How accurate are European perceptions of Muslim Asylum Seeker values?

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Abstract

Amid the problematic European Migrant Crisis (EMC), Member States are free to determine the amount of Muslim Asylum Seekers (MAS) that settle in their respective countries. Policies are to a large extent formed on the basis of what the public thinks about MAS and the values they hold. Should these perceptions be inaccurate then an unnecessary barrier is imposed in an already problematic situation. This study aimed to quantitatively measure the accuracy of perceptions of Muslim Asylum Seeker values (MASV) in two EU countries. By running correlation tests on several variables and perceptions of MASV extremity, one would be able to determine what the broader impact of inaccurate MASV perceptions could be and conversely what strong predictors of MASV perceptions are. The study found that both countries held largely inaccurate perceptions of MASV across all seven topics that were assessed. Whereas Hungarians tended to overestimate MASV extremity, Dutch people generally underestimated them. An association was detected between three variables (ATD, Let More Settle and IMPCT) and perceptions of MASV. Furthermore, although it appeared that the heightened perception of MASV extremity in Hungary spawned from a pronounced fear of MAS violence and terrorism, the origins of this fear could not be attributed to individual economic insecurity, as was hypothesised.

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List of abbreviations and contractions

AAM- Attitudes to the amount of Muslims in the country

ATD- Attitudes to Diversity

EACEA- European Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

EMC- European Migrant Crisis

EU- European Union

IMPCT- Perceived importance of Asylum Seekers adopting local customs and

traditions in order to become "truly Dutch/Hungarian"

Let More Settle - Belief that one's government should allow more Muslim Asylum

Seekers to settle in the country

MAS- Muslim Asylum Seekers

MASV- Muslim Asylum Seeker Values

TFEU- Treaty of the functioning of the European Union

WTA- Perceived willingness of Muslim Asylum Seekers to assimilate with

national customs and traditions.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The European Migrant Crisis (EMC) has emerged as a direct result of the Syrian war and general conflict in the Middle East that has put the lives of civilians in that region in serious danger. Although there is no disputing that this very source of the EMC needs to be attended to through the development of a sustainable geopolitical strategy, such efforts cannot come at the expense of the lives of those that have been forced to leave that region to protect themselves and their families. Subsequently, the European countries where these people arrive to seek asylum are faced with varying degrees of a moral imperative to accommodate them. Intercultural tolerance levels, national security fears, welfare state exploitation and economics all act as barriers against immigration. We already know that the latter two concern the short term wellbeing of nationals but can easily be refuted by long term rationalist arguments (Dumont and Liebig, 2014; Horn, 2016). This study will focus more on national security sentiments and claims of value incompatibilities, and their role in validating protectionist immigration policies.

Should one discover that these concerns are in fact legitimate and accurate, closing borders can still not be regarded as a solution, as one has a right to seek asylum amid the EMC's circumstances under international law (Gil-Bazo, 2015). Accordingly, an attempt needs to be made to reconcile European perceptions of Muslim Asylum Seeker values (MASV) with the latter's actual beliefs about issues that European society feels strongly about. This would facilitate two

developments that are essential for peaceful and respectful Asylum Seeker integration. Firstly, host countries would be aware of typical areas where value and behavioural differences might appear, allowing them to address potential problematic situations through tailored integration programs. And secondly, Asylum Seekers would be made fully aware of where the line is drawn between embracing diversity and exacting compliance with fundamental European values and national systems of law. It is only when these perceptions are aligned with reality that the EU, its Member States and the world's observers can establish which customs are simply different and to be cherished, and which values are a threat to a liberal society and thus incompatible with what it stands for. Analysing the accuracy of current European perceptions of MASV is the logical departure point of this challenge.

Despite the continent having a long history of migration, the current flows are incomparable to anything that has happened previously (Connor, 2016). Over the past century, economic and political turbulence both within and outside of Europe has resulted in a continual shift between net emigration and immigration levels (Koikalainen, 2011). Periods between and outside both world wars and the 1970s oil crisis were generally characterised by high levels of economic growth, which saw a corresponding level of support for labour mobility and thus European immigration. The vast majority of migrants came from within Europe itself and from its former colonies, although by the 1960s and 70s various Muslim groups began to arrive through specialised labour pacts such as the one signed by West Germany and Turkey (ibid; Kirisci, 2003). A study predicts that the percentage of Muslims throughout the continent will continue its growth

from 2% in 1950 to 6% by 2020 (Kettani, 2010). Other authors maintain that this figure will increase further over the course of the century due to the higher Muslim fertility rates relative to other ethnic groups (Yuhas, 2015). Importantly, the current and projected Muslim presence isn't consistent across EU member states and the two countries under investigation in this study have undergone vastly different relationships with Muslim societies over the course of history.

As Schüller (2011) remarks, European views of Muslims have fundamentally changed since the 9/11 terror attacks and are no longer seen as a harmless, minute part of a national economic engine. Accordingly, when an unprecedentedly large amount of Asylum Seekers of Muslim background arrived at Europe's borders in 2015, a significant amount of European citizens feared for their safety. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, most Europeans weren't used to seeing very many Muslims and their knowledge of them had been steadily influenced by negative portrayals of them in the media (Trevino et al, 2010). And secondly, the electoral power of right wing populist groups throughout the continent since the European Debt Crisis had enabled them to opportunistically reframe their agendas around migrant terrorism (Schmuk & Matthes, 2017; Polakow-Suransky, 2016).

The safety aspect, which largely concerns the threat of terrorism, has enabled the media and countless right wing politicians to play on their citizens' fears by emphasizing how incompatible Muslim values are with the values they prioritise themselves (Schmuk &Matthes, 2017). This paper will quantitatively demonstrate that the perceptions of MASV vary considerably between two

European member states, and it will endeavour to shed light on what the main sources of these attitude inconsistencies might be. Moreover, the study's central question will focus on how accurate these perceptions of migrants actually are, which will help one determine whether certain fears are in some cases justifiable or not. The results will provide politicians and key stakeholders with an appropriate departure point for developing effective integration programs that harmonise intercultural relations and enable the necessary level of MAS resettlement.

As the study attempts to quantitatively measure the perceptions of MASV, a survey would need to be conducted where views on a basket of progressive values (BPV) would be specifically addressed. The basket BPV contains questions on women's rights, religious freedom, abortion, democratic governance, attitudes to homosexuality, religious killings and honour killings. However, given funding restrictions, the survey could only be fielded in two countries. Accordingly, I selected Hungary and The Netherlands; two countries that exist at opposite ends of the immigration policy spectrum in the EU with largely different experiences when it comes to experiences with Asylum Seekers and Muslims. This would hopefully allow one to draw clearer conclusions about the relationship between perceptions of MASV and immigration policy preferences, along with providing insights about what the causal factors behind MASV perception disparities are. Before the BPV questions, the survey would require participants to state their attitudes to five broader issues that are relevant to immigration. These issues concern attitudes to diversity, MAS settlement, and the amount of Muslims in a country, along with perceptions of

the importance of MAS adopting local customs and traditions and their willingness to do so. They will be referred to as the study's comparative variables and their selection was based on their salience across multiple studies analysing the factors that determine immigration policy preferences (Markaki, 2012; Ueffing et al, 2015; Suro, 2005; Kymlicka, 2015). Given that there is available data on multiple EU countries that concerns all five of these topics (Pew Research Center 2016), should a correlation be found between any of the comparative variables and MASV perceptions, one will be able to make reasonable assumptions about these perceptions in other EU member states.

Actual MASV data will be taken from a Pew Research Group study in six of the seven top Muslim Asylum Seeker sending countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Kosovo, Albania, Nigeria. Due to the limited amount of available data, Syria has been excluded from the study. A mean score from all countries combined will be used as the point of comparison with MASV perceptions from Hungary and The Netherlands. While this is a limitation given that values differ to a significant extent between the six countries on certain topics, it is useful for two reasons. Firstly, population sizes of these MAS sender countries are taken into account when calculating the mean score (see results section). Considering the two subjects with the most moderate views, Kosovo and Albania, are also the two smallest and do not represent the only MAS in any European country (Connor, 2016), then looking at their values in isolation doesn't have much use. Secondly and more importantly, from my knowledge this is an untouched area of Asylum Seeker literature and in order for the field to develop, one needs to establish a

starting point. This will hopefully allow one to deduce information that can lead to the development of sustainable strategies to the EMC.

If the results of this study indicate that there is a strong reason to believe that European perceptions of Muslim views on BPV are false then one will first look for answers provided by the study's sub question as to why this might be the case, before devising the necessary means to solve the issue. The existence of this false perception would be a barrier to Asylum Seeker integration and poses severe humanitarian problems. Alternatively, if the results signify consistency between European perceptions of Muslim views on BPV and actual Muslim perceptions thereof then there will be a scientific basis to work with in guiding refugee integration programs and national immigration policies.

