# 'Us' and 'Them'?

How a massive influx of refugees from Syria resulted in the establishment of a new social order, which helped to minimize conflict in the conflict prone context of Shatila refugee camp, Beirut, from 2012 until 2017.

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ABSTRACT

This research aims to explore the process of conflict minimization in Shatila camp. Through fieldwork conducted in the Palestinian Shatila refugee camp, which has recently seen a massive influx of refugees from Syria as result of the Syrian civil war, this paper illustrates the increasing hardships in everyday life as result of the severe overpopulation of the camp. The combination of these hardships is, according to contemporary academics, a trigger for inter-group conflict that often escalates over existing social fault-lines. Based on these theoretical premises, we would expect conflict escalation between the three national groups in the camp: the established Palestinian-Lebanese refugees and the new Palestinian-Syrian and Syrian refugees. However, this thesis argues that no inter-group conflict has erupted inside the camp, but that rather regulations were set in place to deal with the current social situation and resulted in the establishment of a 'new social order'. By using the framework of social order, this thesis analyzes how social interactions in the camp are structured. The framework of causal mechanisms is then used to explain how the established social order helps to minimize conflict. The findings demonstrate that the situationally shifting of group boundaries resulting from the individuals' 'positionality' leads to a situation in which 'nationality' does not permanently set the groups apart. The analysis shows that an explanation for the minimization of conflict in Shatila camp can be found in the absence of permanent group boundaries.

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تشرفت جداً باللقاء بكم

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'El weaa le kbiri btesaa el weaa le zghirri'

الواعة الكبيرة بتسع الواعة الصغيرة

'A big bowl can accept a small bowl, but not vice versa'[1]

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[1] The cultural significance of the expression: This expression is an old Arabic saying (here written in colloquial Arabic), used in the Levantine to express how, despite all the difficulties and agonies, people still stand each other. Author's interview with participant 21 and participant 22, a married couple. The husband is a Palestinian-Syrian refugee and the wife is a Syrian refugee, who both arrived in Shatila camp 5 years ago. Shatila camp, 19 April 2017.

ANCRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BAS	*Beit Atfal Assumoud*
IFRC	*International Federation of the Red Cross*
(i)NGO	*International non-government organization*
MSF	*Médicins Sanse Frontières / Doctors Without Borders*
NGO	*Non-government organization*
NISCVT	*National Institution of Social Care and Vocational Training*
PLO	*Palestine Liberation Organization* (منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية, transliteration: Munaẓẓamat at-Taḥrīr al-Filasṭīniyyah)
PRL	*Palestinian refugees from Lebanon* (Palestinian-Lebanese refugees)
PRS	*Palestinian refugees from Syria* (Palestinian-Syrian refugees)
UNHCR	*The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*
UNRWA	*United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*

FREQUENTLY USED FOREIGN WORDS

Yani	*I mean / you know*

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Introduction

> Shatila is a different and difficult situation. We have salty water, little electricity and the service is very, very bad. Before we are about eighty to twenty thousand, so you can imagine, directly [in the first year] you receive 7000, so the issue will be more, more pushing, *yani*. The water will less, the electricity always cut off and on. And we don't have like the services, the medicine, school, aid (…). And the big problem for the youth after we know they [the new refugees] will be [staying] longer is the work. *Yani*, they are refugees and they have right to work. And because they are refugees they are accept anything! To bring money to feed their families. So like me I am a [undisclosed] when I work as [undisclosed] I take salary, one day 40 dollars. And the Syrian come and work by 20 dollars. I, *yani*, I wish good issue for them but in this way we have a problem with them, *yani*. But in the same times we can't say anything because they don't have anything, *yani*. If they are not working, maybe they are dying. So this makes tensions between them and us. But in other things, no, we don't have any problem with them, the medicine the aid the school we don't have any problem with them. But we felt also and that the European associations and NGOs from outside, they let us felt about this, all the aid coming for Syrian. And that is problem for us because: 'oh *yani*, you are just giving for the Syrian, we are Palestinian also refugees and you don't get it for us!'. (…) *Yani*, for me I understand the matter, but for some people, poor peoples they don't understand it in good ways so for that they make problems and shouting in the centers that give aid for the people 'oh we are Palestinian, just for Syrian! We are refugees here also!'[2]

This statement illustrates how life in Shatila, an originally Palestinian refugee camp located in the Southern suburbs of Beirut, has recently changed. The quote shows that tensions are building up over increasing job competition between the established Palestinian-Lebanese refugees, and the new refugees from Syria who recently over-flooded the camp as a result of the Syrian civil war. Shatila camp, that has become infamous for its violent history including the horrific massacre (1982) and the War of the Camps (1986-1988), was originally set-up for 3,000 Palestinian refugees in 1949, who were fleeing from violence during the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, although exact numbers are lacking, estimations indicate that since the

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[2] Author's interview with participant 3, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born inside the camp. Shatila camp, 25 March 2017. This interview was conducted in English. Consequently, this quote contains several grammatical errors as the oral text is presented in its original form.

influx of Palestinian-Syrian[3] and Syrian refugees, the population of the one-square-kilometer camp[4] has doubled and now provides shelter to between 22,000 and 44,000 people (Whittall 14 December 2016). Shatila has seen one of the biggest population influxes of all Palestinian camps in Lebanon, and therefore provides an interesting case study to research the forced co-existence between the established Palestinian-Lebanese refugees and their new neighbors of Palestinian-Syrian and Syrian descent. This forced co-existence means that the 'original' inhabitants of the camp face increasing resource competition with the 'newcomers' over the already limited environmental and economic resources, as well as the services provided by the aid community that is active inside the camp (Klein 2014).

Even before the influx of refugees from Syria, Palestinians in Lebanon were struggling as they are excluded from social, political and economic life by legal barriers. This results in socioeconomic deprivation as well as the partial denial of basic human rights, such as education and healthcare. The majority of the Palestinians in Lebanon are living in the twelve officially registered refugee camps, as they are legally denied owning property and practicing numerous jobs (Chaaban et al. 2016: 7). Living in the Palestinian camps means living in harsh conditions, including severe poverty and high rates of unemployment. It also means experiencing social neglect, reflected in poor and dangerous housing conditions, the sea water running from the taps, the frequent electricity cuts and dangerous electrical systems[5], uncollected garbage, sewage water in the streets, and more (Klein 2014).

Whereas these conditions do not make the Palestinian camps an appealing place to live in, many refugees from Syria have recently settled in the camps. The above mentioned legal restrictions for Palestinians, together with the socioeconomic problems both Palestinian-Syrian and Syrian refugees face, explain the massive influx into the Palestinian camps. Moreover, a significant amount of the Palestinian-Syrian and Syrian refugees lack legal papers and are by settling in the camps escaping from Lebanese checkpoints. This dynamic is due to the mutual agreement between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian political factors that prohibits the access of Lebanese authorities into Palestinian camps. Hence, the Palestinian camps are the only place in Lebanon where the Lebanese authorities do not have the right to patrol (Della Longa 2015).[6]

Due to the rivalry between the Palestinian factions, the security situation inside the camps is tense, including incidental shootings between the competing armed Palestinian political factions. Palestinian camps are therefore often portrayed as "islands of insecurity" (Sayigh 2000), referring to the impunity of the rule of law as Lebanese law does not apply to

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[3] A Palestinian-Syrian refugee is a (descendant from a) person who in 1949 fled from Palestine to seek safety and settle in Syria.

[4] Estimations of the exact size of Shatila camp range from 0,4 km² to 1,5 km².

[5] The massive networks of electric wires are intertwined with water pipes, resulting in regular cases of death due to of electrocution (The Guardian 26 May 2015).

[6] With the exception of Nahr El-Bared camp in North Lebanon.

the Palestinian camps, but rather delegations of the (rivaling) Palestinian factions prevail as 'security providers'.[7]

As in other camps that have seen a massive influx, this impunity of the security apparatus in Shatila camp meant that no central authority was present to efficiently monitor the influx of refugees into the camp and to structure the interactions between the established and new inhabitants. Nor was there an authority to manage the increase in resource scarcity or to supervise the aid allocation.

The need for the supervision of aid allocation in Shatila camp is enhanced by the fact that the distribution of aid in Lebanon is linked to the nationality of the refugees. UNRWA is the main aid provider in the camp, whose mandate only covers providing services to Palestinian-Lebanese and Palestinian-Syrian refugees. UNHCR is responsible for assisting Syrian refugees, but, due to the distinction in the mandates, do not have official offices inside the Palestinian camps.[8] This distinction in aid based on nationality leads to differences in access to - and the amount of - aid individuals are eligible to receive, potentially causing tensions between the different national groups. In addition, the influx of funds to aid organizations did not nearly coincide with the influx of refugees into the camp, leading to severe resource scarcity in housing, medical assistance, education, jobs, and more (Della Longa 2015).

Based on the pressing and unstable conditions in Shatila camp, together with the academic and empirical literature on conflicting refugee-host relationships, I expected to find tensions over competition for scarce resources and aid allocation. Due to the distinction in aid allocation being made based on nationality, together with the severe dependency of the inhabitants on these services, I expected to find the process of crystallization of these nationality boundaries paired with inter-group animosity (e.g. Klein 2014; Parkinson 2014; Walton 2012; Martin 2005; Lawrie and Van Damme 2003).

As the introductory statement illustrates, tensions indeed seem to be present. However, in this thesis, I will argue that in contrast to what was expected based on academic literature, these existing tensions did not result in the crystallization of group boundaries between the nationalities in Shatila camp. Instead, during my research, I found that rather than the escalation of tensions, certain regulations were set in place to deal with the new social reality that emerged after the massive influx. Through these regulations, conflict is actively avoided. I will argue that the installation of these regulations are no 'ad hoc' response to the new situation, but rather resulted in the establishment of a relatively stable social order in which social interactions between the communities are regulated and conflict is minimized.

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[7] In cases of severe criminal acts, the Palestinian factors occasionally cooperate with the Lebanese authorities by handing over criminals to the Lebanese security forces (Della Longa 2015).

[8] An important note is that UNHCR only provides aid to Syrians with the legal refugee status in Lebanon. Those that crossed the borders illegally are not eligible to receive aid at UNHCR. However, a significant amount of illegal Syrian refugees moves to the Palestinian camps as they are afraid to cross of checkpoints by the Lebanese authorities outside of the camps *because* they are 'illegal'. (Author's interview with Othman Afiffi, Associate Director of the NGO Ahlam Lahje2 (translated as: dream of a refugee). Shatila camp, 19 April 2017). UNRWA does not make a distinction in aid provision between legal and illegal refugees (Author's interview with Anne Colquhoun, Communication Manager at UNRWA. Beirut, 11 March 2017).

Besides the empirical complication of the absence of conflict, Shatila as a case study provides a clear theoretical complication for two reasons. Firstly, as several preconditions known to contribute to conflicting relationships between refugees and host communities are present. According to academics, conflicts between these communities may result from competition over scarce resources (Walton 2012), including services by humanitarian agencies (Agblorti 2011; Lawrie and Van Damme 2003), environmental degradation (Martin 2005), economic competition (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2008), and social and cultural threats (ibid.). According to academics, such conflict is likely to erupt over social fault-lines, such as ethnicity or nationality (e.g. Klein 2014; Parkinson 2014; Martin 2005). As I will argue, all these conditions are present in Shatila camp, yet no widespread inter-group conflict has broken out. This research aims to understand and explain why no conflict has broken out and thereby reconsidering certain theoretical assumptions on conflicting refugee-host relationships.

Secondly, Shatila camp provides an interesting and significant case study for inter-group conflict between host- and refugee communities as the host community, in this case, is a refugee community themselves. The Palestinian-Lebanese community, of which almost all members have been born in Shatila or other Palestinian camps in Lebanon as result of their protracted exile, hold the legal status of being refugees, yet currently, they are the 'host community' for new refugees from Syria.

Both the theoretical and empirical complication of the phenomenon of conflict minimization in Shatila camp can be illustrated by the case study of Kakuma refugee camp, Kenya, in which under similar context and conditions inter-communal violence has erupted. Contextually, as in Shatila's case, Kakuma has seen a massive influx of refugees outnumbering the host community (Crisp 2000: 619). As a consequence of this influx, resources have become scarcer and the living conditions both in and outside the camp deteriorated. The security situation is characterized by limitations in the capacity of the local security forces and rule of law (ibid.: 619-620). Lastly, similarly as Palestinians in Lebanon, refugees in Kenya are denied owning property, are prevented from integration into the economic and social life, lack a clear legal status and are denied having identity cards (ibid.: 617). In his analysis of the case study, Crisp concludes that as a result of the increasing hardships in living conditions, (traumatic) past experiences, juridical restrictions and a lack of future opportunities, refugees in Kakuma camp face high mental pressure, leading to growing frustrations (ibid.: 624-625).

Whereas in Shatila tensions have not erupted in inter-group violence, in Kakuma violence has broken out both between refugee and host communities *outside* the camp, as between different ethnic and national groups *inside* the camp. Crisp argues that although it is "impossible to quantify the amount of violence which takes place in and around Kenya's refugee camps, [...] incidents involving death and serious injury take place on a daily basis" (ibid.: 601).

In his analysis of Kakuma camp, Crisp identifies that besides the consequences of the massive influx other factors have contributed to the outbreak of violence: the impact of perceiving refugees as a security threat, economic competition and the perception of inequality.

Firstly, Crisp argues that there is a national Kenyan perception that refugees pose a security threat to the country. This perception has caused resentment and hostile attitudes from the host community towards the refugees (ibid.: 618). Moreover, he illustrates that economic competition has caused resentment between the refugees and their hosts (ibid.: 619). This resentment was exacerbated after locals had the perception that "the refugees are getting all the goodies" (ibid.: 618) from aid organizations and that there is inequality in the access to services provided by aid associations (ibid.: 619). Moreover, inside the camp, such an incident led to the outbreak of violence after only *one* refugee community was selected for a resettlement program, resulting in the selected community being a target of resentment and violence by the other communities in the camp (ibid.: 626). Whereas in the case of Kakuma camp frustrations and/or small disputes have escalated to inter-group violence as a result of the above factors and conditions, I will argue that in Shatila such tensions are actively prevented from escalation to conflict by the inhabitants.

As such, exploring the absence of (violent) conflicts between the hosting Palestinian-Lebanese refugee community and the new Palestinian-Syrian and Syrian refugee groups will be central in this research. More specifically, the research aims and analyze how and why conflict between the communities is minimized, despite the presence of conflict preconditions as result of the massive influx since 2012.[9] As briefly argued above, I aim to answer this question by analyzing what regulates the interactions between the refugee communities and led to the establishment of a social order in which conflict is actively minimized. The first step is thus to analyze the establishment of such social order. Following, I will analyze what mechanisms within the social order contribute to the process of conflict minimization and lead to the relatively peaceful and stable co-existence in Shatila camp. Consequently, the research question I aim to answer in this thesis is the following:

> *Despite the presence of conflict preconditions, how have the mechanisms of a new social order arising between different refugee communities living in Shatila camp, Beirut, helped to minimize inter-communal conflict between 2012 and 2017?*

The outline of this thesis is the following: chapter 1 will provide an overview of the current academic debate on relationships between refugee and host communities and identify potential conditions that might lead to conflicting relationships based on theoretical premises. In chapter 2, I will propose an analytical framework in which I combine social order and causal mechanisms through which I will analyze the minimization of conflict in Shatila camp. Chapter 3 will present the design of the research and an elaboration of the methodological choices made throughout the research. Chapter 4 presents the empirical evidence to illustrate the presence of the conflict preconditions, as well as to illustrate the minimization of conflict. The chapters 5

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[9] Although the outbreak of the civil war in Syria was in the year 2011, a statistical research by Médecins Sans Frontière (MSF) in cooperation with the Children & Youth Centre (CYC), two NGOs working in Shatila, illustrates that a peak in the influx in Shatila camp could be seen in the beginning of 2012.

and 6 contain my analysis of the empirical complication. In chapter 5, I analyze the emergence of a 'new social order' in Shatila camp. Chapter 6 contains the explanatory analysis in which I identify the causal mechanisms within the social order of Shatila camp and their effects on conflict minimization. I will conclude by answering my research question and providing recommendations for further research.

Chapter 1

Refugee-host relationships in the academic debate

In this chapter, I will present the current academic knowledge on refugee-host relationships. Based on this debate, I will identify the crucial conditions known to contribute to conflicting relationships between refugees and their host communities. Subsequently, I will introduce the relatively new and thin body of literature on the hosting community being refugees themselves. I will conclude by proposing an analytical framework to analyze the process of conflict minimization in Shatila camp.

1.1 Hosting refugees

More and more forced displacement crises as a result of people fleeing from prosecution, conflict, violence or human rights violations are occurring around the world. These crises are characterized by a growing complexity and severity of the conflicts, resulting in situations of increasingly protracted displacement. Recent numbers by UNHCR show that at end-2016 over 65.6 million people are forcibly displaced, of which two-thirds live in protracted exile (UNHCR 2017: 2).[10]

This phenomenon does not only reflect the departure from a conflict zone, it simultaneously reflects the influx to the countries people go to in search of a safe haven. Consequently, after refugees settle in their country of refuge, interactions between refugees and host communities are a reality. The relationships that develop between refugees and host communities are highly complex and influenced by many factors. However, in order to ensure a peaceful co-existence between the two, deeper understanding and knowledge of what influences such relationships is necessary.

According to the recent annual report by UNHCR, eighty-four per cent of the world's refugees are hosted by countries in developing regions, thereby putting an increasing burden on the host countries and their populations both in the phase of initial influx as in the long-term presence (UNHCR 2017: 2). The exact impact of hosting refugees on the lives of the host communities is largely unknown and appears to be highly context-specific. Academics working

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[10] Protracted displacement is defined as a situation "in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given asylum country" (UNHCR 2017: 22).

on the development-migration nexus have shown that these impacts can be both positive and negative, depending on many factors. Among these effects are:

> Changes in local markets for food, housing, land, transport, and other goods, services and resources; changes in local labour markets; changes in the local economy and society wrought by the introduction of humanitarian assistance; demands on health care, education and other services; demographic changes, and related influences on health, mortality and morbidity; influences on infrastructure; ecological and environmental changes.
>
> (Sorensen Nyberg, Van Hear and Engber-Pedersen 2003: 16)

Case study analysis present several examples of positive impacts, such as growing market stocks (Withaker 2002: 342), the presence of cheap labor workers (Maystadt and Verwimpt 2014: 6), the increase in attention to the region by humanitarian agencies (Jacobsen 2002: 581) or inter-community friendships and marriages (Otha 2005: 232). However, in many cases, the hosting of refugees has led to tensions and conflicts between the refugees and host communities (Crisp 2003: 15). Knowledge and deeper understanding of the conditions that jeopardize sustainable and peaceful coexistence between the communities is important to prevent the outbreak of conflict. This is reflected in the increase in attention in the academic field of refugee studies to the notion that refugee flows are not only the consequence of violent conflict but can also increase the risk of sparking new conflict in their host countries. Scholar have, based on theoretical assumptions in conflict theory and evidence from case-studies, attempted to identify certain conditions that potentially contribute to conflicting inter-community relationships in countries hosting refugees.

