Institutional Hegemony: Leadership Through Institutions

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Preface

Ever since the very first seminar on International Relations (IR) that I participated in, I have heard complaints about the dogmatic nature of IR theories. Realists are supposedly lost in a rigid perspective in which power is solely based on material strength, whilst Neo-Marxists focus exclusively on economic relations, and Constructivists on ideas. Practically all lecturers I have spoken with between 2011 and 2017 were thoroughly frustrated with this lack of flexibility in IR theory. This project is an attempt to bring the various IR schools in conversation with one another.

Of course, my thesis could not have been written without the support of many people. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Jacco Pekelder for his advice and commentaries, and for allowing me to write this thesis after I had finished my RMA thesis. Others certainly deserving of thanks are Duco, Hans, Paul, and Guus for all the discussions and coffee breaks... There were many coffee breaks. Sabina Beijne also deserves thanks for carefully reading my thesis. But most thanks should go to Sietske, for picking me up when things were down.

Jasper Bongers

Preface

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Introduction

This thesis aims to provide a new perspective on the role of institutions in international politics. In our age of interdependence, states pursue interests within the frameworks of these institutions (organizations, treaties, norms, alliances, etc.). Memberships of international institutions matter a great deal, they determine which rules and privileges apply to which states. States 'play' with institutions, and by doing so with inclusion and exclusion. For example, they can choose between 'solving a problem' within a E.U., NATO, or U.N. framework. In all these arena's different rules and procedures apply, favouring some states and disfavouring others. International institutions are much more than the forums on which states interact. They can be tools through which states attempt to attain hegemony (literally: leadership). To bring this dynamic to light this thesis introduces the concept of institutional hegemony.

In the first chapter, the term institutional hegemony and its theoretical roots will be analysed. The concept hegemony is historically rooted in the writings of Thucydides and Gramsci. These theorists have understood hegemony as leadership – *an asymmetrical relationship between those who are formally equal*. Yet, although practically all contemporary authors recognize the term's historical roots, hegemony has come to be interpreted rather differently by various 'schools' of the academic discipline International Relations (IR). After an analysis of various usages of the term hegemony, this thesis moves on to present the concept of institutional hegemony; not as a new overarching definition of hegemony, but as one of the multiple possible roads to leadership. The only school of international relations that comes close to this thesis' take on institutions is Liberal Institutionalism. However, in Liberal Institutionalism, international institutions are seen as organizations in which powerful states can crystalize their hegemony.[1] This thesis goes a step further, and understands institutional hegemony as hegemony attained *through* institutions (see chapter 1.2).

This conception of institutional hegemony will be explained by discussing four cases. The largest case, that of Britain and France in 1945-1963, will be discussed in chapter two. Building on primary and secondary source material, it is argued that both France and Britain regarded the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) as an important vehicle of power in 1945-63. France used the institution as a tool to bind the economies of the other member-states (Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and especially *wirtschaftswunder* West-Germany) to its economy. Interestingly,

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[1] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Power and Interdependence," *Boston, MA*, 1977,; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton University Press, 2005); G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton University Press, 2012); John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton University Press, 2009).

Britain feared that the E.E.C. would do just that. In a 1960 European Economic Association Committee Report, British foreign policy experts made their fears explicit, stating that "the Community may well emerge as a power comparable in size and influence to the United States and the USSR. The pull of this new power bloc would be bound to dilute our influence with the rest of the world, including the Commonwealth."[2] In 1961, after multiple attempts to disrupt the economic success of the 'common market', Britain issued a bid for EEC membership – if you can't beat them, join them. British membership would deny France hegemony in the E.E.C., hence restoring the power equilibrium in Europe. But, unfortunately for the British, they were not allowed to join; the membership bid was rejected in a 1963 veto by French President Charles de Gaulle (see chapter 2.4).

After the discussion of France, Britain and the EEC, three smaller cases will be analysed in chapter three. The first additional case is closely related to the largest case of this thesis, and discusses the (West-)German European institutional strategy between 1945 and 2017. By embedding itself in international institutions, (West-)Germany has arguably risen from a non-sovereign state to Europe's regional hegemon. The second case analyses the Saudi-Arabian proposal at the height of the Arab Spring (May 2011) to enlarge the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) – an organization of oil producing countries – with Jordan and highly-populated Morocco. This second case of institutional hegemony illustrates that the mechanism of gaining hegemony through institutions is not only applicable in a Western or European context. The third case concerns the initiation of the New Development Bank, a 2014 proposal by the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to rival the America-dominated I.M.F. and World Bank.[3] This last example indicates that institutional hegemony is likely to become even more relevant in the near future, as the waning of the *Pax Americana* will probably bring more challenges to the post-war Bretton Woods system in the years to come.[4]

In the conclusion, the scholarly contribution made in this thesis will be summarized and analysed. Although the concept of institutional hegemony can arguably enhance scholarly understanding in a wide array of cases, the concept is not a *one size fits all* solution to understanding all cases in the history of international relations.

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[2] British Foreign Policy Report, "European Economic Association Committee Report". NA PRO CAB 134/1820. May 25, 1960.

[3] Adriana Erthal Abdenur, "China and the BRICS Development Bank: Legitimacy and Multilateralism in South–South Cooperation," *IDS Bulletin* 45, no. 4 (2014): 85–101.

[4] See: Sebastian Heilmann et al., "China's Shadow Foreign Policy: Parallel Structures Challenge the Established International Order," *China Monitor* 18 (2014), http://blog.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_No_18_en.pdf. For potential ways to counter these challenges see: Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan*.

In contrast with most theses, this thesis is written not as a study of primary source material but as a broad analysis of a particular aspect of international relations – the role of institutions in attaining hegemony. The four cases (of the E.E.C., West-Germany, the G.C.C., and the New Development Bank) are primarily discussed to introduce institutional hegemony. Hence, this thesis will pay more attention to applying the concept of institutional hegemony than to examining all the cases' aspects in depth. The combination of a single large case and the three smaller cases arguably illustrates how institutional hegemony can enhance historians' understanding of international politics better than alternative case selections. Due to the space granted in an MA thesis, the alternatives would either be two large cases or six small ones; the two larger cases would not demonstrate the breadth of potential applications of the concept, whilst the six smaller cases would lack the elaborateness and depth necessary to convince a hesitant reader of the usability of a concept as institutional hegemony.

1. International Relations and Institutional Hegemony

The term hegemony is notoriously vague. Although students of International Relations often use the concept, Realists, Marxists, and Liberal Institutionalists hold hegemony to have vastly different meanings. Ultimately, the various IR schools' usages of the term are not mutually exclusive, although their conceptualizations do make it appear thus. Arguably, the various 'hegemonies' should be understood as different *roads to leadership* in international politics.

1.1 How to Approach Hegemony

Our notion of hegemony stems from Thucydides' brilliant *History of the Peloponnesian War* (431–404 BC). The Athenian general and historian used *hegemonia* to describe leadership, which was not to be confused with political control (*arkhe)*. Thucydides associated *hegemonia* with 'the gift of honour' (*time*), which was attained by consent – not by force.[5] Interestingly, the essence of this view is still present in contemporary ideas about hegemony. For all IR schools, hegemony is not authority, "the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed";[6] nor is it anarchy in the Hobbesian conception, "a state of war of all against all".[7] Hegemony is still a situation of order, that can be defined as a substantially asymmetrical relation between those who are formally equals. As such, the concept still occupies a vital theoretical space between authority and anarchy.

Graph 1: *The conceptual position of hegemony*.

Complete symmetry ← - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - → **Complete authority**

| Anarchy | Hegemony | Colonialism |

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
[5] Richard Ned Lebow and Robert Kelly, "Thucydides and Hegemony: Athens and the United States," *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 04 (2001): 595.

[6] Robert Paul Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism* (Univ of California Press, 1970), 4; Rex Martin, "Wolff's Defence of Philosophical Anarchism," *The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)* 24, no. 95 (1974): 140–149.

[7] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 24–25; Thomas Hobbes, Ian Shapiro, and John Dunn, *Leviathan or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill* (Yale univ. press, 2010), 79.

Interestingly, most contemporary authors writing about hegemony derive their views not from Thucydides, but from the Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci.[8] Although Gramsci's insights are mostly applied in the domestic sphere, his *Prison Notebooks* (1925-35) can help us to understand applications of the concept in the realm of international relations. Gramsci used "cultural hegemony" to explain why the Russian Revolution failed to spread westward.[9] Gramsci argued that the bourgeoisie – the leading class – had maintained dominance by using a subtle mix of arguments and impositions. The working class was convinced by this subtle mix. It accepted its deplorable state of affairs, and did not utilize its revolutionary potential. Hence, Gramsci sketched a situation where the socio-economic relations were very asymmetric and stable, but where no class had formal authority over the other.[10]

Although practically all scholars of international relations would agree with Thucydides and Gramsci that hegemony is a substantially asymmetrical relation between those who are formally equals, most of them do not focus on either Thucydides' honour or Gramsci's subtle mix of arguments and impositions. Realism, the dominant tradition in IR, understands hegemony primarily as a preponderance of "raw, hard power". Christopher Layne, for example, states: "militarily, a hegemon's capabilities are such that no other state has the wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it."[11] The hegemon's military preponderance allows it to impose its demands on other states. Yet, realists do not go as far as to conflate hegemony and authority. Practically all theorists of international politics reserve the term colonialism for cases in which a state has true authority over the other. As in realism, imposition is also the focus of neo-Marxism, another influential school in international relations theory. Emmanuel Wallerstein, a prominent proponent of this school, explains hegemony as economically "anchoring the world capitalist system."[12] To Wallerstein, hegemonic states enforce the capitalist ideology and are dominant in "agro-industry, commerce and finance."[13]

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[8] Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," *Millennium* 12, no. 2 (1983): 162–175; Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, "Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians," *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 1 (1998): 3–21.

[9] Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 19.

[10] Alistair Davidson, *Antonio Gramsci: Towards an Intellectual Biography* (Brill, 2016); Chantal Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," *Gramsci and Marxist Theory* 168 (1979): 204.

[11] Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006): 7–41. See also: Jonathan Joseph, *Hegemony: A Realist Analysis* (Routledge, 2003).

[12] For more on understanding neomarxism and hegemony, see: Herman M. Schwartz, *States versus Markets: The Emergence of a Global Economy* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 65; Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford university press, 2015), 301.

[13] Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World Economy," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 24 (1983): 101.

Despite the fact that Realism and Neo-Marxism define hegemony differently, the basic conceptual logic remains the same. Ultimately, the IR schools differ not on what hegemony *is*, but on *how to acquire it*. Arguably, the academic discipline of IR could benefit from coming to terms with the idea that there are multiple ways to become a hegemonic state. Departing from the dogmatism of most IR schools, historian Paul Schroeder illustratively states, hegemony is "a neutral word, after all, simply denoting a factual condition of leadership or primacy."[14] The starting point of this thesis is that Gramsci's subtle mix of arguments and impositions, the military preponderance of Realists, the honor of Thucydides, and the economic dominance of neo-Marxists can – in theory – all lead to hegemony.

Interestingly, discussions of other vital concepts in political theory have taken this turn long ago. It is, for instance, completely accepted amongst political theorists that there are multiple ways in which political actors can acquire legitimacy (justified authority) – Max Weber's three routes to legitimacy (traditional, charismatic, and legal) date from 1919, and in a recent book, Pierre Rosanvallon has added three additional ways to build legitimacy (proximity, reflexivity, and impartiality).[15] Arguably, it is time for hegemony to be approached in a similar manner.

1.2 A Viable Route to Leadership: Institutional Hegemony

Of the various viable ways in which leadership can be acquired, the institutional road to hegemony is drastically underexplored.[16] Institutions – defined as "formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy" – can play a crucial role in acquiring hegemony. Memberships of institutions can determine which (military and economic) rules apply to which states, and which taxes and debts they have to pay in which forms.[17] Through building, disrupting and participating in institutions, states play a political-strategic game to enhance their positions and ultimately attain leadership.

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[14] Paul W. Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?," *The American Historical Review* 97, no. 3 (1992): 706.

