



INFLUENCING EU FISHERIES POLICY THROUGH (TRANS)NATIONAL NETWORKS: THE CASE OF THE PROVINCE OF FLEVOLAND



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Student number: 5685699

Student email: j.kramer@students.uu.nl

First Supervisor: Dr. Eva Lachnit LL.M.

Second Supervisor: PhDr. Zdeněk Sychra Ph.D.

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Johanna Koffeman-Kramer

HUIS VAN DE NEDERLANDSE PROVINCIES

House of the Dutch Provinces

Trierstraat 59-61 Brussels

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The responsibility of the content of the research is with the author only.

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Student: J. (Johanna) Koffeman-Kramer

E: Johanna.kramer@hotmail.com

L: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/johanna-kramer-69a36aa6/>

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Utrecht University & Masaryk University

Utrecht Student ID: 5685699 | Masaryk Student ID: 444573

Utrecht University

Supervisor: Dr. E. (Eva) Lachnit LL.M. / E.S.Lachnit@uu.nl

Faculty of Law, Economics & Governance / Utrecht School of Governance

Bijlhouwerstraat 6, NL-3511 ZC Utrecht, The Netherlands

Masaryk University

Supervisor: PhDr. Z. (Zdeněk) Sychra, Ph.D. / sychra@fss.muni.cz.

Department of International Relations and European Studies / Faculty of Social Studies

4.48 – Joštova 218/10, 602 00 Brno, Czech Republic

House of the Dutch Provinces

Supervisor: S. (Sidony) Venema / sidony.venema@flevoland.nl

EU Representative Province of Flevoland / Randstad Region

59-61 Trierstraat, 1040, Brussel, Belgium

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List of abbreviations

AER	Assembly of European Regions
CEMR	Council of European Municipalities and Regions
CoR	Committee of the Regions
Council	Council of the European Union / Council of Ministers
CPMR	Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions
DG-REGIO	Directorate General for Regional Policy
DG-MARE	Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
Commission	European Commission
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FRNN	Fisheries Regions Network the Netherlands (BPV)
HNP	Huis van de Nederlandse Provincies (House of the Dutch Provinces in Brussels)
IPO	Inter-Provinciaal Overleg (national association of Dutch provinces)
Perm Rep	Permanent Representation
MLG	Multi-level Governance
TEU	Treaty on European Union
SEA	Single European Act

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Preface

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Johanna Koffeman-Kramer - Brussels, Belgium, June 2017.

Abstract

The Province of Flevoland looks to influence the EU's fisheries legislation, to appeal for European grants and to have a strong voice during the Brexit negotiations. The research asks whether it is worth to build coalitions via (trans)national networks of regions in the field of fisheries and if these coalitions can influence EU policy-making. The basic idea of the research is to analyze the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR) and the Fisheries Regions Network the Netherlands (FRNN) in a multilevel governance context. The thesis establishes a coherent theoretical framework for the analysis of (trans)national networks related to fisheries, by explaining the theory of access, Europeanisation, regionalization and multi-level governance. Furthermore, a SWOT analysis is used to develop an understanding of the CPMR and the FRNN by mapping the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the networks. With help of the insights the SWOT analysis provides, a EU fisheries lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland will be formed.

Keywords: European Union, Flevoland, regions, influence, lobbying, multi-level governance, regionalism, CPMR, FRNN, theory of access, SWOT.

Chapter I: Introduction

Fisheries are often an important element of the economic life of coastal regions. For example, fisheries are in many European regions a major source of employment. Not only directly via the sector itself and the fish-processing sector, which often provides considerably more employment than the extractive sector, but also indirectly for example via tourism (Geblewicz, 2016). A lot of regions in Europe are telling a story of having a centuries old fishing tradition. However, this tradition is often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). This latter statement holds true for the Dutch Province of Flevoland. The reason why is simple: the province only exists from 1986 and thus only recently celebrated its thirty-first anniversary. The province of Flevoland is a human construction and was realized by first damming off portions of the IJsselmeer, followed by pumping the water out and draining almost 1000 km² (Disco and Toussaint, 2014).

Nevertheless, Urk, a former island and now situated in Flevoland, is such a fishing community (see figure one). Urk was mentioned for the first time in 966 in a donation certificate from Emperor Otto the First (Holy Roman Empire) to a monastery in Cologne (Dornseiffen, 1885). The text is in Latin and reads: "*cuiisdam insulae medietatem in Almere, que Urch vocatur*", which roughly translates to "of a certain island in the middle of Almere, which is called Urch" (Ibid.). Since 1986 Urk is part of the Province of Flevoland. Although Flevoland does not have a rich culture of fishing traditions, Urk does and is still the leading fishing fleet of the Netherlands with the biggest fish auction of Western Europe. With fishermen, processors, auctions and exporters, Urk has one of the largest seafood economies in Europe (Urken, 2017).

Given that 39% of the population works in fisheries in a direct sense, Urk is of importance for the region (Municipality of Urk, 2017). It is in the interests not only of fishermen, but also of local and regional authorities to maintain a vibrant fisheries sector, with all the above mentioned positive aspects (Geblewicz, 2016).

Despite its local relevance and interest, almost all fisheries legislation is determined on a European level and thus has direct consequences for the fisheries sector. The European Union (EU) has a shared competence for fisheries policy and the policy is managed under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The CFP was first formulated in the Treaty of Rome. With the entry of three new member states in the 1970s, the UK, Denmark and Ireland - all with a substantial fishing fleet - it was established that the European member states could fish in each other's waters, as long as they would not fish into the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of 22,2 kilometers from their coasts (European Parliament, 2017).

1. Brexit and (trans)national networks

In some policy areas, the possible consequences of a Brexit lead to fear and uncertainty (Kramer b, 2017). Such a policy area is the fisheries (Ibid.). The British fishermen voted *en masse* for the Brexit because UKIP promised the fishermen that they would get their seas back by extending the 22,2-kilometer zone to 372 kilometers (Spekschoor, 2016). It therefore makes sense that many fishing communities felt a sense of shock and disbelief in the morning of 24 June 2016 when it became clear that the British voted to leave the European Union (EU) (Hobolt, 2016). The exit of a member state from the EU has never happened before, and the political, economic and legal consequences are likely to be considerable (Ibid.). That is why this thesis will incorporate the Brexit and assess its possible consequences for the Province of Flevoland.

To limit any disastrous consequence of the Brexit for its fisheries, like mass unemployment in the municipality of Urk, the Province of Flevoland is researching which networks it can use to influence Brexit negotiations and further policy-making regarding fisheries. A lobby-strategy in Flevoland is needed and this thesis will provide one. In order to succeed in lobbying, a supportive government is needed, whether that be a local, regional or national one, as well as a broad network, a shared future vision, and a sound learning environment (Labovic, 2017). According to Milos Labovic there are three valid reasons for investing in lobbying in Brussels. Firstly, to influence policy-making (Ibid.). Secondly, to access funds, and thirdly to build up a network and political capital (Ibid.). This thesis will assess if Flevoland uses one or more of these reasons. The province of Flevoland is now member of the national Fisheries Regions Network the Netherlands (FRNN). This platform represents several municipalities and provinces that deal with North Sea fisheries. The FRNN counts 22 members, from which six are provinces and sixteen are municipalities. These provinces and municipalities keep close contact with each other, join forces, and discuss the various fishing dossiers. This way they have an opportunity to influence decision-making in Brussels or The Hague because they take a common stand. The platform was founded in 2002 to support the fisheries sector and to represent their interests at the national government and the European Parliament. They do this by making proposals, agreements, and work visits at the national parliament, European Parliament and the permanent representation of the Netherlands to the EU.

The unclear consequences of Brexit is thus a reason why the Province of Flevoland looks at the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR), a transnational network. It is not the intention of the Province of Flevoland to replace the FRNN through membership of CPMR, but to have an additional network in which the province can represent itself in the

field of fisheries. The CPMR is older than the Province of Flevoland itself (by 13 years) and consists out of 160 regions from twenty-five member states with maritime interests and represents 200 million EU citizens (CPMR, n.d.a.). It acts like a think tank and interest group mainly focusing on fisheries and other maritime policies (developments in the harbor, shipbuilding etc.) and cohesion policy (Ibid.). All coastal provinces from the Netherlands are member of this network, but it should be noted that the province of Zeeland wants to abolish its membership of the CPMR (Interview HNP b, 2017). The reason behind the cancellation is that the costs and benefits of the membership are not balanced (Ibid.). Besides influencing the CFP and fear of Brexit, another motive for possible membership of the CPMR is that Flevoland is very active in cohesion policy and transport which are also highly visible in the CPMR (Interview Province of Flevoland, 2017). Cohesion policy is not a mere funding pot, but a policy anchored in the EU Treaties at the service of European solidarity (CPMR, 2017). It promotes economic and social cohesion across Europe by reducing disparities between regions and countries (Bachtler and Mendez, 2007). Transport is important because of the two new harbors the Province of Flevoland is building.¹

2. Research question and structure of the thesis

The thesis will research if and why the Province of Flevoland should become member of the CPMR and should stay member of the FRNN. The aim of (possible) membership to these networks for the Province is to influence EU fisheries policy, appeal for European grants and to have a strong voice during the Brexit negotiations. Because the Common Fisheries Policy is a shared competence of the EU, the research question is:

In which ways can the Province of Flevoland use the CPMR and FRNN to influence the Common Fisheries Policy?

And the subquestions will be:

What are the conditions that shape who lobbies where, how and to what effect?

How does the Province of Flevoland use EU institutions and (trans)national networks to lobby within the EU multi-level system?

What is the correlation between Brexit and Urk?

Which kind of network type is the CPMR and FRNN?


What are the strengths and weaknesses of both (trans)national networks?

¹ Flevocoast and a Service harbor

In order to answer the research question and the subquestions, the research will be divided into three stages. First of all, information gathering, or desk research. In this stage a coherent theoretical framework for the analysis of these two networks will be established. It will do so by explaining the Theory of Access, Europeanisation, Regionalisation and Multi-Level Governance. These theories will be explained in Chapter III. In the second stage, the field research stage, the author will go to conferences, seminars and meetings and will conduct semi-structured interviews before using the input of the first two stages for the last one where a SWOT analysis will be conducted. SWOT is an acronym for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats, and the tool will map these four criteria to develop an understanding of the two networks. With its insights, a EU fisheries lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland will be created.

This thesis thus analyses possible membership of Flevoland to the CPMR and the existing membership to the FRNN. It will do so by reviewing literature, by having semi-structured interviews, hypotheses testing, and a SWOT analysis. Before this thesis comes to the results and recommendation including the lobby strategy, some more background about the topic (lobbyism) is given. The subsequent section present the discussion of the theoretical context of the theory of access, Europeanisation, regionalisation and multi-level governance. Thereafter the methodology of the research will be clarified.

Figure one: Urk and Flevoland.



3. Readers guide

This thesis is structured as follows: chapter two provides the reader with some background information on lobbyism, the topic of the thesis. Aspects which are relevant for the research are thus underlined here, as well as the institutional framework that currently exists in the EU regarding fisheries policy-making procedures. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the background of lobbyism. Chapter three provides an overview of relevant, contemporary literature and aims to establish a coherent theoretical framework for the analysis of (trans)national networks related to fisheries. The intention here is to demonstrate an understanding of the literature by applying it to the research and by formulating hypotheses.

Its three subchapters discuss the theory of access, the two-way trend of Europeanisation and regionalism and Multi-Level Governance. This chapter results in the formulation of five hypotheses on regions' decisions on joining and investing in transnational networks of regions. Chapter four explains the methodological approach and the reason why the chosen case selection helps answering the research question. Chapter five presents the results case by case, after which both cases are compared and answers all hypotheses. Concluding remarks are found in Chapter six, together with an answer to the research question. Here, the author also suggests which policy directions are suggested for the Province of Flevoland whether to become or stay member of (trans)national networks, and if so how to influence the CFP.

Chapter II: Topic

This section explains the topic of the research. Here, previous research about lobbying is presented and the first two subquestion will be answered:

1. What are the conditions that shape who lobbies where, how and to what effect?
2. How does the Province of Flevoland use EU institutions and (trans)national networks to lobby within the EU multi-level system?

The paragraph includes a definition of lobbyism and an explanation of the institutional framework that currently exists in the EU regarding fisheries policy-making procedures. The policy instruments and mechanism are included here as well. With this paragraph the author thus tries to highlight aspects which are relevant for the research.

1. Lobbyism

This paragraph reviews the literature on lobbying in the European Union. Following last year's numbers, the average estimation of how many lobbyists are in Brussels is 30.000 (Freund, 2016). This almost matches the employee-rate in the European Commission (Ibid.). There are so many lobbyists, because lobbying at EU level is critical, if organizations are interested in influencing policy-making (Costa et al., 2014). Therefore, lobbying is defined here as the aim of organisations to influence the European policy-making process (Mahoney, 2007). Many in the media hold the view that lobbyists' main asset is not *what* they know, but *who* they know (Bertrand et al, 2014). The academic literature however considers these personal ties to be important, but expertise is what really counts. Organisations can contribute valuable information to the EU institutions thanks to their expertise (Ibid.).

A well-known joke about what lobbyism entails depends on three important things: contacts, contacts, contacts. But what are really the conditions that shape who lobbies where, how and to what effect (Woll, 2006)? There have not been many studies which actually tried to measure influence. So far, most studies have tried to identify the phases of the policy process where lobbying will be effective, or what the reasons for using different channels of representation were (Ibid.). This section firstly explains the latter, but then makes a switch to the measuring of influence.

A. Where

The quick answer to where lobbying takes place is to say it happens mainly in Brussels. Between 1986 and 1994 lobbying activities in Brussels exploded, primarily because of the Single European Act (SEA) (Woll, 2006). The SEA created the single market and transferred a lot of responsibilities to the EU (Coen and Broscheid, 2003). The lobbying activities came from private as well as from public interest lobbying groups in the EU and many coalitions were formed since then, truly illustrating the multi-level system of the EU.² This passage will deal with the institutional framework that currently exists within the EU, with an emphasis on where regions can influence the policy-making process with regards to fisheries. The European Parliament and the European Commission are the most difficult objects of lobbying because they have a code of conduct via the Joint Transparency Register (Manko et al, 2014). The Council only remained an observer to the system (Ibid.). It should be noted that every institution is only briefly described.

A.1. The Committee of the Regions

For regions, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) is the go-to institution. With the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the institution was created to represent all regional and local governments in the EU. This makes the CoR a very visible interpretation of the Multi-level governance in the EU and a result of the EU integration process itself. The CoR allows regions to take part in the policy-making process in the EU by sharing their opinion on EU legislation. Although the CoR remains largely symbolic, it is given a wider consultative role (Hooghe and Marks, 1996). The institution can issue opinions on its own initiative or when it receives a proposal. When the opinion is passed in the Plenary Assembly, it is communicated to the other EU institutions. There are six commissions at the CoR which prepare opinions on new legislation by the European Commission. For fisheries and maritime affairs, the Commission for Natural Resources (NAT) is crucial. For an efficient fisheries lobby, a regional executive influences the opinion the most when it holds the rapporteurship, and thus prepares the opinion. Despite the CoR's political legitimacy, the CoR only acts as an advisory body and thus has no decision-making power, making its impact rather weak (Ibid.). More pathways to influence the policy-making process is thus of importance.

A.2. European Parliament

This institution's origin is from 1952, but it was not until 1979 that the European Parliament (EP) was directly elected. The EP has legislative, supervisory and budgetary responsibilities

² This system will be explained in more detail in the third chapter.

and exists of 751 members of the European Parliament. Together with the Council it passes EU law, both are thus co-legislators (Yordanova, 2013). Again, committees are of importance here. The committees prepare the legislation, make amendments or reject the proposal in a report. The drafting of reports constitutes the most influential individual legislative task within the EP (Ibid.). The rapporteur(s) and shadow rapporteurs serve therefore as agenda-setters and largely shape the content of adopted legislative acts (Ibid.). For fisheries and maritime affairs, the PECH committee serves de facto as the primary committee. There are only three MEPs from the Netherlands in the PECH committee, of which one is a substitute member of the committee.³ By having close ties with these members, the (shadow) rapporteurs and the president of the committee, access to this institution follows naturally.

A.3. Council of the European Union

Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council, together with the EP, is a co-legislator of the EU. The institution adopts EU laws and is the voice of the member states' governments. Most regions try to insert input via their own political capital or via their permanent representation. The members of the Council are ministers from each EU Member State. The members are not fixed since the ministers only come together when they discuss their policy area. In the Council of the European Union, the Agriculture and Fisheries Council Configuration (AGRIFISH) is vital for the fisheries lobby. This configuration is composed of the agriculture and fisheries ministers of the 28 European Union member states and the CFP is one their competencies (Consilium, n.d.a.). The European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development and the European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries also participate in the meetings (Ibid.). When the fisheries are being discussed the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs is present. The Council is not a target for many regional governments, since most regions lobby at their political capital instead.

A.4. European Commission

The Commission is the only institution with the power of initiative. They are thus able to make legislative proposals. Besides this power, they also enforce the legislation, making them the executive arm of the EU. They also allocate funding and draw up the budget, although the latter has to be approved by the EP and the Council. The European Commission is also the face of the EU and represents all EU countries in international bodies. Their power of initiative is what attracts many lobbyists. The European Commission consults experts and the public on regular basis in stakeholder meetings. For fisheries, the Directorate-General for


³ Out of 25 Dutch MEPs and 27 Members of the PECH Commission.

Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) is crucial since they are responsible for EU policy on maritime affairs and fisheries, and thus also for the implementation of the CFP (European Commission a, n.d.a.). This DG alone has 400 people in staff: knowing which ones are willing to exchange resources is useful for your region (Interview Commission, 2017). Since the personnel is mostly understaffed, the region has to let them know they possess the right information for them (Chalmers, 2013). This can provide an access-point for the region.

