, Groet, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis, Soemendang, Cheribon, Koeningan, Indramajoe, Madjalengka, Poerwakarta en Soekaboemi over de maanden November en December 1947', *Proc.- Gen. Hooggerechtshof Ned. Ind.,* 'Politiek-politionele verslagen West-Java met enige bijlagen, 1947 - 1949', NA

Chapter 4. The Indonesia case and terrorism theory

The question that remains is to what extent theories on terrorism could further explain the tactics, motives and goals of the DI and JI. This chapter will examine to what extent the current academic models on terrorism are useful to better understand both movements and the transformation of terrorism in Indonesia. Furthermore, this chapter will elaborate on the discussion whether the DI and JI should be seen as religious-, secessionist- or another category of movements.

4.1 Richardson's three R's

Richardson, through her constructivist approach, argues that terrorist movements are guided by (1) their quest for revenge, (2) their desire to be renown and (3) their attempt to provoke a reaction.

The narrative of the DI does not seem to fit within Richardson's model. Kartosuwiryo did not seem to care about taking revenge on the Dutch, but only desperately attempted to get them out of their country. Furthermore, Kartosuwiryo did not seem to seek revenge on the Republican government, as it saw the Dutch-recognised independence from 1949 not as a victory of the Republicans that needed to be revenged, but more as a misfortunate setback in his own fight for an Islamic state. It could however be stated that Kartosuwiryo did attempt to seek attention through the DI's actions. By ordering his DI to terrorize the Indonesian civilians, Kartosuwiryo attempted to force the Dutch (and later the Republicans) into listening to their demands. Furthermore, the spread of DI-pamphlets was a direct move towards seeking attention and glory for its cause. Next to that, it could be stated that the DI tried to provoke a reaction through its methods as well: Kartosuwiryo explicitly stated he sought to provoke a national and social revolution among Indonesian civilians and he later deliberately attempted to threaten the Republicans into abiding by his demands by hurting Indonesian civilians.

The narrative of the JI seems to better fit into Richardson's model. First, the narrative of Samudra perfectly illustrates that Samudra's deeds were part of a quest for revenge for everything that the 'cruel and sadistic monsters' (America and its allies) have done to thousands of Muslims around the world. Indeed, Islamic scholar Muhammad Hanif Hassan argued that the Bali bombings were a matter of tipping the scale to attain equilibrium for Samudra.[213] Second, the way in which Samudra attempted to spread his narrative as far

[213] Hassan, *Unlicensed to kill*, p. 18.

as possible (through his provocative media outings and the publishment of his book) shows how Samudra sought attention. In both his media outings and in his book, Samudra clearly sought glory for his efforts and the ends of the JI. He saw the spreading of his narrative as a way to redress the humiliation he felt was being done to him, as a Muslim. He therethrough attempted to become renown. Third, Samudra's declaration that his tactics were part of the right pathway for every Muslim shows that Samudra expected to provoke a reaction within the Muslim community to follow the JI in its fight. Furthermore, through the fear Samudra provoked in 'the West' through his attacks, he attempted to force 'the West' into changing their policy in Muslim countries.

Richardson's model is useful to better understand what led individuals to terrorism and what terrorists and their movements want. Even more, her model illustrates why the JI is fighting the West (as a way of revenge) and in which way the DI and JI tried to achieve their goals. However, seeking revenge does not seem to be a core feature of every terrorist movement. By focusing on the three R's only, Richardson neglects other factors that could lead terrorists to their terroristic tactics. Furthermore, her theory fails to explain how and why terrorism transformed in Indonesia.

4.2 Rapoport's theory of terrorism in waves

As aforementioned, Rapoport depicts a movement to be a wave when similar activities occur in different countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participants groups' characteristics and mutual relationship. Following this, it seems logical to consider the DI as part of the Anticolonial wave (1920 - 1960). Indeed, the DI shares their struggle to fight colonialism with other anti-colonial movements such as the Algerian AFLN. However, the DI does not seem to have any connections to other, similar movements. It was only after the formal disbandment of the DI that the DI's ideology became more religious through contacts of supporters of the DI-ideology with similar terrorist movements elsewhere in the world (such as Afghanistan's Taliban and Al Qaeda). This could indicate that the DI is illustrative of what Rapoport describes as a movement that appears to be transcending to the following wave. Rapoport explains such transitions of movements to another wave as a reflection of the newer waves influence.[214] The JI would clearly be part of this Religious wave (1960 – supposedly 2025): it is driven by an energy that also drives movements such as Al-Qaeda: the fight against 'the Christians' that presumably attacked 'the Islam'. Indeed, the JI had strong links with Al-Qaeda.