[15] Max Weber, *Politics as a Vocation* (Fortress Press Philadelphia, 1968); Pierre Rosanvallon, *Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity* (Princeton University Press, 2011); F. Peter, "Political Legitimacy," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2010.

[16] Although not using the term institutional hegemony, John G. Ikenberry's *Liberal Leviathan* and *After Victory* can be seen as such attempts. Ikenberry's work has been an inspiration of this thesis. Yet, this thesis differs from Ikenberry's projects by placing more emphasis not the political-strategic aspects of institutions, rather than on idealistic aspects. Ikenberry, *After Victory*.

[17] Peter A. Hall and Rosemary CR Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms*," *Political Studies* 44, no. 5 (1996): 936–957.

The views of Liberal Institutionalism, another important school in international relations, come closest to those held in this thesis. Proponents of Liberal Institutionalism as Keohane and Nye have even argued for institutional hegemony – albeit of a different type than discussed in this thesis.[18] They argue that power can be crystalized in institutions, and define the hegemonic state as "powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and (…) willing to do so."[19] Another example is John G. Ikenberry, who argues that, "in a liberal hegemonic order, rules are negotiated and compliance is ultimately based on consent. Liberal hegemonic rule is based on bargained and rule-based relations."[20] Scholars as Ikenberry, Qin Yaqing, and Keohane show how, especially after the Second World War, international relations are influenced by (state-created) international institutions.[21] Yet, these scholars have not taken the next step of explicitly analysing the extent to which institutions can help states *attain* hegemony.

In this thesis, institutional hegemony refers to leadership that is acquired *through* international institutions, not to leadership that is *crystalized in* institutions (as discussed by Liberal Institutionalists). Rather than theoretically explaining how institutions can help states in acquiring hegemony, this thesis will make its case by offering four cases, one large (chapters 2) and three small (chapter 3).

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[18] For more on liberal institutionalism and hegemony, see Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 203.

[19] Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Little, Brown Boston, 1977).

[20] Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan*, 83.

[21] Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 1977.

2. The Case of France, Britain, and the E.E.C. (1945-63)

Moving beyond the theoretical realm, this chapter applies the concept of institutional hegemony to the concrete historical case of France, Britain, and the E.E.C. between the end of the Second World War in Europe in 1945 and the French veto of British E.E.C. membership in 1963. The first paragraph discusses the historiographical debate on this case. Arguably, the concept institutional hegemony can unite various existing analyses of the case – which center around economy, geopolitics, decolonization, and grandeur. The following paragraphs delve into the actual case, building on a combination of primary and secondary source material. The last paragraph of this chapter evaluates the extent to which institutional hegemony can enhance our understanding of the case of France, Britain, and the E.E.C.

2.1 The Historiographical Debate on de Gaulle's First "Non"

By discussing how other scholars have sought to understand the case of France, Britain, and the E.E.C. between 1945 and 1963, this paragraph not only provides essential background information for the following paragraphs, but also illustrates how the concept of institutional hegemony can bring together existing analyses of French and British foreign policy strategies.

Arguably, Harvard University's Stanley Hoffman has been the prime interpreter of de Gaulle's foreign policy, and especially his vetoing of British E.E.C. membership in 1963. Hoffman argued that – from a French perspective – de Gaulle's politics were completely understandable, the general merely wanted to restore French grandeur. The E.E.C. provided France with an "elevator" that allowed it to become what it once was, a major world power.[22] De Gaulle held that European nations should pool their powers to stand up to the superpowers of the Cold War. As Hoffmann put it, "the general is quite aware that at the present time, in a universe of giants, a country the size of France cannot regain the rank of great power all by itself."[23] If Britain was allowed to join the E.E.C., this would mean that France had to share its influence over the other continental states, as Britain was a state with similar (or greater) geopolitical weight, economy and population. In other words, British E.E.C. membership would limit the extent to which the E.E.C. could be an elevator for France in international politics.

Hoffman's intervention had more depth than may appear at first sight. In 1963, the dominant school of thought on the E.E.C. was known as neo-functionalism, a school that according to political scientist Ben Rosamond, "has been integral to the study of European unity in the second half of the

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[22] Stanley Hoffmann, "De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance," *International Organization* 18, no. 01 (1964): 1–28.

[23] Ibid., 3.

twentieth century."[24] Authors as Ernst Haas – the most prominent exponent of neo-functionalism – held "that institutions arise because they fulfill certain collective interests among states such as the need to reduce transaction costs in international bargains."[25] The authorities and solutions of these institutions subsequently "spilled-over" to other domains, so that new institutionalization could arise where citizens or statesmen had not (necessarily) intended it to be.[26] For instance in his *The Uniting of Europe*, Haas had argued that,

> Converging economic goals embedded in the bureaucratic, pluralistic, and industrial life of modern Europe provided the crucial impetus [to integration]. The economic technician, the planner, the innovating industrialist, and trade unionist advanced the movement not the politician, the scholar, the poet, the writer.[27]

De Gaulle's political maneuvering indicated that there was more to European politics than Haas' spill-overs and technocratic solutions. If states wanted, they could still take over the reins. In the jargon of European integration theorist Ben Rosamond calls this an "intergovernmental backlash" against "supranationalism".[28] Hoffman's interpretation of de Gaulle's policy illustrated that the state remained the basic unit of international politics. As Rosamond explains, "Hoffmann began from very different premises than Haas, Lindberg, and Schmitter [functionalists and neo-functionalists J.B.]. He rejected the idea that the guiding logics of West European societies had become industrialism and technocracy."[29]

Hoffman's analysis of de Gaulle's foreign policy survived a long time, with most historical research working out the details of the failed British membership negotiations. Historian Olivier Bange, for instance, placed the Anglo-French conflict in the broader international context, by adding the German and American perspectives in his *The E.E.C. Crisis of 1963*; whilst Peter Mangold traced the trajectory of the personal relation between French President Charles de Gaulle and British Prime-Minister Harold Macmillan in his *Almost Impossible Ally: Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle*.[30]

Arguably, Princeton's Andrew Moravcsik launched the most fundamental attack on Hoffman's explanation of de Gaulle's policy as a quest for grandeur. In his 1998 *The Choice for Europe*, Moravcsik defines his own project as addressing "the most fundamental puzzle confronting

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[24] Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, (St. Martin's Press, 2000): 50.

[25] Ibid., 200.

[26] Ibid., 59.

[27] Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, 42 (Stanford University Press, 1958), xix.

[28] Rosamond, "Theories of European Integration," 75.

[29] Ibid., 78.

[30] Oliver Bange and Peter Catterall, *The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Peter Mangold, *Almost Impossible Ally: Harold Macmillan and Charles De Gaulle* (IB Tauris, 2006).

those who seek to understand European integration, namely to explain why sovereign governments in Europe have chosen repeatedly to coordinate their core economic policies and surrender prerogatives within an international institution."[31] Moravcsik argued that previous historians of European integration focused far too much on the 'high politics' of ideologies and geopolitics, and payed too little attention to the 'lower politics' of "economic motivations". Moravcsik argued that, "the primary motivations of France, Britain, and Germany (…) were economic; each government sought above all to realize commercial advantages for agriculture and industry."[32] According to Moravcsik, this was especially true for de Gaulle, "after trying and failing to reform French agriculture domestically, de Gaulle – like his Fourth Republic predecessors – sought to promote its exports through European integration."[33] Moravcsik explains that "France had commodities largely uncompetitive on the world market yet competitive within Europe, and half the arable land among the Six [E.E.C. states, J.B.]. The only remaining solution was to dispose of surpluses within a protected European market."[34] As proof, Moravcsik offers that de Gaulle did not mention geopolitical concerns in his 1963 press conference on the British rejection, "de Gaulle dwells instead exclusively on commercial matters, primarily the contradiction between longstanding British trading patterns and future Treaty of Rome commitments to concern about its overwhelming economic influence."[35]

In the *Journal of Cold War History*, Hoffman responded by stating that de Gaulle saw that "economic modernization was essential for France's grandeur."[36] Hoffman explained that, "de Gaulle's view of the world was a highly antagonistic one, and he saw economic competition as a crucial component of the endless contest of states. Economic modernization thus was a means of the highest importance to the goals of power."[37] De Gaulle was, "a man for whom wealth was power, and power and activism in world affairs were the coins of grandeur."[38] Hoffman contended that Moravcsik was right to study de Gaulle's economic policy. However, "Moravcsik has pushed a sound point too far." Moravcsik was too "either-or" for Hoffman, as he did not analyze the relation between the economy and geopolitics in depth.[39]

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[31] Andrew Moravcsik and Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1998), 1.

[32] Ibid., 1, 160.

[33] Ibid., 177.

[34] Ibid., 180.

[35] Ibid., 190.

[36] Stanley Hoffmann, "Comment on Moravcsik," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2, no. 3 (2000): 69.

[37] Ibid., 69.

[38] Ibid., 70.

[39] A more devastating rebuttal of Moravcsik's thesis came from three little-known historians of Nijmegen University, in the Netherlands. In their review article "De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and The Choice for Europe: Soft Sources, Weak Evidence", Robert Lieshout, Mathieu Segers, and Johanna Maria van der Vleuten checked all the sources used in Moravcsik's *The Choice for Europe*. The authors state that, "we felt it was time to take a closer look at Moravcsik's sources. We were encouraged to do so in part by Moravcsik's own approval of scrutinizing historical sources. Lieshout, Segers, and Van der Vleuten checked the correctness of Moravcsik's 221

Besides grandeur and economy, another, albeit related, explanation for French institutional European politics has been put forth: decolonization. In his 2006 *The Invention of Decolonization*, historian Todd Shepard studies "how Algerian independence transformed France."[40] Shepard argues that "French responses to the Algerian Revolution gave birth to the certainty that 'decolonization' was a stage in the forward march of history."[41] In fact, the French, "came to see Algerian independence as necessitated by the logic of history itself", and, "they came to imagine their acceptance of decolonization as a victory, celebrating the daring of de Gaulle the de-colonizer."[42] Although Shepard's focus is on the cultural realm, he makes a side-step to International Relations, when he states that, "just months after Algerian independence, de Gaulle pointed to the United Kingdom's failure to decolonize fully as a sign of its lack of commitment to building Europe. [It was, J.B.] one key reason (…) why Britain should be kept out of the European Community."[43]

The concept of institutional hegemony can arguably unite the analyses of grandeur, economy, and decolonization. Decolonization meant both a perceived hit to the French economy (as the former overseas territories could no longer be expected to be importers in the long term) and a hit to French grandeur. The pooling of sovereignty with other European states would simultaneously make France the first among equals on the European continent – which was a boost for grandeur – and ensure that France could export its goods to the other member states – which was a boost for the French economy. In a way, European integration filled a gap left by decolonization. The pooling of sovereignty offered France a path that could potentially lead (back) to hegemony.

Arguably, institutional hegemony can also enhance our understanding of British foreign policy. The central British foreign policy idea in 1945-61 was that of the three concentric circles. Supposedly, Britain was positioned at the point of intersection of the three circles of the free world, the English-speaking world (notably the 'special relationship with America), the Commonwealth, and the European continent. The three circles approach was built on the premise that other states would accept Britain's institutionalized role as spider in the web of international relations (see chapter 2.2.2), which, as it would turn out, they did not.

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references, and found a stunning 116 to be "not correct".[39] In the end, Moravcsik simply, "fails to produce convincing evidence". Robert H. Lieshout, Mathieu LL Segers, and Anna M. van der Vleuten, "De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and The Choice for Europe: Soft Sources, Weak Evidence," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 6, no. 4 (2004): 90, 93.
[40] Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Cornell University Press, 2008), 3.
[41] Ibid., 2.
[42] Ibid., 7 and 11.
[43] Ibid., 7.

In a November 29, 1951 memorandum, Prime minister Winston Churchill clarified the British priorities: "our first objective is the unity and the consolidation of the British Commonwealth and what is left of the former British Empire. Our second, the fraternal association of the English-speaking world; and third, United Europe, to which we are a separate closely – and specially – related ally and friend."[44] Macmillan, who would later preside over the British E.E.C. bid, was quick to note that, "ever since then [when Churchill coined the three circles frame, J.B.] we have been, in one way or another, trying to find a practical solution to the problem of their interconnection."[45] As the relationships with America and the Commonwealth proved to be less beneficial than expected (see chapters 2.2 and 2.3), and European integration started to hinder the British economy severely, British priorities shifted to such an extent that Britain filed for E.E.C. membership in 1961.

