

El Alto's Juntas Vecinales

*The Right to the City and Neighbourhood
Self-Governance in Bolivia*



Ralf Leonards

MSc International Development Studies

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By: Ralf Leonards (4292812)

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Supervisor: Dr. Paul van Lindert, Utrecht University



Universiteit Utrecht

International Development Studies
Department of Human Geography and Planning
Faculty of Geosciences
Utrecht University
The Netherlands

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rleonards@gmail.com

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Abstract

This thesis contextualises existing practices of communal self-governance in El Alto, Bolivia, within the framework of the right to the city and neighbourhood consolidation. El Alto, a city that emerged out of indigenous migration, features distinct characteristics of self-help housing regarding its residential composition, and self-organisation regarding its social-communal structure. The city of El Alto is home to a network of neighbourhood-based organisations, the *juntas vecinales* (“neighbourhood councils”), which carry out the task of channelling demands from residents to higher layers of the municipal polity and managing infrastructural needs of their respective neighbourhoods. They constitute a system of neighbourhood self-governance in the administration of public works, thereby fundamentally shaping urban space to the extent that they can be viewed as departing points towards the realisation of a right to the city – a right for urban inhabitants to participate in decision-making processes that determine the access to, use of and production of shared urban space. In shaping the development of neighbourhoods in accordance to inhabitant’s needs and preferences, communal self-governance as exercised by the *juntas vecinales* reinforces the process of neighbourhood consolidation in terms of the improvement of infrastructure and increase in basic service coverage. Moreover, the consolidation process itself shapes self-governance practices, as new demands are articulated via the structure of neighbourhood organisation as urban areas mature. These new demands grow from basic infrastructural requirements such as water supply and electricity, towards education, health and urban open space among other things. As neighbourhoods consolidate, the degree of resident’s participation in self-governance structures can be said to become more irregular due to these more particularised needs. For the assessment whether El Alto’s *juntas vecinales* can contribute to the realisation of the right to the city, deficiencies in self-governance relating to clientelism and institutional accessibility have to be taken into account.

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1. Introduction

In 1968 the French sociologist and philosopher Henri Lefebvre postulated the call for more inclusive and democratic cities, which ever since has resonated among urban social movements all over the globe. In his work *Le Droit à la ville* (“Right to the City”) he advocated a new kind of human right for citizens to produce urban life on own terms, stating that urban inhabitants should play a central role in any decision shaping shared urban space (Lefebvre 1996 [1968]). The right to redefine urbanisation is an especially pressing issue for urban dwellers in the Global South, where inhabitants of informal settlements struggle to secure and improve their livelihoods. A “right to the city” could potentially provide a safety net to protect the urban poor from disenfranchisement caused by lopsided urban planning and large-scale urban projects that do not take into account the interests of the marginalised. The interesting question in that matter is whether structures that allow citizens to exercise a collective power over the forces of urbanisation already exist. Where are the departing points towards the right to the city? This study suggests that significant potential for the realisation of such a right rests within long-established practices of self-organisation in the Andean Altiplano.

From the onset of settlement of indigenous migrants in El Alto, a city located on the Altiplano high plateau over the valley of Bolivia’s administrative capital La Paz at approximately 4,000 metres above sea level, residents have organised themselves in *juntas vecinales*, neighbourhood councils to demand the provision of basic services from the state. Marginalised from the rest of Bolivian society and largely abandoned by the government, immigrants from indigenous farmer’s and miner’s communities have created a largely self-constructed city. As El Alto arose out of self-help housing, its infrastructure has rested on communal self-governance exercised by the neighbourhood councils. The city’s *juntas vecinales* carry out state-like activities such as implementing basic services, drawing up budgets, producing statistical data, and engage in conflict resolution between residents and between residents and state authorities (Risor 2012). As such, these neighbourhood councils form a structure of autonomous self-management parallel to the state and have been described as neighbourhood micro-governments (Mamani 2006). The *juntas* can be viewed as an exemplary case of democratic place management at the neighbourhood scale (Sorensen and Sagaris 2010), whereby local residents possess the capacity of collective self-governance to shape the creation of and determine priorities for their immediate living space. This fits into the debate over who has access to and decision-making power over the use of public urban space – the debate over the right to the city. This debate, which will form the major theoretical basis of this study, constitutes a normative theoretical framework with the aim to establish a collective control for urban dwellers over the process of urbanisation and to create alternative urban realities.

In assessing how El Alto’s *juntas vecinales* operate in practice, this study will deal with the question of *to what extent does neighbourhood self-governance as exercised by the juntas vecinales of El Alto contribute to the realisation of the right to the city?* In the context of asserting this right, engagement in neighbourhood councils and assemblies constitutes a participatory grassroots action to determine the access to and use of public urban space. As

such, the *juntas vecinales* could thus potentially be viewed as a vehicle to realise this new right.

The study is part of a longitudinal research on neighbourhood consolidation in the Zona 16 de Julio in the city of El Alto, which has been ongoing since the 1980s. In continuing the longitudinal research, this study will expand the framework of neighbourhood consolidation in El Alto with the concepts of the right to the city as well as neighbourhood self-governance. Correspondingly, the thesis will start with a thematic-theoretical overview on context and main concepts regarding the right to the city, local self-governance in El Alto, and neighbourhood consolidation in El Alto's Zona 16 de Julio. Subsequently, research design, methodology and research questions will be expounded. The following four chapters constitute the presentation of this study's findings. Chapter four illustrates the functioning of the *juntas vecinales* with regard to their institutional design and role in local/municipal governance. Chapter five analyses the *junta vecinal* as a political actor, while also examining its deficiencies. Chapter six will introduce the process of neighbourhood consolidation in the research area of the Zona 16 de Julio in El Alto. Then, chapter seven will contextualise practices of neighbourhood self-governance within the framework of neighbourhood consolidation. The final chapter will comprise a discussion of findings and concluding remarks.

2. Thematic-theoretical overview

Centre of this study form the *juntas vecinales* of El Alto, neighbourhood councils that engage in communal self-governance in the administration of basic infrastructure and public works, thereby fundamentally shaping the development of the city. The role and function of these *juntas vecinales* will for the purpose of this study be contextualised within two theoretical frameworks, the right to the city and neighbourhood consolidation. This thematic-theoretical overview will, on the basis of a review of relevant literature, introduce firstly the debate around the right to the city, coined by the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre, which calls for a right for urban inhabitants to participate in decision-making procedures that shape the development and transformation of shared urban space. In this regard, its implications in theory as well as already existing examples of its tentative practical application will be discussed. Secondly, the right to the city framework will be narrowed down to the neighbourhood-scale, where the practice of democratic place management on the local level as practiced by El Alto's *juntas vecinales* will be introduced. Lastly, as the role of this type of collective self-organisation fundamentally shapes the development of neighbourhoods, it will be contextualised in terms of the process of neighbourhood consolidation – the theoretical framework of the longitudinal study within which this research is embedded.

2.1. The right to the city in theory and practice

The “right to the city” debate, ignited in the 1960s by the philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre, continues to inspire the minds of activists and academics alike and has gained increasing momentum, especially in Latin America, where more and more urban social movements have incorporated the right to the city into their agenda and considering that countries like Brazil have incorporated this right into their legal-constitutional framework. In concrete terms, the right to the city refers to the right to the access and use of urban space in order for citizens to meet their basic needs, and the right to participate in decision-making processes that determine the use of urban space (Lefebvre 1996 [1968]). The right to the city debate is part of a discourse of critique of capitalism in the context of urban governance. According to Lefebvre, the social and cultural *use value* of public urban space is overshadowed by its *exchange value* in the commodification of urban space. The latter is driven by commercialisation and urban projects over whose planning and execution most residents have no decision-making power. This leads to processes that exclude the marginalised from access to various aspects of urban life, such as the amenities of elite-driven urban transformation. In that context, the right to the city is a normative concept that seeks to replace lopsided and socially unequal urbanisation by introducing a right for citizens to produce urban life in own terms (Lefebvre 1996 [1968]).

As opposed to exclusionary processes of capitalism-driven urbanisation, involving urban projects without consultation of residents, the right to the city would not only constitute an individual right to the equitable access to urban resources. The Marxist geographer David Harvey asserts that the right to the city constitutes a collective more so than an individual right in terms of the right to “the exercise of a collective power over the processes of urbanisation” (Harvey 2012, p.4). This implies an increased role for residents in urban governance and the establishment of a form of democratic management over the way the city and public space is created. According to Harvey, cities play a key role in satisfying capitalism’s “need to find profitable terrains for [...] surplus production and absorption” (Harvey 2012, p.24). Cities absorb surpluses either by mere consumption activities of their residents, expansive real estate development or through large-scale urban construction projects that lie outside the command of ordinary urban dwellers. According to scholars like Harvey, contemporary processes of capitalist urbanisation lead to an urban divide in terms of the uneven production of urban space, as capital is reinvested in areas of elite interest, while other areas are excluded from urban renewal. To counter this lopsided development, a right to the city in the context of capitalist accumulation and production of surplus would imply the exercise of a collective power to have some command over the use and distribution of urban surpluses, as it is these very urban surpluses that shape the process of urbanisation. For that purpose a “democratic management” over the very surpluses arising in cities needs to be established for the equitable allocation of these surpluses for their sustainable use and for the benefit of those previously marginalised (Harvey 2008, p.37).

The original Lefebvrian concept of the right to the city implies two principal rights, (1) a right to participation and (2) a right to appropriation. A right to participation entails that inhabitants of cities should play a central role in any decision that contributes to the production or transformation of urban space. This goes beyond decisions made by structures

of municipal governance on public works, but would further imply for example the right for inhabitants to be represented at the negotiating table to participate in investment decisions in their city carried out by corporations (Purcell 2002, p.102). A right to appropriation entails the right for inhabitants to physically access, occupy, and use urban space as well as the right to produce urban space on own terms, in other words to produce urban space to meet the needs of inhabitants. Hence, the notion of a right to appropriation prioritises the use value of urban space over urban space as a private property to which an economic or monetary value can be assigned (Purcell 2002, p.103). The notion of the creation of urban space is central in this discussion. Only those who live in the city and thereby contribute to urban lived experience as well as lived space can claim a right to the city. Accordingly, the right to the city differs from conventional democratic civil and political rights in terms of who can claim it. Whereas the latter depends on national citizenship, a politically constructed concept, the right to the city rests on inhabitation in terms of place-bound identities of those who contribute to the lived experience of a city (Purcell 2002, p.102).

The concept of a right to the city still remains vague, as there is no consensus on its practical application as well as on the extent to which communities of urban residents should wield a collective decision-making power over the use of urban space. However, there are contemporary examples of a concrete implementation of mechanisms in municipal governance inspired by the right to the city. Especially Brazil can serve as a viable example in this discussion. Already in 1988, when a new Constitution was elaborated in the context of post-dictatorship and democratisation in Brazil, tendencies towards formalising the right to the city in the country's legal-constitutional framework could be observed. The 1988 Constitution granted municipalities authority for urban policy, established the social function of property and of the city, enacted the right to regularisation of informal settlements in terms of ownership rights for small urban lots and rights to public land, as well as basic forms of democratic management of cities, as cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants were required to develop master plans of urban policy with the participation of the public (Friendly 2013, pp.161-163). These measures were made more concrete in Brazil's 2001 Statute of the City, which presents a unique and thus far unprecedented explicit incorporation of the right to the city into law. The statute is based on the combined application of two principles associated with the right to the city. First, the concept of the social function of the city and urban property states that shared urban space should be treated as a public issue rather than a private one. The second concept concerns the democratic management in urban governance and the democratic access to goods and services produced in the city (Friendly 2013).

For the advancement of the social function of property, fiscal mechanisms such as the *solo criado* ("created soil") have been designed, which requires developers to compensate the municipality with a tax for social housing and other social interest works for construction on lands measuring greater than a given coefficient. Furthermore, Article 2 of the Statute specifies the social function of the city by stipulating that municipalities should "guarantee the right to sustainable cities, understood as the right to urban land, housing, environmental sanitation, urban infrastructure, transportation and public services, to work and leisure for current and future generations" (Friendly, 2013, 163). The principle of democratic management of cities has been enacted via the right of citizens to participate through master planning processes. With cities such as Porto Alegre having experimented with participatory

budgeting procedures in the 1990s, following the entry into force of the 1988 Constitution, such planning processes have already been applied before the adoption of the Statute. The Statute specifies procedures by which cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants are required to develop City Master Plans (CMPs) involving public consultations and participatory budgets managed by tripartite councils made up of government, private sector and civil society representatives (Friendly, 2013, 165). At the present however, Brazil's framework for the right to the city suffers from a lack of public participation, a lack of adequate consultation processes in practice, as well as contesting interpretations of the Statute dependent on the capacity and willingness of local municipalities (Fernandes, 2007; Friendly, 2013). As this research's setting is based in Bolivia, a thorough examination of existing legal provisions and political custom that comes close to the implementation of a right to the city will be discussed later in chapter four. The example of Brazil has been taken up in this section to illustrate possible ways by which the right to the city can be transposed into practice.

Scholars and advocates of the right to the city, such as Lefebvre, Harvey and others, aim at the empowerment of urban dwellers to counter processes of urban marginalisation. However, the degree of empowerment (How much control can and should inhabitants have over decisions that affect urban development?) as well as the character of empowerment (Are all inhabitants empowered equally?) is open has not been specified by right to the city theoreticians (Purcell 2002, p.103). The common theme of scholarship related to the right to the city is a critique of contemporary urban policy that is characterised as being increasingly implemented in ways that are undemocratic and exclude the poor, creating cities that prioritise the needs of business elites over those of the majority (Attoh, 2010, 677-678). The purpose of this research is to assess ways in which the urban poor actually do wield the organisational capacity to exert democratic influence over the way the city is created and to evaluate the degree and character of participatory mechanisms in urban governance within the example of the city of El Alto, Bolivia. The act of democratically managing the access to and use of urban public space will thus form the major theoretical basis of this research. For the research setting in Bolivia, the concept of the right to the city applies more appropriately to the neighbourhood level, where basic structures of democratic management in urban governance are observable. This democratic management at the neighbourhood-scale in the setting of the city of El Alto will be introduced in the subsequent section.

2.2. The right to the city at the neighbourhood-scale: Introducing El Alto's *juntas vecinales*

For the present research on *juntas vecinales*, the appropriate level of analysis for the realisation of the right to the city concerns democratic place management at the neighbourhood-scale (Sorensen and Sagaris 2010). At the neighbourhood-scale, self-governance processes, expressed in neighbourhood-based organisations such as *juntas vecinales*, can generate face-to-face social interaction necessary to build democratic consensus and form collective identities and citizenship skills. In that regard neighbourhoods are crucial as ongoing spaces of communication, where people exchange views and information, forge new meanings and identities, develop strategies of contestation of interests

and where ordinary neighbours learn how to actively exercise their rights as citizens (Sorensen and Sagaris 2010, p.301). With the right to the city encompassing collective democratic management in urban governance and the democratic access to goods and services produced in the city, neighbourhood-scale self-governance processes in which organisations claim a right to participate in urban governance or organise to oppose state and/or corporate projects are important vehicles to advance such a right. Sorensen and Sagaris (2010) describe the creation of enduring self-governance institutions at the neighbourhood-scale with case studies of neighbourhood-based organisations such as the *juntas de vecinos* of Barrio Bellavista in Santiago de Chile. Present since the 1960s, the latter have mobilised neighbours in social struggles against pressures from commercial interests and the military junta. The competencies of the *juntas de vecinos* in Santiago thus range from ordinary day to day activities – such as organising festivals, clean-ups and recycling, coordinating with police, distributing local news, encouraging sports and other clubs – to the mobilisation of residents to resist top-down urban planning or more generally to exert an influence over the realisation and planning of public works. Having gained experience as “citizen planners” by their participation in the *juntas de vecinos*, the residents of Barrio Bellavista succeeded in creating enduring self-governance organisations at the neighbourhood scale that act as de facto community planning agencies (Sorensen and Sagaris 2010, pp.303-305).

At the neighbourhood scale, residents’ associations can build their own autonomous networks of shared interests and possess a certain self-governance capacity that can assume the role of de facto community planning parallel to or in opposition to the state and private commercial interests. Thus, neighbourhood organisation can serve as a prime example of realising a right to the city as a collective right in Harvey’s terms. In a similar fashion, the residents or *vecinos* (“neighbours”) of El Alto exhibit a strong identification with their respective neighbourhoods, making territorially-based organisation at the neighbourhood scale the appropriate vehicle for collective organisation (Achtenberg 2009, p.280). Civic organisation in El Alto has its roots in the city’s diverse migratory background of former indigenous peasants and miners. This provided a substantial experience of community organisation as members of *ayllus* (kinship-based forms of indigenous communal bodies), miners’ or peasants’ unions or as ex-hacienda workers. Based on this background, *vecinos* have organised in *juntas vecinales* – neighbourhood councils or associations – from the beginning of settlement in El Alto, demanding provision of basic services from the state and combining with trade union structures of the informal sector and other neighbourhood-based associations to create a structure of civic organisation parallel to the state (Lazar 2008, pp.52-55). Moreover, Lazar (2008) identifies two main forms of collective identity in El Alto, occupation-based and place-based. The former refers to a type of citizenship formed by participation in the city’s abundant trade union structure, composed of *asociaciones* of informal sector workers and traders. The latter refers to collective political agency as expressed by organisations such as the *junta vecinal*, through which available resources are channelled to a neighbourhood as a “motor of local development in the absence of any overall development plan” (Lazar 2008, p.58). In that sense, the *juntas vecinales* administer local development and carry out state-like activities such as articulating demands for and implementing basic services, drawing up own budgets as well as exerting influence over the municipal budget, and engage in conflict resolution (Risor 2012, pp.115-116). Their primary


responsibility however is to obtain *obras* (“public works”) for their respective neighbourhood, such as sewage systems, electricity, street lighting, paved roads, a square, or a park, and so on (Lazar 2008, pp.65-68). In the context of this research, the scope of competences of the *juntas vecinales* qualifies them as institutions exercising neighbourhood self-governance.

The prime goal of the present research is to gain an understanding on how the *juntas vecinales* operate in order to assess their effectiveness as a potential vehicle for the realisation of the right to the city. For that purpose it will be analysed to what extent democratic management is practiced by the *juntas vecinales*, which requires an understanding of the relationship between *vecinos* and the *juntas* as well as of their inner dynamics. This also touches upon the issue of the different types, degree and nature of participation of *vecinos*, which has been assessed via household surveys and in-depth interviews in this research. Based on observations from the field, the concrete functioning of a *junta vecinal* as well as its role in municipal governance and neighbourhood self-governance will be covered in-depth in chapter four.

2.3. Context: Growth and consolidation of neighbourhoods in El Alto

Established practices of self-governance at the neighbourhood level are largely influenced by the heritage of self-construction and self-help housing in the city of El Alto. Located on a high plateau on 4,000 metres above sea level, El Alto extends over the 400 metres lower valley of the city of La Paz, Bolivia’s administrative capital (Fig. 2.1.). Though politically and

Figure 2.1.: Location of El Alto relative to La Paz




administratively treated as two separate entities, the two cities can be considered as one big agglomeration – the *paceña* urban agglomeration – given not only their geographical proximity and connection but also due to the fact that El Alto emerged as the urban sprawl of La Paz’s periphery (Nuñez-Villalba 2011).

The emergence of the city of El Alto follows a series of waves of immigration, comprising predominantly Aymara indigenous people. The first wave of immigration was stimulated by political and economic reforms at the beginning of the second half of the 20th century. In particular, the agrarian reform of 1953 under President Víctor Paz Estenssoro provoked massive migration into urban areas and established La Paz as a receiver of an indigenous rural

migrant population, establishing itself in peripheral belts around the city, as indigenous peoples who formerly lived under conditions of quasi-feudal land relations were then able to leave agrarian areas (Sandoval & Sostres 1989, p.23). The second wave of immigration, starting in the 1970s and extending into the late 1980s, followed the crisis of mining in Bolivia amid the closure and privatisation of state mines. Consequently, entire mining communities relocated and joined the rural migrant population of El Alto (Sandoval & Sostres 1989, p.24). Migration and subsequent natural demographic growth contributed to the rapid expansion of El Alto's population from 11,000 inhabitants in 1950 to 848,840 inhabitants in 2012 – when the last national census was carried out – and thereby surpassing La Paz with 764,617 inhabitants (INE 2012). The migration-induced pressure on scarce space in the valley of La Paz forced up land prices in the city and thereby prompted migrants to settle on the highland above the valley. In that way El Alto grew as the appendix of La Paz, which would later consolidate as a more independent but still marginal urban settlement that was eventually administratively divided from La Paz as an independent municipality in 1988 (Nuñez-Villalba 2011).

Having developed as a marginalised indigenous appendix of La Paz, the city of El Alto features distinct characteristics of informal settlements, such as lack of extensive provision of basic services, lack of infrastructure, and sub-standard housing. Neglect by the state coupled with the collectivist traditions of local governance of rural indigenous communities as well as the trade unionism of mining communities that settled in El Alto, eventually contributed to the for the city characteristic processes of self-help housing and neighbourhood self-governance. These processes are intrinsically linked with the process of consolidation that persists in the present amid the city's continuing growth. Consolidation refers to the maturing of a neighbourhood based on a process of change having roots within the neighbourhood itself. This process features three aspects: (1) increase of tenure security for residents, (2) increase in levels of basic service provision as well as improvement of infrastructure and housing, (3) formation and expansion of social networks and organisations in the neighbourhood (Kranenburg, 2002). The process of neighbourhood consolidation in El Alto was traced within the framework of a longitudinal study of the University of Utrecht, which started in 1984 when a neighbourhood-upgrading project of the World Bank in three self-help neighbourhoods in the Zona 16 de Julio of El Alto (Fig. 2.2.) was initiated, based on the idea

Figure 2.2.: Location of the Zona 16 de Julio in El Alto



Adapted from: Kranenburg 2002 & Van Bree 2010

that the government should facilitate and support the construction of self-help housing. The facilitation of infrastructure, basic services and tenure security contributes to the expansion and improvement of houses through the autonomous efforts of inhabitants. Availability of basic services coupled with property rights that ensure that inhabitants know they can stay in their houses leads to increased willingness of residents to invest in their neighbourhood, thereby furthering the consolidation process. As a result of increased tenure security, availability of basic infrastructure, improved housing, and growth-induced scarcity of urban land, land prices in the Zona 16 de Julio have increased as well as the local demand for goods and services. This has contributed to a related process of urban transformation in terms of the change of the functional use of land from residential to mixed residential-economic with the expansion of commercial activity in the area (Kranenburg 2002). The process of urban transformation is coupled with the process of neighbourhood consolidation. However, urban transformation will be omitted from this study, as it would go beyond the scope of the governance-focus of this study.