1.2   Conflict preconditions in refugee-host relationships

Scholars have found several conditions that contribute to conflicting inter-community relationships in hosting refugees. The main conditions identified in the academic literature are the perception of a security threat, exacerbation of economic competition, perceived inequality in humanitarian assistance and competition over environmental resource scarcity.

The first condition, potentially inducing resentment against refugee communities, is the *perception* of refugees as posing a security threat to the host population. Walton states that the perception that refugees lead to an increase in criminality might contribute to conflicting relationships (2012: 2). Moreover, Salehyan and Gleditsch establish the link between refugee influxes and conflict spillover and thereby jeopardizing the security situation in the host country (2006: 344). They argue that the connections refugees have with rebel social networks active in their country of origin may facilitate the spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies to the host country (ibid.). Based on this argument, the suspicion of host communities towards refugee communities in having connections to rebel networks, enhances the perceived security threat refugees may pose and thereby subsequently contribute animosity towards refugees.

Secondly, based on a systematical meta-analysis, the OECD has concluded that "the economic benefits generated by refugees seldom outweigh the negative impacts of a large-scale refugee presence over extended periods" (OECD 2001: 151 in Walton 2012: 2). Maystadt and Verwimp add to this notion that *when* the host community economically benefits from a refugee influx, these benefits are often unequally distributed resulting in advancing only small (elite) groups (2014: 790). Moreover, Salehyan and Gleditsch argue that the presence of refugees can depress wages and lead to a decrease in prices as a result of increasing scarcity due to their consumption (2006: 344). The authors illustrate this by presenting the case study of the influx of refugees into Macedonia and argue that resentment grows when the host community has to compete over economic resources as employment and housing (ibid.: 346). Concluding, the dynamics resulting from refugee inflows are, especially in developing countries, likely to increase the economic hardships for the host communities. Often, refugees are blamed for these hardships, "sparking discontent and a feeling of [economic] threat" towards refugee communities which potentially enhances the chance of the outbreak of conflict (ibid.: 342).

Thirdly, in addition to economic competition, growing academic attention has been paid to the potential negative impact of humanitarian assistance of refugees on refugee-host relationships, as the result of competition over access to their services. Several academics have illustrated that the difference in access to services by humanitarian agencies is a potential condition for tension and hostility, especially when host communities have the perception that refugee communities are being privileged (e.g. Lawrie and Van Damme 2003; Martin 2005; Ikanda 2008). Agblorti adds to this notion that the difference in access is particularly likely to create antagonism and resentment between refugees and hosts when the host community perceived the assistance to refugees to be above their own average living conditions (2011: 75). Elsewhere, Lawrie and Van Damme argue that restricting the access for the host community to aid agencies risks "heightening the visibility of refugees as a separate and comparatively privileged group, thereby making them a potential target of hostility" for the host community (2003: 575). In line with this argument, Dryden-Peterson and Hovil state that this perceived inequality and privilege is reinforced by the physical separation due to the spatial boundaries of the refugee camp, which often results in the social isolation from the host population. This isolation and lack of inter-community contact may lead to the exaggeration of the perceived privilege refugees hold, thereby enhancing resentment and hostility (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003: 7 in Walton 2012: 2).

Fourthly, growing academic attention has been paid to the link between environmental resource scarcity and refugee-host conflicts. The research by Martin demonstrates the link between increased environmental resource scarcity as the result of an influx of refugees and the "amplification of the perceived significance of ethnic differences and inequalities, creating conditions for conflict" (2005: 333). According to Ratner and colleagues, academics have mainly focused on the link between 'high-value extractive resources' (e.g. gold and timber) and conflict, whereas they also stress the importance of competition over renewable resources (e.g. land use or water) in environmental conflicts (Ratner et al. 2013: 184). In line with this

argument, the case study of Guinea shows that competition for scarce environmental resources and environmental deterioration (in the form of deforestation and soil erosion) as result of the massive influx of refugees have negatively affected the atmosphere between refugee and host communities. Refugees were blamed for this dynamic, which resulted in resentment towards them (Lawrie and Van Damme 2003: 575).

In addition to the four identified conditions, the research by Martin critiques the assumption that resource scarcity and environmental degradation is a *direct* cause of inter-group violence, as he states that not all resource scarce situations in the world inevitably lead to violent conflict (2005: 330). According to Martin, it is thus not the absolute *quantity* of resource scarcity, but rather the social construction and interpretation of the competition over resource scarcity that may lead to conflict. Martin proposes an integrated framework in which he incorporates a variety of socioeconomic variables that he beliefs to influence the social construction of resource competition (ibid.: 334-335). Included in these socioeconomic variables are the above-mentioned economic burdens and the sense of inequality in the allocation of aid. In other words, it is the combination of economic hardships and the perception of inequality *together* with resource competition that may lead to violent conflict (ibid.: 333). Martin states that in such cases, the combination of perceptions of inequality and the presence of a 'resource use conflict' and economic competition fuels inter-group tensions as the social construction of resource scarcity is "mapped onto existing perceptions of inequality, resulting in a hardening of group identities and providing a catalyst for hostility towards out-groups" (ibid.). This hardening of these group identities often happens over existing social fault-lines, such as ethnicity or nationality (ibid.).

In addition to these socioeconomic variables, Martin incorporates two contextual factors that he believes play a role in the social construction of resource scarcity too, and have not yet been addressed in this chapter. The first contextual factor Martin includes is the strategy of 'those who are in power' (2005: 335). Based on the research by Schmidtz (2000), Martin states that the presence of effective leadership and the existence of formal and informal institutions and rules that regulate resource use influence the social construction of resource conflict. When resource scarcity is efficiently coordinated, conflict over this scarcity is claimed to be less likely (Schmidtz 2000: 400 in Martin 2005: 335). On the other hand, Martin argues that powerholders or elite groups may use resource competition as a political strategy in which they "intentionally rally people around a certain understanding of resource use conflict as a means of achieving political ends" (2005: 334).

The second contextual factor that is important in understanding the construction of resource scarcity is the history of violence. The memories of violence between groups can explain the tendency of individuals to think and act based on group categories, "to frame their contact with each other in inter-group ways rather than in interpersonal ways" (ibid.: 338). In addition, Stewart suggests that histories of conflicts can trigger new outbreaks of conflict because "mobilising people by calling on group memories is more effective if there is a history of conflict" (2002: 334).

Section conclusion

To conclude, the perceptions of refugees as posing a security threat, the economic burden resulting from refugee influxes and the perception of inequality in the access to aid provided by humanitarian agencies have been identified as contributing to resentment and hostility towards refugees. Moreover, there is a link between perceived environmental resource conflict and conflicting refugee-host relationships. However, such environmental scarcity has to be seen as an indirect mechanism, as it contributes to violent conflict by "amplifying/triggering *traditional* causes of conflict" (Martin 2005: 339, *emphasis added*) such as perceived inequality, by which group boundaries are crystallized and out-group hostility is catalyzed (ibid.: 333). As argued, the crystallization of group boundaries often happen over existing social fault-lines as ethnicity or nationality (ibid.).

As I will illustrate in chapter 4, all above-identified conflict preconditions are present in the contemporary context of Shatila camp. Therefore, based on the above literature review, we would expect inter-group conflict over the existing social fault-lines in the form of nationality, between the Palestinian-Lebanese, Palestinian-Syrian and Syrian refugees. However, in contrast to this expectation, no inter-group conflict has occurred, but rather a stable social order has emerged. As such, Shatila as a case study challenges certain assumptions on conflicting refugee-host relationships. This research aims to explain *why* and *how* conflict is minimized in Shatila camp, despite the presence of conflict preconditions, and thereby reassess certain theoretical premises on conflicting relationships.

In the following section, I will introduce a new and thin body of literature on the situation in which the host community consists of refugees, as is the case in Shatila camp. As I will illustrate, certain elements of these theories potentially provide a partial explanation for the absence of conflict in Shatila camp.

1.3   Overlapping displacement

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh argues that despite the growing academic attention to the factors that influence the relationships between refugees and their host communities, little thought has been given to the growing empirical phenomenon of refugees hosting new refugees (2016a). Indeed, all above discussed literature is focused on host communities as being local communities. However, as Fiddian-Qasmiyeh argues, the phenomenon of overlapping displacement increasingly leads to host communities being (former) refugees themselves (ibid.).

Overlapping displacement, according to Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, results from two dynamics that become increasingly common to the world today (ibid.). Firstly, displacement is overlapping as many refugees personally and/or collectively experience secondary or even tertiary displacement. Secondly, it results from the actual sharing of physical spaces (e.g. in (urban) refugee camps) with refugee communities from different nationalities (ibid.).

In her recent contribution to this new academic field of knowledge, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh uses the lens of 'hospitality' to analyze the initial dynamics in a case where refugees host new refugees. Her case study is the Palestinian Beddawi camp in North Lebanon, which similarly to

Shatila camp, has seen an influx of refugees from Syria. By analyzing the refugee-led help initiatives, she suggests that 'hospitality' results from an increased feeling of solidarity between the communities as "they share the legal and political status of being refugees and an embodied understanding of the nature and impacts of violence, dispossession, and displacement." (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016b: 467).

However, she notes that this hospitality is "never absolute" (ibid.: 466) as it has a threshold by which being welcomed may potentially turn into hostility and tensions over "the limited space in the camps, but also over increasingly limited resources and job opportunities there" (ibid.: 468). In other words, solidarity as result from similar experiences of displacement may initially lead to hospitality, but when the presence of conflict preconditions become more salient as a result of longer duration and increasing burdens, hospitality can potentially turn over into resentment between the established and new refugees. Although Fiddian-Qasmiyeh provides an interesting explanation for initial responses of hospitality from established to new refugees, besides speculation on potential hostility, her research does not further examine how the relationship between the communities develops *after* the 'threshold' of initial hospitality is being met. This research aims to fill this knowledge gap by researching how the relationships develop after the initial wave of hospitality.

Another recent contribution to this new academic body of literature is the study by Hartman and Morse (2015). In their research on hosting refugees in Liberia, they aim to theorize the link between inter-group violence and altruism, in what the authors call 'empathy-driven altruism' theory (Hartman and Morse 2015: 1). By using a combination of qualitative and quantitative data, the authors claim to provide evidence for the hypothesis that empathy as a result of the experience of direct violence causes greater inter-group altruism (ibid.: 1-2). Therefore, Hartman and Morse argue that violence affected individuals and communities are more likely to host 'new' refugees as a result of empathy coming from their own past experiences. The authors claim that this empathy transcends identity boundaries and thereby not only increases in-group but also out-group altruism, even in case this out-group was held responsible for the previously experienced violence (ibid.: 11).

In their research, Hartman and Morse state that the operative mechanisms in their theory are hardship, trauma and victimization. These mechanisms "may be linked to many wartime experiences, including forced displacement, forced movement through hazardous terrain, lack of access to healthcare, or the innumerable deprivations of everyday life during civil conflict" (ibid.: 13). Despite these linkages between the operative mechanisms and other wartime experiences, the authors limit their analysis to the physical experience of violence. As such, the theory only establishes the link between empathy-driven altruism and the experience of hardship and trauma during violence and does not explain why people who did not personally *experience* violence but *are* displaced would be willing to host 'new' refugees.

Moreover, the theory would suggest that the conflict preconditions that have been identified above do not lead to conflict in case the host community experienced violence as this would lead to empathy-driven altruism between the refugee groups. However, the analysis

cannot back this claim up, as the authors do not provide evidence for altruistic relationships when all conflict preconditions are present. Obviously, they claim that histories of violence are not likely to lead to new violence, as their argument is that histories of violence *create* empathy-driven altruism. In addition, the authors provide empirical evidence of the fact that the support for refugees was not influenced by extreme resource scarcity, as even in 'hunger season', empathy-driven altruism motivated local communities to host refugees. However, the authors do not account for the perception of a security threat, economic competition, perceived inequality in aid allocations or the strategies of power holders. Therefore, the study lacks to provide an all-embracing explanation for altruistic relationships in cases other preconditions than a history of violence and resource scarcity are present.

Concluding, the empathy-driven altruism theory fails to account for all conflict preconditions and only 'suggests' but does not provide evidence for empathy resulting from overlapping displacement. As such, it is no comprehensive theory that provides an explanation for the minimization of conflict in Shatila camp, and an alternative explanation has to be found. By proposing an alternative theoretical framework in the next section, I aim to provide a more inclusive explanation for the minimization of conflict in Shatila camp.

1.4   Proposing an analytical framework

As has been argued, the 'empathy-driven altruism' theory is insufficient in explaining the minimization of conflict in Shatila camp. However, I do not completely reject the notion of empathy-driven altruism, but rather believe that additional mechanisms are important in why conflict preconditions do not lead to conflict in the case of Shatila camp.

Hartman and Morse provide evidence that suggests that the establishment of social norms as a result of empathy "reinforce individual's empathetic motivations to host refugees" (2015: 36). In other words, the behavior of others influences how individuals determine their own behavioral strategy, resulting in behavioral patterns within a society. In order to understand individual decision-making, it is thus important to gain knowledge and understanding of 'what it is' that regulates social behavior.

Besides social norms, Arjona argues that explanation of what structures social behavior can be found in the existence of institutions, which are understood as sets of rules that regulate human interaction and thereby allow for a predictability to exist in social life (2014: 1374). This predictability of social life is what Arjona calls 'social order'.

In order to understand why conflict preconditions in Shatila camp do not lead to conflicting behavior, I first need to understand what regulates the behavior of Shatila's inhabitants. I aim to do so by analyzing the emergence of a new 'social order'. The second step is to analyze what mechanisms of this social order lead to the minimization of conflict that is expected to result from the presence of conflict preconditions. In the following chapter, I will develop the analytical framework that helps me to analyze the empirical phenomenon, by combining the framework of 'social order' and 'causal mechanisms'.

Chapter 2

Analytical frames

In this chapter, I will define the elements that constitute my analytical framework and thereby inform my analysis. My analysis process consists of two steps: analyzing what it is that regulates the social interactions of individuals and analyzing why conflict is minimized in Shatila camp.

In the first step, I draw upon concepts from the analytical framework of social order. A social order is established when an agreement between the actors on certain rules of conduct that structures human interaction is reached. This agreement is called a 'social contract' and will be used to analyze what it is that influences an individual's social behavior and how this plays out in the empirical context. I do so by analyzing two sub-concepts. Firstly, the *content* of the social contract, which prescribes which behavior is desirable and acceptable and which is not. Secondly, I analyze the *compliance* to the social contract, which determines to what extent individuals abide by the content of the content. The content of the social contract is determined by structural factors, in which I include the norms and institutions that tell people 'how to do social life'. The compliance to the content of this social contract is affected by the agency of an individual. This agency stems from two factors that are determined by the individual, namely the personal incentives individuals have for order which influences the extent of compliance, and the personal interpretation they give to the content of the social contract. So although the social contract thus has structural features, the agency of individuals lead to variations in individual behavioral strategies. Therefore, the empirical social order illustrates the interaction between structure and agency.

In analyzing why conflict is minimized in Shatila camp, I analyze how this combination of structural factors and an individual's agency within the social order contribute to conflict minimization. I will do so by identifying the causal mechanisms within the social order and their effects on the process of conflict minimization. In addition to causal mechanisms and their effects, I focus on the sub-concept of mechanisms, social boundary mechanisms, by identifying what elements of the order influence the perception of group boundaries and how situational shifts in these boundaries help to minimize conflict.

2.1 Social order

In order to create social theories and interpretations of the empirical social world, Arjona argues that we need to make assumptions about how actors make the decisions on the ground that

influence their social behavior (2014: 1360). Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to what structures social interactions. By referring to North (1990: 3), Arjona states that explanation can be found in the existence of institutions, which are understood as sets of rules that structure human interaction and thereby allow for predictability to exist in social life. This predictability of social life is what Arjona calls 'social order' (2014: 1374).

Throughout history, the concept of 'social order' has been of central importance to social theory. This has led theorists to have different perceptions on what 'social order' is and how it comes into existence. Some theorists follow the philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1651) in arguing that social order is only possible through coercion by some sort of external authority, as the single interaction between self-interested human beings would invincibly result into chaos and war. Others claim that social order can be established without external coercion. For Durkheim, social order results from the process in which "the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its own life; one may call it the collective or common conscience" (Durkheim 1933: 79). Social order, according to Durkheim, is thus established by the emergence of 'common beliefs' that order social life and bring it to a social equilibrium (Durkheim 1933 in Demmers 2017: 58). In this sense, social order results from the emergence of a collective consciousness and the institutionalization of shared norms that can explain new types of interaction patterns and solidarity feelings without external coercion (Ellis 1971: 694).

A more recent contribution to the academic knowledge on social order is the research by Arjona (2014) on the establishment of social order during wartime. Arjona argues that it is specifically due to the chaos and disorder during wartime that there is a need for some form of order, which leads to the establishment of clear rules that regulate this order (ibid.: 1361). Although it may seem controversial, as my argument is that conflict in Shatila camp is minimized rather than being in a state of war, I borrow Arjona's idea of the establishment of a social order during times of chaos. Because even though Shatila is not in war, we can state that the influx of more than 12.000 refugees in a one-square-kilometer camp and thereby more than doubling its population while no central authority was present to monitor and supervise this dynamic, has initially led to a situation of chaos.

In her article, Arjona defines (wartime) social order as "a set of rules that structure human interaction in a given community during wartime, allowing for a predictability to exist" (2014: 1374). She states that these rules are created by (armed) rebel groups who benefit from a situation of order (2014: 1361-1362). However, in times of absence of a powerholder who creates these rules, followers of the 'Durkheimian' social order would argue that such rules emerge from collective social norms (Durkheim 1933 in Demmers 2017: 58). Although the definition by Arjona shows how social order is established during times of chaos and disorder, it does not incorporate the emergence of collective norms that guide the set of rules.

In line with Arjona's wartime social order, in Elster formerly defined social order as "that what glues societies together and prevents them from disintegrating into chaos and war" (1989: 1). Elster argues that a situation of social order is "characterized by the predictability of

social life and is maintained by the existence of habitual rules and social norms" (Elster 1989 in Misztal 2013: 68). Yet, what is missing in this definition is the collectivity of these norms and rules. Although failing to describe the predictability of social life, Reckwitz does include the collectivity of norms and rules by providing a definition following the *homo sociologicus* tradition in which social order is seen as "a normative consensus on collective norms and values, i.e. to rules which express a social 'ought'" (2002: 245). In order to create a comprehensive definition of social order, I use a combination of the definitions by Arjona (2014), Elster (1989) and Reckwitz (2002). Consequently, I define social order as:

> *A normative consensus established in a given community as the result of incentives for order, maintained in social norms and more concrete institutionalizations of these norms, which structure human interaction and allow for a predictability to exist.*

2.1.1   The social contract

The normative consensus maintained in social norms and more concrete institutionalizations of these norms results from an agreement on a 'social contract', which is defined as the implicit notion of the duties and/or commitments of both sides, in which both sides follow certain agreed rules of conduct (Arjona 2014: 1374). It is only when all actors comply with the social contract, Arjona argues, the emergence of a social order is possible (ibid.).

In this way, the *content* of the social contract (i.e. the rules of conduct) is determined by structural factors in the form of norms and institutions that determine which behavior is seen as desirable and acceptable. The *compliance* of the social contract, however, is determined by the agency of individuals, as they determine whether they have personal incentives for the establishment of an order and thereby to comply with the social contract and which interpretation they give to its content.

