

The Movers and Shakers of the European Security and Defence Policy

The influence of the ESDP on its own development during the institutionalization
phase 2000-2007

Master thesis

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List of abbreviations

CFSP:	Common Foreign Security Policy
CSDP:	Commons Security and Defence Policy
CHOD:	Chief of Defence
CIVCOM:	Civilian Committee
CPD:	Capability Development Plan
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECAP:	European Capability Action Plan
EDA:	European Defence Agency
EDEM:	European Defence Equipment Market
EDTIB:	European Defence Technology & Industrial Base
ESDP:	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS:	European Security Strategy
EU:	European Union
EUMC:	European Military Committee
EUMS:	European Military Staff
FYROM:	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAD:	Global Approach on Deployability
IGC:	Inter-Governmental Conference
LTV:	Long Term Vision
NAC:	North Atlantic Council
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
MILREP:	Military Representative
OHQ:	Operational Headquarter
Pesco:	Permanent structured cooperation
PSC:	Political Security Committee
QMV:	Quality Majority Voting
SG/HR:	Secretary-General/High Representative
SHAPE:	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
UK:	United Kingdom
UN:	United Nations
US:	United States
WEAG:	Western European Armaments Group
WEAO:	Western European Armaments Organisation

Summary

This thesis will determine to which extent the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the institutionalization phase 2000-2007 can be ascribed to the influence of its own structures and personnel.

This thesis will contribute to the academic debate between sociological institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. On the one hand, Sociological institutionalism argues that institutions create a system of norms and values by which they influence the behaviour of Member States. Institutions thus have influence on their own development. On the other, Rational choice institutionalism states that Member States hold control over the institution and its development. Member States are agents who control the development of the institution through their principals which are the ESDP bodies. This thesis will demonstrate ESDP development can be better explained from theories of rational choice institutionalism perspective than the sociological institutionalism perspective. Member States held tight control over the ESDP. Although the ESDP bodies had the potential to create a stronger military cooperation, during the period of institutionalization Member States different perspectives had held back internal development.

The initial framework of the ESDP was focussed on making the ESDP operational. The tasks of the Political Security Committee (PSC), the European Military Committee (EUMC), the Civilian Committee (CIVCOM), and the European Military Staff (EUMS) mainly dealt with crisis management. The ESDP bodies were all linked with NATO structure making NATO deeply integrated within the institutional framework of the ESDP. Scholars have debated the influence of ESDP bodies on the institutional development. Although there was a good degree of socialization within these bodies which could influence policy making, the tasks of ESDP bodies mostly dealt with crisis management which focused on short-term.

ESDP ambitions were set out in the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the Headline Goal 2010, which focused on two main areas of ESDP development; the operational aspect and the integrated aspect. The operational aspect dealt with the EU missions and the necessary developments for the ESDP to conduct these operations coordinated and efficient. This was the area of the Council bodies since they were responsible for crisis management. The integrated aspect dealt with cooperation on military capability. This became the area of the European Defence Agency.

The Council bodies did not have any influence on the development of the ESDP. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK) did not agree on the way forward in ESDP operational capacity. The presence of NATO divided the three nations which led to the Member States holding

tight control over ESDP development. The integration of NATO within the ESDP, the joint EU-NATO operations, and the Berlin Plus arrangement also limited influence of the Council bodies on ESDP development.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) became the centre of cooperation on military capabilities through its long-term projects and its collaboration with the Commission. It had the potential to influence ESDP development by showing the way in military capabilities and by working on a European defence market. However, these projects were voluntary based. Member States lacked political willingness which limited EDA's influence.

Permanent Structured Cooperation (Pesco) was added in the Lisbon Treaty to stimulate commitment towards military cooperation through a legally binding mechanism. This would give the EDA significant influence on ESDP development. However, Member States never implemented Pesco.

Introduction

To what extent do institutions influence states behaviour? This question is at the heart of much research into what underlying factors cause institutional development. It is particularly interesting within the field of security since this issue touches the core of states' sovereignty. In the first years of this millennium, the European Union endeavoured on a project of military cooperation with the creation of the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP), in 1998. The ESDP has been an interesting security organisation for the study of institutional development. When the ESDP came into existence, it entered a complex framework of institutions. European military cooperation had been looked upon with suspicion from outside Europe as well within Europe. However the European Union, spurred by France and the United Kingdom, felt that a European security and defence policy was necessary for the EU to be taken seriously as a global actor.

Historical context

Before the establishment of the ESDP, pooling of national sovereignty in the area of defence was never achieved. This is not to say that there were no ambitions among European states to create a security institution autonomous of NATO. Several initiatives, the European Defence Community (1950-1954), the Fouchet Plans (1960-1963), the European Political Cooperation (1970), and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (1990-1992) were all aimed to give Europe an autonomous institution in the field of defence.¹ None of these attempts resulted in a European security institution or, as in the case of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), in a weak security institution.

Between 1998 and 2000, an important step was taken in the creation of a European security institution. The First step in this direction was the 1998 St. Malo agreement between France and the United Kingdom (UK), in which both countries committed to the creation of capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces.² This meant that France and the UK committed to create a European force able to conduct autonomous missions outside NATO. This agreement would be the

¹ S., C., Hofmann, *The fate of the ESDP? Likely to remain in NATO's shadow* (Cambridge 2013) 3.

² Joint Declaration Issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France', *EU Institute for Security Studies* 3-4 December 1998, 1-2, 1.

prelude to the ESDP; a new institution that backed up the St. Malo's ambition of EU-led operations to which all EU Member States agreed during the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki in 1999.³

With the ESDP coming to existence, questions arose about the role this new institution should play within the international community. NATO had been the primary security institution and the ESDP could undermine this. Moreover, military capabilities of EU Member States were not up to standard due to enduring budget costs in defence. As The Balkan conflicts of the 1990s made painfully clear, Europe still relied on US military power.⁴ In the attempt of the Union to strengthen its military apparatus, much obstacles needed to be overcome. The years after St. Malo are characterized by the Union striving to jointly improve their military capabilities.

Meanwhile, The process of European integration proceeded. The round of EU-enlargement of 2004 called for a new Treaty strengthening and deepening the EU. For the ESDP, this period can be seen as the institutionalization phase. In 2003, The European Security Strategy set out guidelines on the ambitions of the Union as a global security actor.⁵ The ESDP was given a clearer direction on the way forward. New permanent bodies, such as the Political Security Committee (PSC), the European Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Military Staff (EUMS), were established within the Council aimed to optimize decisiveness for future operations and to improve military collaboration among Member States. In 2004, the EU signed the new Constitutional Treaty committing to the new ESDP Council bodies on paper. However, two national referenda resulted in a suspension of the Constitutional Treaty. Member States went back to negotiating. In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty was signed. Agreements about the ESDP's structures remained the same as they were in the Constitutional Treaty. Nonetheless, The ESDP had developed further in the years prior to the Lisbon Treaty through the efforts to reach the set-out goals and through experiences from EU-led operations.

Academic Debate

ESDP development fits within the larger academic debate on neoinstitutionalism. Neoinstitutionalism centres on the issue how states behaviour is influenced by institutions. Within neoinstitutionalism,

³ Only Denmark did not join the ESDP since it opted out in any European security institution in 1996 when the Amsterdam Treaty was signed.

⁴ N., Touzovskaia, 'EU-NATO Relations: How Close to 'Strategic Partnership?'', *European Security* 15(December 2006) 3, 235-258, 239.

⁵ European Council, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, 12 December 2003, 1-14.

two opposite interpretations lay at the core of the academic debate; the sociological and the rational choice approach. Sociological institutionalism aims to expose social structures that are confined within the rules and norms of an institution that determine states behaviour. Rational choice institutionalism also believes that institutions influence states behaviour, however they do not determine it.⁶ Applying These different interpretations to the study of ESDP development is useful in the sense that it provides an insight into the path of development of European military cooperation. Defence integration is a precarious issue since it touches the core of a state's sovereignty. An analysis of ESDP development to determine to what extent this development can be contributed to internal factors outside the influence of Member States can be useful in projecting the way ahead of Europe's military ambitions. This thesis will answer the question to which extent the ESDP structures and its personnel influenced the development of the European security institution during the institutionalization phase between 2000-2007. It will do so by analysing two aspects of ESDP development, based on two strategy papers issued when the ESDP became operational, to determine what factors limited and increased ESDP development.

This thesis analyses ESDP development within the context of sociological and rational choice institutionalism. Sociological institutionalism sees organizations as systems of norms and values that over time conform Member States to a certain behavioural standard. Institutions can affect actors' behaviour and preferences through a system of norms, values, symbols and myths that steer Member States towards a certain direction.⁷ The development of the ESDP has been part of a process of legitimacy and not so much as the product of inefficiency.⁸ This entails that states follow a logic of appropriateness rather than a logic of consequences. States' behaviour within an institution is less focussed on self-interested and more focussed on abiding to the system of norms and values. Sociological institutionalist is based on social and cultural studies and developed during the 70's when sociologist contested the separation of the social world with the rational thinking of institutionalism.⁹ John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan are seen as leading authors who developed

⁶ M.D., Aspinwall, G., Schneider, 'Same menu, separate tables: The institutionalist turn in political science and the study of European integration', *European Journal of Political Research* 38(200001), 1-36, 4.

⁷ J., Jupile, J., W, Mattli D., Snidal, 'Dynamics of Institutional Choice', in: O., Fioretos, *International Politics and Institutions in Time* (Oxford 2017), 117-143, 131.

⁸ A.E., Juncos, 'The other side of EU crisis management: A sociological institutionalist analysis', in: E., Gross, A.E., Junco, *EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Roles institutions, and Politics* (Florence 2011), 84-99, 87.

⁹ P.A., Hall, R.C.R, Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', *MPIFG Discussion Paper* (June 1996), 1-32, 14.

sociological institutionalism.¹⁰ Within the field of European integration, sociological institutionalism is aimed to explore cultural features such as capitalism or social democracy which are rooted in the rules and norms of the EU. It therefore has a long-term focus on institutional development.¹¹ Another notion of sociological institutionalism is that agents form preferences endogenously meaning that their preferences are determined by the institution. Therefore, agents are internalized within the institution and cannot be considered as independent actors.¹² Sociological institutionalism has an inductive approach. It conceptualizes a certain theory through case studies that exposes social structures of an institution.

Rational choice institutionalism sees inefficiency of institutions as a key factor of institutional development.¹³ Inefficiency within an institution are caused by cooperation problems which in turn lead to institutional change. Rational choice institutionalism has its roots in economics and developed parallel with sociological institutionalism during the 70's. rational choice theory started focussing on institutions in order to explain United States Congressional matters.¹⁴ Scholars such as Moe, Weingast and Marshall have brought rational choice theory to the stage of institutionalism.¹⁵ From a rational choice perspective, new institutions are formed based on analysing the cost and benefits of investing in a new institution. Therefore, the ESDP was formed as Member States saw the benefits outweigh the costs by assigning the EU with new authorities within the area of defence. Rational choice institutionalists describe this as the principal-agent approach in which the agent assigns certain tasks to the principal. The Member States, alongside all institutions that represent the Member States, are the agents who have authorized the executive bodies of the ESDP to carry out the tasks which were given to them.¹⁶ In this way, actors remain independent of the institution. This contradicts sociological institutionalism which claims that through socialization institution have an influence on their own development. Rational choice research is short-term fixed for its focus on cost and benefits and its absent focus on enduring cultural features. Rational choice uses a deductive approach. It looks at certain events that either confirm or reject a general assumption.

¹⁰ Hall, Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', 14

¹¹ Aspinwall, Schneider, 'Same menu, separate tables', 20.

¹² Ibidem 8.

¹³ J., Jupile, J., W, Mattli D., Snidal, 'Dynamics of Institutional Choice', in: O., Fioretos, *International Politics and Institutions in Time* (Oxford 2017), 117-143, 135.

¹⁴ Hall, Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', 11.

¹⁵ Hall, Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', 11.