The next chapter of the thesis will commence by presenting the topic area of Immigration and multicultural attitudes more broadly. Thereafter it will explain the theoretical foundations of my hypotheses, analysing the literature on fear's relationship with individual perceptions, the media's role in politics and various theories of social contact. Thereafter, chapter's three and four will present the study's methodology and empirical findings respectively. The latter will be displayed in graphs and numerical figures, which will be interpreted and discussed in chapter five. Here it will also be established whether my hypotheses were correct or not. The conclusion section will identify what one can confidently say in response to the study's central question and sub-questions. Moreover, it will point out what potential gaps remain in this area of

investigation, providing recommendations on what path should be taken by researchers and policy makers from here onwards.

Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review

The introduction of this paper outlined the significance of the study's central question to the policy field of immigration, underscoring the role public opinion plays in shaping government policy. This chapter will subsequently explicate the legal and economic implications of EU immigration policy to highlight the obligations and opportunities of the migrant crisis to member states. Thereafter, a literature review will be conducted to identify what conclusions have already been drawn in the subject area and what gaps persist. As no literature was found on what factors could be good predictors of MASV perceptions, the analysis focuses on what variables are likely to make these perceptions more positive or negative.

i.   Legal implications

The legal basis for EU immigration lies in articles 79 and 80 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Stating its key objective as a "balanced approach" that enables the continent to deal with both regular and irregular patterns of immigration (European Parliament, 2017), issues pertaining to the policy field fall under the scope of shared competences between the EU and its member states. This effectively means that governments of member states are under no legal obligation to harmonise their immigration laws and regulations according to European standards. However, "the EU is

required to prevent and reduce irregular immigration" through the realisation of an effective returns policy in a manner that is "consistent with its fundamental rights" (ibid). The two articles enable Member States to determine how many migrants they allow to settle in their respective countries. However, an important distinction is made between the terms "migrant" and "asylum seeker," where the latter has a right to protection. Partly as result of this newfound understanding, the EU reformed its Common European Asylum System (CEAS) between 2011 and 2014 that did establish common standards concerning the treatment of those "who qualify as refugees due to a well founded fear of persecution" (Papademetriou, 2016). Both the CEAS and EU immigration laws have been complicated by two other forms of legislation.

First and foremost, the Dublin Regulation, which is an instrument designed to "swiftly assign responsibility for processing an individual asylum application to an individual member state" has obfuscated national views on burden sharing and solidarity (Fratzke, 2015, p2). According to the regulation, Asylum Seekers are required to submit their applications for asylum in the state they arrive at, which has fuelled the argument that the processing burden falls largely upon poorer Southern European states. A closer look at statistics however, reveals that there isn't in fact "a large-scale shift of asylum seekers to Europe's external borders" due to the high amount of transfer requests made by Northern states such as Germany and Sweden (ibid, p13). Nevertheless, this perception of disproportionality alone led to the regulation's de facto suspension towards the end of 2015 (Dernback, 2015). As Fratzke (2015) points out, the Dublin Regulation was never about burden sharing it was simply a mechanism for fast -

tracking application processing, and this misconception has led to measures in anti-immigration countries like Hungary and Slovakia that put the CEAS under threat. Secondly, the fact that citizens or legal residents of any EU member state are able to travel freely throughout EU territory under the Schengen Agreement meant that national immigration policies were likely to be restricted, further fracturing the CEAS (ibid). Sentiments from Visegrad countries last year support this theory (Paterson, 2016).

Ultimately, despite the existence of legislation to facilitate collaborative efforts between member states in dealing with the migrant crisis, the only form of concrete harmonisation that remains concerns minimum treatment standards. This lack of coherence has placed a disproportionate share of the humanitarian burden upon certain Member States (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015), which empowers the negative scapegoating capacity of the media (IOM, 2015). The fragmentation of the CEAS and the Dublin Regulation has virtually rendered immigration a national competence throughout the EU, where ad-hoc policies reflect national attitudes towards Muslim Asylum Seekers and other minority groups.

ii.   Economics of Immigration

A thorough assessment of the history of migration throughout the world provides unequivocal evidence of its long term economic benefits (Meganopolous, 2016; Dumont and Liebig, 2014; Horn, 2016). Borjas (1995, p3) summarises the main economic argument for immigration as the arrival of "production complementaries," where the benefits are maximised when

immigrants are "sufficiently different from the stock of native production inputs." A more comprehensive analysis compiled by the OECD (Dumont and Liebig, 2014) however, indicates that the economic advantages of immigration encompass a lot more than simply the diversification of the labour market. First and foremost they increase the size of the workforce, which according to basic economic theory leads to higher growth and an increase in wages across all sectors of a nationally integrated economy (Krugman, 1991).

Secondly, and arguably most importantly in contemporary times given the right wing's inclination for welfare chauvinist slandering, migrants on the whole have contributed "more in taxes and social contributions than they receive in benefits" (Dumont and Liebig, 2014, p1). Furthermore, they compensate for demographic changes that invariably shrink national economies, and they play a major role in redistributing capital to their countries of origin and the developing world, which according to Krugman's theory (1991) is a benefit to the global economy as a whole. Unfortunately, in recent times developed nations have tended to base their immigration policies on the acquisition of high-skilled migrants, which comes "at the expense of humanitarian based admissions" (Aydemir, 2014). This is obviously problematic in a situation, such as the one Europe currently faces, where the vast majority of migrants are fleeing their countries of origin for humanitarian reasons and thus often without a high skill set to match the growth policies of their likely destination countries. Under the *Blue Card* scheme, this selective immigration legacy has been preserved in Europe. Despite the unmistakable evidence supporting the long term economic gains associated with immigration, fifty percent of Europeans claim that refugees are a burden on their

countries because they are believed to "take their jobs and social benefits" (Wike et al, 2016). Hungary and Greece are particularly ignorant of this aspect of immigration, with both 82% and 72% of their respective populations convinced that immigrants are bad for their national economies (ibid).

However, this is the likely result of the short term threat immigration poses to certain locals. As Brader et al (2008) point out, whenever a national economy is relatively stagnant and the local population can't provide a new set of skills to stimulate growth, immigrants pose an immediate threat to their wellbeing given that they will be competing for a limited amount of jobs. As the earlier findings demonstrate, this diversity of skills and an increase in population size and competition eventually results in improved socioeconomic circumstances for the country as a whole. However, public opinion data suggests that whenever individuals find themselves in a position of economic insecurity, they tend to focus only on short term outcomes (Burns & Gimpel, 2000). Interestingly, a pattern emerges in the data where countries that view immigrants as a threat to their national economies like Hungary and Greece, also consider the adoption of their respective countries' customs and traditions more important than the majority of other countries and believe that Muslims prefer to remain distinct (Ibid). This trend and the impact of personal income levels on perceptions of MASV will be elaborated on in the social contact theory section.

Another typical explanation for the emergence of negative views about immigration's effect on the national economy might focus on the relatively low levels of tertiary education attainment in these two countries (Goldstein &

Peters, 2014; Markaki & Longhi, 2012). However when one observes that Germany scores even lower on that marker than both countries (OECD, 2015) and yet is decidedly more positive about immigration and its economic returns, the argument loses most of its credibility. The OECD (2014) attributes these figures (28% of tertiary educated adults) to "low unemployment rates" and the belief that one is just as likely to earn as much money without a degree. A study in New Zealand (IMSED, 2011) concluded that personal economic instability made individuals more receptive to other anti-immigration sentiments, which enable politicians to frame arguments suitable to their national context and respective party agendas. The following subsection will outline how other fears can shape people's opinions.

iii. Fear and perceptions.

In *The Culture of Fear* (1999), Barry Glassner discusses the rationality of people's fears and the ease with which the media is able to exploit them. He affirms that "Atypical threats grab our attention whereas widespread problems go unaddressed." Although his theory uses currently less eye catching issues such as kidnapping as examples of these atypical threats, it is relevant to today's context where the threat of terrorism tends to supersede far reaching and long-standing problems like hunger and poverty. As a result of the public's lowered receptiveness to news that has existed for an extended period of time, politically motivated media outlets often focus on exploiting "rare but disturbing events" (ibid, p5). Asbrock and Fritsche (2013) suggest that this very climate was responsible for the rapid shift from global openness to political self-interest in the early 2000s, with 9/11 being the trigger event. The political responses that

evolved from those attacks were analysed across several countries by Thorne and Kouzmin (2010). What they observed in the USA, UK, EU and Australia was a high level of "synchronic legislative isomorphism" in which the respective ruling parties "exploited the political and economic opportunities presented by the "War on Terror" (p887).

While one observed legal and ideological convergence at a multinational level, Thorne and Kouzmin (ibid) also maintain that "New World Order" globalisation and individual empowerment had dissolved at the hands of protectionist, authoritarian tendencies. Antidemocratic convergence has existed since the Cold War according to several authors (Marrs, 2006; Selznick, 1957; Lasswell & Lerner, 1965), and stems from the similarity of oligarchic motives inherent in each system. So even though political agendas may vary considerably, it is argued that there is a universal desire to form an elite establishment once one enters the power echelons of society. Selznick (1957) and Laswell and Lerner (1965) affirm that this creates a political culture in which the established oligarchy's main opposition becomes a group of alienated elites who reach out to disaffected constituencies, merely perpetuating the cycle of destructive information framing. The combination of theory and empirical data suggests that fear mongering plays a significant role in elections and policy making.

