Brexit, Borders and Belonging

Experiences of citizenship and belonging among highly-skilled EU nationals and politically active Scots in the Central Belt of Scotland

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Picture on front page: We took this picture on 18 March 2017 at the Stand Up To Racism march in Glasgow. The march was organised as a protest against Brexit, xenophobia and discrimination, and as an expression of support towards EU migrants and refugees.

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Introduction

Yesterday, Scotland – like London and Northern Ireland – voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU. We voted to protect our place in the world's biggest single market – and the jobs and investment that depend on it. We voted to safeguard our freedom to travel, live, work and study in other European countries. And we voted to renew our reputation as an outward looking, open and inclusive country. It is significant – in my view – that we did so after a campaign that was positive about the EU and about the benefits of migration. Indeed, I want to take the opportunity this morning to speak directly to citizens of other EU countries living here in Scotland – you remain welcome here, Scotland is your home and your contribution is valued. (Scotland's First Minister Nicola Sturgeon[1])

In early November 2016, Iris spent a short holiday in Scotland, staying with a befriended couple living in the southern part of the country. Being there, she learned that they were very proud of the fact that two-thirds of the Scottish people had voted to remain in the EU on the Brexit referendum and that they supported the Scottish government in still welcoming EU migrants. Personally interested in the possibilities of working, living and creating a home abroad, Iris wondered how the pro-Brexit vote was changing people's experiences and perceptions of freedom of movement. Moreover, what did this sudden change in policies mean for the EU migrants living in Scotland regarding their status and experiences of citizenship? Had it affected their feelings of belonging and being at home in Scotland? She considered this particularly interesting since part of the Brexit campaign had been the problematisation of migration towards the UK in the media and politics (Hobolt 2016, 1260, 1262). To what extent were these same sentiments towards EU migrants present in Scotland?

At the same time, Eva was interested in how Scottish people experienced the Brexit process. Since the Scots had collectively expressed their explicit wish to remain part of the EU, she wondered how the UK's upcoming divorce with the EU affected these people's feelings of belonging in Scotland and the UK as a whole. Moreover, what kind of meaning did Scottish people ascribe to their relationship with the EU and citizens of other EU member states? And how were they expressing their discontent now that their country was taking a course they did not support? What role did political engagement fulfil in their attempts to shape their home and compose it the way they wanted? All of these questions and considerations eventually shaped

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[1] This quote is part of the speech Sturgeon gave on the morning of 24 June 2016. This was the day after the Brexit referendum, in which Britain had collectively voted to leave the EU (BBC News 2016).

our decision to travel to Scotland and conduct research in this country from 6 February until 17 April 2017, in order to learn more about these issues.

Citizenship and belonging in Scotland

As Sturgeon's remarks on the result of the Brexit vote indicate, Scotland's population appears to feature relatively positive attitudes towards the EU and EU migration. In this respect, the country distinguishes itself in an interesting way from some other European countries of which the populations seem to possess more negative attitudes towards the EU (Hobolt 2016, 1260). How does this seemingly pro-European attitude relate to people's notions of belonging and citizenship in this country? In a time of globalisation and movement, belonging to a certain place or nation is often uncertain, unclear and not self-evident (Castles 2002, 1157-1158; Yuval-Davis 2006, 213). Who or what manages to provide a sense of belonging and protect the rights of citizens in the world's current condition of free movement and shifting borders (Shore 2004, 29; Castles 2002, 1157-1159)? And how are notions of 'Self' and 'Other' reflected in these practices (Yuval-Davis 2006, 204; Miller 2003, 217)? With this research, we aim to contribute to this theoretical debate addressing the tension between national and transnational entities and interests when it comes to providing citizenship and a sense of belonging (Shore 2004, 29; Brubaker 2010, 63). Furthermore, we will look into the ways in which individuals themselves are engaging in processes of belonging. What constitutes a sense of belonging to them and how are they attempting to create a feeling of home in a certain place (Miller 2003, 216-217)? As will be argued, individuals may shape their surroundings and create a home for themselves by engaging in practices of political activism (Yuval-Davis 2006, 197, 205). We will consider how such expressions and initiatives to establish social change relate to formal political entities, structures, and decision-making processes.

In order to gain insight into how all of these topics and questions are reflected in people's daily lives in Scotland, we approach these themes from two different angles. We have both focused on a different target population, whose members we expected to be affected by Brexit and to be actively dealing with and expressing notions of citizenship and a sense of belonging. The first target population consists of highly-skilled EU citizens who have moved away from their home country either temporary or long-term, in order to study, work or live in the Central Belt of Scotland. We describe a member of this group as a highly-skilled adult, which we define as an adult enrolled in or having completed studies in higher education. This group of migrants is often perceived differently from low-skilled migrant workers, and we therefore decided it was useful to make this distinction (King 2002, 98). We define *EU citizens* as individuals with a nationality of a member state of the EU other than Scotland, who currently still have the right to travel freely, live, work in the countries that are part of the EU. The second target population

consists of politically active Scots. We describe a member of this group as an adult born in Scotland and currently living in the Central Belt, who actively participates in political processes in order to express his or her opinions. These may be activities of any kind, ranging from practices of formal political engagement to participation in informal grassroots initiatives. These two complementary angles and target populations meet in our central research question: *'To what extent has the pro-Brexit vote influenced experiences and perceptions of citizenship and a sense of belonging among both highly-skilled EU nationals and politically active Scots living in the Central Belt of Scotland?'*

Relevance of this research

Speaking now, little research has been published yet on our research themes in context of the pro-Brexit vote, since the decisive referendum took place only one year ago. Therefore, our research can be seen as an explanatory attempt to gain insight in ideas, experiences and perceptions related to these topics. The pro-Brexit vote signified the first time in history a member state has decided to leave the European Union (Hobolt 2016, 1260). It is uncertain what social and economic effects such a decision will have on the country itself as well as on the other member states. With this research, we aim to shed light on some of the possible consequences of this decision and the sentiments it has evoked regarding experiences of belonging and citizenship. Brexit is not simply a matter of political power over borders; future border policies will actually have a significant influence on people's lives (Hobolt 2016, 1272; Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 188-189). As a result, we believe a greater understanding of the Brexit process and its social implications could be useful for policy makers operating in fields related to migration, social issues or employment, for example.

From a theoretical point of view, we hope to contribute to studies on the effects of border restrictions and limited mobility options. A lot of anthropological and sociological research has been conducted on how non-EU migrants deal with closed border policies and how these affect their personal lives, their family relations and society as a whole[2]. Less is known about the effects of changing from an open border policy to a restricted border policy. Brexit offers a possibility to gain understanding of how people used to having almost absolute freedom of movement within the EU experience and react to the prospect of a restriction in their mobility. Therefore, our research may provide an interesting new dimension to this field of study by focusing on how this restriction is experienced by both EU citizens living in Scotland and a part of the Scottish population themselves. Both lack immediate power to veto a decision that will influence their daily lives drastically.

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[2] See, for example, Andersson (2014); Euskirchen, Lebuhn and Ray (2007); and Alscher (2005).

Methods and techniques

In order to conduct this research and gain insight in the thoughts, behaviours and expressions of our informants, we have used an anthropological approach. Accordingly, we have addressed our research topics using ethnographic fieldwork and qualitative research methods (Amit 2003, 1-2). More specifically, we have chosen qualitative interviews, participant observation, and hanging out as our primary techniques.

Qualitative interviews have helped us to gain a profound understanding of the perceptions, ideas, and experiences of our participants regarding feelings of belonging and concepts such as citizenship and freedom of movement. Their semi-structured nature allowed us to address unforeseen themes and offered room for turns the interview might take due to input from the participant. Therefore, the interviews contributed to the explanatory nature of our research (Boeije 2014, 38). Walking interviews – a special type of the qualitative interview – are a particular form of mobile conversations which change the power relations between interviewer and informant (Evans and Jones 2011, 850). During our research, Iris used this method several times to gain insight in the places that were important to her informants in creating a sense of belonging and feeling at home. By starting at a route determined by the interviewee, she tried to discover the ways in which her informants engage with their environment and the importance they ascribe to spatial experiences (Evans and Jones 2011, 850).

Our interview methods were complemented by participant observation. This method can be described as taking part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions and events of a group of people in order to gain insight in their life routines and culture. This enables the researcher to learn the tacit aspects of the participant's culture: the cultural elements that largely remain outside of a person's awareness or consciousness and can therefore not be discovered by simply asking questions (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011, 1-2). Moreover, by trying to experience the world of the participant, the researcher comes to 'feel' his or her point of view (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011, 10). Thus, participant observation enabled us to obtain an additional level of understanding of the participant's lifeworld. While interviewing was important to gain insight in the ideas and opinions our participants possessed, participant observation allowed us to study a person's actual behaviour. Since this behaviour might differ from or even clash with an individual's statements, we considered it important to complement interview data with data gathered through participant observation.

Hanging out can be seen as a specific form of participant observation, mainly used to gain the trust of informants by participating with them in informal leisure activities (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011, 5). For us, it involved spending time at several political activities where we had informal conversations with individuals, in order to be able to approach them for interviews at a later moment. This method thus allowed us to enhance relationships with our participants (DeWalt

and DeWalt 2011, 47). However, we did not encounter all of our informants at these kind of events. Some we met during our daily activities, for example in a café or in the library. Others we met through the snowball method, meaning we were introduced to them by informants we had already acquired (Boeije 2014, 40).

Structure of our thesis

The next paragraph features our theoretical framework in which we will discuss concepts central to our research, such as citizenship, belonging and political activism. This is followed by a section addressing the context of our study. Here, influential circumstantial factors such as migrant politics within the EU, Brexit, Scotland's political climate and the demographics of our research domain – the Central Belt – will be dealt with. Subsequently, we will present our research findings in two separate empirical chapters. The first chapter addresses the study of highly-skilled EU citizens conducted by Iris, while the second one deals with Eva's research on politically active Scots. Finally, we will reflect on the similarities and differences between our two studies and their relation to theory in the conclusion and discussion of this thesis.

Theoretical framework

Freedom of movement

Through the ages, mobility and migration of people have always been an important aspect of the human experience of space and time. Movement and interconnection are fundamental to the human condition. Or as Glick Schiller and Salazar (2013, 185) put it: "Mobility is the norm of our species". However, human movement is not by definition free and unbounded. Processes of migration and mobility are affected by certain political and economic structures, shaped by individual states as well as by international administrations and regulations. These structures disable flows of movement towards specific geographical areas by denying or complicating access for certain travellers, while enabling and facilitating the movements of others, creating 'regimes of mobility' (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 188-189; Brubaker 2010, 63). Here, different types of mobility and of mobile individuals are being distinguished and hierarchized, resulting in them becoming the subjects of praise, condemnation, desire, suppression or fear. This leads to differential rights and abilities for individuals to travel, work and move across the globe, reflecting unequal social and economic opportunities (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 188-189, 196; King 2002, 92, 98). While human mobility and interconnection are not to be seen as novel, these phenomena have intensified on a worldwide level due to an increase in globalisation. Globalisation refers to social, economic, cultural, and demographic processes that are increasingly fluid, taking place within nations but transcending them as well. As a result, these processes are occurring in global spaces, causing the intensification of worldwide social relations (Castles 2002, 1144, 1146; Kearney 1995, 548-549).

This is illustrated by the rise of supranational entities and the shifting permeability of national boundaries – both of which are exemplified within the project of the European Union. Supranational entities, such as the EU, operate as transnational governments that exceed national boundaries or interests, tasked with shaping governance for all member states. They are the product of alliances between countries, created to cope with increasing transnational processes (Dinan 2005, 1-2; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997, 299). According to Dinan (2005, 1-2), the EU originated from national governments' efforts to enhance the security and economic situation of their countries in a global environment that has become increasingly interdependent and competitive. By tying countries together on a political and economic level, the intention is to strengthen democracy, to resolve traditional causes of conflicts, and to maximise the countries' global influence (Dinan 2005, 1-2). Generally seen as an important part of EU legislation is the principle of free movement of persons and labour between EU member states and coalition

countries[3] (King 2002, 98). This agreement has led to an increase in flows of intra-EU movement and migration, as well as to more cross-border opportunities and new transnational possibilities in terms of travel, tourism, studies, retirement, and labour for EU citizens (Gerhards 2008, 122-124; Braun and Glöckner-Rist 2012, 403). Even those who do not move physically themselves feel the effects of the free movement legislation, as is argued by Favell (2014, 283). It opens up their national territory and exposes their daily lives to interactions with citizens from other countries within the EU, thereby presenting them with different perceptions of what citizenship could entail (Favell 2014, 283; Shore 2004, 28).

Citizenship and the nation

Citizenship can be seen as a means to coordinate and subordinate all other identities within a nation, such as gender, religion, ethnicity and regional identities (Holston and Appadurai 1996, 187). Traditionally, it is said to be connected to a singular geographical territory, outlined by a shared history, specific national identity and corresponding values, privileges, rights and duties. National citizenship therefore emphasizes a communal sense of belonging and attachment, created by a shared set of common values and beliefs under the majority of the citizens of the nation (Yuval-Davis 2006, 204; Brubaker 2010, 62-63). This idea of 'belonging' linked to a sense of community is reflected in the concept of *imagined communities*. According to Benedict Anderson (Yuval-Davis 2006, 204), the nation-state itself can be seen as one, in which its member experience an abstract sense of community. Even though these individuals may have never met or will meet each other, they still feel part of the same group (Brubaker 2010, 62-63). Therefore, citizenship can be seen as the embodiment of the transition from subject to citizen, in which the status of an individual is recognized and confirmed as a member of the community. This membership is created to match the extensive growth of obligations and rules by the state and to create a kind of social security and equality among its citizens (Lachmann 2010, 73).

