

THE RECLAIMING OF SPACE IN KINGSTON, JAMAICA

Struggle for Control in Gang-Dominated Garrison Communities During the Post-Dudus Period 2010-2017



(Taken in August Town on 27 March 2017)

Esmé Nikken

5904420

Utrecht University

3 August 2017

A Thesis submitted to
the Board of Examiners
in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of
Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights

Supervisor: Lauren Gould

Date of Submission: 3 August 2017

Programme Trajectory Followed: Research Project, 30 ECTS

Word Count: 26,043

Acknowledgements

This thesis is a product of extensive literature and field research and built on a collaboration with many wonderful people I had the privilege to meet during my time in Jamaica. Without them I would not have been able to conduct my first field research and I am grateful for their assistance, guidance and their life experiences that they were kind enough to share with me throughout this journey.

First of all, I would like to thank the University of the West Indies for being immensely helpful in providing me a place to stay during my research. I would also like to thank Damian and Milton from the Peace Management Initiative for taking me on community visits in the garrison communities and sharing their stories with me. Thank you to all the members of the PMI who took the time to talk to me and to explain their daily struggles and worries when working in the garrison communities, but more importantly for showing me their pride in the work they are doing every single day. I would also like to thank the community residents of August Town for making me feel welcome and especially Kenneth Wilson for being my gatekeeper and guide in the community. I would like to thank Lauren Gould, my supervisor from the University of Utrecht, for guiding me through this process. La-Mar Griffiths thank you for being my guide in Kingston, I will never forget our trip to the Blue Mountains. Lastly, thank you to my friends and family, who were there every step of the way.

Summary

After the latest elections in February 2016, the newly elected Prime Minister of Jamaica, Andrew Holness, set the goal to eradicate crime in 2017 and urged citizens to reject the 'culture of dons'.¹ Dons are non-state criminal actors who have taken over the role of the formal state in terms of the provision of social goods and services and, due to shifting networks of power, challenge the authority, legitimacy and control of the Jamaican government within garrison communities. These communities are characterized by socio-economic marginalization and strong party-political affiliations. Drawing on qualitative field research conducted in Kingston in March and April 2017, I analyze through which state practices and governing strategies the Jamaican government is trying to reclaim authority, legitimacy and control in gang-dominated garrison communities following the Tivoli-Incursion in 2010. This research is placed within the analytical frame of governmentality to address the need for empirical research on state practices and to research the spatialization of the state and its key components of verticality and encompassment (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 983).

The emergence of dons as alternative authority structures that act as constraints to the reclaiming of space is placed in the historical and political context of party politics and neoliberal developments. These non-state criminal actors operate within a network of authority in the garrison communities and challenge the authority of the state in terms of territorial control and effective practices of vertical encompassment, such as repression, coercion and surveillance. Another non-state actor that operates within this network of authority is the Peace Management Initiative, a NGO, that operates as a 'buffer' between the Jamaican government and the communities in the same network of authority and engage in practices of community visits, mediation, walkthroughs and conflict resolution. The Ministry of National Security and the Jamaican Constabulary Force, that acts as the executive branch of the MNS, have adopted strategies that were initially focused on predatory and suppression tactics. However, after the Tivoli-Incursion in 2010, the approach shifted towards a holistic and need-based approach and saw a change in policing tactics towards community-based, or 'soft-style' policing. These shifts in state practices and governing strategies have been reflected in the case study of August Town, in addition to the practices of vertical encompassment of divers non-state actors through which this community was able to achieve a 'zero-murder rate' in 2016.

¹ <http://jis.gov.jm/prime-minister-urges-citizens-reject-culture-dons/>

Table of Contents

Introduction	Page Number:
i. Introduction_____	7
ii. Academic and Social Relevance_____	8
iii. Research Question and Sub-Questions_____	9
iv. Methodology_____	10
a. Operationalization and Limitations_____	11
b. Textual Analysis_____	12
c. Interviews_____	12
d. Non-Participant Observation and Spatial Analysis_____	13
v. Objectives_____	14
vi. Outline_____	14
Chapter 1 – Theoretical Framework: Governmentality	16
1.1 Introduction_____	16
1.2 Foucault and Power_____	17
1.2.1 Governmentality_____	18
1.2.2 Spatialization of the State_____	19
1.2.3 Neoliberal Governmentality_____	20
1.3 Governance ‘from Below’_____	22
1.3.1 The Emergence of Non-State Governing Actors_____	23
1.3.2 Non-State Criminal Actors_____	24
1.4 Academic Debate_____	25
1.5 Relevance_____	26
Chapter 2 – The Government of Jamaica: A State’s Perspective	27
2.1 Introduction_____	27
2.2 Post-Independence and the Emergence of Dons_____	27
2.2.1 Party Politics and Vertical Encompassment_____	28
2.2.2 Neoliberalism and the Implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes_____	31
2.3 Dons as Non-State Governing Actors_____	33

Chapter 3 – Networks and Authority: Inside the Garrisons	35
3.1 Introduction_____	35
3.2 Networks in the Garrisons _____	35
3.2.1 Non-State Criminal Actors_____	36
3.2.2 The Peace Management Initiative_____	38
3.3 Spatial and Geographical lay-out_____	41
3.3.1 Access and Entry_____	42
3.3.2 Symbolic and Informal Boundaries_____	42
 Chapter 4 – State Practices and Governing Strategies	 45
4.1 Introduction_____	45
4.2 Tivoli-Incursion 2010 and the Fragmentation of Power_____	45
4.3 State Practices_____	47
4.3.1 National Security Policy_____	49
4.3.2 Vision 2030 and NCPCSS_____	50
4.4 State intervention: The Jamaican Constabulary Force_____	51
4.5 From ‘Hard-Style’ to ‘Soft-Style’ Policing Strategies_____	52
 Chapter 5 – A Case Study Analysis: The Success of August Town	 55
5.1 Introduction_____	55
5.2 August Town: A Brief History_____	55
5.3 The Peace Agreement_____	57
5.4 Collaborative Effort in Crime Reduction_____	59
5.5 NCPCSS and Community-Building_____	60
 Chapter 6 – Conclusion	 63
6.1 Introduction_____	63
6.2 The Reclaiming of Space_____	63
6.3 Recommendations_____	66
 Appendix	 68

Introduction

i. Introduction

When the Tivoli-incursion in May 2010 commenced with the sole purpose of arresting the ‘don of all dons’, it revealed the existence of a ‘shadow state’. Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke had taken over the role of the formal state within the garrison community of Tivoli Gardens where he had set up a governing structure including an informal justice and security system to provide for his constituents (Lewis 2012: 49, Blake 2013). After learning about the phenomenon of ‘donmanship’ in Kingston, Jamaica and the presence of a ‘shadow state’, I wondered how it is possible for non-state criminal actors to create a state within a state that contests the authority and legitimacy of the formal state.

I asked myself the question of how and why this phenomenon emerged? Why is a government, that should have the ultimate authority over its population, not able to prevent non-state criminal actors such as organized crime groups or street gangs from taking over control in specific areas? Or why is a government not able to take back control? These questions informed my qualitative research about the specific case study of ‘dons’ in Kingston, where non-state criminal actors have essentially taken over the role of the Jamaican government in terms of the provision of social goods and services within low-income communities in Kingston, and therefore challenge the authority and legitimacy of the Jamaican government. In response, the newly elected Prime Minister Andrew Holness has claimed that ‘the only protector of the community must be the Government of Jamaica, the police force, and Jesus Christ, the Almighty Saviour’ and thus urges its citizens to ‘reject the culture of the dons’.²

I will place my research within this empirical context to discover through which governing practices, policies and techniques the Jamaican government is trying to regain control in these low-income and marginalized communities, known as garrison communities. These communities have strong political affiliations with one of the two major parties in Jamaica, the Jamaican Labour Party and the People’s National Party. To analyze this phenomenon, it is important to understand the context of the Tivoli-incursion, where a power vacuum was created by the removal and extradition of Dudus Coke as the central leader of Tivoli Gardens. The removal of the ‘don of all dons’ resulted in a fragmentation of power throughout garrison communities in Kingston and evoked certain policy responses and policing strategies to better handle organized crime and street gangs operating within these low-income communities (Lewis 2012, Harriot & Katz 2015)

² <http://jis.gov.jm/prime-minister-urges-citizens-reject-culture-dons/>

The empirical complication that emerges is that many Jamaicans who are living in the garrison communities depend on these alternative authority structures provided by dons or community leaders. For this research, the term 'don' is 'commonly used to refer to people who have authority over sections of low-income communities in Kingston and other urban areas, and who are generally involved in criminal activities such as extortion and drug trafficking' (Jaffe 2015: 80). More specifically, these community residents rely on community leaders, or dons, for the provision of security, law and order and social goods and services, either out of fear or necessity, as the state is in some instances not able to provide these services, due to limited access and control in these areas that stems from the party-political history in the 1960's and '70's and neoliberal developments in the 1980's. Thus, within the context of inequality, poverty and violence, how can the state remove the culture of dons without compromising its authority and legitimacy and, more importantly, the safety of community residents in gang-dominated garrison communities in Kingston.

To understand through what specific set of practices and techniques the Jamaican government attempts to regain authority, legitimacy and control within gang-controlled garrison communities, I will place my research within the analytical frame of governmentality to understand these shifts in power from the formal state towards non-state actors. Moreover, this analytical frame allows me to analyze the contestation of authority and legitimacy of the Jamaican government and how the state is trying to spatialize itself as an entity that is above and around its citizens. Therefore, this research will focus on how the government has been trying to reclaim its authority and legitimacy within low-income communities predominantly controlled by a diverse network of gangs, and how these non-state criminal actors are acting as constraints to the reclaiming of space and control by the Jamaican government. Within this research, I have focused predominantly on crime prevention and community safety practices of the Ministry of National Security and the Jamaican Constabulary Force as the executive branch of the government that is engaged in state intervention on local level.

ii. Academic and Social Relevance

The theory of governmentality has highlighted the need of putting this theory into practice. According to several governmentality theorists, there is a lack of data concerning the adaptability of the theory onto empirical data (Lund 2006, Sending & Neumann 2006, Joseph 2010). The academic relevance of this research is that it builds on the academic theory of governmentality and addresses the need for empirical research on state practices (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 983). This research fills this specific knowledge gap through the specific case study of Kingston, Jamaica. Another addition to the academic relevance of this research is that this research aims to move beyond the critique of a 'flat ontology', as argued by Joseph, by placing the theory of

governmentality and the specific neoliberal form of governmentality in a wider social ontology within a non-Western context (2010: 241).

Much has been researched and discussed about the phenomenon of 'dons' and the emergence of a 'shadow state'. Harriot and Katz have discussed state responses to crime in Jamaica, whereas Jaffe has researched the phenomenon of a 'hybrid state' and Munroe and Blake have been researching the emergence of dons within the context of neoliberal developments and the presence of a 'shadow state' (2015, 2013, 2016). However, little has been described on how the Jamaican government is trying to overcome the 'culture of dons'. Therefore, the unique contribution of this research in Jamaica in relation to the state is that this research contributes to the study of 'dons' by analyzing the interaction between the different governing trajectories of both state and non-state actors by placing it within the analytical frame of governmentality. Another contribution to the study of dons is the specific focus on how these non-state criminal actors challenge the state's legitimacy and authority by focusing on both state and non-state practices of vertical encompassment.

Furthermore, the social relevance of this research is that it will assess the current policies and crime reduction strategies of the Jamaican government. Therefore, it may benefit both the Jamaican government and its citizens within the near future to adapt or formulate new policies that will consider both the strengths and the weaknesses of the current policies and practices of crime prevention and reduction developed throughout the past decade. Moreover, in Chapter 5 the success of August Town in the reduction of crime and the presence of gangs will be discussed and analyzed, which may be helpful for future garrison communities to adapt similar methods and means to reduce crime the presence of non-state criminal actors in their space.

iii. Research Question and Sub-Questions

The research question is formulated based on the main components of the theory of governmentality combined with the empirical data gathered throughout this research and is stated as follows:

Which governing practices, policies and techniques does the Jamaican government engage in to regain authority and legitimacy in the gang-dominated garrison communities in Kingston during the post-Dudus period 2010-2017?

Here, the focus is on Kingston and the presence of non-state criminal actors in the garrison communities with an emphasis on dons as community leaders. Within these communities there are low levels of state authority and legitimacy, there is limited access to the garrison communities and a lack of state control. The chosen timeframe reflects the change in policy and practices of the Jamaican government, specifically referring to the state practices of the Ministry of National

Security and the policing strategies of the Jamaican Constabulary Force to tackle crime and violence in Jamaica following the Tivoli-incursion in 2010. The post-Dudus period also signifies the change in donmanship and gang presence throughout the garrison communities in Kingston, as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

From this research question the following sub-questions have been formulated with the aim to operationalize and to break down the research questions in researchable components and indicators that will be used to support the dialogue between theory and evidence. The sub-questions are used to guide the empirical chapters and will be used in an integrative approach throughout the thesis. The sub-questions are formulated as follows:

- Through what specific set of practices do dons represent themselves as reified entities that are above and around citizens living in garrison communities in Kingston?
- Through what specific set of practices and strategies does the Jamaican government represent itself as a reified entity that are above and around its citizens in Kingston?
- Does the Jamaican government hold authority and legitimacy among civilians living in garrison communities?
- What policies are implemented to spatialize the Jamaican government within areas predominantly controlled by non-state armed actors following the Tivoli-Incursion in 2010?
- What are the constraints state actors and non-state actors experience when trying to spatialize itself garrison communities?

iv. Methodology

This research was conducted over a period of two months in Kingston, Jamaica in March and April 2017. The research strategy adopted in this research is that of qualitative research, as the focus of this research is to study the intent behind the policies, practices and techniques of the Jamaican government to regain authority and legitimacy in the areas controlled by non-state actors. The qualitative data were acquired through interviews, policy documents, newspaper articles and non-participant observation, alongside the use of academic literature and they will be elaborated on below. The data collection techniques were used in order to understand which policies, practices and techniques the Jamaican government used in order to regain authority and legitimacy in gang-dominated garrison communities. In addition, this research has also focused on how dons, as alternative authority structures, act as constraints to the reclaiming of space by the state. Moreover, the use of qualitative research has been helpful to understand the interaction, cooperation and competition between the Jamaican government and non-state criminal actors in Kingston. In addition, the sampling method used during field research was snowball sampling,

which allowed me to start with a few contacts who could then refer me to respondents who were either located in areas that had limited access, or respondents who were difficult to get in contact with, such as ex-gang members.

For this research, the ontological and epistemological stance taken is based on an interpretative and individualist approach. This approach has the underlying assumption that 'actors are embedded in society, but have agency, they can act, initiate change' (Demmers 2017: 18). This stance is based in reference to the historical and political processes in Jamaica that have created the 'culture of dons' and to the diverse array of state and non-state (criminal) actors that are competing in a network of authority within garrison communities. This stance is, therefore, in line with the qualitative research.

a. Operationalization and Limitations

The sub-questions posed in the section above can be operationalized through defining the indicators of the core concepts. The methodology that have been used to gather data on the indicators described above will be elaborated on in the next sections on textual and spatial analysis, interviews and non-participant observation during my field research. The key component of the analytical framework of governmentality is the spatialization of the state. This is defined as how states come to be understood as entities with particular spatial characteristics that is 'above' and around its people through the use of specific practices and metaphors. Using state practices and the metaphors of verticality and encompassment, they are able to 'secure their legitimacy, to naturalize their authority, and to represent themselves as superior to, and encompassing of, other institutions and centers of power' (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982). These practices are related to mundane rituals, such as regulation and surveillance of territorial boundaries, but also to policing, repression, state benevolence and coercion. Here, authority and legitimacy are central to the spatialization of the state, where authority is defined as 'the capacity to generate compliance', and legitimacy as 'the approved use of power by appropriate institutions' (Sending & Neumann 2006: 654, Harriot & Katz 2015: 44). According to Harriot and Katz, authority is seen as 'the ultimate source of legitimacy' (2015: 56).

During this research, there have been limitations to the data-collection and, consequently, in answering components of the sub-question. One of the main difficulties was dealing with limited access to the garrison communities that restricted the collection of data on spatial and geographical lay-out and to observe the governing practices of both state and non-state criminal actors within the garrison communities. Fortunately, through snowball sampling, I was able to join the Peace Management Initiatives in a few community visits that were proven sufficient to gather data on the spatiality of garrison communities and to observe interactions between state

and non-state (criminal) actors. Another limitation to gather data on the governing strategies of the Ministry of National Security related to a lack of access to personnel of the MNS, despite continuous attempts to establish contact. However, due to extensive empirical literature and the access to policy documents I was able to gather sufficient data to analyze the governing practices and strategies of the Jamaican government. Lastly, during my research I have experienced that being a female researcher from a Western country in a non-Western context significantly reduced access to female respondents, whereas men were more likely to engage with me. Therefore, most of the interviews were conducted with male respondents. However, I do not believe that this has been a significant limitation to finding answers to the research puzzle and sub-questions described above. Based on the research puzzle and the sub-questions describe above, the following research methods have been selected accordingly to gather data that support the answering of these questions.

b. Textual Analysis

The first data collection technique that has been used to gather information on the practices and governing strategies of both dons, as non-state criminal actors, the Jamaican government and the Jamaican Constabulary Force, is textual analysis. This research method has been based on academic literature to provide the historical and political context of Jamaica. Secondly, policy documents have been obtained from the Ministry of National Security and the Jamaican Constabulary Force to analyze the practices of crime prevention and reduction that have been implemented following the Tivoli-Incursion in 2010. Lastly, newspaper articles have been consulted in order to gather data on the current state of affairs in relation to the 'culture of dons', the progress of August Town and other state and non-state practices on crime reduction. Researching policy documents and media reports has been necessary in order to collect the required data to research through which means the state is trying to regain their authority and legitimacy in areas controlled by dons, and what kind of constraints the Jamaican government faces when trying to implement specific policies. Moreover, textual sources are used to gain a deeper understanding on how dons operate inside their communities and through which practices they gain authority and legitimacy vis-à-vis their constituents.

c. Interviews

Interviews is another data collection technique that is built on textual and spatial analysis that has been used to gather information regarding the level of authority and legitimacy of both state and non-state actors on community-level. More specifically, this method has been used to gain insight in whether the policies and practices of the Jamaican government and the Jamaican Constabulary Force have had an effect on the local population in relation to the spatialization of the state.