 Several studies attempted to discover which events or personal dispositions are most susceptible to emotional responses (Jost et al 03; Duckitt, 2001; Elms, 1969). Shafer and Duckitt (2013) were able to demonstrate through a categorical analysis that both ingroup threats and personal and country based threats have

the strongest correlation with Right Wing Authoritarian preferences. Ingroup threats refer to those where individuals fear that their cultural or ethnic group is being discriminated, excluded from the labour market, losing its standing in the social hierarchy or being segregated. Personal and country based threats are those that concern the safety of both the individual and others in society, such as terrorist attacks. Additionally, the authors also noted that the strong inter-correlations between all five threat factors and right wing authoritarian tendencies gave reason to believe that a strong threat factor in general would also influence the same response. Accordingly, whenever news reports sensationalise individual stories of cultural discrimination in the labour market or terrorist attacks, a chain of outcomes can be expected to unfold. Right wing politicians will use the events as justification for their policies to try to garner further political support by drawing as much attention to the issue as possible. If this is successful, the voting population as a whole will shift further to the right. Although most voters from the left will be aware of the politically driven media's manipulation of reality, the shift in power at the legislative level can lead to "expensive and ineffective public policy" such as those concerning anti-immigration(Glassner, 1999).

Public opinion data reveals that the majority of Europeans are concerned about Islamic extremism (Pew Research Centre, 2011) and that these fears have increased since the onset of the Migrant Crisis (Migrant Research Institute, 2016). This is believed to correlate with a concomitantly high percentage of Europeans that consider relations between themselves and Muslims to be poor (Pew Research Institute, 2011). Moreover, a study conducted by Ipsos Mori

(2016) demonstrated how Europeans grossly overestimate their respective countries' Muslim populations. These perceptions were driven to a large extent by the media's negative portrayal of Muslim extremists, which incited fear among nationals about the general presence of Muslims in society, ultimately making them stand out more than they once did (Danilova, 2014; IOM, 2015; IMSED, 2011, World Migrant Report, 2011).

All findings indicate that this ability of the media to shape opinions towards Asylum Seekers is significantly enhanced during times of socioeconomic turmoil (Ibid). Portrayals of Asylum Seekers and Immigrants are decidedly negative during these times, with a study revealing a preponderance of evocative terms such as "failed," "illegal" and "terrorist" across various forms of media covering the Migrant Crisis (Allen & Binder, 2013). A regional study conducted by the New Zealand government in 2011 (IMSED) also shows that areas of a country that score higher on socioeconomic markers have more favourable views of immigrants. Subsequently, given the recent economic troubles that the continent has suffered in the aftermath of the debt crisis, it can be assumed that certain European citizens have been receptive to the negative portrayal of Muslim migrants in the media. The resulting perceptions should vary from country to country according to personal income level disparities. Finally, it is argued that political agendas are often framed around convenient narratives that arise out of uncommon, fear-evoking events in order to garner support for a party's deeper yet less tolerable ideological programs (Glassner, 1999; Danilova, 2014).

iv. Value incompatibilities

From the above literature we know that Immigration policies in Europe aren't harmonised under EU legislation and that national preferences appear to be affected by various fears of other cultures and individual economic instabilities. However, we don't know much at all about to what extent these fears effect the accuracy of European perceptions of the values held by people that seek asylum across the continent. This lack of knowledge ultimately exacerbates problems of the EMC, as significant misperceptions of MAS can put lives of both MAS themselves and local citizens at risk. In order to remedy this problem one must first seek to establish the reality of each group's values.

Firstly, studies comparing the core values of Islam with Western civilization abound. Despite some commentators arguing that the two are compatible with one another (Rashid, 2016; Pajwani, 2016), when one observes public opinion data in isolation (Appendix 5) there are some marked differences that cannot be ignored in any integration process. Not only is this visible in the aforementioned empirical data set but it is theologically backed up by analyses of Islam and Western religious teachings (Huntington, 2011; Lewis 1990). Furthermore, surveys from populations representing both sides of this "clash" also perceive a relatively high level of incompatibility (Talwar, 2016; Schatchtel, 2015).

We are aware that despite the initial barriers to integration that come from the rapid change of environment, identities and personal values are malleable (Williams et al 2014; Lönnqvist et al 2011). Although complete transformation is very unlikely unless migration occurs at a young age, evidence suggests that

core European social values such as equal treatment of Women can be easily adopted (The economist, 2016). On the other hand, the success rate of de-radicalisation programs has been mixed (Yusuf, 2016; Horgan & Braddock, 2010), which may have considerable implications for perceptions of MAS extremity and MAS willingness to assimilate with security based customs and legal standards. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the psychological barrier to immigration is also present on the side of the western receiver countries due to the path dependent nature of attitudes concerning multiculturalism (Tavan, 2012).

It is clear that there are value incompatibilities between MAS and non Muslim Europeans. However, the above sections demonstrated how peoples perceptions of these incompatibilities can be shaped by the media's portrayal of events concerning MAS and also the country's socioeconomic circumstances. The ensuing chapter will explore theories that attempt to explain how these perceptions may also be influenced by long term attitudinal developments.

v. Cross-cultural interaction theories

There are several social contact theories that could also be used to predict European views of MASV. Despite these theories focussing on overall negative and positive views of minority groups and not their perception of what specific values these groups uphold, they can be a useful guide for perceptions of extremity across all questions of the BPV. After comparing these with the

findings from the previous sections, I will develop several hypotheses for the empirical section of this study.

Theories concerning the relationship between a country's history with immigrants and their inclination towards multiculturalism vary. Wagner et al (2006) assert that an increased presence of ethnic minority groups equates to less prejudice towards them whereas Quilian (1995) argues that the opposite occurs and the level of prejudice increases with the arrival of foreigners. The former is related to intergroup contact theory, which holds that by gaining familiarity with minority groups ones view of them becomes more positive (Pettigrew, 1998; Allport, 1954). Studies reveal that cross-cultural sentiments can improve in conflict-ridden environments such as schools and the workplace (Bourgeois and Friedkin, 2001) and can reduce the tendency to develop negative stereotypes (Wright et al, 1997). Despite evidence from a meta-analysis covering multiple countries indicating that social prejudice was significantly diminished in cases where intergroup contact was present (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008), no research was found by intergroup theorists elaborating on Allport's (1954) claim that positive effects were generally limited to cases where groups held equal status and weren't seen as a competitive threat.

On the other side of the debate there are two prominent theories used to explain how perceptions of refugees are shaped. Ethnic competition theorists argue that a considerable foreign group presence will engender feelings of identity insecurity and cultural insularity (Huntington, 2004; Schneider, 2008; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012). This comes as a result of citizens having to compete for a

limited amount of resources and values that guide the country's identity. Whereas ethnic competition theory deals with cultural related tensions, realistic group conflict theory holds that anti-refugee sentiments stem from the knowledge that one is competing for a limited amount of economic resources (Allport, 1954). Again, as mentioned earlier, this argument can be easily refuted from a long term or macroeconomic point of view, but there is evidence to suggest that when socioeconomic circumstances are poor, one becomes susceptible to scapegoating and prejudice (IOM, 2015; IMSED, 2011; Sniderman et al, 2004). Further support for this theory is found in Dancygiar and Donnelly's (2012) study on the sectoral differences in public opinion towards migration. Here the authors concluded that the level of growth in one's job sector was a key determinant in that person's support for migration.

Social identity theory also shares a similarly negative view of diversity. Here proponents state that groups in society that have felt historically marginalised will seek to establish a sense of belonging by uniting with others who share the same characteristics, in a struggle for social status (Sniderman et al, 2004). This invariably leads to the construction of generalisations concerning the negative traits of competing groups within that society who typically represent a minority, such as MAS, and in turn creates a set impermeable boundaries within the social hierarchy (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Any contact with minority groups thereafter "triggers a defensive reaction and feelings of threat, accompanied by an overreaction about the negative consequences of immigration" (Markaki and Longhi , 2012, p5).

In terms of attitudes to immigration more specifically, Kymlicka (2015) affirms that a multicultural spectrum emerged during the post WW2 period with a social democratic approach on the one end and a neo-liberalist interpretation on the other. The former group viewed the movement as a means of "redressing the social and political marginalisation of minorities" whereas neoliberals saw it primarily for its market potential. Although the latter's conception of multiculturalism mirrored that of the social democratic group by the 1990s by embracing the cultural diversity aspect a lot more, the change was still driven by the market. According to Kymlicka, whenever a serious political issue arises or a welfare state gets put under pressure, nations recoil from a position that was somewhere between diversity and solidarity, to their original state, which is inclusion without solidarity in the multiculturalism case and solidarity without inclusion for the neoliberals. The author argues that this is because attitudes and a nation's interpretation of identity are concepts that are continuous in nature as opposed to ones subject to regular bouts of change. Cavaillé & Trump (2015) share this view in demonstrating how Great Britain, despite temporarily adopting more humanistic immigration policies after driving the neoliberal movement in the 1970s, has returned to its traditional ways of regarding immigrants as "undeserving" due to run off effects of the debt crisis . While this example supports Kymlicka's theory, there is no further evidence presented to give it external validity, and more importantly, one could easily argue that personal income levels were the driving variable. Megalogenis (2016) clearly outlines how this has been the primary determinant of Australia's varied experience with immigration and the population's attitude towards refugees.

