

Strategically steering professionals?

A comparative analysis of how street-level professionals are taken into account in implementation strategies for counterterrorism policies in Belgium and France.



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Executive summary

Counterterrorism is a complex problem that has been high on the political agenda in Western European countries over the last years, due to multiple terrorist attacks by Islamic State (IS) and the leave of European citizens to fight with IS in Syria. The problem is complex in such an extent that it can be called a *wicked problem* (Rittel & Webber, 1973; Head & Alford, 2015). Even though wicked problems are seen as impossible to solve completely, Head & Alford (2015) believe that it is possible to come up with partial solutions. Especially in the case of a crisis event such as a terrorist attack, governments are expected to respond and protect their citizens and reaffirm their legitimacy and control (Crenshaw, 1983). This can be done by making counterterrorism policies, written down in policy documents.

The execution of counterterrorism policies greatly relies on *street-level professionals* (Lipsky, 1980; Lipsky, 2010). To stimulate the realization of the goals of these policies, policymaking actors can try to influence the implementation processes, in which case we speak of an *implementation strategy* (Noordegraaf et al., 2010). Since *street-level professionals* are key to implementation (Lipsky, 1980; Yanow, 1996), they are important to take into account in the implementation strategies for counterterrorism policies. The main question of this research therefore is “*How are street-level professionals taken into account in implementation strategies for counterterrorism policies?*”

When confronted with a crisis, governments can tend to increase top down implementation. The question then is to what extent the needs of *street-level professionals* are still taken into account after terrorist attacks. Therefore, a selection of fourteen policy documents has been analyzed, both before and after the terrorist attacks in France and Belgium. Additionally, a distinction has been made between national and more local policies to discover whether *street-level professionals* play a more substantial role in policies on a local level, since they are the local executors.

The first conclusion of the research is that the studied policies pay most attention to the need for raising awareness and educating professionals on the specific subject of radicalization and terrorism. This is necessary to give them the discretionary power to deal with such situations in their direct contact with citizens. This leads to the second conclusion that the direct contact of *street-level professionals* makes them crucial actors in detecting signals of radicalization and terrorism and adds to their attributed importance in the documents. A stronger urge for top down implementation can indeed be discovered in the policies made after the terrorist attacks. To conclude its impact on professionals' discretionary space requires additional research. Lastly, the institutional context of the countries is a guiding factor for the way implementation is steered.

Preface

The document that you are about to read is the final product of my Master's program in Public Management at the Utrecht School of Governance (University of Utrecht). This thesis on how street-level professionals are taken into account in the implementation strategies in counterterrorism policies is the result of several aspects in the process of my graduation.

At the start of this thesis, I was already interested in counterterrorism thus the choice to do research in this domain was an easy one. In the process of writing this thesis, the relevance and necessity to gain more knowledge on this topic has manifested itself once again when the United Kingdom suffered from several terrorist attacks in London and Manchester. Originally, I wished to speak to several people involved in policy making and execution around the counterterrorism policies in Belgium and France as a complement to the document analysis. I departed to Strasbourg where I was given the opportunity to work at the research lab SAGE and hoped to find my interviewees there. Unfortunately, this was easier said than done. Accepting that I needed to slightly change my approach has been an educational experience. In this preface I would like to thank Mme Michel for giving me the opportunity to work at SAGE, Maxime for all his help regarding my thesis and Vincent for keeping my spirits up and all the conversations we had.

Meanwhile, the focus on counterterrorism has also allowed me to assist in a research project of USBO Advies on the consequences of emergency measures taken after terrorist attacks. Thank you, Scott, for inviting me to assist in the project after hearing that I speak French quite fluently. I would also like to thank Marie-Jeanne, as project leader and my contact person, and all the other team members involved in the project. Special thanks must be paid to my thesis supervisor Ekaterina, for your support and feedback throughout the process. Karin, thank you for your additional feedback and willingness to be the second supervisor of this thesis.

On a more personal level I would like to thank my fellow students of the Public Management program; you have provided me with interesting discussions and even more good times. Thank you Wybrand, for being there for me when I needed it most and supporting me the best you can. My parents are the ones who have stimulated and supported me throughout my education, without ever pushing me. Thanks to you I was able to become the person I am now, for which I am very grateful.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

In the past few years, especially since 2015, Europe has been shocked by a wave of terrorist attacks. Terrorism itself is not a new phenomenon. According to Rapoport (2001), one can distinguish between four different waves of global terrorism. The first 'Anarchist' wave started in the 1880s and is characterized by its aim of assassinating prominent officials, like President William McKinley in 1901 (Rapoport, 2001). The second wave is the 'Anticolonial' wave. In this wave, the IRA was founded in Ireland and already had some successes in the 1920s. The wave really started after World War II when terrorist groups in several colonies started fighting for their independence. An example is the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale, that resulted in the Franco-Algerian war (Rapoport, 2001). The third 'New Left' wave was instigated by the Vietnam war. It stimulated ambivalence among mostly youth about the values of their system, and resulted in the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany and the Italian Red Brigade. The first three waves each lasted about 40-45 years. The fourth wave started in 1979 and is known as the 'Religious' wave. As reported by Rapoport (2001), this wave is characterized by Islamic groups, who have led the most significant, most deadly and most international attacks. Also, terrorists started to regroup themselves in larger networks, such as Al-Qaeda. The attacks of 9/11 are also part of the Religious wave, which continues up to today, as most of the recent terrorist attacks in West-European countries were also characterized by a religious Islamic component because they were claimed by IS.

This wave of terrorist attacks has ensured that fighting terrorism has become one of the highest priorities in Europe, especially in the countries that were struck. In order to deal with the terrorist threat, new counterterrorism policies and measures have been implemented by many European countries. This study considers counterterrorism as a policy domain, within which different measures can be taken and policies can be made to fight the phenomenon. These policies can focus on repressive measures, preventive measures, or a combination of both.

Because terrorism and counterterrorism are complex – or *wicked* – issues (Rittel & Webber, 1973; Head & Alford, 2015), policy making and implementation are not easy tasks. They are so-called *wicked* issues because causality can be difficult to demonstrate, multi-level governance is required and a lot of stakeholders are involved (Head & Alford, 2015). This means that implementation has to deal with network collaboration, where execution depends on collaboration and consensus between different stakeholders involved in solving a problem. Besides the design, leadership, starting conditions and process within such a network, execution of the policies depends for a great deal on *street-level professionals* (Lipsky, 1980). These professionals are usually the ones who are in direct contact with citizens in doing their job. They are thus the ones who can for example signal radicalizing people, while taking into account not only their professional knowledge, but also the policies

and rules that have been made on counterterrorism. Due to the fact that government intervention is suspect to accountability and transparency, policies are written down in documents and then published for and/or spread to the concerned audience. Through these documents, the way that policy measures can be implemented and executed, is recorded. Following Lipsky (1980, 2010), these *street-level professionals* are seen as the key to implementation and are therefore the focus point of this research. To ensure that implementation is more likely to reach the policy goals, policy makers can try to influence the implementation process in such a way that the desired execution is stimulated. In that case we speak of an *implementation strategy* (Noordegraaf, van der Meulen, Bos, van der Steen & Pen, 2010). Since *street-level professionals* are usually positioned within an institutional frame, they are subject to the policies that are made and documented. Given that the actual execution of these policies greatly relies on those *street-level professionals*, such as police men, social workers or teachers, it is expected that they have been given special attention in the policy documents regarding their role in the implementation of the counterterrorism policies and thus also in the implementation strategies. However, counterterrorism is a policy domain that can be confronted with a crisis situation, as is the case when there is a terrorist attack (Rosenthal et al., 1989), in which governments have no other choice but to react. As a result of the government reassuring their control and legitimacy (Crenshaw, 1983), new or changed policies could be imposed and implemented more top-down. This can restrict the way in which *street-level professionals* are taken into account.

This research will therefore analyze how *street-level professionals* are taken into account in the implementation strategies used for counterterrorism policies. For this purpose, different policy documents will be analyzed before and after terrorist attacks, on a national and regional level and between countries.

1.1 Purpose of the study

The goal of this research is to provide an international insight into how *street-level professionals* are taken into account regarding the implementation of policy measures, specifically in the wicked policy domain of counterterrorism. This research thus contributes to the knowledge about how the role of *street-level professionals* in counterterrorism policies influences implementation processes. Besides the contribution on the role of *street-level professionals* in counterterrorism policies, this research contributes to knowledge about the effect of using a certain implementation strategy or strategies when it comes to complex policy domains that require network collaboration, such as is the case in the policy domain of counterterrorism.

1.2 Research question

This leads to the following research question: *How are street-level professionals taken into account in implementation strategies for counterterrorism policies?*

There are certain variables to be taken into consideration when answering this research question. The independent variable in this research are the *street-level professionals* because it is assumed that the amount to which they are taken into account influences the implementation strategy. The dependent variable is therefore the implementation strategy (Manheim, Rich, Willnat, Brians & Babb, 2012).

In order to answer the main question, several theoretical and empirical sub-questions will have to be answered. The theoretical sub-questions will help to fill the academic gap in the field of governance on counterterrorism (Crenshaw, 2010), especially contributing to knowledge about the role of *street-level professionals* in implementation strategies of counterterrorism policies.

The theoretical sub-questions will be answered in the theoretical framework and will address the principal concepts of the main question: wicked policy domains, street-level professionals and implementation strategies.

1. *What are wicked policy domains?*
2. *What are street-level professionals and how do they relate to implementation in counterterrorism policies?*
3. *What are implementation strategies & how can they influence implementation?*

Having answered the theoretical sub-questions, hence allows the investigation of the role that *street-level professionals* play in the policies for a wicked policy domain, specifically the domain of counterterrorism. It also allows the investigation of the used implementation strategies.

4. *How are street-level professionals taken into account in the discourse of counterterrorism policies in France and Belgium?*
5. *Which implementation strategies are used for counterterrorism policies in France and Belgium?*

The empirical sub-questions will allow to investigate the theoretical expectations and combined they will allow to answer the research question.

1.3 Relevance

Investigating the role that *street-level professionals* play in implementation strategies of policy measures in counterterrorism is relevant for both society and science. The problems we are facing these days are transcending boundaries more often and are therefore demanding more and more multi-level collaboration. However, execution still relies greatly on *street-level professionals*, as they are the ones likely to be confronted with the target audience of the policies. How these professionals can be taken into account to enlarge the chances of successful implementation and reaching the policy goals is therefore relevant.

The specific subject of this investigation is also relevant. Counterterrorism measures and specifically policies that are focused on the prevention of radicalization that can lead to terrorism have a high place on the political agenda, as Europe has been confronted with a range of terrorist attacks. These attacks can have a big impact on society. Expanded (scientific) knowledge on the application of counterterrorism measures is therefore important for countries to prevent and combat terrorism.

1.3.1 Societal relevance

As already explained in the background section, terrorist attacks are a threat for many countries worldwide. Given the recent attacks in Paris, Nice, Brussels and München in 2016, it is a realistic scenario that other countries in the European Union will be faced with terrorist attacks as well. Unfortunately, this scenario has already become reality for the United Kingdom, that was faced with two terrorist attacks in 2017. Terrorism is a *wicked* problem due to its unpredictable nature and the many factors involved. Nevertheless, governments are expected to take measures in order to secure their citizens from the threat posed by terrorists.

If an attack does take place, governments will need to take action in response to the attack. Having some knowledge of how the measures taken can be implemented whilst taking into account the unique role of *street-level professionals*, can help countries in deciding what measures to take in such critical circumstances. Learning from countries that have already dealt with implementing policy measures under critical conditions might help other governments in their response to fight terrorism. Such knowledge might help governments in adapting their measures to their own specific context.

1.3.2 Scientific relevance

Scientifically, this research is relevant as well. Terrorism and fighting terrorism is a field of research that many have explored. However, as Crenshaw (2010) noted, legal scholars have done more research to the effects of counterterrorism than political and governance scientists have since the 9/11 attacks. From a governance point of view, this means that there is a gap in our understanding of the impact of democratic responses to terrorism. Even though there are studies that evaluate counterterrorism strategies, these studies usually

focus on one country or institution (for example Noordegraaf, Douglas, Bos & Klem, 2016; Monar, 2007). Studies have also been done on performativity of counterterrorism policies (De Graaf, 2010) and on the robustness of counterterrorism strategies (Sinnige, 2016). However, hardly any comparative studies have been done on counterterrorism policies initiated after a terrorist attack from a public governance point of view. This study therefore aims to contribute in filling the gap of scientific knowledge concerning the role that *street-level professionals* play in implementation strategies of counterterrorism measures. It does so by making an international comparison between two countries that have implemented new counterterrorism measures after terrorist attacks. Due to several constraints, this research has only analyzed the written policy documents and therefore only contributes to filling the theoretical gap, which could be reinforced by adding practical findings retrieved from for example interviews or observations.

1.4 Thesis outline

Chapter two will elaborate upon the context of this investigation by defining terrorism and counterterrorism and by examining literature on policy making. This allows to continue in chapter three with the theory behind wicked policy domains, *street-level professionals* and their role in implementing policies in such wicked domains. It also elaborates upon network collaboration, followed by implementation processes and how implementation strategies can be helpful in those policy domains. The theoretical sub-questions will also be answered in chapter three. Subsequently, chapter four is the methodology chapter and explains how the research has been done. Chapter five is the results chapter in which the results from the discourse analysis and the qualitative content analysis can be found. In chapter five the empirical sub-questions will be answered as well. Chapter six follows with the conclusion and answer to the main question, followed by a last chapter that contains the discussion that reflects upon the research.

Chapter 2 (Counter)terrorism and policy making

This chapter will define what is meant in this study by *terrorism* and *counterterrorism*, since that is the context of the research. Both concepts are so-called *wicked* issues, because of their complexity. This will be further explained in chapter three. Furthermore, this chapter elaborates upon policy making, and how policy making in the domain of counterterrorism differs from normal policy making.

2.1 What is terrorism?

To define counterterrorism, the concept of ‘terrorism’ must be defined first. However, there is no consent thus far on the definition of terrorism. This paragraph will therefore show the nuances in definition that researchers and governments have constructed. These different definitions will be combined in one definition that will be used throughout this thesis, to have a clear understanding of what is meant when discussing terrorism and counterterrorism.

According to Butko (2006), there are three components that most definitions of terrorism have in common – the threat or use of violence, the persistence of broader political objectives and the psychological effect, mostly of generating fear, on innocent victims. Crenshaw (2010) adds that terrorism is a deliberate act and that its aim is to shift the attention of an audience – a political objective. She also adds that, in line with the psychological effect that Butko (2006) names, the aim may be not only to strike fear, but also to mobilize support. Furthermore, the choice of the target is often symbolic (Crenshaw, 2010). Phillips (2015) adds to the work of Butko and Crenshaw by stating that terrorist attacks are mostly executed in a group that is *“part of a campaign by a specific group with particular goals, mobilization issues, structure and other organizational characteristics”* (Phillips, 2015, p. 227).

Terrorism can also be described as a strategy that terrorists use. They believe that something is wrong with the world, or hegemony, we live in and that this needs to change. By committing terrorist acts they try to deliver their message (Calhoun, 2002; Butko, 2006). Crenshaw (1995) adds to this aspect of strategy that terrorists try not only to deliver a message by threatening or attacking ‘the other side’, they also want to deliver a message to ‘their own side’, or to governments that might support their actions (Crenshaw, 1995). Terrorism is therefore embedded in a political or geopolitical process, meaning that it has to be analyzed in its context (Crenshaw, 1995).

In pursuance of a definition of terrorism that fits within this research, the definitions of terrorism as used by organizations fighting terrorism in France, Belgium and by the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) of the European Committee will be examined and

combined. These definitions were chosen because they state how the examined countries define terrorism, which can subsequently be compared to the European consensus definition for a more international component.

In its White Paper on Defense and National Security of 2013, France defines terrorism as

“a mode of action utilized by adversaries who ignore all the rules of conventional warfare to offset their inadequate resources and to achieve their political objectives. Striking civilians indiscriminately, the violence they deploy aims first and foremost to take advantage of the fact that their brutal impact can sway public opinion and thus constrain governments.” (Ministère de la Défense, 2013, p.42).

The White Paper adds to this definition that the destabilizing effect of terrorism can go well beyond their direct impact because the power of modern media significantly magnifies its psychological and political impact. This publicity also encourages the self-radicalization of isolated individuals and thus helps to maintain the terrorist phenomenon; the Internet enables individuals to join virtual terrorist communities, which provides terrorist organizations with a recruitment channel (Ministère de la Défense, 2013).

In its policy document on Integral Security of 2016, Belgium sees an act of terrorism as the final phase of radicalization. Terrorism is defined as when violence is used to terrorize individuals and society to cause excessive individual and societal damage. The application of violence and its consequences serve to create a breeding ground that enables societal and political transformations, or even causes these (Ministerie van Justitie & Ministerie van Veiligheid en Binnenlandse Zaken, 2016, p.44). The Belgian penal law describes terrorism as a crime that because of its nature or context is able to severely damage a country or international organization. A terrorist crime is deliberately committed, with the objective of gravely frightening a population or to force the government or an international organization to illegally perform or abstain from an action. Another objective as stated in the penal law is to seriously disrupt or destroy the political, constitutional, economic or social backbone structures of a country or an international organization (art. 137, lid 1 Strafwetboek 2003).

The difference in the French and Belgian definition give a small insight into the fact that a common definition of terrorism is contested within the individual partners of the European Union. However, there is a consensus definition as used by the Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union which contains three elements and very much resembles the definition in the Belgian penal code. *“Terrorist offences are defined as acts committed with the aim of 'seriously intimidating a population', 'unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act', or 'seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization'.”* (2002/475/JHA).

When analyzing the definitions of terrorism as used by the French and Belgian governments and as used by the European Union, we can see that they share the components of having a political objective and of the psychological effect to generate fear within a population. Oddly, the European definition doesn't explicitly include the act or threat of violence, one of the aspects of terrorism on which scholars and scientist seem to agree. Following Calhoun (2002), Butko (2006) and Crenshaw (1995), the French definition of terrorism agrees with the idea of terrorism as a strategy and delivering a message, by emphasizing the added effect of social media on the psychological and political impact that terrorism has (Ministère de la Défense, 2013).

Combining the different and most common aspects of the different definitions of terrorism used by scholars and governments, for the purpose of this study terrorism will be defined as:

“a mode of action involving deliberate attacks on civilians by adversaries with political objectives. Striking civilians indiscriminately, the aim of the violence is to generate fear, to shift the attitudes of public opinion, or to seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country. The act of violence constrains governments and aims to mobilize support in sympathetic audiences.”. (Crenshaw, 2010; Ministère de la Défense, 2013; Art. 137, lid 1 Strafwetboek; 2002/475/JHA)

2.2 What is counterterrorism?

Having explained and defined the contested concept of terrorism, it is now possible to define the concept of *counterterrorism*. It might not come as a surprise that due to the differences of opinion on terrorism, counterterrorism is a contested concept as well. We can define counterterrorism as activities used against terrorism, as described in the definition above. This is a broad definition that is not restricted to political or military activity. As Crenshaw & LaFree (2017) mention, counterterrorism has a very extensive scope and therefore many diverse measures can be considered as counterterrorism, including juridical changes, expanded powers to executive forces such as the police, but also preventive measures. This study considers counterterrorism as a policy domain, in which different measures can be taken and policies can be made that share the goal of fighting terrorism.

The main distinction that is made for counterterrorism policies, is between repressive and preventive measures. There seems to be a general consensus between policy makers, academics and professionals that counterterrorism requires an integral approach; thus combining repressive with preventive measures. Repressive measures are mostly found within laws and police action, while preventive measures mostly focus upon preventing the process of radicalization, as radicalization is seen as a stadium that can lead to acts of

terrorism. The importance of prevention is stressed by the Radicalisation Awareness Network, which states that *“Preventing radicalization is key – fighting terrorism can only be successful if we remove the soil out of which it grows”* (RAN, 2016, p.8).

Because counterterrorism has such a broad definition and many measures are a part of counterterrorism, they are not exclusively found in separate policies. Even though the concept of ‘counterterrorism policies’ is used within this thesis and regarded as a policy domain on itself, there can be broader policies on security for example that include a part dedicated to counterterrorism measures. When ‘counterterrorism policies’ are mentioned, both specific policies that are entirely dedicated to counterterrorism measures (including radicalization) are meant, as well as parts or chapters dedicated to counterterrorism within broader policies.

2.3 Policy making

Policy-making does not have one way that can be applied to all situations. It depends greatly on the context of the problem. Making counterterrorism policies is not only difficult because it is a very complex problem. Sometimes it can also lead to making these policies in a crisis situation, for example after a terrorist attack. This paragraph will first discuss policy making in general, followed by making policies in the domain of counterterrorism.

