

# Land deals for Social Housing in Tecámac and Zumpango

An evaluation of inclusiveness in the peri-urban area of Mexico City Metropolitan Area

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## Abstract

Between 2000 and 2010 Mexico City Metropolitan Area sprawled significantly towards the north. Private sector developers of social housing engaged in a rush for land in the rural municipalities Zumpango and Tecámac for the creation of large territorial reserves. Land deals took place between private sector developers of social housing and rural landowners governed under the private property and *ejidal* land tenure regimes. This research is one of the first to explore in more detail how peri-urban land acquisition processes in large metropolitan areas take place. Besides an examination of the land acquisition process, its effect on informal housing options in the peri-urban area has been explored as well. The results show that more efforts should be made to improve the position of *ejidal* landowners, associations organizing social housing, and land and social housing invaders.

*Keywords:* peri-urban area, land governance, social housing, *ejido*, Mexico, land deals

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## List of abbreviations

BM	Bolsa de Madrid
BMV	Bolsa Mexicana de Valores
CAEM	Comisión del Agua del Estado de México
CFE	Comisión Federal de Electricidad
CONAGUA	Comisión Nacional del Agua
FOVISSSTE	Fondo de la Vivienda del Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado
INEGI	Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía
INFONAVIT	Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores
MCMA	Mexico City Metropolitan Area
ODAPAS	Organismo de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento
PROCEDE	Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales y Titulación de Solares
RAN	Registro Agrario Nacional
SEDESOL	Secretaría de Desarrollo Social
SOFOL	Sociedad Financiera de Objeto Limitado

## Introduction

In 2009, for the first time in human history, more people worldwide resided in urban areas than in rural areas (UN Population Division, 2009). This year marks the start of the 'urban age'. A phenomenon predicted by academics such as Lefebvre since the 1960s. Proceeding global urbanization trends, halfway the 1980s the population of Mexico turned from predominantly rural to urban. In 2010, 71.6% of the Mexican population lived in urban areas. Although the rate of urbanization is slowing down, it is expected that by 2030 this percentage has increased to 83.2 (SEDATU, 2013). In light of the 'urban age' the number of large metropolitan cities such as Mexico City in Mexico, and the problems related to these areas in for example land governance are expected to increase on a global scale.

Over the past three decades, the urban-rural interface has started to show a change in character towards a new spatial form that goes beyond the traditional dichotomous spatial distinction of urban and rural (Hidding, 2006). In addition, it is increasingly recognized that the livelihoods of people in developing areas have a multi-local character (Zoomers & van Westen, 2011) and that the clear division between urban and rural functions began to fade. The peri-urban area between the city and its hinterlands can be understood as a dynamic transitional zone with mixed livelihoods and spatial uses and two-way flows of people, goods, capital, information and natural resources (Rauws & de Roo, 2011; Ros-Tonen, Pouw & Bavinck, 2015). Ravetz, Fertner & Sick Nielsen, 2013 expect the peri-urban form to be the dominant urban form of the future. The peri-urban area is the topic of research of a wide body of academic literature, but so far very little attention has been paid to land governance and issues with land rights in the peri-urban area (Zoomers, van Noorloos, Otsuki, Steel & van Westen, G. et. al., 2017).

There is an increasing volume of literature available on the peri-urban zone and the peri-urbanization process, but land acquisition processes are described very generally. Instead, land governance literature usually focuses on either large-scale land grabbing in rural areas or on ensuring peoples "right to the city" in the urban area (Zoomers et. al., 2017). In a very recent publication, Zoomers et. al. (2017) have pointed out areas of overlap and potentialities for cross-fertilization between the two debates based on

trends they have observed worldwide. In addition, Steel, van Noorloos and Klaufus (2017) have identified a new trend they call “urban land grabbing”.

Over the past decades, Mexico City has undergone many developments and experienced major urban growth. Among other issues, one of the challenges MCMA is now facing is providing affordable housing to the poor, while preventing further urban sprawl. The Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA) now extends far beyond the administrative borders of the city’s Federal District. In addition to wider suburban areas, it also encompasses a significant peri-urban area that is located in the greater State of Mexico (Alguilar & Ward, 2003). Different vertical and horizontal governmental bodies govern MCMA: the Federal District, the State of Mexico, the State of Hidalgo, and different municipal governments. This complex governance situation has created many difficulties in the organization of the urban development of MCMA (Naxhelli, 2013). For this reason, the peri-urban is considered the governance challenge of the future (Ravetz et. al., 2013).

Besides weak governance, strong competing pressures for land characterize the peri-urban land market of MCMA as well. Different players compete over the relatively cheap lands located far away from the city’s center. Among these players, private sector real estate developers are an important group exerting a strong influence on the metropolitan’s urban form. An interesting segment within these private sector real estate developers are the companies concerned with developing social housing for middle and lower income groups subsidized by the Mexican government. The availability of cheap rural land has lead real estate developers to acquire most of their land at the fringe of the city in the peri-urban land market. The size of these social housing projects and the speed and quantity by which these have been realized since the 2000s has had a significant influence on the urban form of all Mexican cities (SEDATU, 2013). The miraculous speed of these real estate project development raises questions concerning the acquisition of the land necessary for these projects. The characteristics of these land deals indicate this is a type of “urban land grabbing”.

The existence of land issues with social housing in MCMA is not new, but remains an import to explore. This because, besides the intense volume of the land deals that have



taken place since the 2000s, the rural landowners involved in lands deals with private sector developers of social housing are not just private property large estate owners. In the beginning of the 90s, the Mexican government has allowed for communal-held *ejidal* land to be sold as well.

### Research objectives

This research intends to contribute to the international development land governance debate by exploring a new territory. As one of the first in its kind this research explores land deals in the peri-urban area in detail and any land-related issues as a consequence of these land deals. Land deals between rural landowners and private sector developers of social housing, and informal settlement activities in Tecámac and Zumpango, which is part of MCMA, serve as a case study. This improves understanding of the peri-urban land market of one of the world's largest metropolitan areas. The main research question guiding this research is:

**How inclusive were land deals since 2000 in the peri-urban area of Mexico City Metropolitan Area between rural landowners and private sector social housing developers?**

### Structure of this thesis

In order to answer the main research, this thesis contains six chapters, which outline the theoretical framework, the research design, and methodology, the geographic framework, and answers the sub-questions in three results chapters. Then, a concluding section finishes this thesis.

The first chapter containing the theoretical framework presents the academic debates on peri-urban development and land governance thus far. The final part of this chapter presents the Legitimacy-interest-power (LIP) framework. The second chapter explains the research design and methodology used for this thesis research. Besides the main research question, a number of sub-questions will be introduced. Then the following aspects are elaborated upon: conceptual framework, research, the operationalization of variables, methods and techniques, reflection on positionality, limitations and risks, and ethical issues. The third chapter introduces the geographical context. The urban development of Mexican cities is discussed and what role affordable housing has had in

the urban sprawl of Mexican cities. Then, some information on MCMA in specific is given. Finally, the *ejidal* land tenure is explained.

Chapter four, five and six are the results chapters. The fourth chapter is partly based on local literature research and partly on interviews. This chapter reports on government policy of different horizontal and vertical government bodies. These policies had a major influence on the territorial strategies of private sector developers of social housing. These strategies are presented in the second part this chapter. Chapters five and six are based on interviews. Chapter five explains every legal and socio-dynamic step in a peri-urban land deal and makes a comparison between a land deal with a private property rural landowner and an *ejidal* landowner. Chapter six examines what other affordable housing options people consider besides social housing, and to what degree the private sector developers of social housing have created issues with access to land for these groups.

This thesis is finished with a concluding section. This section starts with a summary of the result of each result chapter. After a brief discussion of results, a policy recommendation and final conclusion are given.

## **1. Theoretical framework**

Every research has its place within the existing body of knowledge. This chapter provides an explanation of the most important theories and concepts framing this research. The first part this chapter provides a review of the literature on peri-urban development. The second part will focus on the literature discussing (peri-urban) land governance. Finally, in the third part, a theoretical framework called the Legitimacy-Interest-Power-framework is introduced, which was used for assessing the inclusiveness of the land deals that were studied.

### **1.1 Peri-urban development**

The concept of peri-urban development is not easy to define. Urban growth is no longer following a city-based pattern with clear-cut boundaries of urban and rural and their functions. Advances in technology have allowed the influence of the city expand to a wider area leading to region-based urbanization with more diffuse city limits and a deconcentration of manufacturing activities towards the metropolitan periphery. More intense circulation between the city and its hinterlands are taking place in terms of daily commuting people, but also of commodities, capital, information, and natural resources (Rauws and de Roo, 2011; Ros-Tonen et. al., 2015). The region-based urban growth takes place in a piecemeal fashion resulting in a mix of urban and rural livelihoods and land uses.


Peri-urban areas can be identified in countries in both the Global South and the Global North, but in different forms. In countries in the Global North, the peri-urban area is considered to be a zone of economic and social change and spatial reconstruction (Ravetz et. al. 2013). Whereas in developing countries it is associated with a newly urbanizing zone at the fringe of the city according to a chaotic urbanization process leading to sprawl.

In order to provide some clarification on the peri-urban concept, three dimensions of the academic discussion will be presented next. These dimensions are spatial manifestation, peri-urbanization process and transformation, and drivers of peri-urbanization. A fourth dimension often mentioned in the literature is governance. This dimension is not presented in this part but is mentioned in the next part in the form of peri-urban land governance.

### 1.1.1 Spatial manifestation

The peri-urban area is located on the fringe of the city. The peri-urban area is where the rural area is showing an increased urban character, as a result of rapid urban growth beyond the administrative boundaries of the established city. The geographical location of the peri-urban area is not set, but is determined by the dynamic transformational peri-urbanization process and as such shifts as the city and the peri-urban area expand outwards. The peri-urban area should thus be viewed as an element within the whole city-region. Figure 1 shows how the Peri-Urban Land Use Relationship (PLUREL) project defined the concepts of the peri-urban area and the rural-urban region. There are different ways to define the urban system and city boundaries, the PLUREL project used two well-known concepts for their definition: the functional urban area (FUA) and rural-urban-region (RUR). The rural-urban region consists of the basic spatial types: urban core, inner urban area, suburban area, urban fringe, urban periphery and rural hinterland. The peri-urban area includes both the urban fringe and the urban periphery.

Figure 1: PLUREL concept of peri-urban and rural-urban region



Source: Ravetz et. al. (2013)

The upper picture shows a neat textbook version of the expansion pattern of a city, while the bottom picture presents the more realistic version with settlements of different shapes and sizes surrounded by rural hinterlands that have complex boundaries.

### 1.1.2 Peri-urbanization process

The peri-urbanization process that takes place in the peri-urban area can be explained as a transformational process from rural to urban of a collection of land uses and activities in the peri-urban space. Woltjer (2014) presents a global review of the academic literature on peri-urban development and planning and distinguishes five important transformations, which are: economic change, social and functional reconfiguration, spatial distribution and segregation, urban identity, and spatial innovation.

An important aspect of peri-urbanization is the economic change that takes place in the area. Generally, a shift from agricultural-based to a manufacturing dominated economy occurs, or at least a move towards economic activities of higher productivity (Allen, 2003). The line between urban and rural becomes blurred and a mix of urban and rural economic activity exists (Lin, 2000). Agricultural activity does not disappear under urban growth pressure. However, research shows that it persists and transforms. The peri-urban area has been described as a place of poverty and informal economic activity (Browder and Bohland, 1995) or large-scale land and property development (Leaf, 2002).

Peri-urban areas function as centers of industrialization, regional economic development, and residential development (Woltjer, 2014). The area has a strong pull-effect and as a result land conversion from rural land to urban land happens rapidly, extensively, and largely uncontrolled. Rural land conversion tends to have a considerable impact: loss of agricultural employment, and loss of prime agricultural land, reduced food production, and declining investments in infrastructure for irrigation (Woltjer, 2014).

A second aspect is the social and functional reconfiguration taking place in peri-urban areas (Hoggart, 2005). In general, urban sprawl is heavy but unequally divided and especially in developing regions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, problems of inequality and conflict can occur. Rural livelihoods can be under increasing pressure as the countryside is facing an increasing expansion of the urban sphere (Zoomers, 2002), with different demands for employment, housing, and services. Different results of

urban pressures on rural areas have been described. For example, situations of disorganized land markets and chaotic development (Laquinta and Drescher, 2010) with land fragmentation and social exclusion have been described.

The social and functional reconfiguration leads to spatial distribution and segregation. Spatial segregation may be the result of informal settlement by poor migrants moving to the city (Sieverts, 2003). Peri-urban areas offer the benefits and the nearness of the city, but also the upsides of a modest, semi-urban, agricultural economy. Segregation also expresses itself at the high-income end in the form of high-class residential development. Gated communities create socio-economic segregation since their walls and fences physically separate them from their poorer neighboring communities. These gated communities can be found all around the developing world.

The third aspect to peri-urbanization is the change to an urban identity of those involved. Contemporary research philosophizing on the concept of ‘identity’ speaks of “mental urbanization”. Mental urbanization “symbolizes the transfer of norms and values from urban residents to their broader rural environment through patterns of communication and information exchange” (Wjolter, 2014). A conventional character of peri-urban space could be determined by a rural identity, i.e. a space for agricultural production. An urban identity is from a more commoditized mind-set and more likely based on aspects such as the value, personal use, and amenities of the rural landscape (Evans and Shaw, 2001).

Finally, the fourth aspect of peri-urbanization is spatial innovation. An example could be the introduction of innovations like eco-industries or transport technologies for mass transit (Han et al., 2012).

### **1.1.3 Drivers of peri-urbanization**

The trigger for peri-urbanization is usually large-scale investments, especially in manufacturing, but this depends somewhat on the area of focus. In general, these investments are driven by global capital decisions, in particular, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Rapid urban growth is thus seen as the result of globalization forces. However, in some cases, such as China, domestic investments are more important (Webster and Muller, 2009). The peri-urban area is an interesting area for investments for three main reasons.: (1) there are large and relatively inexpensive extensions of land



available, (2) relatively easy access to a central city with advanced services and access to major government decision-makers, and (3) cheap labor: the price level in rural areas is much lower than in urban areas and more often than not, the peri-urban area often serves as a buffer zone for the many in-migrants of the city.

Especially globally operating large property developers have a significant influence on the speed and degree of peri-urban development in the metropolitan areas. These private sector developers tend to have powerful positions, as they own global portfolios, decide on investments internationally, and are less rooted locally (Jones, 2009). Although Klaufus (2010) notes that in Latin American cities, housing developers from the domestic private sector in situations of weak government coordination play an important role in the shaping of the city as well and contribute to urban sprawl.

Another driver of peri-urbanization is government public policy that explicitly supports the locating of manufacturing activities outside the city center towards suburban areas (Webster and Muller, 2009). Usually supporting public investments consists of large infrastructural projects although government ambitions differ per region and country. A striking common feature in most developing countries is the lack of sufficient investment in social facilities, city building and environmental infrastructure (Webster and Muller, 2009). Frequently, well thought through plans are presented for the development of the peri-urban area with sufficient attention to community needs. However, private and public investments don't materialize as planned.

Besides manufacturing, urban growth and the subsequent need for residential areas is a recurring issue in the literature. Suburbanization by middle and upper-class groups seek more space at an affordable price with benefits such as lower pollution, traffic congestion, and a higher level of individual safety. In Mexico, this area is also used for privately financed lower quality social housing neighborhoods. In other areas, the peri-urban space is used for slum relocating or relocation of rural communities for large projects by the government (Webster and Muller, 2009).

## **1.2 Land governance**

Land is the greatest resource of all countries and of essential need for people. Land plays an important role in economic productions and for social, cultural, and religious values and practices (Palmer, Fricška & Wehrmann, 2009). Essien (2015) describes land

governance as involving ‘all procedures, policies, processes, and institutions by which land, property, and other natural resources are managed. This includes decisions on access to land, land rights, land use, and land development.’ Every country has a policy on how to deal with the management of land in their society in place. They have to deal with the four functions of land tenure, land value, land use, and land development in some way or another (Essien, 2015).

In both the rural and urban context the importance of land governance is receiving increased attention as the role of land has started to change. Land was long considered a mere local asset of importance for people’s livelihood, but now is seen as an essential good for solving the global food, energy, and climate crisis, while it is also needed for nature conservation, mining, and urban expansion (Zoomers et. al., 2017). Under these increasing global pressures on the world’s finite amount of land, issues related to competing for land interests have intensified.

Proper governance of land is key to achieving inclusive and sustainable development. A failure to resolve land issues is increasingly recognized as a barrier to achieving other development objectives as well as those stipulated in the sustainable development goals. In situations of weak land governance, the powerful are able to dominate the competition for scarce land resources, and the powerless are in danger of being evicted, displaced, or left out in other ways. Competition for land is exacerbated when people are displaced from their land and homes because of violent conflicts, natural disasters, and climate change and variability. In their search for new land, people are likely to find themselves in competition with already established communities in new areas (Palmer et al., 2009).

What follows is a short overview of the academic debates on land governance so far. Then, suggested new venues for research are presented. Finally, attention is paid to specific land governance issues in the peri-urban area.

### **1.2.1 Rural and urban debates**

The academic debates on land governance so far can be separated into a section discussing rural land governance and another section concerned with urban land governance. In rural land governance debates the global rush, which is massive

acquisitions of land by domestic and transnational companies, governments, and individuals, has been the main topic of attention. Here scholars have tried to examine the volume, drives, and consequences of land acquisitions. Urban land governance agendas have been dominated by the need for adequate housing and sustainable human settlements. Urbanization in the Global South is often not coordinated by the government, but rather determined by foreign and domestic investments. This “neoliberal urbanization” has been accompanied by displacement and exclusion for the purpose of large investment. Widely known is the term “right to the city” put forward by Henri Lefebvre in 1968, meaning all citizens should have equal rights to space and services in the city.

Considering the continued importance of land for people’s livelihood combined with increased competing land interests, development efforts in land governance have so far been operationalization in terms of ensuring access to land and security of land tenure for the vulnerable parts of society. Inspired by the ideas of De Soto (2000) formalization of property was supposed to bring “dead capital” into formal spheres and improve the position of the marginalized. However, this idea has been criticized for since formal land holdings are more likely to be lost by poor people than informal ones, precisely because of the possibility of selling them formally. In addition, land administration is accompanied with new issues connected to lower level power relations, like when only the male head of a household has registered ownership, while the female head of the same household has no legal right. Furthermore, land administration is also considered as a way to privatize land ownership and to discard other tenure systems.

### **1.2.2 New venues for research: combining observations and approaches**

Since the two debates in essence work to achieve similar goals and need to deal with similar processes, more recent literature has started pointing out areas for cross-fertilization. Zoomers et. al. (2017) identifies peri-urban dynamics as one of four areas of priority. The urban land governance agenda usually views the fringe of the city as a semi-void area surrounding the city into which the city can gradually expand. But this view ignores the fact that the rural area can be densely populated and land is already intensely used. The issue of rural displacement for the sake of urban expansion is often overlooked. An increase in land value when land use is changed from rural to urban combined with the prospect of urban employment and services are considered sufficient

compensation. The rural land governance agenda pays considerable attention to issues of displacement, but developed frameworks are not directly applicable to the case of urban expansion. After all urban expansion can easily be put forward as serving the 'greater good' in comparison to other large-scale investments featured in cases of land grabbing. More often than not financial compensation for urban development is based on the rural price of land instead of the future a true urban price (Zoomers et. al., 2017).

Steel et. al. (2017) continues with this line of thought and coins the term 'rural land grabbing'. These land deals thus far may have been overlooked for rural land grabbing entails mega-deals of more than 200 hectares, whereas urban land grabbing land deals are much more dispersed. Rural land grabs just concern land; in the urban context, the phenomenon concerns both land and real estate. The local effect of these land acquisitions is not only on people's livelihood but also on their housing. Rural land acquisitions initially took place for their natural resources such as forest carbon, food and non-food crops and metals. Now rural land grabs take place for urban purposes such as the development of gated communities, shopping areas, offices, and infrastructure. In addition, the players involved in rural land grabs are foreign individuals, companies, state agencies, and now there is increased attention for the roles of domestic and smaller-scale investors. However, urban land grabs are of a different nature for the players involved are transnational elites, public-private partnerships, with foreign as well as national companies, individuals, and state agencies. Finally, in rural land grabs concern land acquisitions. However, land grabs have a more profound effect as the land use is changed from rural to urban or the land is developer or redeveloped (Steel et. al., 2017).

#### **1.1.1 Peri-urban governance issues**

Locke and Henley (2016) describe the peri-urban area as 'tenure hotspots'. The peri-urban land market is subject to many competing land use claims. Unfortunately, land governance in peri-urban areas is often weak due to three major reasons. Land administration can protect the poor and marginalized by providing security of tenure, however developing countries are often characterized by weak statutory land administration functions. This is especially prevalent in the areas of the recording of tenure rights, land use planning, enforcement of land use, proper valuation of land, and land taxation (Locke and Henley. 2016). As peri-urban populations rise municipality

borders are extended. Urban regulatory frameworks may overlap with customary tenure systems creating complex peri-urban land markets. In addition, confusion on regulations is aggravated by the fact that peri-urban areas are not bound to specific municipal administrative boundaries (Locke and Henley, 2016; Naxhelli, 2013). When an area reaches a specific threshold of population density, national law stipulates that the area is converted to an urban settlement. As an urban settlement, the municipality has the power to regulate land transaction and land use, which overturns and creates issues with in combination with customary laws (Naxhelli, 2013). Finally, the pressure on land may lead to a breakdown of systems of customary authority. Customary systems may not be able to deal with the speed, volume, diversity, and complexity of land use in peri-urban areas (Arko-Adjei, 2011).

### **1.2 Legitimacy-interest-power framework**


Business literature provides inspiration on how to analyze the position of different stakeholders involved in a process. Stakeholder theory has provided research on land governance research with useful theoretical frameworks to assess to what degree major deals can be labeled as “win-win” for or inclusive of all stakeholders involved. The Legitimacy-interest-power framework (LIP) is one of these theoretical frameworks and is used in this research.

The LIP framework by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) allows for an analysis of the balancing of the priority given to the interests of each stakeholder involved in a process. Stakeholder theory assumes that all stakeholders matter and that an enterprise should balance the interest of all stakeholders involved. However, in practice, this act of balancing interests equally is not always realistic. Enterprises are often forced to prioritize the interest of certain stakeholders over others. Prioritization is often based on the degree of power each stakeholder possesses, even though the legitimacy of the interest of certain other stakeholders might be much stronger.

The LIP framework could be used for an analysis of the stakeholders involved in land deals as well. Stakeholders in land deals have varying levels of legitimacy in their claim to land, power in obtaining land and interest in owning land. Figure 2 shows the LIP framework as presented in Teklemariam, Hossein, Nyssen, Hail, and Witlox, (2015).