In another study, the only solid conclusion that could be drawn about the relationship between diversity and perceptions of Asylum Seekers was that increasing and visible diversity gave rise to negative attitudes to immigrants among natives from the political right (Karreth et al, 2015). Goodman & Wright's (2015) nationhood priming experiment similarly showed that if nationhood, a common feature of right wing political rhetoric, is prominent on the political agenda, it tends to lead to sentiments of exclusionary solidarity among right wing voters. However, given that increased conservatism on the right shifts the overall balance of legislative power in that direction (Glassner, 1999), It could be assumed that there is a relationship between diversity and perceptions of MASV. The fact that Kymlicka's (2012) found that countries with a restricted vision of nationhood invariably impose "coercive and paternalistic civic integration policies" upon immigrants, highlights the consequences that such attitudes can yield. Furthermore, the author discovered that these subjects also held that view that MAS were "uninterested in belonging" and complying with the core values of their host nation, which the survey results will be able to test.

vi. Hypotheses

By comparing these theories and data sets, I arrived at four hypotheses:

H1: Personal income levels will be the best predictors of European perceptions of MASV

H2: Hungarians will perceive MASV as being considerably more extreme than Dutch people

H3: Perceptions of MASV will be largely inaccurate in both countries across the majority of questions pertaining to the BPV.

H4: There will be a strong correlation between all five comparative variables [attitudes to diversity (ATD), attitudes to whether or not a country should let more

MAS settle (Let More Settle), attitudes to the number of Muslims in a country(AAM), the importance of adopting local customs and traditions to being considered truly Dutch/Hungarian (IMPCT), the perceived willingness of MAS to assimilate with local customs and traditions (WTA)] and perceptions of the extremity of MASV.

This resulted from the four interrelated understandings based on the literature:

1. Socioeconomic arguments appear to have more empirical support than any other theory.

2. Intergroup contact theory appears to be supported by the findings from appendix 2 and appendix 7, and thus data from tables 5 and 6 become useful.

3. Perceptions about minority groups appear to be driven by politically motivated media outlets rather than the acquisition of accurate information

4. There is enough reason to believe that immigration policy preferences are shaped by the five comparative variables selected in this study. An analysis of table 6 and appendix 2 suggest that perceptions of MASV will correlate with the variables as well.

Chapter 3: Methodology

In order to attend to the thesis's central question, a BPV needed to be created to establish a common reference point. The questions pertaining to these values require participants to respond to the following seven questions on a slider

graph, indicating what percentage of Muslim Asylum Seekers would agree with the following statements:

1. *A woman must always obey her husband.*

2. *Homosexuality is morally acceptable.*

3. *Abortion should be made illegal.*

4. *People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely.*

5. *One can justify killing a family member if they have committed adultery or had non-martial sex.*

6. *Attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are in defence of Islam.*

7. *Authoritarian governments are better than democratic ones in times of difficulty.*

Mean results would be calculated and mapped on a graph of perceived extremity of MASV. These would then be compared with Real MASV data obtained from the Pew Research Center (2016). Given that this would require a mean score to be calculated from six MAS sender countries, one would have to account for population size. Accordingly, Real MASV scores were calculated through the application of the following formula:

(C1P/TAS x C1meanvalue)+ (C2P/TAS x C2meanvalue)+ (C3P/TAS x C3mean) etc
>>> C5 or C6 depending on the amount of countries that had data on each issue.

Where:
-C1P indicates the Asylum Seeker population in Europe of country number 1 in this study
-TAS refers to the combined Total Asylum Seeker population in Europe of all five or six MAS countries (depending on available data)
-C1meanvalue refers to the mean score obtained for country number 1 in response to the value under question.

C2P, C3P, C4P, C5P and C6P correspond with the other countries in the study, as do C2meanvalue, C3meanvalue etc.

Wherever MASV data is displayed on a graph with a scale that exceeds 100, total MASV or MASV perception scores were calculated by simply adding the results from each question. As these are based on MASV extremity levels or perceptions thereof, inverse results were obtained for questions two and four given that they were positively formulated. In order to test for my first hypothesis, I will run a correlation test on personal income levels and perceptions of MASV extremity. If the pearson's "r" result is above 0.15 this will indicate that there is a significant correlation.

Participants were also asked what they thought their country's Non Muslim citizens views were on the same questions, with the wording of question six changing from "Islam" to "one's religion." This was done in order to gain further understanding of the perceived level of compatibility between value sets. Furthermore, participants were required to state what their personal views were on all BPV issues. The selection of these seven questions was ultimately determined by a desire to cover a broad range of progressive principles that the majority of European societies support while also attending to extremist, security based fears. Considering the EU promotes "respect for human dignity, and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law" as its fundamental values (European Parliament, 2014), I deemed it necessary to pose questions related to abortion, democracy, religious freedom, women's rights and homosexuals. Two of the seven questions will attempt to measure the perceived

level of MASV extremity on violence related issues as opposed to more social ones.

The survey included 252 participants in Hungary and 260 in the Netherlands. The slight difference in sample sizes results from the fact that there were several completed surveys that were clearly not taken seriously and had to be discarded. A second study (N=260) was fielded in The Netherlands on the 22nd of June, 2017 a day after three of the major Dutch news companies: *de Telegraaf, NOS* and *de Volkskrant,* had reports about a terror suspect in Utrecht as front page headlines. The purpose of this second survey was to see whether the fear created by this news had an effect on people's views about any of the key variables of immigration policy preferences.

As mentioned in the introduction, despite only fielding surveys in two European countries, I believe that one will be able to make a number of reasonable assumptions about the perceptions of MASV among other EU countries through an analysis of the survey's comparative variables. Extant data would be compared with the results from individual responses to the five assessed variables that participants would answer prior to the surveys sliders on the BPV. The questions pertaining to them are (answer stems in brackets):

1. *How important is the adoption of Dutch/Hungarian customs and traditions to becoming truly Dutch/Hungarian? (Very important, somewhat important, not really important, not important at all).*
2. *Growing diversity makes our country a better place to live? (Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)*
3. *Muslim Asylum Seekers want to adopt the Dutch/Hungarian way of life? (Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)*

4. *Indicate with which statement you agree most. (There are too many Muslims in NL/HUN, there is about the right amount of Muslims in NL/HUN, there aren't enough Muslims in NL/HUN, it doesn't matter how many Muslims there are in NL/HUN)*
5. *We should allow more Muslim Asylum Seekers to settle in our country. (Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree).*

As stated in my third hypothesis, I believe there will be a strong correlation (pearson's r > 0.15) between these five immigration variables and perceptions of mean MASV extremity. Should this be the case, then one will be able to make reasonable predictions about MASV perceptions in other European countries. Despite my belief that the inferences I make will be reasonably accurate, this method is limited by the fact that one will never be able confidently determine a given country's perception of another demos' views on specific BPV values without having been asked the question directly. Even if two countries record near identical scores on all five questions on the comparable variable list, there could still be variance across any of the seven BPV responses. Aside from this and the limitation outlined in the introduction, the sample size of both surveys is not as representative as ones conducted by major research institutes due to funding restrictions.

Chapter 4: Results

This section of the paper will present the data received from the public opinion surveys run in both Hungary and the Netherlands in order to draw conclusions about the study's central question and its sub questions. Relationships between

several different variables will be compared to allow one to see whether certain correlations emerge, which could possibly uncover important predictors and causal factors of MASV.

Table 1- Hungarian perceptions of MASV

Statement.	Mean	SD	Median	Trimmed
A women must always obey her husband.	73.74	30.25	87.5	78.55
Homosexuality is morally acceptable.	27.27	30.59	12	22.23
People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely.	51.26	36.01	50	51.45
One can justify killing a family member if they have committed adultery or had non-martial sex.	57.75	34.13	59.5	59.31
Abortion should be illegal.	51.96	35.60	50	52.25
Authoritarian governments are more effective than democratic ones in times of difficulty.	53.54	32.12	51	54.13
Attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are in defence of Islam.	61.01	34.34	66	63.27

Table 2- Hungarian perceptions of their own population's values.