Structure: norms and institutions

Social norms in a society determine which behavior is considered desirable and which is not (Horne 2003: 129). These social norms will therefore help me to identify the range of desirable behaviors in Shatila camp and thereby influence the individual behavioral decision-making. I will define this concept by making a distinction between proscriptive- and prescriptive norms. The former are norms that "discourage or proscribe certain actions" (Hechter and Horne 2009: 262), whereas the latter "encourage or prescribe certain actions" (ibid.).

These social norms can be institutionalized into more concrete behavioral rules, and thereby help me explain the emergence of institutions. I will use the definition of North, who defines institutions as "rules that structure human interaction" (North 1990: 3 in Arjona 2014: 1361). Whereas norms determine which behavior is seen as desirable, institutions determine which behavior is seen as acceptable, and therefore potentially involve (social) penalties when not abided by. This concept of institutions will help me identify the sets of rules emerged between the refugee communities to structure their social interaction.

Agency: personal incentives and interpretation

Although the content of the social contract is determined by structural factors, this does not mean that all actors within the social order behave in identical ways. Rather, variations in the *compliance* to the social contract lead to variations in individual behavioral strategies. The agency individuals have, defined as "the individual's capacity to initiate change" (Demmers 2017: 16), influences the level of compliance to the social contract. This agency stems from two factors.

Firstly, Arjona argues that order is only established if actors involved in it benefit from this order, and therefore have incentives to comply with the social contact (2014: 1374). These incentives for order explain why individuals might at times behave in ways that are not necessarily directly beneficial for the individual, but do contribute to the social order (ibid.). However, it also explains why individuals who have less or no incentives for order do not comply with the social contract. Analyzing the incentives of my participants for the establishment of order helps in understanding why and to what extent individuals comply with the social contract.

Secondly, besides personal incentives that give individuals the agency to decide to what extent they abide by the social contract, individuals also have agency to initiate changes to the content of the social contract. In this way, agency gives individuals room to give their own interpretation to the norms and rules within the social contract. This interpretation will help me understand why in cases where people have incentives for order, they still can adopt different behavioral strategies while complying with the social contract.

The concepts within the framework of social order help me to understand and explain how social behavior is determined inside Shatila camp. However, analysis of how behavior is determined does not yet explain *why* conflict is minimized in Shatila camp, while not in other cases with similar conditions. Therefore, I combine the components of social order with a second framework, through which I am able to analyze which mechanisms of the social order contribute to conflict minimization and how. The following section discusses the framework of causal mechanisms.

2.2   Causal mechanisms

There is an ongoing theoretical debate on how social and political phenomena, such as the establishment of a social order, should be studied. Some theorists argue that social behavior results from the actions of actors, whereas others state that it is determined - or at least restrained - by the social structures actors engage in. The construction of my first analytical frame is based on the ontological assumption that social order is determined by the interaction between structure and agency. Therefore, in explaining how conflict is minimized, I use a framework that rejects to analyze social and political phenomena from either a structural or individualist perspective, but rather aims to explain them by identifying the mechanisms and processes these phenomena consist of.

In their work on mechanisms and processes, Tilly and Tarrow provide such a set of tools for the analysis of social processes by looking at the mechanisms (2015). For them, analysis of any social phenomena consists of three steps: "a description of the processes, decomposition of the process into its basic causes, and reassembly of those causes into a more general account of how the process takes place." (ibid.: 28). I use the definition as provided by Tilly and Tarrow on mechanisms as: "a delimited class of changes that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations." (ibid.: 29). They argue that a combination and sequences of such mechanisms compound into processes. Processes are defined as "regular combinations and sequences of mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements" (ibid.).

By analyzing the process of conflict minimization via the framework by Tilly and Tarrow, I am able to break up the process into its constituent mechanisms and analyze the independent effects of these mechanisms on the process of conflict minimization. By knowing the independent effects, I am able to reassemble these causes and explain which mechanisms lead to conflict minimization in Shatila camp and how. In this way, analyzing and identifying the unique combination of mechanisms present in Shatila camp will help me explain why conflict is minimized in Shatila whereas under similar conditions has erupted in violence in other cases.

2.2.1   Social boundary mechanisms

In my analysis of the process of conflict minimization, I will focus on those mechanisms that determine the social interactions in the camp, and identify their effects on conflict minimization. According to Tilly, in order to understand social interactions, we should look at the concept of social boundaries, as these boundaries have seen to play an important role in determining social interactions on a variety of scales:

> People everywhere organize a significant part of their social interaction around the formation, transformation, activation, and suppression of social boundaries. It happens at the small scale of interpersonal dialogue, at the medium scale of rivalry within organizations, and at the large scale of genocide. Us-them boundaries matter.
>
> (Tilly 2004: 213)

Tilly continues by arguing that the mechanisms that lead to changes in these boundaries, social boundary mechanisms, consequently lead to changes in social life (ibid.). As such, I incorporate the concept of social boundaries in my analytic frame, as it helps me to analyze how people organize and categorize their social world, how this influences their social behavior. Specifically, I will look for social boundary mechanisms that might lead to changes in social boundaries, as such changes might explain changes in social behavior.

Tilly aims to provide a minimal definition of a social boundary as "any contiguous zone of contrasting density, rapid transition, or separation between internally connected clusters of

population and/or activity" (ibid.: 214). Although this definition explains how people cognitively organize their social world, it does not explicitly enough state what the result of this categorization is on the social life. Therefore, I use the definition of a social boundary as provided by Wimmer, in his work on the making- and unmaking of social boundaries:

> A boundary displays both a categorical and a social behavioral dimension. The former refers to acts of social classification and collective representation; the latter to everyday networks of relationships that result from individual acts of connecting and distancing. On the individual level, the categorical and the behavioral aspects appear as two cognitive schemes. One divides the social world into social groups – into "us" and "them" – and the other offers scripts of actions – how to relate to individuals classified as "us" and "them" under given circumstances. Only when the two schemes coincide, when ways of seeing the world correspond to ways of acting in the world, shall I speak of a social boundary.
>
> <div align="right">(Wimmer 2008: 975)</div>

Important to acknowledge is that Wimmer states that these social boundaries are situational in the sense that different boundaries may be salient in different situations (ibid.: 976-977). This results from the acknowledgement that one's position is always *relational* as it is determined by "where one stands in relation to 'the other'" (Merriam et al. 2001: 412). Therefore, positions can shift, as "the loci along which we are aligned with or set apart from (…) are multiple and in flux" (Narayan 1993: 671-572). This 'positionality' of social boundaries consequently means that social boundary mechanisms are contingent and context specific.

The framework by Tilly and Tarrow on causal mechanisms and the sub-type of social boundary mechanisms provide me with an integrated approach to analyze the mechanisms within the social order in Shatila camp that lead to conflict minimization. One the next page, figure 1 provides a systematic overview of the components of my analytical frame and how they relate to each other.

Figure 1: A systematic overview of the components of the analytical framework.

Figure 1: An overview of concepts of a social order in which the interplay between structure and agency determine the outcome of the social contract. Mechanisms and social boundary mechanisms are to be identified in order to explain the process of conflict minimization.[11]

2.3   Sub-questions

In this section, I develop the sub-questions that help me unpack my research question. These questions help me to systematically answer my research question and therefore guide my analysis in the chapters 4, 5 and 6. I have developed five sub-questions that are to be answered

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[11] Social boundary mechanisms are a sub-category of causal mechanisms. However, in order to make clear that I will not *only* use social boundary mechanisms but also mechanisms that contribute to the process without playing into social boundaries, the two concepts are presented in a horizontal relationship in this diagram.

during my analysis. The accumulation of the knowledge from the sub-questions eventually leads me to answering my research question:

1. What conflict preconditions are present in Shatila refugee camp?
2. How do structural factors determine the content of the social contract between communities in Shatila camp?
3. How does the agency of individuals determine the compliance to the social contract between communities in Shatila camp?
4. What are the mechanisms within the social order of Shatila camp and what are their individual effects on the process of conflict minimization?
5. How does the combination of the mechanisms within the social order lead to conflict minimization?

Conclusion of the chapter

In this chapter, I have developed an integrated analytical framework that helps me analyze how the interplay between structural factors and agency influence individual behavioral through the concepts of social order. Moreover, it helps me to analyze why conflict in Shatila is minimized by identifying the causal mechanisms within the social order and what their effects are on the process of conflict minimization. I have developed five sub-questions that help me unpack my research question. In the following chapter, I will present the methodology of this research.

Chapter 3

Methodology

The research question and sub-questions that have been posed in the previous chapters inform the design of this research. In this chapter, I explain my choices in the research design, data collection and analysis procedure. I will elaborate on my methodological choices and address the limitations of the findings presented in this research.

3.1 Research design

The question this research aims to answer is *why* there is no inter-group conflict, despite the presence of conflict preconditions. In other words, I aim to gain knowledge and understanding of why something is *not* happening, although we would *expect* it based on assumptions presented in contemporary academic literature. Consequently, I adopt an interpretative epistemological stance, as I aim to divert from explaining behavior based on 'causal laws and regulations', but rather aim to *understand* human-decision-making by researching how the preferences that influence an individual's course of action come about (Demmers 2017: 17). Simultaneously, by identifying the presence and effects of the mechanisms of a social order that are the result of both structural factors and individual agency, I employ a structurationist perspective in which agency and structure are not seen as oppositional but as mutually constitutive in determining human behavior (Giddens 1984 in Jabri 1996: 76).

The strategy taken in this research is a qualitative research strategy. Firstly, because the research question I aim to explore demands an in-depth understanding of the participants' perspectives on the social reality they are part of. Such subjective and personal conceptions are best researched with qualitative research methods, as these facilitate the in-depth description and presentation of social phenomena as experienced by the actors engaged in it in a way that captures their inherent nature (Ritchie et al. 2013: 27-28). This in-depth understanding facilitates an interpretive rendering of the social phenomenon that is being studied (Boeije 2010: 32).

Answering my research question demands exploring the interactions between individual practices and motivations, and structural factors such as societal norms and institutions. It requires the identification of mechanisms and their effects on conflict minimization, emerging from units of observation at a micro-level (i.e. individuals) to make claims about a process occurring at a higher level (i.e. social interactions inside the camp). Consequently, the unit of

observation in this research is individuals, whereas the unit of analysis is the mechanisms that emerge from the interplay between structure and agency, as has been stipulated in chapter 2.

3.2 Data collection

In this section, I will address the process of data collection. To begin, I will focus on the sampling method and illustrate the data collection techniques that were used to gather the data. Furthermore, I will elaborate on the method for data collection, in which I will indicate the significance of the data collection techniques during the different phases of the data collection.

3.2.1 Sampling method

Purposive sampling has been used to sample the individual participants throughout the research. The individuals that have participated in this research can be divided into the categories: inhabitants of the camp, NGO workers, and government officials. Most of the inhabitants who have participated in this research were sampled in collaboration with the local NGO Beit Atfal Assumoud.[12] These inhabitants were part of the NGO's social network and were selected based on the following two features: (1) relatively equal division of Palestinian-Lebanese, Palestinian-Syrian and Syrian inhabitants (2) relatively equal division in gender. Due to restrictions in the time I was able to spend in the field, in combination with the tense political situation inside the camp, it was imperative to cooperate with an NGO in order to be connected to participants. This cooperation has not only enabled me to use the NGO's social network and thereby access participants, but also helped me in gaining the trust of the participants as the result of being incorporated in an organization with high credibility in the perspective of the participants.[13]

The interviews with participants that were sampled in cooperation with the NGO were conducted at the NGO's office inside the camp. However, as I believe it is important to gain insights in how people live inside the camp, I aimed to also conduct interviews at people's homes. Therefore, in addition to the interviews arranged by Beit Atfal Assumoud, I have used a specific form of purposive sampling, snowball sampling, in which I asked my established contacts in the camp outside of the NGO's network to identify potential participants and interview them at their houses.

Purposive sampling has also been used to sample NGO workers active in Shatila camp, by first creating a profile of all (i)NGOs active in the camp and later contacting all of them to

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[12] "The National Institution of Social Care and Vocational training (NISCVT) known as Beit Atfal Assumoud (BAS) is a humanitarian, non-sectarian and non-governmental organization, and it is not related to any political and religious groups. It was established on August 12th, 1976 after Tal Al Zaatar massacre to provide assistance and accommodation for the orphaned children who lost their parents during the massacre under the license no. 135/AD given on February 18th, 1980. Today, NISCVT is providing services for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and other disadvantaged people with other nationalities living in the camps or close to them." (Beit Atfal Assumoud official website 2017)

[13] When the participants were asked why they decided to participate in the interviews, most of them said that the organization works hard to provide assistance to Shatila's community and wanted to do something in return.

arrange interviews.[14] In addition, again snowball sampling was used, as the NGO workers were asked to identify other aid workers that could potentially participate in this research. Lastly, the government representative has been sampled by purposive sampling, due to the limited opportunities to gain access to government officials.

3.2.2   Data collection techniques

The data gathered in this research is generated by three data collection techniques: in-depth interviewing, document analysis and non-participatory observation. In-depth interviews with inhabitants of the camp, NGO workers, and a government representative is the data collection technique that generated the main body of my data. The combination of the data assembled by in-depth interviewing with the other research methods has enabled me to triangulate the findings from the interviews and thereby increasing the internal validity of the collected data.

In-depth interviewing

The first data collection method is in-depth interviews. In a two-month period, I have conducted thirty-five interviews with thirty-three inhabitants[15], eight interviews with NGO workers inside the camp[16] and one government representative.[17] These interviews were semi-structured interviews based on a pre-determined topic list. As will be elaborated on in the next section, due to the exploratory and inductive character of my research, I have adopted a fluid frame, as the relationship between ideas and collected data constantly changed during my research (Curtis and Curtis 2001: 29). This fluid frame enabled me to modify the questions I asked during different phases of my data collection.

Fortunately, I was able to record almost all interviews. Those that have not been recorded was because of wishes of the inhabitants due to sensitivity or of aid workers due to confidentiality. In these cases, the wishes of the participants were always respected and prioritized. I tried to type out the notes I made during these interviews on the same day.

The majority of the interviews were translated from Arabic to English by use of a translator. In cases where interviews were conducted in English, this will be mentioned in a

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[14] I have consciously abstained from engaging with aid associations linked to political parties, due to the tense political situation in the camp and thereby prevented the problematic suspicion of me being associated with one of the political sides, as well as guarding my own security.

[15] The vast majority of the inhabitants asked to stay anonymous. Due to the sensitivity of the research and the research context, I decided to remove *all* names and other features that might jeopardize the anonymity, for all participants. When quoting the interviews, an 'interview code' is given, through which additional information about the interview can be found in the Appendix. In addition, a short description of the participant is provided with the background information necessary to understand the context of the statement. This background information contains: 1) the nationality of the participant, 2) the gender of the participant and 3) the duration of presence in Shatila camp. When referring to multiple interviews in one footnote, an enumeration of the interview codes will be given.

[16] Some aid workers also expressed the wish to remain anonymous. In these cases, the name of the aid worker is removed and only the name of the organization, the date of the interview and the interview code is mentioned in the footnote.

[17] See Appendix I for an overview consisting of all the details of the conducted interviews.

footnote.[18] Although I am conscious that some content inevitably was lost in translation, due to strict instructions and practice before conduction the official interviews, I am confident that the translations properly reflect the answers given by the participants.

In addition to formal interviews, some informal talks in a more casual sphere have taken place while spending time inside the camp outside interviewing. I have made notes of these informal talks and used them to triangulate the data from the formal interviews.

Non-participant observation.

In addition to in-depth interviewing, I made use of non-participant observation while spending time inside the camp. During my (almost daily) visits to a befriended family, I have been able to observe their interactions with the five families of new refugees living in their building as well as it allowed me to observe help initiatives between the families. Moreover, spending time in the NGO outside of interviewing enabled me to observe aid allocation processes. Lastly, volunteering in the kindergarten of the NGO that helped me in accessing participants, I have been able to observe the interactions between children from different refugee communities. All observations have been consistently written down in my field notes.

Document analysis

The third technique that was used to gather my data was document analysis. This involved the analysis of policy documents of both international and local aid organizations, as well as the analysis of primary sources including research reports and new articles on the situation inside Shatila camp. This document analysis has helped me to gain an in-depth understanding of the research context, as well as it enabled me to triangulate my findings from the interviews and observations.

3.2.3   Research phases and method for data collection

The preparation of my fieldwork involved obtaining a thorough understanding of the political, social and cultural situation of my research context. However, in the first weeks of my field research, this understanding enhanced and has inspired me to adjust my previous research question and adopting a more inductive exploratory approach.[19] This modification resulted in the data collection of this research consisting of the following three phases:

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[18] The following interviews were conducted in English: [I3P3]; [I10P3]; [I11P11]; [I1NE2]; [I3NE3]; [I4NE4]; [I6NE7]

[19] My initial research question was the following: *How is social group status constructed by the inhabitants in the context of resource scarcity in Shatila camp, Beirut, from 2012 until present?* However, during the first weeks of my fieldwork, I noticed that status differences were minor, as there was little room for the individual inhabitants to construct their own status due to the restrictive policies of aid organizations working in the camp as well as legal regulations. Simultaneously, the complication arose that based on the literature I expected to find crystallization of ethnic group boundaries as result of the severe resource scarcity. Nevertheless, this process could not be observed, rather as will be presented in chapter 4, some regulations were set in place to deal with the current situation of resource scarcity, helping to prevent conflict. It is this complication that has guided my data collection and the construction of my research puzzle.

Phase 1: Data collection on aid allocation and everyday life
Phase 2: Data collection on inter-group relationships and interactions
Phase 3: Data collection on conflict minimization

In the first phase, I conducted in-depth interviews with a (non-exclusive) focus on two themes that were selected based on pre-field work empirical literature review: the influence of the influx of new refugees to Shatila on the daily life and the resulting increase in resource scarcity, including services and aid. In this stage, I aimed to get in-depth knowledge on pressing issues inside the camp as well the process of aid allocation by including 'hypothetical questions' in the topic list, by which a potential situation was presented and the participant was instructed to describe what he or she would do in response to the situation.[20] In addition, I conducted interviews with NGO workers in Shatila camp in which I asked practical questions about aid allocation, whereas in the interview with a government official I was able to address the legal aspects. Lastly, I combined the data gathered from the interviews with observational data on aid allocation at Beit Atfal Assumoud and on the conditions of the camp as well as with document analysis, in which I analyzed policy documents of both international and local aid organizations to be able to triangulate my findings.

At the end of phase 1, I observed that the participants' perceptions on – and experiences of – the inter-group relationships varied greatly. This led me to research the perceptions on social relationships between the three national groups in more detail during the second phase of my data collection. During this phase, I asked questions about the general social relationships between the refugee groups within the camp, as well as about personal motivations to create or avoid relationships with members from other national refugee groups. I aimed to triangulate the findings in my interviews in this phase with observational data on the relationships between the refugee communities on a small-scale by observing the interactions of families of refugees from different nationalities who were living in the same building, as well as the interactions of children in the school. At the end of phase 2, I have analyzed the data gathered thus far, to determine the directional theme of the last phase. The interesting complication that arose from this 'in-between analysis' was that the data illustrated the presence of conflict preconditions I had read about in my pre-fieldwork period, however, that certain regulations were set into place to manage the interactions and maintaining peace.