Although they were located on opposite sides of the Channel, both states had to deal with a similar position in international affairs. Both France and Britain recognized that they were no longer superpowers, both were in the process of decolonization, and both recognized the potential impact of the E.E.C. on international politics. The concept of institutional hegemony can be applied to help understand *how* Britain and France attempted to regain greatness. Both France and Britain sought to attain institutional hegemony by pooling their sovereignty with other states, Britain initially with the Commonwealth and America, and France with the E.E.C.-states. In addition, both states saw their instituitional hegemonic strategies threatened by the other. Britain saw its grand strategy of the three concentric circles threatened by the France and the E.E.C., whilst France saw its leadership in the E.E.C. threatened by potential British E.E.C. membership. Arguably, the concept of institutional hegemony can bring clarity to the debate on de Gaulle's "non", on both sides of the Channel.

2.2 Rebuilding Europe, 1945-59

To understand the role of institutions in the foreign policy strategies of France and Britain, it is essential to understand that, shortly after the Second World War, it was far from certain that European institutions would develop in the direction that they ended up doing. It seemed unlikely that any European institution would flourish without the participation of Great Britain. Not only was Britain one of the war's victors, it had most of its colonies and its Commonwealth intact.[46]

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[44] British Foreign Policy Memorandum 129/48/32, August 29, 1951.
[45] Debate in the British 'House of Commons', August 2, 1961.
[46] John Kent, *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49* (Leicester University Press, 1993).

Yet, despite Britain's prominence, it turned out not to be indispensable for the formation of a successful international institution. In 1951, the French minister of foreign affairs Robert Schuman proposed the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) This institution would comprise France, Italy, West-Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg – but not Britain.

Seen the later animosity between France and Britain, it is ironic that France and Britain cooperated quite intimately in the period 1945-56. In 1956, French Prime minister Guy Mollet had even suggested to form a French-British political union. The British declined, after which Mollet suggested that France could join the Commonwealth. Although this second proposal was also rejected, it points to the fact that relations between the two states were still warm in the first years of the E.C.S.C. – especially from the French side.[47]

Not only the direction of Western integration was unforeseen after the Second World War, it was also unknown what shape Britain's relations with the remains of empire and the Commonwealth would take. In 1944, Britain's colonies and its leadership over the Commonwealth had been reasons for foreign policy expert William Fox to perceive Britain as a superpower alongside the U.S.A and U.S.S.R.[48] Yet, in the increasingly bi-polar Cold War world, with its competing ideologies about freedom and wealth, Third World states no longer accepted the paternal authority of colonizers. This had an important impact on Britain's global stature. Historian Daniel Philpott argues that, "the old British Commonwealth and Empire was being transformed into a much larger, multi-racial Commonwealth of Nations made up of Great-Britain, the old dominions and the newly decolonized republics."[49]

If a defining moment has to be appointed in both Britain's relations with the Commonwealth and its relations with France, it would doubtlessly be the Suez Crisis of 1956. Egypt had undermined French and British prestige by nationalizing the Suez Canal.[50] In response, France, Britain, and Israel attacked on November 5, 1956. It is telling for the anti-colonial Cold War world that America joined the Soviet Union in condemning the attack, despite the fact that Britain and France were its main allies.[51] The Suez Crisis not only affirmed that France and Britain would have to accept a different role in Africa and Asia than the patriarchal role they had played for centuries, but also that both were no

[47] British Foreign Policy Minute of sir Saville Garner (deputy *under-secretary of state for Commonwealth Relations* to his Minister of *Commonwealth Relations*, sir Alec Douglas-Home. September 24, 1956.

[48] William Thornton Rickert Fox, *The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union–their Responsiblility for Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944).

[49] Chris Waters, "Macmillan, Menzies, History and Empire," Australian Historical Studies, 33 (2002): 93-107.

[50] Keith Kyle, "Britain and the Crisis, 1955-1956," in *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences*, by Louis, R. and Owen, R. (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1989), 103–130.

[51] Robert R. Bowie, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis," in *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences*, by Louis, R. and Owen, R. (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1989), 189–214.

longer at the zenith of power in international politics. The Cold War world had only two poles, and offered no room of a rejuvenation of former British and French relations with the Third World.

Britain and France responded entirely differently to the condemnation of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Britain retreated its troops, whilst France was determined to fight on. Britain accepted that it now played the role of a junior partner in its 'special relationship' with America, whilst the Suez Crisis brought France to seek a more continental strategy. Historian Mathieu Segers convincingly argues that it was in the light of the Suez Crisis that French Prime-Minister Mollet and German Chancellor Adenauer decided to make a giant leap forward in European integration.[52] The Treaty of Rome was signed on March 27, 1957, founding the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and the European Atomic Energy Community (E.A.E.C. or Euratom).

It was this E.E.C. that would disrupt the British plans to attain institutional hegemony along the lines of its three concentric circles grand strategy.

2.2.1 Setting the Stage, de Gaulle's Return to Power

France was fully committed to the Western bloc, and was one the first states to sign the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C (April 1949). Yet, de Gaulle did resent being the junior partner in North Atlantic Treaty *Organization* (NATO). America led NATO, and discussed its plans with Britain first and with France later. This did not fit well with de Gaulle's perspective on what role France should play in the world. As the general himself stated, "France is not France, without grandeur."[53]

Regaining French greatness would require breaking the dual hegemony of the Americans and Soviets.[54] Interestingly, Mathieu Segers relates this goal to a letter that de Gaulle received from Heinrich Himmler in 1945. Himmler asked, "you have won, but what's next? Are you going to be submissive to the Anglo-Saxons? They will treat you as a satellite. You will lose all honor. Will you join the Soviets? They will force France to submit to their laws and they will liquidate you. In reality, there is only one way that leads to greatness and independence, and that is an entente with defeated Germany."[55]

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[52] Mathieu Segers, *Reis Naar Het Continent. Nederland En de Europese Integratie 1950-Heden* (Prometheus Bert Bakker, 2013), 129.

[53] Charles de Gaule, *Memoires de guerre:(L'appel): 1940-1942* (Plon, 1963), 5.

[54] The historians Tyler Stovall and Hendrik Lodewijk Wesseling argue that de Gaulle set himself the task of restoring French greatness and glory. Tyler Stovall, *Transnational France: The Modern History of a Universal Nation* (Westview Press, 2015), 401–9; Hendrik Lodewijk Wesseling, *De Man Die Nee Zei: Charles de Gaulle 1890-1970* (Prometheus, 2012), 19–23.

[55] See: Mathieu Segers, *Reis Naar Het Continent. Nederland En de Europese Integratie 1950-Heden*, 26.

In time, France would indeed come to terms with an entente with Germany. However, before de Gaulle could turn his gaze to the international theatre, he had domestic issues to deal with. Especially in the realm of economic policy, the general – refusing to rule by compromise – encountered much opposition. To settle the issues with his political rivals, a referendum was issued. De Gaulle won by a large margin, but was still not satisfied. Despite his victory and a subsequent one in 1946's general elections, de Gaulle resigned from office. According to historian Charles Williams, the general was severely frustrated by the return of petty partisanship so short after the war. Disappointed, de Gaulle entered a period of retreat from public affairs with his goal of restoring grandeur unfulfilled. Yet, the general kept receiving visitors from his "Gaullist" Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF) party, and maintained great influence.[56] In de Gaulle's absence from national politics between 1946 and 1958, 25 French cabinets would fall.[57] Despite his official retirement, speculation of the "last great Frenchman" returning to the forefront of politics never died out.[58]

It was eventually the Algerian Crisis that brought de Gaulle back to power in May 1958. When the rebellion of the Algerian *l'Armée Libération Nationale* (ALN) – the armed wing of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) – reached a new peak, de Gaulle offered his services to the nation in a press conference. The general boldly stated that he was ready to "assume the powers of the Republic."[59] Following this press conference, French president René Coty openly appealed to the "most illustrious of Frenchmen [de Gaulle]" to confer with him on how the French political situation could be improved.[60] The committee that resulted from the talks between Coty and de Gaulle made the latter Prime Minister in June 1958.

In September 1958, a referendum took place on a new constitution which would grant the President more executive powers. It was approved by 79.2%. As expected, the de Gaulle became the first person to hold the enhanced office of President.[61] According to historian Lodewijk Wesseling, de Gaulle became what he had always wanted to be in 1958, the man who could not be surpassed.[62]

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[56] Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General de Gaulle* (Wiley, 1993).

[57] Bart Stol, "Amerika En de Terugkeer van Charles de Gaulle," *Historisch Nieuwsblad* 4/2008 (2008).

[58] Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*.

[59] Charles De Gaulle, "Press Conference" (Palais d'Orsay, May 19, 1958).

[60] Brian Crozier and Gerard Mansell, "France and Algeria," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 36, no. 3 (1960): 310–321.

[61] Dorothy Maud Pickles, *The Fifth French Republic: Institutions and Politics*, vol. 51 (Methuen, 1965)..

[62] Wesseling, *De man die nee* zei, 157.

2.2.2 The Common Market and the British Strategy of Three Concentric Circles

On the other side of the Channel, the previously discussed British institutional strategy of three concentric circles was intended to support a claim well beyond what Britain's limited military and economic resources alone would support.[63] The strategy depended on relations with three groups of partners. (1) Britain aimed to institutionalize its 'special relationship' with America by making itself America's prime partner and advisor. America had only recently become a superpower and – by manner of speech – had to learn the art being a superpower. Who could be a better mentor than the British?[64] (2) Simultaneously, Britain relied on traditional paternal relations with the Commonwealth, consisting mostly of former British colonies. These relations were already quite institutionalized in 1945-59, with the Commonwealth meeting biannually. Within this Commonwealth, Britain's leading role was expected to be more-or-less uncontested.[65] Lastly, (3) Britain aimed to maintain relations with the European continent. During the entire 1945-63 period, the British tactic has been not to allow itself to be excluded from economic relations with the continent, whilst minimizing its involvement.[66] Clearly, the existence of a European common market would endanger this tactic, as the E.E.C.'s trade barriers would hinder British export.[67]

Being the only state that linked these three circles of the 'free world' would make Britain the leading state on the global stage, or so it hoped. As historian John Dumbrell explains the strategy, Britain would "operate as a swing power: not totally integrated into any circle but wielding power as a fulcrum within a wheel."[68]

Questions critical of this policy were bad for those who posed them. As Hugo Young states, "in May 1945 when the second German War ended, British self-esteem was higher than it had been in living memory (…) Britain was unique, indisputably the chief among European equals."[69] When the French proposed the Schuman Plan in 1951 – the plan that would lead to the E.C.S.C. – Britain

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[63] William Wallace, "The Collapse of British Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 81, no. 1 (2005): 55.

[64] Christopher John Bartlett, *"The Special Relationship": a Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (Addison-Wesley Longman Ltd, 1992).

[65] Alex May, "The Commonwealth and Britain's Turn to Europe, 1945–73," *The Round Table* 102, no. 1 (2013): 31..

[66] Stephen George, *Britain and European Integration since 1945* (Blackwell Publ., 1991); David Gowland and Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945-1998* (Routledge, 2014); Segers, *Reis Naar Het Continent. Nederland En de Europese Integratie 1950-Heden*.

[67] For more on influencing policy processes see: Deborah A. Stone, *Policy Paradox and Political Reason* (Addison-Wesley Longman, 1988).

[68] John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and after* (Macmillan, 2001), 7.

[69] Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair* (Overlook Press, 1998), 5.

thought that it could still afford to respond indifferently.[70] Contradicting this idea, Chief Scientific Officer Henry Tizzard wrote:

> We persist in regarding ourselves as a great power, capable of everything and only temporarily handicapped by economic difficulties. We are not a great power and never will be again. We are a great nation, but if we continue to behave like a great power we shall soon cease to be a great nation.[71]

Hugo Young emphasizes that the foreign policy elite responded to this remark "with the kind of horror one would expect if one made a disrespectful remark about the King."[72] In the following decades most bureaucrats found it "easier to succumb to the unsupported certainties of the governing ideology than challenge them."[73] Not many civil servants possessed Tizzard's bravery.

