

The Anti-Climax of the “Second Bandung”

The failure of the second Afro-Asian Conference in the period 1955-1965

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Abstract

After several proclamations of the death of the Afro-Asian movement, the concept was recently revived by commemorating conferences in 2005 and 2015. Exactly because of this renewed interest in a form of Afro-Asian solidarity, the failure of the attempts in the years between 1955-1965 needs further exploration. Whereas most recent scholarship concerning the Third World focuses on the developments of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), this thesis seeks to clarify the failure of the attempt to organise a second Afro-Asian conference, with the (anti-)climax in 1965 in Algiers. Where most literature has focused on the “Bandung Spirit” and feeling of solidarity the first Afro-Asian conference at Bandung produced, historical evidence shows that the profound division at this conference and the years following clouded the prospects of a second Afro-Asian conference in a Cold War atmosphere. This thesis focuses on the Chinese views on the Afro-Asian movement and their advocating for a second Afro-Asian conference, and how it relates to their foreign policy and views on the Third World in general.

Keywords: Afro-Asian Conference, Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation , Algiers Conference, Bandung Conference, Cold War, Non-Aligned Movement, Second Bandung, Second Belgrade, Third World.

Contents

Introduction	4
<i>Chapter 1:</i>	
Revisiting the Bandung Spirit of 1955	7
<i>Chapter 2:</i>	
“Not a place for arguments”: 1956-1961	11
<i>Chapter 3:</i>	
“Arguing against compromise”: 1962-1965	15
Conclusion	23
Bibliography	26

Introduction

1955 was a turning point for the part of the world previously colonised by European powers, and those still to be decolonised. The First Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in that year has entered history as a success for the ‘Third World Project’, resulting in the myth of the “Bandung Spirit”. The Second Asian-African Conference, however, was repeatedly postponed. Although there were plans for a second conference continuously in the ten years leading up to 1965, the plans were not realised during the Cold War. The second conference did not take place until 2005, with a certain symbolic value because it took place 50 years after Bandung.

A second conference was continuously advocated for by China and others, until it was postponed indefinitely in 1965. Why was the second Afro-Asian never realised during the Cold War, even when the first Afro-Asian conference had produced the Bandung Spirit? The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai argued after the second postponement in 1965 that the nature of the conference was what made it impossible to be held. He meant that the Afro-Asian movement in itself was an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist movement, which had two main opponents who lobbied against it: “imperialism” (embodied in the United States) and “revisionism” (embodied in the Soviet Union). The Afro-Asian movement was thus engulfed in the Cold War tendencies it had tried to remain above at the first conference in Bandung.

Sparked academic interest in the perennial territories of the Cold War is part of a larger framework of what has been called the New Cold War history. This new approach to the Cold War has been characterized by analysing the role of ideas in shaping the conflict, as opposed to a military ‘clash of great powers’.¹ This new approach was made possible by the being made public and translation of Soviet and Chinese sources.

Historian Odd Arne Westad has challenged traditional approaches in the same fashion by coining the theory of the Global Cold War, changing the academic view on the Cold War in the sense that it was not just a conflict between East and West. He argues that it also very much played a part in the history of the countries he describes as the ‘Third World’. In his book *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (2005) he argues that Third World leaders during the Cold War made alliances with one of the two power blocs, due to ‘ideological loyalty’.² In this sense his Cold War was a competition for

¹ John Lewis Gaddis, “The New Cold War History”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 20, 1998, fpri.org/article/1998/06/the-new-cold-war-history/, accessed on June 21, 2017.

² Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York 2005) 3-5.

spheres of influences between the Soviet Union and the United States, which stretched out into the Third World. Curious is the fact that Westad does not discuss China's role in this power struggle for influence.

“The Third World was not a place. It was a project”, must be the most quoted sentences of Vijah Prashad's *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (2007) in recent scholarship on the Third World. Rather than a geographical place, it was a project that failed due to internal failures and external pressures, claims Prashad. Rather than seeing the Third World as a periphery area for the power blocs, like Westad, Prashad looks at the agency of the Third World leaders, and the paths they took after the anti-colonial struggle. By looking at the Third World, Prashad emphasizes the way leaders of Third World countries used multiple solidarity movements, both to position themselves in a Cold War setting between power blocs, and to pursue national interests.³ In this sense, he also describes the Bandung Spirit as a fabrication, which was useful for national politics.⁴

A historian who has written about China's role in the Cold War is Chen Jian. In *Mao's China and the Cold War* (2001) he argues that China has inaccurately been placed in the periphery of the Cold War.⁵ Starting from this premise, Kuo-kang Shao approaches China's foreign policy and its main advocate Premier Zhou Enlai in *Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy* (1996). China's initial agenda was threefold: “settle the boundaries, create a neutral belt all round China as a zone of peace and then search for a global role”. In the years between 1955 and 1965, China adopted a foreign policy pursuing, what Zhou called the “united front strategy”. I will look at how this strategy influenced the efforts to create a form of Afro-Asian solidarity, and how the failure of this strategy was visible in the postponement of the second Afro-Asian conference.

The only standard work about this Afro-Asian movement is *The Afro-Asian Movement* (1973) by David Kimche. An undoubted distinction of the work is that it offers not only an account of the mythical Afro-Asianism at Bandung, then subsumed within non-aligned congregations, and finally in disarray at Algiers, but also of a parallel movement, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), which served initially as a Communist front for the prosecution of peaceful coexistence and later as a forum for the Sino-Soviet split which shattered any idea of solidarity.⁶ The value of looking at Kimche's account is that he

³ Vijah Prashad, *The Darker Nations* (New York, 2007).

⁴ Prashad, *Darker Nations*, 31-50.

⁵ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapell Hill and London, 2001) 2-16.

⁶ Kimche, *Afro-Asian Movement*, 144-213.

clearly outlines the actualities of the ‘myth’ of Bandung so that the impact can be assessed accordingly.

The sources concerning the Second Afro-Asian Conference in the Digital Archives of the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project form an important framework for the added value of this thesis. They add much to the conversation on the position of the advocates of a second conference through all ten years, with China being the most continuous advocate. Most of our used sources contain the voice of Premier Zhou Enlai, who influenced China’s foreign policy greatly during the ten years I have analysed. Through this coloured lens we also hear the voice of the opponents of the conference.