Most of the interviews were in-depth and semi-structured, based on a general topic list that I carried with me when meeting respondents regarding crime reduction, the presence of gangs and the practices of the Jamaican government and the JCF. Almost all the conducted interviews were recorded with a recording device, only after I received informed consent of the person I intended to interview at that moment. Some of the interviews were informal and not recorded, either because there was no permission to record, or else due to the sensitive nature of the visits by being in gang territory, as this could be perceived as an intrusion of privacy.

Since access to the inner-city garrison communities was limited, contact with respondents were established based on snowball and non-probability sampling. The sampling methods allowed me to establish contact with Horace Levy, a board member of the PMI, who then referred me to the gatekeeper of August Town, Kenneth Wilson, who is a well-respected community resident and the initiator of the Peace Mission in 2008. Moreover, based on non-probability sampling I got in contact with the Damian Hutchinson, the Executive Director of the Peace Management Initiative who referred me to members of the PMI to conduct interviews and to go on community visits.

Thus, interviews were conducted with various residents of August Town, police officers, members of the Peace Management Initiative and a Geography professor from the University of the West Indies, to obtain a comprehensive image of the level of authority and legitimacy of non-state criminal actors, the Jamaican government and the JCF and to learn about the different practices these actors engaged in. As stated above, I was unable to attain interviews with personnel of the Ministry of National Security, as it proved to be too difficult to establish interviews with personnel from the MNS.

d. Non-Participant Observation and Spatial Analysis

Throughout this research non-participant observation has been used to observe state practices, symbols and interactions between state and non-state actors, but also policing strategies and practices of surveillance during community visits with the PMI. Due to the sensitive nature of these visits, my main objective was to observe, and postpone interaction with gang members until I was introduced to them, although not many residents approached me for an informal conversation. Thus, due to the community visits I was able to see first-hand how this non-governmental organization works in the field and deals with the local realities of everyday life in West-Kingston.

In addition, spatial analysis has been used to analyze the spatial and geographical lay-out of garrison communities that were accessible due to the community visits I conducted with the Peace Management Initiative. Thus, spatial analysis has been used to gather data on informal, symbolic and physical boundaries to analyze the constraints of both state and non-state actors that are

trying to engage in practices of vertical encompassment in order to regain authority and legitimacy in these garrison communities.

v. Objectives

The objectives of this study are both theoretical and empirically supported and stated as follows:

- To explore the case study of Kingston and to add to the empirical knowledge on the topic of gang control and crime reduction in Kingston by contributing an empirical case study to this effect.
- To produce examples of how governmentality works in practice, and therefore to build on governmentality theory within a non-Western context.
- To show how different networks contest authority within a singular space and how power diffuses across these networks within garrison communities.

vi. Outline

The outline of this thesis will be divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 is aimed at analyzing and discussing the theory on governmentality and is the theoretical building block for the empirical chapters that follow. First, I will give an overview of the theory of governmentality by elaborating on Foucault and his idea of government, before moving on to a detailed focus on governmentality, the spatialization of the state and the neoliberal form of governmentality. Then I will discuss how local governance emerged to understand both the dynamics within the garrison communities, and the kind of practices and mentalities that the Jamaican government is using to try to counter these alternative governance structures. Lastly, I will describe and place my research within the academic debate on governmentality and local governance theory.

Chapter 2 is aimed to describe the historical context and political processes in Jamaica, with the focus on party-politics, neoliberal developments and the emergence of dons as non-state governing actors to analyze how both state and non-state actors engage in practices of vertical encompassment. Subsequently, I will elaborate on dons as community leaders who are often involved in criminal activities and how they were able to emerge due to these historical and political processes as described above. More specifically I will describe, how dons, as non-state criminal actors, have assumed the role as authority figure normally associated with the formal state and to see the shift of power from the formal state to non-state actors, that is in line with governmentality theory.

Chapter 3 moves towards analyzing the networks of power and authority that are present within garrison communities. Here, I will start by analyzing the types of non-state criminal actors that are most often present within garrison communities. Subsequently, I will specifically focus on the

Peace Management Initiative to analyze how this non-governmental organization operates within the network of both state and non-state (criminal) actors and how they engage in vertical encompassment. Moreover, I will analyze through which practices the PMI gains authority and legitimacy that allows them to access and operate the most dangerous communities in Kingston. Lastly, the spatial and geographical lay-out of the garrison communities in Kingston will be explored to assess how the creation and maintenance of informal and symbolic boundaries affect the spatialization of the state.

Chapter 4 is aimed at analyzing the state practices and governing strategies of the Jamaican government that is specifically concerned with the reduction of crime and gang presence in the garrison communities in Kingston. I will briefly describe the Tivoli-incursion of 2010 to understand how a fragmentation of power emerged and how this affected the governing strategies of the Ministry of National Security and the policing strategies of the Jamaican Constabulary Force. Subsequently, I will focus on the practices, procedures and techniques of the Jamaican government to regain authority and legitimacy in the gang-controlled garrison communities by focusing on the policies as stated in the National Security Policy, Vision 2030 and the National Crime Prevention and Community Safety (NCPCSS). Lastly, the Jamaican Constabulary Force will be analyzed and discussed as the executive branch of the Jamaican government that is active on community-level, by focusing on the effectiveness and relevance of their policing strategies and their relations with garrison communities following the Tivoli-incursion.

In Chapter 5, I will explore the case study of August Town to show a garrison community in which there was a reduction of crime and gang presence that opened up space for the government to take back control. This chapter is concerned with how this community, through collaborative efforts, networking and by contesting the power and control of gangs, was able to achieve a 'zero-murder' rate in 2016. This will be analyzed based on the history of August Town, the peace agreement in 2012 and the NCPCSS guidelines on community building and crime prevention.

In Chapter 6, a conclusion will be given based on the evidence described in the previous chapters and will be placed within the analytical frame of governmentality to provide an answer to the research question stated above. Here, I will engage in the dialogue between theory and evidence and discuss how my research fits in the academic debate. Lastly, recommendations for future research and policy strategies will be given.

In the Appendix, you will find the academic literature, newspaper articles and other relevant sources that have been referenced throughout this research.

Chapter 1 – Theoretical Framework: Governmentality

1.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the outline and analysis of the theory of governmentality to provide the building blocks for the following chapters, in which the struggle for control within the garrison communities will be discussed. The theory on governmentality is essentially concerned with ‘the processes by which the conduct of a population is governed’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 989). This is not only done by the state, but by many different actors, through self-regulation and the technologies of agency, that will be elaborated below.

Chapter 1 is divided into three parts. First, I describe the outline of governmentality theory (in line with the requirements of the application of the concept) to provide the analytical framework in which to analyze the practices, policies and techniques of the Jamaican government in the following chapters. Here, I will focus on Foucault, who is the founder of governmentality, the spatialization of the state and the shift to neoliberal governmentality. The articles of Rose et.al. (2006), Joseph (2010), Sending and Neumann (2006) and Ferguson and Gupta (2002) will be discussed to provide the most recent and relevant account of the theory of governmentality from different academic angles.

Second, I will focus on the emergence of non-state governing actors, or governance ‘from below’, and will elaborate on this, to research not only how non-state actors act as a constraint to the reclaiming of space by the government, but also how they are able to operate within a diverse network of power relations within a territory to contest the authority of the state. This section will be based on the articles of Stoker (1998), Lea & Stenson (2007), Arias (2006), Lund (2006), Abello-Colak & Guarneros-Meza (2014), Davis (2010) and Daniel (2015), as these articles provide the most recent and complete account of the shift towards and the emergence of local governance (with an emphasis on non-state criminal actors) and help to show how each actor is engaging in these governing practices, and how they are placed within a diffuse network of power and authority.

Third I will place my research within the academic debate on governmentality and the emergence of local governance structures that challenge the idea of the state as an all-encompassing entity that is reaching down into the communities. The theory thus moves away from the traditional idea of the government as the only provider of governance. Subsequently, I will discuss the academic relevance of governmentality in this context before moving on to the case study of Kingston, Jamaica.

I would like to emphasize that the concepts of governmentality and governance are intrinsically linked, as governance is embedded into the theory of governmentality. Throughout the thesis, governance is used in a more general sense, namely 'the process and act of ruling' and is concerned with the mechanisms and processes on which to govern (Blake 2013: 59), whereas governmentality is specifically concerned with the 'subtle networks of power exercised through a network of institutions, practices, procedures and techniques which act to regulate social conduct' (Joseph 2010: 223). Thus, governance is used in the broader sense of governing that is embedded in the theory of governmentality. Henceforward, both concepts will be used.

1.2 Foucault and Power

Governmentality was first introduced by Foucault in the 1970's, who studied the processes of political power and government in the 17th and 18th century. Foucault argued that government could essentially be defined as 'the conduct of conduct' which has as its purpose to regulate the welfare of the population and the improvement of its conditions, also known as the 'art of governing'. This contrasted with the idea of sovereignty that is solely concerned with the act of governing (Sending & Neumann 2006: 656). According to Foucault, the state had to be understood in connection to a particular society that saw the emergence of new techniques of government in the 18th century that was necessary for the state to survive (Joseph 2010: 227). Subsequently, government was therefore 'an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what they do and for what happens to them' (Foucault 1997: 68 in Rose et.al. 2006: 83).

Foucault also began to make the distinction between disciplinary power and governmentality, as the population became the central focus of government and political power in the 18th century (Joseph 2010: 226). Here, disciplinary power focused solely on regulating society through techniques of surveillance that was considered protectionist, whereas governmentality was less restricting and deepened the understanding of how a population should be governed (Joseph 2010: 226). Governmentality, therefore, solely focused on how or through which sets of practices and techniques human behaviour is governed. Here, the state is considered to be essential to the theory of governmentality, as Foucault stated: 'the state is therefore a schema of intelligibility for a whole set of already established institutions, a whole set of given realities' (Foucault, 2007: 286 in Joseph 2010: 225). This does not mean that state power has diminished or has been displaced, rather there is a distinction made between sovereignty, disciplinary power and government and that has been recast 'within this concern for the population' (Sending & Neumann 2006: 657, Foucault 2004: 28 in Joseph 2010: 226).

Since the focus of government was primarily concerned with the population within a specific territory in the beginning of the 18th century, the population, therefore, 'had to be understood by means of specific knowledge and to be governed through techniques that are attuned to these emergent understandings' (Rose et.al. 2006: 84). Here, citizens existing within the sovereign territory were no longer seen merely as 'subjects who must obey the laws', rather they were to be incorporated within a dense network of relations between people and things. Thus, the perception of government shifted to the idea that it was necessary to understand who was being governed, through which processes they became influenced and to replace the focus on state institutions (Rose et.al. 2006: 87). In agreement with Rose et.al., Joseph argued that it became evident that 'the process of governing was to be identified through individuals', rather than through the perspective of the state that governs a society based on its top-down perspective (2006, 2010: 235-236). Moreover, according to Sending and Neumann, governmentality is thus concerned with the shift in focus away from state institutions and more importantly, with the focus on the socio-political functions and processes of governance and to research the change in logic of government 'by which civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon into an entity that is both an object *and* a subject of government' (2006: 651, 657).

1.2.1 Governmentality

Governmentality 'goes beyond the narrow limits of state power to look at how these societies (and states themselves) employ more subtle methods of power exercised through a network of institutions, practices, procedures and techniques which act to regulate social conduct' (Joseph 2010: 223-224). More specifically, according to Sending and Neumann, governmentality is concerned with 'grasping government as a form of power', focusing on the transfer of power towards non-state governing actors and, therefore, the theory moves beyond the scope of the state as the sole provider of governance (2006: 656). Here, the predominant assumption is when power or authority is transferred to non-state actors, there has to be an automatic decrease in state power. However, in agreement with both Joseph and Sending and Neumann, I believe this is a flawed assumption, as the transfer of power from state to non-state actors does not necessarily imply the loss of state power (2010, 2006). Instead, it only implies the willing transfer of state power, indicating the state is still in control.

To study governmentality it is argued by Joseph that the concept should be placed within a social ontology to understand the underlying causes and structures to assess the effectiveness of the analytical framework, as well as being able to understand the specific processes that are going on within a society (2010: 241). Thus, one has to consider the 'different historical, social and geopolitical conditions under which governmentality operates' by placing the concept within a specific case study to empirically assess the effectiveness of the application of governmentality.

This has been one of the main complications within the governmentality theory, as theorists were unable to study the structures and processes within a society in-depth, referring to this complication as a 'flat ontology' (Joseph 2010: 225, 241). This specific research, however, tries to overcome this theoretical complication by placing it within the social ontology of Jamaica.

When looking deeper into the requirements of the application of governmentality to a specific society, Joseph argues that this analytical frame can only be applied to societies that have an advanced form of liberalism, meaning that 'the governing takes place through the development of liberal norms and the population is the main object of government' (2010: 223). However, Rose et.al. have argued that the application of governmentality is considered to be flexible and open-ended and, therefore, it does not automatically mean that it can only be applied to essentially Western contexts (2006: 101). Thus, in agreement with Rose et.al., I argue that the analytical frame could be applied to a non-Western context if one would take into account its social ontology and avoid trying to 'fit' the analytical frame to a specific case study. Moreover, one also has to take into account 'the danger inherent in the concept of governmentality is that it becomes a catch-all category that can be applied far too generally' (Joseph 2010: 237, 2006).

1.2.2 Spatialization of the State

One of the state practices through which the state is trying to spatialize itself as an all-encompassing institution that is above and around its citizens, is vertical encompassment, which is defined as 'a way for the state to secure legitimacy and authority through state practices and methods of domination, control, surveillance and regulation. These everyday practices produce spatial and scalar hierarchies' (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982). The spatialization of the state could, therefore, be defined as 'how states come to be understood as entities with particular spatial properties' that is 'above' and 'around' its citizens through the use of specific practices and metaphors (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982). By using state practices and the metaphors of verticality and encompassment they are able to 'secure their legitimacy, to naturalize their authority, and to represent themselves as superior to, and encompassing of, other institutions and centers of power' (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982).

This idea is closely linked to that of governmentality, but is specifically focused on state practices to make citizens aware that the state is everywhere and around them. These state practices range from mundane rituals, such as regulation and surveillance, through policing, repression and coercion. Thus, practices one could witness in everyday life and that may also be met with opposition and resistance by its constituents who, in turn, are able to contest the states claim to authority and sovereignty. These practices may include implicit everyday practices that are not perceptible to the states subjects in order to know how their lives are formed in relation to the

state (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 984-985). Lund, on the other hand, portrays the spatialization of the state by making the distinction 'between the state as a system and the state as an idea' (2006: 685). In line with the idea of vertical encompassment, Lund describes this phenomenon based on how the state invades certain areas in the form of an idea. This could be done by making subtle explicit and implicit references to the state by different state and non-state actors and institutions (2006: 687-688). Thus, one could argue in line with governmentality theory that non-state actors also engage in practices of vertical encompassment. Since the state is no longer seen as the sole provider of governance, as argued above, non-state actors could therefore similarly claim authority and legitimacy through the practices of vertical encompassment.

The concept of vertical encompassment will be used throughout Chapters 2 to 5, as a way to research through which mechanisms and practices the state is trying to reassert itself in areas controlled by non-state criminal actors. It is important to note that the state does not have automatic success in claiming its sovereignty, rather it has to be created through the practices of verticality and encompassment (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 988). One of the important mechanisms of encompassment within this research is that of 'spatial mobility' that is defined as the 'the ability to transgress space to regulate and discipline' (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 987). This will be linked to the spatial and geographical lay-out of garrison communities in Chapter 3 that will support the sub-question regarding the spatialization of the state and the constraints the Jamaican government faces when engaging in vertical encompassment.

1.2.3 Neoliberal Governmentality

The idea that individuals have become both an object and a subject of governing paved the way into a new form of governmentality that included the development of neoliberalism and the shift from the Keynesian welfare state towards free market policies in Western democracies. Whereas Foucault was only concerned with national governmentality, neoliberal governmentality moves beyond this perspective.

The emergence of neoliberalism and the shift towards free-market policies in the 1980's has necessitated the inclusion of these shifts into the analytical framework of governmentality, since under liberalism, 'individual subjects are constituted as autonomous and rational decision-makers' and therefore act as both subject and object of government, as described above (Joseph 2010: 227, Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 989). The shift towards neoliberalism is often understood as the 'roll-back' or retreat of the state with the overarching assumption that this means less governing power for the state. However, Ferguson & Gupta stress that it actually has entailed 'a transfer of the operations of government to non-state entities', leading state practices and regulatory operations to become 'de-statized' (2002: 989). Moreover, these developments

imposed the shift from government to governance, as it required new forms of governing and, more importantly, the move away from centralized government activity. However, as argued above, this does not automatically mean that this leads to a decrease of state power and authority. Rather, it is a new form of governing in which the state still plays a central role in 'producing legislation and regulatory framework' (Joseph 2010: 227, Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 989).

