The appropriation of History and Religion to promote ethnic nationalism

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"There is no flag large enough to cover the shame of killing innocent people".

Howard Zinn

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This thesis was composed in a period which was marked
by the loss of a very special person in my life.

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to the two people in my life
that are here with me spiritually only,
my father
for inspiring me to be a socially active individual
and my grandmother
for showing me how to enjoy life.

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Introduction

Nationalism is a complex political ideology, often related to the concept of the nation state, as it emerged in 19th century Europe. As a dominant ideology, it has had significant impact upon modern Europe. Its core idea is that it gathers together individuals under a unified and homogenous national identity. When the idea of the nation state emerged, the theory of nationalism was its tool to draw together people of different backgrounds under a common identity; paradoxically, nationalism also divides the population of a country, in ethnic majority and minority groups.

This thesis seeks to investigate how types of Greek state administration, at different times in Modern Greek History have employed the two major components of Hellenic identity – Ancient Greek heritage and Christian Orthodox doctrine - to promote ethnic nationalism; although its hue varied from one type of state administration to the other. Henceforth, the research question has as follows:

How have different types of Greek state administration, at different times in Modern Greek history, appropriated the key components of Hellenic identity, the Ancient Greek legacy and Christian Orthodox doctrine, to promote ethnic nationalism?

This thesis maintains that national identity and religious conviction can be (and have been) misused to impose ethnic nationalism. To confirm the validity of this stance the discourse of two authoritarian and a liberal regime is examined. The relevance of this question to present-day Greece lies in the fact that ever since the outbreak of the political and socioeconomic crisis, nationalism has gained phenomenal popularity both from the right and left sides of the political spectrum. In addition, due to the increased refugee influx in Europe, and especially in Greece, ethnic nationalism has been in the core of the xenophobic rhetoric of the Greek neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn.

The first and second chapters of the thesis address theories of nationalism which facilitate the attainment of a fine-tuned definition. Additionally, in order to have a clear and precise definition of ethnic nationalism, civic nationalism should be defined too. Although the two terms are conceptual polar opposites of each other, in reality they end up merging into each other. None of the presented case studies is representative of pure ethnic or civic nationalism.

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The third chapter explores the concept of Hellenic identity further, with reference to the formation of the Modern Greek state and how its creation became a critical juncture for the emergence of Greek nationalism through the birth of the Hellenic identity. Naturally, there are more characteristics that comprise Hellenic identity, such as language, folk music, traditions, folklore stories and food culture. However, these are utilised indirectly to promote ethnic nationalism and they are of secondary importance for the research question posed. The appropriation of history and religion has had more direct influences and predominantly determined the formation of the ethnic national identity. Therefore, the focus is exclusively on these two parameters.

The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters look into three case studies: the 4th of August regime (1936-1941), the 21st of April regime or Colonels' regime (1967-1974) and the social democrat administration of PASOK's[1] government (1981-1989).

The 4th of August regime (1936-1941) was an authoritarian administration of pre-Second World War Greece, which followed Metaxas' self-coup. Metaxas became Prime Minister of a conservative authoritarian and anti-communist government, inspired by the rhetoric and symbolisms of Mussolini's Nationalist Fascist Party and utilised many propaganda techniques used by Salazar. This case is relevant because for the first time the Hellenic identity as a notion was employed to induce a form of false ethnic superiority, through claims such as the birth of a "Third Hellenic civilisation" succeeding the glory of Ancient Greece and the prominence of the Byzantine Empire. His state propaganda portrayed him as a "Saviour of the Nation", the one who brought unity to a politically divided country.

During the Colonels' regime (1967- 1974) ethnic nationalism was adopted not only as a true political ideology, of its own right, but also as a tool to distinguish citizens to loyal and non-loyal to the Colonels' regime. The law abiding citizens, unlike the communists, were fully inspired by the ideals of ethnic nationalism and took pride of it openly. Again, acceptance of the Christian Orthodox doctrine as the formal religion of the state and praise of Ancient Greek legacy had been used as a litmus test for conformity or disobedience to the regime.

 PASOK's social democratic government, though it used nationalism to enhance the anti-American feelings that prevailed at the time in the south-eastern Mediterranean region, "baptised" nationalism patriotism and blended ethnic identity with folk culture and traditions

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[1] PASOK: Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party

to create national character as an alternative to national superiority. This case although it adopts a more subtle form of ethnic and civic nationalism; it still makes use of the notion of the Hellenic identity, albeit in a more romantic and populist manner. However, it still maintains elements of the two core characteristics of religion and ancient heritage. Furthermore, PASOK's populist nationalism resembles the one adopted by, SYRIZA, the party currently in office.

Finally, a variation-finding comparative study of the three cases is being conducted to pinpoint the similarities and differences in the methods by which appropriation of religion and historical heritage was carried out. Namely, what is investigated is the extent to which national identity was used as a propaganda tool by the authoritarian, totalitarian and liberal regimes respectively. The main hypothesis of the research is that the national identity was employed as a propaganda device but its application was different in the three regimes. The instrumentalisation of the Hellenic identity is adjusted according to the prevailing ideology and the political circumstances in each case. The 4th of August Regime and the 21st of April regime utilised national identity to project elements of ethnic nationalism whilst, in the PASOK's social democrat administration of the 1980s national identity was used to foster a more civic and populist form of nationalism. It is expected that the Metaxas' authoritarian regime and the totalitarian military regime would have a close correlation with each other, whereas, in the liberal regime, the use of the national identity would vary in comparison.

A literary analysis of the publicity material used at the time in each of the three cases is analysed to demonstrate similarities and differences amongst them. The sources are mostly public speeches of leading figures in each regime. In the analysis, although reference is made to the overall style of such speeches, there is a focus on the religious and historical references as well as on the relevant imagery utilised in the speech.

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1. Definitions of nationalism

In this chapter, definitions of key terms are discussed in order to ensure the precise use of these terms in subsequent chapters. The first two terms that are defined are ethnic nationalism and civic/liberal nationalism. These two central terms need to be defined clearly since empirically there is no instance of pure civic or ethnic nationalism in any of the case studies. Therefore, accurate definitions are essential to trace the transition of different forms of nationalism that were caused by the usage of the Hellenic identity in each regime. Furthermore, the term romantic nationalism is also analysed. This style of nationalism was used in the speeches of the military junta and PASOK's social democrat administration. Finally, certain key concepts such as: Gellner's "higher culture", Anderson's "imagined communities" as well as Hobsbawm's and Ranger's "invention of tradition" are revised. These concepts are linked to nationalism and they are used as theoretical tools to examine the primary sources.

1.1. Ethnic nationalism

This section explores Anthony Smith's view of ethnic nationalism. Smith maintains that a nation is based on the pre-existing history of a population. More specifically, he defines nationalism as an "ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed to constitute an actual or potential nation".[2] Furthermore, he argues that nationalists feel an intense kind of solidarity for their nation and other members of the nation. Nationalism builds on a pre-existing kinship and a similar belief system. The nation aims to unify people with a common past under a shared identity. This is probable even if this shared past is not truly accurate. These interpretations of history are done to justify current political and ethnic positions.[3] Additionally, according to Smith, the nation is "a named population sharing a historical territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members".[4] Finally, Smith argues that the nation is a new form of religion for people. It is a religion, in the substantive sense, which has a system of beliefs and practices that distinguish the believers from the non-believers and unites its constituents in one moral community of

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[2] Smith, Anthony D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, p.73.
[3] Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* p. 86.
[4] Smith, Anthony D. *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era.* Cambridge: Wiley, 1995, p. 57.

faithful followers.[5] For example, national heroes are portrayed as living symbols which exemplify the authenticity and sacrifice one should make, for the greater good of the community. This is similar to saviours whose actions live on in the nation's memory.[6] Smith's religious account of nationalism might possibly explain the emotional investment of people with their constructed national identity. This definition of nationalism will prove to be useful in the 4th of August regime case study since the regime involved extensively a religious element in its form of ethnic nationalism.

1.2.   Romantic nationalism

Romantic nationalism provides a primordial account of the history, similarly to ethnic nationalism, giving greater emphasis on folklore culture. This form of nationalism is used as a theoretical tool to examine the form of nationalism that was employed by the 21st of April regime, which followed a form of romantic nationalism. Additionally, the social democrat PASOK administration followed a romantic form of nationalism which in its nature was more civic than ethnic. Furthermore, even Metaxas' regime displayed elements of romantic nationalism too.

An important trait of romantic nationalism is its characteristic to draw upon various elements of culture as well as to employ a kind of national revivalism. This revivalism usually refers to a rediscovery of a historical golden age of the past that romantic nationalists want to associate with their current nation state.[7] However, times of decline are also part of the nation's collective memory, for instance, in the case of Greece, the fall of Constantinople. Revivalist nationalism aims to uphold a common set of values between socially different groups of the nation, fabricating a homogenous moral community.[8] This is achieved when revivalism produces a dynamic interpretation of the past which creates an admiration for a *mythos,* like the legend of the "Marble emperor"[9]; which is alongside - or replaces – the ethnic group's dominant religion and history.[10] This arguably is a pathway for future development of the ethnic community and consequently the nation. Moreover, revivalism by being highly influential upon the urbanised middle class renders it to attach itself to the historical narrative

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[5] Smith, Anthony D. *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 41.

[6] Smith, *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity.* p. 42.

[7] Hutchinson, John. *Nations As Zones of Conflict.* London: Sage, 2005, p. 48.

[8] Hutchinson, *Nations As Zones of Conflict,* p. 51.

[9] Greeks believe that the last Byzantine Emperor, Constantine XI Palaiologos, will awaken and reclaim Constantinople from the Ottomans.

[10] Hutchinson, *Nations As Zones of Conflict,* p.52.

of the nation.[11] Romanticism caused an increase in philology, archaeology folklore and museums which were used to promote the (arguably) primordial heritage of the nation and defend the heritage from foreign influences. Therefore, through romanticism, history is engrained in people's minds and is seen as a national *telos* - despite inaccuracies and continuity errors - instituting a set of role models for the people of the nation.[12] Finally, symbolism has played a crucial role in national revivalism. Its impact can be traced in parts of civil society as well as in national holiday celebrations. These events directed the populace mindset in religiously devoting themselves to the nation, being part of the chain of heroes that were willing to sacrifice themselves for the greater good of the nation, against any attempt of their culture's corruption.[13]

1.3.   Civic nationalism and liberal nationalism

In this section the definition of civic/liberal nationalism is discussed. The definition serves as a tool both to obtain a better understanding of PASOK's type of nationalism as well as to acquire a broader view of what ethnic nationalism is, since civic and ethnic nationalism are often considered polar opposites.

One of the first scholars to compose a definition for civic nationalism was Ernest Renan. He defined nationalism as, a collective solidarity constituting the feeling of sacrifice that people have made in the past and are willing to make in the future for one another. In the present it is expressed by the clear consent to continue a common life.[14] Ernan famously stated that the nation is a, "a daily plebiscite".[15] What he meant by this was that one's national identity is governed by his or her own political principles that he or she shares with other like-minded people.[16]

Renan's form of proto-civic nationalism influenced more contemporary scholars to form of liberal nationalism. A notable contributor to the school of liberal nationalism is Yael Tamir. She defines nationalism as the mutual respect for one another with a common language, history, culture, language, religion, geography (and other substantive elements of individual

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[11] Hutchinson, *Nations As Zones of Conflict*, p.53.
[12] Hutchinson, *Nations As Zones of Conflict*, p.55.
[13] Mosse, George. *Masses and man : nationalist and fascist perceptions of reality*. New York: Howard Fertig Publishing, 1980, p. 88.
[14] Yack, Bernard. "The Myth of the Civic Nation." In *Theorizing Nationalism*, edited by Ronald Beiner. New York: State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 107.
[15] Yack, Bernard. "The Myth of the Civic Nation." In *Theorizing Nationalism*, p. 106.
[16] Yack, Bernard. "The Myth of the Civic Nation." In *Theorizing Nationalism*, p. 107.

identity)[17] with an equal respect for other nations (different identities) as being part of a common civilisation.[18] Furthermore, Tamir argues that the notions of nationalism and liberalism focus on viewing individuals in a social context in their own manner. More specifically, liberalism respects the personal autonomy and choices of the individual; on the other hand nationalism is centred on the feelings of belonging, loyalty and solidarity of the individual. She maintains that these two notions are not mutually exclusive but complimentary.[19] Another, prominent contemporary author of civic/liberal nationalism is Michael Ignatieff. Ignatieff defines civic nationalism as "a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values".[20] Contrary to ethnic nationalist theories, civic nationalism is presented as a form of belonging with one's predecessors through a set of common rational political principles.[21] Tamir Ignatieff's definitions of civic/liberal nationalism are used to outline the underlying civic nationalist principles that PASOK's administration adopted.