A.5. The Ordinary Legislative Process

As mentioned above, the European Parliament and the Council are thus equal legislative partners. This occurred with the Treaty of Lisbon and is called the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) (Kohler, 2014). Although the OLP only applied to 15 policy areas under the Treaty of Maastricht, it has now been expanded to cover the most important policy areas of the Union as can be seen in the figure below (Ibid.). The Treaty of Lisbon enhanced the formal position of the EP (Woolcock, 2010).

Figure two: Application of procedures in %, Votewatch 2012 (Kohler, 2014)



Nowadays, the standard day-to-day decision-making in the EU means a sharing of formal legislative power between the Council and the European Parliament, played out against a backdrop of furious network-building (Cini and Perez Solorzano Borrigan, 2013). This is the result of the unclear lines of power in the EU (Ibid.). As such there are horizontal (at EU level) and vertical (between the EU and (sub)national level) lines of power in the decision-making process which characterize why organisations or networks try to influence the process (Ibid.). These actors try to shape the content of the legislation at an early stage. Under the OLP, the Commission plays a key role in the early stages of the decision-making process because it is the agenda setter and has the right of initiative (Ibid.). The actors are

thus eager to access this institution. However, the Commission is also often open to input from the EP and Council beforehand in order to avoid making proposals that would not get their support otherwise, which results in organisations and networks lobbying here as well institutions (Ibid.). The CoR, as said before, is an advisory body and may be consulted, being represented in this EU institution is therefore also wise. Under the OLP, there is thus room for lobbying, especially when the network or organisation can broker an alliance between the necessary range of institutions (Ibid.).

B. How

The currency of lobbying in the EU is information (Chalmers, 2013). Organisations who have the knowledge and expertise thus exchange the understaffed and pressed-for-time decision-makers with policy-relevant information for 'access' to the EU policy-making process (Ibid.). Access is defined here as "the ability to derive benefits from persons" (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Because lobbying is interactive by nature, the access to the right people in the right places at the right moment is what counts (Chalmers, 2013). Pieter Bouwen, the authority on influence by access-theories, provided a model of an organisation's access by means of information types. Bouwen states that the European Commission requires expert or technical information since the Commission has a very technical function (Bouwen, 2004). The European Parliament with its directly elected members however, requires information that allows it to evaluate the Commission's proposals from a 'European perspective' (Chalmers, 2013). These information requirements come in handy for regional governments. Most regional governments in the Netherlands organise themselves in sectoral organizations or platforms (for example: FRNN, CPMR) or via direct representation (HNP). These governments use (in)formal consultation as main instrument and especially act on the (re)formulation of laws at supranational level. Adam William Chalmers extended this theory of Pieter Bouwen by including information tactics (Ibid.). He makes a distinction between inside and outside tactics. The latter refers to organisations mobilizing citizens to contact officials by using media and organizing events, while the former refers to a more direct form of contact between organisation and policy-makers by ways of face-to-face meetings for example (Ibid.). Most academics are convinced that inside tactics are more effective because making good contacts is usually a better way to win favours than shaming policymakers in the media (Ibid.). Information types and tactics are thus two sides of the same coin. The way how information is seen depends on how information is sent. The difference in tactics can increase the salience of a message, send signals regarding the importance or urgency of a message and indicate an interest group's commitment to the message (Ibid.). The biggest factor in determining regions decision to lobby is economic need (Loftis and Kettler, 2015). At

the same time, political opportunities influence the level of spending on lobbying (Ibid.). The question of how regions lobby is thus answered: they need to provide the right kind of information. All these conditions on how a region lobbies, will be analysed for the Province of Flevoland in chapter V. In order to do this accurately for the fisheries lobby, we need to know what the policy mechanism and the policy instruments are of the CFP.

B.1. Policy mechanism and instruments

The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the EU, which goal is to ensure that fishing is environmentally, economically and socially sustainable, has faced challenges since its creation, but the Brexit might be the fishiest one (European Commission b, n.d.a). The reformed CFP entered force in early 2013 with Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 (European Parliament, 2017). One of the goals of the new CFP is to bring the fish stocks to sustainable levels. Other goals are; bringing new wealth to fisheries, creating an end to the dependence on subsidies and creating new opportunities in terms of employment and growth (Ibid.).

The Common Fisheries Policy originated from a market failure, namely overfishing. This arose with the increase in technical fishing efficiency after WW II (Linke and Jentoft, 2013). This market failure as lots of external costs, the most notable are the extinction of specific fish species, a weakened ecosystem, the depleting of natural resources and driving small business out (European Parliament, 2002). Fishing opportunities are thus reduced for others and future income is lost because young fish have no time to grow before being caught (Ibid.). With the CFP, the EU intervenes in the market not only to reverse overfishing, but also to promote general economic fairness and combat inequities with regulations, taxation and subsidies (Boundless, 2006). Stock conservation is a consequence of effective management and fundamental to the continuance of the economic activity (European Parliament, 2002). The policy mechanism here is thus a market intervention mechanism because the aim of the CFP is to ensure that fishing stocks are fished at sustainable levels. The policy instruments for the CFP are multiannual plans, discard plans, establishment of fish stock recovery areas via Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and quotas, and conservation measures necessary for compliance with obligations under EU environmental legislation (European Commission c, n.d.a.). With these instruments the Commission makes regulations of production, quality, grading, packaging and labelling, and encourages producer organisations to protect fishermen from sudden market changes (Imrie, 2017). It also sets up minimum fish prices, finances buying of unsold fish and sets rules for trade with non-EU countries (Ibid.). The CFP is enforced on a supranational, national and local level (Kramer a, 2017). The Commission sets the standards for national inspection, but the Commission also has its own inspectors (Ibid.). The latter can only visit national authorities however. It is

impossible for them to inspect individual vessels for example, that is up to the national authority. Combined monitoring finds place as well since the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) organises joint control campaigns, where inspectors from different member states join forces as to collaborate more closely and exchange best practices (European Commission d, n.d.a.).

Coming back to the policy instruments of the CFP it has to be noted that now a new multiannual plan for the North Sea is under discussion with the EU's co-legislators: The Council and European Parliament (Interview Commission, 2017). The plan contains a goal for fish stock management. The other policy instrument, the discard plan entails a discard ban in the North Sea. This means that discarding is prohibited through the so-called landing obligation. This has however a bottom-up structure because it allows EU Member States greater control at national and regional level (European Commission b, n.d.a.). With the discard ban, producers can better manage their products (Ibid.). It will replace the intervention mechanism slowly with a market-based mechanism because it improves the efficiency of resource use and better align the incentives of economic agents with those of the broader community (OECD, 2006). Instead of relying on an input control, the system of management is now focused on outputs and results (Ibid.). This is also visible in the landing obligation: all commercial species caught must be landed and the vessels can choose themselves how they want to achieve this result (Kramer a, 2017). The landing obligation makes a decisive shift away from technical measures based on prescriptive legislation (which has not been very successful the last 20 years) to a radically more flexible and adaptable approach to achieving greater selectivity, focused at the individual vessel level (North Sea RAC, 2014). The approach for discarding thus went from a technology-based approach towards a performance-based approach (Kramer a, 2017). The former intervenes in the acting stage and specifies the technologies that should be used (Coglianese and Lazer, 2003). An example of this is the regulation of a certain mesh size and minimum landing size, but this provided an incentive to discard undersized fish (Kramer a, 2017). The latter approach intervenes at the output stage and specifies what must be attained (selective fishing by landing the species caught) (Coglianese and Lazer, 2003, Kramer a, 2017). This shift provides the fishermen an incentive to innovate (Kramer a, 2017). A major disadvantage of a technology-based approach is namely that the incentive for innovation is gone and that the EU fixes the right standard (Ibid.). However, there are so many different fishing vessels that the right standard is not always the right standard for everybody (Ibid.). The performance-based approach on the other hand is more flexible and adaptable for the fishermen since they can now specify themselves how they want to achieve the reduction of by-catch and thus will fish more selectively in the end (Ibid.). The landing obligation's

requirement to land everything thus provides a strong economic incentive to reduce unwanted catch (North Sea RAC, 2014).

The EU thus uses two strategies to remedy the market failure. First of all, the EU uses the price mechanism. They provide subsidies for fishermen and producers via the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF). The point of the financial incentives is to lead to a change in behaviour. The second way of trying to change behaviour is by using legislation and coercion. Because the fisheries are a shared competency of the EU, most legislation is regulations. The EU controls the CFP with a licensing system, as well as a point-system for serious infringements and a quota system (European Commission e, n.d.a.). This point system can suspend the vessel's licence for 2, 4, 8 or 12 months (Kramer a, 2017). The quota system intends to correct the market failure because it provides an economic incentive to counter overfishing. With the TACs the market can adjust to the amount of fishing to the available opportunities. Moreover, as last resort an infringement procedure can be started against a member state if it is not enforcing the regulations properly (Ibid.). The latter is not common however, since they usually first try to resolve issues by consultation or by sanctions such as withholding funds (European Commission e, n.d.a.).

C. To what effect?

General theories of why EU lobbying takes place suggest that regions get motivated to lobby due to concerns over particular issues or resources (Loftis and Kettler, 2015). In the academic literature, inside and outside lobbying are seen as the two ways how organisations lobby. With inside lobbying, the normal pathways of representation are meant. Regional councilmembers and regional executives can contact officials in Brussels and ask them to represent their regional needs. For a long time, inside lobbying was most apparent. Here members of the Dutch Second Chamber, the Dutch Members of the European Parliament, provincial executives themselves, and public interest groups have long lobbied in the EU on behalf of regional governments (Ibid). Nevertheless, since the 1980s, many regional governments such as the provinces of North and South Holland find it advantageous to invest in retaining paid professional representation outside of formal channels to lobby in the EU (Ibid.). This use of "outside" lobbying by regional governments when "inside" pathways are available is puzzling. What motivates governments to supplement the normal democratic channels of representation with outside channels such as hiring lobbyists or become member of a paid network (Ibid.)? Why do regions spend scarce resources lobbying the European Union (Ibid.)? As been made clear above, the institutional framework of the EU provides various pathways for regional representation. In order to influence the EU institutions, regions spend their money on paid representation and build up a network of their own to

voice local and regional needs and concerns about fisheries. Moreover, they appeal for European grants when they do not receive enough funding from state governments to cover their needs (Ibid.). This is also in line with the three reasons for investing to lobby in the EU by Milos Labovic provided in the introduction (influence policy-making, access funds, and to build up a network and political capital) (Labovic, 2017).

Chapter III: Theoretical Framework

Although lobbying is the topic of the research, the basic idea is to analyse fisheries networks in a multilevel governance context. The aim of this thesis is to test a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the lobbying behaviour of the interests of the CPMR and FRNN in the European Union. To establish a coherent theoretical framework for the analysis of (trans)national networks related to fisheries, several individual related theories will be considered in this chapter. Therefore, this chapter starts with a theoretical framework for how lobby influence is measured. For this, the thesis will use Pieter Bouwen's Theory of Access. Bouwen's theory represents the dominant theoretical framework of lobbying success/influence (Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014). The research will investigate the importance of the network's lobbying success/influence at the EU institutions by using a SWOT analysis for evaluation. It will do so in Chapter V. The analysis will help in mapping the four criteria of the networks, resulting to formulate strategic options for the networks, for example by evaluating which kind of information the network should have in exchange for access. The strategic options of the SWOT analysis will lead to the creation of a EU fisheries lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland. The SWOT analysis is a strategic evaluation tool, and is used here to assess the strategic options of the CPMR and FRNN. It does so by evaluating data gathered through semi-structured interviews and working documents. As such, the SWOT analysis will enable to make best use of the networks' strengths, to mitigate weaknesses and threats, and to exploit opportunities.

Before evaluating the theory by a SWOT analysis, first an explanation is provided. The Theory of Access states that the degree of access to the European institutions is explained in terms of the supply and demand of access goods (Bouwen, 2001). Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process (Ibid.). In return for access to an EU institution, business interests have to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution (Ibid.). Ultimately, this theory will be evaluated in the SWOT analysis of Chapter V. In the second paragraph, multi-level governance, Europeanisation and regionalism will be explained. The competencies of the Province of Flevoland regarding the European Union's policy-making process, its existing Europe lobby-strategy, and the role of the Municipality of Urk, is also explained in this chapter. The third paragraph explains the emergence and function of the CPMR and FRNN. During this chapter hypotheses will be formulated.

1. Theory of Access

The main theoretical framework about lobby influence is provided for by Pieter Bouwen with his Theory of Access. In this theory, he explains the access of organisations to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Bouwen states that the degree of access to the EU is explained in terms demand and supply of so-called access goods. These goods have everything to do with information. The EU policy-making process is in need for certain information (demand) and when an organisation can supply this, it is granted access to an EU institution. On the one hand, it should be emphasized that access does not necessarily mean influence, but on the other hand, gaining access to the EU institutions is a *conditio sine qua non* to exercise influence in the policy-making process (Bouwen, 2001). The access of the CPMR and FRNN are therefore studied as it is a good indicator for having influence. This study can be found in chapter V (analysis). First a more detailed description of access goods is provided.


A. Access goods

The three most commonly researched lobbying resources are information, legitimacy and access to multi-level policy-making venues (Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014). This thesis focuses on the first and last resources, since this thesis follows Bouwen's Theory of Access – where information is access. His theory represents the dominant theoretical framework of lobbying success/influence (Ibid.). Access to the European institutions is viewed as the most crucial lobby resource. However, there is always an exchange taking place. In exchange for access, the EU institutions demand information (Bouwen, 2001). This makes information the most important exchange resource. Bouwen identified three kinds of information as can be seen in figure three. The first type of information entails Expert Knowledge (EK) and concerns technical knowhow and expertise which is needed from the private sector to understand a sector (Ibid.). The second type concerns the needs and interests of a certain sector in the European economic arena, such as fisheries (Ibid.). This type is called Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI). Thirdly, the needs and interests of a sector in a domestic market and in the domestic political and social arena relates to the Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI) (Ibid.). The functioning of the fisheries sector relates to this third type of information. Bouwen likes to call these three types of information, the three access goods. These access goods have to be provided by organisations to the EU institutions in order to gain access (Ibid.). As been made

clear above, each access good concerns a specific kind of information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process (Ibid.). Bouwen also states that access goods are related with two issues in European public policy: legitimacy and compliance (Ibid.). The access goods increase the legitimacy of the EU and secures more compliance with the agreed EU legislation (Ibid.).

The exchange of information from the regions to the EU institutions secures in the first place more compliance, because regions can already anticipate the problems of implementation in an early stage of the EU policy-making process. The information of the regions is thus likely to facilitate the implementation of the EU rules later in the process (Bouwen, 2001). The EU institutions thus need close contacts with the regional sector to guarantee their optimal functioning (Ibid.). In the second place, it secures legitimacy of the EU institutions. However, a distinction must be made between input and output legitimacy (Scharpf, 2003; Schmidt, 2013; Majone 1997). The former concerns democratic decision-making at the EU level and is judged in terms of the EU's responsiveness to citizen concerns as a result of participation by the people (Schmidt, 2013). It is seen as "government by the people" (Scharf, 2003). The bigger the organisation, the more the EU sees it as a legitimate partner (Interview Commission, 2017). They try to determine in what way this organisation can increase the legitimacy of the EU policy-making process through its participation therein (Bouwen, 2001). However, there are many organisations involved in the EU's policy-making process. Ranging from business interest groups and networks to regional governments and local governments. The MLG system of the EU thus involves many levels of governance. Later in this chapter more will be explained about the MLG system of the EU. Output legitimacy concerns the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU when dealing with problems. It is thus judged in terms of the EU's effectiveness of the EU's policy outcomes for the people (Schmidt, 2013). This is seen as "government for the people" and is closely linked to Expert Knowledge (Scharf, 2003). Not every organisation can provide this Expert Knowledge: an organisation must make sure that it can provide this kind of information. EU institutions thus make a cost-benefit analysis on the basis of which they decide to interact with (Bouwen, 2001).

Figure 3: kinds of information



B. Criticism

There are a few critical remarks to be made concerning Bouwen's Theory of Access. Firstly, Bouwen's theory is already quite old. However, most literature in political science builds on older articles: Radaelli with Europeanization and Hooghe and Marks with Multi-Level Governance. Secondly, the Theory of Access by Bouwen is limited to business interests. His work already uses different organizational forms of business interest lobbyism, which is quite innovative, but his theory could be used in a broader way as well. For example, this research shows that Bouwen's theory can also be extended to the interests of networks. His work could therefore use an update. Another critique on this theory, is its ignorance of the different actors and their relationship with the EU institutions. Bouwen makes it seem that there always is an exchange taking place between information and access. Although this is certainly true in the beginning -when the relationship is being formed-, Michalowitz cannot imagine a scenario where an exchange always has to happen when a firm relationship between the lobby actor and the EU actor exists (Michalowitz, 2004). Despite this criticism, Bouwen's theory is still one of the leading ones when it comes to the measurement of influence. That is then also the reason why the author followed up on his theory.

2. Europeanisation and Regionalisation

A trend towards regionalization and Europeanisation has been present lately. Also for the Province of Flevoland. Since its existence, the trend of regionalization emerged in the Netherlands, and Flevoland was quick to involve the EU in its policies. They realized that by building coalitions via (trans)national networks would be less costly and more effective.

One of the most important consequences of European integration is the multiplication of extra-national channels for regional political activity (Hooghe and Marks, 1996). New channels have been created for regional mobilization and subnational governments are engaged in transnational patterns of interaction (Ibid.). Much has been written about Europeanisation. As such it was Featherstone who came with a rather simplistic definition: "Europeanization involves a response to the policies of the EU", (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). Radaelli on the other hand, one of the most famous researchers when it comes to Europeanisation, defines it as the:

"Processes of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures, and public choices" (Ibid.).