[214] Rapoport, 'The four waves of modern terrorism', p. 47 – 48.

It could be argued that the wave theory of Rapoport provides a great insight in the general transformation of Islamic Political movements that use terrorist tactics: the development of the ideology of terrorists in Indonesia, that happened to be Muslims, was characterised by a growing international influence from movements that fight for similar goals. The goal of Islamic terrorists in Indonesia indeed transferred from being focused on fighting foreign oppressors to fighting for a religious state and religious believes. These believes were partially obtained through the transnational connections of the DI-network, the same network that eventually founded the JI.

Nevertheless, to categorise movements based on one characteristic (being religious or striving for independence) seems generalising. Schmid already argued that theory to begin with is a simplification of reality.[215] However, depicting movements like the DI and JI as 'religious terrorist movements' is not just simplifying reality, it is neglecting core characteristics of the movements. The term 'religious terrorism' seems to suggest that this form of terrorism is not as political as other forms of terrorism. However, the DI and JI are both Political Islamic movements. It makes perfect sense that it is hard to distinct political from religious motives when addressing Political Islamic movements that use terrorist tactics. However, it does not make sense to label these movements as purely religious. Rapoport's theory is therefore less convincing in describing specific movements such as the DI and JI. However, his theory does provide an explanation for global trends in terrorism that are comparable to the transformation of terrorism in Indonesia in general.

4.3 Law's history of terrorism

Law's division of exploring terrorism as (1) a set of tactics, as (2) an act of symbolic and provocative violence by the few with the goal of swaying the behaviour of the many and as (3) a social construct[216] is useful to gain further insights into terrorism. The *jihad* of the DI could be interpreted within this framework. First, the DI indeed used terrorist tactics in order to sway the behaviour of the Dutch. Second, the DI formed a social construct as it was depicted by the Dutch, together with all other guerrilla movements that fought the Dutch occupation at the time, as terrorists in order to legitimise the Dutch fight against them.[217]

The JI's jihad could be interpreted as both a set of tactics and as symbolic acts with the goal of swaying the behaviour of the many but not necessarily as a social construct. As illustrated in the previous paragraph, their *jihad* against 'the West' consisted of terrorist

[215] Schmid, 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism and Political Violence', p. 201.
[216] Law, *Terrorism*, p. 3.
[217] Keizer, *Oorlog in Indonesië*, p. 83.

attacks for the sole purpose of gaining attention to their cause and provoking the reaction that they desired.

Within the typologies of terrorism Law proposed,[218] DI-terrorism could then also be best understood as ethno-nationalist terrorism. Their purpose was to end their colonial status and to separate its pronounced Islamic state in West- and Central Java from the rest of Indonesia. Following Law's argumentation, the JI would be considered as a jihadi terrorism movement. The term 'jihadi terrorism' in fact seems more appropriate for describing what Rapoport describes as 'religious terrorism': the term jihadi recognises both the political and religious character of the struggle of those movements. The divisions Law proposes hence seem to make sense. However, Law's theorising fails to describe how terrorism transformed in Indonesia. According to Law, jihadi terrorism originated after 9/11.[219] This neglects the development of the DI-ideology until the establishment of the JI in 1993.

4.4 Schmid's handbook of Terrorism Research

As aforementioned, Earl-Conteh Morgan's criteria on terrorism theory as described in Schmid's handbook, will be used in this paragraph to examine whether the theories of Richardson, Rapoport and Law are useful in better understanding terrorism.