Foucault adds to the perspective of neoliberal governmentality by including the concept of technologies of agency, whereby the government offers individuals 'active involvement in action to resolve the kind of issues normally held to be the responsibility of authorized governmental agencies' (Sending & Neumann 2006: 657). Thus, the government is stepping back and creating a sense of agency among its citizens, while the government is still in control. This also links to the concept of 'responsibilization', where 'the governed are encouraged, freely and rationally, to conduct themselves' (Burchell 1996: 29 in Sending & Neumann 2016: 657). This strongly coincides with a neoliberal way of thinking.

The inclusion of neoliberalism within governmentality theory has met some resistance, as it could be seen as 'a political discourse concerned with the governing of individuals from a distance' (Joseph 2010: 228). Thus, the government is actively positioning themselves as neutral and non-interventionists, but through the idea of responsibilization, individuals receive the 'responsibilities' normally associated with the government, thus resulting in societies where citizens essentially govern themselves. Therefore, individuals generate the sense that they are in control over certain processes in their lives, while the government is still involved in social, economic and political processes (Sending & Neumann 2006: 657). According to Joseph, the state itself creates the role as an 'overseer of certain social processes' while being brought into the network of diverse state and non-state actors (2010: 227). On the contrary, the danger lies in the idea that, due to neoliberal developments, individuals become less connected to national states and more tied to other sources of authorities creating new social networks that operate outside the control of the state (Davis 2009: 226).

However, the main concern surrounding the use of the analytical frame of governmentality is that it becomes an overarching concept that is applied to all 'non-state centred policies' without taking into account that the state is still the 'main source of governmentality' (Joseph 2010: 243). Also, when applying neoliberal governmentality, the tendency emerges 'to identify any program with neo-liberal elements to be essentially neo-liberal' (Rose et.al. 2006: 97-98). Subsequently, neoliberal governmentality could be associated with different types of government. Therefore, when researching neoliberal governmentality, one has to take into account that not all elements can be ascribed to neoliberalism, as this analytical frame does not explain everything (Rose et.al. 2006: 97-98).

As with governmentality, the neoliberal form of governmentality has to be applied to societies with certain social conditions, that is according to Joseph 'a developed civil society and a certain type of state' (2010: 243). However, Joseph fails to elaborate on the kind of state that is necessary for the application of neoliberal governmentality (2010: 243).

Nevertheless, as stated above, if neoliberal governmentality does not fit the requirements for a certain society, it does not automatically mean that the theory of (neoliberal) governmentality does not apply. Instead, it has to be placed within the social ontology within the specific society by looking at the structures and processes happening on the ground. While one has to keep in mind that the concept has not been forced upon a society that does not have the 'right' social conditions. However, what the 'right' social conditions should be has not been clarified by the authors and, therefore, remains open to interpretation.

1.3 Governance 'from Below'

In this section, I shift the analytical focus to understand how non-state governance has emerged that challenged and countered the authority of the state through the diffusion and fragmentation of power. In agreement with Lemke, 'what we observe today is not a reduction of state sovereignty and planning capacities, but a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government (2007: 18 in Joseph 2010: 243).

Stoker (1998: 17) and Rhodes (1996: 652-3 in Stoker 1998), among other governance scholars, have rejected the conventional assumption that the state is the sole provider of governance and instead argue that 'governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or the new method by which society is governed'. Therefore, in line with governmentality theory, governance is concerned with the mechanisms and processes on which to govern, which 'do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government' (Stoker 1998: 17). In agreement, Rosenau argues that the state is no longer the sole provider of authority and legitimacy and instead, 'non-state actors have emerged as powerful actors challenging the power and authority of sovereign state' (in Sending & Neumann 2006: 655).

It is typically argued that there is a 'relocation of authority from public to quasi-public and to private agencies' (Sending & Neumann 2006: 654). Thus, as stated above, the theory of governmentality moves beyond the general view of the state as a unitary entity and the sole provider of governance towards the idea of the state placed within a network of different institutions and practices. The power associated with the state, therefore, does not function based on a single source but 'through a diverse set of procedures and techniques' (Joseph 2010: 231). Moreover, as Lund argues in reference to the spatialization of the state described above, 'the idea of the state as unitary and powerful is often being contrasted with the incoherence and incapacity

of the state, the multiple parallel structures and alternative sites of authority' (2006: 689). Thus, the idea of the state is based on subtle references to the state combined with 'people's everyday encounters with representatives of the state and its representations' (Lund 2006: 689).

1.3.1 The Emergence of Non-State Governing Actors

The opening up of spaces for non-state actors and how they were able to emerge, is based on two main assumptions that has been briefly discussed throughout this chapter. On the one hand, the assumption is that the failure or the weakening of states enabled the emergence of non-state actors taking over governing roles. According to Daniel this is related to 'state functions which are limited or completely missing in failing states: these concern the provision of security, a legitimate government and representation of all citizens, and finally, public goods and services' (2015: 89). Contrary to Daniel, Arias argues that we should focus on how non-state and state actors are brought together in the wider political system by focusing networks (2006: 293-294). Hence, in agreement with Lea & Stenson, instead of looking how the state opened up 'ungoverned areas' or deprived areas, we should focus on the interaction between the non-state and state actors and how they reinforce their authority through mutually beneficial practices (2007: 27). These networks then enable non-state actors to challenge the state's claims to superiority and the 'encompassing of other institutions and centers of power' (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982, 988). However, in contrast, Sending and Neumann argue that weak states have not caused an authority vacuum in which non-state actors could take over control, rather it has led to an increase in ways in which authority has moved and focus instead on the idea of neoliberalism (2006: 654).

The second assumption is that the emergence of neoliberal developments in the 1980's has caused the emergence of non-state governance, which is in line with the idea of neoliberal governmentality. In this view, 'political neoliberalism sought to 'roll back' certain state functions regarding the provision of social services' (Abello-Colak & Guarneros-Meza 2014: 3269 & Lea & Stenson 2007). The responsibility in the provision of social goods and services shifted towards the non-state spectrum of corporations, non-governmental organizations and in some cases towards civilians, which could be referred to the concept of responsabilization as described above. Consequently, this shift created a vacuum, rather similar to the idea of weakened states, 'in which non-state action, or 'governance from below, would take place' (Lea & Stenson 2007: 12). As a result, non-state actors were able to take over these 'ungoverned spaces' to fill the authority gap that the state left open. More specifically, non-state actors could challenge the legitimacy and authority of the state, as citizens began to identify with alternative types of authority structures (Davis 2010: 401). These authority structures could be taken over by a diversity of actors ranging from non-governmental organizations, international organizations, civil society, towards non-state armed actors, such as gangs and criminal organizations (Lea & Stenson 2007: 18).

The spaces that have been taken over by non-state actors, due to either the weakening of the state or neoliberal developments, combined with the authority they have gained also necessitates the need to focus on how they remain in control of the territory. Lund argues that for non-state actors to assert authority and remain in power is through 'territorialization by delimitation and assertion of control over a geographic area' (Lund 2006: 695). This could be done by territorial markers, such as flags, graffiti, walls, signs and party banners to demarcate the boundaries of the specific space, that will be further elaborated on in Chapter 3. In this sense, authority is a social phenomenon that is constructed through everyday practices and thus, non-state actors also engage in practices of vertical encompassment to gain authority and legitimacy. Hence, in order for non-state actors to be successful this social construct has to be embedded in the minds of the people they govern (Lund 2006: 695-696).

As argued above and in line with governmentality theory, one of the overarching assumptions regarding the emergence of non-state actors is that the shift in power and authority towards non-state actors automatically leads to a decrease in state power. However, Barry et.al. argue that instead of a decrease in state power it indicates 'a new modality of government' (in Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 989). The danger that arises is the tendency to focus solely on how non-state institutions work and therefore assign more power to non-state actors than necessary, as both governance and governmentality are still concerned with how state institutions work (Joseph 2010: 237). Rather, the focus has shifted outwards to the power relations and networks between the state and non-state institutions.

1.3.2 Non-State Criminal Actors

Within this research the emphasis is on non-state criminal actors, either referring to street gangs or organized crime groups, that contest the authority and legitimacy of the state by establishing alternative authority structures within the garrison communities in Kingston, as will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The traditional view of organized crime is that they are profit-oriented. Contrary to other non-state armed groups, criminal actors do not intend to change the regime, therefore they will not openly fight or contest the state's authority. The only means of coercion is based on the use of violence (Daniel 2015: 88).

Whereas Daniel argues that criminal organizations do not intend to dominate a particular territory, Lea & Stenson oppose that view and argue that criminal organizations do intend to control populations and territories as it is considered to be the main source of their power (2015: 88, 2007: 18). In addition, criminal groups also engage in network practices to sustain drug trafficking as a source of income. Here, Lea & Stenson argue that criminal non-state actors become increasingly important players within areas of limited state control (2007: 18).

These criminal non-state actors are able to challenge the legitimacy and authority of the state, due to the shift of responsibility in the provision of social goods and services (Davis 2010: 401). As a result, citizens become prone to identify with these alternative authority structures, such as those of criminal actors. Consequently, there has been a shift moving away from the traditional modes of governing 'from above' to the recognition of new forms of governing 'from below', focusing on non-state governance both within the theories of governance and governmentality (Lea & Stenson 2007: 9, 14).

1.4 Academic debate

The academic debate concerning the analytical frame of governmentality focuses on the shift of power from state actors towards non-state actors and thus moves beyond the scope of the state as the sole provider of governance, as previously argued by Sending and Neumann (2006: 656). Therefore, there is a need to move away from this top-down way of thinking and include the shift in power towards non-state entities, such as NGO's, civil society or non-state criminal actors (Lea & Stenson 2007). Moreover, to analyze through what set of practices and procedures these non-state actors have caused a diffusion of power and how they create diverse networks that produces power relations, contest authority and ultimately have assumed the role of the state (Joseph 2010: 226, Sending & Neumann 2006).

As argued above, the academic debate centers around two main assumptions. The first and general assumption is that neoliberal developments of the 1980's leading to a 'retreat' of the state has caused the emergence of non-state governance, as spaces opened up for non-state actors to take over the provision of goods and services leading to the contestation of state authority (Abello-Colak & Guarneros-Meza 2014). On the other hand, within the second assumption, scholars have argued that the emergence of non-state governance is related to networks, or the re-articulation of the relationship between non-state actors and the state, often within the context of a weak or failed state leading to a lack of effective state control (Arias 2006, Lea & Stenson 2007).

The context of a weak state is often caused by extreme poverty linked to political dissatisfaction, and in current literature non-state actors have assumed to be cause of instability, conflict and violence (Davis 2009: 221). Within Kingston there are diverse groups of non-state actors who have assumed the role of the state by gaining authority and legitimacy through the provision of social goods and services. First, Jamaica has been a developing country faced with poverty, high levels of violence and party politics. Secondly, the neoliberal developments in the 1980's have led to the separation between gangs and politicians and a further increase of economic setbacks as well as increased violence and lack of state control. This will be elaborated in more detail in the following chapter on the historical and political processes in Jamaica.

Thus, the specific focus of this research, in line with the academic debate and the analytical frame of governmentality, is how non-state actors are operating within a single network of power, how they challenge the authority, and control of the state, and through what set of practices and techniques the Jamaican government is trying to regain control in these areas. Therefore, due to the increased attention of the emergence of non-state armed or criminal actors, the focus of the academic debate is on how non-state actors could emerge and how power flowed from the state towards non-state entities and how these non-state actors act as constraints to the spatialization of the state (Davis 2010, Daniel 2015). More specifically, in reference to the case study of gang-dominated garrison communities in Kingston, Jamaica, this research will focus on how the Jamaican government is trying to regain control over the territories that these non-state actors, often 'dons', have taken over, as researched through the academic lens of governmentality theory.

1.5 Relevance

The academic relevance of this research is mainly concerned with adding to and building on the theory of governmentality. In this sense, it places the theory within a specific society to study the processes associated with governmentality to deepen the understanding of the structures and ontology of a specific case study based on qualitative research, which until now has not been granted adequate attention. Moreover, this research builds on the specific neoliberal form of governmentality, as this research is placed within a neoliberal context based on the historical processes within Jamaica that will be discussed in Chapter 3. Specifically, this research will test whether neoliberal governmentality fits in the context of a non-Western country, responding to the claims made by Joseph, who has argued that neoliberal governmentality could only work if it is applied to the context of an advanced liberal democracy (2010: 235, 238-239). Since this research mainly focuses on how power has flowed from state entities to non-state entities in a context of neoliberal changes through many diverse sets of networks and practices, as well as how the government is responding to this phenomenon, this research thus also looks at these relationships and how they operate (Sending & Neumann 2006: 654). Lastly, this research will add to the idea of the spatialization of the state, and will try to understand through which state practices the state tries to represent itself as an all-encompassing entity that is above and around the citizens, particularly focusing on how social practices are made effective (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982-983).

Chapter 2 – The Jamaican Government: A State’s Perspective

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is aimed at establishing the historical and political context of how and why organized crime and community leaders, or dons, could emerge in Jamaica. Specifically referring to how the Jamaican government opened up ‘spaces’ and in return lost authority and legitimacy within these garrison communities in Kingston that is in accordance to the academic debate described in the previous chapter. In this chapter, one can see neoliberal policies, the emergence of non-state criminal actors and the phenomenon of the ‘shadow state’ all come together.

I will describe the historical processes that led to the emergence of gangs and community dons by focusing on the partisan politics during the post-independence period. Subsequently, the neoliberal developments and the introduction of the neoliberal Structural Adjustments Programmes in the 1980’s will be analyzed and discussed, henceforth called SAP’s. Then, the role of dons as non-state governing actors will be discussed and placed within the historical and political context of the two-party politics combined with the neoliberal developments in order to fully understand the emergence of organized crime and street gangs. Here, I will describe the outline of a significant political process known as ‘garrison politics’ and what type of role dons fulfil as community leaders in general, thus focusing on the shifting networks of power. More specifically, to analyze how dons engage in practices of vertical encompassment to gain authority and legitimacy within the garrison communities.

2.2 Post-Independence Period and the Emergence of Dons

Jamaica became independent from the United Kingdom in 1962 and since then it has been ruled as a constitutional parliamentary democracy by two political parties. The two parties were initially developed ‘to represent the black and brown masses’ during the colonial period under the name of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) and the People’s National Party (PNP) (Clarke 2010: 421). The BITU party changed to the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) in the 1960’s and enjoyed equal popularity with the PNP. Both parties ‘were multi coalitions appealing to the entire stratification range – white, brown and black – of late colonial society’ (Munroe 1972 in Clarke 2010: 422). After independence, state-led developments were imminent and the provision of social services became state controlled and played into the ‘paternalistic tendencies of Jamaica’s two major political parties’ (Moloney 2013: 8).

Since the independence in 1962, the democratic governing structures have not seen major setbacks, however, it has been plagued by high levels of corruption, decades of political instability

and gang violence based on party politics, and these governing structures have shown little participatory elements outside the election periods (Moloney 2013: 12, Blake 2013: 57, Clarke 2010: 422). Moreover, the country has been faced with high levels of inequality, poverty and socio-spatial divisions based on social and economic status, ethno-racial background and party-political belonging that coincided with the garrison politics beginning in the 1960's (Jaffe 2013: 736). The presence of dons as non-state governing actors can be attributed to the political processes that marginalized the urban poor and the inner-city areas in Kingston. More specifically, it opened up 'spaces' for criminal actors to take over and that, consequently, contest the authority of the state in low-income garrison communities.

Dons, as non-state governing actors, were able to emerge due to two important processes. On the one hand, this is related to the phenomenon of garrison politics that coincided with the post-independence period in the 1960's and 1970's. Garrison politics is defined as 'a form of political clientelism in which politicians use state resources to secure votes, and supply loyal communities with material benefits such as housing or employment' (Jaffe 2012: 184). This stems from the 1960's and the 1970's where the two main political parties, the JLP and the PNP, created party-loyal garrisons. On the other hand, the garrison system began to change due to neoliberal developments in the 1980's and the implementation of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes by the IMF. Consequently, the opening of borders and deregulated markets increased the lucrative drugs and weapons trade. This triggered the financial independence of dons and therefore separating these non-state criminal actors from the control of politicians (Blake 2013).

These processes led to the creation of their own 'shadow' state within the garrison communities and, thus, becoming isolated entities where the state no longer has control. This will be elaborated below. Therefore, both processes contributed to the shift in power from the state to dons and street gangs as non-state governing actors. Essentially, this led to the significant loss of state control within the inner-city communities in Kingston by establishing alternative authority structures that operate outside the control of the state (Jaffe 2013: 736, Davis 2009: 226). These historical and political processes will be elaborated in more detail in the next sections.

2.2.1 Party Politics

During the post-independence period, the political process was mainly focused on developing means for the hegemonic elite to gain control over the lower strata of the population (Clarke 2010: 421-422). The JLP and the PNP used their power and patronage to buy votes through the use of community leaders, or dons, who coerced their constituents to vote for a specific party. According to Jaffe and Meikle, 'the term don is commonly used to refer to people who have authority over

sections of low-income communities in Kingston and other urban areas, and who are generally involved in criminal activities such as extortion and drug trafficking' (2015: 80). The two parties essentially created these garrison constituencies within the inner-city areas in Kingston by providing housing in particular areas, dividing the urban poor across socio-economic and political lines.

