

# THE AUTHORITARIAN CONSENSUS

A Legacy of Military Rule in Latin America



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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis provides an analysis on the legitimization of military dictatorships, through the process of consensus building. Military rule was strongly prevalent throughout Latin America during the 1970s-1980s. In both Argentina and Chile, the military regimes tried to inspire consensus among its population, however with different results. The aim of this thesis is to explain these different outcomes, by looking at four different factors. By constructing a theoretical framework, which is later applied through a comparative case study analysis, it becomes clear that in Argentina the military government failed to achieve economic success, relied on ideology and nationalism, lacked strong leadership and was antagonistic in its foreign policy. In contrast, the military dictatorship in Chile successfully stabilized the economy, more pragmatically appealed to ideology and nationalism, relied on strongman leadership and maintained a cooperative foreign policy. These results illustrate that consensus building in Argentina had failed, while it was relatively successful in Chile. These findings are useful, as the focus on consensus building can predict potentially aggressive behaviour of military dictatorships. Also, the theoretical framework provided in this thesis can be used to analyse other historic cases of military dictatorships.

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## I- INTRODUCTION

August 12, 2016, marked the 2000<sup>th</sup> march of the ‘Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo’ in Buenos Aires. In the Argentinian capital the mothers and grandmothers whose children and grandchildren ‘disappeared’ during the military dictatorship, between 1976 and 1983, still march weekly in order to commemorate the victims and to demand justice for what happened more than thirty years ago.<sup>1</sup> For over seven years, Argentina was under control of a military regime that would later become known as ‘*la última dictadura*’, the last dictatorship. This final manifestation, before democracy became the norm, was perhaps the most brutal. By unleashing a wave of political repression, the kidnapping, torture and murder of ‘enemies of the state’ resulted in thousands of civilian casualties. This period of state terror, dubbed as the ‘Dirty War’, sparks controversy even today. For example, the Argentinian Pope Francis (2013-present) has been criticized for his silence in the face of the state terror during the period of military rule.<sup>2</sup>

This troubling period in Argentine history ran parallel to events that took place in its neighbouring country Chile. In 1973, the democratically elected socialist President Salvador Allende was ousted through a military coup. What followed were years of military rule under General Augusto Pinochet, which ended only in 1990. Like its Argentinian counterpart, the Pinochet regime structurally committed human rights violations of vast proportions and heavily suppressed political opposition. In January 2010, twenty years after the Pinochet regime was removed from power, the ‘*Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos*’ opened in Santiago.<sup>3</sup> Dedicated to the memory of the victims that suffered under the military dictatorship, the museum presents an accurate record of the crimes of the Pinochet regime. Moreover, since September 2014, the Chilean government started to make serious efforts to remove the 1978 amnesty law that prevented the prosecution of government officials involved in human rights abuses in the first five years of the military dictatorship.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> “Argentina Plaza de Mayo Groups Holds 2.000th Rally,” *BBC News*, August 12, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37055394> [all digital sources have been last accessed on May 29, 2017].

<sup>2</sup> Uki Goni and Jonathan Watts, “Pope Francis: Question Remains over His Role During Argentina’s Dictatorship,” *The Guardian*, March 14, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/14/pope-francis-argentina-military-junta>.

<sup>3</sup> “Sobre el Museo,” Museo de la Memoria y los Dererchos Humanos, <http://ww3.museodelamemoria.cl/sobre-el-museo/>.

<sup>4</sup> “Chile Moves to Overturn Pinochet-Era Amnesty Law,” International Center for Transitional Justice, <https://www.ictj.org/news/chile-moves-overturn-pinochet-era-amnesty-law>.

What this makes clear, is that both Argentina and Chile are still very much confronted with their past today. These current events in both countries are a testament to the dark days that not only these two nations, but also many other countries in Latin America found themselves in during the 1970s-1980s, such as Uruguay (1973-1985) and Brazil (1964-1985).<sup>5</sup> Although this era of severe political repression and grave human rights violations seems to be over in Latin America today, there have arisen other more recent cases of military dictatorships all across the world. In fact, Thailand is currently ruled by a military regime, ever since a ‘*coup d’état*’ in May 2014.<sup>6</sup> Hence, it is very probable that military dictatorships will continue to rise to power in the future. The intentions and behaviour of these military dictatorships vary widely however. For this reason, more research is necessary in order to gain a better understanding of these different regimes. The rise and fall of military dictatorships can largely be explained through the support and opposition these regimes receive in the form of legitimacy.

The goal of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the relationship between military dictatorship and legitimacy, by focussing on the process of consensus building within society. As consensus building is the central focus of this thesis, an explanation of the concept of consensus is deemed necessary. Within social science there exists a dichotomy between ‘consensus theory’ and ‘conflict theory’. The main difference is that consensus theory states that common interests and ideas form the fabric of social order, while conflict theory believes that this social order is kept through coercion and oppression.<sup>7</sup> To consensus theorists the absence of conflict is the result of a general agreement with the status quo, while for conflict theorists this is only the result of domination practices of superiors upon subordinates. In this thesis I position myself within this debate and contend that military dictatorships not only rely on coercion and oppression, but also try to inspire consensus among its citizens. The main reason for this is that consensus can provide a government with legitimacy, which bestows upon an authority the ‘right to rule’.<sup>8</sup> Understanding how military dictatorships build consensus by enhancing their legitimacy, can help us realize why these regimes come to be and how the international community should deal with them.

The main research question that I try to answer in this thesis is: “How can we account for the differences in consensus building in the military dictatorships of Argentina and Chile during

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<sup>5</sup> Gilbert W. Merckx and Karen L. Remmer, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” *Latin American Research Review* 17 (1982): 3.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas Fuller, “Thailand’s Military Stages Coup, Thwarting Populist Movement,” *The New York Times*, May 22, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/world/asia/thailand-military-coup.html>.

<sup>7</sup> Bert N. Adams, “Coercion and Consensus Theories: Some Unresolved Issues,” *American Journal of Sociology* 71 (1966): 714.

<sup>8</sup> David Copp, “The Idea of a Legitimate State,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 28 (1999): 5.

the 1970s-1980s?”. In order to answer this main research question, the core analysis of this thesis is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, I construct a theoretical framework through the combination of four different variables, in order to provide a comprehensive account on the process of consensus building in military dictatorships. These four variables are: Firstly, socio-economic stabilization and the creation of performance legitimacy. Secondly, the rejections and appeals to both ideology and nationalism. Thirdly, the consolidation of leadership and establishment of internal coherence. Fourthly, partnership and conflict through the use of foreign policy. In the second chapter, I use this theoretical framework to analyse the case of Argentina under the rule of a military dictatorship from 1976 till 1983. Next, in the third chapter, I apply the theoretical framework to the case of Chile under military governance from 1973 till 1990. Lastly, in the final chapter, I provide a conclusion in which I summarize my analysis and give a clear and definite answer to the main research question.

The reason why I have chosen to focus on the cases of Argentina and Chile is because both military dictatorships arose to power in very similar circumstances, but differed widely in their style of governance. Consequently, consensus was built in different manners. The legacies of these regimes reaffirm this fact, as the military dictatorship in Argentina lasted seven years and is widely condemned by the Argentine people today. In contrast, the military dictatorship in Chile lasted nearly seventeen years and up until this day has divided Chileans, as it is condemned by some and praised by others.<sup>9</sup> Hence, while the case of Argentina has proven to be a story of undisputed failure, the case of Chile can be considered a story of relative success. By highlighting the differences in consensus building in both countries, I wish to determine how we can account for these contrasting legacies.

This thesis is based around a comparative case study analysis, focussing on social and historical processes. In conducting my research, I combine a qualitative and quantitative research design. Methodologically, the focus is primarily on qualitative analysis, incorporating relevant quantitative data where it allows me to substantiate my arguments. I make use of secondary sources through an extensive literature study, as well as primary sources. Primary sources include original government documents, truth commission reports, newspaper articles, public statements and speeches, interviews, and declassified interagency communication reports on intelligence. Moreover, the use of theory forms the foundation of this thesis, as it allows me to interpret the data in order to answer the main research question.

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<sup>9</sup> Gideon Long, “Chile Still Split over General Augusto Pinochet Legacy,” *BBC News*, September 9, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-24014501>.

As this thesis focusses on the concept of consensus building, a theoretical clarification is appropriate here. Within international relations theory, social constructivism is the most suitable theoretical lens for the concepts that I concentrate on. Social constructivism stresses the importance of ideas over material forces. According to social constructivists, international relations is not so much shaped by structures and actors, but more by the meaning we attach to them.<sup>10</sup> Hence, the world we live in is socially constructed, meaning it is not static, but continuously changing through historical processes. In this context-driven approach, the focus is primarily on norms, identity and culture.<sup>11</sup> It opposes other traditional international relations theories like liberalism and realism, in that it perceives international relations to be continuously redefined through social interactions. Furthermore, considering the centrality of consensus in this thesis, social constructivism can explain how this consensus within society is socially constructed. From a social constructivist perspective, civilian consensus is not solely determined by political and economic realities, but more by how people interpret these different realities. Hence, perception is a crucial factor when it comes to consensus building. This perception shapes the opinion that people have about the legitimacy of authority and can be influenced through the processes that I highlight in the theoretical framework.

The theories I use in this thesis are jointly bound in that they all refer back to the concept of legitimacy and the process of consensus building within society. First of all, I use Max Weber's theory on the 'three types of legitimate rule'. This prominent German sociologist claimed that there are three 'pure' forms of legitimized authority. Traditional authority produces legitimacy on the basis of tradition and custom, where power is 'inherited'. Charismatic authority creates legitimacy on the basis of the personal and individual qualities of a leadership figure. Rational-legal authority promotes legitimacy on the basis of bureaucratically grounded legal procedures, which form the foundation of power. Weber noted however that in practice legitimacy is always based on an overlapping combination of these three pure types.<sup>12</sup>

I additionally refer to Guillermo O'Donnell's perspective on 'bureaucratic-authoritarianism' on the definition of military dictatorships. The bureaucratic-authoritarian model provides an insightful perspective on how military dictatorships function and what differentiates them from other authoritarian regimes. Moreover, from a social constructivist perspective, it elaborates on how certain perceptions of civilians, like the preceding level of threat, are essential to the rise

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<sup>10</sup> Thomas Diez, Imad El-Anis, Lloyd Pettiford and Jill Steans, *An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2010), 183.

<sup>11</sup> Diez, El-Anis, Pettiford and Steans, *An Introduction to International Relations Theory*, 200.

<sup>12</sup> Craig Matheson, "Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy," *The British Journal of Sociology* 38 (1987): 212.

of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes.<sup>13</sup> According to O'Donnell, in the process of consensus building, the perceived level of threat prior to a military *coup d'état* is essential in legitimizing military regimes. The higher the perceived level of threat to society during the preceding regime, the higher the civilian support for the military to intervene in order to remove this threat.

The 'perfect dictatorship' theory, by Jorge I. Domínguez, is another theory I work with. This theory states that a dictatorship needs to display a number of traits in order to be effective. First, it needs to be installed through consolidation and stabilization of power. Then, it has to be institutionalized through the delegation of power and establishment of a new code of conduct. Finally, it should seek a strategy of governance, using appeals and engagement with the population.<sup>14</sup> If a dictatorship is successful in fulfilling these three steps, it will be met with little societal resistance according to Domínguez. Consensus is built through these procedures and will hold as long as they remain to be respected by the dictatorial government.

Finally, I use the 'diversionary theory of war'. This theory states that governments can try to shift national attention away from domestic problems, by instigating an international conflict. According to this theory, governments believe that war can result in a 'rally around the flag' effect which unifies the country and enhances the legitimacy of its leaders.<sup>15</sup> Former governmental criticism reduces, as nationalist sentiment increases. Diversionary politics can be seen as a way of building consensus, as it tries to compensate for a lack of legitimacy. Hence, in the diversionary theory of war, war making is a tool of consensus building.

With this thesis I wish to contribute to the academic debate surrounding military dictatorships. Over the years, there has been an extensive debate on the effectiveness of dictatorships as a form of governance in the path towards development and its influence on consensus. On the one hand, there are those who argue that dictatorships can provide the much needed political and economic stability necessary to achieve economic growth, thereby building consensus within society. Political scientist, Stephen White, states that the most important factor in determining the legitimacy of a government is its economic performance, as it can justify the restriction of civil liberties.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, renowned philosopher, John Stuart Mill, stated that in developing countries a 'benevolent dictatorship' is preferable to a democracy, as it is more

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<sup>13</sup> Gilbert W. Merkx and Karen L. Remmer, "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited," *Latin American Research Review* 17 (1982): 7.

<sup>14</sup> Jorge I. Domínguez, "The Perfect Dictatorship: Comparing Authoritarian Rule in South Korea and in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29- September 1, 2002), 1.

<sup>15</sup> David Sobek, "Rallying Around the Podesta: Testing Diversionary Theory Across Time," *Journal of Peace Research* 44 (2007): 29.