Consequently, in the last phase of my data collection, I focused on the strategies, behaviors and, motives for conflict minimization in Shatila camp by conducting more interviews with camp inhabitants. In this phase, I again incorporated a hypothetical situation[21]

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[20] In this first phase, three hypothetical situations were presented to the inhabitants: (1) imagine that someone in your family gets sick, can you describe the process? (2) Imagine that you are involved in a social fight with someone in the camp, how are such fights solved, can you describe the process? and (3) imagine that something in your house is dis-functioning, for example, the water pipes are leaking, how do you solve this, can you describe the process? Via who, why, what questions the participants were instructed to describe what they would do in response to these situations.

[21] In the third phase, one hypothetical situation was presented to the inhabitants: image the situation in which someone from [*insert refugee community other than the participant's*] starts to make an argument with you on

in order to not only receive direct statements on motivations for behavior but to be also able to analyze explanations for (hypothetical) behavior to triangulate these statements.

3.3   Data analysis and systematic procedure

In order to make well-substantiated claims about the data I have gathered, I have adopted a systematic data analysis procedure. The procedure consisted of three steps: data preparation, data coding and categorization, and establishing links between the emerging themes.

The first step is the preparation of the data, in which I have created transcript logs[22] of all recordings of the interviews and the field notes (including observations) I collected during my research period. The next step is the categorization of the data. At this stage, I had not yet fully developed my analytical framework. I knew that I was going to use the concepts of the analytical framework of 'social order' to understand why certain regulations to minimize conflict were set into place. However, what these regulations were, how they were established and how they led to conflict minimization was still unclear. Therefore, I coded and categorized by data based on the idea of analytical induction: "a process of identifying patterns and themes in the data rather than deciding, prior to data collection or analysis, what the precise variables of data categories will be" (Patton 2002 in Curtis and Curtis 2009: 43). This meant that the data in the transcript logs, field notes and primary sources received 'open codes'.

The codes of these fragments were later bridged and merged into categories and themes. Based on the quantity of the data categorized under each theme, I have identified the significant themes in my data. Through the concepts of the framework of social order, I was able to identify the existence of certain rules that regulated the social interactions between the refugees in the camp. However, there was no authority figure who enforced these rules, rather these rules seemed to be established by the refugee communities themselves. I also found the existence of social norms that determined how people 'should' behave. At the same time, I found great variety in the behavioral strategies participants adopted, which made me aware of the influence of the individual's agency on decision-making, besides the structural factors of norms and rules.

The last step of the analysis involved creating the connections between the established themes and categories. In this stage, I found that the established institutions were more concrete versions of the prevailing norms. It also became clear to me that the structural factors and the factors resulting from agency were reinforcing each other, as structural factors partly restrain individual decision-making, whereas the outcome of the individual's agency set the new norms, and so on. This led to the realization that it was exactly the interaction of the structure and agency that led to the establishment of the social order in Shatila camp and has guided me in developing my analytical framework.

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the street for the reason that you are [*insert nationality*]. Via who, why, what questions the participants were instructed to describe what they would do in response to this situation.

[22] With a transcript log, I mean a systematic summary of the content of interviews with respective time-frames (e.g. 15:06-18-02:53 inequality in aid allocation due to …)

However, I also acknowledged that the analytical framework of social order helped me to explain how and why social interactions were regulated, but that I needed to adopt another analytical framework to explain how the regulation of these social interactions led to the minimization of conflict. To answer this question, I combined the analytical framework of social order with another framework of causal mechanisms, as this framework helps me to analyze which mechanisms within the social order in Shatila camp, established through the interplay of structure and agency, help to minimize conflict and how. This framework has guided my analysis as based on the list of robust mechanisms that have been identified by Tilly and Tarrow (2015) to play a role in a variety of social phenomena, I looked for patterns in my data that suggested the presence of such mechanisms. After the identification of some of these mechanisms, I noticed that some important patterns in my data could not be explained by these robust mechanisms, and led me to propose additional mechanisms that seemed to play a role in the process of conflict minimization in Shatila camp.

3.4   Limitations of the research

Since the war of the camps in Shatila and neighboring camp Sabra (1986-1988), Shatila has seen an outflow of 'original' Palestinian Lebanese inhabitants of the camp, who fled the violence and settled in other places. Although some returned, a significant amount did not. Consequently, this led to the influx of individuals from other marginalized groups or individuals with poor socioeconomic situations to Shatila camp. Although the vast majority of the inhabitants of Shatila today are still refugees, this dynamic has resulted in Shatila being shared with amongst others Bangladeshis, Indians, Egyptians, Iraqis and even poor Lebanese.

Due to time and access, I was not able to interview *all* nationalities living in Shatila. Firstly, it was impossible to arrange access to non-Arab groups within the timeframe I was present in Shatila because they are not linked to any aid organization and because they do not speak Arabic nor English. Secondly, I was interested in the social interactions between the different refugee communities. I have made the decision to focus on only focus on Palestinian-Lebanese, Palestinian-Syrian, and Syrian refugees and not on refugees from other nationalities based on two reasons: 1) PRL, PRS and Syrians are by far the most dominant groups, and 2) individuals outside of these three national groups are not linked to aid organizations which created difficulties in access.

This decision can be seen as a limitation, as my sample does not reflect the multicultural groups Shatila's society consists of. However, while taking time and access restrictions into account, the choice of focusing on the three dominant groups has created the opportunity to talk to more people within one of the three groups I focused on and thereby gaining more insights in the variations and similarities both within and between the groups in the motivations and behaviors they adopt. I am thereby not claiming that my sample is representative for these three national groups, as my sampling method does not guarantee such a claim.

The goal of this research is to gain a better understanding of why conflict is minimized, realizing that I cannot, and therefore will not, make claims about the whole society, nor about

the groups that the interviewees are members of. However, the external validity of the findings has been created by the identification of robust causal mechanisms that are proven to play a role in a variety of social situations. On the other hand, in the occasions I propose newly identified mechanisms, I can only state that these mechanisms occur within this sample. Further research must explore the robustness of the newly proposed mechanisms and thereby the potential generalization to other contexts.

Chapter 4

Surprisingly no conflict

In this chapter, I will describe the observable situation in Shatila camp. Firstly, I will provide empirical evidence to illustrate the presence of the conflict preconditions that have been identified in chapter 1, followed by providing evidence for the absence of inter-group conflict and thereby emphasize the complication of this research. Moreover, I provide a systematic overview of identified patterns within the variety of social interactions between the communities in the camp. To conclude, I will briefly illustrate the presence of certain strategies to prevent that tensions escalate into conflict.

4.1   Conflict preconditions in Shatila camp

The conflict preconditions identified in chapter 1 all seem to be present in the case of Shatila refugee camp, however, some more prominently than others. I will provide evidence for these preconditions from the data I have gathered during my fieldwork, in addition to empirical primary sources to triangulate these findings. Doing so, will lead me to answer my first sub-question: *What conflict preconditions are present in Shatila refugee camp?*

Firstly, Salehyan and Gleditsch address the perceived security threat refugees may pose for the host community (2006: 344). The Palestinian-Lebanese participants I interviewed commonly expressed that their safety perception had decreased since the massive influx of refugees from Syria. For example, a Palestinian-Lebanese woman told me that she believed crime rates inside the camp had increased. The woman reported that she believed the biggest security issues in the camp are the use and trade of drugs, robberies and the sexual harassment of children.[23] This perception of decreased security was also shared by another Palestinian-Lebanese man who was born in Shatila camp. When asked if he felt safe living inside the camp, he expressed the following:

> Really that… If I say yes… No. Because you are… If you know who is your neighbor, from where who comes from, and how his attitude is, that gives you some… some rest. But if you don't know him that give you some [*yani*] some scary because you don't know every people. *[Did this feeling of safety change in the last*

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[23] Author's interview with participant 2, a female Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who has been living in Shatila camp for 58 years. Shatila camp, 23 March 2017. [I2P2]

couple of years?] Ya. It changed for bad. Not for good. (…) Because anyone can make fight or escape from Lebanese authority. He come and hide here. And that is very bad. And because the situation is very difficult, and very poor for the people, they don't ask who want to rent his home. He just ask about the money. And that is really the… the… what I am sorry about. [*Yani*], if you ask me do you like ISIS, I said no, sure no. But I don't know now if who is rent here, ISIS or bad people, Syrian, Lebanese, Palestinian, Afghanistan, Iran, I don't know.[24]

The section of this interview clearly illustrates that a decrease in inhabitant's perception of safety due to the refugee influx is caused by a lack of information about inhabitants and their affiliations with certain parties or organizations. This observation of the shared perception of decrease in security is supported by the outcomes of a survey conducted by the International Alert (IA) and the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) in which over fifty per cent of the participants in Shatila camp claimed that "safety conditions in their area had worsened since the arrival of Syrian refugees" (IA and LCPS 2015: 3).

In addition to a perception of decreased security, almost all Palestinian-Lebanese participants expressed increased economic hardships as a result of the influx. The most mentioned explanation for these hardships was the increase in job competition as result of the overpopulation. This observation is supported by a research report commissioned by UNRWA, which shows a significant increase in the unemployment rate of Palestinian-Lebanese refugees from eight per cent in 2010 to twenty-three per cent in 2015 (Chaaban et al. 2016: 10).

Tensions over job competition increase as a majority of the Palestinian-Lebanese participants claim that 'new refugees' adopt the strategy to work for lower wages than the host community. This 'strategy' is explained by a Palestinian-Lebanese woman living in the camp:

> Let's say the Palestinian-Lebanese and the Lebanese, their salary is about 500$. (…) The Syrians are taking less. So the bosses are employing the Syrians and the Palestinian-Syrians because they cost less. (…) We are not allowed to work 73 jobs in Lebanon and we have a permanent residency here in this country. The Syrians they were employed here but they have a temporary residence and they work according to that residence permit [and do not face restrictions].[25]

The statement of this woman reflects the belief that employers prefer 'new refugees' because they accept lower wages. In addition, she expressed a sense of inequality in the legal restrictions in the job market. Whereas Syrians are allowed to work in all sectors, Palestinian-Lebanese and Palestinian-Syrians face "restrictive employment measures such as a ban from some liberal and syndicate professions" (Chaaban et al. 2016: 7). Although I cannot generalize this point, based

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[24] Author's interview with participant 3, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born inside the camp. Shatila camp, 25 March 2017. This interview was conducted in English. [I3P3]

[25] Author's interview with participant 28, a female Palestinian-Lebanese refugee, who has been living in Shatila camp for 32 years. Shatila camp, 24 April 2017. [I30P28]

on the interviews I conducted, a pattern is visible in the tensions that developed over job competition, perceived inequality and the perception of preferring 'new refugees' over the Palestinian-Lebanese refugees. This observation can be illustrated by the following passage from an interview with a Palestinian-Syrian refugee, who had lived for several episodes of his life inside Shatila camp and holds close relationships with the original Palestinian-Lebanese community:

> It makes problems between them, it makes problems between the people. (…) The Syrian people that are coming here now, it's not their fault, but because of too much Syrian refugees coming here now, it's making problems for the people that used to live here to find jobs easily. *How do you notice that it is creating problems?* It's making problems between the people that used to live here and the new refugees because they are seeing that you [new refugees] are willing to work for less than us, that is not fair. (…) There are inside tensions, but you don't see fights on the streets. *How do you see there are inside tensions?* They are always stressed, the men. They show that, you can see it on their face. It doesn't go into aggressive behavior or violence, but you can see it from their body language or facial expressions.[26]

When the recorder was already turned off, the man added that he occasionally sees a sign on the windows of shops inside the camp, specifically asking for Palestinian-Syrian or Syrian employees. This section of the interview illustrates the development of tensions resulting from increased job competition. However, the participant here claims that these tensions do not result in violence or conflict.

In addition to job competition, some participants have communicated to experience increasing economic hardships from the rising house rent prices as result of the influx. A local aid worker in Shatila camp stated that the massive influx has led to a growing shortage of houses inside the camp and resulted in a significant increase in rent prices.[27] A similar observation is found by the Middle Eastern research and Information Project (MERIP) which in a report claim that rent quadrupled in 2014 compared to 2010 (Parkinson 2014) Moreover, several participants argued that the influx had a negative impact on the local economy of the camp, for example, because new refugees have opened their own shops inside the camp and provide cheaper goods.[28]

Besides increasing economic hardships, the inhabitants of Shatila camp face a decrease in the humanitarian services provided to them. According to a report by the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), aid agencies working in Palestinian camps in Lebanon

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[26] Author's third interview with participant 4, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila 3,5 years ago, but has been living inside Shatila camp during for several episodes of his life. Shatila camp, 6 April 2017. [I13P4]

[27] Author's interview with an anonymous employee of the local NGO Ahlam Lahje2. Shatila camp, 13 March 2017. [I2NE2]

[28] Author's interview with participant 1, a female Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who has been living in Shatila camp for 25 years. Shatila camp, 23 March 2017. [I1P1]

lack the organizational capacity and funding to provide services to all inhabitants of the camps (IFRC 2013). This lack of capacity can be illustrated by looking at UNRWA, the largest aid provider in Shatila camp. The UNRWA field officer for Shatila, Firas Abo Aloul, states that UNRWA operates with a large and increasing shortage in its' budget, resulting from the growing demand due to the influx of Palestinian-Syrian refugees, but the staggering funding.[29] This lack of funding has also been addressed by UNRWA in a press release, in which they stated that: "UNRWA is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions and financial support has been outpaced by the growth in needs" (UNRWA 2016).

As a consequence of this lack of capacity and funding, the aid and services provided in the camp decreased. The majority of the Palestinian-Lebanese refugees I interviewed have expressed they experienced a decrease in the quantity (e.g. less financial assistance and medical coverage[30]) as well as the quality (e.g. overcrowded school classes[31], medical centers have to provide services to more people with the same capacity[32]) of the aid. Overall, the participants I have interviewed, regardless of their nationality, commonly expressed that the help they received was barely enough to survive. A similar observation has been made by the IFRC, who state that the lack of capacity leads to serious complications of survival for all inhabitants in Shatila camp (IFRC 2013).

As discussed by Martin, the absolute scarcity of resources (or in this case aid and services) does not imperatively lead to violence (2005). However, when it plays into existing perceptions of inequality, this scarcity is more likely to 'crystallize' existing group boundaries and escalate to conflict (ibid.: 333). Although I am not able to generalize this point, I could see a clear pattern in the sample of participants of the belief that the *other* national groups are favored by organizations and receive more help. Moreover, a Palestinian-Lebanese man expressed the sense that aid donors privilege Syrian refugees over Palestinians and thereby feels as if the international community is forgetting about the situation the Palestinian-Lebanese refugees are in.[33] Similar observations of perceived inequality over aid allocation were made by Klein, as he points out that new refugees from Syria are perceived to be "taking aid otherwise earmarked for the camps' original inhabitants" (Klein 2014). However, as mentioned before, the Palestinian-Syrian and Syrian participants also expressed to feel this inequality. In line with the above statement, many Palestinian-Syrian refugees said that Syrian refugees were privileged and claimed that in many occasions they are denied access to help by aid organizations working for Syrians and instead are redirected to UNRWA for support. On the other hand, the majority of Syrian refugees expressed the sense that Palestinians are privileged *because* they have

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[29] Author's interview with Firas Abo Aloul, the Area Communication Officer of Central Lebanon for UNRWA. Ramallah School, Shatila camp, 4 April 2017. This interview was conducted in English. [I4NE4]

[30] Author's interview with participant 1, a female Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who has been living in Shatila camp for 25 years. Shatila camp, 23 March 2017. [I1P1]

[31] Author's interview with participant 17, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who has been living in Shatila camp for 67 years. Shatila camp, 11 April 2017. [I18P17]

[32] Author's interview with participant 3, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born inside the camp. Shatila camp, 25 March 2017. This interview was conducted in English. [I3P3]

[33] Author's second interview with participant 3, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born inside the camp. Shatila camp, 05 April 2017. This interview was conducted in English. [I10P3]

UNRWA and access to Palestinian aid organizations inside the camp. A Syrian refugee told me that he thinks Palestinian refugees receive more help, as "Palestinians are privileged by local organizations".[34]

My aim is not to make a statement about which group receives more aid and services as it is not the *absolute* amount of aid, but rather the *perception* of inequality that might lead to conflict (Martin 2005: 333). In chapter 1, it is discussed that the physical separation of communities exacerbates the perceived privilege of the other (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003: 7). Although the aid allocation is not characterized by a physical distinction in the form of a border of a refugee camp, the distinction in 'where to go for aid' leads to an obscurity of the amount of aid provided to the groups and thereby plays into an exacerbation of 'the other's' privilege. Therefore, I argue that the perception of inequality in aid between the refugee communities in Shatila is exacerbated by the fact that Palestinian-Lebanese and Palestinian-Syrians receive aid from UNRWA and local associations, whereas Syrians receive aid from UNHCR and Lebanese aid organizations while they have limited access to local Palestinian associations.[35] This observation is illustrated by a Syrian woman who claims that: 'we say they get more, they say we get more, nobody knows the truth'.[36]

Lastly, academics identify environmental deterioration and natural resource scarcity as a significant conflict trigger. In the introduction, it was illustrated that the environmental conditions in Shatila camp were already dreadful before the influx. However, as a result of the massive influx, Shatila's inhabitants have faced a further deterioration of the environment due to severe overcrowding (UNHCR 2016: 21-22). The UNRWA agency has stated that this extreme overcrowding results in even more electricity cuts, damp shelters, health issues and a lack of hygiene (UNRWA 2017).

In all the interviews, the participants have collectively expressed that the living conditions in Shatila camp are very bad, both caused by structural aid shortages and the recent additional pressure on already limited resources due to extreme overpopulation. A Palestinian-Lebanese refugee expresses that 'the camp is already small. There is too much population. People are choked because of too much population. Let's say the camp fits 100 people, it's now 500 people, it is too much'.[37] In order to accommodate all refugees while not being able to move outside the restriction of one-squared-kilometer camp boundaries, building upwards is the only option, resulting in a maze of houses build so close next to each other that sunlight cannot enter.[38]

Again, as Martin has argued, environmental degradation in itself does not necessarily lead to conflict (2005: 330). However, it might escalate to violent conflict when (1) it plays into

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[34]Author's interview with participant 14, a male Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila 6 months ago. Shatila camp, 7 April 2017. [I15P14]

[35][I2NE2]; [I3NE3]; [I4NE4]; [I5NE5NE6]; [I6NE7]; [I7NE8]

[36]Author's interview with participant 13, a female Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila camp 5 years ago. Shatila camp, 7 April 2017. [I14P13]

[37]Author's interview with participant 28, a female Palestinian-Lebanese refugee, who has been living in Shatila camp for 32 years. Shatila camp, 24 April 2017. [I30P28]

[38] See Appendix II for an illustration.

existing inequalities, (2) if there is inefficient management by leaders and especially if leaders use the resource scarcity to mobilize people for conflict for political gains, or (3) if it plays into former memories of violence.