During this period, politicians created party political affiliations by distributed housing, employment and other social goods within the garrison communities while the community leaders, often dons, received state funds and political protection to secure votes and loyalty for the specific party. Here, by creating party-political garrison constituencies, politicians used dons as a means to 'secure their legitimacy and naturalize their authority' in these areas and thus engaging in vertical encompassment (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982). In order to maintain access to those resources, citizens, mainly from the lower classes, would engage in violent confrontations with members of the opposing party (Munroe & Blake 2016: 4). The already poor and marginalized communities were eventually divided into competing areas or constituencies based on patronage linkage between the political parties and gangs during the 1970's. Here, dons played a vital role in controlling these areas by promoting their own political affiliation and strengthening the linkage with the formal state. Thus, essentially the state could be reified on local level through the use of dons as the buffer between the 'up there' and 'on the ground', as argued by Ferguson and Gupta (2002: 983). Violence, then, was often used as a tool by non-state criminal actors to secure votes within their garrison communities, as previously argued by Daniel (2015: 88).

By creating armed gangs, they could also defend their own access to the state's resource and protect their constituencies. As Levy argued '[violence] was one tool they used and that tool of violence of course has now slipped out of the politicians' hands and used by others. But, once you elevate violence to that level then you can't control it'.³ Moreover, the community leaders would use their members to secure 'electoral support, to protect the party, and enforce the will of the political hierarchy' (Clarke 2010: 426). During an interview, one of the ex-gang members argued that 'it's a history, Jamaica [is] built by politics, I would say in the 60's, 70's coming on movements was politics. At that time politicians help a lot of people, but then they get corrupt when politicians want to rule their space, want to win the elections. So, it becomes violence, violence, violence'.⁴ The garrison communities, therefore, are a result of these party politics whereby each community is being affiliated to either the JLP or the PNP. This could thus be seen as a successful execution of the state's practices of vertical encompassment where, in this instance, the Jamaican government is 'above' and 'around' its citizens within the garrison communities.

³ Interview with Horace Levy conducted on 17 March 2017.

⁴ Interview with ex-gang member conducted on 8 April 2017.

In every garrison, community residents would vote for one candidate, either from the JLP or the PNP, while the opposition is seen as 'a threat to the hegemony of the successful party' (Clarke 2010: 429). According to Sives, the garrison is, therefore, defined as 'a totalitarian space in which the options of the residents are largely controlled' (2002: 85). In this sense, these 'options' are both controlled by politicians as well as the community dons. Jaffe describes this phenomenon as a 'hybrid state' that involves 'two main systems of governance – donmanship and the 'formal' bureaucratic state' and emerges from 'the entanglement of these forms of political authority' (2013: 735). One of the key features of the garrisons are extreme public and private poverty and violence. Here, private poverty is defined as 'a condition in which people do not have the means to live above a minimum standard, usually referred to as the poverty line', whereas public poverty is defined as 'a condition in which a geographical area lacks basic amenities and infrastructure' related to housing, sanitation and public utilities (Henry-Lee 2005: 84, Blake 2013: 58).

The JLP and the PNP helped establish the 'culture of dons' during the 1960's and the 1970's due to mutual beneficiary practices they had established with the dons in order to gain votes and loyalty of their constituencies. It was thus a means to create vertical encompassment by using dons as a tool to establish a strong state presence in low-income communities. Consequently, dons could adopt the role of community leader, as they gained legitimacy and authority through the same practices of vertical encompassment as the state's, but on a local level. Namely, to become the provider and protector of their community, a role they could assume through collaboration with the state officials and through the subtle shifting of networks of power. Moreover, one could argue that in this case, the government engaged in the practice of technologies of agency, whereby the Jamaican government placed the responsibility to secure votes with dons, while that is normally seen as a task of state officials and governmental agencies (Sending & Neumann 2006: 657).

Thus, 'these garrisons were carefully constructed by a combination of political favouritism in state housing allocation, partisan political violence, and gang rivalries harnessed to party-political ends' (Clarke 2010: 429). The emergence of dons, therefore, is embedded within the political partisan history of Jamaica. Due to these historical processes, dons as non-state governing actors could take control over the garrison communities and limit the access of state institutions and security forces. Moreover, the neoliberal developments, elaborated in the next section, exacerbated the role of dons as authority figure in the communities. Although Jaffe argues that the emergence of dons is perceived as 'side-effects of neoliberal shifts in governance', I argue in the next section that the implementation of neoliberal structural adjustment policies led to the financial detachment of dons from the formal state, decreasing state control, access and oversight in the garrison communities (2013: 738). Thus, the party-politics and neoliberal developments significantly

decreased vertical encompassment in particular territories, as will similarly be argued in the next section.

2.2.2 Neoliberalism and the Implementation of SAPs

During the 1980's, developing countries implemented neoliberal structural adjustment programmes to increase the role of the market and to open the economy to the international spheres resulting in the retreat of the state, as discussed in the previous chapter. While the Jamaican government still faced the legacy of weak social institutions of the post-independence period combined with high levels of political violence, the SAPs essentially hollowed out the state that led to a 'decrease in territorial authority and control of the state' (Munroe & Blake 2016: 2,7). In terms of governmentality, this reflects a shift of power and control out of the traditional 'space' of the state, into a new, emerging 'space' that had been constructed during the post-independence period.

The SAP's expenditure cut in areas of public services, the distribution of social goods, healthcare, education and housing caused an increase in the already high levels of socioeconomic inequality and spatial marginalization of the urban poor in Kingston. Essentially, these policies have led to the decline of state presence from the garrison communities and most social spheres. Consequently, the retreat of the state 'typically exacerbating the marginalization of low-income areas' (Clarke 2010: 431, Jaffe 2012: 185, 187). Moreover, 'the neoliberal emphasis of participatory development, decentralization and community-based project management - that frames this redistribution of power' also led to the shift of responsibility from the state to its citizens, in line with the concept of responsabilization defined in the previous chapter (Jaffe 2013: 738). Hence, the implementation of SAPs could be seen as a redistribution of power from state institutions to non-state actors that is in line with the idea of neoliberal governmentality in terms of shifting networks of power and increasing the responsibilities of non-state actors.

While politicians were losing authority and legitimacy during the neoliberal developments, dons, on the other hand, benefited from the socioeconomic and political consequences of the SAPs, as they were able 'to take advantage of the open borders and deregulated markets, especially as illegal markets ran alongside legal channels of distribution for goods and services' (Munroe & Blake 2016: 8-9). Dons began to equip themselves with weapons to enforce authority and protection within their communities and to prevent access by state actors and members of other garrison communities and thus positioning themselves above and around the community. These weapons became available through the increasing lucrative drug trade of marijuana and cocaine with South-America and the United States and gun trade with Haiti, which gave dons, as both leader of the community and actively engaging in organized crime, a steady cashflow and

availability of guns (Blake 2013: 68). Due to the high levels of corruption and a lack of state oversight, they could then also maintain and expand their criminal activities. This meant that dons were no longer financially dependent on politicians and shifted from a 'mere political organizer/enforcer, to one who is a major political and economic player (Blake 2013: 69, Munroe & Blake 2016: 10-11).

During the 1980's the garrison communities were, thus, 'inadequately governed by the state, and at the same time heavily influenced by the violent order and power of dons and gangs' (Munroe & Blake 2016: 3). This period of the neoliberal adjustments and developments also saw a decline in partisan-political violence that was prevalent before the 1980's and 'political enforcers became de facto patrons to their garrisons' (Munroe & Blake 2016: 10). The emergence of dons, therefore, was specifically related to their financial independence combined with the decrease in politicians' capacities to distribute social goods and services to their constituencies and the retreat of the state from the inner-city communities in Kingston. Essentially, the neoliberal policies weakened the state's legitimacy, authority and control inside the garrison communities (Munroe & Blake 2016: 1). Thus, 'as the state has withered away, so the capacity of politicians, and especially those in government, to offer patronage to their followers has declined' (Clarke 2010: 431).

In agreement with Jaffe, neoliberalism has shaped the emergence of dons and the phenomenon as a hybrid state, but this has not been purely neoliberal (2013: 745). Consequently, I argue that neoliberal developments combined with the partisan-political historical processes of the 1960's and 1970's, has accounted for the emergence of dons, as an alternative non-state governing system in the garrison communities in Kingston. In line with neoliberal governmentality theory, one can thus see the subtle networks of power, created by this hybrid political order, shifting away from state institutions towards non-state actors. As argued by Joseph in the previous chapter, that due to neoliberal developments, the state has adopted the role as 'overseer of certain social processes', while still interacting in a diverse network of state and non-state actors (2010: 227). Here, one could argue that Jamaican government did not lose power as a state per se, but they did lose territorial power, where non-state criminal actors took advantage of the opening up of these spaces. Consequently, the state became less connected to the realm of non-state actors in the inner-city areas of Kingston and consequently citizens began to identify with the authority structures established by dons.

I will elaborate the alternative governing structures in the next section and examine the role they play for their constituents and how they contest the authority of the state through their governance practices.

2.3 Dons as Non-State Governing Actors

Dons, as non-state governing actors were able to manipulate the political shifts described above and have become 'a significant power holder and actor in the Jamaican polity and society' (Harriot & Katz 2015: 32). Whereas, Blake states that 'they are in effect shadowing the state in providing access to goods and services to residents in communities where the state's capacity is hollowed out' (2013: 59). According to Jaffe, it has become increasingly difficult to separate the role of the formal state from the role dons play as informal actors and their systems of governance, as they are embedded in a governance system that has become intrinsically linked to one another (2013: 745). Thus, the balance of power has shifted from the formal state towards gang leaders, or dons, and many 'who command 'respect' are regarded as neighbourhood protectors, despite their reliance on violence' (Clarke 2010: 434). Here, one could argue that the shift in power towards non-state criminal actors engage in practices of vertical encompassment to gain authority and legitimacy in their communities through the coercion of violence, protection and their means of governing.

Dons rule their communities through 'personalistic authoritarian systems' and have their own systems of informal justice and security (Harriot & Katz 2015: 32). As one of my respondents would argue: 'a don is a leader, a don is someone who care for his community, care for his people around him and care for the people outside his space'.⁵ Based on his own empirical research, Blake makes the distinction between the 'mega-don', who governs multiple garrison communities and is involved in illicit drug and gun trade and provides 'welfare, security, partisan mobilization and order and control via jungle justice' (2013: 66). Secondly, the 'area-don', who governs a single garrison community and takes on the same role as the mega-don except in the provision of jungle justice. According to Blake, these dons tend to have the least interest in community development and are more volatile than the other types of dons (2013: 67) Lastly, 'street dons', who 'assume responsibility for the security of the turf they control' and involve themselves in the jungle justice of a community (Blake 2013: 66). Thus, these non-state armed actors operate within a hierarchy in garrison communities where often the younger dons, or street dons, try to challenge the authority of the more established and powerful dons in the community (Blake 2013: 67). They engage in practices that are in line with vertical encompassment normally used by the state as argued by Ferguson & Gupta (2002: 982). Similar to state practices, dons engage in practices of domination, through the means of violence and jungle justice, surveillance of their territories and repression of community residents, members of the opposed party-political affiliation and other gang members in order to remain in control of their territory.

⁵ Interview with ex-gang member conducted on 8 April 2017.

As mentioned above, the term 'jungle justice' refers to the informal justice system in a garrison community and is defined as a radical local version of law and order. According to Blake, jungle justice 'invariably involves violent measures of discipline and punishment', however, it is 'perceived as fair' and is generally accepted by residents and, in line with governmentality theory, could be seen as means of vertical encompassment by non-state criminal actors (2013: 67). Another similar practice to regain authority and legitimacy is the provision of security. This is related to protection from other gang members from the opposing political party and protection in general for which the residents of a community pay 'taxes' to their community leaders. Here, Jaffe argues that this informal provision of security or dons' protection services 'undermine the territorial integrity of the nation-state. Their relative success in 'securing parts of the city' disproves the formal state's legitimate monopoly on the means of coercion, and so delegitimizes the state and generates additional insecurity as a range of irregular armed actors compete with each other' (2012: 195, see also Davis 2010).

Thus, the presence of an informal justice and security system in essence undermines the authority and legitimacy of state institutions and the police force, as community residents rather turn to their community don due to a severe lack of trust in the judicial system and police force, as stated by Davis (2009: 88). As argued above, this is based on decades of corruption and the weakening of these institutions making Jamaica to a 'low-trust society' (Harriot & Katz 2015: 38). Consequently, dons were able to create a form of 'reciprocal trust' with the residents of their garrison community, as 'they provide welfare benefits to neighbourhood inhabitants and in return, those residents accord dons legitimacy and authority' (Blake 2013: 58-59).

As stated above (see definition Jaffe 2015), dons are often embedded in criminal organizations and linked to criminal activities, such as extortion and drug trafficking. Due to the retreat of the state they are able to sustain these criminal activities, as there is a lack of state oversight and access. Moreover, they are able to exploit these opportunity structures due to weak law enforcement, permissive and facilitative politics and social facilitation, that is defined as 'a supportive subcultural normative order that is anchored in marginalization and alienation' (Harriot & Katz 2015: 33). Thus, dons gained a significant amount of influence in the political system and were able to expand their criminal activities due to the historical and political processes described above. In essence, every decision the government makes is influenced by the presence of dons who are embedded in organized crime, be it through corruption or through legitimate state contracts, making it harder to separate the actions of the state from these non-state criminal actors (Harriot & Katz 2015: 30).

Chapter 3 – Networks and Authority: Inside the Garrisons

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to analyze and discuss the various networks of state and non-state actors that are present and operate within the garrison community. Moreover, I also want to give specific attention to the role of the Peace Management Initiative, a non-governmental organization that works in the most violent and dangerous garrison communities. Special emphasis will be given to the spatial and geography lay-out of the community, focusing on how symbolic and informal boundaries function as constraints to the reclaiming of space for the Jamaican government. During my research, I observed the limitations of the spatialization of the state due to these formal and informal boundaries that were present inside some of the garrison communities. I would like to state that I do not intend to generalize my findings to all the garrisons in Kingston, as the garrisons are contextual and non-state actors operate on different levels and in different ways. Due to the sensitive nature and limited visits to the garrison communities, I have not been able to conduct a detailed analysis of one specific garrison community, other than that of August Town that will be discussed in Chapter 5.

First, I will analyze the divers network of state and non-state actors that are most commonly present within a garrison community. More specifically, I will analyze how these non-state actors are operating within networks of power and authority in a single space of a garrison community. Here, I will elaborate on the types of gangs that are most commonly present in garrison community and also by specifically focusing on the Peace Management Initiative, as a non-state actor that is engaged in mediation and conflict prevention that is in line with vertical encompassment. This section will be based on the articles of Jaffe (2013) and Lewis (2012) combined with the book on state responses to gangs in the Caribbean created by Harriot and Katz (2015). Lastly, the spatial and geographical lay-out of the garrison community will be presented to analyze through which practices and mechanisms gang members are preventing access to state officials and security forces to their communities. The specific characteristics of the garrison lay-out in relation to neoliberal developments will be discussed based on the articles of Jaffe & Aguiar (2012), Munroe & Blake (2016) and Jaffe (2012).

3.2 Networks in the Garrisons

Within the garrison communities there are different state and non-state actors operating within a singular space ranging from state officials (mostly during election period), police officers, dons, street gangs and community residents to NGO's, CBO's, international organizations and the church. According to Jaffe, while reflecting on the phenomenon of the hybrid state, 'residents

operate within parameters set by the formal state and the dons. Dons face the constraints imposed by the formal state and by a need to garner loyalty and legitimacy; formal state actors are constrained by economic deficits, electoral imperatives, and international political pressure' (2013: 745). Thus, in agreement with Jaffe, there is a constant power struggle for authority and legitimacy that take place within different spaces, ranging from 'the street corner to the boardroom' (2013: 745). Here, I am focusing on the space of the garrison community and what sort of power struggle is happening on community or local level in relation to the formal state.

As argued in the previous chapter, the presence of the political party affiliations is a central part of the continuous struggle for control in the garrison communities. Levy argues that civil society, in response, should act as 'a counterweight to partisan violence, as these organizations provide an important mediating function and intervene in the conflicts between the citizens and the state' (in Lewis 2012: 47-48). In this instance, civil society is often seen as 'a buffer between the citizens, the family, or the community', it reflects an opposed position with the state and functions outside the realm of the formal state (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 983). Or, in reference to the spatialization of the state, civil society is considered to be 'the zone of mediation between and "up there" state and an "on the ground" community' (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 983). During my research, I have found that the Peace Management Initiative took on this role as 'buffer' between the state and communities by separating themselves from the formal state. Before moving on to the discussion of the PMI, I will make a distinction between different types of non-state armed actors present in certain garrison communities in Kingston.

3.2.1 Non-State Criminal Actors

In general, crime is fluid and with a high level of adaptability it has been difficult to adopt a singular, overarching approach for the Jamaican government in order to regain authority, legitimacy and control in the garrison communities (Harriot & Katz 2015). To understand this struggle, it is important to make a distinction between the types of gangs that are present in the garrison community to see in what kind of network they operate. Whereas, in the next chapter, we will see how the Ministry of National Security and the Jamaican Constabulary Force, as the executive branch of the MNS, deal with the struggle of fluidity and the presence of gangs in garrison communities.

The main distinction among non-state criminal actors is between a street gang and a criminal gang, whereas the former is defined as 'any durable street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity' and the latter as 'a group not necessarily tied to any community, which engages in serious forms of criminal activity, often transnational in nature, that result in economic gain' (Levy 2012 in Harriot & Katz 2015: 3-4). The

groups that are most often present in the garrison communities are 'defence crews' who are often referred to as a street gang, but defined as 'defenders of the community who use guns to protect their communities against violence from rival groups from other communities. They fight for turf, respect and street justice' (Harriot & Katz 2015: 4). Furthermore, according to my respondent you would also have a 'big man' operating in some communities, who is the equivalent of a don, but 'the big man has changed his life around, a businessman and they don't take sides. A big man set a standard where the police them don't have problems'.⁶ A big man would help out in terms of providing equipment for school or providing money if needed and set certain rules within a community in accordance to the law. Thus, different non-state (criminal) actors operate within the same territory and within the same networks of power competing for authority, legitimacy and territorial control.

