

Local Communities' Receptiveness to Host Refugees

A Case Study of Adjumani District in times of a South Sudanese Refugee Emergency



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Cover photo: Nyumanzi refugee settlement, Dziapi sub-county, Adjumani District. I have added some photos throughout the thesis. Some of them are illustrative, others are just added to show the district and its people. All the photos are taken by myself.

Abstract

Local communities are not only directly impacted by refugee crises, they also play an important role in the governance of them. This may be particular true for Uganda where close to a million South Sudanese refugees are settled on customary land. Hence, in order to understand Uganda's open-door refugee policy, this thesis seeks to investigate what the conditions are that render local communities receptive to give out their lands and let refugees settle in their area, in Adjumani District, from 2013 until the present. These conditions are investigated through the analytical lens of governmentality and based on data collected through field research in the period from April till June 2017. This thesis finds that the receptiveness of the local communities is externally regulated by the prospect of development. Internally, the receptiveness of the local communities is self-regulated through a cultural and historically specific notion of hospitality based on reciprocity, cultural kinship, and values pertinent to Madi culture. The receptiveness of the local communities to host refugees has waned over time because of perceptions among the local communities of being neglected by international organisations and the OPM. This manifests itself in protests by youth against tribalism within NGOs and traditional authorities reluctant to give out more land. The reluctance of traditional authorities give out more land to refugees is problematic as it threatens to jeopardize Uganda's self-reliance strategy that is internationally applauded as exemplary. This thesis nevertheless challenges any depiction of Uganda as exemplary or a refugee paradise.

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
Photo 1. The Yamaha Crux being ferried across the Nile river from Adjumani District to Palorinya refugee settlement in Moyo District.

"Udru Alo Ka Eyi Amii Indini"

~

"It takes only one frog to spoil the purity of a spring"

UNHCR Presence and refugee locations



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Creation date: 12 Jan 2017 Sources: UNHCR, UNCS, UBOS. Author: UNHCR Regional Service Centre in Nairobi kensgis@unhcr.org

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Photo 2. Refugees at Elegu-Nimule border waiting for relocation to the settlements

I. Introduction

Local communities are not only directly impacted by refugee crises, they also play an important role in the governance of them. This may be particularly true for Uganda. Due to the most recent flare-up of the South Sudanese Civil War in June 2016,¹ the number of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda has risen from 230,000 to 950,000 at time of writing this thesis and is still growing by the day. Most of the South Sudanese refugees in Uganda are hosted in the West Nile region where they are settled on land that is owned by the local communities. In order to maintain its open-door refugee policy, the Ugandan government is thus dependent on whether the local communities are receptive to give out land for refugees to settle. Local communities in West Nile region, nonetheless, have voluntarily given out their lands and their generosity has even gone so far that in Adjumani District, refugees now outnumber local citizens.²

In order to understand Uganda's open-door refugee policy, the main question that this thesis seeks to investigate is what the conditions are that render local communities receptive to give out their lands and let refugees settle in their area, Adjumani District, from 2013 until the present. Identifying these conditions is worthy of our attention since the viability of Uganda's refugee policy is dependent on the receptiveness of the local community. Yet, the significance of this thesis goes beyond Uganda. Whether it is Greek islanders helping to cater for boat refugees, or small towns rioting against plans to open an asylum-seeker centre in the Netherlands,³ local communities influence when, where, and how refugees are settled. Hence, by investigating the case of Adjumani District's local communities, this thesis aims to gain valuable lessons and insights pertinent to understanding the conditions that render local communities receptive to let refugees settle in their area.

When it comes to coping with a mass influx, the policies and discourses that followed in Europe and Uganda cannot be more contrasting. Where the EU has reacted with various containment technologies, such as the controversial EU-Turkey deal and external border management in northern Africa,⁴ Uganda has kept an open-door and progressive refugee policy even though three times more

¹ Civil war started in 2013 when Vice President Marchar, along with other significant people from the Nuer tribe, defected from the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which they perceived as being dominated by Dinka, forming the Sudanese People Liberation Army in opposition (SPLA-IO). After twenty months of war, a fragile peace agreement was signed in August 2015 in which President Salva Kiir and Vice President Marchar agreed to form a transitional government (Willems and van der Borgh 2016, 352). Yet, this peace agreement quickly dissolved when violence resumed in the capital Juba in July 2016. Whereas the fighting during the 2013-2015 civil war mostly occurred in the Greater Upper Nile region (the northeast of South Sudan), the theatre of the conflict has now moved to the Equatorias in the southern part of South Sudan (ICG 2016a, 20). However, there 'is no single conflict in the Equatorias, but rather a host of often discrete ones that are the product of escalating, pre-existing local tensions exacerbated by wartime conditions at the national level' (ICG 2016b, 13). While the national conflict can for a large part be explained by the 'militarized, corrupt neo-patrimonial system of governance' (de Waal 2014, 347), underlying the multiple current conflicts in the Equatorias are 'disputes over control of land, extractable resources and taxation' (ICG 2016b, 11). Currently, a national dialogue to bring peace to South Sudan is initiated by President Salva Kiir. The hopes that this will result in a lasting peace are limited however as the main opposition leader, former Vice President Marchar, has been excluded from the process.

² As of the 1st of May 2017, Adjumani District is hosting 224,318 refugees on a local population of about 200,000. Only Yumbe District, with world's largest refugee settlement Bidi Bidi and a total refugee population of 272,707, hosts more refugees than Adjumani District. Yet, where refugees account for 33 per cent of the total population in Yumbe District, refugees comprise 57 per cent of the total population in Adjumani District. Along with Moyo District, it is the only District where refugees outnumber the host population. Information retrieved from: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Refugee%20and%20Host%20Community%20Ratios%20by%20District%20as%20of%2001%20May%202017.pdf>

³ The Guardian (17 December 2015). "Thousands riot in small Dutch town over plan for asylum-seeker centre" Retrieved from:

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/thousands-riot-in-small-dutch-town-over-plan-for-asylum-seeker-centre>.

⁴ The EU has even considered to work with Sudan and Eritrea in order to stem migration. According to the Guardian, Europe, "is mulling whether to partner with Sudan, whose president is wanted for war crimes, and Eritrea, whose government

refugees crossed from South Sudan to Uganda than across the Mediterranean in the last year to seek refuge from prosecution, famine and war.⁵ Consequently, Uganda is now the third largest refugee hosting country in the world.⁶ South Sudanese arriving in Uganda receive *prima facie* refugee status and this status entails the freedom of movement and the legal right to work as codified by Uganda's Refugee Act (2006). Further, a unique feature of Uganda is that it maintains a no-encampment policy. Instead, refugees are allotted land in rural settlements. Despite the struggles that Uganda faces due to this large influx of refugees, it has showed commitment to maintain its open-door and progressive policy, for which it has been widely applauded by the international community and press.

Not only Uganda's policies, but also the discourses produced related to the recent influx of refugees differ from those in Europe. In Europe, right winning parties are increasingly winning popular votes by campaigning a political agenda that is often centred around re-establishing sovereign authority over its internal borders and stopping the flow of immigrants and refugees to Europe as refugees and immigrants are seen by these politicians as a cultural, physical and economic threat to the nation, its citizens and the social welfare bureaucracy. Even refugee-welcoming political parties base their arguments on humanitarianism and human rights rather than articulating the idea that refugees can be beneficial to their respective countries.

In Uganda, it seems to be the opposite. During the Nubian Cross Cultural Festival in Adjumani, where I conducted my thesis research, President Yoweri Museveni spoke that in Uganda, "we don't know the concept of refugees. Tribes in Africa migrate and migration is a good thing. In English, we have a word for that... symbiosis".⁷ Museveni went on during his speech stating that Uganda had only five tribes and this number is now fifty-two due to migration of African tribes and that this migration has brought Uganda tea, coffee, cattle and bananas, which are now major export products of Uganda. When listening to Museveni's speech, it seemed to be clear that instead of framing refugees as a threat to Uganda's culture or nation, the Ugandan nation, in the eyes of Museveni, only became what it is now because of migration in the past. Aside from the cultural aspect, the freedom of movement and Uganda's no-encampment policy seem to indicate that refugees are not seen as a physical threat either. It is, however, the economic perspective on refugees that has been portrayed that is most striking. Rather than being an economic burden, recent emerging reports by WFP and others demonstrate that refugees in fact boost local economies in Uganda.⁸

There have been various explanations circulating about why Uganda has such open-door and progressive refugee policies. A senior UNHCR official I spoke to in Kampala, for example, mentioned that President Museveni and other senior key government officials have been refugees themselves and therefore understand the precarious situation in which refugees find themselves.⁹ By keeping its

is accused of crimes against humanity by the UN." The Guardian (6 June 2016). "EU considering working with Sudan and Eritrea to stem migration" Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/06/eu-sudan-eritrea-migration>

⁵ Norwegian Refugee Council (25 Jan 2017). "More refugees flee to Uganda than across Mediterranean" Retrieved from: source <https://www.nrc.no/more-refugees-flee-to-uganda-than-across-mediterranean>. According to UN Secretary-General Mr. Guterres, "the figure is three times higher than the number of refugees who crossed the Mediterranean Sea into Europe". Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57019#.WU4jo-GLRE4>

⁶ According to UNHCR's Data, Uganda is hosting more than 1.2 million refugees in total. Only Turkey (more than 3 million) and Pakistan (1.3 million) are currently hosting more refugees. Retrieved from: <http://reporting.unhcr.org/operations>

⁷ Author's observation of speech given by president Museveni at the Nubian Cross Cultural Festival, Adjumani Town Council, on 15 April 2017.

⁸ Zhu et al. (21 April 2017). "Economic Impact of Refugee Settlement in Uganda", World Food Programme. Retrieved from: http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/wfp288256.pdf?_ga=2.18821049.1002864735.1498297463-213513006.1498297463

⁹ Author's interview Umar Yakhyayev, UNHCR senior protection officer, Kampala, on 15 of March 2017. In an interview published by Finnish Church Aid, Commissioner for Refugees David Apollo Kazungu also mentioned that Uganda has

commitment to host refugees, Uganda boosts its international reputation as a stable and reliable partner in a volatile region, which may in turn steer away international attention from domestic controversies.¹⁰ The economic benefits of Uganda's policy may also explain why Uganda continues its open and progressive policies. With the influx of the refugees, many international organisations and NGOs flock in that bring in employment, roads, schools and hospitals. Refugees in this sense are utilised, as the *Refugee Host community Empowerment (ReHoPE) Strategic Framework* states, as "agents of development" to uplift the impoverished areas of northern Uganda.

These various explanations may all be valid and partial explanations of why Uganda is receptive to continue welcoming more and more refugees. They are, however, all macro-level explanations. Macro-level in the sense that they look for explanations of Uganda's policy at the government level. Refugee policy, in this sense, can be understood as coming into existence through top-down authoritative decision-making.¹¹ In the press, it is also implicitly described as such. The Dutch Broadcast Foundation NOS, for example, describes how the Ugandan government, embodied by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), shows commitment by maintaining its open-door policy and the local community is portrayed as passive receivers of benefits for which they are happy and enthusiastic.¹²

Both may be true. However, what is underlying this reporting on the refugee situation it that it takes "the Ugandan government" as a unified and *the* central actor that caters for the refugees along with the UNHCR. The Ugandan government, embodied by the Office of the Prime Minister, in this respect is portrayed as a coordinating actor that in governance of the South Sudanese refugee emergency situation stands hierarchical above all other actors and is encompassing all its localities. This image of government as state affair is what Ferguson and Gupta describe as *vertical encompassment*:

Verticality refers to the central and pervasive idea of the state as an institution somehow "above" civil society, community, and family. Thus, state planning is inherently "top down" and state actions are efforts to manipulate and plan "from above," while "the grassroots" contrasts with the state precisely in that it is "below," closer to the ground, more authentic, and more "rooted." The second image is that of *encompassment*. Here the state (conceptually fused with the nation) is located within an ever-widening series of circles that begins with family and local community and ends with the system of nation-states (2002, 982).

For Ferguson and Gupta, "the precarious situation of many states in Africa today makes especially clear, the state has no automatic right to success in claiming the vertical heights of sovereignty" (2002, 989). Instead, Ferguson and Gupta argue that in Africa, the disciplining and regulating of people has

"extensive experience in accepting in refugees and many former and current government official have been refugees at one point." Retrieved from: <https://www.kirkonulkomaanapu.fi/en/latest-news/articles/the-man-at-the-heart-of-the-largest-refugee-crisis-in-africa/>

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch, for example, mentions that in the last year, Ugandan security forces have been complicit in the crack-down of the palace of the king in the Rwenzoris that left dozens dead. Museveni also consolidated its power in last years through controversial elections whereby the main opposition leader, Dr. Kizza Besigye of the FDC was preventively arrested and its supporter were beaten and intimidated. Another prominent academic and activist Dr. Stella Nyanzi was arrested for criticising Museveni. Further, HRW notes that while the Constitutional Court overruled an anti-homosexuality bill in 2014 that could put gays to death sentence, many government officials have continued their support for such a bill. Retrieved from: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/uganda>

¹¹ For a discussion on different accounts of policy, see for example: Colebatch, H.K. (2009). *Policy, 3rd edition*, Maidenhead: Open University Press.

¹² Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (25 April 2017). "Welkom vluchteling! Uganda ontvangt je met open armen" Retrieved from: <https://scroll.lab.nos.nl/vluchtelingenparadijs-oeganda>

increasingly been outsourced to NGOs and other nonstate agencies (2002, 990). Furthermore, supposedly local or grassroots actors increasingly have formed transnational connections with other local actors and African states are constrained in their decision-making by international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Consequently, Ferguson and Gupta argue the idea of a dichotomy between the state and society, the former standing in a vertical hierarchy above the latter and encompassing its localities is no longer attainable.

The idea of refugee governance as essentially a state-centred affair encompassing and governing the local community, whether it is the refugees or the host community, may indeed not hold when zooming in on the refugee situation on the ground. The genesis of the current refugee influx of South Sudanese refugees into northern Uganda started in mid-2013. It started when a delegation of chiefs from the Murle tribe arrived in Adjumani District when they were clashing with the people from the Dinka tribe in South Sudan. According to the paramount chief of the Madi people, this delegation did not coordinate their arrival with OPM or the UNHCR. Instead, they first came to the cultural leaders of the Madi people for *Opi Pa Koka*, which can be translated as “grabbing the feet of the chief”, to ask the cultural leaders for protection and land to for settlement.¹³

All the settlements that host South Sudanese refugees, except for Kiryandongo refugee settlement, are on customary land. Sixty per cent of the land in Uganda is customary land and in northern Uganda, basically all the land is customary land.¹⁴ In fact, even government buildings in Adjumani are on customary land that government leases by the from the community. Customary land tenure is in the Uganda Land Act (1998) described as land that is owned in perpetuity by the community or clans and is guided by customary law. Authority over this communal land lies in the hand of elders, clan chiefs or religious leaders. When I asked an officer of the OPM whether it is better to host refugees on public land or customary land, he stated it is better to settle refugees on public land, but this land is already occupied. According to this OPM official, the little land that is owned by the Ugandan government in northern Uganda is already gazetted for IDP camps. These IDP camps cannot be used for the settlement of refugees since they are reserved in cases of domestic emergencies such as the 2010 Ugandan Landslide that displaced 6,000 households in Bududa region.¹⁵

Overall, the Uganda government is thus dependent on the willingness of the local communities to maintain its refugee settlement policies since they have their customary rights on the land on which refugees are settled. Consequently, for explaining why Uganda has continued to keep its open-door policy, it is insufficient to merely examine the motivations of top government officials in Kampala since this government does not stand vertically above the local community when it comes to allocating land to refugees for settlement. Rather than being mere receivers of the benefits or carriers of the burden of refugees, the local host community forms an intrinsic part of the refugee governance and is the key actor that determines the viability Uganda’s open-door and progressive refugee policies. This raises the question of what renders the local host community receptive to give out their land for refugees to settle.

Yet, before turning to this question, it is necessary to deconstruct “refugee governance” further. This is because Uganda’s “government” itself is not a unified actor in managing refugee affairs. Due

¹³ Author’s interview with Drani Steven Izakare, paramount chief of the Madi people, Adjumani Town Council, on 3 June 2017.

¹⁴ Aside from Customary Tenure, other land tenure systems in Uganda are Mailo Land Tenure, Freehold Land Tenure, Leasehold system and Public Land. During a conflict sensitisation training for refugees in Adjumani it was described by the community officer as “the land where tribes battle”.

¹⁵ Author’s interview with Ismael, official of OPM, Adjumani Town Council, on 30 May, 2017.

to Uganda's decentralisation policies in the last decades, Local District Governments (see Appendix A for local government structure) can operate independently from the central government in several key areas such as social service delivery. Local District Councils decide over various aspects of refugee governance in their respective Districts takes form such as the conditions under which international NGOs can operate. These conditions may in fact not be line with Uganda's national policy. For example, at the end of my field research period, NGOs were obliged to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Local District that included the condition that fifty per cent of their support should also target the host community. However, Uganda's national policy states that thirty per cent should target beneficiaries in the host community.

Decentralisation and the customary land rights of the community thus already the challenge the idea of the state as vertically encompassing its localities in refugee affairs. However, the influx of NGOs and UN agencies that followed the influx of South Sudanese refugees may further challenge the idea of the state standing above it localities in managing the refugee crisis. As mentioned earlier, Ferguson and Gupta argue that the disciplining and regulating of people in Africa has been increasingly outsourced to NGOs and other nonstate agencies. This may also be true for the managing the refugee crisis in Uganda. According to UNSC Resolution 46/182 of 1991, the key UN humanitarian resolution governing emergency situations, "each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory" (Harvey 2009, 2). However, the UNHCR lists 47 organisations that cooperate with the UNHCR in response to the South Sudanese refugee situation, ranging from the conventional humanitarian aid organisations such as World Vision to the lesser known organisations such as the Ethiopian Orthodox Church Development and Inter-church Aid Commission (UNHCR 2017, 14). These organisations do not merely support the Ugandan government in taking care of the victims of the conflict in South Sudan, they also cater for the welfare of Uganda's citizens by providing them with infrastructure, social services, livelihood opportunities and so on and so forth. Instead of the refugees and the local communities being only governed by the Ugandan state as the idea of vertical encompassment prescribes, the population in northern Uganda is governed by a wide range of state, nonstate and transnational actors, which can be captured in Ferguson and Gupta's concept of transnational governmentality. It is this notion of governmentality that may provide a suitable lens for analysing refugee governance in Uganda.

The notion of governmentality stems from Foucault who describes it as 'the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactic that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power.' (Foucault 1991, 101). For Foucault, this type of power has the pre-eminence over all other sorts of power (e.g. sovereign power) and may be called 'government' (Foucault 1991, 102). According to Foucault, 'government' should defined as "the conduct of conduct": that is to say, a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons' (Gordon 1991, 2). This mode of power thus relates to the disciplining and regulation of living beings and is what Foucault termed as 'biopower' (Gordon 1991, 4). This notion of biopower was developed as an antithesis to a state-centered approach to power (Foucault 1991, 87-91), which can be expressed as the capacity to maintain sovereignty over a given territory. Foucault thus described a new 'rationality of government', a new system of thinking, in which government is no longer primarily focused on sovereignty, territory and laws, but on 'technologies or instruments and mechanisms that make different forms of rule possible' (Lippert 1999, 296). In fact, Foucault argues against state theorists that 'attempt to deduce the modern activities of government from the

essential properties and propensities of the state, in particular its supposed propensity to grow and to swallow or colonize everything outside itself” (Gordon 1991, 4).

Since government entails ‘the conduct of conduct’, it is thus not restricted state-society relations, but is also performed in relations to the self, private interpersonal relations, relations within social institutions and communities as well as the relations of the self to the exercise of political sovereignty (Gordon 1991, 3). Power can thus be exercised both at the microphysical and the macro level. Based on this notion of power, Foucault thus draws attention to all the processes by which the population is governed. Consequently, government does not only include state-related activities, but includes all kinds of institutions and agencies, and discourses, norms and self-regulation that regulate and discipline the lives and conduct of people (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 989).