Statement	Mean	SD	Median	Trimmed
A women must always obey her husband.	29.14	23.97	20.5	26.25
Homosexuality is morally acceptable.	35.28	24.41	31.5	33.38
People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely.	65.89	27.06	72	68.27
One can justify killing a family member if they have committed adultery or had non-martial sex.	18.39	28.34	5	11.73

Abortion should be illegal.	28.33	27.25	19	24.51
Authoritarian governments are more effective than democratic ones in times of difficulty.	35.61	24.65	33.5	33.91
Attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are in defence of one's religion.	17.5	26.10	4	11.67

**Table 3 - Dutch perceptions of MASV**

Question	Mean	SD	Median	Trimmed
A women must always obey her husband.	62.32	29.64	70	64.88
Homosexuality is morally acceptable.	25.35	29.52	11	19.86
People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely.	52.04	32.86	51	52.19
One can justify killing a family member if they have committed adultery or had non-martial sex.	43.66	33.04	40	42.02
Abortion should be illegal.	53.27	34.17	57.5	53.98
Authoritarian governments are more effective than democratic ones in times of difficulty.	46.4	30.58	50	45.63
Attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are in defence of Islam.	44.02	33.45	41	42.57

Table 4 - Dutch perceptions of their own population's values

Question	Mean	SD	Median	Trimmed
A women must always obey her husband.	19.37	21.36	11	15.38
Homosexuality is morally acceptable.	64.72	25.46	70	67.14
People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely.	70.45	25.27	76	73.3
One can justify killing a family member if they have committed adultery or had non-martial sex.	15.03	25.05	4	8.48

Abortion should be illegal.	24.48	25	19.5	20.6
Authoritarian governments are more effective than democratic ones in times of difficulty.	26.76	21.85	24	24.62
Attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are in defence of one's religion.	12.22	20.7	4	7.03

Figure 1- Real MASV vs. Dutch and Hungarian perceptions

NB: The figures used for both Hungarian and Dutch perceptions of MASV in Column graph 1 are obtained from the "trimmed" column in tables 1 and 3. The trimmed readings take the mean score of a revised results set that ignores the lowest and highest 5% of the data, thus removing outliers.

Mean difference between perceptions of MASV and Real MASV:

Hungary – 18.81

The Netherlands – 14.74

Total perceptions of MASV extremity:

Hungary - 433.83 (385.28 without religious freedom)

The Netherlands - 379.03 (331.22 without religious freedom)

Figure 2- Relationship between attitudes to diversity and perceptions of MASV extremity

Correlation:

Hungary: (r=0.1169), The Netherlands: (r=0.2576).

'We should let more Muslim Asylum Seekers settle in our country'

Correlation:

Hungary (r=0.305), The Netherlands (r=0.287).

Figure 4- Relationship between perceived importance of adopting national customs and traditions and perceptions of MASV extremity

Correlation:

Hungary (r=-0.193), The Netherlands (r=-0.0839).

Figure 5- Relationship between attitudes towards the number of Muslims in the country and perceptions of MASV extremity

Attitudes towards number of Muslims in the country

Correlation:

Hungary and The Netherlands combined: (r=-0.19)

Figure 6- Relationship between WTA and perceptions of MASV extremity

Correlation:

Netherlands r=0.31, Hungary r=0.19

Correlation:

Hungary and The Netherlands combined: (r=0.282)

Correlation:

Netherlands r=-0.398   Hungary r -0.200

Figure 9- Relationship between perceptions of MASV extremity on individual questions and attitudes towards letting more MAS settle in one's country

NB: x-axis= "We should let more MAS settle in our country" (1= strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree). Aborto= "Abortion should be illegal", Homosex= "Homosexuality is morally acceptable." Religious Freedom= "People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely," Women Obey= "A woman must always obey her husband," Honour Killings= "One can justify killing a family member if they have committed adultery or had not marital sex," Authoritarianism= "Authoritarian governments are more effective than democratic ones in times of difficulty," Religious Attacks= "Attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are in defence of Islam."

Figure 10- Comparison between the effect of perceived MAS violence and belief that a woman must always obey her husband on attitudes towards MAS settlement

LET MORE MAS SETTLE

NB: x-axis= "We should let more MAS settle in our country" (1= strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree). MASV-Violence= combined reading from "One can justify killing a family member if they have committed adultery or had not marital sex," and "Attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are in defence of Islam."

Figure 11

Peceptions of MASV extremity among participants who believe their country should keep out MAS.

Figure 12

Why Hungarians believe they shouldn't allow more MAS to settle in their country

- They bring Violence and Terrorism
- Their values are incompatible with those we uphold in Hungary
- They're a burden to our Economy and Welfare System
- Other

Figure 13

Why Dutch people believe their country shouldn't allow more MAS to settle in The Netherlands.

- They bring Violence and Terrorism
- Their values are incompatible with those we uphold in The Netherlands
- They're a burden to our Economy and Welfare System
- Other

Figure 14- Comparison between different MASV and Dutch/Hungarian perceptions of MASV

Figure 15

Hungarian perceptions of the compatibility between their values and those of MASV

Figure 16

Dutch perception of the level of compatibility between their values and MASV

Figure 17 - Comparison of pre and post treatment attitudes to authoritarianism in The Netherlands

Attitudes to Authoritarianism Before and After Utrecht

NB: "Support for Authoritarianism" denotes negative individual response to "Authoritarian governments are more effective than democratic ones in times of difficulty." 1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree

Figure 18 - Effects of age, gender and income on perceptions of MASV extremity

Figure 19- Relationship between income and perceptions of MASV extremity

Correlation:

Hungary r=0.06, The Netherlands r=0.047

Figure 20- Effect of education level on perceptions of MASV

6. Discussion

Figure 1 reveals the differences between Hungarian and Dutch perceptions of MASV and mean MASV scores across all seven questions of the BPV. Hungarian perceptions of MASV were less accurate than Dutch perceptions across all topics except on the question of whether a woman needs to obey her husband or not. The mean difference between their respective perceptions and the real MASV for each topic were 18.81 for Hungary and 14.74 The Netherlands. As I had predicted, Dutch participants tended to underestimate the extremity of MASV (four out of the seven questions), whereas Hungarians opted for a largely negative view of MASV, overestimating their extremity on five out of the seven topics. Moreover, Hungarians perceived MASV to be more extreme than Dutch people on five out of the seven topics, with Homosexuality and Abortion being the exceptions. Overall perceptions of MASV extremity measured a difference of 54. 8 points (54.06 without religious freedom). The real MASV and MASV perceptions figures that are used throughout the remainder of the results section were the accumulated figures of all questions besides the one pertaining to religious freedom due to the its lower reliability (Cronbach's Alpha > 0.7).

In figure 2, one observes the correlation between negative attitudes towards diversity and increased perceptions of MAS extremity in the Netherlands (r=0.2576). Here it appears that when Dutch people perceive MASV extremity to be above 350, they also harbour negative views towards diversity. In the Hungarian case however there is no apparent correlation (r=0.1169), which

suggests that a Hungarian's ATD has no significant impact upon their perceptions of MASV extremity. In figure 3 there appears to be a correlation in both Dutch and Hungarian views on letting more MAS settle in their home country and perceptions of MASV extremity (Hungary r=0.305, The Netherlands r=0.287). However, there doesn't appear to be any significant correlation between perceptions of MASV extremity and IMPCT (figure 4) in either country (Hungary r=-0.193, The Netherlands r=-0.0839), nor between perceptions of MASV extremity and AAM (figure 5). On the other hand one observes a strong correlation between MASV extremity and WTA in both countries (figure 6). Rather interestingly while there is a correlation between AAM and IMPCT (r=0.282) (figure 7), no significant covariance is observed between AAM and WTA(r=-0.281) (figure 8). Consequently, the results presented in figures 5, 7 and 8 suggest that attitudes to the Muslim culture alone are an insignificant factor in determining perceptions of MASV extremity.

In nearly all of the tests seen in the first seven graphs, one observes that Hungarian perceptions of MASV extremity remain consistently higher than those of Dutch people. All comparisons here attempted to demonstrate the consequences that perceptions of MASV can have on other issues important to immigration policy setting and to see whether useful predictors of MASV perceptions can be identified. It appears as though ATD, Let More Settle and the WTA were all affected by one's perception of MASV extremity. This would indicate that immigration policy preferences are associated with perceptions of MASV extremity. Conversely, these three variables could also be good predictors of perceptions of MASV extremity. The results for these graphs however, don't

explain the reasons behind the elevated perceptions of MASV extremity among the Hungarian population vis-à-vis The Netherlands.

In an attempt to discover what these causal factors might have been, an analysis of both countries' perceptions of each separate value was conducted. Figure 8 shows the effect that each issue of the BPV has on determining one's response on whether or not their government should allow more MAS to settle in their country. The relatively flat lines that one observes for questions on religious freedom, homosexuality, abortion and authoritarianism indicate that one's perception on MASV regarding these topics is less influential than others in determining their views on MAS settlement. Conversely, the steep incline visible in both the Honour Killings and Religious Attacks issues indicates that these are key determinants of views on whether governments should allow more MAS to settle. Moreover, there is a difference of roughly 50 points in Hungarian perceptions of MAS support for religious attacks and honour killings between those who strongly agree that more MAS should be able to settle in Hungary and those that strongly disagree with the statement. This difference is significantly less in the Dutch case, indicating that fears of violence and terrorism play a smaller role in determining their views on MAS settlement. Finally, the fact that perceptions about homosexuality and women having to obey their husbands were the only two variables that generated a wider difference of views about MAS settlement among Dutch people compared to Hungarians suggests something interesting. Despite the incline not being as steep in either graph as it is in the two violence topics, it indicates that Dutch people are perhaps more concerned about the social value incompatibilities with MAS than Hungarians,

whereas Hungarians appear to be considerably more concerned about MAS violence and terrorism than the Dutch.