A significant component of the consolidation process in El Alto concerns self-help housing. The original buildings in the Zona 16 de Julio were made of adobe and featured only one floor. Over time, housing has improved and adapted to changing needs of residents, as adobe has been gradually replaced by bricks and houses have expanded vertically. In the wake of this development, high rises have appeared and the housing market has been commercialised, as new buildings are gradually built by professional construction firms (Kranenburg 2002). This has also contributed to the emergence of a new type of architecture, which stands in stark contrast to more marginal areas of the city and to what El Alto has looked like in its initial phases.

Commercial expansion in El Alto has facilitated the development of a type of modern indigenous architecture in El Alto (Fig. 2.3.), featuring traditional Andean motives that express the birth of a new “Aymara bourgeoisie” and which has been dubbed “*cholet*” or “Neo-Andean Architecture” (Suaznabar 2015). This new type of high rise features commercial activities on the ground and first floors, and a residential function in the upper floors, with the proprietor often inhabiting the top floor. In older consolidated areas of the city, such as the Zona 16 de Julio, the *cholets* are one of the most visible indicators of consolidation and commercial transformation, showing that over time economic expansion has raised living standards and thereby produced a new set of demands and necessities of the populace that go beyond basic service provision. The emergence of the so-called *cholets* concerns a relatively new development that has not yet been included in the longitudinal study and could potentially serve for further research

Figure 2.3.: Typical adobe and brick construction (left, photo: Ralf Leonards) and Neo-Andean Architecture in El Alto (right, photo: Alfredo Zeballos)



coupled with a possible continuation of the longitudinal research on neighbourhood consolidation and urban transformation.

The present study on *juntas vecinales* is embedded within the longitudinal research on neighbourhood consolidation, for which household surveys have been carried out in selected lots in five-year intervals, as will be discussed later in the methodology section. The current state of consolidation in the Zona 16 de Julio will be discussed in detail in chapter six on the basis of the most recent household surveys of 2015, and will subsequently be connected to the practice of neighbourhood self-governance in El Alto.



2.4. Summary

The Lefebvrian concept of the right to the city involves the right to participation in any decisions made that determine the access to and use of urban space as well as the right to appropriation of urban space, which should primarily serve to satisfy the needs of inhabitants. In other words, this normative-theoretical framework is based on the social function of the city (urban shared space is to be treated as a public rather than a private issue) and the concept of democratic management in urban governance (democratic access to goods and services produced in the city). El Alto, with its heritage of communally organised self-construction and self-help housing, displays such processes on a more localised level, the neighbourhood-scale. There, neighbourhood councils, the *juntas vecinales*, demand and oversee the provision of basic and public services in assembly-based communal democracy. In doing so, they exercise – in Harvey’s terms – a collective power over the process of urbanisation through their immediate shaping of neighbourhoods. Hence, the task for this study will be to assess in what ways El Alto’s urban poor actually do wield the organisational capacity to exert democratic influence over the way the city is created and to what extent this influence can be exercised through the established structure of neighbourhood-scale self-governance. Furthermore, the way the *juntas vecinales* shape their respective neighbourhoods is intrinsically linked to the maturing of these neighbourhoods. Therefore, the analysis of neighbourhood self-governance needs to be contextualised within the specific consolidation dynamics in the city of El Alto, and more specifically in the research area of Zona 16 de Julio. In the course of this study it will be seen how neighbourhood self-governance and consolidation mutually reinforce each other.

3. Research design

3.1. Conceptual model

Based on the thematic-theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter, three interrelated main concepts in this study can be identified, namely the right to the city, neighbourhood self-governance, and neighbourhood consolidation (Fig. 3.1.). Neighbourhood self-governance, which in this case refers to the realm of El Alto’s *juntas vecinales*, and neighbourhood consolidation mutually reinforce each other within a local neighbourhood context. Local governance processes contribute to the maturing of neighbourhoods, as *juntas vecinales* pursue the obtainment of basic services and other public works. Likewise, as basic service coverage increases through the effort of communal organisation, the nature and role of neighbourhood self-governance can be expected to change. This is based on the assumption that as zones consolidate, different demands may be expressed via the structure of neighbourhood self-governance, from basic to more specified demands, the nature of which will be examined in the course of this study. Lastly, as *juntas vecinales* constitute platforms for deliberation and expression of inhabitant’s needs, they can contribute to the fulfilment of a right to the city by giving inhabitants a right to participate in decisions that shape the use and access to shared urban space on the neighbourhood level. This in turn largely determines the way how neighbourhoods consolidate.



By breaking down each of these concepts into more specified components, the interrelation of these concepts can be refined into a more elaborate conceptual model (Fig. 3.2.). For the

purpose of assessing how neighbourhood-self governance can contribute to the realisation of the right of the city, the institutional design of the *juntas vecinales* as well as their legal-political context or role within municipal governance needs to be analysed. Furthermore, as the right to the city fundamentally refers to a right to participation in urban governance, participation patterns themselves need to be assessed. This involves quality and degree of participation, as well internal social dynamics that shape the way how inhabitants make use of established institutions of neighbourhood self-governance.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study forms part of a longitudinal study of the University of Utrecht on neighbourhood consolidation and urban transformation in El Alto. In the context of this research, basic characteristics that indicate how neighbourhoods change as they mature will be included in order to assess the interrelation between neighbourhood self-governance and neighbourhood consolidation. These characteristics concern demographic, socio-economic, and residential factors by which consolidation can be assessed. A concrete operationalisation of concepts can be found in the appendices (see Appendix 1).

Based on the above, the contribution of this research to the overall longitudinal study will thus be the inclusion of the right to the city debate into the equation by analysing how neighbourhood self-governance is shaping urban development in self-help settlements and how it interacts with the processes of neighbourhood consolidation. In sum, given the local context of neighbourhood consolidation, this study examines the question of *to what extent does neighbourhood self-governance as exercised by the juntas vecinales of El Alto contribute to the realisation of the right to the city?*

3.2. Research questions

Main research question:

To what extent does neighbourhood self-governance as exercised by the *juntas vecinales* of El Alto contribute to the realisation of the right to the city?

Sub-questions:

How do the *juntas vecinales* exercise neighbourhood self-governance with regard to their institutional design and their role in municipal governance?

What is the relationship between the *juntas vecinales* and municipal and state political institutions and what potential deficiencies lie within this relationship as well as within the structure of the *juntas* itself?

How does the role of the *juntas vecinales* relate to neighbourhood consolidation and what are the potential effects of consolidation on the practice of neighbourhood self-governance?

What is the quality and degree of participation of inhabitants in *juntas vecinales*?


What demands are voiced and how are they channelled towards state and municipal authorities via neighbourhood councils?

How do inhabitants of these neighbourhoods assess their opportunities to participate in shaping their neighbourhood?

3.3. Methodology

The research area consists of the three neighbourhoods of 16 de Julio, Ballivián and Los Andes in the Zona 16 de Julio of El Alto, within which for over thirty years and within five year intervals household surveys for the previously mentioned longitudinal research have been carried out. As this research builds on this longitudinal study on urban transformation and neighbourhood consolidation in the Zona 16 de Julio, it has taken up the relevant survey questions as conducted in previous years and has added quantitative and qualitative questions pertaining to the quality and degree of participation in *juntas vecinales* as well as opinions of residents on the *juntas* (see Appendix 2 for the household questionnaire). Only a selection of plots has been subject to investigation in the longitudinal study, consisting of 36 clusters originally considered for household surveys. The original selection of plots as well as the selection of previous years has been adopted for the present research (Fig. 3.3.). In total, surveys from 582 households in the selected plots have been included in this study. Apart from the quantitative data contained in these surveys, qualitative data could be drawn from respondent's comments to qualitative questions as well as from conversations with *vecinos* during the execution of the surveying.

Figure 3.3.: Plot selection in the research area of Zona 16 de Julio, El Alto



Adapted from: Van Bree 2010

Furthermore, a recently-established neighbourhood outside the original research area of the longitudinal study has been selected to gather data from a neighbourhood that displays far lower degrees of consolidation than the Zona 16 de Julio in order to make findings on diverging roles and functions of *juntas vecinales* more generalisable with regards to different neighbourhood characteristics. The selected area concerns the neighbourhood of Solidaridad in El Alto's District 5 and is located in the outskirts of El Alto. As a comparatively young neighbourhood, with settlement having commenced in 2000, it displays low degrees of consolidation, a higher degree of basic necessities, and accordingly higher community cohesion. In Solidaridad in-depth interviews with the community's long-time president of the *junta vecinal*, Esteban Colque, have been conducted as well as conversations with residents on the history and current state of the neighbourhood. In general, five further in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders have been conducted. The interviewees apart from Esteban Colque are Miguel Quispe Mamani, member of the *junta* directory of the third section of Villa Huayna Potosí from 2004 to 2010, Oscar Avila, then-incumbent president of the Federation of Juntas Vecinales in El Alto (FEJUVE) 2014/2015, Santiago Marquez, then-incumbent FEJUVE executive for social control 2014/2015, Jhonny Morales, then-incumbent deputy mayor of El Alto's District 6 2014/2015, and Nancy Conde Alanoca, secretary for human development of Unidad Nacional (UN) in El Alto, the opposition political party which in May 2015 has won the mayorship of El Alto. In addition, data collected by household surveys and in-depth interviews has been supplemented by a literature review beyond what has been mentioned in the thematic-theoretical overview. This does not only include relevant academic literature upon the subject of the right to the city, the *juntas vecinales* and other issues concerning the city of El Alto, but more importantly an extensive review of legal documents to assess the current legal situation with regards to new provisions on citizen's participation and social control. This is due to a series of legal and political changes of the past years, which significantly affect the relationship between state and social movements.

Due to the comprehensiveness of the longitudinal study, six research assistants have been employed – provided by and working for the local NGO Red Hábitat and paid by the University of Utrecht according to Bolivian standards – to help with conducting the household questionnaires as well as with the mapping of the research area regarding land use. The neighbourhood mapping has not been included in this research but forms part of the longitudinal study. The research assistants have been trained and instructed by the researcher.

In sum, this study employs a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods. Quantitative survey-based research has been carried out firstly for the collection of quantitative data on (longitudinal) demographic, socio-economic, and residential household characteristics for the assessment of neighbourhood consolidation in the Zona 16 de Julio. Secondly, quantitative questions on participation rates in neighbourhood self-governance have been added. The qualitative survey questions concern the nature of participation in terms of motives and perceived participation barriers, resident's personal evaluation of neighbourhood-based structures of self-governance and their performance, as well as statements on personal priorities for the development of the respondent's neighbourhood. Together, quantitative data on consolidation indicators and degree of participation in addition to qualitative data on participation patterns and resident's preferences serve to contextualise the concept of neighbourhood self-governance within the framework of neighbourhood consolidation. This

has been supplemented by in-depth interviews and a literature review of academic and legal sources that in total have shed more light on institutional design, legal-political context and internal social dynamics of neighbourhood self-governance and municipal politics in El Alto.

3.4. Reflection on limitations

Existing research on the matter of *juntas vecinales* has thus far been predominantly of a qualitative nature (Mamani 2006, Arbona 2007, Lazar 2008, Risor 2012, and others). This study aims to contextualise the issue of neighbourhood self-governance and the right to the city – largely qualitative social-political issues – within the framework of a more quantitatively-focused longitudinal research. Though this study may in that way contribute to existing research on the matter through its unique angle within the context of neighbourhood consolidation, it also poses a set of particular difficulties and limitations.

First, the household-focus of the longitudinal survey had to be made compatible with the investigation on the functioning of the *juntas vecinales*. This has provided the researcher with valuable insight into residents' views on the role of the *juntas* in their community, as well as into diverse sets of demands expressed through the structure of neighbourhood self-governance. However, because of the extensive scope of the household survey and the time limitation of 15 weeks of research, other potential sources of important qualitative data had to be left out. Apart from unstructured conversations with local experts and residents in the wake of carrying out the survey, only six in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders in urban- and neighbourhood governance could be carried out. Furthermore, due to schedule-related issues, the opportunity to conduct participatory observation at neighbourhood assemblies could not be taken. As a result, much of the more qualitative data needed for the assessment of the institutional design and social dynamics regarding the *juntas vecinales* is based on secondary sources.

Second, the size and scope of the questionnaire itself – seven pages – brought about the necessity to employ six local assistants to support the collection of data from around 600 households. As each research assistant has a different set of skills, different degrees of experience, and different ways to access people for surveying in terms of convincing residents to participate, it can be expected that questionnaires were carried out differently in each area assigned to the respective enumerator. Though all received the same instructions from the researcher, this could have potentially had an impact on the results of each assigned area. In one case, data on participation and resident's evaluation of the work of the *juntas* had to be excluded, as responses were too incomplete to be considered. This means that – as will be seen in chapters six and seven – for certain types of analyses data from one neighbourhood in the research area has been excluded. This concerns approximately 100 households in the neighbourhood of Los Andes in Zona 16 de Julio.

Third, related to the above, the length and nature of some questions in the household survey has raised the mistrust and suspicion of respondents. Often, residents in the Zona 16 de Julio were reluctant to participate. This had not only to do with the length of the survey, but also with the fear of residents that the enumerators were municipal and/or tax authorities or would control registration of businesses or construction permits, given questions on income

statements or on building materials. This might have led to the over- or underestimation of data, especially regarding income statements. The low response rate has also resulted in the necessity to invest more time into the surveying than into the collection of different types of data, as has been mentioned.

Lastly, data has been collected in the wake of the longitudinal survey that has not been employed in this thesis' analysis. The chapters on neighbourhood consolidation include relevant demographic, socio-economic and residential characteristics, which are however not exhaustive indicators of consolidation. That is to say, that other important factors that contribute to the consolidation process, such as densification, the functional use of land, building materials, and other factors have been omitted due to the institutional and governance focus of this study on the *juntas vecinales*.

4. The functioning of the juntas vecinales

As described in chapter two, the prime function of a *junta vecinal* is demanding and administering *obras* (“public works”) for their neighbourhood. This chapter will look at how a *junta* operates in terms of its structure and how it is embedded in the municipal polity of El Alto. For that purpose, first the basic composition and functions of a *junta* on the neighbourhood scale will be illustrated. The question of what exactly constitutes a *junta vecinal* will be answered. Subsequently, this chapter will look at how governance in a neighbourhood as exercised by these neighbourhood associations is embedded in overall urban governance in El Alto by looking at the district and city-wide layers of governance. Finally, the legal status of the *juntas vecinales* as actors of social control will be examined. The findings on the basic functioning of the *juntas vecinales* and their relationship to El Alto’s overall structure of municipal governance are based on conversations with *vecinos* (a common term used in El Alto to refer to residents or more literally to “neighbours”) of the Zona 16 de Julio and the neighbourhood Solidaridad, as well as on a literature review of legal documents and in-depth interviews with experts and community leaders. The latter include first and foremost Lic. Vitalia Choque M., of the local NGO Red Hábitat on urban issues, Miguel Quispe Mamani, member of the junta directory of the third section of Villa Huayna Potosí from 2004 to 2010, Esteban Colque, president of the *junta vecinal* of Solidaridad 2014/2015, Jhonny Morales, deputy mayor of El Alto’s District 6 2014/2015, and Oscar Avila, president of the Federation of Neighbourhood Councils of El Alto 2014/2015.

4.1. Basic structure of the *juntas vecinales* on the neighbourhood level

According to the statute of the Federación de Juntas Vecinales de El Alto (FEJUVE – “Federation of Neighbourhood Councils of El Alto”), a fundamental requirement of official recognition of a *junta vecinal* is the minimum settlement of 200 families in the neighbourhood or zone. The minimum of 200 households serves as an indicator of the constitution of a community with self-governance capacity to make their needs heard by the municipal authorities via the structure of neighbourhood organisation. A zone fulfilling this minimum condition of size is free to determine the rules and regulations of their respective *junta vecinal* autonomously in a statute, in accordance with their needs and organisational preferences. Accordingly, there are variations in how each *junta* of El Alto is constituted. They all share however the common characteristics described in this section and visualized in Fig. 4.1. The heads of every household are considered to be the base members or *afiliados* (“affiliates”) of a neighbourhood’s *junta*, thus forming its organisational foundation from which demands are articulated and upon which the *junta*’s organisational structure is built. As an illustration, the neighbourhood of Solidaridad in El Alto’s District 5 has 450 *afiliados*, corresponding to approximately the same amount of families living in the area.

Every two or three years – depending on the neighbourhood’s statute – a general assembly of *vecinos* elects a *directorio* (“directorate”), which forms the administrative core of the *junta vecinal*. In everyday terminology in El Alto and Bolivia in general, heads of social movements are referred to as *dirigentes*, which likewise applies to the *juntas*. A *directorio* consists normally of between 12 and 15 *dirigentes* – again depending on the statute of each neighbourhood – each occupying a different *cargo* (“function” or “post”) corresponding to each sector of competency of the neighbourhood council, which they occupy for a re-eligible mandate of on average two to three years. In some zones, such as Villa Huayna Potosí, the zone is divided into equally sized parts, for each of which the *vecinos* elect a *dirigente* to ensure an equally distributed representation of the neighbourhood in the *directorio*. It is furthermore customary to have a rotation of *cargos* within the *directorio*, so that a re-elected *dirigente* serves under a new function in the following term of office. The most common *cargos* are those of *presidente de zona* (the president of the neighbourhood and its *junta vecinal*), vice-president, secretary general, recording secretary, treasurer, relations secretary, sports secretary, health secretary, education secretary, transport secretary, roads secretary, and standard-bearer. Some of the *cargos* however are purely formal or ceremonial, which means that they do not necessarily deal with the issue areas that they are nominally assigned to, but still participate in decision-making as exercised by the collective of the directorate. An example for such a *cargo* would be the education secretary, considering that education policy in El Alto is largely shaped and determined by the *juntas escolares* (“school councils”), which mobilize parents for marches and demonstrations and are charged with obtaining various *obras* for schools and other educational facilities (Lazar 2008, p.66). A purely ceremonial *cargo* concerns the standard-bearer, whose only official function is to carry the standard of the *junta vecinal* in processions, marches, anniversaries or protests. Given the often purely formal character of most *cargos*, the president of the *junta* usually tends to do the most work and carries the bulk of the weight of responsibility of obtaining *obras* for their neighbourhood (Lazar 2008, p.66). This is however dependent on the zone, as *juntas* operate heterogeneously




Fig. 4.1.: Structure of *juntas vecinales* in El Alto

and neighbourhoods are diverse in their degree of consolidation and nature of necessities, an aspect which will be dealt with in later chapters.

The basic pre-condition for the eligibility as a *dirigente* concerns property. To be eligible one has to be a home-owner. In that regard, a major obstacle to equitable grassroots participation is the fact that tenants are excluded from the primary decision-making processes. The motivation behind this restriction lies in the assumption that home-owners are more

committed to the long-term development of their zone. As proprietors they are assumed to have a real material stake in the commission of public works and other installations in the neighbourhood where their property is located. A tenant in contrast might only be living temporarily in a neighbourhood or for work- or commerce-related reasons, thus having a more short-term point of view on matters that concern the development of their area. They have however a fundamental interest in the guaranteed provision of public services, such as water and electricity. Accordingly, *afiliados* of a junta have to be home-owners as well, though tenants are allowed to voice requests and opinions during assemblies and meetings convened by the directorate. While being able to make necessities and demands known in *asambleas vecinales* (“neighbourhood assemblies”), tenants cannot vote if decisions are taken. In some zones the *dirigentes* have been known to impose further restrictions to free discourse and deliberation in assemblies and meetings. A *vecino* of Villa Santa Rosa has told me in a conversation that she was prevented from communicating demands and propositions to the directory. During an assembly, other affiliates questioned her allegiance to the zone with the comment “You are new here, you cannot voice your opinion.” A minimum residency of usually around three years for both home-owners and tenants is often taken as a requirement to be able to “*opinar*”, to express one’s point of view in assemblies and meetings. It is on the one hand a restriction to newcomers to a zone, but also a requirement imposed for the sake of community cohesion and to make sure that a resident has a long-term interest in the development of his or her neighbourhood.

The neighbourhood assemblies, convened by the *directorio*, usually occur every first Sunday of the month and are commonly held in the morning. In these assemblies general issues concerning the needs of the zone are discussed. The *asamblea vecinal* is the principal legislative organ of neighbourhood self-governance, where demands are voiced and decisions are taken, which consequently have to be implemented by the *directorio*. During such assemblies consensus is built through repetition of arguments to one predominant viewpoint until leaders decide that a majority of speakers has expressed a particular position, which then has to be approved by the general members. The assemblies run on the idea that all who want to can and should speak, but are as a consensus-based form of grassroots democracy not only time-consuming but also prone to manipulation and distortion of public opinion. Lazar (2008, pp.234-247) describes various forms of manipulation of mass meetings by leaders, who as an illustration place members of the executive committee among the general audience shouting out proposals or make speeches in favour of certain position to steer public opinion. Attendance at the assemblies is diverse and not merely the heads of households attend. Spouses, children and other relatives can attend in representation of the head of the household and tenants in representation of the owner of the house. In general however, it is expected that each affiliated household is represented by one person. The *junta vecinal* can also convene special meetings that treat more specified issues, such as during the implementation of specific *obras*. Such meetings occur irregularly, often convened for urgency, either to inform about important developments or to resolve conflicts. Attendance for special meetings is generally lower than for assemblies, which for some zones is compulsory. To enforce compulsory attendance at *asambleas vecinales*, juntas employ various methods. A common method is the issuing of identity cards for *afiliados*, which register attendance for important assembly meetings. Missed assemblies can be tracked through the card and the *afiliado* in

question is fined if this occurs. *Afiliados* can also be fined for not following a citation by the *directorío* for attending a protest march or other manifestations called for by the *junta vecinal*. Citations for assemblies, meetings and marches are communicated by the so-called *jefes de calle* (“chiefs of the street”) or *jefes de manzano* (“chiefs of the block”), which constitute the link between base members and directorate. Depending on how a zone’s *junta* is organised, the *jefe de calle* is in charge of communicating current events and citations to his assigned street, whereas the *jefe de manzano* fulfils the same task for his respective block. In some zones it can be observed that *jefes de calle* or *jefes de manzano* throw stones at the windows of houses to remind *vecinos* of their obligations to assist marches or to pay fines. Such measures show that participation and community cohesion are not a given in some neighbourhoods and instead are created by pressure. Such occurrences are however rather the exception than the rule.