Based on this conceptualisation of government it is possible to rethink how to understand why Uganda’s has such a progressive and policy. Since the land on which the refugees are settled is customary land which is owned by the local community in perpetuity, an image of a dichotomy between the state as government and society whereby the former standing hierarchical above the latter is no longer attainable. Consequently, Uganda’s refugee policy cannot be a simple product of authoritative decision-making by government officials in Kampala. Rather, Uganda’s refugee policy emerges through constant renegotiations between a wide range of state, non-state and transnational actors that as an interlinked web constitutes refugee governance. In this process, the local community as custodians of the land on which refugees are settled play a crucial role in determining the viability of Uganda’s refugee policy. Hence, to understand why Uganda’s has an open-door policy, it is insufficient to simply look at the motivations of Uganda’s government. Instead, to examine why Uganda’s continues to accept more and more refugees, it is necessary to first and foremost analyse the conditions that render the local communities receptive to give out their lands and let refugees settle in their area. Taking the notion of government as “the conduct of conduct”, which can be found at all levels of society, the receptiveness of the local community can be seen as a conduct that is shaped by a wide range of state, non-state and transnational actors that together constitute refugee governance. To identify these conditions, this thesis draws on two months of field research conducted in Adjumani District in northern Uganda. Hence, the research question that this thesis seeks to answer can be formulated accordingly as:

In order to understand Uganda’s progressive open-door refugee policy, what are the conditions that render local communities receptive to give out their lands and let refugees settle in their area, in Adjumani District, from 2013 until the present?

In order to answer this main research question, this thesis will look at three main sub-topics. First, before starting to investigate the receptiveness of the host community, it is first important to further situate, contextualise and conceptualise Uganda’s refugee settlements. Examining Uganda’s and its inhabitants is not only important because the refugee settlement is central to Uganda’s refugee policy, and the main target of refugee governance, but also because it is the main object to which the host community relates.

The underlying rationale assumption is that the impact the refugee settlement has on the host community is arguably significantly different when the refugee settlement is analogous to a prison or warehouse, or whether it is truly empowers refugees and is genuinely integrated into society and. In scholarly literature, governmentality has been often used to describe refugee camps as sites of being

established to prevent the contamination of the nation and being defined by its exceptional nature in terms of temporality and spatiality (Turner 2015, 4). Uganda's refugee settlements at first sight, however, seem to defy the traditional mould of the refugee camp. Hence, in order to examine the main object of refugee governance to which the host community relates, the first sub-question that guides this research can be formulated as:

1. How can Uganda's refugee settlements be conceptualised?

After examining Uganda's refugee settlements, this thesis uses the analytical lens of governmentality to examine how the receptiveness of the local population to give out their lands is being shaped. By first examining the subjective understanding the local population has of the refugee settlement, this thesis investigates the regulatory processes that shape the conduct of the local host population. More specifically, the receptiveness of the local communities to give out their lands can be externally and internally regulated.

The influx of refugees and the international organisation's interventions, and corresponding positive (and negative) impacts of the refugee settlement can be seen externally regulating the receptiveness of the local communities to give out their land. However, if it were to be only that external interventions shape the local communities' receptiveness, a cost-benefit or rational choice account will be sufficient to understand local communities' willingness to give out land. However, as mentioned earlier, conceptualising government as an activity draws the focus to "all the processes by which the conduct of the population is governed: by institutions and agencies, including the state; by discourses, norms, and identities; and by self-regulation, techniques for disciplining and care of the self" (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 989). Hence, in addition to the external or biopolitical interventions that shape local community's receptiveness, understanding the conditions that render the local communities receptive to give out their lands entails examination of the discourses, norms and identities that internally self-regulate the receptiveness of the local communities to host refugees. Consequently, the sub-questions that need to be addressed are:

2. What subjective understanding do the local communities have of the impact of the refugee settlement?
3. What regulatory interventions shape local communities' receptiveness to give out their lands for refugees to settle?
4. What discourses, norms and identities within the local community self-regulate their receptiveness to give out their lands for refugees to settle?

However, the assertion of this thesis is that local communities are not only directly impacted by refugee crises, they also play an important governance of them. Since the local communities as custodians of land are crucial for determining the viability of Uganda's refugee policy, the third sub-topic of investigation examines how local communities contest and renegotiate their perceived role in refugee governance. In order to do so, the sub-question that needs to be answered is:

5. How do local communities perceive and negotiate their role in refugee governance?

In order to answer the main research question, the rest of this thesis is organised as follows. The subsequent chapter deals with the research design including the justification of Adjumani District as case study, the research methods used, ethical considerations and limitations pertinent to this study. The third chapter examines Uganda's refugee settlement system. The fourth chapter examines whether the local community perception of the refugee settlements as either a burden or beneficial, and consequently examines the conditions that shape the receptiveness of the local communities to give out their land. The fifth chapter deal with the perceived role the local communities play and ought to play in refugee governance. The last chapter concludes and answers the research question.



Photo 3. Biometrics at refugee collection point to check for “recyclers”. According to the field staff in Elegu, recyclers are people who are already registered at a refugee settlement as refugee. They can have either returned to South Sudan which is not allowed without losing refugee status or refugees already registered trying to be registered twice in order to receive double the amount of aid. Biometrics is one of the few disciplinary devices in refugee management in Uganda. In addition to the so-called recyclers, nationals flocking in, and families splitting up in order to be recognised as Persons with Special Needs form the three main challenges in the registration process of refugees according to the field staff in Elegu.

II. Methodology

A. Research design

As this study uses the analytical lens of governmentality to understand the conditions that render the local communities receptive to give out their lands for refugees to settle, the ontological stance of this thesis is structuralism. Rather than that the decision to give out land is, for example, based on individual utility maximisation, this thesis investigates the conditions that *shape* the receptiveness of the local population or the lives of the refugees. Yet, this thesis recognises that conditions that shape the receptiveness of the local population are historically, culturally specific to Adjumani District. Hence, this thesis takes an interpretative epistemological stance.

Corresponding this ontological and epistemological stance, the research strategy taken in this study is that of a qualitative case study. Case studies have a distinctive advantage over other research strategies when ‘a “how” or “why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control’ (Yin 1987, 20). This is particularly true for an ongoing refugee emergency situation. Moreover, refugee crises are often very complex situations in which a wide range of factors influence social dynamics. Therefore, a case study is often more suitable for the study of conflict situations as it allows more variables to be incorporated than large-n studies (Keen 2012, 765-766). Due to the time and scope of this research, the case that thesis focuses on is Adjumani District rather than the whole of Uganda. Yet, as Levy argues, “considerations of “intrinsic interest” or “historical importance” are no longer regarded acceptable criteria for case selection, unless the aim is the purely idiographic one of explaining a particular case as an end in itself.” (2008, 7). As mentioned earlier, most of refugee settlement where South Sudanese refugee are hosted are on customary land. Hence, the selection of Adjumani District as case study needs to be justified.

Adjumani District has a history of chronic marginalisation, violence, and poverty like the rest of West Nile region. The Madi people living in Adjumani District endured the military expeditions of Obote II, lived in exile and were consequently forcefully repatriated from southern Sudan. The Madi subsequently fought a rebellion against Obote’s regime under leadership of Adjumani’s own Moses Ali. Due to its geographical location east of the Nile, unlike the name of the West Nile region implies, Adjumani District and the Madi population have also suffered deeply from the LRA conflict, which has generally often been characterised as an ‘Acholi problem’. Yet, according to the Uganda-based NGO Refugee Law Project, “if northern Uganda was a ‘forgotten crisis,’ Adjumani district was one which was never even acknowledged, let alone forgotten” (2006, 4).

As a consequence, or in addition to these decades of civil unrest, youth unemployment is rampant, life expectancy is with an average of 41.1 years seven years below the national average,¹⁶ and 98 per cent of people living in rural areas farm at subsistence level.¹⁷ Though Adjumani District comprises an area of more than 3,000 km², it has no tarmac roads aside from a few battered roads in Adjumani Town Council. Adding to these constraints are below-average and below-national rain fall patterns and a food security situation that is labelled by Famine Early Warning Systems Networks as being “stressed” for the local population, and minimally “critical” for the refugees (FEWS 2017).

¹⁶ Adjumani District Government (2015). “Adjumani District Five Year District Development Plan (2015/2016–2019/2020)”. Retrieved from:

<http://npa.ug/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ADJUMANI-DISTRICT-DDPII-2015-2016-to-2019-2020.pdf>

¹⁷ Author’s interview with John Bosco, Senior District Planner at Local District Government, Adjumani Town Council, on 19 April 2017.

Furthermore, Adjumani is the district hosting the second most refugees in absolute numbers and the highest number of refugees relative to the local population.¹⁸ Moreover, the refugees that are being hosted in Adjumani have considerably less land available than some other refugee settlements and the land is generally considered by to be of poor quality.¹⁹ Hence, whether it is resource competition, youth bubbles, marginalisation, needs deprivation, or a historical record of violence that causes conflict, there are various conditions present in Adjumani that, *ceteris paribus*, likely to cause tensions between the refugees and the host community.

Despite these factors that would predict Adjumani District to be prone to conflict, Adjumani has, however, proven to be one of the most peaceful refugee settlements in Uganda.²⁰ Assuming that peaceful coexistence between the refugees and the local communities may be indicative for the receptiveness of the local communities to host refugees, then Adjumani District, with its combination of unfavourable conditions and relative peaceful coexistence, arguably provides a strong case for identifying the conditions that shape the receptiveness of the local communities to host refugees. In addition, Adjumani provides an interesting case as refugees are hosted in a cluster of eighteen settlements throughout the district.²¹ The advantage of the cluster system is that it allowed me to compare the various characteristics – size, time of settlement, ethnic composition - of the settlements that may influence the receptiveness of the local communities to host refugees.

Although this thesis takes an interpretative epistemological stance, and the research strategy is that of a singular case study, the goals of this thesis go beyond merely being idiographic. As Flyvbjerg argues, “one of the most pertaining myths about case studies is that one cannot generalise from a single case” (2006, 221). The conditions investigated in this research, however, are situation dependent and historically and culturally specific. In other words, it is unlikely that the identified conditions that shape local communities’ receptiveness to host refugees – e.g. increased access to health facilities, cultural institutions or extra police presence - are to be directly extrapolated to other cases. For example, Dutch local communities are unlikely to be convinced that an asylum-centre is beneficial to their community because of the promise of extra latrines and seedlings. Nevertheless, the case of Adjumani is generalizable to the extent that it generates knowledge and lessons pertinent to the academic debate on governmentality and refugee camps, the debate on refugees as being a burden or beneficial to the host community, and the debate on the extent to which international organisations should cater for the host communities in refugee situation.

¹⁸ OPM and UNHCR (May 1 2017). “Refugee and Host Community Ratios by District”. Retrieved from: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Refugee%20and%20Host%20Community%20Ratios%20by%20District%20as%20of%20001%20May%202017.pdf>

¹⁹ Danish Refugee Council, ZOA, Save the Children, and CEFORD (January 2017). “Conflict Analysis Assessment Support Programme for Refugee Settlements in Northern Uganda (SPRS-NU) (Kiryandongo, Adjumani and Arua Refugee Settlements in Uganda)”, *Unpublished document pp.66*.

²⁰ The DRC report (see footnote 20) finds that Adjumani is more peaceful than Kiryandongo and Rhino refugee settlement. Also, In Lamwo District, for example “Politicians have been stoking tensions by inciting locals to demonstrate in the camps or hamper the delivery of aid. Last month armed youths ambushed a convoy in an attempt to stop supplies reaching the settlements” in: The Guardian (21 May 2017). “Tensions rise as Uganda neighbourly refugee policy starts to feel the strain” Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/may/21/uganda-refugee-policy-breaking-point> Likewise, at Bidi Bidi refugee settlement in Yumbe District, the relations between host community and refugees were even more tense with numerous violent incidences. See for example: Radio Tamazuj (7 April 2017) “Four South Sudanese refugees wounded in fighting with host community at Bidi-Bidi refugee camp” Retrieved from: <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/four-s-sudanese-refugees-wounded-fighting-host-community-bidi-bidi-camp>

²¹ The refugee settlements in Adjumani District are Nyumanzi, Pagrinnya, Maaji I,II, and III, Olua I and II, Ayilo I and II, Baratuku, Agojo, Mungula I and II, Olijj, Alere II, Boroli, Mireyi, and Elema. Some of the refugee settlement only comprise of old old case (OOC) refugees such as Alere II and Olijj. The newest refugee settlements in Adjumani District are Agojo refugee settlement (opened October 2016) and Pagrinnya refugee settlement (August 2016). The largest refugees settlements in Adjumani District are Nyumanzi (39,000), Pagrinnya (30,000+), and Maaji I, II and III (32,000+).

B. Sampling and methods

In order to gain the data needed to answer the research question, this thesis draws on two months of field research in Adjumani District during the period of mid-April till early June. Data for the case study was obtained through a variety of qualitative research methods. Using a multitude of research methods was helpful since one research method often proved to be inadequate for answering all the sub-questions. Furthermore, use of multiple research methods enabled me to compare the collected data and cross-check the results.

This triangulation of data was important for several reasons. The use of ethnographic methods such as interviews and observations allowed me to compare cross-check the findings from content analysis of policy documents and news articles. By conducting ethnographic research, I could check to what extent the various claims in policy document and news articles were matching the data I collected in the field and the other way around. Using various research methods such as formal and informal interviews also helped to make the results of data collection to become more reliable. In addition, informal meetings and interviews with South Sudan experts such as PhDs, consultants, and NGO staff were important at early stages of my research in Kampala and Adjumani District for gathering new ideas and information and helped to give direction to my research. Moreover, informal conversations were invaluable for collecting data from NGO staff, who often were either reluctant or too busy to conduct formal interviews, and talked more openly during informal meetings.

The larger part of the data used in this thesis, however, was collected through semi-structured interviews. In total, I conducted 43 semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews proved to be particularly valuable as they offered a practical and relatively economical way of gathering data, while at the same time were flexible enough to provide additional contextual information and allowed me to develop new ideas and explore new topics. There were two main targets that I aimed to interview. The first group of respondent that I interviewed were local community members living adjacent to the refugee settlement as they were part of the community that had given out their lands and were most directly impacted by the refugee settlement.²² Within this group of respondents, I interviewed landlords, Local Council members, clan elders, and other village members. When I was able access to the refugee settlements, I also interviewed refugees, though this access was limited due to language barriers with refugees and a lack of authorisation to enter the refugee settlement. The second group that I interviewed consisted of people that were on daily basis active with the issue of refugee governance and included respondents from Implementing Partners,²³ CBOs, government officials, and cultural leaders. For both groups, the sampling was done purposively through a process

²² “Adjacent” in the sense that the respondents that I interviewed from the local communities were living no more than 1-2km from the settlement.

²³ In governance of the refugee crisis, the UNHCR, responsible for the coordination and management of the international funding, does not implement its support directly but instead mainly sub-contracts work to NGOs that, as the name implies, implement the various projects and aid for the refugees and the host community. While the work of the NGOs often overlap, each Implementing Partner often has a specific sectoral focus. In Adjumani District, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) each have half of the eighteen refugee settlements under their supervision. In addition for all the refugee settlements, LWF focusses on non-food items and whereas DRC focusses on livelihoods. The World Food Programme supplies the food whereas World Vision is the Implementing Partner for food distribution and focusses on child protection. In Adjumani, ICRC focusses on cases of family reunion and unaccompanied minors, Windle Trust Uganda on education, African Initiatives for Relief and Development on infrastructural development, TPO Health focusses on psychosocial support, and Medical Teams International provides healthcare in general whereas MSF provides health services at initial stages and emergency situations. There are, however, many more organisations active in Adjumani such as Save the Children, Finnish Church Aid, Ugandan Red Cross Federation, War Child Canada, War Child Holland, ACCORD and so and so forth.

called “snow-balling”. Snow-ball sampling helped me to identify respondents that played an important role in refugee governance such as the chiefs and landlords that had given out their lands. Among the respondents from the local communities living near the refugee settlement, I also selected a few respondents randomly. Yet, rather than aiming for a probability sample, the aim of this random selection of respondents was rather to make collected data more reliable by reducing the risk of presenting a biased view of the local communities. By selecting some village members randomly, I aimed to give voice to potentially disempowered voices and to reduce the risk of having data that is overrepresented by the opinions of Local Council members or influential landlords.

The first target group of respondents provided the backbone for answering the sub-questions related to the perceived impact of the refugee settlement as well as the conditions that render local communities receptive to give out their lands. The second target group of respondents was aimed to gain a better of the role refugee governance, and the perceived role that the local communities are playing in refugee governance in the district. Needless to say, due to the interlinkages between the sub-questions and the target groups, several respondents proved to be valuable sources of information for both topics.

Lastly, in order to answer the question of how conceptualise Uganda’s refugee settlement, this thesis mainly relies on content analysis of policy documents, observations, and formal and informal interviews with refugees and NGO staff. Content analysis of UNHCR and OPM documents helped to gain a more in-depth understanding of Uganda’s refugee settlement system. Non-obtrusive and participant observations helped me to familiarise with the settlements in the field. Participant observation at the Elegu-Nimule border, for example, enabled me to see how the refugees arrive and are registered. Due to non-participant observation within the refugee settlement, I could, for example, how the allocated plots of land to refugees are no way near the size to what OPM, the UNHCR or new articles claim that refugees receive.

C. Doing fieldwork: ethics, limitations, and other considerations

It was a few days after I had arrived in Adjumani that that I sattogether with a Madi elder in the shade hiding from the midday sun. While I was still more preoccupied with trying to grapple with the 37 °C midday temperatures, the elder had already showed his hospitality by taking me to a conflict sensitising training for refugees the day before. As we sat together, he reflected on the work that international organisations were doing:

‘Even people who are doing peace-building, they dress like half-naked. According to our culture, you don't need to show your legs. What for? I'm already suffering, I don't need to see your legs. I didn't see food for five days, I didn't see a woman for all these year there has been war, why do come here half-naked talking about "you know conflicts are an incompatible set of goals". These things they learned in Makerere, they come to taught it here. And then they sit like this [pointing to my shorts], you think they are listening? Nothing, they are watching your legs!’²⁴

The comment the elder made reminded me that demonstrating the virtues of a good researcher in field of conflict studies requires more than an ability to paraphrase Galtung or Foucault, it also requires an

²⁴ Author’s interview with Vusso Paulinho, Madi elder, local CBO, Adjumani Town Council, on 22 April 2017.

awareness of the role of a researcher as part of the research environment. Hence, some considerations on the role as researcher as part of the research environment are needed.

Wearing appropriate trousers, however, is one of the easiest ways of being mindful of the research environment as a researcher. As the field where I conducted my research was in a very complex, difficult and precarious refugee situation, I was inevitably confronted with more considerations regarding my role as researcher. One of those issues was the question of ethics. On the individual level, there are ethical concerns that arise when interviewing vulnerable groups such as refugees. Mackenzie et al. argue that two key challenges need to be addressed when conducting qualitative research with refugees. According to Mackenzie et al., a first challenge is constructing an ethical consent process and obtaining genuinely informed consent. The second is the “the issue of how to be attentive and respond to the effects of forced displacement, encampment, and dependence on humanitarian assistance on refugee participant’s capacity for autonomy” (2007, 300). While Mackenzie et al. focus on research with refugees, these challenges are arguable also applicable to local population given the precarious living situation of the rural-based population in the northern region.

In order to make sure that respondents consent was genuinely voluntary, I was always completely transparent about my research with the respondents and made sure that the content of the intended interview were understood and agreed upon by the respondent. In case of language barriers, which was almost always the case with the host population living adjacent to the settlement, I made use of a competent translator. In order to mitigate the risks of having a translator with its own agenda and interests, I selected a youth who just finished his studies in Kampala and who therefore spoke fluent Madi and English and less likely to have an own agenda or interest pertinent to my research.

Another important aspect related to getting voluntary informed consent is that respondent does not feel pressured into participating due to unrealistic expectations or fear for some form of retaliation. Living in an impoverished situation, both refugees and the local communities are often dependent on aid or favours from others. Therefore, some may agree to an interview because they hoped that I could help them with some kind of assistance or because they feared that they would be punished in some way for not participating. In order to mitigate these fears and unrealistic expectations, I have always made clear that 1) I am an independent researcher unrelated to any organisation; 2) it is no problem if they do not want to participate in my research; 3) the benefits and risks of participating were understood; 4) what the anticipated impact of my research were; and 5) confidentiality is assured throughout the whole process whenever desired. I considered to make use of consent forms. However, since only a few people are able to write Madi and most of the vulnerable respondents were not able to speak English, I instead relied on oral consent. In a few cases I have also decided to anonymise a few respondents despite that they formally consented to the interview because I think that their openness could otherwise backfire to them.

Regarding to respondents’ autonomy, Uganda’s national guidelines for ethical research states that respect for persons’ autonomy “requires that research participant be given the opportunity to make choices about what should be done to them”²⁵ Although national ethical committees’ guidelines primarily focus on quantitative biomedical research, the idea of giving refugees the opportunity to make choices in the research process is very much applicable to my qualitative research. By using

²⁵ Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (July 2014). “National Guidelines for Research involving Human Subject as Research Participant” Retrieved from: https://www.swarthmore.edu/sites/default/files/assets/-documents/institutional-review-board/Human_Subjects_Protection_Guidelines_July_2014.pdf p.16

semi-structure interviews with some set topics, I always discussed these topics beforehand and let them share whatever they felt like during and at the end of the interview.

There were also a few challenges and limitations related to this ethnographic research. A first challenge was the language barrier that I was confronted with during interviews with local community members and refugees. With a few exceptions, I always needed an interpreter to mitigate this challenge. Although my interpreter did an excellent job, some of the subtleties may, however, have been lost in the process of translation from Madi to English. For the other respondents, from NGOs, CBOs, the cultural chiefs et cetera, there were no significant language barriers. Secondly, there was the challenge of location of the refugee settlements and the climatic conditions. Because of the distance to the refugee settlements from Adjumani Town, ranging anywhere between 12km and up to 45km, I rented a motorbike to reach the local communities. Yet, the heat at the first stage of the field research and the hard to traverse roads when the rain season finally arrived in May, at times placed considerable constraints on the amount of energy I could commit to do research on the days that me and my t headed out to the refugee settlements.

One of the more constraining limitations of this study was the lack of permission to conduct refugee-related research. To conduct refugee-related research, permission is needed from the Office of the Prime Minister's department for Disaster Preparedness and Management. In order to obtain this permission as a researcher, an ethical clearance is needed from Uganda National Council for Science and Technology, which was next to impossible to obtain given the time span and the monetary constraints of this research.²⁶ Another way to obtain this permission was by getting affiliated with a NGO. Consequently, I successfully wrote a research proposal for an Implementing Partner to collaborate. However, due to length of this process, it was already in mid-May before this Implementing Partner agreed.

Consequently, I ended up conducting research without authorisation of the OPM. For the large part, this was unproblematic since my research was largely focussed on the host community. One limitation, however, was that I was unable to freely interact and interview with government officials. In addition to the permission letter, anyone doing anything related to refugees first needs to report to OPM's Refugee Desk Officer. As I did not have a permission letter, I had not done so which led to a few awkward but never serious situations when I was questioned about the purpose of my stay in Adjumani and why I had not reported to the OPM. The second limitation related to the lack of permission to conduct refugee-related research was that I could not always freely access the refugee settlements. When entering a refugee settlement, people first need to report to the police or camp commander, which would have been similarly problematic. As a non-Ugandan or South Sudanese, I would stand out and get noticed if I decided to conduct systematic research in the settlement. Hence, various people including PhD students advised not to do so. At the same time, these people also noted NGO and OPM presence was often limited during the weekends. Therefore, I was able to visit most of the refugee settlements during the weekends. Furthermore, as the refugee settlements are rather stretched out villages, I was on several occasions able to enter the settlements during the week via back road leading into the settlements. Thereby, it was still possible for me to get a sound idea of how life in the settlements was. In the next chapter, I further examine the Uganda's refugee settlement.

²⁶ It took Dutch PhD student researching access to justice for the Azande from early February till the end of April to obtain an ethical clearance for a "quick review" process.



Photo 4. School at Maaji II refugee settlement.

III. Conceptualising Uganda's refugee settlements

In this chapter I aim to address the question of how to situate, contextualise, and conceptualise Uganda's refugee settlements. Although this research focuses on how refugee governance shapes the host community's receptiveness, it is first important to examine the main object of refugee governance, namely the refugee settlement and its inhabitants. Conceptualising Uganda's refugee settlements is important since the settlements at first sight seem to defy the traditional mould of the refugee camp. Moreover, conceptualising Uganda's refugee settlements is important as the impact the settlements and the refugees have on the host community is arguably very different when the settlements are analogous to a prison or detention centre or whether they are genuinely integrating and empowering refugees. The outline of this chapter is as follows. The first section links the governmentality to the study of refugee camps and outlines the debate on refugee camps as sites of containment. The section that follows examines how protracted refugee situations and an increasing reluctance for local integration refugees created a need for alternatives to the refugee camp, which has led to the promotion of self-reliance strategies such as the refugee settlement. The third section examines Uganda's self-reliance strategy (SRS) and the criticism it has received in the past. The fourth section examines the current situation in Adjumani's refugee settlements by looking at the issue of food security, and the last section conceptualises Uganda's current self-reliance policy.

A. The debate on refugee camps: contained or constrained refugees?

It is often said that "the nature of any society is exposed at its margins" (Hurrell 2011, 85). Likewise, Foucault argues that deeper macro structures of power and governmentality could be exposed by investigating those people living at the margins such as in prisons and mental hospitals (Foucault 1991). While Ferguson and Gupta already showed how governmentality provides an appropriate lens for studying government in Africa, it was Lippert (1999), who explicitly showed the relevance of governmentality for the study of refugees. Today, an unprecedented 65 million people around the world have been forced from home of which some 22 million are refugees. This increased forced migration has affected contemporary politics and attitudes towards refugees. Yet, according to Lippert, the issue of forced displaced has not always been politicised.

Lippert (1999), who in a similar fashion as Foucault traced back where term 'refugee' comes from, argues that the term simply did not exist before the twentieth century in the way we understand the label now. Before World War I, people fleeing from war or prosecution were just seen as a normality and those who fled did not witness any barriers when entering another country in the form of passports or visas. Yet, in the post-war period, "specific historical technologies, rationalities, and forms of knowledge can be observed shaping and making possible the international refugee regime" (Lippert 1999, 320). The invention of 'refugeeness' was a specific moral-political tactic that was used by the humanitarian organisation created by the West – the UNHCR being the most prominent – that legitimized "non"-political interventions in postcolonial states that would have otherwise be considered illegitimate (Lippert 1999, 304-305). The international governmental practices by organisations such as the IRO, the UNHCR and the Red Cross came hand in hand with the intervention of different technologies that allowed intervention into diverse populations (Lippert 1999, 308). Aside from the refugee passport, another major technology of liberalism that Lippert distinguishes is the refugee camp. Inspired by Foucault, it was Lippert who pointed to the idea that the

refugee camp, aside from the promise of distributing food, water and aid in an efficient manner, was used as a disciplinary device or a method, analogous to the prison, by which certain individuals are controlled through the carefully partitioning of space (Lippert 1999, 308-309)

Foucault, Ferguson and Gupta, and Lippert share a same vision of neoliberalism as a rationality of government, a specific mode of governmentality that has now emerged worldwide. Duffield concurs with the aforementioned and basically presents an argument similar to Lippert. Yet, where Lippert demonstrates how (neo)liberalism is used to legitimize interventionism in the underdeveloped world, Duffield emphasises how liberalism also creates a need for liberal interventionism in the underdeveloped world. Duffield argues that since decolonisation and the advent of globalisation, people from the underdeveloped world are now able to circulate globally, and therefore threaten the welfare bureaucracies in the developed world. As a consequence, “the resilience of the consumer societies are now measured in their ability to contain the circulatory effect of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration” (Duffield 2008, 161). Hence, the nexus between security and development that now dominates liberal interventionism is not complete without the term ‘containment’, which Duffield defines as “those various interventions and technologies that seek to restrict or manage the circulation of incomplete and hence potentially threatening life, or return it from whence it came” (2008, 146). It is due to this term that the link between ‘governmentality’ and the refugee camp becomes apparent. In short, where governmentality is about the disciplining and regulating of life, containment is a tactic within a (neo)liberal governmentality. The refugee camp in this respect is a specific technology of containment, “established to prevent the contamination of the nation and its citizens by outsiders” (Turner 2015, 3).

Nowadays, camps are the preferred instrument for containing people and are often labelled differently as “IDP camps, refugee camps, detention centres, transit camps, deportation camps, prisons and ghettos” (Turner 2015, 1). Yet, the function of containment, according to Turner, cannot be the only defining feature of refugee camps. What defines camps is its exceptional character both in temporality and spatiality. Camps are exceptional in spatiality as they demarcate a clear distinction between inside and the outside. Refugee camps are often located in faraway places in the periphery and surrounded by fences. Yet, even when they are located in cities and do not have fences, there is still an invisible perimeter that separates and shapes the lives of those living inside the camp (Turner 2015, 4). Refugee camps are also exceptional as they are always meant to be a temporary measure in response to emergencies and are thus never meant to stay (Turner 2015, 2). Even though refugee camps may exist for decades, they are still temporary in nature as “neither those in charge of establishing the camps nor those who inhabit the know how long the camp will remain or for how long the individual refugee will stay in the camp” (Turner 2015, 4). According to Turner, it is these spatial and temporal characteristics that define the refugee camp. It is for these characteristics that Peteet argues that Palestinian enclaves in Jordan can also be conceptualised as refugee camps (Peteet 2015, 225-226). Similarly, the refugee settlements in Uganda can be compared to the academic literature on refugee camps even though the Ugandan government claims to have no encampment policy. It is not the name that the settlements carry, but the spatial and temporal nature and the function of containment that determine whether they can be labelled as a refugee camp.

While most scholars agree on the exceptional temporal and spatial character of the camp, they are, however, divided over the question what it means to be in a refugee camp. On the one hand, there is a vast body of literature that describes encamped refugees as being deprived from their agency and as silent aid receivers. From this perspective, the encamped refugee is referred to as ‘bare life’ (Agamben

1998) or ‘wasted lives’ (Bauman 2004), and the camp is metaphorically seen as a ‘warehouse’ where refugees can be stocked to keep them out of society (Hovil 2007, 600). Agier, for example, argues that the camp is an ‘exceptional treatment of a human “waste” that has no voice and no place in this world, a way of managing the undesirable in which humanitarian government operates, as it were, as a “subsidiary” form of the “government of the world” (2010, 42-43). The camp in this view, is a place of social exclusion and dissolution, a place where life is depoliticized through humanitarian governance and a temporary place where life is permanently ‘on-hold’ (Turner 2015, 6-7; Hovil 2007, 599). It is mostly this side of the debate that is conceptually and theoretically informed by Foucauldian notions of government and power and hence, it is not surprising that scholars such as Agamben (1998), Lippert (1999), Hovil (2006), Agier (2010) view the refugee camp as the ultimate exercise of biopower. It is also this side of the debate that closely matches the “popular discourse and humanitarian policies [that] often portray refugees as innocent victims of war, violence and ethnic conflict, appealing to humanitarian compassion and a philanthropic will to help fellow human beings in need” (Turner 2015, 5).

More recent writings by several scholars, however, have challenged this depiction of encamped refugees as passive victims and the refugee camp as a site of exclusion. In contrast to the aforementioned authors, these writings do not so much rely Foucauldian notions of biopower or a macro-level analysis to refugee camps, but instead, have come to their findings primarily by conducting ethnographic research in the camps (Moulin and Nyers 2007; Jansen 2011; Turner 2015; Lecadet 2015). Turner, for example, finds that while humanitarian organisations attempt to depoliticise the camp, they are simultaneously creating a place for hyper-politicisation since “every event is new and has no logical space in a symbolic order and is therefore up for interpretation, contention” due to the disruption and temporary nature that characterizes the camp (2015, 7). Other scholars have found that far from being passive victims, refugees organize themselves to contest and protest UNHCR policies. In some cases, these demands are fully ignored by the UNHCR, as was the case with Sudanese refugee protests in Egypt in 2005, which resulted in 28 deaths (Moulin and Nyers 2007, 357). Yet, in Agamé camp in Benin, for example, refugees were also able to successfully protest against the UNHCR’s decision to repatriate refugees back to Togo (Lecadet 2015, 203).

Jansen also challenges the depiction of refugees as passive victims and silent aid receivers. Based on an extensive ethnography of the Kenyan refugee camp Kakuma, Jansen finds that refugees find multiple ways to venture outside the confinements of the camp, even though they are officially not allowed to do so and often are able to engage in informal economic activities in and outside the camp that present alternative livelihoods than a dependency on aid. In fact, Jansen finds that many people who are registered as living in the camp, actually spend most of their time living their lives in Sudan or Nairobi (Jansen 2015, 158). For them, the camp is rather seen as an option, and “aid is a resource rather than a form of assistance, a necessity or hand-out alone” (Jansen 2011, 134). Not only do refugees in camps possess agency, also the camp itself becomes a site of inclusion. Camps as Kakuma, while located in the periphery, often form a major hub for commerce and for welfare provisions that are freely provided to refugees and often of higher standards than the surrounding region of the camp. While people may live precarious lives the camp, they are for instance, not necessarily worse off than the urban poor in Nairobi (Jansen 2011, 167). It is therefore that Jansen, instead of using the metaphor of a ‘warehouse’, refers to Kakuma as an ‘accidental city’ (2011, 2).

The literature on refugee camps thus shows that different ideas or conceptualisations of the refugee camp. Ideas can help researchers to make sense of evidence. Yet, social research also, ‘in simplest

terms, involves a dialogue between ideas and evidence' (Ragin 1994, 55). Hence, ideas concerning governmentality and containment and different conceptions of the refugee camp need to be related to Uganda's refugee settlements in general and Adjumani's settlements in particular, before anything sensible can be said about the latter. The next sections therefore first examine how Uganda's refugee settlement system emerged before situating Adjumani's refugee settlements in the debate.

B. From 'care and maintenance' to 'self-reliance'

As mentioned in the previous section, the camp has been the most preferred instrument for containing people. Uganda's refugee settlements at first sight, however, seem to defy the traditional mould of the refugee camp in terms of a spatially segregated site of containment and, as far as the name implies, in temporality. Nevertheless, the link between refugee camps and refugee settlement cannot be fully understood without understanding how the preferred solutions to protracted refugee situations have changed over time.

The 1951 UN Refugee Convention states that the 'three durable solutions' for protracted refugee situations are voluntary repatriation, third country resettlement, and local integration. Yet, while the UNHCR considers these solutions as being equal and complementary solutions, they have during the 1990s been placed in "a hierarchy by the international community, with voluntary repatriation assuming growing precedence over resettlement and local integration" (Crisp 2004, 4). According to Crisp, there are several factors that contributed to why voluntary repatriation has become the preferred solutions for refugee problems. First, a the perception of host states that more prosperous states in the international community were not carrying their share the burden, and an increasingly restrictive asylum climate related to a fear to lose control on the movement of people across their borders affected host states' receptiveness to accept refugees. Secondly, concerns about the negative economic, environmental, and security impacts of large-scale refugee populations affected the receptiveness of states to host refugees (Crisp 2004, 5).

Despite the preference of voluntary repatriation, refugees are living, on average, seventeen years in a limbo, not knowing whether their future lies in their home country, host country or a third country (Jacobsen 2002). Between 1999 and 2013, the number of protracted refugee situations – those that last more than five years - has increased from 22 to 33 (Kreibaum 2016, 262). Most of these protracted refugee situations are found in Africa due the protracted nature of armed conflicts and the corresponding failure of the international community to bring the conflicts on this continent to an end (Crisp 2002, 1-2). According to Crisp, one of "the most evident characteristics of Africa's protracted refugee situations is that they are usually to be found in peripheral border areas of asylum countries: places which are insecure, where climatic conditions are harsh, which are not a high priority for the central government and for development actors, and which are consequently very poor" (2002, 5). Other characteristics of these protracted refugee situations in Africa are that the camps and settlements are populated by a large proportion of people with special needs; limited international attention as a consequence of "donor fatigue"; and restricted rights for refugees. It is due to the dire situations of refugees that Crisp argues for vigorously pursuing local integration, local settlement and self-reliance (2004, 7).

Local integration is not a novel idea. The UNHCR 1951 Refugee Convention already considers it to be one of three durable solutions to protracted refugee situations. In the Refugee Convention, "local integration refers to the granting of full and permanent asylum, membership and residency status, by

the host government. It takes place through a process of legal, economic, social and cultural incorporation of refugees, culminating in the offer of citizenship” (Kibreab 1989, 469 in: Jacobsen 2001, 1). During the Cold War, local integration was widely practised in the West and while in Africa permanent asylum was not very often given, refugees were often permitted to settle among the host community. After the Cold War this changed, however, due to a shifting politics of asylum and because refugees were increasingly perceived as an economic and environmental burden and were “associated with security problems like the militarization of camps, the spill-over of conflict from their countries of origin, and increased criminal activity” (Jacobsen 2001, 3).

In the 1990s, voluntarily repatriation therefore became the most preferred solutions by host states due to a reluctance to locally integrate refugees and the limited capacity of third country resettlement. Yet, since refugee situations also became increasingly protracted, ‘warehousing’ refugees till their eventual repatriation was often not a feasible solution. Notwithstanding the precarious humanitarian situation of the camps where refugees live, the costs of ‘care and maintenance’ of warehoused refugees and corresponding ‘donor fatigue’ that characterises protracted refugee situations make the refugee camps for the host state and the humanitarian donors an increasingly unsustainable way of hosting refugees.

As an alternative strategy to cope with protracted refugee situations, the local settlement on the one hand recognises the reluctance of host states to opt for local integration, while simultaneously cuts the costs for humanitarian donors for addressing the ‘essential needs’ of the refugee population (Kaiser 2005, 352-353). While local integration and local settlement are often used interchangeably, they are thus conceptually different (Crisp 2004, 1). Where local integration is a process, local settlements are a specific strategy of hosting refugees and defined by Jacobsen as sites which are “organized settlements, are planned, segregated agricultural enclaves or villages created specifically for refugees, but which differ from camps in that refugees are expected to become self-sufficient pending their repatriation” (2001, 7). Where Crisp sees local settlements as a positive intermediary step where local integration cannot be pursued (2004, 7), Jacobsen notes that local settlement are historically a failure and are not necessarily a step towards integration, but are instead often purposively used to prevent the integration of refugees (2001, 7).

The UNHCR, according to Hunter, in recognition of the “donor fatigue” within the international community and the reluctance of host states to opt for local integration as durable solution, started to promote self-reliance as a low cost option to sustainably manage refugee camps (2009, 2). Not surprisingly, the UNHCR’s Handbook find that a self-reliance policy “is appropriate in all stages of an operation. Self-reliance is right no matter what the ultimate durable solution will” (2005, 2). Yet, “urban assistance tends to be expensive, time consuming (with many individual cases) and may have security-related problems” (UNHCR 2005, 9). Hence, it is no surprise that the rural settlement has regained popularity as an instrument to host refugees and promote self-reliance among refugees.

In sum, as refugee situations during the 1990s became more protracted in nature, and voluntary repatriation became the preferred durable solution for host states, the international community started to promote “self-reliance” policies over “care and maintenance” programmes. In this sense, the refugee settlement regained popularity with the international community as it was a cost-saving alternative to the refugee camp. The refugee settlement is thus not necessarily devised as a tool to locally integrate refugees. Instead, the increased popularity with settlement approach since the 1990s should be seen in the light of host states’ growing preference of voluntarily repatriation over local integration as a durable solution to protracted refugee situations.

C. Uganda's refugee settlements and self-reliance strategy

Situated between the volatile regions of Central-Africa and the Horn of Africa, Uganda has almost constantly been hosting refugees since independence. Already since 1959, Uganda has been hosting refugees in rural settlements. Yet, it was in the historical trend of the 1990s that the Ugandan government and the UNHCR began implementing the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) in 1999. It was a programme initially only implemented in the West Nile region, but was later extended to the whole country (Kreibaum 2016, 264). The goal of SRS was “to integrate the services provided to the refugees in regular government structures and policies” and, in so doing, to move from “relief to development” (Crisp 2003 in: Kaiser 2005, 355). Refugees were provided with plots of land, a starters kit of non-food items and received food aid that was gradually withdrawn over a period of four years, except for persons with special needs (Hunter 2009, 18). Notwithstanding the appraisal from the international community, scholarly literature has consistently described SRS and Uganda's settlement approach as a failure. For refugees' livelihoods, self-reliance posed more challenges and failed to improve their lives while serving the political agenda of the Government of Uganda, the UNHCR, and the donor community (Kaiser 2005; Kaiser 2006; Meyer 2006; Hovil 2007; and Hunter 2009).

Related to the impact of SRS on refugees, Kaiser finds that in the settlements, refugees “agricultural livelihoods are seriously compromised by distance from markets, unfavourable climatic conditions, exhausted soil and inadequate inputs” (2006, 597). Yet, another constraining factor to refugee empowerment was the civil war that was ravaging in northern Uganda. However, it was the fact that refugees did not enjoy freedom of movement, according to the aforementioned authors that formed the most constraining factor for refugee empowerment. Freedom of movement is one of the most important rights for refugees, according to the 1951 UN Refugee convention, as it is a gateway through which all other rights are enjoyed (Hovil 2006, 600). Likewise, Kaiser notes that “the principal self-protection strategy available to the poor and marginal populations in situations of insecurity is mobility” (2005, 361).

In addition, the refugee settlement approach has redefined the concept of refugee in the Ugandan context. No longer were refugee defined by their well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin. Rather, refugee status was “essentially only recognised as such if they live in refugee settlements in isolated rural areas” (Meyer 2006, 8). Refugees opting to live outside the settlement are, according to Ugandan government's policy are undocumented ‘aliens’ who do not get protection or are recognised by the UNHCR and therefore, do not receive any direct or indirect assistance. Only those with some form of financial, ethnic, social or political capital (Kaiser 2006, 609). This is dichotomy between those with some form capital and those without, as a study of Refugee Law Project concludes, is not just a neutral fact:

It is not simply a neutral fact that refugees tend to be impoverished and that, needing assistance, they go and stay in settlement where this is provided for them. Rather, the structure of political and institutional response to refugees in Uganda constructs a situation where refugees' own capacities, potential, and comparative advantages may effectively be stripped away from them, and that serviced settlements are represented as the answer to their problems (2005, 35).

Uganda's self-reliance strategy aims were to reduce the cost of care and maintenance, integrate services between refugees and nationals, and offer refugees chance to manage their own lives. Yet, as

SRS failed to deliver any improvements to refugees but instead posed more challenges due to the political and institutional context, Kaiser argues that it “is refugee assistance rather than the refugees themselves, which are to be integrated” (2005, 355). Reflecting on SRS, the Principal Settlement Officer also argues that while the integrated service-delivery was in general an improvement, this was not always an improvement for refugees:

The main strengths were the foundations they laid for integrated programming, for service delivery by local government and for an improved legal regime. Weaknesses included insufficient consultation with refugee and host communities, insufficient consultation with refugee and host communities, insufficient attention to the preparation of local governments, and inadequate funding. In addition, the design of SRS and DAR did not take into consideration the priorities and competing interests of local governments, as a result of which refugees were sometimes disfavoured in relation to host communities especially when resources were limited.²⁷

Uganda’s self-reliance strategy, according to the authors in this section, did not only fail because of the institutional or conditional constraints, but also because it was primarily used instrumentally to advance the self-serving agendas of the Government of Uganda and the international community. Internationally, Meyer and Hunter find SRS was solely self-serving for the UNHCR and the international donors as it was from the outset solely devised to decrease material output, leaving refugees disempowered. For Meyer, this is because UNHCR’s definition of self-reliance is that refugees are able to meet their ‘essential needs’. Consequently, Meyer finds that rather than empowering refugees, the set goal of SRS, namely self-reliance, from the outset had a very low standard whereby the self-reliant refugees find themselves in a condition no better than encamped refugees. Hence, self-reliant refugees are by no means empowered refugees.

Domestically, Uganda’s self-reliance strategy was also used instrumentally in furtherance of the Ugandan government’s political agenda in the northern regions. According to Kaiser, the discourse of self-reliance was used to justify the large-scale forced relocation of refugees in 2002 from safety of Kiryandongo refugee settlement to the unsafe West Nile region (2005, 362). By using the excuse of land pressures that compromised refugees’ capacity to become self-reliant, refugees were forcibly relocated to the insecure district of Yumbe and Arua which during that time were still affected by the LRA insurgency and SPLA activity in the West Nile region. In doing so, Museveni aimed to gain popularity in the northern regions by strengthening the political links between his party, the National Resistance Movement, and the marginalised and dissatisfied regions by means of the immediate developmental attention it would bring to the West Nile. Secondly, it provided Museveni the excuse to harden its presence in the remote border area (2005, 363).

Overall, the authors in this section has described Uganda’s self-reliance strategy as predominantly the interests of the Government of Uganda and the international community. In doing so, the introduction of Uganda’s self-reliance policy brought more challenges to the refugees rather than empowering them and furthermore, infringed on their right to protection and freedom of movement. Hence, Hovil argues that “there is empirical justification for de-emphasizing the local settlement policy in Uganda and moving towards a policy that encourages the local integration of refugees within the host community” (2007, 618).

²⁷ Office of the Prime Minister (April 2015) “A concept paper for the Settlement Transformation Project” prepared by Bafaki Charles, Principal Settlement Officer, OPM.

With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, which marked the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War, most of the Sudanese refugees voluntarily repatriated back to southern Sudan in the years that followed. When the Sudanese refugees left the settlement, so also did scholarly attention. With the current influx of refugees, however, the local settlement approach has regained attention from the international community. Moreover, since the repatriation of refugees there have also been significant changes in Uganda's refugee policy, most notably the Refugee Act 2006. Hence, the question that needs to be asked is whether the criticism in this and the previous section is still applicable to Uganda's refugee settlement today. The subsequent section therefore examines this question by investigating Adjumani's refugee settlements.

D. Adjumani's refugee settlements today: the case of food ration cuts

Walking through the streets of Adjumani Town Council, it becomes evidently clear that South Sudanese refugees are not confined to the refugee settlements. Rather than the Swahili term “*Mzungu!*”, it is “*Khawaja!*” that is commonly used here to greet me while passing by. Part of the immersion of the South Sudanese into the social life in Adjumani may be contributed to the fact that over 200,000 refugees in Adjumani District now enjoy the freedom of movement and the legal right to work due to introduction of the Refugee Act in 2006. Nevertheless, when I asked the four respondents that already stayed in Adjumani as a refugee during the Second Sudanese Civil War to compare the differences in the refugee policy and their lives as refugee then and now, it was not the rights of the Refugee Act that they mentioned. Instead, the refugees for whom it was the second time that they stayed as refugees in Adjumani District, the main differences they experienced were consistently a perception of increased security and decreased food security. Talking about the main differences in their lives as refugees, these respondents reflected that during the previous time there was lot of LRA rebel activity that at times caused them to being chased away from the refugee settlements.²⁸ Likewise, these respondents consistently argued in their comparison between now and then that their food security situation has worsened due to the cutting in food rations.²⁹ As one ‘old old case’³⁰ refugee and local NGO worker reflects:

‘By then I must say, it was mostly the Equatorians, and it was Alere, Oiji and Olua where refugees were settled. That were the three settlements. By then, I should say, there was a lot of food, the amount of food that the refugees were getting. They were getting around 15 to 20kg a person, which is not happening now. They could even give us sugar, which is not happening now the food ration has been reduced and they only get a cup of beans, so it is really a challenge.’³¹

As a follow-up question, when I asked whether the respondents enjoyed different rights now than before, the answer was negative:

²⁸ Author's interview with no. 13, 16, 17, 39

²⁹ Author's interview with no. 13, 17, and 39.

³⁰ Refugees in Uganda are divided in four categories that determine the support that they receive. Old old case refugees (OOCs) are refugees that never went back to South Sudan after the CPA in 2005. Old case refugees (OCs) are refugees that arrived in Uganda in or after 2012, but before 30th of June. New case refugees (NCs) are those who have arrived after this date. The fourth category of refugees are Persons with Special Needs (PSNs) that are identified by the Red Cross. They receive full ration regardless of their date of arrival in Uganda.

³¹ Author's interview with Zhura, old old case refugee and coordinator in Adjumani for African Youth Action Network, Adjumani Town Council, on 1 June 2017.

‘No... there was nothing. Even that time when you want to go to town, there was no restriction, I guess the policy they had then is the same they have now. It is just the food ration and the number of organisations, by that time there were fewer.’³²

Arguably, the Refugee Act may have had a major positive impact for many other refugees in Uganda. Yet, during my field research, it was the cutting of the food rations that proved to be the liveliest topic of conversation and the most pressing issue for the refugees. According to the chief coordinator for food distribution of World Vision, the Implementing Partner contracted by the UNHCR to oversee the food distribution for refugees in the West Nile region, new case refugees normally receive per person per month 11.8 kilograms of cereals; 2.4 kilograms of beans; 1.5 kilograms of soya blend; 0.9 kilograms of vegetable cooking oil; and 0.15 kilograms of salt *or* 31,000 Ugandan shilling (approximately €7.50). The logic behind these quantities of food is that altogether they should provide refugees with 2,100 kcal per day, which corresponds with the Sphere Standard, the internationally recognised minimum standard to be upheld by relief organisations for disasters and emergency situations.³³

In February 2017, the food rations for old case refugees, those who arrived before 30th of June 2015, were cut by 50 per cent.³⁴ In May 2017, however, the food rations for cereals were further cut to 3 kilograms and this time it was for all the refugees in West Nile, including Persons with Special Needs. At time of writing in July, refugees’ food rations in Adjumani were still down to the 3 kilograms of cereals. While the Ugandan government has claimed that the most the constraining factor for Uganda’s refugee policy is the lack of funding,³⁵ the problems with food supply, according to staff members of World Food Programme, was not because of lack of funding, but because of a regional food shortage. Due to the drought that affected East-Africa and because of the influx of refugees, the domestic market of what ought to be a food-exporting country to be exhausted. In addition, Kenya is facing similar problems, Burundi and Tanzania ban the export of staple foods, and Congo and South Sudan suffer from a chronic food shortage. Therefore, food must be shipped by the WFP from Sudan which causes logistical problems.³⁶

Whether it is part of Uganda’s self-reliance strategy, like the first cut in food rations in February 2017, or whether it is due structural constraints such as food shortages in the region, refugees are receiving less than half of what is internationally considered to be a *minimum* standard. However, the Sphere Standard also states that the food rations do not always have to account 2,100 kcal per day. Only “where people have no access to any food at all, the distributed rations should meet their total nutritional requirements” (Sphere Project 2011, 181).³⁷ In the Ugandan context, the cutting of food rations is legitimised due to self-reliance strategy allotting plots of land to refugees and giving them the legal right to work and the freedom of movement.

³² *ibid.*

³³ Author’s interview with Alex Gombe, chief coordinator food distribution World Vision West Nile programme, Adjumani Town Council, on 2 June, 2017.

³⁴ Author’s interview with Roselily Limio, coordinator of Adjumani NGO Forum, Adjumani Town Council, on 18 April, 2017.

³⁵ The Guardian (3 April 2017). “Uganda at breaking point as Bidi Bidi becomes world’s largest refugee camp”

<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/apr/03/uganda-at-breaking-point-bidi-bidi-becomes-worlds-largest-refugee-camp-south-sudan>

³⁶ Author’s informal discussion with staff members of World Food Programme staff, Pakelle, on May 29 2017.

³⁷ As an example, the Sphere Standard states that if refugees can “acquire 500 kcals/person/day from their own efforts or resources, the ration should be designed to provide 2,100 – 500 = 1,600 kcals/person/day” (Sphere Project 2011, 181).

It is, however, questionable whether refugees living in the refugee settlement can genuinely enjoy the freedom of movement and the legal right to work. When it comes to employment opportunities in Adjumani District, it is already hard for the local communities that, due to a lack of employment opportunities, used to go to South Sudan for their livelihoods.³⁸ For refugees, it is arguably even harder since refugees tend to be impoverished and do not have an extensive social network like the local community, and live in refugee settlements that are located on average 20 kilometres from the main towns in Adjumani District.³⁹ In addition, it is similarly questionable whether the most impoverished refugees can genuinely enjoy their freedom of movement. In Uganda, the eligibility of receiving food assistance is still dependent on being registered in a by OPM designated refugee settlement. Hence, those without any form of capital are often confined to the refugee settlement as the *boda boda* fare to the nearest town and back almost equals the monthly aid they receive.

It can be debated whether this seclusion is an infringement on the refugees' right to employment and freedom of movement, or whether it is merely the invisible hand at work to the disadvantage of the refugees. Either way, in order to become self-reliant, refugees are for the large part dependent on having land for cultivation. Uganda's official policy is that "settlement areas are being designed for household plots (30 x 30 metres) with larger surrounding areas designated for agricultural use (50 x 50 metres)".⁴⁰ Nevertheless, none of the refugees I spoke to had any extra land for cultivation.⁴¹ Among the respondents was a refugee leader from Nyumanzi refugee settlement who insisted that during the interview I should call the refugee settlement by what it is, namely a camp, because in order for it to be a settlement, it should have land for cultivation.⁴² Though the local communities already gave significant plots of land for refugees to settle some additional land for cultivation, at least at Olua and Agojo, my own observations confirmed the claim that refugees, on average, do not have land for cultivation. Likewise, a survey by a consortium of NGOs found that 100 per cent of the refugees in Adjumani have less than 1,000 square metres of land in total of whom 67 per cent have less than 500 square metres.⁴³ It is thus considerably smaller than the 2500 square metres that the UNHCR claim to be allotted to refugees.

As a consequence of the cutting of food aid, according to the refugee leader from Nyumanzi, there were people who went or are considering to go back to South Sudan stating that they rather die in South Sudan than starve in Uganda. Famine Early Warning System Network prognoses that due to the influx of refugees and because of below-average rainfall, the food security situation in Adjumani District between June and September 2017 is minimally going to hit crisis-level.⁴⁴ Despite the famine that is affecting some areas of South Sudan, there are also parts where the food security situation is better. The refugee leader from Nyumanzi claimed that South Sudanese are, aside from all the serious

³⁸ Author's interview no. 1, 29, 30 (See Appendix B for corresponding details respondents).

³⁹ These towns are Dziapi, Pakelle, and Adjumani Town Council. Adjumani Town Council is with a population of 34,000 by far the largest town

⁴⁰ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (December 2016). "South Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan", January – December 2017, December 2016, Retrieved from: <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/20>

⁴¹ Author's interview no. 13, 14, 16, 17, 35.

⁴² Author's interview with refugee leader living in Nyumanzi refugee settlement, Adjumani Town Council, on 28 May 2017.

⁴³ Danish Refugee Council and Partners in Consortia (January 2017). "Conflict Analysis Assessment Support Programme for Refugee Settlements in Northern Uganda (SPRS-NU) (Kiryandongo, Adjumani and Arua Refugee Settlements in Uganda)" *Unpublished document*, p.66

⁴⁴ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (April 2017). "Food Security Outlook Update April 2017", April 2017. Retrieved from: <http://www.fews.net/east-africa/uganda/food-security-outlook-update/april-2017> According to the IPC scale, "crisis" is the third level on a 5-level scale whereby level five is labelled as famine. Food security situations can be described as a "crisis" when "even with humanitarian assistance at least on in five HHs in the area have the following or worse: food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition OR are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps".

safety risks, better able to get food in South Sudan by either farming at their place of origin, by collecting wild foods, or at IDP camps that are less crowded.⁴⁵

Likewise, a Belgian researcher conducting a longitudinal study on youth refugees' resilience found that there was a considerable number of refugees in the settlements of Maaji and Ayilo that had already left or were considering going back to South Sudan because of the hunger and lack of a future perspectives in the settlements.⁴⁶ Similarly, the programme coordinator LWF pointed out that: "because of the current situation, some refugees, actually when you go to some of the blocks, they are already running away, back to South Sudan. This one is not tribal, this one is a cross-cutting thing because every household is affected, and forces those to go to the bushes or their place of origin to find vegetables".⁴⁷ According to a South Sudanese director of an NGO and advisory member of the Panel of Experts for UNSC resolution 2250, this issue was not only confined to Adjumani settlements, but affected all the settlements in West Nile.^{48 49}

Yet, the respondents working for international organisations, while not denying the aforementioned obstacle of access to land, found that it was mainly a different obstacle standing in the pathway for refugee's self-reliance. During an informal discussion with a senior official of UNHCR at Adjumani, when I asked the question of what the largest obstacle for refugees to become self-reliance, the answer was that although not everyone is likely to become completely self-reliant, it was arguably the mind-set of refugees that proved to be the main obstacle.⁵⁰ Likewise, an officer from a leading Implementing Partner response to the same question was that refugees are "spoon-fed" and illustrating his argument by stating that "every time you want to do sensitisation or get a piece of information, they always want sodas or cash, they always expect benefits".⁵¹ What these respondents refer to with the "mind-set" is what developmental studies has been coined as an "aid dependency" syndrome or "welfare mentality" (Abdi 2005, 8). As another respondent from an Implementing Partner reflects:

'If you go to Ayilo [refugee settlement], even in their own South Sudan, they used to go walk 3-4 kilometres to get access to water. But now here, some of the boreholes are motorised. So, you just go open tab and see the water flowing. But some of them cannot feel ashamed to tell you that there is no water just because the motorised machine is spoiled. There is borehole maybe just at the hospital there, someone would tell you "we don't have water", because they are used to, instead of this pumping the borehole, someone thinks it should just open. But now, the question is, in their own country, what will they use? I mean, some of the host community walk kilometres to access water. (...) In peacebuilding there is the concept of "do no harm", whatever you do, you do it with good intentions. But by now as you see how it turns, it creates laziness. That is something we need to address, it is the mind-set.'⁵²

⁴⁵ Author's interview with refugee leader living in Nyumanzi refugee settlement, Adjumani Town Council, on 28 May 2017.

⁴⁶ Author's informal discussions with Julie Schiltz, PhD at University of Gent.

⁴⁷ Author's interview with Moses Okello, LWF programme coordinator Adjumani, Adjumani Town Council, on May 29 2017.

⁴⁸ Author's discussions with Malual Bol Kiir, South Sudanese refugee, advisory member Panel of Experts for UNSC resolution 2250, and director of African Youth Action Network, Adjumani Town Council, on May 25 2017.

⁴⁹ It should be noted, however, that it is likely that in comparison to the number of South Sudanese still arriving in Uganda because of hunger. According to a doctor I spoke at the Elegu-Nimule border, the majority of the hundreds of refugees daily crossing Elegu border stated that their principal reason for fleeing South Sudan was famine rather than conflict. At the same time this claim should also be substantiated. In the past months, a large part of the refugees arriving was caused by fighting between SPLA and SPLA-io in Yei and Pajok in South Sudan. These refugees, however, mainly entered Uganda at Koboko and Lamwo District. See: <http://dispatch.ug/2017/04/10/horrible-attack-drives-south-sudan-refugees-lamwo/>

Author's discussion with doctor working for MTI at Elegu Collection Centre, Elegu, 25 May 2017.

⁵⁰ Author's discussion with UNHCR officer, Pakelle, on 3 May 2017.

⁵¹ Author's interview with aid worker working for lead Implementing Partner, Adjumani Town Council, May 29 2017.

⁵² Author's interview with Moses Okello, LWF programme coordinator Adjumani, Adjumani Town Council, on 29 May 2017.

Admitted, based on a dozen accounts of the experiences of refugees and aid workers with Uganda's self-reliance strategy, it is hard to determine whether it is "aid-dependency", structural constraints, or whether is the factors intrinsic to Uganda's self-reliance strategy that proves to be the main obstacle for refugees to become self-reliant. Furthermore, the 1.2 million refugees in Uganda testify that Uganda does have a genuinely *open* policy towards refugees that gives safety and protection to people fleeing the atrocities that presently happening in South Sudan, Congo, and Burundi. Also, there are structural constraints that explain the shortcomings in the food security situation of refugees such as the overwhelming numbers of refugees, the fact that land is not instantly ready for refugees to cultivate, the inadequacy of international funding, and the fact that Uganda is one of the poorest countries in the world.

Notwithstanding the pressures that Uganda faces due to its generous open-door policy, the cutting of food rations raises the question of why the international community views Uganda's policy of self-reliance as *progressive*.⁵³ Why is it that Uganda's policy has become to viewed by the international community as "the best place in the world to be a refugee", "a refugee paradise", or "exemplary",⁵⁴ while the most vulnerable refugees are forced to go back to South Sudan because they are starving in South Sudan? And why if articles emerge that nuance the view of Uganda as refugee paradise, it is only the lack of funding that is criticised and not the underlying assumptions of Uganda's policy?⁵⁵ Of course, Uganda's policy is progressive in comparison to neighbouring countries or even Europe. Looking at the refugee situation in Dadaab, Kenya, it is indeed easy to see Uganda's policy as 'exemplary'.

Nevertheless, the food security situation raises the question of why the international community sees a policy that is *a priori* aimed at cutting the food rations for one of the most vulnerable, malnourished, and impoverished groups to not only what is internationally recognised as a *minimum* standard for emergency situations, but also below the minimum of what is needed to sustain the human body, as a policy that is progressive, legitimate, and exemplary. In a survey of six countries on the percentage of refugees entitled to food rations, including Uganda and Kenya, de Bruijn finds that the percentage of refugees entitled to food rations in Uganda varied between 56 and 82 per cent, "whereas in the other five countries it has not been below 97 per cent" (2009, 20).

If refugees could indeed become self-reliant and manage their own lives while preparing for their eventual repatriation that would be ideal for everyone involved in refugee governance. For pragmatic (or self-serving) reasons such as the cutting the costs of 'care and maintenance' programmes or because of regional food shortages, it is also understandable food rations are cut and that they should try to sustain themselves. Yet, it raises the question of why the international community in the first place sees a policy as progressive or exemplary when it deliberately exposes those living at the

⁵³ For instance, in a speech by EU Head of Cooperation Michelle Labeeu (24 February 2017) referred to Uganda's refugee policy as exemplary and progressive, but it is routinely used by all kinds of donors, governments, humanitarian organisations and in the press to describe Uganda's refugee policy. Retrieved from: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/uganda/21390/eu-launches-eu-10m-ugx-37b-refugees-programme-uganda_enSp

⁵⁴ See for example: Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (25 April 2017). "Welkom vluchteling! Uganda ontvangt je met open armen" Retrieved from: <https://scroll.lab.nos.nl/vluchtelingenparadijs-oeganda>; Washington Post (20 June 2017). "Uganda may be best place in the world to be a refugee. But that could change without more money" Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/20/uganda-may-be-best-place-in-the-world-to-be-a-refugee-but-that-could-change-without-more-money/?utm_term=.ddd7364854d7

⁵⁵ Washington Post (20 June 2017). "Uganda may be best place in the world to be a refugee. But that could change without more money" Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/20/uganda-may-be-best-place-in-the-world-to-be-a-refugee-but-that-could-change-without-more-money/?utm_term=.ddd7364854d7

margins to the uncertainty of volatile external conditions and shocks (e.g. land access, population increase, drought, inflation of food prices).

E. Self-reliance strategy as international containment

A key insight for understanding why Uganda's "self-reliance and resilience framework"⁵⁶ has become to be viewed by the international community as progressive is provided by critical perspectives on liberal development. More specifically, explanations can be found in Duffield's and Evans and Reids' critique on self-reliance and resilience as liberal technologies of containment. As discussed earlier, Duffield describes containment as "the various interventions and technologies that seek to restrict or manage the circulation of incomplete and hence potentially threatening life" (2008, 146). Containment is a security strategy that aims to prevent the threats of unsecured life in the underdeveloped world. In the security-development nexus, development is a liberal technology of security and a way of containing underdeveloped life (Duffield 2008, 145).

Yet, in the 1980s, development strategies shifted from preaching modernisation to preaching sustainable development in line with an emerging neoliberal governmentality. This shift in strategy "preached that development would only follow once people gave up on state-led modernization strategies and learnt to practice the virtue of 'community-based self-reliance'" and thus reflects a neoliberal agenda in that it "shifts the burden of security from states to people" (Evans and Reid 2014, 73). In this sense the people at the margins are disciplined "to give up on states as sources of protection and in improvement of their well-being, and instead practice the virtue of securing themselves" (Evans and Reid 2014, 74). Likewise, the notion of resilience reflects a neoliberal governmentality but goes further in the sense that the people at the margins are disciplined to give up to possibility of security at all and instead disciplines them to believe in "the necessity and positivity of human exposure to danger" (Evans and Reid 2013, 83).

It is this view on development, which Evans and Reid regard as fundamentally nihilistic, can plausibly explain why Uganda's refugee policy, which leaves South Sudanese refugees "dangerously exposed", has become to be viewed by the international community as exemplary and progressive as it similarly shifts the burden of human security from the international community to the refugee (Evans and Reid 2013, 97-98). Moreover, self-reliance functions as a technology of containment in the way that "it allows Western governments to push forward with the externalisation of their asylum policy" whereby "EU's emergency trust fund for Africa is already aiming to externalise the bloc's asylum policy and to tackle migration 'at the roots'" (Schiltz and Titeca). Altogether, this provides an incentive for the West and humanitarian organisations - which are predominantly funded by the West - to promote the idea of Uganda's refugee policy as exemplary. According to Schiltz, the Belgian researcher based in Adjumani, and Titeca (2017), the narrative of Uganda as a success story "allows it to show that African countries are also able to host refugees, which in turn supports European efforts to withhold migrants and refugees before they reach EU borders." As Schiltz and Titeca (2017) describe it well, this also influences how the media reports on the refugee crisis:

⁵⁶ Uganda Government and World Bank (2016). "ReHoPE — Refugee and host population empowerment strategic framework – Uganda". Retrieved from: https://d10k7k7mywg42z.cloudfront.net/assets/5667425fd4c96170fe082173/REHOPE_2_Page_Brief_141015.pdf

All these hidden interests naturally make it difficult for journalists to tell a nuanced story about refugee experiences in Uganda. But, the way journalists obtain stories about Uganda's refugee policy is also part of the problem. Much of the reporting on this issue is done through press trips organised by embassies or humanitarian organisations. This kind of hit-and-run journalism consists of a number of pre-arranged field visits and interviews, highlighting the positive work of the organisation and Uganda's refugee policy. So, presenting Uganda's refugee policy as a success story benefits all actors concerned and makes journalists' jobs a lot easier.

Self-reliance is an ambiguous concept whereby humanitarian organisations attempt to claim it is a policy of empowerment (Duffield 2008; Meyer 2006; Evans and Reid 2013), while in reality it is often self-serving and advances the goal of containment. Self-reliance becomes the norm whereby those that do not comply to this norm, as the NGO respondents describes it, are having a wrong mind-set or are suffering from an aid-dependency syndrome. Uganda's self-reliance policy and its consequent failure is not completely unexpected as it fits in what Duffield describes as the biopolitics of underdevelopment, which entails an "essential circularity or mutual conditioning of relief and development" whereby "an *expansive* humanitarian assistance constantly invokes the need for a *consolidating* developmental self-reliance. Self-reliance, however, regularly collapses into humanitarian emergency which again enjoins a repeat of the governmental process of expansion and consolidation" (2008, 151, italics in original).

This chapter started with the question of how to conceptualise Uganda's refugee settlement as it at first sight seemed to defy the traditional mould of the refugee camp, which is "established to prevent the contamination of the nation and its citizens by outsiders" (Turner 2015, 3). Indeed, Uganda's refugee settlement seem to most noticeable differ from refugee camps found elsewhere is the relative absence of disciplinary technologies of power.⁵⁷ As it maintains a no-encampment policy and provides refugees with the freedom of movement, it seems to indicate that it is not "established to prevent contamination of the citizens and its nations". Nevertheless, since the refugee camp is a conceptualised as a site of containment, the refugee settlement does not completely abandon this function. Rather, it is the level at which the perimeter is drawn that demarcates the distinction between live inside and outside that distinguishes Uganda's refugee settlements from the traditional mould of the refugee camp. Where the refugee camp is "established to prevent the contamination of the nation and its citizens by outsiders" (Turner 2015, 3), the refugee settlement and corresponding self-reliance strategy seem to be established to shift the burden of security from the international community to the refugee while simultaneously preventing the contamination of developed world by the irregular flows of from the uninsured lives and sets a perimeter between the developed and underdeveloped world.

⁵⁷ According to Foucault, discipline is a technique of power which is essentially centred on the body and includes "all devices that were used to ensure the spatial distribution of individual bodies (their separation, the alignment, their serialization, and their surveillance) and the organization, around those individuals, of a whole field of visibility" (2003, 242).

F. Chapter conclusion

One of the least comfortable aspects of the debate on refugee settlements in Uganda is that critics are continually invited to agree that the conditions in refugee settlements there are better than in some camps in other countries or, indeed, than IDP camps in Uganda itself. While this may in many cases be true, it does nothing to obviate the difficulties faced by Sudanese refugees in Ugandan settlements. The fact that the rights of some others are abused more than theirs, does not mean that their own rights are not also being undermined (Kaiser 2006, 604-605).

Like the authors that criticised Uganda's self-reliance strategy in early 2000s, this chapter similarly challenges Uganda's current refugee policy as undoubtedly successful. However, as Kaiser describes it well, the point of critically reviewing Uganda's refugee policy is not to be critical for the sake of being critical. This chapter has attempted to situate, contextualise Uganda refugee settlement. While significant improvements can be traced over time, this chapter finds that Uganda's refugee settlements and self-reliance strategy dangerously expose South Sudanese that have fled their country of origin to seek a place of refuge from famine and war. However, the settlement a can be arguably more be better conceptualised as a technology of international rather than national containment. The hardship of the South Sudanese refugees will undoubtedly also impact the host community. This will be investigated in the next chapter.



Photo 6. Most of the local communities at the settlements are in remote areas and are sparsely populated in comparison to the refugee settlement. At the other side of the hill on which this photograph is taken lies Nyumanzi refugee settlement, which is currently hosting 39,000 refugees (see cover photo). Mount Otze in the background demarcates the border with South Sudan.

IV. Local communities' receptiveness to host refugees

This thesis started by contrasting the discourses that have been produced on refugees in Europe and Uganda. Where in Europe, refugees are perceived as a burden. In Uganda, it seems that they refugees are seen as beneficial and an opportunity. In this thesis, I have set out to investigate the conditions that help to understand why local communities are receptive to give out lands for refugees to settle. For me in simplest terms, this raises two questions. First, are the local communities experiencing the refugees as beneficial and secondly, can these benefits fully account for the receptiveness of the host communities to give out land? In order to investigate these conditions, the subsequent section first briefly recounts the debate on why refugees are either seen as a burden or beneficial.

A. The debate on the impact of refugees: Burden or beneficial?

As explained in the previous chapter, refugees during the 1990s were increasingly seen as an economic, security, and environmental burden (Crisp 2004, 5). Security-wise, refugee camps in Africa are often associated with militarisation and the spill-over of conflict from their countries of origin. Government officials in Keyna, for example, claim that the al-Shabaab planned the Westgate mall in 2013, and the 2015 Garissa terrorists attacks from Dadaab refugee camp.⁵⁸ Typical examples of militarisation of refugee camps in Africa are the SPLA recruiting and planning attacks on Sudanese Armed Forces from the refugee camps in the Gambella region of Ethiopia during the early days of the Second Sudanese Civil War (LeRiche and Arnold 2011, 67), and the recruitment of insurgents for Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front from refugee camps in Uganda (Lomo et al. 2001, 20). Refugee camps in Africa are especially prone to militarisation due to their location in remote and insecure peripheral border areas where small arms are prevalent. (Muggah 2008). In addition, refugees may cause insecurity to the host community due to increased criminal activity and violence related to stealing, organised crime, trafficking of human and drugs, sexual and gender-based violence et cetera (Jacobsen 2002). Lastly, refugees may cause insecurity to the host community because of competition between refugees and the host community over scarce resources (Martin 2005).

Refugees often are seen as an environmental burden. The reasons for it are on the one hand quite straightforward. Due to the stark increase of the population in the area, natural resources are depleted because refugees need wood and grasses for construction, firewood for cooking, deplete and pollute water resources, create waste, and bring animals that may overgraze pastures in the area. However, refugees are often also seen as "exceptional resource degraders" as a consequence of their poverty, short time horizons, lack of local environmental knowledge and traumatized psychological status" (Jacobsen 1997, 19). Freedom of movement may mitigate environmental problems because refugees can range further to collect natural resources, which spread the pressure on environmental resources more evenly. Yet, refugee settlements bring the additional environmental concern of soil depletion as they take up more space and the allotted plots of lands are intensively farmed year after year, which results in declining yields (Jacobsen 1997, 24).

As already discussed in the previous chapter, refugees are often also seen as an economical burden because of the costs associated with 'care and maintenance' programmes. At the same time, camps such as Kakuma also stimulate regional economic development and become a central hub for

⁵⁸ The Guardian (14 April 2015) "World's largest refugee camp scapegoated in wake of Garissa attack", retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/14/kenya-garissa-dadaab-scapegoat-al-shabaab>

commerce and public service provision (Janssen 2011). Yet, it is often Uganda itself that is used in the ‘burden versus benefit’ debate to argue in favour of refugees as beneficial. More specifically, reference is often made to two studies on refugees in Uganda. One is a participatory study conducted by Refugee Studies Centre of Oxford University and the second is an econometric study conducted by the World Food Programme. The study done by Oxford University finds empirical evidence to challenge the prevailing common assumptions on “that refugee economies as 1) isolated, 2) a burden, 3) homogenous, 4) technologically illiterate, and 5) dependent on humanitarian assistance.” (Bets et al. 2014, 5). More specifically, Bets et al. find 24 and 43 per cent of refugees are employed by Ugandans in rural and urban settings respectively, whereas 15 per cent of rural-based, and 21 per cent in urban-based refugees employ non-family members. In rural settings, refugees often bring in additional human capital due to their diverse backgrounds and also “a considerable number of refugees work for Ugandan land owners who are looking for skilled farmers” (Bets et al. 2014, 19).

The study done by World Food Programme on the economic impact of refugees on local communities finds that in Adjumani, an average refugee household receiving cash food assistance increases annual real income in the local economy⁵⁹ by 1,072 dollars. Furthermore, the income generated by refugees exceeds the cost of WFP food as an additional refugee household generates 563 dollars for cash and 318 dollars beyond the cost of WFP aid (Zhu et al. 2016, 2). A lesser-known longitudinal nation-wide study on the economic impact of refugees by Kreibaum finds that refugee presence increases monthly consumption. Increasing the number of refugees per 1,000 by 10 would increase consumption by 3 per cent. Based on the average expenditure in refugee hosting area, this would entail 1,408 Ugandan shilling or 0.75 dollar, which is equivalent to a day’s income (Kreibaum 2014, 270). At the same time, however, refugees negatively affect wages of local citizens as refugees increase labour supply and accept smaller payments. Refugees also decrease the income of local citizens that are depended on financial transfers, most likely as attention is diverted away from the local community to the refugees (Kreibaum 2014, 272). Nevertheless, all the three studies find that refugees have a positive economic impact on the local communities. Yet, it is arguably the subjective understanding of the impacts of refugees rather than the ‘real’ impact that affects the receptiveness of local communities to give out their lands for refugees to settle.

B. Perceived impact of refugees

‘At moment, we have not done comprehensive needs assessment, what is the real impact of the area where they stay? As we are talking now, we see some constructing happening in the areas where they stay. But in the long run, we might realise that is devastating.’⁶⁰

Despite that the study done by the World Food Programme indicates that refugees, overall, have a positive economic impact on the local communities, it is still, according to the highest technocrat in the District Local Government, unknown what the overall impacts are of the refugees in the district. Nevertheless, it is possible to investigate the subjective understanding of the impact of refugees on the local community.

⁵⁹ Local economy is defined here as within a radius of 15 kilometres from the settlement.

⁶⁰ Author’s interview with John Bosco, Senior District Planner at Local District Government, Adjumani Town Council, on 19 April 2017.

1. *Environment, natural resources, and livelihoods*

As mentioned earlier, 98 per cent of the people living near the settlements farm at subsistence level. In addition, some of the rural-based respondents earn an extra income through charcoaling, brick-making, collecting grasses, stone quarrying and other forms of manual labour. It is therefore that perceived impacts on their livelihoods, natural resources, and environment cannot be treated as separate, but need to be seen as deeply interdependent. For the District Planner, the impact of the refugees on the environment was clear:

‘For me, I have already see that in terms of natural resources. In terms of natural resources, the impact of refugees is devastating. Settlements have become so vast. The trees that used to protect our houses against the wind are gone. Two weeks ago, we had storm, everything was gone, the roofs were blown off. The kind of heat you are experiencing in a place used to be covered in vegetation. And now the rain pattern has changed, these are all associated issues. We are using wood fuel, and this population is fed on original vegetation. The semi-desert is not very far.’

When I asked the respondents from the local community about the impact that the refugees have on their lives, the majority of the respondents were similarly concerned about the impact the refugees had on the environment. However, as Jacobsen puts it, “environmental degradation is often in the eyes of the beholder” (1997, 20). Likewise, a minority of the respondents also reflected on deforestation in a positive way, stating, for example, that bush-clearing helps to open land for cultivation and has reduced the presence of Tsetse flies. Nevertheless, what stood out in the responses of the local community members was the association between the refugees and disappointing rain-fall patterns. Most of the times, this association was explained by the deforestation caused by the refugees. Yet, the responses reflected also different causal relations between the influx of refugees and the drought as a village member at Mungula pointed out: “refugees are stubborn people, sometimes when the rain is coming, the start drumming and the rain goes away”.⁶¹

Related to the perceive impact of refugees is the complex issue of food security. Whereas the WFP report finds that the distribution of food may lower the price of food when refugees sell food to the local community, most of the respondents of the local community on the contrary experienced that due to the food shortages – for both refugees and host community – the food prices and consequently food insecurity had in fact increased. Hence, while refugees may boost local economies, respondents from the local communities did not experiences any improvement in their livelihoods.

As most the respondents from the local communities experienced the degradation of common pool resources (CPRs)⁶² as negatively, it raises the question whether there were more restrictions or regulations in place related to the management of CPRs. While there were indeed some customs in the local community in place to manage the CPRs,⁶³ respondents from the local community routinely expressed that there were no special regulations or restrictions in place for refugees and that they were free to access firewood, grasses and other kinds of natural resources in order to meet their needs.

⁶¹ Author’s interview with Minraa Dominica, village member living near Olua II refugee settlement, Pakelle sub-county, on 5 May 2017. Quote translated from Madi to English with use of interpreter.

⁶² See: Ostrom E., J. Burger, C. B. Field, R. B. Norgaard, and D. Policansky (1999). “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges”, *Science*, 284, 278-282.

⁶³ Customs, for example, included that grasses are only to be cut from November onwards, charcoaling is only to be done for own consumption or by the very poor, cattle can graze anywhere during daytime but need to be kept on people’s own clan lands during night and so on and so forth.

While local respondents claimed that refugees were free to access CPRs, refugees consistently thought that refugees' restrictive access to CPRs proved likely to be the main factor that threatens or worsens the dynamics between refugees and the local community. In fact, refugees consistently claimed that the local community often chases them away when they want to collect firewood or grasses.⁶⁴ A respondent from an Implementing Partner working on the issue of host-refugee relations went even further in criticising the host community for restricting refugee's access to CPRs. According to the respondent, the idle lands that were given to refugees were left redundant for years. Yet, now the refugees are settled, the host community suddenly attaches monetary value to their lands and come with cattle near the settlement and starts cultivating the land around the settlement in order to surround and effectively block and contain the refugees in their respective settlements.⁶⁵ The responses from the host community – that refugees are free to access CPRs – rather than indicating a non-issue, may also been a way to avoid this topic of conversation and indicative of how contentious and sensitive the topic of CPRs in reality is for the local community.

2. *Social services: education and health care*

Uganda's *ReHoPE* strategic framework for integrated services for refugees and host community states that refugees will act as "agents of development" that can "positively contribute to the sustainable development of their districts", which in return may contribute to that "the refugee asylum space is not only protected, but strengthened".⁶⁶

The integration of public services seems indeed to be perceived as having a positive impact on the local communities when it comes to education. Respondents often frequently stated that the main benefit that they had received with the coming of the refugees was that school were built in their community. When it comes to health care, the subjective understanding of the impact refugees was mixed. At the newest refugee settlements – Agojo and Pagrinya – respondents were generally positive because health facilities were built that were not in their community before. Yet, in the places where there was already a health facility, respondents experienced preferential treatment of refugees over people from the local community:

'For you who has the same paper in Adjumani, when you fall sick you have to go and struggle with the refugees in Adjumani General Hospital. You find sometimes a line from here to a of hundred meters. You have to follow this line to get service and when you go to this health centres you find that the refugees are prioritised. Now for you as a host, you know you are not given that chance to go and maybe get service immediately, because they say that these are A, B, C, D... what... a lot of nonsense. You wait not until you condition change till that they say take this one to the treatment room. When they are taken you there you condition has already worsened, at the end of the day what your family has to do is to go and bury you. And they keep quit. Are you seeing this?'⁶⁷

It was not only the preferential treatment that bothered some of the respondents. Some of the respondents also found in addition that there was not just preferential treatment, but also that the Local

⁶⁴ Author's interview with no. 13, 14, 16, 17, and 35.

⁶⁵ Author's interview with anonymous respondent working for Implementing Partner, Adjumani Town Council, on 29 May 2017.

⁶⁶ Uganda Government and World Bank (2016). "ReHoPE". Retrieved from: https://d10k7k7mywg42z.cloudfront.net/assets/5667425fd4c96170fe082173/REHOPE_2_Page_Brief_141015.pdf

⁶⁷ Author's interview with Dramoyo James, organiser protest for employment opportunities NGOs, Adjumani Town Council, on 6 May 2017.

District Government disinvested in health care. As a local health worker at Nyumanzi refugee reflects on preferential treatment of refugees by NGOs:

‘So, we told them now for us we are very ready to take action. And even your NGO, you are operating here with your health centre to be removed away and another NGO will come in who can really come in and do what? And also do not segregation from this health centre. Because even before refugees where there we were receiving health services and the health centre was there, even before refugees came. The health services was good, even when refugees were not there because government was giving us medicine. And health workers there were three at first. Now when this NGO came in and support, government was... because now NGO give very many services, now government has removed two staffs and take to other places. Now the services here are few here meaning that there is only one staff.’

Based on Kreibaum’s econometric analysis, the claim of the health worker seems not to be completely unfounded. Regarding the public service provision, Kreibaum finds a significant correlation that “a higher number of refugees is associated with a smaller probability of a government health centre being present in a community” (2014, 270). In other words, the presence of a refugee settlement indicates that the state overall is diverting public funds away from the local population. Rather than that refugees acting as “agents for development”, Kreibaum’s research seem to imply that the NGOs rather than supporting, are in fact substituting governments’ responsibility in public service delivery.



Photo 7. Patients waiting at local health facility.

3. *Security*

Refugee camps can cause insecurity to the host community due to militarisation and spill-over effects of the conflict from the country of origin, increased criminal activity, and due to conflict between refugees and the host community. Even though Adjumani is geographically located in a remote peripheral border area, I only heard anecdotally about illegal recruitments and undercover SPLA agents attempting to kidnap opposition. The often-stated reason by respondents was that “quite frankly, the Ugandan government is ruling with an iron fist when it comes to that”.⁶⁸ In fact, rather than that the refugee settlements cause deep insecurity, it was insecurity that influenced the decision of the landlords of Mungula I and Olua I refugee settlements to give out their lands:

‘It was my father who had some plots of land. My father gave out the land because the population here was very low and there were also LRA rebels active here, we thought it be wise to give this land for refugees so that the government bring some soldiers here maybe to protect us. So, it was about security, it helped us a lot. The places has changed from the first time. Population has increased and there is now also business for us.’⁶⁹

‘My brother, LC 1, took the decision to gather us, the community, and we agreed because this place was underdeveloped and there was Kony’s wars and we thought it wise to give out land for refugees so that there would some kind of security.’⁷⁰

The landlords’ decisions to give out their lands was already made in the 1990s when Sudanese refugees arrived in Uganda because of the Second Sudanese Civil War. For them, the threshold for letting refugee settle again on their land was not so high because of the positive experience they had the previous time. However, the perception of increased security did not only pertain to older refugee settlements. The local community at Agojo refugee settlement, the newest settlement in Adjumani opened in October 2016 and hosting 11,400 refugees, respondents also thought that security had increased with the coming of the refugees:

‘Previously, before the refugees settled, it used to be a challenge of notorious people in between our community and the riverside. When we wanted to go to the riverside, there use to be a lot of fears. Before the people were settled here people went to go and hide there, planning bad things, killing people. Now that the refugees are there, there is nothing of that. People are always, you can move anytime. So, that is the benefit we are receiving.’⁷¹

Overall, most of the respondents thought that their community had become safer or at least not less safe with the coming of the refugees. Aside from the increased population, it was mainly the establishments police posts that contributed to perceived improved security. At the same time, however, respondents from the local community frequently emphasised that the OPM and the police

⁶⁸ Author’s interview Umar Yakhyayev, UNHCR senior protection officer, Kampala, on 15 March 2017.

⁶⁹ Author’s interview with Zema Dominico Ali, landlord owning most of the land of Mungula I refugee settlement, Ofua sub-county, on 1 May 2017. Quote translated from Madi to English with use of interpreter.

⁷⁰ Author’s interview with Kotevu Angelo, landlord owning part of the land of Olua I refugee settlement, on 5 May 2017. Quote translated from Madi to English with use of interpreter.

⁷¹ Author’s interview with Atimaku Florence, Local Chairperson I for Palemo Udendi, Agojo Parish, on 30 April 2017. Quote translated from Madi to English with use of interpreter.

also give preferential treatment to the refugees. As the landlord of Mungula I, whose motivation to give out land was based on security stated:

‘They treat us differently and make us think a lot about our land that we have given to them. They are getting more benefits than us. Besides that, whenever a refugee get problem, falls in problems with the locals, the OPM take all the responsibility in hands and they take the matter so high. Even when it is a small problem, they take the person to the court and prosecute him or her whenever you have a problem with a refugee. So, they don't look at us as a human being.’⁷²

It was the kind micro-level conflict the landlord of Mungula I referred to that for the local communities proved to be main cause of insecurity for the local communities. When I asked 21 out of 23 respondents living adjacent to the refugee settlements about the main factors that threatens or may worsen the dynamics between the refugees and the host community, their answers, due to open formulation of the question, varied widely. Yet, informed by Benford and Snow's concept of “diagnostic framing” (problem identification and attribution) (2000, 615), the respondents' answers can be categorised in four main categories: scarcity and competition over resources (food shortages and refugees stealing food, competition over manual labour such as stone quarrying, stealing of food by refugees, collection of firewood and grasses, grazing grounds, and access to water), spill-over effects of conflict related to divisions among the refugees, unfair treatment by UNHCR, NGOs or OPM, and the culture and behaviour of Dinkas (uncivilised manners, warrior culture et cetera).⁷³ Consequently, eight respondents' answers related to scarcity and competition of resources,⁷⁴ two respondents' answers related to spill-over effects from divisions among the refugees themselves,⁷⁵ three respondents' answers related to unfair treatment by the aforementioned organisations,⁷⁶ and eight respondents to the culture and behaviour of Dinkas.⁷⁷

Related to conflicts over resource scarcity, the respondents in general were still understandable of the precarious situation of the refugees and thought that these issues arising were easily surmountable if the NGOs would be more supportive to the refugees and the host community. It was especially the perceived tense relation between the local communities and Dinka refugees, however, that stood out as troublesome as since tribal affiliation is non-negotiable. Dinkas form the largest ethnic group of refugees in Adjumani (41 per cent). Nyumanzi, Olua I, Mungula I, and Ayilo I and II refugee settlements only consist of Dinka refugees.⁷⁸ Seven out of eight of the respondents that lived adjacent

⁷² Author's interview with Zema Dominico Ali, landlord owning most of the land of Mungula I refugee settlement, Ofua sub-county, on 1 May 2017. Quote translated from Madi to English with use of interpreter.

⁷³ On the one hand, issues of identity and tribalism are an underlying cause of conflict cross-cutting through all other types of conflict. Perceptions of favouritism and superiority, for example, can be an underlying cause feeding into ‘unequal treatment by NGOs’ as cause of conflicts. Although it should be noted that the different categories are interlinked and may overlap, given that I aim to gain their subjective understanding of the impact on the impact of the refugees on their security, it is still possible to divide and categorise respondents' answers on the based on ‘problem identification and attribution’. For example, often respondents claimed that whenever there is a fight between someone of the host community and a Dinka refugee (e.g. access to water boreholes or children fighting in school), all the other Dinkas join in collectively to fight the member of the host community. When the fighting over access to water boreholes, according to the respondents, was caused because it is Dinkas blood to fight, because they are uncivilised beasts, because of their arrogance and warrior culture, the problem can be attributed to the culture and behaviour of Dinkas. On the other hand, when a respondent thought the factor threatening the dynamics between host community and refugees is access to grazing grounds, because ‘Dinkas love milk so much and have very many cattle’, I have instead categorised it as ‘scarcity and competition over resources’.

⁷⁴ Author's interview with no. 4, 6, 7, 8, 19, 27, 31, and 32.

⁷⁵ Author's interview with no. 5 and 9.

⁷⁶ Author's interview no. 10, 11, and 15.

⁷⁷ Author's interview no. 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 28.

⁷⁸ UNHCR and OPM do not have a policy of separating ethnic groups but instead fill up the refugee settlement one by one. Yet, as displacement patterns in South Sudan follow ethnic homogeneous communities, refugees are often *de facto*

to these settlements thought the main factor threatening the dynamics between host community and refugees was to the culture and behaviour of Dinkas. Among the respondents there was a general perception of Dinkas as uncivilised, arrogant, and the problem of having a warrior culture. One problem related to uncivilised manners that caused tensions, for example, was the perception of Dinkas bad manners was that they “defecate every where... in the bush, roadsides, compounds, centres... we try to tell them... then they become violent and want to fight.” Furthermore, in the eyes of the local communities, Dinkas were often perceived as arrogant and doing things by force:

‘They are too arrogant. Especially those ones who haven't gone to school. And sometimes even, leave that one alone, even for those ones who have gone to school it is very hard for them to understand. Also, when I go to health centre there, the person wants to be served at that very time. He or she goes and get some other people also there. Because at the health centre or any other service, first come first serve. But for them, they don't want that. They don't want to be patient. Not even health centre alone, even shop. Somebody's shop, you go and buy something and you find somebody there who has come first, but these people, when they come, they want to be served first!’⁷⁹



Photo 8. Dinka bouncer chasing away children for not paying the entrance fee to the local cinema at Ayilo I refugee settlement. The stick used by Dinkas for cattle herding was by the host community seen as a symbol of the Dinkas' warrior culture.

distributed over the different settlements along ethnic lines because different ethnicities arrive at different times. For example, when I visited South Sudanese border in May, it was predominantly Bor Dinkas that had been displaced due to fighting and were consequently all taken to refugee settlements in Lamwo District.

⁷⁹ Author's interview with Drichi Geoffrey, local village member at Mungula I, Ofua sub-county, on 1 May 2017. Quote translated from Madi to English by use of an interpreter.

In addition, there was the general perception among members of the local community that Dinkas have a warrior culture and the respondents routinely explained that whenever a member of the host community member and a Dinka have a fight, the issue never stayed between the two, but that the whole Dinka tribe arrived and to beat the person of the host community.

It should be noted, however, that it is also the majority versus minority dynamics that influences the perception of Dinkas as arrogant. At Maaji refugee settlement – where Dinkas form a minority – there was a fight between a Dinka and a Madi refugee. However, this time not only Madi refugees, but also the Madi nationals that were volunteering at the food distribution joined in the fight. In Bidi Bidi refugee settlement in Yumbe District, where Dinkas form a minority group, “Dinka property is destroyed, houses are set on fire, and people come to beat, rape and even kill Dinkas”.⁸⁰ At Kiryandongo refugee settlement in Kiryandongo District, it was the Nuer who were showing similar behaviour.⁸¹ Hence, to some ‘majority versus minority’ conflict dynamics and spilling-over effect from the South Sudanese Civil War, rather than purely Dinkas cultural values also help to understand why Dinkas tend to be viewed as dominant and arrogant in Adjumani. Nevertheless, for the local communities, the main cause of insecurity was often attributed to the culture and behaviour of Dinkas.

C. Local communities’ receptiveness as externally regulated

Unlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the new nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species. To be more specific, I would say that discipline tries to rule a multiplicity of men to the extent that their multiplicity can and must be dissolved into individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance, trained, used, and, if need be, punished. And that the new technology that is being established is addressed to a multiplicity of men, not the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness and so on (Foucault 2003, 242-243).

This nondisciplinary power, the ability to “make life or let die”, exercised through regulatory technologies is what Foucault coins as biopolitics. Biopolitics has often been applied in refugee studies to examine how refugee governance renders refugees as governable and contained subjects. Yet, given that Uganda’s refugee policy focusses on the integration of public services for both refugees and host community, it raises the question of whether this nondisciplinary power shapes the conduct of the local communities as well. To be more specific, it raises the question whether nondisciplinary power shapes the receptiveness of the local communities to give out their lands for refugees to settle. This question entails not only looking at the perceived impact of the refugees on the local communities, but also examining the conditions that affected the decision to give out their lands in the first place.

The landlords, chiefs, elders, and local community members gave various reasons of why they gave out their lands. Yet, in almost all cases respondents mentioned the expectation of development, as the landlord of Agojo illustrated: “In Africa we are not developed. We are not learned, we are not

⁸⁰ Author’s discussion with Daud Gideon, project manager South Sudan for Pax, Kampala, on 6 March 2017.

⁸¹ Author’s discussion with Malual Bol Kiir, director AYAN and UNSC advisory member Panel of Experts, Kampala, on 21 March 2017.

educated. I gave this land so that as the refugees are here, the organisations are building schools and our children can go to school and our people can also access the health facilities.”⁸²

Local communities do not just give out their land for refugees to settle. When there is need for land for refugees to be settled, OPM and UNHCR make this need heard through a community-based organisation called the Adjumani District Elders Forum. This CBO reaches out to the different clans of the Madi and their cultural leaders. When a specific land of a clan is identified, it is then the chiefs and his advisory council of elders, the local council chairpersons of the respective sub-county, along with individual landlords that meet with the OPM to discuss and negotiate the terms of agreement. As the chief of Dziapi - whose jurisdiction on land encompasses Nyumanzi, Baratuku, Pagrinya, Ayilo I and II, and Pagrinya refugee settlement - describes the meeting with OPM to discuss the allocation of land for the opening of Pagrinya refugee settlement August 2016, it becomes clear that the OPM is deliberately persuading the cultural leaders with the prospect of development:

‘they said, you are going to get what? You are going to get hospitals, all this will be available... and then... schools will be enlarged. And then the place, then the place that will be given will bring a lot of what? It will bring a lot of partners... then we will remain the owner as we are the right owner, we got the right and the OPM provided us with an agreement form to be signed. First people rejected to give land to the refugees. I said: “people... you are still looking at your feet. You don’t see from afar. When you need help for something and refuse the land to be allocated to refugees.” You know refugees bring a lot of helps. Helps they are bringing, development is there... especially the school, dispensaries, now water to drink and then hospital is there... Now, about the distance from here to Dziapi, something is very far. Even when a person is sick here you just picking him or her up at Dziapi to here. It is very, very far. The OPM told us, “if you rejected, we take them somewhere else”. I said: No! You bring them here! I am the landowner of Dziapi sub-county. Pagrinya is under my umbrella, I got the right to make agreement with that OPM.’⁸³

In a district where the average life expectancy is seven years lower than the national average, where the food security situation is at crisis-level, where there is no running water, and in a region periodically suffering from cholera outbreaks, the question is to what extent the promises of the biomedical interventions can be seen as a mere “incentive” that the local community can take into consideration. Rather, the negotiations between the OPM and the cultural leaders are characterised by an unequal power relations whereby the OPM has the capacity to bring or withheld the development - the latrines, dispensaries, water boreholes and hospitals – that quite literally represents a power to “make life or let die” for the local community. The statement or rather the threat of the OPM that they would just take the refugees alongside with the benefits to somewhere else if the community rejects to give out their lands to the OPM reflects a conditionality of development. Following Foucault, this is a display of the basic mechanism through which the State exercises regulatory disciplinary power on its population, namely racism. For racism “is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (2003, 254-255). Those communities complying to OPM’s request for more land are worthy of the development projects that “make live” whereas those declining are on the other side of the domain of life that constitutes “letting die”.

⁸² Author’s interview with Ida Moses, landlord of the land of Agojo refugee settlement, Agojo Parish, on 30 April 2017. Quote translated from Madi to English by use of an interpreter.

⁸³ Author’s interview with Madrawi Fideli, chief Dziapi, Adjumani Town Council, on 3 June 2017.

D. Local communities' receptiveness as self-regulated:

'We did not bring refugees to Madi sub-region⁸⁴ for us to benefit from them. I did not anyway, I am the lead person in refugee settlement in Madi sub-region. I am responsible for the beginning of refugee settlement and I will ultimately be responsible at the end. Settlements, you can't build a settlement in the sky, you build it on the ground. We initiated the settlement of refugees and when they are finished it will be handed back to cultural institution. Now, we did not bring the refugees here for the benefit of our people. We accepted refugees here in Madi region because of human dignity. So, the issue of whether it is beneficial is irrelevant as far as I am concerned. Is it helpful or beneficial to the refugee, the person seeking refuge, is it helpful to their dignity, that is my concern, do you understand?'⁸⁵

In contrast to the chief of Dziapi mentioned in the previous section, the statement of the paramount chief of the Madi people illustrates that the conditions that render the local communities receptive to give out their lands for refugees to settle cannot be fully be understood by merely weighing the local communities' perceived positive and negative impacts or by examining the expectations from the influx of refugees and NGOs. If it were to be only these external interventions that render local communities' receptive to give out their lands, a cost-benefit analysis would be sufficient. Yet, governmentality draws the focus to all the processes by which the receptiveness of the local population give out their lands is governed: "by institutions and agencies, including the state; by discourses, norms, and identities; and by self-regulation, techniques for disciplining and care of the self" (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 989). Furthermore, like the paramount chief, most of the respondents that mentioned the aspect of development, simultaneously claimed that their decision to give out their lands was based upon ideas of humanitarianism, reciprocity, cultural kinship, and intrinsic values pertinent to Madi culture. It was the phrase "they are our brothers and sisters" that was consistently mentioned by the respondents when they explained why they had given out their lands or consented to refugees to being settled in their communities. Overall, it seemed that a discourse of brotherhood revealed some form of hospitality that self-regulates the receptiveness of the local community to give out their lands for refugees to settle.⁸⁶ The discourse of brotherhood, however, can be broken down in three constituent parts, namely a brotherhood based on feelings of reciprocity, brotherhood because of cultural kinship, and brotherhood as an intrinsic part of Madi culture.

A first aspect of the brotherhood discourse can be understood as an idea of extended family and relates to the cultural kinship between the Madi people of Adjumani and the Equatorians who account 48 per cent of the total refugees.⁸⁷ While cultural differences seem to create animosities between Madi nationals and Dinka refugees, at the same time, culture kinship also helps to understand the receptiveness of the local community. The West Nile region has traditionally been more oriented to (South) Sudan than to Kampala. The Madi live at both sides of the border and leaving aside the current conflict, many South Sudanese in the past came to Adjumani for their studies whereas the people of Adjumani, before civil war broke out in South Sudan, have sought their employment opportunities at

⁸⁴ The Madi sub-region encompasses Adjumani District and Moyo District. Together with Magwi County in South Sudan they form the homelands of the Madi tribe.

⁸⁵ Author's interview with Drani Steven Izakare, paramount chief of the Madi people, Adjumani Town Council, on 3 June 2017.

⁸⁶ Meyer (2006) also briefly mentions a prevailing discourse of brotherhood among northern Uganda.

⁸⁷ Danish Refugee Council and Partners in Consortia (January 2017). "Conflict Analysis Assessment Support Programme for Refugee Settlements in Northern Uganda (SPRS-NU) (Kiryandongo, Adjumani and Arua Refugee Settlements in Uganda)" *Unpublished document*, pp.66.

the other side of the border.⁸⁸ Overall, part of the receptiveness of the local communities to host refugees also seems to be influenced by extensive pre-existing social networks between nationals and refugees.

The second aspect of the brotherhood discourse that was mentioned by the respondents for explaining the receptiveness of the local community related to the intrinsic values and hospitality pertinent to Madi culture. When I asked multiple respondents about what the factors that could possibly explain why in Adjumani District refugees and the host community were living in relative peaceful coexistence compared to Yumbe District, whose population also share close cultural ties with South Sudan, often the determining variable, according to many of the respondents, seemed to be Adjumani's people rather than other factors. As one refugee pointed out: "when the war started again, they [the South Sudanese] never thought of any other part of Uganda. Leaving aside maybe the factor of the language that they share, the core factor is of course, the Adjumani people are so hospitable, they are so polite". More eloquently, the paramount chief claimed that it was the maternal traits of the Madi community: "we are a patriarchal society but it can be misunderstood. Patriarchal does not mean we are not feminine, in terms of maternal instincts they are very powerful and very strong. And our culture is centred around protecting the femininity". More specifically, he claimed that the maternal instincts were specifically related to Madi culture:

'It is for us, it's a Madi thing. And us, the cultural leaders, when someone comes and grabs your feet seeking your protection, it is traditionally ours that we don't turn such a person away. If you turn such a person away is like you are calling for a curse on you. (...) In my past history, my clan alone, we had several of these, other people that have come for such kind of refuge and this kind of *Opi Pa Koka*. And they have settled and now they in themselves, their grandchildren, they are now a big clan themselves, that clan is named after that person that initially came for refuge. Although, we have several of those clans or sub-clans within Madi sub-region. So, there are negative aspects to taking people in, in that you might incur the wrath of their enemy, but also, you might gain a friend, a partner.'

A third aspect the brotherhood discourse was pointed out by one of the respondents at Agojo refugee settlement: "we just gave the land because of human feelings for our fellow African. And also, one day we will also be there. They are in need, *it is their time*, they need our help".⁸⁹ Likewise, the chief of Palamo noted that there is no way that he could refuse the refugees because if he would chase them away now, he knew that they would treat him the same when tomorrow he might be forced to go to South Sudan.⁹⁰ Underlying such answers was not only notions of humanitarianism, but also notions of reciprocity. Likewise, a Madi elder whose community-based organisation facilitated the donating of land stated:

'When they arrived in 2013, this big influx, the NGOs were running with blankets, saucepan for cooking... blankets for covering himself. But for us, the elders, we had nothing but went with a smile. We said "*Karibu. Karibu. Welcome, Welcome*". What happened to you, also happened to us. Don't lose hope. So, have faith. Now you have needs but give it time. Slowly, slowly, it will be addressed. You are not alone in this suffering, *we also suffered like this*."⁹¹

⁸⁸ Author's interview with no. 1, 29, and 30.

⁸⁹ Author's interview with Baku Angelo, village member, Agojo Parish, on 30 April 2017.

⁹⁰ Author's interview with Tom Mapkwe, chief of Palamo clan, Agojo Parish, on 30 April 2017.

⁹¹ Author's interview with Vusso Paulinho

Almost every Madi respondent I spoke to mentioned somewhere during the interview that he or she had been in exile in Sudan during Obote II. Although the Madi people were eventually forcefully repatriated to Uganda during the Second Sudanese Civil War, the respondents often claimed that they were treated well by their brothers when they were in exile. Likewise, Deputy Prime Minister Moses Ali, who originates from Adjumani District and is a former refugee, mentioned in an interview that part of the Uganda's refugee policy is "because of historical background, because of our relationship... and also because it appears that tomorrow you can also become a refugee, so why not be kind to your fellow brothers, who are your relatives" (Moses Ali quoted in: Meyer 2006, 7). It thus seems that part of the humanitarian discourse of brotherhood has also been informed by notions of reciprocity.

Overall, the discourse of "they are our brothers" seemed to imply some form of hospitality. In common terms, hospitality is a value or a show of kindness. This notion of hospitality as a value can maybe explain why people invite a stranger into their house, it is, however, harder to view it as explanatory for the receptiveness of local communities to host 1,000s of refugees in their area. In other words, there is arguably some kind of threshold to this notion of hospitality. Likewise, Kirişçi (2014) argues that examining Turkey's open-door policy requires explanations that go *beyond hospitality*. Yet, the discourse of "they are our brothers and sisters" does not only reveal a notion of hospitality solely grounded in values of humanitarianism. Underlying this discourse of brotherhood is also feeling of reciprocity and a form of hospitality that shows close similarities to the Greek concept of hospitality, namely *Filoksenia*.⁹² Hospitality in concept of *Filoksenia* entails a "relational character of exchange" (Rozakou 2012, 565). Hospitality as reciprocity in this sense works and instrumentally and self-regulates the receptiveness of the Madi community because of the historical recognition they themselves might be refugees tomorrow and in need of a hospitable host.

E. Chapter conclusion

Uganda's strategic framework ReHoPE and Settlement Transformative Agenda promises that refugees are "agent of development" that will benefit the host communities. Likewise, recent emerging reports have found that refugees are economically beneficial to local communities. Nevertheless, the subjective understanding of the local communities on the impact of refugees substantiates from the claims of policy reports, scholarly literature, and news articles on Uganda.

There are broadly two explanations that help to understand why the local communities are nevertheless receptive to host refugees. First, there is the prospective of development that "make life or let die" for the remotely located and sparsely populated communities. By hosting a considerable refugee population on their land, their communities attract developmental attention which brings police presence, health services, and education. Yet, a historical and cultural specific notion of hospitality self-regulates the communities' receptiveness. Rather than alternative explanations, these explanations are arguably complementary. However, the regulatory disciplinary power of biopolitics and hospitality is not absolute. The next chapter will therefore examine how local communities renegotiate and contest their role in refugee governance.

⁹² *Filoksenia* can literally be translated as love (*filia*) of the stranger (*ksenos*).



Photo 9. Consultation meeting of cultural leaders, elders, and landlords on land management and conflicts.

V. Local communities' role in refugee governance

The assertion of this thesis is that local communities are not only directly impacted by refugee crises, they also play an important role in the governance of them. The receptiveness of the local communities to give out their lands is not just passively shaped by regulatory technologies; nor should the hospitality of the local community considered to be absolute. Local communities, as owners of the communal land also actively contest perceived injustices and renegotiate their position in the governance of refugee affairs. This is evidently illustrated by the case of employment opportunities in NGOs in Adjumani District.

A. *The case of employment opportunities in NGOs: Meritocracy versus Tribalism*

In December 2016, a few hundred protesters demonstrated on the streets of Adjumani Town for employment opportunities within NGOs and UN agencies. Their demands were directed to the District Local Government and included the demand that 1) 80 per cent of the employment positions and opportunities should be given to people within the Madi sub-region, 2) all NGOs submit full lists of technical staffs with their photographs attached as evidence to the District, and 3) Adjumani District Council is involved and take active part in the recruitment of further staff. The underlying reasoning behind these demands were disclosed in a petition addressed to the District Local Government earlier in September 2016:

We would like to put your attention to the marginalisation of the youth in Madi sub-region by the NGOs orchestrated by what we think is a deliberate design by the Refugee desk office Adjumani OPM. This happens in auspices of Mr. Titus Jogo. However, we in this regard address ourselves with concern over ill treatment of the host community by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in the refugee settlements as concerns employment opportunities. We highly believe that this is or could be a conspiracy theory UNHCR against the people of Adjumani under the stewardship of OPM Adjumani office.⁹³

The employment of NGO staff, in this sense, was framed by the protesters as being deliberately based on the tribal affiliation. In the observation of the organiser of the youth protest, “the elders have been blind-folded by the government in order to give this land”.⁹⁴ The underlying discontent over employment opportunities in NGOs was, however, not just limited to the youth protesters, but was felt by more respondents from the host community. As one of the Madi elders pointed out:

‘You know, we are not very outspoken, the Madi. We are quite he. But it takes time to get a Madi angry, but when they get angry, it is not easy to calm the anger. And like slowly, we have discovered NGOs promoting tribalism, the thing that causes trouble in Sudan, they are practicing it. We are getting angry, very slowly, because in some of the NGOs, if the program officer is an Acholi, for example, an Acholi from Gulu, you find all the other people, the staff are from Gulu. They can even speak their language in their office. We don't like this. It is the thing that brought these people here. We cannot give

⁹³ “Petition by Adjumani Youths on their concern over the disparities of employment in Non-governmental Organization (NGO) sector in Adjumani District”, laid formally before the Council on 28 September 2016. *Photocopy in hands of author.*

⁹⁴ Author's interview with Dramoyo James, organiser youth protest, Adjumani Town Council, on 7 May 2017

room to practice tribalism which caused a lot of trouble. We don't like it, period. You are doing it, get out of here!"⁹⁵

Among many of the respondents the perception was frequently that all the NGO staff came from outside the District without doing proper interviews. As a village member at Nyumanzi settlement explained: "For NGOs, none from here. You come to health centre, none from here. Doctors, nurse, clinical officers, cleaners, none from here. You find this NGO, they are from Lira. They even come without doing any interview. As long as you're relative of the boss the NGO [Medical Teams International], you get job without interview. Most of them are from Lira."⁹⁶ Likewise, three other respondents when people from outside came for an interview, they already came in their buses stocked with mattresses, their belongings, and their wives, which meant according to the respondents that they are already had the job before the interview.⁹⁷ Further, a Madi that was employed as field staff because of his knowledge of Arabic and Dinka also claimed that he only received 500,000 shilling for a full month of work from morning till evening, whereas cleaners from Gulu easily earned one million.⁹⁸ In addition, chairpersons of community-based organisations complained that their proposals were never considered for funding by UNHCR and the Implementing Partners because the question of who they are and where came from presided questions on what the content of their proposals were.⁹⁹ When questioned the paramount chief whether it was tribalism or nepotism in his view, his answer was that: "you can call it both, because in context, it has got both. In that someone, if I am from a district... if I am a Polish, I come to Holland. And I only employ Polish people and leave the people from Holland out of the jobs. What would you call that?"¹⁰⁰

According to those respondents that experienced the practice of tribalism within NGOs, the people that were employed were mainly drawn from Kampala, Lira, Gulu, or Lamwo. Yet, it was often the Acholis that were perceived as being employed by NGOs. As one elder stated: "you can also pick the volunteers, pick them from here. They know their place, they know their people, and even once the people were in exile, they went to South Sudan. But the Acholi, they never went to exile. They were the ones chasing Madi into exile, people from West Nile into exile. Also Lamwo, and Western tribe try to dominate another NGO. ACORD... they chased away director from West Nile... replaced it with Westerners."¹⁰¹ Likewise, another respondent complaint: "there is a NGO called World Vision, I think also their program officer was an Acholi and everybody their was an Acholi. The watchmen, even the person slashing grass was from Acholi. For War Child Canada, it is the same". While care should be taken not to generalise Madi-Acholi relations, the emphasis on Acholis arguably comes the tense relations between the two communities in the past years.¹⁰²

⁹⁵ Author's interview with Vusso Paulinho, chairperson Adjumani District Elders Forum, Adjumani Town Council, on 22 April 2017.

⁹⁶ Author's interview with village member, Nyumanzi refugee settlement, Dziapi sub-county, on 6 May 2017.

⁹⁷ Author's interview with no. 12, 29, and 33.

⁹⁸ Author's informal discussion field staff Implementing Partner, Adjumani Town Council, on 29 May 2017.

⁹⁹ Author's interview with no. 3, 33, and 34.

¹⁰⁰ Author's interview with Drani Steven Izakare, paramount chief of the Madi people, Adjumani Town Council, on 3 June 2017.

¹⁰¹ Author's interview with Mahammoud Doka, Madi elder, Adjumani Town Council, on 1 May 2017.

¹⁰² There are several factors contributing to the current tense relations between the two tribes. According to Vlassenroot and Doom (1999, 11), "historical expansion of the Acholi territory at the expense of the neighbouring Madi people was seen as a just cause". Further, Obote's regime which forced the Madi into exile drew most of his support from the Acholi and Lango sub-region. In addition, during informal conversations it seemed that the LRA insurgency by the Madi respondents was generally seen as an Acholi insurgency. Yet, it is arguably the current land-conflict between Adjumani and Amuru District that putting most pressure on the Madi-Acholi relations. Four days after I left the field the land-conflict escalated resulting in

In my own observation, a disproportionate share of the NGO staff did indeed come from the abovementioned places. According to NGO staff I spoke to this was, however, not because of tribalism. In fact, according to a youth activist, the OPM thought that it was the protesters instead that promoted tribalism by claiming that 80 per cent of the jobs should go to people from the Madi sub-region:

‘The RDC [refugee desk commissioner] heard of our press conference, the RDC that time was a lady from Lira. She went on air and said she doesn’t want people of Adjumani District to protest about employment opportunities here: “If people are protesting, that is tribalism. People who are working here, they are Ugandan!”’¹⁰³

In this sense, the act of demanding eighty per cent of the jobs was seen as unconstitutional by the RDC as every Ugandan should be equally considered for the position irrespective of tribe or regional origin. Yet, while a minority of the respondents of NGOs believed that the demands of youth protestors were indeed unconstitutional,¹⁰⁴ most of the NGO staff I spoke framed the overrepresentation of people from the aforementioned areas rather as a matter of meritocracy than tribalism.

During my field research, War Child Holland was started to move its operations from Gulu to Adjumani to provide psychosocial to refugees and was in the middle of the recruitment process of field staff. According to the staff members of War Child Holland, the aim was to have a 50/50 ratio of local people and people from outside. However, according to them, it was already extremely hard to get by 50 per cent locals and it is way easier to get competent staff people from the Acholi sub-region as they had extensive experience with psychosocial support due to the LRA insurgency and consequent influx of humanitarian organisations to the Acholi sub-region. The various field staff I spoke to were indeed “competent” in the sense that they typically were former child soldiers or people who had done studies in human rights or Arabic at Makerere University. According to the protection coordinator of LWF, this was a general problem associated with NGOs that, in pursuit of funding, move from the former crises centre to the next and bring along their field staff from other regions and forget about the local dynamics and competences present in the area where they settled.

Irrespective of whether NGO staff are employed on meritocratic basis or tribal affiliation, the perception of tribalism does negatively affect the receptiveness of the local community to host refugees. Consequently, NGOs that come to Adjumani to do peace-building, can be perceived as bringing conflict to the local communities. As the chairperson of the Adjumani District Elders Forum reflected: “We fear, if it is not handled properly and maturely, it can escalate to violence. The host community has already suffered so much violence and when there were the Kony’s wars and the series of changes of government, which were here in Uganda.” Likewise, the organiser of the youth protest reflected that: “if it doesn’t change, honestly, I think with time the things that will be happening here in Adjumani or in West Nile will be a different thing. Because, you know... when someone is almost left with no option... you know, this person can do anything. When you met somebody left with no option the person can do anything that you didn’t expect.”

4 deaths, 27 people severely injured, 1,000 people displaced and 130 houses destroyed. See: All Africa (14 June 2017) “Uganda: Apaa Land Conflict Divides Acholi, Madi Communities” Retrieved from: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201706140600.html>

¹⁰³ Author’s interview with Ekudra Johnson, youth activist, Adjumani Town Council, on 6 May 2017.

¹⁰⁴ Author’s interview with anonymous staff member Implementing Partner, Adjumani Town Council, on 2 June 2017.

Not more than a week after I had the conversation about the recruitment with the War Child Holland staff, their foresights seemed to turn out to be true when non-selected locals turned up at the training session of War Child and demanded to be employed and according to a staff member of War Child Holland, “threatened to kill us!”. Consequently, police had to come and the next day, the staff members left for Kampala as the District Local Government stopped War Child Holland from operating in the district. Whereas the protests had so far been demonstrative in nature, it is arguably a first sign of the protests turning confrontational in nature. The issue of employment opportunities is, however, not just restricted to Adjumani District. According to various respondents, the protests of employment opportunities in Lamwo and Yumbe districts are even more confrontational in nature. Local community members’ protests are supposedly encouraged by local politicians and local community have stormed NGO offices, thrown rocks at vehicles and refugees, and blocked water trucks to bring water to the refugee settlements.¹⁰⁵ Overall, while NGOs often claim that they are neutral and impartial actors that merely carry out their humanitarian mission of bringing peace and development, they can thus also be perceived by the local communities as disruptive and bringing conflict the needs of the local community are perceived as not being addressed.

At the same time, the protest demonstrated that local population can successfully contest perceived injustices in refugee governance. At the end of my field research, War Child Holland had returned to Adjumani. In order to operate in the district, NGOs by this time were now obliged to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the District Local Government that included the youth’s conditions that 80 per cent should be employed from within the District and the of external auditing of NGO’s recruitment and projects by the District Local Government.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, the new MoU included the condition that 50 per cent of the beneficiaries should be from the host communities and other conditions to which a staff member of War Child referred to as “all this other kind of bullshit!”.¹⁰⁷ Due to Uganda’s decentralisation policies, the District Local Government can autonomously from the OPM government dictate the conditions under which NGOs are allowed to operate in the district and these conditions can thus be in contrast to Uganda’s national policy. In this case, the District Local Government’s condition that 50 per cent should target the host community deviated from Uganda national policy of 30 per cent whereas the condition that 80 per cent should be employed from within the district was perceived by the OPM as unconstitutional.

B. Cultural institutions in refugee governance

‘Well you can be like Kenya, but it is un-African. When someone is in trouble, you don’t send him away. Also, the generosity, it can be overstretched, it can be too much, and someone will call it foolish. Like here, the tribalism they [the NGOs] bring here. But know the bad part is they have changed the name Madi, they say 'Mad'. So, they gave us the name Mad, not Madi, like madness. They have mistaken our generosity for madness.’¹⁰⁸

As the point made by the elder implies, the perception of being neglected by the international organisations and the OPM did not only pertain to Adjumani’s youth. It was also a view widely held

¹⁰⁵ Author’s interviews with inter alia OPM official, paramount chief, War Child staff, chairperson ADEFO.

¹⁰⁶ Author’s discussion with Hon. Atoo Josephine, vice-chairperson Adjumani District Local Government, Adjumani Town Council, on 2 June 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Author’s informal discussion with staff member of War Child Holland, on 3 June 2017.

¹⁰⁸ Author’s interview with Mahammoud Doka, Madi elder, Adjumani Town Council, on 1 May 2017.

by the cultural leaders. During a dialogue meeting of the twenty-two cultural chiefs of Madi sub-region, elders, and influential landlords, the concern was raised that when land disputes arise, organisations turn to the OPM or District Local Government instead of the cultural leaders that, according to the Ugandan Land Act, as custodians of the communal land have the authority and responsibility to act in land disputes.¹⁰⁹ This concern also pertains to land conflicts between refugees and host community. Furthermore, the cultural leaders reached consensus during the meeting that the NGOs and OPM should support clan leaders and chiefs more vividly and that this direct support should be seen as an appreciation of their role in refugee-management. The complaint of the cultural leaders was that billions of shillings were given by NGOs and UNHCR to develop the district and nothing was given to the cultural institution. As one elder reflected: “30 per cent is not reaching, it is only said in the mouth, you cannot touch it. That is why people are asking questions: 30 per cent of what? 30 per cent of 10 shillings, or is it 30 per cent of one million. Thirty per cent of what? It is just 30 per cent in air!”¹¹⁰ However, as the programme coordinator of LWF pointed out, the 30 per cent is misunderstood by everyone. According to him, it was in fact way more than 30 per cent that is directly and indirectly given to the local population. The fact that most of it is channelled through the District Local Government is that it aims to augment District’s development plans which benefits in the end have to trickle down to the local population.

Nevertheless, with the current food and land shortages for refugees, the Uganda government and the international organisations are increasingly dependent on these cultural leaders’ receptiveness in the District to give out more land for refugees to cultivate in order to present Uganda’s self-reliance policy as successful showcase model. However, as the paramount chief points out, this willingness of the local cultural leaders to give out their lands has waned over time:

‘We have more land in the district but our past experience has made my cultural chiefs cautious and very... they have a negative feeling. We have hosted refugees for a few years. None has ever gotten a bicycle to do peace-building or a motorcycle, the age of bicycle has finished. You can’t traverse ten square kilometres, twenty square kilometres on a bicycle doing peace-building. Without your own interests, all these chiefs have children, they have their own priorities. That is number one. Number two, this land can be given to an investor in agriculture to plant crops and then these people benefit. But these people have never gotten a benefit.’¹¹¹

Underlying the statement of the claim there are two arguments on why the cultural leaders should receive compensation for the land giver for refugee settlement. First, cultural leaders can be seen managers of the communal land on behalf of the local population and must be compensated for the opportunity costs associated the giving out of land for refugees to settle. Second, the cultural leaders perceived themselves as not only being responsible for the distribution of land, but also responsible for the people living on the land. Likewise, the Chief of Dziapi claimed that the cultural leaders should be supported more because as the father of both the local community and the refugees, the workload for him had increased with the influx of refugees.¹¹² As such, the perception among the cultural leaders is that giving out land for refugees to settle is not only burdensome because of resource scarcity or

¹⁰⁹ Author’s observation of one-day consultative local level dialogue meeting of cultural leaders, Adjumani Town Council, on 13 May 2017.

¹¹⁰ Author’s interview with Mahammoud Doka, Madi elder, Adjumani Town Council, on 1 May 2017.

¹¹¹ Author’s interview with Drani Steven Izakare, paramount chief of the Madi people, Adjumani Town Council, on 3 June 2017.

¹¹² Author’s interview with Madrawi Fideli, chief Dziapi, Adjumani Town Council, on 3 June 2017.

opportunity costs, but also because the burdensome to the cultural leaders in their role as peacebuilders in their community. In this view, the idle land that is given for refugees to settle is not just “about land” (van Leeuwen and van der Haar, 2016). The declining receptiveness of the custodians of the communal land was explained by the cultural leaders as resulting from a lack of acknowledgement by the OPM and international organisations for their role in promoting peaceful coexistence between the refugees and the host community.

Despite their self-acclaimed role as peacebuilders, the Madi cultural institution, as the elders and chiefs admitted, had been in disarray for decades as one of them pointed out: “in terms of our customs and traditional practices, a lot of things have suffered, a lot of damage, our culture has suffered 90 percent damage”.¹¹³ Contributing to the erosion of the cultural institution was the fact that traditional authorities were disbanded and banned from practicing their customs under Obote and Idi Amin. Moreover, the whole social fabric of the Madi society was in tatters due to the years in exile because of the LRA insurgency. While President Museveni in 1993, in a trend of traditional resurgence in Africa (Boege et al. 2008, 8), reinstalled traditional authority in Uganda (Englebert 2002, 345), it was, according to the chairperson of the Adjumani District Elders Forum, not until early 2000s that Madi culture started to recover by re-identifying the chiefs and advisory elders among the population. In spite, or perhaps because of the decades of the erosion of traditional authority in the Madi sub-region, the cultural leaders were visibly engaged in promoting peaceful coexistence between refugees and the host community.¹¹⁴ Cultural leaders claimed to be actively engaged in traditional justice provisioning such as *Toluk Koka*¹¹⁵ and conflict mediation.¹¹⁶

Despite the self-acclaimed active engagement of the cultural institution in fostering peaceful coexistence between the host community and the refugees, the elders and chiefs found that they were neglected and compensated enough for their efforts and therefore unable to give more of the land that refugees desperately need for cultivation. It was at the end of my field research still unclear whether the NGOs were receptive to the demands of the cultural leaders. Nevertheless, it does raise the question whether international aid in refugee situation should also target traditional authorities.

C. *International aid, host communities, and hybrid political orders*

In a normal situation, it is the State that carries the prime responsibility to cater for the welfare of its citizens (Harvey 2009). Refugee situations, however, are by nature a break with normality as they are always intended to be temporal. Therefore, the question that needs to be asked is why humanitarian organisations should also cater for citizens.

¹¹³ Author’s interview with Drani Steven Izakare, paramount chief of the Madi people, Adjumani Town Council, on 3 June 2017.

¹¹⁴ For instance, the cultural leaders were in the process of identifying the cultural leaders and elders among the refugees in the settlements to similarly restore the social fabric and mitigate cultural intolerance among refugees. The 256 cultural leaders they had identified were then again trained in conflict resolution by the Madi elders and Implementing Partners contracted by the EU emergency fund.

¹¹⁵ According to the Madi Elders, *Toluk Koka* is the same as the better-known Acholi practice *Mato Oput*, which Gould describes as a practice “traditionally applied in cases of intentional or accidental killing, Mato Oput involves a process of separating the affected clans, voluntary confession by the perpetrator, mediation and truth-seeking by elders, payment of compensation, and drinking blood of a sacrificed sheep mixed with the bitter root, Oput, symbolising reconciliation between the clans” (2016, 47).

¹¹⁶ For instance, at Olua refugee settlement there was an incident where a UPDF soldier killed four calves of the refugees after which there was a fight between host community and refugees. As a consequence, one of the landlords demanded the refugees to be moved away after which some elders mediated the conflict whereby the refugees were allowed to stay, but the cattle were moved away.

The main argument in favour of international organisations providing aid to citizens is that it fosters perceived equal status between the host community and refugees, which in turn promotes peaceful coexistence between the two groups (Lawrie and Van Damme 2003; Martin 2005; Agblorti 2011). In the case of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea, Lawrie and Van Damme find that animosities between host community and refugees arose when the former felt the latter was privileged and its own poverty ignored (2003, 575). Likewise, Agblorti finds in a case study of refugees in rural Ghana that “where assistance to refugees is perceived to be above average living conditions in the host communities, there is likely to be resentment among the hosts” (2011, 75). It is also for the similar reasoning that humanitarian organisations in Uganda started to target the host communities as beneficiaries (Kaiser 2000, 20). Yet, despite the 70 / 30 (or even 50 / 50) ratio, respondents from the local community find that the privileged position of refugees and the unequal treatment of the host community may be a main detrimental factor to peaceful coexistence between the refugees and the host community.¹¹⁷

At the same time, the counter-argument to providing international aid to the host community and the host state is that international aid may lead to duplication or inappropriate substitution of service provisioning by the state which may lead to aid dependency (Collier 1999). At the far end, it raises the more fundamental concern whether international relief somehow undermines the social and political contract between a state and its citizens (Harvey 2009). Kreibaum’s analysis of public services provision in Uganda, for example, demonstrates that the state in the long run disinvests disproportionately in the health sector in places where refugees are hosted. Also, the LWF coordinator for Adjumani argues that Local Districts always turn to international organisations in order to balance their deficits.¹¹⁸ In this sense, aid may have the unintentional effect of reducing the incentive for good governance.

Overall, there has been a vast body of literature on the pros and cons of providing international aid to the local communities and a vast body of literature has described the pros and cons of providing international aid to the state in refugee situations. The question of whether aid should also target traditional authorities, however, fits in neither of the two bodies of literature. Furthermore, the analytical lens of governmentality challenges the dichotomy between state and the local population. Yet, the question of whether to support traditional authorities is more closely related to an emerging field studies on hybrid political orders. Like governmentality, the concept of hybrid political order is grounded in a Foucauldian critique to sovereign power. The term was coined by Boege et al. as a way of reconceptualising the terms of fragile or failed states in a manner that opens new options for conflict prevention and development, as well as for a new types of state-building (2009, 3).

In order to understand the dynamics of hybrid orders and whether they can promote sustainable peace, it is first important to understand what is meant by the term ‘hybrid’. For Bagayoko et al., the concept of hybridity denotes “the multiple sites of political authority and governance where security is enacted and negotiated” including “the multiple ways traditional, personal, kin-based or clientelistic conditions of particular national and local contexts” (2016, 6). For Bagayoko et al., the term ‘hybridity’ is thus used to capture the intersections of formality and informality in the provision of security and justice (2016, 2). Millar uses a similar conception of hybridity, namely “the mixing and melding of institutions, practices, rituals, and concepts generated through the interaction of coexisting,

¹¹⁷ Author’s interview with no. 10, 11, and 15.

¹¹⁸ Author’s interview with Moses Okello, LWF programme coordinator Adjumani, Adjumani Town Council, on 29 May 2017.

competing, or complementary structures and norms” (2014, 503). Whereas Millar and Bagayoko et al. mostly as a descriptive analytical tool, hybridity in political systems is also used prescriptively, as a way of fostering peace among local people (Millar 2014, 503).

Baker, for example, was one of the first authors theorizing the potential benefits of hybrid security and justice provision in the global South. Engaging with non-state actors may, for example, enhance the legitimacy of security and justice services. State actors may have more economic, cultural and social capital, but often lack the symbolic capital in comparison to non-state actors (Baker 2010, 600). The State in the global South has often been seen as corrupt and incompetent, whereas, local, ethnic or religious community leaders such as chiefs and imams often have unchallenged local legitimate authority (Baker 2010, 600). Strengthening existing, or even initiating links between state and non-state actors may be beneficial as it leads to mutual enhancement and complementarity of symbolic and economic, cultural and social capital (Baker 2010, 612). Establishing links with non-state actors may not only be interesting due to the lack of popular legitimacy of the State, but also because postcolonial states often lack the capacity to provide security and justice services to all their citizens. Furthermore, the state may lessen the burden of the provision of security and justice through the delegation of work to non-state actors (Baker 2010, 603). One point of concern, however, is the sustainability of non-state security and justice provision as the enthusiasm of the local volunteers to provide these services may wane over time (Baker 2010, 609). Nevertheless, Baker argues that for peace-builders, it “would be foolish to ignore links with non-state security and justice providers” (2010, 599).

Bagayoko et al. are more critical about the prospects of hybrid governance. They argue that “by no means all forms of non-state justice and security provision enjoy universal popular acceptance, deliver on their claims to provide protection and justice to local communities, are consistent with rule of law and human rights, or reinforce improved state provision” (2016, 14). Bagayoko et al. specifically point to the potential detrimental effects that non-state or traditional security and justice provision may have in situations of vulnerability, exclusion and social and gender inequity (2016, 15-17). For example, Bagayoko et al. note that “patriarchy tends to be rampant in many ‘informal’, ‘neo-traditional’ non-state security and justice bodies” (2016, 17). Furthermore, they also point to the fact that practices of vigilantism, vengeance and popular punishment is often part of these bodies (2016, 16).

Given the scale of current refugee crisis, transferring some of the peacebuilding tasks such conflict resolution and justice to customary authorities may indeed ease the burden on the OPM and the UNHCR. In addition, the cultural institution may have more symbolic capital than the international organisations due to cultural linkages between northern Uganda and South Sudan. At the same time, the question that can be asked is whether these cultural linkages with the Equatorians will simultaneously promote exclusion of Nilotic tribes such as the Dinkas. Notwithstanding the advantages and disadvantages of the supporting traditional authorities in peace-building, the question is also whether the Ugandan government is willing to strengthen traditional authorities. The reinstatement of the traditional authorities in 1993 was a reward given by the President Museveni for their support in the rebellion against Milton Obote (Goodfellow and Lindemann 2013, 3). In addition, the reinstatement of the traditional authorities was a way of improving popular support since customary practices had persisted and never waned despite being banned under colonial rule and post-independence governments. Nevertheless, the relations between traditional authorities have also been tense. For example, in July 2009, the Bagandas, one of the strongest allies of Museveni in times of his insurgency, rioted because of government’s attempt to control the movement of the Baganda King, which prompted a violent crackdown that resulted in 27 dead, 190 injured, and 560 arrested

(Goodfellow and Lindemann 2013, 4-5). Likewise, tensions in the Rwenzori Kingdom in western Uganda accumulated in November 2016 in the death of 25 soldiers and police, 114 King's royal guards, and 60 civilians as well as the arrestment of the Rwenzori King.

The relation between the Madi cultural institution and the government is arguably better than the aforementioned examples. In addition, in Adjumani District the elected government officials are almost exclusively from the NRM party.¹¹⁹ Moreover, given the fragility of the Madi cultural institution, the relations between the government and the Madi may arguably also improve more rather than turning antagonistic. At the same time, the examples above and the fact that lack of support for the traditional authorities for their self-acclaimed role in peacebuilding may also indicate that international organisations and OPM are hesitant or unwilling to support the traditional authorities. However, due to the food shortages and shortages for land for cultivation, the success of Uganda's refugee policy, at least in Adjumani, it becomes hard to pass by the cultural leaders as custodians of the land on which refugees are settled. The receptiveness of the cultural leaders to give out more of their land, however, seems to be partly dependent on whether the traditional authorities are supported. Consequently, international organisations may find themselves in a predicament whereby giving aid may worsen they relation with the Ugandan government, but not giving aid to the cultural institution may further jeopardise the internationally much-applauded self-reliance and settlement approach.

D. Chapter conclusion

This chapter has investigated how the local population in Adjumani District perceive and contest their role in refugee governance. Youth in Adjumani District successfully protested for employment opportunities in Adjumani. On the one hand the case of employment opportunities in NGOs indicates that the latter are not solely impartial and neutral peacebuilders but can, perhaps unintentional, be perceived by the local population as bringing conflict to the refugee hosting area. Another threat to the receptiveness of the local population relates to the cultural leaders' perception of being neglected by the government and international organisations for their role as custodians of the communal land on which refugees are settled and their self-acclaimed role as peacebuilders.

¹¹⁹ Only the LC III chairperson of Adjumani Town Council was from the FDC, the main opposition party. All the elected government officials in the District Council (LC V), however, were NRM party member.



Photo 10. Local population at Nile river near Itula, Moyo District.

VI. Conclusion and discussion

This thesis has investigated through the analytical lens of governmentality the conditions that render local communities in Adjumani District receptive to give out their lands and let South Sudanese refugees settle in their area. Underlying this main research question is the assertion that the viability of Uganda's open-door and progressive refugee policies is largely dependent on the receptiveness of these local communities to give out the communal lands. While Uganda unmistakably has an open-door refugee policy, which has several genuinely positive and progressive features, this thesis challenges the depiction of Uganda's refugee policy as a "refugee paradise" or "the best place in the world to be a refugee", and as "exemplary". Rather than empowered and self-reliant refugees, the local communities relate to a refugee population that finds itself in a very exposed and precarious situation. This also affects the local communities' subjective understanding of the impact of the refugee settlement on their lives.

Uganda's ReHoPE framework claims that refugees act as agents of development. The often-referenced studies conducted by Oxford University's Refugee Study Centre and WFP also find that refugees have a positive impact on the local economies. The subjective understanding of the local communities, however, is that refugees have a negative impact on their livelihoods because of environmental degradation and associated declining rain fall patterns, competition in economic activities, and associated increases in food prices. Interestingly, whereas academic literature has often associated refugee camps with insecurity, most respondents overall experienced that the refugee settlement had made their community safer or at least not less safe because of increased population and police presence. At the same time, micro-level conflicts related to resource scarcity and perceived dominant behaviour of Dinkas did cause insecurity for the local community.

Overall, part of the local communities' receptiveness is shaped by the prospect of development that "makes live" for the community. In terms of education, most respondents did experience improvement. For health services, the impact was generally perceived to be positive by local communities that did not have access to health facilities before, but negatively in places where there were already existing health facilities because perceptions of preferential treatment, overcrowding, and disinvestment. Where the prospect of development externally regulates the receptiveness of the local communities, the receptiveness of the local communities seems to be self-regulated by a discourse of hospitality. This notion of hospitality stems from a cultural historical perception of reciprocity, cultural kinship, and values pertinent to Madi culture.

Despite these initial conditions rendering the local communities receptive to give out their communal lands for refugees to settle, this receptiveness has waned over time due to a perception among the local communities of being neglected by the NGOs and the OPM. As the case of employment opportunities within NGOs demonstrates, NGOs do not simply come in as neutral and impartial agents of peace and development, but can also be perceived as bringing conflict and negatively affect the receptiveness of the local community. The perception of feeling neglected pertained to the custodians of the communal land. The cultural leaders felt that they were not compensated for the efforts they made to promote peaceful coexistence among refugees themselves and between the host community and refugees. Hence, they felt less inclined to give out more land for refugees to settle, which seems to be problematic as refugees are desperately in need for more land for cultivation because of the food rations cuts and the inadequacy of the land presently allocated to the refugees.

Yet, the findings of this thesis also call for further research. The interpretative epistemological and qualitative approach was invaluable for this research as it revealed how the subjective understanding of the refugee settlement significantly differs from the claims made in the press, academic literature, and policy reports. However, further research should also consider conducting a longitudinal study that takes a mechanism-process approach¹²⁰ to investigate the mechanisms that alter the receptiveness of the local community to host refugees. Due to the limited time and scope of this research, the limited availability and access to government and non-governmental sources, and the lack of reliable news or social media updates in refugee hosting areas as Adjumani, it was hard to follow mechanism-process procedures. However, a longitudinal ethnographic research, preferably at the start of the influx of refugees would present the opportunity to identify the exact mechanisms that alter the receptiveness of the host community and can significantly complement findings from qualitative and interpretative research.

Whether it is “generosity mistaken for madness”¹²¹ or because “now suddenly they attach monetary value to everything”,¹²² the cultural leaders’ receptiveness to give out more land needed has waned whereas the dependency on the receptiveness of the cultural leaders to give out more land has increased. The waning receptiveness of the cultural leaders calls for further research on how the cultural contest and renegotiate their perceived role in refugee governance. Unfortunately, this research did not pertain enough data to fully comprehend the dynamics and interplay between the traditional authorities and state and non-state actors. Further research on the how traditional authorities renegotiate their role in refugee governance may provide valuable lessons and insights pertinent to the leverage traditional leaders have as custodians of land.

Interestingly, the findings of this thesis also call for further research on hybrid political orders rather than governmentality although both analytical concepts are grounded in a Foucauldian critique on sovereign power. More specifically, further research should examine the intersection of research on hybrid political orders, which is mostly relates to the field on peacebuilding and state-building, and research on the effects of international aid on the host community, which relates to the field of refugee studies and disaster management. The latter body of literature has focussed either on the effects of aid on the state or effects the host population. The emerging field of study on hybrid political orders has mostly focussed on informal security and justice provisioning. The case of international aid for traditional authorities as self-acclaimed peacebuilders falls right between the interplay of these bodies of literature. Further research related to the intersection between these fields of study can, for example, investigate whether traditional authorities as beneficiaries of international aid in refugee situations is merely a compensation for their role as peacebuilder, or whether this compensation also strengthens traditional authorities and brings all the associated benefits and downsides as described in the literature on hybrid political orders.

Since the refugee settlement approach is seen as exemplary by the international community, it not surprising that it is or is going to be implemented as pilots in various countries around the world (UNHCR 2016b). Therefore, continued research on the role of local communities in general, and traditional authorities in particular in refugee governance will be increasingly of importance as this research will entail lessons and insights that have a relevance that goes beyond Uganda alone.

¹²⁰ See for example: Tilly, C. And S. Tarrow (2015) *Contentious Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.29-31.

¹²¹ Author’s interview with Mahammad Doka, Madi elder, Adjumani Town Council, on 1 May 2017.

¹²² Author’s interview with anonymous respondent working for Implementing Partner, Adjumani Town Council, on 29 May 2017.



Photo 11. At least 86 per cent of the South Sudanese refugees in Uganda are women and children.

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
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VIII. Appendix:

A. Local Government structure and functions



Source: Brock, K., R. McGee, and J. Gaventa (2004), *Unpacking Policy: Knowledge, Actors and Spaces in Poverty Reduction in Uganda and Nigeria*, Fountain Publishers: Kampala, p.302.

B. List of formal interviews conducted

Interview no.	Name respondent	Function / Role / Organisation	Date interview	Place interview
1.	Roselily Limio (f)	Coordinator Adjumani NGO Forum,	18 th of April	Adjumani Town Council
2.	John Bosco (m)	Senior Planner, Adjumani District Council	19 th of April	Adjumani Town Council
3.	Vusso Paulinho (m)	Adjumani District Elders Forum (CBO)	22 nd of April	Adjumani Town Council
4.	Dima Modesto (m)	Local Council I Chairperson	30 th of April	Agojo Parish, Ciforo sub- county
5.	Ida Moses (m)	Landlord	30 th of April	Agojo refugee settlement
6.	Baku Angelo (m) and friends	Village member	30 th of April	Agojo Parish, Ciforo sub- county
7.	Endreo Esther (f)	Elderly village member	30 th of April	Agojo Parish, Ciforo sub- county
8.	Atimaku Florence (f)	Local Council I Chairperson	30 th of April	Agojo Parish, Ciforo sub- county
9.	Veicnina Draje (f)	Local Council I member for Environment	30 th of April	Agojo Parish, Ciforo sub- county
10.	Tom Makpwe (m)	Chief of Palema clan	30 th of April	Agojo Parish, Ciforo sub- county
11.	Zema Dominico Ali (m)	Landlord	1 st of May	Near Mungula I, Ofua sub- county
12.	Mahammoud Doka	Elder	1 st of May	Adjumani Town Council
13.	Asianjo Victoria (f)	Refugee (Dinka)	1 st of May	Mungula II, Ofua sub- county
14.	Silvia Bassa (f)	Refugee (Madi)	1 st of May	Mungula II, Ofua sub- county
15.	Drichi Christopher (m)	Village member	1 st of May	Mungula I, Ofua sub- county
16.	Asianjo Christine (f)	Refugee (Madi)	2 nd of May	Maaji II, Ciforo

17.	Muraa Martina (f)	Refugee (Madi)	2 nd of May	sub-county Maaji II, Ciforo
18.	Drichi Geoffrey	Village member	2 nd of May	sub-county Between Maaji II and III, Ciforo sub- county
19.	Jeforte (m) and friend (m)	CEFORD (NGO) and village member	2 nd of May	Between Maaji II and III, Ciforo sub- county
20.	Edema Maskondo (m)	Village member	2 nd of May	Near Maaji I, Ciforo sub- county
21.	Local family (names lost)	Village members	2 nd of May	Near Maaji I, Ciforo sub- county
22.	Igama Simon (m)	Village member	5 th of May	Near Olua I, Pakelle sub- county
23.	Buni Alex (m)	Local Council I Chairperson	5 th of May	Near Olua I, Pakelle sub- county
24.	Kotuvo Angelo (m)	Landlord	5 th of May	Near Olua I, Pakelle sub- county
25.	Minraa Dominica (f)	Village member	5 th of May	Near Olua II, Pakelle sub- county
26.	Tako Manuelle (m)	Village member	6 th of May	Near Nyumanzi, Dziapi sub- county
27.	Vunzo Ezakiel (m)	Local Council I Chairperson	6 th of May	Near Nyumanzi, Dziapi sub- county
28.	Anonymous	Health worker	6 th of May	Near Nyumanzi, Dziapi sub- county
29.	Ekudra Johnson (m)	Youth activist	6 th of May	Adjumani Town Council
30.	Dramoyo James (m)	Organiser protest NGO employment	7 th of May	Adjumani Town Council
31.	Abio Agnes (f)	Village member	8 th of May	Near Pagrinya, Dziapi sub- county
32.	Agnes, Opio and Aya	Village members	8 th of May	Near Pagrinya, Dziapi sub- county

33.	Anonymous	CBO	10 th of May	Adjumani Town Council
34.	Olima Denis (m)	DACE (CBO), Director	11 th of May	Adjumani Town Council
35.	Deng Isaiah Ajang (m)	Refugee (Dinka)	28 th of May	Nyumanzi Refugee settlement
36.	Moses Okello (m)	LWF programme coordinator Adjumani	29 th of May	Adjumani Town Council
37.	Anonymous	Implementing partner	29 th of May	Adjumani Town Council
38.	Anonymous	Office of the Prime Minister	30 th of May	Adjumani Town Council
39.	Zhura (f)	Coordinator African Youth Action Network, Old old case refugee	1 st of June	Adjumani Town Council
40.	Anonymous	Implementing partner	2 nd of June	Adjumani Town Council
41.	Alex Gombe (m)	World Vision, Chief coordinator Food Distribution	2 nd of June	Adjumani Town Council
42.	Madrawi Fideli (m)	Chief Dziapi	3 rd of June	Adjumani Town Council
43.	Drani Stephen Izakare (m)	Paramount chief of Madi people	3 rd of June	Adjumani Town Council