Policy making in non-crisis situations has certain characteristics that cannot be used for policy making in crisis situations. According to Hoogerwerf (2003) designing a policy is the process of deliberately devising, substantiating and formulating a policy. It is a thought process and an exercise of power, implying that it is not a very fast process. A policy design must be both rational (including financial feasibility, demonstrable causality) and legitimate. It can be judged on its effectiveness, efficiency and acceptance or legitimacy (Hoogerwerf, 2003).

Complex problems – such as counterterrorism – which are surrounded by uncertainty, require a thorough analysis during a normal situation. Complexity can be found within the distinctive aspects, the number of relationships between them and the extent to which those change (Hoogerwerf, 2003). The approach of such complex issues usually requires a lot of qualitative knowledge (Lipsky, 1980; Hoogerwerf, 2003). The more knowledge and certainty there is on a topic, the easier it is to identify causal relationships. However, when knowledge is uncertain, the policy maker is faced with questions that can’t be answered. The complexity of a problem, in combination with a lack of time, can cause uncertainties in the policy. If such is the case, the policy design must have space left to fill in the details along the way according to Hoogerwerf (2003). Due to such uncertainty, some things cannot be foreseen but require for example an adaptation of the policy.

2.3.1 Making counterterrorism policies

When making policies for counterterrorism, it is a possibility that a normal policy making process is impossible because of a crisis situation, such as a terrorist attack.

Terrorist attacks can be seen as crises in the public domain following the idea of Rosenthal et al. (1989) that we speak of a crisis when a threat that is perceived against the core values of a social system, requires urgent remedial action under conditions of deep uncertainty. Terrorist attacks differ from 'normal' disasters because of the intentional component, other than for example a natural disaster such as a tsunami. Government intervention is therefore not only restricted to disaster management, but must at the same time focus on incarcerating the terrorists as soon as possible and must take into account the threat of a possible subsequent attack. Moreover, terrorist attacks can cause a great societal impact that might lead to agitation and disturbances (NCTV, 2006, in: Muller, Rosenthal, Helsloot & van Dijkman, 2009). This means that counterterrorism policies in crisis situations differ from 'normal' crisis situations.

Traditional policy making and crisis policy making share the concept of *agenda setting*; something must be put on the agenda before it receives attention of the public and politics. This process can be accelerated in the case of an event that draws attention to the subject – such as terrorist attacks – placing the subject of counterterrorism at the top of the agenda.

Politically a crisis can be of great significance. Crises are important episodes for political executives and public organizations involved in responding to them. Crises can be a source of high-visibility failure and blame, but they also present an opportunity for leadership and the opportunity to implement policies that would be unthinkable without a crisis (Boin & 't Hart, 2012). Directly after such tragic events, governments simply have to do 'something', because there is no time and space to consider all the effects and implement measures carefully, before continuing any further.

This urge to act is amplified by public pressure, attracted by the dramatic and emotional consequences of an attack. According to Crenshaw (1983), the gathering of news reporters after an act of terrorism, waiting for the government's response render inaction almost impossible. This pressure has become even stronger with the spreading of (social) media on the Internet. Thus, the public reaction to terrorism limits the government's options because the public encourages the government either to contradict an impression of weakness or to resolve the crisis – at high cost. Therefore, the cost of not acting becomes unacceptably high. Besides, inaction allows the terrorists free rein, damages the reputation of the government and enables private vengeance according to Crenshaw (1983).

However, even though governments have no other choice than to act after a terrorist attack, governments do have choices in *how* to combat terrorism. These choices can be key determinants of the outcome. The government's problem in choosing how to act lies within

the fact that government intervention is always susceptible to different values. Governments faced with terrorist attacks must be concerned with both the effectiveness and legitimacy of their policies, just like in normal situations. Meanwhile they must strengthen their own authority while diminishing the legitimacy of the terrorists (Crenshaw, 1983). Besides legitimacy and effectiveness, accountability and transparency are two other values that governments must strive for. Security policies are inevitably suspect of a certain degree of secrecy, but democratic governments must explain and justify their policies and actions to their electorate (Crenshaw, 2010). Counterterrorism actions must therefore be entirely legal; fighting terrorism using terrorist methods would not only be morally repulsive, but also politically disastrous (Crenshaw, 1983). Governments must therefore maintain effective control over the response to terrorism to assure its proper handling according to legal and moral codes.

To conclude, crisis situations such as terrorist attacks can put counterterrorism at the top of the political agenda. At the same time, governments are required to respond to the attacks or to the threat. This can be done by updating existing policies or by making new policies, which are likely to be initiated by the government to show their authority and strength over the terrorists. In doing so, there are certain aspects to be taken into account to stimulate the implementation of these policies. First, one must take into account that counterterrorism is a wicked problem, which means that it has certain factors that render policy making and implementation challenging. This means – amongst other aspects – that collaboration is a crucial aspect for policies for wicked problems. Thirdly, the execution of counterterrorism policies relies to a great extent on *street-level professionals*, professionals in the public domain such as police men or teachers who execute policies on a local level. If a government wants to update a policy or create a new one, they should take these *street-level professionals* into account to increase the success of the policy. So lastly, to steer the implementation and to facilitate the execution, certain implementation strategies can be used. These four aspects and their interrelatedness will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 3 Theoretical framework

As has already very briefly mentioned, counterterrorism is a wicked problem as a result of its complexity. This chapter clarifies what exactly the characteristics of wicked problems are and why it can be difficult to make and implement policies for such problems. Subsequently, a definition of *street-level professionals* will be given and how they relate to implementation in wicked policy domains. Then collaborative governance is discussed and finally, implementation strategies will be explained to synthesize what role *street-level professionals* are expected to play in implementation strategies for wicked problems as counterterrorism.

3.1 Wicked problems

As already very briefly stated, (counter)terrorism is a *wicked problem* due to its complexity. This paragraph will elaborate upon what exactly is a wicked problem and the reasons that (counter)terrorism is considered to be one of them.

A number of scholars have studied complex problems, for which solutions are either hard or almost impossible to find, also known as *wicked problems*. The study of Rittel & Webber (1973) is well-known in this field. They contrast wicked, societal problems from problems in natural sciences. The latter are definable, separable and have findable solutions, whereas wicked problems are ill-defined and are never solved (Rittel & Webber, 1973). They have come up with 10 properties of wicked problems, which include: not having a definitive formulation of the problem, solutions are good or bad instead of true or false, and the search for solutions never stops. They conclude their article by saying that none of the tactics they propose will answer the wicked problems that countries are facing (Rittel & Webber, 1973).

Following the characteristics of a wicked problem from Rittel & Webber (1973), terrorism and counterterrorism can be identified as wicked problems. They claim that terrorism is a wicked problem, not just because there is a lot of disagreement on which of the many aspects to include in its definition, but also because it is unpredictable and the search for solutions never stops. However, terrorism asks for measures to manage and fight this complex problem. Especially in the case of a terrorist attack, governmental inaction is impossible and governments must try to keep citizens as safe as possible, as already explained in previous paragraphs. Since Rittel & Webber (1973) were skeptical about finding ways to answer wicked problems, a more pragmatic approach to the wicked problem of terrorism, as proposed by Head & Alford (2015), will be used instead.

Head & Alford (2015) agree partially with Rittel & Webber (1973) by stating that conclusive solutions are rare, but they believe that it is nevertheless possible to frame "*partial, provisional courses of action against wicked problems*" (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 712). This

pragmatic approach characterizes wicked problems as dealing with *social pluralism*, *institutional complexity* and *scientific uncertainty*. Examples of these three characteristics will be given for counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism can be associated with *social pluralism*, because multiple interests and values of stakeholders are involved (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 716). Politicians might for example emphasize the so-called repressive measures that can be taken to fight terrorism, by putting pressure on the police to do more house searches. This can differ from the interests of stakeholders involved with the preventive side of counterterrorism, e.g. social workers or even policemen. Even though the stakeholders involved agree on the goal (that terrorism should be prevented and fought), they do not necessarily share the same interests when it comes to the means for achieving that goal. Counterterrorism measures will therefore not always please all the stakeholders involved.

Besides social pluralism, counterterrorism also has to deal with *institutional complexity*. This means that fighting terrorism takes place in a context of inter-organizational cooperation and multilevel governance (Head & Alford, 2015). The foundation of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) of the European Commission is an example itself of the need for international and multi-level cooperation in the fight against terrorism. They point to the variety of breeding grounds for terrorists within the different member states of the EU; on- and offline support for terrorist organizations, the rise of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), the danger of radicalized returnees and the fact that Daesh and Al-Qaeda called upon their followers to “*bring terror to the West*” (RAN, 2016, p. 8). As a result of these intertwining aspects in an international context, terrorism cannot be fought by a country alone, neither by one level of government. The Dutch counterterrorism strategy also underlines the need for multi-level governance in fighting terrorism by saying that local, national and international authorities need to cooperate with social services and private companies because an effective combat against terrorism requires a collective effort of all counterterrorism partners (NCTV, 2016). They stress the need for what they call ‘the broad approach’ of counterterrorism, in which as many stakeholders as possible are involved, thus both involved in repression as well as prevention.

Finally, terrorism is characterized by *scientific uncertainty*, due to fragmentation and gaps in reliable knowledge (Head & Alford, 2015). An iconic example are the attacks on the Twin Towers on 9/11. The risk of a massive suicide attack by hijacking an airplane had been known by the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States. However, this option was dismissed by the authorities because they thought that terrorists wanted to achieve a dialogue by committing an assault, and that dialogue would be impossible when hijacking an airplane (Weick, 2005). It turned out that reality was unpredictable and the impossible option became reality on the 11th of September 2001. Besides the discrepancies in reliable knowledge on possible terrorist attacks, there are other factors that contribute to the

scientific uncertainty surrounding terrorism. According to Crenshaw & LaFree (2017), these factors are the absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism, a lack of agreement on an overarching causal theory of terrorism and the difficulties encountered in measuring (counter)terrorism's effectiveness. According to Bakker (2008), the uncertainty concerning the effect of counterterrorism policies has to do with a lack of evaluation of these policies that were made in critical circumstances.

To conclude we can therefore state that according to Head & Alford (2015), wicked problems are characterized by *social pluralism*, *institutional complexity* and *scientific uncertainty*. In wicked policy domains, conclusive solutions to the problem are almost impossible to find, but partial and provisional answers to the problem can be formulated (Head & Alford, 2015). These factors render policy making and implementation more difficult and this must be taken into account when implementing policies for such complex problems. The first theoretical sub-question '*What are wicked policy domains?*' can thus be answered by saying wicked policy domains cope with social pluralism, institutional complexity and scientific uncertainty. To deal with such issues, governments can formulate partial, provisional answers that take these characteristics into account. Counterterrorism has these characteristics because multiple interests and stakeholders are involved, there is institutional complexity that requires multi-level governance and due to fragmentation and gaps in knowledge, there is scientific uncertainty. Especially due to the (scientific) uncertainty that surrounds counterterrorism, it would be wise according to Hoogerwerf (2003) to leave room for adaptation along the way in these policies. Besides the characteristics of wicked problems, another aspect to take into account for counterterrorism policies is the execution.

3.2 Street-level professionals and policy implementation

Policies are made to be implemented. When we speak of implementing a policy, we mean putting the idea of the policy into practice; executing it. This transition is however not self-evident, as several studies in governance have already showed since the 1970s (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Lipsky, 1980; Yanow, 1996; Hoogerwerf, 2003). The attention for implementation derived from problems with the actual implementation of policies and unintended effects after implementation (Noordegraaf et al., 2010). The literature on implementation theory shows several generations, which over time involve more and more the input from *street-level professionals*; grassroots practitioners who are usually the ones executing the policy. The first generation is characterized by the work of Pressman & Wildavsky (1973), who showed that the process from policy to execution is anything but straightforward and that policies are continuously adjusted. Their research was the first generation to see policy implementation as an element of its own (DeLeon & DeLeon, 2002; Matland, 1995). This led to the second generation on implementation theories. The top down perspective was still dominant and research of this generation focused upon how to

best ensure that policies are executed in the way that the policy makers intended. Hypotheses and empirical research were central factors, just as the attention for the different relations involved with the implementation process (DeLeon & DeLeon, 2002; Hoogerwerf, 2003).

This top down perspective was followed by a generation that focused on bottom up implementation. Lipsky's work (1980) was agenda setting for this generation¹, by analyzing the role of *street-level professionals* (also called street-level bureaucrats) in policy implementation. *Street-level professionals* can be defined as public service definers who have direct contact with citizens in the execution of their profession and therefore need a certain discretionary space in order to adjust the policy to a specific context (Lipsky, 1980; Bakker & van Waarden, 1999). Typical examples of such professionals are police officers, teachers and social workers. These *street-level professionals* are key to implementation according to Lipsky (1980), because they are the ones to execute the policies while being in direct contact with the target group (DeLeon & DeLeon, 2002). In their contacts with citizens, they make decisions about situations that can greatly influence people's lives (Lipsky, 1980, p. 8-9). The third generation therefore focuses on including the implementation in the making of the policy, because the executing professionals partly shape the policies through execution. Yanow (1996) continued upon this idea, which led to the fourth generation of implementation theories. This generation entails that policies are made mostly by *street-level professionals*, following the idea of Yanow (1996) that policy is made where it is executed. The professionals executing the policies are according to Yanow (1996) the ones who should make – at least to a great extent – the policies to ensure successful implementation.

3.2.1 Street-level professionals

Successful policy execution is characterized by a certain tension between flexibility and uniformity and depends on the way that *street-level professionals* implement a policy. These professionals are the ones to ensure the local execution of the counterterrorism policies. The policy execution by *street-level professionals* is mostly immediate and personal; they decide on the spot and their decisions are based on the individual (Lipsky, 2010, p.8). These decisions affect the life chances of people because the professionals decide if they are for example delinquents, or radicalized. When specifically focusing on *street-level professionals* involved in counterterrorism, we see that they can be involved in the execution of repressive measures, but also increasingly in the execution of preventive measures. *Street-level*

¹ The bottom-up approach and the specific attention to street-level professionals was initiated by Lipsky, on which many other authors have built (e.g. Yanow, 1996; Bakker & van Waarden, 1999; De Bruijn, 2011). Lipsky has published an updated version of his 1980s book '*Street-level bureaucracy*' in 2010. This updated version contains some reflections on the 1980s version and contemplates the influences of governmental changes on street-level professionals. For this research, the updated version has mostly been used.

professionals such as police men, social workers and teachers have direct contact with citizens in the execution of their jobs. Therefore, they are important actors who could identify signs of radicalization, changes in behavior or other alarming signals. This can help to prevent possible attacks. Due to the decisions they make about people's lives, *street-level professionals* also deal with citizen's reactions to these decisions. This can mean that they have to deal with angry citizens, or with citizens who try to influence the professional to achieve a better outcome for themselves (Lipsky, 2010).

Since these professionals have usually known an extensive education and because they have built up a lot of experience by doing their job, they have a great power of judgment to execute a policy on their own discretion. This insight is known as *tacit knowledge* (Lipsky, 2010; De Bruijn, 2011; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The tacit knowledge is within the actions, experiences, ideals and values of the professional and is difficult to make explicit or communicate. It is something that the professionals are not aware of sometimes because it has grown through years of professional action and education, even socialization (Lipsky, 2010; De Bruijn, 2011; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The implicitness of tacit knowledge makes it difficult for professionals to make their knowledge *explicit*. Most policies however, are written down explicitly to clearly convey the message and because governments are held accountable for their policies. Therefore, Yanow's claim that policy is made where it is executed (1996) can be criticized. Even though policy executors play a crucial role, they do not know either what exactly constitutes 'good' policy design. Especially for a wicked problem such as counterterrorism that is characterized by social pluralism, institutional complexity and requires multi-level governance, policy executors do not necessarily oversee the entire field of the policy with all the actors and factors involved or can have different opinions on what a 'good policy' is (Yanow, 1996; Noordegraaf et. al, 2010; Head & Alford, 2015). The third generation on implementation thus seems to fit more within the context of counterterrorism policies; where *street-level professionals* are involved in policy making and execution as some of the involved stakeholders.

Street-level professionals can use their discretionary power to bridge the gap between general rules – as explicitly written down in policy documents – and specific situations. Even though the discretionary space has a legal and institutional framework of rules (Lipsky, 2010), these shouldn't restrict the professional's discretionary power in such a way that there are so many rules that a professional must choose which ones to obey. According to Lipsky (2010) a certain amount of discretion is vital for these professionals because they work in complicated situations that are impossible to be foreseen or standardized in a format. The nature of their job requires a human assessment of the situation that cannot be entirely expressed in rules and protocols only and cannot be completely replaced by machines; the professionals must adapt their actions to the circumstances and the person they are dealing with. The scientific uncertainty surrounding counterterrorism increases the

difficulty of establishing rules and protocols, which emphasizes the need for discretionary space of *street-level professionals*. Hill & Hupe (2009) believe that due to their discretionary power, *street-level professionals* see themselves rather as decision-makers whose decisions are based on normative choices, than as functionaries who are only responding to rules, procedures and policies. They argue that enhancing discretionary power may therefore, under certain conditions, be more functional for the implementation of policies than restraining it. Lipsky (2010) agrees with their point of view and adds that one of the ways to enhance the discretion of *street-level professionals* is to enhance their knowledge and skills. Especially regarding subjects that are relatively new for professionals, such as radicalization, enhancing professionals' knowledge and skills can be helpful to improve their discretionary power.

Professionals can also use their discretionary power to thwart the policy goals if they don't agree with them. One can even expect a certain degree of noncompliance with the rules and preferences from the 'higher level' when it is not in line with the interests of the *street-level professionals*. In the aftermath of terrorist attacks, when governments try to strengthen their authority, it is possible that the governments' preferences are not in line with the *street-level professionals'* interests, as a consequence of the need and rush to act. This then leads to a discrepancy between the written policy and the policy execution (Lipsky, 2010, p.17). When it comes to the implementation of a policy, the "*decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish and the devices they invent to cope with the uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out*" (Lipsky, 1980, p.12). Implementation then comes down to the choices of professionals with high service ideals about the use of scarce resources under pressure. Attempts to control them hierarchically would only increase their tendency to stereotype and disregard the needs of their clients (Hill & Hupe, 2009). When making a policy – also when making counterterrorism policies – it is therefore important for civil servants to take into consideration how much precision and details they want to include in the policy and how that affects the execution by *street-level professionals* (Bakker & van Waarden, 1999). This research does not investigate the coping strategies of the professionals involved in the analyzed policies or the actual amount of discretionary space that they have in execution. The analysis focuses on what is written in the policies about *street-level professionals*, their importance, their discretionary space, if and how they are involved in policy making. In the discussion will be elaborated upon this choice and its consequences.

Since *street-level professionals* are public service definers, they are placed within the governments institutional framework. According to Lipsky, "*to deliver street-level policy through bureaucracy is to embrace a contradiction. On the one hand, service is delivered by people to people, invoking a model of human interaction, caring and responsibility. On the other hand, service is delivered through a bureaucracy, invoking a model of detachment and*

equal treatment under conditions of resource limitations and constraints, making care and responsibility conditional" (Lipsky, 2010, p.71). The professionals' discretionary space therefore always has its limits. The extent to which professionals have discretionary space also has to do with the underlying question of the role and power that the state should have. In a strong hierarchical state, one can expect more rules and procedures that *street-level professionals* ought to follow, as part of the top-down control over the process (Hill & Hupe, 2009). However, as already explained in the last paragraph, strict rules and can also lead to noncompliance from *street-level professionals*. A balance should be sought between the rules of the institutional framework that the professionals work in and the discretionary space they are given. This balance can be disturbed in counterterrorism policies due to terrorist threats or attacks that tend to increase the role and power of the state (Crenshaw, 1983; Boin & 't Hart, 2012).