Most British policy-makers argued that there was "not the slightest possibility of the common market coming into existence" and that, "the only troublesome point is whether we should strive to kill it, or to let it collapse of its own weight."[74] Yet, in his private correspondence later Prime Minister Macmillan wondered,

> What are we to do? Are we just to sit back and hope for the best? If we do that it may be very dangerous for us; for perhaps Messina will come off after all and that will mean Western Europe dominated in fact by Germany and used as an instrument for the revival of power through economic means. It is really giving them on a plate what we fought two wars to prevent.[75]

The matter of Britain's relations with the European continent was all the more pressing because the Commonwealth functioned differently than expected in the post-war world. Although the British lovingly called New Zealand its "farm on the Pacific", trade with the European continent turned out to be more lucrative.[76] British export to the Commonwealth dropped from 45% in 1945 to 25% in 1960.[77] Historians Robertson and Singleton argue that, "the Commonwealth had served its purpose admirably during the 1940s and early 1950s, when Britain was short on food and dollars but, by the

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[70] Clemens August Wurm, "Britain and European Integration, 1945–63," *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 02 (1998): 249–261; Young, *This Blessed Plot*, 26–71.

[71] Cited in: Young, *This Blessed Plot*, 24.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid., 70.

[74] Message from the Foreign Office, January 16, 1956. Cited in: May, "The Commonwealth and Britain's Turn to Europe, 1945–73," 31..

[75] Letter from Macmillan to Edward, February 1, 1956. Cited in: Martin Schaad, "Plan G–A 'Counterblast'? British Policy Towards the Messina Countries, 1956," *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 1 (1998): 50.

[76] May, "The Commonwealth and Britain's Turn to Europe, 1945–73," 32.

[77] Keith Perry and Stephen George, *Britain and the European Community: Made Simple* (Clarendon Press, 1984), 7.

early 1960s, the Commonwealth, with its slowly growing economies (…) seemed more a burden than an asset."[78] This development in the economic relations between Britain and the Commonwealth put pressure on the British grand strategy of three concentric circles, a pressure that increased when the E.E.C. became reality.

Britain's first reaction to the E.E.C. was to propose an institutional design circumventing the common market's trade barriers. The so-called Free Trade Area (F.T.A.) seemed to hedge British chances: either the Six would accept which would exempt Britain from the common market import tariff, as a free trade area by definition has no import tariffs; or, the Six would be divided, which would make the splitting up of the E.E.C. likely.[79] It seemed the best of both worlds.[80]

In May 1958, Macmillan still hoped that the plan would succeed. He stated that, "we must continue to strive for the establishment of a Free Trade Area, on terms satisfactory to us, alongside the Common Market which is due to come into being on 1st January 1959.[81]" The biggest problem that the British foresaw was, "the demand of France for special treatment (...) we shall have to be prepared to take a very firm line with the French (…) in order to prevent the whole scheme from being whittled away."[82] The French, however, would only accept the F.T.A. if Britain stopped its preferential treatment of the Commonwealth in trade relations (known as imperial preferences).[83] Macmillan was unwilling to do so. Maintaining existing relations with the Commonwealth was a "firm sticking point (…) even if this entailed a breakdown of the negotiations."[84]

Late in 1958, it became clear to Britain that France would not participate in its plans to create the F.T.A. However, unexpectedly, also the other EEC-states did not join the F.T.A. Although the Dutch favoured the F.T.A., they agreed to decline in return for the profitable E.E.C. Common Agricultural Policy – Segers argues that the Netherlands may have sold the soul of its European politics in doing so.[85]

The failure of the F.T.A. was a big disappointment for the British foreign policy elite. The next tactical step was to found the smaller Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.), including the U.K., Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Austria, and fascist Portugal. In Schaad's words, it was, "an effort to

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[78] Paul Robertson and John Singleton, "The Old Commonwealth and Britain's First Application to Join the EEC, 1961–3," *Australian Economic History Review* 40, no. 2 (2000): 175.
[79] Schaad, "Plan G–A 'Counterblast'?," 39.
[80] Ibid., 42.
[81] British Foreign Policy Memorandum 114, May 20, 1958.
[82] British Foreign Policy Memorandum 256, November 6,1956.
[83] Robertson and Singleton, "The Old Commonwealth and Britain's First Application to Join the EEC, 1961–3," 155.
[84] British Foreign Policy Memorandum 114, May 20, 1958.
[85] Segers wonders whether that would have happened if Dutch Labour (pvdA) was still part of the coalition. Segers, *Reis Naar Het Continent. Nederland En de Europese Integratie 1950-Heden*, 138.

increase economic pressure on the Six in order to facilitate trade negotiations with the EEC."[86] Something had to be done. Britain saw that France – and in the long run Germany – was dominant in continental Europe. Macmillan placed the founding of the E.F.T.A. in historical context, when arguing that "it was Britain's historical role to crush Napoleonic ambitions to integrate Europe, and if France and Germany continued on this road Britain would have no alternatives but to lead another peripheral alliance against them.[87]

In striving to found the F.T.A. and later the E.F.T.A., Britain pursued an anti-hegemonic tactic on the continent; it aimed to disrupt French (and later potentially German) institutional hegemony. This tactic of trying to disrupt the attempts at hegemony of other states should be understood in the context of Britain own hegemonic strategy of the three concentric circles. The British post-War strategy of empire-Commonwealth was failing, and it feared also losing its most important trade partners on the European continent.

2.3 Towards the First British EEC-Bid, 1959-61

Between 1959 and 1961, Britain shifted its position on the E.E.C., and eventually came around to make a bid for membership in 1961. France, however, was increasingly afraid of American hegemony over the entire Western bloc. Because de Gaulle viewed Britain as a potential American satellite, this fear would come to play an important part in de Gaulle's 1963 veto of Britain.

2.3.1 France Fearing American Hegemony

Upon assuming power, de Gaulle was thought to repress the Algerian Crisis, harshly if need be. Instead of following this expected course of action, the general did just the opposite. In his understanding, Algeria was lost and would not come back, whatever action he would take. France retreated and eventually granted Algeria independence in the Évian Accords of March 1962.

In 1960, the international world suddenly looked different from a French perspective. Not only was the Algerian Crisis finally resolved, France also had become the world's fourth nuclear power. After six years of effort, a French nuclear device was exploded in the Sahara desert in February 1960. Although France was already developing nuclear weaponry before the general's resumption of power, nuclear testing intensified under de Gaulle. As Hoffmann analyses this

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[86] Schaad, "Plan G–A 'Counterblast'?,"42.
[87] Cited in: Bange and Catterall, *The EEC Crisis of 1963*, 13.

scientific pursuit, "renouncing an independent nuclear force would mean resignation to permanent dependence on outsiders – i.e., submission to small-power status for France."[88]

Arguably, French atomic power would bring an end to France's "international impotence" in the Cold War, enhancing the French position in NATO and simultaneously enabling it to protect Europe.[89] Making use of this new situation, France acted boldly during the Berlin Crisis of 1961. De Gaulle proclaimed France the guarantor of German security, defying America's more hesitant approach.[90] NATO was no longer necessary for safety, according to the general. Yet, de Gaulle made perfectly clear that he would stand by the North Atlantic Treaty, though not always by its organization. For instance in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, France showed strong solidarity with the rest of the treaty's signers.[91] America was always an ally, though not always a friend.

De Gaulle had resented the informal hierarchy of NATO since the outset of his Presidency. In what has often been described as de Gaulle's initial "memorandum diplomacy", France pursued its security policies within the institutional framework of the Atlantic alliance.[92] As political scientist Edward Kolodziej puts it, de Gaulle strove for "big power status through cooperation and cooptation."[93] Historian Frédéric Bozo adds that "the aim was to reach a tripartite organization [France, Britain, and America] of Western security and to reorganize NATO accordingly, but if an agreement were not possible on a tripartite organization, then France reserved the right to modify unilaterally its position within NATO."[94]

Evidently, the memorandum strategy did not work, Britain and America kept shutting France out.[95] Hence, de Gaulle was forced to pursue his plan B. According to historian Tyler Stovall, the general's strategical shift came at a favorable time, "by the late 1950s the prospects of a Soviet invasion of Europe had diminished considerably, so that many came to see NATO as an arm of US domination rather than a mutual defense organization."[96] In 1959 concrete action followed, the

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[88] Stanley Hoffmann, "De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance," *International Organization* 18, no. 01 (1964): 6.

[89] Charles De Gaulle, *Discours et Messages, Tome 2: 1946-1958* (Plon, 2014), 307. Speech Bordeaux 25 september 1949.

[90] Hoffmann, "De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance," 1964, 5–12.

[91] Erin R. Mahan and Saki Dockrill, *Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke and New York, 2002).

[92] Sebastian Reyn, *Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969* (Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 26.

[93] Edward A. Kolodziej, *French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (Cornell Univ Pr, 1974).

[94] Frédéric Bozo and Susan Emanuel, *Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 18.

[95] Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*.

[96] Stovall, *Transnational France*, 410.

French Mediterranean fleet was pulled back from NATO, and French soldiers returning from Algeria were not integrated in NATO forces.[97]

De Gaulle preferred continental to transatlantic integration. Although he has not always been recognized as such, De Gaulle was in favor of pooling sovereignty in the EEC.[98] Segers states that "France had to give power to Europe to keep influence on the world stage."[99] De Gaulle accepted that France would have less autonomy, if it got more international weight in return – a perfect example of an institutional hegemonic strategy. The general had a reputation of being an "integration-basher" but he saw what the institution could do for his state.[100] As for the other five states, the E.E.C. was very beneficial for France's economy.[101] The French economic growth in the 60's averaged 5.8%, far more than that of Britain and the U.S.[102]

Yet, de Gaulle clearly did not desire a European super-state. The general feared the seemingly unstoppable dynamic inherent in the European treaties – what he called "*ce machin*."[103] The E.E.C. accumulated ever more responsibilities, without the explicit say-so of politicians (this is roughly the idea of Functionalism, discussed in chapter 2.1) Segers makes the case that this dynamic was "identifiably linked to the ongoing undesired and culturally alien Americanization of Western Europe."[104] De Gaulle saw that the institutionalization of European politics could potentially play into the American hegemonic ambitions. Later, this would become one of the reasons for de Gaulle to reject British E.E.C. membership. America was already dominant in NATO – and aimed to enhance this dominance with the Multilateral Force (M.L.F., see 2.4) – de Gaulle' France could not afford to let America become dominant in the E.E.C. as well.

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[97] Garret Martin, "The 1967 Withdrawal from NATO–a Cornerstone of de Gaulle's Grand Strategy?," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 9, no. 3 (2011): 235. Yet, NATO-members were allowed to fly in French airspace and to use its communicational and infrastructural facilities. Reyn, *Atlantis Lost*, 281.

[98] Segers, *Reis Naar Het Continent. Nederland En de Europese Integratie 1950-Heden*, 137.

[99] Segers, *Reis Naar Het Continent. Nederland En de Europese Integratie 1950-Heden*, 24.

[100] Ibid., 139.

[101] Michael Sutton, *France and the Construction of Europe, 1944-2007: The Geopolitical Imperative*, vol. 7 (Berghahn Books, 2011), 128.

[102] The growth of the American, British, and German economies averaged a growth of 3.9%, 2.9%, and 4.9% respectively. Bozo and Emanuel, *Two Strategies for Europe*, 123.

[103] Mathieu Segers, "Preparing Europe for the Unforeseen, 1958–63. De Gaulle, Monnet, and European Integration beyond the Cold War: From Co-Operation to Discord in the Matter of the Future of the EEC," *The International History Review* 34, no. 2 (2012): 355.

[104] Ibid., 356.