¹⁶ N., Klein, 'Conceptualizing the EU as a civil-military crisis manager: Institutional actors and their principals', in: E., Gross, A.E., Junco, *EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Roles institutions, and Politics* (Florence 2011),), 66-83, 69.

Methodology

This thesis looks at key events that determined ESDP development, the issue European Security Strategy and the Headline Goal 2003 and 2010, the 'Tervuren crisis', the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. In accordance with the EU's first common strategy a division is made between the operational aspect of the ESDP and the integrated aspect. This division came forward out of the first common strategy of the EU announced in 2003. The operational aspect covers the execution of EU mission and the necessary developments that were needed for a successful operation. The integrated aspect looks at cooperation between Member States in the build-up of military capabilities. These two different aspects of ESDP development were covered by different bodies within the ESDP and therefore require separate attention. The methodology of this thesis follows a more rational choice institutionalist approach. By analysing the ESDP during the institutionalization phase, it concentrates on short-term development. Therefore, it uses a deductive approach. The thesis covers significant events within the operational and integrated aspects of ESDP development that support the general assumption of the limited influence of ESDP bodies on its own development. As a security institution, Member States preferred to remain in control of ESDP progress and were reluctant in setting aside their national interests. In addition, the ESDP needed to take NATO and its members into account as this was the primary security institution in Europe.

This thesis draws on a variety of primary sources, including multiple publications of Council documents, conference meetings, and reports of the ESDP bodies are used to outline ESDP development and to determine the influence of the ESDP bodies on its own development. These documents are archived in the annually published *Chaillot Papers* by the European Institute of Security Studies (EUISS). several documents containing more detailed information on operational aspects of the ESDP have not yet been open to public. When these documents lose their classified status, a better understanding can be given of the specific factors of ESDP development. However, the Chaillot Papers documents provide a good insight on how the ESDP has evolved in different areas, and will therefore be used extensively in the analysis. However, these papers also tend to be rather general and dominantly optimistic on the progress of the ESDP. Therefore, in specific cases, news articles and scholarly work are used to provide a more comprehensive and critical image of ESDP development.

In chapter one the initial structures of the ESDP are outlined. These structures were tasked to make the ESDP operational and focused on the readiness to conduct EU-missions. Additionally, the process of socialization is explained. This process would support the premise that the ESDP personnel influenced development outside control of Member States. Chapter two outlines the ambitions that

were set for the ESDP through two important documents; the European Security Strategy and the Headline Goal 2010. Out of these documents, the operational and integrated aspects of development come forward. These aspects form the structure of the thesis. Chapter three covers the operational aspect of ESDP development. The influence of socialization on states behaviour, covered in the first chapter, are refuted by demonstrating the limited influence of ESDP bodies on ESDP policy making and the tight control Member States, in particular the Big Three, had on important issues. Chapter four deduces the limited influence of the European Defence Agency within the integrative aspect. However, through the presence of long-term projects the Defence Agency had a potentially greater influence on ESDP development than the ESDP bodies that dealt with the operational aspect. The chapter concludes that national sovereignty of Member States led to halt the potential of the Defence Agency. The final chapter covers the mechanism Permanent Structured Cooperation. This mechanism, agreed on by Member States in the 2004 and 2007 Treaties, would make the Defence Agency less independent of Member States willingness but it encountered the same problem of political reluctance. Until military cooperation within the ESDP moves beyond voluntary-based, limited internal development will remain an issue.

1. The framework of the ESDP

This chapter outlines the initial military framework of the ESDP. An overview of the basic military structures of the ESDP is necessary before the development of the ESDP is analysed. The role of the

different branches within the ESDP needs to be laid out to identify the dynamics of the institution. The European Defence Agency (EDA) will be discussed later. The first bodies that formed the ESDP were set up to make the ESDP operational in the field. These were different from later ESDP bodies that focussed more on defence integration as was the case for the Defence Agency. In addition, the theories on the potential influence of these ESDP bodies show in what way they might have been able to affect ESDP development.

1.1 Making the ESDP operational

At the Helsinki Summit, an agreement was made on the establishment of permanent political and military structures within the institutional framework of the Council. In the Presidency conclusions three main bodies are mentioned; The Political Security Committee (PSC), The European Military Committee (EUMC), and the European Military Staff (EUMS). These were the first military structures agreed upon by the Member States. The Civil Committee (CIVCOM), the PSC, EUMC, and EUMS were to be operative as soon as possible. These bodies were given specific tasks to make the ESDP operational.

The Political Security Committee is the highest advisory organ of the ESDP. It is the 'linchpin' of the organisation and directly informs the Council through meetings with the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). These meetings have been regularly attended by the foreign ministers and, where necessary, by the ministers of defence. The PSC is staffed with Member States representatives on a senior/ambassadorial level. The establishment of the PSC was agreed upon during the 1999 Helsinki Council and its tasks have been further expanded leading up to the 2000 Nice Council. In the Presidency conclusions of the Nice Council, the tasks of the PSC were addressed. All aspects of the CFSP fall under the jurisdiction of the PSC and therefore it plays a central role in the Union's crisis management.¹⁷ In the Presidency Conclusions, emphasis is made on the advisory role of the PSC. They have the right of initiative when drawing up options during a crisis. However, decision-making is reserved for the Council and the Commission:

"Thus, the Council, whose preparatory work is carried out by Coreper, and the Commission alone have powers, each within their own areas of competence and in accordance with procedure laid down by the Treaties, to take legally-binding decisions."¹⁸

¹⁷ 'European Council Nice', (7-8-9 December 2000), in EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 47* (May 2001), 165-211, 191.

¹⁸ 'European Council Nice', 192

The PSC also plays a vital role in the relation with NATO. After the Council of Fiera of 19-20 June 2000, the PSC, at that time still the interim PSC, started biannual meetings with their NATO-counterpart the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Nice Council Conclusions stated that the PSC and NAC meet at least once during each Presidency.¹⁹ The PSC gives direction to its own advisory branches, the EUMC and its civilian counterpart the CIVCOM.

The EUMC provides the PSC of military advice and is, just as the PSC, established within the Council. It is the highest military body of the Council and is composed by Chiefs of Defence (CHOD's) who are represented by their military representatives (MILREP's). Either at request of the PSC or on its own initiative, The EUMC provides military advise and recommendations. During a crisis, the EUMC is responsible for a successful conduct of the operation. A permanent chairman heads the Committee and attends the PSC meetings. The chairman simultaneously functions as military adviser to the SG/HR. The EUMC is based on its NATO's military committee which is designed to provide neutral military advice to its directives.²⁰ MILREP's of Member States that are also a member of NATO are double-hatted in the EUMC.²¹ The Military Committees of both organisations can meet when required as well as the working parties in the form of ad hoc EU/NATO groups.²²

The CIVCOM advises the PSC on civilian crisis management. The CIVCOM was declared operational on 22 May 2000, while the PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS were still in their interim period.²³ This Committee covers the civilian capabilities of the ESDP; police, strengthening the rule of law, and strengthening civilian administration.²⁴ The Council of Maria da Feira mentioned three important civilian tasks for crisis management:

- “
- *acting to prevent the eruption or escalation of conflicts*
 - *consolidating peace and internal stability in periods of transition*
 - *ensuring complementarity between the military and civilian aspects of crisis management covering the full range of Petersberg Tasks* ²⁵

¹⁹ Ibidem 204.

²⁰ C., Bretherton, J., Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (New York 2006) 201.

²¹ M.D.K., Cross, *Security Integration in Europe: How knowledge-based networks are transforming the European Union* (Ann Arbor 2011) 153.

²² 'European Council Nice', 203.

²³ 'European Council Santa Maria de Feira: Presidency Conclusions', (19-20 June 2000), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers* 47 (May 2001), 119-139, 126.

²⁴ 'European Council Santa Maria de Feira', 134.

²⁵ European Council Santa Maria de Feira', 133.

The last task mentioned above points out the importance of coordinating the efforts that are being made by the Union and its Member States to prevent duplication of crisis management. CIVCOM was to play an important role in this.²⁶

The Military Staff works under the EUMC and conducts EU military operations in line of the Petersberg tasks. This includes early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. It provides military expertise to the EUMC and to the SG/HR. Different to the EUMC and the PSC, the Military Staff is a department within the Council Secretariat and is therefore directly attached to the SG/HR as is stated in the Nice Council:

“The EUMS is a Council Secretariat department directly attached to the SG/HR; it is composed of personnel seconded from the Member States acting in an international capacity under the stature to be established by the Council”²⁷

Different from the personnel of the EUMC and the PSC, the EUMS staff are not representatives from Member States. Therefore, the influence of the SG/HR, who directs the Council Secretariat, on the policy of the ESDP increased when the EUMS was put into function.

1.2 ESDP structure and internal influence on development: Brusselization & Socialization.

The basic structure of the ESDP is formed in such a way that the decision-making powers remain within the Council and therefore with the Member States. The EUMS is directed by the EUMC who in its turn is directed by the PSC which answers to the Council. However, each branch has the potential to influence its directives for the advising role they have. The PSC, the EUMC, CIVCOM, and EUMS can only provide limited advice in their field of expertise, but they can play an important role in pointing out certain issues the Council should be concerned about. Furthermore, the ESDP offices were placed in Brussels. The transfer of national delegates towards Brussels can have an effect on the influence of the ESDP structures in policy making, a process called Brusselization. Brusselization is the effect of national policy shifting to Brussels. National delegates working for the different ESDP structures can influence policy by already making decisions in the working groups before these dossiers reach the Council. Ana Juncos and Karolina Pomorska researched the effect of Brusselization in the CFSP structures in 2010. They found that 40-45 percent of the decisions were made within the

²⁶ C., Bretherton, J., Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* 201.

²⁷ ‘European Council Nice’, 198.

Council working groups.²⁸ Brusselization is a well-researched phenomenon and is recognized as a prerequisite for socialization within an institution. The high degree of interaction of national delegates who work in the same building and regularly cooperate can result in a process of socialization. Since Member States have invested in the ESDP, there is a strong need to achieve results. It is therefore important that there are no major conflicts of national interests before certain issues reach the Heads of State in the Council.²⁹ This gives the ESDP branches potential influence in policy making since they have to reach a particular level of consensus before their national leaders decide on the issue at stake. In its own research, Howorth interviewed PSC ambassadors from January to September 2007 about their working style. 63% described their style as 'cooperative and consensus-seeking against 37% describing it as 'rational bargaining'.³⁰ This implies that within the ESDP structures, its personnel contributes to an environment that stimulates European integration from within the institution. The statistical research on socialization within the ESDP is successful in proving that socialization processes are present within the ESDP. However, the structure of these researches do not show to what extent socialization influenced ESDP policy making. The percentages alone are not sufficient to support sociological institutionalist theory.

The assumption that ESDP staff is less concerned in protecting the national interest and more in finding consensus, supports sociological institutionalist theory. Within the ESDP, personnel create a set of norms and behaviour that are aimed at working together to achieve results. Although the PSC, EUMC, and CIVCOM are staffed with national delegates, who still have an obligation to protect national interests, the close interaction results in that to some extent national delegates set aside national interest to bring about success of the ESDP. This is in contradiction with rational choice institutionalism that claims that the agents, the national capitals, remain in control of its principals, the ESDP and its staff. Nevertheless, the Council remains in charge of the final decisions. The ESDP, as it is laid down in the Presidency conclusions, has had an intergovernmental structure and internal influence on defence policy remained therefore constraint. Howorth concluded that the limited but nonetheless significant internal influence on defence policy can be characterized as 'inter-governmental supra-nationalism'.³¹

²⁸ A., Juncos, K, Pomorska, 'Invisible and unaccountable? National Representatives and Council Officials in EU foreign policy', *Journal of European Foreign Policy* 18 (November 2011) 8, 1096-1114, 1102

²⁹ J., Howorth, 'Decision-making in security and defense policy: Towards supranational inter-governmentalism?', *Cooperation and Conflict* 47 (2012) 4, 433-453, 447.

³⁰ Howorth, 'Decision-making in security and defense policy', 445.