In general the *junta* handles a resource called POA, Plan Operativo Anual (“Annual Operative Plan”), containing the annually determined budgetary priorities of every zone. The municipality allocates a fixed budget to each zone whose amount depends on the zone’s number of inhabitants in accordance to the official census. After the budget is allocated, the *vecinos* can prioritize their needs by drafting the POA through the structure of the *juntas vecinales*, which in this regard exercises a form of participatory budgeting. This neighbourhood-based form of budgetary management can be described as a type of communitarian participatory budgeting, as the community makes collective decisions about their own priorities for shaping their neighbourhood in the way they determine. Every month of September or October a special assembly – a general assembly – is held to define the neighbourhood’s POA for the coming year in accordance with their predefined budget. Attendance at general assemblies is commonly higher than during the regular monthly neighbourhood assemblies. In addition to its basic task of planning the annual budget, general assemblies also elect the *directorío* of a *junta* in accordance with the time period of a *directorío*’s mandate, as determined by the neighbourhood’s statute, and designate representatives for conferences convened by the FEJUVE. While the *junta* can define *obras* and other projects, draw up the budget for each individual *obra*, plan and supervise its execution, it cannot influence the amount of the allocated money. In terms of determining priorities of the neighbourhood, *vecinos* have two channels to communicate their demands. If a desired *obra* concerns the whole zone, the *vecino* voices his or her opinion in an *asamblea vecinal*. If a desired *obra* concerns only their block or street, the *vecino* communicates such demands via the *jefe de manzano* or *jefe de calle* to the *directorío*, which in turn will inspect the area in question and facilitate the implementation of the *obra*.

In sum, *juntas vecinales* provide an important forum for citizens to discuss and deliberate on the necessities and priorities of their respective neighbourhoods. They are forums where participatory budgets, albeit in a limited way, are drafted by the community via the determination of the POA. As such, they display certain grassroots democratic characteristics such as rotational leadership and what has been described as an assembly-based democracy (Lazar 2008, pp.241-247). The latter should however not hide the fact that the *juntas*’ structure displays some fundamental inherent limits to the free exercise of communal democracy. As has been described in this section, such limitations concern forms of pressure to enforce community cohesion, sometimes through the imposition of fines for failure of

attendance in important gatherings. The strongest limitation however undoubtedly concerns the exclusion of tenants from decision-making processes. Thus, while literature often hails the purported indigenous self-organisation in El Alto, internal dynamics of exclusion and dominance of *dirigentes* as well as alienation of *dirigentes* from their bases are at work, which should be taken into account. Deficiencies of neighbourhood self-governance such as the dominance of the *dirigente* class will be further examined and discussed in chapter five. First however, the coming section will deal with the question of how the neighbourhood councils relate to the upper layers of El Alto's municipal polity.

4.2. The *juntas vecinales* on the district- and city-scale

On a much broader scale beyond the single neighbourhood, a *junta* is connected to two further layers of urban governance. On the district scale, the *juntas* are linked to a *sub-alcalde* (“deputy mayor”) and his or her administration, charged with *obras* and projects that concern an entire district or more than one neighbourhood in the district. On the municipal scale, each *junta* is represented by the FEJUVE, the Federation of *Juntas Vecinales*. Both the *sub-alcaldes* of every district and the FEJUVE directly communicate with the municipal government, and thus are primary links between neighbourhoods and the municipality of El Alto.

The city of El Alto is divided into 14 districts, ten of which are urban districts and four rural districts. Each of the 14 districts has a *sub-alcalde*, elected by an assembly of presidents, also referred to as an *ampliado distrital* or *cumbre distrital* (“district summit”). This *ampliado*, constituted by the presidents of the *juntas* of all neighbourhoods of a district, also elaborates the POA of the entire district for public works on the district-level in collaboration with the *sub-alcalde*. Essentially, the role of the *sub-alcalde* is one of implementation, execution and planning of public works and projects that concern the level of the district and which are based on the demands of the *juntas vecinales* and other social movements such as the *juntas escolares* of each district. For the task of minor works such as maintenance of roads, cleanup, and rubbish disposal, the administrative apparatus of the *sub-alcalde* – the *subalcaldía* – has the necessary machinery and manpower at its disposal. In terms of the implementation of major public works, these follow not only the demands of the *vecinos* of each district. The *subalcaldía* can, just as the *junta vecinal* for their respective neighbourhood, autonomously decide how their assigned district-level budget should be spent. It is furthermore the mediating and coordinating link between the neighbourhoods of their district and the municipal government of the city. Normally, *sub-alcaldes* are nominated in accordance with law No. 2028 for every district of a municipality corresponding to the competencies of the mayor, who appoints every *sub-alcalde* for a mandate of one year. This occurs in every municipality of Bolivia, except for in El Alto, where it has become custom for the *juntas vecinales* to designate *sub-alcaldes* via the above mentioned *amplios*. In El Alto the FEJUVE, upon request of the municipal government, convenes an *ampliado* of the presidents of each zone of the respective district, which in turn elects one *presidente de zona* to assume the office of *sub-alcalde*. Upon this decision, the *juntas* send a resolution of nomination to the municipal government, which subsequently officially appoints each *sub-*

alcalde. This practice, albeit not codified in any law, has become customary ever since the then-mayor of El Alto, José Luis Paredes, in 2002 acquiesced to a demand of the FEJUVE concerning the eligibility of *dirigentes* and their election by the *juntas* to the post of *sub-alcalde* (Jhonny Morales 2015, pers. comm., 19 May).

The 14 districts of El Alto in total encompass 1580 zones and the corresponding number of *juntas vecinales* affiliated with FEJUVE. The role of the FEJUVE, founded 8 December 1966, is principally the exercise of social control over the work of the municipal government on the topic of public works for the development of the city (Oscar Avila 2015, pers. comm., 05 May). In this role, the FEJUVE is the representative of each *junta vecinal* of the city, whose affiliation with FEJUVE at the same time means their legal recognition in front of the municipality. This is tied to a series of requirements set by the FEJUVE as preconditions for recognition and affiliation with the federation. These requirements are:

- (1) the application for inspection of a candidate neighbourhood by FEJUVE;
- (2) an official resolution approved by the municipal council;
- (3) an approved planimetry and/or documents that accredit that planimetry of the zone is in process;
- (4) a notarized *libro de actas* (minute book, containing content and result of every meeting and assembly of the *junta vecinal*);
- (5) a founding document;
- (6) an election document of the *directorio*;
- (7) the minimum settlement of 200 families and a maximum number of 400 plots;
- (8) the requirement that small *juntas* have to annex themselves to the next *junta* in proximity;
- and (9) 100 Bolivianos cost of affiliation.

Once affiliated with the FEJUVE, a *junta vecinal* is recognized officially by the municipal authorities and is formally represented vis-à-vis the municipality by FEJUVE. Consequently, the FEJUVE constitutes the prime channel for individual *juntas* to communicate demands to the municipal government of El Alto. Given the constant communication between FEJUVE and the municipality, the *juntas* have established working relations with the municipality not only to communicate demands from the bases, but also to access funds for specified projects. Moreover, the FEJUVE possesses the capacity to coordinate mobilisations, articulating specific demands and complaints from a particular neighbourhood, thereby demanding attention from the government if official channels of communication fail (Arbona 2007, p.133).

Everyday politics in El Alto involves a constant communication between *juntas vecinales* and municipal government. Often this relationship is informal and not reflected in laws or statutes, as the appointment of *sub-alcaldes* by the *juntas* demonstrates. The privilege of the *juntas vecinales* to determine *sub-alcaldes* is however not undisputed, an important issue that will be taken up again in Chapter 5. Without initial institutionalisation, the relationship between *juntas vecinales* and municipal government determines how El Alto is governed in terms of budgeting and implementation of public works. Legal recognition of the role of neighbourhood associations came decades after their emergence. These legal aspects of recognition and the legal role of the *juntas vecinales* are subject of the following section,

where the role of neighbourhood associations as actors of social control – that is as supervisors and scrutinizers of government action – will be explored.

4.3. The junta vecinal as an actor of social control

A *junta vecinal* exercises a form of territorialised participatory budgeting through their control over a neighbourhood's POA. This practice is well-established in the city of El Alto and embedded into its legal system. Beyond their fundamental role in the self-governance of neighbourhoods with regard to the demanding and implementation of *obras*, the *juntas vecinales* exercise a form of social control over the actions of the municipal government. This social control is subject of this section, which will illustrate how the *juntas vecinales* are embedded into a new legal system of participatory planning and budgeting, conforming to a significant degree to the demands of right to the city proponents. Thus, this section will discuss the legal situation in terms of citizen's participation in the elaboration of public policy in Bolivia. The question of what role the neighbourhood councils assume in this process will be answered, looking at what role is conferred to them in accordance with legal provisions and eventually looking at what role they assume in fact in the everyday practice of municipal governance in El Alto. In that regard shortcomings of the *juntas vecinales* as actors of social control will be discussed briefly.

Unlike Brazil, which has been discussed briefly in chapter two, Bolivia does not have a legal framework that explicitly recognises the right to the city. Nevertheless, the Bolivian Ley de Participación Popular (LPP – “Popular Participation Law”) of 1994, albeit not specifically mentioning a “right to the city”, has intended to transfer more authority to the local level and to empower traditionally excluded groups in municipal governance (Montambeault 2008, p.115). With the official goal of deepening efforts towards democratisation after the country's return to electoral democracy in 1982, the LPP aimed at incorporating areas without political representation by creating 311 new municipalities in traditionally excluded areas. The lack of official institutions at the local level before the adoption of the LPP does however not signify that communities were left without regulatory structures. On the contrary, indigenous communities displayed significant degrees of self-governance capacities by retaining traditional modes of political and social organisation (Montambeault 2008, p.117). Accordingly, the LPP aimed at incorporating already existing forms of local organisation into its project of administrative decentralisation and fostering popular participation. In the devolution of power from the central-state-scale to the municipal-scale, the LPP created a new municipal structure that incorporates existing communal organisations, such as the *juntas vecinales* in municipalities like El Alto. Approximately 16,000 existing communal forms of organisation were officially recognised as Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (OTB – “Territorially Based Organisations”) in 1994. All OTBs such as El Alto's *juntas vecinales* share common characteristics, including customs of traditional leadership, defining own priority needs, participation in administrative health and education services and election of members of local Comités de Vigilancia (“Watchdog Committees”). The latter were composed of elected representatives of local OTBs, charged with ensuring the accountability of the municipal government by controlling the distribution of municipal financial resources

and formulating demands for the municipal budget. In collaboration with the municipal government, the Comités de Vigilancia used to elaborate a Plan de Desarrollo Municipal (PDM – Municipal Development Plan), determining the priorities for the coming five years (Montambeault 2008, pp.117-118).

Unlike Brazil's Statute to the City, the LPP did not explicitly create new mechanisms for the realisation of a right to the city, even though nominally the law provided for the decentralisation of decision-making so that municipalities could draw up participatory budgets through the involvement of the Comités de Vigilancia. The prime effect of the LPP's implementation was the creation of the legal category "OTB". New forms of governance existed only on paper and the law's prime innovation merely lied in the recognition of reality – namely the recognition and registration of already existing territorialised self-organisation. As of 2015, the LPP is not anymore in effect due to a wide range of criticism related to institutional inefficiency and allegations of corruption. It is further alleged that the formulation of the LPP was not the result of grassroots mobilisation and popular demands. This is due to a lack of public consultation in the drafting process and a political agenda behind the law's design that was not directly linked to enhancing citizen's possibilities to participate in decision-making processes. The then-incumbent government of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada is accused of having enacted the LPP for purely electoral purposes to gain an electoral advantage from the privileging of territorialized actors on the municipal level and thereby circumventing the regional level, where various social movements demanded a greater degree of autonomy from the central government (Montambeault 2008, pp.122-123). In addition, the LPP suffered from a series of institutional deficiencies, such as rent-seeking, where actors would receive monetary and material rewards in exchange for political favours encouraged through the system of the Comités de Vigilancia. The functioning of these committees could also be called in question as members did not actually engage in discussions over the design and implementation of municipal budgets and policies (Montambeault 2008, pp.123-124). OTBs engaged in negotiations with the municipal government rather than participating and agenda-setting as promised by the LPP and were thus not significantly involved in drawing up municipal budgets. Rather than being a part of the decision-making process itself, the Comités de Vigilancia were consulted for approval of a preconceived municipal budget that has to conform to national plans (Goudsmit and Blackburn 2001, pp.591-593). As the actual competencies of the Comités de Vigilancia did not conform to their name, that is to say as committees to supervise actions of government, and due to their often dysfunctional performance, the LPP was replaced under the government of Evo Morales, incumbent president since 2006, as part of his "*proceso de cambio*" ("process of change") towards a more communitarian and participatory democracy.

A new legal category of supervision of government action by civil society actors was conceived, referred to as "social control", which should be more inclusive in terms of participation and confer a more specified and wider array of competencies to those exercising social control. This concept makes its first appearance in Bolivia's new Constitution, which was promulgated on 7 February 2009 after a constitutional referendum and which has re-designated Bolivia from a "Republic" to a "Plurinational State" (Ministerio de la Presidencia 2009). The Constitution itself already points implicitly to the role of the *juntas vecinales* as crucial actors exercising social control. Article 241 (III) determines that civil society actors

have the right to exercise social control over the quality of public services, already a key competence of the *juntas vecinales* in their role as providers of *obras* for their neighbourhoods. Furthermore, Article 20 guarantees the provision of basic services – potable water, sewage, electricity, natural gas, postal services and telecommunications – in connection to supervision by civil society via the mechanisms of social control. “Participation and Social Control” as such is incorporated in Title VI of the Bolivian Constitution, with Article 241 stating that the people “through organised civil society, shall participate in the design of public policies”. The Article determines that participation and social control shall apply to public governance on all levels of the state, to state enterprises and other state institutions, as well as to private and mixed enterprises administering fiscal resources and/or implementing public works. For that purpose a specified law – enacted four years after the promulgation of the new Constitution – should establish guidelines for the exercise of social control, whereas civil society is free to define the structure and composition of their means of participation. Accordingly, on 5 February 2013 the new Ley de Participación y Control Social (“Law on Participation and Social Control”) was passed, thereby replacing the dysfunctional LPP.

The new law replaced the *Comités de Vigilancia*, created by the LPP in 1994, with *Comités de Participación y Control Social* (“Committees for Participation and Social Control”). The exact structure and composition of these new organs of participation and social control can be freely determined by local legislation passed by municipal, departmental or other local autonomous entities, in accordance with the provisions of the national law. The main difference between the *Comités de Vigilancia* and the new *Comités de Participación y Control Social* lies in their degree of inclusiveness in terms of who has the right to participate. Individuals elected into entities of social control can be representatives of any type of civil society organization. In contrast, the LPP, in coining the above mentioned term OTB, only included territorialised actors, such as rural indigenous communities and *juntas vecinales*. The new committees on the other hand are also open to non-territorial actors such as trade unions, market trader’s associations, women’s groups, school councils, and other interest groups. In short, the new mechanisms of participation and social control include both territorial and sectoral social movements (Fundación Jubileo 2013b, pp.10-11). Furthermore, the competences conferred to the new organs are more far-reaching than those of the former organs created by the LPP. These competences include the monitoring of the quality of public services, the right to be consulted and informed about decisions affecting the environment, the exercise of social control over energy development including hydrocarbons- and mining-related issues, and the participation in the elaboration of healthcare and education policies (Fundación Jubileo 2013b, pp.10-11).

However, decisions taken by the new *Comités* are not binding and public servants of the municipality are not obliged to comply with them. More specifically, the law lays down that social control cannot delay or suspend the execution of projects and other administrative acts, unless an evident potential damage to the patrimony of the state or collective rights established in the Constitution is proven (Article. 143, Ley de Participación y Control Social). This does not mean that social control is powerless. Decisions taken by the *Comités de Participación y Control Social* have a character of approval or sanction of the conduct of elected authorities and public servants (Fundación Jubileo 2013 [1]). Therefore, social control implies access to information and the right to scrutinize and demand transparency and good

governance and denounce irregularities in accordance with Article 9 of the present law. The only binding power of social control is expressed in Article 24, which states that social control has the authority to recommend, with binding character to the competent authorities, expert reports and auditing processes in terms of a systematic examination of municipal accounts. These provisions give civil society organisations the opportunity to examine and sanction government action that may be detrimental to their collective rights. Furthermore, the law aims at enhancing transparency and public accountability. Article 37 establishes that the autonomous municipal governments shall inform the organs of social control about their actions and their resource spending. This information should be provided 15 days prior to the official act in written form and should be conducted at least twice per year. Moreover, beyond transparency, as an obligation of the state, there are specified provisions on the monitoring of state activities, as a right of the organised citizenry. A mechanism of specified public accountability allows the actors of social control to monitor a specific project executed by the municipal government or a public enterprise or an enterprise on the payroll of the municipality upon request by the organ of social control (Fundación Jubileo 2013a).

In the context of this study on neighbourhood self-governance and the right to the city, the provisions on social control over the process of drafting budgets and determining public spending and investment are particularly relevant. The degree of citizen's participation in these procedures can serve as an indicator of to what extent *vecinos* exercise a collective control over the process of urbanisation. Without any explicit references to the right to the city, participatory budgeting has made its way to the country's Constitution, as reflected in its Article 321, which stipulates that "the determination of public spending and public investment shall take place through mechanisms of citizen's participation". In the past years, Bolivia has made significant steps to allow processes of participatory budgeting in public governance on all levels of the state. The legal basis for this lies in three pieces of national legislation. These include apart from the already discussed Law on Participation and Social Control and the Political Constitution of the Plurinational State (in particular Articles 241 and 242), the Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización ("Framework Law on Autonomies and Decentralization"). Enacted in 2010, this law is part of the effort of the government to move – at least on paper – towards a decentralized communitarian democracy, which has created a wide range of possibilities for autonomous governance on the municipal level that should include possibilities for citizen's participation. Article 114 of this law stipulates that autonomous municipal governments, such as that of the city of El Alto, "shall present their budgets with the approval of the municipal council and with the verdict of the corresponding organ of participation and social control". As of now, participatory budgeting is thus firmly anchored in Bolivia's legal system. In the Law on Participation and Social Control this right is anchored in Article 36 which provides for participatory planning and budgeting and provides for state organs to elaborate policies, plans, programmes, projects and budgets with the active participation of social control organs. Moreover, a significant innovation of the new law concerns the fact that participation and social control also applies to supervision of state enterprises and more significantly to private enterprises that administer basic services or receive fiscal resources. As a consequence civil society organisations have the possibility to supervise and scrutinise the execution of public works by private companies.

Having discussed the legal basis for citizen's participation in municipal governance and budgeting, the question remains of how social control looks like in practice in the city of El Alto. As the law was enacted fairly recently in 2013, its implementation into practice is at its initial stages during the time this research was conducted. Regarding public services (defined as services provided by both public and private actors that seek the common good or satisfy collective interests) and basic services (defined as potable water, sewage, electricity, gas, postal services and telecommunications), the law directly allows users of public and basic services to exercise social control over the quality of these services. Their right to social control can be exerted by appealing to the Comité de Participación y Control Social. The way the process works in practice was described to me in an interview with Santiago Marquez, the then-incumbent FEJUVE executive for social control and by this function also president of the Comité de Participación y Control Social. Marquez asserted that under the mechanism of specified public accountability any *vecino* who detects that an *obra* has been executed badly, can directly contact the Comité to denounce irregularities. The committee then communicates with the municipality or inspects the area in question directly to identify any wrongdoing and to negotiate a solution to the problem (Santiago Marquez 2015, pers. comm., 5 May). In El Alto the process of appealing to social control to denounce irregularities and supervise the quality of public and basic services works primarily via the structure of the *juntas vecinales*. A *vecino* communicates any complaint either to his or her *jefe de calle* or directly to the *directorio* in an assembly. The president of the junta then makes the complaint known in an assembly of presidents, where in turn it is referred to the FEJUVE or directly to the Comité de Participación y Control Social. As laid down in the law, private enterprises can also be subject to this process of social control. To illustrate, EPSAS (“Empresa Pública Social de Agua y Saneamiento”), Bolivia’s national water supplier that continues to operate as a private enterprise but administers fiscal resources, is a frequent subject to this process as *vecinos* in marginal neighbourhoods voice complaints over irregular water supply and low water pressure via social control (Santiago Marquez 2015, pers. comm., 5 May).

It becomes clear however that despite the innovation of the new law in terms of its wider inclusiveness, it has not yet made a significant impact on municipal governance in El Alto, which continues to be dominated by the *juntas vecinales* alone. The fact that the president of El Alto’s organism for social control is at the same time an executive of FEJUVE serves as a strong indicator for this. Moreover, in the replacement of the Comités de Vigilancia with the new organisms of participation and social control, the *juntas vecinales* have played a prominent part. The announcement of the planned substitution of the LPP was carried out by Efraín Chambi, the then-president of the Confederación Nacional de Juntas Vecinales (CONALJUVE – “National Confederation of Neighbourhood Councils”), who asserted that “the Comités de Vigilancia are an obsolete mechanism and insufficient with regards to the purpose of the Constitution.” The president of the CONALJUVE, a confederation allied with the national government, added that their replacement by social control serves to “return this function to the people and organised society. This control cannot continue to be a privilege of a few persons” (Tapia 2012). For El Alto, the city where Bolivia’s *juntas vecinales* are arguably the strongest, the promise of more inclusiveness in municipal governance has not yet been acted upon, as the *juntas* continue to hold the privilege of exercising social control. In its second year of operation, thus far not a single sectoral civil society organisation is represented

in El Alto's Committee for Participation and Social Control. According to Santiago Marquez, "so far they have not shown the will [to participate]. We have always said that organisations for healthcare, for education, for market traders can accredit their representatives" (Santiago Marquez 2015, pers. comm., 5 May). It could be retorted that it is the responsibility of the existing organ for social control to advertise membership of sectoral organisations more actively. The lack of inclusion of market trader's associations, trade unions and other influential social movements in El Alto illustrates the continuing dominance of territorial organisations in municipal governance.