1. It must be comprehensive or applicable to various situations, and must include relevant variables.
2. It must be cohesive, with all its segments strongly linked to each other with identical variables in its separate paths.
3. It must be empirical and applicable to concrete situations.
4. As a result of the third requirement, a theory must have the greatest validity of empirical evidence to support or enhance its explanatory power.
5. It must be parsimonious, or be able to explain the problem or event with as little complexity as possible.
6. It must be open to verification.
7. Finally, it must be clear and casual in the relationship between and among variables, and in terms of considering and linking units or factors at multiple levels of analysis.[2]

Figure 1: Earl Conteh-Morgan's requirements for an adequate terrorism theory [220]

Based on the previous paragraphs, it could be stated that Richardon's theory is of limited value according to Conteh-Morgan's model (criterion 1) since it is not fully applicable to the DI but only to the JI. It does not seem sufficient to thoroughly explain complicated movements such as the DI and JI. Rapoport's theory could be considered as of limited value

[218] Terrorism in the Ancient world, terrorism in the Middle Ages, Terrorism in the Early Modern Era, Revolutionary terrorism, Racial terrorism, ethno-nationalist terrorism, state terrorism, decolonisation terrorism, Leftist terrorism, international terrorism and jihadist terrorism
[219] Law, *Terrorism,* p. 272.
[220] Idem, p. 201.

as well according to Conteh-Morgan's model. Rapport's division of a movement belonging to a certain wave based on which energy drives a movement is confusing as it forces one to press terrorism in one certain category, therewith neglecting core features of the movement (criteria 3, 5 and 7). Rapoport leaves no space for movements that have a religious character but of which religion does not provide their all-encompassing belief. Law's theory appears to be the only useful one according to Conteh-Morgan's model.

However, neglecting Conteh-Morgan's criteria, Richardson's statement that religion could play different roles in terrorist movements seems a more useful analysis to better understand complex movements like the DI and JI. The DI seems a movement in which the role of religion is only limited; religion only seems to solidify alliances and visions that identify enemies and friends. In the case of the JI, religion appears to provide an all-encompassing belief system that legitimises their actions. Even though their religious character might be questionable, their narrative seems truly religious.

Conteh-Morgan's requirements however fail to identify the aforementioned limits of these theories, that is that they fail to recognise other factors that lead to terrorism and that they are unable to explain all aspects of such terrorism.

4.5 Benefits and Challenges of Terrorism Theory

Indeed, as Richardson herself argued, religion could only lead to terrorism in combination with other factors, such as social and political problems that could be blamed on others.[221] Even though Samudra stated that the attacks of the JI are falsely connected to factors such as poverty, it seems only logical to also take such factors into account when trying to explain terrorism. Many other scholars, among which Mark Juergensmeyer and Brooke Rogers, have argued that religion should only be considered an incidental factor and that such terrorism is primarily geopolitical terrorism.[222]

Given the fact that terrorism is used as a *tactic* by some Political Islamic movements, there is a possibility that the focus of terrorism theory on these tactics and what motivates terrorists to use these tactics, neglects other factors that might be of great importance for better understanding terrorism from Political Islamists. Schmid therefore argues that in order to understand terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, all relevant aspects of the

[221] Richardson, *What terrorists want*, p. 68.
[222] Mark Juergensmyer, *Terror in the mind of God: the Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Idaho 2000), p. 126 - 128; M. Brooke Rogers (et al), 'The Role of Religious Fundamentalism in Terrorist Vioelence: A social Psychological Analysis' (June 2007), *International Review of Psychiatry*, 19 (3), p. 253 - 262, there 254.

phenomenon need to be properly considered.[223] However, neither Richardson, Schmid, Rapoport nor Law try to tackle these other factors, such as regional instability and poverty that could lead to terrorism out of the corner of the Political Islam.

Moreover, as the case study of the DI illustrated, the differences and similarities between Islamic guerrillas and Islamic terrorists are mostly neglected. Indeed, Schmid argues that most theorizing of terrorism fails to link with general theories of violence.[224]

4.6 Terrorism: an alternative view

Sociologist David Kilcullen attempts to tackle these problems by writing about the DI in Java as part of his Ph.D.[225] According to Kilcullen, defining terrorist groups via their use of terrorism as a tactic is less analytically useful than defining them in terms of their strategic approach. In fact, movements like the DI and the JI share their usage of terrorism as a tactic with every other insurgent movement in history.[226] In his well-praised work, *the Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,* Kilcullen proposes three different approaches towards modern terrorism. First, he argues that such terrorism is a 'backlash against globalisation', as the terrorists are the ones not benefiting from globalisation, leading them to see it as a Western-dominated world culture.[227] Both the DI and JI indeed strongly reject the Westernisation of Indonesia. However, the JI as aforementioned utilises the tools of globalisation itself to plan and carry out their terrorist attacks. Second, Kilcullen argues that the terrorism of nowadays could be seen as a 'globalised insurgency' in order to change the established international order.[228] While this explanation could fit the DI as it sought to end Indonesia's colonial status and the JI as it attempts to end Western dominance over 'the Islam', the third approach Kilcullen proposes provides the best framework for addressing terrorism from Islamists: his model of a Civil War in the Islam. According to this model, the current turmoil within the Islamic world, along with the spill over of violence from Muslim countries into the international community via globalised insurgency and terrorism, arises from a *civil war* within the Islam. In these lines of thinking, Islamic terrorist organisations would primarily be a response to a series of internal dynamics within the wider Muslim world: a youth bulge, corrupt and oppressive governments, a dysfunctional relationship between men and women, a deficit of democracy and freedom of expression, economies