However, since the amount of sources concerning the plans in between 1955 and 1965 in this archive is limited, I moved on to search in the Dutch National Archives in The Hague for sources related to this time. Here valuable sources were to be found on the Dutch lobbying for the first Afro-Asian conference in 1955 and the content of the Bandung anniversary celebrations in 1956 and 1957. Together with the final communiqués of Bandung in 1955 and the preparatory meeting for Algiers in 1964 and some incidental sources found in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Archives, and together this creates quite a complete picture.

Starting from our hypothesis that the need for Afro-Asian solidarity in the form of the Afro-Asian conference for China came forth out of their foreign policy which tried to de-isolate them internationally, I will trail the developments in the following structure. In the first chapter, must first turn to the starting point: the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the expectations and requirements it created. An analysis of the creation of the Bandung Spirit is needed, since a lot of the leaders who proclaimed this Afro-Asian solidarity after Bandung turned their back on the Afro-Asian movement later on. We can then look in the second chapter at the first 5 years after the conference when concrete desires were vocalised and plans were created, but never executed. In this chapter I will also outline the different trajectories that were followed in the wake of Bandung. In the last chapter I will therefore turn to the period of 1962-1965, discussing the developments in the Third World leading up to the preparing for a second Afro-Asian conference in Algiers, but climaxing into the indefinite postponement in 1965.

Chapter 1 Revisiting the Bandung Spirit of 1955

In April 1955, 29 countries from Asia, Africa and the Middle East attended a diplomatic meeting held in Bandung, Indonesia. Formally known as the Asian-African Conference, this diplomatic occasion was organized by Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Burma and Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) with the purpose of consolidating political interests across the former colonies. The presence of revolutionary thinkers and political leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Zhou Enlai and host Ahmed Sukarno gave a certain spectacle to the meeting that in turn has generated a certain mythology about it. In short, the Bandung meeting has popularly been viewed as a shining moment of "Third World" solidarity in the face of Western neo-colonialism during the early Cold War period, and a lot of historiography has not given fair due to the variety of opinions and alliances presented at the conference.

In a tense period where war was frequently on outbreak, looking at diplomatic ties of the new emerging countries on conferences is quite essential. Chris Tudda writes in *Cold War Summits: A History from Potsdam to Malta* (2015) about the importance: "Summits, famous or not, often penetrated the public consciousness, and until the last days of the Cold War, they served as bellwethers for the state of Cold War tensions."⁷ In his selection he picks the first Afro-Asian conference at Bandung as the most meaningful of the Third World summits during the Cold War, because it had showed that the "former colonies could no longer be ignored on the world stage". David Kimche describes the initial motive for the conference: "creating Asian solutions for Asian problems". The United Nations as an international forum was seen as a too big a platform for regional discussions.

The conference was looked at by the First and Second World with fear. Chris Tudda about the dilemma of the United States with these conferences in the coming years: "the more Washington opposed the gathering, the more it would face charges of neo-imperialism" So the tactic they employed at Bandung was to make sure their pro-western aligned states attended the conference to steer the conversation to anti-communism and to make the case for the West.⁸ They were afraid of the "emotionalism of nationalist Asian leaders which might erupt at Bandung".⁹ Hence the Western world organised lobbies to make the conference less

⁷ Chris Tudda, *Cold War Summits: A History from Potsdam to Malta* (New York and London, 2015), 2-3.

⁸ Tudda, *Cold War Summits*, 52-53.

⁹ United States Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter: US-CIA), National Security Council Briefing, April 05, 1955.

radical. For instance, Dutch diplomats had asked ambassadors of Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan not to give in to Indonesian efforts to discuss Dutch New Guinea.¹⁰

In the end, however, the Bandung Conference did not lead to a general denunciation of the West as observers from the United States had feared. Instead, the participants displayed a wide range of ideologies and loyalties, of which some strongly connected to the power blocs. Many heads of state came to Bandung to follow their own agenda. India brought Jawaharlal Nehru who wanted his Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to be ratified by the Afro-Asian countries. Gamal Abdel Nasser represented the United Arab Republic, who envisioned a role for Cairo as the new capital of the Third World activity.

The ideological divisions became even more clear when the conference started with the opening addresses. Several focussed on the issue of world communism and the Chinese threat. Many had hoped that China would shoot itself in the foot by advocating communism, but the representative of China, Premier Zhou Enlai surprised them by staying exceptionally moderate and friendly to all.¹¹ This attitude which “relaxed tensions” had been a goal of Zhou. China tried to position itself as the reasonable ally who resisted the idea that the Third World should be divided into the influence spheres of the two powers. In this way, Bandung had provided a forum to end China’s isolation from world opinion and support.¹² In the wake of Bandung, China established relations with for instance Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Guinea, Iraq, Morocco, Syria, Sudan and Yemen. Some of these countries had had a pro-western stance, but developed more positively towards China. China tried to create a “zone of collective peace”.¹³

The expectancy of the world observing the differences of opinion at Bandung had therefore been that it was “probable either that the Conference would end in chaos, which would be very damaging to these new countries in Asia and Africa that were trying to make democracy work, or else that it would do nothing but pass angry resolutions about

¹⁰ *Nationaal Archief*, The Hague (hereafter: Ha-NA), 2.05.191, Dutch embassy in Iran (Teheran), 1955-1980, catalog number 470, dated May 10, 1955, “Uiteenzetting van dr. Abdoh over Bandoeng-conferentie”, Teheran 1468/197; *ibid.*, Posttelegram April 20, 1955, “Afro-Aziatische Conferentie”, Teheran, 1231-177G.S./167; *ibid.*, Codetelegram April 12, 1955, from Reyen/Luns, The Hague to Teheran.

¹¹ Kimche, *Afro-Asian Movement*, 68.

¹² Prashad, *Darker Nations*, 37.