Over the last decades, governments have strived to become more efficient in their provision of services. In the wave of New Public Management thinking, governments need to minimize their budgets and as a consequence started using contracts for their services (Lipsky, 2010; Noordegraaf, 2015). This has led to a smaller difference between the public and private sector because private actors have been contracted for public services. Besides this call for efficiency, citizens have become more critical on the government. This means that legitimacy is not as self-evident as it used to be (Noordegraaf, 2015). These pressures on government intervention have their influence on policies, and therefore also on the *street-level professionals* who are executing or making these policies. More attention has been paid to measuring performance and quality, to increase efficiency and legitimacy. However, according to Lipsky (2010), the performance of *street-level professionals* oriented towards goal achievement tends to be difficult if not impossible to measure. Besides the tendency for public service goals to have an idealized dimension that makes them ambiguous, vague or conflicting, Lipsky believes that there are too many variables to take into account to make an evaluation realistic (Lipsky, 2010). In addition, there is rarely any way to determine what would have happened to the clients in absence of the intervention (Lipsky, 2010, p.49). This is especially true for counterterrorism measures; one cannot say with certainty that the de-radicalization of an individual has for example prevented a terrorist attack. Causality is thus hard to prove. To compensate for this inability and due to the pressure on governments, surrogate measures have been developed to measure performance and quality of *street-level professionals*. An example would be the amount of tickets that a police-officer writes each day to measure his or her performance. The scientific uncertainty that characterizes the wicked issue of counterterrorism increases the difficulties of measuring counterterrorism measures' efficiency. Alexander (2006) mentions a number of the variables used to measure counterterrorism, which include among others the reduction in number of terrorist incidents and the number of terrorists killed, captured and/or convinced, but also

the “*preservation of basic national structures and policies*” (Alexander, 2006, p.7-9). Causality is hard to demonstrate and goals are indeed ambiguous and vague (Lipsky, 2010).

The answer to the second theoretical sub-question, ‘*What are street-level professionals and how do they relate to implementation counterterrorism policies?*’ is that *street-level professionals* can be defined as public service definers who are in direct contact with citizens in the execution of their profession and therefore need a certain discretionary space in order to adjust the policy to a specific context (Lipsky, 2010; Bakker & van Waarden, 1999). They are characterized as having a great amount of professional knowledge, also known as *tacit knowledge* (Lipsky, 2010; De Bruijn, 2011; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Following Bakker & van Waarden (1999), Hoogerwerf (2003), & Lipsky (2010), it would be wise to leave enough blank space for input along the way when writing a policy for complex problems surrounded by uncertainty, that rely on the execution of policies by *street-level professionals*, as is the case for counterterrorism. The discretionary space of these professionals is also a vital component for successful policy implementation; one must rely on the tacit knowledge of *street-level professionals* to judge how to act in an unforeseen situation. Additionally, one must not forget the institutional context that defines the role and power of the government in relation to the professionals. In the case of a crisis – terrorist attacks – the role and power of the government can shift and become more powerful. This could mean that after terrorist attacks the discretionary power of *street-level professionals* becomes restricted and policy implementation becomes more top-down. The institutional context for counterterrorism also means that these *street-level professionals* are surrounded by a network of other (public) organizations, which makes collaboration an important aspect in the implementation of policies.

3.3 Collaborative implementation

As discussed in paragraph 3.1, counterterrorism requires multilevel governance and inter-organizational cooperation according to one of the characteristics of wicked problems (Head & Alford, 2015). Where there is problem complexity, lack of consensus, and institutional complexity, network management is particularly required (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). This means that policies on fighting terrorism need to be made and implemented within a network of actors and thus require collaboration. An advantage of collaborative networks is that there is a wider body of specific knowledge and skills available than there would be without collaboration. Depending on the parties in the network, parties can either bring different and complementary *expert knowledge* to the table, based on professional and other training, and/or *situational knowledge*, based on social or institutional locations (Head & Alford, 2015, p.727). This expert or situational knowledge stems from the experiences that *street-level professionals* have and can be a valuable addition when it comes to tackling wicked problems due to the uncertainty surrounding the problem.

It is not only the characteristics of wicked problems that call for collaboration. Characteristic for crisis governance is that decisions must be taken in a short time period, in which they have to deal with value tradeoffs and political risks, as has been explained in chapter 2. These decisions are normally not taken by an individual leader or small groups of policymakers of a department, but emerge from different groups of decision-making and coordination. Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard (2010) state that one can best describe crisis policy making in terms of a network, “*comprising a wide variety of response organizations that rarely work with each other*” (p.457). Effective response requires intergovernmental – or, multilevel – coordination because only when response organizations work together there is a chance that critical decisions will be implemented effectively. This is in line with Muller, Rosenthal and De Wijk (2008) who say that the new terrorism requires collaboration in order to be effectively combated. This shared decision-making involves flexibility and improvisation of public bureaucracies and can change the authority that exists in daily relations. Relationships and trust are therefore important factors of network collaboration (Rosenthal et al., 1989; Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2010; Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Such network collaboration can be seen as a form of *collaborative governance*, a way of governance that has gained popularity in the last two decades (Ansell & Gash, 2008). It brings multiple stakeholders together with public agencies, to engage in consensus-oriented decision making, in line with the more recent bottom up approach of implementation theories (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 543; DeLeon & DeLeon, 2002; Lipsky, 1980). *Street-level professionals* are valuable stakeholders to be included in such a network for counterterrorism policies because of their expert and situational knowledge. A collaboration network need not exist solely of public agencies, but can also include non-state stakeholders (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Where cooperation in policy networks may remain informal and implicit and through informal patterns, Ansell & Gash (2008) opt for “*an explicit and formal strategy of incorporating stakeholders into multilateral and consensus-oriented decision-making processes*” (p.547-548). Their definition of collaborative governance entails six criteria: the network is initiated by public agencies or institutions, non-state actors are included in the network, participants contribute directly in decision-making – instead of only being consulted –, the network is formally organized and meets collectively, the network aims to make decisions through consensus, and the focus of the collaboration is on public policy or public management (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Accordingly, Ansell & Gash (2008) define collaborative governance as

“*A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets*” (p. 544).

Three criteria are critical contributions or context for the collaborative process. They include the starting conditions, the institutional design, and leadership to facilitate the collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2008).




Figure 1: Network collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008)

When there is a lot of complexity surrounding a certain domain and collaboration is therefore required, direct and controlled implementation is close to impossible. Complexity and collaboration ask for an implementation process that takes place within a network of actors, each having a certain relationship with the other. Some actors involved will have a history together, others do not. The relationships between the actors involved in the network are therefore an important aspect that must be taken into account when dealing with collaborative governance, as relationships and trust are important factors of network collaboration (Rosenthal et al., 1989; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2010). The actors involved are often mutually dependent because they need each other's resources to achieve goals. Policy networks thus form a context in which actors act strategically (Hill & Hupe, 2009). When trust is established and relationships in the network are good, one can expect the actors to cooperate most of the time. If, however, trust is low, there will be less agreement and therefore more conflict within the network (see for example Matland, 1995). This changes the way that policies can be executed, the implementation process.

The relationship between the policy maker, the executors of the policy (*street-level professionals*) and the target group is a highly influential factor when implementing policies. Two aspects are important for this relationship. The first aspect characterizes the

relationship between the government and civilians; how much should the government do, what is the role of other parties? This is essentially a political consideration, because it defines how government and civilians relate to one another (Bakker & Van Waarden, 1999). This relationship can change in a crisis situation, when the government wants to protect its citizens. Secondly, implementation means to manage the relationships between the different actors involved. It is likely that the government or policy makers already have a certain relationship with the executors of the policy, the professionals, and that the executors already have a certain relationship with the target group. The latter is the case because *street-level professionals* are characterized as being in direct contact with the target group. Sometimes when implementing new policies, this also means establishing new relationships, when some parties haven't worked together before. In order to understand the strengths and flaws of an implementation process, one must pay attention to the relationships between the different parties involved in the implementation network (Bakker & Van Waarden, 1999).

Relationships can either be unilateral or multilateral. This means that sometimes *street-level professionals* have several policies to realize, which can be in contrast with one another. And sometimes one policy maker depends on several executors to achieve the policy. The more actors involved in the execution of a single policy, and relationships are plural, the policy field gets more complex and policy execution is more and more dependent on a network of actors to achieve the stated goals (Noordegraaf et al., 2010, p.14), leading to collaborative governance. This is the case for wicked policy domains, such as counterterrorism. *Street-level professionals* thus usually have a say in making the policy when relationships are multilateral. If this is similar after a crisis, remains a question. Due to their local anchorage and direct contact with citizens, involving *street-level professionals* is very valuable in a local network collaboration. This is an opportunity for these professionals to directly contribute to policy making and thus is more likely to have a bottom-up approach. On a national level, it is more likely that representatives of these professionals are one of the stakeholders in the network. *Street-level professionals* can then only contribute indirectly to policy making, through their superiors or representatives. It would then be expected that the professionals' interests are more in line with local policies than with national policies.

The next paragraph will clarify how implementation strategies can help to facilitate implementation for counterterrorism policies and the role that *street-level professionals* play in these strategies.

3.4 Implementation

The implementation process is the act of implementing a certain policy, so actually putting it into practice. Many different stakeholders play a role in this process, each with their own interests and usually within existing networks, or with a certain history between stakeholders. Implementation is therefore part of a network of actors, especially when

dealing with wicked issues. This network is crucial in the process of execution of formulated policies. The question is whether the policymaking actors have adapted their policies beforehand to facilitate this process of execution. If that is the case, there has been a certain *implementation strategy*: policy makers have (consciously) tried to influence the implementation processes for the benefit of realizing their policy goals (Noordegraaf et al., 2010). Figure 2 attempts to clarify the relationship between the implementation strategy, the implementation process, the influence of crisis governance, and which actors are usually involved in the network collaborations for counterterrorism policies.




Figure 2: Implementation strategy and implementation process (based on Noordegraaf et al., 2010)

Successful implementation doesn't only need to be about clear goalsetting and execution within the implementation network, it can also be about finding goals and finding direction (Noordegraaf et al., 2010, p.14). This means that policy execution can be shaped through systematic processes, in which policy documents are the point of departure and goals are set. Or policy execution can take shape through more emergent processes, in which policies,

goals and execution develop along the way. Sometimes frameworks are set beforehand, within which the stakeholders then shape the policies and goals. Implementation processes can thus be either *systematic* and *planned* beforehand or they can be more *emergent*, with space to fill in the details and adapt along the way (Noordegraaf et al., 2010, p.15).

As the different generations regarding the implementation of policies have shown, we can distinguish between two other views besides planned and emergent. The different theories on implementation say that either the primary responsibility lies with the policy makers and execution is *top down*, or the primary responsibility lies with the *street-level professionals* and execution has a *bottom up* character (Hoogerwerf, 2003; Lipsky, 2010; Yanow, 1996; Matland, 1995). This leads to four different types of implementation:

1. **Hierarchical implementation:** the policy maker establishes a policy and executes it top down while supervising the process (*top down* and *planned*).
2. **Decentralized implementation:** the policy makers determine the framework of the policy and leave execution to the professionals (*top down* and *emergent*).
3. **Participatory implementation:** execution is shaped through *street-level professionals* and bottom up processes – but has a clear goal (*bottom up* and *planned*).
4. **Interactive implementation:** policy makers and other (street-level) parties involved attempt to formulate goals and execution through mutual adjustment (*bottom up* and *emergent*). (Noordegraaf et al., 2010)

These four different types of implementation can be used to steer the process of implementation, in which case we can speak of an *implementation strategy* (Noordegraaf et al., 2010). The strategy relates to how the policy makers involved try to ensure that their policy goals will be executed in the way that they have formulated them, or how they create space for *street-level professionals* or other organizations involved in execution to shape these policies. This can either be planned and top down, or more bottom up and emergent.

According to Mintzberg, strategy can be defined as “*a pattern in a stream of decisions*” (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 935). He differentiates between an *intended* strategy and a *realized* strategy. The intended strategy states how implementation *should* take place, while the realized strategy is concerned with what has *actually* taken place. Due to the complexity and uncertainty surrounding counterterrorism – including the risk of a terrorist attack and execution by *street-level professionals* enjoying a certain discretionary space – the intended strategy will never be the same as the realized strategy. When making a policy, one should take into consideration the emergent strategies that arise along the way as a consequence of unforeseen or unknown circumstances. A part of the strategy will therefore not be realized, and part of the strategy will be adapted due to emergent strategies (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). When formulating a strategy for policies in complex areas that require collaboration within an implementation network, one must therefore take into account that

formulating a strategy is just as wicked as the problem itself (Camillus, 2008). The strategy is a way in partially controlling the problem, but will not be a solution on itself. Camillus (2008) therefore states that continuously scanning the environment and adapting the strategy is important for strategies for wicked problems. This is why policy makers can consciously steer the implementation processes, but also why it is not necessarily consciously done; emergent strategies can also lead to unconscious influencing that can only be discovered in hindsight.




FIGURE 1. Types of Strategies.

Figure 3: Intended and realized strategies (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985)

3.4.1 Steering mechanisms

Having defined four different types of implementation and taking into consideration the theory of Mintzberg & Waters (1985) that the intended strategy is never the same as the realized strategy, the question that arises is how implementation processes can be steered by using a certain strategy. Mintzberg (1983) identifies four mechanisms to steer implementation processes.

For **hierarchical implementation**, policy makers can put execution under direct supervision to ensure that the policy is executed as planned and executive parties can be alerted in case of incomplete or unjust implementation (Mintzberg, 1983). Besides supervision, work processes can be standardized through rules and protocols, which is utilized most in governmental bureaucracies. The most important processes of execution can be written down in a detailed manner, leaving little or no room for interpretation. It is characterized by formalization of authorities and responsibilities, and a high amount of task specialization within a hierarchical structure. This should ensure the execution of the policy goals by eliminating disturbances caused by local circumstances or opinions (Mintzberg, 1983; Bakker & van Waarden, 1999). However, the growing complexity of economy and society puts this Weberian mechanism under pressure (Bakker & van Waarden, 1999). The standardization of work processes through rules and protocols does not fit with the wicked characteristics of counterterrorism policies and execution by *street-level professionals* with discretionary space and dealing with people in unforeseeable circumstances, thus requiring room for interpretation. However, in the case of crisis governance after terrorist attacks, governments

could formalize authorities and responsibilities and use rules and protocols as an attempt to steer implementation in their desired direction.

To deal with the economical and societal complexity, the coordination of activities through standardization of output has been used as a mechanism. This is the case of **decentralized implementation**. The result has been established, but the way to reach it is left to the discretion of professionals in execution (Bakker & van Waarden, 1999). This mechanism can be compared with the tradition of New Public Management, focusing on achieving efficiency (Noordegraaf et al., 2010). The problem with this mechanism is that it is difficult to define a standard for results. When a standard is defined, it often doesn't correlate one hundred percent with the policy goals. The focus on results can also lead to a change in execution when professionals adapt the policies to obtain the desired results (Mintzberg, 1983). An example is when police officers need to collect a certain amount of tickets per day and start to fine people in situations they tolerated before. As already discussed in paragraph 3.2.1, the efficiency of counterterrorism measures is difficult to measure because of scientific uncertainty and because many variables need to be taken into account – some of which are vague or ambiguous – which makes evaluation based on some of these variables unrealistic (Lipsky, 2010).

When it comes to **participatory implementation**, the mechanism that Mintzberg (1983) has identified is standardization of knowledge and skills. This requires a high amount of discretion from executing professionals, usually in a context that demands specialized knowledge and skill to deal with complex situations. This coordination mechanism is dominant with professional bureaucracies, which rely for a great deal upon the tacit knowledge of professionals, acquired through extensive education (Bakker & van Waarden, 1999). The problems for this mechanism usually lie within the tension between the intentions of the policy and the standards of the professional. The complex context of counterterrorism requires specialized knowledge and skill to deal with complex, unforeseen situations. The planned process of participatory implementation fits the shared goal of stakeholders that terrorism must be fought and prevented. The question that remains is whether *street-level professionals* are actually given the amount of discretion that is necessary to ensure bottom-up implementation, especially after terrorist attacks.

The coordination mechanism of mutual adjustment is applied for **interactive implementation**. This mechanism is used mostly in adhocracies – small organizations in which a different number of varying specialists from different disciplines works together in flexible teams (Mintzberg, 1983). These adhocracies come up after crises, despite existing contingency plans. People within these organizations enjoy a big amount of discretion because the type of activities, the organization and the outcome of their activities cannot be known beforehand. They learn together from their experiences with the implementation of the policy and continuously adapt to the circumstances (Bakker & van Waarden, 1999).

Mutual adjustment and interactive implementation could thus be found in the emergency crisis governance that follows directly after a terrorist attack, concerning the emergency aid for example.

Combining the different types of implementation with the coordination mechanisms, leads to the following table of implementation models:

| <i>Process</i> | | | |
|----------------|-----------|--|--|
| <i>Primacy</i> | | Planned | Emergent |
| | Top down | <i>Hierarchical implementation</i> A guiding actor has a policy that is executed through supervision and standardization of professionals' working processes via rules | <i>Decentralized implementation</i> A guiding actor determines the framework (results) within which professionals execute. Standardization of output via framework |
| | Bottom up | <i>Participatory implementation</i> Parties work together on implementing a plan. Standardization of professionals' knowledge and skills | <i>Interactive implementation</i> Parties decide collectively what is to be done via mutual adjustment and cooperation |
| | | | |

Table 1: Implementation models (Noordegraaf et al., 2010)

After this discussion on the theory on implementation strategies, the third and last theoretical sub-question – ‘*What are implementation strategies & how can they influence implementation?*’ – can be answered. We can speak of an implementation strategy when the policymaking actors have tried to influence the implementation processes, in order to stimulate the realizing of the policy goals (Noordegraaf et al., 2010). This can be done through the implementation models. These models can have a top down character with a guiding actor who decides how the policy is to be implemented, which can consequently be steered through more planned or emergent processes. Rules can be standardized and fixed to a great extent in protocols or can be determined in a framework, leaving room for the executing actors to decide how they execute the policy – as long as they get the results that the policy maker expects. Implementation can also be steered through bottom-up processes. This is the case when *street-level professionals* have a say in making the policy, or can contribute to the policy. It can also be planned and emergent. In the case of a bottom-up and emergent approach, policy executors – *street level professionals* – have a lot to say about the policy and decide together with the policy makers

how the policy should be implemented. Implementation has a very dynamic character in that case. Another option is a more planned process, in which there is a plan but *street-level professionals* can propose how that plan should be executed. Their discretionary space is an important factor and is stimulated through the standardization of knowledge and skills.

The execution of counterterrorism policies relies greatly on *street-level professionals*, who possess specific knowledge and skills that allow them to assess unforeseen and complex situations in which they have face to face contact with citizens (Lipsky, 2010). They are the ones to execute policies on a local level and are thus likely to have more influence in making local policies than in making national policies. However, this does not disregard the need for national policies to take *street-level professionals* into account. It would be wise to pay attention to these professionals and their role in the execution in implementation strategies, to increase the chances of successful implementation. Additionally, counterterrorism policies need to take the characteristics of wicked problems into account; scientific uncertainty, institutional complexity (requiring multi-level governance) and social pluralism (Head & Alford, 2015). Combining all these aspects, we would expect that implementation strategies for counterterrorism policies take *street-level professionals* into account. Based on Hoogerwerf (2003, Lipsky (1980) and Boin, Ekengrend and Rhinard (2010), we would expect that these policies are not cast in stone, but that there is also room for bottom-up input resulting from the shared-decision making in the collaboration network of the various response organizations involved and that there is room for the discretionary space that *street-level professionals* need in order to execute these policies. However, in a critical context such as can be encountered after terrorist attacks, governments are expected to take action in reaction to such attacks to reaffirm their power and control (Crenshaw, 1983; Crenshaw, 2010). This can lead to an urge of top down implementation, instead of bottom up. The question then rises to what extent the needs of *street-level professionals* are still taken into account after terrorist attacks. Therefore, the documents that are analyzed have been selected both before and after the attacks, to see if the implementation strategy has changed after the attacks. Additionally, a distinction has been made between national and more local policies to discover whether *street-level professionals* play a more substantial role in policies on a local level.

Chapter 4 Method

This chapter elaborates upon the research method that has been used. First we will look at where we can place this research in the philosophy of science, after which the case selection will be discussed. Then the data collection and analysis is explained and the chapter will be closed by looking at reliability & validity.

4.1 Normative research

In research it is helpful to know from what angle of philosophy of science the researcher is working. This angle clarifies the way the researcher looks at reality and the role of theory in the research. In the field of public management, four approaches can be seen as guiding: the critical theory, the interpretive, the postmodern and the normative approach (Deetz, 1996).

These approaches are positioned on two axes, as can be seen in figure 4. The horizontal axe relates to the distinction between local/emergent and elite/a priori. By local/emergent is meant that empirical findings are the starting point of the research. By elite/a priori is meant that previously formulated theories are tested (Deetz, 1996). This research focuses on how implementation strategies for counterterrorism policies take *street-level professionals* into account. Expectations have been derived from combining theories about (crisis) policy making, wicked problems, collaboration, *street-level professionals* and implementation theories. Existing theory has thus been combined and deduced to expectation, which has driven the data gathering process. This is known as deductive theory (Bryman, 2012, p.24). The research can therefore be seen as more elite/a priori on Deetz' horizontal axe.