2.3.2 Britain Fearing the E.E.C.

Macmillan was reelected in October 1959. As historian Peter Hennesy states, "out of the wreckage of Suez and Eden's premiership, he [Macmillan] had not only presided over a political recovery, he increased the conservative majority."[105] Nothing pointed to the dramatic shift in British foreign policy that was about to take place.[106] Yet, as Hennesy puts it, Macmillan "might have deceived the electorate; but he had not altogether convinced himself."[107] Macmillan shifted British policy fundamentally, and February 1960 can be seen as the crucial moment in this shift.

It was in February that Macmillan held his famous *Winds of Change* speech in South Africa.[108] In it, he discussed the "end of the white man's accepted predominance."[109] Richard Thorpe, Macmillan's biographer, states that this was a "key moment in the struggle for black nationalism in South-Africa", and "a harbinger of the eventual ending of apartheid"[110] With the speech Britain distanced itself from the vast colonial empire it had been only decades ago.[111]

It was also in February 1960 that the Future Policy Report was published. The report stated that, between 1960 and 1970, the US and USSR would enlarge their lead on the rest of the world; that Britain could no longer call itself a superpower; and that the E.E.C. *was* – potentially – a superpower. As the report puts it, "if the Six achieve a real measure of integration, a new world power will have come on the scene (…) we will fall still further behind."[112] The report praised the Commonwealth much less than previous policy reports had. It could still "form a bridge between the Western world and the developing countries of Asia and Africa", but this was of little significance, compared with the E.E.C. as an "emerging world power."[113]

To make matters worse, the report stated that "some Commonwealth members do not regard themselves as part of the Western Camp."[114] Not only was British leadership of the Commonwealth called into question, also the degree to which the Commonwealth was still a circle of

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[105] Peter Hennessy, *Having It so Good: Britain in the Fifties* (Penguin UK, 2007), 572.
[106] Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, 110.
[107] Hennessy, *Having It so Good*, 573.
[108] Frank Myers, "Harold Macmillan's' Winds of Change' Speech: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Policy Change," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 3, no. 4 (2000): 560–61.
Myers, F. (2000) *"Harold Macmillan's "Winds of Change" Speech: A Case Study in the Rethoric of Policy Change."* In: Rhetoric & Public Affairs 3:4. P.: 560-61.
[109] Letter from Macmillan to Menzies. February 8, 1962. PREM 11/3665 PRO 6. Cited in: Chris Waters, "Macmillan, Menzies, History and Empire," 119.
[110] D. R. Thorpe, *Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmillan* (Random House, 2011).
[111] Saul Dubow, "Macmillan, Verwoerd, and the 1960 Winds of Change Speech," *The Historical Journal* 54, no. 4 (2011): 1098.
[112] British Foreign Policy Report, "Future Policy Study', 1960-70. C (60) 35. February 29, 1960.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.

the free world was examined. It is safe to say that the report put a bomb under the three circles grand strategy.

A follow-up report, dated July 1960, zoomed in on British relations with the E.E.C. and the Commonwealth. It's conclusions were arguably even harsher:

> Our previous attitude was influenced by our desire to do nothing which might prejudice the Commonwealth relationship, this consideration is now matched by the fear that the growing power and influence of the Six will seriously affect our position in the world- if we remain outside. (…) this itself will be damaging to our relationship with the Commonwealth.[115]

Together, these reports paved the way for a more publicly accessible report, written by the European Economic Association Committee that would explicitly advise membership of the EEC.[116] This report confirms that:

> The [European Economic] Community may well emerge as a power comparable in size and influence to the United States and the USSR. The pull of this new power bloc would be bound to dilute our influence with the rest of the world, including the Commonwealth. (...) the independence which we have sought to preserve by remaining aloof from European integration would be of doubtful value, since our diminished status would suggest only a minor role for us in international affairs.[117]

Macmillan understood that it was in Britain's best interest to offer a bid for EEC-membership. The Prime Minister stated that, otherwise, the E.E.C. would "recreate in Europe the division which had existed in 1940."[118] But Macmillan was nevertheless greatly troubled by this decision. "Shall we be caught between a hostile (or at least less and less friendly) America, and a boastful, powerful Europe of Charlemagne – now under French control but later bound to come under German control? Is this the real reason for joining the common market (if we are acceptable) and for abandoning (a) the Seven (b) British agriculture (c) the Commonwealth? It's a grim choice."[119]

Although the choice may have been grim, the decision was clear by 1960. The famous Fernand Braudel interprets the decision to offer a bid as follows, "psychologically it (…) meant as it were turning the last page in the most successful imperial history ever known."[120] By attaining E.E.C.

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[115] British Foreign Policy Report "6s and 7s Report". C 107, July 6, 1960.
[116] British Foreign Policy Report, "European Economic Association Committee Report". NA PRO CAB 134/1820. May 25, 1960.
[117] Ibid.
[118] CAB 133/243, March 28, 1960. Cited in: Alan S. Milward, *The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945-1963*, vol. 1 (Psychology Press, 2002), 324.
[119] Cited in: Alistair Horne, *Macmillan: The Official Biography* (Pan Macmillan, 2012), 256.
[120] Fernand Braudel and Richard Mayne, *A History of Civilizations* (Penguin Books New York, 1995), 412.

membership, Britain – at the very least – hoped to prevent French (and later German) hegemony in Western Europe. However, quite unexpectedly, Britain failed to become a member until 1973.

2.4 De Gaulle's "Non", 1961-63

With a heavy heart, Britain formally initiated membership negotiations on August 2, 1961. In the negotiations, Britain tried not only to convince the E.E.C. that it was in everyone's best interest if it joined the common market, but also the Commonwealth. In a memorandum, British foreign policy officials argued that, "the only effective way of securing our political objectives in the world, and of averting the dangers of continued division in Europe which we foresee, lies in full United Kingdom membership of the European Economic Community."[121] Nonetheless, the Commonwealth was not convinced, "they undoubtedly have an undefined fear that a close economic union between Britain and the other countries of Western Europe will lead, in some way or another, to a political union which would weaken the Commonwealth relationship."[122] The memorandum states that, "we should expect the Six to show understanding of the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the rest of the Commonwealth, and to recognize the importance of the Commonwealth to the free world."[123] Albeit less explicitly, Britain still seemed to be pursuing some sort of variant to the three circles strategy.

As a country with similar economic and military capabilities, France would have to share its influence with Britain if it was allowed to become a member of the E.E.C. In effect this would mean the loss of France's capability to strong-arm the smaller E.E.C. states and West-Germany, which was only starting to regain its capability of autonomous action (see chapter 3.1). An additional reason for opposing British membership was that Britain was regarded as America's "Trojan Horse".[124] Through Britain, America could exert influence in EEC-affairs.

The Nassau Agreements are often held to have been the main cause of de Gaulle's veto. On the Bahamas, *les Anglo-Saxons* had agreed on the creation of a Multilateral Force (M.L.F.), in which British nuclear weapons would fall under NATO authority. When asked to sign a similar agreement – under which France would dedicate its entire nuclear arsenal to the M.L.F. whilst America retained a degree of autonomous firing power – the General stated that "no one will be surprised that we are unable to subscribe to it."[125] The Nassau agreements would hinder the independent French nuclear force.

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[121] British Foreign Policy Memorandum 84, June 21, 1961.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Segers, *Reis Naar Het Continent: Nederland En de Europese Integratie, 1950 Tot Heden*.
[125] Charles de Gaulle, "Press Conference," January 14, 1963.

Although the Nassau Agreements did not sit well with de Gaulle, they were not the main cause of his veto. It is likely that de Gaulle would also have rejected British membership if the Nassau Conference never took place, British E.E.C. membership simply hindered the French institutional strategy on the European continent too much. Nassau did, however, provide the general with ammunition for his arguments.[126] In de Gaulle's reasoning, the Nassau Agreements proved that Britain was an American satellite. For de Gaulle, this insight in Britain's subordination justified linking the Transatlantic issue to the European one in a major press conference.

On January 14, 1963, the day on which the American President John F. Kennedy held his State of the Union Address, general de Gaulle organized a press conference.[127] In it, he proclaimed his "double non": no to British EEC-membership, and no to the Nassau Accords. According to de Gaulle, "England (…) is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often most distant countries." After this assertion, he stated that English membership under the current conditions posed "without doubt to each of the six states, and poses to England, problems of a very great dimension."[128] According to de Gaulle, the issue of British E.E.C. membership was related to the issue of the M.L.F. The general built his case as follows,

> We are in the atomic era and we are a country which can be destroyed at any moment, unless the aggressor is deterred from attack by the certainty that he too will suffer terrible destruction. (…) no one in the world, and particularly in America, can say whether, where, when, how, and to what extent American nuclear weapons would be used to defend Europe.[129]

France needed to maintain its capability of independent action, and this capability was threatened by both British membership and the M.L.F. The M.L.F. would mean that all states except America would contribute all their "present and future means and the Americans *some* of theirs (…) the main force of American nuclear means remains outside the multilateral force under the direct command of the President of the United States."[130] The M.L.F. combined with British E.E.C. membership would arguably mean American hegemony over the Western bloc.

De Gaulle's veto caused great upheaval throughout the Western world, especially because it was made while negotiations were still underway, without consulting other member states. The *Washington Post*, commented wryly that it saw de Gaulle "at his most inflexible." The Dutch *De*

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[126] Sutton, *France and the Construction of Europe, 1944-2007*, 7:103; Reyn, *Atlantis Lost*, 188–89.

[127] Segers, *Reis Naar Het Continent*, 149.

[128] De Gaulle, Charles. "Press Conference." January 14, 1963.

[129] Ibid.

[130] In return, Britain would be able to buy Polaris missiles- useful for their second strike potential. De Gaulle, Charles. "Press Conference." January 14, 1963.

Telegraaf agreed, stating that the general "made the Western political constellation unstable."[131] But maybe Macmillan put it best, when he complained that, "de Gaulle is trying to dominate Europe. His idea is not a partnership, but a Napoleonic or Louis XIV hegemony."[132]

2.5 Case Conclusion

Of course, de Gaulle's veto did not lead to such Napoleonic or Louis XIV hegemony, it can be said to have been a mixed success. The NATO states stood before the choice between French *or* American dominance.[133] Unanimously, their choice was American. The "double no" was publicly condemned.[134] Yet, from the perspective of institutional hegemony on the European continent, de Gaulle's strategy seems more successful. The general succeeded in blocking British entry into the E.E.C. for a decade (until 1973). As France retained its advantages over other E.E.C. states – despite their resentment – it can be said to have remained Western Europe's regional hegemon. Although most EEC-states would have preferred to have Britain 'in', they accepted the community as it was. In Mathieu Segers' analysis, a sword of Damocles split the West in two, the E.E.C. became something of a bloc within the Western bloc.[135] In that sense, de Gaulle can be said to have reached his goal of geopolitical influence, gaining some independence from America in an otherwise bipolar Cold War world. Although grandeur is hard to measure, de Gaulle succeeded in making France a force to be reckoned with. France may have frustrated the other member states, but it was no longer insignificant.

However, the concept of institutional hegemony not only proves useful in a final analysis of the results of de Gaulle's veto, but also in understanding the process that led up to it. Institutional hegemony is a flexible concept; it brings focus to the role that the pooling of sovereignty plays in quests for hegemony.

Throughout the case of France, Britain and the E.E.C. from 1945 to 1963, we have encountered institutional hegemony in vastly different forms. Sometimes the concept of institutional hegemony has been applied to a state's consciously pursued grand strategy, whilst it has at other times been applied to a semi-conscious fear of another state attaining hegemony. To illustrate the

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[131] *The Washington Post* (1959-1973): January 15, 1963; accessed through Proquest Historical Newspapers (visited on November 21, 2016); De *Telegraaf*, January 15, 1963; accessed through Delpher, http://www.delpher.nl/ (visited on November 21, 2016).

[132] Robert Gildea, "Myth, Memory, and Policy in France since 1945," in *Memory& Power in Post-War Europe*, by Jan-Werner Muller (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 63.

[133] For an analysis of de Gaulle's impact on NATO, see: Reyn, *Atlantis Lost*, 290; Andreas Wenger, "Crisis and Opportunity: NATO's Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 6, no. 1 (2004): 72–73.

[134] Christian Nuenlist, "Dealing with the Devil: NATO and Gaullist France, 1958–66," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 9, no. 3 (2011): 229.

[135] Segers, *Reis Naar Het Continent*, 138–41.

wide range of ways in which the concept of institutional hegemony has been used in this chapter, five applications of institutional hegemony are listed below. Perhaps the clearest form of institutional hegemony was (1) the French strategy of gaining economic strength and geopolitical influence by pooling its sovereignty with that of the five less-powerful E.E.C. members. This French leadership in the E.E.C. was accompanied by (2) the French fear that Britain was a "Trojan horse", a satellite with which the Americans could potentially establish Anglo-Saxon hegemony over Western Europe – which would, as a consequence, disrupt French hegemony over Western Europe. (3) Britain, on the other hand, pursued an institutional grand strategy of 'three concentric circles', an attempt to gain a position of global leadership as the point where the three circles of the 'free world' (the 'special relationship', Europe, and the Commonwealth) were connected. However, Britain saw this strategy threatened by (4) the fear that France would use its hegemony over the E.E.C. to dominate Western Europe, and hence derail the British institutional hegemonic strategy. Lastly, Britain feared that (5) West Germany would eventually out-produce France and gain hegemony over the E.E.C. (see chapter 3.1).

These five applications of the concept institutional hegemony are quite diverse. Two applications relate to ways in which states utilize institutions in a quest for leadership (1 and 3), but, remarkably, a majority of the shapes that institutional hegemony took in the case of France, Britain, and the EEC had to do with fear for other states' strategy (2, 4, and 5). Clearly, the pooling of sovereignty that happens in international institutions can be threatening to states left outside of these institutions. France feared that Britain was a satellite for American hegemony, whilst Britain feared that its grand strategy could be diluted by the E.E.C., and that (West-)Germany would, in time, lead the continent.

The following chapter applies the concept to three additional historical cases, thus expanding the range of forms which institutional hegemony can take even further.

3. Three Additional Cases

The case of France and Britain, discussed in the previous chapter, has shown that institutional hegemony played a crucial role in the trajectory of European integration. However, the concept institutional hegemony could potentially enhance historical interpretation in more cases than just this one. Below, three additional mini-cases are presented to further elaborate on the concept of institutional hegemony.

3.1   (West) Germany and European Integration, 1945-2017

As has been discussed in chapter 2, West-Germany was an important factor in the political calculations of both the French and the British government. In the late 1950s and early 60s, Harold Macmillan frequently stated that he feared that Germany would, in time, grow into the hegemonic state on the European continent. Yet, this hegemonic potential seemed unlikely in the direct aftermath of the Second World War. The remains of the defeated Third Reich were split up into four occupation zones, to be governed by the four post-war 'great powers' (the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France). When the three Western zones merged into the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), this new state (or: proto-state) had virtually no sovereignty. On top of that, it simultaneously had to reconcile itself with a catastrophic history and repair a ruined economy.[136] Under these deplorable circumstances the German foreign policy elite decided: "never again and never alone."[137] Never again would West-Germany allow itself to be feared by its fellow states, it firmly asserted that it would always pursue its interests in concert with them. Arguably, (West-) Germany – first unconsciously and later more consciously – pursued a strategy of institutional hegemony.

An institutional hegemonic perspective on (West-)Germany can build on a substantial body of existing literature. Especially the work of the Hanss Maull is useful. Maull introduces the concept of *Zivilmacht* (or: civilian power). *Zivilmacht* is a role concept, or foreign policy identity, for dealing with international problems confronting states.[138] In his *Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers*, Maull argues that civilian powers (a) "accept the necessity of cooperation with others in the

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[136] Thomas Berger, "The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945," in *Memory& Power in Post-War Europe*, by Jan-Werner Muller (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[137] Helga Haftendorn, *Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 1

[138] Knut Kirste and Hanns W. Maull, "Zivilmacht Und Rollentheorie," *Zeitschrift Für Internationale Beziehungen*, 1996, 283–312; Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power?: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (Manchester University Press, 2001)k.

pursuit of international objectives", (b) concentrate on non-military means, and (c) are willing to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management. Understood in the context of this thesis on institutional hegemony, being a civilian power is a strategical political choice, which helps states build political capital and legitimacy – it is most certainly not a power-neutral choice.

3.1.1 Five Snapshots of West-German Foreign Policy

This thesis does not allow the space to write a comprehensive history of (West-) German foreign relations from the perspective of institutional hegemony. Hence, five snapshots will be discussed to illustrate how West-Germany enhanced its institutional position step-by-step.

Buying a voice: the International Authority for the Ruhr

The West-German foreign policy elite fully understood that Germany's fundamental problem was a "potential for hegemony on the one hand, and mistrust and potential anti-German coalitions on the other."[139] An independent German republic had to be made less frightening for its neighbors. This was easier said than done in 1949, as West-Germany had no voice in its own international relations. West-Germany was still an occupied state that did not even have an own minister for foreign affairs. On the other hand, it was clear to all political observers that the Allies (now occupiers) had problems of their own, they had virtually no popular legitimacy in Germany. The population saw Allied occupation as an occupation by foreign nations, not as 'taking care' by a liberating force.[140]

As a – perhaps unconscious – first step in the West-German (hegemonic) institutional hegemony, Konrad Adenauer agreed to take a seat in the International Ruhr Authority in 1949. By doing so, Adenauer implicitly gave legitimacy to the occupation of the Ruhr. In return, he received (amongst various other rights) the right to maintain consular relations with other states. This was an important move towards the establishment of friendly and peaceful relations with its Western neighbors, and the first step in integrating West-Germany into a network of European nations.[141] West-Germany gave up authority over a piece of its territory but won embeddedness and a voice in international relations. According to historian Helga Haftendorn, West-Germany "happily traded

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[139] Josef Janning, "A German Europe-a European Germany? On the Debate over Germany's Foreign Policy," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 1996, 33–41., 35.
[140] Haftendorn, *Coming of Age*.
[141] Ibid., 16.

sovereignty for participation."[142] Although this does not yet qualify as a hegemonic strategy, it is symbolic for the West-German strategy: gaining power and legitimacy through institutions.

Embedding the (West-)German Economy

Adenauer was continuously afraid that 'East and West' would decide over the fate of Germany.[143] He stated that: "Germany must not be caught in the grist mill of politics again or it would be lost."[144] This perception led Adenauer to conceive plans for a Franco-German core of Europe that could form a block against these superpowers. Only if West-Germany pooled its sovereignty with other states, could Germany have any real influence in the world – basically this was the same idea as that was dominant in French foreign policy circles (see chapter 2). If Schuman (and Monnet) had not beaten Adenauer to the chase with French plans, Adenauer might have introduced similar plans.[145]

The French plans for a European Coal and Steel Community were proposed in May 1950, and West-Germany accepted them in 1951. Membership of the E.C.S.C. brought West-Germany more embeddedness in European international politics, and more embeddedness in the continent's economy. The economic aspect was important in West-German foreign politics. More than other states, the Bonn Republic was capable of keeping wages low, which gave it the opportunity to produce more for less.[146] As European integration evolved, the German share of exports of the Six increased from 10% in 1949, to 27% in 1980.[147] As historians Jeffery and Paterson state, "an export-oriented economic structure gave West Germany a fundamental interest in the creation of frameworks for opening up international trade at the European level."[148] After the Second World War special regulations ensured limited West-Germany export to protect other European economies. The E.C.S.C. would "allow other European states, especially France, to gain sufficient confidence in the Federal Republic to lift post-war discriminatory provisions."[149]

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[142] Ibid., 74.
[143] Ibid., 37.
[144] Ibid., 37.
[145] Ibid., 19.
[146] Ibid., 213.
[147] Ibid., 197-200.
[148] Charlie Jeffery and William Paterson, "Germany and European Integration: A Shifting of Tectonic Plates," *West European Politics* 26, no. 4 (2003): 59–75., 60.
[149] Ibid., 60.

Full NATO membership: playing off France and the United States

Besides economic integration, the E.C.S.C. also had another aim. The E.C.S.C. assured that West-Germany could not make heavy weapons with coal and steel without other states knowing. As part of the post-Second World War demands, West-Germany was demilitarized. In time however, the United States wanted to incorporate a German army into multilateral forces. France was no proponent of this idea, but the West-German leadership had ears for it, and flirted with the integration of a German army into NATO. This flirtation is an example of the German Atlantic policy orientation that existed parallel to the European one.[150] West-Germany betted on two horses, knowing that France and the US feared each other's influence.

France resented the idea of a German army, but feared American dominance over the continent even more. In 1950, it agreed to initiate an European Defense Community (E.D.C.), in which Germany could integrate an army.[151] Unfortunately for the French government, it turned out that it could not get its own E.D.C. plans ratified in parliament in 1954. Following this failure, West-Germany was made a member of the NATO. In Haftendorn's analysis, this was the preferable outcome for the Bonn Republic.[152] West-Germany had fruitfully hedged two institutional options to acquire a military force and a say in the immensely powerful NATO, thus enhancing its institutional position.

From its beginnings the *Bundeswehr* was an alliance army, always part of military projects broader than national interest.[153] The German army projected the image of its soldiers as citizens in uniform, rather than that of the cogs of a machine.[154] In the following snapshot this non-nationalist imago of the German army will be empathized.

Kosovo: the proclamation of a civilian way

In 1990, East and West Germany were re-united. The raw power of Germany grew, as it now possessed a larger territory with more wealth and more citizens than any other European state. There has been abundant scholarly debate on the degree to which German policy changed after

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[150] Ibid., 83.
[151] Ibid., 259 and 75.
[152] Ibid., 49.
[153] Ibid., 90.
[154] Berger, "The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945," 89.

unification.[155] The main reason that many scholars perceive change is that the German participation in the military intervention in Kosovo was without a clear UN mandate.

Yet, although this intervention seems contrary to the 'never again and never alone' doctrine, one could argue that the 1998-9 Kosovo intervention marks the moment when German civilian power policy comes to the fore in its most explicit form. Pursuing this line of argumentation, Maull provides three reasons for why 'Kosovo' was in line with German foreign policy: (a) Germany acted multilaterally, if it would not have done so military intervention would have been constitutionally impossible; (b) Germany showed restraint, "being at the forefront of the movement within the alliance seeking a diplomatic solution"; and most importantly (c) it operated through institutions, preventing a NATO ground campaign by threatening with a veto.[156] Kosovo is a rupture only if one perceives the essence of German *Zivilmacht* policy as being pro-UN, pro-pacifism, pro-America, or as having an *absolute* dedication to diplomacy. However, Kosovo is no rupture from the perspective of a civilian power role strategy. The big difference with previous cases is that in the Kosovo War Germany – however hesitant – intended to lead by using institutions, not (only) to follow.

Eastern enlargement

The fifth, and last, snapshot to be discussed is the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. With end of the Cold War, tensions between East and West cooled. Historians Jeffery and Paterson state that the enlargement of European institutions "seemed a positive by-product of the end of the Cold War."[157] In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the E.U.; whilst the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia were admitted in 2004.[158] Germany strongly pushed for this enlargement. Historian Frank Schimmelfennig states that "the integrationist credentials of Germany (…) were difficult to undermine." This stands in stark contrast to the credentials of France and Great Britain, as these states were perceived to be more driven by political calculation.[159] The *Zivilmacht* strategy had granted Germany the legitimacy and political capital necessary to convince other member states of the benefits of Eastern enlargement.

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[155] Jeffery and Paterson, "Germany and European Integration.", 63.

[156] Thomas Berger, *The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945* (na, 2002)., 96 .

[157] Jeffery and Paterson, "Germany and European Integration.", 65.

[158] See: European Union https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/from-6-to-28-members_en (visited on August 3, 2017).

[159] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55, no. 01 (2001): 47–80, 73.

This dramatic increase in E.U. territory moved Germany to the center of 'Europe'. Understandably, many analysts saw Germany as the prime beneficiary of the Eastern enlargement.[160] The Eastern European member states made it easier for Germany to bypass French and other Mediterranean interests, utilizing the voting power of these new states. Historian Stefan Berger argues "Germany was no longer a divided nation on the front line of the East-West conflict; it finds itself at the heart of an expanding European Union."[161]

3.1.2 The (West-)German Strategy

By embracing international institutions, (West-)Germany gained the right to participate in international affairs on the basis of equal rights.[162] This participation blossomed into leadership. Nowadays, Germany consciously assets its rights in global politics, but always from the credible position of a civilian power. German restraint grew out of necessity but remained when options grew, simply because it was a policy that worked.[163] To be sure, these five snapshots do not tell the complete story; a more complete story would, at the very least, include the acceptance of the Marshall Plan, the Korean Wars, and aid to the so-called Third World.

However, an analysis of these five snapshots does illustrate the German strategy of legitimizing its statehood within institutions. In the end, the British fears that Germany could grow to be become the EEC's hegemon turned out not to be ungrounded. According to many interpreters of international politics, Germany can currently be regarded as a regional hegemon, being the leader of the E.U. Yet, Germany does not lead on the basis of military might, but by embedding itself in institutions.

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[160] Ibid., 47-80.
[161] Berger, *The Power of Memory and Memories of Power*.
[162] See: Haftendorn, *Coming of Age*., 6.
[163] Ibid., 4.

3.2   Saudi-Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council, 2011

The second case to be discussed in this chapter analyses the Saudi-Arabian proposal at the height of the Arab Spring (May 2011) to enlarge the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) – an organization of oil producing countries – with Jordan and highly-populated Morocco.

Image 1: *Map of the Middle-East, with G.C.C.-states highlighted in pink and potential G.C.C.-states in blue.*[164]

3.2.1 Turning Spring to Winter

According to most journalistic and scholarly observers, the Arab Spring began with the self-immolation of the Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi on January 4, 2011.[165] Within weeks, the insurrection spread across the border to Syria, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Bahrain, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The protesters demanded democracy, equal justice for all, and an end to corruption. "*Ash-sha'b yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām*" (the people want to bring down the regime) was an often heard slogan. Understandably, autocratic Saudi Arabia felt threatened. In an attempt to avert the danger, Saudi Arabia assisted autocratic rulers in the region. For instance, it supported Egypt's Hosni Mubarak financially and diplomatically; and when the Tunisian President of 20 years Ben Ali fell after 28 days of protest, Saudi Arabia took him in as a refugee.[166]

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[164] Made by Sietske Tjalma and the author of this thesis in WGS1984.
[165] Habibul Haque Khondker, "Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring," *Globalizations* 8, no. 5 (2011): 675–679.
[166] Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya," *Foreign Affairs*, 2011, 3; T. C. Boekhoud, "Saoedi-Arabië, Turkije En de Arabische Lente: Strijd Om Invloed in Het Midden-Oosten," 2012, 72.

The domestic protests with which the Al Saud family were confronted were mostly located in the South-Eastern tip of the state. The people partaking in it were generally part of the Shia minority. The royal family reacted with a bribe, its default response to insurrections. According to the historian Toby Craig Jones, King Abdullah "offered up over $100 billion in domestic incentives to keep people from taking to the streets."[167] This amounted to 500,000 additional housing units, 60,000 new jobs, two months of additional salary for all state employees, one month of salary for all jobless.[168] In addition, the Wahhabi clergy was empowered to keep the Wahhabi-Sunni from joining the Shia population's protest.[169] The only true political concession made by the Al Saud was the acceptance of local elections with full (male) suffrage, which is far less than most neighbouring states had to concede.[170]

In the analysis of the Al Saud family, the protests had spread to Saudi Arabia from neighbouring Bahrain, where the Shia insurrections had caused much more upheaval.[171] With consent from the Bahraini government, Saudi Arabia intervened militarily – supported considerably by the other G.C.C. states as the United Arab Emirates.

As the Obama government was a proponent of democratization in the Middle East, America resented the Saudi way dealing with the Arab Spring.[172] Saudi Arabia responded to the American complaints by asserting that these "problems are Arab problems. (…) and they should be solved by Arabs."[173] According to political scientist Nawaf Obaid, this attitude caused the Saudi-American partnership to endure some chills, and has even brought their oil-for-security relationship in danger.[174]

However, this was a price that Saudis were willing to pay. The Arab Spring was not only a threat to Saudi Arabia, it also offered opportunities. After undertaking practical counter-revolutionary measures in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia made its next move. [175] In May 2011, Saudi Arabia formally invited the Sunni kingdoms of Morocco and Jordan to join the Gulf Cooperation Council. According to some observers, the invitation altered the G.C.C. from an economic arrangement

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[167] Toby Craig Jones, "Saudi Arabia versus the Arab Spring," *Raritan* 31, no. 2 (2011): 44.
[168] Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, "Repercussions of the Arab Spring on G.C.C. States," *Research Paper, Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies*, 2012; V. D. Meulendijks, "In Which Ways Have Democratisation Processes in Arab Spring Countries Served to Strengthen the Political Position of Monarchical Saudi Arabia from 2011 through 2013?," 2015.
[169] Jones, "Saudi Arabia versus the Arab Spring," 54.
[170] Charles Krauthammer, "Three Cheers for the Bush Doctrine," *New York Times* 7 (2005).
[171] According to Jones, Saudi Arabian intelligence suspected Iran to have been masterminding the insurrections there
Jones, "Saudi Arabia versus the Arab Spring," 56.
[172] F. Gregory Gause III, "Is Saudi Arabia Really Counter-Revolutionary?," *ForeignPolicy. Com* 9 (2011).
[173] Saudi policy according to a anonymous Saudi diplomat in a 2011 interview with Mehran Kamrava. Mehran Kamrava, "Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy," *Orbis* 57, no. 1 (2014): 10.
[174] Nawaf Obaid, "Amid the Arab Spring, a US-Saudi Split," *Washington Post* 15 (2011).
[175] Mehran Kamrava, "The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution," *Orbis* 56, no. 1 (2012): 103.

between economically similar neighbours to a club of monarchical governments.[176] That the economic coherence is jeopardized by the invitation is clear when looking at figure 1. The GDP per capita in Morocco and Jordan is a fraction of that of the existing G.C.C. states. In addition, Morocco seems to be a geographical anomaly, being located several thousands of miles east of the nearest G.C.C. state (see image 1).

Figure 1: *G.C.C.-states' 2011 GDP Per Capita in thousands of U.S. Dollars.*[177]

Country	GDP per capita
Saudi Arabia	23,26
UAE	39,9
Oman	21,16
Kuwait	47,55
Qatar	89,12
Bahrain	22,24
Morrocco	3,07
Jordan	4,27

Just why the G.C.C. chose to expand remains a topic of scholarly debate. This thesis following Toby Craig Jones in arguing that Saudi Arabia is,

> Not just about an oppressive regime being oppressive. Nor does it simply aim to rescue the authoritarian order and the close-knit family of tyrants that had long dominated the political status quo in the region. There is another imperative at work. It is the desperate urge to protect the kingdom's regional hegemony.[178]

Although Jones is right that hegemony is an important imperative, he fails to explain *how* Saudi Arabia tried to protect it.

From the perspective of institutional hegemony, Saudi Arabia's reaction to the Arab Spring can be understood as the enlargement of the sphere over which it is dominant. Very simply put, more G.C.C.-members means more states to lead. Especially Morocco seems a welcome addition to

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[176] Yemen was already having talks with the G.C.C. since before the Arab Spring. Kamrava, "The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution."
[177] Worldbank, "GDP Index," 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2011&locations=SA-KW-MA-BH-QA-JO-AE-OM&start=2011&view=bar&year_low_desc=false (visited on July 22, 2016).
[178] Jones, "Saudi Arabia versus the Arab Spring," 45.

the original members. As Morocco has low wealth and a high population, opening up the possibility for manpower-for-money deals (compare figures 1 and 2).

Figure 2: *Population in millions.*[179]

3.3.2 The Saudi Arabian Strategy

By expanding the G.C.C., Saudi Arabia tried to move into the power vacuum that had arisen once the democratization of the Arab Spring lost its momentum.[180] The chaos that followed the widespread insurrections, had provided Saudi Arabia with a chance to ensure the long term stability of its autocratic regime. Although Germany relatively has less political weight in the E.U. than Saudi Arabia in the G.C.C., the Saudi strategy is somewhat comparable to the German strategy of advocating Eastern enlargement of the EU. As the GGC's most dominant state, Saudi Arabia has, by enlarging the institution, effectively increased the territory over which it is the hegemon.

By expanding the territory over which Saudi Arabia had political leadership, it succeeded in (1) limiting the chance that democracy would isolate Saudi Arabia, as it is easier to keep Morocco and Jordan autocratic when they are 'in' the G.C.C. than when they are 'out', and (2) gaining easy access to cheap Moroccan troops. Potential new insurrections can now arguably be halted sooner and cheaper, and Saudi regional hegemony seems stronger than ever. Although Jordan and Morocco are economically and geographically distinct from the other members, the two Sunni monarchies have much to offer.

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[179] Worldbank, "Population Index," 2016. See: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL (visited on July 22, 2016).
[180] Howard J. Wiarda, "Arab Fall or Arab Winter?," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 34, no. 3 (2012): 134–137.

3.3   The BRICS'S and the New Development Bank, 2014-2017

The third case will discuss the New Development Bank (N.D.B.), a 2014 proposal by the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to rival the I.M.F. and World Bank.[181] The acronym BRIC was coined in 2003 by Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O'Neill. O'Neill argued that Brazil, Russia, India, and China would bring a new dynamic to the international economy.[182] In 2010, South Africa – another developing economy – was added to the acronym. Despite their differences, the BRICS all resented their (relative) lack of influence in American-dominated international institutions. None of the BRICS are, for example, part of the influential Group of Seven (or G7), the dominant 'Western' industrial states (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Another example is that China – currently the state with the second largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the world – has a voting power in the World Bank of only 4.42%, whilst the US have 15.85% and Japan 6.84%.[183]

3.3.1 An Anti-Hegemonic Institution

BRICS expert Adriana Abdenur cites an N.D.B. official stating that, "if the World Bank doesn't want to reform in earnest, we'll just go ahead and create our own bank."[184] On their fifth annual meeting in South Africa (2013), the BRICS states agreed on opening the New Development Bank, to rival the World Bank. On the sixth annual meeting in Brazil (2014), the New Development Bank was a fact – which is rather quick for international institutional politics. This bank would have to encourage the cooperation between the five developing BRICS economies. Forming the bank proved critics wrong, who argued that the BRICS were too heterogeneous to cooperate efficiently.[185]

In their Evidence Report for the Institute of Development Studies, Li Xiaoyun and Richard Carey rightly argue that, "in the absence of a total breakdown or climatic event in the international system (...) the problem of redesign of global governance in the twenty-first century can hardly be negotiated in a Congress of Vienna or a Versailles Treaty, or a San Francisco Conference, or a new Bretton Woods Agreement."[186] The N.D.B. is arguably an elegant step towards reform.

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[181] Abdenur, "China and the BRICS Development Bank."

[182] Xiaoyun Li and Richard Carey, "The BRICS and the International Development System: Challenge and Convergence?" (IDS, 2014), 4; Dominic Wilson, Roopa Purushothaman, and others, *Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050*, vol. 99 (Goldman, Sachs & Company New York, NY, 2003).

[183] Abdenur, "China and the BRICS Development Bank," 95. See also the IMF data on GDP, https://tinyurl.com/lr9fash (visited on July 28, 2017).

[184] Ibid., 90.

[185] Ibid., 87.

[186] Li and Carey, "The BRICS and the International Development System," 5.