¹³ Chen Jian, “China the Third World and The Cold War” in: *The Cold War in the Third World*, 76-77.

colonialism”.¹⁴ Even Nehru had thought the Afro-Asian countries were ideologically too far apart to come together as one.¹⁵

The ending of the conference in a manner of consensus in the form of the Ten Principles promoting world peace and cooperation came to be seen as a victory for the Afro-Asian countries, who showed that they could rise above differences. Leaders like Nasser returned to their countries and proclaimed that the former colonised had entered the world stage, in such an enthusiastic fashion which came to be known as “The Bandung Spirit”. Prashad defines this spirit as thus: “the colonized world had now emerged to claim its space in world affairs, not just as adjunct of the First or Second Worlds, but as a player in its own right.”¹⁶ Looking more closely at the drafting of the final communique, however, shows the struggle for compromise, which made the prospect of consensus and solidarity at a second Afro-Asian conference even less likely. Their only ideological similarities came forth out of their shared history of an anti-colonial struggle. Coming out of the conference as one, however, was of paramount importance in the early Cold War years. The so-called Bandung Spirit was a way to frame Afro-Asian unity, as a counterpart to the First and Second Worlds.

This success created high expectations for a second conference, which already then was thought as unlikely or even unwanted to happen¹⁷. There was, however, a call for a second Afro-Asian conference, in Cairo. Nasser had called that after this conference in Asia, the next Afro-Asian conference should logically be in Africa. Moreover, it should be in his Cairo. More of the African countries which were in an anti-colonial struggle should be attending. Thus for a second Afro-Asian conference not only the location was important, also the number and geographical location of the attendees.

How to organise this second conference, however, was a point of discussion. At the meeting at Colombo between the sponsors of Bandung, already the question was raised about the desirability of forming a permanent organisation of Afro-Asian countries.¹⁸ This conversation is telling about the low expectations of the solidarity at the conference. India’s Nehru did hardly see an institutionalised version of Bandung becoming effective, because of the variety of opinions. Burma’s U Nu concurred and argued for a permanent institution, but only with countries that were in agreement. China’s Zhou went for the middle way; he proclaimed the most suitable way to go was a liaison institution, which would be permanent

¹⁴ Vernon Bartlett, *The Awakening of Afro-Asian Nations*, *African Affairs* (1960), 105.

¹⁵ Kimche, *Afro-Asian Movement*, 50.

¹⁶ Prashad, *Darker Nations*, 45.

¹⁷ NL-HaNA, 2.05.164, Dutch embassy in Sri Lanka/Ceylon (Colombo), catalog number 530, .

¹⁸ Kimche, *Afro-Asian Movement*, 74.

but not too tightly binding. Nehru disagreed and said that any permanent institutionalisation of Afro-Asian countries might be seen as a threat to the United Nations.¹⁹ Bandung turned out to be as divided Nehru had projected. In the final communiqué, therefore, no permanent secretariat was established. So instead the establishment of liaison offices were mentioned, but these were hardly established. The only basis for a second Afro-Asian conference to be found in the final communiqué is that a second conference should be called for by the original sponsors and had to be a consensus decision.²⁰

The expectations which arose from Bandung for a second conference were in summary: (1) the same or higher amount of countries (2) a seeming consensus and solidarity (3) heads of state conference/summit (4) a bigger role for African and newly emerged states (5) a new reason for meeting (6) the possible establishment of a permanent secretariat. An analysis of these expectations will turn out to be important when we look at why the second conference failed to occur in the following years, and how these requirements limited the possibilities. It also showed the divide in opinions and alliances, which made a consensus at a second conference less likely, and the proclaimed Bandung Spirit less believable. And we saw the influence of the Western countries over the Afro-Asian conference. The participation of China had relaxed tensions and provided China with a way out of their isolation. The call for a second conference in Cairo, and it is there that we now must turn.

¹⁹ Prashad, *Darker Nations*, 53-54.

²⁰ *Final communiqué* of the first Afro-Asian conference in Bandung (Indonesia), 1955, 10.

Chapter 2 1956-1961: “Not a place for arguments”

The Bandung Spirit soon revealed itself for what it was: a myth²¹. A second Afro-Asian conference in Cairo was prevented by the Suez Crisis. Changes in leadership of the Colombo Powers countries shifted alliances: Ceylon not pro-Western anymore and Pakistan. Change in foreign policy China, and deteriorating tensions with the Soviet Union. Internal tensions between Afro-Asian countries over the situation in Palestine and the Kashmir-border. China, although not part of the Colombo powers, becomes the main advocate behind the second conference, with support from Indonesia who want to prolong their legacy. Since no solidarity could be reached due to these issues, other organisations with likeminded opinions were formed: the AAPSO and the NAM. This chapter will thus deal with the question: Why did a second Afro-Asian conference not take place in the few years after Bandung, after such a positive spirit of solidarity had been proclaimed?

When the representatives left Bandung, virtually all proclaimed that the Afro-Asian countries had proclaimed their role on the world stage, proclaiming the Bandung Spirit. But it had not yet been one year later and that proclaimed solidarity had seemingly vanished. Upon Bandung's first birthday in April 1956 the second conference which would take place in Cairo had been cancelled. Egypt's Nasser had proclaimed that he wanted the second conference organised in his Cairo, but the situation in Egypt prevented this from happening. The United States revoked its agreement to finance the Aswan Dam, and Nasser retaliated by seizing the Suez Canal, then owned by a French company. In late 1956, a coalition by France, Great Britain and Israel tried to counter this. The United States, the Soviet Union and leading Third World countries condemned these actions. In the end, the situation was too unstable and the second Afro-Asian conference in 1956 was no longer a concrete plan.²²

The Burmese, one of the five Bandung sponsors, argued that this was for the best, because the atmosphere solidarity would be hard to maintain in the current circumstances. They were sure a conference at this time would result in an anti-climax.²³ No effort was made to change the location in 1956. One year later in 1957 at the Burmese commemoration of the second birthday of Bandung there were no mentions of plans for a second conference.²⁴ In the

²¹ Kimche, *Afro-Asian Movement*, 76-81.

²² *Ibid.*, 88-89.

²³ NL-HaNA, 2.05.153, Dutch embassy in Burma (Rangoon), catalog number 216, letter April 21, 1956, 'Verjaardag Bandoeng'. Rangoon to The Hague, 935/168.