The thesis will follow Radaelli's definition. Coen states that Europeanisation was a consequence of the Single Market (Coen, 1997). Now almost every policy area is affected to a greater or lesser extent by the EU (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004). Europeanization has its greatest impact on regional policy-making (Sturm and Dieringer, 2005). Direct pressure for compliance of EU legislation is exerted on this level (Ibid.). In this manner, the hierarchical relationship between the national government and the regional government has been loosened: regions now operate within a broader political system that transcends national borders and in which they are able to develop and pursue projects independently (Kassim et al, 2005). Europeanization cannot be imagined without the misfit hypothesis. This assumes that Europeanization will only have an effect if there is a misfit or mismatch between demands originating from the EU treaties and national and/or the regional institutional, social, economic, cultural or political status quo (Sturm and Dieringer, 2005). In other words, when all EU policies are compatible with the national or regional level, there will not be pressure for adaptation. A misfit is thus a situation which creates change in domestic politics (Ibid.). In short, the lower the compatibility between EU and domestic policies, the higher the adaptation pressure (Börzel and Risse, 2003). However, the strength of Europeanization pressures for policy-making depends on the extent to which competences have already been transferred to Brussels (Sturm and Dieringer, 2005).

The EU's structural policies have enhanced the opportunities for regional governments to become involved in policy formulation (Kassim et al, 2005). With the fact that the regional level upgraded in the European policy process and became of more importance in the European Union, the number of actors, levels and different institutional settings arose as well, making it a true multi-level system (Benz and Eberlein, 1999). These regions have been

seeking to increase their lobby at the EU level so to defend their own interests and increase their level of participation in the decision-making process (Ibid.).

A. Europe of the Regions

The Province of Flevoland is a region inside the European Union. Many key politicians like Jacques Delors, the president of the European Commission who laid the groundwork for the single market, had the idea of a 'Europe of the Regions' in mind. In the Treaty of Rome, a reference was made of the importance of the 'regional question' (Loughlin, 1996). However, the idea to give a big role to regions never flourished so far. The regional question is very visible in the Province of Flevoland, especially in the form of regional policy. This means that the more backward regions, such as the province initially was, receive funding from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund. These funds try to reduce the disparity between various Member States. The European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) also contributes to regional development. These four funds, together with the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), are the so-called Structural Funds. Another way of interpreting this regional question was to reverse the top-down governance with a more bottom-up approach. This way regions could have greater control over the political, economic, and social affairs of their regions (Ibid.). In short, "Europe of the Regions" seems to be a concept for establishing a third governmental level in the European system (Tömmel, 1998).

B. Regionalism

Regionalism is defined here as a demand in regions for greater autonomy from the central or European institutions (Evans, 2002). It has a bottom-up character, instead of a top-down one (Ibid). Today, the slogan "Europe of the Regions" owes its popularity much to a series of conferences initiated by the German Lander in 1989 which were simply "Europe of the Regions" (Loughlin, 1996). The Assembly of European Regions (AER), a network of regional and local authorities whose explicit aim was to encourage the creation of a federal Europe with an enhanced role for the regions took over these conferences (Ibid.). Now, "Europe of the Regions" is one of the most popular metaphors when depicting the future of the EU system (Tömmel, 1998). Before the Maastricht Treaty there was no regional representation yet at the European level. The establishment of the CoR indicates the importance of regionalism in the current period of European integration (Loughlin, 1996). Only after the setting up of the CoR, regions became active in lobbying in the EU decision-making game (Tömmel, 1998). In addition to the institution-building, regional mobilization also started to accelerate. There are two kinds of regional mobilization. On the one hand, intraregional

mobilization took place where public and private organisations within regions wanted a better bargaining position towards the EU. Regional governments from several member states have set up independent offices in Brussels and engage in both competition and cooperation, depending on the issue (Hooghe and Marks, 1996). Within the Netherlands, this has led to the creation of the House of the Dutch Provinces (HNP) in 2000. The twelve Dutch provinces and the Association of Dutch Provinces (IPO) are represented in the HNP. Its main role is to represent the joint interest of the provinces by liaising, informing and identifying (House of the Dutch Provinces, n.d.a.). Another example is the Fisheries Regions Network the Netherlands (FRNN). On the other hand, interregional mobilization takes place where regions work together on a cross-national basis (Loughlin, 1996). Examples are the AER, an association which tries to promote the idea of a Europe of the Regions (Ibid.). Another one is the CPMR, which is an association based on a common interest. A trend towards regionalization and Europeanisation has thus been very present lately.

B.1. Linking regionalism to the CFP

The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU) was established in 1983 and has been reformed numerous times and will be reformed again around 2022 (Interview Commission, 2017). Since the 2002 reform stakeholders from fisheries and NGOs are incorporated to provide more effective and participatory decision-making (European Parliament, 2017). Regionalisation of the CFP showed a means a transfer of competencies from the EU institutions back to the regional level (Lago, 2001). Moreover, fishers' knowledge is not dismissed anymore. Before the 2002 reform, fishers' knowledge was dismissed as of local character, anecdotal, and interest-driven and therefore unreliable for fisheries management decision-making (Linke and Jentoft, 2013).

The EU system consistently interacts between the EU legal order and the domestic one. EU law has vast substantive rules, but almost no procedural rules, so its enforcement often depends on the Member States (Prechal and Widdershoven, 2011). The crux of enforcement is procedural law, because it is through the procedural rules that legal rights are carried into effect. This relationship is governed by several principles, both derived from the Treaties and from case law of the Court of Justice from the EU. Examples of such principles are the Principle of Conferral (Art 4.1. and 5.2. TEU) which states that the EU shall only act within the limits of the competences conferred by the Treaty to attain the set objectives and that competences not attributed to the EU shall remain within the Member States. As said before, the CFP is a shared competence of the EU, which leads to the Principle of Supremacy. This principle was established via EU case law, namely *Costa ENEL* in 1964. This principle states the prevalence of EU law over national law. Furthermore, do not forget the Principles

regulating procedural autonomy of Member States. These principles ensure that Member States remain competent to independently legislate on procedural issues so long as this possibility has not been pre-empted by the European Union (Kowalik-Bańczyk, 2012). These principles are the Principle of Equivalence, Effectiveness and Effective Judicial Protection, also known as the Rewe Principles. The Principle of Equivalence states that the remedies available to ensure the observance of national law must be made available in the same way to ensure the observance of EU law. The Rewe case, where national courts were required to ensure equal protection for the rights stemming from EU law, is an example (Prechal and Widdershoven, 2011). The Principle of Effectiveness ensures that national courts enforce the rights derived from EU Law. The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection states that Member States shall introduce in their procedural code, rules that provide for the effective judicial protection of EU law-based rights. It thus ensures that national remedies and sanctions are adequate to enforce EU law. The procedural autonomy of Member States shall thus ensure the enforcement of EU law by providing effective and equivalent procedures, remedies and sanctions. This relationship, between supremacy and national procedural autonomy, or even regional procedural autonomy, is one of the classic questions of enforcement (Prechal and Widdershoven, 2011). The Court sometimes follows argumentation along the lines of supremacy, and sometimes along the Rewe-test (based on the principles of equivalence and effectiveness) (Ibid.). The Rewe principles are primarily linked to the question of how to articulate substantive EU law and national procedural law in a shared legal order (Ibid.). While in such a constellation, procedural and remedial law is left to the Member States, the major concern is how to ensure that EU law is actually and effectively applied and enforced (Ibid.).

There are four modes of governance as can be seen in the table below. From the table, it can be seen that fisheries are part of the hierarchical mode and includes positive integration, goodness of fit and is vertically structured. This entails that supranational institutions have a considerable amount of power delegated to them. In this case, it is the European Commission (Commission) which introduces an active supranational policy. The CFP has to be downloaded to the Member State level and the Commission ensures that legislation is properly implemented (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004). It has to be noted again that there is supremacy of EU law. However, thanks to regionalism, the regions of Europe have been able to improve their position at CFP policy-making. Regions can now actively pursue their policy goals and cross-border collaborate with other regions (Tömmel, 1998). Below, the EU-competencies of the Province of Flevoland, its policy goals, and the role of the Municipality of Urk are provided.

Table 1: Modes of Governance (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004).

Mode of governance	Type of policy	Analytical Core	Main Mechanism	Examples
Negotiation	Any of those below	Formation of the EU policy	Any of those below	Any of those below
Hierarchy	Positive integration	Market-correcting rule: EU policy templates	Vertical (downloading) Goodness of fit	Environmental, Social policy, EMU, CAP, CFP
Hierarchy	Negative integration	Market-making rules: absence of policy templates	Horizontal (uploading) Regulatory competition	Internal market on goods and services, utilities sector (e.g. telecommunications, electricity)
Facilitated coordination	Coordination	Soft law, OMC, policy exchange	Horizontal Learning	CFSP, JHA, OMC Policies (such as employment, social inclusion, pensions)

C. Multi-level Governance

Both networks are semi-governmental ones, which is why the concept of governance is treated here. Governance is a concept used since the 1980s, but the thesis will follow the definition of R.A.W. Rhodes. According to Rhodes, governance is broader than government and includes interaction between networking members, caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes (1996). Multi-level governance (MLG) is a feature of European governance. It entails that most of the activities of making and implementing European policy involve multilevel activity. Multilevel governance is a result of two sets of developments, Europeanisation and regionalism. Because the EU has little implementation capacity on its own, it relies on the Member States and regions (Peters and Pierre, 2009). This chapter describes MLG as a phenomenon that involves multiple levels, from the local to the regional, national and European. According to Hooghe and Marks, the authority for the MLG framework, there are two types of MLG. The first type refers to the dispersion of authority to a limited number of non-overlapping jurisdictions at a limited number of levels (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Jurisdictions in this system of governance tend to bundle authority in quite large packages, they are usually non-overlapping, and they are relatively stable (Ibid.). The second type however, pictures a complex, fluid, patchwork of innumerable, overlapping jurisdictions (Ibid.). These jurisdictions are likely to have extremely fungible competencies, which can be spliced apart into functionally specific jurisdictions, they are often overlapping, and they tend to be lean and flexible - they come and go as demands for governance change (Ibid.).

Table 2: MLG Type I and II as defined by Hooghe and Marks, 2001

Type 1	Type 2
Multi-task jurisdictions	Task-specific jurisdictions
Mutually exclusive jurisdictions at any particular level	Overlapping jurisdictions at all levels
Limited numbers of jurisdictions	Unlimited number of jurisdictions
Jurisdictions organized in a limited number of levels	No limit to the number of jurisdictional levels
Jurisdictions are intended to be permanent	Jurisdictions are intended to be flexible

In short, the second type can be seen as a variety of different public service industries such as the police and the fire department. The number of jurisdiction are much larger here than in the first type. Interest groups are often found in the second type as well. Under MLG type 1 the number of jurisdictions are limited and fixed. However, thanks to decentralization and privatization space has opened for Type II governance (Ibid.). Some Type II transnational jurisdictions coordinate state actors, others coordinate a mix of state and non-state actors, while others are entirely non-state (Ibid.). The European Commission has actively supported Type II governance with seed money and ongoing funding: One of its best-known programs, Interreg, explicitly aims to facilitate inter-regional networks along the European Union's internal and external borders (Ibid.). It is therefore the assumption that the CPMR and the FRNN fall under MLG Type II.

H1: CPMR and FRNN fall under MLG Type II

D. Flevoland

Here, the competencies of the Province of Flevoland regarding the European Union's policy-making process, its existing Europe lobby-strategy, and the role of the Municipality of Urk, is explained. The aim of this paragraph is to demonstrate a background and understanding of how the Province of Flevoland normally uses its strategies and which incentives it could have for the recommended lobby strategy in Chapter VI.

The position for regions in the policy-making process of the European Union has been strengthened in recent years. Especially thanks to the establishment of the Committee of the Regions, and the trend of decentralization in the Netherlands. Because regions are now more involved in the European policy-making, the Dutch Government made agreements with the Dutch provinces to advise the Dutch Kingdom's position on certain legislation. Provinces

have been given the opportunity to take part in the Working Group Review New Commission Proposals and in Intergovernmental Dossier Teams (Province of Flevoland, 2016). The Provincial Executive which has European Affairs in his portfolio has momentarily three rapporteurships in the Committee of the Regions which increased the province's policy influence on those three subjects. Fisheries however is not among these. Below the Europe Strategy is described, which will give more detail on what the competencies and goals are of the province with regards to lobbying in the EU.

D.1. Europe Strategy

The Europe Strategy of the Province of Flevoland follows the Coalition Agreement of 2015-2019. This agreement says the following about Europe: "the international dimension of the Province of Flevoland is supported by playing an active role as regional partner in the EU. The province uses the opportunities offered by the European funds, as well as their networks as to influence European policy" (Province of Flevoland, 2016). The EU is of importance for the province because the EU either determines how efforts should be shaped or because it provides tools that can contribute to achieve goals. The Europe Strategy answers the questions why the province acts in Europe, on what themes, and what the province can achieve and adjoin in the EU and with which partners (Ibid.). The strategy is based on policies adopted by the Provincial Council and the Provincial Executives, but also connects the objectives set by the European Commission. Fisheries is not part of the priority themes of the province. The main priorities of Flevoland are sustainable spatial development; the development of an innovative and circular economy; to be frontrunner in the Netherlands in renewable energy and to be energy neutral in 2030 (Ibid.). The province thus wants to be innovative and entrepreneurial.

Flevoland's strength in the EU flows from joint action with strategic partners, European networks and regions. The province especially collaborates with Randstad Region, and with the other representations of Dutch provinces in the House of the Dutch Provinces.⁴ The three reasons for representation in the EU is to influence European policies and legislation, to acquire European funding, and to collaborate closely with partners in Europe (Ibid.). For every new lobby, the province first looks what it can give and take in Europe as to measure if the lobby would be productive and effective. This thesis will do this in chapter V. First, the three reasons for representation in the EU are explained in more detail below.

⁴ The Province of Flevoland together with the provinces of North-Holland, South-Holland and Utrecht form Randstad Region.

D.1.1. Policy Influence

European rules are of major influence to the provincial policies. Whether it is environmental legislation or stimulating the regional economy: the province has to do with Brussels (Ibid.). As such the province is responsible for the implementation of European legislation and to embed it via local and regional decision-making (Ibid.). European policy increasingly influences provincial policy. Therefore, the province wants to influence European policy-making. It is important to ensure that European legislation is formulated in such a way that their deposition at provincial level meets the policy objectives of the province, and that European policy can contribute to the achievement of the provincial policy goals and that this policy is feasible (Ibid.). To increase their influence on EU processes, cooperation with other parties is necessary. The idea is thus to incorporate other European regions or networks when they have the same goal as the Province of Flevoland.

D.1.2. European Funding

The province wants to determine lobbying for European funding opportunities of 2021-2027 in the coming period. The Provincial Executives consider it important to make optimal use of European opportunities, whether it be Structural Funds or thematic funds (Province of Flevoland, 2016). Team Europe of the Province communicates with companies, institutions and civil society organisations in Flevoland (Ibid.). They also look at when the formal and informal contact moments are with the provider of the subsidy during the application process, follow progress, and control if the money is well-spent (Ibid.).

D.1.3. Networks

Participation in European networks is important and crucial to retain a strong lobby position. When lobbying a short-term strategy (get something done), the province also thinks about their long-term view: to have their networks in order (be good and tell it) (Ibid.). Lobbying is effective when a climate of trust has been created (Coen, 1997). The province also anticipates strategic dossiers, the fisheries lobby is one of those. Acting on it now, means that they can harvest in at the right time. That is why the Province of Flevoland looks at the CPMR, so they might influence the reform of the CFP in 2022.

Networks are also an instrument for acquiring European resources. More often a consortium with partners has to be formed, and provincial assignments increasingly have a cross-border dimension (Province of Flevoland, 2016). Learning from other regions in Europe prevents the province from reinventing the wheel unnecessarily (Ibid.). Offering the knowledge of the

Province of Flevoland ensures the promotion of the province and its positioning of their companies and knowledge institution. Customization is always important here, because the intended result determines the choice of the network (Ibid). Is it going to strengthen lobbying activities in policy-making, the use of funding opportunities, the finding of right partners or the exchange of knowledge and experience? Depending on this question, the choice of network will be made. The Province of Flevoland work in many networks together with other provinces (especially with the Randstad Region and within the House of Dutch Provinces) to share the burden.

As can be seen, the FRNN and CPMR are not included here yet. Normally, the lobby strategy for a sector is formatted as in the model below:

What do we want to achieve	How do we want to achieve this			2017
	Influence	Subsidies	Networks	

In Chapter VI, this format will be completed for the fisheries lobby of the Province of Flevoland. First, the passage below will explain why it is so important for Flevoland to lobby in the fisheries at this moment in history.


D.2. Urk

Here, the subquestion “what is the correlation between Urk and Brexit” is answered. The history of Urk is interwoven with fisheries (Municipality of Urk, 2017). It is of importance for the research to know a bit of history of the fishing community Urk, because one the reason for analyzing both networks come from the challenges of Brexit and the landing obligation Urk is facing. Traditionally, the people from Urk were dependent on fisheries and to a lesser extent to agriculture as a means to ensure their subsistence (Ibid.). Poverty was not uncommon since fishing was not always successful. The turning point for Urk came with the closure of the Zuiderzee in 1932. The Afsluitdijk (a major causeway in the Netherlands) dammed the Zuiderzee off. As a result, the Zuiderzee was no more and the days of Urk as an island were numbered as well (Ibid.). The Zuiderzee, a salt water inlet of the North Sea turned into a fresh water lake: the IJsselmeer (Ibid.). According to experts, this change would mean it would soon be over with fisheries in Urk since the IJsselmeer would offer too little space for everyone to pursuit fishing, while the North Sea would be virtually unattainable because Urk was localized in the center of the Netherlands (Ibid.). This expectation has not been fulfilled, and therefore people refer to it as "the Miracle of Urk" (Ibid.). The people of Urk went fishing in the North Sea and larger fishing vessels were built. The fish auction of Urk grew steadily (Ibid.). Until the late seventies, the fish was still mostly supplied via the port of

Urk. Thereafter, the fishing vessels were too big to come home via the IJsselmeer and had to be transported to Urk by truck via maritime ports such as IJmuiden, Harlingen, Lauwersoog and Delfzijl (Ibid.). Thanks to the fish auction a huge processing industry rose up (Ibid.). The beam trawl brought Urk great prosperity: the vessels were larger and they had increased engine power (Ibid.). In 1974, nearly twice as many flatfish was caught as in 1966 (Ibid.). The catch limitations started in 1975 (quota). Due to quotas and rising fuel prices, the profitability of beam trawling declined sharply. That is why in the last years many have invested strongly in more sustainable fisheries such as the Masterplan Sustainable Fisheries (Ibid.). The European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) has co-financed the innovations that are integrated in the ship (Maritime Holland, 2016).