Firstly, the above analysis has illustrated that there is a strong sense of inequality and privileging 'the other' among the participants I interviewed. This perception of inequality accounts for legal restrictions, as they are different for Palestinian and Syrian refugees. Moreover, economically, a majority of the Palestinian-Lebanese participants have the perception that new refugees hold the preference of employers. Lastly, the participants from the three national groups all perceive 'the others' being privileged in humanitarian sense and receive more aid.

Secondly, Schmidtz has argued that effective leaderships and the existence of formal and informal institutions and rules that regulate resource use reduce the chance of conflict escalation (2000: 400). In Shatila's case, however, a significant amount of the participants have expressed a lack of effective resource management by the Palestinian factions. A Palestinian-Lebanese man and former fighter for the PLO told me that 'all they [political factions] care about is having their own offices and being powerful. They are distracted from helping people'.[39] Another man states he is trying to work against the development that political factions are using the scarcity of both aid and economic resources for political recruitment.[40] This observation suggests that power holders have used the resource scarcity as a political strategy to gain power, however not in a way to mobilize people over resource conflict between the refugee communities inside the camp.[41] I cannot generalize this point as there is no additional data that confirms this nor have I been able to interview someone currently involved in the Palestinian factions. What can be stated is that most of the participants expressed a lack of trust in effective leadership in general.

Lastly, both Stewart and Martin argue that a history of violence between groups can trigger future violence. When discussing the relationship between the Palestinian-Lebanese and the new refugees from Syria, a Syrian-Palestinian refugee told me that he did not feel accepted by the Palestinian-Lebanese community as they associate him with the Syrian regime and their actions: 'They [Palestinian-Lebanese] have a lot of hatred for everything that is Syrian. The reason of that is old political situations. They consider the regime of Syria, they consider them as they were invading Lebanon. And that is the biggest reason for the hatred.'[42] Although this perception was not expressed by all participants, the past experiences of the Syrian occupation

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[39] Author's interview with participant 27, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born inside the camp and was a former fighter of the PLO organization. Shatila camp, 25 April 2017. [I29P27]

[40] Author's third interview with participant 4, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila 3,5 years ago, but has been living inside Shatila camp during for several episodes of his life. Shatila camp, 6 April 2017. [I13P4]

[41] Informal talk in a private setting, with a politically active Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila camp 2 years ago. Location undisclosed, 9 March 2017.

[42] Author's interview with participant 29, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee, who arrived in Shatila camp 4,5 years ago. Shatila camp, 26 April 2017. [I31P29]

of Lebanon can potentially become more salient when combined with other factors, like inequality or resource competition, as has been proposed in Martin's framework (2005).

Section conclusion and answering the sub-question

By summarizing my argument thus far, I am able to answer the first sub-question: *What conflict preconditions are present in Shatila refugee camp?* Based on the illustrated dynamics as result of the refugee influx into Shatila camp, it is possible to observe the following preconditions: a decrease in safety perception, growing economic competition, the perception of a cutback in humanitarian assistance, increasing inequality, the degradation of the environment and increased competition over scarce resources.

The framework by Martin (2005), that is discussed in chapter 1, suggests that it is the combination of the above factors, together with the absence of efficient resource management and the memories of violence, resource competition is likely to amplify group boundaries over existing social fault-lines and lead to inter-group conflict. In other words, based on the theoretical premises within the academic debate, escalation to inter-group violence between the three national groups in Shatila camp would be expected. However, despite the presence of all significant preconditions no eruption of inter-group conflict can be observed.

4.2 Absence of conflict in Shatila camp

As argued, the influx of new refugees heavily influenced the social life in Shatila camp, giving rise to a variety of new social dynamics. Despite the above-identified increased hardships, the participants have reported almost no inter-group conflicts resulting from these conditions.[43] Over ninety-four per cent of my participants reported having no experience with conflicts with members from a different refugee community. The conflicts that were reported were incidental and have not led to an outbreak of widespread conflict.[44]

This absence of inter-group conflict does not mean that all participants perceive the inter-group relationships as positive and free of tensions. Rather, the statements of the participants showed great variation in how they perceive the relationships between the host community and the new refugees, varying between positive and reciprocal, neutral, and tense relationships. Moreover, dependent on whether the relationships between the established and new refugees are perceived as positive, neutral or tense, participants have shown great variety

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[43] There have been reports of political disputes, including gunshots. However, these were conflicts between political factions in the camp and were already present before the influx as well as they are stated to be separated from the social relations in the camp.

[44] Only two out of all participants have reported experiencing actual conflicts with members from a different refugee community. A Syrian woman reported an individual dispute with a Palestinian-Lebanese woman which has directly been solved afterward and thus has not escalated into inter-community violence [I26P25]. The other case is what I would call an 'unusual case' as the particular participant had been imprisoned by the Syrian regime and reported inhumane treatment and torture during this 3-year-long imprisonment. The participant explicitly stated in the interview that although his personal aim is to see the new refugees as humans and 'feel for them', the traumatic past overshadows this aim and leads to aggression and hate towards "everything that is Syrian". This hatred does not directly lead to violence, but will so when being engaged in a dispute with a Syrian person [I33P31].

in the strategies they adopt that determine their social interactions with others inside the camp. In order to systematically present the variation found in my data, I will provide a typology of the social interactions that covers the diversity of the interactions found in the data.[45] The typology consists of the following types:

(1) The exclusive focus on 'own life' and avoiding any kind of intensive interactions
(2) The focus on close social ties and avoiding intensive interactions outside these ties
(3) Intensive interactions are possible with all individuals.

In the first type, individuals have stated to completely focus on their own survival and avoid any kind of intensive interactions with others. The second type entails an exclusive focus on social ties and social networks and avoiding intensive interactions outside these ties. Based on the interviews with the participants who fall into this category, these close social ties exist mainly within the individual's national group (e.g. a Palestinian-Lebanese person's network mainly consists of other Palestinian-Lebanese people). However, these social ties *can* potentially extend nationality boundaries, as in a variety of cases participants claimed to have one *exceptional* close friend or family member from another national group.[46] The participants in the last type see all inhabitants as potential actors to interact with and thereby do not make a distinction in nationality.

What would be interesting now, is to establish how many participants can be categorized in every category. Table 1 gives an insight in the division of the participants' behavioral strategies that determine social interactions. Participants are classified based on statements both on their 'openness' to intensive social interactions with other inhabitants of Shatila camp as the actual interactions they claim to have.[47]

Table 1: Typology of social interactions in Shatila camp

Type	Participants	Total amount
1	P12, P13, P18, P31, P33	5
2	P1, P2, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10, P15, P16, P19, P21, P22, P23, P24, P25, P26, P29	18
3	P3, P4, P11, P14, P17, P20, P27, P28, P30, P32	10

Table 1: The classification of the behavioral strategies of participants with regard to social interactions with other inhabitants in Shatila camp.

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[45] According to Arjona, the types of a well-established typology meet three conditions, besides internal consistency: (1) identification of variation that matters because we expect it to influence phenomena, (2) within-type variation is minimized and between-type variation is maximized, and (3) parsimony (2014: 1376). Taking these conditions into account, I have established a typology consisting of three 'types' of social interactions that cover the diversity of the interactions found in the data.

[46] [I1P1]; [I2P2]; [I8P10]; [I16P15]; [I17P16]; [I23P21P22]; [I26P25]; [I27P26]; [I31P29]

[47] Important to note here, is that I am talking about *intensive* interactions, whereas superficial interactions occur in every type as they are unavoidable due to the practical fact of over minimal 22.000 people living in one-square-kilometer.

What is striking here is that although this typology shows that individuals have at least some agency to determine their social behavior, no inter-group conflicts resulting from the preconditions have been reported. However, as mentioned before, this absence of conflict does not mean that these preconditions have not led to the development of tensions. Contrary, the analysis above has illustrated how tensions are have developed over job competition and perceived inequality in aid allocation, yet that these tensions did not develop into inter-group conflict between the national refugee groups inside the camp. Based on the data I have collected, I was able to identify patterns in certain behaviors and explanations for behaviors that seem to play a role in preventing the escalations of these tensions. These behaviors are shared by the majority of the participants, regardless the strategy they adopted to determine their social interactions. Whereas these strategies will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, I will briefly describe them here to illustrate how tensions are avoided to lead to the outbreak of conflict.

Firstly, participants collectively abstained from blaming each other but rather attributed blame to external actors, such as the Lebanese government or international politicians. Thereby tensions over difficulties in the situation participants find themselves in are not leading to conflicts between the refugees inside the camp. Some tensions were directed towards each other, but these were reported to be situational in the sense that they mostly occur in the work sphere and are not to be generalized to other aspects of social life. Lastly, in the cases where tensions occurred outside of the work sphere, these tensions were reportedly avoided by conflict avoidance strategies of participants. Empirical evidence and a theoretical explanation for these conflict minimizing strategies will be presented in the next chapter, where I will analyze the emergence of a new social order in Shatila camp.

Conclusion of the chapter

To summarize, in this chapter, I described the observed situation in Shatila camp. Firstly, I have identified the conflict preconditions present in Shatila camp and thereby answered the first sub-question. In addition, I have illustrated the absence of experienced inter-group violence in Shatila camp. I have also presented a typology of the strategies taken by individuals that characterize social interactions as well as I have briefly illustrated how tensions are avoided to develop into inter-group conflicts. We now have insights into behavioral strategies that are adopted to regulate social interactions and prevent conflict escalation. The questions that are raised now are *why* people adopt these strategies and *how* the combination of these strategies leads to the process of conflict minimization. The first part of the question is addressed in the next chapter, in which I analyze the emergence of a social order that regulates individual decision-making. The second part of the question is addressed in chapter 6, in which I analyze what mechanisms of the social order contribute to conflict minimization and how.

Chapter 5

No 'ad hoc' response

The emergence of a new social order in Shatila camp

In this chapter, I will use the concepts of social order as described in my analytical framework to analyze 'what it is that' regulates social behavior in Shatila camp. Empirically, social order is determined by the interplay between structural factors that shape the content of the social contract and the agency individuals hold to determine their compliance with the contract. I will begin by analyzing the structural factors by identifying the establishment of social norms and institutions that guide the behavioral strategies of individuals in the camp. I will follow by analyzing the agency individuals hold and its influence on their compliance to the social contract. I will argue that this agency results from the incentives individuals have for order and thereby to comply with the social contract. In addition, agency results from the space individuals have to give their own interpretation to the norms and rules.

5.1 Structural factors

While talking to the inhabitants of Shatila during the interviews, several statements were made on how people are supposed to behave to deal with the current situation in Shatila. As has been argued in chapter 2, an explanation for the regulation of behavior can be found in the emergence of institutions that contain sets of behavioral rules. I have also indicated that in cases where such rules are not created by powerholders, these rules emerge from social norms. As such, in order to understand the established institutions in Shatila camp, I first need to analyze the emergence of social norms. By analyzing the norms and rules that guide the behaviors on individuals in Shatila camp, I aim to answer the second sub-question: *How do structural factors determine the content of the social contract between communities in Shatila camp?*

5.1.1 Norms

Based on the statements of the participants on what is considered desirable behavior, I have identified four reoccurring norms. These norms seem to play a bigger role in setting the boundaries for the range of preferable behaviors individuals can draw upon when developing their behavioral strategies. These norms are the disapproval of racism, renouncing of (potential) conflict, obligation to humanitarianism, and the acceptation of and adaptation to the new situation. I do not, however, claim that this list is exhaustive and includes all newly established

behavioral norms in Shatila camp, as I only discuss those that share general agreement among the participants. Nor do I claim that all norms are equally perceived as important for all participants.

Proscriptive norms
As defined in chapter 2, proscriptive norms are norms that "discourage or proscribe certain actions" (Hechter and Horne 2009: 262). Many of the inhabitants I interviewed voiced similar opinions on what kinds of behaviors are objectionable inside the camp. Specifically, the most agreed on norms concerned 'the proscription of racist attitudes and behavior' and the 'renouncing of (potential) conflicts' inside the camp.

The norm that proscribes racist attitudes and behavior was expressed by the participants' shared belief that people should not be valued – and thus treated – based on their background and/or nationality, but rather on their individual behavior and manners. Socially, this disapproval of racism is echoed the notion that inter-group marriage is common[48], and the belief that distinctions between nationalities should be absent during the interactions of children.[49] In addition, proscribing racism entails that making distinctions in the rights of a person based on nationality is seen as improper and unacceptable. This disapproval of distinctions in rights is reflected in both the condemnation of differentiating in legal rights based on nationality, as in the commonly expressed disapproval of linking nationality to the access to – and allocation of – aid organizations. The latter can be illustrated by the following statement: 'Why should the UNRWA be unfair with the help of me and others? Why should they give them more of give me more? That is what pisses us off'.[50]

The significance of this norm is reflected in the notion that distinctions in aid and/or legal status does not create *social* boundaries, as the consequences of the distinctions are not ascribed to being the fault of the people. Rather, these boundaries are stated to be drawn by the aid organizations and legal institutions, rather than being instigated by the people themselves. Therefore, such boundaries are said to have no effect on the social relationships. This is not to say that social boundaries are non-existent, as I will argue in the next chapter. However, the social boundaries that are present in Shatila's society are not created by the aid organizations and legal procedures, but are rather designed and enacted through the behaviors of the inhabitants.

The second proscriptive norm that could be identified in my data is the common expression that conflict and fights are not accepted. Firstly, several participants have explicitly told me that they believe fighting is unacceptable and should not be part of social society in Shatila. Explanations for these beliefs varied. One woman explained to me that she believed

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[48] [I1P1]; [I2P2]; [I10P3]; [I14P13]; [I16P15]; [I21P20]; [I23P21P22]; [I24P23]; [I26P25]; [I34P32].
[49] When volunteering in the kindergartens of Beit Atfal Assumoud, I observed that all classes are mixed and all interact without making distinctions in nationality (Author's field notes 2017). This also holds for the classes in Ahlam Lahje2 [I2NE2]; [I6NE7] and Al-Najdeh [I8NE9].
[50] Author's third interview with participant 4, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila 3,5 years ago, but has been living inside Shatila camp during for several episodes of his life. Shatila camp, 6 April 2017. [I13P4]

that, despite the situation they are in: 'The new refugees were forced to come to Shatila, and therefore people are not supposed to fight each other'.[51] Another man who had recently arrived told me that fighting was unacceptable, because the refugees that came from Syria 'just came from war, and want to live in peace'.[52] Despite the difference in explanations, there was general consensus that fights and conflicts are not acceptable.

Moreover, the salience of this norm can be analyzed through stories of former fights in the camp. For example, a Syrian woman told me that when she was engaged in an individual dispute she immediately felt the urge to apologize afterwards and solve it, as conflict cannot be seen as a legitimate way to interact.[53] In a follow-up interview, the same woman replied to a hypothetical situation[54] in which I asked about her behavior in response to a hypothetical social fight, that she would interfere to solve the fight in cases where the person involved in the fight is either a Syrian or someone she knows: 'If the person is a Syrian, I would guide him not to fight. If it is someone from another nationality, I would not interfere because it is none of my business and [interfering] will not be appreciated. I would also interfere if it is a Palestinian-Syrian I know, but not if I don't know him'.[55] This statement assumes that: 1) her norm is that fights are not accepted, 2) that she feels responsible to guide others not to fight and 3) that this feeling of responsibility is limited to her national group and/or people that she knows. While I am not able to generalize this specific example to the whole society, nevertheless, it does provide a clear example of the presence of the norm that fights are considered unacceptable social behavior.

Prescriptive norms

Besides the two proscriptive norms, the third and the fourth norms were encouraging particular behavior. These prescriptive norms are the 'obligation to humanitarianism' and the 'acceptance of - and adaptation to - the new situation'.

The third norm of obligated humanitarianism entails perceiving others as human beings, who are all in need of help and thus stuck together in the same situation. I have determined the existence of this norm from reported feelings of humanitarianism and the actual humanitarian practices by both established and new refugees. These reported feelings of humanitarianism are shared among all participants. However, the actual social practices that result from this feeling vary. A significant amount of the Palestinian-Lebanese participants reported the feeling of being obliged to help due to the new refugees being in need, resulting in refugee-led initiatives such as donating materials and providing support and guidance. As discussed in chapter 1,

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[51] Author's interview with participant 26, a female Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who has been living in Shatila camp for 27 years. Shatila camp, 21 April 2017. [I27P26]

[52] Author's interview with participant 9, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila 1,5 years ago. Shatila camp, 28 March 2017. [I7P9]

[53] Author's interview with participant 25, a female Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila 6 years ago. Shatila camp, 21 April 2017. [I26P25]

[54] See chapter 3, page 32 for the presented hypothetical situation.

[55] Author's second interview with participant 25, a female Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila camp 6 years ago. Shatila camp, 24 April 2017. [I28P25]

similar findings were described by Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2016b) who researched such refugee-led initiatives in another Palestinian camp in Lebanon. The participants who are less involved in such initiatives mainly expressed that the obligation to humanitarianism leads them to empathize with the new refugees as well as tolerate their presence.[56]

The fourth and last norm is the acceptance of, and mutual adaptation to, the new situation. The acceptance part of the norm is expressed by both new and established refugees, as both acknowledge that all people living in Shatila are forced to live there and thus do not voluntarily choose to be in this situation and create difficulties for each other. A Palestinian-Lebanese man told me that: 'at the beginning you look differently, because it is a different nationality. But then you say, it's not in anybody's hands so it is just reality and we have to face it'.[57] This statement also expresses a belief that changing the situation is beyond their capability, so acceptance is the only possible way to deal with their new reality.

Despite the harsh living conditions, the need for mutual adaptation then logically results from this belief. For the new refugees, this includes not only adaptation to the living conditions and new social surroundings, but also to some experienced hardships in social life. As an example, a Syrian woman living in Shatila for 5 years claims that at times she still feels some tensions between her and the established refugees, but she has no other option than just getting used to it.[58] I asked another woman about the fact she felt discriminated by aid agencies, to which she replied: 'it doesn't matter how I feel about it, it wouldn't make a difference. I am used to it now'.[59] On the other hand, for the established refugees it evidently means that they have to accept the changes in life that resulted from the influx and have to adapt to its consequences.

Sub-section conclusion

Through analysis, I have identified four norms that determine the range for what is believed to be desirable behavior inside the camp and thereby influence the individual social decision-making. As has been argued, these norms can be institutionalized into more specific and concrete rules. These rules not only reflect behaviors perceived as desirable, but which behavior is perceived as acceptable, and thereby structure the social interactions in the camp. The identification of these rules helps me understand and explain how a social order in Shatila camp is established. These institutions will be addressed in the next section.

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[56] For example, some participants stated that they would want to help the refugees, but because of their own problems and socioeconomic situations were not able to.

[57] Author's interview with participant 17, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who has been living in Shatila camp for 67 years. Shatila camp, 11 April 2017. [I18P17]

[58] Author's interview with participant 15, a female Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila 5 years ago. Shatila camp, 10 April 2017. [I16P15]

[59] Author's interview with participant 25, a female Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila 6 years ago. Shatila camp, 21 April 2017. [I26P25]

5.1.2 Institutions

As discussed in chapter 2, institutions are sets of rules that regulate human interaction (North 1990: 3 in Arjona 2014: 1361). In my data, I have found a distinction between institutions that apply to established refugees, those that apply to new refugees and those applying to both. Again, I will not claim this list of institutions to be comprehensive, nor do I state that these are the only rules that were reported by my participants.[60] Nevertheless, based on patterns in the statements of my participants as well as explanations for their social behavior, I have been able to create a list of emerged institutions. Table 2 provides an overview of the emerged institutions that regulate the social behavior of the communities inside Shatila camp.