The vertical axe relates to the distinction between consensus and dissensus, to the relation of research and existing social orders (Deetz, 1996, p.197). Dissensus is linked to suppression, to power struggles and conflict while consensus aims to reflect reality as it is, searching for the state of being. Given that this research aims to discover the role of *street-level professionals* in the implementation strategies, it aims to discover the current state of affairs regarding different policy documents. This is in line with the consensus pole. However, since a critical point in time is assumed that can change this state of affairs, there is an aspect of dissensus included as well. The assumption is that this point in time can reshuffle the state of affairs and adapts the order of things but a new order can be discovered nevertheless. We can therefore say that this study has been conducted from a relatively normative approach (Deetz, 1996).

Characteristic for this approach is the search for regularities and testing hypotheses or theories that have been made beforehand (Deetz, 1996, p.201). Counterterrorism is a complex issue that is influenced by many factors, but it would not be feasible to include all those factors for this research. The normative approach has been chosen to give a

methodological focus to the research. However, even though in this approach the theory is used as a guideline and provides sensitizing concepts, this does not mean that all is said within the theory. Thus, room has been left to interpret the empirical findings of the research and give them meaning by for example placing them in their institutional and cultural context. In doing so, this research is not strictly normative but also has interpretive aspects.




Figure 4: Model of Deetz (1996)

4.2 Multiple case study

A goal of this thesis is to provide insight in the ways that implementation strategies take street-level professional into account in wicked and critical policy domains. Given the emphasis in this research on gaining insight, the *case study* has been chosen as research design. Seawright and Gerring (2008) define a *case study* as follows: “*the intensive (qualitative or quantitative) analysis of a single unit or a small number of units (the cases), where the researcher’s goal is to understand a larger class of similar units (a population of cases)*” (p.296). Their definition fits the goal of gaining insight in a certain phenomenon. Since this research focuses upon the role that street-level professionals play in implementation strategies regarding the implementation of policy measures in wicked domains, thereby analyzing policies of two countries, there are two cases. The two cases consist of several policy documents, all of which are naturally occurring data. It is therefore a multiple case study (Bryman, 2012).

4.2.1 Case selection

As this research not only looks in general at counterterrorism policies, but also at counterterrorism policies and measures specifically taken after terrorist attacks, a first selection criterion has been Western-European countries that have recently suffered from such an attack and that consequently have taken new counterterrorism measures. The first selection leads to the following countries: France (2015), Belgium (2016), Germany (2016), UK (2017) and Spain (2017).

The next selection has been made on a rather pragmatic base; because a content and a discourse analysis will be used to analyze the policy documents, a profound knowledge of the language in the documents will be necessary in order to grasp the full meaning of the text. Only then can be fully comprehended what role *street-level professionals* play in these texts and which implementation strategies can be discovered. Taking into account the languages the researcher knows well enough to do such an analysis, this leaves France, Belgium and the UK as possible cases to be studied.

Out of these three countries, France and Belgium have been chosen as the two cases that are analyzed because the attacks in both countries were related – both regarding the period in time as well as the terrorist network – and the documents can to a great extent be analyzed in the same language, which facilitates comparison. The relatedness of the attacks means that the context is comparable for both countries, which according to Crenshaw is a precondition for analysis (Crenshaw, 1995). The advantage of analyzing documents mostly in the same language is that it facilitates a comparison of the discourse, because words don't have to be translated before they can be compared. It is only after the comparison that the words and sentences have been translated to English in order to write them down. The translation after studying and comparing the results has allowed the researcher to better understand the similarities and differences between the two countries analyzed. To write down the results in this research, the original texts have been translated by the researcher.

4.3 Data collection

Due to the fact that government intervention is subject to accountability and transparency, policies are written down in documents and then published for and/or spread to the concerned audience. Through these documents, the way that policy measures can be implemented and executed, is recorded. Since *street-level professionals* are usually positioned within an institutional frame, they are subject to the policies that are made and documented. Since the actual execution of these policies greatly rely on those *street-level professionals*, it is expected that they have been given special attention in the policy documents. This should be seen within the institutional context of both countries, because that context is a guiding factor for the implementation of policies and the extent to which *street-level professionals* have a say in policy-making. The institutional context regarding

counterterrorism of Belgium and France is thus touched upon, after which the document selection is explained.

4.3.1 Institutional context Belgium

Belgium is a federal state that has divided decision-making on the levels of the federal national government, three regions and three communities. The latest state reform of January, 2014 has delegated a great number of powers from national to level to the regions and communities. Regarding judicial and security policy, an agreement has been signed to involve the regions and communities more to improve the coherence between these two policy domains (Wittendorp, de Bont, de Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2017). When it comes to the prevention of radicalization, many authorities thus lie on a decentral level. (Wittendorp et al., 2017, p. 26). Due to this complex governmental structure in which every layer develops its own plans, many different plans in the domain of counterterrorism – including radicalization – have been developed (Wittendorp et al., 2017). The Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA, better known as OCAM in French and OCAD in Dutch) is the organ on national level that analyzes the terrorist threat and is responsible for the execution of the Radicalization Plan, as chair of the National Taskforce (Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee, n.d.; Wittendorp et al., 2017).

4.3.2 Institutional context France

France is a semi-presidential republic in which the president, together with the Prime Minister, has considerable power. Constitutional authority is centralized mostly on the national level, but the lower levels of government (divided into 18 regions, 102 departments and 36.658 communities) have their own powers as well (Heringa, 2016). When it comes to counterterrorism policies, France has a reputation of focusing on repressive measures and has an approach that is shaped by many laws on counterterrorism. A special judge has even been installed for cases related to terrorism. This judge receives cases regarding terrorism from the local prosecutors (E-justice, 2017). Counterterrorism is thus a domain dominated by police and justice, in close cooperation with the intelligence services and the '*préfet*' – the representative of the Ministry of Interior on regional level (Wittendorp et al., 2017). The prevention of radicalization processes has been given attention since 2014 and combines repressive and preventive measures for the first time (Hellmuth, 2015). It should be noted that France's view on secularism does not allow religious institutions in the public domain, which makes the structural involvement of for example imams in counterterrorism policies very difficult (Hellmuth, 2015).

4.3.3 Document selection

A selection of policy documents has been made for both countries, aiming at a selection of comparable documents, also balancing the repressive and preventive policies and measures.

The selection consists of documents that were made before the attacks and after the attacks, both on a national level as well as a regional or local level. The distinction in time has to do with government intervention after a critical event; governments are required to take action after attacks. One of the governments' responses is to formulate new policies, as is clearly seen in the national policies formulated after the attacks. Both in Belgium as in France, new plans to prevent radicalization have been made, following the idea that further attacks of so-called *homegrown terrorists* should be avoided and because both countries agree that an integral approach (combining repressive and preventive measures) is necessary in order to fight terrorism. The preventive approach focuses mostly upon radicalization processes, so the radicalization policies are indispensable for this research.

4.3.3.1 National level

Belgium has updated its Framework Note on Integral Security in response to the attacks. This is compared with the previous Framework Note. Because the previous document stems from 2004, a more recent policy document has also been selected. This is the General Policy paper of the Ministry of Interior and Security, following from the coalition agreement that was made in October 2014 and specifying the plans for this ministry for the government's term of office, including a particular part dedicated to fighting terrorism.

In France, after the elections of president Hollande in 2012, a new Whitepaper on Defense and National Security was published in 2013. Just like the General policy paper of the ministry of Interior and Security of Belgium, this Whitepaper elaborates upon France's strategies and goals regarding Defense and National Security for the coming five years, including a part on fighting terrorism. Besides this document, the National Strategy of Crime Prevention 2013-2017 has been selected, since it has more specific policy goals and is thus similar to the Belgian Framework Note on Integral Security. Besides the Radicalization Plan that has been updated after the attacks (and of which the former version was untraceable), the halfway evaluation of the National Strategy of Crime Prevention has been selected, that was published in June 2016. This evaluation takes the terrorist attacks into account and also dedicates specific parts to counterterrorism, while evaluating the measures that have been taken so far.

4.3.3.2 Regional level

Because it is expected that *street-level professionals'* interests are more likely to be represented in local policy documents because they are closer to the level of execution and *street-level professionals* can thus influence policy making more directly, a selection of national policy documents only is not enough. However, specifically in the case of France, local documents on counterterrorism could not be retrieved because they were not published due to security reasons, specifically regarding the repressive measures. Looking at which documents were available for both countries, has led to the selection of the Parisian Contract of Prevention and Security 2015-2020 in the category 'before the attacks'. This a

regional contract for the *arrondissements* of the Parisian zone and contains a part that is dedicated to the prevention of radicalization. It is also linked to the National Strategy of Crime Prevention. Due to the high amount of secrecy surrounding the repressive measures, especially on a local level, the documents that have been selected to analyze the category 'after the attacks', are in the French case all on radicalization. Besides the focus on preventive measures, the actual detailed local documents on radicalization were not publicly available either. Thus, the documents containing the framework and guidelines for these local documents have been selected because of their approach on local implementation even though they were made and circulated by the Ministry of Interior.

For Belgium, the document most in line with the Parisian Contract of Prevention and Security, was the majority agreement of the Brussels Parliament for 2014-2019. This document has been selected because it also focuses upon the region around the country's capital. Besides this, the regional Flemish Action Plan for the prevention of radicalization and terrorism was published in April 2015. Even though this is a document in Dutch, it has been selected because the published document of the French Community on prevention of radicalization resembled a PowerPoint presentation with some bullet points and was therefore not deemed qualified². The Flemish Action Plan is much more detailed and is therefore expected to contain valuable information for this research. After the attacks, a specific Security and Prevention plan has been made for Brussels, just like the one made for the Parisian region before the attacks. Because of its local focus, relatedness to the terrorist attacks and containing a chapter on radicalization, this document has also been selected for analysis.

All in all, a selection of fourteen policy documents has been made that are either completely dedicated to counterterrorism measures or contain a part dedicated to counterterrorism. The selection with translated titles can be found in the following table. The list including the original titles can be found in attachment 1.

² The document on "*initiatives de prévention du radicalisme et du bien-vivre ensemble*" can be found here: <http://gouvernement.cfwb.be/sites/default/files/nodes/story/7066-pptpreventionradicalisme.pdf>.

| | Belgium | Belgium regional/local | France | France regional/local |
|--------------------|---|---|---|---|
| Before the attacks | Framework Note on Integral Security (2004) | Flemish Action Plan for the Prevention of radicalization and terrorism (April 2015) | National Strategy of Crime Prevention 2013-2017 (2013) | Parisian Contract of Prevention and Security 2015-2020 |
| | General Policy Paper of Ministry of Interior and Security (December 4 th , 2014) | Agreement of majority 2014-2019 of the Brussels Parliament | White Paper on Defense and National Security (2013) | |
| After the attacks | Radicalization Plan (June 2016) | Brussels Global Plan on Security and Prevention (February 2017) | Action Plan Against Radicalization and Terrorism (May 2016) | Prevention of radicalization: reference framework for Action Plans to be added to the City Contracts (April, 2016) |
| | Framework Note on Integral Security 2016-2019 | | Halfway Evaluation of the National Strategy of Crime Prevention (Publication June 2016) | Interdepartmental Guide of Radicalization Prevention (March 2016) |

Table 2: Overview of analyzed policy documents

4.4 Discourse analysis

The documents have been analyzed using two methods, to increase the credibility of the research. The discourse analysis, the first method of data analysis, allows to identify what exactly is *written* about the role of *street-level professionals* in the selected documents and builds expectations for which implementation strategies are related to the used discourse on professionals. The second method is a qualitative content analysis, which is explained in paragraph 4.5.

Discourse is not a neutral device of communication; when people write or talk they seek to accomplish things (Bryman, 2012). This is especially true for the policy documents selected; their aim is to successfully implement the policy. Discourse analysis is about the strategies that are employed in trying to achieve the sender's goal (Bryman, 2012). What is being said, or not said, about *street-level professionals* can reveal how the policy writers think about

street-level professionals and the role they should play in the implementation process (Gill, 2000; Bryman, 2012), thus revealing how they have literally been taken into account.

The documents have first been analyzed by studying what is written exactly about *street-level professionals*, from which codes will be derived. This is also known as ‘open coding’ (Bryman, 2012, p.569). Open coding has been used to prevent that any references to *street-level professionals* are missed. Subsequently, the codes have been axially and selectively coded. Axial coding serves to restructure and rethink the codes that have been made during the open coding and is used to make connections and links between the codes. Selective coding has been used to decide what the core categories are and to eliminate irrelevant codes (Bryman, 2012, p. 569). To code the documents, the program NVivo 11 has been used. The code list can be found in appendix 2. It has to be noted that during the coding process, it was sometimes difficult to decide whether some phrases were about *street-level professionals* or not, because the documents were full with phrases such as “all the concerned actors”, “all the services concerned”, “the local services”, “the local actors”, “the different partners”, etc. etc. Since this research method specifically focuses upon the role of *street-level professionals* in the discourse of these documents, the phrases where it was unclear that these professionals were included, or where it was unclear whether they received specific attention, have not been coded. This choice has been made to eliminate data of which it is uncertain whether it includes *street-level professionals*.

4.5 Qualitative content analysis

The second method of analyzation consists of identifying the implementation strategies that were used for the implementation of these policies. This has been done through a *qualitative content analysis*, the most prevalent approach to a qualitative analysis of documents according to Bryman (2012, p.557). It entails an analysis of underlying themes in the documents analyzed, in this case the policy documents. The exact processes that have been used to extract the themes are not always clarified in qualitative content analysis, as the themes are often illustrated by examples from the studied documents (Bryman, 2012, p.557). The strategy of searching for themes in the available data lies at the heart of the coding approaches that are employed in the analysis of qualitative data, such as for example the coding of interviews (Bryman, 2012, p.559). In order to ensure a stronger scientific approach and increase the reliability of the research, the documents have therefore also gone through a process of coding by using the program NVivo 11.

From the literature, a number of indications to identify the used implementation strategy have been retrieved. These indications have functioned as *a priori* codes. These codes served as *sensitizing concepts* to give a direction to the analysis (Gilgun, 2014, p.181), instead of starting with open coding. This direction giving ensures that important aspects are not overseen and expectations can be tested. Furthermore, using codes leads to efficiency

because the point of focus need not to be searched for (Gilgun, 2014). The disadvantage of these *a priori* codes is that blind spots can be created. This disadvantage has been intercepted by a second coding phase, axial coding, where sub codes have been added to the *a priori* codes and the code 'other' has been replaced by 'Other policy information'. In the third phase, a selective coding process has taken place to eliminate irrelevant codes. The *a priori* codes used were 'actor involved in policy making', 'actor involved in execution', 'top-down decision', 'bottom-up decision', 'steering mechanism', 'planned process', 'emergent process' and 'network collaboration' (based on Noordegraaf et al., 2010; Ansell & Gash, 2008). After two documents, the *a priori* codes have been revised and the code of 'collaboration' has been added as top level of 'network collaboration'. The code 'integral approach' has been added under 'collaboration'. In the axial coding phase, sub codes have been added to the code 'steering mechanism', 'multi-level governance' and to the code 'network collaboration'. The code tree can be found in attachment 3.

The qualitative content analysis has allowed to identify the implementation strategy or strategies in the policies. Which strategy or strategies are used, gives an indication about the role that *street-level professionals* play in the execution of these policies.

4.6 Trustworthiness & Reliability

For qualitative research, other criteria for validity have come about than for quantitative research, because it is concerned with the detailed studying of a small number of cases. Following Bryman (2012), we replace validity with the concept of *trustworthiness*. One of the criteria that can be used instead of internal validity, is the criterion of credibility (Bryman, 2012, p.390). Credibility has to do with social reality, which can have different accounts. In order to ensure that the researcher's findings correctly understand the social world of their findings, the technique of triangulation can be used (Bryman, 2012, p.390). Triangulation entails using more than one method to analyze the findings in social research. To check how street-level professionals are taken into account in the implementation strategies, not only the steering mechanisms are identified through a qualitative content analysis, but also by a discourse analysis to check what exactly is written about these professionals and to see whether those data are comparable.

Triangulation is also a way to counter the endangerment of reliability and validity of the research that has to do with the small number of units of study in case studies. Another way of countering this problem of small numbers is by distinguishing sub-units within the different cases (Van Thiel, 2014, p.92). The cases have been divided in sub-units by distinguishing between different moments in time (before and after the big attacks of 2015 and 2016) and between a national level and a regional level.

Reliability in scientific research has to do with the accuracy and consistency of the analysis (Van Thiel, 2014). To ensure reliability, the documents have been analyzed in a systematic way by use of the Nvivo program and the code lists of both analysis have been added as an attachment. To ensure consistency and accuracy, most important codes have been listed *a priori* for the qualitative content analysis. This list has been drafted from the theoretical framework and ensures that all the documents have been analyzed in the same way.

Chapter 5 Results

The main question of this research is *'How are street-level professionals taken into account in implementation strategies for counterterrorism policies?'* To answer this question, the two empirical sub-questions need to be answered first. To begin with, the way that *street-level professionals* are depicted in the selected policy documents will be elaborated upon, answering the first empirical sub-question – *'How are street-level professionals taken into account in counterterrorism policies in France and Belgium?'* Subsequently, the used implementation strategies in the French and Belgian policy documents will be identified and in doing so the second sub-question – *'Which implementation strategies are used for counterterrorism policies in France and Belgium?'* – will be answered.

5.1 Discourse analysis

In this analysis, specific attention has been given to *street-level professionals* and what has been written about them in the policies. This has allowed to identify several themes around *street-level professionals*. Through the coding process, these themes have become the selected codes. The results will be discussed per theme, for both countries.

5.1.1 Education and training

The theme that clearly has received most attention is concerned with the education and training of professionals. It has been mentioned in almost every document. Specifically in the Belgian documents, it has been mentioned mostly in the regional documents. For France, the education and training of professionals has also been mentioned mostly in the regional documents, but surprisingly also came up quite a few times in national documents, specifically after the terrorist attacks.

In the Brussels Global Plan on Security and Prevention of 2017, specific attention has been paid to *"interdisciplinary and common training and exercises"* to *"improve the partnership approach"*. Street-level professionals need to be educated regarding the definition of radicalism and *"the clarification of roles and tasks of the professions"*. The document also clearly focuses on the Brussels context, which is to be communicated to the professionals through *"a common education module"*. Besides education, professionals need to *"become aware"* of the phenomenon of radicalization. *"Knowledge and tools"* need to be developed and made available for street-level professionals. One of these tools is *"a joint evaluation grid"* that allows professionals to adequately take charge of radicalizing people.

The Belgian Framework Note on Integral Security (2016) focuses on *"an improved support of first-line professionals, through specific education adjusted to the subject"*, as well as *"a structuration of the responses that first-line professionals must be able to produce when confronted with signs of radicalization"*. Even though the latter is meant to support

professionals, it also limits their discretionary space because it suggests that the possible responses are determined beforehand.

The Flemish Action Plan of 2015 wants to support first-line professionals through both theoretical and practical training. *“Central is information exchange, awareness and boosting expertise, but also practical situations and possible responses to those”*. The educational offer is implemented throughout the Flanders region to ensure that every sector receives the same offer. Through education, the discretionary space of professionals is meant to increase, because education is deemed to be the means through which professionals learn to detect radicalization and how to respond to it. Special attention is also given to educating teachers of Islam and the professionalization of imams, by promoting a qualitative education for this group.

In the French referential framework regarding the Action Plans on radicalization, is mentioned that *“it is imperative that the professionals associated to the public response profit from an education on the prevention of radicalization”*. These educations are organized by the CIPDR (*Comité Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance et de la Radicalisation* – the interdepartmental committee of crime and radicalization prevention), and can be followed online, or are offered through other associations.

The Parisian Contract, in contrast with the regional documents of Belgium, does not really mention street-level professionals. It only says that the education of *“professionals in public sector services and communities”* contributes on short and midterm to the efficiency of the measures and that this education should therefore be developed. The evaluation of the national strategy of prevention of crime, a document on national level, pays more attention to educating professionals. They explicitly mention psychologists as professionals that play an important role in the prevention and countering of radicalization. The education on radicalization is meant to *“permit professionals to better understand the mechanism of the radicalization process”*.