The latest figures show that employment in the fisheries sector at Urk in a direct sense is about 470 (supply, UK numbers) and 325 (supply, flag ships) + 1.500 (processing) + 750 (trade) + 300 (transport and storage) = 3,345 jobs from the 8500 total (Municipality of Urk, 2017). That is more than 39% of the total employment (Ibid.). The indirect employment in the fisheries sector is difficult to measure, so an estimation is not provided here.

Figure 4: Urk and the North Sea (Urken, 2017)



D.2.1 Brexit

In 2016, the British (flag)ships at the fish auction in Urk accounted for a quarter of its revenues: € 27 million (Ibid.). Moreover, 60% of the total account (€126.000.000) of the fish auction comes from fishing vessels from Urk and the fish caught in British waters (Ibid.). That means nearly 76 million. Therefore, fisheries in Urk depends on fishing in the British waters for 85% (Ibid.).

The national perspective of 'maritime' is often seen as an umbrella term for various sectors which focus on water (Ibid.). These sectors include seafaring, shipbuilding, maritime service, and fisheries. Urk has a recognizable and familiar profile for everything that has to do with fisheries, partly because of the presence of the largest fish auction of flatfish in Western

Europe (Ibid.). A lot of companies established themselves at Urk because of the fish auction, ranging the spectrum from a broad spectrum of trade and processing, to transport (Ibid.). The second hypothesis will be:

H2: Brexit will have adverse consequences for the Province of Flevoland


The correlation between Urk and Brexit is thus that it could seriously affect the economy and employment in Urk.

3. Networks

Paragraph 2 already answered the subquestion “How does the Province of Flevoland use EU institutions and (trans)national networks to lobby within the EU multi-level system?”. In short, they do this by determining what they intend to achieve. They use (trans)national networks accordingly to strengthen lobbying activities in policy-making, use funding opportunities, find the right partners or exchange knowledge and experience. In this section the emergence and function of the CPMR and the FRNN will be provided in a very brief manner, as well as how the Province of Flevoland use these networks to lobby.

According to Pieter Bouwen, regions who are interested in developing representation at EU level need to make the following decisions (2001). First of all, the region needs to consider whether they want to organize representation themselves or whether they would prefer a third party to do this (Bouwen, 2001). Secondly, the region has to decide whether it will undertake individual action or become a member of a network (Ibid.). Lastly, the region has to think about taking action via the national route or the EU one (Ibid.). However, according to Pieter Bouwen, these decisions depend on three variables. Firstly, the size of the region is a variable. A smaller region relies more often on collective action because it is less resource intensive and is able to undertake action at more levels (Ibid.). Representation by a network avoids the heavy financial burden of establishing a permanent representation in Brussels, is tailored to the needs of the region, and allows membership to be cancelled more easily (Ibid.). The latter reason provides the larger and more resourceful regions to see networks also as an attractive and flexible instrument (Ibid.). The economic strategy of the region is the second variable here and is closely linked to the first variable. If the region is resourceful it is more likely to take individual action, while regions which are less resourceful are more likely to undertake collective action. The third variable relates to the attitude of the idea of representation (Ibid.). When there is a positive attitude, the region is more likely to undertake political action at Member State or European level. For an accurate model of the variables and decisions a region can take, see figure 5 below. In chapter V, this model will be analysed for the Province of Flevoland.

Figure 5: The model of Pieter Bouwen's choice of organisational form



The lobby efforts for just one policy area is already quite intensive when looking at the brief descriptions provided above. That is why regions regularly invest in paid representation and hire professional lobbyists to represent them at the European level (Loftis and Kettler, 2015). For the fisheries lobby, the Province of Flevoland pays a membership fee to the FRNN although it does not have a EU representative in Brussels. In addition, the Province of Flevoland is considering to become member of the CPMR. Via these (trans)national networks they invest in paid representation which saves time and resources in exchange. These two networks thus seem to come in handy when trying to lobby the above institutions.

A. Types of Networks

To influence the policy-making process, regions have established (trans)national networks. As we saw earlier, regions can now promote and develop their interests more easily by means of direct representation, the CoR and networks. These networks have various forms and objectives. According to Coen and Richardson these networks are key actors in the design of politics and policies at EU level (2009). Networks focus on formal and informal contacts and relationships and try to shape the policy-making process and decision-making (Parsons, 1995). This paragraph answers the subquestion: Which kind of network type is the CPMR and FRNN?

Kjaer (2004) described the different features a network has. At the basis of the relationship resource exchange is central (Ibid.). The resource exchange for the FRNN and the CPMR is information and access. There is this a degree of interdependence and reciprocity (Ibid.). Furthermore, the organizations and members should trust each other. Below a table can be found with the features of a market, hierarchy and network.

Table 3: Features of a market, hierarchy and network have (Kjaer, 2004).

	Market	Hierarchy	Network
Basis of relationship	Contract and property rights	Employment relationship	Resource exchange
Degree of dependence	Independent	Dependent	Interdependent
Medium of exchange	Prices	Authority	Trust
Culture	Competition	Subordination	Reciprocity

In the literature, there are types of networks. Marsh and Rhodes for example make a distinction between issue networks and policy communities (1992). Issue networks are loosely structured, have many members and little continuity in membership, values and outcomes (Ibid.). Policy communities are tight networks with few members, they are characterized by continuity in membership, shared values and outcomes (Ibid.). Neither the CPMR and FRNN are a perfect fit for the one or the other definition. The FRNN is loosely structured, has few members, but is characterized by continuity in membership, shared values and outcomes. The CPMR on the other hand is tightly structured, has many members, continuity in members, but it takes a lot of effort to have the same values and outcomes.

Hooghe and Marks made another distinction for networks. The thesis follows their theory. Hooghe and Marks first define what a transnational network is: “diverse overarching and specialized transnational organizations representing regional and local governments” (Hooghe and Marks, 1996). Examples include the Assembly of European Regions (AER), the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), Eurocities, and many many more. According to Hooghe and Marks there are three types of transnational networks. The first type is directly run by the European Commission. Since neither the CPMR nor the FRNN are included in this type, a swift shift to the second type follows. The second set of networks has its origins in self-directed mobilization among regions with common policy problems (Ibid.). The European Commission is eager to exchange information and collaborate with regional associations as long as they are the most representative organisation for regional interests (Ibid.). Another feature of this second type is that they are often concerned with reducing regional disparities via funds (Ibid.). The CPMR is such a network, with its focus on the EMFF and by representing 160 regions and 200 million EU citizens. A third type entails self-organisation of

regions and is driven largely by economic factors (Ibid.). Regional political leaders and civil servants act as "ministers of external trade" and are expected to act as a broker (Ibid.). The FRNN is a type three network: it only exists of provincial executives and aldermen. The president of the network and its secretariat are often in Brussels to bargain.

B. The Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions

There are 350 regions and 500 million people part of the European Union. The CPMR exists of 160 regions and represent almost 200 million people (CPMR, n.d.a.). This means that almost half of the EU is represented by this transnational network. Its function is to operate as think tank and as a lobby for their 160 regions (Ibid.). The network emerged in 1973 and focuses mainly on social, economic and territorial cohesion, maritime policies and blue growth, and accessibility (Ibid.). Relevant topics for Flevoland include fisheries (Urk), maritime (port development), transport, and cohesion policy (Province of Flevoland, 2017). The network claims to have an extensive network of contacts within the EU institutions and national governments. The main decision-maker of the CPMR is its Political Bureau. They meet twice a year and propose policy guidelines for the General Assembly and implements decisions (CPMR, n.d.a.). The Bureau also elects the president of the CPMR. It has to be noted that only politicians are allowed to be part of the Political Bureau, hence the name. All 160 regions nominate a representative and a substitute member to the Bureau (Ibid.). The General Assembly is chaired by the CPMR president and meet once a year. All CPMR member regions are represented in the Assembly. The CPMR is a non-profit organisation, but comes with a membership fee of € 14,111 per year (Interview Province of Flevoland, 2017). However, the costs will stop here because the possible membership would not lead to additional personnel involvement at the Province of Flevoland. The Municipality of Urk will deliver advise on fisheries policy. For advisory services in the field of cohesion and maritime policy (port and shipbuilding) no heavy additional time commitment is anticipated by the Province of Flevoland (Interview Province of Flevoland, 2016). Because only regions can become members of the CPMR, and thus no cities or umbrella organisations, the Municipality of Urk has indicated that it would like to have access to CPMR. An example for a current lobbied file where Urk could benefit from CPMR are the discussions on fishing grounds under Brexit. The CPMR is divided into six Geographical Commissions corresponding to the seas of Europe.⁵ The Province of Flevoland would be divided into the North Sea Commission of the CPMR.

⁵ The six Geographical Commissions are the Atlantic Arc, the Balkan and Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean, the Islands, and the North Sea.

B.1. North Sea Commission

The North Sea Commission covers the regions of Denmark, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, France and Norway (North Sea Commission, 2016). The North Sea Commission is a cooperation platform for regions around the North Sea. The function of the North Sea Commission is to help address the challenges and opportunities presented by the North Sea (Ibid.). Through regional cooperation and collaboration, these opportunities can be better developed, better connected and made more mobile throughout the region, advancing the North Sea Regions position as a centre for innovation, excellence and best practice (Ibid.). The North Sea Commission has three main objectives. First of all, it wants to promote and create awareness of the North Sea region as a major economic entity within Europe (North Sea Commission, n.d.a.). Secondly, it wants to be a platform for developing and obtaining funding for joint development initiatives (Ibid.). Lastly, they want to lobby for a better North Sea region (Ibid.). Cooperation between the North Sea regions focuses on marine resources, transport, energy and climate change, and attractive and sustainable communities (Ibid.). This cooperation involves policy development and political lobbying, development of transnational projects and exchange of knowledge and best practice (North Sea Commission, n.d.a.). A key achievement of North Sea Commission is that it participated in setting up the North Sea Regional Advisory Council (NS RAC). It was the first RAC established in the EU and the European Commission often asks for its input.

The structure of the North Sea Commission is different than the CPMR's one. Here an Annual Business Meeting (ABM) is the highest authority and consists of one representative from each member region. They meet every June and once in two years get to elect the president and its two vice-presidents of the North Sea Commission. The president and two vice-presidents make up the Presidency (Ibid.). The responsibility for the ongoing work and direction of the North Sea Commission goes to the Executive Committee (Ibid.) They prepare for decisions to be made at the ABM and meet three times a year. The Executive Committee consists of the presidency and a national representative from each member country (Ibid.).

C. FRNN

As made clear in the introduction, the province of Flevoland is already member of the national Fisheries Regions Network the Netherlands (FRNN) since 2002. At that time, some aldermen from fishing communities in the Netherlands took the initiative to join forces and that is how the FRNN has been established (Interview FRNN, 2017). The Municipality of Urk provided the secretariat and president of the network. The aim at the time was to support the interests of the fisheries sector towards the government and the European Commission

(FRNN, 2017). A year later, the provinces of North Holland and Zeeland also took an interest in fisheries, followed by Flevoland, Groningen, Friesland and South Holland (Ibid.). The platform thus represents several municipalities and provinces that deal with North Sea fisheries and now counts 22 members, from which six are provinces and sixteen are municipalities. These provinces and municipalities keep close contact with each other, join forces, and discuss the various fishing dossiers. This way they have an opportunity to influence decision-making in Brussels or The Hague because they take a common stand (Ibid.). The platform supports the fisheries sector and represents their interests at the national government and the European Union. They do this by making proposals, agreements, and work visits at the national parliament, European Parliament or the Permanent Representation. The main challenges and opportunities for the network now are pulse fishing (electronic fishing put simply), the landing obligation, and the Brexit (Interview FRNN, 2017). Moreover, the FRNN would really like to see the return of the Ministry of Fisheries, which is now part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The FRNN finds that the importance of the fisheries sector is so big that it must be reflected again in the Ministry's name (Ibid.). The FRNN also wants to postpone, suspend or have an adaptation of the landing obligation via the reformed CFP in 2022. According to the FRNN the socio-economic impact of the Brexit will be very palpable and will go far beyond the fleet (Ibid.). The working document of the Municipality of Urk about the consequences of Brexit, which is discussed before, seems to follow up on this. Lastly, they want to legalise pulse fishing. Pulse is an important innovation that not only makes fishing more sustainable, because there is less soil disturbance, which leads to less discards. In addition, it saves a lot of fuel (20-50%!), which means a significant reduction in CO₂ emissions.

As this paragraph showed, both networks claim to exercise influence over the national executives and European institutions (Lago, 2001). The CPMR however, claims to have an extensive network of contacts within the EU institutions and national governments. This however, brings us to the following three hypotheses:

H3: The CPMR is exaggerating their level of influence.

H4: Both networks fill each other's gaps.

H5: It is worthwhile to build coalitions via (trans)national networks of regions in the field of fisheries

It should be noted that this paragraph only explained the emergence and function of the networks, as well as why the Province of Flevoland is interested in them. The analysis of the networks is presented in the fifth chapter.

Chapter IV: Methodology

The following chapter explains the choice of research strategy, data collection and analysis. In other words: the methodological approach of the research. The methodology used in this thesis is an interdisciplinary approach which encompasses three different academic perspectives, namely an economic, governance and legal one. As for data collection, targeted literature reviews and articles, a SWOT analysis, hypotheses testing and useful data from interviews are used. These data will provide an analysis on the CPMR and FRNN as to recommend a sound lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland. Before mentioning the structure of this chapter, it is important to note that recent studies often have a sectoral focus because the diversity and complexity of EU lobbying (Bouwen, 2001). That is why this thesis keeps the tradition of focusing on one policy area only. It also tries to close the gap in existing literature by its focus on lobbying in fisheries: while fundamental to the functioning of the EU, existing literature on lobbying activities for fisheries is impressive by its absence (Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014).

As said before, a recommendation is included in this thesis. The thesis thus presents positive and normative elements of analysis since it explains how both networks function and emerged, and because the effectiveness of the networks is measured and a recommendation is delivered. This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature by providing insights in incorporating a SWOT analysis for (trans)national networks instead of businesses. The main aspect of the thesis is recommending a EU lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland for fisheries by analysing the CPMR and FRNN. In order to reach this, the author first explains how and why the CPMR and FRNN are chosen as subjects for this research. In the second paragraph the author explains how she managed to get more grip on the arena and how the topic of the research was managed. In the third paragraph the sources used to collect data and why the data chosen are explained. In the fourth paragraph the approach the author took is justified. Thereafter relevant experience in the area and interviews are illustrated. The following paragraph (6) explains the data generating process and justifies why a SWOT analysis helps answering the research question. The chapter concludes with the difficulties the author experienced during the research together with a reflection on reliability and validity of the research.

1. Choice of networks

The reason why the author chose to analyse the FRNN and the CPMR are fourfold. First of all, these networks are researched, because they both concern *regions of a EU Member State*. The networks are both established in the European Union, which is an important

aspect since the Province of Flevoland wants to strengthen their fisheries lobby in the European Union. Secondly, both are networks which deal with fisheries. The third reason for analysing the FRNN and CPMR is because the Province of Flevoland was already interested in becoming member of the CPMR, and because they were already a member of the FRNN. In addition to the latter network it should be noted that the Municipality of Urk (Flevoland) holds its secretariat. The fourth and main reason is because both networks deal to some extent to the European Union. The FRNN exists only of Dutch regions, but also works at EU level. The CPMR exists of 160 European regions from 24 states, including some non-EU Member States such as Norway. The European Parliament and Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the EU are of more importance to the FRNN, while the European Commission is of more importance to the CPMR.

2. Getting more grip on the arena

You would expect that the author of this thesis who is born and raised in the Province of Flevoland, works at the Municipality of Urk, and already gained relevant skills and experience in the field of fisheries during the first internship, to have some sort of grip on the arena. However, the information supply in Brussels is always overwhelming, especially when confronted to analyse a new transnational network. After some 'light reading', an open interview with the EU-coordinator of Flevoland was held in March in order to get a stronger grip on the arena. Alain Hubers clarified the context in which the region was involved with regards to policy-making in the EU. Also, Alderman of Urk, Geert Post, explained the importance of lobbying in the EU when it comes to fisheries. The research question was quickly formulated thanks to this open interview.

Table 4: Open interview

Open interview			
	Name	Organisation/Institute	Occupation
1.	Alain Hubers	Province of Flevoland	Coördinator European Governance

3. Sources

The research question underlying this thesis explains that the (trans)national fisheries networks, the CPMR and FRNN, are the central subject of investigation. The research question is: *In which ways can the Province of Flevoland use (trans)national networks to influence the Common Fisheries Policy?* This means that the main sources researched in this thesis concern policy documents from these networks, but it also concerns other publications. The policy

documents include strategy documents, but also guidelines. The other publications concern news publications, conference reports and summaries between meetings.

The research question also relates to the importance of measuring influence. Only when there is a guideline on how influence is measured, the research question can be answered. As could be seen in the theoretical framework, there are many ways to measure influence, whether it be through information, access or legitimacy. Choosing one of these measurements was essential to answer the research question. The thesis follows Pieter Bouwen's Theory of Access. For this part literature reviews were used as to give more body to the normative framework and to determine what the leading works are. The latter were selected through selecting a recent work about measuring influence, followed by using the snowball method. The SWOT analysis will evaluate the theory.

The research also used hypotheses. The author described in a concrete manner what she expects to happen, in the analysis chapter these hypotheses are tested. The five hypotheses in this research are all statements which are testable. The hypotheses are justified or falsified by evidence. The research would have to show that the evidence supported the hypotheses. Lastly, this research also used interviews and observations from practice. These interviews were conducted with policy advisors, secretariats of both networks, policy officers of the CPMR, civil servants of the European Commission and the permanent representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the EU, and EU-representatives of Dutch provinces. The observations from practice are derived from a research internship conducted at the House of the Dutch Provinces from February 2017 until the end of June 2017, as well as by gaining work experience at the Municipality of Urk as Junior Policy Advisor European and Maritime Affairs from September 2016 until May 2017. Both of these sources are discussed more extensively below.