The non-state criminal actors operating on local level, are prevalent within this research as they contest the authority of the state and that of the JCF directly. Thus, one could have a street gang operating within one area and a defence crew operating on the next corner. What separates them from an organized crime group is that there is generally a lack of organization, they are not solely economically motivated and they mostly operate on the ground (Harriot & Katz 2015: 4). Although dons, as described in the previous chapter, are often linked to organized crime groups and have control over larger areas of a garrison community, one also has to take into account the effect of street gangs and defence crews, as they would operate in the same territory and fighting each other over turf and justice. Moreover, these non-state criminal actors would still be under the control of their community leader, or don, due to the practices of repression and coercion. While, in some cases, these same actors would openly contest the authority of the more powerful don. This diversity of non-state criminal actors that are present in a garrison community, thus poses constraints to the reclaiming of space for the Jamaican government and similarly to dons, due to the diversity of criminal actors and the diverse ways in which they operate. These networks within a garrison community are contextual and continuously transforming the way they operate and challenge the authority and legitimacy of the state.⁷

Thus, when asking respondents about the presence of gangs in their communities, there were mixed responses, as an ex-gang member would argue that gangs still control the community and the police could never take over control⁸, whereas another respondent who volunteered for the PMI stated that gangs are not gone⁹, but have dispersed to communities thus resulting in a

⁶ Interview with Peter Allen conducted on 8 April 2017.

⁷ Interview with Robert Kinlocke (UWI) conducted on 10 April 2017.

⁸ Interview with VI 1 (PMI) conducted on 28 March 2017. A VI is defined as a 'Violence Interrupter' who works for the PMI and is stationed in a community to engage in mediation and conflict resolution.

⁹ Interview with VI 2 (PMI) conducted on 28 March 2017.

fragmentation of power and a third respondent argued that due to the work of the PMI there are no gangs present in their community.¹⁰ The divers statements in relation to the presence of gangs relates back to the differentiation of networks within garrison communities across Kingston that would operate distinctively in each area and, often, residents would not instantly recognize a gang leader or member based on appearance, but from hear-say.¹¹ As my respondent argued, ‘the dress code changed for gangsters, for many reasons’, making it harder for both residents and the police to recognized gang members.¹² Moreover, one could argue that, due to the differentiation of networks, it has become harder for non-state criminal actors to engage in the practices of vertical encompassment, as for community residents it is not clear that gangs exist above and around them anymore. In the next section, I will discuss how the PMI as a non-governmental organization interacts with a diverse network of non-state actors on a daily basis and operates as a ‘buffer’ between the Jamaican government and garrison communities.

3.2.2 The Peace Management Initiative

The Peace Management Initiative (PMI) is a community-based approach to conflict resolution.¹³ The PMI was initially a government-based organization created by the Ministry of National Security in 2002, however the organization has separated itself from the Jamaican government to have a more neutral and legitimate position within the garrisons. The shift away from the formal state was deemed necessary, as one of my respondents would argue, ‘people are kinda distrustful of the government sometimes, especially when it comes to law enforcement’.¹⁴ This neutrality allowed members of the PMI to enter the most volatile and dangerous garrison communities in Kingston and, currently, the PMI is the only organization that has clear access and entry to these communities and is able to engage with non-state criminal actors directly.

The PMI has been able to achieve this neutral status and high level of legitimacy and authority within garrison communities, as they continuously make themselves present and visible through community visits and conducting ‘walkthroughs’. These community visits are conducted with ‘a cadre of experts, such as social workers, violence interrupters, psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, ministers of religion, and data analysts’.¹⁵ According to Erika, who works as a therapeutic intervener for the PMI, a walkthrough means trying to get to know the people, try to talk to all the parties involved and see how they can improve things.¹⁶ More importantly, these types of practices show non-state criminal actors that the organization works in a neutral way without the

¹⁰ Based on interviews with members of the PMI conducted on 28 March 2017.

¹¹ Interview with Peter Allen conducted on 8 April 2017.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20170429/pmi-celebrates-successful-interventions>.

¹⁴ Interview with Erika (PMI) conducted on 28 March 2017.

¹⁵ <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20170429/pmi-celebrates-successful-interventions>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

involvement of the formal state which, in turn, increases the authority and legitimacy of the PMI. Here, one could argue that the PMI, as a non-state actor, also engages in practices of vertical encompassment to make themselves visible in the garrison communities and, by doing so, increases its level of legitimacy and authority in the communities in which it operates.

However, the most important aspect in terms of increasing legitimacy and authority in the garrison community is that the PMI does not share sensitive information with law enforcement or government officials that can incriminate non-state criminal actors.¹⁷ This has significantly increased the level of trust between the organization and non-state criminal actors and it allowed them the unique opportunity to connect with non-state criminal actors, such as dons and members of diverse street gangs and defence crews. Moreover, it has given the organization the unique opportunity to operate in the networks of power within garrison communities and to compete for legitimacy, authority and control that has been difficult to establish for the Jamaican Constabulary Force and other state officials.

The PMI often responds to 'incidents'. This could range from territorial disputes to shootings, but also it conducts follow-ups on communities to see how they are doing. In addition, Hutchinson, the director of the PMI, argued that 'the peace-building approach of the PMI is a 'counterculture', which in some areas has involved the signing of formal peace treaties, bringing together not just warring gangs but also law-abiding residents'.¹⁸ Moreover, by engaging with non-state criminal actors, one could argue that the PMI delegitimizes the authority of gangs and criminal actors by taking over the role of authority figures themselves when operating in a garrison community through the practices of community visits, walkthroughs, and mediation.

The organization is thus mainly concerned with crime prevention and violence interruption through the techniques of mediation and social intervention. It has created a 'four-pronged strategy' that focuses on practices such as violence prevention through mediation and dispute resolution, therapeutic intervention by addressing the psychological impact of violence, youth mainstreaming, focusing on at-risk youth vulnerable to gang involvement and lastly healing and reconciliation through the involvement of the wider community.¹⁹ The PMI engages all residents, but is specifically focused on at-risk youths who are most likely to join a gang on an early age. The PMI shows them, at-risk youth, gang members and community residents, alternative ways of living outside of crime by focusing on education or learning a skill. However, the PMI often does not have the necessary resources to offer these opportunities themselves. Therefore, the PMI

¹⁷ Unanimous statement throughout multiple interviews with community residents of August Town.

¹⁸ <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/news/20151115/pmi-pushes-peace-counterculture-group-identifies-best-practices-reduce>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

collaborates with a range of other agencies or organizations who can offer these opportunities instead.

The interactions between members of the PMI and a diverse array of community members shows a dynamic whereby, in a sense, residents are made 'responsible' for their actions. Although the PMI does not obligate people to participate, by showing them alternatives to crime, it is making residents aware of the possibilities and responsibilities they have toward other community members and their family. As Erika would say during walkthroughs and informal conversations: 'look at the implications for yourself, for your family and the long-term benefits of you being able to move away from this (crime). Because it does impact your life and it definitely can take your life away.'²⁰ This is in line with the idea of 'responsibilization' and self-efficacy and relates to a shift in authority, as residents and especially youths would instead turn to the organization and realise they 'don't need a gang member anymore, I don't need to be in gangs'.²¹ Moreover, it shows that non-state actors, such as the PMI, also engage in practices of 'responsibilization' that initially was seen as a state-centered practice (Sending & Neumann 2006: 657)

As stated above and in line with Ferguson and Gupta, the PMI acts as a 'buffer' between the 'up-there' and 'on the ground' (2002: 983). According to Erika, 'the ground is where you do most of the work anyway, if you are not on the ground it kinda provides a different perspective. Policymakers have a challenge understanding how it works, in the sense that they are not faced to it every day and they don't understand the dynamics of it. So, it is like we are living in two different kind of Jamaica'.²² Thus, the Jamaican government, relating to this example, fails to establish themselves as an all-encompassing entity by lacking the practice of verticality, or simply the visibility on the community-level, especially outside election periods. The JCF is, in this case, the only state actor that operates on a daily basis within garrison communities. However, they face the same constraints as the government, namely that of access to the communities. This will be discussed in the next section.

Thus, as the PMI is operating within the territory that technically falls under the jurisdiction of the police, the PMI and the JCF have established a mutual understanding. When asking about the relation between the PMI and the police, Erika argued that 'we do collaborate in the sense of when we are working in an area the police knows that we are there and we try to respect what they do and they try to respect what we do'.²³ However, the approaches differ vastly, as will be elaborated in the next chapter on state practices and governing strategies. Here, one of the most important aspect for the PMI that allows them access to these territories is that the PMI operates within the

²⁰ Interview with Erika (PMI) conducted on 28 March 2017.

²¹ Interview with VI 3 (PMI) conducted on 28 March 2017.

²² Interview with Erika (PMI) conducted on 28 March 2017.

²³ Ibid.

law and as a general rule they do not work with non-state criminal actors who are wanted by the police in order to uphold their mutual understanding and respect. Another important aspect is that the JCF themselves often have limited access to the most violent and dangerous communities, whereby the PMI is able to access these communities based on their neutral status. A striking example of this collaboration is based on an observation during a community visit, highlighting the network of power and authority operating within the garrison communities. At one instance, the PMI was called to mediate in a territorial dispute between competing gangs within one community. While the director of the PMI was having a conversation with the leader of one of the gangs behind closed doors, the police were called to this location based on an anonymous tip that there was a large group present in this particular area. When the police officers tried to enter the compound, they were sent away by the PMI. When later asking one of the members of the PMI why this happened, he argued that they could not do their work while the police is present.²⁴ This observation reflects the low levels of trust in the police force, while also reflecting the shifting levels of authority and legitimacy away from non-state criminal actors and towards the PMI that they were able to achieve through practices of vertical encompassment, as described above.

3.3 Spatial and Geographical lay-out

In a recent debate, the Minister of National Security set the goal to ‘take back our public space’, that highlights the need to include the spatial and geographical lay-out of the communities to understand how this space has been divided and fragmented.²⁵ Moreover, the analysis of informal and symbolic boundaries is important to understand to what extent this affects policing strategies and state practices and to analyze what kind of constraints the Jamaican government faces to the spatialization of the state.

As argued in Chapter 2, garrison communities are defined as low-income communities with ‘its homogenised party affiliation expressed through community member bloc voting behaviour and partisan mobilisation’ (Munroe & Blake 2016: 4). These characteristics strongly reflect the historical processes of independence, political violence and neoliberal developments described in the previous chapter. In this sense, urban spaces, as argued by Jaffe and Aguiar, are defined as ‘contested spaces where struggles over access and control are played out’ (2012: 155). Combined with the neoliberal developments in the 1980’s, this has had diverse spatialized effects in terms of fragmentation of power, geographical divisions and the emergence of non-state actors. According to Jaffe and Aguiar, ‘this effect has been evident in the fragmentation of urban space, thus traditional socio-spatial borders are either removed or reinforced, while new divisions emerge’ (2012: 154). Here, according to Kinlocke, the geographical lay-out of the garrison communities

²⁴ Informal interview with Milton (PMI) conducted on 29 March 2017.

²⁵ Sectoral Presentation by the Minister of National Security on 26 April 2017.

can be divided along a 'three-tier fragmentation of power'.²⁶ First, there is the administrative division, where the formal boundaries are demarcated by the government. Then, at the next level, there is the fragmentation of the administrative boundaries that consist of the communities who have in turn created informal settlements. Lastly, within those boundaries, smaller sub-sections exist that are controlled by dons, who in turn, have several sub-dons operating under him that control different territories.²⁷ In line with governmentality theory and the idea of 'spatial mobility', as argued in Chapter 1, one could argue that the division of power based on geographical lay-outs could contribute to the limited access of state officials to these communities, as there is a lack of mobility through these territorial boundaries. Moreover, both state actors and non-state actors are further limited by the presence of informal and symbolic boundaries, that will be discussed in the next section.

3.3.1 Access and Entry

The Minister of National Security has argued, that 'we will see the security forces clearing specific communities of gangs, holding their communities, and building out the infrastructure for the social agencies to do their work within these communities'.²⁸ This is in line with one of the main pillars of the National Security policy focused on situational prevention, that will be discussed in-depth in Chapter 4. However, when intervening in the garrisons, one has to consider that the JCF as the branch of the MNS is at a disadvantage when trying to intervene in garrison communities, both in terms of trust and in cooperation, but more importantly in terms of spatiality. As my respondent argued, 'on administrative level they look at the community in a 'top-down perspective'.²⁹ Thus, many of these communities have informal settlements and informal pathways that are not known to the security forces, that non-state criminal actors could use to deter arrest. Moreover, the Ministry of National Security also has to deal with gangs that have control over these territories and will not leave voluntarily. The environmental design that was initially created by the Jamaican government with the purpose to deter crime, has thus been utilized by non-state criminal actors to construct informal and symbolic boundaries in order to limit spatial mobility of both state and non-state actors and to remain in control of 'their' territories.

3.3.2 Symbolic and Informal Boundaries

The boundaries of the garrison communities can be divided along informal, symbolic and physical lines. When discussing these boundaries during an interview, my respondent argued that 'the

²⁶ Interview with Robert Kinlocke (UWI) conducted on 10 April 2017.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Sectoral Presentation by the Minister of National Security on 26 April 2017.

²⁹ Interview with Robert Kinlocke (UWI) conducted on 10 April 2017.

symbolic boundaries are maintained through the very things that precipitated their genesis, so it is really through violence or the threat of violence. Thus, it is the fear of violence that is imprinted on them, so they have to comply with the system of order. If you don't, then the consequences are very real'.³⁰ Thus, residents inside the garrison communities essentially have structured their lives around this system of violence. Moreover, one could argue that non-state criminal actors have effectively engaged in practices of vertical encompassment by creating territorial boundaries that make residents aware that they operate within the constraints posed by non-state criminal actors, as they intrinsically know that certain boundaries exist through coercion of violence and the surveillance of these boundaries.³¹ In agreement with Peter, 'gangs would guard their territory with guns, you do not necessarily see the gun, but you know you have eyes'.³² Thus, the symbolic boundaries are maintained through the appropriation of violence, but more importantly through the perception of the capacity of gangs to use violence that consequently increases the authority, legitimacy and control of non-state criminal actors.³³ Based on my own observations, when accompanying the PMI on community visits, we would drive through diverse garrison communities and you could feel that we were being watched and perceived as 'outsiders', until it was clear that it was the PMI who entered the community.

On the other hand, you would have physical boundaries such as debris, old fridges, car parts and car shells, that sometimes function as explicit markers of territorial boundaries. The purpose of these physical boundaries is to prevent spatial penetration in the community by vehicles to prevent drive-by shootings, effectively limiting the access to both state and non-state actors. More specifically, by making a community less dynamic, residents inside the garrison communities would also be less vulnerable. These practices to limit spatial mobility reflect the aspect of security and protection for their own community that consequently increases the authority and legitimacy of non-state criminal actors that are in control over the particular territory. According to Kinlocke, 'in many cases, you would have to have a good reason to pass through a community'.³⁴ During the community visits with the PMI, I observed potholes and debris placed on intersections to prevent speeding and thus effectively limiting spatial mobility. Moreover, the roads were small allowing access to only one vehicle at a time and all of the houses were walled-in. In relation to state practices and governing strategies that will be elaborated on in Chapter 4, both the physical and informal boundaries limit the effectiveness of policing strategies. This could relate to limited

³⁰ Interview with Robert Kinlocke (UWI) conducted on 10 April 2017.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Interview with Peter Allen (PMI) conducted on 8 April 2017.

³³ Interview with Robert Kinlocke (UWI) conducted on 10 April 2017.

³⁴ Ibid.

access to garrison communities or the JCF might not have been aware of certain boundaries that exist.

Thus, in line with governmentality theory and the idea of spatial mobility, in order for the Jamaican government to spatialize itself in garrison communities, state actors have to be able to 'transgress' space in order to 'regulate and discipline' (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 987). However, as argued above, this ability has been limited due to effective territorial control of non-state criminal actors based on the establishment of symbolic, informal and physical boundaries and through practices of repression and domination that limit the transgression of space for the Jamaican government and the Jamaican Constabulary Force.

Chapter 4 – State Practices and Governing Strategies

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will analyze the state practices and governing strategies of the Jamaican government. Here I will focus on the Tivoli incursion and how it affected state responses and policing strategies to crime and violence. Special emphasis will be given to the Jamaican Constabulary Force as the branch of the Ministry of National Security (MNS) that operates as an intervention mechanism. The JCF is the branch of the government that executes policies of the MNS on local level and thus operates as a means for vertical encompassment.

First, I will discuss the Tivoli incursion and the extradition of Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke to understand how historical and political processes have led to the incursion and how the removal of a central power structure and leadership has affected the governing strategies of the Jamaican government based on the academic work of Munroe and Blake (2016), Lewis (2012) and Harriot and Katz (2015). Subsequently, the state practices and governing strategies of the MNS will be analyzed and discussed based on the MNS policy, Vision 2030, as the overarching framework on crime strategies, and the National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (NCPCSS). These documents are used for the analysis of state strategies to regain authority, legitimacy and control over the inner-city areas of Kingston. Lastly, I will analyze and discuss the policing strategies of the Jamaican Constabulary Force and this will be linked back to the policy formulations and implementations of the Ministry of National Security. This section will be based upon the JCF report of 2015, the article on policing strategies of Jaffe and Meikle (2015).