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter has provided an extensive overview of the functioning of El Alto's *juntas vecinales*, their role in the overall structure of municipal governance as well as their role in exercising social control. Neighbourhood self-governance in El Alto is characterised by assembly-based deliberation and discussion, where *vecinos* can voice needs and priorities for their neighbourhood, which in turn are channelled and communicated by a directly elected and rotational directory. Furthermore, *juntas vecinales* are organs of decentralised participatory budgeting, where a budget, albeit with predetermined financial resources, can be drafted by the community through the POA. However, they suffer from internal limitations of accessibility, firstly through communal pressure to participate in certain neighbourhoods, and secondly through the exclusion of tenants from crucial decision-making processes. In general, it can be observed that neighbourhood self-organisation is well-established in El Alto, to the extent that formal and informal working relations have been established between *juntas* and municipal authorities. Regarding Bolivia's new legal framework for more inclusive citizen's participation, not much has changed for El Alto in comparing social control with the Comités de Vigilancia. But as the law is in its early stages of implementation, it remains to be seen whether sectoral organisations will be included actively in the near future and how they can be efficiently included and registered. The Ley de Participación y Control Social undoubtedly opens up new pathways to a more inclusive democracy with wider opportunities for participatory planning and budgeting on the municipal scale. But as only the *juntas* participate at this stage, it might point to an impervious system of governance where the *juntas* have secured a strong position of dominance that stands in stark contrast to the rhetoric of communal democracy in Bolivia. Furthermore, their dominance can obstruct effective municipal governance as the relationship between *juntas* and municipality is not always characterised by cooperation. Accordingly, the next chapter will look into conflicts between the *juntas*, their city-wide representative FEJUVE, and the elected authorities. Furthermore, in terms of social control, it still rests on the communication between leadership and base in the structure of the *juntas vecinales*. While the law provides for transparency and supervision of government by civil society organisations, one also has to look at the internal dynamics of those organisations that channel supervision of state activities. In this discussion on the *juntas vecinales* an observed discrepancy between bases and directory is particularly relevant and overcoming it should be viewed as a prime precondition for the functioning of social control. The following chapters will take up this issue by examining not only the politicking – or

“*politiquería*” as *alteños* refer to it – that characterises the co-governance of juntas and municipality but also how the relationship between bases and leadership is characterised, what type of complaints *vecinos* voice, but also what the degree of approval of their *dirigentes* is.

5. The junta vecinal as a political actor

In El Alto's structure of urban governance, neighbourhood associations are indispensable in articulating demands from the grassroots. Effective urban governance and politics can hardly circumvent the *juntas vecinales*, without taking into account their importance. On the one hand this allows citizens to actively participate in planning processes and policies that determine the development of their neighbourhood and eventually of their city. On the other it can potentially lead to conflicts over competencies with the municipality and over privileges secured by the leadership of El Alto's social movements. Accordingly, the question arises of possible deficiencies of co-governance between *juntas vecinales* and municipal government. In that regard, it is necessary to analyse the *juntas* in terms of their position vis-à-vis national and local politics. This chapter will analyse the *junta vecinal* in its role as a political actor, by asking how the relationship between juntas and state institutions can be characterised and what deficiencies lie within this relationship as well as within the structure of the juntas itself. Two roles of the neighbourhood associations can be identified – a supportive and a subversive role. Their supportive role is connected to their day-to-day function of neighbourhood self-governance, where the juntas coordinate and negotiate with state actors and formulate demands. However, given their role in channelling demands, they also assume a subversive role when demands are not met or when *dirigentes* defend their privileges vis-à-vis the municipality. Especially in terms of the latter, the often romanticised grassroots character of self-organisation in El Alto is tainted by a web of clientelism and corruption. This chapter will thus firstly discuss the *juntas'* position in national politics as a social movement and briefly describe their relation to the incumbent government. Given their substantial role in bringing the Movimiento al Socialismo party (MAS – “Movement Towards Socialism”) to power, social movements have established clientelist links with governing institutions, which are a crucial subject in this discussion. Moreover, a review of press sources and personal observations from the field will trace the relevant recent events of political change in El Alto amid a change of the municipal government that has a significant impact on the relation between state and social movements on the local level. Finally, deficiencies in the *junta vecinal* structure as challenges to the realisation of the right to the city will be discussed briefly in the conclusion of this section.

5.1. Neighbourhood associations in a national political context

In the past years Bolivia has undergone a profound political and economic transformation under what the government has dubbed the “*proceso de cambio*” or “process of change”. The rise of Evo Morales to the presidency of Bolivia in 2005 followed the rejection of neoliberal paradigms in the country, implemented by previous governments, and involves the contention of social movements, including El Alto’s *juntas vecinales*. In contrast, the two decades prior to 2005 were characterised by the implementation of a neoliberal model of fiscal restraint, privatisation and rollback of the state, policies whose main protagonist was former President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada among others. Raised and educated in the United States, Sánchez de Lozada (in Bolivia also referred to as “Goni”) was the owner of the country’s largest mining company COMSUR, before assuming the presidency in 1992 (Kohl and Farthing, 2009: 65). Amid the implementation of structural adjustment programmes, Goni’s first administration from 1992 to 1997 embarked on policies of stepwise privatisation of strategic public sector enterprises such as in the hydrocarbons sector as well as policies of administrative decentralisation. In 2002 Goni returned to his second term in office, continuing fiscal restraint policies supported by policy-based loans from World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Inter-American Development Bank, which in turn fuelled popular contention that would eventually lead to the government’s downfall (Dijkstra, 2011, 122-123).

Resistance to the scheme of privatisation and structural adjustment culminated in widespread protests in late 2003, triggered by the World Bank-supported move of the government towards the exportation of gas to the United States via Chilean ports. In these uprisings, the *juntas vecinales* and neighbourhood networks played a pivotal role (Arbona 2007). The first series of manifestations started on 15 September, facilitated by FEJUVE as a reaction to a municipal resolution on the introduction of a tax on real estate transactions that was perceived as a government strategy to levy further taxes on the urban poor of El Alto. As the municipal government acquiesced after a series of road blockades, FEJUVE’s success prompted it to make statements on issues of national interest beyond municipal politics, such as the aforementioned exportation of hydrocarbons via Chilean ports (Arbona 2007, 133). In what was later known as the “*Guerra del Gas*” or “Gas War”, violence escalated by 12 and 13 October as the national government imposed martial law on the unruly city of El Alto, where protestors demanded Goni’s resignation and reiterated the popular demand for renationalisation of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon resources. Amid the escalation of violence – 65 deaths were recorded in the aftermath of October 2003 – neighbourhood networks emerged as localised leadership posts, based on the communitarian traditions of the *juntas* and on syndicalist traditions of former miner’s neighbourhoods (Arbona 2007 & 2008). In that sense the *junta* structure provided fertile grounds for self-organisation, filling the power vacuum left by the state throughout the turmoil of rebellion in El Alto. Around 400 communal assemblies constituted what can be described as “neighbourhood microgovernments”. Independent even from the federation of neighbourhood associations FEJUVE, “each neighbourhood constituted its own territorial government” (Mamani 2006, 277). Eventually, on 17 October Lozada’s government broke down under the weight of the popular uprising, ending the neoliberal era of structural adjustment in Bolivia (Mamani 2006, 238). Much due to the events surrounding the

Gas War and the strength of Bolivia's social movements, the left-leaning former coca farmer's trade unionist Evo Morales and his Movement Towards Socialism gained the presidency in December 2005 (Kohl and Farthing, 2009: 71-72).

Until today there is a persistent claim of social movement leaders to be heirs of the Gas War. Especially El Alto's FEJUVE often draws legitimacy from October 2003, though neighbourhood mobilisation eventually grew more and more independent and autonomous from the *juntas*' city-wide leadership. Nonetheless, in an interview conducted with former FEJUVE president Óscar Ávila in May 2015, he contended that "we have opted for a change of the system of government. [Now] it's a more democratic, a more plurinational government. FEJUVE has contributed to this and will continue to do this kind of work" (Óscar Ávila 2015, pers. comm., 5 May). In general however, the involvement of neighbourhood associations in events such as those of the Gas War, within the wider context of social movement mobilisation, demonstrates that neighbourhood-based organisation can articulate demands also in a national context and thus beyond their traditional local scope. This has secured these movements a supporting and privileged role within the new power relations in Bolivia on the national level, which in turn has solidified their importance on the level of municipal governance. However, this solidified role is far from stable and displays a wide array of deficiencies, among others the emergence of clientelist networks, as will be seen in the subsequent section.

5.2. The local political context: deficiencies, corruption and clientelism

Given the events of October 2003 and continuing support of Evo Morales' government by the city's social movements, El Alto has long been considered a bastion of the MAS, where Morales frequently secures a large portion of votes in national elections. The leadership of El Alto's social movements considers itself as central in bringing the current government to power to the extent that it pursues efforts to secure certain benefits and privileges from their amiable relations with the ruling party. During the research period of this study however, the political landscape of the city has undergone a profound change that calls for a re-evaluation of the role of social movements and neighbourhood associations in El Alto. On 29 March 2015 sub-national elections took place regarding governors and departmental governments, mayors and municipal councils in around 390 municipalities, including the Autonomous Municipal Government of El Alto. What came as a surprise to many, was the victory of Soledad Chapeton, candidate for the position of mayor of El Alto of the opposition party Unidad Nacional (UN – "National Unity"), defeating the incumbent Édgar Patana, candidate of the governmental party MAS which has dominated municipal politics in the city since 2005. The opposition won a landslide victory with a new Unidad Nacional majority in the municipal council and 55 per cent of the population voting for Chapeton compared to 31 per cent for Patana (Página Siete 2015a). Given the fact that Unidad Nacional is associated with the wealthy Bolivian entrepreneur Samuel Doria Medina, social movements such as the FEJUVE pictured Chapeton as a representative of privatisation policies and the Bolivian right-wing bourgeoisie in public statements and in campaign posters dispersed in the city during the electoral campaign period. Chapeton however managed to convince voters with an

image of representing El Alto's women and young people, countering the dominance of male older generations at the leadership level of social movements.

While social movements and neighbourhood organisations offer ample means of participation, they also have contributed to the dominance of a class of *dirigentes* on the level of city-wide federations of neighbourhood-based organisations and trade unions. The practice of rotational leadership may be firmly embedded in practice at the neighbourhood scale, however, at higher levels there is tendency of *dirigentes* holding on to leadership positions, a practice referred to as *vitalicismo* ("long-life-ism") (Lazar 2008). This dominant class of *dirigentes* has not only established working relations with the municipality but beyond that also clientelist links with public institutions and the governing party. In that regard, the selection of Patana as mayoral candidate of the MAS relied on the consent of the social movements who actively lobbied for the party to position Patana for re-election. Consequently, Evo Morales blamed the influential Central Obrera Regional (COR – "Regional Worker's Centre") – the city-wide federation of trade unions – and FEJUVE as the driving forces behind the selection of the candidate Patana and thereby for the electoral defeat of the MAS. The selection of Patana was insofar problematic given accusations of corruption and nepotism (Box 5.1.).

Box 5.1.: Corruption and clientelism in El Alto: The case of former mayor Édgar Patana

The accusations of corruption against Patana include cases of bribery, such as the case of the construction company Terra Forte that received an offer to be contracted for a public work worth 11 million bolivianos if Patana would personally receive 40 per cent of the assigned budget (Layme 2015). Retaining a part of the budget for an *obra*, or deliberately over-estimating costs of an *obra* is a form of corruption not uncommon at the neighbourhood level concerning the authority of *dirigentes* in contracting enterprises for the implementation of public works. The case of Édgar Patana demonstrates two processes of clientelism at work. For one, the practice of demanding *coimas* ("bribes") in the contracting of enterprises for public works. Moreover, it demonstrates close links between the class of *dirigentes* and public institutions. In the Patana case, these close clientelist links with El Alto's social movements assumed very visible extents, given the distribution of 24 automobiles by Patana to *dirigentes* of COR, FEJUVE and the gremials in an arrangement to let Patana govern without major interventions (ANF 2015).

The interconnectedness between municipal government and politicised neighbourhood associations during the administration of the MAS boils down to a revolving door scheme. Higher public officials often began their careers as *dirigentes* of social movements and neighbourhood associations, an observation that is also applicable to Patana, himself, a former *dirigente* of the Central Obrera Regional. A glance at the list of candidates posed by the MAS reveals that a vast majority of these prospective public officials are affiliated with a particular movement or association. As regards the *juntas vecinales*, often a motivation to become elected to the directory does not involve the desire to improve living conditions in one's neighbourhood. Rather, the *juntas* are often part of a political ladder, which starts with the position of *jefe de calle*, then directory member, district delegate or president of the zone, and eventually public functionary or municipal councillor. This political ladder is furthermore related to the concept of "*thaki*", which can be translated as "path", an Aymara term referring to the responsibility and recognition received by adults through following and assuming a series of functions in the community. In short, *thaki* refers to the sequence of official tasks and responsibilities which lead to prestige and recognition (Ticona and Albó 1997, 66).

Indigenous forms of self-organisation often tend to be romanticised in literature. However, though *thaki* encourages rotational leadership it also encourages anti-democratic tendencies regarding the dominance of *dirigentes* in higher positions. This means that having followed a sequence of official tasks along the political ladder, *dirigentes* often secure their position by clientelist links.

The recent electoral victory of the opposition in the municipality of El Alto marks a decisive point in terms of clientelist politics in El Alto. It has revealed fundamental structural problems of the parallel governance of municipality and neighbourhood associations, as the reshuffling of the municipal government evoked the resistance of social movement leaders, afraid of losing the privileges secured with the previous administration. As an illustration, the newly elected mayor of El Alto, Soledad Chapeton received threats by representatives of such movements in the immediate aftermath of her victory in the 2015 subnational elections. Braulio Rocha, *dirigente* of the Federación de Gremiales de El Alto (“Federation of Gremiales of El Alto”), drew attention by declaring in front of the media that he will be Chapeton’s “nightmare for the rest of [her] life” (Página Siete 2015b). Following the assumption of her office as mayor, Chapeton encountered the adamant resistance of not only Rocha, but more significantly of the FEJUVE concerning a dispute over competencies. On 2 June, the second day of the administration of Soledad Chapeton, the FEJUVE announced a strike in the wake of a dispute over the designation of *sub-alcaldes* in the city of El Alto. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it has been customary for deputy mayors to be elected and appointed by the *juntas vecinales* of each district, a competency that is not codified into law, but on the contrary lies with the municipal government according to Article 26 of the Ley de Gobiernos Autónomos Municipales (“Law on Autonomous Municipal Governments”) of 2014. In line with Unidad Nacional’s plea to improve institutional efficiency in the municipality of El Alto, one of the first official acts of the new mayor concerned the designation of new deputy mayors for every district of the city. In response to what the city-wide representative of the *juntas vecinales* saw a break with customary rules of governance, FEJUVE’s president Óscar Ávila announced a blockage of El Alto’s main roads, until the newly elected mayor Chapeton revokes her decree of designation of 12 *sub-alcaldes*. Relying on “traditions and customs” as the basis for the designation of deputy mayors by the *juntas*, FEJUVE attempted to retain its privileged position as prime agenda-setting power for district-level policies and project implementation. In some districts *vecinos* organised pickets in front of the offices of the *subalcaldías*, demanding respect for traditions and customs, however the conflict was concentrated only in three districts (Página Siete 2015e). Following a day of small scattered protests organised by the *juntas*, FEJUVE decided to convene an assembly of presidents to officially refuse the recognition of the newly appointed *sub-alcaldes* and organise elections of their own. With around 100 *presidentes de zona* attending, the turnout can be considered as unsubstantial in a city with 1580 neighbourhoods and at least 700 *juntas*.¹ Only junta presidents with credentials from FEJUVE were reported participating, while there was no presence of base members in the convened assembly (Página Siete 2015f).

¹ The total number of *juntas vecinales* varies in literature. According to the Bolivian newspaper Página Siete, around 700 *juntas* are active in El Alto. In a personal interview with FEJUVE’s president Óscar Ávila, he estimated the number as high as 1580 *juntas*, corresponding to the number of registered zones of El Alto’s urban districts.

Following FEJUVE's protest, the *juntas* received an invitation to dialogue by Chapeton, who proposed to jointly evaluate the work of the new *sub-alcaldes* within 90 days. Having rejected the mayor's proposal, FEJUVE returned to protest on 8 June, announcing another series of strikes. The dispute however revealed a profound discrepancy between base and leadership. A lack of support from the base led to the failure of the announced strikes. It furthermore revealed a profound discontent of *vecinos* over the work of the FEJUVE, with more and more *vecinos* pleading for an early electoral assembly – normally convened every two years to elect new executives – to change the incumbent leaders of FEJUVE and to accept dialogue with the municipal government that has secured a solid majority of approval and support by El Alto's population. This sector of the *juntas* organised a march against the planned strike of FEJUVE, demonstrating a wide rejection of the bases for the uncompromising stance of their executives at the city-wide level. These counter-marches expressed the call of the population to respect the election results and for the FEJUVE to cooperate with the new municipal government in good faith. As a result, FEJUVE's plea for strike ultimately did not materialize but backfired. In Ávila's own neighbourhood in District 4, *vecinos* demanded to revoke recognition of his position as leader of FEJUVE and to convene a blockade against him (Página Siete 2015g). Eventually the counter-protests by the *juntas'* own bases made the FEJUVE leadership acquiesce. By mid-June, all of El Alto's 14 districts had new deputy mayors, appointed by the mayor instead of by the *juntas* (ERBOL 2015).

Box 5.2.: Corruption and clientelism in El Alto: The case of Óscar Ávila

Former FEJUVE president Óscar Ávila has been accused of violating the statutes of the organisation in terms of the sponsorship or active vocal endorsement of Édgar Patana and thereby MAS' mayoral candidate for El Alto (Página Siete 2015c). The newly elected president of the FEJUVE, Rolando Huanca, stated that Ávila has violated several articles of the organisation's statute, in particular Article 5 that defines the FEJUVE as a civic entity that prohibits sponsorship of political parties. Moreover, Ávila is accused of nepotism given that a son of Ávila was hired as a public servant in the municipality during Patana's administration (Página Siete 2015d). As major representatives of significant sectors of the population, El Alto's federations of trade unions, of street vendors, and of *juntas vecinales*, claim political independence in their respective statutes. It is clear however that most of El Alto's *dirigentes* clearly position with the MAS. In a personal interview I conducted with Óscar Ávila in May 2015 – that is before his dismissal as president of the FEJUVE – this position came clear. He asserted that “we [the FEJUVE] are defenders of the ‘*proceso de cambio*’, but we are not affiliated with any political party. We represent the *vecino*.” A clear commitment to the “*proceso de cambio*” however is nearly equivalent to vocal support of the MAS, which becomes even clearer regarding his comments of the recently elected Soledad Chapeton. “Our affiliates have voted for her, and we as a neighbourhood organisation have to respect the will of the people. But she has to respect the projects that are already in planning from the previous administration. [...] We will not allow the politics of privatisation to return” (Óscar Ávila 2015, pers. comm., 5 May).

The controversy over the nomination of deputy mayors once more illustrates the dominant position of the *juntas vecinales* of El Alto in its structure of governance. It also shows the fact that certain sectors in the leadership of the FEJUVE and other city-wide federations of social movements have secured special privileges for themselves that counter the image of grassroots communitarian politics in El Alto. FEJUVE's argumentation based on “traditions and customs” concerns a practice of approximately 15 years duration. It is neither reflected in municipal law, nor constitutional and not related to the constitutionally embedded

communitarian democracy, which recognizes indigenous forms of self-organisation. The practice of appointing deputy mayors cannot be described as a form of indigenous communitarian democracy, as it is not based on traditions and customs that are ancestral (Pablo Peralta 2015). Instead they are certain privileges secured by *dirigentes* within a structure of clientelism and favouritism that has relied on the discourse of indigenism as an excuse to widen their personal sphere of influence. Nevertheless, FEJUVE's most recent attempt to retain these privileges amid a change in the municipal government have backfired. Given the defeat of the FEJUVE in the dispute over the nomination of deputy mayors, the neighbourhood associations prompted the resignation of its president Óscar Ávila in a resolution adopted by an over 70 per cent majority of junta executives on Ávila's "dismissal with disgrace". This decision was however not solely motivated by the dispute between Chapeton and Ávila, but also due to corruption allegations towards the latter (Box 5.2.). With regards to the clientelism and favouritism as practiced by the FEJUVE in this case, it has to be noted that patronage networks in El Alto did not exclusively exist during the MAS administration, but have been present in previous municipal administrations, such as with the Conciencia de Patria (Condepa – "Conscience of Fatherland") political party of mayor Carlos Palenque in the 1990s, and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR – "Movement of the Revolutionary Left") of mayor José Luis Paredes in the early 2000s (Lapegna & Auyero 2012, 70).

5.3. Conclusion

The recent conflict between neighbourhood-based organisations and the municipal government demonstrates the short-comings of parallel governance in El Alto. That is not to say that the *junta* system as such is inefficient. Rather, due to the lack of clearly defined structures and boundaries the relationship between neighbourhood-based territorial units and state institutions is not only characterised by coordination and negotiation, but by periodic conflict. In that sense the *juntas vecinales* assume two distinct roles. Firstly, they assume a supportive role in channelling and expressing demands from the bases to the official municipal polity. As such, the neighbourhood councils form spaces where needs are articulated and where citizens can participate in the process of policy-making and policy-implementation. Secondly, the *juntas* assume a subversive role when demands are not met or when state institutions intrude into what they deem their fields of competence. In such cases the leadership of neighbourhood-based organisations convene the *vecinos* for manifestations, marches and strikes. However, as previous examples have shown, such calls of mobilisation by the leadership are not always followed by the bases, revealing a tendency of alienation of *dirigentes* from their affiliates.

In terms of the right to the city discourse, spaces for participatory planning and participatory budgeting are available through the opportunity to participate in agenda-setting neighbourhood assemblies, thereby realising democratic place management at the neighbourhood scale (Sorensen and Sagaris 2010), as has been described in chapter two. However, while *vecinos* have spaces to articulate needs and demands, their means of communication and access to institutions is limited through the strong position of *dirigentes*

who mediate demands but also manipulate their bases for the sake of gaining personal advantages. In an article for *Página Siete*, the new mayor of El Alto, Soledad Chapeton, asserted that “it always has been said that there is no connection between the municipality and the population because there has always been an intermediation by the *dirigentes*: you need their signature to talk to the authorities, to accomplish any proceedings or *obras*” (Soledad Chapeton 2015). This reveals a paradox of neighbourhood self-governance. While the assembly is the main means of articulating demands from the bases, the directory is the means to channel such demands to the municipal government. However, in doing so, the *dirigentes* also form a major obstacle for direct communication between urban residents and the official institutions of the municipal government.