When honour killings and religious attacks are paired together in a "violence" category (figure 10), one observes nearly a 50 point difference in perceptions of MASV on that topic between Hungarians who strongly agree that more MAS should be allowed to settle in their country from those who believe the opposite. For Dutch people this trend is still visible but is less pronounced (figure 10). On the right hand side of the graph the effect of perceptions about women having to obey men is tested against the same dependent variable. As mentioned above, although the gradient isn't as steep here, it is still clear the independent variable here is more influential in determining Dutch responses to MAS settlement than in the Hungarian case. Given that violence related questions could arguably be seen as more extreme than other questions in the BPV, these findings could be interpreted as a reason behind why Hungarians are less likely to believe that MAS want to assimilate to their way of life.

The above inferences are supported by a further set of results. Two thirds of Dutch people who believe their government should stop allowing MAS to settle in their country consider the value incompatibility aspect to be main reason behind that decision (figure 13). This differs from the views of the same group of Hungarians, who are very evenly divided in their reasoning between value incompatibility and the threat of violence and terrorism (figure 12). However, considering that Hungarians regarded the greatest value discrepancy of the BPV to exist in both killing related questions (figure 1), it is reasonable to assume that

those Hungarians who view violence and terrorism as the main threat of MAS would also consider the value incompatibility to be a major reason behind denying MAS settlement in Hungary and vice versa. Consequently, one might infer that Hungarian perceptions of MASV extremity are higher than those in the Netherlands because not only is there a higher amount of Hungarians that believe there is a value incompatibility issue but there is also a considerable amount of them who believe they bring violence and terrorism. The fear that a raised perception of violence and terrorism begets and its relationship with attitudes towards immigration and security will be further explored in the next sub section.

In an attempt to discover whether the difference in perceptions may have spawned from an association of MASV with certain Muslim countries, I separated the data available on the more progressive Muslim nations from the more extremist believers (figure 14). However, despite a much higher concentration of Afghanis and Iraqis among the Hungarian Asylum Seeker population than in the more diverse Dutch group (Appendix 6), there doesn't appear to be any pattern emerging where Hungarians base their perceptions of MASV on the more extremist Muslim groups to a significantly greater extent than Dutch people. If this were the case, one would expect to see a clear divergence between Dutch and Hungarian perceptions on issues where extreme and more moderate Muslim nationals are cleared divided (e.g Women must obey their Husband, Authoritarian governments are more effective than democratic ones in times of difficulty). Furthermore, perceptions of both violence based issues and their links with either MAS group don't return any significant results.

i.   Muslim Culture

I stated in one of my hypotheses that I believed one of the reasons why Dutch people would perceive MASV to be less extreme than Hungarians is because it appeared as though intergroup contact theory was supported by empirical evidence. The theory holds that more experience with Muslims results in greater tolerance of MAS and consequently a decreased tendency to overestimate the extremity of their values.

Table 5 - Percentage of Muslims in various EU populations since 1950

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2016
Gre	1.48	1.37	1.25	1.66	1.66	0.90	2.86	5.3
DT	0.03%	0.03	1.50	2.20	3.10	3.90	5.22	5.80
NL	0.05	0.05	1.10	2.80	4.10	5.50	5.80	6.00
UK	0.20	0.20	1.20	2.20	2.60	2.71	4.00	4.80
ESP	0.01	0.01	0.27	0.27	0.90	1.75	2.6	2.1
Swed	0.01	0.01	0.20	0.30	1.20	3.41	5.38	4.6
Hun	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	-

As table 5 reveals, The Netherlands and Hungary occupy opposite ends of the spectrum of countries in this study when it comes to Muslim populations. This suggests that social interaction theory has more truth to it than any contrary theory. However, an interesting discovery is made when one compares Dutch and Swedish data. Swedish people view Muslims just as negatively as Dutch

people (appendix 2) despite the latter having had considerably more experience

with them since the 1970s along with a larger proportion of them among their

current population. Conversely, Sweden has historically housed twice as many

immigrants and currently has nearly three times the amount of refugees as the

Netherlands as a percentage of their overall populations (Table 6). As one

observes, Sweden views diversity significantly more favourably than the

Netherlands (appendix 7) and also considers national customs and traditions to

be significantly less important than the Netherlands (appendix 3). Given that

attitudes to diversity and the perceived importance of national customs and

traditions appeared to correlate with perceptions of MASV extremity, it appears

from this data that national immigration and refugee data has more of an impact

on national perceptions of MASV extremity than Muslim demographics. One

would have to broaden out the sample before being able to reach a definitive

conclusion. It would be interesting to find out when and where one might expect

to see crossover between the two.

Table 6- Historical Immigration and refugee data in various EU countries since 1950

	Pop (Mill)	HNI (000s)	Net I 2010-15 (000s)	Net I since 1950 (000s)	Mean 5 year I/Pop	Net Ref 2015 (000s)	Ref/Pop
NL	16,924	220 (90-95)	110	1253	0.11%	88.5	0.52%
UK	64,716	1524 2000-10	900	4013	0.10%	123	0.19

Esp	46,121	2829 2000-05	-593	4529	0.15%	5.7	0.01%
Swe	9,779	273 2010-15	273	1474	0.23%	170	1.74%
Hun	9,855	97 (90-95)	30	39	0.006%	4.3	0.04%
Gre	10.955	465 (90-95)	-136	1195	0.168%	30	0.27%
DT	80,689	3233 (90-95)	125	9557	0.182	316	0.39%

Key: HNI= Highest 5-year period of net immigration since 1950. Net I= Net Immigration. Mean 5 year I= Mean 5-year Immigration rate 1950-2015. Ref= Refugees. NB UN definition of refugees used: "Someone forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence."

Given the relative appropriateness of social interaction theory it would appear that neither the ethnic competition theory nor the realistic group conflict theory have any credence (Table 5 and 6). The theories are further undermined when one compares each country's perception of the incompatibility between the values upheld by its own population's citizens and those of MAS (Figures 15 & 16). Although the mean perceived incompatibility score across the BPV is 32.487 for Hungary and 34.48 for the Netherlands, the Dutch figure is considerably inflated by their perception of incompatibility on the topic of homosexuality. When this outlier is removed, Hungarians perceive there to be more incompatibility than Dutch participants (M=36.04 vs M=32.35). As mentioned earlier, the greatest difference in perceived incompatibility among Hungarians occurs in the two questions concerning the most extreme values of the BPV; honour killings and the justification of civilian casualties in religious attacks. In both cases Hungarians perceive there to be between 12 and 16%

more incompatibility with their own population's values than in the Dutch case. The origins of these fears will be discussed in the upcoming sub-chapter.

ii.   Perceptions of Violence and Terrorism.

The above findings appear to indicate that a heightened perception of fear in Hungary is a driving factor behind the difference in MASV perceptions between Hungarians and Dutch people. Figure 1 indicates that these perceptions are largely inaccurate, and given the apparent correlation between MASV perceptions of extremity and attitudes to MAS settlement, it can be said that these misperceptions of violence and terrorism are a significant barrier to Hungary's efforts in the EMC. In the literature review section, several theories about the role of fear in politics and public opinion were outlined. Glassner (1999) pointed out how media outlets were aware of the political power of salient yet rare and relatively unthreatening stories. Thorne and Kouzmin (2010) provided comprehensive evidence to support Glassner's theory, observing how several governments had exploited the 9/11 terrorist attacks to suit a widespread conservative agenda. Interestingly, Hungary scores lower on the Global Terrorism Index than The Netherlands (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2016), which supports Glassner's argument about the relative insignificance of reality in a climate of fear mongering. Confirmation of the heightened fear levels in Hungary would according to Shafer and Duckitt (2013) exist in the fact that elements of authoritarian governance have persisted in the country. However, in order to understand why Hungarian politicians have been able to exploit the fears of their citizens to a significantly greater extent than

those in the Netherlands one would have to conduct a comparative study of the political developments over time in each country. The above demographic analyses indicate that a larger Muslim population has somewhat of a restrictive effect on the impact the media has on the formation of perceptions concerning the extremity of their values. To demonstrate the impact that fear can have even in these mitigating circumstances, a survey was fielded in the immediate aftermath of a terror threat in the Netherlands.