4. Approach

The research internship lasted five months, from February until the end of June 2017. Throughout these months, the author divided the research into respectively three stages: the gathering of information, field research and the SWOT analysis. In the first stage, relevant information was collected for a first analysis. Enough information was gathered in order to ask the right interview questions for the second stage. No bias existed yet in the first stage. The second stage, the field research, consisted of interviews, a mandatory research internship, and relevant work experience at the Municipality of Urk. More about this stage is

discussed separately below. The second stage helped increasing my understanding of the functioning of the networks. The third stage, however, is where the knowhow of the first and second stage was put into practice. All information and data was turned into a matrix here, whereas the matrix led to a SWOT analysis. A SWOT analysis is great for developing an understanding of an organization or situation and is often used as part of a strategic planning process. In this case a SWOT analysis is used for developing an understanding of the two networks and to create a lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland. Again, this stage is discussed separately below.

5. Internship, relevant work experience and interviews

During the second stage of the research approach, the CPMR maritime meeting and the CPMR fisheries meeting in April were very useful. This was also true for the semi-structured interviews with policy and liaison officers, and politicians in Brussels, Flevoland and Urk from March-May. The evaluation of both networks is based by the observations from these interviews, as well as from the internship and work experience at Urk. The interviews should be viewed as a way to provide context, background and confirmation to the author's findings.

5.1. Internship, relevant work experience and semi-structured interviews

Most of the information necessary for answering the research questions was collected by means of desk research. As said before, this entailed the gathering of information via literature, policy documents and other publications. However, some field research was done as well, to get up-to date information. This field research was comprised of visits to conferences and meetings, and conducting semi-structured interviews.

Most interviews were with EU-representatives of Dutch provinces whom are based in Brussels. Their province was often a member of the CPMR and the FRNN. These responses are the most extensive in number and therefore the most representative. In total, ten persons were interviewed. The respondents were selected on basis of their profession and knowledge of the networks.

The interviews were conducted by telephone and in person and lasted 45 minutes on average. The interviews helped to see if the information gathered by the author was backed by the respondents. The insights gained were useful thanks to the many different occupations of the respondents.

Most interviews consisted of fixed closed and open questions, often coupled with flexible follow-up questions.⁶ These interviews were thus semi-structured. This allowed the author to focus more on the respondent's respective institution or region. For example, when the respondent was a policy advisor for a Member of the European Parliament (MEP), a natural focus on the European Parliament occurred. Notwithstanding, all respondents were asked all questions. Almost every interview was conducted in Dutch, but a translation of the questions asked is provided below. There are three formats for the interviews: one dedicated to the CPMR, one to the FRNN and one for policy officers of the CPMR. These formats are attached in the Annex of the thesis. Two open interviews were conducted as well. The first one was with the EU coordinator in Flevoland (see paragraph two of this chapter). The second one was with an economist within DG Mare of the European Commission. She wanted to have a long talk instead of answering questions, which the interviewer agreed to.

The answers on these questions laid the groundwork for transcriptions. The answers have been analysed by grouping everything together and by looking at the keywords. Also, because the interviews were semi-structured, the author used Nvivo, a tool for analysing data and literature. The resulting observations confirmed the author's findings. The interviews were not recorded on a voice recorder for confidentiality reasons, but a non-confidential structured transcript of each interview is available on request. Below a list of the occupation and organisation/institution of the respondents can be found. As can be seen, not everybody was keen to disclose their name.

Table 5: semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews		Conducted March-May 2017	
	Name	Organisation/Institution	Occupation
1.	Juriean Brands	FRNN	Secretariat
2.	Anonymous	European Parliament	Policy Advisor Fisheries for MEP Annie Schreijer-Pierik
3.	Anonymous	European Parliament	Policy Advisor Fisheries for MEP Peter van Dalen
4.	Anonymous	Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU	Attaché for fisheries
5.	Anonymous	European Commission OPEN INTERVIEW	Economist DG Mare
6.	Milos Labovic	House of the Dutch Provinces	EU-Representative Zeeland
7.	Wim Stoker	House of the Dutch Provinces	EU-representative Noord-Holland

⁶ Eight out of ten interviews were semi-structured. The remaining two were open interviews.

8.	Melissa Frödin	CPMR/ NSC	Assistant Executive Secretary
9.	Damien Périssé	CPMR	Director for Maritime Affairs


5.2. SWOT Analysis

This thesis applies the often-used strategy tool known as the SWOT analysis. The author chose this tool for many reasons. As such, with this tool, the author not only looks at the current performances (strengths and weaknesses) of the CPMR and FRNN, but also at the future ones (opportunities and threats). A SWOT analysis also helps decide whether a strategy should be revised or improved. This also goes for lobby strategies. SWOT is thus a powerful technique that can be applied to individuals, groups, networks, organizations, or even plans (Chermack and Kasshanna, 2007). A SWOT analysis can therefore help explore new possibilities.

6. Data Generating Process

All the empirical material is gathered through Nvivo and filtered the information by strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. NVivo is a software that supports qualitative research and is designed to organize, analyse and find insights in unstructured, or qualitative data like interviews and articles (Nvivo, n.d.a.). The resulting empirical material from the 8 semi-structured interviews and two open interviews, and (internal) policy documents from the Province of Flevoland, as well as the policy document from the (trans)national networks are ranked as points as to conduct a SWOT analysis. The highest ranked points get analysed further in a confrontation matrix and in the end, strategical suggestions are made. In general, there are five general steps to conduct a SWOT analysis as can be seen in Figure 1 below. First the objective or desired end state of the SWOT analysis is defined. Secondly, an explanation of the SWOT analysis procedures is provided. In the third place, individuals of specific institutions or organisations are asked to consider what the strengths and weaknesses are. Fourthly, the individual responses are combined into a single worksheet. Lastly a strategy is developed.

Figure 7: General steps SWOT analysis.



During the research process the author dealt with two struggles. The first one relates to the interviews. Forty percent of the interviewees wanted to remain anonymous, and nearly everyone declined to have a recording device on the table. The author solved this by making a structured transcription of every interview in which the identity of the respondent is not easily retraceable. At the same time, the author dealt with the struggle that the interview questions were not exactly the same every time because of the respondent's occupation. For example, the respondents who work at the CPMR could not answer the question when they became member of the CPMR. The author solved the problem by making three different formats. When the respondent was member of the CPMR and FRNN, format one and two were asked. If the respondent worked for a European institution or for the CPMR format three was used. The second difficulty was related to the SWOT analysis. Although the SWOT analysis helps take an objective, critical, and unemotional look at the organization as a whole, there are also some gaps in this tool (Chermack and Kasshanna, 2007). For example, some criticize SWOT to be too rigid in an ever-changing environment which can lead to biases. Especially in Brussels the environments change quickly. However, by realizing that this problem exists, this problem is already solved as long as the author takes into account how the networks are able to deal effectively with its environment (Ibid.). The author chose using the SWOT analysis because it can recommend decisions which will maximize strengths, address weaknesses, explore opportunities and works against threats (Ibid.).

Because the findings are highly likely to be utilised in practice, the evaluation of the quality of research is essential. The conclusions and recommendation of this research have credibility for four reasons. First of all, the author did not have a personal bias in relation to the networks which may have influenced findings. Secondly, the information comes from the networks and the Province of Flevoland themselves, as well as from academic literature. Both types did not contradict each other. Thirdly, the interviews provided a double check for the findings. Lastly, because the research used Nvivo to analyse all data.

Chapter V: Analysis

This chapter reports the findings of the data collection. It will be structured along the lines of Chapter III and connects theory with reality. Also, the data analysis method will be implemented. The method here is the review of literature, semi-structured interviews and a SWOT analysis. It thus analyses the CPMR and FRNN case by case, after which both are compared. With the SWOT analysis, the following subquestion will be answered:

What are the strengths and weaknesses of both (trans)national networks?

The results of the CPMR and FRNN will thus be presented. Throughout this chapter the five hypotheses will be tested as well. The first three paragraphs will answer H1, H2 and H3, then the results of the SWOT analyses will be explained.

1. MLG Type

In Chapter III the assumption was made that the CPMR and FRNN fall under MLG Type 2. This paragraph tests this first hypothesis.⁷ As mentioned earlier, the CPMR is a type two transnational network (Hooghe and Marks, 1996). The CPMR represents 160 regions and 200 million citizens and are thus one of the most representative networks for regional interests (CPMR, n.d.a.). It also focuses on the EMFF as to reduce regional disparities between its members. The FRNN is a type three network, a self-organized network (Hooghe and Marks, 1996). They also focus on funds, but more because of economic factors instead of trying to reduce regional disparities. Where do these networks fall in Hooghe and Marks' framework for MLG types? The Type I form of MLG is more traditional and general. A government-level is a prime example for this type, but also federations. It is thus attached to a state-centric approach (Conzelmann, 2008). A deduction can be made that networks in general are not included in this MLG Type I. However, regional and local government could be seen as a territorial layer in EU policy-making, which justifies incorporation in Type I (Ibid.). It has to be noted though that, although both networks exist of regions, it is not the region itself here, that is cooperating with higher levels in a certain policy areas, but the networks. Can networks therefore be allocated to the Type II form? The MLG Type II is characterised by task-specific jurisdictions, which can overlap at all levels and have a flexible design (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). The CPMR and FRNN both have task-specific jurisdictions, namely: fisheries. Hooghe and Marks argue that Type II MLG consists of special-purpose jurisdictions that tailor membership, rules of operation, and functions to a

⁷ H1: CPMR and FRNN fall under MLG Type II

particular policy problem (Hooghe and Marks, 2004). They also have intersecting memberships and a flexible design that is responsive to temporary need (Conzelmann, 2008). Instead of using governmental levels as the scope of analysis, type II systems focus more on the policy area, with the jurisdictions tending to line up along policy lines, rather than governmental lines (Curry, 2008). This means that jurisdictions may overlap territorially, and the territories themselves may differ depending on the jurisdiction (Ibid.). Finally, these jurisdictions and responsibilities are much more flexible and responsive to the needs of the public and practitioners (Ibid.). Type II systems are most predominant 'at the edges of Type I governance' and may be more clearly exhibited in areas such as the regional level (Hooghe and Marks, 2004). Regional governments are more likely to need to invoke relationships with other regions, because they have to provide and administer governmental services without the safety net of a larger, resource-rich governmental structure (Ibid.). This allows for the use of new, flexible relations in order to deal with policy-specific issues that may arise for regional governments (Curry, 2008). Since both networks are more flexible than hierarchical and more governance than government, the assumption that the CPMR and FRNN fall under MLG Type II holds true (Ibid.). In the table below, some criteria the networks meet can be seen.

Table 6: MLG type II and the networks.

	CPMR	FRNN
Task-specific jurisdictions	Yes	Yes
Overlapping jurisdictions at all levels	Yes	Yes
Jurisdictions are intended to be flexible	Yes	Yes

2. Consequences Brexit

According to Provincial executive Rijsberman, the agrofood and fisheries sector will be hit tremendously since they are export-dependent of the UK (Rijsberman, 2017). If the Dutch fishing fleet will not be allowed to fish in British waters anymore, this will mean a 60% loss of fishing grounds (Ammelrooy, 2017). This percentage is the same for the Municipality of Urk. This refusal has far-reaching consequences and roughly means a reduction of the number of cutters (103 to 30), employment (minus 250 jobs in a direct sense), supply of fish (halving the supply) and revenue of the fish auction (minus 75 million) in Urk (Municipality of Urk, 2017). However, it is still unclear if the British flag-ships will be allowed to stay after Brexit. In the worst case, all landings would then take place in the UK and as a result everything stated above will descend even more (Ibid.). The Municipality of Urk expects certain fish processing

companies to close, as well as some transport companies (Ibid). They also expect a loss of total employment within the municipality of Urk with around 2000 persons (direct and indirect employment) (Ibid.). That is more than 60% of total employment in the fisheries sector and 25% of total employment in Urk (Ibid.). The impact of a far-reaching Brexit, or hard-Brexit, would therefore be adverse for the fishing community of Urk. But the effects on Flevoland do not stop there. The Province of Flevoland scored as the 5th "Brexit-sensitive region" on the ING regional impact index from May 2017 (Ibid.). Jan Nico Appelman, also a Provincial executive, sees a red line: "Looking at studies from leading agencies, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Central Plan Bureau and reputable media sources, we see a red line: namely negative effects for the economy" (Appelman, 2016). Appelman stated that the Netherlands will be hit badly by Brexit because the Dutch economy is interwoven with the UK more than most other EU countries (Ibid.). Export to the UK is approximately € 55 billion (Ibid.). The CPB estimates that the costs for the Netherlands can reach 1.2% of the GDP, which amounts to € 10 billion (Ibid.). It is highly likely that these estimates will also be visible in Flevoland, especially since the CPB investigations indicate that certain sectors are extraordinarily affected, such as the Agrofood and fisheries, which is of great importance to Flevoland (Ibid.). The hypothesis "Brexit will have adverse consequences for the Province of Flevoland" thus proves true. Nevertheless, the scope of these consequences depends on the future relations between the EU and UK. Since the negotiations just started, only time will tell how the Brexit develops. However, it is better to err on the side of caution. That is why a firm lobby strategy regarding fisheries is needed for Urk and the Province of Flevoland.

3. Access


This section mainly deals with the answering of the question "do the CPMR and FRNN have access?". Because the research follows Pieter Bouwen's Theory of Access, where access is information, the information types come back here. Ultimately, the section will reach the question whether these two networks have influence as a result of the access and information provision.

A. Organisational form

First, it is essential to notice why the Province of Flevoland choose to be involved with networks. As has been seen in Chapter III, Pieter Bouwen created an accurate model of the variables and decisions a region can take in choosing the organisational form. The first question one needs to consider is whether the Province of Flevoland wants to organize representation themselves or 'buy' a third party to do this. Flevoland wants to use the CPMR

as to strengthen their fisheries lobby, and is already member of the FRNN (Interview Province of Flevoland, 2017). The Province self-organize themselves. Of course, they need to pay a membership fee, but the provincial executive and EU representative(s) are the ones who have to go to CPMR and FRNN meetings. However, when the lowest denominator is set between the member regions, it is the CPMR themselves which go to the Commission for example. For the FRNN it means that the secretary and president of the network go to Brussels or The Hague. In short, this question does not relate 100% to self-organization, but it does come closest. The same goes for the FRNN. As said earlier, the Province of Flevoland is rather small and quite young, making it less resource intensive (Interview Province of Flevoland, 2017). By involving with collective action such as becoming or being member of a network, the Province spends less resources than when choosing individual action. This answered the second question of whether to undertake individual or collective action. Lastly, because the Province of Flevoland has always been an active province in Europe and has a positive attitude towards the idea of representation in the EU, the Province is in favour of action at the EU level (Rijsberman, 2017). The CPMR only focuses on the EU dimension, while the FRNN deals with the national dimension as well. Figure 7 shows the model of choice or organisation form the Province of Flevoland.

Figure 7: The model of Pieter Bouwen's choice of organisational form and the model filled in for the Province of Flevoland.



B. Do the CPMR and FRNN have access?

The lobby efforts for just one policy area is already quite intensive. That is why regions regularly invest in paid representation and hire professional lobbyists to represent them at the European level (Loftis and Kettler, 2015). For the fisheries lobby, the Province of Flevoland pays a membership fee to the FRNN although the FRNN does not have a EU representative in Brussels. In addition, the Province of Flevoland is considering to pay a membership fee to the CPMR. Via these (trans)national networks they invest in paid

representation which saves time and resources in exchange. These two networks thus seem to come in handy when trying to lobby the above institutions.

The Swot analysis in the next section will show the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of both networks, but also where the CPMR and FRNN have access. Does this access mean they are influencing the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the EU? While this question will not be answered in this chapter, the content below does provide a base as to answer it in the next chapter. It will show that influence and access are interconnected, and that the thesis sees these terms as synonyms since it follows the Theory of Access by Bouwen. As Chapter III showed, both networks claim to exercise influence over the national executives and European institutions. In the table below, some answers of the question “How do you define influence?” of the semi-structured interviews can be seen.

Table 7: Some answers to the question “How do you define influence?”

Respondent	Answer
EP	You are influential when you have a wide network of regular contacts. Someone who is there before the deadlines of legislative procedures and, most preferably, for a Commission proposal. In addition, there is a so-called goodwill factor. This means that people deliver certain things to you, like information, because they want to let you know. Without personal contact, you have nothing in this world.
EP	You are influential when you know how the decision-making process goes. So, when you know when the public consultation moment is there. You need to know which moments are important and you must come to the European Parliament, the Commission and so on. This way you can provide a properly formulated proposal or amendment to the right people at the right time. Signalling is very important.
Permanent representation	You must be trustworthy. Being a reliable partner, yes, that's of utter importance. You must of course have a network, but a reciprocal network. It is giving and taking and not just taking and never bringing anything. Furthermore, you must have knowledge and have the right timing!
HNP	To be influential means you must be able to handle the paper trail, to make amendments. You just need to know what's needed to put things into action. To put a definition behind it: you must be able to enforce policies

CPMR	To change very concrete matters in European regulations. Influence is also to manage priorities and to have the right connections
CPMR	Having influence for me is to take part in the discussion. It may not have the desired outcome, but at least you tried. You are trying to make something just by being present. So... visibility and participation. Influence through participation.

These definitions resulted in the following definition: being influential can be defined as having the knowhow of the decision-making process, be on the right time at the right place, be reliable, can formulate amendments and/or proposals and having regular contacts. The definition is evaluated by the responses of the interviewees, which resulted in the following table.