The regional guide on the prevention of radicalization in France also emphasizes the need for educating street-level professionals dealing with radicalization. Education on the subject should help *“professionals to better react to alarming situations or behavior and to give them responses regarding the principles of secularism and non-discrimination”*. Education is also a way of *“regularly updating the knowledge of the different facilities and measures, appropriate professional answers and collaboration between the implied actors”*. Medical professionals are also included in the range of professionals that ought to be educated on the matter of radicalization. The guide also mentions putting in place academic education of about 120 hours for professionals. These studies address three main topics: *“social sciences of religion, secularism and republican institutions, law of religions and the management of cults”*.

The national Action Plan on the Prevention of Radicalization and Terrorism (PART) in France also mentions the education of professionals. To prevent radicalization in prisons, prison officers need to *“be made aware and educated to be able to better detect signs of radicalization”*. Just like in Belgium, evaluation grids are made available for professionals to help them detect both the signs of people who are radicalizing and people who are de-radicalizing. Education is a way to *“give professionals the means to exercise their missions”*.

5.1.2 Role of professionals

The second theme relates to what is said about the role of professionals. This is also a recurring theme in most of the documents and is mentioned by far most of the times in the French guide on prevention and in the PART.

The French guide on prevention mentions the relation between the prefect, the follow-up cells (*‘cellules de suivi’*)³ and the professionals. Professionals are subordinate to the prefect and the follow-up cells, and need to follow their orders as is indicated by *“The prefect designates a professional to contact the family and to put in place an individualized track for radicalized or radicalizing youth”*. But at the same time, *“the information of the ground professionals (school leaders, teachers, social workers) is essential for the proper functioning of the follow-up cell”*, which indicates that the information coming from professionals is valued. Social workers have a special role in the prevention of radicalization because of *“their numerous contacts and privileged links with youth and their families, and must be considered important actors in the prevention of radicalization”*. The direct contact that street-level professionals have with the target group is thus an important aspect, as well as their expertise.

The PART document also elaborates upon the role of professionals. They are for example needed in prisons to ensure a professional tracking of the prison’s population. Police men, gendarmes and customs officers are needed to control the outside borders of the country and social workers are needed for the support of families of radicalized people. There are many professionals involved on the preventive aspect as well, such as doctors and psychiatrists. The direct contact that teachers have with youth make them *“essential key actors to detect drifts that can lead to radicalization”*.

The French evaluation of the national strategy on crime prevention also mentions that because social workers are familiar with a young audience, they have a good knowledge of teenage problems and are thus the *“preferred interlocutors”*. The document says that in

³ The follow-up cell, or *‘cellule de suivi’*, has been put in place by the prefectures after a ministerial circular of April 29, 2014. Its goal is to accompany people who have been signalized as radicalized, as well as their families. The follow-up cell studies the signal from a mostly social and psychological (thus preventive) point of view and decides which measures to take and by whom (see p.21-22 in the document).

crisis situations, *“management of the crisis and the support over time relies on qualified and competent professionals working with other competent actors”*.

The Belgian Plan R mentions that it is the local level which makes professionals important to *“canalize”* radicalization. Again, the fact that professionals have direct contact with the target audience is related to the reason they are important in the prevention of radicalization. *“With the right instruments and targeted information, they [professionals] can contribute to detect problems and get people back on track”*. Even though the Brussels parliamentary agreement does not specifically mention radicalization and terrorism measures, it does mention that *“social mediators and street educators play an essential role in society”* and that people should know the police officer in their neighborhood.

5.1.3 Discretionary space

In the Belgian Framework Note of 2004, the discretionary space of professionals is mentioned by saying that *“the challenge of local diagnosis is, on one hand, to measure the phenomenon of insecurity in a determined area and not limiting oneself to only the facts of the crime, and on the other hand to permit the actors on the ground to adapt their practices to the local reality”*. In the Plan R, discretionary space seems to be more defined, as is illustrated by *“the approach to follow as well as the implementation of standardized and personalized measures are clearly defined”*. Defining what is to be done in certain situations limits the discretionary space of professionals.

In the French documents, even though professionals are assigned by the follow-up cell, it is the professionals who *“establish the methods of follow-up that are to be followed”*, thus giving them room to do what they think is good. In the meantime, the role of each actor is *“defined with precision”*, as is the case for many procedures, for example in the guide on prevention is mentioned that *“in the case of a worrisome situation, every staff member must alert the head of the establishment who immediately transfers the information to the rector or the inspector, as well as to the national assistance center of radicalization prevention through use of the telephone platform.”* Discretionary space therefore seems surrounded by definitions and protocols for street-level professionals in France.

5.1.4 Managing professionals

Phrases that are related to the managing of professionals have been found in half of the documents. In the most recent Framework Note on Integral Security (2016), this management concerns the access of professionals in the private security sector, which is restricted by a *“tighter screening”*. The Brussels parliament does mention quite some things on the management of professionals, especially the police forces. A *“reorganization of certain police corps is stimulated by decentralizing their means to the maximum benefit of the neighborhood”*, that the *“Government wants to put in place”* for a *“policy open to the local communities, highly anchored, but at the same time well-organized and equipped, to*

intervene as fast as possible when that is esteemed necessary". This reorganization is stimulated through subsidies.

In France, the PART includes paragraphs dedicated to managing professionals. It specifically mentions how many extra jobs are created because of the terrorist threat and how much money is spent on this, as well as on other reinforcements in the counterterrorism domain. Recruitment of professionals is deemed necessary to face the terrorist threat, as for example mentioned in *"The reinforcement of human means equally concerns the intelligence services of the Ministry of Defense. In total, more than 2000 jobs will be created between 2014 and 2019"*. It also mentions how for example the use of armed forces will be improved as part of the *"opération Sentinelle"*, in which soldiers are assigned to defend the national territory.

Professionals in the field in France are mostly managed by so-called *"référénts"*, contact persons. The contact persons for regional health agencies support the actions of the prefects, and their mission is *"to establish a regional network of medical and paramedical volunteers, whose role is to prevent the phenomena of radicalization and handle them. They can also organize the connections between those professionals and the departmental cells to ensure that youth or their families are taken care of or accompanied"*. Just like these health *référénts*, the delegates of the prefect also manage professionals. Their role is to *"identify the most appropriate local actors to ensure the individual approach of radicalizing people and their families"*.

5.1.5 Collaboration with professionals

Roles and tasks are clearly defined for people and for the collaboration networks in France. A monitoring unit in schools, *"to which the principal, social service assistant, nurse and doctor"* participate, has for example the roles of *"Identifying students with particular problems by usual indicators, analyze the individual and collective problems of the identified students, propose a personalized accompaniment or orient them to external structures, [...] and to follow, evaluate and adjust the measures put in place"*. Collaboration is necessary because *"the quality of follow-up greatly relies on the interdisciplinarity of the structures, in which the psychologists, specialized teachers, social assistants and cult representatives are present"*. Regarding the creation of a counter-discourse, *"it is essential to create a collaboration between those who have the technical expertise and those who produce and those who transmit the counter-discourse"*. The latter would be new collaboration.

In the Brussels Global Plan on Security and Prevention, the collaboration between security and preventive professionals is said to improve public order. Therefore *"a concrete collaboration between the actors on the ground and institutional actors"* must be put in place, that integrates the socio-preventive actors. It seeks to *"decompartmentalize the different approaches"* through sharing of best-practices and exchanging processes. Information exchange, collaboration and better communication between professionals and

active services must “*encourage a cross-sectional vision of the phenomena and coordination of the actions*”. This points to a network that combines actors who already know each other with actors who haven’t collaborated beforehand in a structural way. Other Belgian documents also stress the need for communication and collaboration between different levels of government and professionals on the ground.

5.2 Conclusion discourse analysis

The previous paragraphs have illustrated what is mentioned about *street-level professionals* in the different policy documents that have been analyzed for Belgium and France. This allows to answer the first empirical sub-question ‘*How are street-level professionals taken into account in counterterrorism policies in France and Belgium?*’.

In both countries and almost in all documents, a lot of attention has been paid to the education and training of *street-level professionals* on the subject of radicalization and terrorism, specifically after the terrorist attacks. To be able to deal with these phenomena, it is deemed important in both countries that professionals know what they are dealing with, and how they can react in such situations. They therefore do not only need theoretical training, that can be given to them by online training modules, academic education or a shared regional program, but they also need practical training that allows them to prepare for real-life situations. In order to help professionals deal with radicalizing people and judging whether people are a potential danger or not, evaluation grids have been made in both countries. They consist of indicators that professionals and others can use to decide whether someone is radicalizing or radicalized. This is in line with the idea that enhancing professionals’ knowledge and skills can have a positive impact on their discretionary power (Lipsky, 2010; Hill & Hupe, 2009). The professionals need a certain amount of knowledge to possess the discretionary power to decide what to do when confronted with radicalization.

Practical training is very important for *street-level professionals* since they are the ones who are in direct contact with the policies’ target group. This direct contact makes them the preferred “*key actors*” in the fight against radicalization and terrorism and is related to their specific and unique knowledge of the target group. Teachers are for example the ones who see their students every day and can easily detect changes in their behavior or absence in class. The direct contact is mentioned only in the policies published after the attacks in both countries. Interesting is also that France’s evaluation on the strategy of crime prevention mentions the indispensable value of professionals in crisis situations.

Street-level professionals have a certain expertise that makes them valuable. Even in the hierarchical structure that has been put in place in France, where prefect’s delegates are responsible for assigning professionals to the departmental cells, the information that professionals have is seen as valuable, which acknowledges their unique expertise on the

subject. Most of the time however, discretionary space of professionals is limited because the tasks and roles of professionals and networks have precisely been established and do not leave a lot of room for emerging or unknown situations. This tendency seems to be strengthened after the attacks. The need for structural, interdisciplinary collaboration is emphasized likewise in the policies after the attacks, especially the need for decompartmentalizing the repressive and preventive actors and organizations involved.

The discourse analysis thus shows that *street-level professionals* have been mentioned especially *after* the terrorist attacks. The need to arouse awareness and educate them on the subject of counterterrorism – specifically radicalization – is a recurring theme, both in regional and national documents and in both countries. Likewise, the direct contact that *street-level professionals* have with citizens is valued in both countries and seen as characteristic for the professionals, which makes them crucial in execution. However, more interdisciplinary and structural collaboration needs to take place between the different professions and organizations involved, which seems to be a top-down decision.

Through a qualitative content analysis and by using *a priori* codes, the documents have been analyzed a second time. This time, the focus has been put on the steering mechanisms and processes (see Table 1 in paragraph 3.4) that can be found within the documents. The policy documents of before the attacks will first be discussed, on a national level and on the regional level. The results for Belgium will be discussed first, before continuing with France.

5.3 Implementation strategies in Belgium

5.3.1 Before the attacks – national level

On a national level, two documents have been analyzed that date from before the range of terrorist attacks in 2015: the Framework Note on Integral Security of 2004, and the General Policy Paper of the Ministry of Interior and Security of December 2014. Even though they both focus on security, there is a ten-year difference between the two documents. This could mean that the approach to terrorism has changed. The Framework Note has only been updated in 2016, which was according to the new document due to the complex federal structure where powers are scattered on different levels of government.

5.3.1.1 Framework Note on Integral Security 2004

The Framework Note is a long-term strategic policy document that states the governments' goals related to security. It is seen as the basis document of Belgium's security policies. The framework note is translated into short-term operational and detailed plans through policy notes from the ministers of Justice and Interior. The policy goal is *"to register in a coherent and structured way the security priorities of the governmental agreement in the integral and integrated security policy of the ministers of Justice and Interior"*. The document has been

divided into three blocks: the conceptual frame with the key points of an integral and integrated security policy, the legislature's priorities of criminal phenomena, and the implications for management and policy. The fight against terrorism has been mentioned as the first policy priority of the Belgian government and a paragraph has been dedicated to the fight against terrorism in the framework note.

The integral approach means that there is permanent attention to the prevention, repression as well as the follow-up of actors (criminals) and their victims. The integrated approach focuses upon the need for collaboration between all the concerned actors and within the different levels of government. Regarding the administrative chain of security it is said that the local security policy is the base of all other partners in the administrative chain; even in this global and national framework note, the local level is thus seen as important.

The main actors named involved in the making of the policy are the ministry of Justice and the ministry of Interior. They have been helped by other ministries and the College of Public Prosecutors regarding most legislative measures.

Actors involved in policy execution are the federal prosecution service, the State Security Service, the general service of intelligence and security (SGRS), the '*Groupe Interforces Antiterroriste*' (GIA), federal police services specialized in terrorism, the Directorate General of the Crisis and Coordination Centre (DGCC), the Directorate General of Aerial transport ('*SPF Mobilité et Transport*'), the Service of Criminal policy ('*SPF Justice*') and other partners involved who can help to detect terrorist threats. The collaboration between those actors needs to be reinforced. The integrated police and the judiciary should share their experiences regarding terrorism.

The strategic goals of the policy priority of terrorism are:

- The government follows the European measures to fight the problem more efficiently;
- A reinforced coordination of the initiatives taken by the ministries of Justice and Interior in the fight against terrorism;
- Provide the means necessary to effectively and efficient put in place the new laws;
- Improvement and augmentation of communication between authorities and companies regarding possible threats by installing an information exchange system;
- Dry the financial streams that finance terrorist actions and organizations.

Besides these goals, emphasis is put on the legislative measures that can be elaborated to fight terrorism more effectively. This includes the sharing of information between judicial authorities and security and intelligence services.

The national policy is leading for the regional and local policies that need to be adapted in order to come to a coherent multi-level policy. Even though the process of implementation seems mainly planned and top-down, attention is given to the importance of a local diagnosis, taking into account the local context and there should be room *“to permit the actors on the ground to adapt their practices to the local reality”*. The local policies are facilitated by the federal level through a *“methodological support”* that allows to develop *“adequate tools and instruments”*.

Public-private collaboration is stated in the document, and therefore network collaboration between non-state stakeholders and the public services. Regarding this collaboration is said that *“First, the different responsibilities, tasks and competences need to be clearly defined”*, which is one of the *“critical factors”* that can make a collaboration succeed or not. It also pays attention to the elaboration of concrete and realizable goals, as well as mutual confidence and respect for everyone’s individuality.

5.1.1.2 General Policy paper of the Ministry of Interior and Justice 2014

This policy paper is a parliamentary document that has come about after forming the new government in 2014. It addresses the policy priorities of the safety policy for the coming term of office. Just like in the Framework Note of 2004, the integral approach in fighting terrorism is one of the priorities of the government, but with the addition of radicalization. The document is divided in different parts. The first part treats security in general, the second is dedicated to terrorism, the third to civil security, then modernization, and the last part is dedicated to European funds.

The general part on security emphasizes the need for an integral security policy, *“based on collaboration, prevention and strong intervention of the security services”*. One of the initiatives regarding prevention is the encouragement of operational collaboration and development of partnerships on a local level. The policy paper also refers to the new Framework Note on Integral Security that should come about in *“close collaboration with the local governments and federal provinces”*.

Mentioned actors involved in policy making are local authorities and federal provinces, ministry of Justice and Interior, CUTA, the Crisis Centre and the National Taskforce Radicalism.

The importance of a preventive approach to terrorism is mentioned in the part dedicated to terrorism. In this part is written that *“besides a reactive approach to radicalization and terrorism, specific attention must be paid to the development of an integral and preventive approach of radicalization and terrorism”*.

Special attention is paid to the dynamics of the domain, *“which requires collaboration to develop a shared vision of security”*. This means that bridges must be built within and

between different levels of government, demonstrating the need for multilevel governance. Multi-level governance is deemed necessary because the *“complexity of radicalization transcends the functioning of different departments and different levels of government”*.

The need for collaboration is therefore closely linked to the need for multi-level governance. The different ministers decide together which initiatives should be taken and consult the federal provinces shortly after to come to a global approach. A national Taskforce needs to assure an optimal coordination regarding the exchange of information between the services on local and federal level. Local taskforces can ensure a local, operational follow-up of targeted people, while maintaining a global approach. Besides collaboration between and within different levels of government, collaboration with and between unspecified experts is organized to share their knowledge and to improve the policy. Information sharing seems an important aspect to ensure an integral and integrated approach.

Even though it is said that *“local authorities are the directors of the local security policy”*, which implies that they have a leading role in policy making, the national government has laid out the framework of the policy and seems to have planned out how the counterterrorism measures should unfold in general. But at the same time it is said that the continuous changes in the security domain require a dynamic organization that is able to deal with existing and emergent security problems.

The government tries to steer implementation by supporting local governments to put the policy into practice through stimulating a methodological approach based on scientific knowledge, through sharing best-practices and through financial support for pilot projects. The sharing of knowledge – education – is emphasized to put the local polices in place. Local authorities will be able to use different educational modules to deepen and spread their knowledge of radicalization. In the general part it is mentioned that the strategic documents on security and prevention will be evaluated based on their output and the used criteria. The sharing of best-practices is also mentioned here, as well as guaranteeing an efficient use of public resources.

5.3.2 Before the attacks – regional level

On a regional level, two policy documents dating from before the attacks have been analyzed. These are the ‘Flemish Action Plan for the Prevention of radicalization and terrorism’ of April 2015 and the ‘Agreement of Majority 2014-2019’ of the Brussels Parliament. Since Brussels is a region of its own, they have their own parliament. However, the Brussels region is considerably smaller than the Flemish and is therefore closer to the local level.

5.3.2.1 Flemish Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalization and Terrorism

The Action Plan has been established starting from the growing problem of radicalization and the leave of many youngsters to fight for Islamic State in Syria. The people that have left

are called *foreign terrorist fighters*. Several cities in Flanders are struggling with the prevention of radicalization, to which the action plan wishes to give an answer. The focus is on information sharing, better collaboration, and a stronger coordination. The Flemish governments thus hopes to answer the need for support that is felt locally. The proposed measures concern supporting cities and municipalities, education, support of first line practitioners and parents, strengthening the resilience of youth and supporting them in their search for their own identity.

Actors involved in policy making were the platform radicalization, the cities of Antwerp, Vilvoorde, Courtrai, Mechelen and Maaseijk, the VVSG (the society for Flemish Cities and Municipalities), the VGC (Flemish Community Commission), and the Muslim community. Besides the active involvement of these actors, exchanges have been made with the French community, with several countries to exchange best practices, and several experts have been consulted to ensure public support for the plan and to make sure the proposed measures are *“action-oriented and specific”*.

Just like the national policies before the attacks, the action plan states the need for an integral approach and multi-level governance, combining preventive and repressive measures. It adds that regarding repressive measures, most power lies with the national government but that the federal provinces have important powers regarding prevention, sensitization and early detection of radicalization.

Special attention has been paid to the need for emerging measures, which is why the action plan is continuously monitored by the Flemish Platform Radicalization. *“The action plan needs to be able to respond to new developments and new challenges”*. In order to do so, the phenomenon of radicalization is monitored through a research agenda. Besides monitoring, the region meets local requests when they are demanded for.

Besides emergent processes, some smaller projects within the policy have a clear line of implementation that has been planned beforehand and seems more top-down. For example, municipalities need to take on a directive role regarding the local radicalization policies and network collaboration between local governments and organizations is *“guaranteed”*. Furthermore, within youth welfare, the social services of juvenile courts, and within several organizations of the educational sector, reference persons are to be installed that share their expertise regarding radicalization with colleagues and others.

Multilevel governance is stressed in order to support local administrations in their approach of radicalization: *“coordination and collaboration are needed between on the one hand the different policy domains involved within the Flemish government and on the other hand the different policy levels (local, regional, federal and European)”*. Information exchange between different levels and domains is also seen as an important factor in successfully implementing the radicalization policy. The region is able to gather and transfer local

knowledge around radicalization, in order to share this knowledge and these best practices between different cities. The reference persons also help to disperse knowledge from a regional to a local level.

Network collaboration is something that is steered on in the action plan. *“A network of islam experts will be established to provide a counter discourse within schools”*. Not much is said however about the conditions of this network collaboration. The tasks of the local taskforces are mentioned, namely the exchange of information within the taskforce, with other levels and proposing measures to be taken for returned foreign terrorist fighters. They can also reach out to other organizations for the measures regarding an individual.

When looking at the steering mechanisms that can be found in the document, the main focus lies on the standardization of knowledge and skills of the professionals dealing with the problem of radicalization. The support for first-line practitioners (also known as street-level professionals), is optimized through extending the educational supply both on theoretical knowledge as well as practical knowledge. *“Central aspects are information transfer, raising awareness and promoting expertise, but also practical cases and how to respond in those situations”*. *“The content of the offer is implemented on a regional level to ensure that every sector receives the same message”*. Another measure that helps the street-level professionals to gain more knowledge is the implementation of a telephone helpline of the Muslim community that allows professionals or parents to ask questions related to theological support. The action plan thus focuses on radicalization coming from Islamic influences, as is also shown through teachers receiving educational support regarding ideology and Islam. Imams are stimulated to follow a qualitative education in Flanders.