Winkler (2008) defines power as ‘the potential for obtaining a desired result in a relationship in which there are competing or opposite interests’ (Teklemariam et. al., 2015). Relations of power are not static and can change throughout a relationship (Elkin, 2007). Interest can be interpreted as the aspiration or wanting, in this case, of land and its accompanying resources. Legitimacy is the generalized perception or assumption that the actions of a stakeholder are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Teklemariam et. al., 2015).

Figure 2: Legitimacy-interest-power (LIP) land deal framework



Source: Mitchell et. al. (1997); Teklemariam et al. (2015)

According to the LIP framework, stakeholders can take one of following seven positions: inactive, discretionary, exigent, dominant, dangerous, dependent, or definitive. *Inactive* stakeholders have the power to exert considerable influence but lack both the interest and the legitimacy to do so and hence, hardly play any role in a land deal. *Discretionary* stakeholders hold the legitimacy to claim land but lack an interest, likely because of their lack the power or other contextual settings, to the pursue this claim. *Exigent* stakeholders consist of those with an urgent need or interest, but yet lack legitimacy and power. *Dominant* stakeholders play a considerable role in land transactions as they both hold the power and the legitimacy of land. Righteously called *dangerous* stakeholders have the power and the interest in a land deal, but lack legitimacy, which may lead this group to use coercion or violence to enforce their claim. Then again, *Dependent* stakeholders completely lack power, although their claim to land is legitimate and their



interest is urgent. It is this group of stakeholders that could benefit greatly from capacity-building techniques. Finally, *definitive stakeholders* are at the center of the framework since they all three aspects of legitimacy, interest, and power apply to this group (Teklemariam et. al., 2015).

Stakeholders only holding one of the three characteristics (stakeholders with numbers 1, 2 and 3 in figure 2) is *inactive*, *discretionary* and *exigent* as a group is called *latent* stakeholders. Parties that display two out of three characteristics (stakeholders with number 4, 5 and 6 in figure 2) are *dominant*, *dangerous* and *dependent* and together could form *expectant* stakeholders. Whereas *definitive* stakeholders hold all three elements of legitimacy of their claim to land, an interest or urgency that access land and the power to excerpt their will.

## **2. Research design and methodology**

Besides a theoretical framework, every research has a methodological framework as well. This chapter introduced the research design and methodology used. First, the main research question and five sub-research questions are presented. Second, the research is visualized in a conceptual framework. Third, an operationalization of variables clarifies measurement of research results. Fourth, the methods and techniques are discussed to define how results have been retrieved. Fifth, a reflection on the positionality is provided. Sixth, a number of limits and risks are put forward. Finally, attention is paid to what measures have been taken to ensure ethically correct interaction with respondents.

### **2.1 Research question**

The main research question framing this research is:

**How inclusive were land deals since 2000 in the peri-urban area of Mexico City Metropolitan Area between rural landowners and private sector social housing developers?**

Deconstructing the main research questions into more specific elements lead to the formulation of the following six sub-research questions:

**Where have recent land deals taken place?**

**How did private sector social housing developers select land for social housing projects?**

**What stakeholders were involved in peri-urban land deals?**

**What were the legitimacy, interest, and power of each stakeholder?**


**What changes in land tenure, land use and land value accompany peri-urban land deals?**

**Which informal housing options exist in the peri-urban area?**

## 2.2 Conceptual framework

Visualizing the process lead to the drafting the following conceptual model:

Figure 3: Conceptual framework



Source: Own elaboration

The conceptual model shows how the land deals for the purpose of social housing projects result in a change in land use from rural to urban. This change in rural to urban land use is regularly accompanied by a steep rise in land value. In addition, land either remains private property or is converted from *ejidal* to private property. During the land deal, different stakeholders are involved with or without legitimacy, interest, and power. The evaluation of these aspects of the stakeholders allows for an assessment of overall inclusiveness.

## 2.3 Research aim

The aim of this research is to explore the dynamics of the peri-urban land market of Mexico City Metropolitan Area and to explore the concept “urban land grabbing”. Since this research is conducted from a development perspective, the focus is on how inclusive land deals that have taken place in the peri-urban areas have been. The land deals in Tecámac and Zumpango between rural landowners and private sector developer of social housing are a case study. Here rural and urban land interests collide, which makes determining whether the interests of all sections of society are adhered to equally adhered to complex.

## 2.4 Operationalization of variables

The main research questions and conceptual model include a number of concepts that require some specification so the means of measurement are clear. The process that is explored is a land deal. The term land deals can be understood as ‘land transactions that have contractual implications in terms of the transfer of land ownership or tenure ship

from a lessor to a lessee. It allows the lessee the use of the land owned or managed by the lessor for a period of time' (Gasu and Agbley, 2015). Land deals can thus mean the actual change of private property ownership or the leasing of land. For this research, the term land deal is used to describe the actual change in full private property ownership unless specifically indicated.

Land deals take place between rural landowners and private sector social housing developers. Within a land deal, the rural landowner is considered the selling party, while the private sector social housing developer is the acquirer. The landowner is a rural landowner because the land he or she owns land with rural land use. Land use is the function of land. A variety of land uses exist. In rural areas, land use can include forestry and farming. In urban areas (towns and cities), land use could be housing or industry. Other land uses could be commercial, residential agriculture, and recreational. In this research, reference is made to either rural or urban land use.

A change in land use is often accompanied by a change in land value. Land value 'is the value of a piece of property, including both the value of the land itself as well as any improvements that have been made to it. Land values increase when demand for land exceeds the supply of available land, or if a particular piece of land has an intrinsic value greater than neighboring areas (e.g. oil can be found on the land).' (Investopedia, 2017)

The research takes place in the peri-urban area, a concept explained in the theoretical framework. Land cannot have a peri-urban land use, but the concept refers to an area where one encounters a mix of rural and urban land uses.

Rural land can be regulated under different forms of land tenure. Land tenure can be understood as the formal and informal rules of how people relate to land. It is an institution composed of rules invented by society to regulate behavior. The land tenure rules define how property rights to land are allocated within societies: how access to rights to use, control, and transfer land, as well as responsibilities and restraints are arranged. (Zevenbergen, 2012)

Four types of land tenure can be distinguished:

- Open access (to everyone)

- Communal or common property (communally held by specified group of people)
- Private property (ownership of asset to one person only)
- State property (asset owned by the government for social good purposes)

In addition, land tenure can be understood as a 'bundle of rights'. A variety of rights to land exist under different forms of land tenure. Broadly speaking literature distinguishes the following type of rights:

- Right to use land including transforming the by changing land use or even destruction ('usus')
- Right to receive income by renting to other parties ('fructus')
- Right to permanently transfer ownership to another as a gift, sale or mortgage ('abusus')

Private sector developers of social housing are companies from the private sector that are involved the complete process of the development of social housing. The private sector is that part of the economy that is not owned by the government, which is called the public sector. The goal of the private sector is to make money. In the private sector, one or more person(s) can hold a company privately, or the ownership is divided into stocks and publicly traded on the stock market. Private owners could be the company's founders, management, or a group of private investors. In a situation of public ownership, shareholders have a claim to part of the company's assets and profits. The main advantage of public companies is that they have the ability to raise capital for expansion and projects by selling stock or bonds (Investopedia, 2017). H

Housing developer can be interpreted as a company that alters the landscape for the purpose of housing development. The development of housing sometimes considered as the construction of housing, but this is only one element of the whole development process that also includes buying land, arranging finances, project planning and more. Different types of housing developers exist for different income groups, like residential, middle-income, and social housing. Social housing is housing provided to people with low incomes or with particular needs, by or with the support of government agencies or non-profit organizations.

The focus of this research is to examine the inclusiveness of land deals. According to the Oxford Dictionary (2017), inclusive means “not excluding any part of society or any group involved”. In the context of this research, the focus is limited to an analysis of the stakeholder (groups) involved in the land deal. The LIP introduced above analyzes the inclusiveness of a land deal by positioning stakeholders in terms of their degree of legitimacy, interest, and power. Comparing the position, and especially the power, of the stakeholders provides an estimation of which stakeholder should be held accountable and which stakeholder’s position should be strengthened.

Four types of land interests can be distinguished: overriding, overlapping, complementary, and competing. The peri-urban area is characterized by competing land interests. Here, power can result in a situation where one stakeholders’ land interest is prioritized over that of another. Power can be interpreted as ‘the potential for obtaining a desired result in a relationship in which there are competing or opposite interests’ (Teklemariam et. al., 2015). Finally, legitimacy refers to a ‘generalized assumption or a perception that the actions of a party or stakeholder are appropriate, desirable, or proper within a given socially constructed system of beliefs, definitions, norms, and values’ (Teklemariam et. al., 2015). In a situation of competing land interests, powerful actors can undertake illegitimate actions, while powerless could act in a legitimate manner.

## **2.5 Methods and techniques**

The research techniques used in this research are literature desk research and semi-structured-interviewing. The structure of this research can be divided into two phases: an exploratory phase and a practical field-visit phase during which the semi-structured interviews were held.

The first part of this research consisted of an exploratory phase, which took place in the Mexico City. The aim of the exploratory phase was to answer the first sub-research question on the location of recent land deals by private sector developers of social housing and to select a more specific research area based on locally available knowledge. This phase took about three months. Over the course of this time span, several meetings with researchers of UNAM University, UAM University, University of Colima, Habitat International Coalition Latin America, an employee of Oxfam Mexico,



and a former government employee at National Urban Development Mexico have taken place. In addition, local academic literature was studied. Table 1 is an overview of which local literature and document were most useful and where these have been retrieved. The literature has been read to get a more detailed impression of the recent urban developments that have taken place in MCMA.

**Table 1: Overview of local literature consulted**

Location	Literature
UNAM library	Cabrera Olivares, C. (2011). <i>Cooperative de Producción y transformación piscícola</i> . UNAM –Dirección General de Bibliotecas. Hernández Escobedo, J. A. (2016). <i>La gobernanza metropolitana en el estado de México. El caso de la política de vivienda municipal en Huehuetoca, Zumpango y Tecámac (2006-2012)</i> . UNAM –Dirección General de Bibliotecas.
Research institute Dr. José maría Luis Mora	Rodríguez Sosa, A. R. (2015). <i>Urbanización de la región Huehuetoca-Zumpango-Tecámac, del Estado de México: entorno al desarrollo de vivienda</i> . Instituto de investigaciones Dr. José maría Luis Mora.
Enrique Ramirez Favela	Enrique Ramirez Favela. <i>Mercado de suelo para la vivienda de interés social en ciudades seleccionadas: indicadores y orientaciones básicas</i> . Proyecto Fondo Sectorial CONAFOVI-CONACYT, 8392.
Municipality Zumpango	Mexico, State of Mexico, Secretary of Urban Development (2008). <i>Ciudades del Bicentenario: Una propuesta de ordenamiento del territorio para tener mejores ciudades</i> . Mexico, Municipality Zumpango, Urban Development (2003). <i>Plan de Desarrollo Urbano Zumpango 2003</i> .
Municipality Tecámac	Mexico, Municipality Tecámac, Urban Development (2007). <i>Modificación del Plan Municipal de Desarrollo Urbano de Tecámac</i> .
INEGI <sup>1</sup>	Censos Económicos 2004; 2009; 2014.
IGECEM <sup>2</sup>	Estadística Básica Municipal 2005; 2010; 2014; 2016.

Source: Own material

Based on the results of the exploratory phase a more specific case study area was selected. The researcher conducted her research independently and decided to focus on

<sup>1</sup> INEGI is the abbreviation for Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía

<sup>2</sup> IGECEM is the abbreviation for Instituto de Información e Investigación Geográfica, Estadística, Catastral del Estado de México

<sup>3</sup> BMV is an abbreviation of Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (Mexican Stock Exchange Market)

<sup>4</sup> BM is an abbreviation of Bolsa de Madrid (Madrid Stock Exchange)

<sup>5</sup> The ejidos in Zumpango are: Santa María Cuevas, Zumpango, San Miguel Bocanegra, San Juan del Estado de México

Tecámac and Zumpango. Selection of these two municipalities was based on three major criteria: safety, relevance, and diversity.

First and foremost, safety was an important issue. General orientation started with an examination of urban territorial expansion since the 2000s due to social housing towards the northern and eastern direction of MCMA. The focus soon became the northern area when everyone consulted indicated this to be much safer.

In addition, the criterion relevance also directed research efforts towards the north. Relevance can be interpreted as how recently the land deals have taken place and whether these had a large impact. Private sector developers started to invest in territorial reserves in different areas around MCMA just before the year 2000. Data on the amount of land deals is difficult to retrieve so the number of social housing that has been constructed was used as a proxy. Chapter four on recent land deals will discuss the situation in Tecámac and Zumpango. The local literature in table 1 all indicated that Huehuetoca, Zumpango, and Tecámac have been the main destination of social housing in MCMA between 1999 and 2010.

Finally, diversity can be interpreted as differences in land tenures involved in land deals. In Zumpango, most rural landowners that made the decision to sell had large estates governed under the private property land tenure regime, while in Tecámac there was more of a mix and a lot of the rural land bought by private sector developers was governed under the *ejidal* land tenure regime. The difference in land deals under different land tenure regimes is interesting to explore because the point of departure for private property rural landowners and *ejidal* landowners already implies a very probable difference in their position in relation to the private sector developers. Both kinds of rural landowners obtained ownership of their land under the respective land tenure systems through inheritance. However, looking further into the past there is an important difference. The ancestors of private property rural landowners once had the means to acquire their estates and their family has been able to maintain these estates. The ancestors of *ejidal* landowners were people with few means to start with. The *ejidal* land tenure regime has been brought to life in an effort to expand the social sector and transferred land from large landowners to peasants and indigenous people.

The practical field-visit part of the research consists of visiting Tecámac and Zumpango and conducting semi-structured interviews with in total 16 respondents. Interview questions were tailored to each specific respondent. In total 15 different lists of questions for interviews have been drafted and used. All original questionnaires in Spanish can be found in Appendix A. All interviews were held in Spanish by the researcher. In general, the interviews were one-on-one. During a number interviews, the contact person was present as well. Table 2 presents an overview of the respondents.

**Table 1: Overview of respondents**

	<b>Zumpango</b>	<b>Tecámac</b>
Government	Coordinator urban development Administrative assistant urban development	Technical secretary
	Urban development state of Mexico (Tecámac office)	
Private sector developers	Casas Geo Hogares Union	Urbi
Private property rural landowners	Estate owner President livestock association	
<i>Ejidal</i> rural landowners	<i>Ejidal</i> Council San Bartolo	<i>Ejidatario</i> San Pedro Pozohuacan (female) <i>Ejidatario</i> San Pedro Pozohuacan <i>Posesionario</i> San Pedro Pozohuacan President <i>Ejidal</i> Council Ozumbilla
Civil organizations	Unión Fomento Patrimonial Amoor	

Source: Own material

The sampling strategy used is purposive sampling. This means that certain people have been selected as representative of a group. Since the research area was rather large and the scope of the research involved rural landowners governed under two land tenure regimes, the focus was on the direct stakeholders of the land deals examined. The aim was for each group of stakeholders to reach at least two respondents. Each interview was finished with the question whether the respondent could recommend reaching out to anyone else in relation to the topic, to check whether all relevant stakeholders had been identified.

The information retrieved in the interviews has been analyzed in the following manner. All interviews have been recorded and the audio files transcribed. The Spanish

transcripts have been translated into English and analyzed with the computer software Nvivo.

## 2.6 Reflection on positionality and impact on research

In any type of research, it is important to reflect on the positionality of the researcher. The intention of the following reflection is not to eliminate a bias, but simply to inform the reader. The researcher is a university-level educated, middle-class, Dutch female in her mid-twenties.

The researcher's impression was that in Mexico Western people are considered very interesting and something a bit special. Europe is an area of the world that for many people is too expensive to visit and it seems like the perfect part of this world to live in. In addition, having the opportunity to obtain a Master's degree is something exceptional in Mexico. A Master's degree is expensive. Thus, the researcher was often considered quite young for a Masters student.

As a result of the researcher being European and attending university, and possibly other aspects not consciously noted, some respondents felt comfortable than others. Respondents from Urbi, the Technical Secretary in Tecámac, the president of the *ejido* Ozumbilla and the private property landowners spoke very freely. Other respondents from private sector developers, civil organizations, and the government were very friendly and showed some form of admiration. The researcher felt that her being European helped in obtaining information. There was an apparent distrust among Mexicans, but much help and friendliness towards foreigners. Respondents from the *ejido's* were equally willing to answer the questions, but only after an introduction by someone familiar.

The majority of the respondents were male. The Mexican culture is relatively masculine and although not perceived as such, it may have been that respondents were less frank in their versions of events. The only female *ejidatario* respondent was very withdrawn and vague in her answer. Whether this was gender-related is unsure. She really did not have a very prominent role in events. The only other female respondent was from the civil organization Amoor and was the president of the organization. She had distinctly more powerful position and very talkative.

## **2.7 Limitations and risks**

An obvious limitation of this research is the time limit set for the internship. In total, the researcher was in Mexico for 16 weeks. If the researcher would have had more time the local context could have become clearer and more interviews could have been conducted. Upon arrival, the researcher only spoke basic Spanish. Thus, next to organizing the research, the researcher herself also had to learn a new language. This slowed down progress. In the final month, the researcher mastered the Spanish language sufficiently to do all interviews in Spanish herself. This added to confidentiality and therefore to the reliability of results. Having a translator has its issues. However, overall comprehension and fluency in communication could have been better. Finally, Mexican culture is obviously different than Dutch culture. In the professional context especially when making appointments and interpretation of unspoken rules about time this proved to be challenging at times.

## **2.8 Ethical issues**

Research ethics emphasize four issues that have to be taken into account. When retrieving information the respondent: has to give informed consent, should not be harmed in any way during the research or by the result, has to be respected and sure of complete anonymity and confidentiality, and privacy should be respected. At the start of every interview, the interviewer informed the respondent on the aim and topic of the research and asked for specific permission to record the interview. Appendix A contains the introduction before each interview. Ensuring no harm would be done consisted of not passing forward any specific information or mentioning names of respondents to anyone else. Land transactions could be considered a sensitive topic. Some potential respondents declined the request for an official interview. Anonymity and confidentiality are important. The researcher did not transcribe the interviews herself but hired some students from a Catholic University in Peru. Hiring students from another country were one way to ensure confidentiality, and a confidentiality contract was signed as well. Anonymity was ensured by not mentioning names in the interview. In addition, the audio file names are the stakeholder group the respondent represented and not their own names. All respondents explicitly agreed to have their name mentioned before the interview started, but as a precaution, throughout this thesis, only names of organizations and their function will be mentioned. This was decided out of respect for their privacy. The audios of the interviews and the transcripts have not been

shared with anyone else other than those necessary. None of the respondents required any financial incentive for participation.

### **3. Geographic context**

The geographic location of this research is the peri-urban area of Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA), Mexico. Before presenting the results of the practical research in the upcoming three chapters, this chapter provides some information that is needed to understand the geographic context. In the first part of this chapter, the general urban developments of Mexican cities are presented. In the past decades, Mexican cities have been characterized by rapid urbanization and major urban sprawl. High urban poverty rates come with a high need for affordable housing. Informal settlements were formed and the Mexican government set-up a social housing policy. Both initiatives make inefficient use of space. In the second part of this chapter, more specific information about the urban development of MCMA and the formation of its peri-urban area is provided. In the third part of this chapter, the different land tenure regimes in Mexican are explained.

#### **3.1 Urban Development of Mexican Cities**

Urbanization of Mexican cities since the 1950s until now has been an explosive process characterized by a large degree of urban sprawl. In the late 1950s during a period of economic development the country underwent rapid urbanization as a consequence of general population growth and rural-urban migration. From 1960 to 2010 the total population of Mexico grew from 35 to 112 million, accordingly in MCMA the population went from 5 to 20 million (INEGI, 2010). Annual urban population growth rates went from 4.7%, 4.5%, 3.5%, 2.6% to 1.9% every decade between 1960 and 2010. Currently, the urban population is growing at a rate of about 1.5% both nationwide (World Bank, 2017) and is due to within city natural population increases rather than rural-urban migration (SEDATU, 2013).

Since Mexican cities were not prepared to take in such a great number of (poor) rural-urban migrants, the urbanization process has gone largely uncoordinated and resulted in major urban sprawl. The growth of the urban territory has far exceeded rates of population growth. While the urban population doubled during the past thirty years, the urban area multiplied by six times (SEDATU, 2013). There are two trends that have contributed greatly to an uncoordinated urban sprawl, and both are connected to providing housing to the urban poor: informal settlements and social housing. The immigration of previous decades has brought high degrees of poverty to Mexico's urban

areas. About two-thirds of the Mexican poor reside in urban areas and in 2012, in Mexican urban areas 30.9 million people lived in conditions of moderate poverty in Mexican urban areas, while 5.7 million people lived in conditions of extreme poverty (CONEVAL, 2012). This means providing housing for the urban poor is a major task for the Mexican government. The large inequalities in Mexican cities are reflected by a high degree of spatial segregation. Low-income and informally employed households tend to reside at the urban fringe, while high-income and formally employed household are more centrally located (Monkkonen, 2012). In addition to this spatial segregation, a trend of fragmentation is also being observed as housing and services for high-income households are increasingly being developed in areas where the poorer segments of the population reside.

### **3.1.1 Informal settlements**

Thus, one contributing factor to urban sprawl is informal settlements. Before the 1960s, the urban rental market usually served low-cost housing demand (Bredenoord and Montiel, 2014). However, as the urban population grew, demand for low-cost housing soon exceeded supply and many people settled informally on lands adjacent to the city. Over time irregular settlements consolidated and formalized, new groups of migrants resorted to increasingly peripheral areas, which often were areas at risk and not suitable for human settlement (SEDATU, 2013). To this day the lack of suitable and affordable land within cities results in continuing informal settlement in peripheral areas at risk by the most disadvantaged and marginalized segments of society. In the past groups with political support illegally occupied such lands, but nowadays lands are rather acquired informally by middlemen and illegally subdivided. Although settlers have legal ownership of land these subdivisions are considered informal settlements since the subdivision is not made in accordance with (urban) regulations. The majority of low-income households find housing by means of self-help housing or, the more developed version, self-managed housing (Bredenoord and Montiel, 2014).