Table 8: Interviewees definition of influence

	CPMR	FRNN
Knowhow decision-making process EU	X	
Right timing	X	
Reliable	X	X
Formulation of amendments/proposals	X	
Wide network of regular contacts	X	X

Because the CPMR claims to have an extensive network of contacts within the EU institutions and national governments, the third hypothesis will be answered:

H3: The CPMR is exaggerating their level of influence.

The CPMR is partly exaggerating their level of influence since they do not have an extensive network of contacts within the EU institutions and national governments. Their level of influence is high in DG Mare, but not in the CoR, EP and at permanent representations. The secretariat of the North Sea Commission argued that the EP is not a target group of the CPMR, because the regions should take that initiative themselves and the EP, CoR and permanent representations is not of strong additional value to the CPMR (Interviews CPMR, 2017). The CPMR can check all boxes of table 7. Ironically, it was the same interviewees who graded the CPMR's influence as just sufficient (6.2 out of 10). A policy advisor at the EP claimed that the CPMR picks dossiers up on time, but that these dossiers have often nothing to do for Dutch issues such as pulse (Interview EP b, 2017). A EU representative at the House of the Dutch Provinces also stated that his province does not influence the Common

Fisheries Policy of the EU through CPMR membership, but that they do get invited for meetings and public consultations of the Commission (Interview HNP a, 2017). Three interviewees responded with a firm no on the question whether they would recommend membership of the CPMR to the Province of Flevoland. Another interviewee also tended to say no, unless they had really good access to the Commission. The ones who answered no, would rather see more efficient spending to the FRNN or a Brussels based representative instead of CPMR membership (Interviews EP, HNP b, Permanent Representation 2017). A Dutch representative of the province can handle specific Dutch dossiers better than a transnational network they claim (Ibid.).

The FRNN on the other hand was graded a 7.5, while it cannot check all boxes of table 7. A policy advisor of the EP stated that the FRNN is able to find them and vice versa (Interview EP a, 2017). An EU representative of the House of the Dutch Provinces Argues that the FRNN is very visible and is improving more and more as a network (Interview HNP b, 2017). There is mutual trust between the members (Ibid.). However, another source said that the FRNN does not have much influence since they have too little knowledge about EU processes and take more than they bring (Interview Perm Rep, 2017).

Although the interviewees definitions provide a sneak peak of what relevant (EU) institutions think about influence, their definitions are not very relevant for this research, because they are not academic sources. Because we cannot trust the definition provided for by the interviewees, this thesis sticks to the theory provided for by Pieter Bouwen: Influence is reached when the network has access to the EU institution(s) (Pieter Bouwen, 2001). To analyse this, a brief return to Chapter II is necessary. Here the subquestion “What are the conditions that shape who lobbies where, how and to what effect?” was answered. This passage now shows which institutions the CPMR and the FRNN use to influence fisheries policy. Because the semi-structured interviews were analysed through Nvivo, a tool for qualitative data, it was rather easy to determine *where* the FRNN and CPMR lobby most. The results are also in line with the experiences the author had during her internship in Brussels and work experience at the Municipality of Urk. The FRNN lobbies mostly at the European Parliament via two Dutch Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (Interview FRNN and interviews EP, 2017), whereas the CPMR mainly tries to influence DG Mare of the Commission (Interview CPMR b, 2017). The EU representative of the Province of Flevoland has some contacts here and there in the Parliament and Commission, but these contacts are often not fisheries related. While the Province of Flevoland itself also lobbies in the Committee of the Regions, neither the CPMR and FRNN lobbies there (Interview CPMR a and FRNN, 2017). As said before, the Council is not a target for the Province of Flevoland, since the province lobbies at The Hague instead. *How* the Province of Flevoland lobbies is

by means of joining networks which can exchange policy-relevant information for access to the EU. Flevoland organizes itself in sectoral networks, like the FRNN and additionally maybe the CPMR, and via direct representation by means of the House of the Dutch Provinces. In Chapter II.B. it was argued that regional governments especially act on the (re)formulation of laws at supranational level. This statement holds true for the Province of Flevoland only so far as it relates to amendments at the Committee of the Regions (Venema, 2011). Amendments towards the Parliament or Council or amendments on proposals of legislation by the Commission are often done via networks instead of directly via the Province of Flevoland. The CPMR is proactive and focuses their energy on making position papers before the Commission with a proposal legislation (Interview HNP b, 2017). Sometimes they also amend EU legislation via the European Parliament, but almost never via the Committee of the Regions because they do not think highly of this body in terms of influencing the policy process (Interview CPMR a, 2017). The FRNN has another approach, they write letters to the Dutch Second Chamber about their position, and talk to members of the European Parliament and let them make the amendment, but never wrote one themselves (Interview FRNN, 2017). The FRNN and CPMR both use inside tactics, where they meet with the policy-makers face-to-face instead of naming and shaming policy-makers in the media (Chalmers, 2013). In order to lobby effectively the Province of Flevoland needs to provide the right kind of information, and they can do this by joining (trans)national networks such as the CPMR and FRNN. The Province of Flevoland spends money on paid representation by a network to voice local and regional needs and concerns about fisheries. The Province of Flevoland lobbies *to the effect* that it fears the consequences of Brexit, wants to influence the CFP and wants to receive EU funding. This is in line with the three reasons for investing to lobby in the EU by Milos Labovic, namely influence policy-making, access funds, and to build up political capital. In short, the Province looks at the CPMR and FRNN to influence the EU institutions, to appeal for European grants and to have a strong voice during the Brexit negotiations (Interview Province of Flevoland, 2017). The Province is thus moving away from inside lobbying and instead uses outside lobbying.

In Chapter III the three kinds of access goods were also identified. Each access good concerns a specific kind of information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process (Bouwen, 2001). For a quick reminder, there were three access goods: Expert Knowledge (EK), European Encompassing Interest (IEEI) and Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI). EK relates to technical information, IEEI to the needs and interests of the European fisheries arena, and IDEI to the needs and interests of the fisheries sector in a domestic market and in the domestic political and social arena (Ibid.). In this passage, the author looks which kind of access good the CPMR and FRNN use.

Table 9: Access goods

	CPMR	FRNN
Expert Knowledge	Technical knowledge from third parties and in-house knowledge	In-house technical knowledge
European Encompassing Interest (IEEI)	Knows exactly what DG Mare expects, wants and needs Proactive	Not their strong suit They get more than they bring Reactive
Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI)	Too many regions, so only on broad issues	Very good, can focus on their own issues


Although each access good concerns a specific kind of information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process, all three are needed to have the perfect network (Bouwen, 2001). However, the CPMR is missing IDEI, since it mostly focuses on issues which are backed by the bigger regions/member states, or on broad issues because there are too many regions to really specify (Interview HNP b, 2017). Also, most of their technical knowhow comes from third parties. This is not bad per se, but in-house knowledge would be more efficient. The IEEI is very strong, because they are proactive (Interview HNP b and CPMR b, 2017). The CPMR knows exactly what DG Mare wants and needs. However, they miss this element for the European Parliament. The FRNN on the other hand has lots of in-house knowledge and know exactly what is best for their domestic arena (Interview European Parliament b, 2017). However, they are very reactive when it comes to the European interest. They get more from the EU than they bring (Interview Permanent Representation, 2017). They do not have much contacts within the European Commission (Interview Commission, 2017). Some Members of the European Parliament however, have a soft spot for the FRNN since it wants to hear the voice of their constituencies (Interview Permanent Representation, 2017). Neither the FRNN or the CPMR can provide all three access goods, making full access impossible. In the lobby strategy in the next chapter, the author tries to work around this.

4. SWOT analysis

This thesis will probably be the first in its kind by analysing these two networks by means of a SWOT analysis. The SWOT analysis here is used to assess the CPMR and the Fisheries Network the Netherlands. The S and W refer to internal aspects, while the O and T are external. Strengths and Weaknesses are seen as internal factors, because they are

controllable, and can be acted upon (Chermack and Kasshanna, 2007). The S already states what the network has and where it can build upon. The W is what the network lacks for example or what it should eliminate. Opportunities and Threats are external, because they are uncontrollable (Ibid.). The O refers to what could be possible and exploit these possibilities. Lastly, the T stands for what the networks could lose and is included so the effects of the threats can be mitigated. This analysis thus gathers information about the internal strengths and weaknesses of the networks as well as external opportunities and threats. It does so by means of the answers of the interviewees and by using work documents. In the figure below, the steps for a SWOT analysis are shown.

Figure 8: General steps SWOT analysis.



Here the author explains these five steps. As such, the first step, the objective of the SWOT analysis, is to see what the strengths and weaknesses, and the opportunities and tensions are of the CPMR and FRNN. The second step, the procedure, was carried out by means of the semi-structured interviews, as well as by collecting work documents from the CPMR, FRNN, the Municipality of Urk and the Province of Flevoland with regard to (dis)advantages, opportunities and threats. The interviewees described the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats that the network is currently facing. The individual interviews and work documents were analysed via Nvivo, which helped to make a clear list of the responses (step three). First these responses are shown in a word cloud. This tool provides an overview of the most frequently used words of the source in a graphical representation. These word clouds all kind of look the same: the CPMR and the word network are often said, since they are big and bold in every response (see below). But since networks and the CPMR are both the main topics of this research, this should not come as a surprise.

CPMR



House of the Dutch Provinces




Permanent Representation



European Commission



Province of Flevoland



European Parliament



On the basis of word frequency, we cannot make a SWOT analysis, although it shows how little contradictions exist in the world of European fisheries. Thanks to Nvivo, all the interviews were neatly ordered because of the coding option. This made it easier to see what every respondent answered to – for example - question six: What are the advantages of the network? From here onwards the author summed up all the advantages and thus arrived at step four: the combining of the responses. The two SWOTs can be seen below followed by a summary of every strength, weakness, opportunity and threat. By making a clear distinction between these four criteria, the two networks are easily comparable next to each other and provide the answer to the remaining three hypotheses. These answers will be provided a bit further down; first the SWOTs are provided. The responses have been aggregated into one larger picture containing *all* the perspectives on organizational strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (Chermack and Kasshanna, 2007). Because the following two tables do not show a clear prioritisation, these points will be ranked in a confrontation matrix to highlight strategical options. On this basis, the Europe Lobby Strategy of the Province of Flevoland for the two networks will be created in the next chapter. First, the next two tables provide an answer for the subquestion:

What are the strengths and weaknesses of both (trans)national networks?

A. Data collecting

Table 10: Combination of all strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for the CPMR

Strengths	Weaknesses
S1. Strong name in European regions	W1. CPMR's brand power is not optimal
S2. Relationship with DG Mare	W2. Secretariat of the North Sea Commission
S3. History	W3. Follow-up from the regions is not sky-high
S4. Knowledge of the process.	W4. Regions don't take initiative themselves
S5. International regional cooperation	W5. Internal process takes long(er)
S6. Long term perspective	W6. Too broad issues
S7. Diversity	W7. Lowest common denominator
	W8. High financial burden
	W9. Dominant core
Opportunities	Threats
O1. Cooperation with other networks	T1. Domino-effect of withdrawal of members
O2. More input from members	T2. Environmental disaster and overfishing and the risk of extinction of certain species
O3. Synergy network - EP	T3. Losers of globalisation
O4. Future Brexit negotiations and CFP	T4. Brexit
O5. Possibility to collect on broad issues, including non-fisheries ones.	T5. Like-minded cheaper network arises
O6. Territorial integration	
O7. Increasing of awareness	

Table 11: Combination of all strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for the FRNN

Strengths	Weaknesses
S8. Strong name in Dutch fisheries communities	W10. Brand power: Only the Dutch MEPs in the PECH Commission and the Dutch Permanent Representation knows FRNN, the Commission does not.
S9. Relationship with two Dutch MEPs and the Permanent Representation	W11. No knowledge of the process.
S10. Can translate concrete and specific issues well	W12. Visibility
S11. Low financial burden	W13. No consistency
S12. Tailored to needs of the Dutch fisheries.	
Opportunities	Threats
O1. Cooperation with other networks	T2. Environmental disaster and overfishing
O2. More input from members	T3. Losers of globalisation
O4. Future Brexit negotiations and CFP	T4. Brexit
O7. Increasing of awareness	T6: cannot grow much anymore
O8. Synergy network - DG MARE	
O9. EU funding	
O10. Transnational cooperation	
O11. Representative in Brussels	

The SWOT-like analyses, mostly based on the interviews, can be summarised as follows:

Strengths:

S1: According to the CPMR, the network is relatively well known throughout Europe, which brings new members to them instead of the CPMR having to actively search for new members (CPMR, n.d.a.).

S2: The CPMR has a strong relationship with DG Mare. They get invited by them for consultation and the CPMR knows who they can reach out to when necessary. Connections between CPMR and DG Mare are strong. There is a strong dialogue between policy makers at DG Mare and the CPMR (Interview CPMR and Commission, 2017). The CPMR has lots of closed door meetings with DG Mare (Interview CPMR b, 2017). For example, about the implementation of the new CFP and EMFF (Ibid.).

S3: The CPMR is a well-established network that has been around since 1973. In 44 years, a network obtains a lot of experience. They thus have good experiences and channels (Interview CPMR a, 2017).

S4: The CPMR knows the OLP process very well. They are proactive since they consult the European Commission right before the legislation process or try to amend certain articles before it is a proper legislation proposal. The secretariat and coordination of the CPMR has been efficient and has delivered numerous times (Interviews CPMR, 2017).

S5: The CPMR represents 200 million people in the EU and has around 160 member regions (CPMR, n.d. a.). The regional cooperation is thus international in nature and their mass open doors (Interview HNP b, 2017). They have an office in Brussels, and it is easy to find information on the internet. Its international character enhances the European perspective and thinking in the field of fisheries.

S6: The CPMR mostly works with long term work plans and follows the timeline of the EU (Interviews CPMR b and Commission, 2017).

S7: The diversity of the member regions possesses a different set of potentials that can be exploited (Espon, 2007).

S8: The FRNN consists of different political parties and all come from different places, resulting in a strong name in Dutch fisheries communities (Interviews EP, 2017). Strong contacts between aldermen and provincial executives (Interview HNP b, 2017).

S9: The FRNN has a strong relationship with the Dutch Permanent Representation and the two Dutch members of the European Parliament who are fixed members of the fisheries committee in the EP (Interviews EP and Permanent Representation, 2017). There is good coordination with Perm Rep and MEPs (Ibid.).

S10: The FRNN has the knowhow of fisheries (Interview HNP b, 2017). The aldermen and provincial executives know exactly what happens in the world of fisheries (Interview EP b, 2017). They pay attention to a wide range of issues but can translate this in a concrete and specific way to their audience. The dossiers themselves have a long breath and they have good points (Interview Permanent Representation, 2017). A lot of knowledge on pulse and multi-year plans and Norwegian fishing (Ibid.).

S11: The membership fee is approximately 1500, - euros per year. Especially when compared to the CPMR (> €14.000 annually), the financial burden of being a member of the FRNN is low (Interviews FRNN and Province of Flevoland, 2017).

S12: The FRNN only treats issues and dossiers that are of importance to Dutch fisheries (Interviews EP, 2017). The network is thus tailored to the needs of the Dutch fisheries.

Weaknesses

W1: Only the European Commission knows what the CPMR is, but the European Parliament and the Dutch Permanent Representation did not, they even had to google the network (Interviews EC, EP and Permanent Representation, 2017). The latter two institutions are still of importance for the Province of Flevoland though.

W2: The CPMR themselves always have had an independent secretariat, but at the North Sea Commission this is not the case (Interview HNP a and CPMR a, 2017). The secretariat and presidency of the North Sea Commission are now one. Consequences are that when the president has to quit for some reason, the secretariat also has to stop. This is not convenient for consistency (Interview HNP a, 2017). Also, the poor regions can now not hold presidency because they also need to be the secretariat which costs money (Interview CPMR a, 2017).

W3: The follow-up from the regions is not sky-high (Interview CPMR b, 2017). Much time and effort is then wasted.

W4: Regions do not take initiatives themselves. The regions should take more initiative to start something, because they are the ones who should contact their national governments as well (Interview CPMR a, 2017). There is a need to take initiative, because the secretariat of the North Sea Commission for example only exists out of two persons (Ibid.). Regions do not show what projects and subjects are of importance (Ibid.).

W5: In the CPMR the internal process always takes a bit longer, which has as result that precious time is wasted (Interview CPMR a, HNP b, 2017). Because a lot of time goes to internal processes, the CPMR can insufficiently do what the settings require (Interview HNP b, 2017).

W6: The CPMR deals with thematic over-dependence on broad issues (Interview EP b, 2017). For the Netherlands, specific issues are of importance, issues the Netherlands are often alone on (Ibid.). The CPMR thus does not deal with issues that is specifically important to the Netherlands (Ibid.). The network is not tailored to the needs of the Dutch fisheries.

W7: The CPMR always had to deal with opinions by all members, their advice to the Commission is therefore always very broad because it has the lowest average between members (Interview HNP b, 2017).

W8: The membership fee of the CPMR is > € 14.000 annually, this is a high financial burden especially in comparison with the annual fee of the FRNN (€1.500) (Interviews FRNN, and Province of Flevoland, 2017).

W9: Especially the bigger regions hold the rope (Interview EP b, 2017). This core leads and steers to decisions (Ibid.).

W10: Only the Dutch MEPs in the PECH Commission and the Dutch Permanent Representation knows FRNN, DG Mare of the Commission does not (Interviews EC, EP, Permanent Representation, 2017).

W11. FRNN has no knowledge of the EU process. They need to learn how to influence politics (Interview Permanent Representation, 2017). The FRNN often has too little knowledge of dossiers of the EP (Interview EP a, 2017). Furthermore, the network is more reactive of nature than proactive.

W12: The FRNN does not has a website, has no office or fixed representative in Brussels and are less often in Brussels (Ibid.). The visibility of the FRNN is thus a weakness.

W13: There is no consistency in the network. The energy of the network is too dependent on the aldermen/ provincial executives (Ibid.). As such it is also very dependent on the alderman or provincial executive how much they visit Brussels (Ibid.).

Opportunities

O1: Cooperation with other fisheries networks would reduce resources. By cooperating on some issues the network can share and coordinate resources and expertise.

O2: High performing networks are made up of high performing members. More input from members would reduce personnel resources on which issues they should pursue.

O3: By exploring better complementarities and synergies with European institutions results can be improved (Epson, 2007). By building a relationship with MEPs, the CPMR would have one more access-point in the EU institutions.

O4: By being proactive the network could give input relating to fisheries for the future Brexit negotiations and for the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy.

O5: The CPMR exists out of more departments than the fisheries one. There is thus the possibility to collect on broad issues, including non-fisheries ones (Interview EP a, 2017).

O6: The CPMR can increase territorial integration and economic development of their members because they work on cohesion policy as well (Interview Province of Flevoland, 2017).

O7: The network can increase awareness and involvement as to strengthen their input in fisheries policy.

O8: By exploring better complementarities and synergies with European institutions results can be improved (Epson, 2007). By building a relationship with civil servants of the Commission, the FRNN would have one more access-point in the EU institutions.

O9: Accessing the EU funds via the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund would be a way to increase resources. The Commission is now busy working on new criteria for accessing the EMFF (Interview Commission, 2017).

O10: All members of the FRNN are from Dutch regions, it could be convenient to engage in transnational cooperation, starting with border-regions of the Netherlands situated at the coast (Interview EP a, 2017).

O11: Having someone permanently based in Brussels for the FRNN, will lead to more insight and information of and from the EU institutions.

Threats

T1. The Province of Zeeland withdrew its membership. Zeeland is a fisheries region par excellence (Interview HNP b, 2017). A possibility is that this will lead to a domino-effect by more withdrawals of (Dutch) regions.

T2: Environmental disasters and overfishing can have serious consequences for the entire marine environment (European Environment Agency, n.d.a.). Certain trawling techniques, for example, cause damage to the highly important seabed habitat (Ibid.). Certain species will risk extinction. At the other end of the food chain, seabirds, seals, whales and other marine mammals will be left with nothing to eat (Ibid.).

T3: With globalisation, external competition is growing resulting in asymmetric shocks, adding to the process of geographical concentration of activities and population (Epson, 2007). While the EU fishermen must stick to quota's, farmed fish from Asia is so cheap that competition is getting more and more asymmetric.

T4: The consequences of Brexit could be adverse for North Sea fisheries.

T5: If like-minded cheaper network arises, membership of the CPMR could hit a low.

T6: If the FRNN only has members of the Netherlands, the rate of growth with regard to memberships will slow down eventually.

B. Swot Ranking

The previous paragraph showed all collected information. Now an interpretation is made, based on this information. First the author ranked all the information points by seeing how relevant each point was. The number five stood for 'very relevant' and number one for 'completely irrelevant'. Because more than one point can be 'very relevant', the author needed to rank it. Only the top three of the ranking is taking into account for the confrontation matrix in the next paragraph. Below, the precise ranking of the information points can be seen for the CPMR and the FRNN.

Table 12: Ranking of the SWOT analysis' points of the CPMR.

CPMR	Strengths							Weaknesses									Opportunities							Threats				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
Relevance	3	5	4	5	4	5	3	5	4	3	3	4	5	4	3	4	3	3	5	5	3	3	5	2	5	4	5	4
5= very relevant		X		X		X							X						X	X			X	X	X		X	
4= quite relevant			X		X				X			X		X	X												X	X
3= somewhat relevant	X						X			X	X				X		X	X			X	X						
2= somewhat irrelevant																								X				
1= completely irrelevant																												
Ranking	6	2	4	1	5	3	7	1	6	9	7	3	2	4	8	5	4	5	1	2	6	7	3	5	1	3	2	4

Table 13: Ranking of the SWOT analysis' points of the FRNN.

FRNN	Strengths					Weaknesses				Opportunities						Threats					
	8	9	10	11	12	10	11	12	13	1	2	4	7	8	9	10	11	2	3	4	6
Relevance	5	5	5	3	4	5	5	4	3	3	3	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	4	5	2
5= very relevant	X	X	X			X	X					X	X	X	X		X	X		X	
4= quite relevant					X			X								X			X		
3= somewhat relevant				X					X	X	X										
2= somewhat irrelevant																					X
1= completely irrelevant																					
Ranking	3	2	1	5	4	2	1	3	4	7	8	2	4	1	3	6	5	1	3	2	4

C. Strategic options matrix

The intent of SWOT is to capitalize on the strengths, address weaknesses, take full advantage of opportunities, and minimize the impact of threats (Chermack and Kasshanna, 2007). SWOT should therefore be used to identify issues in the CPMR and FRNN that are considered key for the Province of Flevoland present and future lobby performance (Ibid.). Now the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats have been evaluated and compared, the aim moves toward a lobby recommendation. In the next tables the strategic options for the CPMR and FRNN are shown, but it will not be for the next chapter that the lobby strategy will be answered. The confrontation matrix combines all points. How are strengths best used to take advantage of opportunities (growing)? How can weaknesses overcome threats (withdrawing)? How are strengths used to reduce the probability of threats (defending)? Lastly, how can weaknesses be mitigated so that opportunities are more likely to occur (improving). In the tables below, these questions are answered for the CPMR and FRNN.

Table 14: Confrontation matrix which shows suitable strategical options for the CPMR

Confrontation Matrix CPMR	Strengths	Weaknesses
	<p>S2. Relationship with DG Mare</p> <p>S4. Knowledge of the process</p> <p>S6. Long term perspective</p>	<p>W1. CPMR's brand power is not optimal</p> <p>W5. Internal process takes long(er)</p> <p>W6. Too broad issues</p>
Opportunities	Growing	Improving
<p>O3. Synergy network – EP</p> <p>O4. Future Brexit negotiations and CFP</p> <p>O7. Increasing of awareness</p>	<p>Ask DG Mare to organise a behind closed doors meeting where members of the fisheries committee of the EP are invited for as well (S2, O3)</p> <p>The CPMR can already start with creating pieces for CFP legislation and make a position paper or Memorandum of Understanding on the Brexit, and hand this in at DG Mare on time (S2, S4, S6, O4)</p> <p>By increasing awareness more among the members that the EP also a meaningful role and needs to be lobbied, the CPMR could create more synergy with the Parliament and the Commission at the same time. Then two out of three EU institutions of the OLP are close with the CPMR. (S2, S6, O3, O7)</p>	<p>Brand awareness among members of the fisheries committee at the EP (W1, O3)</p> <p>Set strict response deadlines to result in higher level of performance and commitment of the members. Avoid time wasting due to internal processes and spent that time on the future Brexit and CFP negotiations (W5, O4, O7)</p> <p>By engaging the member regions to take initiative on certain issues, some members can choose a less broad issue (W6, O7)</p>
Threats	Defending	Withdrawing
<p>T2. Environmental disaster and overfishing and the risk of extinction of certain species</p> <p>T3. Losers of globalisation</p> <p>T4. Brexit</p>	<p>Strong relationship with DG Mare not enough to deal with overfishing, Brexit and globalisation; cooperation on a world level is required (S2, T2, T3, T4)</p> <p>Promote CPMR as the means to work on pressings fisheries issues (S4, S6, T2, T3, T4)</p>	<p>No market exists anymore due to the extinction of species making the CPMR redundant (T2)</p> <p>EU-27 lose a big portion of the market share due to Brexit, globalisation and/or overfishing (T1, T2, T3)</p> <p>Regions invest in another network (W1, W5, W6)</p>

Table 15: Confrontation matrix which shows suitable strategical options for the FRNN

Confrontation Matrix FRNN	Strengths	Weaknesses
	<p>S8. Strong name in Dutch fisheries communities</p> <p>S9. Relationship with two Dutch MEPs and the Permanent Representation</p> <p>S10. Can translate concrete and specific issues well</p>	<p>W10. Only the Dutch MEPs in the PECH Commission and the Dutch Permanent Representation knows FRNN, the Commission does not.</p> <p>W11. No knowledge of the process.</p> <p>W12. Visibility</p>
Opportunities	Growing	Improving
<p>O4. Future Brexit negotiations and CFP</p> <p>O8. Synergy network - DG MARE</p> <p>O9. EU funding</p>	<p>The FRNN can start to make a position paper/Memorandum of Understanding on the Brexit, and hand this in at their contact at the EP and Perm Rep on time, which will be accepted because of their strong name (S8, S9, O4)</p> <p>By increasing awareness among the members that the Commission also plays a meaningful role and needs to be lobbied, the FRNN could create more synergy with the Parliament and the Commission at the same time. Then two out of three EU institutions of the OLP are close with the FRNN (O8, S9)</p> <p>FRNN's input for the reform of the CFP could be useful since the FRNN knows exactly what happens in the world of fisheries (S10, O4)</p> <p>The FRNN can ask the Commission what their plans are for EMFF criteria so they can anticipate on it (S10, O8, O9)</p> <p>By hiring a FRNN Representative who is based in Brussels, the synergy between the network and EU institutions can increase (O4, O8)</p>	<p>Brand awareness among civil servants of DG Mare (W10, O8)</p> <p>FRNN members could come together more often in Brussels and meet with the different EU institutions to increase visibility and knowhow of the OLP process and EU funding (W11, W12, O4, O8, O9)</p>
Threats	Defending	Withdrawing
<p>T2. Environmental disaster and overfishing and the</p>	<p>Strong name of the FRNN not enough to deal with overfishing, Brexit and globalisation; cooperation with regions outside the Netherlands is required (S8, T2, T3, T4).</p>	<p>No market exists anymore due to the extinction of species making the FRNN redundant (T2)</p>

risk of extinction of certain species	FRNN Representative based in Brussels to deal with overfishing, Brexit and globalisation via existing relationships (S8, S9, T2, T3, T4).	EU-27 lose a big portion of the market share due to Brexit, globalisation and/or overfishing (T1, T2, T3).
T3. Losers of globalisation		
T4. Brexit	Promote FRNN as the means to work on pressings fisheries issues (S8, S10, T2, T3, T4).	Regions invest in another network (W11, W12)

In order to come to a lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland, this SWOT analysis was needed as to show their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Some of these clearly structured strategical options are used for the lobby strategy in the next chapter. What can be answered at this moment is hypotheses number four and five:

H4: Both networks fill each other's gaps.

H5: It is worthwhile to build coalitions via (trans)national networks of regions in the field of fisheries

Since the CPMR's strength lies in its strong relationship with DG Mare, their knowledge of the ordinary legislative procedure and the long-term perspective, the Province of Flevoland would gain from these strengths since the FRNN does not own these. However, it is also of importance that the Province of Flevoland is represented in the fisheries committee of the European Parliament and the Permanent Representation via the FRNN. Besides, the FRNN knows exactly what is going on in Dutch fisheries communities, including the Flevoland ones. This results into the FRNN taking on lobby activities tailored to the needs of Dutch fisheries, while the CPMR tackles the broad issues. The CPMR and FRNN thus fill each other gaps when it comes to having access at the right EU institutions, but also to issues. It is worthwhile to build coalitions with the FRNN and CPMR, because the Province of Flevoland is rather small and quite young, making it less resource intensive (Interview Province of Flevoland, 2017). The Province thus relies more often on collective action so to undertake action at more levels. By involving with collective action such as becoming or being member of a network, the Province spends less resources than when choosing individual action. Representation by these networks thus avoids the heavy financial burden of hiring an extra permanent representative in Brussels, is tailored to the needs of the region thanks to the FRNN, and focuses on broader issues via the CPMR. These networks are an attractive and flexible instrument (Ibid.). This indeed makes it worthwhile for the Province of Flevoland to build coalitions via (trans)national networks of regions in the fields of fisheries.

To come back at the question whether they have access (and thus information) and influence, the following can be said. When we follow the theory of Bouwen, the CPMR has Expert Knowledge and European Encompassing Interest (IEEI). Because they can trade these access goods to DG Mare, they have access to it and as a result are quite influential there (Interview Commission, CPMR, HNP, 2017). The FRNN has Expert Knowledge and Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI), which is convenient for members of the European Parliament and the Permanent Representation. They have access to these two institutions, but only have moderate influence (Interview Perm Rep, EP, HNP 2017). The next and final chapter will show which strengths and opportunities of the networks the Province of Flevoland can use in the lobby strategy, but first a conclusion is provided which answers all subquestions and the research question of this thesis.

Chapter VI: Conclusion and recommendation

The purpose of the research was to provide an answer to the Province of Flevoland which advantages the CPMR and FRNN would bring if the member regions exchanged knowledge, cooperate and scale-up with each other. This thesis researched if and why the province of Flevoland should become a member of the CPMR, but also if it should stay member of the FRNN. That is why this thesis analyzed the function, emergence and effectiveness of both networks. It did so by reviewing literature, by having semi-structured interviews, hypotheses testing, and a SWOT analysis. Before the research question will be answered with the provided literature and empirical research, the five subquestions will be answered, but only after a brief recap of the treated literature in this thesis.

The basic idea of the research was to analyse the CPMR and the FRNN in a multilevel governance context. The thesis established a coherent theoretical framework for the analysis of (trans)national networks related to fisheries, by explaining the theory of access, Europeanisation, regionalization and multi-level governance. Pieter Bouwen's Theory of Access represents the dominant theoretical framework of lobbying success/influence (Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014). The degree of access to the European institutions is explained in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of access goods (Bouwen, 2001). In return for access to an EU institution, organisations have to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution (Ibid.). The wish to be granted access to an EU institution has everything to do with the two-way trend of Europeanisation and regionalisation. Influencing EU policy-making has been of growing importance due to these two trends. Despite supremacy of EU law regarding the CFP, the regions of Europe have been able to improve their position at CFP policy-making thanks to regionalism. Regions can now actively pursue their policy goals and cross-border collaborate with other regions thanks to Europeanisation (Tömmel, 1998). Europeanisation and regionalism also resulted in Multi-level governance (MLG). MLG is a phenomenon that involves multiple levels, from the local to the regional, national and European. It thus entails that most of the activities of making and implementing European policy involve multilevel activity. The position for regions in the policy-making process of the European Union has been strengthened in recent years. Especially thanks to the establishment of the Committee of the Regions, and the trend of decentralization in the Netherlands. European policy increasingly influences provincial policy. Therefore, the province wants to influence European policy-making. To increase their influence on EU processes, cooperation with other parties is necessary. Participation in European networks is important and crucial to retain a strong lobby position (Province of Flevoland, 2016).

The research outcomes form the basis of the EU lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland and, more general, shed new light on the connection on influencing the EU policy-making process via the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR) and the Fisheries Regions Network the Netherlands (FRNN). The thesis concludes that there are practical implications for a policy response, a so-called lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland in which the research question '*In which ways can the Province of Flevoland use the CPMR and FRNN to influence the Common Fisheries Policy?*' will be answered. Here, the author thus suggests which policy directions the Province of Flevoland should consider and whether they should become or stay member of the CPMR and FRNN. This lobby strategy also shows how to influence the Common Fisheries Policy through these networks.

Subquestion one: What are the conditions that shape who lobbies where, how and to what effect?

In Chapter II the institutional framework that currently exists within the EU was explained. Besides answering this question in a general sense, it also answers it for Province of Flevoland. The EU's institutional framework showed us *where* lobbyism can take place. Under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), the European Parliament and the Council are co-legislators and the Commission is the agenda setter. The Committee of the Regions is an advisory EU body and may be consulted. For the Province of Flevoland, the Commission, Parliament and Committee of the Regions are most important. What the two networks concern, the FRNN lobbies mostly at the European Parliament, while the CPMR mainly tries to influence DG Mare of the Commission. While the Province of Flevoland itself also lobbies in the Committee of the Regions, neither the CPMR and FRNN lobbies there (Interview CPMR and FRNN, 2017). The Council is not a target for the Province of Flevoland, since the province lobbies at The Hague instead. *How* lobbyism takes place is via providing the right information to the right institution. The Province of Flevoland does this by joining networks which can exchange policy-relevant information for access to the EU. Flevoland organizes itself in sectoral networks, like the FRNN and additionally maybe the CPMR, and via direct representation by means of the House of the Dutch Provinces. The Province of Flevoland thus spends money on paid representation by a network to voice local and regional needs and concerns about fisheries. *To what effect* lobbyism takes place is usually to influence policy-making, access funds, and/or to build up a network and political capital (Labovic, 2017). Via the CPMR and FRNN the Province of Flevoland invests in paid representation to save time and resources. The Province of Flevoland looks at the CPMR and FRNN to

influence the EU institutions, to appeal for European grants and to have a strong voice during the Brexit negotiations.

Subquestion two: How does the Province of Flevoland use EU institutions and (trans)national networks to lobby within the EU multi-level system?

In short, the Province of Flevoland does this by determining what they intend to achieve. They use the EU institutions to amend or propose legislation. The Province of Flevoland focuses on the CoR for this and uses (trans)national networks to strengthen lobbying activities in the EP and Commission. The Province also uses funding opportunities, find the right partners or exchange knowledge and experience. The coordinating role of (trans)national networks enhanced the Province's influence in EU policymaking. Besides, doing everything alone is costly and ineffective. The multi-level system is represented here because Europeanisation and regionalization are both visible in the province of Flevoland, and they both accompany each other. Although European integration led to the conferral of competencies by the national governments to a European one, it also delegated more responsibilities to the regional ones.

Subquestion three: What is the correlation between Brexit and Urk?

In some policy areas, the possible consequences of a Brexit lead to fear and uncertainty. Such a policy area is the fisheries. Almost all fisheries legislation is determined on a European level and thus has direct consequences for the fisheries sector. The European Union (EU) has a shared competence for fisheries policy and the policy is managed under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Given that 39% of the population works in fisheries in a direct sense, the fishing industry is a considerable part of the economy in Urk (Municipality of Urk, 2017). To limit any disastrous consequence of the Brexit - like mass unemployment in the municipality of Urk- for Urk and thus the region, the Province of Flevoland wants to influence Brexit negotiations via the CPMR and FRNN.

Subquestion four: Which kind of network type is the CPMR and FRNN?