[223] Schmid, 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism and Political Violence', p. 214.
[224] Idem,, p. 261.
[225] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, p. 12.
[226] Ibidem.
[227] Idem, p. 7 - 12.
[228] Idem, p. 12 - 16.

dependent on oil but unable to provide fulfilling employment to an increasingly educated but alienated young male population, and a generalised anomie and a sense of being victimised by a vaguely-defined 'West'.[229] Kilcullen justly questioned whether the DI and the JI could even be seen as *religious* terrorist movements:

> 'And clearly, while religion was subjectively very important to members of both movements, the theological content of their ideology did not seem to be the primary driver. If the same individuals and families could belong to two such theologically different movements within a generation, then theology alone was not a sufficient explanation for their behaviour. Similarly, if radical Islam was the key, why did so few Indonesians, out of the many millions who shared the theology, join the movement? (…) And why did these movements erupt at specific moments of societal flux and political instability in Indonesian history, even though their theological basis in Islam had been present in a relatively constant form for centuries? The motivational basis for DI and JI behaviour seemed to lie somewhere else – in the notion of religion as rebellion, belief in the redemptive power of violence and sacrifice, in family traditions of belonging to a subversive or insurgent movement, in the deep structures of mass movements, or in the nature of the social networks and local institutions themselves.'[230]

This indicates that the deeper roots of DI- and JI- terrorism seem to lay in a combination of factors: dissatisfaction with their lives (due to the political situation and factors such as poverty) and a tradition of mass insurgent movements. This - again - raises the question whether it is helpful to categorise terrorism in any way at all.

Indeed, Kilcullen's model of a civil war within Islam illustrates the shortcomings of terrorism theory. Kilcullen focuses on the interaction between different forms of violence while terrorism theory fails to link with general theories of violence. Additionally, this model provides an explanation on micro- as well as macro level and is hence able to describe the transformation of terrorism in general, whereas the above discussed theories mostly focus on either micro- or macro level.

However, Kilcullen's model of civil war does not seem fully applicable to the DI. The DI did not fight other Muslims or 'the West', rather, it fought colonialism and the young Indonesian government. Kilcullen's model does seem more applicable to the JI. In the light of a civil war within the Islam, the JI fighting fellow Muslims of whom they think are

[229] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, p. 16.

not properly abiding by the rules of 'the Islam' makes perfect sense. This all could indicate that general theories on violence such as Kilcullen's theory could be more helpful to understand movements like the JI better, where religion seems to provide an all-encompassing belief system that legitimates their action.

Kilcullen however did not explain why he is questioning the religious character of the JI. This assumption seems to be false, as Indonesia has known separatist movements such as the Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM) that comply the same religious values as the JI but do not profile their religious character the core motivation behind their struggle. Muhammad Nur Djul, the leader of the GAM, stated:

> 'For Achehnese, being Achehnese is being Muslim. We live the religion, from birth to death. We do not need a label or proof to tell the world we are Muslim. We do not need laws to force ourselves, much less others, to practice the religion. We have been and still are practicing our religion, even under oppression. Islam has never fallen in Aceh, hence there is no necessity to fight for it; it is as strong as ever. For Achehnese, it is our freedom, not our religion, that has fallen and that is why, and for what, the Achehnese are struggling. In fact it is the demand of our religion that we fight for freedom, not the other way around that we need freedom in order to be able to practice our religion.'[231]

Scholar Hasan Ansori explains that according to the GAM, the intention of the struggle and method by which it is carried out is important, less than the outcome. As such, the end of the struggle cannot justify all possible methods, which is the main reason why the Aceh conflict was confined to Aceh and did not spread, via terrorism, to Indonesia's other vulnerable areas.[232] It therefore seems like if the JI were not a truly religious movement, the GAM would not have separated its struggle from the JI's struggle.