4.2 Tivoli-Incursion 2010 and the Fragmentation of Power

One of the most significant examples of a post-independence don who has acquired significant power and authority is Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, whose family ruled the garrison community of Tivoli Gardens from the 1960’s until 2010 (Munroe & Blake 2016: 1). The incursion commenced in May 2010 when security forces used lethal force to enter Tivoli Gardens that killed 76 civilians and one soldier. During the incursion, many residents of the garrison showed support for their leader by orchestrating demonstrations and protests in front of Tivoli Gardens, blocking all the main entrances to the community. Dudus Coke eventually turned himself in, ending the violent incursion. He was then charged with gun and drug trafficking and extradited to the United States (Munroe & Blake 2016: 1). According to Levy, ‘the government did something that was long overdue, which was to assert authority. Tivoli Gardens had become a state within a state and

needed the assertion of authority to say enough, you must be subject to our laws'.³⁵ Here, we see the initial steps taken by the Jamaican government to reclaim the space previously occupied by a powerful non-state criminal actor who took over the governing role of the formal state within a garrison community.

As most of the garrison communities, Tivoli Gardens had a governing system that had 'its own justice and security system, its own systems of execution, welfare, and economic activity around Jamaica's largest network of markets' (Lewis 2012: 49). As one of my main respondents argued, 'Dudus set himself up as if he's a government. He loved to see everybody happy, he tried his best to see the community, not just his community, but overall in the neighboring community, where they would have a problem and he would fix it. Don't know how he do it, but he do it. With Dudus leadership it set a center stage, we could live from the ruling, the teaching, the principality of what he was trying to do'.³⁶ The principles that the respondent discussed, revolved around not stealing inside and outside the community, and more importantly, there was a low number of homicides in and around the community, as Dudus 'cut out the politics war', resulting in a decrease in political killings and homicides in general.³⁷

The incursion was an excellent example of the linkages between crime and politics. It exposed the constraints the Jamaican government faced in reclaiming this area dominated by one of the most powerful leaders, Dudus Coke, but it was also an opportunity for the government to overcome these constraints and to show its citizens that they are doing something to remove criminals from the garrison communities (Harriot & Katz 2015: 213-217). Although the Jamaican government took the necessary steps to regain authority and legitimacy in one of the most powerful garrison communities, the government failed to utilize this opportunity to fill the power vacuum that was created with the removal of the central leadership of Tivoli Gardens.

When asked about the aftermath of the Tivoli Incursion, my respondent argued that there was no one around at the time, some police officers would come in and 'deal the citizens like animals'.³⁸ There was nothing done about the poverty level or education, 'nobody look at West Kingston people'.³⁹ Thus, with the removal of the central leadership in West Kingston, there opened up a power vacuum in which many young people took over the role of don in a non-traditional sense of having the status as a don through the act of killing, but not wanting to provide the services that the traditional don provided to their communities. As my respondent argued in relation to the

³⁵ Interview with Horace Levy conducted on 17 March 2017.

³⁶ Interview with ex-gang member conducted on 8 April 2017.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

removal of Dudus Coke, 'you can't just move X and then leave a vacuum, somebody [is] going to go in that space and fill it and not with the reason it is supposed to be filled'.⁴⁰

On the other hand, Levy argued that the Tivoli incursion did change the garrisons in the sense that 'the garrisons as a completely closed off area is not so closed off anymore'.⁴¹ More importantly, one of the main achievements of the Tivoli incursion is that 'a trend in crime and violence which lasted for almost 30 years was disrupted' (Harriot & Katz 2015: 217). In support of this development, the homicide rate declined to an average of 39,2 per 100.000 inhabitants in 2012 as opposed to around 60 per 100.000 in 2009.⁴²

4.3 State Practices and Responses

Based on the historical and political processes described above, the state practices of the Jamaican government have faced many difficulties in terms of high levels of corruption and socioeconomic inequality, limited access to the garrisons, competing authority structures and high levels of crime and violence. The state as a central institution has lost authority, legitimacy and control inside the garrison communities due to neoliberal developments and the state's incapacity to provide the necessary goods and services that consequently allowed for 'co-rulership of the communities of the urban poor' by the dons (Jaffe 2012: 194). However, as argued by several respondents, the state is perceived as a centralized institution and overseer of the country.⁴³ Moreover, the Jamaican government provides the legal and regulatory frameworks, a mechanism that allows the government to engage in state practices to reduce crime and violence to regain authority, legitimacy control over garrison communities (Moloney 2013: 16).

According to Levy, one of the main critiques surrounding the state responses on crime and violence is that there is a lack of 'systematic and region-specific understanding of gangs, gang members and gang problems' that need to be addressed to be able to mitigate gang violence and control (in Harriot & Katz 2015: 2). Moreover, based on interviews I conducted with residents from garrisons during community visits, the state is still seen as 'up there' somewhere. Although one would see banners or posters of a specific party inside the garrison communities, that reflect the party-political history, the main critique that I have heard multiple times is that politicians and members from parliament do not 'show' or make themselves visible on the ground to see what these residents are struggling with on a daily basis.⁴⁴ In line with governmentality theory, one could argue that state officials do engage in practices of verticality where the state is seen as an institution somehow 'above' civil society, but fail to engage in practices of encompassment,

⁴⁰ Interview with VI 2 (PMI) conducted on 28 March 2017.

⁴¹ Interview with Horace Levy conducted on 17 March 2017.

⁴² UNODC Homicide Report 2013, p.83.

⁴³ Fieldnotes.

⁴⁴ Interviews with several respondents from August Town and the PMI.

where the state is perceived to be 'around' its citizens (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982). As argued by Ferguson and Gupta, these practices 'produce spatial and scalar hierarchies' (2002: 982). However, in this case it has increased the separation between the 'up there' and 'down here' and consequently diminished the legitimacy and authority of the state on a local level.

The state practices and governing strategies can be divided into three main categories; namely legislative strategies, suppression strategies and intervention and prevention strategies that are currently used to guide the policymakers of the Ministry of National Security on policing strategies and gang reduction. The legislative strategies of the Jamaican government entail the process of drafting legislation, to 'uncover the scope and nature of the gang problem' and it provides 'law enforcement guidelines and national standards' in relation to crime prevention, reduction and social intervention (Harriot & Katz 2015: 14). The second strategy of the government is suppression strategies. These strategies are currently the primary response of the Jamaican government and are linked to the Jamaican Constabulary Force as the executive branch for state intervention. These strategies entail: 'arrest, prosecution, intermediate sanction and imprisonment' and are often used in a knee-jerk reaction and on 'incident by incident rating' (Harriot & Katz 2015: 15). However, the suppression strategies have faced many setbacks due to the lack of knowledge on non-state criminal actors inside garrison communities and severe human rights violations due to extrajudicial killings by security forces.

Lastly, the intervention and prevention strategies of the Jamaican government are aimed 'to weaken or limit attraction of forming or joining a gang in the first place, as a long-term strategy' (Harriot & Katz 2015: 17). One of these strategies relates to prevention techniques on community-level by NGO's or civil society organizations. Moreover, in line with the work of the PMI, this specifically entails peace agreements and mediation practices. These strategies are aimed to 'encourage members to tolerate political diversity' in order to reduce political violence and killings (Harriot & Katz 2015: 17). Another governing strategy relates to address and identify root causes focusing on improving academic, economic, and social opportunities. Therefore, these social interventions techniques are aimed at the community-level, mainly to deter at-risk youths from crime and gangs (Harriot & Katz 2015: 17-18). Thus, in line with governmentality theory, we can differentiate between different types of state practices relating to suppression, intervention, and prevention techniques.

However, according to Harriot and Katz and in line with the concept of responsabilization, 'recent gang-control efforts have positively impacted public confidence in law enforcement and the idea of community self-efficacy' (2015: 213). Here, self-efficacy is defined as 'people's beliefs about their capabilities to produce designated levels of performance that exercise influence over events that affect their lives. Self-efficacy beliefs determine how people feel, think, motivate themselves

and behave' (Harriot & Katz 2015: 213-214). Referring to neoliberal governmentality and the idea of responsabilization, citizens would have the sense that they are in control over their immediate surroundings, while the state has transferred these 'responsibilities' towards non-state actors. These gang control efforts and governing strategies have shown citizens that they too are responsible for the reduction of crime and reduction of gang presence within their own communities, while the Jamaican government remains in control and 'overseer' over these social processes, as previously argued by Sending and Neumann and Joseph (2006: 657, 2010: 227).

Although the authority structures and power of the gangs inside the garrison communities have not been fully broken and removed, there have been advances made during the post-Dudus period in terms of community efforts, rebuilding trust and reformulating policing strategies following the Tivoli-incursion in 2010. According to several respondents I have interviewed, there has been an increase in the level of trust in the police and their strategies.⁴⁵ This will be discussed at the end of this chapter. Moreover, when asking one of my main respondents whether the government is capable of reclaiming the areas dominated by crime and gangs, he argued that they have the power to do it. 'It is just to keep the focus on each area having crime and violence. We have enough citizens now who are trying to work with the police. So yes, they have the power to do all those things'.⁴⁶

4.3.1 National Security Policy

The National Security Policy of the Jamaican government is aimed at 'reducing violent crimes, preventing increases in crime, strengthening the justice system, and promoting the rule of law' (Harriot & Jones 2016: xi). The general policy acknowledges the problems of high levels of homicide, violent crime, drug trade and corruption linked to the garrison communities and therefore aims to provide a holistic approach. The strategy on crime management and prevention is, therefore, built on five pillars that consist of 'crime prevention through social development, effective policing processes, sure and swift justice, reducing re-offending and situational prevention'.⁴⁷ For this research, the main focus is on effective policing processes that are defined as 'increased efforts that pursue police reform by bridging the gap between institutions and citizens through mechanisms such as community policing'.⁴⁸ Another relevant pillar within this research that relates to the spatial and geographical lay-out described in the previous chapter, is situational prevention. This refers to 'measures that reduce opportunities for particular crime and violence problems through spatial interventions'.⁴⁹ Moreover, the pillar of crime prevention

⁴⁵ Interviews with several respondents from August Town and the PMI.

⁴⁶ Interview with ex-gang member conducted on 8 April 2017.

⁴⁷ See Summative Matrix on 5-Pillar Crime Management Strategy.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

through social development to address the root causes of violence and ‘the malfunctioning of society’ is an important aspect of regaining control of the garrison communities.⁵⁰ However, this has been partially excluded from my research, as I have not encountered these measures and practices to tackle root causes of crime in practice during my field research. Lastly, the measure of social intervention is used by different state and non-state actors operating within the garrison communities. The measure of social intervention has been briefly addressed in the previous chapter and will be elaborated on in the next chapter on August Town.

4.3.2 Vision 2030 and NCPCSS

Vision 2030 is the overarching framework and long-term development plan for Jamaica that has been created and implemented across all ministries of the Jamaican government. Vision 2030 was established in 2009 and aims to achieve the status as a developed nation by 2030 (Harriot & Jones 2016: x). The main goal stated in Vision 2030: National Security and Correctional Services, is that the policy ‘seeks to reduce the involvement of young people in crime, instil a culture of law among all citizens, and restore public trust in the protective services. It calls for a holistic approach focusing on root cause eradication and greater participation of community members and the private sector in national reduction efforts’.⁵¹ The state practices and responses to violent crimes are focused on ‘capacity building in communities to participate in creating a safe and secure environment, modernizing law enforcement systems and strengthening the anti-crime capability of law enforcement agencies’.⁵²

The Ministry of National Security has set forth, in addition to the general policy on crime and violence, the National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (NCPCSS) to lay-out the ‘course of action for the next decade’ both short-term and long-term.⁵³ Whereas Vision 2030 is the overarching framework of the Jamaican government and the Ministry of National Security, the NCPCSS is incorporated within Vision 2030 for the implementation of crime prevention and community safety initiatives. Therefore, the MNS has adopted a need-based approach that is specific to each community that focuses on a holistic approach and in close collaboration with the police, NGO’s, community-based organizations and its residents. The most relevant aims that are laid-out within this policy are reducing the trust gap between police and citizens, address deep-rooted social and institutional response problems and to rethink current policing strategies.⁵⁴ Both strategies have made it clear that in order to regain control, legitimacy and authority in the garrisons, i.e. to reduce crime and violence significantly and to reduce gang presence, it is

⁵⁰ Sectoral Presentation by the Minister of National Security on 26 April 2017.

⁵¹ NCPCSS 2013, p.10.

⁵² Ibid, p.iii.

⁵³ Ibid, p.vii.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p.5.

necessary to reduce the perceived gap between the state, police and the communities and to increase the level of trust to gain cooperation and, possibly, the rejection of the authority structures of dons. Thus, 'the NCPCSS has been developed in support of overarching national development and security policies and to help provide a co-ordinating framework for the crime prevention and community safety aspects of a number of justice and police reform initiatives'.⁵⁵

To conclude this section, the NCPCSS acknowledges the presence of alternative governance structures, or parallel governance structures, and argues that 'a strengthened state, with responsive systems of justice and policing, as well as responsive social services can diminish the influence and supplant such groups'.⁵⁶ Here, one could argue that the Jamaican government is making increasing efforts to overcome the 'culture of dons' in the garrison communities through formulating adaptive policies that incorporate and acknowledges the non-state authority structures of dons.

4.4 State Intervention: The Jamaican Constabulary Force

The Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) is the executive branch of the Ministry of National Security that conducts state intervention 'on the ground'. The JCF has a history of predatory strategies and extrajudicial killings leading to human rights violations that, consequently, have significantly reduced the level of trust among residents in the police force (Blake 2013: 59). This has also been acknowledged in the NCPCSS, as 'continued abuses of citizens' rights have created an uneasy distance between the police and citizens, particularly in urban underserved communities'.⁵⁷ This 'distance' has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the policing strategies of the JCF and the level of authority and legitimacy that the JCF holds and, consequently, limits the spatialization of the state through the ineffectiveness of these predatory policing strategies.

The strategic priorities of the JCF have thus focused on reducing this trust gap and 'to enhance respect of human rights and human dignity'.⁵⁸ This requires a strong commitment to uphold 'high standards of integrity and the provision of high quality services'.⁵⁹ However, the JCF has been faced with a low police to population ratio and corruption. Moreover, the police force is losing 500 to 1000 members annually due to poor conditions, poor pay and inequality within the police force.⁶⁰ This also contributes to the low levels of trust and ineffective policing strategies. When asking a respondent working for the PMI about police control in the communities, he argued that 'the police would never control a community, the gangs control the community. When the police

⁵⁵ NCPCSS 2013, p.9.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p.7.

⁵⁷ NCPCSS 2013, p.5.

⁵⁸ JCF Annual Report 2011-2015, p.18.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Interview with Horace Levy conducted on 17 March 2017.

come in the community, everybody knows the police, they would come with an attitude'.⁶¹ To clarify, the police would be looking for a person, often involved in a gang, and they would 'mash-up' innocent people for information and, in effect, decreasing their authority and legitimacy as a police officer.

In order to avoid these situations of harassment, physical abuse and in some cases extrajudicial killings that harm the credibility, authority and legitimacy of the police force, the JCF 'recalibrated its gang suppression tactics and introduced some new elements' (Harriot & Katz 2015: 230). These elements consist of a 'more permanent and active presence' within the garrison communities and by doing so are actively challenging 'the gangs for territory and support for the residents' (Harriot & Katz 2015: 230). Thus, in line with the NCPCSS, the Ministry of National Security is promoting effective policing by using practices, such as community based policing and social intervention strategies to become more involved in the communities and, therefore, trying to bridge the gap between the JCF and residents.⁶² This relates to the shift from 'hard-style' policing towards a softer approach that will be described in the next section.

4.5 From 'Hard-Style' to 'Soft-Style' Policing Strategies

Following the Tivoli-Incursion in 2010, there has been much debate 'on the efficacy of previous policing strategies in combatting the country's high rate of crime' (Jaffe & Meikle 2015: 75). This particular discussion revolves around the use of 'hard-style' policing methods, or paramilitary strategies, such as 'harsh anti-gang legislation, military curfews and death squads, that were reinforced during and shortly after the incursion in order to regain control over these areas. According to Jaffe and Meikle, 'the government and security forces have been weighing the pros and cons of 'hard' and 'soft' policing styles in diminishing the influence of organised crime in inner-city neighbourhoods (2015: 75). Initially, the Tivoli-incursion led to new governing strategies, such as the idea of being 'tough on crime', however, these 'hard-style' policing strategies were not seen as effective. Consequently, the post-incursion strategies to reduce crime and to tackle the presence of gangs in the communities also led to the inclusion of 'softer' policing strategies in order to be able to 'mainstream inner-city communities' and to overcome the lack of trust in the security forces (Jaffe & Meikle 2015: 76).

As described above, one of the main issues in terms of regaining control over the garrison communities is the trust gap and low level of cooperation between residents and the police, caused by extrajudicial killings, corruption, human rights violations and paramilitary policing strategies. To address this issue, the JCF adopted a 'soft-style' policing approach, specifically

⁶¹ Interview with VI 1 (PMI) conducted on 28 March 2017.