Table 2: Institutions in Shatila camp

Rules for established refugees	Rules for new refugees	Rules for both established and new refugees
1) Tolerate the presence of new refugees	1) Respectful treatment towards hosts 2) Adapt habits from Syria to new context	1) Judge people on their behavior, not on heritage 2) Avoid blaming 'the other' 3) Tensions and conflicts are to be seen as situational and as such may not be generalized 4) Avoid conflicts 5) Do not resolve to violence 6) Avoid talking about politics

Table 2: Institutions established for the refugee communities in Shatila camp. A distinction is made between the established and the new refugees. No distinction is made between Palestinian-Syrian refugees and Syrian-refugees as after analysis the same rules seem to apply to these groups.

Rules for established refugees

I have identified one rule that solely applies to the established refugees. This identification is based on statements from the established refugees themselves and from those by new refugees, as both voice the significance of this rule. It emanates from the norm of obligation to humanitarianism and implies that the established refugees should tolerate the presence of new refugees. A Palestinian-Lebanese woman told me that because the new refugees were forced to come to Shatila, the established refugees should tolerate their presence, even if this might lead to situations that were not perceived to be 'normal' before the influx. For example, she explains how she tolerates Syrian families sharing one room of a house she owns[61], by which they are able to share the rent because they do not have enough money to pay the full rent.[62] Moreover,

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[60] The rules identified here are the ones that structured the human interactions inside the camp and found general agreement among the participants.

[61] To prevent potential confusion resulting from this statement: a Palestinian person in Lebanon is not allowed to own property *outside* of the Palestinian camps. This explains why this woman owns a house inside Shatila and rents it to refugees from Syria.

[62] Author's interview with participant 26, a female Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who has been living in Shatila camp for 27 years. Shatila camp, 21 April 2017. [I27P26]

in an interview with a married couple that fled from Syria, they expressed that the established refugees should tolerate their presence. The Syrian woman clarifies by stating that: 'Lebanon has always been full of war and every time people wanted to escape they came to Syria and they were more than welcome' indicating that the Lebanese society in general, should do the same now it is the other way around.[63]

Rules for new refugees

The rules that apply only to the new refugees emerge from the norm of acceptation and adaptation. I have identified the existence of two rules: remain respectful for the hosts and adapt certain traditions to the new context. What is interesting here is that whereas the rules *only* apply to the new refugees, they are actually established by the new refugees themselves, and not explicitly *demanded* by the established refugees I spoke to. This notion supports my argument of the institutionalization of the above-described norms, rather than rules that are created and enforced by authority figures.

The first rule entails that new refugees should remain respectful to their hosts and can be illustrated by a Syrian woman who explains the importance of this rule through a saying her mother taught her: 'Guests should always be polite. We should always stay respectful so we show the good image of our country'[64] A Palestinian-Syrian man described what he does when getting into an argument with another person in Shatila: 'I try to be patient, absorb and try to understand his point of view. I will try to convince him with my point of view. If that doesn't work, I will avoid or ignore him'.[65] This means that new refugees should also remain respectful in possible unpleasant situations, such as disputes.

The second rule demands new refugees to adapt some habits from Syria to their new context. Although due to the geographical proximity of both countries and the predominant confession to Sunni Islam, very few differences are stated to exist in cultural and religious practices, some differences in lifestyle are reported. Due to a different contextual situation, some practices have to be adapted. Examples that were given by participants were the abandonment of traditions in the form of big celebrations (e.g. engagements, marriages)[66], certain habits such as taking evening walks[67], as well as certain rules parents have for raising their children.[68]

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[63] Author's interview with participant 21 and participant 22, a married couple. The husband is a Palestinian-Syrian refugee and the wife is a Syrian refugee, who both have arrived in Shatila camp 5 years ago. Shatila camp, 19 April 2017. [I23P21P22]

[64] Author's interview with participant 25, a female Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila camp 6 years ago. Shatila camp, 21 April 2017. [I26P25] The original and authentic form of the saying in Arabic "Ya gharib kon adeeb" (ياغريب كون اديب)

[65] Author's interview with participant 29, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee, who arrived in Shatila camp 4,5 years ago. Shatila camp, 26 April 2017. [I31P29]

[66] Author's interview with participant 25, a female Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila camp 6 years ago. Shatila camp, 21 April 2017. [I26P25]

[67] Author's interview with participant 20, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila camp 4 years ago. Shatila camp, 13 April 2017. [I21P20]

[68] Participant 29 told me that in Syria he forbade his son to grow his hair long, whereas he allows him to do it here in Shatila. He explained this by the sense that he could not pressure his son here too much, as the environment

Rules for both established and new refugees

As table one displays, the majority of the emerged rules account for both established and new refugees. These rules originate from the norms of proscribing racist attitudes and behavior and the renouncing of (potential) conflicts and are developed into more concrete rules that individuals should abide by.

The norm of rejecting racism is institutionalized into one explicit rule, namely that people should be judged on their individual manners and behavior, and not on their nationality. A Palestinian-Lebanese woman explained this to me by means of a saying: 'Not all your fingers are the same. It means that there is good and bad behavior in every nationality'[69], indicating that pre-existing expectations based on nationality are unacceptable. The application of this rule is illustrated by the shared notion that one's behavior towards a person is not affected by the nationality of that person.[70]

The rest of the rules (two until six) that apply to both the established and new refugees emerge from the norm of renouncing (potential) conflict. Based on the interviews I conducted, a clear pattern could be found in the existence of the rule to avoid blaming each other. With very few exceptions, the participants expressed the notion that people should not blame each other for the situation they are in. Rather, blame was attributed to external actors that were held responsible for the situation the participants are in. Examples of such external actors are (international) aid organizations, (international) politicians, the Lebanese government, and the Israeli government. The main reason for the existence of this rule the notion that the difference (and cut back) in aid is the outcome of aid organizations' policy and not the fault of people. This observation is summarized in the following statement by a Palestinian-Syrian man:

> The medical help or any kind of help, it makes problems, not between the groups, but between the people that are getting help and the organizations that are giving help. But it doesn't make problems between the groups of people. (…) This is because it makes us mad that we know that is not the fault of the people but it is the problem of the organizations.[71]

It is not only Palestinian-Lebanese and Palestinian-Syrian participants, but also Syrian participants who state that difference in aid allocation is not the fault of the people inside the camp. A Syrian refugee explains: 'They [Palestinians] are not the ones to blame, it's UNRWA and Najdeh, they help the Palestinians. But it's not the Palestinian's fault, it is the fault of the

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and surroundings of living in Shatila were pressuring enough already. Author's interview with participant 29, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee, who arrived in Shatila camp 4,5 years ago. Shatila camp, 26 April 2017. [I31P29]

[69] Author's interview with participant 26, a female Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who has been living in Shatila camp for 27 years. Shatila camp, 21 April 2017. [I27P26]

[70] [I14P13]; [I17P16]; [I18P17]; [I19P18]; [I21P20]; [I24P23]; [I27P26]; [I28P25]; [I29P27]; [I30P28]; [I31P29]

[71] Author's interview with participant 4, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila camp 3,5 years ago, but has been living inside Shatila camp during for several episodes of his life. Shatila camp, 4 April 2017. [I9P4]

organizations. (…) There is no need to have fights with them [Palestinians].'[72] As such, the resulting tensions over resource competition are mainly directed towards outside actors and not towards 'each other'. The existence of this rule is thus reflected in the behavioral strategy in which outside factors are blamed for the current situation, as has been illustrated here.

The third rule that could be identified demands that occurring tensions and conflicts are to be seen as situational and may not be generalized to other aspects of life. Based on the interviews I conducted, I found that reported tensions mostly occur in the work sphere and are stated not to be generalized to other aspects of social life. This observation is supported by the fact that participants have reported no violent disputes regarding tensions over job competition or other economic hardships. Moreover, both established- and new refugees repeatedly told me that appearing conflicts are seen as individual disputes, and may not be generalized to societal conflicts between groups, as is clarified in the following statement: 'Tensions exist only between individuals and are not generalizable to the whole society. Individuals [that make problems] will be arrested. The people who do not accept the new refugees lead to individual problems between them, but not inter-group problems'.[73] This rule thus also includes that (bad) individual behavior cannot be generalized to groups, a notion that was frequently expressed during the interviews, and refers back to the first rule that people should be valued based on their behavior rather than on their membership of a national group.

The fourth rule I have identified entails to actively avoid conflicts. In the cases where tensions occurred outside the work sphere, such tensions were reported to be avoided by certain conflict avoidance strategies of participants, as is exemplified in the response of a Palestinian-Syrian man when he was asked what he would do in a potential conflict situation:

> I try to be patient to the max of the limit. And I try to absorb, I try to absorb my tension and try to understand his point of view. I try to convince them with my point of view. But at the end of the day, if he or she still is stubborn with their [*sic*] mentality, I ignore them, I avoid them. [*Why do you decide to take this particular strategy?*] This is in my opinion one of the peaceful ways to avoid conflicts so that it doesn't get worse.[74]

The strategy to ignore tensions in order to avoid conflicts is one that is shared by a significant amount of the participants.[75] Other mentioned strategies were remaining patient[76] and trying to

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[72] Author's interview with participant 18, a female Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila camp 5 years ago. Shatila camp, 12 April 2017. [I19P18]

[73] Author's third interview with participant 4, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila 3,5 years ago, but has been living for several episodes of his life inside Shatila camp. Shatila camp, 6 April 2017. [I13P4]

[74] Author's interview with participant 29, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee, who arrived in Shatila camp 4,5 years ago. Shatila camp, 26 April 2017. [I31P29]

[75] [I6P7P8]; [I8P10]; [I16P15];, [I23P21P22]; [I28P25]; [I29P27]; [I31P29]; [I34P32]; [I35P33]

[76] [I17P16]; [I21P20]; [I31P29]; [I34P32]

create dialogue.[77] This collective agreement in the sense that conflict is to be avoided, has led me to identify the existence of this rule.

The fifth rule that was reoccurring in the participant's statements demands that when involved in disputes, to restrain from using violence. As an illustration, a Palestinian-Lebanese man told me that: 'Even if their [new refugees'] behavior is bad, I would only shout and not start to fight'.[78] In addition, a Palestinian-Syrian refugee stated that tensions about job competition are internalized and do not lead to violence because nobody is to blame for the situation.[79]

The sixth and last rule that applies to both established and new refugees is to avoid to talk about politics in the camp. This rule was expressed by some participants, as well as derived from the fact that when during the interviews political issues were addressed, some participants were hesitant to express themselves. For example, one man expressed: 'I do not want to call the associations by name, as they might feel as if I am attacking them. This has happened before'.[80] The actuality of this rule is also found in empirical journalistic research on Shatila camp, in which a shop owner claimed to have one rule: 'No one is allowed to talk politics in the shop.' (The New York Times 28 November 2014).

Explanation for patterns in behavior

The above-mentioned rules suggest that certain rules have been developed to deal with the current situation in Shatila camp, by which rather than an escalation of tensions, alternative collective coping mechanisms are adopted to deal with the existing tensions. I have provided evidence for the existence of behavioral rules and the collective behavior that results from these rules. The emergence of these rules thus provides a possible explanation for the patterns in my data which showed that there were three behavioral practices that were adopted by the vast majority of the participants, as was briefly mentioned at the end of chapter 4. Firstly, the rule of avoiding blaming 'the other' explains why participants collectively blame outside actors for the structural hardships they experience in daily life. Secondly, in cases where tensions occur, the rule that such tensions are not to be generalized to other domains of social life explain why participants repeatedly claimed to see conflicts as situational and incidental and thereby do not generalize them to inter-group conflicts. Lastly, when such incidental disputes occurred, participants collectively stated that they avoided conflict, a behavioral practice that can be explained by the rule to avoid conflict, to not discuss politics and to restrain from using violent means.

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[77] Author's interview with participant 26, a female Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who has been living in Shatila camp for 27 years. Shatila camp, 21 April 2017. [I27P26]

[78] Author's interview with participant 27, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born inside the camp and was a former fighter of the PLO organization. Shatila camp, 25 April 2017. [I29P27]

[79] Author's third interview with participant 4, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila 3,5 years ago, but has been living inside Shatila camp during for several episodes of his life. Shatila camp, 6 April 2017. [I13P4]

[80] Author's interview with participant 3, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born inside the camp. Shatila camp, 25 March 2017. This interview was conducted in English. [I3P3]

Section conclusion and answering the sub-question

By looking for patterns in my data on the creation of institutions, I have identified three sets of rules, where one only applies to new refugees, one to established refugees and one to both. In order to understand the emergence of these institutions, I first had to analyze the social norms where the rules stemmed from. As such, by analyzing the social norms and institutions and their effects on the behaviors of the participants, I aimed to answer my second sub-question: *How do structural factors determine the content of the social contract between communities in Shatila camp?* The answer to this question is that norms and rules influence the behavior of individuals, and thereby explain the behavioral practices in which individuals actively avoid tensions and conflicts, blame outside actors, and keep tensions and conflicts situational. In the next chapter, I will refer to these three specific practices as the 'shared behavioral practices'.

However, despite these 'shared behavioral practices', chapter 4 has shown the existence of a great variety of strategies individuals adopt while determining their everyday social interactions with others inside the camp. In other words, despite these 'shared behavioral practices' which tell an individual how to deal with tensions and potential conflicts, individuals have some room to determine their own strategy in everyday social life. As such, the question that needs to be answered now is why, despite the existence of these structural factors in the form of norms and institutions, such a variation can be seen. I aim to answer this question by looking at the *compliance* to the social contract, which is influenced by the agency individuals hold to initiate change.

5.2   Agency

The typology established in chapter 4 illustrates that there is great variety in the social interactions in Shatila camp. This means that the structural factors (i.e. norms and rules) do not lead to a situation in which all individuals act in identical ways, implying that there is at least some room for individuals to initiate change and determine their social behavior. This agency, I argue, is enhanced by the absence of the legal enforcement of the rules, as well as the absence of related punishments when not abiding by them. As mentioned in the introduction, there is (limited) enforcement of the law with regard to criminality, but a central authority monitoring everyday interactions is absent. The only 'punishment' of not abiding by the rules is the disapproval of fellow inhabitants. As such, abiding by the social contract, although desirable considering the existing norms, is not legally obligatory, allowing for individuals to decide whether or not they comply with the social contract and/or in what way. Variations in this compliance results in variations in behavioral practices.

In order to understand this variation, I will analyze the compliance with the social contract. This compliance, I will argue, results from the individual's agency. This agency is determined by two factors that are decided by the individual. The first factor is the personal incentives individuals have for order and thereby explain why they comply with the social contract. The second factor is the personal interpretation individuals give to the content of the social contract. This interpretation determines in which way individuals decide to comply with

the contract. By analyzing these two factors, I aim to answer my third sub-question: *How does the agency of individuals determine the compliance to the social contract between communities in Shatila camp?*

5.2.1 Incentives for order

Arjona (2014) argues that a social order is likely to develop in times of chaos due to the incentives actors have for order. These incentives for order explain why individuals comply with a social contract. Based on the current situation in Shatila, it is likely to infer that the incentive both sides have is the absence of widespread conflict and violence. However, as we have seen in the case of Kakuma camp in Kenya, the solo existence of the incentive of relative peace does not necessarily lead to processes of conflict minimization in similar situations. By analyzing the additional motives for social order, I aim to gain understanding of the individual's motivations to comply with the social contract. Based on my analysis, there are two incentives for social order shared by both the established and new refugees in Shatila camp, namely: a sense of solidarity and the perception of the temporality of the situation.

Solidarity

The first motive for order is the general sense of solidarity between the refugee communities, resulting in the groups having no incentive to resort to the use of violence. Although I cannot generalize this claim, based on the interviews I conducted I could see a clear pattern in this sense of solidarity resulting from several beliefs that were shared by the participants. This sense of solidarity that unites the refugee community can be a reason to accept each other's presence and abide by the social contract to orderly live in peaceful coexistence.

This sense of solidarity firstly seems to stem from humanitarian feelings and understanding. A Palestinian-Lebanese man explained to me that he feels obliged to help people in need because according to him everybody has to be considered as a human being. He states that the refugees from Syria were forced to flee and therefore understands they are seeking shelter in Shatila camp.[81] Another Palestinian-Lebanese man states that everybody in need is welcome and that the only problem is that the camp is now overpopulated.[82] On the other hand, several new refugees expressed the understanding of the hardships the influx created for the established refugees, and why there are limitations in the help they can or want to offer to the new refugees. This sense of humanitarianism and understanding of each other's situations were given explanations for the feeling of solidarity between the communities.

The above-mentioned sense of solidarity implies a reinforcement by the sense that all inhabitants face similar problems, both in the daily hardships they face by living in the camp as in sharing the status of being 'refugees'. The latter is expressed by a Syrian refugee, who stated:

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[81] Author's interview with participant 23, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born in Shatila camp. Shatila camp, 20 April 2017. [I24P23]

[82] Author's interview with participant 17, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who has been living in Shatila camp for 67 years. Shatila camp, 11 April 2017. [I18P17]

It's good that we have the same problems for the relationship. But for me... For example, until now I am still in a dream. I am not believing I am in a camp and not believing there is war. So of course, there is no tension between us. We have the same problems, that's why we have a good social life with each other.[83]

Whereas some participants expressed the opinion that the cause of the Palestinian and Syrian refugee communities was different because, for example, 'Syria is about who controls the politics, and in Palestine it is international'[84], most participants also commonly expressed the sense of sharing similar experiences of overlapping displacement: 'I put myself in their shoes because I had the same experience before'.[85]

Lastly, the feeling of solidarity was expressed to result from perceived similarities between the groups. Based on the interviews I conducted, these similarities seemed to be rooted in religious and/or cultural overlap. Religious overlap because the dominant confession is Sunni Islam and cultural overlap due to geographical proximity as well as from overlapping ancestries. These overlapping ancestries result from sharing being a 'Palestinian' identity between Palestinian-Lebanese and Palestinian-Syrian refugees, whereas being 'Syrian' is shared among Palestinian-Syrian and Syrian refugees. The sharing of ancestries was frequently expressed as leading to feelings of solidarity during the interviews.

Temporary situation

Another explanatory motive for order is the perception of living in Shatila as a temporary situation. The majority of both communities expressed the expectation of the departure of the new refugees to Syria after the ending of the civil war. A Palestinian-Lebanese inhabitant of the camp tells me he is experiencing growing tensions but simultaneously explains: 'Now, because it is a temporary situation, we might cope with it for a while'.[86] Without generalizing this point, this perception of the current situation being temporary seems to lead to an increase in resilience to deal with the hardships of the situation and reduces the incentives to resort to violence, and increase those to live in stability and peace.

To summarize, both the sense of solidarity and the perception of living in a temporary situation are incentives for order and stability and thereby enhance the resilience to cope with the current situation. These incentives explain why individuals at times behave in a way that is not necessarily beneficial for the individual. For example, tolerating the presence of new refugees is not beneficial for the Palestinian-Lebanese as this leads to resource competition. However, it is beneficial for the maintenance of social order.