From the results, despite perceptions of MASV remaining fairly constant, considerable difference was observed in the support for authoritarianism among individual respondents and also perceptions of its support throughout the country (figure 17). Although the Dutch government doesn't exhibit any authoritarian tendencies, these findings mirror Shafer and Duckit's (2013) conclusion that an environment of fear, particularly one based upon the threat to one's country and its people, engenders support for authoritarian leadership. Given that multiple scholars consider Viktor Orban's Hungary an authoritarian state (Keleman, 2017; Müller, 2014, Fekete, 2016), one can infer that he owes a great deal of his electoral success to the environment of fear that he reigns in. With a very low score on the Global Terrorism Index, it would appear that this fear stems from a source different from the one assessed here in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, this heightened state of fear that sees the Hungarian population tolerate Orban's authoritarian style leadership is consistent with higher perceived threat of MAS led violence and terrorism in Hungary.

iii.   Age, Gender and Income

It appears as though my first hypothesis was incorrect and that one cannot confidently attribute the heightened levels of fear among Hungarians to the overall correlation between personal income levels and perceptions of MASV extremity (Hungary r=0.06, The Netherlands r=0.047). Although figures 18 and 19 show that income levels are substantially lower in Hungary than in the Netherlands and that the Dutch sample is more representative, even when the sample is enlarged to include both countries no correlation is observed between the two variables (r=-0.089). This combined sample also delivers a more confident set of results (p value= 0.043). Subsequently, one hasn't been able to prove from this data that personal income levels are accurate predictors of MASV perceptions, and in turn whether they are the causal factor behind the apparent heightened level of fear among Hungarian citizens.

The other standout finding from figure 18 is that young Hungarian males consider MASV to be considerably more extreme than both their female and older male counterparts. This belies the commonly held belief in Western Europe and the USA that younger generations are more progressive than people from their parents and grandparents' generations (Gibbs, 2010, Rhoden-Paul, 2015). The next sub chapter will discuss where this seemingly paradoxical finding could stem from.

iv. Hungarian Youth

The results from figure 18 indicating that perceptions of MASV extremity were significantly higher among Hungarian males than any other group warrant further analysis. There is no clear answer as to why young males perceived MASV to be considerably more extreme vis-à-vis their female counterparts. However, a possible explanation exists in the fact that Women are still disenfranchised "in all spheres of life" in the view of the UN Human Rights council (2016), and thus potentially afraid to speak out in a manner that is at odds with the majority. On the other hand, theories behind the seemingly contradictory intergenerational difference abound.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there appears to be a common perception throughout the western world that Millennials have more progressive views than people from older generations (Gibbs, 2010, Rhoden-Paul, 2015). Public opinion data indicates that these views are accurate in Western European countries and the United States (Park et al, 2013; Pew Research Centre, 2004). However, one of the two data sheets also reveals that this trend didn't remain consistent in Eastern Europe in 2004, with views on Nationalism and Immigration appearing almost identical across generations (Pew Research Centre, 2004). In the Hungarian context specifically, recent surveys and political party agendas seem to reflect this Eastern European pattern of more than a decade earlier. Not only is there considerable support for both of the country's major right wing parties (Fidesz and Jobbik) from people under the age of 30 (Lestyansky, 2015), but even the nation's most promising youth left wing party, *Momentum Movement*, appears to paradoxically lay emphasis upon a fixed

national identity (Varga, 2017). Thompson (2014) would likely interpret this as confirmation of his theory about the contradictory nature of millennial political activists, who might be more liberal on social issues than people from older generations they tend to "get more economically conservative when they make more money." Strict identity formation, he argues, is to a large extent economically motivated (ibid).

Considering tertiary education attainment "makes a significant difference to one's wages" in Hungary (OECD, 2013), this perhaps then explains why education appeared to have an inconsequential effect upon perceptions of MASV in Hungary (Figure 19). As Nadler (2012) writes, "In other parts of Europe the extreme right tends to draw those who are poor, not highly educated and living on the fringes of society. But in Hungary, it appears the opposite may be true." Bartlett et al (2012) cite the entrenched fear of Hungarian identity disintegration as a major reason behind this. While there appears to be a similar level of condemnation of elitism, Nadler (2012) argues that young, educated Hungarians have decided to take action by uniting with those that share their identity. Furthermore, the fact that more than sixty percent of young people in Hungary are either "not interested" or "barely interested" (Beni, 2017) in politics may further diminish the chance of a genuine progressivist wave sweeping through the upcoming generation.

Figure 20 reveals the effect tertiary education has on perceptions of MASV extremity among Dutch and Hungarian participants. Although it appears as though a trend has emerged in both Hungary and The Netherlands in which

perceived MASV extremity is highest among tertiary degree holders and lowest among those with post-graduate qualifications, the results aren't statistically significant. What is interesting however is that contrary to Ford's (2008) theory on the positive correlation between education levels and tolerance of minority groups, the results from figure 20 indicate that education has a limited effect on perceptions of MASV extremity. Once again, a larger sample would be needed to confirm this inference.

In summary, contrary to the apparent intergenerational political divide present in the majority of Western countries, it appears as though young males in Hungary are considerably more conservative in their views on culture and immigration than the rest of the Hungarian population and Dutch people in general. No covariance tests were conducted to measure a relationship between this constituency and education levels, however education didn't appear to have an effect on the accuracy of MASV perceptions in both Dutch and Hungarian samples in general.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

This study aimed to assess the accuracy of European perceptions of MASV in order to work towards establishing a starting point for an improved European response to the EMC. Results from the study indicated that both Hungarians and Dutch people held inaccurate views about MASV across the majority of issues in the BPV. Hungarians tended to overestimate the extremity of MASV whereas Dutch people did the opposite and underestimated them. Although there wasn't

enough evidence from the survey data to be able to confidently explain this difference between the perceptions of both countries, a starting point for future literature was identified. It appears as though fear plays an integral role in European views on MASV, with the two violence-based questions having a more significant effect upon Hungarians in comparison to Dutch people. The effect of fear was further evinced by the post treatment results in the Netherlands where Dutch preferences and perceived support for authoritarianism increased considerably after a day of terrorist headlines. These results were interpreted as evidence that a heightened state of fear was the reason behind why Hungary's authoritarian state is tolerated. Although this authoritarian aspect and its association with fear mongering would explain why Hungarians appear to be far more concerned that MAS bring violence and terrorism than Dutch People, the source of those fears couldn't be proven from the survey's results. Contrary to my hypothesis, one wasn't able to prove that there was a correlation between personal income levels and perceptions of MASV extremity. Moreover, Education appeared to have a statistically insignificant effect on perceptions of MASV extremity.

The surveys did however indicate that there was a strong association between perceptions of MASV extremity and immigration policy preferences. This conclusion was reached through the discovery of a correlation between three of the five comparative variables (ATD, Let More Settle and IMPCT) and perceptions of MASV extremity. Consequently, it appears as though these three variables would all be relatively accurate predictors of European perceptions of MASV extremity.

This study has made several important discoveries, which can be further investigated in future research projects. First of all it would be interesting to see whether it can be proven through other testing methods if there is in fact an association between personal income levels and perceptions of MASV. A more representative study would possibly generate different results on this relationship to what one found here. Moreover, one could then make confident conclusions about whether a country's experience with Muslims and Immigrants plays a major role in MASV perceptions or if it is simply a reflection of socioeconomic conditions. Secondly, a more comprehensive comparative analysis of the effects that the media has on perceptions of each individual MASV assessed in the survey would allow one to draw more precise conclusions about why certain perceptions vary like they do. Furthermore, it would be very useful to discover why it appears as though education has a limited capacity to influence perceptions of MASV extremity. Finally, one would like to see if attitudes to diversity, attitudes to MAS settlement and perceptions of the willingness to adopt local customs and traditions are in fact accurate in predicting perceptions of MASV in other European countries.

Given that perceptions of MASV are inaccurate in both Hungary and The Netherlands and that the survey's findings indicate that it is likely that such perceptions will also be inaccurate in other countries throughout Europe, it would appear that the provision of information needs to be improved. Although education is not an exclusive competence of the European Union, better efforts can be made by its agencies to attend to this information gap. The Erasmus network should take on a greater responsibility in educating exchange students

along with students of host institutions about the realities of MASV. This way a core segment of the EU's diversity project will be accurately informed about the realities of one of the challenges to the EMC. A similar program could also be implemented by the European Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) across the European labour market. In both cases, the Erasmus network and EACEA should endeavour to hold compulsory workshops that outline real MASV and explain what is being done through national Asylum Seeker integration programs to help MAS understand EU law and settle in their new host country. There is a strong likelihood that the Hungarian education system and its control of the media is posing a barrier to this information reconciliation process. However, unfortunately legislative measures to address this problem would be hampered by the EU's unanimity voting system that such a change would be subject to. This is why it is recommended that the earlier suggested measures are taken by both the EACEA and Erasmus Plus as an opening initiative.

This study has been able to demonstrate that the perceptions of MASV in two European countries with very different demographics are largely inaccurate. Given the relationship between several of the variables analysed in the study and national immigration policy preferences, it can be deduced that these misperceptions could have major implications for the EMC. Further research needs to be done in order to develop more comprehensive solutions for mitigating the manifestation of false perceptions of MASV.