²⁴ NL-HaNA, 2.05.153, Dutch embassy in Burma (Rangoon), catalog number 216, letter April 24, 1957, Rangoon to The Hague.

aftermath of the creation of the Bandung Spirit, clearly a lack of enthusiasm characterised the opinion to bring about a second conference.

For a forum which was created to discuss “Asian solutions for Asian problems”, most countries sure seemed to be sceptical about the actual following through on that. What were these circumstances which made an atmosphere of solidarity impossible, like these leaders proclaimed? For one, their own moral rules as set in the ten principles did not always turn out to be followed in practice. The eighth principle in the Bandung communiqué pledged the countries to settle disputes “by peaceful means” within the framework of the United Nations. While this principle was treasured in rhetoric and sometimes in practice, it could not be sustained in many instances. India and Pakistan fought a border war over Kashmir before the British troops had even left the subcontinent, while the Israeli state and its Arab neighbours went to war as soon as the former came into existence. The PRC threatened Formosa with an invasion, while Morocco and Algeria in 1960 went to war over their various disputed boundaries.²⁵

The United States’ government grew more and more interested in the Afro-Asian countries over time.²⁶ In one of the reports on the failure to bring about a second Afro-Asian conference, they made a quite accurate conclusion about the variety of reasons why the second Afro-Asian conference failed to occur: “the insistence of some of the Colombo powers on the inclusion of Israel, the thorny question of the propriety of Soviet participation, the reluctance of states participating in the Baghdad and SEATO pacts to expose themselves to criticism at such a gathering, satisfaction with the cooperative efforts and consultative opportunities available within the framework of the United Nations, and concern that if the gathering were to take place in the Near East- in either Cairo or Damascus – it might be exploited primarily as a forum for extremist Arab nationalism.”²⁷ The Afro-Asian nations clearly were not as solidarity group as the “Bandung Spirit” had framed it to be.

Later that year, however, there were other countries that, like China and Indonesia, advocated for a conference in 1957. Cambodia, for example, wanted a new conference as a place for an exchange of thought.²⁸ Syria, among other Arab countries, wanted a forum to discuss the Israel-Palestine issue.²⁹ Ceylon, similarly, wanted a forum where they could voice

²⁵ Prashad, *Darker Nations*, 167.

²⁶ Robert B. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge, 2013).

²⁷ US-CIA, Report on “The Afro Asian Solidarity Conference, Cairo, Egypt”, RDP78-00915R000700140001-8.

²⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.05.164, Dutch embassy in Sri Lanka/Ceylon (Colombo), catalog number 532, letter February 22, 1957, ‘Tweede Afro-Asiatische Conferentie’, Colombo to The Hague, 448/79.

²⁹ CWIHP, “Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Syria, 'The Situation of Ambassador Chen’s Visit to the Syrian Foreign Minister’,” February 11, 1957, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114822>.

their opinion, themselves being relatively internationally isolated by taking a pro-Western stance.³⁰ Had Sir John Kotewala in January 1956 agreed to postpone a second conference “because he saw no point in holding one” if there was “nothing to talk about”³¹, in 1957 Ceylon went the other way. Elected in 1956, the new prime-minister Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike tried to make changes to the international isolation of Ceylon. In this year Ceylon made itself the main initiator for a second conference, proposing Colombo as likely venue. Bandaranaike had sent notifications to all the Bandung countries to see where their opinion stood on a possible second conference.³² They were not greeted with a surge of enthusiasm. The plans for a conference in 1958 got disrupted when security could not be guaranteed with the Tamil-Singhalese riots escalating in Ceylon.

However, Zhou also knew that the tensions at the first conference made consensus at a follow-up conference even less likely. Zhou, in conversation with the Indonesian ambassador in April 1957, said plainly: “it is impossible to have a consensus like last time”. He then went on to other possibilities: “It is possible to hold a conference of major countries; participants might be limited to only major [countries] and Afro-Asian countries in agreement. Such as: India, Indonesia, Burma, Egypt and our country, etc.” Due to the expectations created by Bandung, Zhou said that if the number of participating countries is very small, then they would rather wait until the time was right. A second Afro-Asian conference had to be “beneficial to solidarity”. Therefore they did not want the conference to become “a place for arguments.”³³

Why was reaching a consensus so important for Zhou? This can be explained through China’s change in foreign policy and ideology. They developed in their ideology for the Third World from a “Zone of Peace” policy to a “United front” policy. Increased tensions with their former allies like their “ideological brother” in the Soviet Union and with India, combined with the national economic and social campaign of the “Great Leap Forward” had created a new international approach. No longer with Soviet Union and India on the ‘peaceful coexistence’ idea in relation to the Western imperialist countries.

Both streams of thought then resorted to creating their own organisations with like-minded groups. Kimche describes the radical approach gaining momentum in the immediate

³⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.05.164, Dutch embassy in Sri Lanka/Ceylon (Colombo), catalog number 532.

³¹ NL-HaNA, 2.05.164, Dutch embassy in Sri Lanka/Ceylon (Colombo), catalog number 532, letter January 3, 1956, ‘Tweede Afro-Asiatiese Conferentie’, Colombo to The Hague, 71/9.

³² NL-HaNA, 2.05.164, Dutch Embassy in Sri Lanka/Ceylon (Colombo), catalog number 532, letter February 20, 1957, ‘Tweede Afro-Asiatiese Conferentie’, Colombo to The Hague 417/76.

³³ CWIHP, “Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, ‘Main points of the Discussion between the Premier and Soekardjo Wiriopranoto,’” April 03, 1957, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114704>.

aftermath of Bandung with the establishment of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) in Cairo in the beginning of 1958.³⁴ With "professional efficiency" they created without flaw a permanent institution, ensuring a regular call for new conferences.³⁵ In his account of the rise and fall of nonalignment, Mark Lawrence Atwood argues that this "radical approach then gradually lost its pull on the Third World after 'the Sino-Soviet split transformed AAPSO meetings into shouting matches among Communist factions'³⁶. The AAPSO's pro-Communist stance alienated key countries, like India. Similarly it saw no place for countries with a different geographical location, like Yugoslavia. These countries voiced their nonaligned in the creation of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), with their first meeting in Belgrade in 1961.³⁷ Between these movements, a deteriorating relation between China and the Soviet Union became clear. For the Third World this created the possibility for increased assistance, since both looked for local allies.