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[83] Author's interview with participant 20, a male Palestinian-Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila camp 4 years ago. Shatila camp, 13 April 2017. [I21P20]

[84] Author's interview with participant 17, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who has been living in Shatila camp for 67 years. Shatila camp, 11 April 2017. [I18P17]

[85] Author's interview with participant 23, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born in Shatila camp. Shatila camp, 20 April 2017. [I24P23]

[86] Author's interview with participant 27, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born inside the camp and was a former fighter of the PLO organization. Shatila camp, 25 April 2017. [I29P27]

On the other hand, this also means that when an individual has fewer incentives, this individual has fewer motives to comply with the social contract. I am to illustrate this by addressing the behavior of one participant that was an unusual case (see footnote 44). This participant claimed to have fewer feelings of solidarity than other inhabitants of the camp. Moreover, he was the only interviewee who expressed generalized hatred for 'everything that is Syrian'[87], thereby not 'abiding' by the rule of judging people on their behavior rather than their heritage. In addition, this participant made statements as 'Syrians are not human beings', suggesting that the norms of humanitarian values and objection of racism are not guiding the participant's perceptions. However, the participant did *partly* comply with the social contract as he claimed to tolerate the Syrian refugees' presence, 'as long as they don't bother me'.[88] Moreover, he stated that he tolerated their presence during prayers in the local mosque as well as in the work sphere as his job entailed working with and for the Palestinian-Syrian and Syrian refugees too.[89] Although this example is an 'unusual case' within my sample, I choose to present it as it shows that when individuals have fewer incentives for order (in this case fewer feelings of solidarity) this can lead to a reduced level of compliance with the social contract. The concept of agency is an individual's capacity to decide to do something different. Therefore, I argue that an individual's agency to decide which incentives he/she has for order explains why and to what extent an individual decides to comply with the social contract.

5.2.2 Personal interpretation

Besides explaining why and to what extent individuals comply with the social contract, there can also be found variations in *how* individuals comply with it and in that way exercise their capacity to initiate change. In Shatila, this capacity plays out in the space individuals have to make their own interpretation of the content of the social contract, and thereby modify the prescribed behavior in the norms and institutions.

I aim to explore the individual agency of the inhabitants of Shatila by means of closer analysis of a systematically selected micro-case study in which I compare the individual behaviors of two analytically similar participant profiles: participant three and participant twenty-six.[90] The participants in this case study are members of the same refugee community, incorporate the same norms and emphasize the importance of similar institutions.[91] By

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[87] Author's interview with participant 31, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born inside the camp. Shatila camp, 27 April 2017. [I33P31]

[88] [I33P31]

[89] Author's interview with participant 33, a male Syrian refugee who arrived in Shatila camp 1,5 years ago. Shatila camp, 28 April 2017. [I35P33]

[90] Participant 3 is a Palestinian-Lebanese male, who is 45 years old and lives in Shatila since 1985. Participant 26 is Palestinian-Lebanese female, who is 47 years old and lives in Shatila since 1990.

[91] Participant 3 and participant 26 are both Palestinian-Lebanese refugees who explicitly express all identified norms in section 5.1.1 during their interviews. In addition, they both mention the importance of the rule for the established refugees to tolerate the new refugees, that tensions and conflicts are situational and may not be generalized as well as the avoidance of blaming the other. The only difference between the profiles is that where participant 26 explicitly expresses that fights and violence are not accepted, I cannot back the perspective of participant 3 on this rule up with tangible data. However, participant 3 was one of my key informants, with whom I have had extensive contact during the two months of my fieldwork, even 'outside' of my research. Based on

analyzing similarities and differences between the behavioral strategies, I aim to explore the effect of the individual interpretation of the prescribed rules in the social contract.

Within this micro-case study, a similarity can be found in the fact that both participants express to be socially active in helping the new refugees as result of the influx. However, they have a different interpretation to how they should help the new refugees, leading to different practices. As an example, the male in this case study states the following:

> I have always been socially active. I am active in sports and many different things. The only change is that when these people came and I felt the displacement that they felt and they were able to feel with each other, it made me even more socially active, it made me want to help more. (…) It gave me more motivation and incentive to be even more socially active in my community. And because I have a sports club, I am taking kids from the streets and let them play sports. That is my specialism.[92]

With a similar goal, the woman explains: 'I let Syrian kids play in my house and let them listen to the Quran. I let them play to take them off the streets'.[93] However, besides these kids, the woman states to have no contact with refugees from another nationality than Palestinian-Lebanese.

These two examples illustrate that although the goal of their behaviors is 'taking kids off the streets', nevertheless, the man aims to do so by letting kids play sports, whereas the woman beliefs this should be done by religious education. In other words, the goal is similar, whereas the agency of the individuals provides them decide for themselves how the goal should be achieved. This difference in strategies suggests that there is room to design and adopt individual behavioral strategies. This explains why, although the participants incorporate the same structural factors in the form of norms and rules, the woman is classified in type *two* of the typology of social interactions, as outside the Syrian kids who play at her house she states to have no contact with other refugees from a different nationality than hers, whereas the man who states to see all refugees in Shatila as potential people to interact with, is classified in type *three*. The concept of agency is known to determine an individual's capacity to decide to do something different. Therefore, I argue that individual's agency to give a personal interpretation to the norms and institutions that exist in Shatila camp determines *how* an individual decides to comply with the social contract.

Section conclusion and answering the sub-question

By analyzing what factors contribute to the agency individuals have to initiate changes in the behaviors proscribed in the social contract, I have answered my third sub-question: *How does*

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my personal evaluation, observational data and the combination of the for the participants' important norms and rules, I am certain participant 3 would reject conflicts and the use of violence in any situation.

[92] Author's second interview with participant 3, a male Palestinian-Lebanese refugee who was born inside the camp. Shatila camp, 05 April 2017. This interview was conducted in English. [I10P3]

[93] Author's interview with participant 26, a female Palestinian-Lebanese refugee, Shatila camp, 21 April 2017.

the agency of individuals determine the compliance to the social contract between communities in Shatila camp? This agency is determined firstly by the personal incentives individuals have for order, that explain *why* and to *what extent* individuals comply with the social contract. Secondly, individuals have the capacity to give their personal interpretation to the norms and institutions that exist in Shatila camp, which determines *how* individuals comply with the social contract.

Conclusion of the chapter

To summarize, in this chapter, I have identified both the influence of structural factors and agency on the behavior of individuals. By analyzing the emerged norms and established institutions, I have identified which structural factors determine the content of the social contract. In addition, by analyzing the incentives for order and the personal interpretation of individuals, I have identified how agency influences the compliance to the social contract and thereby explains the variation found in the behavioral practices. Doing so has enabled me to understand the patterns of social behavior that were found in the data. However, the remaining question is how the combination of these behavioral strategies contributes to minimization of conflict in Shatila camp. This question will be answered in the next, and final, chapter.

Chapter 6

Conflict minimization

Based on the conflict preconditions and theoretical premises, we would expect the outbreak of inter-group conflict between the Palestinian-Lebanese, Palestinian-Syrian and Syrian communities in Shatila camp. However, in chapter 4, I illustrated the absence of such inter-group violence. Moreover, in the previous chapter, I have used the concepts of social order to provide a theoretical explanation for the way social interactions in Shatila camp are regulated. Identifying regulating factors of individuals' behavior might help us understand what people do to minimize inter-group conflict, as it provides insights into why people behave the way they do and what prevents them from behaving in violent ways. However, it does not yet explain *why* conflict is minimized in this case and not in other cases such as the case of Kakuma camp. In order to explain this, the elements of the social order that contribute to conflict minimization need to be identified and understood. Therefore, in this last and most crucial part of my analysis, I draw upon a second analytical framework of causal mechanisms. This framework will help me to identify the individual components of the order that contribute to the minimization of conflict.

As discussed in the chapter two, Tilly and Tarrow state that the analysis of any complicated social processes requires three steps: "(1) description of the process, (2) decomposition of the process into its basic causes, and (3) reassembly of those causes into a more general account of how the process takes place" (2015: 28). These three steps will provide the structure of the remainder of this chapter. First, I will provide a description of the process of conflict minimization, after which I will break up the process by identifying the mechanisms within the social order and analyze their causal effects on the minimization of conflict. To conclude, I will synthesize the causal effects of all crucial mechanisms of the social order to provide a comprehensive explanation for the process of conflict minimization in Shatila camp.

6.1   Description of conflict minimization

The aim of this thesis is to understand is *why* inter-group conflict in Shatila camp is absent and *how* the establishment of a social order contributes to this process. Consequently, the process I aim to analyze is the process of conflict minimization. This process is a component of the establishment of social order, as, besides conflict minimization, the social order has also set

into motion other processes, such as refugee-led help initiatives. However, the focus of this thesis is conflict minimization.

An elaborate description of this process has been given in the previous chapters. In chapter four, I have provided empirical evidence for the absence of inter-group conflict and argued that individuals adopt different strategies in their social interactions to avoid conflict. I have established a typology of social interactions inside the camp consisting of (1) the exclusive focus on 'own life' and avoiding any kind of intensive interactions, (2) the focus on close social ties and avoiding intensive interactions outside these ties, and (3) intensive interactions are possible with all individuals. In chapter five, I have used the concepts of social order to provide an explanation for the typology of social interactions. In addition, the identification of established institutions has provided an explanation for the three shared behavioral practices that were identified in the data: blaming outside actors, the refusal of generalization of individual and incidental disputes to the larger community and active conflict avoidance.

Tilly and Tarrow argue that "no complex outcome ever results from the operation of a single causal mechanism" (ibid.: 33). Therefore, I claim that it is the combination of these behavioral strategies in both the typology and the shared strategies, which are the result of the establishment of a social order that leads to the process of conflict minimization in Shatila camp. However, before being able to grasp *how* exactly this combination leads to the process of conflict minimization, it is necessary to decompose this process into its constituent mechanisms. Analyzing the independent effects of these mechanisms on the process of conflict minimization will subsequently help to answer the fourth sub-question: *what are the mechanisms within the social order of Shatila camp and what are their individual effects on the process of conflict minimization*?

6.2   Decomposition of conflict minimization

In their book 'contentious politics', Tilly and Tarrow establish a list of robust mechanisms that seem to play a significant role in a variety of social realities (2015: 29). Some of these robust mechanisms can be identified to pertain to the process of conflict minimization in Shatila camp as will be explained below. In addition, I am proposing an additional mechanism essential for conflict minimization. I will start with an analysis of the causal effects of the mechanisms in the typology of social interactions (see page 43), after which I will evaluate those mechanisms in the shared practices and propose additional mechanisms.

6.2.1   Mechanisms in social interactions

The first type of the typology is the exclusive focus on the 'own life' and avoidance of any kind of intensive interactions. By adopting this behavioral strategy, a boundary between the 'self' and the 'other' is created. When going back to the definition of a social boundary, Wimmer states that the distinction between the 'self' and the 'other' is a categorical representation, but also determines the social action of the individuals creating this boundary (2008: 975). As such,

the creation of this boundary in this first type inhibits the occurrence of intensive social interactions between the two sides of the boundary.

This 'boundary formation' is one of the robust mechanisms that have been established by Tilly and Tarrow, which they define as a situation in which a boundary is drawn that creates an us-them distinction between (political) groups (2015: 36). In Shatila, the creation of this social boundary leads to limited, or even avoided interaction across this boundary. In a situation where *all* interaction is hindered, *conflicting* interaction is hindered too, logically leading to a decrease in the chance of conflicts to occur.

The second type of the typology of social interaction is the focus on close social ties and avoidance of intensive interactions outside these ties. Again, this strategy resembles Tilly and Tarrow's mechanism of boundary formation. The difference with the first type is that the in-group here has expanded from the 'self' to close social circles and/or networks as the boundary that is formed is located between the people an individual is familiar with and those he/she is not familiar with. As such, not *all* interaction is prevented, but interaction is limited to people who are familiar to the individual or their networks.

In this sense, the possibility of inter-group conflict is minimized in a similar way as in the first type: intensive contact outside the familiar social circles is avoided, whereby conflicting contact with individuals who are perceived to be located outside the boundary is avoided too. It is important to remark, however, that the focus on close social ties does not necessarily prevent conflict in itself, as conflicts within social circles have a probability to occur in all societies. Nevertheless, conflicts within close social ties will most likely be individual disputes over personal issues (e.g. incidental arguments within a family) and have therefore a minor probability of developing into inter-communal conflicts.

Moreover, the location of the boundary in the second type potentially leads to conflict minimization in an additional way. The exclusive focus on social networks intensifies the strength of these social networks. Although most people expressed to have close ties within their own national group, I have already indicated that in a number of cases, these social networks were stated to cross national group boundaries by incorporating one 'exceptional' connection with a person from a different national group. In these cases, positive personal inter-group relationships may be intensified, which according to several inter-group theorists leads to a reduction in stereotypes and conflicts (e.g. Pettigrew 2008; Hewstone and Swart 2011). This dynamic resembles another mechanism identified by Tilly and Tarrow, namely the mechanism of 'boundary deactivation', which is the decrease in the salience of the us-them distinction that separate actors (2015: 36). By crossing nationality boundaries within social networks, the boundary that separates the national groups loses salience in determining the possibility of social interactions. Although in this type this nationality boundary deactivation occurs on a small scale as it only involves close social ties, it does also on a small scale reduce the chance of conflict over these national boundaries.

This latter dynamic is reflected on a larger scale in the third type of social interactions, which is the possibility of having intensive interactions with all individuals in Shatila camp. In

contrast to the former two types in which a boundary is drawn that regulates who potential actors are to interact with, individuals within this type adopt the strategy in which no boundary regulates social interaction. As such, the mechanism of boundary deactivation occurs here not only in a private sphere such as in the case where close social ties cross national group boundaries. Rather, in this type, no boundaries are formed nor do the boundaries that separate national groups play a role in social interactions. The actual deactivation of the importance of group boundaries consequently reduces the possibility of conflict over these boundaries.

6.2.2   Mechanisms in shared behavioral practices

Besides the typology of social interaction, the patterns in my data have suggested that three social practices exist in all three types, and therefore are assumed to be shared. The first shared practice is outside blaming, by which blame is not ascribed to each other, but to outside actors and factors that are said to be responsible for the situation they are in. This practice displays the mechanism of boundary formation. Instead of blaming each other and creating a boundary leading to an in-group out-group division within the society, the participants create a boundary between Shatila's society and the outside actors and influences they hold responsible for the hardships they face. In other words, by having a 'common enemy', a boundary is created between Shatila's society and these outside 'powers'.

In this way, the preconditions that are claimed to be created by these powers do not lead to conflict *within* Shatila's society, but rather situationally unites the different national groups by being in-group versus the out-group of outside actors. Perceiving each other as in-group reduces the possibility of conflict over nationality as fault-lines for conflict as a result of the preconditions that are claimed to be caused by their common enemy.

The second shared behavioral practice is the avoidance of generalizations. This practice resembles the mechanism of boundary deactivation. As discussed in the previous chapters, the inhabitants I interviewed deploy a strategy of avoiding the generalization of incidental and individual conflicts to the national groups (e.g. 'individuals' have disputes, not 'Syrian individuals' have disputes). Thereby, nationality as a group boundary is deactivated during incidental conflicts by decreasing its salience. This decrease in salience reduces the possibility of the escalation of widespread inter-group conflict.

The last shared practice is the active avoidance of conflict. I argue that this practice is a significant mechanism because it has clear causal effects on the process of conflict minimization. The active avoidance of conflict in general, but also abstaining from the use of violence during conflicts evidently determines the level of conflict minimization in Shatila camp. Because this strategy is collectively and repeatedly used by Shatila's inhabitants, escalation of widespread violence is prevented. As such, I propose the new mechanism of 'conflict avoidance' as being of significance for the process of conflict minimization.

6.2.3 Additional mechanisms in the social order

Besides the typology of social interaction and behavioral practices, I claim there are two additional causal mechanisms that contribute to the process of conflict minimization, namely the collectively expressed sense of solidarity and the perception of the situation being temporary. The solidarity felt between the refugee communities resembles what Tilly and Tarrow call the mechanism of the 'attribution of similarity'. This mechanism entails "the attribution of similarity among people who did not know one another earlier or may have seen each other as strangers" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015: 126). This sense of solidarity is stated to be the result of ascribed similarities between the groups, as discussed in chapter 5, such as being stuck in the same situation, having similar experiences of displacement and having overlapping ancestries. This sense of solidarity and attributed similarity unites the individuals. Due to this unity, I argue that the solidarity felt between the refugee communities decreases the possibility of conflict, because it creates resilience as well as a deeper understanding of the situation, and thus reduces incentives to develop conflicting relationships *within* the united group.

Lastly, the perception of the situation being temporary also reflects the mechanism of boundary drawing. With having the perception of the new refugees being in Shatila on a temporary base, a boundary is drawn between the established refugees as 'hosts' and the new refugees from Syria as 'guests'. It is in this case not the location of boundary itself, but the meaning ascribed to the boundary that contributes to the minimization of conflict. There is a certain implied temporality in the host-guest distinction. This implied transitional content of the relationship influences how both 'sides' of the boundary perceive each other (i.e. either being 'hosts' or 'guests'). The temporal character enhances the ability of individuals to cope with the situation as they anticipate that 'things will get better in the future'. Thereby, it decreases incentives to develop conflicting relationships with 'the other side of the boundary' due to the very existence of this boundary as not being perceived as permanent.

Section conclusion and answering the sub-question

In this section, I have identified the independent components of the process of conflict minimization and analyzed the mechanisms' causal effects on this process, thereby answering the fourth sub-question: *what are the mechanisms within the social order of Shatila camp and what are their individual effects on the process of conflict minimization*? The individuals in type one and two of the typology of social interactions adopt the mechanism of boundary formation by creating a boundary that determines who to interact with. However, in type two, these interactions can extend national boundaries, thereby on a small-scale deactivating the salience of these national boundaries for social interaction. Lastly, the individuals in type three completely deactivate the salience of national boundaries, as all inhabitants are seen as potential actors to interact with.

Besides these individual strategies, several causal mechanisms were identified within the strategies that were shared by all participants. These mechanisms were boundary formation in which all inhabitants of Shatila are categorized as in-group when attributing blame, the

deactivation of the salience of nationality as a boundary during incidental conflicts, the avoidance of conflicts, the attribution of similarity between the refugee groups and the perception of the host-guest boundary as being non-permanent.

When analyzing and comparing the mechanisms in the typology of social interaction and those in the shared practices, the observation can be made that different boundaries are drawn, activated and deactivated. These different processes of boundary drawing happening at the same time seems contradicting and odd. However, exactly these situations of 'oddness' are what makes studying social phenomena interesting. How is it possible that in the first two types of the typology boundaries are created, whereas in the shared practices boundaries are claimed to be deactivated or seen as temporal? That similarity is attributed across these created boundaries and even new boundaries are created that put individuals who were previously separated by a social boundary within the same containing boundary? I aim to answer these questions in the following section, by taking this phenomenon to a higher level of analysis and by identifying an overarching mechanism that explains these ostensible contradictions.