1.4. Clarification on the nature ethnic and civic nationalisms

David Brown has challenged the notion that civic nationalism has liberal connotations while ethnic nationalism has authoritarian. He has scrutinised the various debates concerning these two forms of nationalism. For instance he questions the presumption that civic bonds are based on rationalism and voluntarism, whereas cultural bonds are irrational and hereditary.[22] Brown then argues that the liberality of nationalism does not depend on whether it is cultural or civic; instead he argues that it is based firstly on whether the social group that uses nationalistic rhetoric has been marginalised and secondly on whether a considerably large part of society displays hostility towards some group that falls outside the spectrum of what is considered nation; seeing that group as a potential peril to national identity.[23] However, Brown does conclude that the distinction between the two types of nationalism is important for the comprehension of the political tensions and the dynamic of nationalism and how the state ought to deal with the minorities within the nation.[24] Additionally, both forms of

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[17] Tamir, Yael. "The Enigma of Nationalism." *World Politics*, 1995, p. 427.
[18] Tamir, Yael. *Liberal Nationalism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 4.
[19] Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism.* p. 6.
[20] Ignatieff, Michael. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995, p. 5.
[21] Ignatieff, Michael. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995, p. 7.
[22] Brown, David. "Are there good and bad nationalisms?" *Nations and Nationalism* (Nations and Nationalism), 1999: 281-302, p. 281.
[23] Brown, "Are there good and bad nationalisms?", p. 281.
[24] Brown, "Are there good and bad nationalisms?", p. 299.

nationalism intend to unite individuals into groups that would equally last for a long period of time and outweigh one's individual interest for the collective interest.[25] Therefore, the impact of nationalism is determined by the principles engrained in the concept of the nation itself.

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[25] Brown, "Are there good and bad nationalisms?", p. 299.

2. Theories of nationalism

2.1. Gellner's theory of nationalism

Gellner's book of *Nations and Nationalism* has been referenced because it discusses nationalism as a political principle. This view of nationalism is useful in understanding its necessity as a political tool for each type of regime or state administration. Gellner argues that nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries are not trumped by political ones and that the two together form an inter-dependant relationship within a given state and should not separate the power-holders from the rest.[26] Furthermore, Gellner taking notice of the human desire for knowledge he claims that, as knowledge peaks, it would institutionalise as "high culture". He then defines nationalism as the hegemony of "high culture", over the lower cultures taken up previously by the population, necessary for bureaucratic and technological communication.[27] This communication creates an anonymous impersonal society, of individuals that are united by a shared culture which is reproduced and maintained distinctively by the individuals and small groups within the larger culture, rather by large institutions and the education system.[28] Gellner maintains that the phenomenon of a unified and systematic shared culture occurred due to the demands created by the commuting and transfers of population into the city. It was essential that a common identity was to be created so that the workers would have a further incentive to work harder in the industrial society, in the name of their "country" and to unite the mobile workforce.[29] This common identity was achieved by constructing a common culture, requiring a common language. This theory of nationalism is beneficial as an overarching understanding of why nationalism's outbreak as part of the Modern Greek State at the onset of industrialisation in Modern Greece. Therefore, it is used in the first part of the discussion, on the formation of the Modern Greek State. Additionally, it is used in each case to illustrate how the type of nationalism changes according to the socioeconomic circumstances in the time-period of each case.

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[26] Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism.* Ithaca: Cornell University, 2008, p. 1.
[27] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 57.
[28] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 57.
[29] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 46.

2.2.   Benedict Anderson's theory of Imagined Communities.

Benedict Anderson's account of nationalism in the book, *Imagined Communities:* has also been referenced. Anderson maintains that the sense of imagined community originated from culture and the role of print capitalism to the development of the nations.[30] This was achieved by entrepreneurs printing. He argues that nationalist culture originated from religious culture. This religious culture was then replaced by the modern national culture. Furthermore, Anderson addresses two paradoxes that exist when trying to define the notion of nationalism. Firstly, he highlights the contradiction between the objective modernity of nations, as seen by historians, and the subjective antiquity of the nation in the eyes of the nationalist. Secondly, he demonstrates the inconsistency of nationalism, as a weak philosophical concept in contrast to the political power this concept has to the social process.[31] He illustrates these paradoxes with the example of the "Tomb of the Unknown Soldier". He argues that even though the tomb itself might be empty or filled with unidentifiable parts, it constitutes a symbol of the nation, which people acknowledge as part of their shared imagined community.[32] Hence, Anderson defines a nation as an imagined political community in which fellow members may not ever meet or know each other. However, these members will have similar interests and identify as part of the same nation.[33] Anderson argues that a nation is an imagined community, despite the socioeconomic inequality that may exist within it, because the nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal connection amongst people.[34] The notion of a collective identity is interrelated with the formation of an imagined community, which may reinforce both civic and ethnic forms of nationalism. This definition is used in the discussion chapters of the thesis to study how the notion of imagined communities exists regardless of the type of nationalism that may prevail in each case. The imagined community is a far deeper subliminal mechanism which to a large extent determines national identity almost independently from any other type of political scheming. In other words, regimes utilise national identities for their own political gains and their ideology might only partially alter it.

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[30] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, p. 8.
[31] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, pp.6-7.
[32] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, pp.6-7.
[33] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, p. 7.
[34] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, p. 7.

2.3.　Hobsbawm's and Ranger's notion of the invention of tradition

Finally, Hobsbawm's notion of invention of tradition is an important term because it is used in the case study section of the thesis to show the 4th of August regime, the military junta or Colonel's regime and the social democrat administration of PASOK's government invented new traditions[35] which were designed to alter Greek identity for political purposes. Frequently, the invention of traditions of relatively recent origin but claimed to be old and naturally invented. Hobsbawm argues that this phenomenon is clear in the modern development of nation states, by creating a national identity aiming at national unity and legitimising institutions and cultural practices.[36] The concept has been applied to various cultural phenomena throughout the world and in various major religions. Furthermore, Hobsbawm points out that even the duality between what is considered tradition and modernity is also invented.[37] All in all, the main questions that are raised from the notion of invented tradition is how strong is the antiquity, authenticity and legitimacy of nationalism. This is an important question for this thesis, which shows how nationalism has been used to legitimize political actions in Greece. The concept has been applied to various cultural phenomena throughout the world and in various major religions. Furthermore, Hobsbawm points out that even the duality between what is considered tradition and modernity is also not invented. All in all, the main questions that are raised from the notion of invented tradition is how strong is the antiquity, authenticity and legitimacy of nationalism. This is an important question for this thesis, which shows how nationalism has been used to legitimize political actions in Greece.

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[35] PASOK established the 17th of November as a national holiday, in remembrance of the victims of the Polytechnic uprising.

[36] Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Osborn Ranger. The Invention of Tradition.Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1983, pp. 1-3.

[37] Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Osborn Ranger. *The Invention of Tradition.*, p.3.

3. The formation of the Greek State and the rise of ethnic nationalism

In this section there is a brief account of the formation of the Modern Greek nation state, in 1932, up until the time of the first case study, and the parallel emergence of the notion of Hellenic identity. The fabrication of the nation state and the birth of nationalism were congruent and of equal weight in the political dominance in the time of the "Modern Greek Enlightenment".[38] The Greek Orthodox Church was - and still is - a key component in the building of the Hellenic identity. The Greek Orthodox Church had achieved to become a pivotal national, political and cultural institution hence its overbearing role in the growth of religious nationalism. The Greek Orthodox Church had so far managed to amalgamate Hellenic history and Orthodox belief in order to assert Hellenic Christian ideology and identity as the principle driving forces in the Greek nation state formation and its subsequent strategically politicisation. A noteworthy contradiction is the incorporative type of social inclusion of the Orthodox Church in contrast to the weak civil society that existed in various Orthodox countries. Undoubtedly, the implemented high level of religious and national homogeneity reinforced significantly the power and interference of the Orthodox Church in state affairs.[39]

During the formation of the Greek state, there were opposing tensions between politicians that believed that Greece ought to become a secular republic and those who were for an Orthodox republic. Greek secular nationalists were inspired by the Enlightenment thinkers, Adamantios Korais and Riggas Feraios, had the vision to place Greece back as a Western European power by curtailing its Ottoman influences and its religious fascination with Christian Orthodoxy.[40] The concept of republican liberty pushed by these two and other Greek Enlightenment figures and the subsequent hostility that arose between them and the Church was detrimental. This is pivotal because it demonstrates how the Greek State is the outcome of a fusion of European nation state structures, nationalism, and religion in an authoritarian political environment, which trumped any form of individual liberalism.[41] Finally, the key element in creating a national identity is finding or even crafting differences that differentiate one kind of national group from another. Usually this dichotomy tends to be with neighbouring states. In the case

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[38] Modern Greek Enlightenment (1774-1821).

[39] Georgiadou, "Greek Orthodoxy and the Politics of Nationalism.", p. 299.

[40] Vermis, Thanos, and Martin Blinkhorn. *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality.* Athens: Educational Institute of the National Bank, 2012, p. 133.

[41] Kitromilides, Paschalis M. *Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013, p. 200.

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of Greece, it is the Greek-Turkish clash of identities based first and foremost on religion. Historical traumas, whether they are real or imagined, reinforce the identity of a nation by demonising the identity of the "Other".[42] In this sense, a historical narrative is quintessential in the creation of identities.

At the outbreak of the 1821 Greek national-liberation uprising against the Ottoman occupation, ethno-religious sentiments were highly prominent among the agrarian strata. Nevertheless, after the War of Independence, a secular monarchy was established, in 1832 at the Convention of London by the Great Powers (the United Kingdom, France and the Russian Empire, which was not particularly popular among the people.[43] There were many disputes as to how members of the Greek nation were to be called, such as "Hellenes", "Romioi" or "Graekoi", which all had different religious or historical connotations. The naming dispute was settled by Prime Minister Kolletis[44] 'Great Idea'.[45] The "Great Idea" was a "sacred" mission to demolish the Ottoman Empire and reunite all Greeks under the newly formed Greek state, creating a second Byzantine Empire in Eastern Europe with Constantinople as the capital. The "Great Idea" is the core idea of Greek irredentism throughout the 19th and early 20th century. Intellectuals of the time focused on restoring the classical and religious character of Byzantium. One of the ways this was to be achieved was by revitalizing the archaic language of "Καθαρεύουσα (Katharevousa)"[46] over the simple "Δημοτικη (Demotic)" Greek language. "Katharevousa" became the official language but Demotic was used in everyday life. The conflict between these two was an issue in Greek society and politics for decades.[47] In the late 19th century, the idea of the state-based ethnic identity came under threat from other forms of ethnic nationalism among Orthodox people in Eastern Europe.[48] Additionally, the 1897 Cretan revolt was detrimental for the Greek monarchy as heavy criticism upon palace and the government regarding its dependence upon the European Great Powers instead of relying on the – robust at the time - Greek Diaspora .[49] This never-ending debate peaked on whether Greece should join the Triple Alliance, between European oriented and ethno-religious supporters. The 1922 population exchange between Turkey and Greece, dictated by

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[42] Heraclides, Alexis. "The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity." *Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe* , 2011: 1-28, p. 1.
[43] Vermis and Blinkhorn, *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, p. 186.
[44] In office: 12/61834 – 1/6/, 1835.
[45] Vermis and Blinkhorn, *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, p. 188.
[46] A purist form of Greek. Today it is only used by the Greek Orthodox Church.
[47] Vermis and Blinkhorn, *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*,p. 153.
[48] Kitromilides, Paschalis M. *Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013, p.137.
[49] Vermis and Blinkhorn, *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, p. 275.

the Lausanne treaty, caused a further split amongst republicans and royalists. This led to the abolition of monarchy for the first time, in 1924 and the birth of the Greek republic.[50] The brand new republican administration made attempts to implement up to date institutions to shift the state from pure ethnic to civic. However, this was hindered by a number of domestic military interventions which in the end restored monarchy under the military dictatorship of General Ioannis Metaxas, bringing back the nationalist agenda. Metaxas claimed that he would establish the "Third Hellenic civilisation" - subsequent to Ancient Greece and Byzantium.