The second Afro-Asian conference had become a tool for the Afro-Asian nations. Nasser had wanted it to hold it in Cairo, so it would become the capital of the Third World. Indonesia wanted it to prolong their Bandung legacy. Syria and Cambodia had wanted it to create a forum to air international tensions. China and Ceylon wanted it to de-isolate themselves on an international level. China's foreign policy had gone in this period from 'a zone of collective peace' to 'united front strategy'. Because the aftermath of the first conference had created the myth of the Bandung Spirit of Afro-Asian solidarity, the need for consensus ruined the plans, since internal tensions in the Afro-Asian world would not allow a continuation of this solidarity.

³⁴ Kimche, *Afro-Asian Movement*, 144-167.

³⁵ Ibid., 135.

³⁶ Mark Lawrence Atwood, "The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment", in: *The Cold War in the Third World*, 143-144.

³⁷ Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM", 202-204.

Chapter 3: 1962-1965 “Arguing against compromise”

In the following years China experienced a growth of domestic radicalism and polemics with Moscow. In the Afro-Asian organisations the Sino-Soviet split became apparent, and the reputation of the AAPSO became a communist forum. More tension between India and China also rose from 1961 onwards, climaxing in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. At the same more and more African states decolonised, and united themselves in the Organisation for African Unity, which united militant anti-imperialist views and more moderate non-aligned voices. China at this time pursued economic cooperation with the Third World and saw the Third World as the forefront in the battle against imperialism and neo-colonialism. A new reason for a second Afro-Asian conference came in the new common enemy in the United States. No-one could reasonably support the United States intervention in Vietnam, after having had themselves an anti-colonial struggle. China’s call to discuss this issue at an Afro-Asian forum was therefore not a hopeless one. This chapter will thus start with the question: Which circumstances made the Chinese concrete plans for a second conference possible? Then it will continue the reasons why it was postponed.

Due to an economic recovery, Mao wanted to push China towards a new period of “revolutionary high tide”. Mao’s openly criticized the strategy of the Soviet Union of peaceful coexistence. From these tendencies forward, Mao coined his Two Intermediate Zones thesis. The first included “the vast economically backward countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America” and the second encompassed : imperialist and advanced capitalist countries in Europe”³⁸. These zones were between the United States and the Soviet Union. Just like at Bandung, China increasingly voiced their identification with the first zone.

Against this backdrop, increasing influence in Africa was a way to secure new allies in the Afro-Asian world. Africa was also seen as an important battle field against the United States, the leader of the "capitalist world" and, more important, the anti-Communist China coalition.³⁹ Zhou therefore made a tour through Africa to get countries on his side for the United Nations and Second Afro-Asian conference.⁴⁰ In late 1963-early 1964, Zhou spent three months visiting ten African countries. During the trip, the Chinese premier repeatedly emphasized that China was a true friend and natural ally of newly independent African countries. In order to prove this point, China began to provide economic, technological and

³⁸ Quote Mao in *The Cold War in the Third World*, 91.

³⁹ Chen Jian, “China, The Third World and the Cold War”, 90.

⁴⁰ Taomo, “Working paper #67”, 5-6.

medical support to the African countries that were most friendly to China, including Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Tanzania and Zambia.⁴¹ China tried to forge a vision of an “imagined community” of post-colonial developing countries that were against the domination of world politics by the two superpowers, as they had tried first with the Asian countries.⁴²

Both a second NAM conference and a second Afro-Asian conference were now on the Third World agenda. Most Third World countries were not eager to decline an invitation to either. Mohamed Yala, the Algerian ambassador to China said: “Our attendance of the Non-Aligned Movement Conference is because African and Arab countries attend, it is so that we can prevent the conference from going in another direction. The real conference is the Asia-Africa Conference, these are the countries that have common goals.”⁴³

The outcome of the NAM conference in Cairo was disappointing for many. The call for nuclear disarmament for instance proved futile. India made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Cairo conference to make a direct appeal to China not to proceed with their effort to become a nuclear power.⁴⁴ The NAM conference was relatively willing to approve the test-ban treaty and proclaim its own innocence in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but nobody wanted to offend China needlessly by protesting at what everyone knew was shortly going to happen. And like expected, the first Chinese bomb was exploded in the Takla Makan desert a few days after the end of the NAM conference in Cairo.⁴⁵ Next to this, the conversation about the question of United States intervention in Vietnam had been discussed from a theoretical point of view, which had displeased the radical anti-imperialists.

A second Afro-Asian conference was therefore expected to create more controversial results. A lot had changed in the Afro-Asian movement compared to 1955. It was expected to be attended by more than twice the number that was present at Bandung.⁴⁶ More than half the membership of the United Nations now belonged to Asia and Africa. The outside world who looked at a second Afro-Asian conference felt like a consensus at such a conference “could influence world affairs at large”⁴⁷

⁴¹ Chen Jian, “The Cold War in the Third World, China the Third World and The Cold War”, 92.

⁴² Shao, *Zhou Enlai*, 212-213.

⁴³ CWIHP, “Memorandum of Conversation from the Meeting between Premier Zhou Enlai and the Algerian Ambassador to China Mohamed Yala,” August 06, 1964, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118723>.

⁴⁴ Abraham, “From Bandung to NAM”, 212.

⁴⁵ G. F. Hudson, “The Neutrals and the Afro-Asians”, *The World Today* 20 (Dec., 1964): 12, 546.