6.3   Positionality and boundary transposition

The combination of boundary creation in some behavioral practices and the deactivation of those boundaries in others seems contradicting. However, when taking it to a higher level of analysis, an all-embracing dynamic can be identified. In both the practices within the typology of social interactions and the shared practices, the salience – or even the very existence – of social boundaries depend on the situation and context. This explains how and why individuals may adopt the strategy of boundary formation in their everyday social life, but at the same time might give salience to *different* boundaries when talking about conflicts, their experiences of being displaced or that what has led to them being in the situation. I argue that this phenomenon can be explained by an overarching mechanism of 'boundary transpositioning' in which the *position* and *salience* of the boundary depend on the positionality of the actor and/or group that is adopting the social boundary. First, I will elaborate on the overarching mechanism of 'boundary transpositioning', after which I will explain how this mechanism is the result of shifting positionalities.

6.3.1   Mechanism of boundary transpositioning

Academics have identified the alterations in social boundaries as a mechanism that leads to transformations in social interactions. Tilly calls this the 'relocation' of social boundaries, which is a mechanism that "alters the major boundaries that are organizing actions and interactions" (2004: 225). The effects of this mechanism can range from the extreme situation of erasing all boundaries to the more frequent scenario of the deactivation of one boundary and the activation of another (ibid.).

However, in Shatila camp, the new 'major boundary' is not necessarily the result of the activation of another existing boundary but can also entail drawing a new boundary. With a focus on ethnic boundaries, this latter dynamic is comparable to what Wimmer describes as

'boundary blurring' (2008: 989-990). Boundary blurring is the strategy individuals adopt while "aiming to overcome ethnicity as a principle of categorization and social organizations altogether. Other, non-ethnic principles are promoted in order to undermine the legitimacy of ethnic, national or racial boundaries" (ibid.: 989).

By combining both Tilly's mechanism on boundary relocation and Wimmer's boundary blurring, I propose a new mechanism called *boundary transpositioning*. This mechanism entails the transpositioning of the significance of boundaries from an existing to another existing or 'newly' created boundary and thereby decreasing or completely erasing the significance of the former boundary. In the next section, I argue that this transpositioning of the significance of boundaries in Shatila camp depends on the positionality of the actors.

6.3.2 Positionality and boundary drawing

In order to support my argument that the transpositioning of social boundaries in Shatila camp is the result of the shifting of the positions by the ones drawing the boundary, I build upon the concept of 'positionality'. This concept implies that one's position is *always* relational, as it is "determined by where one stands in relation to 'the other'" (Merriam et al. 2001: 412). Important is that these positions can shift, as "the loci along which we are aligned with or set apart from […] are multiple and in flux" (Narayan 1993: 671-672). Hence, positionality means that aspects of identities are indicators of *relational states*, rather than fixed entities.

Anthias builds upon this notion of positionality by providing an integrated framework to analyze identity formation and the sense of belonging (2008). She establishes the concept of 'translocational positionality' to critically account for contemporary dynamics of diaspora, hybridity and cosmopolitanism and their influence on identity formation. Anthias argues that while studying social phenomena, we should move away from the idea of fixed attributes of a group (e.g. gender, ethnicity, class) but rather see them as fluent, shifting and therefore possibly contradictory, as they are dependent on context, meaning and time. She theorizes 'positionality' as the combination of "a reference to social position (as a set of effectivities: as <u>outcome)</u> and a social positioning (as a set of practices, actions and meanings: as <u>process)</u>" (ibid.: 15, *emphasis in original*). By linking the concept of positionality to the concept of 'location', she aims to account for the importance of the situational context and thereby recognizes the existence of possible variability in dynamics resulting in more complex, and at times contradictory, positionalities.[94]

What is clear in the context of Shatila camp, is that boundaries drawn in the context of social interactions are different than those that determine the us-them distinction in, for example, processes of blaming. In explaining this situational transpositioning of social

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[94] By definition, 'translocational positionality' is the positionality of actors that is "structured by the interplay of different locations relating to gender, ethnicity, race and class (amongst others), and their at times *contradictory effects.*" (Anthias 2008: 15, *emphasis in original*).

boundaries in Shatila camp, I draw upon the notion of (translocational) positionality as established by Anthias (2008).

When drawing boundaries in everyday social life, as is what is happening in the typology of social interactions, individuals position themselves in relation to other social agents who are (relatively) free to determine their behavioral strategy. However, in a different context and situation, this relational position changes. In the context of blaming, for example, the relational position is no longer that of being a social agent who is determining who is, or is not, a potential actor to interact with. Rather, in the context of blaming, the position is that of being a victim, as it is relational to those who are seen as perpetrators as well as to those who are seen as fellow victims. This means that the two individuals who were previously separated by a social boundary in the context of everyday social interactions are now embraced by another and more important boundary of 'victimhood' in the context of blaming.

A similar process of shifting positionality can be detected when incidental conflicts inside the camp occur. In these situations, people position themselves and others as being either insiders or outsiders of the conflict situation, thereby drawing boundaries that have effects on who is considered to be involved in, and thereby responsible for, the conflict and who is not.

Moreover, shifting positionality takes place when participants are describing a sense of solidarity. In this situation, individuals do not position or identify themselves as victims, insiders or outsiders of a conflict situation, but rather as refugees (or Arabs, from the Levantine, etc.). Again, this positions the individual *separated* by a social boundary in the context of everyday social life *within* the same boundary in a situation where meaning is ascribed as a result of feelings of solidarity.

Lastly, when discussing the mechanism of boundary drawing with regard to the temporal boundary of hosts/guests, the conception of time emerges. As Anthias has identified, time plays an important role in determining one's position too (2008: 5). 'Time', in this case, draws a different boundary than is drawn in other situational contexts, as here it makes a distinction between hosts-guests rather than potential/non-potential interaction partners, victims/perpetrators, refugees/non-refugees, and so on.

Section conclusion

This shifting of positionality over different contextual situations explains how different boundaries can exist at the same time, but how the positionality in relationship to 'the other' determines which boundary is significant and therefore perceived as meaningful. I thus propose that the mechanism of transpositioning social boundaries depends on the situational context and the meaning ascribed to the context. In line with the ontological stance of the concept, I simultaneously argue that in order to understand the process of conflict minimization in Shatila camp, we should divert our focus from 'fixed' group boundaries that lead to rigid group entities between which violent conflict can occur, to fluent boundaries that vary between different situations. Due to the positionality determining the situational salience of boundaries, fixed and crystallized boundaries that are persistent over *all* situational contexts are absent in Shatila

camp. It is exactly this absence of fixed group entities that prevail over all other situational boundaries, what explains the minimization of inter-group conflict in Shatila camp.

6.4 Regeneration of causal effects

Thus far, I have given a description of the process of conflict minimization, identified the mechanisms that played a significant role in this process and identified their individual effects on the process of conflict minimization. The third step in analyzing social phenomena, as established by Tilly and Tarrow, is the "reassembly of those causes into a more general account of how the process takes place" (2005: 28). This reassembly of those causes and their connections to each other in contributing to conflict minimization helps me to answer my last sub-question: *How does the combination of the mechanisms within the social order lead to conflict minimization?* Answering this last sub-question allows me to answer my research question.

I aim to answer my research question by arguing that single mechanisms are not sufficient to result in the level of conflict minimization occurring in the camp, but that it is the unique combination of the mechanisms at play in the social context of Shatila camp that allows the process of conflict minimization to happen.

Solely 'conflict avoidance' is not enough to prevent the outbreak of conflict, as it would not be a 'sustainable' solution to deal with presenting tensions. Rather, I argue that the additional mechanisms of boundary drawing, and more specifically the overarching mechanism of boundary transpositioning that results from shifts in the actor's positionality, together with the mechanism of attributing similarity, lead to sustainable conflict avoidance. They do so by decreasing the salience of nationality as group boundaries, as they situationally increase the salience of other boundaries that overrule such nationality boundaries. The resulting absence of crystallized (nationality) group boundaries ensures that incidental avoidance of conflict is enough to minimize the outbreak of widespread conflict.

Consequently, I argue that if one of the three components of this process would be absent, the process of conflict avoidance would be different too. If there was no attribution of similarity (and sense of temporality), there would have been fewer incentives for the establishment of a social order. In cases of an absence of incentives, conflict could have potentially occurred before an order had been established. If the mechanism of boundary transpositioning would have been absent, the conflict preconditions would in all likelihood have led to the crystallization of boundaries over social fault-lines in the form of distinctions in nationality, as was expected based on theoretical premises. Lastly, had the mechanism of conflict avoidance been absent, tensions would potentially accumulate and an increase in the number of conflicting disputes could be noticed. It is thus exactly the combination of conflict avoidance, boundary transpositioning and attribution of similarity that *together* result in the process of conflict minimization in Shatila camp.

Conclusion

The aim of this study has been to understand why no eruption of conflict has occurred in Shatila camp, despite the presence of conflict preconditions identified in academic literature. I have done so by researching how a social order was established in the camp, and what mechanisms of this social order have helped to minimize conflict in Shatila.

Chapter 4 looked at the presence of conflict preconditions, which showed that camp inhabitants tend to perceive a threat to their security as well as a competition over economic and environmental resources. Moreover, all three national groups that have been researched exhibit a strong sense of inter-group inequality. However, despite these conditions, chapter 4 has also shown that no inter-group conflict is present, but rather that certain patterns in behavioral strategies could be identified that seemed to help in minimizing conflict. The data has shown a variety in the strategies participants adopt to regulate their social interactions. This variety has been translated in a typology of social interactions consisting of three times: focus on the self and avoiding any social interactions, focus on interactions within close social ties, and potential interactions with all individuals in Shatila camp. Besides these strategies by which individuals determine their social interactions, I have also identified three behavioral practices shared by the vast majority of the participants: blaming outside actors, the refusal of generalizing tensions or conflicts, and the active avoidance of conflicts.

By analyzing these behavioral practices of the participants through the lens of social order, chapter 5 has allowed for a focused discussion on how structural factors and agency influence the individuals' social decision-making. It was illustrated that despite the absence of a clear authority to monitor social interactions, certain institutions were established that regulate the social interactions in the camp. The specific rules these institutions are composed of emerged from collective social norms and together determine the rules of conduct by telling the individuals 'how to do social life'. The agency of individuals influences how they decide to comply with these rules of conduct and is determined by the personal incentives individuals have for order and their interpretation of the content of the social contract. As such, the interaction between structure and agency influences individual social decision making and provides a theoretical explanation for the variations in the typology of social strategies as well as for the shared behavioral strategies.

In the last chapter, I explored what elements of the social order lead to the minimization of conflict. Based on the list of robust causal mechanisms (Tilly and Tarrow 2015) and social boundary mechanisms (Tilly 2004), I have been able to identify the presence of some of these robust mechanisms in Shatila camp. These mechanisms have proven to play a role in a variety of social phenomena (Tilly and Tarrow 2015: 29) and are crucial for the minimization of

conflict in Shatila camp by drawing different social boundaries and thereby structure the social interactions. These robust mechanisms, however, did not seem to provide a comprehensive understanding of conflict minimization. Rather, an additional mechanism of 'conflict avoidance' seemed to play a crucial role, as inhabitants collectively avoid (potential) conflict situations.

A contradiction could be noticed after the identification of the mechanisms, as various - and at times contradictory - dynamics of boundary drawing were taking place at the same time, all affecting the social interactions in the camp. Where in some situations people were separated by a boundary, they were placed within the same boundary in others. This contradiction was explained by the notion of positionality. This positionality causes the drawing of boundaries to be depended on the contextual situation of individuals. Based on this analysis, I have identified an overarching mechanism of boundary transpositioning. This mechanism explains why different boundaries are drawn at the same time, because the salience of a social boundary – and thereby its influence on social interactions – is determined by the position actors take towards each other.

As such, the research question is answered by arguing that this transpositioning of social boundaries helps to minimize conflict between the three refugee communities in Shatila camp, as the different situations lead to different social boundaries separating these groups. It is the very absence of clear group boundaries that permanently separate certain groups within the society of Shatila camp that prevents the outbreak of conflict. I am hereby not claiming that an outbreak of conflict in Shatila is impossible. Rather, I have argued that an outbreak of conflict is prevented as widespread conflict cannot break out between groups that situationally shift between being in-group and out-group and are therefore not clearly and permanently separated from each other by crystallized group boundaries.

These findings and analyses have a threefold contribution to the current academic knowledge. Firstly, it implies that certain academic premises in their current formulation, based on conflict theory and case studies, do not apply to all cases. As argued, an explanation for absence of conflict in Shatila can be found in the absence of permanent group boundaries. Therefore, I state that whether the preconditions lead to the eruption of violence or not, is determined by the presence of clear and permanent social group boundaries, in which the categorical perception of an 'us' and 'them' distinction correspond to "ways of acting in the world" (Wimmer 2008: 975). As such, violence can only erupt between 'ethnic' or 'national' groups, when these exact boundaries also determine ways of connecting and distancing (ibid.)

Secondly, whereas overlapping displacement is an increasingly growing phenomenon, little academic attention is paid to the case where the host community is a refugee community itself (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016). A recent contribution to this thin body of academic knowledge is an analysis of the initial responses to a refugee-influx in Beddawi camp in Northern Lebanon. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh has illustrated that an initial sense of solidarity over overlapping experiences of displacement has led to refugee-led help initiatives, however that these initiatives were unsustainable due to the growing hardships for the established refugees and thereby set a

threshold for initial hospitality. However, the research by Fiddian-Qasmiyeh does not go into what happens after this threshold is reached. This research fills this knowledge gap by illustrating that the experienced solidarity that was found by Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, together with the belief of the temporality of the situation, are incentives for individuals to establish a social order that regulates the social interactions and prevents escalation in to chaos and conflict.

Lastly, the empathy-driven altruism theory that is established by Hartman and Morse (2015) was insufficient in providing an explanation for the absence of conflict in Shatila camp. As explained in chapter 1, this is due to foundational issues as the theory fails to account for all preconditions and only 'suggests', but does not provide evidence for, empathy resulting from overlapping displacement. By explaining the establishment of a social order and identifying the causal mechanisms and their effects on conflict minimization, I have provided an alternative and more inclusive explanation to the absence of conflict in Shatila camp, despite the presence of all identified preconditions.

Recommendations for further research

Within this research, I have been able to identify several causal mechanisms and their effects on the process of conflict minimization. Some of these mechanisms have proven to be robust mechanisms, as they have seemed to play a role over a variety of social phenomena (Tilly and Tarrow 2015: 29). However, in addition to these *robust* mechanisms, I have identified other mechanisms that seemed to play a role in the process of conflict minimization in Shatila camp, namely the mechanisms of 'conflict avoidance' and 'boundary transpositioning'.

However, the identification of these new mechanisms in only *one* social phenomenon is insufficient in proving the robustness of these mechanisms for the process of conflict minimization. As such, the explanation for the minimization of conflict in Shatila camp as provided in this research, cannot yet be considered as a general explanation for conflict minimization in other cases. In order to be able to prove the robustness of the two newly identified mechanisms, further research on conflict minimization should be conducted, in which researchers should look for patterns in the data that suggest that these mechanisms play a role in conflict minimization in different contexts, and thereby providing evidence for the robustness of these mechanisms. Only then, the explanation for conflict minimization as developed in this thesis will have explanatory value in processes of conflict minimization in other contexts too.

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Appendices

Appendix I: Overview and demographics of participants

Inhabitants

Interview code	Date	Interview	Participant	Gender	Nationality	Connection	Remarks
I1P1	23-03-2017	1	1	Female	PRL	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I2P2	23-03-2017	2	2	Female	PRL	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I3P3	25-03-2017	3	3	Male	PRL	Personal network	Interview in English
I4P4	27-03-2017	4	4	Male	PRS	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I5P5P6	27-03-2017	5	5, 6	Male, Female	PRS, PRS	Beit Atfal Assumoud	Married couple
I6P7P8	28-03-2017	6	7, 8	Female, Female	PRS, PRS	Beit Atfal Assumoud	Two friends
I7P9	28-03-2017	7	9	Male	PRS	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I8P10	04-04-2017	8	10	Female	PRS	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I9P4	04-04-2017	9	4	Male	PRS	Beit Atfal Assumoud	First follow-up interview
I10P3	05-04-2017	10	3	Male	PRL	Personal network	First follow-up interview, interview in English
I11P11	06-04-2017	11	11	Male	PRL	Personal network	Interview in English
I12P12	06-04-2017	12	12	Female	Syrian	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I13P4	06-04-2017	13	4	Male	PRS	Beit Atfal Assumoud	Second follow-up interview
I14P13	07-04-2017	14	13	Female	Syrian	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I15P14	07-04-2017	15	14	Male	Syrian	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I16P15	10-04-2017	16	15	Female	Syrian	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I17P16	11-04-2017	17	16	Male	Syrian	Beit Atfal Assumoud	

I18P17	11-04-2017	18	17	Male	PRL	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I19P18	12-04-2017	19	18	Female	Syrian	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I20P19	12-04-2017	20	19	Male	Syrian	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I21P20	13-04-2017	21	20	Male	PRS	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I22P21	13-04-2017	22	21	Male	PRS	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I23P21P22	19-04-2017	23	21, 22	Male, Female	PRS, Syrian	Beit Atfal Assumoud	First follow-up interview in which participant 21 brought his wife (participant 22)
I24P23	20-04-2017	24	23	Male	PRL	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I25P24	20-04-2017	25	24	Male	PRL	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I26P25	21-04-2017	26	25	Female	Syrian	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I27P26	21-04-2017	27	26	Female	PRL	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I28P25	24-04-2017	28	25	Female	Syrian	Beit Atfal Assumoud	First follow-up interview
I29P27	25-04-2017	29	27	Male	PRL	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I30P28	25-04-2017	30	28	Female	PRL	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I31P29	26-04-2017	31	29	Male	PRS	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I32P30	27-04-2017	32	30	Female	PRS	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I33P31	27-04-2017	33	31	Male	PRL	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I34P32	28-04-2017	34	32	Female	PRL	Beit Atfal Assumoud	
I35P33	28-04-2017	35	33	Male	Syrian	Beit Atfal Assumoud	

(International) NGO employees

Interview code	Date	Interview	Participant	Gender	Organization	Remarks
I1NE1	11-03-2017	1	Anne Colquhoun	Female	UNRWA	Interview in English
I2NE2	13-03-2017	2	Anonymous	Male	Ahlam Lahje2	
I3NE3	17-03-2017	3	Prue Coakley	Female	MSF	Interview in English
I4NE4	04-04-2017	4	Firas Abo Aloul	Male	UNRWA	Interview in English
I5NE5NE6	07-040217	5	Anonymous, Anonymous	Female, Female	UNRWA	
I6NE7	19-04-2017	6	Othman Afiffi	Male	Ahlam Lahje2	Interview in English
I7NE8	27-04-2017	7	Mohammadali Al Genedi	Male	UNHCR	Volunteer at UNHCR

| I8NE9 | 28-04-2017 | 8 | Anonymous | Female | El Najdeh | Interview in English |

Government representatives

Interview code	Date	Interview	Participant	Gender	Organization	Remarks
I1GR1	12-04-2017	1	Ziad El Sayegh	Male	Lebanese government	Senior Advisor for the Ministry of Displaced, interview in English

Appendix II: Images

Image 1: Author's picture of an alley in Shatila camp, showing the electric wires and proximity of the houses inside the camp.