<sup>16</sup> Stephen White, "Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy," *World Politics* 38 (1986): 463.

effective in dealing with the early difficulties of development.<sup>17</sup> Likewise, social scientist, Mancur Olson, claims that the self-interest of the dictator is equal to that of the people and that a dictatorship is a necessary intermediate stage in the evolution of a state from anarchy towards democracy.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, there are those who believe that a dictatorship inevitably descends into oppression and corruption, thereby undermining development and consensus within society. Economic historian, Jan Luiten van Zanden, concludes that dictatorship in the long-term always results in economic disaster. According to him, governmental policies start to shift from national interest towards private interest as time progresses, thereby devastating the country's economy and civilian consensus.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, political economist, George B.N. Ayittey, believes that dictatorship is a self-defeating system of governance, as it is inherently plagued by inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement. This dysfunctionality makes a regime incredibly instable, forcing it to use repression, thereby hindering development and damaging consensus.<sup>20</sup> Within this thesis I highlight that both sides within this academic debate illustrate relevant aspects and that the two forces of building up and breaking down consensus always interact within a dictatorial government, influencing legitimacy. In fact, this 'rise and fall' mechanism behind consensus is determined directly by the four different factors that I highlight in the theoretical framework that follows.

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<sup>17</sup> John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (London: John W. Parker and Son, West Strand, 1859), 7.

<sup>18</sup> Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development," *The American Political Science Review* 87 (1993): 569.

<sup>19</sup> "Dictators Ruin Economies," RNW Media Archive, <https://www.rnw.org/archive/dictators-ruin-economy>.

<sup>20</sup> George B.N. Ayittey, *Defeating Dictators: Fighting Tyranny in Africa and Around the World* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2012), 33.

## II- THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### Introducing the Theoretical Framework

In order to provide more insight on the differences in consensus building in military dictatorships, in this chapter I construct a theoretical framework which provides a deep and clear representation of this process. A combination of four different factors allows me to interpret the data of the two cases that I analyse in the next two chapters. Moreover, I believe that this theoretical framework is not limited only to the cases of Argentina and Chile. The goal of this thesis is to construct a theoretical framework which can provide data for any other similar historic cases of military dictatorship. I contend that these four factors together allow for a comprehensive account on the process of consensus building, as they all directly contribute to the emergence and evolution of consensus. However, before addressing the issue of consensus, a short introduction to the concept of military dictatorship ought to be provided.

The Encyclopaedia Britannica describes a dictatorship as a “form of government in which one person or a small group possess absolute power without effective constitutional limitations”.<sup>21</sup> According to political theorist, Carl J. Friedrich, when rule is based upon a confiscation of power, and the capacity of those in power to resist against attempts to remove them, power is dictatorial.<sup>22</sup> The term dictatorship is derived from the Latin term ‘dictator’, which in the Roman Republic was an official who was entrusted with full authority over the state, in case of military crisis. However, the modern dictatorship as we know it today came into existence many centuries later. In the 19th century, two new forms of government started to emerge, replacing absolutist monarchies. Gradually, dictatorships and constitutional democracies became the new norm of governance within the international system.<sup>23</sup>

In Latin America, so-called ‘*caudillos*’ started to appear after many countries became independent. *Caudillos* were military chieftains who wanted to maximize personal power in the resulting chaos after the Wars of Independence in Latin America.<sup>24</sup> These *caudillos* were notorious for their repressive style of governance and their personalist type of rule. What defines ‘*caudillismo*’ is its legitimacy on the basis of charisma, to put it in Weberian terms, meaning that authority is built upon individual personal qualities. Many scholars believe that Latin America has maintained a long tradition of *caudillismo* even till today. For example, Fidel

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<sup>21</sup> “Dictatorship,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/dictatorship>.

<sup>22</sup> Carl J. Friedrich, *Totalitarianism* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), 41.

<sup>23</sup> E. Wilson Lyon, “Dictatorship and Democracy in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century,” *The American Scholar* 8 (1939): 447.

<sup>24</sup> Jack C. Plano and Ernest Rossi, *The Latin American Political Dictionary* (Santa Barbara: Clio Press, 1980), 129.

Castro of Cuba (1959-2008) was often considered to be a personalist dictator, with traits similar to those of the old *caudillos*.<sup>25</sup>

A second type of dictatorship emerged during the twentieth century. With the rise of new political ideologies like communism and fascism, one-party dictatorships started to take hold in the international system. China under the Kuomintang (KMT) was an example of a one-party dictatorship.<sup>26</sup> In contrast to personalist dictatorships like the *caudillos* in Latin America, one-party dictatorships derive political power from a dominating party, rather than an individual. Within this system, other opposing parties are either forbidden or controlled to such an extent that they are not able to form a threat to the ruling party.<sup>27</sup> It must be noted, however, that it differs from 'totalitarian' regimes like Nazi Germany, in that one-party dictatorships are only concerned with political power and leaves social liberties at least to some extent intact to its civilians.<sup>28</sup>

What binds personalist and one-party dictatorships is that they are 'civilian dictatorships', meaning that the ruling individual or party has to create its own institutions of power from within civil society.<sup>29</sup> This stands in contrast to the third and final type of dictatorship that I will highlight, which is the military dictatorship. With this type, dictatorships are created out of the structure of the armed forces within a country. In a military dictatorship, the government is formed by a group of military officers. In Latin America this group was referred to as a military '*junta*', or council.<sup>30</sup> This type of dictatorship was present all over Latin America during the twentieth century. Traditionally, in countries prone to severe economic and political instability and corruption, the military is the most reliable stable institution.<sup>31</sup> Hence, it sees upon itself the duty to intervene, whenever the political and economic order within a country is threatened. As an allegedly politically neutral party, the military intervenes in most cases through a *coup d'état*, after which it tries to 'cure' the country of economic, political and social illness, by installing a military government. According to Guillermo O'Donnell, a military dictatorship can be framed as a 'bureaucratic authoritarian' state, meaning it is characterized by political coercion and economic normalization, a reliance on technical rationality, and the closure of

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<sup>25</sup> Irving Louis Horowitz, "Castro and the Caudillos," *The National Interest* 91 (2007): 70.

<sup>26</sup> "Nationalist Party: Chinese Political Party," Encyclopaedia Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nationalist-Party-Chinese-political-party>.

<sup>27</sup> Gustav Lidén, "Theories of Dictatorship: Sub-Types and Explanations," *Studies of Transition States and Societies* 6 (2011): 54.

<sup>28</sup> Lidén, "Theories of Dictatorship," 52.

<sup>29</sup> William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2013), 359.

<sup>30</sup> Lidén, "Theories of Dictatorship," 54.

<sup>31</sup> James Ockey, "Thailand in 2006: Retreat to Military Rule," *Asian Survey* 47 (2007): 134.

democratic access for ‘popular’ interests to the government bureaucracy.<sup>32</sup> Traditionally, military rule is impersonal.<sup>33</sup> Unlike in personalist *caudillo* style dictatorships, military governments are formed by multiple officers, with no direct hierarchy between them.

To conclude, I have classified dictatorships into three pure types. However, what is crucial to take into account, is that in reality these forms of dictatorship frequently overlap. It is rarely possible to classify a dictatorship as a purely personalist, one-party or military dictatorship. For example, a dictatorship can be based on military rule, but still possess characteristics of personalist rule. In the two cases I present in chapters III and IV this will also become evident. Now that I have introduced the theoretical framework and established what differentiates a military dictatorship from other forms of dictatorship, let us take a closer look at the four factors that directly contribute to the process of consensus building within this form of governance.

### **Socio-Economic Stabilization and Performance Legitimacy**

Perhaps the most important factor when it comes to consensus building in military regimes is the economic and political situation prior to, and during the military dictatorship. As stated above, the main ‘*raison d’être*’ of military dictatorships is to restore the socio-economic order in the country when it is threatened. Proclaiming a permanent ‘state of emergency’ in order to legitimize a ‘rule by decree’ is crucial to this end.<sup>34</sup> From a social constructivist point of view, however, it is not only the threat itself, but also the perception of this threat which determines how civilians respond to a military takeover of the government. This perception of threat is determined by two factors: the level of economic and political instability and the rate of increase of these instabilities.<sup>35</sup>

O’Donnell believes that in bureaucratic authoritarian states this perceived threat is crucial in determining consensus. According to him, the higher the level of threat towards the socio-economic order in ‘pre-coup’ states, the higher the civilian consent with a military intervention.<sup>36</sup> At the same time it is also true that higher threat levels result into slower economic recovery in the ‘post-coup’ situation, as for example levels of inflation and corruption are much higher. This means that with low threat levels, economic recovery is easier, but at the

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<sup>32</sup> Gilbert W. Merkx and Karen L. Remmer, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” *Latin American Research Review* 17 (1982): 6.

<sup>33</sup> Karen L. Remmer, “Neopatrimonialism: The Politics of Military Rule in Chile, 1973-1987,” *Comparative Politics* 21 (1989): 149.

<sup>34</sup> Roberto Barros, “Dictatorship and Rule of Law: Rules and Military Power in Pinochet’s Chile,” in *Democracy and the Rule of Law*, ed. José María Maravall et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 191.

<sup>35</sup> Merkx and Remmer, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” 11.

<sup>36</sup> Merkx and Remmer, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” 8.

same time takes away the *raison d'être* of military dictatorships, creating more demand for a return to democracy. Nevertheless, economic success is crucial in order to build consensus within society. As highlighted before, from a social constructivist perspective, it is mainly about the civil perception of this economic success. For this reason, I believe that it is more about relative, rather than absolute economic success. The larger the pre-coup destabilization of the economy, the larger the margin in which a military dictatorship can achieve relative economic success, while at the same time not losing its relevance in the eyes of its civilians. Hence, it is more about the rate of economic recovery, rather than actual recovery.

Moreover, what is typical in military dictatorships is the application of a 'technocratic' system of governance, especially in the realm of economics. Technocrats are experts in the field who are in control of the governmental decision-making process.<sup>37</sup> They are selected on the basis of their intellectual competences and form an elitist group who collectively decide upon policy decisions. In areas the military traditionally has not much knowledge about or experience with, like the economy, technocrats are appointed to power. Their independence from partisan politics enhances the claim that they are acting solely in the name of national interest, thus legitimizing the military dictatorship.<sup>38</sup>

Within academia, the link between economic success and consensus building is called 'performance legitimacy'. It means that government legitimacy is derived from socio-economic performance.<sup>39</sup> What is crucial with this concept is that economic success comes at the cost of political freedom and civil liberties. This political-economic trade-off means that rights like freedom of speech, freedom of press and the right to vote are compromised upon in order to promote economic success. A recent example is that of China, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) derives its legitimacy from its relative economic success, which to Chinese civilians justifies the repression of their civil and political rights.<sup>40</sup> In fact, in military dictatorships it is argued that it is exactly these democratic principles which result in political and economic instability in the form of populism.

A core goal of the military dictatorship is the removal of popular sectors in society. Populism in this context refers to an anti-elitist form of political activation, which aims to fundamentally

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<sup>37</sup> R.S. Milne, "Technocrats and Politics in the ASEAN Countries," *Pacific Affairs* 55 (1982): 404

<sup>38</sup> "Technocrats: Minds Like Machines," *The Economist*, November 19, 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/21538698>.

<sup>39</sup> Stephen White, "Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy," *World Politics* 38 (1986): 463.

<sup>40</sup> Yuchao Zhu, "Performance Legitimacy and China's Political Adaptation Strategy," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 16 (2011): 130.

reform the state to end social and economic inequality within a country.<sup>41</sup> However, in countries where military dictatorships intervene it is argued that populist policies have resulted in severe economic and political destabilization. Again, we see here that the perceived threat that this populist sentiment causes towards society, which is the level of political instability and its rate of increase, is crucial in determining how military dictatorships deals with it. Higher levels of perceived threat result in more repression and therefore more political deactivation.<sup>42</sup> Acts of repression can range from non-violent acts like political exclusion, to severely violent acts directed against proclaimed ‘enemies of the state’. Hence, repression undermines the consensus of the direct and indirect victims.

In summary, I have established that military dictatorships try to build consensus by attempting to act as a stabilizer for both the economy and the political situation within a state. By appointing depoliticized technocratic experts in certain sectors of governance, like the economy, relative stabilization of the socio-economic order can be achieved. This relative economic success then helps to legitimize acts of repression and political deactivation of populist sectors. The mechanism behind this economic-political trade-off is called performance legitimacy. Important is to remember that too much absolute stabilization of the economy and political situation can result in a breakdown of consensus, as it is exactly this necessity for stabilization which forms the military dictatorship’s *raison d’être*.

### **Ideological and Nationalist Rejections and Appeals**

Social constructivists believe that ideas make up the perception that people have of the world that surround them. To be more specific, it is intersubjective ideas which shape world politics.<sup>43</sup> One of these shared idea systems is ideology. Ideologies are shared doctrines, beliefs and ideals which form the basis of economic and political theory and reflect the needs of social groups like classes, cultures and states.<sup>44</sup> Hence, ideology inspires consensus among its citizens as it forms the foundation of the economic and political decision-making process within a state.