The capital of the bank was set to be $100 billion dollars, divided in one million shares distributed equally between the founding members. Although this financial arrangement limits the potential capital base of the bank – as China was prepared to buy much more shares – it avoided tedious negotiations over voting shares, which could have threatened BRICS cohesion.[187] The bank would focus on infrastructure development, much as the World Bank did in its early days.[188]

Qobo and Soko assert that the N.D.B. is a non-hegemonic institution, as it does not try to attain leadership, "although the rise of the BRICS represents a challenge to the Western-dominated global order, there is little evidence to suggest that the BRICS grouping has designs to overhaul the contemporary global system."[189] However, in the context of this thesis, it makes more sense to define the NDB as an *anti*-hegemonic institution, rather than as an *non*-hegemonic institution. The Mercator Institute for China Studies Berlin has made this case brilliantly, showing that the NDB fits perfectly with China's broader grand. As the Mercator Institute puts it, "China's foreign policy is working systematically towards a realignment of the international order through establishing parallel structures to a wide range of international institutions" (see image 1).[190]

Image 1. *China's Shadow Foreign policy*.[191]

Graphics: Johannes Buckow © MERICS Berlin

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[187] Ibid.,14.

[188] Abdenur, "China and the BRICS Development Bank," 94; Mzukisi Qobo and Mills Soko, "The Rise of Emerging Powers in the Global Development Finance Architecture: The Case of the BRICS and the New Development Bank," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 22, no. 3 (2015): 280.

[189] Qobo and Soko, "The Rise of Emerging Powers in the Global Development Finance Architecture," 277.

[190] Heilmann et al., "China's Shadow Foreign Policy," 1.

[191] Ibid., 2.

3.3.2 The BRICS Strategy

Although it remains unknown what the exact strategical aims of BRICS – and specifically China – are, the N.D.B. clearly challenges U.S. institutional hegemony.[192] The BRIC'S 'New Development Bank' can be seen as a 'counter institution' to the I.M.F. and WTO that America initiated.[193] In that sense, there are similarities with the British G-Plan. This dynamic of institutions and counter-institutions (presumably with open membership) could make the 'institutional game' even more interesting in years to come. In fact, the US has attempted to form a Trans-Pacific Partnership deal which would exclude China, but include US, Japan, and ten other Pacific states.[194]

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[192] Andrew F. Cooper and Assif Farooq, "Testing the Club Dynamics of the BRICS: The New Development Bank from Conception to Establishment," *International Organizations Research Journal* 10, no. 2 (2015): 32–44.
[193] Abdenur, "China and the BRICS Development Bank"; Ikenberry, *After Victory*.
[194] Qobo and Soko, "The Rise of Emerging Powers in the Global Development Finance Architecture," 285.

Conclusion

Throughout this thesis, institutional hegemony has referred to leadership that is acquired *through* international institutions. Rather than theoretically explaining how institutions can help states in acquiring hegemony, this thesis has made its argument by applying the concept of institutional hegemony to four cases.

Chapter two has discussed the largest case, that of France, Britain and the E.E.C. between 1945 and 1963. In this chapter, the concept of institutional hegemony has proved useful in elucidating the French and British foreign policy strategies. Both states had to deal with a similar international position. France and Britain were both decolonizing, were both surpassed in terms of power by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and both recognized that they had to pool their sovereignty with other states in order to maintain influence in international affairs. France aimed to do so in the context of European integration, whilst Britain expected much of the Commonwealth. Another similarity between the two states was that they both recognized that the E.E.C. could become an important factor in international relations. The difference being – of course – that whilst France was *in,* Britain was *out*.

Five very different forms of institutional hegemony have been encountered in this first case:

1. The French strategy of gaining economic strength and geopolitical influence by pooling its economy with that of the other five E.E.C. -members
2. The French fear that Britain was a "Trojan horse", a satellite with which the Americans could establish hegemony over Western-Europe.
3. The British strategy of 'three concentric circles', an attempt to gain leadership by virtue of being the point where the three circles of the 'free world' (the special relationship, Europe, and the Commonwealth) were connected.
4. The British fear that France would use its hegemony over the E.E.C. to dominate Western-Europe, limit British export opportunities to the continent, and hence derail the British institutional hegemony strategy of 'three concentric circles'.
5. The British fear that West-Germany would eventually out-produce France, and gain hegemony over the E.E.C.

In addition to this large case on Britain, France, and the E.E.C., three smaller cases have been discussed. The first of these additional cases, on West-Germany and European integration, provides an addition to the main case of this thesis. Through the E.C.S.C., the E.E.C., and later the E.U., (West-) Germany regained its sovereignty, and ended up becoming the leading state on the European continent. The second case, on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council, illustrates that the concept of institutional hegemony can be applied to a broader range of cases than only the 'Western'

ones. After the 2011 Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia proposed to expand the G.C.C. with Jordan and Morocco, expanding the institution which it lead, and thereby its leadership. The third case discussed the 2014 New Development Bank, a potential rival to the World Bank and I.M.F. initiated by BRICS states. Although these three additional cases were less elaborate than the first case, three additional forms of institutional hegemony have been found:

6. Born out of necessity, the (West-)German *Zivilmacht* strategy of always acting within the confines of international institutions has helped Germany to become Europe's regional hegemon. Embedded within European institutions, the German economy was less frightening to other states, which allowed Germany to attain the power position that it has today.
7. By expanding the G.C.C., Saudi Arabia enlarged the institution over which it was dominant, and thereby its hegemony. The G.C.C. is currently much more than a group of oil producing states. One could argue that it is an institutionalized conservative alliance ready to strike down any kind of revival of the 'Arab Spring'.
8. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa have formed the New Development Bank to counter the I.M.F. and World Bank over which America is dominant. The NDB is best understood as an anti-hegemonic institution, aimed at limiting the dependence of the BRICS on the United States.

As this list of eight applications of institutional hegemony shows, the concept of institutional hegemony can appear in multiple forms. States scheme to attain hegemony – or to undermine the hegemony of other states – by employing a wide variety of tactics.

This thesis has illustrated that institutional hegemony can be applied to elucidate four cases. However, the potential of the concept is much broader than only these cases. Institutional hegemony can also enhance our understanding of, for instance, American post-Second World War grand strategy, and even Russian politics in the Warsaw Pact. One interesting direction that future work on institutional hegemony can take is to broaden the range of cases to which the concept is applied. Pursuing this research direction will help historians understand to which types of cases the institutional hegemony can be best applied – and in which types of cases institutional hegemony adds little to interpretation.

Another route that further research on institutional hegemony could take is comparative. As discussed in this thesis, France and Britain had similar views of the E.E.C. However, France was quicker than Britain to recognize the potential power that the institution could bring to member states – in particular to France itself. Future research could study how various states' perspectives of the E.E.C. developed, and whether these perceptions of the institution converged or diverged. Understanding what various states expected of European institutions could arguably enhance historians' knowledge of the trajectory of European integration. Naturally, this comparative approach

could also be beneficial to historians' understanding of various other institutional trajectories. If, for instance, historians understand how the BRICS states' perception of the international financial institutions as the I.M.F. and World Bank developed, this could help them interpret the role of the New Development Bank in international politics – and the extent to which the BRICS are on the same page in running their bank.

However, not only historians can profit from the concept of institutional hegemony. Also policy makers, of both powerful and less powerful states, could find an institutional approach to leadership interesting. For instance, Dutch policy makers can utilize the concept of institutional hegemony to analyze potential future routes of European (dis-)integration. The perspective of institutional hegemony can inform their assessment of both the German stake in upholding the E.U. and potential British attempts to found a rivalling institution – as in the time of the E.F.T.A.

Although institutional hegemony is not a one size fits all solution to all problems of IR theory, the concept could be a valuable addition to the conceptual toolkit of all those interested in international politics. Leadership still plays a crucial role in global affairs, but it cannot always be captured by the perspectives on hegemony that existing schools of International Relations offer.

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Fraude en plagiaat
Wetenschappelijke integriteit vormt de basis van het academisch bedrijf. De Universiteit Utrecht vat iedere vorm van wetenschappelijke misleiding daarom op als een zeer ernstig vergrijp. De Universiteit Utrecht verwacht dat elke student de normen en waarden inzake wetenschappelijke integriteit kent en in acht neemt.

De belangrijkste vormen van misleiding die deze integriteit aantasten zijn fraude en plagiaat. Plagiaat is het overnemen van andermans werk zonder behoorlijke verwijzing en is een vorm van fraude. Hieronder volgt nadere uitleg wat er onder fraude en plagiaat wordt verstaan en een aantal concrete voorbeelden daarvan. Let wel: dit is geen uitputtende lijst!

Bij constatering van fraude of plagiaat kan de examencommissie van de opleiding sancties opleggen. De sterkste sanctie die de examencommissie kan opleggen is het indienen van een verzoek aan het College van Bestuur om een student van de opleiding te laten verwijderen.

Plagiaat
Plagiaat is het overnemen van stukken, gedachten, redeneringen van anderen en deze laten doorgaan voor eigen werk. Je moet altijd nauwkeurig aangeven aan wie ideeën en inzichten zijn ontleend, en voortdurend bedacht zijn op het verschil tussen citeren, parafraseren en plagiëren. Niet alleen bij het gebruik van gedrukte bronnen, maar zeker ook bij het gebruik van informatie die van het internet wordt gehaald, dien je zorgvuldig te werk te gaan bij het vermelden van de informatiebronnen.

De volgende zaken worden in elk geval als plagiaat aangemerkt:
- het knippen en plakken van tekst van digitale bronnen zoals encyclopedieën of digitale tijdschriften zonder aanhalingstekens en verwijzing;
- het knippen en plakken van teksten van het internet zonder aanhalingstekens en verwijzing;
- het overnemen van gedrukt materiaal zoals boeken, tijdschriften of encyclopedieën zonder aanhalingstekens en verwijzing;
- het opnemen van een vertaling van bovengenoemde teksten zonder aanhalingstekens en verwijzing;
- het parafraseren van bovengenoemde teksten zonder (deugdelijke) verwijzing: parafrasen moeten als zodanig gemarkeerd zijn (door de tekst uitdrukkelijk te verbinden met de oorspronkelijke auteur in tekst of noot), zodat niet de indruk wordt gewekt dat het gaat om eigen gedachtengoed van de student;
- het overnemen van beeld-, geluids- of testmateriaal van anderen zonder verwijzing en zodoende laten doorgaan voor eigen werk;
- het zonder bronvermelding opnieuw inleveren van eerder door de student gemaakt eigen werk en dit laten doorgaan voor in het kader van de cursus vervaardigd oorspronkelijk werk, tenzij dit in de cursus of door de docent uitdrukkelijk is toegestaan;
- het overnemen van werk van andere studenten en dit laten doorgaan voor eigen werk. Indien dit gebeurt met toestemming van de andere student is de laatste medeplichtig aan plagiaat;
- ook wanneer in een gezamenlijk werkstuk door een van de auteurs plagiaat wordt gepleegd, zijn de andere auteurs medeplichtig aan plagiaat, indien zij hadden kunnen of moeten weten dat de ander plagiaat pleegde;
- het indienen van werkstukken die verworven zijn van een commerciële instelling (zoals een internetsite met uittreksels of papers) of die al dan niet tegen betaling door iemand anders zijn geschreven.

De plagiaatregels gelden ook voor concepten van papers of (hoofdstukken van) scripties die voor feedback aan een docent worden toegezonden, voorzover de mogelijkheid voor het insturen van concepten en het krijgen van feedback in de cursushandleiding of scriptieregeling is vermeld.
In de Onderwijs- en Examenregeling (artikel 5.15) is vastgelegd wat de formele gang van zaken is als er een vermoeden van fraude/plagiaat is, en welke sancties er opgelegd kunnen worden.

Onwetendheid is geen excuus. Je bent verantwoordelijk voor je eigen gedrag. De Universiteit Utrecht gaat ervan uit dat je weet wat fraude en plagiaat zijn. Van haar kant zorgt de Universiteit Utrecht ervoor dat je zo vroeg mogelijk in je opleiding de principes van wetenschapsbeoefening bijgebracht krijgt en op de hoogte wordt gebracht van wat de instelling als fraude en plagiaat beschouwt, zodat je weet aan welke normen je je moeten houden.

Hierbij verklaar ik bovenstaande tekst gelezen en begrepen te hebben.
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Datum: 3-8-2017

Dit formulier lever je bij je begeleider in als je start met je bacheloreindwerkstuk of je master scriptie.

Het niet indienen of ondertekenen van het formulier betekent overigens niet dat er geen sancties kunnen worden genomen als blijkt dat er sprake is van plagiaat in het werkstuk.