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[50] Vermis and Blinkhorn, *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, p. 292.

Discussion

The three case studies are presented chronologically. The necessary preconditions which led each regime to power are outlined. The ideology and practices of each type of state administration are summarised separately in order to ensure a better understanding of the political and social conditions present at the time the speehes and other material were publicized. Finally, analysis of the imagery and diction in the speeches has been carried out to demonstrate how references to national identity, especially in the speeches, were used to promote different types of ethnic nationalism.

4. The 4th of August regime (1936-1941)

In this section, to study the 4th of August regime, the works of four authors have been referenced. The works of the first two authors - Vasilidis Rafailidis and Richard Clogg – have been revised to identify the preconditions that brought Metaxas' regime to power. The works of these two authors have been selected for their accurate chronology of the events and for their lucid insight of how these events interrelated. In the following section on the ideology of the Metaxas'regime Marina Petrakis' work on propaganda techniques and Othon Evangelos Anastasakis' work on the ideology of the 4th of August regime are cited.

4.1.   The preconditions that brought the 4th of August regime to power

In 1922, Greece went through a series of political, economic and ideological changes. The events that sparked many of these changes were: the defeat of Greece by the Turkish National Movement, during the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies (1918-1922), and the massacre (as perceived by the Greeks and other ethnicities in Asia Minor) of Orthodox communities, in 1922.[51] This defeat finalised the borders of the Greek state and raised the issue of inclusion, within mainland Greece, of eradicated Greeks from the Ottoman Empire, as it was finally settled by the population exchange specified by the Treaty of Lausanne (1924). At the time, the country was prone to rapid capitalist development, political

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[51] Vermis and Blinkhorn, *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, p. 277.

instability and ideological turmoil brought a large scale reorganisation of the Greek society.[52] The fragile condition of the parliamentary democratic system epitomised the political instability caused mainly by the extreme polarisation of the Greek society in Royalists and Republicans.[53] This instability was deepened further by the continuous intervention of the military leadership in the political domain. This constant intrusion of the army officers led to the one-year Lieutenant General Pangalos dictatorship (1925-1926) followed by seven parliamentary elections and two referenda to reach the decision whether there should be abolition of monarchy in Greece.[54] In this sequence of events, the military was essentially utilised as a tool to deliver power to the respective dominant political group (Republicans or Royalists). In return, officers needed the politicians to secure their positions in the army. This resulted in a clientele-based political system where the 4th of August regime was supported by a dominant royalist group within the army and vice versa.[55]

As regards society, extensive polarisation amongst different social groups was present. These different types of tensions and divisions were of regional, class related, ethnic or political nature. The regional tensions came up between people who were living in regions which belonged to the Greek state ("Old Greeks"), and those living in the newly acquired territories, after the First World War. The issue of dispute involved the size of government funds to be allocated in these territories. People in the old regions were resentful having to share their budget with people in the newer regions. In response, those living in the new areas claimed that the Athenian administration ignored them completely, - to say the least, as many believed that the government discriminated against them - because of the number of ethnic minorities living in those regions e.g. Western Thrace. Unfortunately, ethnic tensions also arose between people living in the larger cities of Greece and Greeks from Asia Minor and Istanbul (repatriated due to the Treaty of Lausanne population exchange) when the latter were housed in slums, on previously un-built lands at the outskirts of those cities that potentially could be developed. Class polarisation between the bourgeois faction and the industrial workers and peasants was eminent.[56] The political division between Republicans and Royalists, or as they were commonly known, Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists was deep (National Schism period,

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[52] Rafailidis, Vasilis. *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974.* Athens: Twenty-First press, 2010, p. 121.
[53] Rafailidis, Vasilis. *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974.* Athens: Twenty-First press, 2010, p. 122.
[54] Rafailidis, *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974,* p. 124.
[55] Rafailidis, *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974,* pp. 119-21.
[56] Clogg,. *A concise history of Greece.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 101.

1914-1917). The former included bourgeois entrepreneurs, liberal intellectuals, new smallholders, economically less-well-off, less cultured strata and people from the newly acquired territories or repatriated Greeks. The anti-Venizelists were mostly academics, judges, clergy, old bourgeoisie and people living in the old lands of the Greek state ("Old Greeks"), who were more economically secure and more highly educated.[57] The common failure, of the subsequent democratic regimes, was their incapacity to control and please all these different groups and satisfy their diverse interests. Furthermore, the civil society was feeble. Neither the industrial proletariat nor the agricultural proletariat were able to organise grass-roots movements to resolve their socioeconomic and political issues.

The economic situation in Greece prior to the rise of the 4th of August regime was favourable. The large inflow of refugees provided cheap labour and also expanded the size of the Greek market. Furthermore, the increase in land brought further economic development, resulting in a rapid growth in agriculture and in the country's industrialisation. However, Greece was deeply indebted to the Great powers. At the same time it also suffered from the consequences of the 1929 Wall street crash. Greece was finally able to economically recover by 1933.[58] Contrary to other European countries such as Germany, Italy, and Portugal, which continued to encounter economic difficulties. At the time, Greece faced relatively favourable economic conditions despite its phase of declining democratic administration. On the other hand one ought to mention that contrary to other European countries, Metaxas displayed no tendency of any aggressive form expansionism.

The events of 1922 marked the end of Greek wishful irredentism[59] which had had an obvious impact upon the ideological landscape of the Greek society, especially as regards people's perception of national identity. A plethora of ideological stands concerning nationalism appeared, namely, anti-western nationalism, a liberal notion of nationalism, socialist nationalism and nationalism with communist affinity. An exogenous factor that played an adverse role on the influence of these ideological currents was the so-called "fear of communism across Europe". Despite the relatively small number of communists in Greece, the propaganda against communism was highly influential and intimidating, scattering

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[57] Rafailidis, *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974,* p. 123.
[58] Anastasakis, Othon Evangelos. *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967.* London: ProQuest, 1992, p. 68.
[59] Greek Irredentism is explained on page 13 of the thesis.

uneasiness throughout Greek society.[60] The answer to this contradiction may well be that "Old Greeks" feared that the large number of disadvantaged refugees from (Asia Minor and Istanbul) could potentially be attracted to communist ideas and turn into a potential peril for the present socioeconomic establishment. Therefore, anti-communism became a strong legitimising factor of ideologies with nationalist inclinations, which anyway in their core were opposing the principles of communism. In 1929, after a series of vigorous strikes the voting of "Idionymon Act"[61] epitomised the adoption of anti-communism and authoritarian practice. The term referred to the "special" offense, as described in Law N.4229 / 24th of July 1929, which was passed after a proposal by the Venizelos Government. The title of the law was "On the security measures of the social status and protection of citizens' freedoms". Its aim was to criminalise "subversive" ideas, especially the persecution of communists, anarchists and to suppress the trade union mobilisations.[62] The term "Idionymon" in the field of legal science is the term for a crime for which special more severe penalties are stipulated in relation to the other crimes in the same the general class. The term since 1929 has gained political significance and has meant any repressive measure implemented until 1974, which criminalised the support and dissemination of communist ideas.[63] One ought to mention that contrary to other European countries, Metaxas displayed no tendency towards aggressive form of expansionism. Arguably, all the above provided favourable ground for the 4th of August regime to come into power. Moreover, failures of previous governments made some people in Greece to believe that democracy was not a competent type of administration.

The 4th of August 1936, the so-called Metaxas' regime was backed by King George II of Greece. The regime was put into power by two decrees, signed by the king, which nullified two constitutional articles that were cornerstones of democracy. The one article secured the exercise of individual and collective liberties; the other protected the Parliament from attempts of dissolving it. Without these decrees Metaxas would not have been able to get into power and consolidate it.[64] Even though the King did not interfere much with current affairs of the regime, he still maintained supremacy over Metaxas, monitoring the authoritarian personality Metaxas possessed. The 4th of August regime was also backed by Britain.

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[60] Anasataskis, *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967, p. 69.*

[61] Delictum sui generis / Delict

[62] Law N.4229 / 24th of July 1929, "Idionymon Act", (Gazette 245 / First Issue / 25 July 1929), from http://www.et.gr/index.php/2012-12-15-13-09-24/skourch-laws

[63] Anasataskis, *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967,* p. 70.

[64] Rafailidis, *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974,* p. 135.

However, the British avoided interfering with Greek politics as long as the British hegemony in the Mediterranean was not compromised.[65]

4.2.   The ideology of the 4th of August regime

Metaxas in his speeches and memoirs never described his ideology as being "fascist" or "national socialist". However, he definitely employed various fascist rhetorical and organisational techniques that were widely used by other fascist regimes at the time. Metaxas, like other fascist leaders, claimed that his regime's ideals were original and had nothing to do with the ideals of other fascist regimes. They were based solely on true Ancient Greek ideals. In the ideology of the 4th of August regime there were both Ancient Greek elements as well as fascist characteristics. The traditional features were centred on manipulating national history and the notions of the Orthodox doctrine within the context of the ideology of nationalism. The fascist characteristics were mostly prevalent in his rhetoric and propaganda techniques.[66]

Anti-communism was the cornerstone in the regime's ideology, as it was in the ideologies of most European right-wing authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, anti-communist ideas were also adopted by more liberal state administrations of the 1920s and 1930s. It was under the liberal regime of Eleftherios Venizelos, when in order to halt the rising strikes' movement, the anti-communist "Idionymo" law (mentioned in the preconditions) "on measures of security of the social status" was voted.[67] The 4th of August regime followed more arbitrary and atrocious forms of repressive practices. In the period 1931-1936, due to the great economic crisis that followed the 1929 Wall street crash and Greece's 1932 suspension of payments, the trade union movement was at a climax. Strikes were unprecedented massive and often ended up in conflicts with police with dead and wounded. Workers' protests reached their peak in May 1936 in Thessaloniki, with the great strike of tobacco smokers, which resulted in 12 dead and more than 200 injured.[68] It was then when Metaxas' government replaced L.4229[69] with the more authoritarian Law. 117/15 18th of September 1936 "On Measures to Combat Communism and Consequences"[70], maintaining the spirit of the original law by intensifying

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[65] Rafailidis, *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974,* p. 136.
[66] Ploumidis, Spyridon G. *The Metaxa Regime (1936-1941).* Athens: Estia Publishing, 2016, p. 29.
[67] Anastasakis, Othon Evangelos. *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967.*, p. 90.
[68] Ploumidis, Spyridon G. *The Metaxa Regime (1936-1941).* Athens: Estia Publishing, 2016, p. 112.
[69] See page 17, Law N.4229 / 24th of July 1929, "Idonymon Act", (Gazette 245 / First Issue / 25 July 1929), from http://www.et.gr/index.php/2012-12-15-13-09-24/search-laws.
[70] Law. 117/15 18th of September 1936 "On Measures to Combat Communism and Consequences" (Government Gazette 402 / Issue 1/18 September 1936), from http://www.et.gr/index.php/2012-12-15-13-09-24/search-laws.