### **3.1.2 Social housing policy**

Another major contributor to the urban sprawl has been the Mexican government's social housing policy. In 1972, the government of Mexico started to exert a more active role in the supporting the provision of affordable housing to the urban poor. Whereas government policy so far had mostly entailed the gentrification of informal settlements, now a social housing policy was set-up that was involved in the actual production of



housing for the urban poor. Cooperatives between the government, labor unions and employers were set up. From then onward, formal sector workers have to save 5% of their monthly salary in a public housing fund that corresponds with the sector they are working in. These savings are then used to provide social housing for the workers. Public housing institutions such as INFONAVIT, for private sector workers; and FOVISSTE, for public sector workers were established.

Influenced by neoliberal ideology, the Mexican government changed the structure of their social housing policy in 1992. Since the 1990s, the Mexican government has been moving towards a structure of only providing workers the financial means to get a mortgage. Bredenoord and Montiel (2014) call this a paradigm of 'financialization'. Social housing is no longer initiated, organized and executed by public organizations such as INFONAVIT and FOVISSTE, but construction is left to private sector developers. The credits workers can obtain only allow for a choice between a restricted of type of social houses in specific areas. In the following time period, the social housing sector has undergone serious developments and changes. And while government social housing policy mostly had quantitative objectives making sure as many social houses were built as possible, without specific regards to quality, in the meantime the private sector housing developers have seized a business opportunity in constructing large-scale social housing neighborhoods in cheap, but also increasingly peripheral areas. A major urban sprawl-inducing aspect of the social housing neighborhoods is that for the larger part these are built horizontally with large amounts of 30-50 m<sup>2</sup> single-family houses. The biggest private sector developers of social housing in Mexico are Casas Geo, Homex, Urbi, Hogar, ARA, SASI, SARE, and DeMet (Sánchez Corral, 2012), which are registered at the Mexican Stock Market (BMV) and financed by U.S. and European investors.

Besides their contribution to excessive urban sprawl, the social housing neighborhoods have proved a disappointment with major shortcomings concerning their peripheral location in relation to existing infrastructure, basic service provision, and financial accessibility for lower-income households (Boudreau, Gilbert & Labbé, 2016). Since social housing was constructed in peripheral areas basic urban services and infrastructural connectivity was either lacking or limited. In addition, private sector developers have often failed to oblige to obligations on infrastructure and basic amenities. In addition, the poor quality of the housing constructed became apparent

within years after construction (Sánchez Corral, 2012). Social housing neighborhoods are known for the major issues they have with social cohesion and safety. There are an enormous amount of vacant social houses due to abandonment and an over-supply (Bredenoord and Montiel, 2014).

### **3.2 Mexico City Metropolitan Area**

Mexico City and its vast outskirts form one of the largest metropolitan areas in the world (UN, 2016). Mexico City Metropolitan Area consists of Mexico City itself, a province that includes 16 municipalities, and 56 adjacent municipalities located of the states of Mexico and Hidalgo (CONAPO, 2010). Urbanization in Mexico has mostly concentrated in MCMA illustrated by annual population growth rates of 27% between 1950 and 1970, and rates of 21%, 9.6%, 8.5%, 4.4% in 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010, accordingly. In accordance with national trends urbanization has slowed down to 1.6% annually (UN, 2017). The current total population in MCMA is 21.57 million. (World Bank, 2016).


#### **3.2.1 Peri-urban**

Even though urbanization rates have slowed down, urban sprawl continued in recent decades. Alguilar and Ward (2203) describe some of the demographic and socio-economic changes parts of peri-urbanization. Where a majority of 66% of the city's population was concentrated in the center in the 1950s, by 2000 this percentage had dropped to only 9%. Correspondingly between 1990 and 2000, a centrifugal trend of high population growth rates can be observed in the peripheral areas (Alguilar and Ward, 2003). Examination of socio-economic data on economic changes, services, and education indicated the formation of urban centers and corridors in what territorially can be categorized as peri-urban area. Manufacturing activities have intensified in the small center places in the peri-urban area especially industries heavy, large-scale and high technology activity, such as metallic and chemical industries (Alguilar and Ward, 2003). In contrast, most of these economic centers show that population proportion that has received education has declined (Alguilar and Ward, 2003).

In addition, changes in the territorial surface of MCMA between 1990 and 2014 evidently follow a peri-urban pattern. Map 1 is MCMA in 1990, whereas map 2 is MCMA in 2014. The purple (urban built-up), pink (suburban built-up), dark grey (rural built-up) and yellow (urbanized open space) colors delineate the urban extent. The grey colors reflect exurban area (exurban built-up area and exurban open space), while the


green color represents rural open space. Comparing the two maps reveals that MCMA has expanded all directions with unconsolidated sprawl, especially towards the north and east.

**Map 1: Mexico City Metropolitan Area, 1990**



Source: Atlas of Urban Expansion (2017)

Map 2: Mexico City Metropolitan Area, 2014



Source: Atlas of Urban Expansion (2017)

### 3.3 Rural land available for urban growth

Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution has established three different land tenure regimes: social (*ejidal* and indigenous), private, and public. The lands surrounding Mexico City is regulated under these three land tenure forms, but urban expansion usually takes place on social (*ejidal*) and private property land. The Secretary of Social Development (Sedesol) has estimated that 70% of land-for-urban-growth is *ejidal* land (Bredenoord and Montiel, 2014). Regulations governing *ejidal* lands are more complex than private property, which makes the acquisition of these lands more difficult.

After the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917), the Mexican Constitution (1917) redistributed land from large estates to peasant workers and indigenous peoples as communal land. Before the establishment of the Constitution large *haciendas* and

*ranchos* covered 92% of the land areas of Mexico owned by 1.5% of the population (Assies, 2009). This skewed pattern of land ownership was one of the major causes of the Mexican Revolution and the Constitution thus needed to ensure an expansion of the “social sector”. Ownership of private property land in Mexico either is urban or rural. Rural land is then again divided into three categories: small, medium, or large. As a result of the land redistribution of 1917, there is hardly any medium and large landownership left, and small private property land ownership is the most common form of rural landownership. The exact limits on surfaces of land for categorization according to any of the three categories depends on the type of agricultural activity the land is used for.

The land redistribution process as stipulated in Article 27 (also called the Agrarian Law), took place over the course of the twentieth century and resulted in 1991 in 55% of the land area of Mexico being held under *ejido* tenure (Jones and Ward, 1998). The land titles granted to *ejidatarios* were, as opposed to private property ownership, incomplete property rights. *Ejidatarios* could hold the land in perpetuity, however, the land had to be used for agrarian purposes (Jones and Ward, 1998) and when an *ejidatario* failed to use the land for two years in a row than their rights to the land could be taken away. As such it was a ‘use it, or lose it’-deal. The *ejidal* land rights were inalienable and ‘unencumberable’, which meant that sales, mortgages, and land rentals were not allowed (Barnes, DiGiano & Augustinus, 2015). They could only be passed on to their children.

### **3.3.1 Territorial structure and governance bodies**

All *ejido*’s have their distinct character, but the land administration structure and governance system are always the same. Within the *ejidal* surface, three types of land rights can be distinguished: (i) usufruct to the common area within an *ejido*, (ii) usufruct rights to an individual parcel usually used of agriculture, and (iii) private rights to a housing lot within the urban zone of an *ejido*. In 2007, across *ejido*’s nationally the lands were 65% common-held, 32% for individual tenure, and 3% for other purposes (Barnes et al., 2015). Within the *ejido* three types of stakeholders can be identified: the community leaders (*ejidatarios*), possessors of use rights in land (*posesionarios*), and other inhabitants (*avecindados*). Only the *ejidatarios* have a voting right in the primary decision-making body of the *ejido*: The Assembly (Barnes et. al., 2015).

The *ejido* is governed by three internal entities. The primary decision-making body is the General Assembly (*Asamblea General*). Only the *ejidatarios* can vote during the Assembly. A majority vote is needed to make decisions that concern the whole *ejido*. The Assembly is concerned with internal regulations. The second key governance entity is *Ejidal* Council (*Comisariado Ejidal*), which is the executive arm and consists of a president, secretary, and treasurer that switch every three years. The third and final governance entity are the Supervisory Council (*Consejo Vigilancia*) of a president and two secretaries. Their obligation is to oversee the activities of the Assembly and the *Ejidal* Council and to ensure they obey the rules and regulations (Barnes et. al., 2015).

Influenced by neoliberal ideas on deregulation and privatization, and in the run-up to the North American Free Trade Agreement president Carlos Salinas reformed Article 27 in 1992 (Jones and Ward, 1998). These reforms allowed the *ejido's* to change tenure status to private property if two-thirds of the *ejidatarios* voted in favor of this conversion. This implied that if *ejido's* chose to privatize (*dominio pleno*), then they could sell parcels to outsiders. Furthermore, *ejido's* could enter into joint ventures with domestic or foreign private companies, and individuals, and to sell the usufruct rights on individual agricultural parcels to other community members (Barnes et. al., 2015). The rationale behind the reform was that the agricultural sector had such a relatively low productivity because of a lack of access to the capital market due to *ejido* regulations (World Bank, 2001). In addition, the average farmer was quite old since the lack of marketability prevented the transfer of *ejidal* lands. Another important motivation was the lack of access to *ejidal* land by the local government for the purpose of urban expansion (Barnes et. al. 2015). Allowing for the privatization of *ejidal* land was one of important governmental policy and regulatory changes made in the '90s in support of an increasing role for the private sector within the social housing policy.

Following the reform in 1992, the Mexican government launched a land regularization and certification program called PROCEDE (*Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales y Titulación de Solares*). This was a nationwide program and implemented to ensure the workings of the reform (Barnes et. al., 2015). Four government entities were responsible for the implementation of the program: the National Statistics and Geography information (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía*; INEGI), the

Agrarian Reform Secretariat, the Agrarian Attorney's Office, and the National Agrarian Registry (*Registro Agrario Nacional*: RAN). Participation was voluntary and without costs. Although the aim of the government was to provide security of property rights, this program is viewed as a way to subdivide and privatize the *ejido* (Tequiro Juridico, 2009). In 2012, 94% of rural *ejido*'s that cover about 90% of *ejidal* lands were regularized and certified (Salazar, 2014), although to what degree these land administrations are up-to-date is unsure.

### 3.3.2 Different views towards reform

Before the reform *ejidal* lands at the urban fringe acted as a buffer for the urban area, which provided cheap informal lands to the poor. Since transaction between the irregular settlers and *ejido*'s were informal there is no registered information that could provide a quantitative estimation of these practices. Nevertheless, it commonly recognized the *ejido* fulfilled an important role in housing the urban poor, and this function could be lost when *ejidal* land is privatized. Other informal deals for the purpose of for example leasing and sharecropping have been reported as well. Academics are not uniform in theirs on the motivation and result of the reform. Some see the reform as an opportunity: the *ejido*'s can conduct lucrative business in the short-term by selling their land (Varley, 1993). If this were the case it is likely that *ejido*'s would have grabbed the opportunity to urbanize their lands legally on a large scale. However, Barners et. al. (2015) estimates that up until now only a 6-9% of the *ejidal* land has been in privatization and informal deals persist. Other academics see the reform as a way of commercializing and commoditizing land and in so depriving communities of land ownership and their shared sense of communality based on the jointed ownership of land. In an early phase of the reform, Austin (1994) reports on land invasion, intrusions by middlemen and the government, and under-pricing of *ejidal* parcels. In support of this view, one would expect illegal transactions to continue.

## 4. Tecámac and Zumpango

The most recent land deals between rural landowners and private sector developers of social housing have taken place in Tecámac and Zumpango. The first part of this chapter explains the special position of the municipalities Tecámac and Zumpango in governmental urban development plans in the past two decades. The selection of land by private sector developers of social housing such as Casas Geo, Homex, Urbi, and Sadasi was part of their long-term territorial strategies. The most important land selection criteria are presented in part two of this chapter. The final part of this chapter describes the seven criteria that determine the selection of land at the municipal level.

### 4.1 Governmental Policies

Under president Vicente Fox Quesada between 2000 and 2006, the federal government encouraged the private sector to develop social housing. This encouragement has been expressed in the following four major ways: (1) the State of Mexico attempted to coordinate private sector developers' activities in their Urban Development Plan *Ciudades del Bicentenario*; (2) the state government increased its authorizations for social housing development; (3) municipal government declared an increased part of their territorial surface to be adequate for urbanization; and (4) the structure of the credit institutions INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE changed, resulting in higher credit volumes. Each of these policies will be discussed in a separate part next.

#### 4.1.1 Urban Development Plan: *Ciudades del Bicentenario*


In 2007, in an effort to ensure coordinated urban growth, the State of Mexico announced a project called *Ciudades del Bicentenario* in their Urban Development Plan. *Ciudades del Bicentenario* was a long-term urban development project that would take place from 2008 to 2020 and intended to structure and coordinate the territorial area to create both competitive cities and develop the regions (SEDAGRO, 2008). The aim was to organize the territory of the State of Mexico, re-orientate the population growth, channel private and public investments, and support the economic and social development of the different regions of the whole State of Mexico (SEDAGRO, 2008).

Six municipalities were selected for the *Ciudades del Bicentenario* project based on their capacity to absorb an increased population; availability of electricity, potable water, and other natural resources; their potential for infrastructural improvements for better



connection on a regional, state, and national level; and their current function as a service center for the surrounding area (SEDAGRO, 2008). Map 4 depicts the State of Mexico with the Federal District and surrounding States in white, and indicates the location of the six municipalities with means of different colored dots, while important roads are shown in red.

**Map 3: The six *Ciudades del Bicentenario* Municipalities**



The vision of *Ciudades del Bicentenario* was creating self-sufficient, structured, sustainable and competitive model cities. Investments were planned to take place in sufficient public spaces, green and recreational areas, urban zones well-connected to the developments in the municipality, a mixed usage and diversity in the types of housing, integration in terms of communication and transport, optimal use of urban spaces and specific attention for the creation of productive areas (Poder Edomex, 2008). The private sector played a large role in this plan as all investments in infrastructure, housing, industry, commerce, and services should be directed and supported by the government, but provided by the private sector. The role of the financial sector was to provide sufficient funding, while the social sector would give consulting. The explicit aim of the project was to not just create housing, but also the necessary industry to create employment (Poder Edomex, 2008).

#### 4.1.2 Authorizations of social housing

In line with national government social housing policy and *Ciudades del Bicentenario*, Urban Development of the State of Mexico increased the number of social housing authorizations. Table 2 presents the number of authorizations of social housing projects and the number of municipalities where these authorizations were granted for the State of Mexico between 1999 and 2014. It is clear that especially after 2001 a large increase in authorizations was granted, while after 2009 the number of authorizations shows a rapid downward trend. The increased amounts of credits to workers announced annually and ease of authorizations granted, made private sector workers invest in large territorial reserves. The social housing projects have been concentrated in 25 municipalities, while the State of Mexico consists of 125 municipalities in total.

**Table 2: Authorizations in the State of Mexico, 1999-2014**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number Of Social Housing Authorizations</b>	<b>Number Of Municipalities</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Number Of Social Housing Authorizations</b>	<b>Number Of Municipalities</b>
<b>1999</b>	2	2	<b>2007</b>	38	21
<b>2000</b>	19	11	<b>2008</b>	50	20
<b>2001</b>	18	12	<b>2009</b>	40	16
<b>2002</b>	28	12	<b>2010</b>	26	15
<b>2003</b>	37	17	<b>2011</b>	18	8
<b>2004</b>	45	23	<b>2012</b>	18	11
<b>2005</b>	32	23	<b>2013</b>	9	7
<b>2006</b>	53	25	<b>2014</b>	11	6

Source: Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano Estado México from Rodríguez Sosa (2015)

Between 2000 and 2008 the State of Mexico had authorized more than 8,461 hectares of rural land to be changed to urban land for the purpose of social housing. In this period 523,250 houses have been constructed providing social housing to 1,888,411 inhabitants (Esquivel, 2011). More specifically, map 5 is a picture of the State of Mexico where the black circles reflect social housing authorizations by Urban Development of the State of Mexico and the size of these circles represents the extend of these authorizations. A quick review of the map reveals that Tecámac, Zumpango, and Huehuetoca, in that order, have been the main destination of social housing in MCMA between 1999 and 2011.

**Map 4: Authorizations of social housing in the State of Mexico between 1999 and 2010**

### La urbe contra los pueblos

Urbanización salvaje y resistencia en la Zona Metropolitana del Valle de México




Viviendas construidas en conjuntos habitacionales

Fuente: Gaceta Oficial del Estado de México (1999-2011)

### Infraestructura, megaproyectos y resistencias



Fuente: geocomunes.org  
Elaborado por Agencia SubVersiones



Source: Geocomunes in Díaz (2015)

### 4.1.3 Municipal Urban Development Plans

The municipalities Tecámac and Zumpango were instructed to adjust their Municipal (Urban) Development Plan accordingly. The idea and preparations for *Ciudades del Bicentenario* were already in progress at the municipal level a number of years before the official announcement in 2007. In 2003 the Urban Development Plan of Zumpango and the Municipal Development of Tecámac both broadened the area with viability for future urban land use. Appendix B and Appendix C are maps taken from both municipal urban development plans. In both maps, the existing urban area at the time is indicated in vertically striped red and the area suitable for urbanization are yellow. In addition, municipalities became cooperative in granting the permits private sector developers needed for obtaining authorization of social housing projects.



Photograph 2: Municipality Office Zumpango



Source: Own material

Photograph 3: Municipality Office Tecámac



Source: Own material

#### **4.1.4 INFONAVIT and FOVISSTE**

The operations of both INFONAVIT and FOVISSTE also reformed under president Vicente Fox Quesada. Changes in regulations allowed INFONAVIT to collaborate more with commercial banks and private non-bank financial institutions (Sofoles) to create mortgage products. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the organization had granted a little over 250 thousand credits each year. At 10 December 2006, INFONAVIT granted 374.749 credits of the 435.000 announced as an annual target for the year. During the presidential period of Vicente Fox, INFONAVIT granted a total of 3 million credits, a number of credits similar to that of the preceding 28 years (Alguilar Juarez, 2006).

#### **4.2 Long-term territorial reserve strategies**

Private sector developers of social housing were one of the stakeholders with a strong interest in land. In order to obtain land in the most strategic way possible, long-term territorial reserve strategies were drafted at the corporate office of the different private sector developers of social housing. This chapter will discuss the most important selection criterions when drafting the long-term territorial reserve strategies and select land. The first two parts discuss the corporate structure and ownership, and land reserve management strategies of developers of social housing. Then, the different private sectors developers in Tecámac and Zumpango are presented. The remaining parts explain how when selecting land, private sector developers of social housing considered the following factors: urban development policy at the different governmental levels, the presence of water, future infrastructure, rules by INFONAVIT, land prices and the existing community.

##### **4.2.1 Corporate structure and ownership**

The territorial reserves expansion plans were drafted at the corporate office. The private sector developers have a corporate office and depending on the geographic market they serve and the size of these markets the country is divided into zones. At the corporate level, there is a board of directors with a general director, financial director, and business development director. During the rush for land a department called “territorial reserves” at set out a long-term growth strategy and was responsible for opening up new markets.

As the years passed, many developers of social housing changed from being owned privately by a family to being owner publicly. As a result, their growth plans became significantly more ambitious because shareholders tend to ask for a good return on their investment. The territorial reserve strategy of privately owned developers was very prudent. They bought land with own assets and only engaged in new investments after a previous project was finished. The developers of social housing that registered at the stock market started to take loans from banks to create large territorial reserves and made plans, with in hindsight, excessive expectations of yearly growth.

#### **4.2.2 Land reserve management**

Maintaining territorial reserves requires a constant search for new and suitable land. For financial reasons, developers such as Urbi have a policy of maintaining territorial reserves for 3 years. In metropolitan zones like here in Tecámac and Zumpango, the policy is 5 years. This is because obtaining an authorization is more difficult. Every 5 years the territorial reserves have been renewed completely. When one part of the land has just been authorized for social housing, the search for new land is already taking place. It is common that land is sold to smaller developers after a few years when it has not been fully authorized for social housing yet.

#### **4.2.3 Private sector developers in Tecámac and Zumpango**

Upon arrival in Tecámac and Zumpango, private sector developers drafted ambitious multi-phased plans for social housing neighborhoods. In Tecámac the first land deal between rural landowners and a private sector social housing developer was in 1997, whereas in Zumpango such land deals began to take place in 2004. When Urbi acquired land in Tecámac the company already had the vision of developing a small city in 6 phases called *Villa del Real* consisting of 13,500 houses. That plan was formed in 2000. Casas Geo outlined a complete Master Plan for Zumpango, within the municipal Urban Development Plan of Zumpango, that would take from 2004 to 2022 covering 8,000 hectares with housing, industry, commercial areas, community facilities, infrastructure, parks, services and even agricultural areas.

After Urbi entered the land market in Tecámac, Sadasi, Casas Geo and Vinte started to acquire land too. The dominant private sector developer of social housing in Tecámac was Sadasi. At the beginning of 2017, the State of Mexico had authorized construction of 162,199 social houses in Tecámac. About 50% of these authorizations, 84,100 social



houses, were granted to Sadasi (Data from Urban Development Tecamac at consult at 4 May 2017). In Zumpango, besides Casas Geo, Hogares Union and Homex had territorial reserves too. Since a number of years, Casas Javer owns land in Zumpango too.

Table 3 summarizes some information of the different social housing developers. All private sector developers were involved in the whole process of social housing: from the purchase of land to the sale of the constructed social housing.

**Table 3: Overview of Private Sector Developers of Social Housing**

	<b>Year of foundation</b>	<b>Location of Head Office</b>	<b>Geographic Presence</b>	<b>Market</b>	<b>Ownership</b>	<b>Consequence of economic crisis</b>
<b>Casas Geo</b>	1981	Mexico City, Federal District	22 states of Mexico; also in other Latin American countries	Lower-income	Public - Registered at BMV <sup>3</sup> in 1994; registered at BM <sup>4</sup> in 2005	Bankruptcy in 2013
<b>Urbi</b>	1981	Mexicali, Juárez	15 Mexican cities	Lower-income	Public - Registered at BMV in 2004	Bankruptcy in 2014
<b>Homex</b>	1989	Culiacan, Sinaloa	Country-wide; also in Brazil	Social, middle-income and tourist	Public - Registered at BMV in 2003	Bankruptcy in 2015; financial scandal at New York Stock Exchange in 2017
<b>Grupo Sadasi</b>	+/- 1980		12 states of Mexico	All income segments	Private	Growth opportunity
<b>Venti</b>	+/- 2005	-	6 states of Mexico	Social, middle-income and residential	Public - Registered at BMV in 2016	Growth opportunity
<b>Hogares Union</b>	-	-	8 states of Mexico	Lower-income (brand of Parnelli that serves broader market)	Private	Growth opportunity
<b>Casas Javer</b>	1973	Monterrey, Nuevo León	8 states of Mexico	Social, middle-income and residential	Public - Registered at BMV in 2016	Growth opportunity

Sources: BMV (2017); Financial Director Casas Geo Zumpango (2017, May 8). Personal interview; Urbi (2017); Grupo Sadasi (2017); El Informador (2013); Whelan (2017); Commercial Manager Hogares Union (2017, May 17).

<sup>3</sup> BMV is an abbreviation of Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (Mexican Stock Exchange Market)

<sup>4</sup> BM is an abbreviation of Bolsa de Madrid (Madrid Stock Exchange)

The information presented thus far illustrates the economic strength and therefore power of the private sector developers of social housing. Especially Casas Geo, Urbi and Homex operated in a large geographic area nationwide and went public at the beginning of the twentieth century, indicating these were powerful companies.

#### 4.2.4 Relationship with authorities

The first part of this chapter explained how different federal, state, and municipal government urban development plans and policies created the context for land deals between rural landowners and private sector developers of social housing to take place in Tecámac and Zumpango. The urban development plans and policies were of importance for private sector developers' strategies for a number of reasons. One of these reasons is that a good relationship with the authorities is important in getting things done. One respondent explains that because Zumpango was part of *Ciudades del Bicentenario* they got much help with getting the right permits. He also described corruption and difficulties you encounter when you don't have the right contacts within the local government, which happened to him in Tecámac: "So to say Zumpango established itself as one of the *Ciudades de Bicentenario*. The previous administration. This implicates that the authorities helped the developers a lot in these municipalities. This was not the case in Tecámac. This is private, but the thing is that the municipality of Tecámac has been governed practically by the same person for many years. He went back into the government many times, his son, his friends, the same scheme. It is a very complex scheme, very expensive to develop there. This has a lot to do with this situation of government support. Since there is no help in Tecámac, we are not interested in working there." (Commercial Manager Hogares Union Zumpango (2017, May 17). Personal interview.

Another respondent within the local government confirms this statement in the context of changing land use: "The right land use can be obtained by means of lobbying. The president has to talk to his councilors 'look a company wants to buy an *ejido*, they have an agreement on changing ownership'. They allow it, and this how they all win but without any consideration of what the administration outlined beforehand [referring to the Municipal Urban Development Plans]. This is corruption." (Technical Secretary Tecámac (2017, May 9). Personal interview).



#### 4.2.5 Services: Water and Electricity

Land is only suitable for human settlement when it provides the services: water and drainage, and electricity. Private sector developers of social housing were very interested in areas relatively well endowed with water. Water was one of the main reasons Casas Geo decided to focus on Zumpango: “Zumpango was one of the areas closest to Mexico City, remember what I told you the other time, that one of the most difficult issues to get authorized for a development is water, the closest area to Mexico City that had water was Zumpango. Tecámac at some point had water problems, there was no water there.” In response to land appearing greener in Cuautitlán on images presented: “Yes, but here I think the water issue was more because of the [government] body that did not want to permit the right volumes of water, not because physically it did not exist there. Yes, there was [water], but at the moment as part of water management they did not authorize us to access water.” (Financial Director Casas Geo Zumpango (2017, May 8). Personal interview)

The normativity for a social housing neighborhood is written in the *libro quinto*. *Libro quinto* determines what public amenities for example primary schools, secondary schools, churches, and roads have to be donated to the state or the municipality. Furthermore, it stipulates a number of requirements that private sector developers need to adhere to. Only when the normativity in the *libro quinto* is adhered to the state government allows a developer to develop social housing.

Land can be well endowed with water, but at the moment of purchase a permit that allows for usage of the right volumes of water needed for human settlement is often lacking. Permits are needed at the federal, state, and municipal level. The Federal Water Commission permits the perforation of wells (CONAGUA), the State Water Commission (CAEM) determines the levels of water volume to be used and the Drinking Water, Sewage and Sanitation Organization (ODAPA) at the municipal level grants feasibility of access. Private sector developers used administratively tricks to arrange permits for their land: “Yes indeed it is important that you count in water, but it is not fundamental. What happens is we, as a company, have parameters [of price red.] to buy volumes of water and to the value of the land we add the parameter for water when they have titles for it. If it does not have the titles then no harm is done. Because we buy the land and

buy the titles somewhere else and then transfer the titles to someone else. It is an administrative procedure. So we transfer the title to this land and we can a perforation or a well, that is how we deal with the water issue.” (Commercial Manager Hogares Union Zumpango (2017, May 17). Personal interview)

Obtaining permission for electricity is a federal theme. The Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) gives out the viability and the conditions on how you can obtain energy. Furthermore, in order to get a social housing project authorized all levels of government are involved. The state government decides on the final authorization for social housing development. This authorization stipulates a number of requirements and is published in the *Gaceta*.

Once the authorization for social housing is obtained, land use changes from rural to urban and the land is divided into cadastral registered individual plots. Once the land use is changed and the individual lots have been established, the developer starts to pay a considerably higher amount of taxes for the land. Because of this financial burden, developers want to finish constructions and to start with selling social housing as soon as possible. The state and municipal government had an interest in changing land use in their territory. A higher percentage of land with urban land use means a higher population and a higher tax income, which results in increased governmental importance.

#### 4.2.6 Infrastructure

The planning policies and government investments in infrastructural works are an influential factor. A strategic location in terms of infrastructure will raise social housing prices. As explained above, Zumpango and Tecámac were part of *Ciudades del Bicentenario*. At the moment of purchase, the municipalities were still rural and did not have a well-developed infrastructural connection to Mexico City. But the planned government investments in infrastructure, industry and other public services, were a favorable prospect. Casas Geo and Urbi both indicated that future road access enforced their decision to focus on Zumpango and Tecámac. (Territorial reserves Urbi (2017, May 18). Personal interview)

#### 4.2.7 Social housing credits: INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE

From the perspective of the private sector developer, a land deal is only one part of a larger investment project: the social housing project. Every investment project is tied to a budget. Figure 6 shows what the budget of a social housing investment project looks like. The main source of revenue of the private sector developer is the sale of social housing. Hence, people's ability to buy social housing is of essential importance to private sector developers. The majority of social housing is bought with credits of INFONAVIT. Therefore, the amount of credit given to workers by the largest credit providing institution INFONAVIT, and to a lesser extent FOVISSSTE, is of significant influence, and the institutions had a high amount of (indirect) power.

Figure 4: Social Housing Investment Project Budget

Project Investment		
<b>Revenue</b>		
Social Housing Sales		100%
<b>Expenses</b>		
Acquisition of Territorial Reserves	7-15%	
Infrastructure		
Special constructions		
Urbanization		
Construction		
	70%	
Administration and Sales	5%	
Financial	5%	
<i>Total expenses</i>		-80%
<b>Profit</b>		20%

Source: Own elaboration based on information from personal interview with Territorial Reserves Urbi (2017, May 18).

Furthermore, social housing neighborhoods intends to adhere to the INFONAVIT point system for workers to be able to get a credit. "The long-term strategy is largely influenced by INFONAVIT. There are areas that have INFONAVIT. These are our main clients. So INFONAVIT has areas where they assign a series of points based on a number of circumstances, where there is public transport, whether it is close to jobs, whether there are commercial centers, all of that has a certain value. INFONAVIT assigns a rating and gives certain points. You have to have a certain minimum amount of points so that

INFONAVIT can grant points for the development. If the development is not within the minimum point range of INFONAVIT they will not lend anyone to buy there. So we check that. For example, Zumpango is well placed for having the *possibility* of assigning points in this municipality.” (Commercial Manager Hogares Union Zumpango (2017, May 17). Personal interview)

#### 4.2.8 Land price

Figure 6 shows that land is one of the expenses in an investment project, which can take up about 7% to 15% of the budget. Remaining within these price limits is important. “In general, the housing developers already have a price margin, they have a financial budget, of everything that the whole project costs. So they already take how much they need to pay more or less for the land and this depends on what they will develop. So they already have their financial budget, they already have the financial parameters to buy land, so for he who wants to sell, this are more or less the prices that one can get.” (Ranch owner Zumpango (2017, May 22). Personal interview). Therefore, developers follow the zoning trends of the city. The zones are an indication of the price of land. Since rural land is cheaper than urban land, low-income housing is always located at the urban fringe, where plenty of land with rural land use is available.

#### 4.2.9 Existing community

A final element to be considered is the community: “There is another very important theme which is the community, the people, the neighbors. You can have everything arranged, but it is a problem when people say ‘we don’t want more houses over here’ and there are a lot of manifestations. They do not go to us directly, but to the municipality or the state: ‘the new ones will steal my water’, ‘they will bring danger to my streets’, ‘they will create more traffic’. When the community is not in agreement with the new developments that could be an element, which makes us decide not develop over here.” (Territorial Reserves Ubi (2017, May 18). Personal interview) Both municipalities did not have a very active civil society even though the existing community did have the legitimacy to protect their land and access to services. According to respondents, during the land rush and when the social housing was developed, there have not been any protests. However, in 2005 the daily newspaper *La Jornada* reported on protests from livestock farmers against the massive change to urban land use of 158 hectares of agricultural land. And in 2015, the activist newspaper

*Subversiones* reported on a fight for access to water as water levels are dropping as a consequence of the constructed social housing (Díaz, 2015).

#### 4.3 Selection of land at municipal level

Once a private sector developer had decided to invest in a certain municipality, the following 7 indicators determined whether land would be acquired: land tenancy, land access, water, electricity, land use, authorities, and community. The land price had to fit the predetermined budget. The importance of the type of land tenancy has not been explained. For the purpose of social housing, private sector developers have bought under the private property and *ejidal* land tenure regime.

Respondent mention arguments in favor and against purchasing land governed under either of these two tenancy regimes. Land deals with private property rural landowners are a lot easier and faster to arrange than with *ejidal* landowners. Private property land has one owner, while *ejido*'s can consist of 70 to 600 *ejidatarios*. In addition, land held the *ejidal* regime cannot be sold immediately. A land tenure change is needed. The main advantage of *ejidal* is that it is much cheaper.

This indicator also covers legal issues concerning registered landownership. "When the companies come to buy the first thing they check is that there nothing like this. They look whether the land has a mortgage that has outstanding burden or a mortgage, and they check whether the land is invaded. The developers are not interested in land with problems. They do not buy into problems. Sometimes they buy land and then later some issues arise." (Ranch owner Zumpango (2017, May 22). Personal interview)

#### 4.4 Conclusion

The most recent land deals between rural landowners and private sector developers of social housing took place in the municipalities Tecámac and Zumpango. The information above shows how governmental and institutional policies created a favorable context for land deals between rural landowners and private sector developers of social housing to take place in Tecámac and Zumpango. The state and municipal governments directed social housing development to this area by authorizing social housing neighborhoods and changing land use from rural to urban. The governmental and institutional plans and policies inspired private sector developers to focus their long-term territorial strategy on Tecámac and Zumpango. Major criterions in the selection of land were:

access to water and sanitation, access to electricity, expected infrastructural investments, land price, and the existing community. On the municipal level, the land tenure regime was considered as well.

Based on the information above, the following stakeholders were identified and positioned. The federal government and INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE held an *inactive* stakeholder position. Their role was indirect but had a high impact on the contextual settings. The loans that banks have provided to developers made the ambitious long-term territorial strategies possible, so the bank was in an *inactive* position as well. The state and municipal governments are placed in *dangerous* stakeholder position. Their urban developments had a more direct impact in the land deals with a high degree of power. In addition, their interest in the urbanization of Tecámac and Zumpango resulted in placing these stakeholders another position. The private sector developers had high power and an interest in land. Their position will be further examined in the next chapters. Finally, the existing community was not organized and vocal enough to have sufficient power to influence outcomes. Because they did have legitimacy, the existing community of Tecámac and Zumpango were in a *discretionary* stakeholder position.

## 5. The land deal

After selected appropriate rural land for social housing development, private sector developers approached rural landowners to make a land deal. Rural landowners involved in land deals with private sector developers in Tecámac and Zumpango had rural land, which was ruled under either the private property or the *ejidal* land tenure regime. The first part of this chapter discusses the land tenure of land in Tecámac and Zumpango. Land deals under the two different land tenure regimes were distinctly different in: livelihoods of the rural landowners, intermediates involved, legal matters, social relations in negotiations, reasons to sell, outcomes for rural landowners and payment. This will be discussed in the following parts of this chapter.

### 5.1 Land tenure of land in Tecámac and Zumpango

The surface of both municipalities is divided under three different land tenure regimes: *ejidal*, private, and public. Appendix D and Appendix E are maps taken from the Urban Development Plans of both municipalities from 2003 and indicate the location of the land tenancy of the surface of the municipalities in that year. Comparing the appendixes with the maps in Appendixes B and C, which highlighted those areas suitable for urban land use in yellow, shows that both *ejidal* and private property land was part of the indicated buffer for urban expansion. Land deals in Zumpango were between private sector developers and rural landowners under the private property land tenure regime, whereas in Tecámac there land deals were with both rural landowners ruled under the private property and *ejidal* land tenure regime.

#### 5.1.1 Private property land

Private property rural land in the municipalities is mostly of small private property with estates that covered 30, 50, 80, or up to 100 hectares each. In a land deal the landowner can decide to sell the complete surface or a part of the estate, and instead of agreeing on a complete transfer of ownership, a landowner can decide to enter into an association. Respondents state that in Zumpango most private property estate owners have sold their complete property. Picture 4 shows the land of one of the respondents.



Photograph 4: Private property rural land in Zumpango



Source: Own material

#### 5.1.2 *Ejidal* land

There are a number of *ejidos* in the municipalities. In Zumpango there are 11 *ejidos*<sup>5</sup> and Tecámac has 12 *ejidos*<sup>6</sup>. The name of the *ejido* usually originates from the nearest village or town. Picture 5 is a photograph of the land of the *ejido* San Bartolo Cuautlalpan in Zumpango.

The size of the *ejidos* differs in terms of the amount of *ejidatarios* and territorial surface. The sizes of the *ejidos* interviewed varied between 70 to 600 *ejidatarios*, and the complete surface of the *ejido* was 600 to 2,000 hectares. Since these are small communities that live in the same village or town *ejidatarios* of the smaller *ejidos* are usually related, whereas in the larger *ejidos* family ties have weakened over time. In comparison to private property-held estates, the complete surface of the *ejido* is much larger.

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<sup>5</sup> The *ejidos* in Zumpango are: Santa Maria Cuevas, Zumpango, San Miguel Bocanegra, San Juan Zitlaltepec, Santiago Tequixquiac, Wenceslao Labra, San Miguel y San Lorenzo, San Sebastian, San Lucas Xoloc, San Bartolo Cuatlalpan, and Naucalpan (Bando Municipal Zumpango, 2016).

<sup>6</sup> The *ejidos* in Tecámac are: Reyes Acozac, San Fransisco Cuautliquixca, San Lucas Xolox, San Jeronimo Xonacahuacan, San Pablo Tecalco, San Pedro Tecalco, San Pedro Atzompa, San Pedro Pozohuacan, Santa Maria Ozumbilla, Santo Domingo, Santo Domingo Ajoloapan, Tecámac, Santa Maria Tonanitla, Santo Tomas Chiconautla, and Santa Maria Ajoloapan (Municipalidad Tecámac, Desarrollo Urbano, 2007).



Picture 5: Land of *ejido* San Bartolo Cuautlalpan in Zumpango



Source: Own material

The surface of the large *ejidos* is divided into *poligonos*. Since the land redistribution at the beginning of the twentieth century expropriated pieces of land from various large estates and reallocated these to the *ejido*, the surface of the *ejido* is not always a contiguous area. For example, the *ejido* Ozumbilla is the largest *ejido* in Tecámac and consists of 7 *poligonos*. Different fractions of land, *poligonos*, combined form the complete surface of the *ejido*.

In Tecámac and Zumpango, the *ejidos* do not have an urban zone. Most people live in the nearby village or town. The surface of all *ejidos* in Zumpango and Tecámac are divided into only two types of land rights: individual parcels and common areas. Private sector developers have bought both land right types. Examples of common areas are a mine, roads, the *ejidal* auditory or machinery. The only common area sold, were the communally held roads. The common roads are called: *Sacacosechas*. These are simple unpaved small roads surrounding the parcels for picking up the harvest. Everyone shares the use and responsibility of the maintenance of the roads. In order to have access to the parcels and obtain ownership to a large contiguous area for housing development, private sector developers acquired as well.

### 5.1.3 Comparison

The territorial size of the *ejidos* is in larger than that of the private estates in Tecámac and Zumpango. However, because the *ejidal* territory is divided into smaller parcels owned by many *ejidatarios*, a land deal with an *ejido*, in fact, involves many smaller landowners.

## 5.2 Livelihood rural landowners

Land deals between private sector developers and rural landowners concerned rural land with agricultural land use. Even though the rural land is still used for agriculture, rural landowners do not derive their main income from agricultural activity. As rural municipalities, the main driver of Zumpango's and Tecamac's economy has always been the agricultural sector, but in the past two decades, this has started to change. Respondents state that making a sufficient income out of working land is impossible. The government does not have any support programs for the agricultural sector, while prices of the needed supplies such as seeds, pesticides, machinery, and gasoline and diesel keep rising. Even on larger estates, where benefits of large-scale production can be expected, farming is not a big business.

### 5.2.1 Private property rural landowners

Rural landowners of the large estates governed under the civil law are not fulltime farmers. The majority of the landowners were dairy farmers that produced milk mostly for la Alpura, which is the strongest milk brand in the region that has an installation in Cuautitlán. Barley is the main crop cultivated, which is sold to Impulsora Agrícola, a company that owns the two important breweries in Mexico: La Cauthemoc Moctezuma and La Modela. Being a Ranch owner is an important part of their identity, but all Ranch owners have their profession.

Most private property rural landowners do not live on their property, but live closer to Mexico City and use their Ranch as a second house for the weekend. One of the respondents explains how in his youth his family lived in a house in Naucalpan, which is a state located in the State of Mexico close to Mexico City and a high-class suburban zone of the city. The family would go to their Ranch in Zumpango on the weekends every other week. His father worked as a lawyer and received the Ranch as an honorarium in 1954 in a legal matter. His mother managed the ranch and kept sheep and young pigs, but a caretaker handled the daily work. The respondent himself moved to Zumpango in

2001, as the only one of his family, and he is a lawyer as well. He worked as an externally hired lawyer for Casas Geo for a while and now in the municipality's office Board as Governance Director. On his estate, he continues to keep kettle for dairy production and to cultivate barley for the largest beer brewery in the country in summer.

Another respondent also inherited his Ranch from his parents that arrived as migrants from Italy in the 1950s. In this time period, more Italian migrants arrived in Zumpango and they all bought large extensions of land in the area. The respondent works as president of the Kettle Farming Association of the State of Mexico, and on his own Ranch, he produced dairy. In this professional position, he had good relations with Casas Geo too. An illustration of this relationship is that he gets invited to events such as the company's barbeque to celebrate construction worker's day.

#### 5.2.2 *Ejidal landowners*

Until the beginning of the '90s, the Agrarian Law obliged *ejidatarios* to work their land, but many *ejidatarios* get their income from other activities. Respondents' estimates of the percentage of *ejidatarios* to be actively involved in agriculture vary across *ejidos* from 50% to a mere marginal percentage. Those that work as fulltime farmers have invested more than their companions, and own the equipment and the machinery needed for crop cultivation or keeping livestock. They usually rent additional parcels from other *ejidatarios* and work for example 20 or 30 hectares. Older generations often work as farmers, but they close to retirement. Younger generations go to school and prefer a different career path.

Each *ejidatario* has one parcel of for example 2 hectares in each or most of the *poligonos*. The *ejidatario* can make his or her own decision on agricultural activity. The most frequently cultivated crops are corn, beans, oat, wheat and barley; and many *ejidatarios* keep livestock. The choice between these crops depends on the time of rainfall in summer each year as the *ejido* lacks funds to place irrigation. In the past, seeds or machinery was sometimes purchased as a group. Nowadays, *ejidatarios* and *posesionarios* make their own farming decisions.

Renting out of a parcel or hiring people to work on the land are very common practices. Some *ejidatarios* rent out their parcels permanently, live in Mexico City, and never visit their lands.

As a result of the increased interest in other career options, most *ejidatarios* have a job in the surrounding area or in Mexico City. The occupational situation of *ejidal* landowners is much more diverse than among private property rural landowners. Respondents worked as a bricklayer, seamstress, owner of an event garden, and farmer. But there are also shop or food stall owners, doctors, lawyers, or housemothers. The different professions of the *ejidatarios* show what a diverse group in terms of socio-economic positions the *ejidal* nucleon is.

Obtaining ownership of the right to parcels as *ejidatario* works through succession, and as *posesionario* through a purchase. Either the father or the husband of the respondents used to be *ejidatario* and left their title to a relative. Only one successor can be assigned. If someone wants to enter the *ejido* he or she can do so by buying parcels. He or she is then a *posesionario*. This title gives you right to the parcel, but not to the common areas.

### 5.2.3 Comparison

Only a small percentage of the rural landowners under the *ejidal* land tenure regime work as a full-time farmer. The majority of rural landowners have another fulltime job. It seems that private property rural landowners have good jobs and find themselves a comfortable socio-economic position. Most of the private property rural landowners are on familiar terms with private sector developers of social housing. In terms of power, this would put the two stakeholders at more or less equal power positions. The professional and linked socio-economic status of *ejidal* landowners is more mixed. This creates power imbalances within the *ejido* and in relation to the private sector developer as well.

### 5.3 Intermediates

During the rush for land in Tecámac and Zumpango, local intermediates fulfilled an important role. The territorial reserves department of private sector developers arrived well prepared with their plans for investments, but opening up a land market required local knowledge and, most importantly, contacts. Therefore, the network of

intermediates was of essential importance and these stakeholders pre-selected rural land for private sector developers.

#### 5.3.1 *Corredor*

Intermediates are called *corredores* and could anything between an individual to a company with an office offering a complete technical analysis with pictures. In private property land deals, the intermediate is someone external with a limited role. He or she facilitates contact between the two parties. Since the private sector developers of social housing had the capacity do much of the work themselves, they worked with individuals. A *corredor* can be someone working in real estate, a lawyer or just anyone with the right contacts. One respondent working at the municipality office of Tecámac mentioned that the brother of the municipal president worked as an intermediate since “one has to take advantage of the information one has” (Technical Secretary Tecámac (2017, May 9). Personal interview). The majority of the *corredores* only do the intermediate work: they just introduce the purchaser to the seller. Depending on the type of *corridor*, the payment of a *corredor* is a commission of 2-5% of the value of the final land deal.

Since this person is responsible for the pre-selection of land, some respondents consider the *corredor* as an influential stakeholder in a land deal. The added value of they bring is their local knowledge and network.

#### 5.3.2 *Representative*

Some private property landowners worked with intermediates. Intermediates approached rural landowners with the offer to find a purchaser for their land. The intermediate then makes a contract with the landowner. The contract determines a commission price and a period of time in which the land will be sold. Arrangements like these take place because landowners have a job during the day and do not have any time to arrange to sell their land. The intermediate has a lot of power since the private sector developer lacks the contacts and the rural landowner has a lack of time, making both purchaser and seller depend on the intermediate. The respondent that works as a lawyer and owns a Ranch in Zumpango the negotiations for the land deal easy, but some landowners prefer to hire a representative to take care of legal matters.

#### 5.3.3 *Ejidal Governance bodies*

The strategy to establishing contact with an *ejido* is different. The Agrarian Law obliges anyone with an interest in purchasing *ejidal* land to contact the representatives of the

*ejido*: the *Ejidal* Council. The Assembly discusses and, when needed, votes on important matters for the *ejido*. The *Ejidal* Council is the only body that can call for an Assembly. However, in practice, the *Ejidal* Council might be the legal leader but is not always the moral leader as well.

For example, a professor at a university in Mexico City and used to be a member of the *Ejidal* Council. He lives in Mexico City. When a developer came with an interest in buying *ejidal* land, he did not even know the location of his own parcels. Oppositely, the same *ejido*, San Pedro Pozohuacan, once had very active *Ejidal* Council members as well. One of the respondents talked about one of the *Ejidal* Council members working as an intermediate for Homex. Even before the private sector developers approached the *ejido* this person had the idea to sell land. He wrote a letter to the Governor of the State to ask for help with selling *ejidal* land because it was so unproductive. He came with the developer when they visited the respondent, an influential *ejidatarios*, to talk about selling land.

In other situations, the position of member of the *Ejidal* Council is prone to misuse too. One of the respondents from the *ejido* San Bartolo mentioned that they never sold any land, but a while ago the previous *Ejidal* Council had contact with Casas Geo. A representative of Casas Geo looked for contact with the *ejido* since they need to cross the *ejidal* territory in order to put down drainage in their housing development. As compensation, Casas Geo offered to deepen the well of the *ejido*. This was an attractive offer as water levels had dropped beyond the depth of their current wells and the *ejido* did not have the funds to deepen the well themselves. But the *ejido* turned down the offer. The respondent mentioned that he thinks the *Ejidal* Council was bribed. (*Ejidal* Council *ejido* San Bartolo (2017, May 2). Personal interview)

The Supervisory Council is supposed to oversee the *Ejidal* Council's work and should be present at every important meeting. In practice, this role is not always fulfilled with great dedication. One of the respondents talked about the president of the Supervisory Council of the *ejido* Ozumbilla: "Next to that there is a Supervisory president, but he is not really involved. He is not interested in what happens in the *ejido*. He is nothing more than a requisite to fill the post, an act. [...] the guy did not want... to accompany us on



anything.. Whatever arrangement is done he needs to be present, but he has not been here.” (*Ejidal Council ejido San Bartolo* (2017, May 1). Personal interview). In a land deal, the Supervisory Council is supposed to have an observing and supervisory role.

#### 5.3.4 Moral leaders

Since serving on the *Ejidal* Council is a legal obligation that each *ejidatario* has to fulfill at one point, there is no certainty the *Ejidal* Council actually knows all *ejidatarios* and the complete surface of the *ejido*. Therefore, in the case of an *ejidal* land deal, it is common for private sector developers to look for other ways to establish contact too and approach well-known members of the community. A respondent from the *ejido* San Pedro Pozohuacan explained: “There are people, like in my case I know everyone, I know every parcel and of whom it is. This is why I have a closer relation with the companies that came to buy. With whatever there is they look for me and tell me ‘we want contact with the owner of this parcel’. So I gave them the name and we go look for them and everything. The *Ejidal* Council cannot do this.” (*ejidatario* San Pedro Pozohuacan (2017, May 2). Personal interview)

A common practice is to hire an *ejidatario* as an employee of the private sector developer, who has much influence in and knowledge of the *ejido*. In this case, the intermediate is not external but internal. The role of this person is then to unite the *ejido* and convince his companions to sell their land. “A strategy that all companies use is to have an *ejidatario* at your side. Someone that lives there, knows all people. These are towns so everyone knows each other. We had Hugo. He was an employee of ours. We contracted him. He is our employee and he knows everyone until the dogs of each *ejido*. [...] These are the ones that approach the *ejidatarios*, because when you arrive as a developer to buy, they automatically sell to you at a higher price. As time passes it gets more difficult. This was 20 years ago.” (Territorial Reserves Urbi, Tecámec (2017, May 18). Personal interview)

These intermediates thus have a double position: as *ejidatario* with the right to vote in the Assembly and as an employee of a private sector developer. This situation also creates disparities in knowledge, and thus knowledge, since the developer has an insider that can provide the company with all the information they need about the *ejido*, while the *ejido* does not have such a person at their side.

### 5.3.5 Comparison

The intermediate in land deals with private property rural landowners was external. The *corredor* had power as a result of the knowledge that private sector developer needed and an economic interest in the land deal. The representative of private property rural landowners had power too and a similar economic interest, because of they had time available that the landowners did not and were also paid by means of a commission.

The role of intermediates in an *ejidal* land deals is more disruptive. There is a legal course of action: approach the *Ejidal* Council and call an Assembly where discussions and votes on a land deal take place. In practice, an intermediate from inside the *ejido* was hired. This construction gave much power to the private sector developer of social housing and the intermediate over many of the *ejidal* landowners. This power was on top of the already existing economic dominant position of private sector developer. Furthermore, within the *ejido* power imbalances existed between those working for the developer (this could both be a member of the *Ejidal* Council or a moral leader) and those who did not.

### 5.4 Land tenure change: *Ejidal* to private property land

The private property land tenure allows for an immediate sale. However, in case of a land deal concerning *ejidal* land a change in tenure system needs to be made. An *ejidal* land deal can technically not take place since *ejidatarios* and *posesionarios* do not have full ownership. In order for an *ejidal* land deal to take place, the Assembly needs to make a majority vote on the adoption of the *dominio pleno* (private property land tenure).

The parts of the *ejido* sold to the developer are the individual parcels of *ejidatarios* and *posesionarios*, and the *sacosechas*. The Assembly votes on whether the *ejido* should apply for the faculty of changing the land tenure of parcels to *dominion pleno*. The Agrarian Office has the power to decide on this land tenure change. Once the *ejido* has obtained this faculty each individual *ejidatario* and *posesionario* can ask for a full ownership certificate for their parcel at RAN. So the change to private property does not happen automatically. Everyone can decide for themselves to change the land tenure regime or not, and once the Agrarian Attorney gave their approval, the faculty to change land tenure remains. Switching land tenure obvious means the land is governed under Civil



Law instead of Agrarian Law, and it also increases the price. Because the tenure change can double the land price the developers make agreements on a price before the change has been made.

Besides the adoption of the *dominio pleno*, the *ejido* needs to vote on parceling the *sacosechas* and their price. *Sacosechas* are common areas and are governed by the whole *ejido*. What happens in a land deal is that the Assembly as a whole agrees on a price and then the *sacosechas* are changed to a parcel on the name of someone of the developer. The decision is made collectively and the return is shared among all *ejidatarios* of the *ejido*, whereas the return on the parcel is for everyone individually.

### 5.5 Social and power relations during negotiations

During the negotiation for land deals, the social relations between rural landowners and private sector developers differed depending on land tenure. Because the *ejido* is a community in itself, there were also many internal social relations and power balances.

#### 5.5.1 Private property negotiations

When talking about the relationship between private property landowners and private sector developers, respondents indicate a pleasant relationship. As previously mentioned, both private property estate holders in Zumpango were connected to Casas Geo in a professional context. One of them even started working as an externally hired lawyer for Casas Geo and was involved with the *apeo y deslinde* of plots of land all over the State of Mexico.

Another respondent presented a different relation between the two parties. He mentioned how a developer tried to put some pressure on a private property landowner he knows: "One time Don Lima called me and told me 'I have two of the developer here, it is about my land here next to the canal. That if I do not sell it, they will expropriate me. What do I do?' This made me angry and I told him 'tell the asshole that I will be there in a minute, let's see if they expropriate it.' So I went there and when I arrived my friend told me they had just left. This has happened very little, but yes, there were this types of pressures to frighten them." (Employee Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries, and Food. (2017, May 2). Personal interview with *ejidatario* San Pedro Pozohuacan). However, this was the only respondent mentioning intimidations.

Private sector developers are well aware of the importance of having a good reputation towards potential sellers of rural land, especially when it comes to reliability in payments. Developers arrived with the intention to acquire more land in the future and rumors about bad treatment would lead people to withdraw from selling to that particular developer and prefer to deal with another developer. The financial director of Casas Geo in the office of Zumpango said that in time rural landowners started to approach them as well with offers to sell their land to them. They had a preference of selling to Casas Geo because of the reliable reputation of the company.

### 5.5.2 *Ejidal negotiations*

An *ejidal* land deal involves many smaller landowners. The Assembly is the legal entity where the *dominio pleno* should be discussed and voted upon, but in practice, many informal talks take place beforehand so when the Assembly takes place the developer has more certainty that steps will be made. In an ideal situation, the *Ejidal* Council and the intermediate manage to unite the *ejido* and arrange a land deal with all *ejidatarios* and *posesionarios* at the same time. If this is not possible, the developers negotiated with everyone individually or, more preferably with the representatives of groups within the *ejido*.

Especially land deals with the smaller *ejidos* could be arranged in the Assembly at once. A respondent from the developer Urbi remembered: “The *ejido* San Pedro de Atzompa we bought in an Assembly. We found two leaders here that united all people with the *Ejidal* Council. We brought this proposition, they had the Assembly, made an act and then we paid them. It took us three years to buy this.” (Territorial Reserves Urbi, Tecámac (2017, May 18). Personal interview)

However, the developer often worked with their intermediate to create groups and negotiate with the representatives of these groups. The position of representative is one prone to bribery. An *ejidatario* of the *ejido* San Pedro Pozohuacan admitted: “In another meeting they told me ‘do not bring your friends. Without companions. Come alone.’ So I was a bit distrusting of what they will discuss. I did not go to their office but to a restaurant, but I brought some people that kept an eye on me. The problem was that they wanted to bribe me. They said ‘here you have 3 million for you and for your parcel,

we will pay 140, but do not tell anyone'. I said they put me in a difficult position. I will not betray my companions." (*ejidatario* San Pedro Pozohuacan (2017, May 2). Personal interview)

During negotiations, it happens that a new *Ejidal* Council needs to be elected and the developer tries to influence politics to get their person of preference to be chosen. Again in the *ejido* San Pedro Pozohuacan at one point a change in *Ejidal* Council was due. Agreement had been reached on a land deal, but because Homex ran into financial difficulties, the finalization of administrative matters and payments took a long time. The *ejido* was unsatisfied with the process because in the meantime land prices had appreciated and the peso had depreciated, they wanted to negotiate a compensation. These negotiations took place in three groups. One of the respondents said: "So when there was a change in the *Ejidal* Council the company looked for me and asked me 'How do you see this? Who do you think will win the groups? Because I am interested in your group being in charge, because we have worked well.' In other groups the company still did not pay, it would complicate the paperwork again, the agreements." (*ejidatario* San Pedro Pozohuacan (2017, May 2). Personal interview)

Besides having an insider at their side, one respondent talked about how one of the developers tried to seduce the *ejido* into selling their land. "In my experience, in Santiago Atocan, in a meeting they just put the bills on the table. They were dazzled by the gold. So many people said 'I know I am selling cheaply but the parcels have never given me much. I want to enjoy life now' There were people that have the knowledge and I guess then it is fair, but there are people that thought the money would never end in their life and then it was gone in a year." (Employee Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries, and Food. (2017, May 2). Personal interview with *ejidatario* San Pedro Pozohuacan)

In each land deal, there were always some *ejidatarios* that asked for a much higher price than his companions. Agreeing to this will automatically raise the price surrounding land as well. Therefore, the developer decided to leave these parcels and to build around it. Some *ejidal* landowners sold their parcel at a later time, but there are cases when social housing constructions had finished without the parcel. Once *ejidatarios* and

*posesionarios* became more aware of the value of their land they started to wait longer and longer in agreeing to sell their own parcel.

#### 5.5.2.1 *Posesionario and avencindado*

Within the Assembly, only the *ejidatario* has the right to vote, while those with the position of *avencindado* or *posesionario* do not and are denied access to special Assemblies. The *avencindado* is not really affected by the land deal. This is just a recognized member of the village or town close to the *ejidal* lands and is a position that does not really mean much. The *posesionario*, however, has his own parcels within the *ejido* and did have his own stakes in the land deal. He or she can ask for the *dominio pleno* to his or her own parcel once it has been adopted and sell. When asked to a *posesionario* in the *ejido* San Pedro Pozohuacan how much influence he has despite not having a right to vote, the respondent mentioned that his relationship with the *ejidatarios* is just the same and there is no difference. This is mainly in terms of social connection since he does not have any rights. He was one of the representatives very involved in negotiations.

Being a *posesionario* is an interesting way to speculate on land. In some cases, *ejidatarios* from *ejidos* closer to the urban fringe that have already sold their own parcels, have bought *ejidal* land as *posesionario* speculatively and made good profits from this. This happened at San Pedro Pozohuacan as well: "Well, we inform them. Information runs fast here and usually, these people already have some experience. They have already sold their parcel and they see where sales are advancing. When the moment comes they look for the company directly or wait until the company looks for them. But they already know what is going to happen and for what value they want to sell. It is like we talked about, they give 600 thousand for a parcel of 3 hectares and then they [the developer] gives them 9 million after 3 years. They came to acquire in 2015, while the *posesionarios* bought in 2002. [...] How much did he gain? Nine or ten times the value." (*ejidatario* San Pedro Pozohuacan (2017, May 2). Personal interview)

#### 5.5.3 Comparison

In terms of social relation, the private property rural landowners had to have an equal relationship with the private sector developers of social housing than the *ejidal* landowners. Intimidations and trick within negotiations took place in land deals with all rural landowners. Within the *ejido* the moral leaders representing their companions had

more power. In general, the *ejidatarios* and *posesionarios* did not have much power in relation to the private sector developers. Even though the *posesionario* had less power legally, in reality, their position was more or less equal. Sometimes the position of *posesionario* was used quite ingeniously for land speculation. Furthermore, the position of *posesionario* had legitimacy because of their legal status, but no interest nor power.

### 5.6 Reasons to sell and outcomes for rural landowners

The main reason rural landowners decided to sell their land seems to be the economic compensation. Since agriculture is not a big business the offer private sector developers made was an opportunity to finally have a substantial amount at hand. How the amount has been spent thereafter differs.

#### 5.6.1 Private property reasons and outcomes

In the beginning, private property landowners were not aware of the option to sell their land and needed convincing, but as the interest of private sector developers became known the initiative for a land deal came from the seller's side as well. The reason for private property rural landowners to sell was mostly economical: the opportunity presented itself and the amount received for their land could be used for investment.

Although the price was cheap, the total offer made by private sector developers was a lot of money for the rural landowners at the time and multiple respondents mentioned that at the time no one else was interested in buying land in the area. About 15 years ago the price for rural land was 5 pesos per meter and the developers started with offers of 30 pesos per meter. As their businesses were not growing anymore some of the strongest dairy farmers decided to no longer investment in their property, but to sell and move somewhere else. One respondent explained: "The majority of those who sold, sold because with that money they went to the zone that we call here in Mexico the zone of the Bajío, which is the most productive zone here in Mexico. Querétaro and then more northern is the Central zone of the country. They managed to obtain bigger and more productive Ranchos. Here with this type of Ranch, they were not going to expand anymore." (Ranch owner Zumpango (2017, May 22). Personal interview).

The same respondent made the decision to sell a part of his own estate to Casas Geo, which has been used for the construction of the well-known social housing neighborhood called 'Trinidad' in Zumpango. This part of his estate was completely

unproductive and not used for anything anyway. Since the offer by Casas Geo was a lucrative opportunity he decided in favor. The respondent also explained how he has been working the land since he was young and how this has created his affection for it. Therefore, after long consideration, he and his mother decided to retain the remainder of the estate that is still used for production.

#### 5.6.2 *Ejidal reasons and outcomes*

Since a land deal with an *ejido* entails many *ejidatarios* and *posisionarios* a multitude of reasons for selling have been encountered. Agriculture does not result in enough returns to support a family and the developers offered more for the land than one could ever earn with farming. People of all ages sold their land and mostly those people that had a job and had never been involved in agriculture. Others do work as farmers and sell their lands to use the money for further investments in land and machinery.

Many from the older generations were less inclined to sell, but especially as land prices increased more and more it became a favorable option. The *ejido* Ozumbilla is located more south in Tecámac and close to the urban fringe. In a land deal with Urbi and Sadasi in 2001, there were hardly any older *ejidatarios* that chose to sell. The *ejido* San Pedro Pozohuacan lies further away from the urban fringe and made a land deal with Homex. Here there was a mix in the age of the *ejidatarios* that decided to sell. Older people had decided to enjoy their old days in a comfortable way too. Younger generations were most interested in selling, as land did not interest them. Land speculations tend to occur in the younger generations.

People sell for the desire to have a better life. Some were overwhelmed by the amount of money that developers offered and had some unrealistic expectations on how long the money would last. It has been spent on alcohol, cars, and long holidays with the whole family or other more consumptive purposes. In these cases, the *ejidatario* or *posesionario* and his family were left no better than before. Others used the money for medical bills, or for the construction of or improvement of a house. There was again another group that did use the money productively and bought greater extensions of land in cheaper and more fertile areas for example in the States of Veracruz or Hidalgo.

Important to note that an *ejidatario* does not cease to be part of the *ejido* when he has sold one of his parcels. For example, the *ejido* Ozumbilla consists of 7 poligonos and each *ejidatario* has a parcel in each of these poligonos. After a land deal with a private sector developer, the *ejidatarios* continued to have their parcels in the other poligonos. In addition, the *ejidatario* continues to have his rights to the communal areas.

### 5.6.3 Comparison

The main motivation of both private property rural landowners and *ejidal* landowner was economic. Even though the private sector developers of social housing did not pay much considering the rise in land value after urbanization, but it was still a lot for the rural landowners. Many former private property rural landowners bought larger and more fertile estates. The outcome for (former) *ejidal* landowners is more mixed. A number of *ejidal* landowners invested the money in land, but many others used it for more consumptive purposes and net was not much better off after the land deal.

### 5.7 Apeo y deslinde

An important step in the technical analysis of the land is called *apeo y deslinde*. This is the exact measurement of the surface of land. Developers buy in the modality of the *ad corpus* of land, so the body (or surface) of the land. *Apeo y deslinde* is done in the presence of a lawyer, a *colindante*, and the neighbors of the landowner. The importance of this act is twofold as it is not only of influence for the price of land, but also makes sure no later issues on the exact lineation of the land with the neighbors occur.

### 5.8 Payment

Rural landowners under both land regimes got paid in installments. With each important legal step, a percentage of the agreed amount was paid. Because *ejidal* land deal required a land tenure change, payment took place in three installments instead of two.

#### 5.8.1 Installments in private property land deals

Once an agreement has been reached the developer hands the landowner a letter of intention, which is then followed by signing the contract and the agreed upon payments. The letter of intention provides security to both parties involved. The landowner knows the developer will do what he said he would do and the developer has the certainty of a future land purchase. Only after all negotiations have been dealt with, the owner or the corporate director of the private sector developer comes in to sign the contract with the

rural landowner. During the signing of the contract, a public notary was present for two functions: taxes and legal registration. In a land deal taxes on rents need to be paid. The public notary is the one holding this money and transferring it to the government. In addition, legal registration needs to take place at the municipal Cadaster.

How payments are arranged varies: “In my case, I am a lawyer, so I will sell and they pay me in installments. I did a payment with dominion reservation, which is a formality in the sale. It means ‘yes I sell it to you but I do not give you the *dominio* [ownership red.] of the land until you finished paying me’. So the sale stays conditional until you finished paying me. So at the beginning, you pay me 50% and the remainder in due time. They did not buy everything in one go, it is always in parts. In general, this was 40% or 50% while signing the contract and the other 50% in x months.” (Ranch owner Zumpango (2017, May 22). Personal interview)

#### 5.8.2 Installment and administration in *ejidal* land deals

After the land deal has been agreed upon, the adoption of *dominio pleno* is a long administrative process. Since the private sector developers have a lot of experience with the disincorporation of *ejidal* land, the involved *ejidatarios* and *posesionarios* hand over the needed documents to the developer. First, the Attorney’s Office needs to approve the request for *dominio pleno* and then this needs to be registered at the RAN. In total it takes about a year to arrange.

There is an obligation to consult with the relatives of the *ejidatario* that wants to alienate his land; the people who have worked on the parcel for more than a year; the individual *ejidatarios* that constitute the *ejido*, the *avencindados* and the remaining population within the *ejido*. In addition, the state and municipal governments have the right of preference to assign another use of the land for purposes of developing projects that serve the public interest. This right must be exercised within a period of thirty calendar days. This consultation is called *derecho del tanto*.

Since there are a number of steps that need to be undertaken for the land tenure change in the *ejidal* land deal, the payment for land is split into three installments: one when the agreement is made, one when the *dominio pleno* is obtained and one when the registration is completed. The percentage of the complete price per installment depends.



Urbi talked about a construction of 50-25-25, while the *ejido* San Pedro Pozohuacan and Homex agreed on 30-30-40. The higher the installment in the beginning the more security the *ejido* has of receiving their money.

### 5.9 Conclusion

Rural land sold in land deals in Tecámac and Zumpango was private property rural land and *ejidal* land. In order to sell *ejidal* land, the land tenure regime had to be changed to private property. Based on the information presented above a number of stakeholders in the land deals in Tecámac and Zumpango were identified and placed into the following stakeholder positions.

A number of stakeholders have been mentioned above which an indirect role, but were in charge of a number of important decision. These stakeholders only had power and were in an *inactive* stakeholder position. These are public notaries, the agrarian attorney and RAN. The intermediates and representatives both had power and interest, which put them in a *dangerous* stakeholder position. Because the private property rural landowners were at an equal position with private sector developers of social housing, they are the only stakeholder in these land deals in a *definitive* position with power, legitimacy, and interest. The *ejidatario* and the *posesionario* were in a *dependent* stakeholder position. They had much less power but did have an interest and legitimacy. *Avencindados* also did not have power so were in a *discretionary* stakeholder position. Finally, the *ejidal* Council and/or moral leaders had a double role. Even though their actions are legal, it is not legitimate. Therefore, they are in the *dangerous* stakeholder position.

## **6. Informal housing options for the urban poor**

The peri-urban zone of large metropolitan cities usually serves as a buffer zone with affordable land for low-income households. Even though the social housing created by private sector developers is supposed to provide an alternative to informal settlement and self-help housing, evaluations have already proven that the social housing policy does not reach all segments of low-income households – it does not reach the poorest of the poor and does not serve people with informal employment. In addition, many people do not consider the social housing developed a dignified housing option. Therefore, many families continue to choose the option of informal settlement through various strategies. This chapter examines to what extent the land deals in Tecámac and Zumpango have affected low-income families' access to land, and what other informal housing options do the urban poor currently pursue.

### **6.1 Peri-urban land market**

With the land deals between private sector developers and rural landowners, the land market in Tecámac and Zumpango has changed irreversibly. The value of land appreciated rapidly. One respondent stated that in Zumpango before 2000 the price of rural land was about 5 pesos per meter, while the current price is around 150 to 200 pesos per meter. For current landowners with right knowledge, the appreciation of land prices is an opportunity to capitalize, but it is making it increasingly difficult for newcomers such as poor immigrants to acquire land. The area of Tecámac and Zumpango has changed rapidly from rural to the peri-urban zone of MCMZ. With the construction of social housing neighborhoods at localities removed from the existing urban built-up and urban infrastructure such as roads, a hospital and a stadium, a spotted alternation of rural and urban land uses now exist side-by-side. With the urban fringe moving towards the municipalities the interests in land have intensified.

### **6.2 Informal settlements**

Informal settlements in Tecámac and Zumpango started about 30 years ago. Tecámac is located above Ecatepec, which is the most densely populated municipality of the State of Mexico, and closer to the urban fringe than Zumpango. In Ecatepec, there are companies and good infrastructure. Hence there are more employment opportunities and public transport is more affordable and secure in Tecámac. For these reasons, there are more informal settlements in Tecámac than in Zumpango. Between 1985 and 2003, the first

informal settlements were formed. When private sector developers started buying rural and developing social housing, the growth of informal settlements slowed down.

Most families that settle informally in Tecámac and Zumpango are in-migrants from other states in Mexico and come in the hopes of finding a job in the economic center of the country. Since these families need a place to reside, their interest in land is obvious. Both municipalities are reasonably close to Mexico City, and near Ecatepec and for example the industrial area of Tizayuca. The land in both municipalities is flat and very adequate for human settlement. The informal settlements are formed on rural land without services. This land usually bought legally and then subdivided. Sometimes land is invaded. Both private property rural land and *ejidal* land were used for informal settlements. Most of the informal settlements are on private property rural land. Even though this land is acquired legally and legitimately; legal human settlements are governed by urban regulations. Oftentimes the subdivision is not in line with urban settlement regulations and therefore informal.

The urban expansion of the municipalities is planned carefully by their respective Urban Development Departments, but these plans are hardly ever followed in practice. Among respondents, there was a clear distrust and lack of confidence in the Mexican government in general. There is a high perception of corruption and paternalism, which from the respondents' perspective reduces the legitimacy of their actions. Before human settlement can take place, a change from rural to urban land use needs to be granted by Urban Development Department at the state level. However, this process takes time and it is a lot of effort. The ownership of private property land is registered at the Cadaster, while the RAN deals with *ejidal* landownership. The Cadaster is responsible for the land administration but does not check Urban Development Plans. The Urban Development Department is not aware of any changes in landownership until people start lobbying for public services. The result is that it is very easy to form an informal settlement.

#### **6.2.1 Subdivision of land**

Most informal settlements are subdivided plots of land and organized through associations. There are many leaders and associations involved in one or multiple steps of buying land, subdividing and claiming services. An informal settlement starts with the acquisition of land at the right price level. The budget for land acquisition of informal

settlers is similar to that of the developers and, thus, both are interested in rural land without any services. After acquiring the land, the same steps need to be undertaken to make the land inhabitable: obtain urban land use and permits for and access to public services. Some of these leaders and associations just help with regularization, others arrange permits at the municipality office, and yet others are just involved in the acquisition of land.

One of the largest associations in housing that provides assistance in the whole process of forming a human settlement is called Amoor. The association works in different municipalities in the State of Mexico. Amoor has an 8 headed-board, and runs different programs in food, health care and housing. They form cooperatives between poor families in order to provide them with housing. The first step in creating a human settlement is putting out a call for families that are in need of land to build their own house. At the moment of interviewing their main project involved 35 families. Unlike the major social housing neighborhoods developed by private sector developers, civil organizations active in housing have small projects with no more than 50 families. Bigger projects are too complicated and costly.

The difference between people that buy a house through INFONAVIT and people that join Amoor is their availability of time and the informal nature of their employment. In general, people that buy a house with INFONAVIT work all day and do not have any time left. After joining a cooperative created by Amoor, people are placed in committees that have certain responsibilities. Everyone needs to have the time to care of his or her tasks to achieve the common goal. Participation is important. Furthermore, most beneficiaries work in the informal sector but have a steady income. Overall the groups seem to be in a similar position with a high interest in land, but with low power. The association only works with Mexican families and never with immigrants from other Latin American countries.

With the signing of the contract with a rural landowner, the cooperation between the families is formed as well. The density of housing is much lower than with a private sector developer, because the respondent indicates that social housing is very small and families need more space. Every family has 200 meters to build a house, while for

private sector developers deliver social housing covering 50 meters. The land should be at a price that is affordable for all families involved. As part of the cooperative, the families all have to make a monthly contribution to pay for the land. The cooperative is made with all the beneficiaries so that everyone puts down money and land is bought in co-ownership.

After buying land, the lobbying at the municipality to obtain permissions for water, electricity, drainage, and pavements starts. After the permits are arranged, which takes a long time, the next step is to assign all plots to the families and to make sure the land is subscribed to their names so they have legal security. It is illegal for families to live on their land before all permits and regularizations have been arranged. As a result, families often have to pay for landownership without being able to live there. This whole process takes about 5 years in total. In Mexico City, this process is a lot easier and can be finished in 3 years.

The respondent from Amoor indicated that finding affordable land in Tecámac was increasingly difficult every time, but there is still land available. The respondent stated that in every land market there is competition. The most difficult part of the process is not finding and buying the land but is making sure that the State of Mexico provides services and gives permits. In comparison to the private sector developers, the association has more issues with obtaining permits, because they have less economic resources. The association has to reunite the money, while developers can get credits from the bank. Everything takes more time within in an association because assembling money within the families is difficult. So even though the private sector developers and the associations have a similar land interest, the associations have less power.

#### **6.2.1.1 Initiatives with private sector developers**

Private sector developers and associations arranging human settlements are competitors on the land market, but initiatives exist between the two as well. At the time of interviewing, Amoor and one of the housing developers were carrying out a housing project together. The association acquires the land and unites the families that will live there. The developer has the machinery and the capital to construct the houses. Since the association provides the land and assures buyers the housing, negotiations focused on lowering the costs of the development of housing.

The benefit would be that people can live in the sort of housing that the association and the families want, which is 120 square meters and not just 60. Furthermore, there would no longer be a role for INFONAVIT. The respondent considered an advantage. The credits of INFONAFIT are expensive and take about 30 years to pay off. The interest charged for a credit of 350 million pesos paid in 30 years is high. Amoor's aim is to have their beneficiaries pay for no more than 8 years.

#### **6.2.1.2 Land tenure**

Informal settlements can take place on both private property rural land and *ejidal* land. The human settlements formed by associations were usually on private property rural land. In the past small parts of *ejidal* land were sold to individuals. Amoor did not want to buy *ejidal* land because it takes too much time. The private sector developers need about one year to arrange an *ejidal* land deal, but Amoor mentioned to a timespan of five years and stated the interest in land of their beneficiaries is too wait so long.

In the past, the *ejido* Ozumbilla has sold some parcels to migrants. With PROCEDE these urban parts have been disembodied of the *ejido* and regularized. At the moment of interviewing, there were no intentions to sell land to an association or individual. Even though these would pay a similar price for land, the respondent considered them unreliable partners. The *ejido* prefers to deal with private sector developers. So both in terms of time and knowledge, and economic resources the private sector developer is a stronger position to acquire *ejidal* land than informal settlers.

#### **6.2.2 Land invasions**

In the State of Mexico invasions of land are taking place less frequently than in the past. The Mexican government has more strict regulations on land invasions. Land invasions tend to take place in municipalities closer to Mexico City such as Xochimilco. Land invasions are not a frequent phenomenon in Zumpango and Tecámac. Both private sector developers and associations sometimes face occupation of their property, but there is a significant difference in their ability to deal with this issue.

The territorial reserves of the major private sector developers of social housing were large. Their territorial reserve management policy depended on the previous land tenure. In the case of private property land, the rural landowner sold his land and left.

Developers then hired two or three people for vigilance of the area. In the case of *ejidal* land, the developer made an agreement with the *ejidal* landowner that he or she could continue farming until constructions started. So while paperwork for different permits was underway and the land had no use yet, the farmers' activities were a security that no invasions take place.

In Tecámac and Zumpango, Casas Geo had to deal with a land invasion of their territorial reserves only once. Casas Geo sued the invaders and in the meantime made sure they left the land as soon as possible. Once people start building their house it becomes more difficult to remove them. The respondent explained that the police did not want to get involved because they do not want to be associated with a scandal. Therefore, Casas Geo asked for a favor at the trucker's union of their transport workers. In Mexico, these are politically strong group with a lot of "punch". So "When this started to happen, we called the union and the union with sticks and stones took the people of the land, as this is how you remove them, and then the lawsuit followed, which we won." (Financial Director Casas Geo Zumpango (2017, May 8). Personal interview). The legitimacy of these type of actions is highly questionable.

At the moment of interviewing, the organization Amoor was dealing with a similar situation. Compared to Casas Geo, they had considerably fewer means to solve the situation. Other people invaded land that they bought for the 35 families they were working with. The president of Amoor explained: "while it is legally possible to evict these people, you need to approach the municipality office for this and they need to help you. Right now we are paying to get these people off our land. It is ridiculous. Why didn't the municipality allow our families to live on this land without services? Now we are paying for the land while it is used by invaders." (President Amoor (2017, May 24). Personal interview).

The best approach is to negotiate with the leader of the land invasion. Developers sometimes just pay the leader, since legal affairs are expensive too. An association cannot afford this. Because of their economic situations, the private sector developers have a higher power position than associations in case of land invasion. Even though the land interest of associations is higher.



#### **6.2.2.1 Social housing invasions**

Instead of buying or invading land to build new housing, there is a group that chooses to occupy social housing. This is a trend that started nationwide in social housing neighborhoods around Mexican cities around 2009. This was when some private sector developers abandoned some neighborhoods half-finished without access to services because of their financial situation. In Zumpango, Homex abandoned their social housing neighborhoods. In Tecámac Casas Geo and Urbi did the same. Many people started to abandon their house because the neighborhoods became unsafe and the daily commutes to their work too exhausting. There are people that took advantage of this situation and occupied empty social housing illegally.

A leader or an association usually organizes the social housing invasions. Unión Fomento Patrimonial (UFP) is one of the main civil organizations that organize invasions in Tecámac. They were formed in 2012 in the social housing neighborhood Valle San Pedro of Urbi. Their aim is to provide people with affordable housing and to regularize the ownership of those that have already invaded social housing.

The organization has contact with developers and banks to negotiate favorable deals for their beneficiaries. All agreements are made verbally. The developer agrees to make a certain amount of social housing in an area of their neighborhoods available for invasion and the bank agrees to people paying a lower price. The secretary of UFP explains that the value of a house as registered in the cadaster is when it has three floors 570 thousand, with two floors 458 thousand and the apartments are 358 thousand. In an agreement with the bank, they give them houses for 200 thousand pesos. Besides these deals with the developer and the bank UFP lobbies at the municipality to lower the cadastral value of the land and in order to lower the amount taxes people need to pay.

The main beneficiaries of UFP are informal sector workers for example street vendors or other kinds of small entrepreneurs. Inhabitants of Santa Fe in Zumpango claimed that the invaders in their neighborhood were family of people that already lived there. They told their family members that certain houses were empty and invited them to come live there too. The secretary of UPF confirms that these are usually migrants from the state

of Mexico or Mexico City and relatives of someone that already lives there. The difference between buying land and building your own house, and invading existing social housing is budget. Both groups have an interest in housing but invading social housing costs half of what is needed to buy land. For people that do not have any money and are in a position of very low power, the best option is to invade a house.

**Picture 6: Invaded Social Housing Social Housing Neighborhood Sante Fe in Zumpango**



Source: Own material

### **6.3 Conclusion**

With the entrance of private sector developers of social housing, the land market in Tecamac and Zumpango has changed irreversibly. The value of land has appreciated with 40% in a number of years. As result, urban poor are in a more difficult position to acquire land. Less powerful groups of urban poor now have a new affordable housing option: invade empty social housing.

Based on the analyses above, the following stakeholders and their positions have been identified. Since the associations that organize informal settlements on legally acquired land have little power, but their beneficiaries do have a land interest and legitimacy

these are in a *dependent* stakeholder position. The same applies to those groups who invade land or social housing of powerful actors such as a private sector developer. However, situations also occur where stakeholders invade land of associations or social housing abandoned by their official owner. Since these groups are in vulnerable position as well, these stakeholders just have a land interest and no legitimacy. Hence they are in an *exigent* stakeholder position.

## Conclusion

In order to achieve sustainable development increased attention to peri-urban land governance is required. This world has entered an “urban age” with the peri-urban area as the dominant urban form of the future and global pressures on land are intensifying. However, the peri-urban area has so far not been part of land governance discussions. Therefore, this research has examined the peri-urban land market where two municipalities located in MCMA were selected to serve as a case study.

Recent land deals between rural landowners and private sector developers of social housing have taken place in the eastern and northern areas of MCMA. The most intense part of the rush for land by private sector developers of social housing was in the municipalities Tecámac and Zumpango.

For their territorial reserves, private sector developers bought rural land without services. The development of social housing is tied to a limited budget and rural land is more affordable. Private sector developers’ territorial strategies focused on Tecámac and Zumpango speculatively: government urban development plans promised to provide services, improve infrastructure and pull economic activity to these municipalities, which would make the area well-located and land value go up. Others elements private sector developers of social housing considered where issues such as the availability of large amounts of contiguous land, the availability and possibility of access to water and electricity, and the existing community. On the municipal level, the issue of land tenure was important as well.

As part of the examination of the land deals that have taken place and the peri-urban land market, a number of stakeholders with different degrees of legitimacy, interest, and power were identified. Table 4 provides an overview of the analysis so far.

**Table 4: stakeholder position of stakeholders in rural land deals in Tecamac and Zumpango since 2000s**

<b>Stakeholders positions and groups in LIP-Framework</b>		
<b>Latent</b>	<b>Expectant</b>	<b>Definitive</b>
<i>Inactive</i>	<i>Dominant</i>	<i>Definitive</i>
Federal government		Private property landowners
INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE		
Banks		
Public notaries		
Agrarian Attorney		
RAN		
<i>Discretionary</i>	<i>Dangerous</i>	
Existing community Tecamac and Zumpango	State government	
Neighbors of private property rural landowners	Municipal government	
<i>Avencindados</i>	Intermediates	
	Representatives	
	<i>Ejidal</i> Council and/or moral leaders	
	Private sector developers of social housing	
<i>Exigent</i>	<i>Dependent</i>	
Land invaders for informal settlement of other low-income groups	<i>Ejidatarios</i>	
Social housing invaders of social housing owners	<i>Posesionarios</i>	
	Informal land subdivision associations	
	Land and social housing invaders of social housing developers	

Source: Own elaboration based on own analysis

Private sector developers of social housing have been engaged in land deals with rural landowners governed under two different land tenure regimes: private property and *ejido*. Since *ejidal* land could not be sold directly, a land tenure change to private property was required. For the development of social housing, the use of land was changed from rural to urban. This land use change took place after the land deals. Furthermore, the land value of the area researched appreciated. Both the land tenure and land use changes made land prices go up. The private sector developers paid a high price for rural land, but considering the rapid appreciation of land value after urbanization, the private sector developer gained the most from the land deals.

Besides the developed social housing, many people continue to pursue other informal housing options as well. The known informal housing form of subdivisions with self-help housing is mostly present in Tecámac and Zumpango and takes place on private property rural land. Collaborations between associations organizing informal housing and private sector developers of social housing are initiated. Land invasions with self-help housing take place as well, but this is not very common. Finally, one group of urban poor has started to invade abandoned or empty social housing, which is a new and more economic informal housing option.

### Inclusiveness

In a fully inclusive land deal none of the stakeholders is excluded or left out, but the analysis of results showed that a number of stakeholders were in a *dependent* position. *Ejidatarios*, *poseisionarios*, associations involved in informal subdivisions, and invaders of land or social housing of private sector developers of social housing were left out. These stakeholders had an interest in land and legitimate claim, but little to no power to defend their interests.

The situation studied in Mexico is exemplary for overall complexity of land governance in peri-urban areas. The land deals examined took place for the development of social housing that should provide a solution for a nationwide problem: a lack of affordable housing for the urban poor. However, if these rural land deals created a new problem for more disadvantaged rural groups, an evaluation is required in which urban and rural needs are weighed.

The private property regime and the regularization of *ejidal* land at least made sure that rural landowners were not expropriated or displaced, as is often the case in rural land grabbing. Negotiations took place and both parties had to agree. However, specifically within the *ejidal* land deals, power relations between the *ejidal* landowners and the private sector developers were clearly not equal. The government should have governed these land deals in a more structured way, but failed to do so. Rural landowners have been underpaid, but some rural landowners were aware the approaching urban fringe and capable to capitalize and re-invest their gaining from the land deals.

Associations organizing informal land subdivision compete with private sector developers for similarly priced land, but associations mentioned the government and

their provision of services as the most pressing issue. Here the situation in Tecámac and Zumpango shows how rural governments in peri-urban areas are not prepared to deal with urban land issues. Mexico City had regulations and programs for informal settlements, but Tecámac and Zumpango did not.

The stakeholders that invade land or social housing of private sector developers are the least powerful stakeholders identified. Of the informal housing options, these are the most affordable and insecure ones. The example of Casas Geo showed how private sector developers could easily expropriate these people. In addition, respondents mentioned that especially land invasions were recently being punished more strictly.

The dynamics of the peri-urban land market of MCMA shows how complex peri-urban governance is. In an effort to improve the situation of the urban poor, both disadvantaged rural landowners and urban poor ended up in a *dependent* stakeholder position, while more powerful actors gain and remain in a *dangerous* stakeholder position. The results presented are a first exploration of peri-urban land market dynamics of major metropolitan areas. It adds a development perspective to peri-urban research and explores a new land governance topic.

The set-up of the Mexican social housing policy can only be found in a number of countries. Therefore, one of the limitations of this research is that private sector social housing developers are not an actor in metropolitan peri-urban areas. Furthermore, local contexts may lead to different conclusions for other countries with similar social housing policies. In general, peri-urbanization tends to have slightly different characteristics in between continent and the Global South and North.

### Policy suggestion

In the case of Mexico, literature and news articles provide plenty of proof that the social housing developed did not serve the needs of the urban poor. Considering the dynamics of the peri-urban land market described, the researcher would like to suggest an alternative set-up of the social housing policy in Mexico. At the time of research, the informal housing associations and private sector developers were looking for ways to collaborate. The associations buy land in a cooperative formed by their beneficiaries, while the developer develops housing adjusted according to their needs. Instead of allowing private sector developers to be involved in all steps of housing development,



the Mexican government could focus part of the efforts to supporting such alternative ways of affordable housing development.

There are a number of advantages in such as an alternative set-up. Since families buy the required land together, and not major private sector developers, the position of rural landowner and buyer becomes more equal. Furthermore, forming a cooperative and pooling resources takes time. This slows down the rate of land deals and urban sprawl. Municipalities would then also better be able to guide urban expansion by timely arranging services. With a more gradual growth of the metropolitan area, land prices appreciate at a lower rate, retaining the affordability of land. Furthermore, in a cooperative more people might be in a position to acquire their own land. Families with fewer resources could opt for a smaller plot of land, while families with more resources can get a larger plot of land within the same cooperative. The city as a whole will have better social cohesion and more safety than in many of the social housing neighborhoods. Finally, this approach still allows for a role for the private sector, but in a way that is less determining and better adjusted to people's needs.

Further research on peri-urban governance should focus on existing collaborations between the civil sector and private sector in affordable housing. Another interesting trend to explore further is the invasions of unoccupied social housing.

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## Appendixes

### Appendix A: Lists of interview questions

#### Introducción entrevistas

El tema de mi investigación es la compra de suelo en Zumpango y Tecámac de las desarrolladoras para la construcción de conjuntos urbanos. Es parte de una maestría en Holanda que se llama “Estudios de Desarrollo” en la facultad geografía. La vista de mi investigación es social y política sobre los actores involucrados, de cual manera y sus influencias en el proceso de compra-venta.

Voy a utilizar la información obteniendo en este entrevista por escribir mi tesis de maestría, que estará en inglés. Después de acabarlo el documento será la propiedad de la universidad en Utrecht y no será utilizando por ningún otros propósitos.

Me gustaría enfatizar que si hay algunos preguntas que no quiera contestar, esta bien. No hay problema. Quiero asegurarle confidencialmente en completo en la tratamiento de todo el información que me diga y anonimidad en completo también. Si prefieras, no mencionaré su nombre o ningún otra dato que se permita reconocer usted. Hasta ahora, ¿todo bien para usted?

Además me gustaría preguntarle para su permisión de grabar esta entrevista. Es que mi español todavía no esta excelente y no quiero perder información. Luego quiero transcribir la grabación. En este manera puedo hacer un análisis de nuestra cita mas tarde y demostrar a mi asesore que de verdad hice mi proprio investigación acá. ¿Está de acuerdo con participación en esta entrevista? ¿y me da su consentimiento para grabar esta entrevista?

## **Ejidatario de un ejido sin ventas – San Bartolo Cuautitlalpan**

### Preguntas de introducción

- Para empezar me gustaría saber un poco sobre el carácter del ejido de que es parte. ¿Qué proceden en los terrenos agropecuario?
- ¿Cuántos ejidatarios hay en este ejido?
- ¿Cuántos hectáreas de terreno cada ejidatario tiene?
- ¿Podría explicarme la estructura del núcleo del ejido? Como entiendo hay ejidatarios, propietarios, vecinos y que mas?
- ¿Cual es el papel de las diferentes personas que forman parte de la comunidad del ejido?
- ¿Cuánto gente hay en el núcleo en total? Incluido vecinos y propietarios.
- ¿Los ejidatarios son familia?
- ¿Cuál es su posición entre el ejido?
- ¿Cuanto fue el fundación del ejido?
- ¿El nombre tiene un significado especial?
- ¿En cual manera este ejido tiene otro carácter en comparación de otros ejidos en Zumpango y Tecámac?
- ¿Que terrenos son parte del ejido?
- ¿Cual es el función del las diferentes zonas?
- ¿Que parte es suya específicamente?
- ¿Como y cuando obtuvo el derecho de usar estas parcelas?

### Preguntas generales

- ¿En cual manera el mercado de terreno se cambio desde los años 2000s? En términos de precios, actores involucrados, relación con los diferentes actores, complejidad, corrupción.
- ¿Cuándo dio cuenta del interés de desarrolladoras en comprar terrenos en Zumpango y Tecámac por primera vez?
- ¿Qué es su opinión sobre las desarrolladoras?
- ¿Cuál actor o organización tiene lo mas influencia en determinar la dirección del desarrollo urbano en Zumpango y Tecámac? Ayuntamiento, gobierno estatal o federal, sector privado, pequeñas propietarios.
- Ya me explico que las desarrolladoras no tienen contacto con el ejido porque sus terrenos no tienen lo correcto uso de suelo. ¿Qué sabe sobre los pequeñas propietarios quien vendieron terrenos?

### Preguntas específicas

- ¿La presencia de las desarrolladoras desde algunos años, se cambio el ambiente dentro el ejido?
- ¿Cuáles son los efectos de específicamente de la entrada de las desarrolladoras en el mercado de terrenos?
- ¿Cuáles son los efectos de la construcción de los fraccionamientos en el ejido?
- ¿Cuál es tu visión del futuro del ejido si las desarrolladoras continúan con el construcción de fraccionamientos?
- ¿Si el ejido esta en acuerdo de vender terrenos cual parte del ejido seria ser? Parcelas o comunales? Parcelas – selección del parcela?

**Muchas gracias!**

## **Ejidatario quien vendió tierra rural - San Pedro Pozohuacan, Tecámac**

### Preguntas de introducción

- Para empezar me gustaría saber un poco sobre el carácter del ejido San Jerónimo Xonacahuacan y San Pedro Pozohuacan. Creo que ya me explicó pero aún no entiendo en completo porque son dos grupos con otros nombres pero les son parte de lo mismo ejido. ¿Cómo se pasó?
- ¿Cuál es el superficie del ejido en completo?
- ¿Qué producen en los parcelas?
- ¿Cuántos ejidatarios hay en este ejido?
- ¿Los ejidatarios son familia?
- ¿Cuento hectáreas de tierra cada ejidatario tiene?
- ¿Al lado de trabajar en sus parcelas los ejidatarios tienen otro trabajo también? ¿Cuál tipos de trabajo?
- ¿Cuál es su posición dentro el ejido? (parte del comisario, vigilancia, ejidatario)
- ¿Cual es el papel de las diferentes personas que forman parte de la comunidad del ejido?
- ¿Cual es el función del las diferentes zonas de un ejido?
- ¿Como y cuando obtuvo el derecho de usar estas parcelas?

### Preguntas generales

- Antes del primer contacto con Homex, ¿Ya daba cuenta de las actividades en la compra de terrenos de las desarrolladoras en Tecámac? ¿Cuándo dio cuenta de lo por primera vez?
- ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre la compra de terrenos de las desarrolladoras en Zumpango y Tecámac? (positivo – buen manera de vender terreno; negativo: complica la realización de las actividades agrícolas e influyó en la atmósfera dentro del ejido)
- ¿Los conjuntos urbanos como se afectó las actividades agropecuario del ejido?
- ¿Las compras de terrenos de las desarrolladoras, cómo se afectó el mercado de tierra en Tecámac y Zumpango?
- Además ¿Hay otros cambios que pasó que influyó el mercado de tierra, la venta de terrenos de pequeña propietarios y ejidales en general en Zumpango?
- ¿Como cambio el precio de los terrenos en los años pasados?
- ¿El cambio en precio y la venta de terrenos tuvieron una influencia en el ambiente dentro el ejido?

### Preguntas específicas

- Ya me dijo que en el año 2006 el ejido empezó de negociar con Homex sobre la posibilidad de vender terrenos de su ejido. ¿Quien se acercó al ejido para comprar terrenos? ¿El contacto fue directamente entre Homex y el ejido? Si no, cual tipo era el intermediario? ¿Cómo podría contactar el?
- ¿Quién era el representante del ejido durante los negociaciones? ¿Había cambios en el representación del ejido? ¿Por cual razón?
- ¿La desarrolladora tuvo en interés en terrenos específicos? ¿Cuáles y por cuales razones?
- ¿Cuál terreno el ejido se vendió? Fue parcelas, área comunales, etc. ¿Cómo fue el selección entre el ejido de cual terrenos son adecuados para vender?

- ¿Por cuales razones el ejido decidió de vender terrenos?
- ¿Entre el ejido la gente estaba en acuerdo en completo sobre la venta? Si no, porque no?
- Ya me dijo también que el proceso de vender cuestó 6 o 7 años en total. ¿Podría decirme, después el primer contacto entre la desarrolladora y el ejido, como fue el proceso de vender? ¿Cuál pasos pasó entre el primer contacto y la venta final algunas años después? (Claro hable sobre pasos legales e ilegales; quien estaban involucrados y cuales eran sus papeles)
- Desde su vista, en el proceso de vender terrenos ejidales, ¿Quién tiene un papel más importante e influencia de decidir en la venta de terrenos?
- ¿Cómo el ejido decidió el precio que le gustaría recibir para sus terrenos? ¿Cuál consideraciones fue importantes? (Cualidad del terreno, locación, etc.) ¿El ejido ahora esta satisfecho con el precio que recibieron?
- ¿Si el ejido vendió parcelas, que pasó con los ejidatarios quien antes usaban estos parcelas? ¿Hubo un redistribución de los parcelas entre los ejidatarios después de la venta?
- ¿Por quien fue el pago de la desarrolladora? ¿Se distribuido entre los ejidatarios?
- ¿Ahora el ejido tiene interés en vender mas terrenos o no?
- ¿Hay otras ofertas para vender mas terrenos?

#### Preguntas de cierre

- También me gustaría saber sobre el proceso de vender terrenos desde la vista de alguien sin el poder de votar sobre eso por ejemplo un vecino o propietario de ese ejido. ¿Sabe alguien quien podría contactar para una entrevista?
- ¿Sabe si otros ejidos vendieron terrenos a desarrolladoras en Tecámac también? ¿Cómo podría contactar gente de eso(s) ejido(s)?
- ¿Hay características del proceso de vender terrenos que aún no le pregunté o aun no discutimos?
- ¿Tiene algo más que agregar sobre esta tema?
- Si más tarde surgen mas preguntas, ¿ Lo puedo contactar otra vez?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mi en este momento?

**Muchas gracias!**

## **Presidente Asociación Ganadera**

- ¿Podría decirme cual es la meta de la asociación ganadera?
- ¿Desde cuando esta presidente de la asociación ganadera?
- ¿Cual es tu trabajo como presidente de la asociación ganadera?

Mi investigación es sobre la compra de terrenos de desarrolladoras en los municipios Zumpango y Tecámac. Ayer platicué con un ejidatario de un ejido en Tecámac que vendió algunas parcelas hace algunos años. Fue una entrevista muy interesante. Sin embargo la mayoría de los fraccionamientos y conjuntos urbanos están construyendo en terrenos que antes eran parte de un rancho. Por entender ambos procesos, la compra de terrenos ejidos y pequeña propiedad a desarrolladoras, también me gustaría entrevistar un rancho quien vendió sus terrenos a por ejemplo Casas Geo o Homex. XX de la Secretaria de Agropecuario me dijo que si alguien tenga conocimiento sobre eso o sepa con quien otro debo platicar tiene que ser usted. Entonces:

- ¿Cuando empezó de da cuenta del interés de desarrolladoras en terrenos en Zumpango?
- ¿Desde su vista en cual manera las desarrolladoras se afectaron el mercado de terreno en Zumpango?
- ¿Por cuales razones mucha gente quiere vender sus terrenos?
- ¿Como va el proceso de vender terrenos de propiedad privado a una desarrolladora?
- ¿En cual manera la desarrolladora busca contacto con propietarios de terrenos?
- ¿Cual actores están involucrados en cuales están sus papeles?
- ¿Cual actor tiene un papel con mucha influencia?
- ¿Cuanto tiempo cuesta todo el proceso?
- ¿Como va el negocio del precio? Cuales son consideraciones importantes durante la determinación del precio de terrenos?
- ¿Hay casos de conflictos o presión?
- ¿Sabe algo sobre gente quien compro terrenos especulativos cerca de un conjunto urbano?
- ¿Sabe alguien quien antes tuvo terrenos pero les vendió a una desarrolladora y todavía esta viviendo en Zumpango y quizás vaya estar de acuerdo con una entrevista conmigo?

**Muchas gracias!**

## Casas Geo

### Preguntas de introducción

- ¿Desde cuándo esta trabajando para Casas Geo? ¿Desde de cuando en Zumpango?
- ¿Podría decirme cuál es su trabajo y cuáles son sus principales responsabilidades?
- ¿Sabe qué compañía de inversión es la propietaria actual de Casas Geo?

### Preguntas generales

- ¿Cómo predice Casas Geo el crecimiento de las áreas urbanas de las diferentes ciudades en México?
- En previsión del crecimiento urbano, ¿Casas Geo utiliza estrategias para comprar tierras especulativamente? ¿Cómo funciona una estrategia como eso?
- ¿Es esto lo que se denomina una estrategia de banca terrestre?
- ¿La decisión de invertir en Zumpango coincidió con el anuncio del proyecto Ciudades Bicentenario o fue el interés de Casas Geo en esta área antes? ¿Si no, Por qué?
- ¿Cuándo Casas Geo empezó de adquirir terrenos necesaria para sus proyectos de vivienda social en Zumpango?

### Preguntas específicas

- ¿Cuál tipo de **intermedios** Casas Geo usa en general? Personas individuales o empresas profesionales
- Podría decirme cómo Homex generalmente adquiere la tierra necesaria para sus proyectos de vivienda social? Pasos que sobre que estaba pensando y me gustaría saber mas es por ejemplo
- la selección de terreno (Homex utiliza un empresa intermediaria o personal individuales intermediaras?, y
- cual son los criterios (cualidad de tierra, locación etc.) de selección terreno?),
- el procese de negociación del precio y
- el tratamiento de temas legales.
- ¿Cómo se dividen las responsabilidades en el curso de este proceso entre diferentes empleados? (Central o centralmente organizada, por distrito o incluso más central)
- ¿Cual persona tiene la responsabilidad final de comprar terreno para la empresa Casas Geo en general?
- **¿Podría describir el proceso de comprar tierra para la última adquisición en la que usted estuvo involucrado personalmente?**
- ¿Qué sucede con la tierra rural (ejidal) después de convertirse en propiedad de Geo Casas?
- ¿Y Qué pasa con los ejidatarios o otras personas viviendo en esta tierra?
- ¿Cuál es la política de Casas Geo relativa a las tierras que se han comprado pero todavía no se utilizan para ningún conjunto urbano?
- Pregunta sobre situación financiera?
- ¿Casas Geo todavía compra tierras para sus conjuntos urbanos en general en México? Si todavía comprando ¿Por donde?

- ¿Quién fue responsable de comprar tierra en la zona al norte de DF, y más específicamente en Zumpango?
- ¿Cómo podría contactar a esta persona?
- ¿Hay alguna tierra que todavía se está comprando en Zumpango?
- ¿Hay tierra de Casas Geo en Zumpango todavía no se usa para proyectos de vivienda social?
- ¿Quién es responsable de la gestión de las áreas? ¿Casa Geo quiere revender los terrenos?

#### Preguntas de cierre

- Quiero entender el proceso de compra y venta de terrenos de pequeña propiedad o ejidatales a desarrolladoras y quienes están involucrados en el proceso. ¿Tiene algo más que agregar sobre esta tema?
- Si más tarde surgen mas preguntas, ¿ Lo puedo contactar otra vez?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mi en este momento?

**Muchas gracias!**



## **Secretaría Técnica Municipalidad Tecámac**

### Preguntas de introducción

- ¿Cuál es su trabajo en el ayuntamiento de Tecamac?
- Pues, ahora trabaja como secretaria técnica, ¿que estaba tu trabajo antes en el Desarrollo Urbano?
- ¿Desde cuando estas trabajando en la oficina del ayuntamiento?
- ¿Cuándo empezó de da cuenta del interés de desarrolladoras en tierra en Tecamac?
- ¿Cuál desarrolladores de conjuntos urbanos hay en Tecamac?

### Preguntas generales

- ¿En que tipo de terreno ocurrió la mayoría de los cambios en desarrollo urbano? (pequeña propiedad, ejidal, comunal, otro) ¿Por qué?
- Desde su vista, ¿Cómo fue la compra de tierra de las desarrolladoras al principio?
- ¿Desde su vista en cual manera el mercado de terreno se cambio desde los años 2000s? En términos de precios, actores involucrados, relación con los diferentes actores, complejidad, corrupción.
- ¿Sabe porque muchos dueños quieren vender sus terrenos? Vi muchos anuncios de personas quien quieren vender sus terrenos en la municipalidad.
- ¿Las desarrolladoras todavía están adquiriendo tierras?
- Pensaba que la autorización para construir un fraccionamiento es la responsabilidad del Estado de México, pero alguien me dijo que desde algunos años la municipalidad tiene una voz en esta cuestión también. ¿Podría explicarme como y desde cuando? ¿Y la municipalidad tiene influencia en las decisiones en nivel Estatal en cualquiera manera?
- ¿Cuáles otras decisiones de la federación o del estado de México han tenido un gran influencia en el desarrollo urbano de Tecámac? ¿La municipalidad siempre es en acuerdo con las decisiones a nivel Estatal y Federal? ¿De cual manera la municipalidad tiene una influencia?

### Preguntas específicas

- ¿Cómo está la relación entre las desarrolladoras y el ayuntamiento? ¿De cual manera y sobre cual temas tienen contacto? (cambio en uso de suelo)
- ¿De cual nivel de gobierno son las regulaciones en transacciones de terrenos? ¿El municipio tiene una voz en eso? ¿Quién en el ayuntamiento tiene una vista y mantiene la regulación de transacciones de terrenos?
- ¿Hubo/Hay conflictos sobre acceso a tierra en Zumpango?
- ¿Dónde están los asentamientos irregulares en Zumpango?
- ¿Desde cuando se existen?
- El municipio, ¿Cómo se resuelve conflictos de tierra?
- ¿En cual tipo de tierra están?
- ¿El crecimiento de estos asentamientos fue rápido?
- ¿Hubo invasiones de las reservas territoriales de desarrolladoras?
- ¿Que sabe sobre la relación entre los desarrolladores y los pequeños propietarios en Tecámac?
- ¿Que sabe sobre la relación entre los desarrolladores y los ejidos en Tecámac?
- ¿Conoces algún ejido que vendió parte de su terreno a un desarrollador comercial? ¿Cuál ejido? Cuando? ¿Sabe como le pueda contactar?

### Preguntas de cierre

- ¿Con quien mas debería platicar si saber mas sobre diferentes grupos con un interes en tierra en Tecamac?
- ¿Tiene algo más que agregar sobre esta tema?
- Si más tarde surgen mas preguntas, ¿ Lo puedo contactar otra vez?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mi en este momento?

**Muchas gracias!**

## **Oficiara de Municipalidad Zumpango #1**

### Preguntas de introducción

- ¿Cual es su trabajo o función en el municipio de Zumpango? ¿Cuales son sus responsabilidades?
- ¿Desde cuando trabaja en la oficina del ayuntamiento?

### Preguntas específicamente

- ¿Dónde están los asentamientos irregulares en Zumpango?
- ¿Desde cuando hay asentamientos irregulares en Zumpango?
- ¿Cuál tipo de gente esta en un asentamiento irregular?
- ¿Cuánto tiempo cuesta mas o menos hasta un asentamiento irregulares se convertir en una colonia populares?
- ¿En que tipo de terrenos están los asentamientos irregulares?
- ¿El crecimiento de asentamientos ha sido rápido? ¿Mas rápido en los anos recientes que antes?
- ¿Hubo conflictos entre la gente de asentamientos irregulares y los propietarios de tierra?
- Mas específicamente entre desarrolladoras y gente de asentamiento informal? Por ejemplo cuando una desarrolladora compre tierra pero la utiliza directamente para construcciones y gente invade estas tierras.
- ¿Cual es la política del municipio para resolver los conflictos en propiedad de tierras entre los justos propietarios y gente de asentamiento informal?
- ¿Cómo podría contactar el líder de un asentamiento irregular para preguntarle mas sobre cuestiones en propiedad de suelo?
- ¿Hubo conflictos en propiedad de tierra en general en Zumpango?
- Leí en internet sobre invasiones de casas desocupadas en conjuntos urbanos en Zumpango. ¿Qué sabe sobre la invasión de casas desocupadas en los conjuntos urbanos?
- ¿En cuales conjuntos urbanos se pasó?
- ¿Cantidad de invasiones? ¿Hay crecimiento rápido en invasiones?
- ¿Desde cuando la municipalidad empezó de da cuenta a invasiones?
- ¿Qué es el papel de la municipalidad de eso?
- ¿Cómo podría contactar gente quien invadió una casa en un conjunto urbano?

### Preguntas de cierre

- Si quiero saber mas sobre solapamiento de intereses en acceso de tierra y/o invasión de casas en conjuntos urbanos, ¿con quien mas me aconsejaría de hablar?
- ¿Hay algo mas que quiera agregar sobre la compra de tierras en Zumpango y solapamiento de intereses?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mi en este momento?

**Muchas gracias!**

## **Ejidatario #2 San Pedro Pozohuacan**

### Preguntas de introducción

- ¿Cuál es su posición entre el ejido? Comisariado, ejidatario?
- ¿Como y cuando obtuvo el derecho de usufructos de sus parcelas?
- ¿Dónde están sus parcelas?
- ¿Cuál es el superficie de sus terrenos?
- ¿Qué produce en sus parcelas?
- ¿Se dedica a trabajar en sus parcelas en tiempo completo?

### Preguntas generales

- Antes de la reforma de la Constitución en los noventas, ¿Hubo rentas informales de parcelas o parte de parcelas para asentamientos humanos de por ejemplo migrantes? ¿Hubo invasiones de tierras ejidales de gente con escasos recursos en algún manera? ¿Y mas recentó hay?
- Antes del primer contacto con Homex, ¿Ya daba cuenta de las actividades en la compra de terrenos de las desarrolladoras en Tecámac? ¿Cuándo dio cuenta de lo por primera vez? ¿Cómo?
- ¿El cambio en precio de suelo y la venta de terrenos tiene una influencia en el ambiente entre los ejidatarios en el ejido? ¿De cual manera?

### Preguntas específicas

- ¿Qué recuerda de la venta de parcelas de algunos ejidatarios en 2006?
- ¿Cuántos ejidatarios se vendieron sus parcelas?
- ¿Cuáles tipos de gente eran los ejidatarios? Joven, viejo, con otro trabajo o no.
- ¿Estuvo involucrados en la venta en algún manera? ¿Cómo?
- ¿De quien estuvo la iniciativa de vender parcelas? (intermedio, ejidatario, desarrolladora)
- ¿Los ejidatarios quien quería vender se unieron para los negocios con la desarrolladora sin conflictos internos?
- ¿Cómo fue el contacto con la desarrolladora?
- ¿Por qué se costó muchos años entre el primer contacto con la desarrolladora y la venta en 2006?
- ¿El ejido estaba en acuerdo sobre la venta? ¿Por qué si o no?
- ¿Quién dentro del ejido tenía un papel en la venta muy importante? ¿Por qué?
- Desde su vista, ¿Quién ganó lo más durante la venta a la desarrolladora?
- ¿Qué fueron las consecuencias de la venta para el ejido?
- ¿Sabe como los ejidatarios quien se vendieron sus parcelas están ahora? ¿Cómo se usaron el dinero de la venta?
- ¿Tiene un interés en vender sus parcelas también?
- ¿Esta en negociación con una desarrolladora ahora?
- ¿Negocios con una desarrolladora van diferentes ahora que antes? ¿Mas igual, mas rápido?
- ¿Cómo va a usar el dinero de la venta?
- ¿Los conjuntos urbanos a lado de sus parcelas afectan sus actividades agropecuario? ¿Cómo?

- ¿Qué es su vista del futuro del ejido en San Pedro? ¿Piensas que en 10 años todavía existirá un ejido o todos los ejidatarios ya se fueron a otros lugares?
- ¿Ejidatarios quien van a vender sus parcelas, como se van a usar el dinero de la venta?

#### Preguntas de cierre

- ¿Tiene algo más que agregar sobre esta tema?
- Si más tarde surgen mas preguntas, ¿ Lo puedo contactar otra vez?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mi en este momento?

**Muchas gracias!**

## **Posesionario San Pedro Pozohuacan**

### Preguntas de introducción

- ¿Desde de cuando vive en el municipio Tecámac? ¿Su familia es de Tecámac también? ¿Cuál era el profesión de sus padres?
- ¿Desde cuando se renta una parcela de ese ejido?
- ¿Sabe cual periodo de rentar una parcela de un ejido es lo mas común?
- ¿Trabajar en la parcela es su profesión en tiempo completo? ¿Qué otro trabajo hace?
- ¿Antes de rentar una parcele que era su profesión?
- ¿Por cual razón se renta una parcela y no tiene posesión de su propia?
- ¿Como encontró la posibilidad de rentar de este ejido?

### Preguntas generales

- ¿Como esta su relación con el ejido? (amable, comunicativo, complicado)
- ¿Sabe algunos ejidatarios o solo hay comunicación con el comisariado? ¿La relación con el ejido es mas de uno de informar o tiene influencia en decisiones comunales en cualquier manera? ¿El ejido se consulta con usted?
- ¿De cual manera el ejido se informó de los negocios con una desarrolladora algunos anos pasados?
- ¿Que recuerda de la venta de parcelas de este ejido algunos anos antes?
- ¿Quién dentro el ejido tenia un papel importante? ¿Por qué?
- ¿Cuál es su impresión de como fue los negociaciones con la desarrolladora?
- ¿Cómo eran las relaciones entre los diferentes ejidatarios durante la venta?
- ¿Estaba en acuerdo con la venta de las parcelas? ¿Por que?
- ¿Tenia un voz en el decisión en cualquiera manera? ¿Seria importante para usted de tener mas influencia en decisiones dentro el ejido? ¿Platicó con diferentes ejidatarios sobre los desarrolladores dentro el ejido?
- ¿La venta había consecuencias para usted en cualquier manera? Cultivar en su parcela, seguridad de su cultivación, otro.
- ¿Desde su vista quien en el ejido tiene mucho influencia en los decisiones en general?

### Preguntas generales

- ¿Cuando empezó de dar cuenta del interés de desarrolladoras en comprar terrenos en Tecámac en general?
- ¿Las desarrolladoras antes de la venta ya se afectaron la renta de su parcela?
- ¿Tiene la impresión que la llegue de las desarrolladoras tenia una influencia en el ambiente del ejido?
- Desde su vista, como posesionario de ese ejido y habitante de Tecámac, ¿cuáles son los costos y los ingresos de la presencia de las desarrolladoras y los conjuntos urbanos en Tecámac?

### Preguntas de cierre

- ¿Tiene algo más quera agregar sobre la venta de parceles de ese ejido a una desarrolladora?
- Si más tarde surgen mas preguntas, ¿Seria bien si contactarle otra vez?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mi en este momento?

**Muchas gracias!**



## **Unión Fomento Patrimonial**

### Preguntas de introducción

- Rolando me dijo que la organización se llama Unión Fomento Patrimonial, ¿Cuándo y cómo se formó?
- ¿Podría explicarme la meta de UFP?
- ¿Con que tipo de acciones espera de conseguir esa meta?
- La organización frente mexiquense para defensa de la vivienda digna es muy similar de UFP, ¿cuál es la diferencia entre las organizaciones?
- ¿UFP trabaja en Zumpango también?
- ¿Cómo esta la organización dentro la UFP? ¿Cuál es su trabajo dentro la organización? El líder y ¿Quien mas con cuales papeles y cuantos personas en total?

### Preguntas generales

- ¿Cómo fueron las invasiones? ¿Es algo individual o organizado?
- ¿Cuándo empezaron estas invasiones?
- ¿Cual tipo de gente son los que invaden? (Familias, parejas, individuales)
- ¿Son familia de les habitantes de esos conjuntos urbanos o migrantes del afuera?
- ¿Crea que sea más económico de vivir en una casa invadido de comprar un lote en un asentamiento irregular?
- ¿Por qué eso pasa en algunos conjuntos urbanos y en otros no?
- ¿Existen otras organizaciones que están involucradas en invasiones de casas desocupadas?
- ¿Como podría contactar esas organizaciones?
- ¿Durante negociaciones entre UFP y la desarrolladora, municipalidad, etc. ¿qué organización o persona tiene lo más poder?
- Durante negociaciones sobre una cantidad de casas para invadir, ¿Siempre es sobre casas en nuevos conjuntos urbanos o a veces también sobre conjuntos urbanos ya construidos?
- ¿Cuántos casas en Tecamac ahorita están invadiendo?
- Después de invadir una casas, ¿La gente quiere quedarse en esa casas?
- Rolando me dijo algo de un programa que llama paga tu casa como renta ¿Sabes que es paga tu casa como renta?
- ¿Hay razones para continuar las invasiones de casas? ¿En la de misma cantidad de ahora?

### Preguntas de cierre

- ¿Hay algo mas que quiera agregar sobre esta tema?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mi en el momento?

**Muchas gracias!**

## Parnelli/Hogares Union

### Preguntas de introducción

- ¿Desde cuándo esta trabajando para Parnelli en Zumpango? ¿Trabaja en la municipalidad Tecámac también?
- ¿Cuál es su trabajo y cuáles son sus principales responsabilidades?
- ¿Qué son/eran sus responsabilidades durante en la compra de terrenos en Zumpango?

### Preguntas generales

- La gente me dijo que Parnelli y Hogares Union son la misma empresa. ¿Por qué existen dos nombres?
- ¿Cuál empresa de inversión es el propietario de Parnelli/Hogares Union? ¿Hubo muchos cambios en el propietario desde la fundación de Parnelli?
- ¿Cuándo fue la fundación de Parnelli?
- ¿La empresa solo se dedica a la construcción de conjuntos urbanos con viviendas de interés social?
- En previsión de crecimiento urbano, ¿Parnelli utiliza estrategias para comprar tierras especulativamente?
- ¿Cual departamento es responsable para el planificación de la estrategia para ciudad de México?
- ¿Cómo planifica Parnelli en nivel macro la compra de sus terrenos?
- ¿Cómo se dividen las responsabilidades durante la planificación de la estrategia y la compra de terrenos entre diferentes empleados en Parnelli?
- ¿Cual persona tiene la responsabilidad final de comprar terreno para la empresa Parnelli en general?

### Preguntas específicas

- ¿Cuándo Parnelli empezó de adquirir terrenos necesaria para sus proyectos de vivienda social en Zumpango (y Tecámac)?
- ¿Hubo una estrategia para ambas municipalidades? ¿Cómo se aparecieron? ¿Por qué se escogió esas municipalidades? ¿Cuándo?
- ¿Quién fue responsable de comprar tierra en la zona al norte de DF, y más específicamente en Zumpango (y Tecámac)?
- ¿Por cuales razones Parnelli compro terrenos de pequeña propiedad en Zumpango y terrenos ejidales en Tecámac?
- **¿Podrías describir el proceso de comprar tierra para la última adquisición en la que usted estuvo involucrado personalmente?**
  - selección de terreno – quien y como? Corredor?
  - cooperación entre el comité de los negocios
  - papel intermedio
  - El negocio del precio
  - Actores – directo/indirecto; papel de los actores
- ¿Cuál autorizaciones o permisos necesitas de los diferentes niveles del gobierno?
- Entiendo que los autorizaciones para usar agua, tener acceso a *servicios públicos* y la autorización estatal de construir un conjunto urbano son aspectos muy importante para una desarrolladora en la compra de terrenos. ¿Parnelli siempre espera con una compra hasta tiene esas autorizaciones? ¿por qué si o no?

- ¿Cuál actor tiene un papel con gran influencia en el proceso de la compra?
- ¿Sabe qué sucede con terrenos después de convertirse en propiedad de Parnelli?
- ¿Cuál es la política de Parnelli relativa a las tierras que se han comprado pero todavía no se utilizan para ningún conjunto urbano?
- ¿Hubo invasiones de terrenos de Parnelli de grupos de gente con pocos recursos?
- El crisis en 2009, ¿De cual manera se afecto Parnelli?
- ¿Parnelli todavía esta comprando terrenos para construir conjuntos urbanos en Zumpango y Tecámac? ¿Por donde?
- ¿Hay terrenos de Parnelli en Zumpango y Parnelli que todavía no se usa para proyectos de vivienda social?
- ¿Quién es responsable de la gestión de las áreas? ¿Parnelli quiere revender los terrenos?
- ¿Cuál conjuntos urbanos en Zumpango y Tecámac están de Parnelli? ¿Todos son con viviendas de interés social?
- ¿Hay invasiones de casas desocupadas en conjuntos urbanos en Zumpango y/o Tecámac? ¿En cuales conjuntos urbanos? ¿Cuál es el papel de Parnelli en eso?

#### Preguntas de cierre

- ¿Tiene algo más que agregar sobre esta tema?
- Si más tarde surgen mas preguntas, ¿ Lo puedo contactar otra vez?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mi en este momento?

**Muchas gracias!**

## Urbi

### Preguntas de introducción

- ¿Cuál es su trabajo y cuáles son sus principales responsabilidades?
- ¿Desde cuándo está trabajando para Urbi en Tecámac?
- ¿Qué son/eran sus responsabilidades durante en la compra de terrenos en Zumpango?

### Preguntas generales

- ¿Cuándo fue la fundación de Urbi?
- ¿Quién es el propietario de Urbi? ¿Cuál empresa de inversión es el propietario de Urbi? ¿Hubo muchos cambios en el propietario desde la fundación de Urbi?
- El crisis en 2009, ¿De cual manera se afectó Urbi?
- ¿La empresa solo se dedica a la construcción de conjuntos urbanos con viviendas de interés social?
- ¿Cuál es la estructura del corporativo Urbi?
- ¿Cual departamento es responsable para el planificación de la estrategia para ciudad de México?
- En previsión de crecimiento urbano, ¿Urbi utiliza estrategias para comprar tierras especulativamente?
- ¿Cómo se dividen las responsabilidades durante la compra de terrenos entre diferentes empleados en Urbi?
- ¿Cual persona tiene la responsabilidad final de comprar terreno para la empresa Urbi en general?

### Preguntas específicas

- ¿Cuándo Urbi empezó de adquirir terrenos necesaria para sus proyectos de vivienda social Tecámac?
- ¿Urbi tiene una preferencia de comprar terrenos de pequeña propiedad o terrenos ejidales? ¿Por qué?
- **¿Podrías describir el proceso de comprar tierra para la última adquisición en la que usted estuvo involucrado personalmente?**
  - selección de terreno – quien y como? Corredor?
  - cooperación entre el comité de los negocios
  - papel intermedio
  - El negocio del precio
  - Actores – directo/indirecto; papel de los actores
- ¿Cuál actor tiene un papel con gran influencia en el proceso de la compra?
- Entiendo que las autorizaciones para usar agua, tener acceso a *servicios públicos* y la autorización estatal de construir un conjunto urbano son aspectos muy importantes para una desarrolladora en la compra de terrenos. ¿Urbi siempre espera con una compra hasta tiene esas autorizaciones? ¿por qué si o no?
- ¿Sabe qué sucede con terrenos después de convertirse en propiedad de Urbi?
- ¿Cuál es la política de Urbi relativa a las tierras que se han comprado pero todavía no se utilizan para ningún conjunto urbano?
- ¿Urbi todavía está comprando terrenos para construir conjuntos urbanos en Zumpango y Tecámac? ¿Por donde?

- ¿Hay terrenos de Urbi en Zumpango y Urbi que todavía no se usa para proyectos de vivienda social?
- ¿Quién es responsable de la gestión de las áreas? ¿Urbi quiere revender los terrenos?
- ¿Cuál conjuntos urbanos en Zumpango y Tecámac están de Urbi? ¿Todos son con viviendas de interés social?
- Entiendo que hay muchas invasiones de casas desocupadas en los conjuntos urbanos de Urbi en Tecámac. ¿Qué tipo de gente son? ¿Qué es su estimación de la cantidad de esas invasiones? ¿Cuál es la política de Urbi acerca de invasiones?

#### Preguntas de cierre

- ¿Tiene algo más que agregar sobre esta tema?
- Si más tarde surgen mas preguntas, ¿ Lo puedo contactar otra vez?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mi en este momento?

**Muchas gracias!**

## **Desarrollo Urbano Estatal en Tecámac**

### Preguntas de introducción

- ¿Qué es su trabajo en el Desarrollo Urbano Estatal? ¿Desde cuando? ¿Cuáles son sus tareas más importantes?
- ¿Cuál es su papel en encontrar una solución o al menos manejar las invasiones?
- ¿Qué diferentes organizaciones representando invasores hay? ¿Tiene contacto con todos los líderes de invasores de casas en conjunto urbanos? ¿De cual manera?

### Preguntas generales

- ¿Qué podría decirme sobre las invasiones de casas desocupadas en conjuntos urbanos en Tecámac?
- ¿Desde cuando el Estado de México empezó de dar cuenta a invasiones en casas desocupadas en estado de México? ¿Cómo? ¿En cual áreas? ¿En cual municipalidad se empezó? ¿Qué sabe sobre invasiones en Tecámac y Zumpango?
- ¿Cuál tipo de gente es quien invade una casa desocupada en un conjunto urbano? ¿Todas las invasiones son organizadas o no?
- Para gente con escasos recursos también hay la posibilidad de vivir en un asentamiento irregular. ¿Es lo mismo tipo de gente quien viven en un asentamiento irregular y quien invaden una casa? ¿Cual diferencia hay? ¿Los asentamientos irregulares o las invasiones son más problemática para el Desarrollo Urbano Estatal? ¿Por qué la gente prefiere ocupar una casa en un conjunto urbano sobre un lote en un asentamiento irregular? ¿Desde las invasiones en conjuntos urbanos hay menos crecimiento en los asentamientos irregulares?
- ¿Cuál es la policía del Estado de México en resolver esta cuestión?
- ¿Cómo está el contacto entre las organizaciones civiles, la desarrolladora, la municipalidad y el estado?
- ¿Sabe por qué eso pasa en algunos conjuntos urbanos y en otros no? ¿Uno conjunto urbano es más adecuado que otro? ¿Cómo?
- ¿Cuáles otras organizaciones están involucradas en las invasiones de casas?
- ¿Cuántas ocupaciones hay en este momento en Tecámac y Zumpango?
- ¿Hay organizaciones para defender de los derechos de los dueños de casas desocupadas?
- ¿Hay la posibilidad de comprar la casa que ha invadido?
- ¿Cree que las invasiones van a continuar? ¿Al velocidad más rápida o no?

### Preguntas de cierre

- ¿Con quien más me aconsejaría de platicar sobre este tema?
- ¿Hay algo más que quiera agregar sobre este tema?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mí en el momento?

**Muchas gracias!**

## **Ejidatario de un ejido que se vendió terreno –Ozumbilla, Tecámac**

### Preguntas de introducción

- ¿Cuanto fue el fundación del ejido?
- ¿El nombre tiene un significado especial?
- ¿Qué proceden en los terrenos agropecuario?
- ¿Cuántos ejidatarios hay en este ejido? ¿Y cuánto vecinos o posesionarios?
- ¿Cuanto hectáreas de tierra cada ejidatario tiene?
- ¿Los ejidatarios son familia?
- ¿Cuál es su posición entre el ejido? Comisario, ejidatario.
- ¿Como y cuando obtuvo el derecho sus parcelas?
- ¿Dónde están sus parcelas?
- ¿Cuál es el superficie de sus terrenos?
- ¿Qué produce en sus parcelas?
- ¿Se dedica a trabajar en sus parcelas en tiempo completo?

### Preguntas generales

- Antes de la reforma de la Constitución en los noventas, ¿Hubo rentas informales de parcelas o parte de parcelas para asentamientos humanos de por ejemplo migrantes? ¿Hubo invasiones de tierras ejidales de gente con escasos recursos en algún manera? ¿Y más recientemente hay?
- Y antes del primer contacto con la desarrolladora, ¿Ya daba cuenta de las actividades en la compra de terrenos de las desarrolladoras en Tecámac? ¿Cuándo dio cuenta de lo por primera vez? ¿Cómo?
- ¿El cambio en precio y la venta de terrenos tuvieron una influencia en el ambiente entre los ejidatarios en el ejido? ¿De cual manera?
- ¿Cómo los conjuntos urbanos a lado de sus parcelas se afectó sus actividades agropecuario?

### Preguntas específicas

- ¿Cuándo el ejido se vendió terreno a una desarrolladora?
- ¿A que desarrolladora?
- ¿Cuál terreno del ejido se vendió? Era parcelas, área comunales, etc.
- ¿Cuántos ejidatarios se vendieron sus parcelas?
- ¿Cuál tipos de gente eran los ejidatarios? Joven, viejo, con otro trabajo o no.
- ¿Por qué quieren vender?
- ¿Dónde estaban los terrenos?
- ¿Cuál conjunto urbano hay por allá ahora?
- ¿Qué recuerda del proceso de vender parte del ejido?
- ¿De quien estuvo la iniciativa de vender suelo de ese ejido?
- Desarrolladoras necesitan un gran superficie para sus construcciones, ¿Hubo negociaciones entre los ejidatarios también para “needed convinced neighboring ejidatarios to sell too” para vender un superficie bastante grande en una vez?
- ¿Cómo fue el contacto con la desarrolladora?
- ¿Quién era el representante del ejido durante las negociaciones? ¿Por qué los ejidatarios se eligieron esa persona?

- ¿Los ejidatarios quien quería vender se unieron para los negocios con la desarrolladora sin conflictos internos?
- ¿Había cambios en el representación del ejido? ¿Por cual razón?
- ¿Cuál tipo de intermediario tuvo en los negocios?
- ¿Cómo fue los negociaciones de precio? ¿Hubo otras desarrolladoras o alguien otro con un interés de comprar también? ¿Se uso ese en los negocios para un precio mas alto?
- ¿Quién dentro el ejido tenia un papel en la venta muy importante? ¿Por qué?
- Desde su vista, ¿Quién gano lo mas durante la venta a la desarrolladora?
- ¿El ejido estaba en acuerdo sobre la venta? ¿Por qué si o no?
- ¿Qué fueron las consecuencias de la venta para el ejido?
- ¿Sabe como los ejidatarios quien se vendieron sus parcelas están ahora? ¿Cómo se usaron el dinero de la venta?
- ¿Tiene un interés en vender sus parcelas usted mismo también?
- ¿Esta en negociación con una desarrolladora ahora?
- ¿Negocios con una desarrolladora van diferentes ahora que antes? ¿Mas igual, mas rápido?
- ¿Cómo va a usar el dinero de la venta?
- ¿Los conjuntos urbanos a lado de sus parcelas afectan sus actividades agropecuario? ¿Cómo?
- ¿Qué es su vista del futuro del ejido Ozumbilla? ¿Piensas que en 10 años todavía existirá un ejido o todos los ejidatarios ya se fueron a otros lugares?
- ¿Ejidatarios quien van a vender sus parcelas, como se van a usar el dinero de la venta?

#### Preguntas de cierre

- ¿Tiene algo más que agregar sobre esta tema?
- Si más tarde surgen mas preguntas, ¿ Lo puedo contactar otra vez?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mi en este momento?

**Muchas gracias!**



## **Rancho (pequeña propiedad)**

### Preguntas de introducción

- ¿Desde cuando su familia vive en Zumpango?
- ¿Cuál era el profesión de sus padres?
- Entiendo que tenía dos Ranchos: uno del lado de su padre y otro del lado de su madre. ¿Desde cuando su familia es propietario de los Ranchos?
- ¿Cual tipo de Ranchos fueron ambos? ¿Qué produces en su Rancho? ¿Qué produjo en el Rancho que se vendió? ¿Cuánto empleados tenía en el Rancho que se vendió?
- ¿Cuál trabajo hace en la municipalidad a lado de manejar su Rancho? Pensaba que estar propietario de un Rancho es un trabajo en tiempo completo. ¿Porque hace este trabajo?
- ¿Dónde están los terrenos que se vendió? ¿Cual conjunto urbano esta por allá ahora?

### Preguntas generales

- ¿Cuando empezó de dar cuenta del interés de desarrolladoras en terrenos en Zumpango? ¿Cómo?
- ¿Desde su vista en cual manera las desarrolladoras se afectaron el mercado de terreno en Zumpango?
- ¿Sabe mucho gente quien vendió terrenos? Por cuales razones mucha gente quiere vender sus terrenos? ¿Dónde están ahora?

### Preguntas específicas

- ¿A cual desarrolladora se vendió su terrenos?
- ¿Cuando se vendió terrenos a la desarrolladora?
- ¿Cuales eran sus razones para vender terrenos a una desarrolladora?
- ¿Como fue el proceso de vender su terrenos?
  - Iniciativa para vender?
  - diferentes pasos y actores involucrados – directo/indirecto (comprador, vendedor, municipalidad,
  - cuanto tiempo en total
  - negocios de precio
  - papel de los actores
  - cual actor quien tiene mucho influencia?
- ¿Quién era el intermediario? ¿Qué sabe sobre intermedios en generales?
- ¿Come fue el 'Apeo y deslinde' con sus vecinos?
- ¿Al lado de los actores involucrados ha notificado alguien sobre su venta?
- ¿Había conflictos en algún manera durante o después la venta?
- ¿Cuáles son diferencias distintos entre la compra de tierras de un dueño de pequeña propiedad y de un ejido?
- ¿Qué paso con los empleados en el Rancho que se vendió?
- ¿De cual manera Zumpango el ambiente social ha cambiado en los quince anos pasados mas o menos?

### Preguntas de cierre

- ¿Tiene un idea como podría contactar un intermedio?

- ¿Tiene algo más que agregar sobre esta tema?
- Si más tarde surgen mas preguntas, ¿Le puedo contactar otra vez?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mi en este momento?

**Muchas gracias!**

## **Asentamiento irregular**

### Preguntas de introducción

- ¿Dónde está ese asentamiento irregular? ¿Nombre?
- ¿Eres el líder social de un asentamiento irregular? ¿Cuáles son sus responsabilidades como líder? ¿Tiene responsabilidades en otros asentamientos irregulares también? ¿Tiene contacto con otros líderes de asentamientos irregulares?
- ¿Cómo es la organización social dentro de un asentamiento irregular? (¿Al lado del líder hay más gente con diferentes responsabilidades?)
- ¿Qué servicios públicos el asentamiento irregular tiene? ¿Cómo fue el negocio con el municipio para esos servicios?

### Preguntas generales

- ¿Cuándo fue la fundación de ese asentamiento irregular? ¿Y cómo?
- ¿Cómo fue la compra de tierras necesaria para ese asentamiento irregular? (selección de tierra, de quien era, indicación de precio)
- ¿Cuál tipo de gente compró un lote en el asentamiento irregular? (De donde son, trabajo, individual/familia/pareja, trabajo formal/informal)
- ¿Después de comprar un lote la gente se queda por acá o hay muchos cambios en los habitantes en el asentamiento irregular?

### Preguntas específicas


- ¿Los conjuntos urbanos en Tecámac hubo un efecto en el asentamiento irregular? (acceso a agua y/o electricidad)
- ¿Desde la construcción de los conjuntos urbanos hay la misma cantidad de interés de gente en un lote en el asentamiento irregular? (competición para habitantes)
- ¿Las compras de tierras de desarrolladoras se afectan la posibilidad de comprar tierras para crecer el asentamiento irregular? (precio subió, vendedores prefieren desarrolladoras)
- ¿O la posibilidad de empezar un nuevo asentamiento irregular?
- ¿Cuál actor en la municipalidad tiene una gran influencia en la posibilidad de comprar o tener acceso a tierras?
- ¿Tiene contacto con las desarrolladoras sobre algunas cosas?
- ¿Ha oído de gente invade casas desocupadas en conjuntos urbanos?
- ¿Tiene una idea cual tipo de gente es?
- ¿Cuál diferencia hay entre invasores de casas desocupadas en conjuntos urbanos y la gente por acá?

### Preguntas de cierre

- Mi tema de investigación es el efecto de las compras de tierras de desarrolladoras en accesibilidad de tierra para gente con escasos recursos, ¿Hay algo más de agregar sobre ese tema?
- Si más tarde surgen más preguntas, ¿Lo puedo contactar otra vez?
- ¿Tiene preguntas para mí este momento?


**Muchas gracias!!**

## Appendix B: Map of Urban Development Plan Zumpango 2003 – Expansion of areas suitable for urbanization






## Appendix C: Map of Urban Development Plan Tecamac 2003– Expansion of areas suitable for urbanization



## Appendix D: Map of Urban Development Zumpango 2003 – Tenancy of land





## Appendix E: Map of Urban Development Tecámac 2003 – Tenancy of land