Appendix 1: Average monthly wages in European countries

Rank	Country	Population	2014	2015	2016	2015-2016 %	2014-2016 %
			EUR Net	EUR NET			
1	Luxembourg	0.50	3,189	3,149	3,149	0	-1.27
2	Denmark	5.60	3,122	2,307	3,100	25.58	-0.70
3	Sweden	9.50	2,690	2,551	2,560	0.35	-5.07
4	Finland	5.40	2,330	2,300	2,335	1.49	0.21
5	Germany	80.60	2,054	2,155	2,225	3.14	7.68
6	France	66.00	2,128	2,180	2,180	0	2.38
7	Netherlands	16.80	2,136	2,158	2,158	0	1.01
8	Ireland	4.60	2,160	2,129	2,129	0	-1.45
9	Austria	8.50	2,114	2,124	2,124	0	0.47
10	United Kingdom	64.10	2,597	2,253	2,113	-6.62	-22.90
11	Belgium	11.20	1,946	2,091	2,091	0	6.93
12	Italy	59.80	1,923	2,033	2,033	0	5.41
13	Spain	46.70	1,615	1,734	1,754	1.14	7.92
14	Cyprus	1.10	1,833	1,574	1,574	0	-16.45
15	Slovenia	2.00	1,044	1,092	1,092	0	4.39
16	Greece	11.00	818	1,004	1,069	6.08	23.47
17	Malta	0.40	1,092	1,021	1,021	0	-6.95
18	Portugal	10.40	985	1,001	1,001	0	1.59
19	Estonia	1.30	841	832	903	7.86	6.86
20	Czech Republic	10.50	701	765	793	3.53	11.60
21	Croatia	4.20	710	735	742	0.94	4.31
22	Poland	38.50	678	705	723	2.48	6.22
23	Slovakia	5.40	683	704	708	0.56	3.53
24	Latvia	2.00	557	601	664	9.48	16.11
25	Lithuania	2.90	524	544	585	7.00	10.42
26	Hungary	9.80	503	643	570	-12.80	11.75

Appendix 2: Unfavourable views of Muslims in EU countries

Views of Muslims more negative in eastern and southern Europe

Unfavorable view of Muslims in our country

Country	%
Hungary	72%
Italy	69
Poland	66
Greece	65
Spain	50
Netherlands	35
Sweden	35
France	29
Germany	29
UK	28

Note: In Poland, question was asked of a subsample of 686 respondents.

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q36c.

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Appendix 3: Perceived importance of Customs and Traditions in EU countries

Sharing customs and traditions is very important to being considered truly Hungarian or Greek

Sharing our national customs and traditions is ___ for being truly (survey country nationality)

- ■ Very important
- ■ Somewhat important
- ■ Not very important
- ■ Not at all important

Country	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not at all important
Hungary	68%	26%	5%	1%
Greece	66	27	6	1
Poland	56	39	4	0
UK	54	33	7	5
Italy	50	38	8	2
France	45	38	12	4
Spain	44	33	15	7
Netherlands	37	46	11	5
Germany	29	44	23	3
Sweden	26	38	25	11

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q85d.

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Appendix 4: Perceptions of MAS willingness to assimilate

Most Europeans say Muslims in their country want to be distinct

Do you think most Muslims in our country today want to adopt our country's customs and way of life or do you think they want to be distinct from the larger society?

	Be distinct	Adopt customs
Greece	78%	11%
Hungary	76	16
Spain	68	24
Italy	61	27
Germany	61	32
UK	54	31
Netherlands	53	42
France	52	43
Sweden	50	43
Poland	45	33
MEDIAN	58	32

Note: Volunteered category "Both" not shown.

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q71.

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Appendix 5: Real MASV by country

	Women must obey Husband	Hsex M-accept	Abort M-wrong	RF	Honour killings justifiable	Divorce -wrong	N-M Sex-accept	Autho Over Demo	Civilian attacks sweet
AFG	94%	-	55%	-	59.5%	31%	-	51%	39%
IRAQ	92%	1%	57%	78%	49% (men only=60%)	26%	0%	42%	7%
PAK	88%	1%	82%	86%	37.5%	71%	0%	56%	13%
NIG		1%	91%	89%	-	41%	7%	33%	-
KOS	34%	3%	75%	85%	15%	23%	76%	5%	11%
ALB	40%	5%	65%	93%	14%	26%	58%	25%	6%

Comparison with other Muslim Countries

PAL	87%	1%	77%	86%	35%	26%	93%	55%	40%
INDO	93%	1%	93%	87%	7%	42%	94%	61%	7%

Appendix 6: Origins of MAS in various EU countries

Belgium	
Syria	2 235
Afghanistan	2 225
Iraq	760
Somalia	725
Guinea	720
Other	7 585

Bulgaria	
Afghanistan	8 645
Iraq	5 240
Syria	2 585
Pakistan	1 775
Iran	440
Other	305

Czech Republic	
Ukraine	355
Iraq	140
Cuba	80
Syria	65
China (including Hong Kong)	65
Other	495

Denmark	
Syria	1 255
Afghanistan	1 110
Stateless	490
Iraq	435
Morocco	325
Other	2 440

Germany	
Syria	266 250
Afghanistan	127 010
Iraq	96 115
Iran	26 425
Eritrea	18 855
Other	187 610

Estonia (¹)	
Syria	45
Iraq	20
Albania	10
Iran	10
Palestine	10
Other	55

Ireland	
Syria	245
Pakistan	235
Albania	220
Zimbabwe	190
Nigeria	175
Other	1 170

Greece	
Syria	26 630
Iraq	4 770
Pakistan	4 420
Afghanistan	4 295
Albania	1 300
Other	8 460

Spain	
Venezuela	3 960
Syria	2 920
Ukraine	2 550
Algeria	725
Colombia	610
Other	4 805

France	
Albania	6 850
Afghanistan	6 065
Sudan	6 055
Haiti	5 145
Syria	4 670
Other	47 205

Croatia	
Afghanistan	685
Syria	335
Iraq	335
Pakistan	180
Iran	140
Other	475

Italy	
Nigeria	26 550
Pakistan	13 470
Gambia, The	8 845
Senegal	7 550
Côte d'Ivoire	7 435
Other	57 335

Cyprus	
Syria	1 165
Somalia	225
Pakistan	205
India	200
Vietnam	150
Other	895

Latvia	
Syria	150
Afghanistan	35
Russia	25
India	20
Pakistan	20
Other	95

Lithuania	
Syria	165
Russia	50
Iraq	40
Ukraine	30
Afghanistan	30
Other	95

Luxembourg	
Syria	330
Albania	220
Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/99)	195
Iraq	180
Serbia	150
Other	990

Hungary	
Afghanistan	10 775
Syria	4 875
Pakistan	3 650
Iraq	3 355
Iran	1 250
Other	4 310

Malta	
Libya	655
Syria	285
Eritrea	255
Somalia	225
Ukraine	85
Other	230

Netherlands	
Syria	2 865
Eritrea	1 865
Albania	1 665
Morocco	1 270
Afghanistan	1 025
Other	10 595

Austria	
Afghanistan	11 500
Syria	8 730
Iraq	2 735
Pakistan	2 410
Iran	2 410
Other	12 075

Poland	
Russia	7 435
Tajikistan	830
Ukraine	595
Armenia	320
Vietnam	70
Other	530

Portugal	
Ukraine	140
Congo	50
Guinea	50
DR Congo	40
Iraq	35
Other	395

Romania (²)	
Syria	805
Iraq	460
Pakistan	95
Afghanistan	75
Eritrea	45
Other	375

Slovenia	
Afghanistan	410
Syria	270
Iraq	115
Pakistan	105
Iran	75
Other	290

Slovakia	
Pakistan	15
Ukraine	15
Syria	10
Afghanistan	10
Iraq	10
Other	40

Finland	
Iraq	1 080
Afghanistan	685
Syria	600
Somalia	425
Eritrea	275
Other	2 210

Sweden	
Syria	4 710
Afghanistan	2 145
Iraq	2 045
Somalia	1 280
Stateless	985
Other	11 165

United Kingdom	
Iran	4 780
Pakistan	3 700
Iraq	3 645
Afghanistan	3 100
Bangladesh	2 225
Other	20 840

Iceland	
FYR of Macedonia	460
Albania	230
Iraq	75
Georgia	40
Syria	35
Other	265

Liechtenstein (³)	
Serbia	15
Ukraine	10
China (including Hong Kong)	5
Albania	5
Belarus	5
Other	35

Norway	
Eritrea	545
Syria	540
Afghanistan	365
Iraq	205
Ethiopia	155
Other	1 430

| Switzerland	
Eritrea	5 040
Afghanistan	3 185
Syria	2 040
Somalia	1 530
Sri Lanka	1 315
Other	12 710

(¹) Russia: also 10.
(²) Stateless: also 45.
(³) Eritrea, Georgia, Somalia and Syria: also 5.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappctza)

Appendix 7: Attitudes to diversity in EU countries

Few say growing diversity makes their country a better place to live

Overall, do you think having an increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in our country makes this country a better place to live, a worse place to live or doesn't make much difference either way?

Country	A worse place to live	Doesn't make much difference	A better place to live
Greece	63%	27%	10%
Italy	53	25	18
Hungary	41	39	17
Poland	40	33	14
Netherlands	36	46	17
Germany	31	40	26
UK	31	34	33
Sweden	26	38	36
France	24	48	26
Spain	22	45	31

Source: Source Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q44.

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