³¹ *Ibidem*, 449.

Socialization is an enduring process. In the years after the main structures of the ESDP were established, socialization gradually developed. The influence of ESDP branches on defence policy should therefore have gradually been increasing over the years. The early structures of the ESDP were set up to make the ESDP operational for future missions. Their 'bottom-up' tasks were to inform the Council about crisis situations and the state of the Unions capability to undertake civil-military action. The 'top-down' tasks were to supervise and coordinate the necessary steps that needed to be taken for the Union to become operational. Thus, the focus of the ESDP lay in becoming operational within a short period of time. European defence integration was narrowed down to efficiency in the field. This has raised questions on the actual influence of ESDP structures on defence policy. Even when socialization occurred over the years within the PSC, EUMC, and EUMS, did these bodies gained significant impact on the development of the ESDP? Mai'a Cross argues that socialization within the ESDP structures did not so much effect the way ahead for the institution. In the case of the PSC, Cross argues that a lack of long term planning has narrowed the role of the PSC down to merely crisis management.³² The EUMC and EUMS had a greater influence on ESDP development since the have a greater authority within the task there are given because of their field of expertise.³³ The staff of the EUMC and EUMS have a defensive background in contradiction to the staff of the PSC, which is comprised off ambassadors. Their military advice carried more weight. However, the EUMC and EUMS are restricted in their influence as they only give military advice.

Conclusion

The initial framework of the ESDP was created to make the organization capable of conducting its desired autonomous operations. The ESDP had an intergovernmental structure where the Council had control over the decision-making. The PSC, EUMC, CIVCOM, and the EUMS had an advisory role to its superiors and an executive role in conducting the operations the Council decided to initiate. The EUMS was the only body not under direct control of the Council but its tasks were limited to executing the future EU-operations. Another interesting aspect of the ESDP framework is the presence of NATO. Every ESDP body, apart from CIVCOM, was connected with NATO structures.

Scholars have researched, through interviews with ESDP staff, the level of decision-making on policies before they are presented through the council. Their results indicate that a lot of decisions were already made within the ESDP structures. Through processes of socialization and Brusselization, ESDP bodies could influence policy making. However, others argue that the function

³² Cross, *Security Integration in Europe* 140.

³³ *Ibidem* 156-157.

of the PSC in crisis management limited their influence on ESDP development since crisis management focussed on short-term solutions. Socialization within the ESDP has been well-documented through interviews with personnel. It is important to see if this socialization has led to an internal influence on ESDP Development. Socialization brought more consensus within the ESDP but did not necessarily achieved in strengthening the ESDP from the inside. This is showed later through the development of the ESDP within operational capability and within defence integration. First the ambitions of the ESDP projects are outlined to present a better view on the form ESDP development would take.

2. The ambitions of the ESDP

After the ESDP structures were put into function, the Council set out goals to further develop the institution. These were stated in two important documents which gave the ESDP bodies a direction

for its development. The European Security Strategy (ESS) was a broad guideline in which the role of the EU within the world was described. The new Headline Goal 2010 was based on this strategy paper that gave more specific targets for the ESDP. These targets were still comprised of overall goals. How these goals would be achieved became clear in the years following through the experience of EU operations and through the attempts to make the Union more coherent and coordinated in their military cooperation. Two areas of ESDP development are taken out of the ESS and the Headline Goal that structured the forming of the ESDP. The first area was operational development. This meant that the ESDP needed to become an efficient organisation during its operations. Coordination between the military and civilian capabilities within the field was vital for ESDP's operational capability. The second area was focussed on defence integration among Member States. For the EU to become a strong military power, Member States needed to pool and share their military capabilities to become a coherent and coordinated unit. Specific bodies of the ESDP dealt with these two areas. This chapter analyses the expectations of the ESDP and what form its development would take according to the strategic documents of the ESS and the Headline Goal 2010.

ESS & Headline Goal: interoperability as the horizon for ESDP development

The ESDP Presidency Reports showed the progress that had been made over the years. These reports, issued by the Council Presidency, are based on different documents that have set the agenda for the ESDP. The Helsinki Headline Goal, of which the first one was published in 1999, was one of these documents that made the agenda for the ESDP. In 2003, a new Helsinki Headline Goal was forged and set to be achieved in 2010. The new Headline Goal was more comprehensive than the first Headline Goal that only aimed for the ESDP to perform military operations.

The Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 itself was based on the ESS. The ESS was the first common vision of the Union on strategic issues. It called upon the Union to show itself as a global actor that represented the scale of its population and its role as an economic heavyweight.³⁴ The ESS was issued and brought forward by High Representative/Secretary General (HR/SG) Javier Solana following approval from the council during the Presidency of 12 and 13 December 2003. The ESS set the guidelines for the new Headline Goal:

³⁴ European Council, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, 12 December 2003, 1-14, 1.

*'Member states have therefore decided to set themselves a new Headline Goal, reflecting the European Security Strategy, the evolution of the strategic environment and of technology.'*³⁵

The Helsinki Goal in its turn served as a guideline for the ongoing development of the ESDP. The June 2004 ESDP Presidency Report stated:

*The document "Headline Goal" (Annex 1), approved by the Council on 17 May 2004, sets the main parameters for the development of European military capabilities with a 2010 horizon.*³⁶

The Headline Goal specified the ESS goals for ESDP development. The two documents were approved by the Council and laid down the envisioned progress of the ESDP on paper. These documents provide a good structure for the analysis of ESDP development.

The ESS defined five main threats against which the Union should play its role; terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, organized crime, and failed states.³⁷ The policy implications to address these threats were stated cursive in the document; more active, more capable, more coherent, and working with partners.³⁸ These goals were reflected in the Headline Goal 2010 with three areas where progress was essential to reach these goals. Deployability, sustainability, and interoperability. On the definition of these terms, the Headline Goal stated:

*"Interoperability can be broadly defined as the ability of our armed forces to work together and to interact with other civilian tools. It is an instrument to enhance the effective use of military capabilities as a key enabler in achieving EU's ambitions in Crisis Management Operations. Similarly, deployability involves the ability to move personnel and materiel to the theatre of operations, while sustainability involves mutual logistic support between the deployed forces."*³⁹

Cooperation between Member States' forces and transportation of these forces to the region of operation and during the operation where fundamental requirements for the military capability of the ESDP. Deployability and sustainability were solely directed to the effectiveness and readiness of the EU forces during operations, the term interoperability had a broader meaning. Cooperation between armed forces of the Member States, as stated in the Headline Goal 2010, would need to be done on multiple levels:

³⁵ 'European Council: Presidency Conclusions', (17-18 June 2004), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Paper 75* (February 2005), 84-141, 111.

³⁶ 'European Council', (17-18 June 2004), 104.

³⁷ European Council, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', 2-4.

³⁸ *Ibidem* 11.

³⁹ 'European Council' (17-18 June 2004), 111.

“This approach requires Member States’ to voluntarily transform their forces by progressively developing a high degree of interoperability, both at technical, procedural and conceptual levels. Without prejudice to prerogatives of Member States over defence matters, a co-ordinated and coherent development of equipment compatibility, procedures, concepts, command arrangements and defence planning is a primary objective”⁴⁰

According to the Headline Goal, more cooperation by Member States on strategic issues and defence planning was vital. Furthermore, interoperability between civilian and military instruments of the EU, as well as with other organizations such as NATO and the UN, needed to be strengthened and coordinated for the ESDP to be more efficient and coherent in their decision-making, planning and execution.⁴¹

The ESS and the Headline Goal 2010 set out the path of development for the ESDP. The ESDP development can be categorized in two main areas based on the ESS and the Headline Goal 2010; the building-up of civil-military capabilities and the efficient and coherent execution of EU operations. The building-up of civil and military capabilities, as mentioned above, can be divided in the enhancement of interoperability between Member States’ forces and interoperability between civilian and military capabilities. These two areas of development were represented through different bodies within the ESDP, as was stated within the Headline Goal:

“The relevant bodies of the Council and the European Defence Agency when established, will develop the necessary set of benchmarks and milestones in order to evaluate progress towards the achievement of these objective notably in the field of interoperability, deployability and the other crucial requirements identified above”⁴²

The relevant bodies of the Council and the EDA each got their own role in ESDP development. Interoperability between Member States dealt with strengthening military capabilities through different projects. These projects were aimed to create more coherent EU troops through multinational cooperation. This would be the area of the EDA. The efficient and coherent execution of EU operations dealt with the operational capacity of the EU and focussed on necessary developments for the ESDP to carry out its missions properly. This was the area of the Council bodies.

⁴⁰ Ibidem 113

⁴¹ Ibidem 113-114.

⁴² European Council’ (17-18 June 2004), 114.

Cooperation with other organizations was another important aspect for the ESDP to find its space in the international community. NATO in particular needed careful attention. The ESDP aspired to become a security organization in areas where NATO was the primary institution. Most EU-members were also NATO-members. The ESDP needed to take NATO into account when it stated its goals and ambitions. This is reflected in the presence of NATO in the institutional framework of the ESDP. The bodies of the ESDP all had connections with structures of NATO. The operability of the ESDP was limited because of NATO's presence. The ESDP needed a certain approval of NATO since they remained the primary security organisation.

Conclusion

The ESS and the Headline Goal laid out the role of the ESDP in the global security environment. The way ahead for the ESDP was based on the ESS and further worked out in the Headline Goal 2010. The Headline Goal defined three areas where the ESDP should improve; sustainability, deployability, and interoperability. Sustainability and deployability were directed to the effectiveness of EU forces during operations. Interoperability had a broader meaning and can be divided into an operational and an integrated aspect. Interoperability focused on the cooperation and coordination of the Union's civilian and military capabilities. The operational aspect entailed the coordination between the civil and military capabilities as well as the cooperation between ESDP and other organisation during operations. The Council bodies, who were responsible for the execution of ESDP operation would play a role in this. Better coordination between ESDP and NATO was necessary as well. NATO was the primary security institution and the ESDP needed clear arrangements to avoid tensions among Member States and with the US. The integrated aspect of interoperability was aimed at cooperation between Member States in strengthening the military capabilities of the ESDP. Member States needed to cooperate to address the shortfalls that existed for the ESDP to become a more active and autonomous actor in the international community. This became the area of the EDA. The ESS and the Headline Goal provide the ESDP bodies handles to proceed in developing a stronger and more coherent European security institution.

3. EU Missions: from military to civil-military and the role of the Council bodies

In 2003, the Union made its first appearance on the global stage as a military actor with two EU missions; operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Concordia was executed under the prerequisites of the Berlin-Plus agreement, meaning that the EU could make use of NATO assets to execute its mission properly. Since 2003, the EU has expanded its area of operation as well as its range of missions between military and civilian. Conducting and overseeing these missions comprised most of the work for the PSC.⁴³ The development of the EU missions over the years show how the ESDP and its bodies worked towards perfecting their operability. The PSC, EUMC, and EUMS guided and executed these missions by providing data and advice to the Council. Chapter 1.2 explained the process of socialization within these bodies and its potential influence on ESDP development. Although socialization might have occurred in these bodies, it does not necessarily mean this influenced ESDP development. The PSC, EUMC, and EUMS spend most of their effort in conducting EU-missions, a task that had little influence on ESDP's way forward. Moreover, when important steps were taken in ESDP operational development, Member States made sure they kept control of the process. The negotiations on a more autonomous EU operational capacity in 2003 supports the assumption of limited internal influence.

3.1 The operational tasks of the Council bodies: limited by its executive role

EU missions have developed towards a more comprehensive character combining both military and civilian tools. This ambition was stated in the ESS of 2003:

"In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations."⁴⁴

Civilian and military assets needed to be combined to make the EU an international actor with a broad spectrum of tools. Crisis management was given a broader meaning. Preventive engagement and institution building, using civilian tools, would assist the military aspects in reaching regional stability. The ESDP evolved to a more civil-military institute. In 2003, the ESDP became active with two military operations. By 2009, 4 more military operations were initiated opposed to 14 civilian operations. The ESDP became more invested in their civilian role. In the ESDP Report of December 2005, the request of more funding for civilian capabilities underlined this:

⁴³ Cross, *Security Integration in Europe* 140.

⁴⁴ European Council, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', 12.

“This rapid increase in the EU’s level of activity in the field of civilian crisis-management has highlighted the need for an increase in the CFSP budget and the need to address the issue of financing civilian operation rapidly.”⁴⁵

The first two military operations of the ESDP, in the DRC and in the Balkan, have showed how the Union envisioned its role as international actor. Of the 14 civilian missions, half of them were in the Balkan and the DRC. A strong commitment to its operations through military presence, police training, strengthening the rule of law, and assisting in reforming army structures (Security Sector Reform) would improve the chances of stabilizing the region of interests. Furthermore, it would strengthen the relations of the Union with other regional partners. For the Balkan region, this is clearly shown in the long-term plans for EU-accession of the Balkan states. In the DRC, this is reflected in the efforts to enhance cooperation with the African Union. The Union’s international ambition was aimed at becoming a reliable and more powerful actor in the international community and, through their wide spectrum of operations, strengthening their ties with other regions in the world.

The coordination between civilian and military tools in EU missions became the responsibility of the PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS. At the Göteborg Council of 15-16 June 2001, a Police Action Plan was adopted. Through this Action Plan, the ESDP would have a police staff at its disposal to carry out policing missions. The PSC was tasked to ensure civil-military coordination with the new civilian capabilities coming to the disposal of the ESDP.⁴⁶ Ensuring civil-military coordination meant that civilian and military assets needed to cooperate efficiently during EU-missions. This could be achieved through multiple exercises as was stated in the Seville Council of 21-22 June 2002 in the mandate for the next Presidency:

“...to further strengthen EU’s crisis management mechanisms by taking into account the lessons learned from CME 02, by developing conceptual and practical aspects related to civil-military co-ordination and by taking forward the implementation of the Exercise Programme, and in particular the Council decision of 18 March 2002”⁴⁷

⁴⁵ European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’ (15-16 December 2005), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Paper 87* (March 2006), 400-454, 400.

⁴⁶ European Council, ‘European Council Göteborg’, (15-16 June 2001), in, EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 51* (April 2002), 30-68, 43.

⁴⁷ European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, (21-22 June 2002), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 57* (February 2003), 73-103, 81.

The PSC, as the responsible body for the strengthening of civil-military capacity through field-exercises, limited its influence on further development of ESDP on this aspect. The tasks of the Committee were more focussed on the execution and less on long-term development. The role of the Council bodies in the development of EU-missions is characterized by its vital role in conducting operations. However, progress in operability remained an intergovernmental issue.

3.2 National interests in ESDP's operational development

In his speech to national and European officials during a seminar in Berlin on 29 January 2007, Solana talked about the ESDP development in operational aspects. Solana mentioned three important developments for the operability of the ESDP of the previous years; The creation of a civil-military cell, the introduction of a civilian head of command, and the establishment of a EU operations centre.⁴⁸ These three developments were the order of discussion between the UK, France, and Germany in 2003. The discussions were held within the context of a new Constitutional Treaty expected to be concluded in 2004. At the same time, the Iraq invasion by the US caused a division between different EU members. On 29 April 2003, four Member States who opposed the US Iraq-invasion came with a proposal for ESDP development. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg pleaded for an autonomous EU operations centre located in Tervuren:

“As to EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, and expanding on the different proposals made within the Convention, we believe we must improve EU capabilities with regard to operational planning and conducting operations while avoiding useless duplications and competition between national capabilities. To this end, we propose to our partners the creation of a nucleus collective capability for planning and conduction operations for the European Union.”⁴⁹

This proposal led to opposition from the UK. During an informal meeting of EU defence Ministers, the UK elaborated on its opposition to the earlier made proposal:

“Work under way includes identifying and training “primary augmentees”, expert personnel we would be available to go to any national HQ acting as an EU [Operational Headquarter] OHQ. An EU cell at SHAPE could also play a role here. Augmentees enable all Partners to contribute experienced personnel directly to the

⁴⁸ J., Solana, ‘From Cologne to Berlin and beyond – operations, institutions and capabilities’, (29 January 2007), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 112* (October 2008), 21-25, 23-24.

⁴⁹ ‘European defence meeting – ‘Tervuren’: Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium on European Defence’ (29 April 2003), in EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 67* (December 2003), 76-80, 79.

*operational level of command, while preserving the core role of a “live” national HQ in an EU OHQ. We see this as fundamental to the successful command and conduct of an operation. For this reason and given the cost and duplication involved in a permanent structure, the UK would not support a separate OHQ solely for autonomous EU operations.”*⁵⁰

The ‘Tervuren-crisis’ about an autonomous EU operations centre showed that important developments for the efficiency of EU-missions remained a matter for national capitals. Although not clearly stated, the chances of a EU operations centre undermining NATO were unacceptable for the UK.⁵¹ The ‘Big Three’, France, Germany, and the UK, resolved the issue through a series of negotiations. On 29 November 2003, they published a joint paper that was accepted word-for-word by other Member States at the European Council two weeks later. The autonomous EU operations centre was to be set up as a temporary operational Headquarter (OHQ) within the ESDP structures. The temporary OHQ would be part of the civil-military cell within the EUMS:

“In certain circumstances, the Council may decide, upon the advice of the Military Committee, to draw on the collective capacity of the EUMS, in particular where a joint civil/military response is required and where no nation HQ is identified.

*Once such a decision was taken, civilian/military cell in the EUMS would have responsibility for generating the capacity to plan and run the operation. This would not be a standing HQ. Rather it would be a capacity rapidly to set up an operation centre for a particular operation. The centre would operate separately from the strategic role of the EUMS, under a designated Operation Commander.”*⁵²

The ‘Big Three’ found a compromise with an agreement to create a civil-military cell that could function as an operations centre when no national HQ was identified. An operation Commander for civil-military coordination would be appointed in the event where the EUMC pleaded for a multi-nationalised HQ. The three most important developments of which Solana spoke in 2007 were realized when the three big Member States collided in their national interests. This underlines that real development of the operational capacity of the ESDP occurred only when Member States, in particular the three most influential, decided to align their national interests in order to move forward. Although the influence of the preparatory work by the PSC cannot be determined, the

⁵⁰ ‘Informal meeting of EU defence ministers: British non-paper ‘Food for thought’ (29 August 2003), in: EUISS *Chaillot Papers 67* (December 2003), 204-207, 206.

⁵¹ D., Keohane, ‘ESDP and NATO’, in: G., Grevi, D., Helly, D., Keohane, ‘European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009)’, *EU Institute for Security Studies* (2009), 127-138, 130.

⁵² ‘Joint paper by France, Germany and the United Kingdom: European defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning and operations’ (Naples 29 November 2003), in: EUISS *Chaillot Papers 67* (December 2003), 283-284, 284.

sensitiveness of the issue made it so that national capitals had the final say. In this way, rational choice institutionalism prevails over sociological institutionalism; agents, member states, remain in control of their principals, PSC ambassadors.

The eventual success of the civil-military cell, its operations centre, and designated Commander has been a topic of discussion. The establishment of this cell within the EUMS resulted in an underappreciation of the civilian aspect of operations. The civil-military cell is divided in two branches; the Strategic Planning branch and the Operations Centre permanent staff. The Strategic Planning Branch comprises of 8 military and seven civilian personnel.⁵³ However, within the structure of the EUMS, the civilian personnel became quickly isolated that halted further civil-military integration.⁵⁴ A call for further development of the civil-military cell in the same speech by Solana in 2007 highlighted this:

“Therefore, we need to make sure we are structured and staffed to meet all these different challenges. Important decisions such as those establishing the Civilian/military Cell and the Operations Centre, have to be followed by further developments if we want to be up to the task.”⁵⁵

The operations centre became ready for use in the beginning of 2007 but its first activity was in 2012 in the Horn of Africa, more than 9 years after the first agreement on a EU operations centre.⁵⁶ The difficult path of development and the need for Member States to enforce these developments show that the structures of the ESDP had limited influence on the way forward. Although these examples do not contradict that within the PSC, EUMC, and EUMS processes of socialization occurred, the intergovernmental structure remained intact when important changes took place.

3.3 NATO's presence in EU operations

⁵³European Council, ‘Working for anticipation and coherence: the civil-military cell of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), *ESDP Newsletter* (June 2006), 7-9, 9.

⁵⁴ C., Gebhard, ‘The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate: Recalibrating ESDP Planning and Conduct Capacities’, *CFSP Forum* 7 (2009) 4, 1-14, 12.

⁵⁵ J., Solana, ‘From Cologne to Berlin and beyond – operations, institutions and capabilities’, 23.

⁵⁶ European Union External Action, ‘Common Security and Defense Policy: EU Operations Centre Horn of Africa & Sahel’, June 2015 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-operations-centre/docs/factsheet_eu_opcen_23_06_2015.pdf, last used 12 August 2017, 1-3, 3.

The role of NATO can also be accounted for the limited influence of the Council bodies on ESDP operational development. NATO was heavily integrated within ESDP structures. The EUMC staff was double hatted with NATO's military committee where this was possible, ad-hoc groups between NATO and the EUMC were established to enhance cooperation, and the PSC and the NAC met biannually to uphold transparency. Moreover, the Berlin agreement of 2003 between EU and the Alliance gave NATO the right of 'first refusal' when a crisis occurred in exchange for EU's ability to use NATO's assets when conducting an autonomous operation. During the conflict between Member States about an EU operations centre, the UK opposed it for its potential of undermining NATO. As a result, a watered-down agreement of the concept of an operations centre followed. Another outcome was that an EU cell was established within NATO's HQ (SHAPE). This was to ensure full transparency between the two organizations and strengthening EU-NATO cooperation. Liaison arrangements of NATO within the EUMS were also established.⁵⁷

The opinions about NATO's influence on the ESDP differed between Member States. Operations CONCORDIA in 2003 and EUFOR ALTHEA in 2004 showed that the Union still depended on NATO's assets in high risk operations. NATO represented the transatlantic ties between Europe and the US. Countries such as the UK, Italy and the Netherlands cherished this dearly. France was more opposed to NATO's influence and advocated for a more autonomous role for the Union in security and defence. The issue about an EU operations centre exemplified the division within the EU on its relationship with NATO. The ESDP, being the new security institution within Europe, constantly needed to take NATO's interest into consideration because within the Union, prominent members such as the UK demanded that NATO remained the primary security institution. This gave NATO influence in ESDP development, since NATO members decided policy making for the ESDP and since NATO's structures were integrated within the framework of the ESDP.

The Tervuren-crisis and the disagreement on the Iraq invasion have been indications a troublesome EU-NATO relationship. In addition, the EU-accession of Cyprus in 2004 complicated EU-NATO consultation since Turkey refused Cyprus to attend any EU-NATO meetings. EU-NATO meetings therefore could only discuss joint operations and military capabilities since other topics needed the full attendance of all 25 Member States.⁵⁸ Daniel Keohane has coined the period from 2003 to 2007 'the turbulent years'.⁵⁹ However, since EU and NATO were interwoven with each

⁵⁷ Joint paper by France, Germany and the United Kingdom: European defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning and operations', 283.

⁵⁸ D., Keohane, 'ESDP and NATO', 132-133.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem* 130.

other, cooperation continued in the field. Through the Berlin Plus arrangement in the Balkan, mutual interests in regions in Africa, and the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, NATO has kept investing in the ESDP. Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the third military operation of the EU, was carried out under the Berlin Plus agreement in 2004 and in 2005 the EU and NATO set up a cell in Addis Ababa to coordinate their efforts in Darfur.⁶⁰ In 2007, the ESDP assisted NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with a Police Mission (EUPOL Afghanistan). EUPOL Afghanistan would be conducted with close coordination with NATO's forces⁶¹

Conclusion

Several Council documents outlined that the tasks of the Council bodies were more focussed on properly executing EU missions. This did not leave much room for the bodies to engage in long-term development projects. The earlier mentioned perspective of Cross, who claimed the Council bodies lacked any influence on long-term developments, is generally validated by this.

The civil-military cell, EU operations centre, and civilian head of command were the most significant ESDP operational developments. These issues were resolved during the 'Tervuren-crisis'. Out of this crisis, three statements can be deduced that relate to the question about the degree of influence of the ESDP bodies on its own operational development. First, the Member States held tight control over issues that touched national interests. Second, the slow implementation of the operations centre and the civil-military cell showed that even when Member States agreed on new developments for the ESDP, the bodies could not sufficiently take over to speed-up the process. Third, NATO's interests were protected by Member States who preferred the Alliance being the dominant security institution in Europe. In addition, NATO had certain control on the ESDP through cooperation in several missions and its connection with the ESDP structures. These conclusions support the assumption of limited influence of ESDP bodies on their own development.

A critical note must be given on the sources that confirm this limited influence. The sources that are available do not give a precise insight on the details of the negotiations. Therefore, the exact role of the PSC, EUMC, EUMS during the negotiations on ESDP's operational development remain unclear. Since the 'Tervuren-crisis' dealt with issues that were of national interest, it is a logical

⁶⁰ J., Solana, 'Launch of Operation *Althea* in Bosnia and Herzegovina', (2 December 2004), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 75* (February 2005), 322-325, 323; 'European Council: Presidency Conclusions', (16-17 June 2005), in: *EUISS Chaillot Papers 87* (March 2006), 148-194, 161.

⁶¹ 'EUPOL Afghanistan – Council Joint Action', (30 May 2007), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 112* (October 2008), 146-155, 148.

assumption that Member States had the final say in resolving these issues. Later research, when more detailed documents are available for the public, can present a clearer picture of the influence of ESDP bodies on their own development.

4. The path of ESDP integrative development: ECAP & EDA

Within the operational aspect, there was little room for the Council bodies to have a significant influence on the development of the ESDP. National interests limited the influence of the PSC, EUMC, and the EUMS. The other aspect of ESDP development strived for a deeper integration between

Member States and their military capabilities. Cooperation between Member States in building up military capabilities was a complicated endeavour. A nation's military lays at the core of its sovereignty. Committing to military cooperation meant that Member States would put themselves in a vulnerable position. However, European states were defensively weak and depended too much on NATO, the United States in particular. The Balkan conflicts during the 90s had made this painfully clear and was one of the factors that led to the creation of the ESDP. This gave the bodies of the ESDP who dealt with military cooperation and integration an important but difficult task. Military cooperation was also an answer to rising defence costs of EU States. Pooling resources to strengthen military capabilities had a financial advantage. A consequence was that Member States needed to open their defence industry. The realization on the one hand that military cooperation was crucial for Europe's military strength, and the fear of losing a great part of their sovereignty on the other, characterised the attempts of the ESDP bodies to stimulate defence integration among Member States. The Council showed its willingness to collaborate when they approved on creating a European Defence Agency to work on a more integrated European defence. The EDA developed to an important body of military cooperation and its structure potentially gave it great influence on forging a coherent European defence. However, this initial willingness was not followed by real commitment. Integrative development encountered the same implementation problems as operational development. Within defence integration, the EDA had more potential influence on the development of the ESDP. More autonomy within the ESDP, a long-term planning approach, and its expertise in defence integration gave the EDA more chance to succeed in ESDP development than the Council bodies.

4.1 ECAP: starting the project of defence integration

The Headline Goal 2010 recognised the work that needed to be done on the existing capability shortfalls. These shortfalls had been examined earlier in the so-called European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) groups. The ECAP was brought forward during the Conference of EU Capability Improvement in Brussels on 19 November 2001. The goals of the ECAP groups were to point out the shortfalls to provide a baseline for a new Headline Goal and to serve as an instrument for Member States to improve European military capabilities.⁶² A 'bottom-up' approach was crucial for the ECAP. The statement on the creation the ECAP declared:

⁶² 'General Affairs and External Relations Council', (22 November 2004), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers* 75 (February 2005), 278-316, 302.

“Member States’ commitment would be on a voluntary basis, with due regard for national decisions. The required capabilities will be achieved partly by carrying out national and multi-national projects which are already planned and partly by developing new projects and initiatives to make good remaining deficiencies.”⁶³

The ECAP would become the responsibility of the EUMC. The ‘bottom-up’ approach was ensured by making use of national personnel.⁶⁴ The voluntary basis was needed to ease the Member States’ minds that national decisions could not be contested by the ESDP. Defence integration within the ESDP began with a voluntary character. Member States held control over their own military capability building.

This voluntary basis of integration resulted in a lack of incentive by Member States. An ECAP evaluation was issued during the Council summit on 22 November 2004 that pointed out this lack of incentive:

“4. The Single Progress Report of May 2004 noted that marginal progress had been made since the Helsinki Progress Catalogue 2003. It also stated that Member States had to give considerable extra impetus to the development of capabilities in order to realise the ambitions expressed in the ongoing work on the Headline Goal 2010, including the EU Battlegroups Concept. The Headline Goal 2010 focuses on the qualitative aspects of capability development and calls for the development of a longer-term vision.”⁶⁵

Qualitative improvement remained problematic. The number of troops that needed to fulfil the Headline Goal 2010 was relatively easily achieved.⁶⁶ Therefore, many ECAP groups focussed their efforts on the qualitative improvement of military capability. Also, the ECAP evaluation mentioned that many of the ECAP groups had already reached their maximum result. This is reflected in the Capability Improvement Charts issued in the years following the ECAP evaluation. The 2004, 2005, and 2006 Charts show that of the 64 different ECAP groups only one saw improvement, that of strategic airlift.⁶⁷

The ECAP initiative assisted Member States in giving an overview of the shortfalls that needed to be addressed. ECAP, that worked through project groups staffed with national personnel,

⁶³ ‘Conference on EU Capability Improvement’, (19 November 2001), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 51* (April 2002), 93-102, 98.

⁶⁴ ‘Conference on EU Capability Improvement’, (19 November 2001), 98.

⁶⁵ ‘General Affairs and External Relations Council’, (22 November 2004), 303

⁶⁶ *Ibidem* 304.

⁶⁷ ‘Meeting of EU defence ministers – Summary of the remarks made by Javier Solana’, (17 May 2004), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 75* (February 2005), 70-80, 76-80; ‘Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference’, (21 November 2005), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 87* (March 2006), 346-359, 351-356; ‘Meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers’, (15 May 2006), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 98* (March 2007), 130-146, 142-146.

lacked structure. The 'bottom-up' and voluntary approach that was deemed necessary for Member States to participate did not give ECAP clear goals to work with. Still, ECAP promoted the idea of military cooperation to Member States. The lack of incentives by Member States did not lead to a termination of ECAP. Member States remained invested in the ECAP project.

4.2 The EDA: Military Cooperation through long-term projects

Despite the slow improvement of the shortfalls, the need for ECAP remained significant within the ESDP. ECAP would be essential in the cooperation between Member States within the ESDP and would therefore stimulate military cooperation within the Union. It would show the way for Member States towards multinational solutions in areas where capabilities shortfalls existed. The ECAP evaluation pleaded for an enhanced ECAP. The ECAP Groups had expressed that additional guidance would help to better coordinate their work. The Defence Agency within the ESDP framework would provide this guidance. On 20 June 2003, during the Thessaloniki summit, the council agreed on the creation of the EDA. The EDA would be an intergovernmental agency contributing to the development of defence capabilities, research, acquisition, and armaments.⁶⁸ The HR/SG became the head of the Agency but the Steering Board would be the decision-making body. The Steering Board was chaired by the Defence Ministers of each Member State as well as a representative of the Commission. The EDA was under complete control of the Council, who set the guidelines for the Agency's tasks in defence development. In the proposal for an enhanced ECAP, the EDA needed to play a crucial role as a conscience and catalyst in multinational solutions for the existing shortfalls:

*"Based on the guidelines from the Council, EDA will make suggestions and recommendations to the Council, thereby providing more systemic and analytical approach to the co-ordination and the implementation of ECAP. This could include specific courses of action for individual ECAP Project Groups, which would be assisted by the EDA in such cases."*⁶⁹

The Agency would combine its tasks of assisting in an open European defence market with encouraging Member States to cooperate in improving defence capabilities. The four primary tasks of the EDA were laid out in the Council Joint Action of 12 July 2004:

"The European Defence Agency (the Agency), which should be subject to the Council's authority and open to participation by all Member States, will aim at [1] developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis

⁶⁸ 'European Defence Agency – Council Joint Action' (12 July 2004) in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 75* (February 2005), 175-197, 177-178.

⁶⁹General Affairs and External Relations Council', (22 November 2004), 304.

management, [2] promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation, [3] strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base (DTIB) and [4] creating a competitive European defence equipment market, as well as promoting, in liaison with the Community's research activities where appropriate, research aimed at leadership in strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities, thereby strengthening Europe's industrial potential in this domain."⁷⁰

This technically gave the EDA great potential. It would form the centre of increasing interoperability. The EDA was giving a legal personality as well. This meant it had a certain degree of autonomy in their activities and that opinions or recommendations expressed by the EDA were to be taken seriously.⁷¹ However, the EDA remained an intergovernmental organisation; Member States remained in control of policy-making since they invested in the defence projects of the EDA.⁷² The EDA, different from the ECAP groups, was an agency with its own staff. ECAP groups were staffed with national personnel and worked together with the EUMC and Member States. The EDA had close links with the EUMC but its personnel were not representatives of Member States. Personnel within the Agency did not need to answer to their national capitals. Earlier discussed processes of Brusselization and socialization fit within the EDA structure and the potential it had in effecting ESDP policy in military cooperation. Furthermore, the Agency worked with Member States to find solutions in addressing shortfalls and stimulating military cooperation using their expertise in the field. Their opinions and recommendation carried more weight for the professionalism of the EDA and its personnel. The Steering Board enjoyed a relative similar status since it was not comprised by the Heads of State or their Foreign Ministers but with the Ministers of Defence who, within their governments, were the highest authority on military affairs.

The issue of deployability exemplifies the level of influence the ECAP groups and the EDA had in improving defence capability as well as the limitations that existed. In the same ESDP report where the ECAP evaluation was published, a Global Approach on Deployability (GAD) was issued. The GAD was a proposal from ECAP groups that requested for an urgent improvement in strategic mobility for EU Battlegroups to be operational.⁷³ The Headline Goal 2010 set targets to improve strategic airlift starting with a 'strategic lift joint coordination' in 2005.⁷⁴ Within ECAP, work had been done on this issue since 2003 with considerable results. The 2004 ESDP report showed that multinational and national solutions had been found in the areas of airlift and sealift and that an EU Movement Co-

⁷⁰ 'European Defence Agency – Council Joint Action' (12 July 2004).

⁷¹ F.C., Chang, 'European Defence Agency – Motor of Strengthening the EU's Military Capabilities?', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 16 (2011), 59-87, 71

⁷² Chang, 'European Defence Agency – Motor of Strengthening the EU's Military Capabilities?', 80.

⁷³ General Affairs and External Relations Council', (22 November 2004), 307.

⁷⁴ 'European Council' (17-18 June 2004), 112.

ordination Cell concept had been further developed by the designated ECAP group. The work done by the ECAP group was then handed over to the EDA, in close communication with the EUMC. They had the responsibility to work out the EU Movement Co-ordination Cell to become functional in 2007.⁷⁵ Within the EDA, another initiative aimed at improving capabilities that would benefit deployability was brought forward on 13 October 2005. Ten Member States agreed to cooperate on an air-to-air refuelling project. Initiatives within NATO and the EU had thus far showed no progress. At HR/SG Solana's initiative, ten member states agreed to work together within an EDA supported ad hoc group.⁷⁶ Both initiatives were seen as crucial improvements for the ESDP's deployability. At the Council summit on 15-16 December 2005 Solana expressed the importance of the two initiatives:

*"Meanwhile, progressing the air-to-air- refuelling initiative, tackling the strategic lift shortfalls and pursuing improvements in command, control and communications should be the top priorities during the coming months."*⁷⁷

The EDA regularly reported on the progress made on strategic airlift. As mentioned above, the capability improvement charts show that progress was made on strategic airlift in the years following the GAD. However, this progress was paired with frustration on the lack of commitment by Member States. The same applied to the air-to-air refuelling initiative. At the Council summit on 13 November 2006, Solana expressed his dissatisfaction about the lack of incentive from Member States:

*"Principally, we still lack evidence of real readiness on the part of pMS to take significant steps towards repairing the now familiar capability gaps in any early time-frame. Thus the Hampton Court-inspired efforts to progress Air-to-Air Refuelling and Strategic Lift made no real progress, in the absence of any sign of Member States' preparedness to find ways to fund the significant investments that these capabilities will require."*⁷⁸

The commitment of Member States by agreeing to cooperate did not reflect in funding the EDA projects. Earlier on 20 October 2005, new steps were made in pooling resources on strategic airlift. 15 Member States and two NATO-members, Canada and Norway, agreed on the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS). EU and NATO members together invested in a timely availability of

⁷⁵ General Affairs and External Relations Council', (22 November 2004), 308.

⁷⁶ 'Informal meeting of EU defence ministers and European Defence Agency Steering Board', (13 October 2005), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 87* (March 2006), 290-294, 294.

⁷⁷ 'European Council' (15-16 December 2005), 430.

⁷⁸ 'European Defence Agency – Steering Board', (13 November 2006) in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 98* (March 2007), 375-381, 380.

aircrafts for the deployment of outsized cargo.⁷⁹ Solana, as head of the Agency, was not impressed by the progress. The same was the case for air-to-air refuelling. Although the ten Member States agreed to work together to tackle this issue in the fall of 2005, it would take till October 2012 to launch the project within the EDA.⁸⁰ The gap between agreements on capability improvement and actual progress indicates that Member States were reluctant to put their words into action.

ECAP groups and the EDA served as a platform for improving interoperability among Member States. The potential of the ECAP groups and especially the EDA was confirmed several times within the Council and the Commission. In the ECAP evaluation in 2004, it was already suggested that the ECAP groups should be incorporated within the EDA. This happened in the following years. The European Council Conclusions of 15-16 December 2005 mentioned that most of the ECAP groups had been migrated into the EDA framework and was finalised on 13 November 2006.⁸¹ The two branches within the WEU concerning capability improvement, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and the Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO), were transferred to the EDA in 22 April 2005.⁸² The EDA became the centre for pooling resources to improve interoperability among Member States. However, real results remained absent.

The lack of funding the EDA in their projects, like those of strategic airlift and air-to-air refuelling underlined, resulted from internal issues based on national sovereignty. Multinational cooperation in defence capabilities means that states need to overcome their national security by opening up their defence markets to each other. National defence markets become more vulnerable for competition from outside and national research and technology are less secured in an open-border defence market. The EU institutions believed that a common European defence market could stimulate interoperability and optimize defence expenditures.

On 22 September 2004, the Commission published the Green Paper on defence procurement. It identified three main areas that caused stagnation of the EU defence market; fragmented defence markets, the specific features of defence markets, and limits to the existing legal

⁷⁹ 'Informal meeting of the Defence Ministers', (6-7 March 2006) in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers* 98 (March 2007), 58-61,59.

⁸⁰ 'Air-to-Air Refuelling', <https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/air-to-air-refuelling>, 1 June 2017, last used on 3 July 2017.

⁸¹ 'European Council' (15-16 December 2005), 416; 'European Defence Agency – Steering Board', (13 November 2006), 433.

⁸² 'European Defence Agency: European Defence Agency Steering Board agrees transfer of WEAG/WEAO activities to EDA', (22 April 2005), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers* 87 (March 2006), 85-89, 85.

framework.⁸³ A European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM), as it was called, would increase economic efficiency and competitiveness among European companies. It would assist in strengthening the European Defence Technological & Research Base (EDTIB). The EDEM would harmonize European military capabilities by procuring the same equipment among the Member States thereby improving interoperability. The Commission worked closely with the EDA to develop the EDEM establishing better links between the Commission and the EDA. The EDA would work out proposals to set up a framework for the EDEM.

The priority of this framework was to assure Member States that a common defence market would be beneficial for the EU. Transparency, non-discriminatory, and security of supply were fundamental requirements if the EDEM should succeed.⁸⁴ The Steering Board decided that the framework of the EDEM should be constructed as a voluntary intergovernmental regime.⁸⁵ The principals of this regime were captured in the Code of Conduct that was implemented on 1 July 2006. The Code of Conduct was set up to make participation by Member States voluntary and fair as possible. Creating a platform of cooperation based on willingness of Member States and not on obligatory and legally binding procedures would convince Member States to see the advantages of a common European defence market. Furthermore, if big Member States committed to the Code of Conduct, other Member States would too avoid the risk of being left behind.

The development of the EDEM was brought optimistic by several reports. However, in addition to the success was the enduring plea for Member States to remain invested in the EDEM. Progress was made, but defence procurement remained mostly within national borders. In the years after the implementation of the EDEM and its Code of Conduct, reports on a lack of commitment remained present. States have had the right to refrain from internal market rules when it comes to their national interests. Solana, speaking as the Head of the Agency, mentioned this problem during a meeting of Defence Ministers on 15 May 2007:

“Though comprehensive data are unavailable, we believe that in recent years less than half of defence procurement has been carried out in accordance with the public procurement regulations of the EU internal

⁸³ European Commission, ‘Green Paper – Defence procurement’, (22 September 2004), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 75* (February 2005), 242-250, 243-246.

⁸⁴ ‘European Defence Agency’, (2 March 2005) in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 87* (March 2006), 42-44, 42.

⁸⁵ ‘European Defence Agency’, (21 November 2005), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 87* (March 2006), 359-363, 359.

*market; Member States in general have relied on the 'national security' exception in Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community to make the bulk of their defence purchases on a national basis*⁸⁶

Within the ESDP, the national security exception was seen as an obstacle to improve defence capabilities. The EDA had worked on creating the right conditions to convince Member States that an EDEM would be the best way forward. However, the voluntary and not legally binding character of the Code of Conduct gave Member States too little incentive for opening their national defence markets. The Commission had proposed a Directive in its Green Paper the implementation. The Directive would form a set of rules that would narrow the scope in which Member States could fall back on the national security exception.⁸⁷ The Steering Board responded on the Commission's proposal. The knowledge on what exact segments of the market fall under the national security exception was insufficient to implement a Directive in the short term. The Steering Board did see a Directive as a beneficial instrument for the EDEM in a later stage when the Agency had a better understanding of the defence markets.⁸⁸ In 2009, a Directive was agreed upon that set clear rules on the use of the national security exception in the case of defence procurement. The Directive was an important step of strengthening the EDEM and EDTIB, however the latest report in 2016 still concluded that a significant share of defence procurement proceeds outside the internal market.⁸⁹

The case of defence procurement and the efforts to construct an EDEM demonstrated the growing significance of the EDA within the ESDP as the centre of defence integration. The Commission saw a Directive as beneficial instrument in getting closer to creating a EDEM, and it needed the EDA to realize this. The preparatory work that the EDA had done in the years after the Commission published its Green Paper, gave the Agency a central role in realizing an open European defence market. The EDA became a platform where the supranational Commission and the intergovernmental Council came together to work out a realistic plan for strengthening the ESDP. Working towards an EDEM was a long-term project in which the Agency contributed much to realize it. Addressing shortfalls in military capability, offering solutions for Member States to cooperate, and advising the Council and Commission on the way ahead gave the EDA a prominent role within the ESDP development. Final decisions were made at higher levels, within the Council and the

⁸⁶ 'Meeting of the Defence Ministers', (14-15 May 2007), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 112* (October 2008), 131-142, 139.

⁸⁷ European Commission, 'Green Paper – Defence procurement', (22 September 2004), 249

⁸⁸ 'European Defence Agency', (2 March 2005), 43.

⁸⁹ European Commission, 'Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC on public procurement in the fields of defence and security, to comply with Article 73(2) of that Directive', *COM(2016) 762 final* 30 November 2016 (Brussels), 1-11, 10.

Commission. The reluctance of Member States contributing to the EDEM and the Commission's decision to implement a Directive underlined this. The significance of the EDA is shown in working out these long-term projects showing the way forward for the Union on military cooperation.

4.3 Long term Vision & CPD

In November 2005, the Agency was tasked to work on a Long-Term Vision (LTV). This paper would outline the future security environment, how future ESDP operations would take form, and what kind of military capabilities were needed.⁹⁰ The LTV gave the EDA more room for structured work on improving military cooperation by pointing out a new horizon for the Union's military capability to meet certain criteria. To succeed these criteria, the LTV set out guidelines for capability development. The LTV was published on 3 October 2006 and looked ahead 20 years to the economic, social, and military global situation assessing what role the ESDP should have. ESDP crisis management would be multinational since interventions would be based on common objectives. Interoperability was essential for a successful conduct of multinational and civil-military operations.⁹¹

Member States needed to conform their military forces with each other. This message had been preached numerous times by many EU officials but with the LTV the Agency put forward a new framework to tackle. On 13 November 2006, the Council agreed that the Agency should work out a Capability Development Plan (CPD).⁹² The CPD would be a live document of the EDA where Member States could work out collaboration initiatives based on the LTV:

*"Start developing, in close cooperation with the EUMC, taking into account its role as stated in its Terms of Reference, a Capability Development Plan, with a coherent analysis of future capability needs beyond the Headline Goal 2010, and mutual disclosure by participating Member States of their medium-and-long-term planning in order to identify opportunities for cooperation; participating Member States will decide on the way ahead in this process"*⁹³

The CPD was like the ECAP initiative. It pointed out capability shortfalls and offered Member States a forum where they could find necessary information to set up cooperative projects. Member States decided on the way ahead, as is stated. This was the case with the ECAP project with the difference that the EDA did not work with national personnel. Another difference was the long-term vision that

⁹⁰ 'European Defence Agency – Long-Term Vision', (3 October 2006), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 98* (March 2007), 304-326, 305-306.

⁹¹ 'European Defence Agency – Long-Term Vision', (3 October 2006), 319.

⁹² 'European Defence Agency – Steering Board', (13 November 2006), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers 98* (March 2007), 375-381, 376.

⁹³ 'European Defence Agency – Steering Board', (13 November 2006), 376.

was the foundation of the CPD. The ECAP groups looked to the Headline Goal of 2010 where the CPD was based on the LTV which looked further ahead. This gave projects within the CPD more room for development, although still dependant on the willingness of Member States. The LTV and the CPD gave the Agency more long-term projects. According to Cross, this could eventually lead to a situation where Member States would have less control over integrative development within the EDA.

Conclusion

The EDA became the body within the ESDP with the potential to stimulate European military cooperation. Member States declared their commitment and expressed the significance of EDA's initiatives several times but they did not deliver the needed efforts to make these projects a success. The ECAP groups had started mapping the necessary areas where military capability needed to improve. They succeeded but, as the Capability Charts showed, made no real progress in solving these shortfalls.

When the EDA was set up, it took over the work of ECAP groups and, with incorporating the WEAO and WEAG, became the centre of defence integration. With long-term projects, the EDA proved its strength in showing the way for Member States to improve their military capabilities together. Projects on strategic lift, initiated through ECAP, and air-to-air refuelling showed that the EDA could assist Member States in finding multinational solutions to capability shortfalls. The lack of funding made clear that Member States lacked the political will. The EDA was held back in its development by the Member States.

The Commission had tried to tackle the problem of lack of support from Member States by investing in a European Defence Equipment Market. The Agency became important in working out the Commission's proposal and advising on the way forward to solve national defence procurement. With its intergovernmental structure, as the decision-making body was comprised of the Union's Defence Ministers, and its cooperation with the Commission, the EDA was the centre of supranational and intergovernmental collaboration in defence integration. The progress in creating an EDEM remained slow. The non-binding and voluntary form of the Code of Conduct gave too little incentive for Member States to open up their defence markets. A later Directive by the Commission did not change this. Member States were reluctant to give the EDA more control over their military capabilities.

The Long Term Vision and the Capability Development Plan, based on the LTV, is another example of the Agency showing the way for Member States in improving their military cooperation together. It also showed the durable character of the EDA. As Cross argued, long term planning was lacking within the PSC limiting its influence on ESDP development. This was not the case for the EDA.

The areas where ECAP and the EDA worked on, encountered the same problems the Council bodies experienced. Member States were not willing to take integration to the next level. Agreements were made to collaborate in military projects or a European defence market but this was not followed by the required efforts to carry these initiatives forward. Lack of implementation was in both aspects of ESDP development a recurring issue that supports the rational choice perspective. During the institutionalization phase, ESDP bodies were incapable of influencing their own development. This was due to the voluntary and non-binding character of European defence integration. The failed attempts to change this character prove that Member States controlled ESDP integrative development.

Significant differences do exist between operational and integrative development. First, the EDA worked on long-term projects. This gave the EDA a more active role in the shaping of the ESDP, although it was still restricted by the Council and the Commission. Second, as the EDA became the centre of defence integration, its opinions and recommendation carried much weight because of its military expertise. It can be stated that the EDA had more potential of influencing its area of ESDP development than the Council bodies did. If Member States would take the next step in military cooperation, the integrative aspect of the ESDP could develop more outside the control of their agents.

The analysis of ESDP integration of military capabilities suffer the same limitations as the operational aspect. Documents that could give a better insight to the extent of influence the EDA had in getting results outside control of the Member States are not yet available to the public. A definite conclusion can therefore not be given. The lack of funding and the constant requests of the Commission and the HR/SG of more impetus from Member States do point out that Member States were reluctant in speeding up defence integration within the Union. Further research needs to be done to make the claim of Member States control on ESDP development indisputable.

5. Permanent Structured Cooperation: an end to voluntarism?

During the institutionalization phase of the ESDP, two important intergovernmental events took place where Member States came together to work out new policies that would improve European integration in the area of defence. In 2003, through an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), negotiations began on forging the Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1996), and the Treaty of Nice (2000) had not prepared the Union well enough for the upcoming enlargement. Forging a new institutional architecture was needed for the future functioning of the Union. The ESDP as well became the topic of discussion. The leading-up to the signing of the Constitutional Treaty saw debates between the big Member States on a new mechanism to stimulate military cooperation and to accelerate the European defence project; Permanent Structured Cooperation (Pesco). By 2004, Member States had agreed on the new Constitutional Treaty. However, in 2005 France and the Netherlands rejected the implementation of the Treaty via a referendum. This was a setback for the ESDP since the new mechanism was postponed. Member States were forced to restart negotiations on a Treaty that would be accepted by their citizens. In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty was signed. The ESDP was renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The replacement of 'European' to 'Common' implies that the CSDP became a more coherent institution after Lisbon. The Pesco-framework was officially implemented three years later. Pesco had great potential in bringing Member States closer together on the issue of military cooperation. Much of the issues that were dealt with in the Constitutional Treaty were taken over word-by-word in the Lisbon Treaty.

This chapter explores the influence the new mechanism had on the ESDP/CSDP. These developments were realized through agreements between Member States that gave the ESDP/CSDP a new instrument to work further on strengthening military cooperation within the Union. When Member States showed readiness to take the next step in integrating their defence, the ESDP/CSDP made efforts to stimulate defence integration. However, even when Member States agreed on the implementation of the new mechanism, lack of real commitment remained an issue. Pesco was a procedure concerning interoperability. Since this was the area of the EDA, the chapter focusses on the effects these mechanisms had on the functioning of the Agency.

Permanent Structured Cooperation

In the same paper where France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg proposed the earlier discussed civil-military cell and a EU operations Centre, the four also issued a concept for new forms of cooperation within the ESDP:

“in order to give new impetus to the European Security and Defence Policy, we propose that the Convention on the future of the European Union and the Intergovernmental Conference approve the following principles and integrate them into the constitutional Treaty:

- *the possibility of setting up enhanced co-operation in the field of defence.*
- *A general clause of solidarity and common security binding all member states of the European Union and making it possible to face all kinds of risks concerning the European Union.*
- *The possibility for member states that express that wish to accept supplementary obligations, within the frame of enhanced co-operation and with no obligations for third parties”⁹⁴*

Enhanced cooperation was not new. In other areas outside defence, enhanced cooperation was already implemented. But this form of cooperation within defence was a sensitive issue. Other Member States feared that it would lead to a core group that would conduct military operations under the flag of the Union and thereby excluding other Member States.⁹⁵ While enhanced cooperation was not intended for military operations, the broad description of the concept in the proposal of the four countries caused suspicion among others. The UK gave its opinion on the concept of enhanced cooperation, stressing once more the risks of undermining NATO and fearing the idea of a core group conducting military operations:

“In considering proposals for different forms of co-operation, it is worth recalling that, using the Nice arrangements, the Council has shown itself able to plan, agree, launch and conduct two military operations, one in particular in short notice. (...) The UK is therefore against proposals which would fundamentally alter the balance achieved at Nice, especially any which would imply competition, rather than complementarity, with NATO. We believe the range of options available (...) will mean the Nice arrangements can work effectively in an EU of 25”⁹⁶

During the IGC, under the Italian Presidency on 2 December 2003, a clarification and agreement on enhanced cooperation was made. In the draft Constitutional Treaty, enhanced cooperation was re-named permanent structured cooperation and redefined as cooperation on military capabilities.⁹⁷ PESCO with a new protocol was implemented in the Constitutional Treaty in

⁹⁴ ‘European defence meeting – ‘Tervuren’’ (April 29 2003), 77.

⁹⁵ J., Howorth, ‘The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A Question of Flexibility’ *European Foreign Affairs Review* 9 (2004), 1-25, 4.

⁹⁶ ‘Informal meeting of EU defence ministers: British non-paper ‘Food for thought’’ (29 August 2003), 207.

⁹⁷ ‘Conference of the representatives of the governments of the member states’, (2 December 2003), in: EUISS, *Chaillot Papers* 67 (December 2003), 432-444, 433.

2004. With the Constitutional Treaty rejected by two referenda in 2005, the exact same text on Pesco was put into the Lisbon Treaty.

Pesco was officially implemented after the Lisbon Treaty. Within the ESDP, core groups already cooperated with military capabilities through the EU battlegroups. The battlegroups were part of the Headline Goal 2010 stating that by 2007 battlegroups should be completed and ready to deploy.⁹⁸ The battlegroups were comprised of 1500 troops and could be composed national or multinational. At the GAERC Council on 22 November 2004, the commitment of Member States willing to contribute to the battlegroups was listed. In the period of 2005-2006, a battlegroup needed to be available to the ESDP. The provider of the battlegroups rotated each half year.⁹⁹ The EDA was tasked to work with Member States in filling the battlegroup slots, assisting in finding national and multinational capabilities.¹⁰⁰ Other multinational projects like the earlier discussed air-to-air refuelling and strategic lift show that military cooperation proceeded without Pesco having officially put into action. Since the ESDP had given a green light by the Member States to work on cooperation in military capabilities, it carried on finding multinational solutions to capability needs.

There was a difference in the cooperation between the years before and the years after Pesco was implemented. Under the mechanism of Pesco, Member States had an obligation to comply to the agreements that were made:

“4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitment referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a European decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned.”¹⁰¹

The decision to suspend a Member State from Pesco was based on Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). For it to succeed 55% of the participating States that together comprised 65% of the total population of these States needed to vote in favour of suspending the Member State.¹⁰² This replaced unanimity giving Pesco a more supranational character.

Pesco would be implemented under the framework of the Agency, as was stated in the protocol:

⁹⁸ European Council: Presidency Conclusions', (17-18 June 2004), 116.

⁹⁹ 'General Affairs and External Relations Council', (22 November 2004), 301.

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem 296.

¹⁰¹ *Treaty of Lisbon: Amending the Treaty on European Union and Treaty Establishing the European Community*, 12 December 2007, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12007L%2FTXT>, 1-283, 39.

¹⁰² *Treaty of Lisbon*, 39.

“To achieve the objectives laid down in Article 1, Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation shall undertake to:

(...) (e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency.”¹⁰³

The EDA was strengthened through Pesco. It had more leverage to stimulate Member States in multinational defence cooperation. It did not have any authority in policy-making but through its knowledge and expertise it could show the way forward to Member States.

The potential of Pesco was high and the EDA would become even more important in ESDP development. However, Pesco has till this day not been initiated. Once more, political willingness among Member States has been absent. In 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker made Pesco one of the three main objectives for European foreign policy, trying to breathe life into the neglected agreement of the Lisbon Treaty.¹⁰⁴

Member States are reluctant to push forward with Pesco for two reasons. First, Pesco is designed as a single framework and not on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, Member States need to be fully committed to Pesco. The binding aspect of it puts additional pressure on their commitment. Second, Member States have not decided on whether Pesco should be inclusive from the start or that a core group will lead the way with the rest joining the framework later. In 2010, Belgium, Hungary, and Poland putted forward the Ghent Initiative proposing to give Pesco a top-down approach. In other words, they called for a core group which would eventually lead to convergence.¹⁰⁵ The Ghent Initiative immediately encountered opposition because it would not fix the absence of consensus.¹⁰⁶ The issue has not been resolved. Moreover, France and Germany have been looked at for them to lead the way in realizing Pesco. However, both countries have not shown incentive to tackle the issue any time soon. This is remarkable giving the fact that it was France and Germany who proposed this form of cooperation in 2003. Recently, with the Franco-German engine showing signs of revitalization, a breakthrough in implementing Pesco might become interesting once more.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ *Treaty of Lisbon*, 160.

¹⁰⁴ F., Mauro, ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation: the sleeping beauty of European defence’, *GRIP*, 27 May 2015, https://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2015/NA_2015-05-27_EN_F-MAURO.pdf, last used 13 August 2017, 1-16, 1.

¹⁰⁵ L., Chappel, P., Petrov, ‘The European Defence Agency and Permanent Structured Cooperation: Are we heading towards another missed opportunity?’ *Defence studies* 12(2012) 1, 44-66, 52.

¹⁰⁶ Chappel, Petrov, ‘The European Defence Agency and Permanent Structured Cooperation’, 52.

¹⁰⁷ Mauro, ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation: the sleeping beauty of European defence’, 13.

Conclusion

Through IGC's, Member States agreed on important reforms that would strengthen the ESDP/CSDP. Pesco stood out as a framework that would push military cooperation within the Union. Its legally binding character made it different than other initiatives started within the ESDP before the Lisbon Treaty. The EU Battlegroups were a similar project more aimed at creating military capacity relied on voluntary commitment by Member States. Pesco would obligate Member States to invest in military cooperation. The EDA was given an important role. Their knowledge and expertise gained over the years would show the way to Member States. However, Member States have not been willing to implement Pesco. Not wanting to commit to a single framework on military cooperation and disagreement on the inclusiveness of Pesco have brought a halt to the new mechanism. The difference between commitment by Member States on paper and their actual commitment has been an issue since the creation of the ESDP. The issue of Pesco showed that through IGC's and Treaties, Member States remain in charge of significant development of the ESDP/CSDP. Once agreement is made, the ESDP/CSDP and its significant bodies can carry out these reforms to strengthen the institution. However, Member States lack of incentive make it so that the ESDP/CSDP is in constraint in its influence on its own development. If Pesco might ever be implemented, it could end the apathy of Member States.

CONCLUSION

This thesis researched the degree of influence of ESDP bodies on the development of the institution during the institutionalization phase of 2000-2007. It did so, by employing two important approaches within institutionalist theory that have a markedly different perspective on the role of institutions on their own progression. Sociological institutionalist authors argue that through a continuous process of socialization a system of norms and values evolves that lead Member States to conform to a certain behavioural standard. According to this perspective, institutions influence their members through this process. Rational Choice institutionalism contradicts this by claiming that Member States remain in control within institutions. The concept of principal-agent, formulated by Klein and Cross, is crucial to understanding the rational institutionalist perspectives. 'Agents', i.e. Member States and those bodies within the institution that represent Member States, grant certain task to their 'principals', the bodies of the institution. By analysing the costs and benefits of an institution the agents remain in charge of their principals. A security organization like the ESDP, which touches the core of a nation's sovereignty, would through the perspective of rational choice institutionalism remain in control of its agents since its costs, losing sovereignty, are high.

ESDP's structures and its limited influence of socialization processes on ESDP development

The first bodies of the ESDP were created so that the EU could execute its first autonomous mission. The ambition to collectively improve European military capabilities was not yet incorporated in the ESDP structure. The PSC, EUMC, CIVCOM, and the EUMS all were under strict control of the Council. With exception of the EUMS, all bodies were staffed with national delegates, strengthening the control of Member States on the ESDP bodies. The strict control of the Council held on the ESDP bodies when the ESDP was set up are in line with the rational choice perspective; there could be no degree of autonomy for the ESDP outside the control of Member States. Additional to the control by Member States, the ESDP bodies were also limited by NATO. NATO-ESDP connections, agreed upon during several Council meetings, prevented the ESDP bodies to act on their own without approval of NATO.

Scholars such as Juncos, Pomorska and Howorth, have pointed out that through the processes of 'Brusselization' and socialization, the personnel of the ESDP bodies have focussed progressively less on defending their national interests and more on reaching consensus in policy making. This indicates that indeed a system of norms and values developed within the ESDP which

gave the institution control over its own development. In chapter 1, the research done by Cross implies that the tasks of the ESDP bodies limited their influence in ESDP development. The tasks were mainly directed to crisis management and this lacked any long-term vision. This indicates that socialization processes did not have significant influence on ESDP development.

To determine in which way the ESDP developed, two important documents, published in 2003, were analysed. The ESS and the Headline Goal 2010, that was based on the ESS, set out the guidelines for the ESDP to efficiently respond to threats around the globe. These two documents have served as a guideline for ESDP development. The influence of ESDP bodies on its own development has been determined by extracting the aspects of ESDP development, stated in these two documents, and establishing what role the ESDP bodies had in strengthening the ESDP in the following years. According to the ESS and the Headline Goal, civil-military coordination was one of the important requirements for ESDP operations for the Union to become an overall global actor. The Headline Goal defined three areas through which the ESDP should improve its civil-military character; sustainability, deployability and interoperability. Interoperability was especially important for ESDP development and can be divided in two aspects. The operational aspect of interoperability dealt with coordination between civil and military capabilities and between ESDP and other organisations during operations, NATO in particular. The PSC, EUMC, and the EUMS played an important part in this. The other area dealt with interoperability between Member States and their civil-military capabilities. This entailed defensive integration between Member States forces and strengthening the capabilities for the ESDP. The EDA would be responsible for this.

Consequences of EU-NATO relations on internal influence on ESDP's operational aspect

The development of EU missions during the institutionalization phase remained under tight control of the Member States. The Council bodies, the PSC in special, played an important role in executing EU operations but important developments touched the national interests of Member States therefore limiting internal influence on the operational aspect. The three major developments were the civil-military cell, a EU operations centre, and a civilian head of command. These were resolved during the 'Tervuren Crisis' in which France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg clashed with the UK on these matters. The UK opposed because the new additions to the operational aspect of the ESDP would undermine NATO. The three big Member States of the Union needed to align their national interests. The ESDP bodies were left outside these decisions showing that their influence on important developments was limited when Member States, especially the Big Three, saw their national interests jeopardized.

The 'Tervuren Crisis' also showed that NATO's interests were protected through EU Member States who saw the Alliance as the primary security institution. NATO's presence within the ESDP structures as well through EU-NATO arrangements further limited the ESDP bodies influence. The integration of NATO within the structures of the ESDP as well as the Berlin-Plus arrangement, that gave NATO the first right of refusal in any operation, constrained the ESDP. This is not to say that NATO had a negative influence on the ESDP. This standpoint differed with each Member State. The ESDP still relied heavily on NATO's assets since its own military capacity was still relatively weak. Although EU-NATO relations encountered some trouble during the institutionalization phase, this did little to the cooperation between the Alliance and ESDP. Through operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and through mutual interest in regions in Africa, ESDP and NATO kept close cooperation.

The notion of sociological institutionalism does not hold up in the operational aspect of the ESDP. Although socialization was present within the ESDP bodies, this did not affect ESDP development. The bodies had an important role in conducting EU operations but through clashes of national interest and a constant presence of NATO, development remained tightly in the hands of the Member States. European defence integration only proceeded when Member States deemed this was necessary. ESDP bodies had little say in this. During the institutionalization phase, the UK, as a firm supporter of 'NATO first', was most responsible for holding back defence integration. With the UK leaving the Union, NATO and the ESDP operating more independently from each other lies in the line of prediction. The findings of this thesis have pointed out that the ESDP has conducted more civilian than military missions. The military missions executed by the ESDP are all supported by civilian operations that are in line with the goals stated in the ESS of the EU striving to be a global actor with a broad spectrum of tools. NATO has remained the primary security institution in Europe during the first phase of the development of the ESDP. This has contributed to the civil-military role the ESDP has been given. The ESDP developed its operational aspect in areas where EU-NATO relations would not be jeopardized. In line with the findings of this thesis that the ESDP will remain more civilian oriented than military because external influence has limited the ESDP to develop more towards an autonomous military security institution. NATO has played a large part in ESDP development during the period when the ESDP was given its permanent structures. A different stance of Member States towards NATO will be necessary before the ESDP will become a more balanced civil-military institution.

Analysing integrative development

ECAP groups showed that within the ESDP a drive for defence integration was present. Their tasks were limited in pointing out the shortfalls but they were successful in outlining where capability improvement was needed within a short period of time. These projects also show that, like in the operational aspect, development of defence integration was halted by Member States.

When defence integration became more institutionalized through the EDA, bigger projects were taken on but with similar results. The EDA became the centre for European defence integration and got results in multinational projects such as air-to-air refuelling and strategic lift. Opening up national defence markets to create the EDEM developed the EDA in an agency where the Commission tried to push defence integration to a higher level. The voluntary and non-binding framework of the Code of Conduct have held control on defence integration with Member States. The reluctance ECAP groups encountered from Member States was not sorted out by the EDA.

It has been the long-term approach, used for the projects the EDA carried out, that has given it the potential to develop the ESDP into a more integrated and autonomous institution. The Long Term Vision, created by the EDA, showed that the Agency strived to engage Member States to jointly improve military capabilities. The Capability Development Plan, a live document similar like the previous ECAP groups to find multinational solutions that would reach the goals outlined in the Long Term Vision, functioned as an instrument for the EDA to encourage Member States to take defence integration serious.

The Green Paper, issued by the Commission with assistance of the EDA, aimed at giving the same structured long-term framework to the functioning of the EDEM as the Capability Development Plan did with the Long Term Vision paper. These documents gave the ESDP bodies responsible for defence integration the potential to influence their own development. These projects, through decisions made by Member States, were voluntary and legally non-binding, giving Member States who were reluctant to improve military collaboration room to slow down the integration process.

As Cross argued, institutional bodies are more open to processes of socialization when they engage in projects with a long-term vision. Therefore, the EDA might become more influential in ESDP development when obstacles of voluntarism and non-binding commitment are overcome.

The division between the operational and integrative development of the ESDP that has been made in this thesis outline important similarities and differences relevant to the projected path of ESDP development. ESDP development has been limited in both aspects by a reluctance of Member States. An important difference is the long-term character of integrative development that has been missing in operational development. With a long-term planning, there has been a lesser need for direct results in the integrative aspect. This has made integrative development a more low-issue politic than operational development giving more autonomy to ESDP bodies responsible for defence integration. Operational development has remained more under the control of Member States because issues within this aspect have been more vulnerable for immediate concerns, i.e. the ESDP competing with NATO, than has been the case in the integrative aspect of ESDP development. During the institutionalization phase, The ESDP has gained more control on the integrative aspect of development through the EDA than on the operational development where Member States held tight control on the ESDP bodies.

The future success of Pesco

The obstacles in integrative development of voluntarism and non-binding commitment have been tried to resolve through Permanent Structured Cooperation. During the negotiations on a new Treaty in 2004, an important new mechanism was agreed on that would accelerate the process of defence integration within the ESDP. The mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation would implement a legally binding character to cooperation on military capabilities. This would be a breakthrough in ending the voluntary character of projects within the EDA which had slowed down cooperation. In 2005, two referenda rejected the Constitutional Treaty which postponed the implementation of Pesco. When in 2007 the Lisbon Treaty was signed, Member States still agreed on adding Pesco to the Treaty. Pesco would be implemented under the framework of the EDA, strengthening the EDA to a certain degree where they could overcome Member States reluctance and have significant influence in ESDP development. Although Member States all agreed on Pesco, it was never initiated. France and Germany, who initially proposed Pesco have shown reluctance to realizing this new mechanism.

Recently, there have been new signs of Pesco being implemented. France and Germany have both stated their willingness to commit to the binding framework and the Council has shown its readiness to truly implement Pesco by the end of 2017. This would be the next step in European defence integration. The history of Pesco, as is analysed in this thesis, gives the impression the now-called CSDP is at a crossroad. The lack of implementation the ESDP has encountered during the

institutionalisation phase, might favour a more sceptical stance towards an enactment of Pesco. Yet, two points can be made that could give an optimistic perspective on Pesco's success. First, the UK leaving the EU. Developments in the operational aspect have shown that UK has held back the ESDP becoming more autonomous. The UK leaving the Union might change the dynamics in favour of a more integrated European defence cooperation. Second, as the integrative development has shown, long-term projects have had more potential to succeed. Pesco, since it was agreed during the Constitutional Treaty in 2004, has been a long-term project that might go into its next phase. If Pesco is implemented and if Member States engage into the new framework, European defence integration would take a significant step away from protecting national interest and towards a shared European defence policy.

Discussion and further research

The outcomes of this thesis have shown that during the institutionalisation phase agents, i.e. Member States, have held control of their principals, i.e. ESDP bodies. Although socialization processes were in motion during this period, they have not influenced ESDP development. With Federica Mogherini stating that the ESDP/CSDP will move forward to a further integrated institution and with Germany and France again confirming their commitment to Pesco, this thesis has become even more relevant in determining the projected path of European defence. More can be said about the socialization process within the ESDP/CSDP when relevant papers, which are now classified, become available for research. This thesis made use of documents in which public statements were made that, due to the issue of protecting national interests, do not fully reveal the intentions of Member States regarding the development of the ESDP. Future research could give a more explicit insight on internal ESDP development during the institutionalisation phase. Sources that have not yet been declassified could clarify to what extent decisions were already made by delegates of the ESDP bodies outside the control of Member States. In the area of operational development of the ESDP, further research on the differences and similarities between the military cultures of Member States could point out if the ESDP will cooperate with NATO in a lesser degree and if ESDP bodies will become more influential in operations through a possible autonomous EU-operations centre without the need of a national HQ. If such operational aspects are strengthened, it would underline that differences of national interest between Member States has been responsible for the limited development of the operational aspect of the ESDP.

The issue whether EU defence integration complies with rational choice or with sociological theories is of fundamental value since external developments currently pressure EU states to pool

their military capabilities. Politicians have stated their concerns of an 'European army' that would be outside the control of the individual Member States. As this thesis concludes that Member States held tight control on ESDP both the operational and the integrative aspect of development during the phase when ESDP structures were institutionalised, it lays in the line of prediction that the ESDP/CSDP remains an intergovernmental institution. This being said, the lack of implementation by Member States has been a dominant force in holding back internal ESDP development. Once mechanisms, such as Pesco, will do away with this lack of implementation, ESDP/CSDP bodies will have more control on their own development at the expense of Member States. Whatever commitments will be made regarding Pesco in the upcoming period, it will have an historical impact on the European defence integration.

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