Besides this, the plan is based on the competences that street-level professionals already possess and states that *“The measures taken to prevent radicalization need to be focused on strengthening the competences of the first line practitioners dealing with this problem instead of creating something new”*.

The regional expertise is made available for cities having problems with radicalization in case there is a demand. The focus on coordination of supply and demands has some aspects of interactive implementation because it requires mutual adjustment. However, the main focus is on supporting the standardization of knowledge and skills.

5.1.2.2 The Agreement of Majority 2014-2019 of the Brussels Parliament

This parliamentary document is officially also a regional document. However, since it is about the Brussels region (thus the city and its surroundings), it has a more local approach than the Flemish document. The regional government wants to create a *“regional Brussels project”* around clear priorities and a new ambition. *“The priorities are put in place by effective public instruments and are systematically evaluated”*. The goal is to *“effectively focus on these priorities by decompartmentalizing the regional competencies and reinforcing*

the collaboration with all of the administrations present in Brussels". The agreement is focused around seven challenges for the coming years, but terrorism and radicalization are not mentioned as one of those main challenges.

The fight against radicalization is mentioned later on as *"one of the fundamental priorities of prevention and security of the parliament's term"*. The importance of multi-level governance is stressed by stating that *"Every level of government has to be partner of a work that must mobilize even more intensively all the concerned actors"*.

The consultation and coordination of the security policies is to be improved by installing a network of actors consisting of: the federal ministers of Interior and Justice, the Prime Minister and the competent operational ministers, the presidents of the zones and the commanding officers, DirCo and DirJu and the Brussels public prosecutor. According to the theme, the network meetings could also include other actors such as representatives of penitential establishments, social workers, etc.

To insure collaboration and coherence between the policies in the police zones, the government watches over the implementation of harmonized policy regulations in the different police zones. It also stimulates cost efficiency by centralizing purchases and regrouping of administrative services. At the same time, some police forces are incited to reorganize in order to have an anchorage in the neighborhoods *"while remaining well organized and equipped"*.

The Brussels region also possesses a police academy to ensure the standardization of knowledge and skills of the Brussels police. Regarding the different professions in security, the document mentions the development of gateways between the professions. For example, peace officers (*gardiens de la paix*) have knowledge of the neighborhood they work in and have developed skills to become good police men and reinforce deficit zones. Lastly, the government wants to develop, in collaboration with the Communities, vocational training devoted to the security professions.

5.3.3 After the attacks – national level

Following from the terrorist attacks in November 2015 and March 2016 that struck Paris and Brussels, the Radicalisation Plan (Plan R) and the Framework Note on Integral Security have been updated. The preparations for the latter have already been mentioned in the General Policy Paper of the Ministry of Justice and Interior and within the regional documents of 2014 and spring 2015 that have been analyzed. From the theory is expected that the documents after the attack show more tendency towards planned and top-down implementation.

5.3.3.1 Radicalisation Plan

The 'Plan R' is a general policy document that is designed *“to nip extremism and radicalization processes in the bud”*, as one cannot rely solely on security forces and intelligence services to combat terrorism, according to the document. A global, integral and integrated approach that implies all competent services is said to be necessary, for which the Plan R can serve as lever. The great number of actors involved can contribute to *“the richness of the new approach, if everyone is on the same page. In other words, if all the concerned actors collaborate in harmony and follow the same vision and are overseen by the same management”*. The new vision also strives for maximal transparency, as opposed to the secrecy that was previously surrounding the policies. The Radicalisation Plan is the beginning rather than the goal; it is meant to invite all the services to fight together.

Two policy goals of the Plan R are *“to map the individuals and groups that have a radicalizing effect on their environment and to reduce the vectors of radicalization”*. The policy can contribute to an evidence-based policy and to knowledge management. It stresses the importance of profound knowledge to attack the problem.

The National Taskforce is constituted of the State Security Service, the General Information and Security Service, representatives of federal and local police, the Federal Public Service (FPS) of Foreign Affairs, the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTIF-CFI), the FPS of Interior, the Foreigner's Office, the DGCC, representatives of the Communities and Regions, DG of Penal Institutions (DG EPI), DG Security and Prevention and the Ministry of Public. Mostly actors concerned with the repressive side of terrorism are thus part of the National Taskforce. Regarding the institutional design of the network is mentioned that the members of the taskforce meet monthly. About the collaboration process is mentioned that *“Every decision of the national taskforce is taken unanimously”*. The National Taskforce needs to ensure the transmission of all changes in the policy towards the involved actors. The National Taskforce is responsible for execution, as coordinator of the plan.

The focus on collaboration is extended by installing Local Taskforces that are said to be the ideal platform to exchange important information. The function and tasks of these local taskforces are established beforehand. They have a strategic and an operational component and the connection with local administration and socio-preventive service is reinforced, for example by creating a local Integral Security Cell⁴. The purpose of the local taskforces is a local follow-up of radicalizing individuals or groups as well as reducing their impact by proposing measures to be taken. The goals are to exchange information, intelligence and analysis, determine which entities need to be followed, support police officers who are not

⁴ Called *“Cellule de Sécurité Intégrale Locale (CSIL)”* in French. Is a local consultation platform in which at least the mayor, local police, preventive and social services take place. Is meant to be the place for information exchange between the social and preventive services, the local taskforces and local governments.

specialized in the matter but who are susceptible to be confronted with signs of radicalization, propose preventive as well as repressive measures to stop the process of radicalization and to maintain structural contact with local authorities and services.

Besides the National and Local Taskforces, there are also some permanent and ad hoc working groups that focus on specific phenomena related to the prevention of radicalization, such as prisons, extreme right, but also foreign terrorist fighters, mosques, and migration. Of all the studied policies, this is the only one that mentions the possibility of extreme right radicalization. The working group's goal is *"to realize a permanent collaboration and develop salient know-how regarding a specific vector of radicalization"*. They hand in an evaluation report each year regarding their state of affairs. The working groups are led by a pilot service that needs to reunite all the competent partners to execute the envisaged missions.

Information sharing has special attention, and to achieve this special media have been designed such as the Joint Information Box and the databank for foreign terrorist fighters.

The Plan R reinforces the links between the different political levels (federal, community and regional, local). The chain approach and the combination of preventive, repressive and curative measures requires multi-level governance.

One of the steering mechanisms is using rules and protocols. *"The approach to follow as well as the concrete follow-up of entities (implementation of standardized and personalized measures) are clearly defined"*. This means that there are rules and protocols to follow, but also that there is room for personalized measures. However, the extent to which there is discretionary space to decide upon those personalized measures is left unsaid. The document does mention that *"concrete measures have been formulated"* to stop the radicalizing influences. There is even *"a set of measures destined specifically to counter the process or impact of radicalization"*, which implies that there are rules & protocols to follow. The taskforces should lead to *"adequate measures"*. The Plan R should lead to knowledge based policy, which fits with the idea of standardization of knowledge and skills.

5.3.3.2 Framework Note on Integral Security 2016-2019

The Framework Note on Integral Security is a reference frame and strategic policy document for everyone who can contribute to an effective approach of security, starting from the idea that civil society is an important factor in security instead of an exclusive mission of integrated police services, justice and other public services. It is the base document of the security policy of Belgium and determines the policy documents derived from it. An effective security policy is however not easily put in place in a federal state structure, where fundamental competencies are attributed to federal provinces and therefore divided between regional and national level. This is why the 2004 document hasn't been updated until 2016. The policy also continues upon the idea of an integral and integrated approach. It is seen as a dynamic plan that can elaborate upon several identified phenomena and which

is open for new phenomena. The policy is divided into phenomena and transversal themes that are interrelated. In order to monitor the policy, indicators have been identified for each phenomenon. Radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism (included polarization) are one of the transversal themes/phenomena of the policy.

Actors involved in policy making are the federal ministers of Justice and Interior, together with a working group of experts and governments of the federated entities, the National Security Council and the College of Public Prosecutors.

The Framework Note aspires to be both a dynamic and strategic document that needs to be monitored and adapted regularly. Even though the use of phenomena is meant to ensure a dynamic and more emergent approach, the action plans that have been drafted at different levels *“define their goals as much as possible in SMART terms, and consequently in concrete measures and initiatives”*. This seems very much planned and rather top-down.

Regarding terrorism, several laws have been made and adapted but policy has also been planned out by ministerial circulars. The Regions and Communities have also made policies regarding radicalization, which need to follow the outlines of the Framework Note. The DGCC proposes security measures based on the threat analysis of the CUTA, which can be executed by the competent services once approved by the minister of Interior. The coordination between public services, administrative authorities and judicial authorities is pushed further by updating a ministerial circular.

About multilevel governance is said that the social responsibility for security is spread over three levels. It is the task of the authorities to watch over their citizens' safety and they possess the monopoly on violence. The second level regards the social links – associations, institutions, enterprises – that positively influence security. Finally, each citizen needs to watch over its own security too and that of its surroundings. The problem of radicalization *“requires the complementarity and confidence in the cooperation on local, national, European and international level”*.

The focus is once again laid upon an integral and integrated approach, through the national taskforce that consults different actors of the security chain, as well as a chain approach in preventive, repressive and curative ways at all levels of government. Attention is given to improving the collaboration between the administrative and judicial authorities, especially regarding the sharing of information. This needs to be done structurally. If necessary, the legal framework to do so will be adapted. This is also the case regarding the information exchange between the security and intelligence services and the Communities, Regions and local services. The policy aims to arrive at *“an integrated security policy that horizontally englobes all the sectors that are relevant for one of the security phenomena”*. The national and local taskforces, as well as the local integral security cells are an example of network collaboration that is established to execute the policy.

The policy is developed *“based on knowledge and evidence”*, but also has a *“custom-made individual approach based on the measures to take”*, thus leaving room to adapt to the context. The political framework should allow local administration to decide themselves what legal possibilities they wish to use. This decision can be made in tripartite consultation between the mayor, the public prosecutor and the local and federal police chiefs. Through stimulation and development of pilot projects, practices, expertise and knowledge, the expertise regarding radicalization should be spread at all strategic levels. Street-level professionals can count on increased help, *“through specific trainings that are adapted to the subject”* and by structuring what ought to be the professionals’ response when confronted with signs of radicalization. *“With the right instruments and targeted information, they can help detect problems and get people back on track who risk to radicalize or are radicalized”*.

5.3.4 After the attacks – regional level

The Brussels region has made a global security and prevention plan after the attacks of 2015 and 2016. Polarization and radicalization is one of the themes that is elaborated upon in the document.

5.3.4.1 Brussels Global Plan of Security and Prevention

The document is the first regional plan of security and prevention, even though the idea of such a plan was already mentioned in 2011 and is again mentioned in the Brussels Parliamentary Agreement of 2014-2019. Conform to the idea of coordinating all security plans at different levels, this plan is situated between the Framework Note, the National Security plan and the zonal police plans. The document is meant to be a strategic framework for different zonal and local plans. The Brussels criminality is monitored in order to incorporate the findings in the policies. Based on the results from this monitoring, the themes of the document have been established and in making the policy, the director of the federal police and the public prosecutor of Brussels have been consulted. The group of partners has been consulted through a questionnaire, from which the results were given to a group of experts that have written the policy together with its leading actor, BPS (Bruxelles Prévention & Sécurité).

The policy states the measures that are to be taken, but leaves room to *“assure that measures are put in place adapted to individuals or groups”*, thus taking into account the specific context.

The focus is on *“territorial anchorage, the proximity and accessibility of public services, [...] as well as the work at neighborhood level”*. Problems are treated at the level they correspond to, because local problems are best to be solved at municipal level by local partners, while supra-local problems require a regional assist and collaborative treatment.

The regional authorities also continue to raise awareness at the federal government for the financial problems regarding police zones, thus influencing policy bottom-up.

In order to prevent fragmentation, regional, zonal and local actors have been mobilized. The document mentions that *“the phenomena of radicalization and polarization reveal a transnational character that far exceeds the regional and national agencies and consequently needs greater coordination between the different actors who are active in the fight and prevention of these phenomena”*. *“Radicalism and jihadism have a resonance in the Brussels Region and are a local declination of an international phenomenon”*. The policy therefore seems well aware of the *wickedness* of the issue.

Like all the other Belgian policy documents, this plan also departs from an integral approach. *“The intervention and partnership of all the actors concerned are the concrete answer”* to improving public order and its compliance by *“reinforcing collaboration between the traditional security actors and those of prevention”*. It aspires to decompartmentalize to have a *“concrete collaboration with the actors on the ground and institutional partners, while integrating the socio-preventive actors”*. Together with this decompartmentalization, the focus is put on sharing best practices. The goal is to reinforce the transfer of knowledge and skills between different actors, promoting a partnership-based approach. This should lead to a permanent coordination that invites administrative services to share best practices and to share information between judicial and administrative services. The platform Radicalism and the associative platform are the means to coordinate actions and reinforce the territorial anchorage. They are meant to structurally unite the actors involved, offer training that meets the demands of the platform, create room to share best practices and to create synergy.

Regarding the steering mechanism, focus is put on the standardization of knowledge and skills: *“a common training module will be created to propose the same training to all the security and prevention actors in the Brussels region and to raise awareness to the regional and institutional context”*. This fits with the idea of standardization of knowledge and skills. Raising awareness and providing training are important steering mechanisms of the policy. This is why in 2016 a regional school for security professions has been established, that follows the goal of professionalization of the actors involved. It offers interdisciplinary training, modules related to region related problems and pays special attention to radicalization. The policy is based on the idea that street-level professionals need to be trained and *“supported by making the knowledge and tools available”* that they need. There is also discretionary space for professionals because of the idea that measures need to be adapted to the individuals or groups that are targeted. Professionals are given *“an evaluation grid to help them to adequately approach radicalized or radicalizing individuals”*. This measure is supposed to harmonize the care specified to radicalized people within the Brussels' community and to enable adequately taking care of radicalizing or radicalized

people. The BPS will work on this grid together with *“the competent authorities”*. The evaluation grid thus seems a little paradoxical; it is established top-down to standardize professionals’ actions, but at the same time it is supposed to help them know what to do.

5.4 Intermediate conclusion Belgium

From 2004 up to 2017, the Belgian documents all stress the importance of an integral and integrated approach to terrorism and from 2014 onwards include the prevention of radicalization within their policies, as it can lead to terrorism. The only exception is the Agreement of the Brussels Parliament, which says that terrorism and radicalization are indeed a policy priority but does not pay further attention to it. The Framework Notes on Security and Prevention are seen as the ‘mother’ policies and therefore leading for all other security policies. The importance of collaboration is stressed in all the documents. The first Framework Note mentions public-private collaboration, but the other documents focus on the collaboration between repressive and preventive actors, especially including the preventive actors in the prevention of radicalization and terrorism. The policies seem mostly planned and top-down, but some mention the *“dynamic”* context, that asks for room for emergent matters. Due to this dynamic context, the new Framework Note on Integral Security & Prevention has an approach based on phenomena, so it can adapt to changing circumstances. However, that same policy document also requires concrete and SMART measures, which leave little room for emergent situations and can be seen as planned.

From 2014 onwards, a National and Local Taskforces have been set up to assure network collaboration on the subject of preventing and stopping radicalization. The National Taskforce is leading in the implementation of counterterrorism measures, as is explained in the ‘Plan R’. The functions and tasks of these taskforces are clearly defined but not much is said about the collaborative process, most is concerned about the institutional design. Regarding collaboration, emphasis is put on sharing information between the repressive and preventive services, thus *decompartmentalizing* the two. The new Framework Note on Integral Security & Prevention also emphasizes the collaboration between the administrative and judicial authorities that needs improving.

Nearly all documents mention the need for multi-level governance in order to fight radicalism and terrorism, which is beautifully captured in the Brussels Plan on Security and Prevention (2017): *“Radicalism and jihadism have a resonance in the Brussels Region and are a local declination of an international phenomenon”*.

In general, street-level professionals are depicted as important (f)actors in fighting against radicalism and terrorism, who *“need to adapt their practices to local reality”* (Framework Note Integral Security 2004). The Flemish Action Plan Radicalization acknowledges the specific knowledge of street-level professional and claims that attention must be paid to

“strengthening professionals’ competences” (Flemish Action Plan Radicalization, 2015), rather than initiating new measures. This focus on supporting professionals through education and training remains an important factor in the policy documents. The idea seems to be that through training, professionals can be given a certain amount of discretionary space in order to adapt their practices to local and individual circumstances. However, some measures are concrete and *“clearly defined”* (Plan R, 2015). The Brussels Global Plan of Security & Prevention (2017) mentions an *“evaluation grid”* that should help professionals to adequately approach the target group but that seems to be made and implemented top-down and thus rather imposed than supportive.

5.5 Implementation strategies in France

Following the same order of the results for the Belgian documents, the results for the qualitative content analysis of the French documents are given here.

5.5.1 Before the attacks – national level

The analyzed policy documents before the attack are the National Strategy of Crime Prevention 2013-2017 and the White Paper on Defense and National Security, both published in 2013. The first is mostly preventive, while the other has a more repressive approach focused on security.

5.5.1.1 National Strategy of Crime Prevention 2013-2017

This national strategy can apply to the whole of the national territory, mobilizing its resources firstly in the direction of priority security zones and priority neighborhoods. The policy is translated into departmental plan and integrated in the *‘contrats de ville’*, the city contracts, of 2014-2020. The new strategy can be placed within the policy commitments of the President and takes into account other policies. Three action programs will follow from the policy priorities. They are focused on youth that is exposed to delinquency, the prevention of violence and help for victims and the improvement of public order.

Prefects are given an important role in the implementation of the strategy. They are the ones responsible for organizing the collaboration that is needed to elaborate the departmental crime prevention plans. They are also accountable themselves to the Minister of Interior and so the policy seems steered in a top-down manner through the prefects.

Strikingly, this document does not mention radicalization or terrorism once, whereas the White Paper does mention the fight against terrorism. That radicalization is not mentioned in the document could be because radicalization only became a policy priority for France in 2014. However, as already explained in the institutional framework, there were already many laws on terrorism before 2014 and delinquency was linked to terrorism (Wittendorp et al., 2017; Hellmuth, 2015), so one would expect more attention to terrorism in this policy

document. That this is not the case in the strategy on crime *prevention*, does confirm the focus on repressive measures rather than preventive measures on terrorism before 2014.

5.5.1.2 White Paper on Defense and National Security (2013)

Even though the National Strategy on Crime Prevention does not mention terrorism, it had already been identified as a national threat in 2008. The White Paper on Defense and National Security has both an inward and outward point of view regarding the fight against terrorism.

It states that the security forces and armed forces need to possess a certain flexibility, to quickly react to changing circumstances. Even though this leaves room for emergent situations, they are probably trained to quickly react to such changes.

In order to efficiently respond to the terrorist threat, international coordination is deemed necessary, which reflects the need for multi-level governance, with a focus on exceeding the national level.

Regarding collaboration is said that terrorism requires a global approach that envisages to prevent risks, but also to develop the government's measures in the fight against radicalization. The Vigipirate plan⁵ is mentioned and *"assures the mobilization of different ministers, regional authorities, important operators and citizens to reinforce our level of protection"*. The bilateral and multilateral collaboration need to be reinforced to *"enrich the exchange of information and analysis between the countries subject to the same threat"*.

The steering mechanism used in the document is focused mainly on the standardization of knowledge and skills, and competences of professionals: *"It is important that the security forces and the armed forces master, through adapted and common training, the indispensable knowledge to give a broad response on the national territory"*. Regarding possible hostility from other countries is mentioned that *"Our forces need to have the high-quality capacities that are needed to respond to the threats of use of force by other states"*.

5.5.2 Before the attacks – regional level

On a regional level, there is one document selected that was published before the attacks, this is the Parisian Contract of Prevention and Security 2015-2020.

⁵ The 'plan Vigipirate' is a governmental plan initiated in the 1990s that can be put in place in case of terrorist threat or attack and provides authorities with several possibilities to respond. A well-known example is the checking of bags at many public places in France, especially after the attacks of November 2015. The goal is to improve society's resilience and the approach is focused on caution, prevention and protection. See <http://www.gouvernement.fr/vigipirate> for more information.

5.5.2.1 Parisian Contract of Prevention and Security 2015-2020

Just like the Brussels Global Plan of Security & Prevention, the Parisian region has a document regarding Prevention & Security. It has been updated in the beginning of 2015 and one of the new action cards is the *“prevention of radicalization and accompaniment of families”*. The Parisian contract is related to the National Strategy of Crime Prevention and follows the three action programs that are stated in that policy.