Hooghe and Marks made a distinction between three types of networks. The first type is directly run by the European Commission. Since neither the CPMR nor the FRNN are included in this type, a swift shift to the second type follows. The second set of networks has its origins in self-directed mobilization among regions with common policy problems (Ibid.). The European Commission is eager to exchange information and collaborate with regional associations as long as they are the most representative organisation for regional interests (Ibid.). Another feature of this second type is that they are often concerned with reducing regional disparities via funds (Ibid.). The CPMR is such a network, with its focus on the

EMFF and by representing 160 regions and 200 million EU citizens (CPMR, n.d.a.). A third type entails self-organisation of regions and is driven largely by economic factors (Ibid.). Regional political leaders and civil servants act as "ministers of external trade" and are expected to act as a broker (Ibid.). The FRNN is a type three network: it only exists of provincial executives and aldermen. The president of the network and its secretariat are often in Brussels to bargain.

Subquestion five: What are the strengths and weaknesses of both (trans)national networks?

In order to answer this subquestion, a SWOT analysis was used for developing an understanding of two networks. The intent of SWOT is to capitalize on the strengths, address weaknesses, take full advantage of opportunities, and minimize the impact of threats (Chermack and Kasshanna, 2007). The analysis mapped these four criteria of the networks and formulated the strategic options for the networks. The results with regard to strengths of the CPMR of the data collection were that:

- The CPMR is relatively well known throughout Europe;
- The CPMR has a strong relationship with DG Mare. They get invited by them for consultation and the CPMR knows who they can reach out to when necessary. Connections between CPMR and DG Mare are strong;
- The CPMR is a well-established network that has been around since 1973. They thus obtained good experiences and channels;
- The CPMR knows the OLP process very well and are proactive since they consult the European Commission right before the legislation process or try to amend certain articles before it is a proper legislation proposal;
- The CPMR represents 200 million people in the EU and has around 160 member regions (CPMR, n.d. a.). Their mass open doors, they have an office in Brussels, and it is easy to find information on the internet;
- The CPMR mostly works with long term work plans and follows the timeline of the EU;
- The diversity of the member regions possesses a different set of potentials that can be exploited (Espon, 2007).

The results with regard to weaknesses of the CPMR of the data collection were that:

- Only the European Commission knows what the CPMR is.;
- The secretariat of the North Sea Commission The secretariat and presidency of the North Sea Commission are now one. Consequences are that when the president has to quit for some reason, the secretariat also has to stop. This is not convenient for consistency (Interview HNP a, 2017). Also, the poor regions can now not hold

presidency because they also need to be the secretariat which costs money (Interview CPMR a, 2017);

- The follow-up from the regions is not sky-high (Ibid.). Much time and effort is then wasted;
- Regions do not take initiatives themselves. The regions should take more initiative to start something, because they are the ones who should contact their national governments as well (Ibid.);
- In the CPMR the internal process always takes a bit longer, which has as result that precious time is wasted (Interview CPMR a, HNP b, 2017);
- The CPMR deals with thematic over-dependence on broad issues (Interview EP b, 2017). The CPMR is not tailored to the needs of the Dutch fisheries;
- The CPMR always has to deal with opinions by all members, their advice to the Commission is therefore always very broad because it has the lowest average between members (Interview HNP b, 2017);
- The membership fee of the CPMR is > € 14.000 annually, this is a high financial burden especially in comparison with the annual fee of the FRNN (€1.500) (Interviews FRNN and Province of Flevoland, 2017);
- Especially the bigger regions hold the rope (Interview EP b, 2017). This core lead and steers decisions (Ibid.);

The results with regard to strengths of the FRNN of the data collection were that:

- The FRNN consists of different political parties and all come from different places, resulting in a strong name in Dutch fisheries communities (Interviews EP, 2017). Strong contacts between aldermen and provincial executives (Interview HNP b, 2017);
- The FRNN has a strong relationship with the Dutch Permanent Representation and the two Dutch members of the European Parliament who are fixed members of the fisheries committee in the EP (Interviews EP and Permanent Representation, 2017); There is good coordination with Perm Rep and MEPs (Ibid.);
- The FRNN has the knowhow of fisheries (Interview HNP b, 2017). The aldermen and provincial executives know exactly what happens in the world of fisheries (Interview EP a, 2017). They pay attention to a wide range of issues but can translate this in a concrete and specific way to their audience;
- The membership fee is approximately 1500, - euros per year. Especially when compared to the CPMR (> €14.000 annually), the financial burden of being a member of the FRNN is low (Interviews FRNN and Province of Flevoland, 2017).

- The FRNN only treats issues and dossiers that are of importance to Dutch fisheries (Interviews EP, 2017). The network is thus tailored to the needs of the Dutch fisheries.

The results with regard to weaknesses of the FRNN of the data collection were that:

- Only the Dutch MEPs in the PECH Commission and the Dutch Permanent Representation knows FRNN, DG Mare of the Commission does not (Interviews EC, EP, Permanent Representation, 2017).
- FRNN has no knowledge of the EU process. They need to learn how to influence politics (Interview Permanent Representation, 2017). The FRNN often has too little knowledge of dossiers of the EP (Interview EP b, 2017). Furthermore, the network is more reactive of nature than proactive.
- The FRNN does not has a website, has no office or fixed representative in Brussels and are less often in Brussels (Interview EP a, 2017). The visibility of the FRNN is thus a weakness.
- There is no consistency in the network. The energy of the network is too dependent on the aldermen/ provincial executives (Ibid.). As such it is also very dependent on the alderman or provincial executive how much they visit Brussels (Ibid.).

This brings us to a quick performance assessment of both networks:

CPMR

	<u>Assessment of performance</u>
Interaction with members	Strong
Policy influence	Medium
Policy Influence Commission	Very strong
Policy influence CoR	Weak
Policy influence EP	Weak
Public investment	Weak
Technology and knowledge base	Medium (misses IDEI)

FRNN

	<u>Assessment of performance</u>
Interaction with members	Medium
Policy influence	Weak to Medium
Policy influence Commission	Weak
Policy influence CoR	Weak
Policy influence EP	Medium
Public investment	Strong
Technology and knowledge base	Medium (misses IEEI)

After conducting this research, the author recommends the Province of Flevoland to

1. Stay member of the FRNN, and
2. Become member of the CPMR

The Province looks to influence the EU institutions, to appeal for European grants and to have a strong voice during the Brexit negotiations, and membership of both networks will realize this. While both networks miss some essentials (such as access to a EU institution), the two networks together fill these gaps. For example, the CPMR's strength lies in its strong relationship with DG Mare, their knowledge of the ordinary legislative procedure and the long-term perspective. The Province of Flevoland would gain from these strengths since the FRNN does not own these. However, it is also of importance that the Province of Flevoland is represented in the fisheries committee of the European Parliament and the Permanent Representation via the FRNN. Besides, the FRNN knows exactly what is going on in Dutch fisheries communities, including the Flevoland ones. This results into the FRNN taking on lobby activities tailored to the needs of Dutch fisheries, while the CPMR tackles the broad issues. The CPMR and FRNN thus fill each other gaps when it comes to having access at the right EU institutions, but also to issues. This indeed makes it worthwhile for the Province of Flevoland to build coalitions via (trans)national networks of regions in the fields of fisheries. Flevoland can build on the CPMR and FRNN, and contribute to a quicker solution of fisheries challenges faced by the EU. The main aspect of the thesis was to recommend a EU lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland for fisheries by analysing the CPMR and FRNN. Below, the recommended lobby strategy can be seen. The research question "In which ways can the Province of Flevoland use the CPMR and FRNN to influence the Common Fisheries Policy" is therefore answered in the strategy.

Although this research tried to close the gap of fisheries lobbyism, it should be regarded as a first approximation and would require further information and debate in order to sharpen it up and validate it (Epson, 2007). This would be an opportunity for future research.

Since the EU changes fast, the lobby strategy should be evaluated every year, and a cost-benefit analysis of the CPMR and FRNN should be made every two years.

1. EU Lobby Strategy - Fisheries

June, 2017

A. Introduction

Here, a lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland is provided so to strengthen their fisheries lobby in the European Union. The key elements of this strategy include: the lobby aim, situation analysis, resources, actors, targets and strategic actions.

B. What does the Province of Flevoland want?

The aim of the Province is to have a strong fisheries lobby so to influence the legislation of the Common Fisheries Policy, to appeal for European grants and to have a strong voice during the Brexit negotiations.

C. Situation analysis

As the end of the current CFP (2022) and EMFF (2021) period approaches, the debate on the future EU fisheries policy is gaining prominence. The availability of the European Maritime and Fisheries Funds creates a strong incentive for the Province of Flevoland to engage in grantsmanship and to lobby for favourable rule changes at the EU level (Kassim et al, 2005). To influence legislation, the Province of Flevoland looks at the CPMR and FRNN. Flevoland can build on these networks and contribute to a quicker solution of fisheries challenges faced by the EU. The biggest challenge at the moment is the Brexit. The fisheries sector will be hit tremendously since they are export-dependent of the UK (Rijsberman, 2017). If the Dutch fishing fleet will not be allowed to fish in British waters anymore, this will mean a 60% loss of fishing grounds (Ammelrooy, 2017). The same percentage occurs for the Municipality of Urk (Municipality of Urk, 2017).

D. Resources

The Province of Flevoland will have to pay an annual membership fee of € 14.111 to the CPMR and around € 1.500 to the FRNN. There will not be extra personnel costs.

E. Actors

The actors and stakeholders should explore options for a renewed CFP beyond 2022. The following actors and stakeholders are present:

Actors:

- The Province of Flevoland
- Municipality of Urk
- The Province of North Holland
- The Province of Zeeland
- Randstad Region
- House of the Dutch Provinces/IPO
- All 160+ members of the CPMR
- All 22 members of the FRNN

Stakeholders:

- European Commission
- European Parliament
- Committee of the Regions
- Regional and Local Governments associations: CPMR, FRNN.
- Fisheries organisations: VisNed, Vissersbond, Pelagic Freezer-Trawler Association

F. Targets

The key targets and allies for the Province of Flevoland are:

- EU Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (K. Vella)
- The Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (J.A. Machado)
- Chair EP PECH Committee (A. Cadec)
- National members of parliament
- National government: Economic Affairs
- Head fisheries permanent representation (I. van Tilborg)
- Rapporteur Brexit EP (L. Ní Riada)
- Dutch civil servants DG Mare
 - E. Roller (head of unit CFP)
 - J. Paardekooper (deputy head of unit Fisheries Management North Sea)
 - V. Tankink (head of unit human resources)
 - S. Kruiderink (economist)
- Dutch MEPs PECH Commission
 - A. Schreijer-Pierik (CDA/EPP)
 - P. van Dalen (CU/SGP/ECR)

There are practical implications for a policy response, a so-called lobby strategy for the Province of Flevoland. These strategical options can be found below. The Province of Flevoland does not need to engage in all these responses, but can cherry-pick which ones are best. Of course, by engaging to all responses, a more efficient and strong fisheries lobby will occur. By membership of the CPMR and FRNN, the Province of Flevoland can influence the Common Fisheries Policy, thanks to their access to the fisheries committee of the European Parliament, DG Mare and/or the permanent representation. However, the condition exists that these networks should have the right information and the right timing, something the Province of Flevoland can help with when following the strategical options below.

A Strong Fisheries Lobby

What do we want to achieve	How do we want to achieve this			2017
	Influence	Subsidies	Networks	
<p>The aim of the Province is to have a strong fisheries lobby so to influence the legislation of the Common Fisheries Policy, to appeal for European grants and to have a strong voice during the Brexit negotiations.</p>	<p>Influencing the European Agenda on the Common Fisheries Policy and pursue action at the national government, the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands in Brussels, the European Commission and the European Parliament.</p> <p>Profiling Urk in Brussels as front-runner pulse fishing for better shot at EMFF.</p> <p>Show the results of pulse fishing in Brussels</p> <p>Amend the EU's Landing Obligation</p>	<p>European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)</p> <p>End of 2017 start of the new EMFF programmes 2021-2027 in Brussels.</p>	<p>CPMR, North Sea Commission</p> <p>FRNN</p> <p>For the EMFF: tag along with the municipality of Urk, the Province of Zeeland and the FRNN.</p> <p>In the EU context, the NAT Commission of the Committee of the Regions and / or the European Network CPMR (together with the provinces of North and South Holland)</p>	<p>Brexit: gather information and keep updated with negotiations</p> <p>Initiative Flevoland's standpoint on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy and develop key messages</p> <p>Understand the policy framework and its entry points (provided in the research)</p> <p>Organise a seminar about the Brexit / reform of the Common Fisheries Policy in Brussels (optionally with other regions).</p> <p>Become member of the CPMR:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CPMR can ask DG Mare to organise a behind closed doors meeting where members of the fisheries committee of the EP are invited for as well. This will strengthen contacts with the EP - Start creating pieces for CFP legislation and/or make a position paper or Memorandum of Understanding on the Brexit, and hand this in at DG Mare on time - Encourage members and partners to communicate (more) about the added value and success/failures of the Common Fisheries Policy in their region.

A Strong Fisheries Lobby

What do we want to achieve	How do we want to achieve this			2017
	Influence	Subsidies	Networks	
<p>Positioning for EU funding</p> <p>Get involved in discussions at EU level about the CFP, EMFF and Brexit</p>				<p>Stay member of the FRNN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Follow up on the Memorandum of Understanding on the Brexit, which was handed in at the EC, EP and Perm Rep last May - Propose to hire a permanent representative of the FRNN in Brussels <p>Prepare regular briefings for the Province of Flevoland and member regions of the networks to maintain their interest and mobilize them for key moments</p> <p>(Introductory) meeting with Pim Visser (president VisNed), Johan Nootgedagt (president Dutch Visserbond and/or Gerard van Balsfoort (president Pelagic Freezer Trawler Association) for expertise on, among other things, Brexit, pulse fishing, funds, numbers, etc.</p> <p>EP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introductory meeting with Liaoh Ni Riada: Brexit rapporteur for fisheries in the European Parliament. - Keep close contact with MEPs van Dalen and Schreijer-Pierik via FRNN - Introductory meeting with Alain Cadee, president of the fisheries commission in the EP <p>Committee of the Regions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gauge whether Provincial Executive Rijsberman is eligible to actively lobby in the NAT Commission of the Committee of the Regions. Otherwise, collaborate with Randstad Region to send a message (C. Loggen of the Province of North Holland is active in NAT Commission)

A Strong Fisheries Lobby

What do we want to achieve	How do we want to achieve this			2017
	Influence	Subsidies	Networks	
				<p>Permanent Representation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Keep close contact and coordination with Ingeborg van Tilborg via FRNN <p>Commission:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Initiative to meet with DG Mare to ask about the timeline of the EMFF/public consultation. See what the options are for Flevoland - FRNN needs to gain access to DG Mare: Build up close contact with Dutch civil servants at DG Mare: J. Paardekooper (deputy head of unit Fisheries Management North Sea), E. Roller (head of Unit CFP), V. Tankink (head of unit human resources) and S. Kruidrink (economist DG Mare) <p>House of the Dutch Provinces/IPO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Collaborate with all 12 Dutch Provinces to mitigate the consequences of Brexit (would be broader than fisheries alone) <p>The Hague:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordinate with the The Hague lobbyist for the Province of Flevoland - Inform the national members of Parliament and the Minister and vice-minister of Economic Affairs of the Brexit situation and Urk/Flevoland to act preventative, instead of focusing on the Dutch Permanent Representation.

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Chapter VIII: Annex

The three formats regarding interview questions:

Format 1:	
Interview Questions about the CPMR	
1.	What are important projects/dossiers for you in the area of fisheries?
2.	To what extent is the CPMR present in these projects?
3.	How familiar are you with the CPMR network?
4.	How do you define 'to be influential'?
5.	If you had to give a grade between 1 and 10 of how influential the CPMR is, what grade would you give?
6.	Would you recommend CPMR membership to the Province of Flevoland?
7.	What are the advantages of the network?
8.	Are there any (recurring) problems with the network?
Extra questions in case of being a member of the CPMR	
1.	When did you become a member of the CPMR and why?
2.	How active is your province in the CPMR and what is your role?
3.	What area do you focus most on? (Maritime, cohesion, climate, transport)
4.	Who is the trinity? (Expert – lobbyist – Provincial executive)
5.	What are the biggest results achieved by membership?
6.	Are you satisfied with the membership?
7.	Who are the key actors to achieve successful goals? (EC / EP / CoR)
8.	Do you influence the Common Fisheries Policy through membership?
9.	Is there somebody in your network I could interview about this subject?

Format 2:

Interview Questions about the FRNN

1. What are important projects/dossiers for you in the area of fisheries?
2. To what extent is the FRNN present in these projects?
3. How familiar are you with the FRNN network?
4. How do you define 'to be influential'?
5. If you had to give a grade between 1 and 10 of how influential the FRNN is, what grade would you give?
6. Would you recommend to stay member of the FRNN to the Province of Flevoland?
7. What are the advantages of the network?
8. Are there any (recurring) problems with the network?
9. How do you see co-operation in the future between FRNN and the European Parliament/European Commission/your province?

Extra questions in case of being a member of the FRNN

1. When did you become a member of the FRNN and why?
2. How active is your province in the FRNN and what is your role?
3. Who is the trinity? (Expert – lobbyist – Provincial executive)
4. What are the biggest results achieved by membership?
5. Are you satisfied with the membership?
6. Who are the key actors to achieve successful goals? (EC / EP / CoR)
7. Do you influence the Common Fisheries Policy through membership?
8. Is there somebody in your network I could interview about this subject?

Format 3:**Interview Questions for policy officers at the CPMR**

1. What are important projects/dossiers for you in the area of fisheries?
2. Why should our Province become member?
3. A Dutch province just withdrew its membership, is this common?
4. How do you define 'to be influential'?
5. If you had to give a grade between 1 and 10 of how influential the CPMR or the NSC is, what grade would you give?
6. What are the advantages of the network?
7. Are there any (recurring) problems with the network?
8. What are big achievements of the CPMR/ NSC
9. Which EU institution is closest linked to the CPMR/ NSC?
10. What do you expect from the Province of Flevoland inside the CPMR/ NSC?