Ideology plays a crucial role for military governments. Most importantly, the rejection of a certain ideology forms a key component of the consensus building process. According to the

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<sup>41</sup> Joel Horowitz, “Populism and Its Legacies in Argentina,” in *Populism in Latin America*, ed. Michael L. Conniff (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 2012), 23.

<sup>42</sup> Gilbert W. Merx and Karen L. Remmer, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” *Latin American Research Review* 17 (1982): 14.

<sup>43</sup> Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 166.

<sup>44</sup> Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 167.

military government, it are these ideologies that fuel populist sentiments within a state and polarize society, and therefore threaten socio-economic order. For this reason, in many of these military dictatorships a purging of society takes place through the ‘eradication’ of the so-called ‘cultural enemy’.<sup>45</sup> The cultural enemy refers to all traces of the pre-coup ideology within society. By kidnapping, torturing and murdering ideological enemies of the state, and prohibiting certain political parties and censoring the media, even organizing book burnings, military dictatorships try to eliminate pre-coup ideologies.<sup>46</sup> In this case, political repression builds consensus under the pretext of securitization of society. This is also the reason that many military governments frame themselves as saviours of the country. For example, the military coup in Greece in 1967, was referred to as the ‘revolution to save the nation’, claiming that communist conspirators had infiltrated the government.<sup>47</sup> Similarly, the military government in Ghana (1972-1975) defined itself as the ‘National Redemption Council’.<sup>48</sup>

Especially during the Cold War, ideology was one of the main motivations for military coups. The schism between capitalism and communism resulted in political polarization in many countries. However, many experiments with communism and socialism did not bring about the socio-economic prosperity that the people had hoped for. Hence, the failure of these ideologies facilitated the rise of anti-communist military rule, especially in Latin America. As a counterweight to socialism, these military dictatorships naturally embraced pro-capitalist policies. In these regimes, socialist oriented economic policies like import substitution industrialization (ISI) were replaced by more capitalist oriented attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) in order to achieve modernization.<sup>49</sup>

According to Jorge I. Domínguez, an essential component of the ‘perfect dictatorship’ is the appeal to ideology. This is because ideology can prevent the civilian opposition to take on independent standards in order to hold a dictatorship responsible.<sup>50</sup> Hence, ideology directly contributes to consensus building within society. Similarly, nationalism is used as a form of legitimization. Patriotism is another tool in which commitments can be asked of civilians

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<sup>45</sup> Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, *Democratie en Dictatuur in Latijns-Amerika* (Amsterdam: Thela Publishers, 1996), 107.

<sup>46</sup> Koonings and Kruijt, *Democratie en Dictatuur in Latijns-Amerika*, 108.

<sup>47</sup> George Bistis, “Golden Dawn or Democratic Sunset: The Rise of the Far Right in Greece,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 24 (2013): 36.

<sup>48</sup> Maxwell Owusu, “Economic Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and the Military: Ghana’s National Redemption Council,” *Africa Today* 22 (1975): 32.

<sup>49</sup> Gilbert W. Merx and Karen L. Remmer, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” *Latin American Research Review* 17 (1982): 3.

<sup>50</sup> Jorge I. Domínguez, “The Perfect Dictatorship: Comparing Authoritarian Rule in South Korea and in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29- September 1, 2002), 2.

without having to rely on coercion techniques.<sup>51</sup> For example, in Spain, the dictator Francisco Franco (1936-1975) tried to inspire consensus by building a unified national identity. Through repressing the traditional cultural diversity in Spain, Franco tried to homogenize Spain's national identity in order to promote patriotism.<sup>52</sup> Love for '*la patria*', the mother country, then allowed for political repression to be seen as a necessary sacrifice in order to protect the country from internal and external dangers.<sup>53</sup>

In closing, I have established that ideology forms a central part of the consensus building process in military dictatorships. First of all, through rejection of the pre-coup ideology, which according to the military government is tainted with populism and has resulted in economic and political chaos. In Latin America these 'dangerous ideologies' were communism and socialism. Second of all, by adopting an opposing ideology which, in the context of the Cold War in Latin America, was capitalism. Moreover, nationalism is another, sometimes complementary tool which military dictatorships can use in order to build consensus.

### **Consolidating Leadership and Establishing Internal Coherence**

A government needs to be unitary and effective in its leadership. If the unitary character or decision-making capabilities of a government are questioned by its civilians, it will most definitely result in a breakdown of consensus. Especially in the first months after a military coup, the position of the new military government is fragile. This is also due to the fact that there is the possibility that the armed forces are not unanimous in the decision to remove the previous government from power. For example, in Brazil in 1964, fighting ensued between soldiers loyal to the previous government and soldiers in favour of the new military rulers.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, the political chaos that comes with an illegitimate transfer of power from the previous government to the military government, creates a window of opportunity for counter-coups from within the armed forces. Such was the case in Nigeria in 1966, where after an initial coup in January, an opposing group of military officers initiated a counter-coup in July that year.<sup>55</sup> Thus, it is vital to remove any grievances that might be present within the military ranks.

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<sup>51</sup> Jorge I. Domínguez, "The Perfect Dictatorship: Comparing Authoritarian Rule in South Korea and in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29- September 1, 2002), 17.

<sup>52</sup> Geoffrey Jensen, *Irrational Triumph: Cultural Despair, Military Nationalism and the Ideological Origins of Franco's Spain* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2002), 8.

<sup>53</sup> Jensen, *Irrational Triumph*, 29.

<sup>54</sup> Domínguez, "The Perfect Dictatorship," 7.

<sup>55</sup> Max Siollun, *Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria's Military Coup Culture 1966-1976* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2009), 97.

Doing away with competition within the ranks is therefore the first step to consolidate unity within a military dictatorship. As the ruling junta is made up by multiple officers, personal preferences need to be overcome for the greater good of establishing a stable government. One way of doing this is to step away from the 'pure' type military dictatorship as described earlier and to allow for an incorporation of a more personalist style of rule. In a military-personalist hybrid dictatorship, hierarchy is established within the junta, with an individual as the undisputed leader of the military government.<sup>56</sup> Hierarchy creates stability. However, the establishment of hierarchy can result into conflicts between those who aspire to assume the leadership. An alternative is to create a system of a power-sharing, rotating presidency between senior officials for leadership over the government, with a set timeframe.<sup>57</sup> This way, power is equally distributed between senior officials, while leadership is still consolidated. The final option is not to appoint any military official as head of state, but instead choose to let a civilian assume the position. In this situation 'de jure' power over the government is with the civilian president, but 'de facto' power is with the military forces. This was the case in the civic-military dictatorship in Uruguay (1973-1985), where the pre-coup civilian president was allowed to remain head of state, but was controlled and severely limited in his functions by the armed forces.<sup>58</sup>

Also, in order to maintain stability in the future it is desirable to establish a clear plan of succession of leadership over the military government, in order to live beyond the founding junta, thereby creating continuity.<sup>59</sup> According to Weber, continuity is a crucial part of 'traditional' legitimacy. In traditionally legitimized governments, consensus is derived from the continuation of rule, as people have accepted it as societal custom.<sup>60</sup> A clear plan of succession reduces ambiguity surrounding the transfer of power process, preventing the possibility that a transfer of power can turn violent.

To sum up, I have stated that strong and stable leadership is essential in the consensus building process, as it allows the military government to act unified and effective. Especially in the first months after the coup, leadership needs to be consolidated in order to prevent internal conflict.

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<sup>56</sup> Gustav Lidén, "Theories of Dictatorship: Sub-Types and Explanations," *Studies of Transition States and Societies* 6 (2011): 54.

<sup>57</sup> Eric Frantz, "Comparative Leadership in Non-Democracies," in *Comparative Political Leadership*, ed. Ludger Helms (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 302.

<sup>58</sup> Edy Kaufman, *Uruguay in Transition* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1979), 94.

<sup>59</sup> Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Perfect Dictatorship: Comparing Authoritarian Rule in South Korea and in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29- September 1, 2002), 5.

<sup>60</sup> R.W. Smith, "The Concept of Legitimacy," *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory* 35 (1970): 19.

This can be done through appointing an individual military official as leader, establishing a system of rotating presidency between military officials, or allowing for a civilian president to remain in power, acting under strict control of the military. Finally a plan of succession of leadership needs to be established in order to transfer power without the threat of violent escalation.

### **Partnership and Conflict through Foreign Policy**

So far I have only discussed how military dictatorships build consensus within society on a domestic level. However, equally important is to consider how this consensus is built through international means. Foreign policy forms an integral part of how military governments try to legitimize themselves. Here I draw the distinction between policies of international cooperation and international conflict.

Military governments can strengthen their domestic position by gaining international support. This support is often given in the context of political and ideological alignment with foreign governments. Especially in the fight against those who seek to overthrow the military government, foreign governments can supply the military government with the necessary resources to resist rebellion. These resources range from technical support and military aid, to economic trade deals and direct financial support. For example, although not a military dictator, Cuba's Fidel Castro made a deal with the Soviet Union, so that military, diplomatic and economic support was given to his government.<sup>61</sup> It must be noted, however, that this can result in a situation of dependency. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, so did the Cuban economy, as the result of their economic dependence on the export of sugar to the Soviet Union. Also, this dependency gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to force Castro to apply the Soviet model of communism, rather than his own 'Cuban road' to socialism.<sup>62</sup> Hence, economic crisis and betrayal of ideals can result into delegitimization of the government.

International conflict is another form of consensus building through foreign policy. Here the process of 'othering' constitutes a central aspect. From a social constructivist perspective, othering is an essential part of the construction of identities, as a distinction is made between insiders and outsiders of an identity group. This distinction gives a group its own identity, in contrast to the 'other'.<sup>63</sup> Conflict can enhance this distinction by antagonizing the other and

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<sup>61</sup> Kosmas Tsokhas, "The Political Economy of Cuban Dependence on the Soviet Union," *Theory and Society* 9 (1980): 320.

<sup>62</sup> Tsokhas, "The Political Economy of Cuban Dependence on the Soviet Union," 358.

<sup>63</sup> Thomas Diez, Imad El-Anis, Lloyd Pettiford and Jill Steans, *An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2010), 197.

thereby reaffirming group identities. One of these group identities is nationality, and it is on the basis of this identity signifier that military governments try to build consensus through conflict.

This assumption underlines the ‘diversionary theory of war’. According to Jaroslav Tir, political leaders who are losing in domestic popularity create foreign conflicts in order to legitimize themselves. By diverting public attention away from domestic economic and political problems, territorial conflicts can bolster nationalist sentiment within society.<sup>64</sup> The othering of the enemy results in more cohesion within the nation, thereby legitimizing the military dictatorship in the fight against this enemy. This means that war forms a practical tool that can be used whenever consensus is lacking. Hence, the higher the domestic economic and political instability, the higher the dissatisfaction with the military government and the higher the probability that this military government will create an international conflict.

Especially in a military dictatorship, the one area in which a military government should be able to perform well, is in war. At the same time, this also means that if a military government proves to be unsuccessful in war, the legitimacy of not only the military government, but also the armed forces itself, will take a significant blow that might prove to be fatal for civilian consensus. For this reason, I believe that territorial conflict is only considered to be a last resort tool of consensus building, as the stakes for a military government are so high.

To conclude, I have highlighted how military dictatorships try to build consensus through foreign policy, both in the form of international cooperation and international conflict. International cooperation is mainly established through political and ideological alignment with foreign governments to provide and receive military, economic and diplomatic support. Though it must be noted that this cooperation can result in dependency relationships, thereby possibly damaging consensus. International conflict, however, is based on the othering of foreign governments, in which war is an essential tool. International conflict can divert attention away from domestic problems and increase nationalist sentiment. But, especially for military governments this involves a high risk, as defeat can result in a total breakdown of consensus.

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<sup>64</sup> Jaroslav Tir, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict,” *The Journal of Politics* 72 (2010): 413.

### III- CONSENSUS BUILDING IN ARGENTINA

“I wish to waive any claim to originality in closing this indictment. I wish to use a phrase that is not my own, because it already belongs to all the Argentine people.

Your Honors: “Never Again!” (Nunca más).”

- *Closing statement of Chief Prosecutor Julio César Strassera at the Trial of the Juntas, September 18, 1985*

#### **A Brief History of Military Rule in Argentina from 1976 to 1983**

Throughout the twentieth century Argentina experienced five military interventions in state governance before ‘*la última dictadura*’ established itself. This pendulum between democracy and military dictatorship was largely the result of a loss of faith in democracy and the call upon the military to restore order in the country when democratic governments had failed. The events preceding 1976 echo the history of earlier military interventions as a civilian president was removed from power through a military *coup d’état*.