censorship, by introducing the famous "statements of repentance" denouncing communism. The anti-communist weaponry of Metaxas dictatorship had been reinforced by many other legislative acts. The most important of them was Law 1075/10 11th of February 1938 "On security measures of the social status and protection of citizens"[71], where he introduced stricter provisions and tougher conditions for the imprisonment of his leftwing political opponents replacing the previous laws of the central government. This law provided Metaxas the legal framework to be able to persecute any type of dissident ideas and actions.[72] It was under the implementation of this law that atrocities such as censorship, burning of books, and extensive torturing by the military police of citizens under arrest, allegedly agents of anti-establishment actions that became justifiable.[73] In addition, Metaxas in his propaganda introduced dubious allegations that Greek intellectuals who had studied or lived abroad were responsible for the infiltration of communism in the Greek society. The nationalist and anti-communist overtones of the regime can also be seen at the preamble of the royal decree:

"The regime has intervened promptly to save the country from a forthcoming disaster. The effervescent situation in Greece is due to the upsurge in communist propaganda, which, having infiltrated the civil service, threatens to paralyse the state machinery, to penetrate the national armed forces, and to cultivate a spirit of anarchism in its ranks having absorbed the leaders of the conservative working class and the peasantry, it has caused a series of unjustified strikes, aimed at overturning the social status quo and the disintegration of Greek society."[74]

Arguably, phrases such as, "[Communism] threatens to paralyse the state machinery" illustrate the strong anti-communist sentiment that permeated the regime, overstating the impact of communism in Greece and its peril especially upon the armed forces and state machinery.[75] Expressions such as, "…aimed at overturning the social status quo and the disintegration of Greek nation" feature how communism was actually regarded as a threat to the moral values of society. Furthermore, Metaxas influenced by his two top legal advisors

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[71] Law. 1075/10 11th of February 1938 "On security measures of the social status and protection of citizens" (Gov. Gazette 45 / First Issue / 11 February 1938), from http://www.et.gr/index.php/2013-01-28-14-06-23/search-laws.

[72] Anasataskis, *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967,* p. 91.

[73] Anasataskis, *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967,* p. 92.

[74] Preamble to the first royal decree "On the Suspension of Constitutional Rights" 04/08/1936, issue 324, from http://www.et.gr/index.php/2013-01-28-14-06-23/search-laws.

[75] Anasataskis, *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967, p. 69.*

and political philosophers N, Koumaros and G. Mantzoufas developed an organic conception of the nation,

"…a living omnipresent organism with its own civilisation. It comprises a total of people connected by social', historical, physical, biological and psychological relations. The nation exists in the unity of the past, the present, and the future. It is not identified with the numerical strength of the living people because it is a historical reality, the product of a historical evolution over many generations, the unifying element of which is national consciousness".[76]

The nation was seen as an entity that was above individuals and social groups, an entity of some sort of religious character. Besides, it is no surprise that he believed that the nation's will could only be expressed by the nation's leader, "It may be possible that the will of the nation is not identical to the totality of the people or even with the majority but only with a minority or just one person".[77] In other words, by identifying the will of the nation with the will of the leader he provided himself with the perfect excuse for the imposition of the ruling of one single leader upon the entire population.

Nationalism under the 4th of August regime was, as mentioned earlier, did not display any aggressive expansionism. Its aim was to focus on domestic affairs and stay out of international affairs, since it was realistically understood that Greece was not a major power in the international field. As a result of this perception, Metaxas adopted a pacifist relationship with neighbouring countries, avoiding the claiming of any of the lands lost in 1922.[78] Nevertheless, he focused heavily on strengthening the army, in order to protect the nation from outside threats. This policy was supported by many Greeks since the Asia Minor disaster was still in their minds. Although Metaxas' nationalism was not racist regarding foreign affairs; his domestic affairs were highly discriminatory towards ethnic minorities living in northern Greece. He prohibited the Macedonian dialect and banned the music of the Bulgarian minority. He forced members of many ethnic minority groups to paint their houses with the national blue and white colours, as a symbolic act of Hellenisation, attempting to homogenise the ethnic identity of people living in the Greece.[79]

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[76] *The Youth*, periodical, October 1939, p.3.
[77] *The New State,* newspaper, October 1939, p.1-3.
[78] Anastasakis, Othon Evangelos. *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967.*, pp. 98-99.
[79] Machaira, Helen. *The Youth of 4th of August [regime].* Athens: IAEN, 1987, p.44.

 The 4th of August regime followed a revised form of the "Megali Idea".[80] Metaxas wished to create a nation that replicated elements of both the Ancient Greek and the Byzantine civilisations. He was also inspired by the politicians involved in the creation of the Greek nation state. The regime had a very particular interpretation of past historical events, promoting particular aspects of History that glorified the Greeks by understating events that did not particularly favour the Greeks. For instance, the Athenian city state was portrayed as "high in intellectual and artistic achievements but low in religious faith"[81] but the Spartan political model was vastly projected over the Athenian democracy. According to Metaxas,

"Democracy, the system of the Ancient Athenian society, is characterised by mediocrity. The leaders of democratic regimes are only mediocre human beings, servants o f the sovereign masses, while what societies need are superior beings to lead their nations. Democracy derives its strength from amorphous and misguided masses".[82]

In his eyes the Spartan oligarchy, "brought out the best qualities of human nature, the qualities of self-discipline, austerity, obedience and courage".[83] Metaxas admired Byzantium for its religious character although it was not approved for its intellectual merits.[84] Metaxas' "Third Hellenic civilisation" would encompass the cultural heritage of Ancient Athens, the social structure and political matters of Sparta and Macedonia, and the religious practices of Byzantium.[85]

The key institutions that Metaxas used as tools to create his "Third Hellenic civilisation" and induce Greek people to follow his vision, were the ministry of press, the ministry of education, and the EON youth-movement. The ministry of press was tasked to "enlighten" public opinion through the friendly media and censor the media that were critical. The periodical "Neon Kratos", which was the mouthpiece of the regime, published articles which typified the fascist characteristics of the regime's ideology. [86] Censorship took place in its strictest form. The ministry of press not only would it practically burn published material that

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[80] *The New State,* newspaper, October 1939, p.1-3, [original translation from www.metaxasproject.com].

[81] Metaxas, Ioannis. *The Personal Diary of Ioannis Metaxas.* Vol. 4. Athens, 1941, p.456.

[82] Metaxas, Ioannis. *Speeches and thoughts of Ioannis Metaxas.* Vol. 4. Athens, 1937, p. 182 [original translation from www.metaxasproject.com].

[83] Metaxas, Ioannis. *Speeches and thoughts of Ioannis Metaxas.* p. 182 [original translation from www.metaxasproject.com].

[84] Metaxas, Ioannis. *Speeches and thoughts of Ioannis Metaxas.* p. 186 [original translation from www.metaxasproject.com].

[85] Anasataskis, *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967,* pp. 100-1.

[86] Petrakis, Marina. *The Metaxas myth: dictatorship and propaganda in Greece.* London: I.B. Tauris publishing, 2011, p.26.

was of leftwing or Marxist affiliation but liberal and centre liberal also. Shockingly, works of Ancient Greek scholars such as Thucydides and Sophocles were banned too.[87] The press was also heavily scrutinised and any journalist that allegedly criticised the regime would mainly be sent to exile on the remote islands of the Aegean or fewer would be imprisoned in urban penal institutions where in order to denounce communism or Marxism torturing was a common tool.[88] Songs that originated from Asia Minor - the so-called Smyrnaika and Rembetika - were banned on the pretence of having music of Asiatic rhythmic structures which contaminated the "purity" of Greek forms and their lyrics inspired delinquent habits such as the use of alcohol or cannabis, gambling or precarious love-life. In fact, the lyrics of those songs simply reflected, and provide evidence, how socially marginalised were the repatriated Greeks and how this social out-casting made them prone to a controversial lifestyle.[89]

Religion was seen as "the seeking of truth through having faith in the religious ideals of Greek Orthodox Christianity and in the expression of man's dependence on God".[90] One of the major goals of the regime was to "strengthen the role of the Church and elevate the role of the clergy in the community, aiming to enhance the religious sentiments which in his view had preserved Greek civilisation for centuries".[91] This was to be achieved by drafting a new constitution which would define the symbiotic relationship between the Church and State, restricting the influence of other religious minorities (Christian or other). The revival of orthodox ethics was perceived as an important factor against ideologies of materialism. This was put into practice by imposing compulsory church attendance during school time and proceeding to prosecutions of atheist teachers. Consequently, the Church became supportive of the 4th of August regime since it appeared to bring stability to the nation and did not threaten but strengthen the position of the Church within Greek society and more importantly vis-à-vis in the many moral compromises of the politicians, even in previous more liberal cases of state administration.[92]

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[87] Petrakis, Marina. *The Metaxas myth: dictatorship and propaganda in Greece.* London: I.B. Tauris publishing, 2011, p.26.
[88] Petrakis, *The Metaxas myth: dictatorship and propaganda in Greece,* p. 165.
[89] Petrakis, Marina. *The Metaxas myth: dictatorship and propaganda in Greece.* London: I.B. Tauris publishing, 2011, p.168.
[90] *The Youth,* periodical, 15th of November, p.5.
[91] Fourth of August, Regime. *Four Years Of I. Metaxas Rule.* Athens, 1941, p. 210.
[92] Anasataskis, *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1937 and 1967,* pp. 105-6.

4.3. The use of national identity, in speeches, public statements and publications to promote nationalism

In this section the speeches and publications delivered during the 4th of August regime are analysed. The purpose of this analysis is to illustrate how two chief aspects of national identity were utilised to promote nationalism and to demonstrate how an increased sense of a highly imagined (and deeply misconceived) notion was cultivated, that a modern community was connected to two others in the past.

The first display of nationalism can be seen in Metaxas' proclamation on the 4th of August 1936.[93] In his proclamation Metaxas states publically his view of Greek society, and how he believes it ought to be. He addresses the conditions that forced him to seize control as Prime minister, i.e. the "incurable party conflicts" and "…communism seriously threatening the social status of Greece". Ironically, in other public statements he had made he promised to improve the lives of farmers, workers and the poorer strata in society, which by definition are the prime target audience of the Communist Party. However, he broadens the scope of his audience by stating that, "I appeal to the full and undivided contribution of all Greeks, who believe that our national traditions and our Greek culture must remain intact". This sentence is an apparent example of how national identity is used to unite people under the imagined idea of the nation. In the proclamation there is no implicit reference to Hellenic identity is. This will become more apparent through the entirety of the sources on Metaxas. An example of Metaxas view on the impact of the Hellenic identity is, "The word Hellenism is a symbol and this symbol is the central point around which the civilisations of all the nations on earth will be constructed".[94] The metaphor of Hellenism as a symbol is a direct reference to Ancient Greece as the foundation for many concepts that are dominant in the western world civilisation. This suggests that Metaxas' glorification of Ancient Greece is a technique to strengthen - a commonly perceived myth - of ancient heritage to pursue ethnic nationalism. This technique is reminiscent of Anderson's notion of the symbol of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.[95] In his 6th of September 1936 speech, a month after self-coup he announced that, "Greece cannot exist socially if its society consists of unhappy and, miserable people. The Greek people have reached such a point of degradation and inddiference that they have endangered the fate of the Nation and the Country. Thus I repeat: Regeneration from a

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[93] See Appendix I.
[94] H Neolaia, issue 44 3rd of August 1940, p 1384 [original translation from www.metaxasproject.com].
[95] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, pp.6-7.

national perspective: because you cannot exist but as Greeks, as Greeks who belive in the power of Hellenism and through it you can develop and create your own civilisation...”[96] He used Hellenism to arouse the supreme Greek ideals amongst Greeks of all classes. The above extract is permeated by an almost a religious overtone through its carefully selected diction “...belive in the power of Hellenism”, reinforcing the importance of Hellinism as the exclussive national identity for the good of the nation and the state.