In conclusion, the role of the *juntas* is ambiguous. On the one hand, the *juntas* are important for grassroots democratic place management, as demonstrated in previous chapters. On the other, neighbourhood self-governance is limited by its own structure, given the dominance of *dirigentes* within a system prone to clientelism and favouritism. As the dispute on appointing sub-alcaldes shows, the politics of patronage is reinforced by a lack of clarity on overlapping competencies. This points to a further tension between two forms of democracy that are practiced parallel in El Alto, namely representative electoral democracy as represented by the official structures of the state and communitarian grassroots democracy as practiced on the neighbourhood scale. Such a structure of parallel governance can work if institutions are clearly defined, which however cannot be said for El Alto. Rather, co-governance of municipality and *juntas* within a poorly structured scope of overlapping competences as well as the politicisation of El Alto’s social movements, have reinforced corruption practices and clientelism. Nevertheless, the events of October 2003 – the Gas War – as well as the events of June 2015 – the dispute between FEJUVE and Soledad Chapeton – show that the power of the *junta*’s lies with the bases. The latter possess the capacity to govern themselves in the absence of state power as well as the capacity to revolt against their own leadership. It furthermore shows that the role of the *juntas* is adaptable and changeable in a political sense, as supporting the structure of municipal governance and as subverting it. The following two chapters will further analyse the changing role of the *juntas*, this time along the premises of the aforementioned longitudinal study. How does this role change not merely in a political sense, but also in the wake of more material forces, namely the consolidation of neighbourhoods in terms of improvement of basic service provision, infrastructure development and other factors over time?

6. Neighbourhood consolidation in the Zona 16 de Julio

Having expanded as the urban sprawl of La Paz, the city of El Alto features distinct characteristics of informal settlements, such as lack of extensive provision of basic services, lack of infrastructure, and sub-standard housing. Over the course of the city's development, the neighbourhoods constituting El Alto underwent a process of consolidation, which persists in the present amid the city's continuing growth and as neighbourhoods mature. In the assessment of the role of the *juntas vecinales* in neighbourhood-based self-governance, it is essential to analyse the maturing of neighbourhoods itself. The question is therefore not only how self-governance via *juntas vecinales* has an impact on the development of neighbourhoods, but beyond that, how the development of neighbourhoods itself affects self-governance practices in El Alto. However, before that connection can be made, the process of neighbourhood consolidation in the research area of Zona 16 de Julio needs to be assessed. As described in earlier sections, the consolidation of neighbourhoods features three aspects: (1) increase of tenure security for residents, (2) increase in levels of basic service provision as well as improvement of infrastructure and housing, (3) formation and expansion of social networks and organisations in the neighbourhood (Kranenburg, 2002). In the previous household surveys conducted in 2010 connected to the longitudinal study of the University of Utrecht, van Bree (2010) concluded that the research area of Zona 16 de Julio can be considered as consolidated, given its central location, economic activity, increased access to basic services, higher tenure security and densification.

Based on the field research of 2015, this chapter will deal with demographic, socio-economic, and residential characteristics in the Zona 16 de Julio that indicate the current state of neighbourhood consolidation. For that purpose a comparison between previous data from earlier household surveys carried out in connection to the longitudinal study and data collected in the most recent household surveys of 2015 will be made. The demographic, socio-economic and residential characteristics analysed in this chapter are not exhaustive indicators for neighbourhood consolidation. That is to say that other important factors that contribute to the consolidation process, such as densification and the functional use of land, were not featured in the 2015 household surveys, as it would go beyond the scope of this investigation. For the eventual purpose of this study, the research area will further be split up into two neighbourhoods, Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio, to compare levels of consolidation where such differences are significant enough to be considered. Villa Los Andes has been excluded for this comparison due to problems regarding data collection² in this particular neighbourhood. In terms of the research on neighbourhood self-governance in *juntas vecinales*, the comparative data that can be gathered from the two selected neighbourhoods in the area of the longitudinal research can potentially shed light on differences in participation and other factors regarding the *juntas vecinales*. The assumption for this particular part is that Villa Ballivián can be considered slightly less consolidated than


² The data collected from Los Andes displays too many gaps to be considered for a comparison regarding the relationship between neighbourhood organisation and consolidation. This is not due to specific characteristics of the neighbourhood, but due to problems encountered with the enumerator in charge of collecting survey data from this area. However, as Los Andes constitutes one of the three neighbourhoods comprising Zona 16 de Julio, it is included in the charts and tables for the Zona as a whole, where it was possible and unless stated otherwise.

Villa 16 de Julio. Once this difference is established, a comparison regarding data on participation and neighbourhood organisation can be made in chapter seven.

In short, this chapter serves to illustrate which factors indicate consolidation to later assess whether this process has an impact on the governance of the *juntas vecinales*. Accordingly, the first section will deal with demographic characteristics of consolidation in terms of the composition of the population. The second section will take into consideration socio-economic factors, such as education attainment levels, occupational structure, the structure of the labour market, and incomes. The third section elaborates on residential characteristics, such as sanitation in households, the level of service provision and tenure relations.


6.1. Demographic characteristics

Fig. 6.1.: Population pyramid of Zona 16 de Julio in 1992




Adapted from: Kranenburg 2002

Fig. 6.2.: Population pyramid of Zona 16 de Julio in 2010



Adapted from: Van Bree 2010

Fig. 6.3.: Population pyramid of Zona 16 de Julio in 2015



Source: Survey 2015

Around two decades before this year's longitudinal survey was carried out, the research area of Zona 16 de Julio was, in demographic terms, a characteristic neighbourhood of El Alto – that is, just as the rest of the city it was characterised by an eminently young population. In 1992 more than three quarters of the Zona's population were younger than 30 years (Kranenburg 2002). This has changed considerably in 2010, when the last longitudinal surveys were conducted, when comparing population pyramids of both time periods (Fig. 6.1. and 6.2.). The population pyramid of 2010 could already be considered as atypical for less-developed countries, which usually display a broad basis. This means that the population in the research area has aged to a notable degree, with only 56 per cent under the age of 30 in 2010 (Van Bree, 2010). This tendency persists in 2015 (Fig. 6.3.) with a slight drop to 53 per cent of the population under the age of 30. The upwards movement of the population pyramid, a process characteristic for more developed nations, can be viewed as a strong indicator of consolidation and social development. The aging of the population of the Zona 16 de Julio is however not only exceptional for a less-developed country such as

Bolivia, but also for the total of the city of El Alto, which still features a predominantly young population. This illustrates the fact that the Zona 16 de Julio constitutes an exceptional neighbourhood as the city's commercial hub and one of its oldest areas. In comparing the two

biggest neighbourhoods that comprise the Zona, Villa Ballivián and 16 de Julio, there is no significant difference in their age structure.

As outlined previously, El Alto has a migratory background. The initial phases of population growth were predominantly fuelled by migration. For older consolidated neighbourhoods, migratory population growth has gradually been replaced by natural demographic growth, as more people are born within the city. In 2010, only 40 per cent of the population of the Zona 16 de Julio was born outside the city. This applies first and foremost to the neighbourhood’s younger generations, whereas the older generations more often have a migratory background (Van Bree, 2010). In 2015 however, survey data show a reversal in terms of migrant populations, indicating that 52 per cent are born within and 48 per cent outside the city of El Alto. The reversal of the tendency of a drop in the Zona’s migrant population that was observed in previous years could be explained by an increase in economic activity in the area. Over the past five years, the Zona’s bi-weekly market – the Feria 16 de Julio – has expanded spatially covering more and more streets in the neighbourhood and attracting more merchants to live in proximity to the Zona’s commercial centre. To exclude possible mistakes in data collection in the 2015 household surveys, further research could shed light on whether there is indeed a renewed migration to consolidated neighbourhoods induced by commercial expansion. However, when comparing migrant population of Villa Ballivián, a mostly residential neighbourhood in the Zona, to Villa 16 de Julio, where commercial activity is concentrated, the latter features a significantly lower migrant population. Whereas 51 per cent of Ballivián’s population were born outside El Alto, this is only the case for 37 per cent in Villa 16 de Julio. This indicates that Villa 16 de Julio can be considered more consolidated in terms of a higher proportion of its population being born within the city. This is not surprising, considering that Villa 16 de Julio is comparatively older than Ballivián. In terms of the possibility of commercially induced migration to the Zona overall, the reason why migration may be concentrated in a neighbourhood in proximity to the commercial centre (Ballivián), rather than the commercial centre itself (16 de Julio), lies in the rise of land prices and tenancy cost that goes hand in hand with commercial expansion.

Table 6.1.: Amount of members per household in the Zona 16 de Julio in 2005, 2010, 2015 and Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio in 2015 (as percentage of total)

	2005	2010	2015	Villa Ballivián; 2015	Villa 16 de Julio; 2015
1	4.9	3.7	9	3.8	7.1
2	12.7	15.1	16	11.5	17.1
3	21.4	27.4	20.3	17.6	22.8
4	24.4	23.7	25.7	24.2	27.8
5	17.7	17.3	15.1	21.4	13.2
6	8.8	7.4	8.2	11	8.2
7	5.4	2.9	3.8	6.6	3.2
8	2.6	1.1	1.2	2.2	0.4
>8	2.2	1.4	0.7	1.6	0.4
Total (N=)	1,133	727	582	182	287
Average amount	4	4	3.7	4.3	3.6

Source: Surveys 2005, 2010 & 2015

Households in the Zona in 2005 and 2010 on average counted four household members (Van Bree, 2010), a tendency that roughly persists in 2015 (Table 6.1.). However, whereas

only approximately four per cent constituted single person households in 2010, this number has risen to nine per cent in 2015. When comparing Ballivián and 16 de Julio, single households appear to be more concentrated in the commercial centre of the Zona, with four per cent of households being single person households in Ballivián and seven per cent in 16 de Julio. This could indicate a type of functional residence that is tied to commercial activity. It furthermore implies consolidation in terms of an aging population, with most of these single households consisting of widows and widowers. However, 30 per cent of Villa 16 de Julio's single households constitute people below the age of 30, a possible further indicator of functional residence. While the household surveys were carried out, many of the households along the main commercial avenues in Villa 16 de Julio stated that a room was rented because their place of work is located in the same building or in its proximity. However, this often implies only bi-weekly residence in the sense of people renting a room in the area for the two market days in 16 de Julio. Residence in Ballivián may tend to be more permanent, as entire families move there for its proximity to the market area.

6.2. Socio-economic characteristics

6.2.1. Education

Table 6.2.: The education attainment level (five years and older) in the Zona 16 de Julio in 1992, 2005, 2010, 2015 (as percentage of total)

	1992	2005	2010	2015
No education	13	11	5	2
Alphabetisation	--	--	1	1
Básico	35	25	24	19
Intermedio	23	17	20	10
Medio	23	30	36	39
Técnico	1	6	3	7
Normal	1	11	2	4
University	3		9	18
Other	1	--	--	--
N = (100%)	40,709		2,264	1,917

Source: Kranenburg, 2002 and surveys 2005, 2010 & 2015

With respect to socio-economic household characteristics that indicate consolidation, education attainment levels will be considered first, given education's role as prerequisite for many income-generating activities. Higher education attainment levels signify higher levels

of human development. Likewise, a more consolidated neighbourhood with a high concentration of economic activity should be expected to feature a more educated population. In the Zona 16 de Julio, only two per cent of the area's population older than five years is left without formal education in 2015. This constitutes a rate that is significantly lower than in 1992 with 13 per cent and 2010 with five per cent, reflecting an overall tendency of increased access to education (Table 6.2.).

Moreover, attainment of secondary education has expanded significantly over time. While in 1992 about 48 per cent had a lower education than *intermedio*, and in 2010 30 per cent, in 2015 this number has dropped to 22 per cent. The *intermedio* level constitutes one of several age-specific components of the Bolivian education system. The age of compulsory education is six, when children enter primary education following five years of *básico* (education). This is followed by three years of *intermedio* and four years of *medio*, both of which are part of


secondary education. The end of general education is reached once students reach the age of eighteen years. Following the end of general education, there is an optional special or tertiary education (*técnico, normal, and university*).

Low education attainment levels can generally be observed to a greater extent for older generations. However, in past surveys gaps in education could also be observed for younger generations. For the age-group of 14 to 17, the age group supposed to follow *medio* secondary education, six per cent had no further education than *básico* and 29 per cent no further than than *intermedio* in 2010. In 2015 this has shifted substantially, with only 1.7 per cent of this age group having no further education than *básico* and 94 per cent having attained or following *medio* secondary education. The higher education attainment levels illustrate on the one hand the ongoing process of consolidation in the research area. On the other hand they could illustrate a wider context of better education opportunities and the long-term effects of improvements in social policies in Bolivia. This concerns especially the Juancito Pinto Fund, enacted by the government in 2006, a conditional cash transfer programme that aims to reduce the indirect costs of public education (transport, books and other school materials), by providing school vouchers for children. Since its inception, the Juancito Pinto programme has had a substantial impact in the reduction of students leaving school prematurely and the increase in enrolment rates in Bolivia (Marco Navarro, 2012).

Apart from higher enrolment rates in secondary education, a further significant observation that can be made in the Zona 16 de Julio concerns the higher levels of university education, given a steep rise from nine per cent in 2010 to 18 per cent in 2015. In that regard, the only significant difference in education attainment levels between the two neighbourhoods Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio lies in the difference in tertiary education attainment levels. University education levels number 15 per cent in Ballivián, and 19 per cent in 16 de Julio. Again, this points to higher commercial activity and more employment opportunities in the latter neighbourhood.


6.2.2. Occupational structure

With respect to the Zona’s labour market and occupational structure, it can be observed that more men are participating in the labour market than women. Longitudinal data show that over time men continue participating longer than before and that over time women participate more often and continue to participate longer (Van Bree, 2010). In 2010 (Fig. 6.5.) there was a sharp decrease in participation for men from the age of 55 years onwards. For women this decrease in labour market participation occurs from 65



years onwards. Five years later, the most recent survey indicates firstly overall more employment, especially seeing a rise of women participating in the labour market (Fig. 6.6.). Secondly, the trend of longer participation in the labour market persists. The decrease in participation after 55 years for men and 65 years for women is less

Figure 6.6.: Age specific participation on the labour market in the Zona 16 de Julio in 2015



Source: Survey 2015

steep, again pointing to overall higher employment rates and that more people continue to work in older age groups. Lastly, participation of women on the labour market for the younger age group between 15 and 29 is equal to and partly even surpasses male labour market participation. This could point to an increase of commercial activity in the Zona over the past five years, as “*comerciantes*” or market traders and sales people in El Alto tend to be in their majority women. With 11.4 per cent of men working as *comerciantes*, it constitutes the second-most significant category of occupation for men after driver in the Zona 16 de Julio. For women however, an overwhelming 51.6 per cent consider *comerciante* as their main occupation.

Table 6.3.: Labour relations in the Zona 16 de Julio in 1989, 1994, 1999, 2005, 2010, and 2015 (as percentage of total economically active population)

M = Men W = Women T = Total	1989			1994			1999		
	M	W	T	M	W	T	M	W	T
Employee	40	10	31	51	23	41	50	25	43
Day Labourer	3	1	2	5	1	3	3	5	3
Self-employed	54	85	64	39	73	51	45	66	51
Employer	2	0	1	3	0	2	1	1	1
Other	1	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	2
Total (N=)	213	153	508	386	219	605	213	85	298
	2005			2010			2015		
	M	W	T	M	W	T	M	W	T
Employee	25	17	22	40	25	36	48	31	40
Day Labourer	13	6	10	7	1	5	2	0	1
Self-employed	50	67	57	48	63	53	45	67	54
Employer	2	2	2	3	2	3	4	1	3
Other	10	8	9	2	8	3	2	2	2
Total (N=)	1,189	820	2,009	711	418	1,129	482	372	854

Source: Kranenburg, 2002 and surveys 2005, 2010 & 2015

Labour relations have changed over time in the Zona 16 de Julio. Economic restructuring and structural adjustment in the 1980s have led to a sizable decrease of the fraction of the population participating as paid employees in the labour market (from 1984 to 1989 from 48 per cent to 31 percent), with a concomitant increase in self-employment (from 1984 to 1989

from 46 per cent to 64 per cent) (Kranenburg, 2002). From 1989 onwards however, there has been a reversal of that trend, given a fluctuating but continuous rise of formal employment and self-employment, stabilising to roughly half of the people in the labour market from the 1990s until 2015 (Table 6.3). Moreover, in the 2000s there is a steady increase of women as paid employees, whereas between 1989 and 2015 there is a trend of decreasing self-employment. This may indicate an ease in access to the formal labour market for women. Self-employment can be considered to imply employment in El Alto's informal economy. Residents considering themselves as self-employed often work within the Zona itself and engage in this location's commercial market activities. However, also thanks to the increase in commercial activity over the past years, the occupation of merchant could gradually formalise in the form of shopkeepers.

Table 6.4.: Job stability in the Zona 16 de Julio in 1989, 1994, 1999, 2005, 2010, and 2015 (as percentage of total economically active population)

M = Men W = Women T = Total	1989			1994			1999		
	M	W	T	M	W	T	M	W	T
Permanent	63	70	64	63	59	61	64	67	65
Temporary	37	30	36	37	41	39	36	33	35
Occasional	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total (N=)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
	2005			2010			2015		
	M	W	T	M	W	T	M	W	T
Permanent	64	62	63	65	62	63	82	80	81
Temporary	30	30	30	28	24	27	14	14	14
Occasional	6	8	7	7	14	10	4	6	5
Total (N=)	1,175	810	1,985	702	415	1,117	487	370	857

Source: Kranenburg, 2002 and surveys 2005, 2010 & 2015

In general, the overall decrease of formal paid employment and the increase of self-employment from the 1980s until 2010 had a negative effect on job stability. From 1984 to 1989 permanent employment decreased from 86 to 64 per cent (Kranenburg, 2002), after which it stabilised until 2010, when 63 per cent of the economically active population had a permanent job (Van Bree, 2010). Between 2010 and 2015 this has changed significantly. In the present surveys, 81 per cent of respondents consider their job as permanent (Table 6.4.). Though formal employment has not increased as much (from 36 per cent in 2010 to 40 per cent in 2015), more people consider themselves as permanently employed or self-employed. Thus, labour relations have not changed in proportion to the increase in confidence on the labour market. This could imply that self-employment or engaging in informal economic activities no longer bears the character of temporary or occasional work. A factor that greatly contributes to respondents' self-assessment as being permanently employed may concern the overall economic growth in Bolivia. The latter is also interrelated with commercial expansion in the Zona 16 de Julio by creating among other factors higher purchasing power and demand. Fuelled by the nationalisation of the hydrocarbons sector, gas and mining exports, as well as mounting public investment, Bolivia has enjoyed significant economic growth in the past decade. In terms of the timeframe of the longitudinal study, this growth has been higher for the period between the current and the previous household survey, with an annual average growth of 5.34 per cent from 2010 to 2014, than for the previous period from 2005 to 2009,

with an annual average of 4.66 per cent (World Bank 2015). Moreover, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean projects sustained growth for the year 2015. With a projected growth rate of 5.5 per cent, Bolivia displays the second-highest growth rate in Latin America for 2015 (Lazcano 2015). In short, continuing economic growth may have contributed to the rise in confidence in the labour market, making a higher proportion of respondents consider their job stability as permanent.

The majority of the economically active population in the Zona 16 de Julio works as merchant or *comerciante* (a sales person in a shop or a market trader). This is unsurprising, given the commercial character of this area. Over the past five years there has been a slight increase in the percentage of merchants of the total population, showing that it remains a commercially dominated labour market (Table 6.5.). The most significant difference between 2010 and 2015 however, is the diversification of occupations. A wider range of occupations that could not be subsumed under a different category could be observed in the 2015 surveys. This diversification further indicates consolidation, implying more job opportunities in the area.

2010				2015			
		%	Frequency			%	Frequency
1	merchant (sales person or market trader)	33.6	349	1	merchant (sales person or market trader)	34.1	269
2	tailor	10.9	113	2	driver	9.9	78
3	driver	8.8	91	3	tailor	7.3	58
4	workshop (car mechanics, steel workshop, etc.)	7.7	80	4	teacher	7.2	57
5	teacher	6.3	65	5	workshop (car mechanics, steel workshop, etc.)	6.1	48
6	employee*	5.5	57	6	employee*	5.8	46
7	artist	4.2	44	7	carpenter	3.2	25
8	bricklayer	3.2	33	8	bricklayer	2.8	22
9	electrician	2.3	24	9	doctor, dentist, nurse, optician	2.5	20
10	sales person catering	2.2	23	10	artist	2.0	16
11	doctor, dentist, nurse, optician	1.7	18	11	public employee	1.9	15
12	farmer, miner, fisherman	1.4	15	12	farmer, miner, fisherman	1.6	13
12	baker	1.4	15	13	assistant	1.5	12
14	police, military	1.3	14	14	police, military	1.4	11
15	secretary	1.2	12	15	lawyer	1.3	10
16	cleaning company	1.1	11	16	electrician	1.1	9
17	hairdresser	0.9	9	17	secretary	0.8	6
18	architect, engineer	0.6	6	18	security	0.6	5
18	public employee	0.6	6	18	caretaker	0.6	5
18	painter	0.6	6	19	accountant	0.5	4
--	others	4.4	46	--	others	7.8	62
Total (N=)				Total (N=)			
1,038				790			
* Respondents answered they are employee, without specifying in what branch they are employed.							
Source: Surveys 2010 & 2015							

As regards this section on the labour market of the research area, no significant difference in the occupational structure between the neighbourhoods Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio could be observed.

6.2.3. Incomes

The previous section has demonstrated that over the past five years self-employment has stabilised amid a slight increase in formal employment. Moreover, in a context of economic growth and diversification of occupations, significantly more people consider their job as stable as compared to previous years. In such an environment, an increase in fixed incomes would be expected. However, the amount of people with fixed income has only increased slightly as compared to 2010, but has remained relatively stable compared to other income categories (Table 6.6.). The rest of the population has an eventual or daily income, or only get paid for the amount of work they deliver. From 2010 to 2015 there is a steep increase in

	2005	2010	2015
Fixed	42.3	37.7	39.9
Eventual	29.5	21.7	10.9
Daily wage	5.1	10.9	3.1
Piecework payment	13.4	15.6	25.9
Lump sum work	4.2	10.9	14.7
Other	5.5	3.2	5.5
Total (N=)	1,965	1,122	777

Source: Surveys 2005, 2010 & 2015

piecework payment or lump sum work, amid a decrease in daily wage. An increase in piecework payment again may result from the overall increase in commercial activity in terms of the expansion of the Feria 16 de Julio. Moreover, the interpretation of these data depends on the self-understanding of income of respondents, though eventual income, daily

	1989	1994	1999	2005	2010	2015*
Men	190	404	588	840	1174	2212
Women	101	213	376	554	866	1181

*Due to missing values, the income data from 2015 only include Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio, i.e. Villa Los Andes is excluded in this measurement.

Source: Kranenburg, 2002 and Surveys 2005, 2010 & 2015

wage, piecework payment, and lump sum work can all be considered as irregular payment as opposed to fixed payment. In that regard, with 40 per cent of the population living from a fixed income, and 60 per cent from an irregular income, the

relationship between regular and irregular income has remained roughly the same in the past decade. This is surprising considering that at the same time – as demonstrated in the previous section – a significantly higher number than previously considers their job stability as permanent. Nevertheless, permanent job stability does not guarantee a permanent income in a market environment, such as that of the Zona 16 de Julio.

The longitudinal study has demonstrated a continuing tendency of rising incomes over time (Table 6.7.), with the caveat of the development of price levels or purchasing power, which is not considered here. The overall tendency of men earning more money than women continues to date. In 2015, this difference has grown to an extreme extent, with men's income's being double the amount of women's incomes. While between 1989 and 2010 incomes of women have increased more than those of men, from 2010 to 2015 this trend has reversed, with

incomes of men nearly doubling. Moreover, between 1989 and 2010 the income gap between men and women has closed. In 1989 men earned 1.8 times more than women, while in 2010 they earned 1.4 times more (Van Bree, 2010). However in 2015 income gap has grown again, as men earn 1.9 times more than women, showing that men have disproportionately benefited from economic growth and commercial expansion in the Zona 16 de Julio. The period between 2010 and 2015 shows an extraordinarily steep rise in incomes, with that of men doubling over the period of five years. It has to be noted, that income data collected through household surveys cannot be viewed as absolutely reliable. This is due to factors such as respondents not making accurate statements, or not being willing to disclose incomes, thereby explaining a comparatively low response rate for income statements (N = 367 out of a total 2131 individuals included in this year's sample). Moreover, a wide range of stated incomes makes the collected income data problematic for use in any generalisable analysis. For 2015, the overall mean income is 1760 Bolivianos with a standard deviation of 1302 Bolivianos, indicating a wide dispersion of stated incomes. Given the wide range of income statements, it is not possible to meaningfully conclude differences in consolidation of the two neighbourhoods Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio with certainty based on income levels.

6.3. Residential characteristics

6.3.1. Morphological characteristics

Neighbourhood consolidation involves the densification of neighbourhoods, firstly horizontally in terms of an increasing amount of plots as well as a decreasing average surface per plot, and secondly vertically in terms of higher buildings. The longitudinal study has shown that as a result of rapid growth and pressure on space, the process of densification is very present in the Zona 16 de Julio, given division of plots, extensive use of plots, and upwards construction (Kranenburg, 2002; Van Bree, 2010). Horizontal and vertical densification results in more families per plot as well as more space per family, though one to four families per building are most common. The average amount of families per building was 2.7 in 2010. This has dropped slightly to 2.3 in 2015. For Villa Ballivián, the average is 1.9 per cent, whereas 2.6 per cent is the average for Villa 16 de Julio (Table 6.8.). This indicates that the latter may be more consolidated in terms of higher density.

Table 6.8.: Amount of families per building in the Zona 16 de Julio in 2010 and 2015 and Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio in 2015 (as percentage of total)

Amount of families	2010	2015	Villa Ballivián; 2015	Villa 16 de Julio; 2015
1	28.8	32.3	49.1	19.6
2	25.1	31.5	29.6	32.9
3	16.7	20.4	11.8	27.5
4	15.5	10.3	7.1	15.3
5	6.6	2.8	1.8	2.7
6	3.7	1.8	0.6	1.6
7	2.0	1.0	0.0	0.4
8	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
10	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Average	2.7	2.3	1.9	2.6
Total (N=)	701	496	169	255

Source: Surveys 2010 & 2015

Table 6.9.: Households with a shower, toilet or kitchen in the Zona 16 de Julio, Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio in 1989, 1994, 1999, 2010, and 2015 (as percentage of total)

	Total of the Zona					Villa Ballivián					Villa 16 de Julio				
	'89	'94	'99	'10	'15*	'89	'94	'99	'10	'15	'89	'94	'99	'10	'15
Shower	4	22	29	74	76	1	26	28	74	67	6	20	30	81	82
Toilet	65	83	92	95	91	53	80	92	96	97	77	88	100	92	87
Kitchen	--	--	--	94	98	--	--	--	93	97	--	--	--	96	98

*Due to missing values, the total data from 2015 only include Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio, i.e. Villa Los Andes is excluded in this measurement.

Source: Kranenburg, 2002, and surveys 2010 & 2015

Living conditions improved substantially over time due to increasing availability of sanitary amenities in houses, such as showers, toilets, and kitchens (Table 6.9.). In the late 1980s a low access to showers and toilets could be observed. Longitudinal data shows a substantial increase in coverage over time. In 2015 the vast majority of households has access to a kitchen and a toilet. Only one quarter of population is left without a shower in their house as of 2015. Moreover, the data indicate that Ballivián has been and continues to be less consolidated regarding the availability of showers, toilets and kitchens. However, over time it can be observed that the neighbourhood is catching up with Villa 16 de Julio, although a difference remains in terms of higher access to showers and kitchens in the latter neighbourhood.

6.3.2. Level of service provision

Consolidation of neighbourhoods involves the increased access to basic services of electricity, water, sewer and gas. Especially for the purpose of this study on

Table 6.10.: Households with access to basic services in the Zona 16 de Julio in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2010 and 2015 and Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio in 2015

	1984	1989	1994	1999	2010	2015	Villa Ballivián; 2015	Villa 16 de Julio; 2015
Electricity	99	99	98	99	100	100	99	100
Water	5	95	98	100	97	99	99	100
Sewer	1	77	84	97	95	97	98	100
Liquefied gas	--	--	--	--	--	74	46	85
Natural gas	--	--	--	--	60	60	61	70
Total (N=)	--	--	--	--	729	565	180	283

Source: Kranenburg, 2002 and surveys 2010 & 2015 (percentage of total)

the role of El Alto's *juntas vecinales*, it is important to compare consolidation levels in basic service coverage terms, as the *juntas* are the main vehicle for neighbourhoods to obtain such services. The first service residents of Zona 16 de Julio obtained access to is electricity. Later on water and sewer system coverage increased gradually. Presently, almost everyone has access to electricity, water and sewer systems in the Zona (Table 6.10.). Moreover, almost every household has access to gas, either in the form of liquefied gas or via direct access to natural gas. The access to the latter has not changed over the past five years for the Zona as a whole. In comparing Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio, access to the basic services of electricity, water, and sewage systems is nearly equal. However, Villa 16 de Julio displays a higher percentage of households with a natural gas connection. In general, it can be observed that Ballivián is slightly less consolidated in terms of the level of service provision. The difference however is minute, save the number of households with natural gas connection.

6.3.3. Tenure relations

Table 6.11.: Changes in tenure relations in the Zona 16 de Julio in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2010, and 2015 (as percentage of total)

	1984	1989	1994	1999	2010	2015
Owner	44	46	46	45	46	44
Tenant	27	25	21	39	34	33
Free tenant	29	29	33	16	19	23
Other	--	--	--	--	1	0
Total (N=)	412	388	389	215	686	564

Source: Kranenburg, 2002 and surveys 2010 & 2015

The consolidation process of a neighbourhood often involves an alteration of tenure relations. The original parcelling out of land in El Alto was directed at owners, meaning that the first residents in the Zona were home-owners. The subsequent increase in construction activity and expansion of space led to the renting out of rooms.

At this point, tenure relations were predominantly characterised by free tenancy, mostly for family members from rural areas. Over time regular tenancy developed (Kranenburg, 2002). From 1984 to 2015 the proportion of home-owners has remained more or less constant. As of 2015, almost half of the Zona's residents are home-owners. In the same time period the amount of free tenants has decreased amid an increase of regular tenancy (Table 6.11.). An important factor in home-ownership in El Alto concerns documentation. Over the past five years significant improvements have been made in that regard, considering that in 2010 the vast majority of home-owners did not have legal papers. In 2015 this has reversed, showing that an extensive legal documentation of home-ownership has taken place in the past five years (Table 6.12.). Nevertheless, just as with income statements these numbers have to be viewed with caution due to respondents' lack of trust. This is especially relevant, given that before and during the period of the field research the municipal government has taken down illegal constructions. In general however, given an increase of entrepreneurship in the area, documentation can be assumed to have risen over time. Regarding the comparison between Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio, no significant differences in tenure relations could be observed.

Table 6.12.: Documentation of home-ownership in the Zona 16 de Julio in 2010 and 2015 (as percentage of total)

	2010	2015
Owners with legal papers	12	37
Owners without legal papers	33	7
Tenants and others	55	56
Total (N=)	686	564

Source: Surveys 2010 & 2015

6.4. Conclusion

The longitudinal data presented in this chapter has demonstrated that the research area of Zona 16 de Julio has undergone a profound process of consolidation considering demographic, socio-economic and residential factors. In demographic terms this implies an aging population as well as the upwards movement of the population pyramid. Furthermore, over time there has been a gradual replacement of growth through migration with natural demographic growth. However, recent data have shown a reversal over the past five years, indicating renewed migration to the area, possibly due to commercial expansion. More research is needed to ascertain whether this is indeed the case. A new observation in the Zona's demographics concerns the higher frequency of single-person households. This indicates further consolidation on the one hand with regard to an aging population (widower's

or widow's households) and on the other with regard to functional residence (single-person households renting a room for solely economic reasons).

Apart from purely demographic tendencies, ongoing consolidation processes are reflected in socio-economic transformations. Firstly, this involves significantly higher education attainment levels. Overall enrolment has increased, while less and less young people leave school prematurely. This can be in part explained by the government's school voucher programme, the Juancito Pinto Fund. Furthermore, tertiary education has expanded in the Zona, reinforcing income-generating activities in the area. In terms of the labour market, one can observe higher employment rates, with more people continuing to work in older age groups. While labour relations have not changed regarding the proportion of formal and informal employment, significantly more people consider their job situation as stable. This is also applicable for self-employed people in the informal sector, which is mostly comprised of merchants. While merchants prevail in the Zona's occupational structure, job opportunities have diversified over time.

Regarding residential characteristics, living conditions have improved substantially. This is reflected in higher availability of toilets, showers, and kitchens in households. Coverage of basic services has reached almost 100 per cent in the research area, save natural gas connections, which still lacks for 40 per cent of the Zona's residents. A further observation could be made for tenure relations in the research area in terms of a substantial increase in legal documentation for home-ownership.

As mentioned in the introduction, in the previous study that formed part of the longitudinal project in the Zona 16 de Julio, van Bree (2010) concluded that the research area of Zona 16 de Julio can be considered as consolidated. The 2015 data has shown that residents have solidified their basic needs and further improved their living conditions within a smaller margin of an already consolidated old neighbourhood. In that context, the question arises of what the role of a *junta vecinal* constitutes in an older and highly consolidated area such as the Zona 16 de Julio. For the purpose of making the connection between *junta* governance and consolidation, the Zona has been divided up into a less-consolidated and a more-consolidated neighbourhood – Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio. Due to their proximity and location in one of El Alto's oldest areas, they do not differ to a substantial degree. However, this chapter could confirm that Ballivián is slightly less consolidated than 16 de Julio. This observation is based firstly on demographic factors. Villa 16 de Julio contains a smaller migrant population and displays more natural demographic growth in terms of more people being born within the city rather than without. Secondly, education attainment levels are higher in 16 de Julio. Also given this neighbourhood's economic importance, it contains more residents with tertiary education than Ballivián. Thirdly, 16 de Julio displays a higher density. This is reflected in a higher average amount of families per building. Lastly, while basic service coverage is almost the same in both neighbourhoods, access to natural gas is higher in 16 de Julio. Based on these findings, the next chapter will accordingly take up the aspect of consolidation and bring it into the context of neighbourhood self-governance.

7. Juntas vecinales in the context of neighbourhood consolidation

The previous chapter has outlined the process of consolidation in the research area of Zona 16 de Julio and has established a difference in levels of consolidation of its two component neighbourhoods Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio. It has been concluded however, that Ballivián is only slightly less consolidated than 16 de Julio. In making a connection between consolidation processes and neighbourhood self-governance and in taking into consideration that the differentiation between the selected areas is only marginal, this chapter will discuss the question of in what ways high consolidation influences neighbourhood self-governance. Do different degrees of consolidation have an impact on neighbourhood self-governance, and if so what are its effects? With regard to this question a preliminary hypothesis has been formulated, namely that higher consolidation may induce lower levels of participation in activities of the *juntas vecinales*. This is due to the primary function of the *juntas vecinales* as neighbourhood-based organisations that administer and demand the implementation of basic public works in accordance with the demands articulated by its base. The data presented in this chapter is based on the longitudinal household surveys in Zona 16 de Julio and always feature a comparison between Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio in order to examine whether differences can be established between these two neighbourhoods. This chapter will first assess the degree of participation in neighbourhood assemblies in differently consolidated areas. It will then take into consideration the differing demands and priorities as well as the evaluation of the work of the juntas in both neighbourhoods. Subsequently, perceived participation motives and barriers will be discussed briefly. To support the examination of neighbourhood self-governance across differently consolidated areas, qualitative research has been conducted outside the area of the longitudinal study in the neighbourhood Solidaridad, a recently established low-consolidated neighbourhood in the outskirts of El Alto.

7.1. Degree of participation in differently consolidated areas

With regards to participation, the main hypothesis was proposed that participation in activities of the *juntas vecinales* would be lower in more consolidated areas than in less consolidated areas. This is due to the fact that less consolidated areas have a higher degree of basic necessities, in particular public services such as electricity, gas, water, sewage and others, which form the principal areas of competency of each *junta*. A *vecino* may see less of an obligation or necessity in participation, when the basic needs of his or her neighbourhood are satisfied. Furthermore, the gradual implementation of more and more public works as a neighbourhood matures translates into a lower workload for the *juntas*, which in turn decreases their influence and significance. This may additionally decrease the level of support from the base. Measurement of participation in neighbourhood self-governance procedures in this case is participation in *asambleas vecinales* or neighbourhood assemblies, the main activity in which every *vecino* can participate in to voice demands, necessities and ideas, as well as partake in decision-making in the case of *afiliados*. The corresponding question for this assessment in the household survey was “Do you regularly participate in *asambleas vecinales* in your neighbourhood?”. The household survey revealed that participation rates in the two selected neighbourhoods are approximately equivalent, with 39.9 per cent of respondents in Villa 16 de Julio indicating that they participate regularly in neighbourhood assemblies, and 40.8 per cent in Villa Ballivián (Table 7.1.). With approximately one percentage point less participation in the more consolidated of the two neighbourhoods, the difference is not significant enough to draw meaningful conclusions on the connection between consolidation and degree of participation. Considering that both Villas in the research area of Zona 16 de Julio have high degrees of consolidation in the wider comparison with other areas of El Alto, the generalisability of these results must be viewed with caution. As the analysis in the previous chapter has demonstrated, the two selected neighbourhoods only differ in details in terms of consolidation.

Table 7.1.: Participation in neighbourhood assemblies and economic organisations in Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio in 2015 (as percentage of total)

	Villa Ballivián	Villa 16 de Julio
Participation in neighbourhood assemblies	40.8	39.9
Participation in economic organisations	14.6	22.3
Total (N=)	179	281

Source: Survey 2015

In general, a participation rate of approximately 40 per cent is surprisingly high for a matured highly consolidated locality, such as the research area of Zona 16 de Julio in which both analysed neighbourhoods are located. Table 7.1. further shows participation rates in economic organisations, such as trade unions or associations representing street vendors or other occupations. Such organisations usually have a high rate of membership, given strong trade union traditions in Bolivia. However, compared to participation in neighbourhood assemblies, the figures on participation in economic organisations appear notably low. 14.6 per cent of respondents in Ballivián, and 22.3 per cent of respondents in 16 de Julio have stated that they are member of an economic organisation. The fact that this figure is higher for Villa 16 de Julio is not surprising, as it constitutes the focal point of commercial activity in El Alto. A likely reason for lower membership in trade unions and other economic associations

as compared to participation in assemblies convened by the *juntas* is related to automatic affiliation. In El Alto it is customary for members of an occupation, be it a minibus driver, merchant, or street food vendor, to be member of a *sindicato* or an *asociación* (a trade union or an association) corresponding to their profession. However, membership in such sectoral organisations is not compulsory, with non-affiliates being referred to as *independientes* or independents. In contrast, as territorially-based organisations, affiliation with *juntas vecinales* is automatic for home-owners in each neighbourhood. Therefore affiliation differs from organisational membership, the latter of which is by definition of a voluntary nature. Whether attendance at assemblies and meetings convened by a *junta vecinal* is voluntary or compulsory depends on the statute of each neighbourhood. Some *juntas* have mechanisms to enforce compulsory attendance, as outlined in chapter four on the functioning of neighbourhood associations. Compulsory attendance is more common in smaller less-consolidated neighbourhoods, where basic needs are more urgent and where full attendance of heads of households is more plausible due to the smaller number of affiliates.

For larger high-consolidated neighbourhoods compulsory attendance is less likely to be enforceable due to a larger population. According to Jhonny Morales, former *dirigente* in Villa Ballivián and incumbent³ deputy mayor of District 6, within which the Zona 16 de Julio is located, attendance at neighbourhood assemblies in zones such as Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio should not be higher than 15 per cent as an absolute maximum. Furthermore, in zones with around 10,000 inhabitants approximately 400 to 500 *vecinos* attend the monthly assemblies, whereas in smaller and also younger and more marginal zones in District 6, such as Villa El Salvador, participation can be as high as 100 per cent (Jhonny Morales 2015, pers. comm., 19 May). In that regard not only the higher degrees of consolidation may induce lower levels of participation, but also the sheer size of the older zones, which does not permit the same level of attendance in assemblies as in smaller and younger zones with higher community cohesion. This does not necessarily mean that the present measurement of around 40 per cent participation should be discarded as a gross overestimation. Rather, it has to be noted that the figure measured here for participation in assemblies is not an estimate of the rate of attendance itself. That is to say, a neighbourhood assembly in Ballivián may have an attendance of 15 per cent of its affiliates, with 40 per cent of the neighbourhood's *vecinos* having attended assemblies in the past. Respondents may have reinterpreted the question on whether they regularly attend and have responded positively even if they merely have assisted an assembly once in the preceding year, or once in the past months, which may not accurately indicate regular participation. The question did not specify if they assist monthly, or in other time intervals or whether they only assist when *obras* are discussed that immediately affect the *vecinos*. The figure resulting from the survey thus indicates overall participation, regardless of whether it is occasional or regular. Sometimes *vecinos* attend assemblies if they know that the issue discussed concerns their street or *manzano*. At other monthly gatherings that affiliates deem unimportant they may be absent.

Moreover, in some neighbourhoods, that are smaller and have more basic needs, 100 per cent of the home-owners may show up at some assemblies with participation going down to around 50 per cent at assemblies where low-priority *obras* are discussed, which also shows that participation is not regular over a period of time. This makes measuring participation

³ During the research period February to June 2015.

quantitatively more difficult. Based on the household surveys of this research, no conclusive evidence can be drawn for the hypothesis of declining participation with higher consolidation. This observation is however confirmed by testimonies of *dirigentes* and *vecinos*, but may also be a result of the sheer size of older consolidated neighbourhoods. Furthermore, based on such observations, participation changes not only in terms of its magnitude in more consolidated areas, but also in terms of its type. While the type of demands change, the way people participate in activities of the *juntas vecinales* changes as well. More concretely, in terms of type of participation, participation in more consolidated areas becomes more irregular. That is, if there is an issue that some *vecinos* consider highly relevant, they will attend assemblies and meetings, while others remain absent, so that participation levels fluctuate more in such neighbourhoods. Such issues may be relevant for a resident because of personal preferences, or because an *obra* is discussed that affects the resident's street or *manzano*. In less-consolidated neighbourhoods, where a *junta* is constantly preoccupied with the implementation of a basic service that affects all of the residents, such as the first installation of a sewage system, participation is more regular, because not only a street or *manzano* is affected, but the entire neighbourhood. In more consolidated neighbourhoods, the neighbourhood association deals with more particular *obras*, related for instance to maintenance and renewal, which do not necessarily affect the entire neighbourhood, but only fractions of it. This is reflected in respondent's comments on why they attend the assemblies. It often occurs that respondents name as reasons for participation motivations such as "because they are working on the street" or "because they are installing gas", which can be categorized as participation during the execution of a public work. The latter can serve as an indicator for a more irregular type of participation.

Based on the above findings, a new hypothesis can be formulated that may require future research, namely that higher consolidation involves more irregular participation. With regards to the previous hypothesis stated in the introduction of this chapter, there is not enough evidence to neither confirm nor refute the first hypothesis on declining participation with higher consolidation. Interviews with *dirigentes* have confirmed an observed tendency for participation to decline in areas whose basic needs in terms of public service provision are largely satisfied. As mentioned, the result of this particular question has to be viewed with caution. However, if we interpret it as a refutation of the hypothesis that lower degrees of consolidation translate into higher degrees of participation in activities of the *juntas vecinales*, a possible explanation could lie in the change of necessities in more consolidated areas. That is to say that the nature of demands changes in consolidated zones, not necessarily the level of participation itself. The following section will ascertain what type of demands and necessities are brought forward by residents of more consolidated neighbourhoods.

7.2. Demands and necessities in differently consolidated areas

The Zona 16 de Julio, together with the Ceja and Ciudad Satelite, forms one of the oldest parts of El Alto and is approximately as old as the city itself. Given its age it has already matured to the extent that basic service coverage has reached almost every household in the area, in stark contrast to neighbourhoods in El Alto's margins. As the longitudinal study is

based in Zona 16 de Julio, quantitative data could only be collected from an already highly consolidated research area. For the purpose of distinguishing neighbourhood self-governance in an area that is closer to what El Alto looked like in its early phase of development, more qualitative observations could be made from a low-consolidated neighbourhood in the wake of the field research connected to this study. This neighbourhood concerns Solidaridad, located in the outskirts of El Alto and established comparatively recently (Box 7.1.), where interviews were conducted with the local *presidente de zona*.

Solidaridad's early phases of establishment involved the delimitation of the area by a land surveyor who assigned a lot per family. Self-organisation in this phase involved the formation of a *junta vecinal* and the communal effort to construct adobe brick houses and dirt roads. Due to its recent establishment the neighbourhood's priorities still concern the coverage of the most basic services of water, sewage, and electricity. While the settlement has formally been recognised by the municipality as a neighbourhood of El Alto in 2006, Solidaridad has only gained access to clean water in 2011, first through standpipes and later through the installation of a water tank. The main issues on the agenda of the local *junta*

Box 7.1.: The neighbourhood "Solidaridad"




Solidaridad (Photo: Ralf Leonards) with its approximately 450 households constitutes one of the youngest neighbourhoods of El Alto. Settlement in this area began in 2000, when around 250 inhabitants of the hillsides of Cupichico, a neighbourhood of La Paz, were forcefully relocated to this formerly uninhabited area in El Alto's northernmost part, on the outskirts of the city's fifth district. The forced resettlement followed landslides that put the adobe brick houses built along the slopes under severe risks. Left without any belongings, the former residents of Cupichico found themselves on state-owned land where improvised shelters, tents and an abandoned warehouse formed their new home for almost four years. Over time, the former tent village consolidated into a permanent settlement, until its official recognition as part of the municipality of El Alto in 2006.

junta vecinal during the period of research concerned the connection to the rest of the city's sewage system – which was finally inaugurated mid-May 2015 – and the connection of the neighbourhood with the rest of the city through new minibus routes. Moreover, legal matters regarding the documentation of ownership of the plots of land that constitute Solidaridad continue to be an important item on the agenda. Corresponding to the neighbourhood's high degree of basic demands, around 200 to 300 out of a total of 450 affiliates attend the monthly assemblies convened by the *junta vecinal* of Solidaridad (Esteban Colque 2015, pers. comm., 15 April). Basic infrastructural problems mobilise the neighbourhood to participate, explaining relatively high attendance levels. In that context the question arises of what types of issues mobilise residents in neighbourhoods, which have long solved the problems that Solidaridad encounters now.

Zones like Ciudad Satelite and the Zona 16 de Julio boast rising income levels and an emerging Aymara middle class, with a new set of needs such as security, leisure, green

spaces, education, health, and others. These demands may also be articulated via the *juntas*



vecinales, whereas in less consolidated zones more traditional demands are articulated such as sewage systems, roads, electricity, and water supply. This does not necessarily have an effect on participation levels as such, as these demands fall under the competencies of the *juntas vecinales* and are put forward by the *vecinos* in the same way through the structure of neighbourhood self-organisation. Residents participating in the household surveys were asked to state what *obras* or projects they consider as priorities for their neighbourhood (Fig. 7.1.). For Villa Ballivián the ten most frequently named priorities are:

- (1) urban open space (green spaces, squares, and parks) with 24 per cent of respondents stating this as first priority,
- (2) improvement of roads with 15 per cent,
- (3) street lighting with 12 per cent,
- (4) security with 10 per cent,
- (5) recreational centres (such as sports or cultural centres) with 10 per cent,
- (6) sidewalks with 10 per cent,
- (7) hospitals or clinics with 4 per cent,
- (8) change of sewer pipes with 3 per cent,
- (9) gas connection with 2 per cent, and
- (10) speed bumps with 2 per cent.

For Villa 16 de Julio, the corresponding priorities are:

- (1) security with 32 per cent,
- (2) police presence with 14 per cent,
- (3) change of sewer pipes with 11 per cent,

- (4) hospitals or clinics with 7 per cent,
- (5) improvement of roads with 7 per cent,
- (6) street lighting with 5 per cent,
- (7) urban open space with 3 per cent,
- (8) kindergartens with 2 per cent,
- (9) regulation of street commerce with 2 per cent, and
- (10) waste collection with 2 per cent.

In general both zones display demands that are characteristic for consolidated zones. These characteristic demands, articulated in the research area, can be subsumed under the categories of leisure (such as urban open space and recreational centres), maintenance and improvement of already established basic and/or public services (such as maintenance of sewage systems and roads), security, health, and education. The wide range of maintenance-related demands points to the old age of the two neighbourhoods in question, especially Villa 16 de Julio, which has been one of the first areas in the city to install a sewer system. The issue at hand at the present in this neighbourhood is therefore the gradual replacement of the long-standing

Box 7.2.: The Feria 16 de Julio



Villa 16 de Julio is home to the Feria 16 de Julio, a street market taking place every Thursday and Sunday. Having emerged as a market for agricultural products, the Feria now features every product imaginable, clustered in segments of food and electronics, cars and automobile parts, furniture and pets, clothing and other products. Over the past years trade has increased to a substantial degree with the result of ever more streets being covered by market stands (Photo: Ralf Leonards). This has evoked complaints from residents calling for a better regulation of street commerce, including demands for a fixed commercial centre building for market traders, given among other factors litter, noise, and the blockage of transport during Feria days.

cement tubing by better suited materials. Only in the less-consolidated neighbourhood Ballivián, a more traditional demand that is related to first instalment of a public service – in contrast to maintenance of a public service – is expressed, namely the installation of gas connections. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Ballivián is less consolidated in terms of gas connection coverage than 16 de Julio, hence this demand is particular to the less-consolidated neighbourhood. In contrast, a demand particular to Villa 16 de Julio concerns the regulation of street commerce, given the expansion of market activity in the neighbourhood (Box 7.2.). Moreover, the predominant demand in 16 de Julio is security,

more so than in Ballivián. This is likely due to higher safety concerns in this commercial area due to more activity in the streets and higher concentration of property, giving rise to theft and pickpocketing. Urban open space forms the prime demand in Villa Ballivián, a largely residential area that features fewer centres for recreation than already exist in the commercial Villa 16 de Julio. In general it can be observed that once basic services are covered, priorities


of resident's in consolidated residential neighbourhoods naturally shift towards creating urban open space to increase the quality of life in the area.

To conclude, three types of neighbourhoods could be included in observations for this research: an unconsolidated recently-established area (Solidaridad), a consolidated residential area (Villa Ballivián), and a consolidated commercial-residential area (Villa 16 de Julio). An unconsolidated recently-established neighbourhood grapples with basic infrastructural necessities, issues of first instalment of basic services as well as legal documentation. The latter two consolidated neighbourhoods display demands of infrastructural improvement and maintenance, as well as demands related to the fields of leisure, security, health and education. Special necessities related to economic activity are visible in the commercial area, where an important demand of residents is the regulation of street commerce as well as a higher concern with security issues. While no final statement could be made with regards to potential declining participation in high-consolidated neighbourhoods in the previous section, a rise of a new set of demands as well as the permanent necessity of maintenance of already implemented public works may guarantee the continuing existence of the *juntas vecinales* in areas that have already solved the basic infrastructural problems of recently-established neighbourhoods. The following section will take up the question of how *vecinos* of these high-consolidated areas evaluate the performance of their *juntas* and what types of concerns regarding the system of neighbourhood self-governance they voice.

7.3. How do vecinos evaluate their juntas?

In both analysed neighbourhoods in the consolidated Zona 16 de Julio, a majority of respondents has stated that the *juntas vecinales* are highly important for their quality of life (Fig. 7.2.). This is more so the case in the less-consolidated neighbourhood in the research area. In Villa Ballivián 64.8 per cent of respondents state that they estimate the *juntas'* importance as high or very high, in contrast to 55.8 per cent of respondents in Villa 16 de Julio. Only about five per cent of respondents in both areas consider the *juntas vecinales* as not important or of low importance respectively. The tendency for higher evaluation of importance in the less-consolidated neighbourhood could point to more pressing needs in Ballivián and a higher experienced satisfaction of needs in 16 de Julio.


Figure 7.2.: Perceived importance of the juntas vecinales in Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio (as percentage of total): How important is the junta vecinal for your quality of life?



Regarding the provision of the public goods of water supply, sewerage, electricity, gas, and roads, there is an overall consensus in both neighbourhoods that the *juntas* have contributed to improve the access to these services, whereas they have failed in contributing to improve neighbourhood security (Fig. 7.3.). Patterns of satisfaction with contribution to basic service

Figure 7.3.: Residents' evaluation of the juntas vecinales in Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio (as percentage of total): The junta vecinal has contributed to improve:

(1) the access to water supply; (2) the access to sewerage; (3) the access to electricity; (4) the access to gas; (5) roads; (6) security in the neighbourhood.



Source: Survey 2015

implementation and improvement – which were assessed with Likert scale assertions – are similar in both analysed neighbourhoods. Respondents in both areas agree the most to the assertion that the *juntas vecinales* have contributed to the access to gas connections (66.4 per cent in Ballivián and 73.8 per cent in 16 de Julio). Residents in both areas have commented that the *junta* has recently been in the process of starting to arrange gas connections for tenants, whereas the process has already been completed for home-owners.


The relatively lowest approval rating for basic service provision through neighbourhood self-organisation processes in Ballivián concerns electricity (35.3 per cent). Local inhabitants of this neighbourhood asserted that every *vecino* arranges their connection to the electricity grid directly with the local electricity provider Electropaz. These procedures largely depend on the way how each *junta* manages its respective neighbourhood. In some areas residents appeal to the *junta vecinal* to arrange gas, water, and electricity connections for their home, whereas in others residents directly communicate with the service provider. The practice of *juntas vecinales* mediating between residents and service providers is not without controversy. For some inhabitants it may be perceived as convenient that the community takes care of these processes – frequently referred to as *trámites* – on behalf of each *vecino*. However, this arrangement also provides room for abuse in terms of the creation of unnecessary transaction costs. A resident in Ballivián commented that “I did the *trámites* alone, because the *junta vecinal* wanted additional money aside for giving me the necessary document. So I did the gas *trámite* myself.”

For 16 de Julio the comparatively lowest approval rating concerns the contribution to improving the area's sewerage system (46.6 per cent), corresponding to the widely issued demand of residents to change old sewerage pipes in the area. In general there is more

disagreement to the assertions posed in the survey in Villa Ballivián. There is however no possibility to clarify – based on the collected data – whether this is because Ballivián is less-consolidated or whether this depends on the general management and performance of the areas’ respective *juntas*. Furthermore, it is not surprising that the approval rating for contribution to access to gas is highest, even though – as the previous chapter has shown – this basic service displays the lowest comparative rate of coverage in both neighbourhoods. This is due to the fact that the effort to obtain gas connections via the *juntas* is much more recent than the already accomplished implementation of other services. Given the age of the entire Zona 16 de Julio, younger generations do not remember the essential contribution of neighbourhood self-governance to the implementation of water, sewerage, electricity and roads. In general however, higher satisfaction with the *juntas*’ contribution to improving the access to public goods in Villa 16 de Julio than in Villa Ballivián coincides with the perceived higher importance of the *juntas vecinales* for inhabitant’s quality of life in the former neighbourhood. As the new type of demands in consolidated areas was not known prior to elaborating the household survey only basic services and security have been included for this part.

Figure 7.4.: Residents’ evaluation of the juntas vecinales in Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio (as percentage of total): Municipal politics and internal dynamics:

- (1) *The junta vecinal should have more authority in front of the municipal government.*
- (2) *The junta vecinal should be more democratic.*
- (3) *There are too dominant individuals in the juntas.*
- (4) *The leaders of the junta vecinal have been exercising their function for too long.*



Source: Survey 2015

Residents were furthermore asked to respond to assertions on municipal politics and internal dynamics of neighbourhood self-governance (Fig. 7.4.). Respondents in both neighbourhoods agree overwhelmingly that the *juntas vecinales* should be more democratic (approximately 80 per cent in both areas), whereas a lower number of respondents agrees with the assertion that they should have more authority vis-à-vis the municipal government (approximately half of the respondents in both areas). *Vecinos* emphasize the representative function of neighbourhood associations and some are wary of more confrontation between neighbourhood-based movements and the municipality, especially in the wake of the municipal elections that took place during the research period as discussed earlier. Moreover,

less people agree with the assertions of dominant *dirigentes* as well as *dirigentes* that have been exercising their function for too long. In these cases residents often have no particular opinion, whereas some have commented that *vitalicismo* – the tendency for *dirigentes* to cling to their position beyond the mandated period of time – has been an issue of the past in the Zona 16 de Julio. However, one resident in Villa Ballivián has complained about cronyism in the directory of the *junta*, stating that there are *camarillas* or cliques of friends that dominate and appoint each other to posts in the directory. The high rate of respondents indicating that they neither agree nor disagree with the last two propositions may also point to the fact that base members are often unaware of the internal dynamics of the *juntas vecinales*.

7.4. Motives for participation and perceived participation barriers


Related to awareness of base members of the internal dynamics of the *juntas vecinales*, residents have been asked whether they perceive certain factors that (1) stimulate and (2) obstruct participation in neighbourhood self-governance (Table 7.2.).

Table 7.2.: Residents experiencing factors that (1) stimulate and (2) obstruct participation in the *juntas vecinales* in Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio (as percentage of total)

	Villa Ballivián	Villa 16 de Julio
stimulate participation	17.9	21.9
obstruct participation	63.1	67.6
Total (N=)	168	274

Source: Survey 2015


While only around 20 per cent of respondents in both neighbourhoods experience factors that stimulate participation, approximately two thirds of respondents perceive factors that can be described as participation barriers.



Stated motivations for participation (Fig. 7.5.) involve primarily the need for information and the opportunity to voice needs and opinions, as assembly meetings chiefly serve to inform residents of current developments in their area while at the same time providing a platform for discussion. In Villa Ballivián there is a larger tendency for respondents to state that the work for the sake of the neighbourhood itself stimulates participation.

Again, this can point to a higher degree of pressing needs in the less-consolidated neighbourhood or to higher community cohesion.

Figure 7.6.: Perceived factors that obstruct participation in the *juntas vecinales* in Villa Ballivián and Villa 16 de Julio (as percentage of total)



Source: Survey 2015

Regarding perceived participation barriers (Fig. 7.6.) more than half of the respondents in both neighbourhoods name a lack of time as a main factor, with few pointing to internal constraints of low accessibility such as hierarchies or clientelist practices. The time constraint points to the fact that due to job and leisure time not all people are motivated to attend assemblies, let alone to occupy a function in the directory. The position of a *dirigente* can be viewed as a

full-time occupation, more so in less-consolidated areas than in consolidated areas. The time factor is important to consider in terms of the right to the city discourse that demands the participation of inhabitants in any decision that contributes to the production or transformation of urban space. El Alto serves as an example of what people would do if they had the opportunity to take part in such participatory procedures, here via the structure of neighbourhood self-governance. The example of the *juntas vecinales* points to already existing problems of grassroots participation, where not everyone is willing take up the

Table 7.3.: Age groups of assembly participants in 2015 (as percentage of total)

	Villa Ballivián	Villa 16 de Julio
1-19	0	0
20-39	28.4	33.6
40-59	41.9	39.1
60-79	27	26.4
80-99	2.7	0.9
Mean age	49	48
Total (N=)	74	110

Source: Survey 2015

Table 7.4.: Gender of assembly participants in 2015 (as percentage of total)

	Villa Ballivián	Villa 16 de Julio
m	46.7	57.1
f	53.3	42.9
Total (N=)	74	112

Source: Survey 2015

opportunity to participate, not necessarily because of a lack of interest but because direct involvement in urban decision-making is time-consuming. Residents often not only lack time to attend neighbourhood assemblies and meetings, but also the time to accurately educate themselves on issues of public works implementation and maintenance.

The second-most stated participation barrier is tenancy, especially in Villa 16 de Julio where a higher proportion of the population are tenants. As discussed earlier, assembly participation is open to all residents of a neighbourhood, whereas the right to vote and participate in decision-making is restricted to affiliated home-owners. Correspondingly, the majority of assembly participants are home-owners. In Villa Ballivián only 18.3 per cent of assembly participants are tenants, whereas in Villa 16 de Julio tenants make up 15.2 per cent of participants. In contrast to tenure relations, other household or demographic

characteristics appear to be less perceived as participation barriers. Few people have stated generational or gender barriers to participation. In terms of assembly participants, age groups are relatively evenly dispersed, with the mean age of assembly participants being 49 years in Villa Ballivián and 48 years in Villa 16 de Julio (Table 7.3.). Likewise, there is a relatively even equal representation of men and women in assembly participants (Table 7.4.). However, at the level of *dirigentes* or in the directory it can often be observed that leadership is dominated by male older generations. This observation holds for most social movements and can be explained by the in chapter five briefly discussed concept of *thaki*, prevalent in Andean communitarian traditions and referring to the responsibility and recognition received by adults through following and assuming a series of functions in the community. This practice often serves as an invisible barrier for women and youth to assume communal leadership positions.

7.5. Conclusion

The hypothesis of declining participation with higher consolidation could neither be confirmed nor refuted by the data collected in this research, though the observation of lower participation in older consolidated areas has been made by interviewed *dirigentes*. This does however not mean that the maturing of a neighbourhood would eventually lead to the insignificance of neighbourhood self-governance. The observations made here point to a new hypothesis of higher consolidation involving more irregular participation rather. This is due to the rise of more particularised issues and demands of residents that do not concern the entire consolidated neighbourhood anymore in contrast to the basic infrastructural demands in recently-established areas that affect all residents. Recently-established low-consolidated neighbourhoods feature high community cohesion and high assembly attendance due to their characteristic elementary necessities of implementation of the basic services of water, gas, electricity, and road infrastructure. In older high-consolidated neighbourhoods different sets of demands – such as maintenance, security, leisure, health and education – still mobilise residents to participate in the *juntas vecinales*. Moreover, residents show high approval ratings of the work of the *juntas* in terms of service provision and maintenance, even in a high-consolidated area such as the Zona 16 de Julio. While new types of demands may ensure the continuing importance of neighbourhood self-governance in El Alto, internal political and social dynamics of the *juntas vecinales* pose barriers to participation. Residents have expressed the desire for the *juntas vecinales* to be more democratic and accessible, though they often lack time to actively participate. Neighbourhood organisation can serve as a vehicle for urban inhabitants to not only shape the development of their neighbourhood directly but also to channel demands to the municipal government. However, the question still remains whether the *juntas* themselves are accessible enough. Their mediating position between residents and municipal authorities as well as between residents and service providers is often viewed as more controversial rather than convenient, due to additional transaction costs and *dirigentes* demanding financial incentives from residents to handle their documents for the access to public services. In terms of participation, assemblies feature an even representation of gender and age, while tenancy still remains a defining participation barrier due to the

exclusion of tenants from decision-making. Moreover, while gender and age groups are evenly represented at assemblies, directories are still dominated by male older generations.

8. Discussion and conclusion

This study has demonstrated that El Alto's *juntas vecinales* possess the capacity for neighbourhood-based self-governance in the channelling of demands from the grassroots to the higher layers of municipal governance as well as in terms of a communitarian form of participatory budgeting. Substantial potential lies in these long-established local procedures of self-organisation. However, this is not without limitations and deficiencies related to legal-political context, institutional design, and internal social dynamics. Moreover, these dynamics have to be viewed within the context of demographic, socio-economic and residential household characteristics of neighbourhood consolidation. In high-consolidated locations, such as the research area of Zona 16 de Julio, a new set of demands and necessities of inhabitants has emerged that goes beyond the traditional scope of competencies of the *juntas*. This however does not necessarily lead to their debilitation. Rather, existing structures of local self-organisation can adapt to new demands, thereby ensuring their continuing relevance. In terms of the right to the city debate, this means that the *juntas vecinales* constitute viable departing points for the exercise of a collective control over the process of urbanisation.

Within the context of neighbourhood consolidation in the Zona 16 de Julio of El Alto, this study has focused on in what possible ways the *juntas vecinales* can contribute to the realisation of the right to the city. In concluding this thesis, the following sections will discuss the research findings in connection to the conceptual context of the right to the city and neighbourhood consolidation, before closing with some concluding remarks.

8.1 Overview and discussion of the main findings

The functioning of the *juntas vecinales*

The basic function of the *juntas vecinales* lies in the demanding and administration of *obras* – public works – for their neighbourhood. To fulfil this function, the neighbourhood councils are organised through monthly assemblies that form spaces for discussion and deliberation on the status of the neighbourhood's development and current necessities. Inhabitants have the opportunity to voice needs and priorities for the neighbourhood, which in turn are channelled and communicated to the relevant institutions by a rotationally elected directory. In drafting the so-called POA or Plan Operativo Anual (“Annual Operative Plan”), which constitutes the budget for priority *obras* for each neighbourhood, the *juntas vecinales* exercise a decentralised and communal form of participatory budgeting. While inhabitants can formulate priorities to the budget in assemblies, there is little budgetary flexibility, as neighbourhood councils are not able to raise their own funds. The municipality allocates a fixed budget depending on the official number of inhabitants of each zone in accordance with the census. This often results in insufficient funds for public works, as not every inhabitant is captured by the census. This is especially problematic for marginal neighbourhoods in the periphery of El Alto, whose residents to a large degree comprise migrants who periodically return to their rural villages of origin where they are also registered. In addition to the budgetary limitation, there are internal limitations regarding accessibility, such as the exclusion of tenants from decision-making procedures and the communal pressure to attend assemblies and meetings in certain neighbourhoods. Thus, internal social dynamics and institutional design of the *juntas vecinales* in terms of their accessibility pose a fundamental constrain on their potential to be a vehicle for the realisation of a right to the city.

Nevertheless, the *juntas* form channels for residents to communicate demands to the higher layers of urban governance on the district- and municipal level. The role of neighbourhood-based organisation is well-embedded within the overall municipal polity, to the extent that *dirigentes* have established working relations with public official and thereby easing communication from the grassroots to the higher layers of the city government. Everyday politics in El Alto involves constant communication between neighbourhood councils and municipal government. This can significantly contribute to the accountability of public institutions. This accountability has been expanded with a new comprehensive legal framework of social control. The latter has been codified into a new law – the Law on Participation and Social Control of 2013 – that provides for expanded civil society involvement in the design and execution of public policy. Similar to the demands of right to the city proponents, social control aims for a seat for citizens at the negotiating table for any decision of public interest. Social control by civil society is supposed to apply not only to public institutions, but also to private actors that implement public works or administer fiscal resources. It furthermore allows citizens to monitor the quality of public services and denounce irregularities to newly established Committees of Participation and Social Control. In that way, urban inhabitants could potentially exercise – in the terminology of Harvey – a collective power over the processes of urbanisation. However, though such a committee has been established in El Alto, it is not yet entirely working according to the new legal

specifications. The Law on Participation and Social Control promised the inclusion of not only territorial organisations like the *juntas vecinales* but also of sectoral civil society organisations such as trade unions and women's groups in the committees in terms of a permanent seat. So far, only *dirigentes* of the neighbourhood councils are actively participating, indicating their dominant position in El Alto's political structure. Moreover, social control aims at the transparency and accessibility of public institutions and the *juntas* have been established as actors of social control. However, the *junta vecinal* system itself sometimes lacks transparency and accessibility internally as well as in their working relations with public servants, which often assume clientelist extents, as will be discussed in the following section.

The junta vecinal as a political actor

In terms of the overall structure of municipal governance in El Alto, the *juntas vecinales* assume a supportive role in their day-to-day function of neighbourhood self-governance, where the *juntas* coordinate and negotiate with state actors and formulate demands. However, they also assume a more politicised subversive role by mobilising *vecinos* and convening protest marches, when demands of the citizenry are not met. This subversive role can also be politicised in more negative terms, when *dirigentes* defend personal privileges vis-à-vis the municipality. Especially in terms of the latter, the often romanticised grassroots character of indigenous self-organisation is tainted by a web of clientelism and corruption, which fundamentally limits the potential capacity of neighbourhood self-governance to further the right to the city in El Alto. Citizens' demands often are mediated through their *dirigentes* before needs are satisfied, which constrains citizen's capacities to shape public urban space, as the formation of a class of *dirigentes* with their own personal and particularised interests emerges due to the dominant position of the *juntas vecinales* in El Alto's polity. This dynamic has become very visible in the wake of a conflict – during the time this research was conducted – between the Federation of Juntas Vecinales of El Alto (FEJUVE) and a newly elected municipal government, over the privilege secured by the *juntas* to autonomously elect the public authorities of the city's districts. The aforementioned conflict has demonstrated a lack of clarity over overlapping competencies of public institutions and neighbourhood institutions, which has served as a breeding ground for patronage and corruption practices. This is due to the fact that communication channels between public servants and leaders of social movements are highly informal. A revolving door scheme in El Alto's polity can be observed, visible in a political ladder whereby public functionaries have often assumed a function in the system of *juntas vecinales* to build up clientelist links before assuming an office. Moreover, this is facilitated by the indigenous conception of *thaki*, Aymara for “path”, which refers to communal responsibility and recognition after following a path of assuming several functions within the community. The latter has contributed to the dominance of certain individuals in communal self-governance.

The formalisation of channels of communication between civil society and public institutions through newly created institutions – such as provided for in paper by the Law on Participation and Social Control – should be viewed as a fundamental requirement to increase

transparency for the sake of enhancing the right to exercise social control over government. This may prevent the type of nepotism facilitated through entanglement of social movement leadership and government in contemporary Bolivia and in El Alto in particular. This is especially pressing for neighbourhood councils, given their agenda-setting power regarding the administration of public works. At the present, the role of the *juntas vecinales* remains ambiguous. They clearly display characteristics of democratic place management at the neighbourhood-scale, that is, the capacity to democratically manage local needs. Paradoxically however, neighbourhood self-governance is limited by its own structure that is prone to clientelism and favouritism. At the root of the emergence of clientelist politics in El Alto lies the tension between two parallel practiced forms of democracy, namely representative electoral democracy as represented by the official structures of the state and communitarian grassroots democracy as practiced on the neighbourhood scale. Such a structure of parallel governance can work if institutions are clearly defined, which however cannot be said for contemporary El Alto.

Neighbourhood consolidation in the Zona 16 de Julio

The practice of self-governance in the demanding and administration of public works is intrinsically linked to the development of a neighbourhood in terms of its consolidation. Neighbourhood consolidation refers to the maturing of neighbourhoods as tenure security and basic service coverage increases and as infrastructure and housing improves. The longitudinal data presented in this study has demonstrated that the research area of Zona 16 de Julio can be considered as highly consolidated. In demographic terms this implies an aging population as well as the upwards movement of the population pyramid. Furthermore, over time there has been a gradual replacement of growth through migration with natural demographic growth, though, renewed migration to the area can be observed. An observed increase in commercial activity since the last longitudinal surveys have been carried out may have contributed to this pattern. Future research could shed light on whether a renewed migration wave to already consolidated neighbourhoods is related to commercial expansion in such areas.

Regarding socio-economic indicators of neighbourhood consolidation, two major observations could be made. Firstly, the Zona 16 de Julio displays significantly higher education attainment levels. Overall enrolment has increased, while less and less young people leave school prematurely. Furthermore, tertiary education has expanded, reinforcing income-generating activities in the area. Secondly, in terms of occupational structure, higher employment rates and increased participation in the labour market has been observed, with more people continuing to work in older age groups. While labour relations have not changed regarding the proportion of formal and informal employment, significantly more people consider their job situation as stable amid increased confidence in the Bolivian economy in general. Furthermore, while merchants prevail in the Zona's occupational structure, job opportunities have diversified over time.

Regarding residential characteristics, living conditions have improved substantially. This is reflected in higher availability of toilets, showers, and kitchens in households. Coverage of basic services has reached almost 100 per cent, with the exception of natural gas connections,

which still lacks for 40 per cent of the Zona's residents. A further observation could be made for tenure relations in the research area in terms of a substantial increase in legal documentation for home-ownership.

In sum, the data of the 2015 longitudinal survey has shown that residents have solidified their basic needs and further improved their living conditions within a smaller margin of an already consolidated old neighbourhood. The question was then posed what high consolidation implies for the practice of neighbourhood self-governance, which has traditionally relied on the provision of basic infrastructural necessities. This question is discussed in the last section of this discussion.

Juntas vecinales in the context of neighbourhood consolidation

The interrelation between neighbourhood consolidation and neighbourhood self-governance has been examined in this study. It has been demonstrated that both processes are mutually reinforcing. El Alto's heritage of self-construction and self-help housing, which are intrinsically linked to the process of neighbourhood consolidation, has facilitated self-governance in the administration and improvement of public works. Not only do neighbourhoods organise to demand such public and basic services from the state. In the cases of some neighbourhoods left behind by government, *vecinos* autonomously organise to auto-construct sewage systems, roads, and other types of basic infrastructure. When basic service coverage increases amid neighbourhood consolidation, this consolidation process itself affects the nature of neighbourhood self-governance. New demands beyond the traditional scope of competencies of the *juntas vecinales* arise. In the traditional scope of competencies of neighbourhood organisation the term "*obras*" or public works referred specifically to the basic services of water, sewerage, electricity, roads and transport infrastructure, and gas. From responses to the household questionnaire it could be observed that residents of Zona 16 de Julio now perceive issues such as security, centres of recreation, green space, education, and health, as priority *obras*, indicating an expansion in meaning of the term "*obra*" for inhabitants of high-consolidated areas. Thus, the previously formulated hypothesis of declining participation with higher consolidation has to be reconsidered. Increase in basic service coverage does not necessarily lead to the debilitation of the *juntas vecinales*. Participation declines only relative to the larger population of consolidated areas. The observations made in this study point to a new hypothesis of higher consolidation involving more irregular participation. This is due to the rise of more particularised issues and demands of residents that do not concern the entire consolidated neighbourhood anymore in contrast to the basic infrastructural demands in recently-established areas that affect all residents. Moreover, in high-consolidated areas the issue of basic services remains important. Not in the sense of their first installation, but in the sense of maintenance of what has already been implemented lies the continuing importance of neighbourhood self-governance. The major barrier to participation as perceived by inhabitants is thus not a lack of interest, but rather – as resident's responses in the household survey have demonstrated – a lack of time. This is important to consider for the right to the city debate in general. Providing participation opportunities for urban inhabitants is not enough. Citizens also need to be able to observe the

effective impact of participatory urban governance in order to be willing to sacrifice time for participation.

The evaluation of residents of the role and work of the *juntas vecinales* has furthermore shed more light on the internal social dynamics of neighbourhood organisation. Next to the lack of time, a fundamental perceived participation barrier concerns tenancy. The exclusion of tenants from decision-making is particularly problematic if the *juntas vecinales* are to be seen as departing points towards the realisation of the right to the city. In areas such as the Zona 16 de Julio, heightened neighbourhood consolidation has not only led to new types of necessities, it has also increased tenancy relative to the rate of home-ownership, as more rooms are rented out in the wake of densification and commercial expansion. Moreover, and as a result of economic growth, proprietors of residential space often do not live in the same neighbourhood where their property is located, even though home-ownership qualifies them to participate in the *juntas vecinales* and thereby to shape decision-making in areas they do not factually inhabit. That is not to say that such proprietors do not have a stake at decisions made in these neighbourhoods. However, from the point of view of the right to the city, which is not only fundamentally linked to inhabitation but also serves as a protection-mechanism for the urban poor from powerful external actors, this can be viewed as a major obstacle to the equitable share in the production of shared urban space. In the current system tenants may voice their opinion in assemblies, but cannot participate in voting procedures, making them less able to protect themselves from abuse through proprietors of their living space. Tenants constitute an important demographic that represents a new advanced urban lifestyle in El Alto, with its new set of demands, particular to high-consolidated neighbourhoods. This also applies to youth and women. In order to effectively guarantee a collective right over the way shared urban space is created, the *juntas vecinales* need to be made more accessible. A policy recommendation in that regard could be that – given the fact that the FEJUVE employs minimal criteria for the recognition of a *junta vecinal* – specified additional requirements of equitable institutional access should be imposed as a pre-condition for the formation of *juntas vecinales*. This may involve a streamlining of the institutional design of *juntas* in each neighbourhood, which thus far depends on each neighbourhood's respective statute. Increased accessibility is also relevant for the inclusion of youth and women. While gender and age groups are evenly represented, directories are still dominated by male older generations. Achieving inclusiveness and accessibility to neighbourhood self-governance in El Alto will thus eventually depend on overcoming the discrepancy between leadership and base.

8.2. Concluding remarks

El Alto's *juntas vecinales* practice a form of neighbourhood self-governance that can be considered as a powerful departing point towards the realisation of the right to the city – a right which has hitherto remained a normative framework more so than an actually implemented legal right. In their daily activities, the *juntas vecinales* shape urban inhabitants' immediate living spaces on the neighbourhood-scale and beyond by channelling demands from the grassroots to the city-scale of governance and by exercising social control over public institutions. However, indigenous forms of communal governance should not be

romanticised. This study has pointed out major deficiencies in terms of institutional accessibility and clientelist politics. Transparency and formalised channels of communication between the bases and the upper layers of urban governance are needed to solve problems of overlapping competencies and institutional inefficiency.

Observations from the recently-established low-consolidated neighbourhood Solidaridad point to the fact that basic infrastructural necessities foster community cohesion and motivate residents to autonomously mobilise for the participation in forms of neighbourhood self-governance. In a high-consolidated area, the willingness to participate persists, as household survey data from the Zona 16 de Julio shows that residents estimate the importance of the *juntas vecinales* for their quality of life surprisingly high, considering that basic infrastructural necessities have been largely satisfied. The point is however, that self-governance has to address a new set of demands that are more particularised and facilitate, not necessarily lower rates of participation, but more irregular patterns of participation, a proposition on which further research could shed more light on. An important conclusion for the right to the city, as a right for inhabitants to produce urban life in own terms, can be drawn from these observations. Participatory urban governance can counter processes of exclusion of the urban poor from the way the city and public space is created. However, the right to the city is not only a right for the marginalised. As living standards increase, new demands give rise to a continuation of the need for more participatory systems of urban governance not only in the context of poor urban areas, but also in consolidated ones. Just as neighbourhood self-governance and neighbourhood consolidation are mutually reinforcing, so are consolidation and the right to the city. As urban areas mature, the production and transformation of shared urban space assumes ever new forms that change with the emergence of new necessities of inhabitants.

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Appendix 1 Operationalisation of concepts

Concept	Concept	Variables
<i>Longitudinal context</i>		
Neighbourhood consolidation	Demographic characteristics	Age of population
		Sex of population
		Amount of household members
		Types of households
	Socio-economic characteristics	Education attainment level
		Age specific participation in education
		Age specific participation on the labour market
		Labour relations
		Job Stability
		Type of occupations
		Type of incomes
		Number of household members with an income
		Residential characteristics
	Amount of floors per building	
	Amount of families per building	
	Amount of floors per household	
	Amount of rooms per household	
	Amount of bedrooms per household	
	Households' access to shower	
	Households' access to toilet	
	Households' access to kitchen	
	Materials of walls	
	Materials of floors	
	Materials of roofs	
	Access to basic services	
	Tenure relations	

<i>Neighbourhood self-governance context</i>		
Quality and degree of participation	Quality and degree of participation in neighbourhood-based activities/organisations (other than a junta vecinal)	Frequency of participation
		Type of activity
		Motive for participation
	Quality and degree of participation in junta vecinal	Frequency of participation
		Type of activity
		Motive for participation
Internal social dynamics	Resident's opinion on junta vecinal	Priorities for the development of the neighbourhood
		Perceived importance of juntas
		Resident's evaluation of juntas' role in provision of public works
		Resident's evaluation of leadership of juntas
	Accessibility of junta vecinal	Factors that stimulate participation
		Factors that complicate participation
	Demographics of participants	Age
		Sex
		Tenure relations
	Institutional design	Role of juntas at neighbourhood level
Role of juntas at district level		
Role of juntas at municipal level		
Legal-political context	Competencies of juntas according to law	
	Relationship of juntas with state- and other institutions	

Appendix 2 Household questionnaire

Encuesta El Alto

Número de encuesta (*no llene!*):

Fecha: Calle: Manzano:

Número de la casa: Código de la casa: Entrevistador:

INFORMACIÓN: X = la persona no quiere responder N = la pregunta no corresponde

¿Cuántas familias viven en este lote?

Hogar	Número de encuesta (<i>no llene!</i>)	Nombres y apellidos de los jefes/as y sus esposas/os → anota con quién ha hablado (con *)	Número de los miembros en el hogar
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
Total de los habitantes en este lote			

¿Quién es el dueño del lote? (*Ponga la dirección completa*)


Nombre: Dirección:

Responda a estas preguntas al final de la encuesta con el primer hogar del lote!


¿Qué tamaño tiene el lote? m²

¿Cuánto sitio está edificado? m²

Dibuje el lote desde arriba, anote el número de pisos de cada vivienda.



Dibuje la fachada de la casa (incluidos los pisos y las puertas)



NÚMERO DEL HOGAR:

A. Nombre	B. Relación/ Parentesco	C. Sexo	D. Edad	E. Lugar de nacimiento	F. Estado civil	G. Grado de Instrucción	H. Año	I. Condición de actividad	J. Ocupación principal
Ponga los nombres de los miembros por orden de relación	1 jefe del hogar 2 esposa(o)/ concubino(a) 3 hijo(a) 4 hermano(a) 5 padre/madre 6 otro pariente 7 empleado(a) 8 otro no pariente	1 m 2 f		1 esta casa 2 esta zona 3 El Alto (nombre villa) 4 La Paz (nombre villa) 5 otra parte (esp.)	1 soltero(a) 2 casado(a) 3 concubino(a) 4 viudo(a) 5 divorciado(a)/ separado(a)	1 ninguno 2 alfabetización 3 básico/ primaria 4 intermedio/ primaria superior 5 medio/ secundaria 6 técnico 7 normal 8 superior/ universidad	Último año que tenía educación	1 trabaja actualmente 2 desocupado 3 ayuda familiar 4 ama de casa (no renumerado) 5 labores de casa (renumerado) 6 ama de casa y trabaja 7 sólo estudia 8 estudia y trabaja 9 estudia y ayuda 10 jubilaría/rentista 11 otro (esp.)	¿Qué ocupación tiene usted? (En el caso de decir que no trabaja *)
1									
2									
3									
4									
5									
6									
7									
8									
9									
10									
11									
12									

K. Rama de actividad	L. Categoría de ocupación	M. Estabilidad del trabajo	N. Número de trabajadores	O. Lugar de trabajo ¿Donde se realiza el trabajo?	P. Horas	Q. Tipo de ingreso	R. Otras actividades	S. Ingresos
Especifique exactamente, ¿en que tipo de negocio, empresa o institución desempeña a su trabajo?	1 obrero/ empleado 2 jornalero 3 cuenta propia 4 patrón 5 otro (esp.)	1 permanente 2 temporal 3 ocasional/ eventual	¿Cuántas personas trabajan en esa empresa/negocio (incluido a Usted)?	1 esta casa/ patio 2 esta villa 3 El Alto (nombre villa) 4 La Paz (nombre villa) 5 Otra parte (esp.)	¿Cuántas <u>horas por semana</u> y cuántos <u>días por semana</u> se dedica a esa actividad? 1 = # de horas 2 = # de días	1 fijo 2 eventual 3 a destajo/ a comisión 4 jornal 5 obra vendida 6 otro	¿Realiza usted cualquiera otra actividad para obtener ingresos? 1 = no 2 = sí, ¿Cuál?	Apunte los ingresos por mes de cada miembro del hogar en Bs./\$ (llene al final de la encuesta!)
1					1 2			
2					1 2			
3					1 2			
4					1 2			
5					1 2			
6					1 2			
7					1 2			
8					1 2			
9					1 2			
10					1 2			
11					1 2			
12					1 2			
Total de los ingresos								

Vivienda Actual

1. ¿Porqué se ha establecido aquí?
 Motivo 1
 Motivo 2

2. ¿Cuál es la tenencia?
 Dueño,
 ¿Su título está en trámite? No Si
 ¿Cuánto son sus gastos por mes? Bs./\$
 Inquilino, alquiler Bs.\$ por mes
 Contrato mixto, Bs..\$
 Contrato anticrético, Bs./\$
 Vivía gratuitamente, como

3. ¿Quién construyó esta casa?
 Usted mismo
 El dueño actual
 El dueño anterior
 Un contratista privado
 Otro:.....
 No sabe

4. ¿Quien le ayudo con la mudanza a su vivienda actual? (*Especifique!*).....

5. ¿Cuántas planta(s)/piso(s) ocupa el hogar?

6. a ¿Cuántos cuartos tiene su vivienda, sin contar el cuarto de baño ni la cocina? cuartos
 b De estos cuartos, ¿cuántos usa solamente para dormir? Dormitorios
 c ¿Cuál es la superficie de su terreno? m²
 d ¿Qué es la superficie de todos los pisos construidos de vivienda? m²

7. ¿En su vivienda, usted dispone de....

	Sí, uso privado	Sí, uso común	No
Energía eléctrica	0	0	0
Gas natural	0	0	0
Gas liquado	0	0	0
Agua corriente	0	0	0
Alcantarillado público	0	0	0
Ducha o tina de baño	0	0	0
Letrina	0	0	0
Baño (excusado)	0	0	0
Cuarto especial para la cocina	0	0	0

8. ¿Cuáles son los materiales de construcción predominantes en la vivienda?

Techos	Paredes exteriores					Pisos (incl. planta baja)						
	Piso					Piso						
		pb	1	2	3	4		pb	1	2	3	4
Calamina	0	Adobe	0	0	0	0	Tierra	0	0	0	0	0
Teja/cerámica	0	Adobe con fachada	0	0	0	0	Ladrillo	0	0	0	0	0
Losa de hormigón	0	Ladrillo	0	0	0	0	Madera	0	0	0	0	0
Duralit	0	Ladrillo con fachada	0	0	0	0	Cemento	0	0	0	0	0
Otro, esp.		Otro, esp.....	0	0	0	0	Otro, esp	0	0	0	0	0
											

9. ¿Este año, ha ampliado y/o mejorado usted su vivienda?

- 0 No, ¿Porque?
- 0 Sí, ¿Qué tipo de mejoramiento y/o ampliación se ha realizado?.....
- ¿Porqué ha mejorado o ampliado su vivienda?.....

Organizaciones Barriales y Juntas Vecinales

10. ¿Este último año, usted u otro(s) miembro(s) del hogar, han participado en alguna organización barrial? (por ejemplo junta de vecinos, club de madres o parroquia)

- 0 No 0 Sí, llene el esquema (una fila para cada función)

A. Nombre	B. Tipo de organización	C. Función	D. Tiempo	E. Motivos
Ponga los nombres de los miembros	1 junta vecinal 2 junta escolar 3 club de madres 4 grupo de mujeres 5 asociación de padres de familia 6 asociación deportiva 7 organización política 8 otro, esp..... Anote los nombres!	¿Qué función realiza en la organización?	¿Aproximadamente cuántas horas por semana se dedica a la organización?	¿Porque está participando en esta organización?

PREGUNTAS AL JEFE O ESPOSA(O) DEL HOGAR

Hablado con:

11. ¿Usted es miembro de alguna organización **económica**? (por ejemplo asociación de gremiales o sindicato)

- 0 No 0 Sí, ponga nombre y dirección.....

12. ¿Usted conoce a dirigentes de la junta vecinal de su barrio?

- 0 No 0 Sí

13. ¿Participa usted regularmente en asambleas vecinales en su barrio?

0 No 0 Sí

14. ¿Porque está participando en las asambleas?

.....
0 No aplicable

15. ¿Participa usted actualmente en reuniones de una junta vecinal en su barrio?

0 No 0 Sí

16. ¿Porque está participando?

.....
0 No aplicable

17. ¿Cuál es su cargo en la junta vecinal?

.....
0 No aplicable

18. ¿Por cuánto tiempo ha participado en la junta vecinal?

.....
0 No aplicable

19. ¿Qué tan importante es la junta vecinal para su calidad de vida?

0 muy alta 0 alta 0 media 0 baja 0 no importante

Explique:

20. ¿Existen algunos factores que estimulen participar en la junta vecinal?

0 No 0 Sí, cuales.....

21. ¿Existen algunos factores que dificulten participar en la junta vecinal?

0 No 0 Sí, cuales.....

22. En orden de prioridad, ponga las obras mas prioritarias para el desarrollo de su barrio:

1.
2.
3.

Responde a las próximas suposiciones sobre la participación barrial y explique sus respuestas.

1=totalmente en desacuerdo, 2=en desacuerdo, 3=ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo, 4=de acuerdo, 5=totalmente de acuerdo

23. La junta vecinal ha contribuido a resolver conflictos entre vecinos.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

24. La junta vecinal ha contribuido a resolver conflictos entre vecinos y órganos del estado.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

25. La junta vecinal ha contribuido a mejorar el acceso al suministro de agua.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

26. La junta vecinal ha contribuido a mejorar el acceso al alcantarillado.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

27. La junta vecinal ha contribuido a mejorar el acceso a la electricidad.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

28. La junta vecinal ha contribuido a mejorar el acceso a caminos (pavimentados).

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

29. La junta vecinal ha contribuido a mejorar seguridad en el barrio.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

30. La junta vecinal ha contribuido a mejorar el acceso al gas.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

31. El impacto que tiene la junta vecinal en mí barrio es en general positivo.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

32. La junta vecinal debería tener más autoridad frente al gobierno municipal.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

33. La junta vecinal debería ser más democrático.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

34. Hay individuos demasiado dominantes dentro de la junta vecinal.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

35. Los líderes de la junta vecinal han estado en su cargo por demasiado tiempo.

1 2 3 4 5

Explique:

Observaciones/comentarios del jefe/esposo(a) del hogar:

.....

.....

Observaciones/comentarios del encuestador:

.....

.....

.....