In 1943, Colonel Juan Domingo Péron took part in a military coup to remove the allegedly corrupt President Ramón Castillo. From 1946 till 1955, and again from 1973 till 1974, Péron served as the president of Argentina. Péron opposed both communism and capitalism and proposed a ‘third way’, using nationalism and populism to end social injustices, while also achieving economic growth. Péron’s legacy remains controversial to this day, as while he did try to eliminate poverty in Argentina, he also severely limited constitutional liberties. In fact, he openly sympathized with fascist dictators like Benito Mussolini from Italy and Francisco Franco from Spain.<sup>65</sup> When Juan Domingo Péron died in 1974, his wife Isabel Martínez de Péron became the new president of Argentina. However, she lacked the charisma and experience her husband had. In the already instable Argentina she inherited from her husband, inflation started to soar and guerrilla activity heavily increased.<sup>66</sup>

This was reason enough for the military to step in once again. On March 24, 1976, Isabel Péron was ousted through a military coup. A military junta was installed who referred to itself as the ‘National Reorganization Process’, or simply ‘*el Proceso*’.<sup>67</sup> Army General Jorge Rafael Videla, together with Navy Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera and Air Force Brigadier General

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<sup>65</sup> Frank Owen, *Peron: His Rise and Fall* (London: The Cresset Press, 1957), 12.

<sup>66</sup> Jonathan C. Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina* (New York: Facts on File Inc., 2003), 235.

<sup>67</sup> Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina*, 237.

Orlando Ramón Agosti headed this junta. General Videla was assumed the position as president of the nation.<sup>68</sup> Under President Videla, Argentina was confronted with a military dictatorship unparalleled in brutality compared to earlier military regimes in the country. The ‘Dirty War’ saw the continuation of violence directed against socialist sympathizers, which had already started in 1974. From 1976, the junta promised to eliminate the guerrilla threat in a way which can only be described as a campaign of state terror. The junta defined socialism as a cancer that had to be removed surgically.<sup>69</sup> Between 1976 and 1983, an estimated 30.000 people were killed or ‘disappeared’.<sup>70</sup> Moreover, the military also imprisoned, tortured and raped proclaimed ‘enemies of the state’ by the thousands. General Iberico Saint Jean, the governor of the Buenos Aires province stated, “first we kill all the subversives, then we kill their collaborators, then their sympathizers, then those who are indifferent, and finally, we will kill all those who are timid”.<sup>71</sup>

Despite relative initial economic success, the military junta was not able to improve Argentina’s economic situation in the long-term. From 1980 onwards, the economy started to contract and inflation went up again. In 1981, Argentina saw the consecutive appointments of three new presidents, of which Leopoldo Galtieri was the last.<sup>72</sup> By this time, the grave human rights violations of the military regime had been exposed not only to Argentinians, but also the rest of the world. Hence, domestic and international pressure on the regime increased. Political resistance combined with economic failure put the junta in a peril position and it was argued that the government needed to do something drastic in order to remain in power.

Then, in April 1982, President Galtieri ordered the army and navy to invade the Falkland Islands. Despite being a part of the United Kingdom (UK), Argentinians considered this small archipelago as part of Argentina. President Galtieri hoped that the UK would not fight back as they were making significant defence cutbacks. Moreover, Galtieri expected the United States (US) to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, meaning that any act of war against a country in the Americas would be considered an act of war against the US.<sup>73</sup> This was not the case, as the US did not help in order to prevent any disagreement with the UK. UK Prime Minister Margaret

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<sup>68</sup> Luis Alberto Romero, *A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 215.

<sup>69</sup> Jonathan C. Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina* (New York: Facts on File Inc., 2003), 240.

<sup>70</sup> Ed Stocker, “Top-Secret Files Shed New Light on Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’,” *The Independent*, November 3, 2013, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/top-secret-files-shed-new-light-on-argentina-s-dirty-war-8923307.html>.

<sup>71</sup> Thomas C. Wright, *State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina and International Human Rights* (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 107.

<sup>72</sup> Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina*, 244.

<sup>73</sup> Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina*, 244.

Thatcher decided to dispatch a naval task force in order to reclaim the territory. After seventy-four days the Argentinian government surrendered. This humiliating defeat was the final straw and the military junta saw itself forced to resign.<sup>74</sup> In October 1983, general elections were held and democracy returned to Argentina, this time for good.

Since then, the country has struggled to come to terms with what happened during the seven years *la última dictadura* was in power. The ‘*Nunca Más*’ report revealed the true extent of the human rights violations committed by the regime.<sup>75</sup> Transitional justice in Argentina is an ongoing process, as many of those responsible for the crimes of the regime have escaped prosecution to this day.

### **Socio-Economic Stabilization and Performance Legitimacy in Argentina**

The situation in Argentina before 1976 was very grim. From an economic perspective, the problems in the country were spiralling out of control. The funding of Juan Domingo Péron’s social programs and nationalization of foreign companies came at the cost of rising inflation and decreased economic efficiency. This trend continued after his death in 1974, which saw his wife Isabel Péron faced with inflation percentages reaching a 100 percent by 1975. In fact, this inflation rate rose almost accumulatively, reaching a staggering 600 percent by March 1976.<sup>76</sup> This high level and high rate of increase of inflation, resulted in a high perception of threat to the socio-economic order. For this reason, the people of Argentina were heavily encouraging the military to intervene in order to ‘save the nation’. Yet, the generals purposely waited in order to build enough consensus until the inflation rate hit the 600 percent mark.<sup>77</sup>

This high pre-coup threat to socio-economic order left the military junta a large margin in which it could achieve economic growth without losing their *raison d'être*. However, the economic history of Argentina had always been a troubling one. The military junta tried to break with this legacy and aimed for strong economic growth. The government tried to apply a more neoliberal approach to Argentina’s economy, although it was limited. Initial economic success was followed by a rising inflation rate after 1981.<sup>78</sup> Economic inequalities increased,

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<sup>74</sup> Deborah L. Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 71.

<sup>75</sup> Jonathan C. Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina* (New York: Facts on File Inc., 2003), 253.

<sup>76</sup> See figure 1 in the appendix.

<sup>77</sup> Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina*, 237.

<sup>78</sup> See figure 2 in the appendix.

as well as poverty and unemployment. The foreign debt of Argentina rose from 7.9 billion to 43.6 billion US dollars in 1985.<sup>79</sup>

The junta appointed a strong technocracy in order to boost economic growth. José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, who strongly favoured privatization, became Minister of Economy. However, he was denied by the junta the opportunity to fully apply the neoliberal agenda, who feared it would result into unemployment, thereby damaging consensus. For example, the junta did not allow privatization of the country's oil reserves and social security.<sup>80</sup> Paradoxically, this fear resulted in semi-applied neoliberal economic policies, feeding economic stagnation, thereby delegitimizing the government. The inability of the junta to accept short-term repercussions of fully applied neoliberal policies resulted in capital flight and forced the government to print more money, thereby increasing the inflation rate.<sup>81</sup>

This relative economic failure of the junta meant that it was confronted with a lack in performance legitimacy. Despite this fact however, the junta made use of severe political repression. The junta tried to remove populism from society in the most brutal way possible. It must be noted however, that the pre-coup perceived level of threat of political instability to society was high. There was a strong presence of guerrilla activity in Argentina and the level of violence was only growing in the years leading up to the coup. In 1973 alone, there were 723 guerrilla incidents including kidnappings, assassinations and bombings.<sup>82</sup>

The military junta hit back hard. One of the biggest leftist urban guerrilla group in all of Latin America, the '*Montoneros*', were annihilated completely during the Dirty War. The report of the '*Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas*', also known as the *Nunca Más* report, highlights the full extent of the human rights violations committed by the junta. One of the testimonies in the report was on the infamous 'death flights', given by three women who were freed from the Navy School of Mechanics, a secret detention centre used during *el Proceso*. It reads: "They were taken to the first-aid room in the basement, where a nurse was waiting to give them an injection to send them to sleep, but not kill them. They were taken out by the side door of the basement like that, alive, and put in a lorry. They were driven to Buenos Aires Municipal Airport half-asleep, put into a plane which flew southwards out to sea, and

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<sup>79</sup> Michiel Baud, *Militair Geweld, Burgerlijke Verantwoordelijkheid: Argentijnse en Nederlandse Perspectieven op het Militaire Bewind in Argentinië* ('s-Gravenhagen: Sdu Uitgevers, 2001), 29.

<sup>80</sup> Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 2007), 88.

<sup>81</sup> Eul-Soo Pang, *The International Political Economy of Transformation in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile Since 1960* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 40.

<sup>82</sup> Jonathan C. Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina* (New York: Facts on File Inc., 2003), 235.

thrown in alive”.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, on the use of torture as a political weapon the report states that “because of these indiscriminate methods, not only members of armed groups but also their relatives, friends, colleagues at work or school, political party activists, priests and laymen committed to the problems of the poor, student activists, trade unionists, neighbourhood leaders and - in a remarkably high number of cases - people with no kind of trade union or political activity at all, were all rounded up and tortured. It was enough to appear in somebody’s address book to instantly become a target for the notorious ‘task forces’”.<sup>84</sup> These civilians were treated with the same ruthlessness as left-wing guerrilla forces. This makes clear that the junta was both cruel and indiscriminate in their use of political repression.

Hence, the junta in Argentina was ambitious in its plans to restore both the economic and political situation in the country. The high pre-coup level of perceived threat to socio-economic order provided the junta with a window of opportunity to legitimize itself. However, they failed to do this as they were unwilling to fully implement neoliberal economic policies, contributing to resurge of inflation and increase in foreign debt. Nevertheless, the junta used incredibly harsh repression to combat the high pre-coup threat to political stability. Without economic success it was not possible to justify a political-economic trade-off in the form of performance legitimacy. Thus, the combination of economic failure and grave human rights abuses resulted in a severe breakdown of consensus in Argentina.

### **Ideological and Nationalist Rejections and Appeals in Argentina**

The military junta in Argentina framed itself as saviour of the nation from the dangerous ideology that had created economic and political instability. Its name, the National Reorganization Process, referred to the reorganization of society in order to re-establish order in the country. In the ‘*Documentos Basicos*’ the junta highlighted that the primary task of *el Proceso* was to, “restore the core values that serve the foundation of the integral behaviour of the state, emphasizing the meaning of morality, capacity and efficiency, essential to the reconstruction of the image of the Nation”.<sup>85</sup> What this makes clear is that the junta portrayed

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<sup>83</sup> Report of the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (1984), available on [http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain\\_001.htm](http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_001.htm).

<sup>84</sup> Report of the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (1984).

<sup>85</sup> Original text: “restituir los valores esenciales que sirven de fundamento a la conducción integral del Estado, enfatizando el sentido de moralidad, idoneidad y eficiencia, imprescindibles para reconstituir el contenido y la imagen de la Nación”.

Documentos Basicos y Bases Politicas de las Fuerzas Armadas para el Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional, available on <http://www.ruinasdigitales.com/revistas/dictadura/Dictadura%20-%20Documentos%20Basicos%20y%20Bases%20Politicas.pdf>.

the country as being 'ill', as its core values and image had been tarnished. Recurring in the speeches of General Videla in the wake of the coup were negative words like "defeated", "anarchy" and "corruption" in order to describe these ills.

Moreover, in 1976, Videla stated that "the aim of the Process is the profound transformation of consciousness".<sup>86</sup> This transformation of consciences refers to the removal of socialist thought within society. With declaring a war against the socialist ideology the junta not only murdered persons affiliated with socialism, but also prohibited socialist political parties and prosecuted its members, censored media outputs promoting socialism and burned books of famous leftist authors like Karl Marx and Pablo Neruda.<sup>87</sup> While today critics refer to the period of state terror as the Dirty War, the Argentine military officers referred to it as the "war against subversion" as defined in Directive 404/75.<sup>88</sup> This subversion was the undermining and corrosion of the state from within, by the people who aimed to overthrow the junta.

However, the elimination of the guerrilla threat was not the sole purpose of the war against subversion. General Acdel Vilas stated that "the war we confront is pre-eminently a cultural war [...] culture is the true motor and motivating force of the subversive effort". Moreover, right-winged author Jordán Bruno Genta concluded that "it is intellectuals who lead revolutions, not the masses [...] it is the public universities today that are the central headquarters and mastermind of communism".<sup>89</sup> Hence, intellectuals were, regardless of their intentions, framed as subversive cultural enemies.

Next to the purging of society of both the guerrilla and cultural threat, the junta also tried to install their own ideology within civilian consciousness. This ideology was the National Security Doctrine (NSD). It stressed the importance of both national interest and national security. Furthermore, it implied the armed forces to be the only source of national values and interests.<sup>90</sup> Therefore, any attack against the regime was considered an attack against the nation, and vice versa. This also explains that the increase in criticism on the junta resulted in a broadening of the war against subversion, as it was considered an attack against the nation itself. The security threat was a paranoid vision of the junta that the guerrilla threat would reappear,

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<sup>86</sup> Marguerite Feitlowitz, *A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 20.

<sup>87</sup> Mathilde Arrigoni and Elodie M. Bordat, "Cultural Repression and Artistic Resistance: The Case of Last's Argentinean Dictatorship," *European Consortium for Political Research* (2011): 10.

<sup>88</sup> "Servicio de Inteligencia Aeronáutica Aeronautical Intelligence Service (SIA)," *Global Security*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/argentina/sia.htm>.

<sup>89</sup> Mark J. Osiel, "Constructing Subversion in Argentina's Dirty War," *Representations* 75 (2001): 136.

<sup>90</sup> David Pion-Berlin, *The Ideology of State Terror: Economic Doctrine and Political Repression in Argentina and Peru* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 99.

despite the announcement of the government in 1977 that the guerrillas had been totally defeated.<sup>91</sup>

Moreover, in line with the NSD, the junta heavily tried to appeal to the ideology of ‘*nacionalismo*’, a political movement that arose in Argentina around 1910. *Nacionalismo* was an ultraconservative ideology that promoted Catholic family values and authentic Argentinian traditions.<sup>92</sup> In their narrative, civilians had an obligation to the ‘father’, the junta, and the ‘mother’, the nation.<sup>93</sup> Accordingly, the relationship between the junta and the Church during the Dirty War was predominantly positive. Another example of appeal to nationalist sentiment was the 1978 football World Cup, which was organized in Argentina. As Argentina was the host and winner of the World Cup, nationalism soared, helping the military regime to legitimize itself. International criticism on human rights abuses surrounding the World Cup caused controversy, as it was compared to the 1936 Berlin Olympics in Nazi Germany. In fact, the political prisoners kept and tortured at the Navy School of Mechanics could hear the crowd during the matches held less than two kilometres away.<sup>94</sup>

In sum, the military junta in Argentina appealed to both ideology and nationalism. First of all, by rejecting socialism and purging society in the war against subversion. This not only included the guerrilla threat, but also the cultural enemy. Moreover, it developed its own ideology in the form of the NSD, stressing the fight against subversion in all facets of society, even after guerrilla activity in the country had stopped. They combined this doctrine with a Catholic interpretation of nationalism in the form of *nacionalismo*. Consensus within society was built through these ideological and nationalist appeals, but at the same time weakened as the result of atrocities committed in the name of those appeals.

### **Consolidating Leadership and Establishing Internal Coherence in Argentina**

Considering the dire economic and political situation, most civilians in Argentina welcomed the coup in 1976. In fact, a seemingly fatalist assumption existed in society at large that Isabel Péron’s days were numbered and that a military coup would happen sooner or later. Preparations for the coup took place in the open as military units were moving into position

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<sup>91</sup> David Pion-Berlin, *The Ideology of State Terror: Economic Doctrine and Political Repression in Argentina and Peru* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 101.

<sup>92</sup> Diana Taylor, *Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina’s “Dirty War”* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 274.

<sup>93</sup> Taylor, *Disappearing Acts*, 88.

<sup>94</sup> David Winner, “But Was This the Beautiful Game’s Ugliest Moment?,” *Financial Times*, June 21, 2008, <https://web.archive.org/web/20100611233444/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e6347c16-3f2a-11dd-8fd9-0000779fd2ac.html>.

along the Argentinian highways, while Péron was meeting with her cabinet discussing the rules of the election that would take place later that year.<sup>95</sup> However, equally important is the unanimous position of the military to orchestrate such a coup. In Argentina all three different branches of the military were advocating a military coup and cooperated in executing it. The military opted for a moderate, rather than hard-line coup, as there were no major arrests and people who served in the last government were simply told to go home. According to the US embassy in Argentina, it was “probably the best executed and most civilized coup in Argentine history” as it was carried out with such low violence.<sup>96</sup> Hence, the political chaos that normally comes with a military coup in this case was minimal. Considering the massive approval of the coup both within and outside the military, countercoups were not to be expected.

While the coup itself saw the junta work as a unitary actor, this proved to be just temporarily. In consolidating their leadership position, the military government tried to overcome internal rivalries by equally dividing the government between the three different branches of the military. Thus, a three man junta headed the government. Also, the ministries were divided. The army controlled the Ministries of Labour and Interior, the navy commanded the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Social Welfare and the air force directed the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Economy was the only ministry left entirely in the hand of a civilian technocracy.<sup>97</sup> However, the problem with this construction was that a coherent government could not be formed, as there was always competition between the three different branches for resources and positions of power. This inevitably led to corruption within the government, as people were acting in the name of personal, rather than national interest. For example, military officers used their position to acquire low-interest foreign loans, which they used for private speculation, rather than public investments.<sup>98</sup>

There was also internal competition on the position of presidency, as a document of the US embassy in Argentina on the political situation in the country in 1976 reveals that “since the coup there has been a general feeling of unease in political circles over Videla’s apparent reluctance to assert himself as ‘the leader’ of the government. Until this matter who rules Argentina is solved, the Junta will lack the authority and the political backing it needs to carry

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<sup>95</sup> Klaus Friedrich Veigel, *Dictatorship, Democracy and Globalization* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 47.

<sup>96</sup> United States Embassy Argentina Telegram to Department of State (1976), available on <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB185/19760330%20Videlas%20moderate%20line%20prevails%20%2000009EF2.pdf>.

<sup>97</sup> Deborah L. Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 64.

<sup>98</sup> Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina*, 65.

out its programs. [...] Admiral Massera, though lacking the manpower available to the Army commander, had much greater political skills”.<sup>99</sup> Tensions between Videla and Massera grew over the position of the presidency. The latter even tried to collaborate with the *Montoneros* in order to assume the presidency, however failed to do so.<sup>100</sup> Also, Argentina had a long political tradition of *caudillismo* personalist rule, most famously during the regime of Juan Domingo Péron. Especially compared to Péron, the military junta drastically lacked the charismatic leadership the people of Argentina were so familiar with.<sup>101</sup> In 1980, professor Peter H. Smith described General Videla as, “not a charismatic leader, but a rather colourless man”.<sup>102</sup> This was also the case with his successors, as all presidents of the military junta never fulfilled the charismatic role of a *caudillo*. This meant that charismatic leadership was lacking in the military government.

The junta formulated a system of rotating presidency among its members, as documented in article two of the ‘*Estatuto para el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional*’.<sup>103</sup> The presidential term was determined to be a single, five-year mandate. Hence, there was a clear plan of succession in order to establish continuity. The junta could therefore live beyond the ‘founding fathers’, without descending into violence when transferring power. However, due to the economic failure of the military government, the political situation in 1981 became extremely unstable and the newly appointed President Roberto Eduardo Viola was replaced only eight months later. Since 1981, new presidents never fulfilled their five-year mandate, resulting in a lack of continuity, thereby damaging civilian consensus.

Overall, the military junta in Argentina successfully consolidated leadership in the wake of the military coup. This was the result of the overwhelming consensus among citizens and unanimity among the military, to orchestrate a military intervention. However, in the following years it became clear that the division of the government along the lines of the three different military branches resulted in internal competitions and corruption. Moreover, although a clear plan of succession on the presidency was established, no president was able to fulfil the five-year mandate after 1981, thereby halting continuity. Internal competition, corruption and lack

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<sup>99</sup> United States Embassy in Argentina Memorandum of Conversation (1976), available on <http://search.proquest.com/dnsa/docview/1679045088/fulltextPDF/D69E775964D3443APQ/9?accountid=14772>.

<sup>100</sup> Gerardo L. Munck, *Authoritarianism and Democratization: Soldiers and Workers in Argentina, 1976-1983* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 249.

<sup>101</sup> Peter and Susan Calvert, *Argentina: Political Culture and Instability* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1989), 132.

<sup>102</sup> Peter H. Smith, “Argentina: The Uncertain Warriors,” *Current History* 78 (1980): 63.

<sup>103</sup> *Estatuto para el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional* (1976), available on <http://coleccion.educ.ar/coleccion/CD10/contenidos/teorico/mod2/art9/index.html>.

of continuity all contributed to a failure of leadership and a breakdown of consensus among the population.

### **Partnership and Conflict through Foreign Policy in Argentina**

In an international context, Argentina was seen as an important proxy battleground of the Cold War. Hence, to the US, the takeover of an anti-communist military dictatorship in this country was very much welcomed. ‘Operation Condor’ was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) backed covert plan in order to counter the socialist threat in South America by supporting multiple right-winged dictatorships. Declassified CIA documents reveal that “representatives from all member countries of the condor organization met in Buenos Aires 13-16 December 1976 to review past activities and discuss future plans” and that current Condor operations were based on “the exchange of information on subversives and terrorists [...] between intelligence services of member counties”.<sup>104</sup> This reveals that through Operation Condor, Argentina was not only cooperating with the US, but also with other right-winged regimes in South America like Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil.

Argentina cooperated with ideologically aligned governments in order to exchange resources in the fight against communism, especially depending on the US government. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, met with Argentinian foreign minister, César Augusto Guzzetti, in October 1977, where Kissinger implicitly approved of the Dirty War. In this conversation he said, “what is not understood in the US is that you have a civil war. We read about human rights problems, but not the context”.<sup>105</sup> Despite this cooperation the military government in Argentina was relatively autonomous and therefore did not develop any dependency relations with the US, or other major powers.

This independency is exemplified by the creation of international conflicts, challenging international alliances and the wishes of the US. The military government was in search of an ‘external enemy’ which could complement the ‘internal enemy’ in order to legitimize the regime. In 1978, Chile nearly became that enemy in a border dispute between the two nations over the Beagle Channel, where at the last minute war was prevented through a diplomatic

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<sup>104</sup> CIA Report on Operation Condor (1977), available on <http://search.proquest.com/dnsa/docview/1679043625/fulltextPDF/8C4D4F7A9C414D00PQ/7?accountid=14772>.

<sup>105</sup> Duncan Campbell, “Kissinger Approved Argentinian ‘Dirty War’,” *The Guardian*, December 6, 2003, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/06/argentina.usa>.

solution.<sup>106</sup> Argentina refuelled a border conflict dating back to 1904, when the country challenged Chile's territorial claim on the Tierra del Fuego islands. Sovereignty disputes were considered to be a source of nationalism by the military government. However, the Beagle conflict proved to be a prelude to a military operation resulting in the government's ultimate downfall.

With civilian consensus reaching an all-time low due to economic failure and political instability in 1982, the government once again tried to reignite a decades old sovereignty dispute in order to spark nationalist sentiment in the country. The majority of the Argentinian population saw the Falkland Islands as a by the UK usurped territory, that historically had always belonged to Argentina.<sup>107</sup> At that moment, the UK was experiencing both economic and social problems. Consequently, the junta assumed that Prime Minister Thatcher would not counter any acts of aggression on Argentina's part. In January 1982 the military government launched '*Operación Rosario*' and occupied the Falkland Islands. Despite the limited value and of the Falkland Islands and its great distance to the UK, the British retaliated with a determined military campaign in order to reconquer the islands. For Thatcher it was also a great opportunity to bolster her national popularity, by winning a war that would divert attention away from domestic problems in her country. In her victory speech Thatcher proudly stated that "there are those who [...] had their fears that it was true: that Britain was no longer the nation that had built an Empire and ruled a quarter of the world [...] Well they were wrong", "Britain found herself again in the South Atlantic and will not look back from the victory she has won".<sup>108</sup>

Moreover, due to lingering grievances over the Beagle conflict a few years earlier, Chile supported the UK's military campaign in the form of intelligence reports.<sup>109</sup> As the US did not support Argentina in order to prevent damaging relations with the UK, the Argentinian armed forces found themselves underequipped in the fight against an overwhelmingly powerful nemesis. Thus, after seventy-four days Argentina surrendered and President Galtieri was forced to resign.<sup>110</sup> Not only did the military government suffer a humiliating defeat, the legitimacy of

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<sup>106</sup> Deborah L. Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 68.

<sup>107</sup> Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina*, 69.

<sup>108</sup> Speech to Conservative Rally at Cheltenham (1982), available on <http://www.margarethatcher.org/document/104989>.

<sup>109</sup> Harriet Alexander, "Without Chile's Help, We Would Have Lost the Falklands," *The Telegraph*, July 7, 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/falklandislands/10947350/Without-Chiles-help-we-would-have-lost-the-Falklands.html>.

<sup>110</sup> Jackson Diehl, "Galtieri Forced Out as Leader of Argentina," *The Washington Post*, June 18, 1982, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/06/18/galtieri-forced-out-as-leader-of-argentina/237cff8f-0034-48d9-a5ab-607e6a41ca06/?utm\\_term=.ccd436369fc5](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/06/18/galtieri-forced-out-as-leader-of-argentina/237cff8f-0034-48d9-a5ab-607e6a41ca06/?utm_term=.ccd436369fc5).

the armed forces itself was severely weakened as well.<sup>111</sup> The scars of the Dirty War combined with the defeat in the Falklands War, meant the end of the military rule in Argentina.

In conclusion, the military government tried to build consensus by strengthening its power through international cooperation. Under the pretext of Operation Condor, the junta received support in the fight against communism, mainly from the US. However, at the same time the junta isolated the country with its aggressive behaviour concerning sovereignty disputes. Attempts to build consensus through war, in the form of nationalism, backfired, as an earlier conflict with Chile over the Beagle Channel resulted in Chilean support for the UK a few years later. The decision of the junta to go to war with the UK in the Falklands War can be explained as a diversionary tactic, in order to compensate for domestic instabilities. However, this all-in gamble proved to be a fatal one, as the devastating defeat resulted in an irreparable breakdown of consensus and the eventual downfall of the regime.

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<sup>111</sup> Peter and Susan Calvert, *Argentina: Political Culture and Instability* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1989), 78.

#### IV- CONSENSUS BUILDING IN CHILE

“Workers of my country, I have faith in Chile and its destiny. Other men will overcome this dark and bitter moment when treason seeks to prevail. Keep in mind that, much sooner than later, great avenues will again open, through which will pass the free man, to construct a better society.

Long live Chile! Long live the people! Long live the workers!

These are my last words, and I am certain that my sacrifice will not be in vain, I am certain that, at the very least, it will be a moral lesson that will punish felony, cowardice, and treason.”

- *Final words of President Salvador Allende to the people of Chile, September 11, 1973*

#### **A Brief History of Military Rule in Chile from 1973 to 1990**

Since 1932, Chile experienced a period of turbulent, but democratic rule. The country had always been characterized by strong polarization along the political spectrum, as left and right were in constant conflict, taking turns in power.<sup>112</sup> However, Chile was unique in Latin America, as it was one of the few countries that successfully upheld democratic rule without turning to authoritarianism. However, this democratic experience was to be put on an abrupt hold, as a siege on the presidential palace in Santiago in 1973 marked the beginning of a new era.

Inspired by events like the 1959 Cuban Revolution, socialism was making a strong march throughout Latin America. This was also the case in Chile, as socialist Salvador Allende and his ‘*Unidad Popular*’ party won the elections in 1970, promising to end social injustices in the country. However, Allende did not win by an absolute majority, as he was only chosen after it was put to a vote in Congress.<sup>113</sup> From the beginning, a strong opposition emerged from within society against his socialist program. When the new government expanded land reforms and nationalized key mineral industries and foreign banks, many people from the right started to protest. Allende successfully reduced unemployment and improved living standards for the

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<sup>112</sup> William R. Keech, “Democracy, Dictatorship and Economic Performance in Chile” (paper presented at the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Santiago de Chile, July 28-30, 2004), 2.

<sup>113</sup> Alan Angell, “Chile Since 1958,” in *Chile Since Independence*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 170.

poor through economic redistribution and social reforms.<sup>114</sup> However, in the context of the Cold War, the US could not tolerate socialist rule, especially in the Western Hemisphere, and started to weaken the regime through economic pressure and political destabilization. The CIA tried to persuade the Chilean Congress to vote against Allende assuming the presidency after the outcome of the elections. When this failed, a new plan to instigate a coup to remove Allende from power was constructed.<sup>115</sup>

The initial economic success of the government took a dramatic turn by 1972. US pressure, decreased export revenues and soaring inflation resulted in strong political polarization. Consequently, the military decided to remove Allende and to seize power over the country. On September 11, 1973, the military bombarded the presidential palace. The siege ended with Allende taking his own life.<sup>116</sup> A military junta was installed to rule the nation, headed by General Augusto Pinochet, ending a streak of over forty years of uninterrupted democratic rule in Chile.

From 1973 onwards, the military government of Pinochet took Chile on a pro-capitalist course and reversed Allende's social reforms. This proved to be highly successful, as the economy stabilized. Moreover, the Pinochet regime sought to remove the socialist 'threat' from Chilean society. Especially the first years were marked by severe human rights violations. The notorious 'Caravan of Death' was a death squad appointed by Pinochet that executed political prisoners labelled as dissidents.<sup>117</sup> In 1980, in the midst of economic prosperity, a referendum was held which approved a constitutional reform, authorizing Pinochet an eight-year extended presidency.<sup>118</sup> Eight years later, after more than ten years under dictatorial rule, many people started to wish for a return to democracy. Human rights abuses in the country continued, despite the economic prosperity. In 1988, a national referendum was held on the extension of Pinochet's presidency by another eight years. In the final result, the 'no' vote won by nearly fifty-six percent.<sup>119</sup>

The following year, the first democratic president in more than sixteen years was elected and in 1990 Pinochet left office. In 1991, the 'National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation'

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<sup>114</sup> Alan Angell, "Chile Since 1958," in *Chile Since Independence*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 161.

<sup>115</sup> "CIA Activities in Chile," Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/>.

<sup>116</sup> Roger Burbach, *The Pinochet Affair: State Terrorism and Global Justice* (London: Zed Books, 2003), 19.

<sup>117</sup> Cabello V. Fernandez Larios, "Pinochet's Caravan of Death," The Center for Justice and Accountability, <http://cja.org/what-we-do/litigation/cabello-v-fernandez-larios/>.

<sup>118</sup> Genaro Arriagada, *Pinochet: The Politics of Power* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 43.

<sup>119</sup> Burbach, *The Pinochet Affair*, 75.

was established, which released a report on the human rights abuses, revealing the true extent of the systematic murder and torture during the regime. However, due to the 1980 constitutional amendment, Pinochet remained commander-in-chief of the Chilean army till 1998 and senator for life, granting him immunity from prosecution. Nevertheless, he was arrested during a medical visit to London in 1998 and placed under house arrest. He died in 2006, without ever facing trial. To conclude this brief survey of Chile's recent history, today the country is still deeply divided on the Pinochet years, as to some he was a hero that saved the country from economic misery, while to others a tyrant who murdered innocent civilians.<sup>120</sup>

### **Socio-Economic Stabilization and Performance Legitimacy in Chile**

The combination of Allende's failed policies and US pressure, devastated the Chilean economy. Moreover, the socialist agenda of Allende deepened the already strong polarization within society, resulting into increasing outbursts of violence between left and right. The high pre-coup level of perceived threat to socio-economic order allowed the Pinochet government to legitimize itself, as it successfully restored the Chilean economy. This provided the regime with strong performance legitimacy, which was needed to compensate the use of severe political repression. The undermining of consensus due to political repression was counterbalanced by the economic performance of the regime. In this way, consensus was able to hold for many years. However, the economic success also meant that the military regime lost its *raison d'être* in the long-term, as people started to wish for a return to democracy. It was felt that severe political repression was no longer acceptable in a stable economic and political environment. This explains the national and international request for the 1988 referendum and the eventual victory of the 'no' vote.

Four days after the 1973 coup that overthrew President Allende, *The Economist* wrote that "the armed forces had tolerated Dr. Allende for nearly three years. In that time, he managed to plunge the country in the worst social and economic crisis in its modern history".<sup>121</sup> While the blame for the situation certainly fell upon the Allende government, the US also played its part in destabilizing the Chilean economy. A 1970 memorandum to Henry Kissinger, written by the US 'Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile', revealed that the Nixon administration called upon international financial organizations like the World Bank and the Inter-American

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<sup>120</sup> Gideon Long, "Chile Still Split over General Augusto Pinochet Legacy," *BBC News*, September 9, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-24014501>.

<sup>121</sup> "The End of Allende," *The Economist*, September 15, 1973, <http://www.economist.com/node/11674052>.

Development Bank to restrict or terminate credits provided to the Chilean government.<sup>122</sup> Allende had tried to end the oligarchic structure and US dependency characterizing the Chilean economy, through land reforms, nationalization of copper mines and gaining control over the banking industry. This came at the expense of foreign, mainly US, businesses. Uncertainty about property rights resulted in discouragement of foreign investments in the country.<sup>123</sup> Moreover, ‘macroeconomic populism’ saw the Allende government increase wages, government expenditure and the money supply, in order to create strong short-term economic growth in its first year on power.<sup>124</sup> However, this came heavily at the expense of long-term economic growth, as revealed in the second and third years in power. While the inflation rate in 1971 was only around twenty percent, it heavily started to increase after July 1972, reaching 320 percent by July 1973.<sup>125</sup>

A high level of inflation with a strong of rate increase resulted in a high perceived threat to socio-economic order. Moreover, it allowed the military government to achieve economic success without becoming obsolete in the eyes of its civilians. However, the Pinochet government faced a difficult task in trying to recover the economy. In the aftermath of three years under socialist rule, the inflation rate in Chile reached an all-time record, with 746 percent by April 1974.<sup>126</sup> The regime took a 180 degrees turn from what the Allende government had tried to do. Socialist economic policies were replaced by a fully applied neoliberal agenda. Recognizing their own lack of knowledge, the junta appointed a civilian technocratic elite in order to handle the economy. The so-called “Chicago Boys” were economist trained at the University of Chicago, under the lead of the famous US economist Milton Friedman.<sup>127</sup> Neoliberal economic policies were applied, focussing on the control of inflation and the establishment of a market economy. In 1982, Friedman proudly stated that “Chile is an economic miracle [...] After a difficult transition, the economy boomed, growing an average of about eight percent a year from 1976 to 1980”.<sup>128</sup> However, that same year Chile experienced a massive economic crisis due to debt accumulation and an overvalued currency. Nevertheless, with the help of international financial institutions, from 1983 onwards the Chilean economy

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<sup>122</sup> Memorandum for Henry Kissinger on Chile (1970), available on <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc20.pdf>.

<sup>123</sup> William R. Keech, “Democracy, Dictatorship and Economic Performance in Chile” (paper presented at the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Santiago de Chile, July 28-30, 2004), 27.

<sup>124</sup> Keech, “Democracy, Dictatorship and Economic Performance in Chile,” 28.

<sup>125</sup> See figure 3 in the appendix.

<sup>126</sup> See figure 4 in the appendix.

<sup>127</sup> Genaro Arriagada, *Pinochet: The Politics of Power* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 19.

<sup>128</sup> Milton Friedman, “Free Markets and the Generals,” *Newsweek*, January 25, 1982, 1.

started to boom again, as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) started to grow once more. A trend that, with a few exceptions, continues to this day.<sup>129</sup> The economic ‘miracle of Chile’ provided the Pinochet government with strong performance legitimacy. It allowed the government to compensate for political repression, not resulting into a severe breakdown of consensus.

Under Allende, conflicts between left and right-winged activists had often turned violent. With the backing of the CIA, right-winged terrorist groups destroyed highways, railroads and power plants in order to disrupt the country.<sup>130</sup> Two months before the coup, ultra-right terrorists assassinated Allende’s naval aide in his own garden.<sup>131</sup> Left-winged activists responded with more violence and the situation was spiralling out of control, as the country found itself on the brink of civil war. Thus, the perceived level of threat of political instability in society was alarmingly high. One day after the coup, the Pinochet regime stated in Decree Law No. 5 that the country was in a ‘state of siege’ which must be understood as a ‘state of war’.<sup>132</sup> This allowed the government to expand its authority, including the ability to close the Chilean border and to open mass detention centres.

The ‘Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation’ revealed that methods of torture used by the regime included electric shocks, waterboarding and sexual degradation.<sup>133</sup> The Truth Commission found the Pinochet regime to be responsible for an estimated 2.200 casualties and 30.000 cases of torture. In the face of these atrocities, national and international pressure on the regime started to grow over the years. The US and Europe, combined with international businesses and human rights organizations, had tried to democratize Chile since 1982. This accumulated in the government agreeing to the 1988 referendum.<sup>134</sup> However, the outcome of this referendum meant the end of the Pinochet regime and the return of democracy.

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<sup>129</sup> See figure 5 in the appendix.

<sup>130</sup> Roger Burbach, *The Pinochet Affair: State Terrorism and Global Justice* (London: Zed Books, 2003), 15.

<sup>131</sup> “Allende’s Naval Aide Is Slain By Terrorists,” *Chicago Tribune*, July 28, 1973, <http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1973/07/28/page/202/article/allendes-naval-aide-is-slain-by-terrorists>.

<sup>132</sup> Decreto Ley No. 5 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (1973), available on <http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=5664>.

<sup>133</sup> “Life Under Pinochet: “They Were Taking Turns to Electrocute Us One After Another”,” *Amnesty International*, September 11, 2013, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/09/life-under-pinochet-they-were-taking-turns-electrocute-us-one-after-other/>.

<sup>134</sup> Alejandro Ortega, “International Effect on the Democratic Onset in Chile,” *Stanford Journal of International Relations* 11 (2010): 32.

## **Ideological and Nationalist Rejections and Appeals in Chile**

The Pinochet government heavily relied on the rejection of socialism in order to legitimize itself. Emphasizing how Allende had ruined the country with his socialist agenda, the junta portrayed Chile to be in a permanent war with this ‘dangerous’ ideology. In this war everything was permitted, including murder and torture. This presentation of a fight against the ideological ‘internal enemy’ was a way to strengthen consensus, as repression was legitimized under the pretext of securitization. Complementing this rejection, the military government appealed to both capitalism and nationalism. In this ideological mix, political nationalism was combined with neoliberal economic internationalism. In this way, consensus was built as patriotism in the nation was fuelled, without economically isolating the country.

Issued the same day as the coup, Decree Law No. 1 on the seizure of power stated that “the country finds a process of systematic destruction [...] by the effect of dogmatic and justified ideology inspired by the principles of Marxism-Leninism”. Therefore, as stated later in the decree, “on this date the Junta Government is formed [...] with the patriotic compromise of restoring the country, the damaged justice [...] as the only form to follow the national traditions, from the founders of the motherland and the History of Chile”.<sup>135</sup> What this decree and the other public statements from the military junta make clear, is that the new government presented itself as the saviour of the nation. In Pinochet’s own words in a press conference moments after the coup, “The armed forces have acted today solely from the patriotic inspiration of saving the country from the tremendous chaos into it was being plunged by the Marxist government of Salvador Allende”<sup>136</sup>

Unlike many other countries in the region, Chile was not faced with merely the threat of socialist revolution. The revolution had in fact already begun, with the election of a socialist president in 1970. Allende’s ‘Chilean road to socialism’ formed the ideological foundation of his government.<sup>137</sup> The transformation of Chile into a socialist state was already taking place, as a socialist programme was being implemented. Hence, in removing this strong ideological footprint on Chilean society, the Pinochet government faced a significant challenge. According

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<sup>135</sup> Law Decree No. 1 Ministry of Defense (1973), available on <https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-10-chile/primary-documents-w-accompanying-discussion-questions/document-29-military-decrees-on-seizing-power-augusto-pinochet-1973/>.

<sup>136</sup> Original text: “Las fuerzas armadas y de orden actuaron sólo bajo la inspiración patriótica de sacar al país del caos que en forma aguda lo estaba precipitando el gobierno marxista de Salvador Allende”.

Press Conference of the Junta on the Military Coup (1973): available on <http://www.24horas.cl/40anosdel11deseptiembre/general-pinochet-las-fuerzas-armadas-han-actuado-bajo-la-inspiracion-patriotica-810880>.

<sup>137</sup> Julio Faúndezb, “The Chilean Road to Socialism,” *The Political Quarterly* 46 (1975): 310.

to General Gustavo Leigh, one of the coup plotters, the military government had to “extirpate the Marxist cancer in Chile”.<sup>138</sup>

The Pinochet government always framed the failure of Allende’s government in relation to its alignment with socialism. According to them, it was socialism which had brought the country on the brink of civil war. Furthermore, the government tried to blacken Allende’s legacy, claiming he was conspiring with Cuba’s Fidel Castro to orchestrate Marxist total seizure of power in Latin America, helping to train 13.000 foreign terrorists and revolutionaries.<sup>139</sup> The Pinochet regime even fabricated a fake document called ‘Plan Z’, which revealed a plot drawn up by the Allende coalition, calling for the murder of Chilean military generals at an independence day celebration.<sup>140</sup>

It was in this context of preventing a civil war, that the Pinochet government executed its campaign against socialism. The political repression that followed was presented to the people as painful, yet necessary, in order to provide security. The government used war rhetoric to justify the use of murder and torture. According to Pinochet, in times of war a military government was the only possible way of governance. In his vision, Chile was in an internal and external permanent state of total war, meaning not only militarily, but also economically and psychologically.<sup>141</sup> Left-winged newspapers disappeared from the kiosks and book burnings were organized. In this way, the Pinochet government successfully portrayed socialism as the undisputed root of all evil and misery in Chilean society.

As the antithesis of socialism, capitalism was the medicine the country needed to cure itself from the ‘Marxist cancer’ that had spread through society. The implementation of neoliberal economic policies illustrated this embracement of capitalism. Moreover, the military government allowed businesses and landowning groups to form pragmatic coalitions and to access the decision-making process, all in the name of economic progress. This way, a strong upper-class elite was formed which had a significant influence on the government.<sup>142</sup> Hence, compared to other authoritarian regimes in the region, the Pinochet government was relatively inclusive, allowing a strong and loyal capitalist alliance to articulate its interests to the regime.

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<sup>138</sup> Phil Gunson, “Gustavo Leigh,” *The Guardian*, October 2, 1999, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/1999/oct/02/guardianobituaries1>.

<sup>139</sup> “Blackwashing Allende,” *The Economist*, January 28, 1999, <http://www.economist.com/node/184063>.

<sup>140</sup> “CIA Activities in Chile” Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/>.

<sup>141</sup> Genaro Arriagada, *Pinochet: The Politics of Power* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 23.

<sup>142</sup> Eduardo Silva, “Capitalist Regime Loyalties and Redemocratization in Chile,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 34 (1992): 80.

This positively contributed to consensus within society, as civilians were involved in the decision-making process.

In the political sphere the government promoted the Chilean nation, which according to them was based on Christian and Western culture. Pinochet himself stated that “the Chilean army is the protector of the traditional values of Western Christianity”.<sup>143</sup> However, while the Pinochet regime appealed to nationalism in the political sense, this was only to the extent that it would not interfere with the economy. In the realm of economics, the *nacionalismo* movement in Chile was overruled by the Chicago Boys, who advocated internationalist neoliberal policies.<sup>144</sup> Hence, it is important to distinguish between political nationalism and economic nationalism, as the Pinochet government appealed to the former, but rejected the latter.

### **Consolidating Leadership and Establishing Internal Coherence in Chile**

Out of necessity the armed forces in Chile overcame initial division within their own ranks on the decision to remove Allende. They orchestrated a bloody coup, which was both welcomed and rejected by the deeply divided Chilean society. Strong leadership was necessary in order to overcome this division, which the military government successfully created by appointing a strongman like Pinochet to rule both the junta and the nation. This strong leadership enhanced societal consensus. In the following years, Pinochet consolidated his leadership position even more, eliminating anybody from power who questioned his authority. No clear plan of succession was established, but due to his extensive control over the government this did not halt continuity, as he served as the leader of the regime from the beginning till the end. Internal coherence and peaceful continuity all positively contributed to consensus building within society, but also within the military itself.

The military coup was not welcomed unanimously by the Chilean civilians. This was evident in the March 1973 elections, which saw Allende’s ‘*Unidad Popular*’ party electorate increase from thirty-six percent in 1970, to forty-four percent in 1973.<sup>145</sup> Maintaining more than one-third of Congress made Allende safe from impeachment. The armed forces initially also found itself divided in the decision to stage a coup. However, due to reports of a communist naval mutiny plot, more officers joined the pact to overthrow the government.<sup>146</sup> In June 1973, ‘*el*

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<sup>143</sup> Raquel Correa and Elizabeth Subercaseaux, *Ego Sum Pinochet* (Santiago de Chile: Editora Zig Zag, 1989), 216.

<sup>144</sup> Jean Grugel, “Nationalist Movements and Fascist Ideology in Chile,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 4 (1985): 118.

<sup>145</sup> Simon Collier and William F. Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-1994* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 351.

<sup>146</sup> Collier and Sater, *A History of Chile*, 357.

*Tanquetazo*, the tank putsch, saw a failed coup attempt from a Santiago tank regiment.<sup>147</sup> While the government successfully crushed the rebellion, it served as a prelude to the successful coup a few months later.

The military coup on September 11, 1973, was executed with brute military force. An infantry force stormed 'la Moneda Palace' and fought on its footsteps, while the air force bombarded the palace. The coup plotters offered Allende a plane to leave the country, but he refused, stating, "you treacherous shits! Stuff your plane up your arses!"<sup>148</sup> Declassified CIA documents reveal that after Allende was found dead in his office, "Chilean troops in the palace began taking prisoners, threatening execution [...] The troops made no attempt to identify whether the people in the palace were Chilean or foreigners, apparently assuming that everyone found in the palace was a die-hard Allende supporter".<sup>149</sup> The coup had been executed with a lot of bloodshed. However, in the aftermath no countercoups were to be expected, as all branches of the military had approved and were involved in the September 11 coup.

A military junta was formed headed by Army General Pinochet, Navy Admiral José Toribio, Air Force General Gustavo Leigh and head of the national police, General César Mendoza. Plans were made to establish a rotating presidency between the four leaders. Representing the oldest military branch, Army General Pinochet was appointed as the head of the junta. However, he proved to be unwilling to participate in a rotating presidency, proclaiming himself 'Supreme Chief of the Nation' and later president of Chile, in 1974.<sup>150</sup> This did not go well with all officers in the armed forces. Especially General Leigh opposed Pinochet's single leadership position. However, in 1978, the junta forced Leigh to retire and he was replaced by General Fernando Matthei. The CIA noted that "Leigh's removal eliminates Pinochet's most critical colleague and strengthens the President's control over the junta", but also that "Despite Pinochet's efforts, some military officers are reported to have been conducting low-key discussions on the possibility of replacing him".<sup>151</sup> Pinochet faced the constant threat of replacement from inside the military, but successfully used his leadership position to prevent this from happening. The hierarchy that had been established within the army, with him at the

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<sup>147</sup> Mark Ensalaco, *Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 2.

<sup>148</sup> Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Chilean Coup: Forty Years Ago I Watched Pinochet Crush a Democratic Dream," *The Guardian*, September 7, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/07/chile-coup-pinochet-allende>.

<sup>149</sup> "Accounts of Coup d'État," CIA Directorate of Operations (1973), available on <http://search.proquest.com/dnsa/docview/1679138988/fulltextPDF/FE0C6A323EE84E1EPQ/20?accountid=14772>.

<sup>150</sup> Ensalaco, *Chile Under Pinochet*, 54.

<sup>151</sup> "Center Latin America Weekly Review" National Foreign Assessment Center (1978), available on [https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0000342334.pdf](https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000342334.pdf).

top, allowed him to successfully counter any signs of dissidence. Moreover, it created order among the ranks and prevented internal divisions, allowing the regime to build consensus within the military itself.

Within this clear hierarchical structure competition was minimalized, as Pinochet assumed the position as strongman above the armed forces. Consequently, the regime increasingly acquired aspects of personalist rule. Pinochet saw his legitimacy grow even more with the 1980 referendum, which extended his presidency with another eight years and authorized him increased powers. Over the years, the role of the junta diminished, as Pinochet gained almost absolute control over executive power and he himself decided over post assignment within the government. Due to this personalist style of governance, Pinochet was often framed as another ‘modern *caudillo*’, comparing him to political leaders like Fidel Castro.<sup>152</sup>

However, as Pinochet was so concerned with centralizing power around himself, he failed to establish a clear plan of succession. In fact, he was convinced that he would be serving as the president of Chile until his own death.<sup>153</sup> There was a strong presence of continuity in the regime due to his long individual reign, but the government did run the risk of descending into chaos if for some reason Pinochet would no longer be able to continue his presidency. Nevertheless, due to the removal of the regime after the 1988 referendum this never happened and the country saw a streak of nearly seventeen years of uninterrupted individual leadership.

### **Partnership and Conflict through Foreign Policy in Chile**

On the international level, the Pinochet regime made considerable efforts to inspire societal consensus. The government cooperated with both the US and other right-winged Latin American dictatorships, in order to exchange resources in the fight against socialism, under the pretext of Operation Condor. After the CIA’s role in the removal of Allende from power, the US re-established its formal relationship with Chile, providing the Pinochet government with economic, political and military support. The military regime also aligned with other Western governments, exemplified by the Chilean support for the UK’s military campaign in the Falklands War. This international support strengthened societal consensus. As conflict carried the risk of hindering international trade, an aggressive foreign policy was not considered to be a logical tool to build consensus, as it could only damage it. However, when the Cold War

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<sup>152</sup> Mark Ensalaco, *Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 54.

<sup>153</sup> Jorge I. Dominguez, “The Perfect Dictatorship: Comparing Authoritarian Rule in South Korea and in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29- September 1, 2002), 8.

reached its conclusion, the US started to reassess its role in Latin America. Without the socialist threat, human rights abuses in Chile were no longer excused. The dependency of the Chilean economy on international capital allowed the West to pressure the Pinochet government to agree to the 1988 referendum. Paradoxically, the economic ‘miracle of Chile’ had created the conditions in which the government was unable to refuse a final test of civilian consensus, which proved to be insufficient, resulting in the downfall of the Pinochet regime.

In the midst of the Cold War, the US was very uneasy by the election of a socialist president in their own Latin American ‘backyard’. As a result, the CIA became deeply embedded in Chile in order to prevent Allende from taking office. ‘Track I’ was a plan which involved the funding of political opposition parties in order to block Congressional approval of Allende’s presidency after his election in 1970. After this failed, ‘Track II’ involved the instigation of a military coup by supplying weapons to numerous groups of plotters. While the ultimate successful coup of 1973 was not instigated by the CIA, they did have intelligence relations with the plotters and were informed about their plan, which the CIA condoned.<sup>154</sup> A telegram from the US embassy in Chile to Washington DC on the morning of September 11, 1973, revealed that they were completely aware of the course of action that the armed forces were planning to take in order to execute the coup later that day. It even states that the “plotters emphasize that this notification is to serve warnings to all US government agencies to terminate all US flights, ships, etc. from entering Chilean territory during this period to prevent compromising the US government”.<sup>155</sup>

After the coup, the Pinochet government built a strong relationship with the US. The US supported the Pinochet regime both politically and economically. While under Allende, Chile received 19.8 million US dollars in economic assistance between 1970 and 1973, under Pinochet, Chile received 186 million US dollars between 1974 and 1976.<sup>156</sup> In 1974, the country also received 18.5 million dollars in military assistance from the US.<sup>157</sup> Moreover, the dictatorship coordinated its political repression with other countries in Latin America. A declassified document on the invitation of intelligence officers from other right-winged Latin American governments, by the head of the ‘*Dirrección de Inteligencia Nacional*’ (DINA), the

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<sup>154</sup> “CIA Activities in Chile,” Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/>.

<sup>155</sup> “Military Coup Plotting for Morning of September 11,” United States Embassy in Chile (1973), available on <http://search.proquest.com/dnsa/docview/1679139151/fulltextPDF/2D3EA9AF4B7949C4PQ/26?accountid=14772>.

<sup>156</sup> Grace Livingstone, *America’s Backyard: The United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror* (London: Zed Books, 2009), 59.

<sup>157</sup> William F. Stater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 190.

secret police of Chile, reveals that the plan behind Operation Condor was in fact drawn up in Santiago in 1975.<sup>158</sup> Chile was therefore part of an extensive network of ideologically aligned Latin American dictatorships, who shared resources in the fight against socialism.

While initially the US relations with Pinochet were warm, this slowly decreased over the years, due to the systematic human rights violations of the military government. When US tensions with the Soviet Union started to decline after the mid-1980s, so did the threat of a 'global communist empire'. Without this threat, the US government started to favour democratic governments in Latin America and began to speak out against human rights violations of the Pinochet government.<sup>159</sup> Hence, the US started to alienate the Pinochet regime and pressure it towards democratization. Due to its neoliberal economic policies, the Chilean economy had become dependent on the attraction of foreign capital. The US used this fact to force the Pinochet government to reform and to "meet certain conditions", as the US State Department and US representatives of the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank restricted loans provided to Chile.<sup>160</sup> Thus, while the strong economy of Chile allowed it to build consensus in many ways, it also created a situation of dependency, which allowed Western governments and businesses to force Pinochet to organize the 1988 referendum.

While internally the Pinochet government acted in a severely confrontational manner towards 'enemies of the state', externally this was not the case. The Chilean government used foreign policy to build consensus through cooperation, rather than conflict. Next to the US, the Pinochet government shared warm relations with other Western countries like France and the UK. Pinochet was also an admirer of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, whose funeral he attended in 1975.<sup>161</sup> The only conflict that the Pinochet government engaged in was with Argentina over the Beagle Channel in 1978. However, the conflict was entirely provoked by the Argentinian military junta, after which the Pinochet government saw itself forced to respond. While the Beagle conflict ended without violent escalation, this confrontational stance from the Argentinian government towards Chile resulted in Chilean support for the UK during the Falklands War in 1982. At the time, Argentinian President Galtieri had said, "This is the first step for recovery of our islands in the South", referring to a possible reignition of the Beagle

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<sup>158</sup> Inivitacion del Jefe de Inteligencia de Chile (1975), available on <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB239b/PDF/19751000%20%5binvitation%5d.pdf>.

<sup>159</sup> William F. Stater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 199.

<sup>160</sup> Stater, *Chile and the United States*, 201.

<sup>161</sup> Salvatore Bizzarro, *Historical Dictionary of Chile* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2005), 699.

conflict once the Falkland Islands had been conquered.<sup>162</sup> UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher never forgot the support she got from Pinochet, standing by him even while he was placed under house arrest in 1998, stating that “without President Pinochet’s considerable practical help in 1982, many more of our servicemen would have lost their lives in the South Atlantic. The country thus owes him a great debt”.<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> “Falklands’ War: Chilean Top Commentator Defends Chile’s Role in Supporting the UK,” *Merco Press*, July 3, 2015, <http://en.mercopress.com/2015/07/03/falklands-war-chilean-top-commentator-defends-chile-s-role-in-supporting-uk>.

<sup>163</sup> Margaret Thatcher Statement on General Pinochet (1999), available on <http://www.ukpol.co.uk/margaret-thatcher-1999-statement-on-general-pinochet/>.

## V- CONCLUSION

Let me restate the main research question that I have been trying to answer in this thesis: “How can we account for the differences in consensus building in the military dictatorships of Argentina and Chile during the 1970s-1980s?”. Through detailed research and comprehensive analysis I answered my main research question, first by constructing a theoretical framework on the processes of consensus building in military dictatorships, which I later used to examine the cases of Argentina and Chile.

I started my theoretical framework by explaining how there are three types of dictatorships. These are personalist dictatorships, one-party dictatorships and military dictatorships. I observed that military dictatorships differ from the other two civilian forms of dictatorship, but I additionally emphasized that it is important to note that the three pure types in reality often overlap. Furthermore, I introduced the two case studies by providing a short summary on the course of events in both Argentina and Chile, from the years leading up, until the end of military rule in both countries.

Then, as the first process of consensus building within society, I highlighted the role of socio-economic stabilization and performance legitimacy. I explained that military governments try to stabilize the economic and political situation in their country. The larger the perceived threat to the socio-economic order, the larger the margin in which a military government can achieve success, without losing its *raison d'être*. By appointing technocratic experts, economic success can provide a government with performance legitimacy, which it needs in order to justify political repression used by the regime.

In the case of Argentina, I highlighted that the dire economic and political situation prior to the coup became increasingly perilous. However, despite the potential for success, contradictory neoliberal and protectionist economic policies saw the military junta unable to restore the socio-economic order in the country, resulting in a lack of performance legitimacy. Nevertheless, the military government unleashed a wave of political repression and state terror in the form of the Dirty War, with an estimated 30.000 casualties over a period of seven years. The combination of economic failure and brutal political repression resulted in a breakdown of consensus.

In Chile, the macroeconomic populism of Allende combined with US pressure, had wracked the Chilean economy. The Pinochet regime successfully stabilized the economy and created long-term economic growth on the basis of neoliberal principles. This way, performance legitimacy was produced, which justified the political repression used by the military

government. This political repression cost the lives of an estimated 2.200 people over the course of seventeen years. While consensus was successfully built through performance legitimacy for many years, political repression became unacceptable in the economically and politically stable environment in the final days of the regime, ultimately damaging consensus.

Next, as the second process of consensus building within society, I foregrounded the use of ideological and nationalist rejections and appeals. I stated that military governments reject the ideology embraced by the preceding government. They claim to save the nation from the dangerous ideology that had resulted in economic and political disaster and therefore needs to be purged from society. Subsequently, military dictatorships appeal to a contrasting ideology in order to legitimize themselves. In addition, they stoke up nationalism within society to further improve consensus.

Regarding the case of Argentina, I explained how the military junta presented itself as saviour of the nation, as the regime attempted to eradicate socialist thought from society through the war against subversion, which targeted both guerrillas and the cultural enemy. Also, it adopted an ideology which stressed the importance of national security, in the form of the National Security Doctrine (NSD), and of Catholic nationalist values, in the form of *nacionalismo*. While consensus was built through these rejections and appeals, it was at the same time undermined by the atrocities it aimed to justify.

In scrutinizing the Chilean case, I stated how the Pinochet regime also presented itself as saviour of the nation, however, in a country where a socialist revolution had already begun. The dictatorship explained the failure of the Allende government to be a failure of socialism and attempted to purge society by declaring a total war against this evil ideology, in which all means were permitted. The regime embraced capitalism as the state ideology and built a strong upper-class elite which was included in the decision-making process. Also, it appealed to Christian nationalist values in the political sphere, but maintained an international character in the economic sphere.

Addressing the third process of consensus building within society, I discussed the importance of consolidating leadership and establishing coherence. I highlighted that a military coup must be instigated unanimously and executed effectively in order to be successful and to prevent countercoups. Moreover, internal competition must be overcome by establishing strong leadership, where traditionally power is shared within a junta. However, personal or civic leadership can also be an option. Furthermore, a plan of succession needs to be constructed in order to prevent violent transfers of power and to create continuity, enhancing societal consensus.

In the Argentinian case, I highlighted that the military coup was welcomed by the Argentine people and executed with unanimous approval from the military. However, the armed forces failed to maintain unity after the coup, as power struggles within the ranks created friction and corruption. Moreover, the regime missed a strongman and therefore lacked charismatic authority. Also, the established system of rotating presidency failed to create continuity, as no president after Videla was able to fulfil the five-year term. Consensus was weakened as a consequence.

As for the case of Chile, I foregrounded that the military coup that ousted Allende from power was bloody, as well as controversial, as many people were still loyal to Allende. Nevertheless, the armed forces acted unified and maintained coherence in the years after the coup. This was largely the result of General Pinochet proclaiming himself as the undisputed leader of both the junta and the nation. From this strongman position he could enforce obedience from the armed forces and obtain charismatic authority from Chilean civilians, due to his personalist style of rule. At the same time, the regime lacked a clear plan of succession, threatening continuity. However, this proved to be no problem, as Pinochet was able to serve as the president from the birth till the death of the regime, further enhancing societal consensus.

Finally, as the last process of consensus building within society, I explained the use of foreign policy in order to create partnership and conflict. International cooperation can strengthen civilian consensus, as the military government can improve its position by aligning with other foreign governments and exchange resources. However, in this way a situation of dependency can be created, which could undermine legitimacy. International conflict can be used to bolster nationalist sentiment within society, but at the same time carries the risk of defeat, possibly devastating the legitimacy of a military regime.

Concerning the case of Argentina, I demonstrated that Argentina was one of the members of Operation Condor, allowing the government to exchange resources with other ideologically aligned countries in Latin America. In this context, the US also supported the regime. However, due to domestic problems, the military government saw itself forced to behave rather confrontational in order to divert attention away from these problems, and to inspire nationalist sentiment. Chilean support for the UK in the aftermath of the Beagle conflict, contributed to a crushing defeat of the Argentine government in the Falkland War, shattering societal consensus and ending military rule in Argentina.

In the case of Chile, I highlighted that Operation Condor was founded in Santiago and provided the Pinochet government strategic alliances with other right-winged Latin American governments. Moreover, the US played its part in destabilizing the Allende government before

the coup, and supported the Pinochet government after the coup. The Pinochet regime did not instigate any international conflict, only supporting the UK's military campaign in the Falklands War in response to Argentine aggression during the Beagle conflict a few years earlier. Warm relations with the US started to cool when the US no longer accepted the human rights abuses of the Pinochet regime, in the face of a collapsing socialist threat in the final days of the Cold War.

In sum, I have provided an account of the differences in consensus building in Latin America, by analysing two different cases which came to power under similar circumstances, but achieved different results in consensus. In comparison, the Pinochet regime outperformed the military junta in Argentina economically and was less violent in using political repression. Also, compared to Argentina, the socialist threat in Chile was larger, as a socialist president was leading the nation. Moreover, the Pinochet government was more pragmatic in preventing nationalism hindering international trade. In addition, the military government in Chile maintained more unity and continuity, compared to that in Argentina. Also, personalist rule provided Pinochet charismatic authority, which the Argentine military junta lacked. Finally, compared to the military junta in Argentina, the Pinochet regime was more cooperative and less antagonizing towards foreign powers. All these differences contribute to the legacy of undisputed failure in Argentina, and the controversial legacy of relative 'success' in Chile. This is why in Argentina today, the military government is widely condemned, while in Chile, the people are very much divided in their opinion on the Pinochet regime.

In this thesis I sought to emphasize that the concept of military dictatorship is a fluid, rather than static one. The long tradition of *caudillismo* in Latin America resulted in military governments possessing elements of personalist rule, as we saw in Chile. The way in which a military regime attempts to build consensus within society, seems to be strongly embedded in the national political culture which it stem from. Also, the Beagle conflict of 1978 revealed how two similar military dictatorships can come onto a collision course, due to the failure of consensus building in one of the countries, in this case in Argentina. Analysing consensus is therefore crucial in determining the future behaviour and possible transgressions of a military regime. This is important to keep this in mind when researching other historic cases in different regions across the world. The theoretical framework that I have constructed in this thesis could be of use in analysing such cases in different contexts.


The failed military coup in Turkey in 2016 is a testimony to the relevance of this topic today. Moreover, in Latin America the current disastrous situation in Venezuela demonstrates that this region still struggles to maintain socio-economic order. With populism on the rise all across the

globe, attempts at military seizures of power will most likely continue to transpire in the future, stressing the need for further research. The format of this thesis is limited only to the issue of consensus in military dictatorships. In order to create a more comprehensive account on the behaviour of military dictatorships, not only in Latin America, but all throughout the world, I would like to stress the need for future research into the significance of these regimes in an international context. The question of how these particular regimes fit into the international system and how they interact with other countries deserves a deeper understanding, if only for the threat to international peace that these regimes can potentially form.

## APPENDIX


**Figure 1**

Inflation rate in Argentina under Isabel Péron (01/07/1974-01/04/1976)




**Figure 2**

Inflation rate in Argentina under the military junta (01/04/1976-30/10/1983)




**Figure 3**

Inflation rate in Chile under Salvador Allende (03/11/1970-09/11/1973)




**Figure 4**

Inflation rate in Chile under Augusto Pinochet (11/09/1973-11/03/1990)



**Figure 5**

Gross domestic product growth in Chile (1971-2015)



\* Figures one till four have been created via: <https://tradingeconomics.com/>.

\* Figure five is taken from: <http://ivanstat.com/gdp/cl.html>.

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