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[230] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, p. xxvii.
[231] Cited in: Damien Kingsbury, 'The Free Aceh Movement: Islam and Democratization' *Journal of contemporary Asia*, vol. 27, no. 3 (May 2007), p. 166 - 189, there p. 184 - 185.
[232] M. Hasan Ansori, 'From Insurgency to Bureaucracy: Free Aceh Movement, Aceh Party and the New Face of Conflict' *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 1 (1) (November 2012), p. 31 - 34, there p. 33.

Conclusion

The case of terrorism in Indonesia is a puzzling one. The Darul Islam and Jema'ah Islamiyah do not seem to fit in the academic standard models on terrorism. However, Rapoport's, Law's, Richardon's and Schmid's academic models on terrorism did clarify the terrorist tactics of the DI and JI to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the analysis presented in this thesis illustrates that terrorism theory fails to grasp important aspects of the phenomenon and is therewith of limited value in explaining the transformation of terrorism in Indonesia and the involute nature of complex terrorist movements such as the DI and JI.

Historical development

The historical overview of terrorism in Indonesia illustrates how terrorism by Islamists in Indonesia seems to have shifted from political- towards more religious goals. This shift was first visible in the developments within the DI after Indonesia's independence. After the DI failed to proceed its fight for a Political Islamic state, its ideology transferred to a more religious one, manifested in the JI. This development was affected by an increasingly globalised international environment. When the DI started to fall apart, followers of the DI ideology that fled to Malaysia got increasingly connected to radical Islamist in other parts of the world, such as Afghanistan's Taliban and Al Qaeda. These contacts inspired the DI-network to continue their fight with a more religious and transnational focus, which eventually resulted in the establishment of the highly religious JI.

Narratives

Even though it is difficult to separate religious from political motives,[233] the analysis of the narratives of Sukarmadji Meridian Kartosuwiryo and Imam Samudra illustrated that a distinction between different motives and the role of these motives within the movements is not unfeasible.

Kartosuwiryo was initially politically motivated. His non-Islamic upbringing and his early political focus (in the Javanese youth movement, the *Jong Islamieten Bond*, the PSII and finally Masyumi), suggest that the only thing Kartosuwiryo was missing in his struggle was an appeal through which he could mobilise more Indonesians. He found this appeal in Islam: *al-jihad al- asghar* and *al-jihad al-akhbar* seemed to perfectly legitimise his desired national and social revolution. Furthermore, religion provided his DI-members with a certain determination to fight for independence. The narrative of Kartosuwiryo combined with his

[233] Richardson, *What terrorists want,* p. 62 - 63.

historical background shows us that Kartosuwiryo was indeed highly pragmatic. He used the appeal of the Islamic religion, which makes the true religious character of the DI questionable. This thesis illustrates that the DI is a secessionist nationalist movement, using religious appeals to justify its goals.

Through increasing transnational connections, supporters of the DI-ideology further developed their religious beliefs after the fall of the DI. The narrative of Imam Samudra illustrated how this ideology developed to a full doctrine that is able to mobilise radical Muslims into a determined fight against 'the West'. Even though it is often argued that this narrative only served as a mask and as a way of legitimising the JI's fight against 'the West', this thesis illustrated that the JI is a truly religious movement.

The analysis of the narratives of Kartosuwiryo and Imam Samudra illustrated what the Indonesian Political Islam actually aims at and why these Political Islamists raise arms and decide to use terrorist tactics to fight for their ends. The DI proceeded to terrorist tactics as a last resort, while the JI used them from the beginning as a way in which 'the Islam' could revenge 'the West'.

Theorising Islamic Terrorism

Even though terrorism theory shows that the tactics of both the DI and JI are clearly terroristic, the case study of Indonesia illustrates that terrorism theories are of limited value to understand the complex nature of terrorist movements and the transformation of and connections between such movements.

Richardson theory of revenge, renown and reaction is not fully applicable on the DI, but it is on the JI. Nevertheless, this model proved to be useful to better understand what individual terrorists want – and therewith what their movements want. However, her model does not recognise other factors that could lead terrorists to their terrorist tactics and her theory fails to provide any explanation on how and why terrorism transformed in Indonesia.

Rapoport's theory of terrorism in waves appeared highly useful to explain general trends of terrorism throughout history. His third (anticolonial) and fourth (religious) wave illustrate how Islamic terrorists in Indonesia transferred from being focused on fighting foreign oppressors to fighting for a religious state. However, the termination of his 'religious wave' seems an oversimplification of the motivations and purpose of movements that fall under this wave.

Law's theory of terrorism poses the opposite problem. The DI could be categorised as ethno-nationalist terrorism (fighting for an end to their colonial status) and the JI as

'jihadi terrorism'. In fact, this thesis demonstrated how the term 'jihadi terrorism' is more adequate in describing movements such as the JI than the term 'religious terrorism'. However, Law's theory fails to provide an explanation for the general transformation of terrorism in Indonesia.

Conteh-Morgan's requirements for a good theory have proven to be helpful to examine to what extent terrorism theories are useful. However, his requirements fail to identify the aforementioned limits of these theories, that is that they fail to recognise other factors that lead to terrorism and that they are unable to explain all aspects of such terrorism. Indeed, Schmid argues that if scholars confine themselves to one single theory, they might misunderstand the full nature and scope of terrorist motivations and modes of operation.[234] Even though these theories have cultivated our understanding of categorising and comprehending terrorist organisations and motives of individual terrorists, this research has illustrated the limitations of these theories when applied to the case of terrorism in Indonesia. The transformation of the DI to the JI could hence not fully be explained through common academic models of terrorism research. The utility of categorising terrorism and terrorism theory on itself has been proven to be questionable.

Academic debate

The limits of terrorism theory that this thesis presents illustrate that the distinctions between different terrorist movements are practical and therefore cannot be theorised. Terrorism theory seems helpful in explaining certain aspects of terrorism, but not in explaining DI- and JI-terrorism in general.

Through illustrating the benefits and limits of terrorism theory in addressing complex cases like the Indonesian one, this thesis poses an example for analysing other terrorist movements: it provides insights on which theory is the most valuable one for future research on certain aspects of terrorist movements.

Furthermore, this thesis argues that general theories on violence could fill the academic gap terrorism theory leaves behind. The fruitful analysis of the narratives of both movements as explained in Demmers' *Theories on Violent Conflict*, illustrates this. Furthermore, Kilcullen's thesis of a civil war within the Islam explains what terrorism theory often neglects: other factors that - in combination to the factors Richardson, Rapoport and Law distinguish - might lead to terrorism. Furthermore, Kilcullen's thesis picks up on the belief that the Muslim community is suppressed and under attack and illustrates how

[234] Alex P. Schmid, 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism and Political Violence' in:

different Islamic groups do not agree on how to react to this.

The merging of two types of theories - general theories on violence and terrorism theory - appears to be the answer to the shortcomings of terrorism theory when addressing terrorism out of the corner of the Political Islam.

Final remarks

However, this research remains explorative. In order to fully establish to what extent terrorism theory is truly helpful to better understand the transformation of terrorism in Indonesia, the Indonesian archives and Indonesian academic sources should be consulted as well. Also, the narratives of more DI- and JI-terrorists should be analysed. Next to that, other terrorism theories should be analysed in the way this thesis did. Additionally, even though the Indonesian case seems illustrative of the violent side of the Political Islam in general, more research on other case studies is needed in order to establish whether terrorism theory is useful to better understand the violent side of the Political Islam in general.

Terrorism and Political Violence, 16:1 (2004), p. 214.

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Appendix

I. General Timeline

16th Century	Acehnese Muslims successfully challenge the Portugese
1800	Formal establishment of the Dutch in Indonesia
1873 – 1904	Aceh War
1905	Kartosuwiryo was born
1918 – 1920	Collapse of the Ottoman empire
1925	Kartosuwiryo joins the *Jong Islamieten Bond*
1927	Kartosuwiryo was expelled from his Dutch medicine study
1942	Foundations of the Darul Islam movement
May 1942	Japanese invasion of the Dutch Indies
1943	Founding of the Masyumi
17 August 1945	Sukarno and Hatta declare Indonesian Independence, beginning of the decolonisation war
April 1946	Dutch troops arrive in Indonesia
June 1946	Kartosuwiryo's speech *Haloean Politic Islam*
July 1947	First Dutch Police Action (Operation Product)
17 January 1948	Renville agreement
December 1948	Second Dutch Police Action (Operation Kraai)
May 1949	Roem- van Royen Agreement
August - November 1949	Round Table Conference
7 August 1949	Kartosuwiryo declares his Negara Islam Indonesia
December 1949	End of the decolonisation war, Dutch recognision of Indonesian Independence
1950	Indonesian government launches smaal-scale offensives against the Darul Islam
17 August 1950	The Republic Indonesia declared itself as a unitary state
1956	Indonesian government launches a large offensive against the Darul Islam
June 1962	Kartosuwiryo was captured and assassinated
1 August 1962	DI-members sign a joint declaration in which they renounce the DI and pledge allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia
1966	Suharto becomes President of the Republik Indonesia
1966 – 1967	Komando Jihad activity
1976	Founding of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
1979	Start Religious wave (4) Rapoport
1989	Mujahidin's victory in Afghanistan over the Russians
1990	Samudra fights the jihad in Afghanistan
1991	Trade embargo on Iraq
1 January 1993	Founding of the Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI), Imam Samudra becomes a member
1994 – 2001	The American embargo on Afghanistan during the Taliban Rule
1997 – 1998	Economic crisis in Indonesia
1999 – 2000	Muslim cleansings Ambon and Poso
2000	Ending New Left wave (3) Rapoport
24 December 2000	Terrorist attacks on 11 churches in Indonesia (JI)
11 September 2001	9/11 attacks

12 October 2002	Bali bombings I (JI)
2003	Bombing of the Jakarta Mariott Hotel (JI)
2004	Publishment *Aku Melawan Teroris* (Imam Samudra)
2004	Bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta (JI)
2005	Bali bombings II (JI)
2008	Imam Samudra was sentenced to death and excecuted by firing squad
2008	Founding of the Jema'ah Ansharut Daulah (JAD)
13 May 2018	Surabaya attacks (JAD)
16 May 2018	Bombing police station in Riau (JAD)

II. List of Figures

1. It must be comprehensive or applicable to various situations, and must include relevant variables.
2. It must be cohesive, with all its segments strongly linked to each other with identical variables in its separate paths.
3. It must be empirical and applicable to concrete situations.
4. As a result of the third requirement, a theory must have the greatest validity of empirical evidence to support or enhance its explanatory power.
5. It must be parsimonious, or be able to explain the problem or event with as little complexity as possible.
6. It must be open to verification.
7. Finally, it must be clear and casual in the relationship between and among variables, and in terms of considering and linking units or factors at multiple levels of analysis.[2]

Figure 1: Earl Conteh-Morgan's requirements for an adequate terrorism theory, p. 21; 50.

Scholar	Approach	Definition	Theory
Louise Richardson	Constructivist	The act of 'deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes'. The means employed and not the ends pursued, nor the political context in which a group operates determines whether a movements is a terrorist movement or not.	**Three R model:** terrorists (1) seek *revenge*, (2) want to be *renown* and (3) are trying to provoke a *reaction*.
David C. Rapoport	Historical	'The use of violence to provoke consciousness, to evoke certain feelings of sympathy and revulsion.'	**Terrorism in waves:** 1. The Anarchist wave (1881 – 1919); 2. The Anticolonial wave (1920 – 1960); 3. The New Left wave (1960 – 2000); 4. The Religious wave (1979 – 2025).
Randall D. Law	Historical	'A *strategy* that makes use of certain *tactics*'	**Historical categories of terrorism:** terrorism in the Ancient world, terrorism in the Middle Ages, terrorism in the Early Modern Era, revolutionary terrorism, racial terrorism, ethno-nationalist terrorism, state terrorism, decolonisation terrorism, Leftist terrorism, international terrorism and jihadist terrorism.
Alex P. Schmid	Overarching (academic)	(1) 'A *doctrine* about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence' and (2) 'a conspirational *practice* of calculated demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties'.	**Criteria to test the usefulness of terrorism theories (Eearl Conteh-Morgan)**

Figure 2: Schematical overview of the four scholars, p. 23 – 24.

III. List of Abbreviations

DI	Darul Islam	The post-1945 organisations that under the name of the *Darul Islam* tried to realise the ideal of an Islamic State of Indonesia
GAM	*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*	Free Aceh Movement
JAD	Jema'ah Ansharut Daulah	Terrorist organisation in Indonesia
JI	Jema'ah Islamiyah	Terrorist organisation in Southeast Asia
NII	*Negara Islam Indoneisa*	The Islamic State (established by the DI)
PSII	*Party Sarekat Islam Indonesia*	Political Party of which Kartosuwiryo was a member
RIS	*Republic Indonesia Serikat*	The United State of Indonesia
RTC	Round Table Conference	Ronde Tafel Conferentie
TII	*Tentara Islam Indonesia*	The official army of the DI
TNI	*Tentara National Indonesia*	The Indonesian Republian army

IV. List of Names

Ansori, Hasan	Social/political scientist
Azzam, Abdullah	Author of *Allah's Signs in the Afghan Jihad*
Bin Haji Halimi, Mahfuh	Scholar of International Relations
Boland, B.J.	Islamic scholar
Conteh-Morgan, Earl	Professor of International Studies
Demmers, Jolle	Scholar of International Relations and Conflict Studies
Denoeux, Gilian	Political scientist
Hanif Hassan, Muhammad	Islamic scholar
Hatta, Mohammed	Indonesian nationalist, Indonesia's first vice president
Iqbal, Muhammad	Bali bomber (2002), member of the JI
Juergensmeyer, Mark	Religious studies scholar and sociologist
Kartosuwiryo, Sukarmadji Meridian	Founder of the Darul Islam
Kilcullen, David	Sociologist
Knapp, Michael K.	Historian
Law, Randal D.	Historian
Rapoport, David C.	Historian
Moertopo, Ali	Indonesian general, reactivated the DI in Komando Jihad
Nur Djul, Muhammad	Leader of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
Richardson, Louise	Political Scientist
Rogers, Brooke	Professor in Risk and Terror
Schmid, Alex P.	Scholar in Terrorism Studies
Suharto, Haji Muhammad	Indonesia's second President, known for his New Order
Sukarno (Koesno Sosrodihardjo)	Indonesian nationalist, frist President of Indonesia
Sungkar, Abdullah	Founder and leader of the Jema'ah Islamiyah
Temby, Quinton	Professor in Asian Studies
Van Dijk, Kees	Professor of the History of Modern Islam in Indonesia
Vickers, Adrian	Historian
Westerling, Raymond	A Dutch Military officer, nicknamed 'the Turk', who became infamous for his ruthless tactics that caused a massacre in Sulawesi during the decolonisation war.

V. Glossary

Aceh moorden	Acehenese murders as part of an inner *jihad* after the Aceh war
Al-jihad al-akhbar	Social revolution to decolonise the minds of society
Al-jihad al-asghar	National revolution to fight foreign oppressors
Darul Islam Rebellion	The period from 1949 to 1962 wherein the DI revolted against the Indonesian Republic government
Haloean politic Islam	Meaning 'The political Islamic Flow', speech of Kartosuwiryo
Hikayat prang sari	Acehnese story of the holy
Imam	Leader of the Islamic State
Istimata	Absolute struggle (Arabic)
Jema'ah	Group
Jema'ah Ansharut Daulah	JAD, Indonesian terrorist movement
Jihad	Struggle/striving in the way of God
Jong Islamieten Bond	Association of Young Muslims
Jong Java beweging	Javanese youth movement
Komando Jihad	Indonesian terrorist movement (1966 – 1967)
Masyumi	Political party found in 1943, facilitated by the Japanese in an attempt to control Islam in Indonesia
Narrative	The stories groups of people create, uphold and communicate to others to make sense of the world around them
Operatie Kraai	Second Police action, second military offensive of the Dutch in the decolonisation war (December 9148)
Operation Product	First police action, first military offensive of the Dutch in the decolonisation war (July 1947)
Peering sud	Holy war/armed struggle
Renville Treaty	Agreement signed on 17 January 1948 that ceeded West-Java to the Dutch.
Roem–Van Royen agreement	Agreement signed on 7 May 1949 to end the hostilities in the run up to the Round Table Conference later that year.
Round Table Conference	Conference that led to the eventual transfer of sovereignty to a Republic of the United States of Indonesia, making the Republic itself, along with a several other states in Indonesia, part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Tarbiyyah	Education
Ulama	Muslim Scholars
Umalid	Ideology on which the Jema'ah Islamiyah is based.
Ummah	The Muslim Community

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