⁴⁶ Franklin B. Weinstein, “The Second Asian-African Conference: Preliminary Bouts”, *Asian Survey* 5:7 (Jul., 1965), 360.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

The final communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Djakarta preparatory meeting for the second Afro-Asian conference is significant as it laid down the objectives as well as the agenda of the now concrete plans for the second conference. The seven goals as proclaimed by the meeting were generally set upon a continuing of the Bandung spirit, and created not much controversy.⁴⁸ The agenda, however, was a little bit more controversial. For instance, alongside a discussion about the United Nations, the desirability of the establishment of a permanent Secretariat to facilitate effective cooperation amongst African-Asian nations would be discussed. Also, the second point on the agenda after reaffirming the Ten Principles of Bandung would be a discussion about “decolonization and the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism”⁴⁹.

The scholarship on the second Afro-Asian conference in 1965 has focused on the fact that as soon as the Algerian coup happened, most of the participants backed out. Claiming for example that the conference “lacked a *raison d’être*” and most of the countries just “did not want it to meet”.⁵⁰ Looking at all the tensions in the Cold War setting in the years leading up to 1965, I tend to disagree with this statement by a contemporary G.H. Jansen in *The World Today*.

In the two years leading up to a second Bandung United States’ policy had directly affected the Afro-Asian countries. They had had a direct impact in coups in the Congo, Bolivia and Brazil, and later Indonesia. In February 1965 their air forces began the bombing of North Vietnam.⁵¹ Indonesia and China saw these developments as their opportunity to frame their reason for a conference.⁵² We can see this in Zhou Enlai’s note to Algerian ambassador to China Mohamed Yala: “America is both the last and the strongest imperialist nation in the world. If we are to expel them, Asia, Africa, and Latin America will have to fight for a long time. We must support one another in this struggle. We face this common enemy together.”⁵³ And so the situation in Vietnam gave the conference a *raison d’être*⁵⁴.

⁴⁸ Final Communiqué Preparatory meeting at Djakarta, 15 April 1964, 2-3.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ G. H. Jansen, “Postponement of the ‘second Bandung’”, *The World Today* 21(Sep., 1965):9, 399.

⁵¹ Robert B. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge, 2013), 213-215.

⁵² CWIHP, “Memorandum of Conversation from the Meeting between Premier Zhou Enlai and the Algerian Ambassador to China Mohamed Yala,” August 06, 1964,

⁵³ CWIHP, “Memorandum of Conversation from the Meeting between Premier Zhou Enlai and the Algerian Ambassador to China Mohamed Yala,” August 06, 1964,

⁵⁴ CWIHP, “Memorandum of the First Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Ri Ju-yeon,” November 10, 1965,

For the United States in 1964, tensions rose significantly, when it was clear the main organisers intended to make the conference anti-American and condemn the United States for their actions in Vietnam.⁵⁵ In the article by Eric Gettig the lobby from the United States to influence the second Afro-Asian conference is exposed.⁵⁶ The United States “undertook a subtle, but vigorous, diplomatic effort to influence the conference from behind the scenes”.⁵⁷ Seemingly in the same fashion as at Bandung, instead of influencing the holding of the conference, they influenced the would-be participants. They feared that the conference would condemn the United States as an imperialist power, particularly for its actions in Vietnam, and that the event would be part of a general Third World drift in a radical, anti-Western direction under Chinese leadership.⁵⁸ At the NAM conference in Cairo they had managed to dodge a bullet, but the main advocates of the more radical Afro-Asian conference had a greater intention.

The rest of the final communiqué was valuable for showing which controversial issues were most discussed. For instance, the controversy over the invitation to the Soviet Union. Zhou continued to object against Soviet participation on the grounds that it was neither an African nor an Asian state. In his opinion the Afro-Asian movement was not a racial or continental concept. What the Afro-Asian countries had in common was a shared history of being suppressed by a Western colonialist.⁵⁹ The Indonesian chairman created a sub-committee comprised of nine countries to consider the proposal to invite the USSR, including Pakistan, Philippines and Indonesia, but India was excluded. The sub-committee eventually agreed on the formulation that stated in the final communiqué: ‘In the case of the USSR, after full discussion, no decision was reached’,⁶⁰ meaning that no invitation could be issued.⁶¹

A smaller discussion was the Indonesian objection to the invitation to Malaysia. It is interesting to note that nearly half of the countries present at the Djakarta meet had recognized Malaysia, however, except India and Ceylon, none of the others came out in support of Malaysia against the Indonesian objection.⁶² Ceylon had been an advocate of the conference, but were also advocates for USSR and Malaysia as participants. Ceylon switches positions because of foreseen radicalization of the conference by Indonesia. Indonesia quitted the

⁵⁵ Robert B. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson and the Non-Aligned World* (Cambridge, 2013).

⁵⁶ Eric Gettig, ““Trouble ahead in Afro-Asia”: The United States, the Second Bandung Conference, and the Struggle for the Third World, 1964–1965”, *Diplomatic History* 39 (2015): 1.

⁵⁷ Gettig, “Trouble Ahead”, 127.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Kimche, *Afro-Asian Movement*, 118-119.

⁶⁰ Final Communiqué Preparatory meeting at Djakarta, 15 April 1964, 5.

⁶¹ Abraham, “From Bandung to NAM”, 213.

⁶² *Ibid.*

United Nations after protesting the entry of Malaysia as a new member. Sukarno intended to create an organisation which would function as an alternative United Nations.⁶³

China and Indonesia, the advocates of the second Afro-Asian conference expressed their views openly in a joint Sino Indonesian statement issued in Peking on January 28, 1965. Following Sukarno's decision to withdraw from the United Nations, despite numerous Asian and African appeals to reconsider this radical gesture, the joint statement proclaimed that “the United Nations cannot reflect the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist desire of the people of the world, nor can it organizationally reflect the reality in which the new emerging and revolutionary forces have far outstripped the decadent forces.”⁶⁴ An awareness had been created that participants in a second Afro-Asian conference might be confronted with an uncomfortable choice between the United Nations, in which the smaller countries play an important role, and an unpredictable new organization of “New Emerging Forces”.⁶⁵

Since the Sino-Indian border war in October 1962, the relationship of the former friends had further deteriorated. Beijing systematically pushed Delhi out of the Afro-Asian Movement, which explained India's sudden increase of interest in the NAM⁶⁶. India tried to keep a second Afro-Asian conference from happening with “foot-dragging tactics”.⁶⁷ Nehru had never been a big advocate of the Afro-Asian movement and had nestled itself firmly in the NAM. With his death India became a lesser deal than it once had been, which was visible at the NAM conference in Cairo in 1964, where it played virtually no role.⁶⁸ Prospects for a conference where the non-aligned would be in minority, made India less enthusiastic about a Second Bandung. Declining an invitation was no option however. As it was an original member of the Colombo Powers and cosponsor of the first Bandung Conference, India “had a lot to lose by disavowing its own international legacy”.⁶⁹

The first postponement was proclaimed in the beginning of 1965. Were the plans first for March, now the participants agreed to meet in June. This first postponement turned out to be, as Kimche calls it, “a bad omen”⁷⁰. On his tour through Africa, Zhou had insisted that the

⁶³ Alastair M. Taylor, “Sukarno: First United Nations Drop-Out”, *International Journal* 20 (Spring, 1965):2, 206-213.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ NL-HaNA, 2.05.164, Dutch embassy in Sri Lanka/Ceylon (Colombo), catalog number 532, newspaper article June 14, 1965, “Ceylon will not support another UN”, *The Sun*.

⁶⁶ Lüth, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973*, 126.

⁶⁷ Abraham, “From Bandung to NAM”, 211-212.

⁶⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.05.153, Dutch embassy Burma (Rangoon), catalog number 256, letter “India en de niet geallieerden conferentie”.

⁶⁹ Abraham, “From Bandung to NAM”, 212.

⁷⁰ Kimche, *Afro-Asian Movement*, 118.

fight against colonialism “must be continued until all Africa has been freed”. Furthermore, African independence could only be achieved via “armed struggle”. Algeria was cited as the example, and made it a good place to discuss imperialism. The common history of the radical anti-colonial struggle was still fresh, and it gave the Afro-Asian movement the opportunity to meet in Africa. But, a day before the foreign ministers were to have their meeting in Algiers, a bomb exploded in the conference hall. A lot of chaos was created by the coup on the 19th of June, when the president of Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella, was overthrown. Conversations between the ministers involved show that diplomats on the location had no clue what was happening, and if the conference would continue.⁷¹

Thus in between the June and October, for which the conference was newly scheduled, the countries that had already doubted if they should be supporting this conference in the first place, saw their chance to back out. It gave an excuse to abandon a ‘Second Bandung’ without breaking the myth of the Bandung Spirit. For instance, the Burmese General Ne Win already had a dislike of these big conferences. The Dutch ambassador describes that the Algerian instability was just the excuse Ne Win needed to pull out of the conference.⁷² More were to follow, like Zhang Hanfu reported to Zhou on the 21st of June “If the situation is unstable, some delegations will not attend the [Second Asian African] Conference.”⁷³

There were still advocates for the holding of the conference on time. Most notably were the new Algerian leaders, Boumediene and Bouteflika. “They are under the impression that if their foreign friends come, their power will be consolidated and they will be able to ignore the larger issues.” Wanting to protect their relations with the new Algerian regime, also the Arab appeared to be rather positive, explained Deputy Minister Qiao.⁷⁴

Efforts to simply change the location were not seen logistically plausible. In a record of conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and North Korean Ambassador in China Pak Se-chang on the 23rd of July they discuss the possibility of the changing of the location. When postponed, it would come within the same time as the scheduled African

⁷¹ CWIHP, “Cable from Zhang Hanfu, 'Situation of the Talks with Foreign Minister Pak Seong-cheol',” June 21, 1965, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118871>.

⁷² NL-HaNA, 2.05.153, Dutch embassy Burma (Rangoon), catalog number 217, July 2, 1965 “Birna en de Afro-Asiatiese conferentie”, 690/191.

⁷³ CWIHP, “Cable from Zhang Hanfu, 'Situation of the Talks with Foreign Minister Pak Seong-cheol',” June 21, 1965, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118871>.

⁷⁴ CWIHP, “Record of Conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and North Korean Ambassador in China Pak Se-chang,” October 11, 1965, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118773>.

Summit in Guinea. Changing the location to Cairo or Addis Ababa was then discussed as another option, but it would be “difficult to restart preparations from the beginning”.⁷⁵

Thus, as previous advocates turned on their positive opinion, holding a conference became less and less likely. And, if held, attendance of the Soviet Union became even more likely. For instance, Egypt, had made a joint announcement with the Soviet Union on 1 September, which in Chinese eyes communicated the same message as “the United Arab Republic taking the lead in approving the USSR's attendance. The problems of the United Arab Republic's rightward swing, and Mali are not going to be easy to resolve.”⁷⁶

On 11 October Sihanouk expressed the Cambodian opinion to Zhou: “if the Second Asia-Africa Conference is used as a conference against imperialism, then we might as well hold an actual conference against imperialism.” Zhou agreed with him in principle, but saw in reality this conference would only be attended by a few countries. His plan for the conference had been to show that a united front of Afro-Asian countries would be denouncing the neo-imperialist United States. In reality however, multiple Afro-Asian nations had diplomatic relations with the United States, and “If the core and the front are different, then the front cannot be too narrow”.⁷⁷ To be able to gather support for a conference, it had to at least appear to be non-controversial. The goal was therefore to be different in nature, but should not be as such by name. That would be too controversial for many countries which Zhou had wanted to form a united front against the First and Second World with.

It then became paramount for China to uphold the myth of solidarity. It was more important for the world to think they are still united than hold a planned conference and visibly show the division. Advocating an indefinite postponement, therefore, was the only way to get out without losing face. “Otherwise”, as Chinese Deputy-Foreign Minister Qiao told the North Korean ambassador to China on the 11th of October, “the conference would lose [its] prestige”. He went on to say: “Today's postponement is for the conference's success in the future.”⁷⁸

⁷⁵ CWIHP, “Record of Conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and North Korean Ambassador in China Pak Se-chang,” July 23, 1965, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118830>.

⁷⁶ CWIHP, “Record of Conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and North Korean Ambassador in China Pak Se-chang,” October 11, 1965, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118773>.

⁷⁷ CWIHP, Record of Conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and North Korean Ambassador in China Pak Se-chang, October 11, 1965 <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118773>.

⁷⁸ CWIHP, “Record of Conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and North Korean Ambassador in China Pak Se-chang,” October 11, 1965, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118773>.

A few weeks later, China went even further. The *Peking Review*, a weekly review of Chinese outlooks, wrote in big letters on its front page: “China will not attend conference which leads to split”. In this issue they published the “Joint Proposal of China and the Kingdom of Cambodia For the Postponement of the Second African-Asian Conference”, which had been issued on the 22nd of October. In the letter accompanying this statement the Chinese government stated that they would boycott the conference should it be “forcibly convened in schedule in violation of the principle of consensus”.⁷⁹

We cannot look at this failed conference without placing it in a Cold War structure. In November 1965 Zhou confirms that they would still like to hold an Afro-Asian conference, but that the United States (‘imperialism’) and the Soviet Union (‘revisionism’) prevent a solid outcome. “Therefore, imperialism is terrified of this conference, they cannot afford not to destroy it. Revisionism is scared as well, and is willing to fight its way in and do imperialism's work for it.”⁸⁰ “The other conferences were tolerated because they were not about the fight against imperialism and colonialism, nor were they promoting armed struggle. The Asia-Africa Conference on the other hand is one to oppose imperialism and colonialism. There is struggle here both in support of and counter to revolution.”⁸¹

And so the conference was postponed indefinitely. On November 10, Zhou spoke about the future of the Afro-Asian conference to Vice Premier Ri Ju-yeon: “If we are able to hold a conference like this, we will maintain revolutionary policies, arguing against compromise”.⁸² A future second conference, however, never came during the Cold War years.

⁷⁹ Edition of the *Peking Review* 44 (26 October 1965).

⁸⁰ CWIHP, “Memorandum of the First Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Ri Ju-yeon,” November 10, 1965, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118694>.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

Conclusion

I answered my research question: Why was a second Afro-Asian never realised during the Cold War, even when the first Afro-Asian conference had produced the “Bandung Spirit”? in three parts. In the first chapter we analysed what kind of expectations and requirements were raised for a second Afro-Asian conference at the first conference in Bandung . The most important conclusion was that already at Bandung, the Afro-Asian countries had aligned themselves in one way or another to either pacts or opinions. The non-Afro-Asian countries who observed the conference tried to influence it through their diplomatic relations. I then went on to show how the successful drafting of the final communiqué was the main reason for the proclamation of Bandung’s success of Afro-Asian solidarity, and how this framing has been dubbed ‘The Bandung Spirit’. Finally, I analysed how the first Afro-Asian conference created a set of requirements and limitations for a potential second conference: (1) the same or higher amount of countries (2) a seeming consensus and solidarity (3) heads of state conference/summit (4) a bigger role for African and newly emerged states (5) a new reason for meeting (6) the possible establishment of a permanent secretariat.

In the second chapter I tried to show how the need for consensus created by the so-called “Bandung Spirit” influenced the failure of organising the second Afro-Asian conference in the five years after Bandung. I tried to continue in trying to see which possibilities there were for a follow-up, and how internal tensions and unfortunate circumstances possibilities for a potential second conference. At the end of the Bandung conference there had been voiced intentions for a follow-up. Instead, I show that when this did not happen, the different groups started creating organisations which followed their opinion. Some continued in their Western alliance pacts, but most notably the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation and the Non-Aligned Movement .

The conditions for a second conference improved from 1962 onwards. So in the third chapter I analysed why despite the realistic chance of happening, in the end the conference was postponed anyway. The positive reactions to the invitations could be explained in two ways: First, now a real possibility of a second conference had been created, Afro-Asian leaders could not realistically say no. This would mean a undermining of their proclaimed Bandung Spirit. And second, the newly decolonised African nations had recently undergone a similar situation, and adhered the radical militant view, which would be the tone of the Algiers Conference. The case of the participation of the Soviet Union shows how the conference functioned within a cold war setting, and how there was a difference between

Bandung and Algiers. In preparation of Bandung, there was not one participant who brought up inviting the Soviet Union. In 1965 the situation had changed in the Afro-Asian countries, and many did not want to choose between the divided Soviet Union and China. We have also shown the influence, or tried influence, of opponents of the conference. India tries to let the conference fail, because it had no interest in a forum where China was the dominator. The United States revived the policy of “lobbying behind the scenes” which they thought had worked at Bandung in de-radicalizing the conference. Countries which had been positive about the objectives and agenda of a second Afro-Asian conference started doubting if they should attend after China and Indonesia radicalised their viewpoints. There was a fear that if the conference was held, a permanent Secretariat would be created, which would start to function as a counter United Nations. Only the “anti-imperialist-axis” showed enthusiasm for this idea.

This thesis fits into Westad’s idea of the Global Cold War, in the sense that it was not just an East versus West conflict, but that it was the battle for influence in the South that made the Cold War a global conflict. Chinese sources have been opened up for historians, and, not unimportant, been translated into the English language, which altogether has created a different view on the Cold War in the Third World.

What does this thesis mean for historiographical developments then? Scholarship has tended to look at the Third World project as a linear direction from the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung to the NAM, but this thesis offers a different narrative. Looking at this event as a hitch in the non-aligned Third World project is not useful, or historically accurate. New source material has shown us that there were clearly two paths to be followed.

This thesis then argues creation of the Bandung Spirit was the first Afro-Asian conference’s way to proclaim success, but it was similarly the downfall of the second. The appearance of solidarity between the former colonies became a such an ideal in the Cold War tensions, that it itself created the need for consensus in future conferences. Bandung was used by leaders as a platform to spout their ideas, and there were clashes of opinion. It could have grown to be a useful platform for airing problems and creating solutions. More in-depth research can be done how much influence the United States actually had with the “behind the scenes” influence, like Gettig suggested. The same suggestion could be made for the way China influenced the Third World. More translated Asian and African sources can be used to see how far China’s influence extended into the African Third World nations, for which I have tried to make a start. Considering the recent rise in Afro-Asian activity, and the

revalidation of the “Bandung Spirit”, a revisit to the aftermath of the first Afro-Asian conference in Bandung is still important.

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