Although citizenship is still associated with strong attachments to a single nation-state and its national territory, the nation-state is no longer alone in expressing and providing meaning to the different aspects of citizenship. Arising social changes and challenges – such as globalisation, growing transnationalism and diminishing borders – result in growing insecurity concerning the role fulfilled by the nation-state and its position towards its citizens, as well as the position of citizens themselves (Holston and Appadurai 1996, 188, 191; Bosniak 2000, 394). At the same time, nations appear to expect more autonomous actions, self-actualisation and self-governing

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[3] As early as in 1952, the idea of European freedom of movement was part of the negotiations for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor of the EU. In 1985, it was formalised in the creation of the Schengen Agreement, a treaty on the removal of internal border controls within the EU (Maas 2005, 235; Yeong 2013, 3, 6).

from their free subjects when facing global insecurities (Ong 2006, 501). These apparently paradoxical processes seem to raise questions about the presumed strong relationship between the nation-state and the concept of citizenship, putting forward the idea that other mechanisms providing new ways of security and direction could perhaps fulfil a role similar to that of the nation. In order to gain an understanding of this multilayeredness of citizenship that our populations cope with in their daily lives, we will now further examine the meaning, function and possibilities that alternative approaches of citizenship offer (Sassen 2002, 278).

Dual and supra-state citizenship

In this time of enhanced social-spatial interconnectedness and growing mobility, it is possible for citizens to obtain dual political membership. This form of membership attempts to meet the needs of citizens that have social, political, cultural, economic or spatial connections in for example two or more countries. Dual political membership creates a space for transnational communities, in which cultural elements from different origins can interweave and where new types of cultural and political practices, as well as mixed identities, can emerge (Faist 2000, 204, 208-209). Another expansion to the classical notion of citizenship is provided by supra-state citizenship, which refers to the overlapping of several political communities. It can be seen as a plural form of citizenship that includes all subordinate political geographical levels, including regional ones (Faist 2001a, 39). Supra-state citizenship as offered by the EU contributes to the previously mentioned debate by presenting an example in which citizenship is not provided by a nation-state, but rather by a network or collaboration appearing next to the nation-state, thereby increasing the options of citizens with regard to – for example – socio-spatial mobility (Faist 2001a, 46, 53). On the other hand, this so-called EU citizenship can only be facilitated by being connected to an outlined territory of nations and legally conferred by the laws of a nation-state; it therefore still complies with the more traditional conception of citizenship being connected to the nation-state (Brubaker 2010, 78) (Bellamy and Warleigh 1998, 449).

Defining EU citizenship

When compared to the clear cultural-political requirements that determine citizenship connected to a nation-state, it is however difficult to determine what EU citizenship further entails than merely a set of rights applicable to citizens of the Union[4] (Shore 2004, 28-29; McLaren 2001, 82). Therefore, one may wonder whether the present shape of EU citizenship takes sufficiently into account other, less law-orientated dimensions provided by citizenship and whether it entails more than new labour opportunities and social benefits (Lachmann 2010, 73;

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[4] See also Article 21 (ex Article 18 TEC) of the Treaty on European Union (EUR-Lex 2017).

Shore 2004, 28-29).

In this regard, Maas (2004, 242) argues that the creation of the Schengen Agreement, one of the most well-known aspects of EU citizenship, was not driven merely by economic aspirations. It was also largely motivated by the political ambition of creating a borderless Europe in which European citizens can travel freely. This borderless Europe raises another issue: that of the ability of the EU to provide accountability to its citizens while not being a state itself, but merely an organisation or a form of cooperation between states (Shore 2004, 32). This ability is particularly questionable when taking into account that citizenship in the more traditional sense is seen as both a by-product of gaining (democratic) control by the state over its civilians and by civilians over the state. With its promise of European citizenship, the EU has become responsible for the policies it creates and implements in and for its member states. Similar to a state, it now has to function as a protector of boundaries, a moderator of citizenship and executor of foreign policies, in order to create security for its citizens (Kearney 1995, 548). However, to what extent can the European Union be seen as a shared political and ideological project in which both citizens and governing powers have to answer to each other? Can EU citizenship be seen as something that builds on a strong shared history, common national identity and mutual agreement about privileges, rights and duties (Shore 2004, 29; Brubaker 2010, 77-78)?

Faist (2001b, 17) argues that if the EU desires to integrate as a political community, it has to work on gaining trust and solidarity among its citizens and nations. It needs to achieve the acceptance for democratic majority decisions and supra-state social policies, in order to develop to a more substantive kind of citizenship. By doing so, the EU may become less of an elitist and top-down project of reconstructing Europe (Faist 2001b, 17; Shore 2004, 38). The free movement legislation can be interpreted as such an attempt. Gerards (2008, 122-124) states that the motivation behind developing this key right within European citizenship is formed by the idea of developing European equality. This idea entails that citizens from EU member states deserve similar or the same rights and opportunities as nationals of any given EU member state and should not be discriminated against (Gerhards 2008, 122-124). In this sense, European citizenship embraces a different approach of what citizenship could entail: that of having certain basic rights not merely tied to being member of a national identity, but of being linked to a broader idea of universal human rights (Shore 2004, 27, 29; Faist 2001a, 45).

However, the EU is not simply a neutral legal constitution detached from emotional, territorial, and ethno-cultural affinities (Shore 2004, 29; Faist 2001b, 17-18). This becomes visible when we look at the creation of EU citizenship, which reflects a need for emotional and psychological binding as well to connect people to the former soulless interpretation of the institution (Shore 2004, 29, 35-36). Here, a similar sense of belonging is facilitated for EU citizens that nations in their imagined communities can so naturally achieve (Shore 2004, 36;

Yuval-Davis 2006, 204). However, one may ask why this sense of belonging is necessary: for the EU citizens in general, for the EU citizens living in member states different from their own, or as support for the cultural legitimacy of the EU itself (Aradau, Huysmans and Squire 2010, 949, 959; Shore 2004, 31, 33)? What EU citizenship lacks in political reality by the small amount of rights it provides and by the absence of duties for its citizens – two core principles necessary for substantive citizenships in the traditional sense – is compensated by the ideas and metaphors it visualises: a less state-oriented identification for citizens, a more embracing outlook on homogeneity and mobility within Europe and support for an ongoing project called the EU (Shore 2004, 30-32; Aradau, Huysmans and Squire 2010, 947-950).

However, does this idea of equality among people, for which the EU is often known, apply to everyone that comes into contact with the European Union? As Guiraudon (McLaren 2001, 82-84) explains, the "efforts to give some substantive meaning to European citizenship in the Treaty on European Union ([such as] granting local voting rights to EU nationals residing in other member states) widened the gap between EU citizens and so called 'third-country-nationals'", creating regimes of mobility (McLaren 2001, 82-84). Van Houtum and Pijpers (2007, 306) explain that the two-faced immigration policies applicable to the EU, existing of internal freedom of movement and external neoconservative (b)ordering policies, can be compared with a gated community in which protectionist logic causes anxiety and cherry-picking of highly skilled individuals from outside the European Union. This raises the question of where the border between Self and Other becomes manifest within a collective identity such as the EU.

Defining belonging

Conceptions of Self and Other are connected to hierarchies and power relations within a society. They involve what being a member of a certain cultural, ethnic, religious, or national group might mean. This way, all humans are engaging in processes of inclusion and exclusion when constructing a sense of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006, 199, 202, 204). A sense of belonging is considered essential to humanity. Humans are caught in processes of wanting to belong and become, reflecting emotional investments and the desire for attachments (Miller 2003, 217; Yuval-Davis 2006, 202). As a result, we consider ourselves to belong to certain categories – such as a particular gender, age-group, profession, race, class, ethnicity, nationhood, and citizenship – that have been chosen voluntarily or may be ascribed, although not all of these are considered equally important (Yuval-Davis 2006, 199, 202). These social categories influence the ways in which we express ourselves and tend to be changeable and contested through time; as a result, feelings of belonging are fluid and characterized by transition (Antonsich 2010, 645; Yuval-Davis 2006, 199, 202).

However, belonging is not merely about people's perceptions of whether other individuals do or do not belong to a certain category or group, it is also about personal feelings (Miller 2003, 217; Yuval-Davis 2006, 204-205). As mentioned by Yuval-Davis (2006, 197), sentiments of belonging are about emotional attachment, about feeling 'safe'. This positive sense of connection characterising belonging is also described by Miller (2003, 217-218). According to her, belonging represents the ideal state of being for humans (Miller 2003, 222). She proposes three senses of belonging: a sense of social connection to a particular community; a sense of historical connection to the past and certain traditions; and a sense of geographical connection to a particular place. Everyone belongs in some sense, because we are all connected to the world in which we live and in relationship with our communities, histories and localities. However, belonging is about more than that; it is a relation that makes individuals feel good about their state of being and being-in-the-world. Belonging therefore means to being in harmony with oneself as well as being in correct relation to our physical and social context (Miller 2003, 217-218, 220).

Place attachment and a sense of home

Belonging can also refer to a personal feeling of being 'at home' in a place. This connects to the third sense of belonging that was distinguished by Miller (2003, 217), for 'being at home' consists of attachment to a specific geographical locality. This sense of place attachment is facilitated by everyday practices and personal rituals (Antonsich 2010, 644, 648). As Steel (Cross 2001, 1) argues, however, the immediate physical and social setting persons find themselves in also contribute to this experience of belonging, as well as the characteristics that grants a place a specific identity. Therefore, Cross (2001, 1, 3) argues, to truly understand what a sense of belonging to a place entails, we should approach the idea by looking at the multiple relationships that people can have with a place and the emotional and symbolic meaning they ascribe to these. Nevertheless, place can also be seen as a commodified good, fulfilling a rather functional relation. When providing certain economic and material opportunities, a place can stimulate a conscious decision of belonging, creating motivations to stay or move to a certain place based on the lifestyle it offers (Cross 2001, 7-8; Antonsich 2014, 452).

Hummon (Hashemnezhad, Heidari and Hoseini 2013) notes that "people's satisfaction, identification, and attachment to communities caused different kinds of sense of place which vary among people". Therefore, it is important to take into account the depth of the individual's attachments to the local community and its social cohesion. Vasta (2013, 197) argues that newcomers in a society might think differently of a sense of belonging in a specific place than natives do. The nation itself might feel like a cohesive home for natives, while non-native or multi-local individuals might attach more value to other relationships within the specific setting

they are located in (Wiles 2008, 116-117). Therefore, Massey (Desforges, Jones and Woods 2005, 443) argues that places can be as much shaped by their global connections as they are by any local qualities inherent to those places.

These processes of embedding and disembedding divert attention from the territory towards a product of networks and relations (Desforges, Jones and Woods 2005, 443, 445). Multiple localities or dwelling arrangements provide new possibilities of and shapes of rootedness for people in relation to their surroundings, thereby calling for an inquiry into the relationship between home, space and place. What is their underlying relation and what do these notions imply for people's lives (Wiles 2008, 116, 124)? According to Dovey (1985, 1-2), we should first recognize that the notion of home is something different than the physical property of a house. Although the latter can provide a sense of home, it is not necessarily a requirement to feel at home somewhere. However, to understand the difference, we should move away from the idea of space being an abstract, objectively measured place in which people or things exist. Instead, we should interpret it as a meaningful experience of lived space and 'being out there' (Dovey 1985, 1-2; Duyvendak 2011, 37). As a result, the idea of 'home' and 'being at home' shifts towards a more personal experience of belonging and homemaking practices, thereby creating space for both new placed and placeless identity orientations (Duyvendak 2011, 7, 26-27). When looking at home as a lived experience we can say that one dimension of feeling at home deals with certainty and stability, in which a spatial order provides a sacred place existing within physical and symbolic boundaries in which a person moves and knows it ways (Dovey 1985, 2). Another dimension deals with the temporal order, in which home can be seen as a familiar environment or experience which is rooted in our bodily practices; therefore, the place or activities we find ourselves in can unconsciously start to feel as home (Dovey 1985, 3; Duyvendak 2011, 27). The last dimension of home, that of sociocultural order, is rather flexible and transportable. It consists of patterns and rituals that people stick to and can be re-created in another place or adapted to the social circumstances (Dovey 1985, 4-5). Thus, home is about connectedness with the past, future, present locality and with affective social relations (Wiles 2008, 116, 123). It is related to ordering principles raising the question 'where' we are at home, as well as to identity questions of 'who' we are as expressed in our home, and 'how' we are while being at home (Dovey 1985, 5-6).

All of this shows that the idea of belonging and home is a multilayered and multidimensional process. It can include several forms of citizenship, a limitless range of connections to cultures, places and groups and it can have numerous attachments concerning both status and emotional aspects (Antonsich 2010, 645-646; Wiles 2008, 116).

Belonging, political activism and social change

One way in which individuals express their sense of identification and belonging to a certain community is through engagement in practices of political activism. Feelings of belonging tend to be naturalized; only when belonging is being threatened and a lack of security is experienced, it becomes articulated and politicized through the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006, 197, 205). Häkli and Kallio (2014, 183) define politics in general as a situation in which issues that are perceived as important by actors are being challenged or questioned. Since this means there is something being put at stake for those involved, individuals get involved in political struggles to defend their interests; it is through these struggles and projects that social change occurs (Häkli and Kallio 2014, 181, 183). The politics of belonging involve specific political projects with the aim of constructing a sense of belonging in particular ways, executed by particular groups; here, belonging is a dynamic process, influenced by power relations (Yuval-Davis 2006, 197, 199). Political activism and expression thus serve as a way of articulating and shaping what 'home' should look like according to the actors involved (Yuval-Davis 2006, 205).