Collaboration is an important aspect in the document. The 20 mayors of the arrondissements have been consulted from the first phases of making the policy, *“to take better account of their expectations, which also allows for a better return in the experiences of their local contracts”*. Through the use of citizen associations, citizens have been consulted in the policy making process because *“they are the first who are concerned by the contract, its priorities and its goals”*. Many actors have thus been consulted, but this doesn't imply shared-decision making. Responsible for the implementation and follow-up of the contract is the Parisian Council of prevention and security. It entails a network collaboration between the prefect of the police, the mayor of Paris, the public prosecutor of Paris, elected representatives, magistrates, representatives of state services, representatives of associations and qualified people who work in the policy domain. Within the different arrondissements, such Councils of prevention and security are also installed through decree. They are responsible for *“information exchange between the heads of public and private institutions concerned, and they set goals and measures to preserve security and public order”*.

The police headquarters have established a prevention and accompaniment cell, that monthly reunites representatives of the police headquarters, the prefecture of the Ile-de-France region, the education authority, prosecution and of the city. This cell mobilizes the existing local competences and can direct persons reported as radicalized and/or their families to the services they need. It is seen as complementary to the intelligence services' work as well as to the classic procedure of treatment by prosecution or social services. The prevention cell can pick up the *“weak signs”* of radicalization as well as propose social, psychological and administrative measures to radicalized people.

To prevent radicalization, the actors and institutional and associated partners need to be trained in the matter of radicalization, thus focusing on knowledge and skills as steering mechanism. The efficiency of the measures put in place *“relies on the training of different professionals of the public services and collectivities (social services, inspector of education, principals, people in contact with a young audience), who are confronted with this type of problem”*. Even though the training of street-level professionals is emphasized, the output of the policy priority is measured in numbers of studied alerts by the prevention and family accompaniment cell, the number of people of which the associative partners have taken care, and the number of people who have become aware of the phenomenon of

radicalization. This focus on numbers and output seems to fit with the steering mechanism of decentralized implementation, where the focus is on achieving efficiency based on output.

5.5.3 After the attacks – national level

The selected documents that are made after the attacks are the Action Plan against Radicalization and Terrorism (PART) of May 2016 and the Halfway Evaluation of the National Strategy on Crime Prevention, also published in 2016. Regarding the last-mentioned document, some interesting changes can be seen compared with the document dating from before the attacks.

5.3.3.1 Action Plan Against Radicalization and Terrorism (May 2016)

The first Action Plan against radicalization and terrorism was adopted in April 2014 and consisted of 22 measures. Strong complementary measures were taken in January and November of 2015, after the terrorist attacks in France. Through use of the “*numéro vert national*” – the national telephone line where radicalized people can be reported – the departmental heads of security and the departmental cells for monitoring and action, a pilot mechanism has been put in place as well as follow-up of the signals. The current document is the leading document for the national strategy against radicalization and terrorism. It is built up around seven axes and divided into 80 measures, of which 50 are new. The seven axes are:

- The early detection of radicalization tracks and terrorist networks
- Monitoring, obstructing and neutralizing of terrorist networks;
- Fight terrorism in its international networks and sanctuaries;
- Density the prevention system of radicalization to assure an individualized approach;
- Develop applied research around counter discourse and mobilize the Islam in France;
- Better protection of vulnerable places and networks;
- Know how to react to every terrorist attack and show the resilience of the nation

The strategy implies continuity, perseverance and resilience, the latter in case of an attack. But at the same time it “*supposes flexibility, reactivity and an adaptable capacity towards the ever changing phenomena, without renouncing the fundamental principles of the constitutional state*”. After evaluating the actions that have already been taken the government decided that they needed to be continued, by adjusting them to the latest evolutions of the threat and by involving even more actors and intervention domains.

One of the measures that is planned and top-down is to create a national coordination and support cell at the Interdepartmental Committee of Prevention of Crime and Radicalization (CIPDR) for the coordination and support of the action of the prefects, collectivities and

associated networks. Another of the top-down measures is to add a local Action Plan against Radicalization in every *'contrat de ville'*, adjusted to the local intensity of the phenomenon but with quantitative and qualitative goals. To raise citizens' awareness of the problem, the government has implemented several (parts on) websites that can be used to spread information about radicalization. Another top-down and planned measure is the dispersion of the interdepartmental guide on prevention of radicalization that assembles all the procedures and actions that every actor must be able to put in place. This leading top-down role of the national government is in line with the expectations after a terrorist attack.

The actor in charge of the radicalization policy, the Interdepartmental Committee of Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalization (CIPDR), pursues an international policy by active international exchange, in order to *"feed the French policy with best-practices from abroad"*.

Besides gathering information from abroad, *"a collective response"* is mentioned. This means that *"every prefect, every magistrate, every mayor, every school head must be able to appeal to"* one or more structures that are put in place. A more collaborative approach is also envisaged by decompartmentalizing the intelligence services and sharing available information on terrorist networks. The follow-up cells that have been created in every department for the prevention of radicalization are multidisciplinary and open for external actors and can opt for a more preventive or more repressive follow-up of individuals. They have a partnership with social public services, regional authorities and associated networks. Besides these actors, the *'caisses d'allocations familiales'* (CAF), the social security funds, are seen as an important actor that can contribute in the prevention of radicalization because of their capacity and expertise.

The government tries to ensure implementation by increasing the capacity and thus creates many jobs and puts aside substantive funds in order to implement the measures and claims that this is necessary to deal with the threat. The capacity to deal with the problem of radicalization must be *"doubled within two years"* to meet the growing demands. The government plans to develop an *"array of responses"* that can assure a tailor-made approach because *"the individual and collective parameters that determine radicalization tracks are numerous, vary from one person or group to another, and are combined through complex mechanisms"*. Two evaluation grids have been elaborated by the CIPDR; the one for signs of radicalization is used by the employees of the telephone line, as well as the regional intelligence services and prefectures. The second evaluation grid *"intends to support"* professionals to point to signs of de-radicalization, but it also limits their discretionary space if they must use it. But besides the evaluation grid, professionals are also given *"a better understanding of the mechanisms at work in the processes of radicalization"*, through an extensive educational plan. *"Educational modules dedicated to preventing radicalization have been made available online and are meant for every public agent"*. The government

wants to foresee in an array of responses to radicalization that corresponds with the diversity of the profiles. Interesting is that in the French document, psychologists are specifically mentioned as professionals that play an important role in preventing radicalization.

5.3.3.2 Halfway Evaluation of the National Strategy of Crime Prevention (June 2016)

This policy document is a little different because it is the mid-term evaluation of the National Strategy of Crime Prevention. In contrast to the 2013 version, this report does include the prevention of radicalization, as it has become a policy priority of the government since 2014. A part is therefore dedicated to the prevention of radicalization and requires reinforcement of the instruments and facilities that are put in place by the government and coordinated by the CIPDR. The report presents the support, methods, events and means of exchange that contribute to value the public response to prevent delinquency and radicalization.

With all the ministerial circulars defining the policy goals, measures to be taken and clear task distributions, the implementation is highly planned and steered top-down. The evaluation mentions that the *“prefects have responded to the urgency of the situation by developing local partnerships adapted to the needs of the mobilized ground workers for the social and psychological accompaniment of youth and their families”*.

The policy has a top-down approach as is illustrated by the fragment that *“the radicalization prevention policy has a juridical base. She is mainly based on the circulars of the ministry of Interior, that have specified the plan since its launch in April 2014”*. These circulars seem decisive in outlining the policy implementation. What stands out is that there is a lot of focus on the departmental cells, and less on the local cells. *“In 2015, a dozen of local missions are associated with the follow-up cells”*. At decentralized level, prefects have supervised the pursuit and improvement of the implementation of the prevention of radicalization policy. The prefects have mentioned having difficulties identifying the structures and associations likely to assist in de-radicalization processes. Therefore *“a labelling procedure of competencies is revealed necessary. A referential system can be put in place, that is administered at national level and made available for prefectures”*.

At the level of the prefecture, two operational cells are put in place. One is in charge of the evaluation and follow-up of situations of radicalization and the second is multidisciplinary and takes responsibility over radicalized or radicalizing people and their families, by using the facilities of law and structures financed by the FIPD (the interdepartmental funds for the prevention of delinquency). The follow-up cell is composed of state members such as *“intelligence services, Pôle emploi [the French employment agency], social cohesion departments and delegations of the prefect”*. The prefects' role is very important in the implementation of the policy; they receive information from the national telephone

platform, after which they inform the public prosecutor. When he approves of the proposed measures, the prefect can inform the mayor of the concerned municipality.

To gather and determine the actors involved in the policies of prevention of radicalization, an interdepartmental group composed of actors of the ministries of Interior, of Justice, of national education, of Social Affairs and Health, of Cities, Youth and Sports has been installed. At the local public prosecutor's office, contact persons on the subject of terrorism have been installed. These contact persons are informed about every file related to terrorism and violent radicalization. This person is also part of the departmental follow-up cells to improve collaboration with the judicial institutions.

A steering mechanism that can be identified is the direct supervision of the implementation on decentralized level of the policy by the prefects. The ministerial circulars are mostly constituted with rules and protocols that need to be followed. An example is that *"conform the circular of December 2, 2015, cosigned by the minister of Interior and the Minister of Cities, the prefectural delegate for radicalization needs to be mobilized"*. Its role is to improve the coherence between the actions taken on local level and the goals of the radicalization policy. They can also help local partners and identify street-level actors that can contribute to the execution of the policy. At the same time, attention is paid to the education of professionals and other actors involved in the execution. A training kit has been made *"to be distributed to all participants in training and intervening actors in the prevention of radicalization"*. Education adapted to the requests and audience has also been offered to many state and non-state actors, including local professionals. The document also clearly mentions the amount of money that is made available to support the implementation of the policy.

5.5.4 After the attacks – regional level

No documents have been found from a regional level that deal with counterterrorism policies. The documents that have been analyzed stem from the ministry of Interior, in collaboration with other ministries, but they are about the implementation of policies on a regional level.

5.3.4.1 Reference framework for Action Plans to be added to the City Contracts (2016)

As already mentioned in the previous document, the cities ought to add a part, an action plan, dedicated to the prevention of radicalization in their City Contracts. This document is the referential framework that cities can use to help them add those plans. The city policies need to be involved in the prevention of radicalization because *"they can have innovative responses to the encountered difficulties of the population and of the youth in particular"*. *"The territorial steering of the radicalization prevention policy belongs to the departmental prefect, to which the authorities and associations can provide support"* while benefiting from the financial support that comes along with it.

The document aims to precise the roles of the different actors, as well as their coordination, and to give methodological and practical advice to formulate the addendum. It has been established with the help of the different ministries involved, experts and ground actors. *“The action plans are defined taking into account the size of the cities and their agglomerations, adjusted to local situations and according to the degree of intensity of the phenomenon”*, thus allowing cities to adjust the action plan to their local situation. However, the implementation is very much planned, as a calendar has been attached indicating the time frame to follow for establishing the action plans.

The document mentions the importance of a local anchorage to improve the preventive response to radicalization. However, a lot of information is given to the local level in a top-down manner, as for example the information coming from the telephone platform. Also, the prefects’ delegates are assigned to play a connective role between the local level and departmental cells. *“Once the situations are identified on local level, it is necessary to give feedback to the competent authorities”*.

Not much is said about multi-level governance, the most illustrative being that *“To improve the preventive response to radicalization, one has to reinforce the local anchorage in a partnership logic”*.

The actors signing the city contract are organized in an operational group, *“composed of the principal partners and assign a contact person to lead the group”*. This leader can come from the communities’ services, can be the head of the city policy, or any person capable of providing a coordination role. *“The name of this person can be given to the prefect to facilitate the network collaboration”*. The group can be a working group and way of exchanging information on a thematic base, which the local or intercommunal councils of prevention of crime can create. The local group is complementary to the follow-up cell and can structure the tracking of radicalization on the local level. Social housing should also be part of this group, because of their daily contact with the population. To establish the city contracts, the citizens’ councils are also consulted and made aware to the prevention of radicalization. The public response to radicalization *“is situated at the confluence of different approaches; educational, social, psychological and theological”*, this seems to be an integrated approach.

“Training modules can be organized for government officials and ground actors” to help them gain knowledge of the problem. Regarding the discretionary space of professionals, the document mentions that government officials and associations can propose actions that are examined by the prefectural follow-up cell, who can subsequently confide the entire or partly follow-up of a person to the community or association. The document also refers to the interdepartmental guide on the prevention of radicalization, that contains practical ways to detect radicalization, coordination and execution methods for the local level and other

helpful tools *“for the departmental prefects and public prosecutors, who lead the departmental follow-up cells.”* The operational group can identify *“professionals who necessarily need to be educated to be able to intervene”*, everyone in their own domain. This document also recommends the evaluation grid that has been established as a helping tool for professionals and other actors. Associated professionals *“must benefit from an education on the prevention of radicalization”*, thus in this document attention has been paid to the standardization of knowledge and skills. The evaluation of the policy is ensured by a focus on numbers, a focus on output.

5.3.4.2 Interdepartmental Guide of Radicalization Prevention (2016)

Two years after the launch of the national assistance and prevention center of radicalization (CNAPR), that is mostly known because of the telephone line, and after the prefects have started to guide the deconcentrated public action by installing the departmental cells, this guide should help local actors to structure the accompaniment of families and taking care of persons who are identified as radicalized. It is a practical tool that is meant to facilitate the signaling of radicalization at the *‘numéro vert’* and improve the coordination and local implementation of the facilities to prevent radicalization.

The guide is a follow-up of measures that have been decided upon two years earlier. It mentions some best-practices, but mainly focuses upon giving direction to how these measures should be implemented on the deconcentrated level. In 2015, a booklet has been distributed on the website of the ministry. It mentions different signs of alert regarding radicalization and *“can be used as a base for exchanges in the establishment when a particular situation is preoccupying and needs consultation between all stakeholders”*. The planned aspect also comes back in the detailed manner that describes the tasks of for example the prefect(’s delegate) or the network of psychologists and psychiatrists that is to be put in place.

As the guide has been made through collaboration between several ministries and has been distributed by the ministry of Interior, steering is rather top-down than bottom-up. Even when communication flows bottom-up, that is because it has been decided beforehand how that ought to happen; *“From the moment of identification of the first signs of radicalization, this should be signaled at the competent authorities. The actors can usefully rely on the indicators of radicalization that have been defined on national level and which permit to precisely apprehend the situations of radicalization”*. In the case of signaling by the national telephone platform, information is transferred to the prefect, who then informs the public prosecutor. *“With the permission of the public prosecutor, the prefect informs the mayor of the concerned municipality”*. The departmental cells have been put in place following a circular of the minister of Interior, in which the prefects are asked to do so. Other ministerial circulars plan the collaboration between the departmental follow-up cells and the local

councils of security and prevention of crime, which are led by mayors. The prefects are the ones in charge of deciding who should be involved in the cells.

Network collaboration is an important aspect in the guide and is for example found in the departmental cells of follow-up that *“mobilize the state services and concerned operators (police, gendarmerie, national education, juridical protection of youth, the employment agency, local mission), the territorial authorities (besides the concerned mayor, the social services of the general council), the family allowance funds (CAF) and the associated network”*. The approach combines repressive, preventive and curative services and actors. The cells are stimulated to meet two-weekly or monthly. Also, a local network that can identify signals of radicalization must be put in place in the domain of sports, combining sports clubs and sport deputies. The sharing of information *“between police and other partners can be coordinated by the prefect’s cabinet”*. *“The information that is given to the partners is stripped of the most sensitive data. It cannot be the subject of communication to outsiders of the working group. A local and specific chart on information sharing can be established between the partners”*.

It is stimulated that all actors likely to identify signs of radicalization follow some sort of training to gain knowledge on the subject. The actors involved in sports are for example given specific guides to help them identify signs of radicalization. Besides guides, procedural cards, and the spreading of best-practices *“seem indispensable”*. Professionals should be helped by *“encouraging the development of places for exchanges of practices”*. Actors involved in the domain of sports are also encouraged to follow training and be made aware to situations of radicalization. The partners of the social follow-up cell have been educated on the subject of radicalization. The *“cross-fertilization between public agents, religious leaders, scholars, civil society, under the aegis of the university, is very much appreciated. Therefore, the need for education in the matter [...] must make the academic education an educational reference at national level”*. The French evaluation grid is added in the Interdepartmental Guide of Radicalization Prevention and is based on several domains, for which indicators and strong or weak signs have been identified. Even though the document mentions that the evaluation grid cannot replace human assessment and that human behavior cannot be simplified to be completely understood by using such a grid, it is deemed *“an indispensable tool for prefects”* to respond to the problem of radicalization.

Besides these tools and training that are given to involved actors, the use of rules and protocols seems to be ambivalent in the implementation of the policy. It is characterized by a high task and procedure definition. Also, supervision is ensured through the prefects who install the network cells and decide who is involved, even which professionals are to execute the measures.

5.6 Intermediate conclusion France

In the French documents, different ways of steering implementation can be discovered than in the Belgian documents. The National Strategy on Crime Prevention of 2013 is the only policy document that does not include a specific mention of radicalization and terrorism, even though the other document of that year, the White Paper on Defense, does devote a part on terrorism and even mentions radicalization as a threat. The White Paper is the only document that really focuses on the defense policy and has a view on terrorism that is focused both on protecting French territory as well as fighting terrorism abroad. It focuses on the skills, knowledge and capacity of the armed forces: *“It is important that the security forces and the armed forces master, through adapted and common training, the indispensable knowledge to give a broad response on the national territory”*.

The other documents focus mostly on the prevention and countering of radicalism instead of fighting terrorism. A whole range of professionals is mentioned in the documents after the attacks that contribute to preventing radicalization or de-radicalization, including medical professionals, psychologists and sport professionals. Education and training on the subject of radicalism is important to raise awareness and train professionals to give them *“a better understanding of the mechanisms at work in the processes of radicalization”*. To help professionals and other actors confronted with radicalization to identify the signals and possible responses, two *“evaluation grids”* have been established on a national level and are recommended to use. The grids contain indications of (de-)radicalization and cannot replace human assessment.

The policies have a planned and top-down character, complemented by laws and ministerial circulars. There are many rules and protocols for the actors concerned by the policies that not much space seems left for emergent matters. The role of every actor involved is precisely defined. A pivotal role in implementing the measures is given to the prefects and their delegates. They are the ones responsible for establishing a multi-level governance, as they are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior and leaders on the departmental level. The delegates of the prefect have a leadership role in establishing a network collaboration between different actors on departmental level, in the follow-up cells, but are equally the ones appointed to identify local actors capable of executing the counter-radicalization measures. A list containing these local actors is then kept on centralized level. Due to the importance and leadership role given to the (delegates of) the prefect, the prefect is also the one to directly supervise implementation and to ensure a local anchorage of the policies.

The top-down approach is clearly visible after the attacks, in line with the expectations of policy making in a crisis situation. As France had declared a state of emergency, the policies after the attacks of November 2015 were definitely made and published in a crisis situation. The government searches to reaffirm it is in control and this is reflected in the hierarchical implementation through highly defined rules and protocols and supervision on execution by

the prefects. Regarding street-level professionals the need is mentioned to give them specific education and training on the subject of radicalization. Their discretionary space seems limited due to the rules, protocols and supervision. It is however difficult to conclude to what extent this top-down approach differs from the approach before the attacks, since the documents analyzed before the attacks unfortunately do not provide much material for comparison.

5.7 Implementation strategies in Belgium and France

Having discussed the results of the document analysis for all the policy documents, the second empirical sub-question – ‘*Which implementation strategies are used for counterterrorism & radicalization policies in Belgium and France?*’ – can be answered.

The policies on counterterrorism and radicalization of Belgium are mostly planned and rather top-down, but also leave room for bottom-up decisions and emergent matters that have not been foreseen. The regional Flemish Action Plan that was published before the attacks, seems to leave most room for bottom-up decisions, as it mentions several times to support the local needs and answer to local demands. Almost all documents stress the importance of an integral and integrated approach, thus stressing the importance of collaboration and multi-level governance. An example of this is the National Taskforce that has been put in place in Belgium and which has the role of coordinator of the counterterrorism and radicalization policies and is responsible for the functioning of the local taskforces.

When it comes to execution of the measures and policies, street-level professionals are depicted as important actors in fighting against radicalism and terrorism, who “*need to adapt their practices to local reality*” (Framework Note Integral Security, 2004). Attention is paid to the standardization of knowledge and skills, for example by providing a common education for all the involved actors in the fight against radicalization and terrorism in the Brussels region. Through education professionals obtain a certain amount of knowledge that can help them adapt their practices to local and individual circumstances, also known as discretionary space. Even though their discretionary space is limited because some measures come with concretely defined prescriptions, the general idea is that the professionals in Belgium are not completely restricted by rules and protocols even though tasks and protocols seem a little more defined after the attacks than before.

Although the policies are implemented mostly planned and top-down, the steering mechanism that has been given a lot of attention is the standardization of knowledge and skills and collaboration between the different actors involved. Still, the “*decompartmentalization*” of the different services involved can and should be improved.

When looking at the results for France, it is clear that a different implementation strategy can be identified. Even more than in Belgium, implementation has a character that is very

much top-down and planned. It leaves almost no room for emerging matters and little attention is paid to the dynamic context of the problems. Only the PART document mentions the need for adaptable capacity. Policies are made mostly on national level and are implemented by making rules and protocols and by supervision through the prefects. Specifically after the attacks there is a high amount of task and role definition, with much attention to the procedures to follow – which have been established by the government and are spread by ministerial circulars or via the prefects, as subordinated of the Minister of Interior. The departments therefore play a crucial role in the implementation of the policies; they are the link between the national and local level.

Collaboration is an important aspect as well, as the need for a preventive, repressive and curative approach is also felt in France. The curative approach involves ‘curing’ people and involves for example psychologists or psychiatrists. The Framework for the City Contracts mentions the possibility of establishing a local network collaboration that include preventive, repressive and curative actors but besides this, most attention is paid to the departmental cells that are mostly composed of representatives from a more repressive point of view. Even though professionals’ needs and capacities are not given much contemplation, a lot of attention is paid to raising awareness and educating professionals on the specific subject of radicalization and counterterrorism. Specific knowledge therefore seems unbearable in the execution of the policies and should be possessed by all actors involved. According to the Parisian Contract, this training of professionals is an indicator of the efficiency of the measures taken.

This efficiency of the measures is evaluated mostly by measuring output variables, such as the amount of radicalized people that have been helped. This seems like the steering mechanism of standardization of output. Another quantitative focus can be found in increasing the capacity by creating more jobs and through enlarging the funds that are made available for the fight against radicalization and terrorism. The latter is the case after the terrorist attacks and fits with the expectations of crisis governance where the government wants to show that it is in control. In this case that is to be assured through increasing the capacity that the government can dispose of in the fight against radicalization and terrorism.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

This research is concerned with the question how street-level professionals are taken into account in implementation strategies in the wicked policy domain of counterterrorism. The theoretical framework and the analysis of selected documents are the base to answer the main research question '*How are street-level professionals taken into account in implementation strategies for counterterrorism policies?*'.

Through the discourse analysis has been identified that the education and training of street-level professionals is an important theme in the policies regarding the prevention of radicalization and terrorism. Professionals must be educated specifically on the matter of counterterrorism, to have both theoretical and practical knowledge of the phenomena and to be able to signal possible signs of radicalization regarding the people they face daily. Through educating professionals, they obtain a certain amount of knowledge that can help them to adapt their practices to local and individual circumstances, also known as discretionary space (Lipsky, 2010, Hill & Hupe, 2009). The qualitative content analysis confirms this image and shows that specific attention is paid to the standardization of knowledge and skills as one of the steering mechanisms (Mintzberg, 1983). The education mentioned in the documents is mainly on radicalization. Since radicalization is a relatively new policy priority – especially in France, where it has only surfaced in policy documents since 2014 – one can assume that the knowledge of *street-level professionals* on the matter is not as profound or tacit yet. Thus, the fact that the need for training and education of *street-level professionals* on the subject is emphasized that much in the documents seems positive, because enhancing professionals' knowledge and expertise can increase their discretionary power (Hill & Hupe, 2009). Taking the scientific uncertainty of counterterrorism into account, increasing professionals' knowledge and skills would to some extent help them when dealing with unforeseen circumstances. The direct contact that *street-level professionals* have with the target group, is said to make them the preferred "key actors" in the fight against radicalization and terrorism and is related to their specific and unique knowledge of the target group. However, after the terrorist attacks discretionary space of *street-level professionals* seems to be rather limited than enlarged, due to the strictly defined tasks, rules and protocols that have been established.

Both in Belgium and in France, evaluation grids have been made after the attacks that are meant to help *street-level professionals* identify signs of (de-)radicalization and how to act. These grids seem a bit paradoxical in terms of whether they increase the professionals' capacity to deal with situations and radicalizing or radicalized people, or whether they feel this limits their discretionary space since they were not involved in making the grids (as far as mentioned in the documents) and because it is implemented rather top-down, especially in France. The French evaluation grid is added in the Interdepartmental Guide of

Radicalization Prevention and is based on several domains, for which indicators and strong or weak signs have been identified. Even though the document mentions that the evaluation grid cannot replace human assessment and that human behavior cannot be simplified to be completely understood by using such a grid, it is seen as an indispensable tool for prefects to respond to radicalization. It would be interesting to study how professionals receive these evaluation grids.

An interesting aspect in the counterterrorism policies in France, is the extent to which the prefect is responsible for policy implementation. France's institutional context has a history of hierarchical relations and top-down implementation, which has also been the case for counterterrorism. Whereas before 2014, France's counterterrorism policy was characterized by a focus on the repressive side and implemented mainly through laws and ministerial circulars, the need for actively including preventive actors has manifested itself by adding the aspect of (prevention of) radicalization in the fight against terrorism (Hellmuth, 2015; Wittendorp et al., 2017). Traditionally, the prefects have been involved in counterterrorism policies and seem to have been given an even greater role now that they are also responsible for the departmental follow-up cells. They play a pivotal role in the implementation of the policies, following the hierarchical line stemming from the Ministry of Interior, through the prefects, that subsequently execute the orders they have been given or transfer the information to the appointed people, such as the public prosecutor. Additionally, delegates of the prefect have been assigned to see to the execution on a local level, for which they must identify the appropriate actors. Even though the documents mention the importance of *street-level professionals* – mostly their expert knowledge and direct contact – the top-down structure with a strong direction from the prefects does not give the impression that *street-level professionals* actually have a say in the policy and thus are only partly taken into account in the implementation strategies after the terrorist attacks in France.

In order to deal with the institutional complexity and social pluralism that characterizes counterterrorism (Head & Alford, 2015), the need for collaboration is stressed in every document that has been analyzed. All the Belgian documents mention an “*integral and integrated*” approach, to not only unite the preventive with the repressive actors, but also to ensure an approach that transcends multiple levels of governance. The wickedness of the problems is therefore a known factor in the policies. There are several network collaborations that have been established in 2015, just around the terrorist attacks. In both countries, attention is paid to the institutional design and leadership of the network, but not much is said regarding the starting conditions and collaborative process even though they are crucial for successful collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008). It is therefore difficult to answer to what extent *street-level professionals* have a say in decision-making in these networks. As was expected, the professionals are not directly involved in the national

networks, in which sometimes even only ministries, counterterrorism organizations and other governmental organizations or departments are involved. Since the documents with the most local approach that have been found were still regional documents, additional research would need to answer the question whether *street-level professionals* are indeed involved in policy-making on a local level due to their situational and expert knowledge (Head & Alford, 2015). What can be concluded here is that the regional Flemish Action Plan is the document that explicitly included several Flemish cities in the policy making process and which seems to give most room to adapt to the needs of local professionals, by stating that they will provide for the needs of those professionals. The policy is thus partly based on a bottom-up approach, taking the *street-level professionals* into account and giving them a say in the policy.

This bottom-up approach is uncommon compared to the other documents, where guiding actors can be identified that try to steer implementation either by defining rules and procedures or by defining the desired output and naming variables that are used to evaluate the measures that have been taken. Some of the measures, in the Framework Note on Integral Security of 2016, are even formulated in a SMART way, thus being very explicit and precise. This focus on output does not fit with the complex context of counterterrorism and cannot grasp the actual effect of the measures according to Lipsky (2010). Since this research could not include the actual execution of the policies, it is impossible to say how this affects *street-level professionals* and whether they have come up with coping strategies for example to deal with this focus on output. Additional interviews or observations could be an appropriate way of studying the effects of these measures on *street-level professionals*.

The institutional context of Belgium, being a federal state where powers are spread throughout multiple layers of government, complicates the implementation of policies. The fact that it took 12 years to publish a new Framework Note on Integral Security, is a good illustration of this complexity that seems to thwart the possibilities for the integral and integrated approach that Belgium hopes for. Due to the latest state reform, a great number of powers have been transferred from the national level to the regions and communities. Many authorities regarding the prevention of radicalization thus lie on a decentral level, whereas security powers remain at national level (Wittendorp et al., 2017). This means that there are many different plans in the domain of counterterrorism, which makes an integrated approach harder to realize since all those plans would need to be synchronized. Another important aspect that is mentioned in the Belgian documents is the need to decompartmentalize; due to the federal structure it is apparently difficult to break the barriers between the different actors involved in counterterrorism, especially the barrier between preventive and repressive actors. Another barrier can be found between administrative and judicial authorities, as the new Framework Note mentions. The policy makers thus seem to be aware of the need for collaboration with all stakeholders involved

and on different levels of government (Head & Alford, 2015), but this is harder to accomplish in reality than in the policy. The institutional context also makes it more difficult to define rules and protocols that must be followed by all levels of government due to the powers that regions and communities possess. Parties therefore need to work together on implementing a plan but are mostly steered by the national government as a guiding actor nonetheless.

In general, very little room is left for emerging or unknown situations. Even though the need to adapt to unforeseen circumstances is acknowledged both before and after the attacks in both countries, the question remains to what extent there really is room to adapt the policies in case of a changing situation. The need to fight and prevent terrorism and radicalization seems to leave the national governments feeling like they have no other choice but to control the implementation through a – more or less – planned and guided implementation. Of course, there are nuances in the amount to which certain measures are emergent or planned and some aspects leave room for bottom-up input, as *street-level professionals* are indeed the ones to ensure implementation on a local, daily basis, but the main idea behind the policies seems to be that governments must act due to the terrorist threat to secure their citizens (Crenshaw, 1983; 2010).

Looking at the models of implementation (Noordegraaf et al., 2010), a mix of steering mechanisms has been used, except for one. The model of interactive implementation has not been discovered in the analyzed policies, which is no surprise due to the context of counterterrorism and the need for governments to show that they are in control and to act (Crenshaw, 1983). Hierarchical implementation is found mostly in the French policies, specifically in the documents dating from after the attacks. Prefects and their delegates are the actors who supervise the departmental cells and implementation on a local level, by many rules and protocols that have been established through ministerial circulars. This steering mechanism, combined with the institutional context also explains why the documents for the local level have been established by the ministry of Interior and are thus implemented top-down. However, the French also pay attention to increasing the capacity to execute their policies, which can be linked to the evaluation on output that is characteristic for decentralized implementation, however not so much for *street-level professionals* dealing with wicked issues such as counterterrorism (Lipsky, 2010; Head & Alford, 2015). Collaboration is an important component in the French documents, even though the documents give the impression that it is steered mostly top-down. Lastly, the French documents stress the standardization of knowledge and skills of professionals and other actors involved in counterterrorism, through raising awareness to the problem and making training available for as many actors as possible. Likewise, in the Belgian documents, this need for education and standardization of knowledge and skills is omnipresent and seems to be linked a little more with empowering professionals than is the case in the French documents. Above all, the *street-level professionals* need to be supported and it

seems to be the government's task to provide them with the right instruments and information needed to do so. Due to the fragmentary institutional context, policies cannot be implemented in such a hierarchical manner as in France, but require more bottom-up approaches. The need for efficiency and focus on output does not receive much attention. Although the Belgian measures are not as much defined in rules and protocols as in France, many tasks and procedures have been clearly defined beforehand. They seem however to leave a little more room for emergent matters, as is mentioned in the documents.

All in all, the implementation strategies in the studied documents recognize the special role of *street-level professionals* as being the ones in direct contact with citizens, especially with citizens who might be subject to radicalization. To be able to deal with such situations, they do need to possess a certain knowledge and expertise regarding radicalization and counterterrorism. Therefore, additional training and education must be made available by the government to provide *street-level professionals* with the knowledge and expertise they need to execute the policies. Besides these aspects, it is difficult to say to what extent exactly professionals play a part in policy making on a local level, as the studied documents did not provide this data. Whether discretionary space of professionals has been comprised in the policies made after the attack, where a stronger influence of the government can be seen, is unclear. In the discussion will be elaborated upon the implications of this research.

Chapter 7 Discussion

This research has focused on studying what is mentioned in the policy documents about the role of street-level professionals and which implementation strategies can be derived from the documents. Something that unfortunately is not included, are the opinions or observations of street-level professionals concerned with these policies. The question remains how they feel about the policies and whether they feel supported by the training and evaluation grids that are made available for them, or whether they feel this limits their discretionary space. Have they developed certain coping strategies to deal with the rules and protocols that they ought to follow? Or is radicalization – or more broadly, counterterrorism – a domain that is relatively new for them and for which help and rules are helpful to guide the professionals? Further research could be done that does include the experiences of these *street-level professionals*. If anything has been learnt from the generations of research on implementation, it would be that reality is always different than what has been written down beforehand. This research has examined what has been written down in documents but unfortunately could not continue by doing interviews due to several circumstances. The original idea was to combine a content analysis with interviews, but access to the right people could not be found. On a regional level, possible interviewees were almost impossible to track down and when localized they didn't seem to dare to talk about the policies. This has given me the idea that secrecy is still dominant regarding counterterrorism policies – especially in France. Unfortunately, due to time constraints, at some point I therefore decide to not include interviews anymore and instead do a more profound research on what is written in the documents, by adding the discourse analysis.

The implications of not having done any interviews are that this research does not include all the desired results. It rather shows one side of the story – the one on paper. This can be related to the literature on this subject and from that point of view the results have been interpreted. Whether this is the same when put in practice, remains the question. This research could therefore be improved by doing interviews that allow to discover what *actually* happens and what impact the studies policies have on *street-level professionals*. I hope that someone is able to find the access needed to complete this research. In the meantime, I cannot help but see the irony of doing a research on the role of *street-level professionals* and their indispensable role in the execution of policies, while only analyzing the policies that have been written down and thus only focusing on the theoretical point of view.

A methodological point to be mentioned concerns the discourse analysis, where phrases about “*local actors*” have been left out to specifically focus on what is said about street-level professionals. It is uncertain who exactly the policy writers have meant in those phrases. If for them *street-level professionals* were included in those phrases, then the documents have

given greater attention to professionals. This is something that also could be checked by doing interviews with the policy writers.

Furthermore, a remark that must be made regarding this research is the orientation of the policies on radicalization stemming from Islamic extremism, even though that is not the only breeding ground for radicalization. Even though in France the involvement of imams in the approach to counter radicalization is a very sensitive subject due to the *laïcité*, the secular state, many Belgian policies do mention the education of imams as one of the measures in the policies. Even though this can be understood when one looks at the number of foreign terrorist fighters leaving from Belgium (and France) to join and fight with Islamic State, there are other breeding grounds for radicalization too, for example right-wing extremism. The Belgian 'Plan R' does mention that a working group has been established that focuses on this phenomenon. In all of the documents that have been studied, this is however the only mention of possible radicalization coming from another angle than Islamic radicalization.

Something that hasn't been taken into account for this research is that government interventions after terrorist attacks have received criticism. Critics mention a lack of forethought and preparation, including insufficient check on what the government does (Crenshaw, 2010). They add that the possible problematic political consequences of the counterterrorism policies are often presented as the price that must be paid for security, as a trade-off. A restriction of democracy is then seen as unavoidable in order to achieve the central goal of counterterrorism policies: protecting society from harm by preventing terrorist attacks. This leads to broadened conceptions of what constitutes national security (Crenshaw, 2010) and is not in agreement with the idea of Noordegraaf (2015) that one must try to align the different values of government intervention. Legislation adopted under crisis conditions and in haste is said to gravely undermine democratic norms of transparency and deliberation. The possibility of informed and involved public debate is then rendered impossible, in the rush of the 'first act, then think' reaction to terrorist attacks. Secrecy becomes dominant, whilst the concentration of political and legal authority in the executive branch is enlarged (Crenshaw, 2010). Even though this has already been a point of particular interest due to the declaration of the state of emergency in France, it is not only in a state of emergency that such trade-offs can take place but also as a result of the crisis situation. A research conducted by USG Advice (USBO Advies) has recently studied whether policies and measures taken in the aftermath of terrorist attacks have indeed restricted democracy, to what extent they have influenced the government's intervention capacity and has studied the societal consequences of these emergency measures. The report is to be published in January 2018 and could complement this research within a broader context of implementing policies after terrorist attacks and the effects of making policies and measures in such crisis situations.

Another aspect that has not been taken into account in this research is the difference between the intended and the realized strategy (cf. Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). By analyzing the documents, the intended strategy has been identified but not yet the emergent strategies. Further research could identify in what ways these emergent strategies have (un)consciously influenced the implementation strategies. Additionally, analyzing the realized strategy allows to complement the identified implementation strategies and at the same time to check whether the strategies discovered in the documents are also to be discovered in the execution.

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Attachments

Attachment 1: List of policy documents

| | Belgium | Belgium local | France | France local |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|--|
| Before the attacks | <p><i>Note Cadre de Sécurité Intégrale / Framework Note on Integral Security (2004)</i></p> <p><i>Note de politique générale Sécurité et Intérieur / General Policy Paper of Ministry of Interior and Security (December 4th, 2014)</i></p> | <p><i>Vlaams actieplan ter preventie van radicalisering en terrorisme / Flemish Action Plan for the Prevention of radicalization and terrorism (April 2015)</i></p> <p>Accord majorité 2014-2019 Parlement Bruxellois / Agreement of majority 2014-2019 of the Brussels Parliament</p> | <p>Stratégie Nationale de Prévention de la Délinquance 2013-2017 / National Strategy of Crime Prevention 2013-2017 (2013)</p> <p><i>Livre blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale / White Paper on Defense and National Security (2013)</i></p> | <p><i>Contrat Parisien de Prévention et de sécurité 2015-2020 / Parisian Contract of Prevention and Security 2015-2020</i></p> |
| After the attacks | <p><i>“Plan R” / Radicalisation Plan (June 2016)</i></p> <p>Note-Cadre de Sécurité Intégrale 2016-2019 / Framework Note on Integral Security 2016-2019</p> | <p><i>Bruxelles Plan Global de Sécurité et de Prévention / Brussels Global Plan on Security and Prevention (February 2017)</i></p> | <p><i>“Plan d’Action Contre la Radicalisation et le Terrorisme (PART)” / Action Plan Against Radicalization and Terrorism (May 2016)</i></p> <p><i>Evaluation mi-parcours de la Stratégie Nationale de Prévention de la Délinquance / Halfway Evaluation of the National Strategy of Crime Prevention (Publication June 2016)</i></p> | <p><i>Prévention de radicalisation: cadre de référence du plan d’actions à annexer au contrat de ville / Prevention of radicalization: reference framework for Action Plans to be added to the City Contracts (April, 2016)</i></p> <p><i>Guide interministériel de prévention de la radicalisation / Interdepartmental Guide of Radicalization Prevention (March 2016)</i></p> |

Attachment 2: Alphabetical code list of discourse analysis

- Collaboration with professionals
 - Information sharing
 - Network collaboration
 - Sharing best-practices
- Discretionary space
- Education and training
 - Support tools
- Involved in execution
 - Local
 - National
 - Regional
- Involved in policy-making
 - Local
 - National
 - Regional
- Managing professionals
 - Budget increase
 - Creating jobs
 - Reorganization
 - Rules & protocols
- Role professionals
 - Direct contact with target group
 - Expertise

Attachment 3: Alphabetical code list of qualitative content analysis

- Bottom-up relation
- Collaboration
 - Information sharing
 - Integral approach
 - Network collaboration
 - Collaborative process
 - Mutual trust
 - Sharing the same vision
 - Institutional design
 - Structural meetings
 - Leadership
 - Meta-governor
 - Starting conditions
 - Public-private collaboration
- Emergent process
 - Adapting to context
 - dynamic
- Multi-level governance
 - International level
 - Local level
 - National level
 - Regional level
- Other policy information
 - Actor involved in execution
 - Actor involved in policy making
 - Goals
 - Legislative measures
 - Links with other policies
 - Policy priority
 - Relation to politics
 - Transparency
- Planned process
- Steering mechanism
 - Accountability
 - Capacity
 - Direct supervision
 - Discretionary space
 - Direct contact
 - Framework
 - Knowledge-based policies
 - Monitoring
 - Rules & protocols
 - Standardization of knowledge & Skills
 - Profound knowledge
 - Subsidies
 - Support
 - Tailor-made
 - Task distribution
- Top-down relation