⁶² NCPCSS 2013, p.26.

focused on community-based policing. Hence, in agreement with the NCPCCS, 'the traditional style of para-military policing is not suitable to deliver modern policing'.⁶³ The community-based policing approach was initially established in 2006 as 'the preferred model of policing to reduce crime in Jamaica'.⁶⁴ However, only recently this has begun to gain some foothold in the community and among the JCF. Initially, the police force would only respond to violent incidents by increasing police surveillance and placing extra police posts in the community, but these practices would not necessarily increase their legitimacy and authority. Therefore, the JCF changed this reactive approach to a more proactive approach in terms of crime prevention.⁶⁵

This has been noticed by many respondents when conducting interviews, as Levy stated when asked about policing strategies of the JCF, 'one thing in particular has please me very much is that he [the Prime Minister] has not taken the hard-line approach, this calling on the police to use force to resolve the problems. So, this is the first PM who has taken the position that says longer term way of social intervention is the way to deal with violence, not paramilitary policing, not 'hard-policing'.⁶⁶ This strategy focuses specifically on the relation between the police and residents within an inner-city community that promotes 'problem solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions to give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime'.⁶⁷

Another policing strategy, as stated in the Annual Report of the JCF, is 'continuous training and education for members of the JCF', specifically focused on the use of 'less lethal devices'.⁶⁸ According to the JCF, this approach has increased the level of trust and information sharing between residents and the police. Moreover, the JCF have increased police surveillance and, in collaboration with the MNS, have adopted spatial intervention techniques, such as camera surveillance and urban renewal, referring to the increase of street lighting in high risk areas and zinc fence removal. In line with the idea of vertical encompassment, these specific practices significantly increase the 'presence' of state actors throughout garrison communities, as it makes residents and non-state criminal actors 'aware' that the state is actively present in the communities through the use of camera's and other spatial intervention techniques.

When asking about the relation with the police, Peter, who is a long-term resident of the garrison communities himself, argued that 'the police, they are doing a wonderful job now. They are not hostile as before towards the guys, the youths them. They are not coming *killy killy* as before, they

⁶³ NCPCCS 2013, p.6.

⁶⁴ JCF Annual Report 2015, p.14.

⁶⁵ Interview with Robert Kinlocke (UWI) conducted on 10 April 2017.

⁶⁶ Interview with Horace Levy conducted on 17 March 2017.

⁶⁷ JCF Annual Report 2015, p.14.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p.18.

try to work with the gangsters as well.⁶⁹ The move from hard style approach to a soft style approach had a significant impact on the relation between the police and community residents. This has been confirmed by police officers who stated that doing a 'walkthrough' or simply talking to residents inside the community, have helped to reduce the trust gap within specific communities and has led to an increase in cooperation and less extrajudicial killings.⁷⁰ This is also reflected in the annual report of the JCF, where the statistics of police fatal shooting have decreased since the Tivoli incursion and in 2015 it has been the lowest since 2011.⁷¹

To conclude, in line with governmentality theory, the JCF did engage in practices of vertical encompassment to assert authority within garrison communities. However, due to their history of predatory strategies that resulted in extrajudicial killings and human rights violations, these practices remained ineffective for the regaining of control in these communities. On the other hand, the acknowledgement of these ineffective 'hard-style' policing methods and shift towards a 'soft-style' policing strategy that focused on restoring the relation with the community has deemed successful. Thus, these softer practices, such as community-based policing and 'walkthroughs' have significantly increased the authority and legitimacy of the JCF on community-level.

⁶⁹ Interview with Peter Allen conducted on 8 April 2017.

⁷⁰ Interview with police officer conducted on 5 April 2017.

⁷¹ JCF Annual Report 2015, p.18.

Chapter 5 – A Case Study Analysis: The Success of August Town

5.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to elaborate on a case study where there was a significant reduction of crime and a reduction of gang presence inside a garrison community in Kingston, which opened up space for the government to take back control. I came across this case study while I was doing research in Kingston upon reading the Jamaica Gleaner. What struck me was a newspaper article that showed the celebration of the zero-murder rate that was achieved in August Town in 2016.⁷² This story made me wonder through what practices and strategies this particular community was able to significantly reduce the presence of gangs. This chapter, therefore, centers around the case study of August Town, formerly known as one of the most violent communities in Kingston. Due to extensive collaborative processes between different state and non-state actors, August Town was able to achieve a zero-murder rate in the year of 2016.⁷³ Although August Town is not ‘there’ yet, it has made significant achievements in reducing crime and violence through engaging in divers practices of vertical encompassment within competing networks of authority.

I will start by describing the violent history of August Town in the early 2000’s, leading up to the establishment and signing of the peace agreement in 2008. Subsequently, I will move on to elaborate on the success of August Town in reaching a zero-murder rate in 2016 decreasing the presence of gangs in the community. Lastly, I will analyze the practices and strategies in relation to the NCPCCS guideline on community-building and crime prevention. The article of Charles (2004) will be used throughout this chapter to describe the political party affiliations and criminal violence that signified August Town before the peace agreement in 2008.

5.2 August Town: A Brief History

The garrison community of August Town is divided into five areas that make up the whole of the community consisting of Afghan Garden, Rose-Town Village, Goldsmith Villa, Hermitage, and August Proper.⁷⁴ Thus, August Town is divided into sub-communities, as previously argued in Chapter 3 where a three-tier fragmentation of power exists in the garrison communities through which different state and non-state actors operate and engage in vertical encompassment. Consequently, these sub-communities have their own identity and have their own unique way of responding to crime and violence in the community.⁷⁵

⁷² <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20170108/no-shot-nah-bus-murder-free-2016-august-town>.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Interview with Kenneth Wilson conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

August Town has a strong history of political party affiliations and political violence. Although the community is predominantly considered to be a PNP constituency, there have been tensions between JLP supporters and PNP supporters that led to outbreaks of violence in the past. Thus, based on the strong political affiliation and socio-economic marginalization, August Town can be classified as a garrison community (Charles 2004: 38). When referring to the history of August Town, my respondent who is a peacebuilder and respected elder in the community, argued that 'everybody talks about August Town, a lot of badness and whatever. It was like every corner fighting against one another. Even them *'fren a fights genes fren'* [even friends were fighting friends]. It was horrible, terrible'.⁷⁶

The overarching assumption of August Town during the early 2000's, was that of a community 'where residents of this politically divided community allegedly resolved their differences without resorting to violence' (Charles 2004: 38). Due to this perception, several state and non-state actors already tried to incorporate crime reduction programmes. However, the presence of non-state criminal actors and political violence, specifically during the 2002 elections, remained due to the strong political ties and remnants of the garrison politics of the 1960's and 1970's, which led to the failure of these programmes (Charles 2004: 64).

The non-state criminal actors that were actively present at that time, ranged from street gangs to organized crime groups. Here, Jungle 12 was considered to be the most powerful non-state criminal actor in the area. According to Mr. Wilson, Jungle 12 'had a very far reach, the larger part of the community was under their control'.⁷⁷ In agreement, Charles stated that 'the Jungle 12 enforcers saw themselves as defenders of the community against the criminal corner gangs in Hermitage' (2004: 66). The leader of Jungle 12, therefore, could be seen as a traditional and post-independence don who actively challenged the authority and legitimacy of the state through the establishment of an alternative governing system. More specifically, the leader of Jungle 12 created an informal justice system and provided protection and social services for the community. Mr. Wilson would counterargue that 'they claim protecting people and really, what they are doing is they are protecting themselves, as them got the enemies come at them'.⁷⁸ However, Jungle 12 still enjoyed strong support from residents in the community, often out of fear through the constant threat of violence, as argued by Kinlocke in Chapter 3. This support allowed these non-state criminal actors to remain in control of the territory.

Since Jungle 12 had adopted the role of informal police, the JCF within the community was seen as an obstacle to their role as 'community provider'. According to Charles, 'the constant presence of

⁷⁶ Interview with peacebuilder from August Town conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁷⁷ Interview with Kenneth Wilson conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

the formal police would put pressure on the informal justice system' (2004: 69). One could argue that the competing networks of authority in the community and the presence of the JCF consequently limited the practices of vertical encompassment for Jungle 12 and paved the way for the peace agreement in 2008, as discussed below.

5.3 The Peace Agreement

The community of August Town was thus seen by many state and non-state actors as a place with 'a lot of *badness*'.⁷⁹ The community had been plagued by periods of extreme violence for several years and there was a high level of gang presence within the community. However, a change occurred in 2008 when a diverse array of both state and non-state actors came together and decided that 'enough is enough'. The actors that were involved consisted of community residents, Horace Levy as a board member of the PMI and chairman of the meeting, police officers of August Town, gang members, scholars from the University of the West Indies, a reverent from the Church, and Members of Parliament.⁸⁰ During this process, Mr. Wilson was seen as the cornerstone of the peace agreement, as he actively spoke about the atrocities that were taking place in the community and took action to fix the 'problem'.⁸¹ 'So, these individuals should be acknowledged for the role they play in ensuring the citizens find, you know, solutions to the problems other than just resorting to violence and destruction of life so I'm saying they are to be given credit'.⁸²

Based on the collaborative effort between both state and non-state (criminal) actors, a peace agreement was drafted and signed in 2008. According to Mr. Wilson, as the initiator of the peace mission, 'the peace agreement in 2008 made a big difference. Basically, [it] put an end to the gang warfare sort of speak'.⁸³ The peace agreement was signed for a period of five years wherein gang members were required to end all forms of gun violence in the community. The exact demands of the peace agreement were stated as follows:

1. 'All persons are allowed to move freely across all boundaries, regardless of reputation or affiliation.
2. No gun salute or any other shooting is taking place in the community for a period of at least five years.
3. Corner leaders have a responsibility to guide and counsel their mentees, urging them to abhor domestic violence, theft, extortion, carnal abuse, rape and other crimes'.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ Interview with peacebuilder from August Town conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁸⁰ <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/focus/20170319/andre-hylton-august-towns-war-and-peace>.

⁸¹ Interview with Principal in August Town conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Interview with Police Commissioner conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁸⁴ <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120708/focus/focus1.html>.

In line with governmentality theory, the non-state criminal actors involved in the peace agreement were required to increase the spatial mobility within the community for all actors involved to allow unrestricted access in and out the community. One could argue that the removal of informal, symbolic and physical boundaries would consequently lead to an increase of state presence in the community, either by state officials or members of the JCF as the executive branch of the MNS. Moreover, as stated in the peace agreement, gang members were obligated to withhold from any gun violence in the community during this period and thus taking away the means for non-state criminal actors to assert authority and legitimacy in the community, as previously done through the coercion of violence. Lastly, in line with the neoliberal form of governmentality, non-state criminal actors were made 'responsible' for their mentees to deter them from any type of crime. Here we can see that the peace agreement consequently limited the practices of vertical encompassment for non-state criminal actors and thus limiting the level of authority, legitimacy and control within this particular community.

Although the peace agreement stated the necessary means and practices to effectively limit the authority and legitimacy of non-state criminal actors in the community, there have been ups and downs following the signing of the peace agreement in 2008. Due to the upsurge of violence in 2012, many actors involved thought that this rise in violence would be the end of the peace agreement.⁸⁵ As a response, it was argued that the peace agreement was just a 'façade', giving people a false sense of security. According to Levy, gangs had no intention of turning in their guns, because 'it is a matter of their own protection, as they feel that the police are inefficient and ineffective'.⁸⁶ Despite these views, community members and police officers remained active and kept engaging in practices, such as youth clubs, soccer matches and other activities, to tackle crime and violence, and to limit the presence of gangs. This led to a significant decline in the murder rate from 2013 and led to a zero-murder rate in 2016 which was widely celebrated as 'the success of August Town'.⁸⁷ As one of the peacebuilders argued, 'the people really needed the change, because they were tired of certain things, so it was good. The whole community collaborated and we can't stop improving, because when you stop they [criminals] get time to do what they want all over again'.⁸⁸

Currently, the type of crime that is still present in the community is 'simple things like people having confrontations with each other, or domestic issues'.⁸⁹ In addition, when asking Mr. Wilson if there were still gangs present in the community, he said that they are still there but they are

⁸⁵ <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120708/focus/focus1.html>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Based on interview with Police Commissioner of August Town conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁸⁸ Interview with peacebuilder from August Town conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

'non-functioning', while adding that 'truth to be told is that many of them [gang members] have changed, they changed their whole operation, their behaviour. They see that, most of them realize that, that kind of life is not working anymore.⁹⁰ Thus, the peace agreement limited the authority and legitimacy of non-state criminal actors based on an extensive and continuous collaborative effort that opened up the space for state actors, such as the JCF, to reclaim authority in the community. Moreover, in collaboration with the PMI, gang members were offered alternatives to crime. Consequently, non-state criminal actors no longer hold authority and legitimacy in August Town. Thus, in line with neoliberal governmentality, this could be referred back to the emergence of a form of 'responsibilization' among community residents combined with the efforts of other state and non-state actors to decrease gang presence in the community.

5.4 A Collaborative Effort in Crime Reduction

Instead of a fragmentation of power, a lack of trust and a lack of cooperation, that are prevalent in garrison communities in West-Kingston, the success of August Town has been based on a collaborative effort, both by state and non-state actor. One of the most important collaborations that has not been discussed in this chapter, is the collaboration between the JCF and community residents. As argued in previous chapters, the relation between the residents and the police throughout Kingston was essentially non-existent due to a significant lack of trust.

According to the Police Commissioner of August Town, this has significantly changed due to the gradual shift towards the soft-style policing practices following the Tivoli-Incursion in 2010. The Police Commissioner argued that 'we sorta soften the approach, coming from all of those years that it was numbing strategies that they used and we try to change all of that and try to soften our policing approach'. This has meant an increase in practices, such as community-based policing and one-on-one policing. However, this shift has also been met with several constraints within the police force as police officers had to change their mentalities based on years of implementing 'hard style' policing strategies referring to the 'police stepping in and breaking down your doors and asking questions'.⁹¹ According to the police commissioner, this has not been an easy transformation, but they kept asserting the soft-style approach. 'So, it is a slow integration from one style to another style' and it has proven successful'.⁹²

The policing strategies that have been adopted in August Town reflect the change to the 'soft-style' policing method, as discussed in Chapter 4. The JCF in August Town have gradually adopted a community-based policing strategy, whereby police officers in August Town conduct a 'walkthrough' and actively engage with citizens. As previously argued, these practices

⁹⁰ Interview with Kenneth Wilson conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁹¹ Interview with Police Commissioner conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁹² Ibid.

significantly increase their visibility and presence in the community and consequently their level of authority and legitimacy. This is similar to the violence interruption program of the Peace Management Initiative, as described in the Chapter 3. When asking to elaborate on these types of policing strategies, the police commissioner explained that 'you naturally walk from house to house, talk to citizen about what they want to see, how they want the police to hear you. They would tell us that they don't like this or want to change that. So, we sorta adjust, we sorta put all of what they mention to us and we put it together and pick the best practice from it'.⁹³

In addition, the police force of August Town is involved in many initiatives in the community, such as youth clubs, church initiatives, parenting groups and would also have corner meetings where the police interact with the people on the corner.⁹⁴ This has significantly increased the level of trust and cooperation between residents and the JCF, contributing to the low level of crime and violence in the community. As one of the peacebuilders in August Town stated 'we have a good relationship with the police. [We show outsiders] that we have been working with the police [in a good way] and they are doing the same with us'.⁹⁵ These shifting networks of power and authority away from non-state armed actors toward the JCF and in turn to the government to regain control over the garrison communities, have been highlighted through the case study of August Town. As Mr. Wilson argued that 'because of the empowerment of citizens they [gangs] have to take a back-seat, because the relationship between the police and the community have increased that much, where citizens are now sharing more information with the police, so that also helped to cripple the gangs'.⁹⁶ According to Kinlocke, 'the best pro-active approach is to use the few police you have in the community to engage the citizens of the community to get productive outcomes'.⁹⁷

5.5 NCPCSS and Community-Building

The relative success of August Town in terms of reducing crime and gang presence is also reflected in the NCPCSS guideline for community-building and crime prevention, as argued in Chapter 4. The Jamaican government has established a framework to address crime and community safety and to work towards sustainable peace focusing on a need-based approach that can be applied to different contexts and 'to respond to the specific challenges of different communities'.⁹⁸ The change in approach is reflected in the NCPCSS and the four steps that refer to increase of community safety and crime prevention. These steps can all be traced back to the peace agreement in August Town and is reflected in four connected stages.

⁹³ Interview with Police Commissioner conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁹⁴ Interview with Kenneth Wilson conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁹⁵ Interview with peacebuilding from August Town conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁹⁶ Interview with Kenneth Wilson conducted on 27 March 2017.

⁹⁷ Interview with Robert Kinlocke (UWI) conducted on 10 April 2017.

⁹⁸ NCPCSS 2013, p.32.

As reflected in the NCPCCS, the boundaries between these stages are dynamic and flexible. First, the NCPCCS states that in order to address community safety it is necessary to instigate a peace treaty or agreement to 'broker the peace'.⁹⁹ The peace agreement in August Town reflects this initial stage, when a diverse array of both state actors and non-state (criminal) actors drafted and signed the treaty in order to reduce crime and violence in the community. The second stage is to 'assess and understand crime and violence'. The content of the peace agreement in August Town shows the understanding of gang presence and the type of practices non-state criminal actors engaged in before drafting the peace agreement. The most important aspect of the peace treaty was to increase spatial mobility and to prohibit the use of guns that are normally used as a means to increase territorial control and as a practice of vertical encompassment used throughout garrison communities in Kingston.

The third stage of the NCPCCS focuses on practices of community building.¹⁰⁰ As argued above, August Town has shown significant developments relating to the increase of cooperation and trust between residents and the JCF, who are actively engaging in practices of vertical encompassment, such as 'walkthroughs', police youth clubs, and participating in community activities. The last phase of community-building and crime prevention, as stated in the NCPCCS, is to 'secure development'.¹⁰¹ This is the current phase of August Town and in order to sustain the low levels of crime and violence, it is necessary to keep engaging in continuous follow-ups by state actors. In addition, Erika argued that 'the problem is constant engagement. We still go to August Town now, because you have to contemplate, you know, reinforce the goals and the objectives, because you have young men who were not grown at that time who might want to get involved in something, so you have to have that constant engagement'.¹⁰² Thus, one could argue that constant engagement is an important practice of vertical encompassment to create an awareness among residents that both state actors and non-state actors, such as the PMI, are actively present and visible in the community to prevent non-state criminal actors to regain authority and control in the community.