To be able to influence politics and get involved in decision-making processes, actors mobilise organisational structures for political expression (Lazar and Nuijten 2013, 3, 4; Norris 2002, 3). The shapes and forms of these structures have changed since the late twentieth century, as is for example reflected in the decline of traditional forms of political participation in today's post-industrial societies (Bang 2009, 103; Norris 2002, 2, 3). These traditional forms can be described as formal, hierarchical, bureaucratically structured, and clearly demarcated, and are exemplified by political parties and trade unions. However, more and more people move outside of these 'big' politics and engage in other ways of expression to solve their common concerns (Bang 2009, 105; Norris 2002, 3). According to Bang (2009, 101), this is caused by the fact that ordinary people are increasingly being made into spectators of the public discourse by political authorities. As a result, the interactive link between these two groups is crumbling; mistrust in 'big' politics is spreading and people are searching for alternative ways to make a political difference (Bang 2009, 101). They participate in a diverse range of alternative activities and new social movements that go beyond traditional organisations and formal institutions, in order to stand up for the rights and interests they see insufficiently reflected in 'formal' politics (Bang 2009, 101, 105; Norris 2002, 3). Norris (2002, 3) describes these networked movements and bodies as characterized by direct action strategies, communication through internet, horizontal organisational structures, and a loose and informal sense of membership based on shared concern about diverse issues. Especially younger generations have become more likely to express themselves through these new forms of participation and are getting involved in a variety of more spontaneous, ad hoc activities (Bang 2009, 103; Norris 2002, 3). New social movements may employ mixed action strategies, combining traditional political acts such as

voting and lobbying with alternative activities, such as street protests and direct action. However, the same mixing of strategies is emerging within traditional political groups and structures (Norris 2002, 4). Therefore, rather than the new forms replacing the older ones, both Norris (2002, 4) and Bang (2009, 105, 106) argue that actors nowadays tend to combine traditional and newer forms of political participation and organisation as a means of their political expression and identity formation. The ways and activities they decide to use in a particular situation depend on their concerns at that specific time (Bang 2009, 106). These activities do not have to be limited to concerns with domestic affairs, but may feature a wider outlook on the world and a relation to an international society as well (Tarrow 2005, 8). In that case, political engagement is based on a shared ideology and common objectives that can be related to a wide range of sectors transcending the level of the nation-state, such as human rights and global justice, empowerment, and the environment (Tarrow 2005, 9, 11, 12). Such political expressions serve as examples of *rooted cosmopolitanism* – a term that entails that individuals may move outside their original locality in a cognitive and physical sense when expressing themselves politically. At the same time, however, they continue to be linked to a specific place and the social networks, resources, experiences and opportunities provided by that place (Tarrow 2005, 8).

Context

In this description of the context of our fieldwork, we will elaborate on four levels that influence the lives of young EU migrants as well as the lives and views of left-wing politically active natives in the host country Scotland. These levels are (1) the EU, (2) the UK, (3) Scotland, and (4) the Central Belt of Scotland. Due to their distinctive social and political factors, each of these levels shapes processes of and attitudes towards citizenship and mobility in its own way.

The EU's migrational climate

This first level relates to a few recent phenomena that influence the public and political debate concerning European unification, freedom of movement and migrational practices in the EU, and presumably the lives of our participants.

The first phenomenon is the worldwide economic recession that started in 2007 and brought along a rise in right-wing politicians in Europe. These politicians are stressing the danger of migration and call for restrictions to protect the social well-being of their own national citizens, thereby labelling (the already declining) low-skilled migration from mainly the eastern to the western part of the EU as unwanted (Ghosh 2011, 183; The New York Times 2016; Benton and Petrovic 2013, 8). However, the recession did not only divide the EU in 'us' and 'them', it also strengthened the EU's position by deepening its cooperation to secure a stable position within the international trade market (European Commission 2012). Moreover, it introduced extensive political programs against, for example, youth unemployment, which promote working and studying abroad (Martín 2012, 7).

The second phenomenon is the rise of terrorist attacks since 2001, often linked to Islamic extremist groups. This has led to a politicisation of asylum-seekers and immigrants, who are blamed for both the defiance of the welfare state and security threats. These arguments are used by right-wing politicians for limiting migration. The attacks also created an undesirable association between violence and foreigners (Swank and Betz 2003, 224; The New York Times 2016; Huysmans 2002, 751-752). Therefore, terrorism raises questions in both daily life and the political debate about the connection between migration, liberty, security and borders within the EU (Neal 2009, 334-335, 340).

Another crisis linked to these questions is the Syrian (refugee) crisis that started in 2011 and increased the interest of nations to be able to control their own borders and migration. The crisis shows several divisions within the EU, to begin with the uneven nature of the distribution of refugees during the early days of the crisis in the Mediterranean (European Commission 2016). This was caused by a European regulation that states that refugees have to apply for asylum in the first safe country they enter (Refugee Council 2016). Later, Germany and Sweden

decided to open their borders and consequently the regulation appeared to be abolished (Fargues 2014, 2-3). Refugees delayed their appeal and started to apply for asylum in West European countries (The UN Refugee Agency 2016). This led to a second division, concerning the refugee (re)distribution quota, proposed by the western part of the EU and declined by East-European countries such as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic in 2015 (Migration Policy Institute 2016). All these disputes raised questions about burden sharing beyond the nation-state and how far the borders of free movement reach within the EU's mobility regime (Thielemann 2003, 254).

Finally, the difference between Schengen and non-Schengen countries concerning the right to close borders – for example to prevent refugees or migrants to enter – creates a tension between the national interest and supranational commitment (The European Institute 2016). The most recent incident that illustrates this is the vote for Brexit – the UK's withdrawal from the EU – by the citizens of the UK in the summer of 2016. As a non-Schengen country, the UK is already allowed to check borders, but the recent plans for Brexit now also question the movement of EU citizens aiming to work within the UK's national sphere. This indicates the vulnerability of citizenship and belonging in the context of migration and transnational processes (Pisani-Ferry et al. 2016, 5).

The UK in context of Brexit

Brexit brings us to our second contextual level: that of the UK. When it comes to Brexit, the UK is divided into two camps: on one side there are the pro-Brexit voters, a group that consists mainly of the less well-off and the less well-educated, and on the other side are young people in the urban centres who welcome freedom of movement and declared themselves against Brexit (Hobolt 2016, 1260). Moreover, voting practices concerning Brexit varied greatly between the UK's four countries. For instance, England and Wales voted in favour to leave the EU, while all thirty-two local Scottish authorities voted to remain. Considering Scotland's resistance to leave the EU, Brexit is very likely to increase tensions between Scotland and England (MacKenzie 2016, 578-579).

During our fieldwork period, several political events related to the Brexit process occurred and were prominently portrayed in both national and international media. Several of these came up during interviews we conducted or were discussed at events we attended; therefore, we consider them important to our research and will now address them shortly in chronological order.

On 1 March, the House of Lords voted in favour of an amendment on the Brexit bill for the protection of EU nationals in the UK after Brexit. As such, the Lords expressed their disagreement with the use of EU nationals as bargaining chips in the Brexit negotiations

(Astana and O'Carroll 2017). On 13 March, the House of Commons rejected the proposal, leaving EU nationals dealing with uncertainty about their future once again. A few hours later, Sturgeon announced her plans to stage a second independence referendum in the run-up to Brexit in the spring of 2019 (Howarth 2017). On 28 March, the Scottish Parliament cast their votes on the proposal and decided in favour of having the referendum (Jackson 2017).

That same day, Guy Verhofstadt, the European Parliament chief Brexit representative, stated that – as long as Britain is a member state – a restriction on the rights of EU citizens living in the UK would be unacceptable and against EU law. He expressed that the EU Parliament would veto all Brexit deals that implied such a treatment and that it would not be the right way to start Brexit negotiations (Merrick 2017).

On 29 March, May officially triggered Article 50 by sending a letter to the European Union. This was the starting sign for the official procedure of the UK leaving the EU. The next day, Sturgeon formally requested the independence referendum by sending May an official letter (Jackson 2017).

On 18 April, two days after we had concluded our research, Theresa May announced a snap general election, supposed to take place in June 2017[5]. As the reason for doing so, she mentioned the divisions in the UK and its politics over Brexit. By announcing an early election, she hoped to seek a stronger mandate in her Brexit negotiations (Gourtsoyannis 2017).

Scotland's unique case

The third level of our context is Scotland. The decision to conduct our research in this country was determined by the special case Scotland presents with regard to its political climate and immigration policy compared to the rest of the UK. To begin with, Scottish national politics can be considered quite unique. As was common in the rest of the UK, Scotland used to have a two-party system for many decades, with the Conservatives on one side and alternately the Liberals or the Labour Party on the other. However, this political system underwent great changes over the last century. Since the devolution of the United Kingdom and the resulting transfer of power to a Scottish Parliament in the late 1990s, Scotland features a multi-party system. Six parties compete on the left wing of the political spectrum: the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP), Solidarity, the Scottish Green Party, the Labour Party, and the Liberal Democrats. The first four of these support Scottish independence. The right side of the political spectrum is represented merely by the Conservatives. This situation is uncommon compared to other European countries, of which many have been met with an increase in right-

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[5] Since the elections took place after our research period, we did not incorporate their outcome and the resulting political changes into this research. Nevertheless, we are aware of the fact that these changes are likely to have affected the perceptions, opinions and daily reality of our participants.

wing nationalist parties over the last years. In Scotland, however, the *left*-wing nationalist party in particular – the SNP – has experienced a rise in power (Hepburn 2010, 532, 540). The SNP features a very clear pro-immigration stance. This can be considered remarkable, since nationalist parties are often associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants as they generally perceive them as a threat to indigenous culture (McCollum, Nowok and Tindal 2014, 82-83). The SNP's attitude can partly be explained by country-specific factors. The Scottish population is rapidly aging and shrinking; for most of the past decade, deaths have exceeded births, resulting in labour force decline. Only through immigration the Scottish labour force and population have managed to increase (Coldwell, Lisenkova and Wright 2011, 54). This indicates the importance of immigration for ensuring Scotland's economic growth (McCollum et al. 2013, 3).

As a result, the Scottish Parliament aims to maintain a high level of immigration to Scotland. This positive stance towards immigration appears to reflect in the opinions of the Scottish public as well. Inhabitants of Scotland seem to be less hostile to immigration than residents of many other parts of the UK. They are less likely to identify immigration as a key concern and describe themselves as little prejudiced against people from other races (McCollum et al. 2013, 3; McCollum, Nowok and Tindal 2014, 80). Migration to Scotland, however, is being countered by the UK government, which aims to reduce levels of immigration to its territory (Coldwell, Lisenkova and Wright 2011, 54). It is widely assumed that Scotland would practice a much less restrictive immigration policy than is currently the case if the country had sufficient power to do so (McCollum, Nowok and Tindal 2014, 80).

Research domain: the Central Belt of Scotland

Our research domain and the last level we will discuss is the Central Belt of Scotland. The Central Belt is an urban area with the highest population density of Scotland, accounting for over half of the country's total population. It encompasses the region between Scotland's two major cities, Glasgow and Edinburgh, and is situated just south of the Highlands (Bailey and Turok 2001, 702-703, 706).

Glasgow, the largest city within this only metropolitan area of Scotland, has been our home base during our research. It is known as the country's most ethnically diverse city and probably one of the most dynamic places in Scotland with regard to expressions of citizenship, political engagement and contact between migrants and natives (Understanding Glasgow 2016). In 2015, the city featured a population of 606,340 and is still growing. It contains 11.3% of the total population of Scotland. The growth of inhabitants of the city of Glasgow can be traced back to an expanding internal migration into the city and an increase in arriving overseas migrants (Understanding Glasgow 2016). In the most recent numbers of net migration, it can be seen that

overseas migration between 2003 and 2013 towards Glasgow has been significantly higher than internal migration within the UK or Scotland (Understanding Glasgow 2015). Similar to many other old industrial cities, Glasgow features two sides, one of a diverse and strong cultural life caused by migrational flows and one of poverty created by endless cheap labour (Bailey and Turok 2001, 706; Mooney 2004, 328). We can distinguish this second side of the city in *figure* 1, which helps us to gain a better understanding of the environment in which the majority our informants dwell and move in their daily lives.

Figure 1. Different neighbourhood scores at income, employment, health, education, housing, geographic access and crime ranks. Blue zones score high in these areas; red zones score low (Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 2016).

Next to Glasgow, Edinburgh features high levels of migration as well. In 2011, the city's council area had the largest number of non-UK born inhabitants in Scotland, who represented 15.8% of the local population (The Migration Observatory 2013). Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland and, after Glasgow, the country's second populous city. It is home to the Scottish Parliament and can therefore be regarded Scotland's political centre (Bailey and Turok 2001, 703, 708). This fact, combined with the city's central location within the country, makes Edinburgh an ideal place for politically engaged people to meet and express their views. Due to the two cities' high levels of political activism, close ties and diverse populations, we believed it would be interesting to incorporate both Edinburgh and Glasgow in our research domain. Assuming that our target groups – highly-skilled EU migrants and politically activists living in Scotland – were probably the best represented here, we eventually defined the metropolitan area of the Central Belt as our research domain.

Iris Neeleman

When the daily life becomes political

Belonging and citizenship among highly-skilled EU nationals living in the Central Belt of Scotland in context of Brexit

On top of a grey concrete pedestrian bridge in Glasgow I wait for Katja, a German artist that has lived here for over eighteen years. The beautiful red sandstone tenement buildings around me form a harsh contrast with the major road junction below. There, a constant stream of coloured cars and loud sounds move on a daily basis between Glasgow – a vibrant migration city – and Edinburgh, the political capital of Scotland. Despite the sunny weather, the chaos of the place gives me a sad feeling. I'm curious why she chose to meet here, when I asked her to bring me to a place that gives her a sense of home and belonging. Ten minutes later, while we cross the bridge away from the centre, she starts to reveal why she chose this particular place. "That bridge carries lots of personal history and speaks a lot about the city[6]." She explains that for her, it functions as a connection between her previous house in Sauchiehall Street and her new home in the West End, a space where she meets people and a symbol of Glasgow. "I drove in actually the first time via the M8. I took my small VW Polo from Dresden via The Netherlands to study here and then I met my Scottish partner. I stayed, it wasn't my plan, and that's life isn't it?"

In this chapter we will look at the perceptions and experiences[7] of highly-skilled EU nationals[8] living in the Central Belt of Scotland. We examine to what extent a sense of belonging and home is experienced while living abroad, taking into account their daily relationships to citizenship and voting on a local, national and European level. This way, we investigate how the EU provides them with a sense of security, belonging and possibilities to move freely within the EU. By doing so, we aim to understand how the recent pro-Brexit vote and its implications on socio-spatial mobility and belonging impacts EU citizens' daily lives and future plans while living in Scotland, the UK and the EU itself.

Voting: a practice of embedding and disembedding in society

Francine – a French entrepreneur – recalls that even as a teenager, she never really felt at home in France. However, she felt immediately at home when she visited Scotland at the age of fifteen. Once back in France, she would go to the library to search for pictures of Scotland until she

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[6] Katja, open interview, 24 March 2017, Glasgow.

[7] I have spoken with people of the following nationalities: Belgian, Dutch, English, French, German, Israeli-Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Polish, Spanish and Swedish.

[8] From now on I will refer to highly-skilled EU nationals that reside in the Central Belt of Scotland as 'EU nationals', 'EU citizens' or 'EU migrants'.

realised that within the EU she was free to move and live wherever she wanted, and she relocated permanently[9]. This principle of free movement that Francine refers to has led to an increase in flows of intra-EU movement and migration, as well as to more cross-border opportunities and new transnational possibilities, resulting in approximately three million[10] EU citizens living in the UK today (Gerhards 2008, 122-124; Braun and Glöckner-Rist 2012, 403). However, when moving from one country to another, "you have to take responsibility to become part of the society instead of looking in as an outsider[11]", Shannon – a Dutch woman working in the pharmaceutical field – explains. This voluntary kind of integration is not only a matter of self-imposed moral obligation, but can also be a desire of the person himself to make such a commitment. This is reflected in, for example, the practice of voting that may facilitate a sense of belonging and a feeling of becoming an accepted member of the community. For Francine, the right to vote for the independence referendum in 2014 was a proud moment. Being allowed – just like a Scottish person – to cast her "vote for such a big decision (…) to be able to be part of [such] a historical time in this country, that is important to me[12]." In granting (EU) citizens of another nation the same right to vote in Scottish parliamentary elections as natives, without having any guarantees in return for their commitment, Scotland is quite unique. This shows that the freedom of movement principle, as Favell (2014, 283) argues, not only opens up national territories for mobility practices or exposes daily lives to interactions with citizens from other EU countries; it also facilitates different perceptions of what citizenship could entail (Favell 2014, 283; Shore 2004, 28). The feeling of belonging and having a political voice in another country is not merely defined by the attitude of the host country towards the newcomers. As Yuval-Davis (2006, 197) explains, people's personal feelings of belonging to a certain place or feeling at home in the adopted community where they live plays an equally important role (Miller 2003, 217; Yuval-Davis 2006, 204-205). Among my informants, there is this shared desire for the common space where they live to be inclusive, to be nice and to be enjoyable. As Alina – a Polish woman working in the migrational field – explains:

> I want to know the city I live in. I want to care about the city I live in. It's not just a city I couldn't
>
> bother about. (…) I would like to know that I live in a city that introduces a policy that makes people

[9] Francine, open interview, 22 March 2017, Glasgow.

[10] This number of three million people comes from the website The3million, to which many of my informants refer (The3million 2017). This website is created by EU citizens themselves to raise their voice in the Brexit procedure and to claim a different permanent residency process in order to prevent the risk of two million EU citizens living in the UK to becoming undocumented. This way, EU citizens living in the UK today are trying to secure their future.

[11] Shannon, open interview, 21 February 2017, Glasgow.

[12] Francine, open interview, 22 March 2017, Glasgow.

happy and that [makes them feel] it's good to live in a certain place. I think it's important to care

about where you live, because if you don't really care … When you care about something, it is also a

way of saying: this is my home[13].

Therefore, we could say that for EU citizens moving abroad, places are as much about the functional aspect (lifestyle preferability) they can offer as about the emotional and symbolic relations they provide and stimulate (Cross 2001, 7-8; Antonsich 2014, 452). Katja herself illustrates this by explaining that after living in Glasgow for so long, the city itself reflects the life it has given her and the path she took and therefore is close to her heart. She feels connected to the city in a way she imagines a local would: she knows her way around, often bumps into people on the street, is acquainted with persons in different life stages and her children are born and raised here. Therefore, she knows what goes on in the place she feels embedded in. She stresses the personal affection of things: "I want to see things change, simple things, local things. Like [for example] cycle lanes, well, you name it[14]." Therefore, she highly values the right to vote in local elections and in parliamentary elections of the EU and Scotland, and she is not alone in this idea of wanting to shape the future and co-decide on how the country is run.

It is interesting to consider this appreciation of being able to share your voice in the country in which you reside in relation to the outcome of the UK-wide EU referendum and the inability of EU citizens themselves to vote. This created an unexpected experience of how feelings of becoming embedded and feeling at home in a society can shift overnight. As Dovey (1985, 1-2) and Duyvendak (2011, 37) describe when referring to home as a lived experience, one dimension of home deals with having a particular amount of certainty and stability. The pro-Brexit voted threatened this spatial order and the physical and symbolic boundaries within which a person moves and knows his way (Dovey 1985, 2). This created a declining sense of security, as Katja described: "I did not expected to feel so threatened and disempowered after the referendum as I do now[15]." She elaborates on the fact that – because she was not allowed to vote – she was unable to decide on her own future, that of her family and of being a European citizen. This made her realise she might just lose all the things that the EU has provided her with, such as the right on healthcare and schooling for her children. She is astounded that not everyone is on the streets every weekend to raise their voice. Karin – from Belgium and a full-time mother – is still surprised by the fact that before 23 June the UK was a cool place to live and that after the 24th it felt completely different. She remembers on the 25th "feeling absolutely sick,

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[13] Alina, open interview, 14 March 2017, Glasgow.
[14] Katja, open interview, 24 March 2017, Glasgow.
[15] Katja, open interview, 24 March 2017, Glasgow.

thinking there was some part of me [gone] that I didn't know existed, but I know it's dead now. It was the fact of being completely rejected for being European, while this is very much part of our identity." When reflecting on that moment, she shares:

> A lot of [people], even my parents-in-law, didn't really understand what was happening and looked at me when I was crying. 'What? For sure you [will just be alright] and at first they were protective of their country and the English. Now they are just totally disillusioned, at least my mother-in-law is not proud to be British. So it's been a time of quiet anxiety, it's been a time when people who have been married or are married to a British citizen actually would feel I'm no longer part of it, so some people are splitting up and leaving[16].

Karin stresses that she believes that people – Europeans – are really hurt by this apathy of nobody doing anything. As especially emphasized by Yuval-Davis (Antonsich 2010, 645; Yuval-Davis 2006, 199, 202), social categories influence the ways in which we express ourselves. In the light of Brexit and its implications on people's lives, this might explain why both UK and EU citizens initially seem to fall back on their ascribed group in order to find a sense of belonging. Francine remembers this surreal awareness of suddenly feeling unwelcome – although she experienced this mostly in relation to Westminster and England rather than to Scotland, which voted significantly to remain in the EU (MacKenzie 2016, 578-579). At the same time, Francine explains that these two are not completely inseparable and that sometimes, when she is looking at her neighbours, she wonders: "Did you vote [for me] to leave[17]?"

Defining the Other through Brexit politics: daily anxieties of EU citizens
On a Wednesday evening in a charming local pub in Govanhill, I encounter Nita, a Swedish woman that has lived for the past ten years here in Glasgow. She shares with me how much she loves this city because of its diversity in people. While she converses with my friends, my eyes start to wander around the pub. Similar to most Scottish pubs, there is a big TV on the wall. The bright interference of the outside world it brings seems such a big contrast with the dark calmness of the old wooden walls inside. At that moment, my eyes catch an image of the British parliament and a subtext appears: "House of Lords votes to protect rights of EU citizens in the UK." I turn to Nita and ask her how she feels about this fairly positive news. She says that even if there is this bill, it doesn't change the fact that she still has to pay her own costly private health

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[16] Karin, open interview, 23 March 2017, Glasgow.
[17] Francine, open interview, 22 March 2017, Glasgow.

insurance. She adds that the government is probably disappointed now, losing their negotiating position concerning UK citizens living in the EU. With a tired look, she sighs: "I don't believe it will hold[18]." A week passes by and another TV, this time in my living room, shouts: "The House of Commons rejects the amendments of The House of Lords", leaving everyone in uncertainty about their future once more. The day after the withdrawal of the bill of the House of Lords, I meet Alina. I ask her opinion on this political game that seems to be played when it comes to the status and the use of EU citizens as pawns or bargaining chips[19]. She elaborates that due to the complexity of obtaining a permanent residence permit and her inability to comply with the requirements[20], she will not try to obtain one. However, she expresses that the way politicians treat EU citizens makes her feel terrible, and that all of it adds up to "the feeling of anxiety and insecurity. We are speaking of three million people in the UK, you can't just ignore such a huge group of people. It's very disrespectful, it's outrageous[21]." Since before Brexit none of my informants were aware of the need to obtain a private health insurance when not working and the situation was uncertain at that moment, nobody had obtained one. There was an anger to be witnessed about the lack of communication from the UK government on this subject. Informants stress that, when moving to the UK, there are no obligatory integration practices named. Karin argues that this seemingly open-border enforcement, granted to EU citizens by the EU, is at the same time the immediate cause for Brexit. She expresses: "[UK citizens] have been completely manipulated and the big problem in the UK is that you don't have a population register. So if you come and live in Holland or in Belgium you have to register. Here you don't, so it opened up a can of worms, it opened up for xenophobia. People suddenly got scared of immigrants, 'there is to many of them', not knowing exactly how many[22]." Stefano – an Italian exchange student – shares this concern by explaining that in a referendum like this, people can be deceived easily. "In this country it was like, 'you want to have control over your borders?' So people would say 'yeah, that sounds right', so then logically, if you vote Brexit, that will happen[23]." In the line of Bang (Bang 2009, 105; Norris 2002, 3) we could argue that in the UK, ordinary people are

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[18] Nita, informal conversation, 1 March 2017, Glasgow.

[19] Here you can read a part of an e-mail I received from the creator of Freemovement on 12 April 2017, in which he explains his motivation to work in immigration law (Freemovement 2017). He shares:"(…) I consider the Brexit vote to be a potential disaster for the UK and the EU, and I want to try and reduce the impact where I can. The stance of the UK government in explicitly using EU citizens as bargaining chips is a disgrace, I do not trust the UK government and I am trying to help them secure their position as best they can. (…)"

[20] As explained to me by Karin on 23 March 2017, there are two procedures. One is the short online application for which you need to be currently employed; there is also a longer one of around eighty pages, for which you have to prove that you have worked at least five years in a row or have obtained additional expensive private health insurance when not working or studying. In the last version, you have to include all of your travels outside of the UK and the reasons for them since living in the UK.

[21] Alina, open interview, 14 March 2017, Glasgow.

[22] Karin, open interview, 23 March 2017, Glasgow.

[23] Stefano, open interview, 10 April 2017, Glasgow.

increasingly being made into spectators of the public discourse by political authorities. As a result, the interactive link between these two groups is crumbling and mistrust in 'big' politics is spreading (Bang 2009, 101). Katja sheds light on this through expressing her discontent with the way May speaks: "She is referring all the time to that the public has spoken. However, this whole referendum of fear is so irresponsible, it's very disrespectful towards the forty-eight percent that voted to remain[24]." Some people like Karin even go as far as saying that the outcome of this whole referendum in the name of the people has been planned. She explains that, normally, the running of a referendum takes several months. In the case of the independence referendum it took about six, the running of the EU referendum was only one month and without proper discussion[25]. Francine confirms this by saying: "I never heard about it until maybe a month before the voting. It just happened suddenly because now one thought it would go through, so no one really cared[26]." In the meantime, Karin explains, there have been all these law changes, such as in 2012, when May removed the law on granting British citizenship to the spouse when marrying. Later, in December 2015, she replaced this idea of British citizenship with permanent residency status. Therefore, she stresses that May as Home Secretary has been planning and implementing this, "knowing that lots of people would apply to secure their future[27]." Before this, nobody even thought about obtaining dual nationality, since many rights obtained by it correspond to the ones offered by EU citizenship itself (Faist 2000, 204, 208-209).

However, now it feels that UK is distancing itself from the EU and EU citizenship, my informants have experienced that they have to find other ways to regain their previous, apparently natural rights. For instance, the application for a permanent residence permit in order to stay has become a daily concern in people's lives, even when they are not thinking of applying. Katja states: "Lots of my friends have been applying for this permanent residence permit on the moment. I actually don't want to put myself through that, maybe I'm bit stubborn as well, but I'm thinking I'm a European citizen and I still have the right to reside here[28]." In this she is supported by Ellish – a woman originally from the Republic of Ireland – that rather would get her Scottish wife an Irish passport, so they can both continue to enjoy their freedom of movement within Europe[29]. On the other hand, this idea of simply not getting this document or the inability to obtain one can have varying consequences. Stefano explains that if you don't have this permanent resident status, you likely won't be able to find jobs because future job

[24] Katja, open interview, 24 March 2017, Glasgow.
[25] Karin, open interview, 23 March 2017, Glasgow.
[26] Francine, open interview, 22 March 2017, Glasgow.
[27] Karin, open interview, 23 March 2017, Glasgow.
[28] Katja, open interview, 24 March 2017, Glasgow.
[29] Ellish, email interview, sent on 13 March 2017, answered on 30 April 2017, met in Glasgow.

applications will ask if your status is secure in this country[30]. All this is not just simply about the functional aspects of a certain place, such as job opportunities. People have created a home here, they have attached themselves both symbolically, emotionally and some even physically to this specific territory (Cross 2001, 1, 3, 7-8; Antonsich 2014, 452). As Miriam, an Israeli-Hungarian woman that recently obtained her EU citizenship, explains: "We just bought a house and now we don't know if it was a smart thing to do. We just wonder what will happen if people decide to move. What will happen to the stock and house market when people start selling their houses[31]?" Due to the fact of not feeling welcome or at home anymore in society, there is this returning awareness of the uncertainty of not knowing how society will react on Brexit. How will people relate to immigrants in the future and will Scotland still be a place where they want to live?

Different perceptions of feeling welcome

It is not only the attitude that is displayed towards EU citizens and their right to live in the UK that makes people angry and upset. It is also this sense of entitlement that the English living abroad display, as is illustrated by Ellish and her wife, who recently embarked on a lengthy travel through the mainland of the EU. During this journey, everyone they met was curious about Brexit. However, as Ellish stresses, nobody seemed to think Brexit was a smart idea, with one exception: "The majority of English people we have met on our journey have been pro-Brexit, despite clearly enjoying the luxury of free movement in Europe, or in many cases – especially in Spain and France – enjoying their holiday homes abroad[32]." For hard-working EU citizens such as Dora, who contribute to the local community here in Scotland with both taxes and time, it is very difficult to see that retired UK citizens that live in her own country display such an attitude of entitlement and belonging[33]. This feeling that the UK is displaying and always has displayed a kind of hypocrisy and sense of entitlement compared to other EU countries is a shared feeling. This contributes to the question to what extent the European Union can be seen as a shared political and ideological project in which both citizens and governing powers have to answer to each other (Shore 2004, 29; Brubaker 2010, 77-78). Although the UK itself might not feel they have to answer to all others involved, this idea is not shared by my informants. As Stefano states: "You're not free to do what you want when you're in the EU, because you're part of something else, and every action that you take will risk us[34]." Nevertheless, it is mainly due to this ambiance and attitude that my informants, especially the ones that used to live in England, share that they

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[30] Stefano, open interview, 10 April 2017, Glasgow.
[31] Miriam, open interview, 25 February 2017, Edinburgh.
[32] Ellish, email interview, sent on 13 March 2017, answered on 30 April 2017, met in Glasgow.
[33] Dora, open interview, 8 April 2017, Glasgow.
[34] Stefano, open interview, 10 April 2017, Glasgow.

are relieved to be on this pitiable moment in Scotland[35]. Helena, second year student at the University of Glasgow, being English herself, relates to this feeling of not being at ease in the current political and social climate in England. She expresses that on the moment she would rather be Scottish, since similar to herself the Scots voted to remain in the EU and to continue welcoming EU citizens in their country. Helen shares: "I feel such a disconnect to the English government, and although what the English do still affects me, it affects me a lot less since I live here[36]." In this way we could argue that Helen is starting to feel less connected to the imagined community of the English nation-state and starts to affiliate more with the Scottish and European one, thereby questioning her membership (Yuval-Davis 2006, 204). Overall there is this recurring awareness of the tangible difference between the English and the Scottish when it comes to welcoming EU citizens. As Ellish shares: "I feel in Scotland like I'm part of a community of people that wants immigrants to stay and feel welcome. (…) [However Brexit] made me feel less welcome as part of the UK, but still very welcome in Scotland. I think if Scotland was to have voted pro-Brexit as a majority and if Nicola Sturgeon took an anti-immigrant stance, I would have left the country very easily[37]." Besides Scotland's current political stand, the idea of being welcome in Scotland appears to be also closely related to idea that Scotland feels closer to Europe than to England. This feeling is commonly shared, however is articulated especially when having lived and worked in both England and Scotland. Karin stresses that this connectedness between Scotland and the EU originates from the old alliances with the French and therefore the mainland. Reflecting on her own experiences, she states: "England has still very much that kind of island attitude, this attitude that 'we are the best', which Scotland doesn't have too, Scotland likes to reach[38]." She explains that this reaching to the Other can be seen as well in the speeches that Sturgeon gave in the first week after the referendum. Karin states that, in the absence of other parties, Sturgeon tried to provide some sense of security, firstly by emphasizing that EU citizens are and remain welcome in Scotland. She remembers that Sturgeon

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[35] Here you'll find a part of the interview on 3 March 2017 in which Helen elaborates on how her uncle and she herself have experienced the relationship that Scottish people have with English people and how this differs from the way they deal with other European citizens.
She explains: "My uncle, he lives now in Edinburgh and he is English, and he said to me when I moved here: 'They will never accept you.' So I said: 'O, I love to be Scottish because of all these benefits.' He is like: 'You can live here as long as I have' – he has lived here for twenty-five years – 'but I will never be accepted as a Scottish person', which is interesting, because I feel that's not always the case when you move somewhere, that is not the idea. (…) Within the UK, for me it's not difficult logistically, getting a place and all of that. Especially now, it is probably easier for me as an English person for sure. But emotionally and community-wise I would argue that if I was … Say I was an Italian woman, and I moved here now and I would stay here for twenty-five years, I think I would be accepted as a normal Scottish person, while I do think an English person will never ever ever get that [and] I can understand why."
[36] Helen, open interview, 3 March 2017, Glasgow.
[37]Ellish, email interview, sent on 13 March 2017, answered on 30 April 2017, met in Glasgow.
[38] Karin, open interview, 23 March 2017, Glasgow.

later offered: "Well, English people, if you're not happy, come and live with us[39]" (see speech Sturgeon in introduction). Therefore, we could say that her expression serves as a way of articulating and shaping what Scotland should look like according to the Scottish people (Yuval-Davis 2006, 205).

Categorising nationality and cherry-picking of highly-valued individuals

The Scottish government and the majority of the Scots have expressed their intentions to stay in the EU, as Karin mentioned. Therefore, we could argue they welcome migration. Nonetheless, the possible consequences of Brexit for EU citizens has caused their daily life itself to become political. As Shannon illuminates, feeling at home has a lot to do with "the feeling of fitting in and connecting to the society you live in[40]." However, in the current discourse the emphasis seems to be explicitly on defining belonging exclusively through nationality or the skills one offers, a structure that my informants themselves do not embrace. We could argue along the ideas of Yuval-Davis (2006, 197, 205) that feelings of belonging that first felt naturalised are now threatened and that a lack of security is being experienced. Therefore, belonging will now become articulated and politicized. This we can witness already through the sudden incorporation of notions such as 'migration', 'Brexit' and 'the EU' in people's associations with a sense of belonging. In relation to this, people are becoming politically involved in the political struggle they find themselves in (Häkli and Kallio 2014, 181, 183). This involvement is characterized by both individually bound interests and a range of mixed action strategies. For example, my informants have started reading blogs in which other EU citizens all over the UK share their experiences with Brexit; they are joining interactive forums where they can share their struggles with others or that provide them with legal advice; they join lobbying groups at EU level; attend demonstrations; or start new social movements.

One particular event in which all these layers came together was the One Day Without Us Rally, where EU citizens could share their support and stories with each other. It also provided a possibility for Scottish people to realise the impact[41] a possible leave of EU nationals would have

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[39] Karin, open interview, 23 March 2017, Glasgow.

[40] Shannon, open interview, 21 February 2017, Glasgow.

[41] Here you find a part of the interview with Katja on 24 March 2017, in which she elaborates on how Brexit has changed her relation to local Scottish people and how it made her realise that it is hard for people to understand what they – EU citizens – are going through.

She explains: ''You feel like a complete idiot, [when they say] 'of course everything will be fine, what are you worrying about?' (…) But that's people's reactions as well and I think it's also to do with the familiar, people know you are around all the time, they know you live here and bump into you all the time and all the rest of that. So they [can't] imagine that one day you won't be here, because you're just not part of the community like they are and you take that for granted, because it's a compliment and that is great. They don't see [me as a migrant], which is great; on the other hand, it's all the more infuriating that they then say 'don't worry about it', because they can't make that step like 'o, there is something happening with me

on their own daily life. They did this, for instance, by singing the following songs together: "Say it loud, say it clear, everyone is welcome here" and "Here I say, here I say, we're all human and we're here to stay". These simple songs embody the realisation of what Brexit means for a significant group of the UK population when it comes to the uncertainty of being able to stay and the institutions to be able to hold onto the EU nationals they employ. They also shed light on the consequences for society itself, that is unknowingly tearing apart mixed families consisting of UK and EU nationals. However, not everyone in Scottish society feels connected to these open migration policies and some affiliate themselves more with the British way of reasoning. Katja recalls such an experience on that particular day:

> I never really found myself predominantly defined by my nationality here in this country and now I am, through Brexit and the referendum. And already you sense this division of who are the good Europeans and who are the bad ones. Where I met you at the demonstration, I stepped out of the taxi. The taxi driver said: "All the beggars and people, you know, are taking our jobs and *we* don't want the Romanians sitting in each corner [and] all the rest of it." I said [to] him: "Well, you know what, I'm an immigrant too and these people are also European and I don't want you to make a [distinction]." I don't see a division between why I'm a better immigrant than the person sitting in the street begging. Everyone has a personal history and a reason to migrate, who are you to judge who is the right one and who isn't[42]?

Although none of my participants themselves have felt being an immediate target to these allegations, it appeared that most of them were aware of the distinction being made. Francine states that for her, as a French person, it is easier to be accepted than for people from relative new European countries – due to the fact of being associated with a richer country and therefore higher classified than an economic migrant[43] (Yuval-Davis 2006, 199, 202, 204; McLaren 2001, 82-84). However, what happens when you don't fall in the right category? Dora elaborates on this by explaining that in the beginning, she heard people speaking on the radio saying things like "there are too many of them" or "I don't like people from Albany or Servia here"[44]. At first, she was relieved they didn't mention Spanish people coming here. However, shortly after she realised that these attitudes people take towards different EU citizens are dangerous. She states:

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and affect her life'. (…) I can imagine it's always about the others, your friends will [not] be affected by it, but everyone else, people that I don't know about."

[42] Katja, open interview, 24 March 2017, Glasgow.

[43] Francine, open interview, 22 March 2017, Glasgow.

[44] Dora, open interview, 8 April 2017, Glasgow.

"When they were voting 'no', I felt this hate towards the foreigner[45]." It is not only this defining by nationality that bothers my informants. It is also the cherry-picking of highly-skilled individuals, something Dora has experienced first-hand when the British medical association recommended her to get official citizenship. She states: "Because I'm a doctor, they welcome me, but what about the rest of the foreigners? If they [are] not accepting the rest of the foreigners, I prefer they don't accept me[46]."

Among my informants there is this shared resentment against this welcoming of the persons they need based on credentials and the intention to dismiss the others. Ellish adds to this: "It seems like they are continuing to reject a high percentage of applicants[47]." However, so wonders Shimon – the husband and EEA-dependent[48] of Miriam – "what will they do if people are not allowed to work? They won't deport people, and if they're not granting a permanent residency permit, that would make them practically second-class citizens[49]." He argues this is probably not even allowed according to international law. Nevertheless, my informants in Scotland feel relatively safe due to the positive attitude of the Scottish government, which emphasizes that they welcome migration and even depend on it (see speech Sturgeon in introduction). However, Scotland still has to obey by the rules created in Westminster and therefore Sturgeon has called for a second referendum (Jackson 2017). This could possibly lead to Scotland becoming its own fully sovereign nation with its intentions to stay in the EU. This could secure the position of my informants, something long-term residents and the people that have a Scottish partner hope for. However, this time not all of my informants feel comfortable to take such a gamble with the life of Scottish people, not knowing if they still want to live in Scotland after Brexit is triggered.

New senses of community: feelings of belonging in the 'local' EU space

As we have seen in the previous chapters, ''European citizenship is marked by a tension: between a citizenship that is derivative of the nation-state and a citizenship that is defined by free movement'' (Aradau, Huysmans and Squire 2010, 945). Since the UK with its defining power has made EU citizens the Other, we could argue that EU citizens themselves have come to be identified as a group and new boundaries and relations have started to emerge (Antonsich 2010, 645; Yuval-Davis 2006, 199, 202). Due to this feeling of 'in-betweenness' while living abroad – not being completely Scottish and not being completely at home in their home country either – my informants seemed to have become more aware of their connection to other EU citizens in the UK and the EU itself, in which mobility can be witnessed as a mode of sociality and a form of

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[45] Dora, open interview, 8 April 2017, Glasgow.
[46] Dora, open interview, 8 April 2017, Glasgow.
[47] Ellish, email interview, sent on 13 March 2017, answered on 30 April 2017, met in Glasgow.
[48] European Economic Area (Gov-UK 2017).
[49] Shimon, informal conversation, 25 February 2017, Edinburgh.

bounding through circulation (Aradau, Huysmans and Squire 2010, 950, 953). Karin illuminates this by saying it feels almost as a kind of diaspora of EU citizens across the EU[50]. Along this line we could argue that a new sense of community is simulated, based on a shared background of moving between countries and corresponding values – such as the right to move. Moreover, this sense is facilitated by EU migrants being pro-European and their feeling of being more or less in the same position due to Brexit, when it comes to the uncertainty of their future in the UK and, more specifically, their adoptive country Scotland. Katja elaborates on this feeling of interconnectedness by saying: "I feel much stronger now as a European. Before the referendum I felt much more like … Well, I'm from Germany, but it doesn't really make a big difference. Now I feel I want to be part of the EU[51]." Dora adds to this that Brexit made her realise that "when you're in the EU, you don't need to show a visa and you don't even have to show your passport and you feel you're in a common area." This feeling of living in a borderless Europe comes with a renewed awareness of how in a sense all people that move from one place to another can be considered migrants, since we all enter an unknown space, have to build friendships, learn the language, get acquainted with different lifestyles and create a sense of belonging. However, argues Alina, on an emotional level you move from one place to another, like any other migrant, and therefore you feel like a migrant. Nonetheless, when it comes to using the term in relation to legal practices or when being used by a Brexit politician, there is a difference. Namely, when she decided to move she "moved within a certain legal entity that allows you to move within free movement[52]." Therefore, she argues that she isn't a migrant but an EU citizen. This exemplifies that my informants, in context of processes of migration and mobility that are affected by certain political discourses, rather chose to identify themselves with the term *(EU) citizenship* than *migrant* (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 188-189; Brubaker 2010, 63). So, Brexit has made people aware of the several layers of citizenship they deal with on a daily basis. It has stimulated people to articulate and order their senses of belonging and re-consider their attachments towards Scotland, the UK and the EU itself, showing that both are fluid and multi-layered concepts that can shift (Antonsich 2010, 645-646; Wiles 2008, 116).

Yet, Brexit raises another question: if a country like the UK can change the rules so easily while playing, what does EU citizenship then actually entail? Moreover, can it guarantee the rights it offers EU citizens? The EU itself declares that they will not allow the right of EU citizens living in the UK to be restricted (Merrick 2017). However, one can doubt the strive for equality within the EU. As Katja stresses: "I think [there is] this danger that Europe might be not strong enough to be one entity when it comes to enter this negotiations and stand ground. I fear [this]

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[50] Karin, open interview, 23 March 2017, Glasgow.
[51] Katja, open interview, 24 March 2017, Glasgow.
[52] Alina, open interview, 14 March 2017, Glasgow.

and I don't know if I'm wrong[53]." The whole pro-Brexit vote has also made my informants more aware of the growing right-wing populism in Europe and its threat towards the EU, showing a wider outlook on the world and a relation to an international society as well (Tarrow 2005, 8). Miriam shares: "While Brexit is not a vote of anti-Semitism, I think it shows us once again that, as the Other, your human rights can be revoked and you are not protected[54]." Interesting to see is that since the pro-Brexit vote long-term residents seem to have gained interest in what is happening at the national level of their home country. One the one hand, this is stimulated by the idea of a forced return; on the other, we could say it is caused by the motivation to make a statement and give their voice that they want a safe, united and pro-free-movement Europe. Katja adds to this: "We have to make a stand like in the Netherlands, we have to show the world and our fellow Europeans that Brexit and right-wing populism is not what the majority wants. So if I can cast a vote [in Germany] then I will do that now, because it's a crucial moment for the EU. It's really important that we stand our ground and hopefully the EU will not crumble under this right-wing shift[55]."

[53] Katja, open interview, 24 March 2017, Glasgow.
[54] Miriam, email interview, send 12 April 2017 respond 12 April 2017, met in Edinburgh.
[55] Katja, open interview, 24 March 2017, Glasgow.

Eva van der Schans

Independent within Europe

Belonging and citizenship among politically active Scots living in the Central Belt of Scotland in context of Brexit

The afternoon sun glistens on the windows of the modern-looking Scottish Parliament building. It is a bright day in March with a cloudless sky, a rare occurrence for the people of Scotland. In a small park right next to the parliament, a crowd has spread over the green lawn. These people have gathered in Edinburgh today for the March for Europe, an event organised as a protest against Brexit and a celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the EU. Among the assembled, the colour blue is everywhere: blue of the European Union flag, blue of the Scottish flag. Both are painted on bodies and faces, being waved in the air by dozens of people, or displayed on signs and banners. The atmosphere is pleasant and relaxed, almost making me feel as if I'm at a picnic or festival – probably partly due to the nice weather. On the elevated stage in the shadow of the parliament building, a somewhat chubby politician is just finishing his fervent speech: "… free movement of goods, people, capital, and services, which is created, as has been described earlier, as being the biggest project of peace the world has ever seen. I don't want to turn my back on that. I don't want to relinquish my citizenship. Theresa May, if you're coming for my EU citizenship, bring a scalpel, because I keep it here! Thank you[56]." The crowd around me bursts into a thunderous applause, accompanied by enthusiastic cheers.

Appreciation of the EU and demonstrations of a sense of European belonging were noticeable everywhere during my fieldwork. In this chapter, we will examine this specific sense of belonging among politically active Scots living in the Central Belt. Moreover, we will explore what other experiences of citizenship and belonging are salient for this specific target group. What do these Scots base their ideas of attachment on, and how do these different conceptions relate to each other? Most importantly, to what extent did the vote for Brexit alter these perceptions and feelings and their interrelations? Finally, in what ways do these politically active Scots attempt to express these sentiments and influence their surroundings through political engagement?

European belonging: 'being part of something bigger'

Many of my informants tended to describe Scotland and its people as possessing a pro-European attitude. Among them was our flatmate Maisie. She was a twenty-three year old woman who had been politically engaged in the last few years through participation in marches and street

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[56] Speech, March for Europe, 25 March 2017, Edinburgh.

protests, mainly directed against racism and Brexit. During our interview, while comfortably drinking tea on our couch at home, Maisie argued that "Scotland is so pro-EU", which she based on the EU subsidiaries and funding Scottish communities received[57]. One of my other informants, Josephine, who was in her early thirties and the assistant of an MEP[58] representing Scotland, shared this view. When asking her about the best thing the EU had provided for Scotland, she answered: "Probably bringing it up to a level where we can compete." She mentioned the construction of roads in the Highlands and Islands[59], the provision of digital communication technology for the university campuses in that area, and the improvement of deprived neighbourhoods in Glasgow – all being made possible through EU funding[60].

According to many informants, economic benefits of being an EU member were not just brought along by subsidiaries, but by free movement as well. Maisie highlighted the opportunities freedom of movement provides in terms of employment. "You know, you can work anywhere," she said[61]. Another person to argue this was Andrew, a 27-year-old man who was employed as the assistant of an MSP for the SNP. During our interview in a quiet Belgian beer bar in the West End of Glasgow, he stated: "People in the UK have benefited vastly from freedom of movement. You only need to go to Spain or even to many European capitals across the EU to see British people working in many different fields." However, he later added that freedom of movement is not just important economically. "It's also important socially. It is quite a close-knit continent when you think about it. We're not … This is not Asia, you know, this is actually one of the smaller continents in the world[62]."

Many other Scots I spoke to appeared to share this perception. They treasured freedom of movement as part of their EU citizenship rights not merely because of its associated economic advantages, but mostly because of its cultural value, providing them with a sense of interconnectedness to other EU citizens. On a morning in March, Iris and I had an appointment in Edinburgh to interview an MSP representing the Labour Party. In the small meeting room of the Scottish Parliament Building, the middle-aged politician with friendly eyes said:

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[57] Maisie, open interview, 8 April 2017, Glasgow.

[58] In conversations during my fieldwork, three different parliaments representing the Scottish people were often mentioned or referred to. The first one is the Scottish Parliament, only established in 1999, whose members are called Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSP); the second one is the Parliament of the United Kingdom, whose members are simply referred to as Members of Parliament (MP); the last one is the European Parliament, its members being called Members of European Parliament (MEP) (The Scottish Parliament 2017).

[59] The area generally referred to as the Highlands and Islands encompasses the Scottish Highlands and the archipelagos of Orkney, Shetland and the Western Isles. While covering more than half of Scotland's territory but featuring less than one tenth of the country's population, the region is very sparsely populated compared to other parts of the country (Highlands and Islands Enterprise 2013, 3-4).

[60] Josephine, open interview, 2 March 2017, Glasgow.

[61] Maisie, open interview, 8 April 2017, Glasgow.

[62] Andrew, open interview, 6 April 2017, Glasgow.

> I think the biggest thing we will lose [because of Brexit] is the sense of intimacy and closeness to
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> continental Europe. Something that my children have grown up with and that I have known all my
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> adult life is that we can travel easily, we can live and work and study in different countries, and
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> people from different countries can live and work and study here. For me, it is that cultural loss that
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> is the biggest loss. There's an economic impact as well, but I think it is that cultural loss that we will
>
> feel most keenly[63].

Indeed, as Favell (2014, 283) has stated, European free movement is affecting the lives of not only those who move around themselves, but also of those who remain in their European home countries. With their emphasis on closeness to Europe and cultural loss, the MSP's words indicate he experiences quite a strong sense of cultural intertwinement and emotional connection to the EU. Both Shore (2004, 29) and Miller (2003, 217) have argued that social and emotional attachment are essential in creating meaningful and substantive experiences of citizenship and belonging. As such, the EU appears to succeed in providing both in this situation. The MSP links his sense of EU attachment to the mobility options provided by freedom of movement, and consequently free movement indeed seems to fulfil its purpose here in facilitating European integration and citizenship (Maas 2005, 241-242).

Another informant, Emma, highlighted cultural enrichment by being part of the EU as well. We met Emma at a meeting by Global Justice Now. Emma, who organised the event, mentioned how important it was to be able to travel in her opinion: "Engaging with other cultures makes us more accepting of people coming from places and backgrounds different from our own; it makes us less hostile towards them." As a consequence, she expressed her discontent with the prospective loss of free movement caused by the decision for Brexit: "It's rubbish we cannot travel anymore. After Brexit we will need to get visas and pay lots of money to be able to travel to Europe. Rich people will probably continue to travel, because to them those kind of things don't matter that much[64]." This statement sheds light on how the UK will withdraw itself from the notion of European equality by choosing for Brexit (Gerhards 2008, 124). Although travelling to and within the EU will not become impossible for UK citizens, their practices of mobility will be restricted and complicated by the loss of freedom of movement. The whole process of Brexit therefore entails a reconstruction of the EU's regime of mobility, in which the borders of legitimized unequal treatment are shifted and UK citizens are becoming 'third-country nationals' (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 188; Maas 2005, 234; McLaren 2001, 83-84). This redefinition

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[63] Labour MSP, semi-structured interview, 29 March 2017, Edinburgh.
[64] Emma, open interview, 26 February 2017, Glasgow.

of boundaries reflects changing interrelations of both physical and social mobility by reshaping flows of migration as well as affecting individuals' economic and social opportunities (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 189, 191, 193). While individuals already have unequal access to mobility options due to their economic status, this inequality will presumably be exacerbated among UK citizens by Brexit (Black, Natali and Skinner 2005, 4). The loss of freedom of movement is likely to result in extra costs due to visa applications and more expensive flights for travelling to mainland Europe (Calder 2017). As such, Brexit is not merely creating inequality between UK citizens and other EU nationals, but is likely to exacerbate inequality in British society as well (McLaren 2001, 83-84; Glick Schiller and Salazar 188, 193).

During my fieldwork, I learned that a positive sense of European identification and the resulting strong rejection of Brexit was especially true for the Scottish young adults I spoke to. This matches survey statistics on the Brexit referendum[65] and emerged clearly during one of the last political activities I attended in Scotland: a panel discussion that took place in the dim cellar of a Glaswegian pub. There, several political commentators had gathered to discuss English identity and politics and the potential implications these have for Scotland. One of the speakers – a young woman and member of the Green Party – firmly stated that she identified as a young European. "Young people want to be part of a community or a collective. The EU provides this for them. They want to feel interconnected. This is reflected in Brexit votes as well, with the majority of young people voting to Remain," she said. "I think it is important to have a sense of shared identity across Europe[66]." Her remarks reflect a notion of the EU as an imagined community, capable of providing a sense of shared identity and interconnection among its members (Yuval-Davis 2006, 204). Similar to the words of the MSP, this suggests a strong sense of emotional attachment to the EU, central to a sense of belonging as well as a meaningful experience of citizenship (Yuval-Davis 2006, 202; Shore 2004, 29, 36). European citizenship is thus not to be dismissed as insignificant or irrelevant, as some scholars like to call it (Shore 2004, 30). Rather, these sentiments contribute to the citizenship debate by illustrating that citizenship – encompassing both official and substantial layers – can be created above the level of the nation-state and may be provided by supra-state institutions (Shore 2004, 29; Sassen 2002, 278). As Faist (2001a, 53) argues, empirical evidence indeed suggests a collective cultural identity among European citizens, who regard this sense of EU belonging as a complementary dimension to their national identity. Such an experience of EU citizenship thus adds an

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[65] An article in *The Scotsman* on 17 February 2017 discussed the results of a survey conducted by YouGov. These suggested that the majority of younger people had voted to remain in the EU. Arguing that this age group enthusiastically embraced the Continent, it was stated that 44 per cent of 18- to 24-year-olds saying they were more likely to visit Europe than they were 12 months ago.
[66] Member of the Green Party, panel discussion, 9 April 2017, Glasgow.

additional layer to the notion of citizenship as a whole (Faist 2001a, 47, 53) (Yuval-Davis 2006, 206).

'Scottishness' vs. 'Englishness': the English as the Other

When taking into account the widespread sense of European belonging and appreciation of freedom of movement, it is not particularly surprising that many of the Scots I spoke to expressed to be sympathetic towards EU migration into Scotland as well. When I asked Andrew why this kind of migration is to be seen as something good, he illuminated economic benefits once more. "One of the things that most of the parties based in Scotland recognise is that Scotland … We need more immigration. We're a small country, we're only 4,5 million people. We want Europe's best and brightest, and from the rest of the UK as well, to come here and help shape our economy and help develop it[67]." This value ascribed to EU migrants was not only expressed through words, but largely through actions as well. Many of the Scots I spoke to were participating in street protests, marches or political discussions aimed at supporting EU migrants in the UK, whose position had become insecure since the Brexit vote. Some informants were even involved in the organisation of these kind of events, such as Laura. She was one of the organisers of One Day Without Us in Glasgow, a two-day grassroots campaign in February. The campaign was set up in order to celebrate the contribution of migrants to the UK and to reject divisive politics and discrimination, and consisted of a spoken word event on the first day and a rally on the second. As Laura argued in her speech during the rally: "Migrants are being dehumanized. But it is often forgotten that they are people too: they are the teachers that teach our children; they are the nurses that take care of our parents. We have to fight the xenophobic fever that is spreading nowadays[68]." Thus, next to economic, rather rational considerations for supporting EU migrants, emotional motivations and personal connections to migrants appear to play a major role as well. By criticising discrimination of EU migrants, Laura appears to support the notion of European equality, a concept that advocates similar opportunities for all EU citizens. This extension of equality beyond the national community reflects a broadening of the classical conception of citizenship, embracing EU foreigners as well (Gerhards, 122, 124).

This perspective on equality arose again in the responses to the debate within the UK government on whether or not to guarantee EU migrants their right to stay in the UK after Brexit. Many of my informants felt it was unfair to leave migrants dealing with such high levels of uncertainty, which was especially apparent at the March for Europe in Edinburgh. Here, a Scottish MP for the SNP described his opinion in this regard fervently in his speech. The

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[67] Andrew, open interview, 6 April 2017, Glasgow.
[68] Laura, speech, One Day Without Us rally, 20 February 2017, Glasgow.

audience regularly overwhelmed his voice with cheering applause, reflecting their agreement with his words:

> They [the British government] lied when they used the most ugly campaign that I have seen in my lifetime to whip up racial prejudice against migrants in our country. They lied when they said that migration was a bad thing, when we know from every investigation, every survey, that it is indisputably a good thing, and that it enriches the communities in which migrants dwell. (…) On behalf of politicians who have left some decency, I would like to apologize to everyone, every European national in this city for the way in which you have been treated. If the Scottish government had the authority to do so, I know that by now, you would already have had a letter and a certificate guaranteeing your status in this country, because you are welcome here, and we want you to stay forever[69].

Moreover, these words suggest a sense of distance between the politics of Scotland and those of the UK as a whole – a view I learned to be shared by many others. As was clearly reflected in their opinions on Brexit and EU migrants, many informants would rather see Scotland choosing a different path from the one the UK as a whole has taken. However, this is difficult – if not impossible – due to the limited authority the Scottish government has when it comes to the implementation of its own policies on immigration and foreign matters. Decision-making on these issues is largely executed by the UK government in Westminster. However, many Scots feel they are not being properly represented by the UK government, and that as result their country in fact has little influence on this process. Several of my informants perceive UK politics to be largely dominated by England, such as Laura. "I mean, for 50 years our votes don't count in Westminster. For 50 years! It's a statistical fact," she said in an agitated voice. "The only time in the last 50 years that Scotland has voted the same way as Westminster was for Tony Blair[70]. I mean, for my entire lifespan and half that of my parents, what we vote doesn't matter. It will be what England votes is what we get[71]." Several informants stated that this political discrepancy between Scotland on the one hand and the UK and England on the other can be traced back to differences in norms, values and a general outlook on the world. Andrew's words summarise these views held by many I spoke to in this regard:

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[69] SNP MP, speech, March for Europe, 25 March 2017, Edinburgh.
[70] Tony Blair was a Labour Party politician and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2007 (Office of Tony Blair, 2017).
[71] Laura, open interview, 3 March 2017, Glasgow.

You know, Scotland is a progressive, leftist-centre – or in some areas very left-wing – country, and

we want to see a kind of progressive, nationalist, egalitarian, and fair society. We have no hope of

delivering that within the UK, it's extremely impossible to be able to deliver that in Britain. In this

present time we have one MP in the Conservative Party that is in the government in the UK. So

Scotland is not getting what it votes for. (…) We don't have a respected position within the country,

we don't have the power of a veto over what the British government does. You know, they talk

about the UK as if it's a family of nations and that we're Scottish, we're English, we're Welsh, and

we're Irish. But in practicality, we don't see that in reality. So for me … I don't feel British. I feel

Scottish, I feel European[72].

In many conversations and interviews I conducted, the English were described as
conservative and narrow-minded, while Scotland was defined as progressive and outward-
looking. These negative characteristics ascribed to Englishness by Scottish people have been
addressed in literature before, for example by McIntosh, Sim and Robertson (2004). They
suggest that anti-Englishness is in fact an important part of Scottish national identity.
'Scottishness' is being defined as precisely that what 'Englishness' is not – although the
differences between the two nations – whether politically, socially, culturally, or economically
– are in fact almost indistinguishable. They explain this paradoxical phenomenon on the basis
of *the narcissism of minor differences*, a term coined by Sigmund Freud. This theorem argues
that especially related communities with adjoining territories engage in conflicts in order to
reinforce their own identity (McIntosh, Sim and Robertson 2004, 44, 52-53). This could offer
an explanation as to why many of my informants possess such negative perceptions of the
English. Naturally, the contrast in Brexit votes – between Scotland on the one hand and
England and the UK as a whole on the other – has provided them with a powerful argument to
support such stereotypes. As Andrew continued his argument:

Now we have a scenario where Scotland is forced to between two different options, because the UK

has said: 'We're definitely not going to be part of the single market, we're definitely not going to be

part of the EU, no freedom of movement.' We have to make a decision whether or not we want to

embrace that narrow-minded, closed-off, and regressive attitude, or if we want to see ourselves as a

European nation that wants to be connected, outward, part of the future of Europe, shaping the

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[72] Andrew, open interview, 6 April 2017, Glasgow.

future of Europe, whilst also still maintaining links with, you know, partners across the UK. (…)

Scotland, to me, always feels like a very progressive country. I feel that we're a very outwardly-

looking country, like the Irish, one of the great emigrators of the world. We send people across the

world and have been a very proactive global nation as it is, so I think that explains in some way why

we have a very pro-European outlook in Scotland. Historically, of course, we are a very European

nation. Before we joined the UK, we obviously had the Auld Alliance[73] with France[74].

Andrew's words thus counterpose Scottishness and Englishness, but they also draw attention again to the Scottish experience of European belonging. By aligning Scottish norms and values with those of Europe, Andrew here provides a possible explanation for the Scottish sense of cultural closeness and connection to Europe as expressed by the MSP and the woman at the panel discussion. Maisie shared his line of reasoning: "I think Scotland in general has a lot more European values than Britain as a whole. Britain just wants to go back to good old wartime, sort of. I guess we have a slightly more tolerant way towards people. We were kind of at the forefront in the UK for LGBT rights. People were allowed gay marriage in Scotland a year before it was even debated in England."

When taking all of the above into account, it can be stated that the whole process of Brexit can be understood as an ongoing (re)definition of concepts of the Self and the Other. In a sense, the decision for Brexit entails a resetting of boundaries, reconsidering who stands inside and outside a particular community – thereby questioning existing conceptions of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006, 204; Antonsich 2010, 645-646). Based on her interpretations from critical discourse analysis, White (2016, 1, 50-51) suggests that the pro-Brexit voters can be seen as defining Britain and the British people as the Self, while turning the EU into the Other – that is, the EU as a political, unified body, but not necessarily all Europeans or individual European member states. Meanwhile, my findings have suggested so far that my participants, all being Remain-voters in Scotland, appeared to possess a different conception of Self in this regard, enveloping the people of Scotland and the rest of the EU instead. This is supported by Hobolt's (2016, 1269) study, suggesting that voters who described themselves as having a European identity were much more likely to vote Remain. My informants tended to perceive the rest of the UK and especially England as the Other – a perception that seems to be exacerbated by the vote for Brexit. While the differences in the Brexit vote indicate that there *are* in fact differences in desires and interests between the two countries, they also

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[73] Alliance between Scotland and France based on a treaty signed in 1295, that stipulated that if either country was attacked by England, the other country would invade English territory (Murphy, 2015).
[74] Andrew, open interview, 6 April 2017, Glasgow.

appear to fuel the Scots' narcissism of minor differences in relation to the English (McIntosh, Sim and Robertson 2004, 53). Indeed, as Campbell (2016, 490) argues, Remainers often engage in stereotyping by naming the Leavers – the Others – 'racist', 'stupid' or 'ignorant', while they tend to describe themselves as internationalist, cosmopolitan and considered.

This lack of identification with and belonging to the UK is clearly demonstrated by the Scottish independence question, which brings us to another layer of citizenship. For many informants, Scottish national citizenship and identity played a prominent role in their lives and was something they felt strongly attached to. This great sense of Scottish national belonging appeared to be quite profound and widespread to me; the SNP holding the majority in the Scottish government seemed to confirm my ideas. While many of my informants, however, considered the SNP quite extreme and were sceptical about First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, they did support to some extent the party's views, especially those concerning the question of Scottish independence. In 2014, a first independence referendum took place in Scotland, resulting in a small majority of 55.30% voting against it (BBC News 2014). As MacKenzie (2016, 278) states, for quite some time now the aim of Scottish nationalism has been an independent Scotland within Europe. Over the last year, widespread dissatisfaction with Brexit thus has provided the SNP with an opportunity to bring the independence question back to the table and formally request permission from the UK government to stage another referendum (Jackson 2017). Emma stated: "I think they [the SNP] are actually happy with Brexit. It helps them in their fight for independence, because the majority of Scottish people wants to remain in the EU. Independence is a way to achieve that[75]." While at first it was not entirely clear if Scotland would be allowed to re-join the EU once independent, in the weeks after Sturgeon's announcement several European politicians argued this would presumably not be a problem[76]. I then started to encounter more and more expressions of support for Scottish independence embedded in the greater desire to remain an EU citizen after Brexit – the first perceived and pursued as a means to achieve the latter. Especially the March for Europe provided me with numerous examples in this respect, of which *figure* 3 provides an impression. Among the audience, EU-flags, Scottish flags and "Yes"-flags – the emblem of the pro-independence side – were all to be spotted.

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[75] Emma, open interview, 26 February 2017, Glasgow.
[76] An example is German MEP Elmar Brok, who stated there would be little obstacles for Scotland to become an EU member, since the country already met the entry criteria (*The Scotsman*, 6 April 2017).

Figure 3. March for Europe

At the march, the same fiery SNP MP that had accused the British government of lying argued in his speech:

I now believe that if we are to exercise our own will, as a people of 5 million people who live in Scotland, and if we really want a different relationship with our European neighbours, then we demand the right to have a choice. Once the Brexit deal is known, we should get the opportunity to say: 'Do we want it? Do we want to continue as a part of an isolationist, anti-European United Kingdom, or do we want to take control ourselves and lead our own destiny towards a different relationship with Europe and the world?' You will get that choice![77]

Taking into account such expressions, it can be stated that the vote for Brexit appears to have intensified feelings of identification not only with the EU, but with Scotland as well. Moreover, it seems to have fostered an intertwinement of the two: the pursuit of Scottish independence and the desire to be part of the EU were increasingly being put in one perspective by bringing up independence as a means of remaining part of the EU's community of nations. The greatest embodiment of a combined pro-EU and pro-independence attitude I encountered at the march was presented by Ian, a middle-aged man I had a short conversation with. He was

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[77] SNP MP, speech, March for Europe, 25 March 2017, Edinburgh.

wearing a kilt, Scotland's well-known traditional clothing, and was waving a big EU flag, a Scottish flag and a "Yes"-flag – all at the same time.

Political expressions of belonging: activism and independence

How are all of these sentiments concerning different kinds of citizenship and belonging displayed? As may have already become clear, manifestations often took the shape of political activities of all kinds: marches, street protests, panel discussions, meetings of political parties, and even creative expressions. Although not all, many of these events resulted from popular initiatives and grassroots efforts, such as the One Day Without Us Campaign. Initially set up as a national campaign, Laura described how she and her friends organised the events in Glasgow:

> It came down to just people individually deciding to do something. So myself and my poet friends decided to put on some events, and then I searched Facebook and put a message up on the Facebook group, and then other people from Glasgow said: "Oh yeah, we'll be part of this". And then I found an email address, and then they had a meeting and then I got to meet them. So initially I had to go search for them, and then a couple of people got together and just started the Glasgow side of it. And there was a team in Edinburgh, there was a team in Glasgow, Manchester, Liverpool, London, Bristol, so quite a few. But they must have done, like, a UK launch and then people just sort of self-organised within the cities, I think[78].

The One Day Without Us Campaign serves as an example of individuals moving outside 'big' politics and formal structures in order to make their voice heard (Bang 2009, 105; Norris 2002, 3). As has been argued by Bang (2009, 101), this can be considered the result of a sense of powerlessness and mistrust in 'big' politics. So far, I have brought forward several examples which illustrate that many of my informants appear to experience such feelings in relation to the British government. However, the informal political activities I attended during my fieldwork were not entirely separated from formal political structures, but rather intertwining and cooperating with them. This is exemplified, for instance, by the large number of MPs, MSPs, and other professional political representatives contributing to such events by giving speeches to the audience. Moreover, I learned from my conversations with informants that many of them had become more politically engaged over time. During the

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[78] Laura, open interview, 3 March 2017, Glasgow.

first week of my fieldwork, I attended the annual general meeting (AGM) of the Glasgow branch of the Green Party. Here, I spoke to Aiden, a man in his thirties who told me he had only been involved in the party since the 2014 independence referendum. He added that the referendum had caused many others he knew to become engaged in Scottish politics as well, since it had made them feel their vote mattered and that they could actually make a difference[79]. The Brexit vote appears to have intensified this surge of political engagement even more. This was reflected in the speech of a young woman during a Brexit-related film event we attended in Glasgow, who introduced herself as a representative of Undivided: a youth campaign set up to give young people a voice in Brexit negotiations. The campaign had launched a website where young people could submit their demands about what should happen after Brexit. The woman stated that Undivided had been formed because of a lack of youth engagement; young people had felt excluded from politics, but the Brexit referendum had made them want to get involved. She added that Undivided was not cooperating with one political party, but rather with all of them, and that politicians had started to pay attention to the campaign as well due to its popularity[80].

Such examples demonstrate that individuals have different opinions and interests related to the Brexit debate, which they express and defend by engaging in political activities (Häkli and Kallio, 2014, 181). Many of these activities demonstrate an intertwinement of informal and formal political structures, where the chosen mode of expression varies by situation (Norris 2002, 4; Bang 2009, 105-106). As Yuval-Davis (2006, 197) has argued, political projects may serve as a means to articulate and construct a sense of belonging. According to Antonsich (2010, 650), it is even necessary for people to feel they are being listened to in order to belong to a certain community. My informants' engagement in politics to make their voice heard and communicate their interests can therefore be regarded as attempts to create or regain a sense of belonging in turbulent political times (Lazar and Nuijten 2013, 3; Yuval-Davis 2006, 205). In my opinion, the fact that notions of Scottish, British and European belonging and citizenship were explicitly addressed and questioned at many of such activities supports this interrelationship between political activism and belonging.

Nevertheless, the political efforts of my informants were not merely focused on domestic affairs such as Brexit and Scottish independence, but related to greater global themes as well. As has been passingly mentioned already, topics such as racism, xenophobia, and the treatment of refugees worldwide were widely debated and criticised. At the Stand Up To Racism March – held on UN Anti-Racism Day – several speakers criticized populism, racism

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[79] Aiden, informal conversation, AGM of the Scottish Green Party (Glasgow branch), 11 February 2017, Glasgow.
[80] Representative of Undivided, Brexit-related film event, 26 February 2017, Glasgow.

and xenophobia as being carried out by politicians such as Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. As a female representative of the STUC[81] stated there: "Today is UN Anti-Racism Day and it's great to see support and solidarity being shown for an anti-racist message. This march is just one of many that are happening across the world today and it is right that we come together to say, with one voice: no to racism, no to xenophobia, and yes to supporting migrants and refugees in this country[82]." She was followed by a Labour MSP, who said firmly: "And that is why we should say loudly and proudly that refugees are welcome here in Glasgow, are welcome here in Scotland, are welcome here in the United Kingdom and should be welcome in the United States of America too[83]." In this sense, the march reflected shared claims and common objectives among those who participated, extending beyond the territory of the Scottish nation. It demonstrates that the involved individuals possess a wider outlook to the world, together with a willingness to commit to broader causes related to the transnational space, such as global justice (Tarrow 2005, 32, 43, 73). Nevertheless, these practices should not be seen as deterritorialised, but as rooted in their specific local surroundings (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 187). The words of the STUC woman illustrate this intertwinement of the global and the local: she highlights the march's transnational character and coordination, while at the same time addressing the local national environment in which it takes place. As such, the involved actors are operating as 'rooted cosmopolitans', tapping into their local social networks for political mobilising and social activism in order to express their globally-oriented visions and convictions (Tarrow 2005, 42, 47).

This brings me to the final point I wish to make: that ideas of belonging and experiences of citizenship are not attached to merely one community, territory or group, but rather to multiple and coexisting ones (Antonsich 2010, 645-646; Faist 2001a, 47). Throughout this chapter I have tried to illuminate different levels of belonging and citizenship that play a prominent role in the lives of the Scots I have encountered, as well as their mutual interrelationships. The Brexit vote appears to have caused an aggravation of already existing sentiments: among my informants, it has resulted in a wider gap between feelings of attachment to Scotland and the EU and feelings of non-attachment to the UK. This also indicates the fluid character of such sentiments. Indeed, as Yuval-Davis (2006, 199) argues, belonging is a dynamic process, rather than a reified fixity. Therefore, I would like to highlight that my research findings can only be perceived in their specific time frame and the particular political and societal circumstances Scotland found itself in during that period. The important

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[81] STUC stands for Scottish Trades Union Congress, the national trade union centre in Scotland (Scottish Trades Union Congress, 2017).
[82] STUC-representative, Stand Up To Racism march, 18 March 2017, Glasgow.
[83] Labour MSP, Stand Up To Racism march, 18 March 2017, Glasgow.

argument here remains that meaningful experiences of citizenship and various senses of belonging are coexisting and interrelated, together constituting a multi-layered and multidimensional whole – although these should not all be considered equally strong or important (Antonsich 2010, 645-646; Yuval-Davis 2006, 202). However still linked to a territory and membership of an EU nation-state, the notion of European citizenship transcends national levels and appears to be capable of providing a sense of transnational interconnectedness (Faist 2001a, 39). As Josephine thoughtfully stated: "I grew up in the Highlands, so for me, my identity first and foremost is a Highlander. And then I'm Scottish. And yes, there is an element of UK there. But it's … EU … I've probably got more in common with people in other countries than some of the people who voted Leave here, simply because your outlook is the same and you're working towards the same goals[84]." Belonging to the local and the transnational are thus not mutually exclusive; they do not contradict each other, but rather intertwine and facilitate each other (Antonsich 2010, 645-646; Faist 2001a, 47).

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[84] Josephine, open interview, 2 March 2017, Glasgow.

Conclusion and discussion

In this thesis, we have attempted to shed light on experiences of citizenship and a sense of belonging in the Central Belt of Scotland, and on the ways these have been affected by the Brexit vote. In order to do so, we have conducted qualitative research among both highly-skilled EU nationals and politically active Scots living in this area. Beforehand, we expected these two groups, as inhabitants of Scotland, to be directly affected by Brexit. Because of the insecurity the Brexit process entails for EU migrants' position in the UK, we presumed the first group to be actively dealing with questions related to this process. Judging by their involvement in political expression, we expected the second group to feature outspoken opinions on and active involvement in the Brexit process as well. Focusing on Scotland's two major cities, Glasgow and Edinburgh – the country's most vibrant centres and greatest hubs for migrants – also enabled us to address the interaction between these two groups (Understanding Glasgow 2016; The Migration Observatory 2013). Moreover, our aim was to examine how such sentiments related to the debate whether citizenship and a sense belonging can be developed above the level of the nation-state, as a meaningful alternative to national citizenship (Shore 2004, 28-29).

Belonging of EU citizens living in the Central Belt of Scotland is characterised by being adopted at first, subsequently rejected and currently uncertain of what the future holds. Due to this political, economic and emotional uncertainty, Iris's informants have regained awareness in the power of raising their voice through voting – a practice that put them in this position in the first place. Nevertheless, they realised that there are several other ways to alter the politics of a community and express notions of belonging, by using mixed strategies such as demonstrating, lobbying or becoming even more involved in local politics (Norris 2002, 4). At the same time, Iris's informants have regained interest in national voting in their home country, motivated by the need to secure the political situation from right-wing politics in case of forced return. Moreover, through national politics they hope to influence the European landscape by giving a positive statement of support towards the EU and its free movement and mobility practices. Therewith, they express their hope for all EU member states to take a united stand in the Brexit negotiations when it comes to securing their official citizenship status and their right to move and live freely in countries within the European Union (Gerhards 2008, 122-124). We could argue that Brexit has made explicit that EU citizens on daily base deal with multiple layers of citizenship at a time (Antonsich 2010, 645-646; Wiles 2008, 116). Each layer provides them with different rights – such as the right to vote – and duties and instead of being separate layers, each layer influences the other. Here, the ability to vote shows both their expression of politics as well as the ways in which they shape their sense of belonging and home (Yuval-Davis 2006, 205). However, the incapacity to vote during the EU-referendum and the outcome of it has led to a

decline in their experiences of substantive citizenship in the local sphere. EU citizens feel as if they are now being turned into 'second-class citizens', suddenly possessing significantly less rights than natives (McLaren 2001, 82-84). Nevertheless, this has caused EU citizens to become more open to social change and new ideas of the Self and Other have become explicit (Yuval-Davis 2006, 199, 202, 204). New forms of communal belonging and unbelonging have been experienced at the level of their home (country), migrant communities in general and EU citizenship itself. Informants have experienced a renewed awareness of what EU citizenship constructs in their daily lives and have gained a sense of belonging in the shape of a supportive, interconnected and mobile imagined community of EU citizens living in Scotland and the UK (Yuval-Davis 2006, 204). To be founded upon the previously showed relations we can therefore conclude that different kinds of citizenship and dimensions of belonging should be seen as multilayered and interconnected practices.

For politically active Scots living in the Central Belt, it appears that citizenship can entail other dimensions than merely the one of the nation-state as well. Various layers of citizenship appeared to provide Eva's informants with a meaningful sense of belonging. The first noticeable one is a feeling of identification with and appreciation of the EU. Informants did not only ascribe this to subsidiaries the EU provided them with, but to the economic and social advantages of European freedom of movement as well. Most importantly, many expressed a feeling of cultural connection and emotional intertwinement with Europe, describing the EU as a community providing a shared identity and calling Scotland's relationship to it 'close' and 'intimate'. This positive attitude is also reflected in Eva's informants' attitudes towards EU migrants, whom they regarded as welcome in Scotland and valuable to society. As such, many informants were involved in activities aimed at defending EU migrants and their rights in context of Brexit and rising xenophobia, which suggests they share the notion of European equality as carried out by EU policies (Gerhards 2008, 124). As argued by Shore (2004, 29) and Miller (2003, 217), notions of attachment are essential in creating meaningful and substantive experiences of citizenship and belonging. These findings support Faist's (2001a, 53) argument that the provision of these experiences is not reserved to the nation-state, but that they may be facilitated by entities transcending the national level as well.

At the same time, Eva's informants express an aversion of 'Englishness'. They argue that the basic elements of 'Scottishness' and 'Englishness' are essentially opposed and that English politics and Scottish interests are highly divergent. Although these oppositions may be explained through *the narcissism of minor differences* and might in reality be significantly smaller than as how they are perceived, these feelings are nevertheless very real for Eva's informants and are thus not to be trivialized (McIntosh, Sim and Robertson 2004, 44, 52-53). Since Eva's informants perceive the English to be domineering UK politics, they express their believe that the UK

government is not properly representing Scottish interests. This mistrust and feeling of powerlessness in politics is reflected by the many popular initiatives politically active Scots engage in, moving outside of 'big' politics in order to make their voice heard (Bang 2009, 101, 105; Norris 2002, 3). Moreover, these feelings seem to have evolved into a sense of alienation and detachment from UK identity as a whole. The results of the Brexit vote appear to have exacerbated this, since they highlighted the differences in interests and outlooks between Scotland on the one hand and England and the UK on the other. Politically active Scots' sense of belonging in the UK therefore seems to have been affected in a negative way by the Brexit vote, which is reflected in the prominence the independence question has been gaining again. Not merely reflecting a strong sense of Scottish national belonging, this debate also indicates a sense of European belonging and an appreciation of EU citizenship by suggesting Scottish independence as a means to remain part of the EU after Brexit. Next to expressions of Scottish, British and European (non-)belonging and citizenship, Eva's informants also appear to feature a more globally-oriented sense of interconnectedness. Their political activities, not merely aimed at domestic matters but at globally-occurring issues as well, reflect the notion of *rooted cosmopolitanism* (Tarrow 2005, 42, 47). Taking into account these various feelings of belonging and experiences of citizenship, we have argued that these notions are not attached to merely one community, territory or group (Faist 2001a, 47). Rather, they are connected to multiple and coexisting ones, although these should not all be considered equally strong or important. Together, they constitute a multi-layered and multidimensional whole (Antonsich 2010, 645-646; Yuval-Davis 2006, 202, 206).

As such, several parallels can be discerned between our two target populations. While our informants' sense of belonging appeared to be naturalised before, the Brexit vote has caused both of our groups to question what their feelings of citizenship and belonging, encompassing various levels, actually mean and entail. Both groups experience Brexit as a menace to their ideological ideas, the general rights they are used to having, and the benefits the EU has presented them with. We could argue that Iris' informants appear to perceive Brexit as a personal threat, making them to a certain extent feel unwelcome in their adoptive country. At the same time, Brexit forces Eva's informants to distance themselves from the EU community and thus violates the intimate relationship to mainland Europe these individuals pursue. In response to this perceived threat, both of our groups tend to express their sense of belonging to the EU and its community more explicitly through becoming increasingly politically engaged. For Iris' informants, Brexit has caused their daily lives to become political, which forces them to deal with EU matters that affect their sense of belonging personally. Eva's informants have started to articulate their desire to remain in the EU by actively involved in political activities of all kinds, in an attempt to make their discontent known. In this sense, the Brexit vote may not have caused

a greater sense of attachment to the EU per se among our informants, but it seems to have led to a greater awareness and appreciation of the interrelatedness among the EU community.

As a second parallel, the Brexit vote appears to have led to a decline in identification with and belonging to the UK as a whole among our informants. Due to the current discriminative ambiance they experience within the UK, EU citizens have become to feel insecure, anxious and unwanted. As a result, they have started to question their feelings of belonging within the UK. The perceived lack of willingness among the Brexit politicians to secure their status or express their solidarity with EU citizens living in the country plays a major role here as well. Although Iris' informants think the deportation of EU nationals will be unlikely, many EU citizens seem unable to gain a secure status. What will become of them? Will they end up as 'second-class citizens'? For politically active Scots, the Brexit vote has emphasized and exacerbated the – perceived – differences in values and interests between Scotland and the UK as a whole. Once more, Eva's informants feel that the UK government is not properly representing Scotland's interests and is doing 'what England wants'. As a result, the Brexit vote has fuelled the desire for independence as a means for the Scottish people to decide their own path, future and the shape of their relationship to the European continent.

However, when it comes to a sense of belonging to Scotland, there are differences to be noted between our two groups of informants. While the Brexit vote appears to have led to a greater identification with Scotland among politically active Scots, it has made EU migrants' relationship to the country more ambiguous. Since the majority of Scottish people has voted to remain in the EU, Eva's informants seem to regard their fellow countrymen and themselves as 'together' against Brexit. As such, the Brexit vote has provided them with a common cause to fight against and turned pro-Brexit politicians into a shared opponent. In this regard, Scottish independence has presented itself as a common goal to pursue. While the Scottish population previously appeared to be more divided on this matter, the possibility of using independence as a means to remain in the EU appears to have led to a greater support of the cause, thus binding the Scottish Remain-voters together. Iris' informants explain that although Brexit has influenced their sense of home in the UK and Scotland, this changing feeling of belonging is mostly the result of England's influence on the country. They are aware that the majority of the Scots do want them to feel welcome and that discriminative practices mostly come to them through UK-wide politics and English media. However, it cannot be denied that EU citizens do experience a change in their feelings of belonging, influenced by the lack of support or empathy they experience from Scottish people they interact with and come across in their daily lives. All of this affects their perceptions on the rights they have been granted by the Scottish parliament to cast their vote when it comes to the second independence referendum. Not all of Iris's informants are certain

whether they would like to co-decide the future of a country in which they are not sure they will continue to feel at home or will even be allowed to stay.

When connecting all of these findings to theory, several things are worth noting. When it comes to the citizenship debate and the role of nation-state in providing citizenship, we argue that our findings illustrate that citizenship can indeed entail other dimensions than merely the one of the nation-state. Various forms and shapes of citizenship, such as supra-state or local citizenship, appear to provide our informants with a meaningful sense of membership, capable of providing a sense of belonging as well as a shared ideology and emotional attachment to a community. Ideas of belonging and experiences of citizenship are thus not attached to merely one community, territory or group, but rather to multiple and coexisting ones, encompassing different geographical and societal levels. We therefore argue that belonging to the local and the transnational are thus not mutually exclusive; they do not contradict each other, but rather intertwine and facilitate each other (Antonsich 2010, 645-646; Faist 2001a, 47).

Secondly, our research suggests that the Brexit process entails a redefinition of boundaries and a reshaping of the EU regime of mobility. By having voted to leave the EU, the UK is now collectively excluding itself from the European regime of mobility, thereby withdrawing itself from the notion of European equality (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 188-189; Brubaker 2010, 63; Gerhards 2008, 122-124). This entails a significant change in the official citizenship status of all of our informants. First of all, EU nationals are no longer sure of their future in the UK and whether they will be allowed to stay. As such, they are losing significant rights they did possess before the Brexit vote. It is uncertain what place they will occupy; we can only assume that it will be a place somewhere in between the status of third-country nationals/migrants and the position they used to have as EU citizens, creating a redefinition of their rights and their access to the UK. Moreover, Scots will lose their EU citizenship and are thus becoming 'third-country nationals' in relation to the EU, which will restrict their movement and remove the opportunities and benefits provided for them by the EU (McLaren 2001, 82-84). However, many informants express a willingness to fight this status by pursuing Scottish independence, in order to be able to redefine their relationship to the EU on their own terms. Thus, for them it is still unclear as well how they will relate to the EU regime of mobility in the future. As such, for both of our groups the Brexit vote entails changes in their physical and social mobility, causing inequality among previously equal EU citizens (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 188; Maas 2005, 234; McLaren 2001, 83-84). These imposed changes in regimes of mobility have affected ideas of belonging in the way that it entails a redefinition of notions of Self and Other among our informants, encompassing several polarities. This shows that a sense of belonging is constituted through people's personal perceptions of categorisation, as well as others' perceptions whether these individuals do or do not belong. The Brexit process reflects the fluidity of both dimensions,

affecting notions of belonging and citizenship among our target groups to quite some extent –
with potentially far-reaching implications. Since Brexit is currently still fully under construction
and therefore highly dynamic, it could prove to be interesting to conduct more research on this
topic in the future, in order to gain insight in how sentiments in Scotland may have changed
again as a result.

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