As argued above, Greek national identity has been used to foster a particular type of nationalism. In many speeches Metaxas in order to advocate the merging of Ancient Greek legacy and Christian Orthodox doctrine kept criticising Western culture especially the separation of Church and State in northern European countries.[97] Metaxas states,

“In the West there is a total separation between Church and State, and the Church is denied a role in education. Here in Greece, Church and Nation constitute one whole. The Greek Nation and the Greek Orthodox Church share the same history since the rise of Christianity. Thus the state in Greece never dared seek anti-religious aims; even the parliament of 1927, when and where there was such an inclination, did not dare undermine the special position of the Orthodox Church”.[98]

The connection of, “The Greek Nation” and the “Greek Orthodox Church [which] share the same history since the rise of Christianity”, illustrates that he was trying to create a strong relationship between Ancient Greek legacy and Christian Orthodox religion. Further on in his speech the use of words, “family”, “nation”, “church” in the extract:“…Family, Nation and Church are the new pillars of the Greek society, nation and state” are all three characteristics of the national identity and its designated safeguards are primarily “teachers” and “professors”, “…it is the duty and role of the State and the new national structures to ensure that no teacher, professor or any individual promotes ideas that will overthrow our society, our state and our nationalism”.[99] The overall rhetoric demonstrates how tightly woven elements of national identity (Family, Nation and Church) ought to be to the social

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[96] Metaxas, *Speeches and thoughts of Ioannis Metaxas*, p. 33-34 [original translation from www.metaxasproject.com].

[97] Needless to say that no administration of the Greek state - be it liberal or conservative - ever had the “audacity” to implement religious-free policies; even the liberal majority parliament of 1927, when and where there was such an inclination, did not dare undermine the special role of the Orthodox Church in Greek society.

[98] Metaxas, *Speeches and thoughts of Ioannis Metaxas*, p. 150 [original translation from www.metaxasproject.com].

[99] Metaxas, *Speeches and thoughts of Ioannis Metaxas*, p. 150 [original translation from www.metaxasproject.com].

superstructure (society, nation and state) and how this identity has to be preserved at all costs. National identity is the cornerstone of what Metaxas envisioned as the "Third Hellenic civilisation" and his venture for the regeneration of Hellenism.

On the 13th of June 1937 Metaxas uttered his complete view for the birth of the "Third Hellenic civilisation" and how it would draw from Ancient Greek and Byzantine civilisations. He gave this particular speech to the youth-movement of the 4th of August regime,

> "You must be prepared for what is coming because you will live to see the creation of the "Third Hellenic civilisation" which is the Modern Greek civilisation. The first civilisation was the ancient civilisation which was great in spirit but lacked religious faith. The second Greek civilisation came, which did not attain great spiritual accomplishments but had [nonetheless] a deep religious faith. Now it is your turn to combine Christian faith… and the inspirations drawn from the great accomplishments of your ancestors... you must create the "Third Hellenic civilisation".[100]

The language used by Metaxas inspires undoubtedly ethnic nationalism especially by pointing out the "greatness" of the Hellenic identity against the mediocrity of the Greece he came to save. Furthermore, remarks such as, "Let not our previous civilisations intimidate you… You will perfect… And you, modern Greeks, do you not have the ambition to create your own civilisation derived from these two other civilisations. Do you not like such a supreme ideal and a paramount objective?",[101] create a sense of cultural hegemony of supposed high culture over lower cultures that do not adhere to the civilisations that Metaxas was admiring.

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[100] Metaxas, *Speeches and thoughts of Ioannis Metaxas*, p. 197 [original translation from www.metaxasproject.com].
[101] Metaxas, *Speeches and thoughts of Ioannis Metaxas*, p. 45 [original translation from www.metaxasproject.com].

5. The 21ˢᵗ of April regime (1967-1974)

In this section, in order to study the 21ˢᵗ of April regime, two main authors, Vasilidis Rafailidis and Othon Evangelos Anastasakis, have been revised. Their works have been used to summarise the political and conditions before the military junta seized power. Their works have been selected because they provide an accurate chronology of the events and a precise judgement of how the events connect. Additionally, their work is covers both on the 21ˢᵗ of April and the 4ᵗʰ of August regimes, allowing a systematic comparison of each regime's rise to power. Finally, Anastasakis' work contributes to understanding the regime's ideology and how it diverged from the ideologies of other contemporary regimes.

5.1.   The preconditions that allowed the 21st of April regime to seize power

The end of the Second World War marked the defeat of fascist authoritarian powers in the European political scene with Spain and Portugal being the only two exceptions. In Greece, a civil war broke out in Greece from 1946 to 1949 between the Greek government army (mainly royalists backed by the United Kingdom and the United States), and the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE, the military branch of the Greek Communist Party, backed by Yugoslavia and Albania as well as by Bulgaria, most probably the first proxy war of the Cold War). The two wars crippled Greece economically.[102] The civil war ended in 1949 with the defeat of the leftwing and communist forces, the Greek society was split in two, however on behalf of the state anti-communism was high. The military would interfere in politics, policing parliament. Furthermore, The United States had a strong presence is Greek domestic affairs, due to the geopolitical significance of Greece for the United States.[103] The geopolitical interest of the United States increased the presence of foreign military and the institutional autonomy of the Greek military from politics. The end of the civil war marked a drastic change in the meaning of Greek nationalism, being associated with anti-communist ideology in state discourse.[104] Nationalism was in stark opposition to the external communist threat that could appear though from within the Greek society. The escalating international tensions of the Cold war of the 1950s and 1960s, further and further legitimised this form of anti-communist nationalism. Greek society was still divided into two large categories, (neo)

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[102] Rafailidis, *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974,* p. 308.
[103] Rafailidis, *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974,* p. 309.
[104] Anasataskis, *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967,* p. 152.

nationalists and non-nationalists who were subdivided into communists and anti-communists. Dogmatism was dominant on both sides of the social polarisation, which further separated society.[105]

Contrary to the political tensions in the 1950s and 1960s, the Greek economy was recovering rapidly from the losses of Second World War and the Greek Civil War and growing on an average of 7.7%. This was due to foreign direct investment and American aid relief in the context of the Truman doctrine and Marshal Aid. The resulting economic growth brought an overall increase in the standard of living which indirectly resulted in the strengthened civil society by people having more time to and money to deal with socio-political events. Yet, this growth was not enough to overcome the dominant socio-economic conditions that existed prior to the wars. Such conditions were a state-sector dominant economy, responsible for the majority of employment of the lower middle class, weak technological advancements in agriculture and a constant increasing power of shipping capital.[106]

The strengthening of Greek civil society is also strongly correlated with the weakening of the authoritarian form of anti-communist mindset of the 1950s by people being more active in political and social matters. An example of the shifts in public opinion was the increased number of demonstrations for civil rights. Furthermore, the clear victory[107] of the Centre Union[108] illustrates a shift towards a more liberal mindset. The Centre Union loosened the authoritarian form of anti-communist mechanisms that prior governments had supported. This caused the military to once again intervene in politics, creating a series of political turmoil from 1965-1967. On the 28th of May 1967, there was going to be a new round of general elections. It was speculated that the Centre Union would win the elections but would not be able to form a majority government. It was likely that the Centre Union would form a coalition government with the United Democratic Left, which was suspected by anti-communists as a proxy for the Communist party (KKE). Fearing that such a coalition would create a constitutional crisis and most importantly that having a proxy communist party in power would seriously threaten the dominant anti-communist nationalist hegemony in Greece. A group of Colonels seized control by a coup d'état on the 21st of April 1967, abolishing

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[105] Rafailidis, *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974,* pp. 310-1.
[106] Anasataskis, *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967,* p. 151.
[107] With the aid of EDA (United Democratic Left) handing over part of its electorate so the Centre Union could win the election.
[108] A Venezelian liberal party with a significant minority of social democrats.

parliament.[109] The abolition of parliament was the first shift in power of the 1950s anti-communist powers. The complete shift in power was in December of the same year when the 21st of April regime was able to suppress a counter-coup by the royalists[110], resulting in the King being exiled. This series of events contextualize why the 21st of April regime's stance on nationalism and harsh anti-communism.

5.2.   The ideology of the 21st of April regime

There are three principal features in the mentality and ideology of the military regime. Firstly, it developed a rigorous form of anti-communist nationalism, originating mostly from the officers that fought against Marxists and communists during the civil war.[111] Secondly, the military junta adopted client politics, stemming from their prior relationship with politicians. Thirdly, it was heavily inspired from the mind-set of its spiritual predecessor, the secret military organisation IDEA. From these characteristics the one which has, surprisingly enough, been least developed is their non-coherent view of nationalism. In relatively homogenous countries, the army is supposed to be the defender of the nation state. The army fights against external enemies that threaten the existence of the nation-state. For these international developments also shape the army's' understanding of their nationalistic identity. As mentioned earlier, the predominant enemy was the spectre of communism, both within the country and internationally. Greece - having joined NATO in 1952, and the fact that all of its Balkan neighbours, excluding Turkey, were communist - enhanced nationalism within the military as a form of anti-communist shield.[112] The selection of recruits was done through a strict testing of their commitment to nationalism. This way, military academies were "safeguarded" from the infiltration any form of radical thought that would exist in society. The colonels exaggerated gravely the alleged communist threat and used it as their pretence for their 1967 coup d'état.[113] A significant aspect of the colonels' nationalism was the defence of Helleno-Christian values. More specifically, their motto was "Greece of Christian Hellenes". This motto required Greeks to love their country, to be law-abiding and to be strong. They believed that their coup epitomised these values. The officers themselves were the embodiment of these values, dazzling of puritanism, cultural conservatism and

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[109] Rafailidis, *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974,* pp. 410-2.

[110] The royalist counter-coup was proposed by United States President Johnson; however, the United States did not back the coup.

[111] Papandreou, Andreas. *Democracy in ruins.* Athens: Karnasi Publishing, 1974, pp. 489-490.

[112] Papandreou, Andreas. *Democracy in ruins.* Athens: Karnasi Publishing, 1974, p. 307.

[113] Anasataskis, *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967,* p. 186.

religious morality. They opposed modern western lifestyle and of the counterculture of the 1960s in Europe.[114] The alternative social movements for world peace, human rights, feminism, sexual orientation that appeared in the United States with the Vietnam anti-war campaign and climaxed in Europe in the 1968 riots in Paris were considered as "ethically" degrading, leading society to moral disintegration. This anti-western prejudice in the form of a so-called ideology was highly evident in one of the regime's leading officers Ioannis Ladas' speeches: "The Greeks are threatened by insignificant subjects who through the arts bring the decay of their societies, to our people corrupting them with their filthy values. This is an organised conspiracy against the Greek civilisation". [115] This rhetoric resembles Metaxas' ideas of Greek civilisation; however, the unrefined xenophobic language reflects the colonels' populist nature. Paradoxically, despite the 21st of April's anti-Western intolerance, there was a large inflow of foreign luxury goods as well as high investment in promoting tourism and both of which were parameters of the Western European model of a free market economy.

In general, the ideas of the military regime did not adhere to a concrete ideology. They were of an incoherent ideology which aimed to legitimise their authoritarian rule based upon a debatable interpretation, with many flaws, of historical facts. This can be seen in one of Papadopoulos speeches, "The Greeks have always been Greeks of Greece, Greeks of the Greek nation".[116] Colonel Ladas' perception of history was limited to military history, "I have to fight in life in order to be able to achieve the victories of Salamina, Marthona, of the revolt of 1821 and of the heroes of the 1940 war. All these events offer historical justice to our country's people and the nation…History shows that the Greek exists only when he proves to other [nations] his superiority".[117] Even the regime's theorists and "intellectuals" made a rather simplistic interpretation of history, "The underlying theme throughout European history has been the endless fight of the Greek civilisation against the Asiatic totalitarian spirit, which has now transformed into a fight against communism."[118] The military junta had no consistent ideology. There were two ideological periods, the royalist era from 1967-1973 and the presidential, parliamentary era from 1973-1974. The regime was absolutely incongruous, in its communiqués gave the impression that it defended the principles of democracy but employed censorship, torture, persecution, violence, curfew and other totalitarian methods

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[114] Anasataskis, *Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the dicatorships of 1936 and 1967,* p. 182.
[115] Ladas, Ioannis. *Ladas' Speeches.* Athens, 1974, p. 47.
[116] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 2. Athens, 1969, p. 55.
[117] Ladas, Ioannis. *Ladas' Speeches.* Athens, 1974, p. 83.
[118] Giorgalas, George. *The Ideology of the 21st of April Revolution.* Athens, 1972, p.44.

(although they were not applied in a consistent fashion, their implementation varied from year to year or from town to town) in order to maintain law and order in what they thought was a viable and healthy democracy. The colonels were determined to make people politically apathetic. They also tried to unite the public by drafting a new constitution mirroring the constitutional democracies of Western Europe, which converted the dictatorship into a "pseudo-liberal" regime. However, this never took place due to their own internal disputes. One of the most prominent theorists of the regime, G. Giorgalas wrote,

"The revolution[119] did not overthrow democracy since it did not really exist. It was abolished by the irresponsibility of the enemies of freedom, corruption, the decline in functioning institutions, and the influence of enemies of the country within the country's domestic affairs. The revolution overthrew this state of affairs and is [the regime] is an anti-dictatorial, anti-totalitarian regime for the goal of true freedom".[120]

G. Papadopoulos, leader of the military junta, regularly stated that he would decide himself when Greeks would be ready for a democratic regime and compared Greek people to a sick patient and his regime as the surgeon who would heal the patient.[121]

5.3.   The use of national identity in speeches to promote nationalism

In this section some of the speeches and publications during the military dictatorship, between 1967 and 1974, are studied in order to examine the nature of its ideology. The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how the perception of the Ancient Greek legacy was utilised to reinforce nationalism as the prevailing dogma. For, colonels utilised conformity to nationalism and acceptance of its principles as a litmus test to separate public to obedient and dissident. Those selected as nonconforming were labelled mutinous and thereafter either exiled or imprisoned, in both cases, after serious torturing.

A controversial element in the ideology of the military junta was its attempt to present a pseudoscientific perception of both the Greek race and the Greek nation. Through an uncertain approach, military junta's ideological spokesmen made inferences, from historically flawed interpretations based on dubious and arbitrary biological assumptions, regarding the nature of the Greek nation. For instance, "The reason our nation exists until now is due to the

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[119] Referring to the coup d'état
[120] Giorgalas, George. *The Ideology of the 21st of April Revolution.* Athens, 1972, pp. 36-8.
[121] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 2. Athens, 1969, p. 61.

biological potency of the Greek race, which has been hand down from our ancestors, to us, their descendants…Biologically, this potency survives from Greek to Greek".[122] Papadopoulos, taking advantage of Herodotus four criteria (of common blood, common religion, common language, and common customs) for being a Greek, or Hellene, acclaimed consanguinity as the exclusive genetic trait, the "root of the race and the nation".[123] "In your veins you carry Greek blood and Greek blood has been blessed with a special power to nourish the mind".[124] Quotations of this sort encapsulate a primordial nationalism, emphasising on the racial dimension of the Hellenic identity. In order to support his argument of biological supremacy, Papadopulos misused conveniently parts from the works of Ancient Greek thinkers. In his eighth book (Urania) of the "The Histories", Herodotus is the first who gave an early definition of the four criteria of ethnicity, with his famous account of what defines Hellenic identity, "…there is the bond of the Hellenic race, by which we are of one blood and of one speech, the common temples of the gods and the common sacrifices, the manners of life which are the same for all".[125] This explicit reference to consanguinity on behalf of Herodotus fired up Papadopoulos to say,

"… [Consanguinity] demonstrates us, Greeks, as a race that illuminates the path of all other races…"…We have a cultural history stemming from depths of time. We [Greeks] accomplished a bright journey in the history of mankind, through the distinguished forms of Hellenism, either in spirit, or in arts, or goodwill, [and] in every other way possible. We have a history which is written with the blood of our ancestors, on this very land, we have a heavy duty and obligation to maintain this soil free, for as long as there are humans. We are through our heritage and traditions the chosen people illuminating the path of humanity with the wonders of the most perfect civilisation".[126]

Papadopoulos presented Greeks all the time as the chosen or enlightened race. This delusional superiority is further enhanced by other fantasies such as racial invincibility. "The self-awareness of the invincible of the Greek race, which has survived throughout the centuries under circumstances that would have worn out any other race, this self-awareness persists and should always persist on being a quality of the Greeks".[127] Once again, diction such as

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[122] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 5. Athens, 1969, p. 229.
[123] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 7. Athens, 1969, p. 247.
[124] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 7. Athens, 1969, p. 247.
[125] Herodotus, Book 8: Urania accessed from http://classics.mit.edu/Herodotus/history.8.viii.html "…τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, ἐὸν ὅμαιμόν τε καὶ ὁμόγλωσσον, καὶ θεῶν ἱδρύματά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι ἤθεά τε ὁμότροπα…."
[126] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 2. Athens, 1969, p. 80.
[127] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 5. Athens, 1969, p. 89.

"invincibility", figurative speech and connotations such as, "circumstances that would have worn out any other race" serve to demonstrate an unrealistic sense of superiority that yields from an over-simplified and linear understanding of Greek history. This inflated vision of the Greek race is reproduced in metaphors such as, "We are born carrying the torch, which we received from our ancestors, the torch of spirit, ready to hand it to our descendants."[128] The speech's style is sensational; the torch is used to establish the continuity of the Greek race. Evidently, the torch represents a number of things including purity, striving for perfection, the passing of knowledge, relaying hope for prosperity. As a symbol it creates an impression of antiquity and a sense of continuity of the nation.

Through this linear interpretation of Greek history Papadopoulos deems the nation with an exclusive historical status. He claims that it is the outcome of "… a historical responsibility of so many thousands of years, which all of us carry on our shoulders and which we must stop being [only] proud of the accomplishments of our ancestors but become proud of own creations".[129] This overstated figurative language, such as, "historic responsibility" and "carry on our shoulders", ingrains subliminally feelings of nationalism to people's consciousness. By painting a grandiose picture of the past Papadopoulos and his spokesmen cast a moralistic obligation upon Greek people. Moreover, Papadopoulos seems to believe that the notion of the nation links to Greek people's collective historical memory, "We have every reason to be proud of our history, not only, due to its uninterrupted course but also due to its quality. It is exceptional and has offered much to the whole of mankind, both at peaceful times and crucial times. We ought to remember this history and honour it, because it is a source of self-confidence and a compass that guides us through times…Historical memory is vital for nations which wish to live and accomplish responsibly their mission [on earth]".[130] Undoubtedly, these statements demonstrate how features of national identity, such as historical memory and Ancient Greek history can be exploited to boost ethnic nationalism especially when asserting obligations through the form of "mission". Papadopoulos believes that the nation as a concept is only fully integrated when Greek people's collective national consciousness would metamorphose into a uniform national psyche. "Only our psyche stays eternal and liberates an everlasting flare and the spirit of ethnicity".[131] As a matter of fact, according to the colonels' credo, one's principal duty is loyalty to the nation. "From the

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[128] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 1. Athens, 1969, p. 110 .
[129] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 5. Athens, 1969, p. 100.
[130] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 6. Athens, 1969, p. 164.
[131] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 1. Athens, 1969, p. 144.

moment we are born as Greeks, our first contact with our surroundings is through the notion of Nation, the notion of Homeland, the notion of Hellas".[132] A bona fide citizen ought to show obedience and devotion not only to the Greek nation as an abstract concept but also to believe in its supreme uniqueness. "We belong as to a nation that has left its stamp upon the World History.[133]

Of course, Papadopoulos and his ideological spokesmen sooner or later faced the conflict between Ancient Greek philosophy and Christian Orthodoxy. For this they employ the idea of 'Helleno-Christian civilisation, an ideological construct that emerged at the beginning of the life of the newly established Greek state. This fabricated theory regards the merging of Hellenism and Christianity, resulting in the formation of the term "Helleno-Christian" civilization. The first synthetic - Helleno - refers to the nation as well as the civilisation and culture, whilst the second synthetic - Christian - to the religion. The two components of the term combined together aim at connecting the Ancient Greek era the Byzantine period in two stages in the history of Greece. Papadopoulos in 'Our Creed' states,

"The neologism "Helleno-Christian civilisation" means that type of civilisation that has been shaped by the influence of the Ancient Greek spirit in unison with the religious and socio-ethic principals of Christian teachings. We Greeks have always carried the responsibility of safeguarding the principles of our civilisation. For, we openly declare that the present world is inspired and ought to be inspired by the principles of the Ancient Greek spirit and the Christian teachings…The basic deficiency that the Greek nation is facing today is that academics and scholars have not systemised or dare one say codified this philosophy or worldview upon which Greece based in modern times its fate, orientation and its advancements, for all of which as Greeks find ourselves, live and act. If the term 'Helleno-Christianism' is dissected, reference can be made to two theories, the principles of which intertwine harmoniously".[134]

This quotation demonstrates how Papadopoulos did not have a clear idea of what exactly Hellenism or Christianity truly are. They are not necessarily intertwined harmoniously. The merging of these two concepts is far less clear than how Metaxas imagined his "Third Hellenic civilisation". To encapsulate in three words the Hellenic identity and the Helleno-Christian ideology, military junta's central motto became "Greece of Christian Greeks"

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[132] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 5. Athens, 1969, p. 88.
[133] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 5. Athens, 1969, p. 207.
[134] Papadopoulos, Georgios. *Our Creed.* Vol. 5. Athens, 1969, p. 145.

creating an invented tradition with puritanical values by merging two concepts that are not particularly related, despite his view that they are compatible. It can be argued that the military junta appropriated the Hellenic identity to promote a more puritan and anti-communist form of ethnic-nationalism.

6. The PASOK (1981-1989) social democrat administration

In this section, the works of Richard Clogg and Andreas Pantazopoulos are used to study PASOK's social democrat administration and its impact on ethnic nationalism. Clogg's work is used to summarise how PASOK got into power and the political situation in Greece at the time. His material is useful because it provides a simple and clear account of rather complex issues such as the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot dispute. Pantazopoulos' work is centred on the ideology of the PASOK's social democrat administration and how it frequently resorted to nationalism and populism.

6.1.   The preconditions that brought PASOK to power

In 1974, the military regime of 21st of April 1967 collapsed due to a combination of domestic and external factors. The domestic events that contributed to the fall of the military dictatorship were the student uprising in the Polytechnic School of the University of Athens, and a series of changes in the regime's leadership. The Polytechnic uprising took place during the liberalisation period of the regime. Many political prisoners were set free and censorship was loosened. Protesting became easier. On the 14th of November 1973, students of the Athens Polytechnic seized its buildings, protesting against the regime and broadcasting their messages through their pirate radio station. In the early hours of the 17th of November, a tank crashed the heavy wrought iron gates of the Polytechnic, causing 24 deaths.[135] This event has stigmatised the military regime in the eyes of the public up until the present day. Nevertheless, this event alone did not bring the downfall of the Junta. It led instead to a second coup d'état by Dimitrios Ioannidis, eradicating Papadopoulos as the Junta's leader of the. Ioannidis hindered Papadopoulos' liberalisation period and reinstated a stricter military law. The detrimental exogenous factor that resulted in the collapse of the military junta was the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot incident in Cyprus. Ioannidis instigated and supported a coup d'état which brought to power a Cypriot military puppet-government. Turkey fearing that the Turkish ethnic groups would be in danger invaded Cyprus and conquered the Northern part of the island. The Greek public was heavily discontent with the event and

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[135] Karamanolakis, Vangelis, ed. *(1967-1974), The Military Dictatorship.* Athens: Lambrakis Publishing, 2010.

blamed the military regime for it. Consequently, the division of Cyprus resulted in the downfall of the Junta regime and a call for general legislative elections.[136]

The period after the collapse of the military regime is called *Μεταπολίτευση/Metapolitefsi* (Change in political scene). It is debatable as to when this period actually came to an end.[137] It is commonly argued that its end coincided with Greece's economic crisis and the massive decline in popularity of social- democratic PASOK. Civil society was weak after the harsh authoritarian rule of the Colonels, making the democratisation process be rather difficult. Many democratic politicians who had fled Greece during the time of the Dictatorship, returned to Greece. New parties were founded. Two newly-born parties were New Democracy (ND) - the successor party of the pre-junta conservative party (ERE) and the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK), which was considered the successor party of the left-wing sector of the Centre Union (Enosi Kentrou). The leader of both the pre and post-dictatorship conservative parties was Konstantinos Karamanlis. PASOK's leader was Andreas Papandreou, son of Georgiou Papandreou, leader of the Centre Union. On November 17th (on the one year anniversary of the Polytechnic uprising), General legislative elections were held. Karamanlis won the elections.[138] He emphasised the importance of political parties in the democratisation procedure. Karamanlis believed that political parties were unique institutions which are supposed to guide and stimulate citizens to engage into politics, cooperate collectively for a common goal, provide people with a political identification, in direct contrast to the political apathy the military regime had been trying to induce in Greek society.[139]

The appropriate environment necessary for a healthy parliamentary democracy was gradually getting re-established. One of the top priorities was to modify the previous discourse on nationalism. A biased and intolerant, based on anti-communism, nationalist discourse was not appropriate for a liberal democracy.[140] In 1974, given Karamnalis' highly regarded view on political parties and liberal view on communism, had his party New Democracy (ND) propose the legalisation of the communist party (KKE). In 1974 a referendum was held for the

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[136] Rafailidis, *The (tragicomic) History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1974,* pp. 437-8.
[137] Personally, I believe it ends when PASOK gets into power in 1981.
[138] Clogg, Richard. *A concise history of Greece.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 168-9.
[139] Clogg, *A concise history of Greece.*p. 171.
[140] Clogg, *A concise history of Greece.*p. 171.

abolition of monarchy.[141] Additionally, to "clean the air" from the dark days of the military junta, a set of televised trials were set off for the tortures by the military police and for the killings of civilians during the Polytechnic uprising. The guilty were given long sentences and life imprisonments. The harsh punishments were intended to prevent any supporters of the old regime from ideas of reattempting a coup. Finally, professors and teachers that were affiliated or appointed by the old regime were removed from their positions [142]

Karamanlis wanted Greece to distance itself from the United States, to be less dependent on its foreign policy and its aid. He believed Greece ought to be closer to the European Economic Community (EEC) and to shortly gain membership. He assumed that by joining the European Economic Community would safeguard Greek democratic institutions - and ensure the country's self-determination.[143] The European Commission officials were not sure though whether Greece would be competitive enough to compete in the Common Market. This along with the issue of Turkey, were topics that brought Karamanlis harsh criticism on behalf of the leftwing opposition. As a result premature elections had to be held in 1977. The conservative party's (ND) vote percentage dropped from 54% to 42%. It was still the first power but it had lost significant ground to the social-democrat party (PASOK), which doubled its vote percentage from 14% to 25%, diminishing the Centre Union party. PASOK became the main opposition party. Andreas Papandreou "Third World" national-liberation, populist-socialist rhetoric epitomised in the motto - "Greece belongs to Greeks" - had a much greater impact on the population than Karamanlis' low-key motto "Greece belongs to the West".[144]

In 1979 after many negotiations, Karamanlis managed to convince the Commission to accept Greece's membership in the European Community.[145] After completing this objective, in 1980, Karamanlis ran for President of Greece avoiding this way to compete against the Papandreou in the 1981 elections. [146] This move weakened the conservative party (ND), having lost such a charismatic leader from its lead. Consequently, this was greatly to PASOK's benefit. The Rome treaty was signed on the 1st of January 1981. The ratification process was boycotted in parliament by the social democratic party (PASOK) and the

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[141] The first referendum for the abolition of monarchy was held by the military junta in 1973 in attempt to liberalise the regime. The outcome of the referendum was 78.6% against monarchy but it was never acknowledged as the seven-year dictatorship is considered an irregular period in the social life of the country.
[142] Clogg, *A concise history of Greece.*p. 170.
[143] Clogg, *A concise history of Greece.* p. 172.
[144] Clogg, *A concise history of Greece.* p. 172.
[145] Kalyvas, Stathis. *Modern Greece: What everyone needs to know.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp.126-7.
[146] Kalyvas, S. *Modern Greece: What everyone needs to know.* P.130.

communist party (KKE). PASOK hijacked KKE's slogan "EEC and NATO the same syndicate". Nevertheless, during the pre-election period, Papandreou in his attempt to gain further ground for the upcoming elections alleviated his radical class-based Marxist stances to gain support from the dissatisfied centre right New Democracy voters. Nonetheless, PASOK wished to focus primarily on representing the large "non-privileged" strata of Greek society against its oligarchs. The party's central slogan summed all of Papandreou's ideas under the single-word motto "Αλλαγή" (Change). PASOK won the 1981 elections by almost doubling its vote from 25% to 48%, attaining 172 seats out of 300 in parliament. New Democracy dropped from 42% to 36%.[147] Papandreou managed successfully to capitalise on both nationalism and socialism in a populist manner, giving status and hope to people that had felt excluded from the growing economic development of Greece during the 1970s.

6.2. PASOK's social democrat ideology

PASOK's rise in power may also be seen as a return to the pre-1967 political scene when there was a high possibility for a leftwing coalition government. Papandreou had raised the public's hopes with his promising slogan of "Αλλαγή" (Change) and with his socialist rhetoric. He was undeniably a charismatic orator although his opponents argued that he was no more than a competent demagogue. In the early days of his government, he managed to change society by indulging the lower strata of the population in ways that had, very little, or no economic cost at all. For instance, one of these reforms was PASOK's national reconciliation policy which recognised the anti-Nazi resistance in the Second World War.[148] This allowed many communists which had fled after the civil war to Eastern bloc countries to return from exile. However, this amnesty was only limited to ethnic Greeks and excluded a large number of Greek communists of the Slavo-Macedonian minority.[149] Socially progressive reforms were launched such as the complete revision of the Family Law (which led to the introduction of the civil marriage, strongly opposed by the Orthodox church), adultery was no longer a criminal offence, gender equality in divorce and child custody.[150] In Greek parliament, PASOK amended reinforced proportional representation to simple proportional representation and introduced gender balance.[151] The first ever National Health

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[147] Clogg, *A concise history of Greece.* p. 179.
[148] Pantazopoulos, Andreas. *Nationalist Populism: The case of PASOK.* Thessaloniki: University of Thessaloniki: National Documentation Centre, 2000, p. 182.
[149] Pantazopoulos, *Nationalist Populism: The case of PASOK,* p. 175.
[150] Pantazopoulos, *Nationalist Populism: The case of PASOK,* p. 210.
[151] A good example of this is the much higher women-men MPs PASOK had in comparison to ND.

Service was introduced, even though people in the medical field were against it.[152] The introduction of the public health service increased the number of clinics in rural areas.[153] Additionally, cultural and administrative reforms were made to strengthen the quality of life in rural Greece. Although the administrative reforms were not being very successful, people from the countryside were very supportive of PASOK. Nevertheless, PASOK made some very costly reforms in order to establish a modern welfare state.[154] Jobs were drastically increased; wages were drastically increased in the already oversized public sector.[155] Furthermore, PASOK claimed to have adopted a strategic ideology for socialisation, which supposedly gave autonomy and high worker participation, to key industries.[156]

6.3.   The use of national identity, in speeches to promote nationalism

In this section some of Andrea Papandreou's speeches are examined. The chosen extracts are mainly from Papandreou's speeches because he was a competent orator and because he personified the visions of PASOK's nationalism. The purpose of this analysis is to explore how aspects of Ancient Greek heritage were utilised by PASOK, a liberal administration and contrasted with the two previous authoritarian regimes.

In his speeches Papandreou adopted a populist style of rhetoric,

"This endless sea of people is the grand evidence of the will of the People, to consolidate the victory of Change and the validation of their struggles. A folk that has been betrayed so many times that fought but was abandoned…. Today is the peak of a continuous journey of the people in our cities, villages and our country. [Our representatives] listened to the concerns of the citizens; they took note of the peoples suggestions and criticisms… A country like ours, which has been governed by xenocrateia (by foreign governments), paved the way of our Nation right after the epoch of 1821, is still in search for its path to independence, justice and the redemption of the people".[157]

Papandreou's references to "people", "a country like ours" and a deliberate remark on the 1821 National Independence uprising are valuable assets (for his speech) drawn from

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[152] Clogg, *A concise history of Greece.*p. 181.
[153] Pantazopoulos, *Nationalist Populism: The case of PASOK,* p. 210.
[154] Pantazopoulos, *Nationalist Populism: The case of PASOK,* p. 183.
[155] Pantazopoulos, *Nationalist Populism: The case of PASOK,* p. 183.
[156] Pantazopoulos, *Nationalist Populism: The case of PASOK,* p. 184.
[157] Papandreou, Andreas. *Speech of Andrea Papandreou at Syntagma square, at the celebration of the two years from his rise to power*, Monthly Newsletter, October/November 1983.

historical legacy. He stays focused upon the idea of an "eternal past" which (together with the will of the people) can legitimise all the actions of his government.

At a celebratory event in the centre of Athens, Papandreou goes on to criticise right-wing political parties in a public speech by stating that,

"The political and social establishment of the ruling class, the oligarchic control of wealth, the graces of wealth, the so called 'philhellenes' and the political intermediaries of the state apparatus that the Right has built. This web of fraud and injustice is interlinked with the national platform which is imposed by our struggle for national independence, for territorial integrity, for national defence and resistance to the imperialist force [of the U.S.A.]".[158]

It is obvious that Papandreou channels upon people a form of anti-imperialist rhetoric, reminiscent of his election campaign in 1981, which nonetheless has a nationalist undertone. Arguably, Papandreou is adhering to a defensive form of nationalism which is critical of the commonly perceived notion of Greek national identity, having used the term of 'philhellenes' sarcastically. Papandreou is mocking the previous political and social status quo in order to present his new hegemonic discourse and his own type of political and social state of affairs.[159] Nevertheless, at another instance, Papandreou utilised the Hellenic identity, when speaking at the Colonels' Association, he made the statement,

"We are the metropolis of Hellenism, having a significant cultural heritage. Hellenism in contrast to other 'isms', it is not based on blind faith, but it is based on logic. It is the great contribution of the Ancient Greeks, what is known as Hellenism is logic without passion, without blind devotion and that is what we have to preserve because it a great contribution to humankind".[160]

Here, his reference and utilisation of Hellenic identity, especially via metaphors such as, "metropolis of Hellenism", resembles the way this notion was used in the previous two case studies. Yet, phrases such as, "what is known as Hellenism is logic without passion, without

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[158] Ta NEA, 12/5/1984, pp. 2-3.
[159] Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the* Prison *Notebooks. London:* The Electric Book Company ltd, 1999 book 8, p.368.
[160] Papandreou, Andreas. *Speech at the Association of Colonels in Larissa*, Monthly Newsletter April/May 1988.

blind devotion", have a definite undertone of civic nationalism, based on a form of belonging with one's predecessors through a set of common rational political principles.[161]

Finally, one of Papandreou's most representative speeches using nationalist rhetoric was one given to an audience of farmers in Ioannina.[162] The speech is a homage to a more romantic and defensive type of nationalism. Papandreou invoked strong patriotic sentiments through his romantic narrative which is in accordance to the educational level of the audience and its own populist "folk philosophical wisdom". This enabled the audience to relate to this speech through its own particular and personal worldview, allowing for the orator to be able to guide and sway the audience and maintain a strong bond between the leader and his people. This was achieved by stressing the importance of the farmers during the hardships of wartime and emphasising how previous governments to his had forgotten or taken for granted their worth in society. Through this, Papandreou made redundant the former Hellenic identity - which for the farmers was irrelevant - to a Collective identity that was more relatable to them. The official recognition of their struggle (together with their monetary compensation), was a clever technique that rendered the previously conceived notion of identity latent and reinforced Papandreou's new adaptation.

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[161] Ignatieff, Michael. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995, p. 7.
[162] See Appendix II

7. Comparative analysis of case studies

In this section the comparative analysis of the three case studies is presented. The the preconditions that brought each regime to power, the ideological framework of each type of administration and how each regime appropriated national identity to reinforce ethnic nationalism are compared.

In both authoritarian regimes (the 4th of August 1936 regime and the 21st of April 1967 military regime) intervention into parliamentary politics took place in a time of rapid economic development. This proves that authoritarian manifestations of nationalism do not necessarily occur at times of economic and political crisis, as it is often argued. However, there are some distinct differences in the preconditions that brought these regimes to power.

The socio-political conditions before the 4th of August 1936 dictatorship came to power were contradictory. It was a time of intellectual pluralism and ideological exchange, both domestically and internationally, which coincided though with an inter-war phase of stagnated political polarisation. The civil society in Greece in this period was feeble. Due to extensive internal quarrelling traditional parties had lost their appeal to people. Moreover, the establishment (that is parties together with the palace) saw Metaxas as a competent politician, who due to its military past would be able to safeguard their interests and their security against the forthcoming communist threat. At the same time, the international juncture was in Metaxas favour. In 1936 Europe was more concerned with the rise of communism, than the crisis in the parliamentary system and the popularity of fascism and Nazism across Europe. Thus, anti-communism both on domestic and international level together with the deteriorated domestic political situation, assisted by the lack of trust on behalf of the palace to the bourgeois political parties, favoured the 4th of August regime to seize power.

In the case of the 1967 military junta, it was the high level of political radicalisation in the population and the strong civil society in the 1960s that caused the military intervention. After the Civil War the Greek society was still highly polarised. Complaints on behalf of the Left for discrimination against it were frequent. The political system was incapable of reforming: Karamanlis' proposal for a revision of the Constitution in 1963 was not fruitful. In June of the same year Prime Minister Karamanlis was forced by the King to resign. In November 1963 and February 1964, the Centre Union party, which formed a government with Prime Minister George Papandreou (father of Andreas Papandreou, PASOK's leader) won the elections. The

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Government of the Centre Union, in a short period of time, tried to further democratize Greece. In the following years, the political crisis intensified and political passions were revived. The government of George Papandreou was overthrown by an unconstitutional intervention by the new King Constantine II. A centre leftwing coalition government was expected to take power after the scheduled elections in May 1967. Furthermore, all this was taking place at a time when the ideological hegemony of nationalism was linked to anti-communism of a semi-democratic state which was failing to keep consolidate its power. The political crisis continued unabated, until on April 21, 1967, a group of colonels seized the parliament and ceased the democratic regime.

PASOK's rise to power in 1981 was through a normal democratic election, civil society was strong and economic development was high. Furthermore, the anti-communist sentiment had been narrowed down significantly in comparison to the other two previous cases. Moreover, there was no political instability and no military intervention in administrative state affairs[163]. In terms of ideology and government practices, the Metaxas' regime and PASOK administration followed defensive-passive nationalism with non-expansive form of foreign policy. The military junta also followed a defensive form of nationalism but did pursue an expansive foreign policy. On 15 July 1974, the second consecutive military junta in Athens, together with Cyprus's National Guard, made an attempt to annexe Greece by imposing a coup d'état against President Makarios and replaced him with pro-Enosis Greek irredentist) nationalist Nikos Sampson as dictator. Five days later Turkey invaded Cyprus.

Additionally, to all three cases having different preconditions, a common although paradoxical approach was followed as regards their status quo within Europe, in each respective period. The contradiction, that the three regimes displayed, was their anti-Western stance in parallel with having received aid and maintaining amiable relations with Western powers. This can be observed in Papadopoulos' criticism of Western values, yet being funded and supported by the U.S.A. to get into power; Papandreou's anti-American and anti European stance, but doing nothing to leave the EEC; and Metaxas' isolationist foreign policy but not having clear stance towards the political powers in Europe at the time.

Hence, this comparative analysis suggests that Hellenic identity has been utilised to promote ethnic nationalism, in different ways and to a different extent. It was mostly used by authoritarian and rightwing regimes and to a lesser extent by liberal. One more observation,

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[163] Forbidden by the current constitution.

which emerged in this comparative analysis, is that national identity can be directed in various ways to promote diverse forms of nationalism by uniting people under the umbrella of an imagined community.[164]

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[164] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, pp.6-7.

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Conclusion

In conclusion, in all three case studies, the Hellenic identity was deliberately manipulated - to one degree or the other - to boost ethnic nationalism. However, not all three cases pursued national identity in a similar manner. Metaxas employed national identity to enhance ethnic nationalism through the influence of Ancient Greece and Byzantium, attributing to ethnic nationalism an aspect of moralism, which appealed to Christian moralists. In fact, he sought ethnic nationalism through his high regard of religion and his dream to reconstruct the glory of the past, unifying people of different backgrounds under an umbrella of a "high culture".[165] The 1967 military junta also handled Hellenic identity in a similar manner. The regime's leader, Papadopoulos, had a similar vision to Metaxas'. However, his pseudo-biological interpretations of race differentiated his approach, to revive the past, as naive and lacking in rigour compared to Metaxas' more elaborate and coherent perspective. Furthermore, Papadopoulos' symbolisms - such as the "patient" Greek people which required "operation" - were ludicrous and lacking in originality, it served however as a tool to impose obedience and respect to authority upon the less educated social strata. Contrary to the previous two cases, during PASOK's administration Hellenic identity was not utilised to promote ethnic nationalism. Instead, Papandreou succeeded to dispute the characteristics of Hellenic identity and reshaped it to accord with a more romantic type of nationalism. When he made reference to Ancient Greek heritage it was without "blind faith", but it was "based on logic", remarks of this kind suggest focus on romantic and civic nationalism rather than ethnic. By and large, the appropriation of national identity by the two authoritarian regimes intended to demonstrate the Greek nation's supremacy. On the contrary, PASOK utilised national identity to prove the nation's "uniqueness", which was not necessarily associated with supremacy, but with the nation's eccentricity as regards its cultural and folklore traits. Although this "uniqueness" aimed to make the Greek national identity initially more popular and eventually more admired - by Greeks and other nations - elements of pure ethnic nationalism were concealed underneath it.

Undoubtedly, the most versatile arguments to enhance ethnic nationalism in a politician's quiver are the glory of the Ancient Greek past and the "moral correctness" of the Christian Orthodoxy. They both are the main components of Hellenic identity and their adoration can serve as a master tool to reinforce ethnic nationalism under all types of state administration. In

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[165] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 57.

political practice, this is done via parties' publication material but mostly in the speeches of the parties' leaders. Additionally, what can be deduced from the case studies, is that ethnic nationalism was promoted more prominently by illiberal than liberal regimes. However, this inference by no means bears any general validity. What can be concluded though is that appropriation of the national identity is subjective to the individual (leader), depending on what conviction that person wishes to create in people's minds. Hence, different state administrations – whatever their type may be – have the power to shape a population's comprehension of what is believed as a quintessential part of their being.

A systematic revision of the preconditions for many different past cases, where nation states have mistreated national identity to reinforce nationalism in order to fulfil dubious interests may allow us to extrapolate and understand with greater precession, present day nationalist and anti-nationalist movements across the world. This study has shown that nationalism has different faces shaped by a multitude of factors and there are many more phases in Greek history and the histories of other nations which deserve further analysis. This research could serve as groundwork for further investigation in the field, so as a more thorough understanding of the manipulation of national identity, in other regimes in different countries across Europe and the world. It could also serve as groundwork in a comparative study of Metaxas' authoritarian European contemporaries, Franco, Salazar and Mussolini. Comparative analysis could pinpoint possible parallels between Mussolini's revivalism of the Ancient Roman civilisation and Metaxas' revivalism of Ancient Greece. Since the Cuban Revolution (1959) until the end of the Cold War (1989–1990), long-term and short-term military governments controlled Latin American countries. The similarities and differences between these regimes and the 21st of April 1967 military regime could be scrutinised. In fact, what could be explored is how national identity was utilised against communism during the Cold War era. More specifically, how regimes utilised boasting publically about one's national identity to differentiate non-communists from alleged communists. This thesis could also be helpful if future research expanded to the type of nationalism the Ba'ath parties in the Middle East reinforced, by emphasising national-liberation and anti-Americanism, similar to PASOK's anti-American rhetoric.

Finally, this thesis could serve as groundwork on current issues concerning Hellenic identity. At present, an on-going debate exists amongst Greek nationalists whether the Byzantine Empire was an equal successor of the Ancient Greek civilisation. Some extreme nationalists maintain that Byzantium was an inferior successor and did not form any kind of continuity with Ancient Greece. Only the Ancient Greek civilisation can truly render such nationalists proud. If the popularity of such allegations continues to grow ethnic nationalism in Greece may suffer a severe dichotomy.

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Appendix

I: Metaxas' proclamation on the 4th of August 1936

"To the Greek People,

While the Parliament elected after the long domestic adventures of the Nation in January 1936, in order to redress domestic peace and order, proved itself right from the beginning incapable in this and in providing a Government to the country, and this incapacity proved later and even recently due to incurable party conflicts and personal contentions, that little interested the vast mass of the working people, Communism taking advantage of the circumstances and of the support given to it by different political groups raised its head impertinently, seriously threatening the social status of Greece…

My Government, above any party, having been summoned to power in April of this year and detecting right from the beginning the risks that the Greek society was taking and determined right from the beginning to take all measures… aiming at the moral and material improvement of all society and especially of farmers, workers and the poorer in general classes…

I appeal to the full and undivided contribution of all Greeks, who believe that our national traditions and our Greek culture must remain intact…

For this I ask from all full discipline to the State, essential for the salvation of Greek society without which discipline there cannot be real freedom. I also have to categorically declare that I am determined to exterminate by the harshest way any opposition to this national task of national regeneration.

The President of the Government Ioannis Metaxas".[166]

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[166] Metaxas, Ioannis. *The Personal Diary of Ioannis Metaxas*, Volume 4, Athens, 1970, p. 15 [original translation from www.metaxasproject.com].

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II: Speech of Andreas Papandreou in Ioannina 1988.

"You, the farmers of the Thessalian fields, you know how important your wheat was during times of War. You also know what collecting wheat means. It would not be an exaggeration to say that during times of war, a country is ruled by those who are able to control the food supplies, because they are able to feed the population behind the lines. So, during the harvests of 1943 and 1944, the Thessalian fields became a battlefield. On the one side, the occupier forces trying to take the wheat; on the other side, the farmers with their scythes and the rebels with their weapons…The largest part of crop yields was saved in this battle in 1943-44. That is why this incident is remembered by the name 'the battle of the harvest'. We must not forget this. We must not forget the 'fighters of the harvest' still among us. I stand in awe to the battles of that time. They are taken for granted in post-war Greece. Forty years have had pass for them to be recognised as part of the history and collective memory of our fight for national liberation. Together with the recognition of the National resistance, the government has subsidised pensions for all members of the resistance during the [Nazi] occupation, in order to live well in their old age, from the previous intolerant governments. Of course, the pensions we subsidised come nowhere near to repaying for your struggle…. I feel proud, but also gratitude, for being fortunate to have the chance to be part of the final recovery of our struggles during the Second World War. Nevertheless, conditions change but there is always a battle of the harvest. Today, this fight is not being fought with weapons. It is being fought with the weapons of technology, knowledge and quality. We call you again to this fight for the harvest, Greek farmers! From my experience, from my time in the public sphere, I promise to give you an insight: There will always be Greek farmers, Greek workers, the progressive people of the land who will fight for our harvest, either in the fields or in the public sphere or in the government institutions. I want to assure you that we will win this fight". [167]

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[167] Speech of Andreas Papandreou in Ioannina: *Together with the Prime minister, for peace, independence, democracy and development.* 11th of February 1988.