According to several respondents, the main issue preventing constant engagement is the availability of resources. For August Town, this relates to a lack of investments to provide opportunities to deter citizens and at-risk youths from crime. Moreover, these investments are also necessary to improve public and private spaces, living conditions, and to increase the access and availability of education and jobs.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ NCPCCS, p.32.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Interview with Erika (PMI) conducted on 28 March 2017.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

To conclude, August Town could be seen as a model community for other garrison communities in West-Kingston. This has been stated throughout several interviews and as a police officer in August Town would argue 'if they would put our police force in communities in West-Kingston we could fix their problems, because of our approach'.¹⁰⁴ It is also a model that the Ministry of National Security could use in collaboration with the JCF and community residents. This highlights the need for a context-specific approach that should incorporate bottom-up perspectives and initiatives combined with top-down policy strategies focused on social intervention and crime reduction programmes. In comparison to August Town, the inner-city areas of West-Kingston show that the government cannot implement a one-size-fits all approach, as the garrison communities in West-Kingston still face high levels of crime, violence and inequality and are context-specific.¹⁰⁵ According to a recent news article, the homicide rate in Jamaica has seen an increase of 20 percent in 2016, while August Town achieved a zero-murder rate.¹⁰⁶ This reflects the success of their approach and practices of vertical encompassment. In addition, when asked about who holds the ultimate control in August Town to reflect on the effectiveness of these practices, one resident argued: 'I would say the community has the authority with the police. Everybody. That is why we have to keep on having meetings and dialogues. So, it is not a one-man issue'.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Interview with police officer from August Town conducted on 5 April 2017.

¹⁰⁵ http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/West-Kingston-will-be-ungovernable-for-many-years-to-come_17467951.

¹⁰⁶ http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/jamaica-homicides-jump-20-per-cent--highest-level-in-5-years_48331.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with peacebuilder from August Town conducted on 27 March 2017.

Chapter 6 – Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

The main aim of this research was to understand how the Jamaican government is and has been trying to reclaim its authority and legitimacy within low-income communities predominantly controlled by a diverse network of gangs, and how these non-state governing actors are acting as constraints to the reclaiming of space and control. The research question, as specified in the Introduction, was built on this theoretical framework and the empirical context and stated as follows:

Which governing practices, policies and techniques does the Jamaican government engage in to regain authority and legitimacy in the gang-dominated garrison communities in Kingston during the post-Dudus period 2010-2017?

Throughout this thesis I have addressed and analyzed the main issues surrounding the reclaiming of control in the gang-dominated garrison communities in Kingston by highlighting the historical and political processes of party politics and neoliberal developments. These processes essentially gave rise to the power of dons as alternative authority structures that challenge the authority of the state within these areas. Moreover, I have addressed the diversity of actors and non-state actors that operate within subtle networks of power within a single space by focusing on types of non-state criminal actors, the Peace Management Initiative, the JCF and the case study of August Town.

To understand these networks of authority and power and how dons, as non-state governing actors, were able to create a 'shadow state' and contest the authority and legitimacy of the government, I have placed this research within the analytical frame of governmentality. This frame allowed me to understand the shifting networks of power from state institutions towards non-state (criminal) actors within a non-Western context, namely that of a developing country. I have shown that the analytical frame of governmentality can be applied to a non-Western context that has experienced neoliberal developments, as the Jamaican government is still seen as a centralized state with strong state institutions and whose governing strategies fit the aspects of governmentality theory.

6.2 The Reclaiming of the State

To be able to answer the research question, the key component of this research has been the spatialization of the state and the practices of verticality and encompassment to understand how the Jamaican government has been trying to regain authority and legitimacy in the gang-

dominated garrison communities in Kingston following the Tivoli-Incursion in 2010. The governing practices, policies and techniques that were highlighted throughout this research have been focused on the state practices of the Ministry of National Security, the policing strategies of the JCF, and that of non-state criminal actors inside garrison communities. Moreover, the Peace Management Initiative, as a non-state actor, has played a vital role in the shifting networks of power due to their constant engagement in practices of vertical encompassment, such as that of community visits, walkthroughs, mediation and conflict resolution that significantly enhanced their presence and consequently acts as a 'buffer' between the Jamaican government and the communities.

In reference to the academic debate on the emergence of non-state governance, this research has been placed within this debate and has shown the importance of the inclusion of non-state (criminal) actors when studying the processes of governance and governmentality. This research reflects the main assumptions on the emergence of non-state governance, namely that of neoliberal developments and the 'retreat' of the state, and the weakening of state institutions in terms of the provision of social goods and services. Within this research, the inclusion of non-state governing actors and their specific practices of vertical encompassment are relevant, as within this research these actors have shown to act as constraints to the spatialization of the state and the reclaiming of space. In line with governmentality theory, due to the successful practices of vertical encompassment of by these non-state (criminal) actors, specifically referring to dons as community leaders, they have been able to delegitimize the authority and legitimacy of the state and have assumed the shift in power from the formal state towards the non-state (criminal) actors.

The Tivoli-Incursion in 2010 and removal of 'Dudus' Coke consequently led to power vacuums throughout the garrison communities and reflected a change in approach of state practices and governing strategies of both the Jamaican government and the JCF. Here, I argue that the post-Dudus period (2010-2017) saw a change in mentality among state and non-state actors, in relation to acknowledging the reduced efficacy of state practices and policing strategies. The change in mentality led to a change in approach to reduce crime and the presence of non-state criminal actors throughout garrison communities in Kingston. Thus, while researching the practices and techniques of the Jamaican government, the five pillars of the MNS, and the NCP.CSS described in Chapter 4, this change in approach has shown that the Jamaican government acknowledges the presence of the alternative governing structures of dons and the lack of state control. As a result, the MNS has adapted its governing strategies to include a holistic, comprehensive and need-based approach. This includes the adopting bottom-up aspects of community building and social intervention techniques to tackle the non-state authority

structures of dons and to reduce the presence of other non-state criminal actors. Moreover, in relation to the JCF, this led to the change from predatory, or 'hard-style' policing strategies to the inclusion of 'soft-style' practices, such as community-based policing and the increasing engagement between residents and the police. This allowed the JCF to be more engaged with community level and consequently enhanced their presence and visibility within garrison communities. Here, the JCF successfully engaged in practices of vertical encompassment.

These changes in state practices and governing strategies also signify the willingness to overcome the limitations that have been prevalent in the reclaiming of space, that have been discussed in previous chapters. One of the most significant limitations, that is reflected in the pillar of situational prevention, is the limited and restricted access to garrison communities for state actors and the JCF. This lack of access significantly reduced the ability to engage in practices of encompassment. While it became clear during interviews that the state is still seen as somewhere 'up-there', or as the 'overseer of social processes' and according to some holds the ultimate authority, the state has failed to engage in practices of encompassment. This relates to a severe lack of visibility and presence of state actors within garrison communities, especially outside the election periods and consequently limits the level of authority and legitimacy of the Jamaican government. Thus, one could argue that there is a significant gap between the 'up-there' and the local level that has affected, to some extent, the level of authority and legitimacy the Jamaican government holds inside garrison communities.

Whereas non-state criminal actors, specifically referring to dons, effectively engaged in practices of vertical encompassment through the provision of social goods and services and due to territorial control based on the practices of repression, coercion and surveillance. This relates to another limitation that the Jamaican has acknowledged by adapting new policies on policing strategies, namely to restore the trust gap between the police and community residents. As argued in previous chapters, this trust gap has developed based on a history of predatory strategies, extrajudicial killings and human rights violations. Here, the study of August Town has shown us that these limitations could be overcome in other garrison communities through the continuous engagement of state and non-state (criminal) actors within a community.

In addition, August Town has shown us that it is possible for the state to regain authority and legitimacy within garrison communities, based on a collaborative effort between a diverse array of state and non-state actors, with the inclusion of gangs. This has been achieved, first, by establishing guidelines for the community to allow more spatial mobility in order for the state to 'transgress space'. Second, by taking away the means of coercion for non-state criminal actors to prevent spatial mobility and effective policing. Third, by adopting soft-style policing methods and through engaging in practices, such as walkthroughs and one-on-one policing methods to

significantly increase the level of trust and cooperation between the JCF and community residents. One of the pitfalls in adopting a long-term strategy that has been done with the implementation of the peace agreement in 2008 is that it is not a straight line towards success. The danger herein is that short-term achievements often trump long-term commitments. As we have seen in the predatory policing strategies of the JCF that often been a 'knee-jerk' reaction to violent incidents, while it did not prove to be effective in terms of crime reduction and these strategies did not increase the authority and legitimacy of the Jamaican government. However, the shift towards soft-style policing methods following the Tivoli-incursion does show the necessity of adopting practices and policies that focus on the long-term goals of crime prevention and the reduction of non-state criminal actors in terms of constant engagement with all actors involved.

Although significant achievements have been made in terms of adopting a community-based policing approach, social intervention techniques and shifting the focus towards a need-based approach that is specific to each community, there still is a lot to be done in terms of implementing the necessary strategies to achieve the same level of success as August Town. The presence of non-state criminal actors and the continuous gang wars combined with informal boundaries and pathways makes it difficult for the police and state officials to access these communities and, consequently, makes it also harder to implement the need-based strategies that are necessary to increase the level of trust and cooperation between state and non-state actors.

Here, the PMI has achieved great results in terms of reducing the trust gap, providing alternatives to at-risk youths and to reduce the level of crime and violence in communities through practices of mediation and conflict resolution. However, to fully overcome the limitations above that prevent the spatialization of the state and the reclaiming of space, it is important that the Jamaican addresses structural problems and root causes of the problem. For example, by increasing the effort of the government to increase the accessibility and availability of education and employment for residents living in the low-income garrison communities in Kingston. As shown through the work of the PMI, providing alternatives to crime will significantly help to deter youths from crime and to make it interesting for non-state criminal actors to change their way of living. As one of my respondents, who lives in West-Kingston, stated that the main reason for changing his livelihood was because he was provided with alternatives.¹⁰⁸ Currently, he works as a violence interrupter for the PMI.

6.3 Recommendations

I would like to address some recommendations for future research. During my research, I have experienced a lack of knowledge about the networks between non-state criminal actors and the

¹⁰⁸ Interview with ex-gang member conducted on 28 March 2017.

types of roles they adopt. This is necessary to fully understand the shifting and dynamic networks of power that involves non-state criminal actors. Thus, my recommendation is to conduct an in-depth case study analysis about the different roles non-state criminal actors adopt and how they consequently challenge the authority and legitimacy of ruling dons within a specific garrison community to effectively analyze the divers gang network in a community.

Another recommendation is to conduct a study about the effectiveness of the types of crime reduction programmes on the long-term, to clearly assess which programmes work and which strategies do not work. Due to the constraints the government faces in terms of resources and the limitations discussed above, it is therefore necessary to know which types of programmes are effective. As argued in the case study of August Town, the essential idea is that there is no one-size fits all approach to the reclaiming of space in Kingston, as there are many different types of non-state (criminal) actors operating within different networks of power and authority. More specifically, each garrison community has its own particular social ontology and context. Here, my recommendation is to research and assess the effectiveness of different types of programmes relating to community safety, social intervention techniques, crime reduction and prevention and placed within different garrison communities to assess the applicability of these programmes.

Appendix

Abello-Colak, A. & Guarneros-Meza, V. (2014) 'The Role of Criminal Actors in Local Governance' *Urban Studies*, 51(15): 3268-3289.

Arias, D.E. et.al. (2012) 'The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social Order in Rio de Janeiro' *American Ethnologist*, 38(1): 293-325.

Blake, D.K. (2013) Shadowing the State: Violent Control and the Social Power of Jamaican Garrison Dons' *Journal of Ethnographic & Qualitative Research*, 8: 56-75.

Charles, C.A.D. (2004) 'Political Identity and Criminal Violence in Jamaica: The Garrison Community of August Town and the 2002 Election' *Social and Economic Studies*, 53(2): 31-73.

Clarke, C. (2006) 'Politics, Violence and Drugs in Kingston, Jamaica' *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 25(3): 420-440.

Davis, D. (2009) 'Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communities, and Shifting Patterns of Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern World' *Contemporary Security Policy*, 30(2): 221-245.

Davis, D. (2010) 'Irregular Armed Forces, Shifting Patterns of Commitment, and Fragmented Sovereignty in the Developing World' *Theory and Society*, 39(3): 397-413.

Demmers, J. (2017) *Theories of Violent Conflict* London & New York: Routledge.

Ferguson, J. & A. Gupta (2002) 'Spatialising States: Towards an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality' *American Ethnologist*, 29(4): 981-1002.

Harriot, A. & C.M. Katz (ed.) (2015) *Gangs in the Caribbean: State Responses of State and Society* Kingston, The University of the West Indies Press.

Harriot, A. & M. Jones (2016) 'Crime and Violence in Jamaica' *IDP Series on Crime and Violence in the Caribbean*.

Henry-Lee, A. (2005) 'The Nature of Poverty in the Garrison Constituencies in Jamaica' *Environment and Urbanization*, 17(2): 83-99.

Holness (2017) 'Prime Minister Urges Citizens to Reject Culture of Dons', January 5, 2017 Retrieved from <http://jis.gov.jm/prime-minister-urges-citizens-reject-culture-dons/>.

Jaffe, R. & J.C.G. Aguiar (2012) 'Introduction - Neoliberalism and Urban Space in Latin America and the Caribbean' *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, 33: 153-156.

Jaffe, R. (2012) 'Crime and Insurgent Citizenship: Extra-State Rule and Belonging in Urban Jamaica' *Development*, 55(2): 219-223.

Jaffe, R. (2012) 'Criminal Dons and Extralegal Security Privatization in Downtown Kingston, Jamaica' *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, 33(2): 184-197.

Jaffe, R. (2013) 'The Hybrid State: Crime and Citizenship in Urban Jamaica' *American Ethnologist*, 40(4): 734-748.

Jaffe, R. & T. Meikle (2015) 'Police as the New Don? An Assessment of Post-Dudus Policing Strategies in Jamaica' *Caribbean Journal of Criminology*, 1(2): 75-96.

Jamaica Gleaner (2015) 'PMI Pushes ... Peace Counterculture Group Identifies Best Practices to Reduce Violence', November 15, 2015. Retrieved from: <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/news/20151115/pmi-pushes-peace-counterculture-group-identifies-best-practices-reduce>.

Jamaica Gleaner (2017) 'August Town's War and Peace', March 19, 2017. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/focus/20170319/andre-hylton-august-towns-war-and-peace>.

Jamaica Gleaner (2017) 'No-Shot-Nah-Bus – Murder-Free 2016 for August Town', January 8, 2017. Retrieved from: <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20170108/no-shot-nah-bus-murder-free-2016-august-town>.

Jamaica Gleaner (2017) 'PMI Celebrates Successful Interventions' April 29, 2017. Retrieved from: <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20170429/pmi-celebrates-successful-interventions>.

Jamaica Observer (2014) 'West Kingston will be Ungovernable for many years to come', September 14, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/West-Kingston-will-be-ungovernable-for-many-years-to-come_17467951.

Jamaica Observer (2016) 'Jamaica Homicides Jump 20 Percent, Highest Level in 5 Years', January 10, 2016 http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/jamaica-homicides-jump-20-percent--highest-level-in-5-years_48331

JCF Annual Report 2015 by the Jamaican Constabulary Force. Retrieved from https://issuu.com/jamaicaconstabularyforce2015/docs/annual_report_final_2015.

Joseph, J. (2010) 'The Limits of Governmentality: Social Theory and the International' *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(2): 223-246.

Lea, J. & K. Stenson (2007) 'Security, Sovereignty, and Non-State Governance 'From Below'' *Canadian Journal of Law and Society*, 22(2): 9-27.

Lewis, R. (2012) 'Party Politics in Jamaica and the Extradition of Christopher 'Dudus' Coke' *The Global South*, 6(1): 38-54.

Lund, C. (2006) 'Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa' *Development and Change*, 37(4): 685-705.

Ministry of National Security (2013) – A New Approach: National Security Policy for Jamaica. Retrieved from <http://www.cabinet.gov.jm/node/383>.

Ministry of National Security (2013)– National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (NCPCSS). Retrieved directly from the Ministry of National Security Information Service.

Ministry of National Security (2017)– 5-Pillar Strategy Crime Management and Citizen Security. Retrieved from <https://www.mns.gov.jm/content/five-pillar-strategy-crime-prevention-and-citizen-security>.

Moloney, K. (2013) 'Governing Without Collaboration: State and Civil Society Relations in Jamaica' *International Public Management Review*, 14(1): 1-26.

Monroe, M. & D.K. Blake (2016) 'Governance and Disorder: Neoliberalism and Violent Change in Jamaica' *Third World Quarterly*: 1-16.

Rose, N., O'Malley, P. & M. Valverde (2006) 'Governmentality' *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 2(1): 83-104.

Sectoral Presentation by the Minister of National Security Robert Montague on April 27, 2017. Retrieved from <https://www.mns.gov.jm/content/speeches>.

Sending, O. & I. Neumann (2006) 'Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGO's, States, and Power' *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(3): 651-672.

Sives, A. (2002) 'Changing Patrons, from Politicians to Drug Don: Clientelism in Downtown Kingston, Jamaica' *Latin American Perspective*, 29(5): 66-89.

Stoker, G. (1998) 'Governance as Theory: Five Propositions' *International Social Science Journal*, 50(155): 17-28.

United Nations on Drugs and Crime (2013) – Global Homicide Rate Report. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf.