

The Role of Users in the Platform Economy

A comparative case study of institutional change by users of Airbnb

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Summary

An enormous increase in the number of users of peer-2peer (P2P) service platforms has recently displaced, altered, or threatened existing and regulated markets. Moreover, these platforms have boosted discussions about their economic and social value and are concurrently changing social and economic dynamics, which has both intended and unintended consequences. These consequences involve changes in legitimacy and legality, which can be defined as institutional change. This thesis is one of the first that aims to explore and explain institutional change due to P2P service platforms. As platforms facilitate the communication between its users, the dynamics are different than in traditional businesses. It is expected that the role of the user is more prominent and pro-active in influencing institutional change. This leads to the following research question: *What is the role of users of home sharing platforms in influencing institutional change?* In this thesis a framework is constructed to explain and emphasize the role of users in institutional change. This role is explored during a comparative case study of three cities in which Airbnb is active; Amsterdam, New York, and London. Four types of data sources are used; newspaper articles, policy reports, user initiatives reports, and expert interviews. These are analysed by means of event history analysis, to obtain a comprehensive overview of institutional change due to Airbnb and its users. The main finding is that a platform's users play an important role in influencing institutional change. This becomes apparent through three distinctions; type of user, type of activity, and type of influence. Firstly, there are users who already have a legitimate position and possess specific knowledge, the expert user, and the 'regular' user who does not have specific knowledge. Secondly, there are activities with a high barrier, these are time consuming and specific knowledge is needed, and there are activities with a low barrier, these are less time consuming and often involve the expression of an opinion. Thirdly, there are activities that influence the degree of legitimacy, these are aimed at accustoming the society to the new service, and there are activities that influence the degree of legality, these are aimed at mobilising regulatory support. To conclude, this thesis shows that the degree of legality is predominantly influenced by activities with a high barrier, which are mostly performed by hosts. While the degree of legitimacy is predominantly influenced by activities with a low barrier and are performed by all users.

“In simpler times, people threw Tupperware parties or took in lodgers. Now they run pop-up supper clubs or rent out spare rooms on Airbnb”

– The Daily Telegraph
(London)
February 20, 2016

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**“Get big first, then negotiate with the government
about the rules”**

– The Daily News (NY)
April 23, 2014

1. Introduction

In the past few years, a new type of service has been introduced which has experienced a considerable growth (Mair & Reischauer, 2017). This type consists of peer-2-peer [P2P] service platforms, which enable customers to order or provide access to goods or services in exchange for payment (Busch et al., 2016). These platforms have displaced, altered, or threatened existing and regulated markets (Constantiou et al., 2016; Kenney & Zysman, 2015). For example, Uber has altered the taxi market, and Airbnb is challenging the housing market and the hospitality industry by facilitating people to engage in home sharing (Constantiou et al., 2016; Kenney & Zysman, 2015). Consequently, this has boosted discussions about the economic value of P2P service platforms and their impact on traditional businesses.

Moreover, these platforms not only initiated economic debates, also the social impact is part of the overall discussion. The main topics of these debates are for example labour exploitation, unequal access for low-income and minority communities, and the status of regulation and taxation (Frenken & Schor, 2017; Schor, 2016). These discussions illustrate that economic and social dynamics are changing (Kenney & Zysman, 2016; Mair & Reischauer, 2017). These changing dynamics involve intended and unintended consequences, such as challenged labour structures and the commercialisation of personal assets. Subsequently, this provokes different opinions and an increased interest from among others, policy makers (Mair & Reischauer, 2017; Martin, 2016).

Intended and unintended consequences can be categorised in changes in legitimacy and legality. An enormous increase in number of users of P2P service platforms (McKee, 2016) indicates a change in legitimacy of these platforms. While cities concurrently cope with divergent regulatory debates and policy challenges and respond to these challenges differently (Codagnone & Martens, 2016), which indicates changes in legality.

Changes in legitimacy and legality are necessary for new businesses, and thus these P2P service platforms, to become part of institutional frameworks (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). P2P service platforms are often at first perceived as illegal or illegitimate because of their newness, in the form of, for example, labour structures which differ from traditional businesses. Therefore, they do not align well with current institutional frameworks (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Möhlmann, 2015). At first they are thus part of the informal economy, perceived as illegal, illegitimate, and/or often unregulated. Changes in legitimacy and legality, and thus changes in institutional frameworks are necessary to become part of the formal economy, being legal, legitimate, and regulated. These changes are defined under the umbrella term; institutional change.

This thesis focuses on the changing dynamics, intended and unintended consequences, and changes in legitimacy and legality, due to P2P home sharing platforms. These platforms are prone to all economic, social, legitimacy and legal topics of discussion and have seen different developments in different urban institutional frameworks (Schor, 2016; Schor, 2017). P2P home sharing platforms are defined as infrastructures that enable their users to order or provide access to a home in exchange for payment.

Changing dynamics, consequences, and changes in legitimacy and legality in the form of institutional change have had much attention of scholars, and studies have been performed into the activities that have to be executed to initiate institutional change (Battilana et al., 2009; Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2016). Few of these studies, however, have focused on institutional change from an innovation or technology perspective. The lack hereof is two-sided. On the one hand the newness of the topic is exciting. On the other hand it is more difficult to connect the phenomenon to existing theory.

Research into new phenomena adds to new research directions, while it simultaneously adds to understand practices (Mair & Reischauer, 2017).

Moreover, research on institutional change has to date focused solely on dynamics in traditional businesses. However, home sharing platforms enable different dynamics, as they are infrastructures that facilitate the communication between its users. These users are heterogeneous and have to be attracted and engaged, and can execute activities on behalf of the platform. Users are understood as “*crucial to a platform’s capacity to cultivate and capture value*” as they are not solely consumers but they are the creators, producers, and generators of value, content and data (Langley & Leyshon, 2016; p. 12). The role of the consumer has thus changed and has become more important, prominent, and pro-active as users (Constantiou et al., 2016). It is therefore expected that users can facilitate or oppose the institutionalisation of a platform. This dynamic is, to date, not yet studied from an institutional theory perspective. However, this perspective enables the identification of reasons why certain users choose certain activities to change institutions in an urban context and why some succeed and others do not.

This thesis aims to fill these two knowledge gaps and extend existing institutional theory by theorising what characteristics and conditions are relevant in the case of institutional change by users of a platform. The aim is to provide a better view on what users engage in institutional change activities, why they perform activities that contribute to or hinder the institutionalisation of a platform, and how these activities of users influence institutional change. Therefore, the main question of this study is the following:

What is the role of users of home sharing platforms in influencing institutional change?

The question is explored during a comparative case study of three cities in which home sharing platform Airbnb is active; Amsterdam [NL], New York [USA], and London [UK]. Airbnb is chosen as a platform as this is currently the largest home sharing platform and has seen extensive debates about its legitimacy and legality. It is therefore interesting to study Airbnb in the context of institutional change (Mair & Reischauer, 2017; Schor, 2016). Amsterdam, New York, and London have all three seen different institutional outcomes and different development paths. In London and in Amsterdam, Airbnb is part of the institutional setting as it is allowed, however in both cases under different circumstances (Kraniotis, 2016; Woolf, 2016). In New York Airbnb regulation is restrictive and renting out an apartment through Airbnb is illegal in most cases (Katz, 2017). These differences are clarified in this study by using a process approach, which enables the exploration of Airbnb in all three cities during the time of introduction until the current situation.

Insights in this process of institutional change due to home sharing platforms is also of societal value. Firstly, it can help policymakers understand this process of change, how to react to this new form of businesses and how to shape valuable policies, regulations, and laws that create an honest, fair, and safe playing field for organisations and citizens. Secondly, it can help to understand the change in informal institutions, such as norms and values that occur in the different layers of society. Moreover, it provides an understanding and it educates the market and the society in these changes and in what activities can be engaged to influence institutional change.

This thesis is structured as follows: firstly, the concepts needed to understand the process of institutional change due to a platform and its users are discussed. After this, Chapter 3 provides an explanation of the explorative nature of the research, of Airbnb as a case, and of the process approach for the analysis. Chapter 4 presents the results that are obtained during the study, which are discussed and analysed. Chapter 5 presents the answer to the research question and Chapter 6 concludes with the theoretical and practical implications.

2. Theoretical Review

This chapter contains the theoretical background and concepts that are used to guide this thesis. Firstly, the overall process of institutional change is introduced. After which, the process is divided into two parts. In Section 2.2 the enabling conditions for institutional change are discussed. Hereafter, Section 2.3 discusses the activities that initiate and influence institutional change by means of institutional work. These three sections contribute to the understanding of the institutional change and the dynamics of this process, which enables the identification of the role of the user in these conditions and activities. Therefore, subsequently, the role of the user is discussed and different types of users are categorised.

2.1 Institutional Change

Institutional theory explains the behaviour of actors and the emergence and diffusion of common practices by emphasising the relevance of institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995). The behaviour of actors, firms, and organisations is shaped by these institutions and constitute constraints and incentives for innovation (Edquist, 1997). In this context institutions are *“sets of common habits, norms, routines, established practices, rules, or laws that regulate the relations and interactions between individuals, groups, and organisations. They are the rules of the game”* (Fagerberg et al., 2005; p. 182).

Institutions, however, do not only shape and influence actors, actors can purposefully diverge from these institutions and initiate change (Giddens, 1984). Actors are able to change or maintain the institutional context they operate in (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Eisenstadt, 1964) while this institutional context influences their behaviour (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). The institutional context consists according to Scott (1995; 2008) of three types of institutions; regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions. Regulative institutions refer to *“rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities”* (p. 222). Examples of regulative institutions are standards, formal rules, laws, incentives, and sanctions. Normative institutions refer to a *“prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life, stressing appropriate behaviour”* (p. 222). Normative institutions are created by social formation. Cognitive institutions refer to *“symbolic systems; the use of common schemas, frames, and other shared symbolic representations that guide behaviour”* (p. 222). Cognitive institutions are for example the use of symbols, such as words or myths, but also beliefs and priorities.

In this thesis I make a similar distinction, and I assume that an organisation institutionalises through two levels; the degree of legitimacy and the degree of legality. This distinction is based on the definition of institutions of Faberberg et al. (2005) and the distinction of Scott (2008). A change in the degree of legitimacy refers to a change in common habits, norms, values, and established practices [normative and cognitive institutions]. A change in the degree of legality refers to a change in rules and laws that regulate relations and interactions [regulative institutions].

In order to initiate institutional change time and effort are crucial. It is therefore crucial that actors engage in activities that create or transform institutions. The actors engaging in these activities are called institutional entrepreneurs and have an interest in changing a particular institutional context (Battilana et al., 2009), i.e. the platform, the users of the platform and other actors involved in this particular institutional context. Institutional change is, however, a process that is enabled by certain conditions. Battilana et al. (2009) distinguished between two enabling conditions for institutional change; field characteristics and an actor's social position.

2.2 Enabling Conditions

Field Characteristics

Field characteristics are the characteristics of an environment in which actors are embedded. Three types of field characteristics are found to influence institutional entrepreneurship. The first characteristic is that of jolts and crises, which *“include social upheaval, technological disruption, competitive discontinuity, and regulatory changes that might disturb the socially constructed, field-level consensus and invite the introduction of new ideas”* (Battilana et al., 2009; p. 74). The second characteristic is the degree of heterogeneity, which refers to the diverging characteristics of institutional arrangements in a field. Multiple institutional arrangements provide opportunities for agency and action. Heterogeneity often prompts contradiction, which causes for actors to be more likely to question institutions and possibly diverge from these institutions (Battilana et al., 2009). The third field characteristic is the degree of institutionalisation. *“Lower degrees of institutionalisation are associated with higher levels of uncertainty in the institutional order, which might provide opportunities for strategic action”* (Battilana et al., 2009; p. 75).

Actor’s Social Position

The actor’s social position is relevant for two types of actors; the organisation and the individual actor. An actor’s social position is found to affect both the perception of the field and the access to resources that are needed in order to change institutional arrangements. Studies have found evidence that institutional change can be initiated by either organisations characterised by a low status at the periphery of a field as well as by high status organisations at the centre of a field. Whether an organisation at the centre or at the periphery of a field initiates divergent change might be due to differences between the degree of heterogeneity and institutionalisation. Also, organisations that find themselves at an intersection between fields are more likely to initiate divergent change (Battilana et al., 2009). The social position of individual actors, i.e. the user, is also stated to be an enabling condition. Initiators of institutional change tend to be actors that have a legitimate position in the field (Battilana et al., 2009). The social position of an organisation or a user *“is likely to influence ... the likelihood that the given actor will engage in institutional entrepreneurship”* (Battilana et al., 2009; p. 77). The organisation and the user can both engage in institutional entrepreneurship independently, however both actors can also jointly engage in institutional entrepreneurship through interaction. This interaction between organisations and users, however, is not yet fully understood and studied (Battilana et al., 2009).

The actor’s social position thus influences the perception of the field characteristics. Subsequently, this influences the likelihood of institutional work activities being performed, as it influences the institutional entrepreneurs’ perceived need for institutional change.

2.3 Institutional Work

The concept of institutional work describes the activities that are executed in order to initiate institutional change, persuade others that change is necessary, or maintenance is needed (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Institutional entrepreneurs use the activities described by the notion of institutional work to initiate and influence institutional change. Institutional work, however, adds to institutional change activities a focus on maintaining activities which are focused on counteracting and resisting change. In this particular study, this is an important focus to include as it is likely that some involved actors and users are against change and will perform activities to maintain current institutions.

Institutional work offers a framework which focuses on the agency of actors related to shaping their institutional context (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2016; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). This agency refers to activities purposefully executed by actors in order to create, maintain, and disrupt institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). This framework created by Lawrence & Suddaby (2006) draws from institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) as well as legitimacy literature

(Suchman, 1995). Therefore, the framework includes both strategies for changes in the degree of legitimacy as well as changes in the degree of legality.

2.3.1 Creating Institutions

The creation of institutions explains activities that are executed by actors to enable the formation of institutions. These activities are mostly described in studies in the field of institutional entrepreneurship and refer to a wide range of actors that have resources and skills as well as actors that constitute a more supporting role (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Leblebici et al., 1991). Creating institutions involves especially political work to enable the introduction of new regulations and policies. However, it also involves reconfiguring belief and meaning systems in order to change normative and cognitive institutions (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2016). Therefore, creating institutions refers to both initiating change in the degree of legitimacy as well as in the degree of legality.

Lawrence & Suddaby (2006) have defined nine sets of activities that can be executed by actors, and thus also by users of platforms to create institutions. These are presented in Table 1 below, which is adapted from Lawrence & Suddaby (2006).

Table 1. Forms of institutional work for creating institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).

Forms of institutional work	Definition
Advocacy	The mobilisation of political and regulatory support through direct and deliberate techniques of social suasion
Defining	The construction of rule systems that confer status or identity, define boundaries of membership or create status hierarchies within a field
Vesting	The creation of rule structures that confer property rights
Constructing identities	Defining the relationship between an actor and the field in which that actor operates
Changing normative associations	Re-making the connections between sets of practices and the moral and cultural foundations for those practices
Constructing normative networks	Constructing of inter-organisational connections through which practices become normatively sanctioned and which form the relevant peer group with respect to compliance, monitoring and evaluation
Mimicry	Associating new practices with existing sets of taken-for-granted practices, technologies and rules in order to ease adoption
Theorising	The development and specification of abstract categories and the elaboration of chains of cause and effect
Educating	The educating of actors in skills and knowledge necessary to support the new institution

2.3.2 Maintaining Institutions

Maintaining institutions refers to activities that are employed in order to keep institutions in place. Institutions do not automatically remain in effect without maintenance (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2016). Both highly institutionalised structures as well as less institutionalised structures need verification and ratification by actors. Actors consciously or unconsciously incorporate institutions in their daily lives. This can be in the form of routine, however most often they use institutions to “*specifically counteract ongoing change or destabilization*” (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2016; p. 301). Maintenance activities are therefore likely to negatively influence changes in the degree of legitimacy and the degree of legality.

Lawrence & Suddaby (2006), in their literature review, have defined six types of activities that can be executed in order to maintain institutions. These are presented in Table 2 below, which is adapted from Lawrence & Suddaby (2006) and Fuenfschilling & Truffer (2016).

Table 2. Forms of institutional work for maintaining institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).

Forms of institutional work	Definition
Enabling work	The creation of rules that facilitate, supplement and support institutions, such as the creation of authorising agents or diverting resources
Policing	Ensuring compliance through enforcement, auditing and monitoring
Deterring	Establishing coercive barriers to institutional change
Valorising and demonising	Providing for public consumption positive and negative examples that illustrates the normative foundations of an institution
Mythologizing	Preserving the normative underpinnings of an institution by creating and sustaining myths regarding its history
Embedding and routinizing	Actively infusing the normative foundations of an institution into the participant's day to day routines and organisational practice.

2.3.3 Disrupting Institutions

Disrupting institutions is the least well known form of institutional work. It is often seen as complementary to institutionalisation and as a consequence of the emergence and diffusion of new institutions (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2016; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Previous research, however, has shown that it can also be actively pursued by actors, by executing the types of institutional work that are presented in Table 3, adapted from Lawrence & Suddaby (2006). Disrupting activities are expected to positively influence changes in the degree of legality and the degree of legitimacy.

Table 3. Forms of institutional work for disrupting institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).

Forms of institutional work	Definition
Disconnecting sanctions	Working through state apparatus to disconnect rewards and sanctions from some set of practices, technologies or rules
Disassociating moral foundations	Disassociating the practice, rule or technology from its moral foundation as appropriate within a specific cultural context
Undermining assumptions and beliefs	Decreasing the perceived risks of innovation and differentiation by undermining core assumptions and beliefs

2.4 Role of the User

The previous part enables the identification of activities that have brought about institutional change, which subsequently allows for the exploration of the role of users in these activities. As mentioned before, P2P service platforms do not operate as traditional companies for which these theories have been constructed. Traditional organisations are most often based on a bipolar transactions between the consumer and the producer. P2P service platforms, however, are based on a triangular transaction. Within this transaction, the platform functions as a mediator and the users are both the providers and the consumers of the service (Busch et al., 2016). Therefore, the role of the user has become more prominent (Langley & Leyshon, 2016). Users are perceived as the creators of value for these platforms. This can be value in the form of economic value and social value. It is therefore assumed that users can also perform the abovementioned activities in order to create a favourable

institutional context. As platforms function on the notion of momentum, large amounts of users are necessary to become successful (Constantiou et al., 2016; Kreijveld et al., 2014), and these users are highly heterogeneous. Moreover, as explained in Section 2.2 all users have a certain social position which influences the likelihood that these users will engage in institutional work activities. To structure these heterogeneous users, they are categorised in certain user groups.

Three distinctions between user groups can be observed in the case of platforms. These distinctions are made as it is expected that the users in these categories will perform different activities of institutional work. The first distinction is based on the two-sided nature of the platform (Constantiou et al., 2016) and divides users into providers and consumers. The second distinction refers to the time of adoption. This distinction divides between innovators and early adopters and late adopters and laggards (Rogers, 2010). The third distinction refers to the level of commitment of the user of the platform and divides between active users and non-users (Wyatt et al., 2003). The three distinctions are expected to influence both the degree of legitimacy as well as the degree of legality, as all categories are expected to be able to mobilise support from and influence either regulatory bodies and society. The distinctions are elaborated on below.

2.4.1 Providers vs. Consumers

The core business of P2P service platforms is that of facilitating and mediating the supply and demand side of services (Constantiou et al., 2016). There are two main categories of users of platforms, namely the users on the supply side that provide a service and the users on the demand side that purchase the service. Platforms attract users by making the interaction through the platform more efficient than when transacting directly (Eisenmann, 2006). These two-sided markets are characterised by network effects, if the demand side increases in number, it is most likely that the supply side will also increase and vice versa (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2008). As *providers and consumers* use the platform differently and therefore will probably attach value to the platform differently, it is expected that both groups take in a different role (Böcker & Meelen, 2016) and execute different activities in the process of institutional change. In the case of home sharing platforms, providers are called hosts, and consumers are called guests. These terms are used interchangeably in the remainder of this thesis.

2.4.2 Innovators and Early Adopters vs. Late Adopters and Laggards

The success of platforms is determined by the amount of users of a platform. Therefore, positive networks effects are critical (Constantiou et al., 2016). In the first stages it is important to attract and engage users that promote the platform. Innovators and early adopters are therefore of crucial importance (Rogers, 2010). Innovators and early adopters are expected to play an important role in the diffusion of the platform, by actively promoting the platform. These types of users create the first form of momentum for the platform and by this enable a platform's early survival (Allen, 1988; Frattini, 2014; Rogers, 2003). Innovators and early adopters facilitate the adoption of the platform by followers, late adopters, and laggards. These groups are more careful, awaiting and hesitant in adopting (Rogers, 2010). These groups are expected to facilitate the eventual transition into a sustainable business, as augmentation of the platform is crucial for a platform's long-term survival (Constantiou et al., 2016). It can be concluded that *innovators and early adopters* are crucial in the first stages of the platform and may take in an active role in promoting the platform. While *followers, late adopters and laggards* are crucial in a later stage as well, but may take in a more passive role.

2.4.3 Active Users vs. Non-Users

For platforms it is especially important that their users become locked-in (Shapiro et al., 1998). There are however, differences in the type of users in the sense that degree and forms of participation differ and change over time (Wyatt et al., 2003). Previous innovation studies have described the agency of users and have introduced the notion of the lead user (Hienerth, 2006; Von Hippel, 1976; Van Oost et al., 2009). The concept of lead user refers, traditionally, to user innovation. Lead users are those users that do not only adopt products, but also introduce new products. The lead user can thus be

understood as an active user which actively executes activities in order for the product to improve (Hienerth, 2006; Von Hippel, 1976; Van Oost et al., 2009), an *active user* in this study will thus actively execute activities in order for the platform to institutionalise.

Not only the users can be categorised in different groups, also non-users can be categorised, as there is a difference between passive and active resistance. Wyatt et al. (2003) has distinguished four types of non-users that take in a different role in relation to the internet. For the non-users of platforms, I use a similar distinction. The four types of non-users are; resisters, rejecters, excluded users, and expelled users. *Resisters* refers to those who have never used a platform, from conviction or just because they do not want to. *Rejecters* refers to the group who have stopped using the platform voluntarily, the platform thus did not succeed in creating lock-in with this group of users. *Excluded users* are those that have never used the platform, because they for example do not have access to it, either due to social, physical, or technical reasons. *Expelled users* refers to those that were forced to stop using the platform. In her study Wyatt et al. (2003) stresses that policy implications are different for the different groups. Therefore, it is assumed in this study that these groups of non-users also facilitate a different role regarding the institutionalisation of P2P service platforms.

2.5 Theoretical framework

In Figure 1 the theoretical framework is presented. It shows the concepts that are used to answer the research question and how they are related. The framework consists of three levels, which are separated by the dotted lines. The first level represents the context level, which consists of the field characteristics and the actors' social position and captures why institutional change is desired. The context level consists of the conditions for institutional change and thus enables institutional work activities to be executed, which subsequently leads to institutional change; this illustrates the traditional process of institutional change [dark grey block and arrows in Figure 1].

The second level represents the action level and consists of the activities of institutional work and the users that are expected to perform these activities. This level thus captures what is done in order for institutional change to occur. The third level represents the outcome and thus institutional change in the form of changes in the degree of legality and changes in the degree of legitimacy.

This study incorporates the user categorisation as users are perceived to be able to perform institutional work activities. These users however, do also have a certain social position, which is why these two are connected as well.




Figure 1. Overview of theoretical concepts.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research design

The aim of this research is to explore institutional change due to P2P home sharing platforms and to explore the activities of users of platforms and their contribution to institutional change. In order to do so, an explorative qualitative study is executed. This research design is most appropriate because it enables a deep understanding of concepts and the relations between these concepts (Bryman, 2012). The research is divided into three parts. Firstly, institutional change due to P2P home sharing platforms is studied. For this, knowledge on the current institutional context and the alignment of the platforms with the institutional context is necessary. Secondly, the activities performed to initiate institutional change are searched for. Thirdly, the activities executed by the user of the platform and its contribution to institutional change is explored. In all three parts, institutional change is thus the dependent variable and the activities performed by the platform and respectively the user are the independent variables. For this, a comparative case study is executed, in order to be able to compare institutional outcomes and identify the relation with executed activities.

3.2 Case Selection

Cases are selected that have experienced different institutional outcomes in order to be able to compare institutional outcomes and to find relations with executed activities. Airbnb is the P2P home sharing platform that is studied. Airbnb has seen multiple debates about its legitimacy and legality, and has seen different developments in different cities. In this study, three locations are chosen to study Airbnb. These are; Amsterdam, New York, and London.

Airbnb is introduced in each city at a different time. New York and Amsterdam already had their first users in 2008, while London's first users started in 2009. After the introduction of Airbnb, London and New York experienced a quick growth, while Amsterdam grew less explosively. As can be seen in Figure 2, when taking into account absolute numbers, London currently has the highest number of listings, followed by New York, and then Amsterdam. Figure 3 shows the growth of Airbnb corrected for the number of households. It shows that Airbnb is relatively to the city's size most institutionalised in London, where approximately 2% of the households provide an Airbnb listing. This number is however, not corrected for hosts that provide multiple listings.




Figure 2. Number of Airbnb listings over time & Figure 3. Percentage of Airbnb listings relative to inhabitants (AirDNA, 2017; WCCF, 2017).

These cities are chosen as they have different institutional outcomes, have seen different activities, and documentation is either in a language the author masters professionally or in mother tongue of the author. Airbnb New York has very strict regulation which states that it is allowed to list a home on Airbnb for less than 30 days while the owner is present during the stay. People who do not conform to

these rules can face a fine of \$7500 (Katz, 2017; Marcus, 2016). Airbnb London has recently experienced some restrictions, from now on an Airbnb user can list an apartment for 90 days a year and Airbnb has agreed to help the municipality with enforcement (Woolf, 2016). Also, Airbnb Amsterdam has recently seen some restrictions, from now on it is allowed to rent an apartment for 60 days a year, and Airbnb has also agreed to help the municipality of Amsterdam with enforcement (Kraniotis, 2016).

Table 4. Overview of cases and institutional outcomes.

Case	Airbnb Amsterdam	Airbnb New York	Airbnb London
Institutional outcome	60 days allowed	Owner must be present	90 days allowed

3.3 Data Collection

Data is collected from four different data sources; newspaper articles, user initiatives data, municipality reports, and expert interviews, which causes for the research to meet the requirement of data triangulation. Data triangulation is the use of multiple data sources to collect information that is not likely based on coincidence (Yin, 1994).

Firstly, during a media search, newspaper articles about Airbnb in Amsterdam, New York, and London are collected. The LexisNexis Academic database is used, as this database includes all newspaper. These articles provide a clear overview of the activities and developments over time. For each city newspaper articles are collected from the top 2 most read newspapers as these reach most people. Articles from the introduction of Airbnb till the end of May 2017 are searched for using a query containing “Airbnb” and “name of the city”. In total 2324 articles were read, of which 513 articles are selected that covered institutional change and were used for the analysis. The articles that were not selected were either double articles or did not cover institutional change. In Table 5 an overview is presented with the newspapers and the number of articles. Furthermore, a code is provided which is used to refer to the articles in the result section, each newspaper has its own code which is supplemented with the date of the corresponding article. Access to the database containing all selected articles can be granted by contacting the author. However, the code in combination with the query enable the search for the article in LexisNexis Academic or on the internet.

Table 5. Overview number of articles per newspaper.

City	Newspaper	Code	# of articles
Amsterdam	Het Parool	(Pdd/mm/yyyy)	105
	De Telegraaf	(Tdd/mm/yyyy)	69
	Total amount of articles		174
New York	New York Times	(NYTdd/mm/yyyy)	101
	The Daily News	(DNdd/mm/yyyy)	103
	Total amount of articles		204
London	The Guardian	(Gdd/mm/yyyy)	65
	The Daily Telegraph	(DTdd/mm/yyyy)	70
	Total amount of articles		135

Secondly, in the newspaper articles user initiatives are mentioned that are either proponents or opponents of Airbnb. Reports and opinions of these user initiatives are also collected and provide a view on the citizens’ perception on Airbnb. As these were mostly opinions on social media platforms¹,

¹ Pretpark020: <https://www.facebook.com/pretpark020/> & <https://twitter.com/pretpark020>

or internet websites², the researcher followed these initiatives and websites to obtain an overview of the developments of opinions about Airbnb.

Thirdly, municipality reports are collected in order to obtain a clear overview of the legal situation and changes in rules and regulations regarding Airbnb in a city. The reports used are presented in Table 6 and also have a code with which is referred to in the result section. These reports are selected as they all refer to and are a response to Airbnb specifically.

Table 6. Overview of policy reports.

City	Policy document title	Code
Amsterdam	Evaluatie toeristische verhuur van woningen	(A08/06/2016)
New York	Airbnb in the city	(NY01/10/2014)
London	Promoting the sharing economy in London	(L09/02/2015)

Lastly, expert interviews are performed in order to verify, validate, and nuance the data obtained from newspaper articles, user initiatives, and municipality reports and obtain a deeper understanding of institutional change. In-depth semi-structured interviews are executed with policymakers and experts involved in home sharing [Table 7]. These respondents are selected because they were either mentioned in newspaper articles, referred to by contacts at the organisation, or referred to by other researchers. An interview guide is used to structure the interviews which is applicable to each of the interviewees and can be found in Appendix A.

Table 7. Overview of interviewees.

City	Name	Occupation	Code
Amsterdam	Martijn Arets	Founder Crowd Expedition ³	R1
	Anonymous	Employee of the municipality of Amsterdam	R2
New York	Murray Cox	Founder The Inside Airbnb Project ⁴	R3
London	Dominic Curran	Employee of the municipality of London	R4
All	Anonymous	Former Airbnb employee	R5

3.4 Data Analysis

As this study is explorative in nature it combines an inductive research strategy with a deductive research strategy. In order to be able to use the collected data, the data has to be prepared. The collected articles are saved as individual documents. The interviews are transcribed shortly after taking place and are used to validate the newspaper articles.

In order to structure the data in these documents, the concepts of Figure 1 [field characteristics, actors' social position, types of institutional work in Table 1-3 and types of users in sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3] are used as codes. However, in order to be able to provide context to the data and prevent that implicit results are ignored, there is also room for open coding. The breaking down of data into smaller parts enables the exploration and identification of relations between the concepts.

For the second step, a database is constructed using excel. In excel the newspaper articles are coded. Coding refers to "the process whereby data are broken down into their component parts and those

² Inside Airbnb Project: <http://insideairbnb.com/>, Subletspy.com: <https://subletspy.com/>, Home Sharing clubs: https://community.withairbnb.com/t5/Home-Sharing-Clubs/ct-p/en_clubs

³ Crowd Expedition is a project in which the collaborative economy and its contributions are studied and identified. <http://www.collaborative-economy.com/nl/over/>

⁴ "Inside Airbnb is an independent, non-commercial set of tools and data that allows you to explore how Airbnb is really being used in cities around the world" <http://insideairbnb.com/>.

parts are then given labels” (Bryman, 2012; p. 13). It allows for the data to be structured and to provide an overview of *“a collection of references about a specific theme, place, person, or other area of interest”* (Bryman, 2012; p. 596).

When the data is prepared, the cases can be compared on the emerged categories and patterns. Institutional change happens over time and is therefore approached as a process, where multiple activities need to be executed and events need to happen respectively in order for institutional change to happen. A process approach enables the mapping of these activities and events, which subsequently explains change (Hekkert et al., 2007; Van de Ven et al., 1999). For this step, this study makes use of event history analysis. Event history analysis has been used more often in innovation studies and it explains outcomes as the result of events and activities (Hekkert et al., 2007; van de Ven et al., 1999).

All events are mapped over time and are allocated to user or actor groups. This enables an overview of which activities and events are executed by whom, when and what the outcome is. These activities and events can be both positive or negative, therefore these labels have also been incorporated in the coding process. This is done for each case individually. The context level shows why there is a need for institutional change, the action level shows what activities are performed by who and why, and thus how institutional change is initiated, and the outcome level shows what the results are of the first two levels. In this analysis the activity, the time of the activity, who has performed the activity and why, and its outcome are visualised in graphs. An example of how this is documented in the database is presented in Table 8. By performing event history analysis, potential differences, similarities, patterns, and their explanations are identified. This enables the identification and explanation of the different levels and the relations between the different levels of the theoretical framework.

The database in Table 8 allows for the selection of different categories, which enables the counting of activities and the counting of actors performing these activities. These counts are visualised in graphs in order to identify which activities are relatively performed most, which actors are relatively most involved, and which activities influence legitimacy and legality. It is for example illustrated that most create activities positively influence institutionalisation, while maintain activities predominantly negatively influence institutionalisation, as these activities resist change. In qualitative research it is rather unconventional to quantify data, however doing so does provide clarity in the form of a relative overview (van Weele et al., 2017). The visualised graphs and the results are grounded with the qualitative data obtained in this study.

Table 8. Example database for data analysis.

Date	Newspaper	Title	Category	Activity	Specified	Reason	Effect	Nature	Executor
8/10/2011	Guardian	Travel:..	Create	Theorize	“quote”	“quote”	Legitimacy	Positive	Platform

3.5 Research Quality

Case studies can be tested on their quality with four core condition; construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Yin, 1994). Construct validity is obtained by analysing multiple data sources, which is obtained by conducting a media analysis and validating this data with interviews, user reports, and policy reports. Internal validity refers to whether the outcome of the dependent variable is caused by the independent variable or by some other variable (Fraenkel et al., 1993). The process of open coding used in this study enables the exploration and indication of other variables that are of influence. External validity refers to the generalisability of the research. This study focuses solely on one P2P service platform, Airbnb, however it does include multiple cases of Airbnb. The study is therefore generalizable for Airbnb, and to some extent to P2P service platforms. Lastly, reliability refers to whether the study is repeatable with the same results (Yin, 1994). A clear and elaborate coding process and access to the same newspaper articles enables the repetition of this study.

4. Results

Section 4.1 discusses the overall institutional change in each city. It focuses on both degree of legality and degree of legitimacy. Secondly, section 4.2 presents the enabling conditions by discussing field characteristics and the actors' social position. Section 4.3 elaborates on the institutional work activities executed that have driven and stimulated or resisted change. Subsequently, the role of the user in these activities is discussed in section 4.4. Chapter 4 concludes with an overall analysis of the results in section 4.5.

4.1 Institutional Change

4.1.1 Degree of Legality

For each of the three cities the developments regarding legality have seen different outcomes. Several regulative institutions have been put in place to regulate Airbnb and to create a level playing field for the housing market, the hospitality industry and Airbnb. The developments are presented in Figure 4. With every change in laws, rules, or regulations, the degree of legality increases as Airbnb becomes more institutionalised as it becomes more part of daily routines. The changes are thus believed to be in favour of Airbnb. The changes that are visualised are relative to each other and the more a change is in favour of Airbnb, for example the 90 day rule in London or the 60 day rule in Amsterdam, the more the degree of legality increases.




Figure 4. Overview of legal developments.

Amsterdam

After the introduction of Airbnb in Amsterdam in 2008 the influence of Airbnb on the market of tourist rentals became apparent for the municipality in 2012. Because of the growth of number of users of platforms such as Airbnb and the growing discussion about the societal impact, the municipality introduced policies regulating tourist rentals through platforms (A08/06/2016). Several regulative institutions were created to ensure a level playing field and embrace change (R2). In 2014 "Amsterdam's local government was the first in the world to develop regulations for Airbnb...which

meant it could operate legally” (DT01/10/2015). The regulation stated that vacation rental in homes was allowed for a maximum of 60 days a year and to a maximum of 4 tourists at a time. This policy was especially constructed for Airbnb (R2) and excluded social housing and left housing corporations and owner associations with the possibility to still prohibit vacation rental. Subsequently, Airbnb and the municipality started a collaboration, which resulted in 2014 in a tax arrangement in which was stated that Airbnb would deduct tourist tax and pass this to the municipality. This collaboration resulted in 2016 in enforcement of the 60 days and 4 tourists rule on the platform by the platform itself. When hosts approach the 60 days they are notified and when they exceed the 60 days the listing should be deleted for that year. Moreover, Airbnb also incorporated the 4 tourists rule, which should make it impossible for hosts to advertise a listing for more than 4 tourists. However, still there are users that circumvent these rules and misuse the platform. For example, R1 mentions the following, referring to enforcement of the 60 day rule: *“Of course there are all sorts of ways to circumvent that [the 60 day rule], you can just create a new account for example”.* With this misuse in mind and trying to simplify enforcement, the municipality suggested another regulative institution in 2017. It was suggested and accepted to introduce a compulsory registration for hosts in order to create transparency in the number and location of hosts and to ease enforcement of rules and policies. This rule will be applied from October 1st 2017 (R2).

New York

The legal situation in New York differs from the situation in Amsterdam. In 2010 New York created the first law which applied to Airbnb, named the multiple dwelling law [MDL]. New York introduced this law to *“protect guests, ensure the proper fire and safety codes, and protect permanent residents who must endure the inconvenience of hotel occupancy in their buildings”* and to *“preserve the supply of affordable permanent housing”* (NY01/10/2014) as New York coped with little space, and a housing crisis. This law prohibits renting out apartments which are part of three or more apartment buildings for less than 30 days, when the host is not present during the stay. This law made renting out an apartment through Airbnb in most of the cases illegal, which is illustrated with the following: *“In many cases the e-hotel arrangement is illegal in New York City thanks to a 2010 law cracking down on short-term rentals.”* (DN22/09/2013). Subsequently, a second rule was put in place particularly applicable to Airbnb in 2016. This law stated that it is illegal to advertise listings through sites such as Airbnb to which the multiple dwelling law is applicable. Apartments and homes to which the multiple dwelling law is not applicable can advertise their listing on sites like Airbnb. However, there are numerous other rules that may make Airbnb hosting illegal. For example *“Hosts are violating safety, housing, zoning and tax laws⁵ and exacerbating New York City’s affordable housing crisis”* (DN04/10/2013; R4). When these rules are met, Airbnb is allowed in New York.

London

In London Airbnb has operated the first few years without laws and rules explicitly created for them. From the first users in 2009 till 2014 a rule was in place that made it illegal to host tourists for periods of less than three months through Airbnb without planning permission from the local planning authority. However, *“The British government has been largely supportive of the sharing economy”* (DT06/06/2016). The supportive attitude towards Airbnb can be illustrated with the following quote: *“San Francisco-based Airbnb has fallen foul of tough laws in London that require landlords to apply for planning permission from the council to rent out their homes for periods of less than three months. In response ministers have promised to sweep away the rule and allow homeowners a more flexible route to renting a room or the whole place whenever they don’t need it for themselves.”* Thus, in 2014 the rule that obliged homeowners to have permission to rent out their homes was abolished, which legalised the use of Airbnb in London. In 2015 the government stated that the current legislation was

⁵ *“Property use and safety laws establish basic standards for the permissible and sound use of property. These laws seek to protect the health, safety, morals, welfare, and reasonable comfort of the residents of the property.”* (NY01/10/2014)

outdated and inconsistently enforced, which was apparent during the Olympic games in 2012 [which was hosted by London]. The government wanted to update the laws in order to boost the sharing economy, as platforms such as Airbnb were increasingly popular (L09/02/2015). In 2015 a new law was put in place which allowed citizens of London to rent out their homes for a maximum of 90 days a year. Subsequently, renting homes through sites like Airbnb was encouraged by two tax breaks. These tax breaks allowed for Londoners to rent out their home and earn £2,000 tax-free (DT17/03/2016). London and Airbnb, similar to Amsterdam and Airbnb, started collaborating as well. This collaboration has resulted in Airbnb enforcing the 90 day limit on the platform, and is illustrated with the following quote: *"That is why we are introducing a change to our platform that will create new and automated limits to help ensure that entire home listings in London are not shared for more than 90 days a year, unless hosts confirm that they have permission to share their space more frequently."* (G3/1/2017). London has not only favoured Airbnb with policies, a higher stamp duty has also been enforced. Stamp duty is a tax that has to be paid when buying a property or a land. By introducing this higher stamp duty London aims to counteract landlords buying property only for renting this property out through Airbnb.

First Analysis of Degree of Legality

From the developments in legality in the three cities it can be concluded that New York has been early in creating restrictive laws regarding Airbnb. New York was also one of the first places Airbnb situated, after being founded in San Francisco in 2008. While Airbnb is allowed in New York when the host is present, most of the activity on the platform is illegal. London and Amsterdam both took action in 2014, when Airbnb gained momentum. Both cities created policies to allow Airbnb with a certain restriction in order to create a level playing field for the market, but they have also allowed citizens to use the 'new' service with these new regulative institutions. Subsequently, London created more policies which were encouraging Airbnb use, while Amsterdam created policies to restrict freedom of movement of users and Airbnb. It can be concluded that degree of legality in London is highest, followed by Amsterdam, followed by New York.

4.1.2 Degree of Legitimacy

The degree of legitimacy is associated with the degree to which Airbnb has become part of norms, values, beliefs, systems, routines, and established practices. It is therefore associated with the actors' perception of Airbnb. The development of legitimacy differs for each city, however both differences as well as trends can be discovered. For each city the number of institutional work activities per category, creating, maintaining, and disrupting, have been visualised over time, showing their influence on the degree of legitimacy as well. Creating activities focus on stimulating mostly positive changes in the degree of legitimacy. Maintaining activities aim to resist change and therefore stimulate predominantly negative changes in the degree of legitimacy. Disrupting activities react against existing institutions, by this stimulate change and thus enhance mostly a positive change in the degree of legitimacy.

Amsterdam

As can be seen in Figure 5 after the introduction of Airbnb there has not been much activity regarding institutional work documented in newspapers. In 2010 the first article about Airbnb was published and illustrates the contradictory perception on home sharing with the following quote: *"Are you going to rent your home for a month?! To strangers, through internet?! Some acquaintances responded with disbelief to my plan. Some because of the hustle, some with suspicion. The neighbour, however, offered to help with the key transfer and to keep an eye on the renters...She exchanges her house two times a year with alternating Parisians"* (P15/10/2010). From 2012 more activities are executed regarding Airbnb. Airbnb also started to attract more users in 2012 and experienced a six fold growth, which indicates an increase in legitimacy with citizens as Airbnb became increasingly part of norms, values, beliefs, and established practices. This is illustrated with the following quote: *"The number of listings increases every day, especially now when the summer is coming and people rent out their homes for*

the period of their vacation". This growth has also caused some resistance with the established hospitality industry, the KHN [Koninklijke Horeca Nederland; the industry association for the hospitality industry] has for example started lobbying for ensuring enforcement of rules that apply to them on Airbnb listings. One of the board members of the KHN has said the following: *"I do see that this [referring to Airbnb] is a trend, and we do not oppose that. However, equal rules must apply. The owners should pay tourist and income taxes. And they should be similarly enforced and controlled"* (T22/08/2012).

During the course of the years it can be seen that more activity is centralising around Airbnb. Airbnb has grown in number of listings and is taking a more prominent place in the playing field. Events such as Amsterdam Dance Event [ADE] have boosted the number of Airbnb hosts and guests. While on the other hand, this growing number of Airbnb use has also increased the number of negative narratives that are told. Correspondingly, as the number of users has grown, misuse of the platform has also increased, which caused for more resistance and maintenance of current institutions. Misuse is also more easy to define as at this moment in time rules have been created which define boundaries for Airbnb use. The municipality is counteracting this growing number of misuse by enforcing higher fines, which can rise up to tens of thousands of euros, and by employing more enforcement agents (T03/04/2015). While experiencing much resistance from citizens, neighbours, and the established industry, Airbnb kept collaborating with the municipality and in July 2016 offered to share anonymised data and is also enforcing the 60 days and 4 tourists rule on the platform. The perception of the Amsterdam municipality is therefore both negative, because of the number of illegal hotels that are able to advertise on Airbnb, and positive, as they are willing to collaborate and help with simplifying enforcement (R2). However, misuse is still an issue in Amsterdam and an increasing number of hinder is experienced by citizens of Amsterdam. The controversial nature of Airbnb in Amsterdam is in late 2016 highlighted with a documentary [VPRO Tegenlicht "Sleeping Rich"], in which both sides are exposed and users share their experiences and the positive externalities and opponents share their dissatisfaction and the negative externalities.

During the years, companies have used Airbnb as a benchmark, for example real estate agencies marketed houses by saying these are good Airbnb houses with which you can earn money. Moreover, companies have been created to facilitate Airbnb use, such as Iambnb, which manages listings and arranges key transfers. One of the last developments documented in the collected data is the compulsory registration, which would simplify enforcement and complicate misuse. Resistance may decrease when this compulsory registration decreases or eliminates misuse (R2).




Figure 5. IW Activity in Amsterdam over time based on the media analysis.

New York

The developments surrounding activities in New York are visualised in Figure 6. As in Amsterdam it can be seen that in the first few years after the introduction of Airbnb not much activity has been executed. Activity in these early years is mostly focused on educating people on the Airbnb service and sharing experiences. After the introduction of the MDL in 2010, which made Airbnb use in most cases illegal, the website still experienced growth in number of listings. This growth caused for the municipality to subpoena Airbnb for their data in order to obtain insight in the listings and the possible illegal listings. However, Airbnb has fought this subpoena and simultaneously lobbied for a change in regulations. These events between regulatory bodies and Airbnb have also caused for the housing market to engage in the debate. For example *"The Real Affordability for All Coalition - made up of 50 tenant advocate and labor union groups - is accusing Airbnb of "throwing gasoline on a fire" by contributing to a growing affordable housing crisis"* (DN21/04/2014). Much of the resistance in New York comes from housing advocates and regulatory bodies, while respectively the number of listings increases. After the lobby activities of the housing advocates and the enforcement activities of regulatory bodies, Airbnb started a collaboration with the Road Runners who arrange the New York City Marathon. Airbnb became a sponsor of the marathon and simultaneously started more marketing campaigns to raise awareness of the service, which yielded more users. The collaboration between Road Runners and Airbnb has also spurred negative reactions on behalf of the hospitality industry, which is illustrated with the following quote: *"It's a questionable decision by an important New York institution like the Road Runners to partner with a company struggling with regulators here in New York City and throughout the world," said Josh Gold, political director for the Hotel Trades Council, a union representing hotel workers. "I hope the money was worth it"* (DN04/07/2014).

Subsequently, in December 2015 Airbnb released anonymised data about its listings and where, how, and how often these listings are offered. The release of the data has spurred activity surrounding

Airbnb. For example, an independent initiative ‘Inside Airbnb’ released a report in which it showed different statistics than the Airbnb data. This is illustrated with the following quote: *“But an independent report released Wednesday cast a shadow on that rosy picture, claiming that the company “mised the media and the public” by removing more than 1,000 listings from its site in November before making available the data” (NYT12/02/2016)*. After this debate, the municipality has created additional rules regarding the MDL, making it illegal to advertise listings which are illegal to rent out under the MDL. The municipality has also enabled the enforcement of these rules and instated high fines of up to \$7500 when misuse is identified.




Figure 6. IW Activity in New York over time based on the media analysis.

London

In London less institutional work activity is executed surrounding Airbnb compared to Amsterdam and New York. In Figure 7 it can be seen that few creating activities are executed in the period between introduction and the legalisation of Airbnb. Most of the activities were educating citizens with knowledge necessary in order to support the institution. Airbnb has much relied on mouth-to-mouth advertising by early users. The following early user has shared his story in 2011: *“And without paying much attention, I clicked on a sidebar to see what the advert was about. A small act. But it would lead, over the subsequent year, to 68 total strangers arriving at my door, planning to stay the night. In that idle moment, I had signed up to be a host in one of the most successful travel start-ups of all time.” (G08/10/2011)*. The overall perception of Airbnb was positive and citizens, market, and government accepted the new service, which can be illustrated with the following quote: *Again and again, the internet eliminates the supposed professional and lets you do the job better yourself. Airbnb, the American home rental company, has revealed how overpriced hotels are; and how we'd prefer to stay in each other's houses than in a tiny, single-bedroom cell with a minibar. As Eric Pickles, the Communities Secretary, said yesterday as ministers scrapped rules restricting Airbnb's use in London: “The internet is changing the way we work and live.” (DT11/06/2014)*.

Early 2015 a trade body was founded in order to enhance these new sharing services, Sharing Economy United Kingdom [SEUK]. This organisation exists of different members, these members are all part of the most influential sharing economy businesses, such as Airbnb, LoveHomeSwap, Car2Go, etc. The aim of this organisation is *“to champion the sector, ensure best practice and act as a single voice for the industry. As well as signing up to a code of conduct, members will work together to develop a kitemark for responsible sharing practice”* (DT06/03/2015). SEUK has been engaged in for example lobby activities in the UK and the EU. In the middle of 2015 the government introduced the 90 day rule, which has boosted the number of Airbnb listings. However, correspondingly, more hinder was experienced and communicated due to Airbnb rentals by neighbours and landlords, but also by users. Moreover, horror stories and side-issues were increasingly publicly spread. This can be seen in the following quote: *“Airbnb may have spearheaded the sharing economy boom, but even putting horror stories of swinging parties aside, there are still many reasons why people may be deterred from becoming hosts - from having to stop using the spare room as an offshoot of the airing cupboard, to the fuff of changing the sheets after each guest”* (DT22/01/2016).

In 2016 an EU report came out which was in favour of sharing economy services and thus Airbnb. The following quote illustrates the perception of the EU to regulating sharing services: *“The commission told Europe’s national governments in no uncertain terms to lay off the sharing economy, and attacked the “patchwork” of current rules in some states that “creates uncertainty for traditional operators, new services providers and consumers alike and may hamper innovation, job creation and growth”.* (DT06/06/2016). However, this report functioned as an advisory report and local governments are still responsible for regulating the services. Not only governments can prohibit, restrict, or allow Airbnb, also landlords, insurances, and mortgage lenders can create policies regarding short term rentals through Airbnb. Consequently, institutional work activities also consist of educating citizens in these different policies in order to be able to engage in Airbnb. This is illustrated with the following: *“But many of these hosts might not be aware that their sideline rental business could lead to trouble with their mortgage lender, insurer, freeholder or local authority. If you are thinking of joining this new branch of Britain’s “sharing economy”, read these warnings first.”* (DT07/06/2016).

However, this educating of citizens in different policies has not eliminated misuse of Airbnb, which is recorded by an association of landlords. *“Analysis by the Residential Landlords Association [RLA] found that 61 per cent of entire houses and flats advertised on Airbnb in London were shown as being available for more than 90 days a year, prompting fears landlords may be using the site to avoid adhering to regulations covering the private rented sector”* (DT02/09/2016). This misuse of the platform is spread publicly in different ways, such as newspaper articles, but also documentaries. Similar to the documentary about Airbnb in Amsterdam, a documentary about Airbnb in London is created. This documentary is: *“Airbnb: Dream or Nightmare? This film focuses on the horror stories: faulty electrics, creepy hosts and flat-trashing parties”* (DT/17/09/2016).




Figure 7. IW Activity in London over time based on the media analysis.

First Analysis of Degree of Legitimacy

It can be seen that when Airbnb grew in number of users and number of listings, which was 2013 and especially 2014 [as can be seen in Figure 2 and 3], an increasing number of activity was executed regarding Airbnb. Essentially, more use has led to more misuse, which subsequently led to more hinder, which then led to more resistance. Increased resistance has also led to more collaboration on part of Airbnb. Especially in London and Amsterdam, Airbnb has much collaborated with the local government to enforce the rules on the platform. It can therefore also be seen that misuse did not only lead to more maintaining activity, it has also caused more creating activity in order to attract users and educate users to be able to support the new service.

While overall creating activities positively influence institutional change, some activities have had a negative influence. For example failed advocacy activities, which were aimed to obtain more legitimacy or legality resulted in the opposite, which is illustrated with the following quotes: *"Airbnb has capitulated to the demands of lawmakers over its operations in New York City, the company's largest market in the United States, agreeing to drop a lawsuit in which it was pushing back against a newly passed state law that it said could have hurt its business."* (NYT03/12/2016). And *"Airbnb is . . . spending millions of dollars on this frivolous lawsuit, making it clear to anyone paying attention that they care more about their bottom line than about protecting tenants and affordable housing"* (DT02/11/2016).

Maintaining activities predominantly have a negative effect on institutional change, as these activities are focused on resisting and counteracting change. However, some maintaining activities have had positive influence on the institutionalisation of Airbnb. For example, the following quote shows that the market is not actively deterring the new service but is boosting its own business in order to protect it against Airbnb, and thus accepts the existence of Airbnb: *"It is not impacting the business yet but we do keep a very close eye on rivals and do things to protect us from things like Airbnb, such as refurbishing rooms and upgrading our technology"* (DT02/05/2017).

As can be seen in the Figures 5-7, few disrupting activities have been performed and this has not been a main strategy in order to stimulate institutional change. In New York for example some users have disassociated moral practices, which is illustrated with the following quote: *"This is happening ... because of a poorly written law originally designed to stop slumlords from running illegal hotels with dozens of rental apartments. As a New Yorker just trying to pay my bills, I don't understand why [the AG's office thinks] I'm a slumlord"* (G20/11/2013). In London it is seen that the state has disconnected sanctions, which is illustrated with the following quote: *"San Francisco-based Airbnb has fallen foul of tough laws in London that require landlords to apply for planning permission from the council to rent out their homes for periods of less than three months. In response ministers have promised to sweep away the rule and allow homeowners a more flexible route to renting a room or the whole place whenever they don't need it for themselves"* (G16/06/2014). In New York 'most' disrupting activities are executed, which may be due to the fact Airbnb is less accepted, which may stimulate more aggressive strategies. While in Amsterdam and London, Airbnb is more collaborating, which may reduce the need for an aggressive strategy. The absence of disrupting strategies can also be explained with the following quote of R5: *"I think that if you look at Airbnb as an organisation, they will not be confrontational, but will illustrate Airbnb's positive sides"* and thus the fact that it is not Airbnb's fundamental idea to be aggressive and confrontational.

4.2 Enabling Conditions

The institutional setting in which Airbnb was introduced differs per city. Amsterdam, London, and New York have different institutions in place which regulate and form the playing field for Airbnb. While institutions differ, several enabling conditions for Airbnb can be discovered for all three cities. Firstly, the field characteristics that were mentioned in both the interviews and in the newspaper articles for each of the cities are presented, these are; technological disruption, the crisis, the degree of heterogeneity, and the degree of institutionalisation. Subsequently, the field characteristics for each city specifically are discussed. Moreover, the social position of actors is discussed.

4.2.1 Field Characteristics

Technological disruption

The first enabling condition for the introduction of Airbnb that is mentioned is the technology of a two-sided platform. This is partly due to the use of the Internet and smartphones, which can be demonstrated with the following quote; *"Sharing things - like houseswapping - has been going on for years, but the sharing economy has really kicked off with the growth of smartphones and the internet."* (DT18/06/2015). The technology of a two-sided platform enables the facilitation of matching supply and demand and is the basis for Airbnb. With this technology they can easily match people who are searching for a place to stay, the guest, with people who are renting out their homes, the host. The technology lowers thresholds for use and participation and decreases transaction costs. It makes supply transparent, hosts are able to present their homes in a nice manner, while guests obtain a full overview of supply (R1). Furthermore, the use of review systems within this technology has also boosted the growth of Airbnb, which is mentioned by a sharing economy expert in the Daily Telegraph, Alex Stephany. *"This online infrastructure has allowed businesses such as Airbnb, JustPark and notonthehighstreet to flourish"* (DT21/11/2015).

Crisis

Another condition that was mentioned for each of the cities was the economic crisis. The economic crisis was an opportunity for Airbnb due to two reasons. Firstly, the crisis had as a result that people became unemployed and/or were having trouble making ends meet. Using idle capacity to earn some extra money and renting out homes or rooms in homes thus came as a solution for people to be able to keep paying the bills and keep busy. This is illustrated through the following quote: *"At first the rise in self-employment could be dismissed as largely the result of the recession of 2008/9. Lots of laid-off*

workers were "freelancing" for a while as they looked for a new permanent job" (DT19/01/2016). Secondly, the hotel industry was also struggling because of the crisis. They saw their occupancy rate decrease, as a result of which they focused especially on lowering costs instead of focusing on service and hospitality. This created dissatisfaction with the hospitality industry, which in turn offered an opportunity for Airbnb. As Airbnb, as a platform, does not own physical capital and can thus offer low costs for overnight stays, and created a new hospitality service; "live like a local" (T31/05/2013).

Degree of heterogeneity

In each of the three cities different institutions were in place that regulate and form the field around hospitality, tourists and housing services. The institutional setting is described as a jungle of laws in which it is unclear what is allowed and what is not. In all three cities there is a high degree of heterogeneity in institutions as housing laws, tax laws, and hospitality laws may or may not be applicable to the case of Airbnb. In Amsterdam, for example, a law already existed which allowed short stay rentals without a permit. These short stay rentals are defined as rentals for more than seven days, however less than half a year. This would indicate the legality of rentals through Airbnb, however, this law was enforced for people who would stay for longer periods [expats etc.], and were thus not defined as tourists. Moreover, Airbnb also enabled rentals for less than 7 days. When referring to tourists, rules and regulations for, for example, bed&breakfasts [B&B] were enforced, these B&B's need to register and do need permits for renting out to tourists. The lack of clarity can be illustrated with the following quote referring to the situation in Amsterdam: "*Marieke rents a house in Amsterdam. She does not inform her landlord about her subletting activities. She is also not certain whether it is allowed. I don't think so, so I won't ask. Moreover, it is not easy to find out.*" (T22/05/2013). Similar problem with lack of clarity in institutions occurred in New York and London.

Degree of institutionalisation

The last condition that is applicable to all three cities is the newness of platforms. Digital platforms are not yet regulated much. In addition to the newness of two-sided platforms there are digital [privacy] laws, which are in favour of the platform, as they state that they are not allowed to share the data which is made available on the platform and they are not responsible for what is shared on the platform. "*Citizens have the right to be unobserved. A host does not provide Airbnb with data to subsequently see this end up with the municipality.*" (T11/10/2016). In the case of Amsterdam the municipality was warned that they were "*on the verge of breaking the law*" (T11/10/2016). The activity on the platform can thus not be controlled and the platform is not obliged to share information on these activities. The low degree of institutionalisation of digital platform has thus enabled the introduction of home sharing platform Airbnb.

Amsterdam

The Dutch mentality towards innovation is generally open and they aim to stimulate the introduction of new businesses. The Dutch government and Amsterdam municipality do not want to overregulate innovation and new businesses, as a result to which the climate in the Netherlands and in Amsterdam was favourable for Airbnb. This can be illustrated with a quote of the municipality: "*It should not be the case that the whole city is packed with apartments that are not being used as homes anymore, however we do not want to overregulate*" (T22/08/2012).

At the same time, a growth in tourism because of economic recovery and reopening of several museums resulted in a shortage of hotel rooms (P30/11/2012).

During the process of institutional change regarding Airbnb, legislators did not always communicate the same opinion about Airbnb, which caused for ambiguity and a lack of clarity and resulted in opportunities for Airbnb. However, it did also cause lack of clarity with users whether their use was legal or illegal. This is illustrated with the following quote: "*He [the Mayor] philosophized about the way Airbnb should be bridled, while Ivens [Alderman for housing in Amsterdam] is trying to come to an*

agreement with the company. This, of course, does not help the situation, and it is not in any way polite to cancel out colleagues' efforts" (T02/11/2016).

New York

In New York the jungle of laws is even more heterogeneous as New York city laws and New York state laws also differ. In the media different laws are used interchangeably, which enhances ambiguity and a lack of clarity. Moreover, state and city officials also enforce different laws in different cases, which causes for vacation rental and the use of Airbnb to become even more ambiguous and unclear.

Furthermore, hotel rooms in New York city were very expensive, which increased the demand for alternatives for overnight stays. The need for cheaper overnight stays can be illustrated with the following quote: *"The illegal hotel catered to "poor tourists" who otherwise couldn't afford to travel to New York City" (DN28/02/2016).* The low transaction cost which Airbnb offers was therefore a desired response to this problem. However, there is not only a need for home sharing services on the demand side, there is also a need on the supply side as *"New York rents are really expensive, this is allowing people to hold on to their places." (DN21/07/2009)* and *"In this exceedingly high-rent city, Airbnb is a welcome innovation that lets New Yorkers earn some extra pocket money and encourages tourism, particularly outside Manhattan" (DN20/10/2016).*

The housing crisis, however, has been a condition that has not been in favour of Airbnb (R5). This crisis has caused much resistance to Airbnb on behalf of the government, as it is stated that Airbnb contributes to this crisis (DN04/10/2013; R4).

London

An enabling condition which is particularly applicable to London is the high cost of rent. Therefore, making extra rent money by hosting space that is not being used to tourists was an opportunity for Londoners.

London has also been a proponent of the sharing economy and therefore has had an open attitude towards new initiatives that respond to the sharing economy ideals. *"The government wants to ensure that Britain is the global centre for the sharing economy, enabling individuals and businesses to make the most of their assets, resources, time and skills through a range of online platform " (G28/03/2015).*

4.2.2 Actor's Social Position

The actor's social position refers to both the position of Airbnb and the position of the users that engage in institutional change. Airbnb touches upon and concerns multiple divergent markets, such as the housing market and the hospitality market, Airbnb therefore operates at the intersection of fields. It is a new organisation with resources in the form of venture capital and offers a service which is not yet regulated and by this Airbnb initiates institutional change. The social position of users that engage in institutional work is more heterogeneous as there are different types of users. Both users with a legitimate position, such as experts and 'normal' citizens engage in institutional change. Users also perceive the field characteristics differently and engage in institutional change activities for different reasons. These different types of users and the reasons for engaging in institutional change are elaborated on in section 4.4.

4.2.3 First Analysis of Enabling Conditions

Overall conditions were in favour of Airbnb. Several field characteristics made for institutional change to be enabled. Firstly, there was the technological opportunity. Developments in technology made it possible to offer the services of Airbnb. Secondly, the number of heterogeneous institutions caused for Airbnb to be able to frame their operations as if they were unregulated and it operated in a grey area. Thirdly, the highly institutionalised hospitality and housing industry, with which discontent existed provided an opportunity to which the new service could respond. Discontent existed in form of

for example the low quality of service of the hospitality industry and the high prices of the housing market. Furthermore, in each of the cities different specific conditions also favoured Airbnb in terms of demand and supply, e.g. the high rents and little hotel rooms in New York. Moreover, a field characteristic that has emerged from the data and influenced the developments of Airbnb is 'culture'. The Dutch culture is characterised by not wanting to overregulate and is naturally welcoming innovation and innovative, services. However, they do have a tendency to regulate innovation. The British culture is especially momentarily in favour of new sharing services, as they want to become the global centre for the sharing economy.

The social position of Airbnb can be defined as at the intersection of fields with access to resources, in the form of for example venture capital. The social position of users is both a legitimate as well as a regular position.

The position of Airbnb and the users has been different than theorised in section 2.1, as Airbnb is a new innovative organisation and therefore not in the centre of the field, however does have access to resources. Furthermore, the social position of individual users is also different, as 'normal' citizens in addition to users with a legitimate position engage in institutional change.

4.3 Institutional Work

In Figure 8 all institutional work activities that are mentioned in the newspaper articles are presented. It can be seen that mostly creating and maintaining activities are performed, while disrupting strategies are less used in the case of Airbnb. It can be seen that within creating and maintaining strategies, some activities are more performed than others. For the category creating; advocacy, defining, educating, and theorising are prevalent. For the category maintaining; deterring, policing, and demonising are predominant.




Figure 8. Overview of IW activities based on media analysis.

4.3.1 Creating Institutions

Advocacy

Advocacy is one of the most used activities for creating institutions. The mobilisation of political and regulatory support is needed in order to change regulative institutions and thus enhance the degree of legality. In Amsterdam most regulative institutions have been created due to a collaboration between the municipality and Airbnb. The compulsory registration, however, was introduced by the municipality, which Airbnb tried to counteract by mobilising its users to advocate against the registration. In London Airbnb has faced little resistance from the government, which is also reflected in the small amount of advocacy activities in London. There were some activities that on the one hand advocated for liberalising the market, and on the other hand advocated for stricter regulations in order to be able to enforce the platform to behave. In New York relatively the most advocacy activities are performed, as regulative institutions defined most of the Airbnb activity being illegal. The mobilisation of political and regulatory support is either done by the platform, users of the platform, or organisations supported with resources by the platform. This is illustrated with the following two quotes: *The "Home Sharing Clubs" are created for hosts to connect with others in their neighborhood and advocate for the company. On Monday, several picketed outside Democratic Assemblywoman Linda Rosenthal's Upper West Side office to protest her bill that would prohibit advertising illegal home shares in New York City.* (DN15/06/2016) and *"Airbnb provided funding for the "Fair to Share" campaign in the Bay Area, which lobbies to allow short-term housing rentals, and is currently hiring "community organizers" to amplify the voices of home-sharing supporters."* (NYT07/08/2015).

Advocacy not only influences the degree of legality, it also influences the degree of legitimacy as lobby activities are also often communicated to the public. For example, in Amsterdam the collaboration between the municipality and Airbnb was perceived as controversial and negatively influenced the degree of legitimacy. This is illustrated with the following quote: *"the expensive Airbnb lawyers against the losers from the municipality...With hindsight this was not the case, but that was the way it was brought to public knowledge."* (R1).

Defining

The construction of rules that assign status, define boundaries and create a position within a field influence both the degree of legality and the degree of legitimacy. In Amsterdam and London it can for example be seen in the enforcement of the rules on the platform itself, which is illustrated for London with the following: *"We want to help ensure that home-sharing grows responsibly and sustainably, and makes London's communities stronger," the company said when it introduced the change. "That is why we are introducing a change to our platform that will create new and automated limits to help ensure that entire home listings in London are not shared for more than 90 days a year, unless hosts confirm that they have permission to share their space more frequently."*(G03/01/2017). Defining is often used after negative publicity about Airbnb. In New York defining activities are for example in response to accusations of discrimination on the platform due to which the platform created new rules on its platform: *"It told its rental hosts that they needed to agree to a "community commitment" starting on Nov. 1 and that they must hew to a new nondiscrimination policy"* (NYT09/09/2016). Moreover, defining can also take the form of deleting listings from the platform: *"the online home-sharing company said that the listings removed from its platform in New York City "were controlled by commercial operators and did not reflect Airbnb's vision for our community"."*(DN25/02/2016).

Theorising

Activities such as the creation of categories and elaboration chains of cause and effect are used in each of cities in order to become institutionalised. These activities are mostly performed by the platform and users of the platform. In all three cities similar logics are used and categories such as trust and more effective use of resources are created. This is illustrated by the following quotes: *"Airbnb's real innovation is not online rentals. It's "trust." It created a framework of trust that has*

made tens of thousands of people comfortable renting rooms in their homes to strangers” (NYT21/07/2013) and *“By sharing resources, AirBnB users can reduce the number of hotels being built”* (G09/05/2014). Theorising predominantly influences the degree of legitimacy as it focuses on embedding and placing Airbnb in the current context, which familiarises the new services and eases adoption.

Educating

In each city one of the first institutional work activities that was executed was bringing Airbnb to the attention by means of mouth-to-mouth advertising, which consisted of educating citizens in skills and knowledge necessary to support and use Airbnb. Educating has predominantly influenced normative and cognitive institutions and by that the degree of legitimacy. At first Airbnb needed to gain brand awareness, which is illustrated with the following quote: *“For anyone low on cash and high on wanderlust, there's a new option: AirBed & Breakfast, a Web-based company that hooks up locals with visitors looking for a place to crash”* (NYT17/05/2009). Over time, educating became in skills how to best use Airbnb, which is illustrated with the following title of a newspaper article: *“The Guide to Being an Airbnb Superhost”* (NYT11/01/2017) or in how to protect yourself from fraud: *“What can you do to ensure a problem-free letting through Airbnb, Wimdu and other “social travel” sites?”* (G11/10/2014).

4.3.2 Maintaining Institutions

Policing

Policing is the most often executed maintain activity in order to ensure compliance of Airbnb with the existing institutional framework. It is used in order to restrict Airbnb’s operations in the cities. It is mostly used in New York and Amsterdam as these cities were less accepting of Airbnb than London. In Amsterdam and New York more enforcement activity was mobilised by the government and the platform was monitored by means of data scraping and hotlines for complaints. Policing activities are illustrated with the following quotes: *“The mayor's Office of Special Enforcement, charged with cracking down of scofflaws, has wisely used that power strategically - responding to complaints dialed to the city's 311 system by neighbors and using data analysis to catch illegal hotel operators who deal in bulk.”* (DN10/12/2016) and *“The war against illegal hotels and housing fraud is being intensified. By using new digital search methods, not only physical locations, but also all citizens who do not follow the rules will be proceeded against. This ‘scraping’ is the automated collection of content of databases from booking sites, such as Airbnb”* (P15/02/2016). Policing influences both the degree of legality and the degree of legitimacy. When more enforcement action is taken, more users are hesitant to use the service as they often do not know whether their activity is fully legal and they do not want to face a fine. This thus lowers the degree of legitimacy. It influences the degree of legality in the sense that it became clear during enforcement processes that more and more illegal activity was taking place and that enforcing the rules was difficult. This subsequently resulted in more restrictive rules and regulations, such as the compulsory registration in Amsterdam.

Deterring

One of the main activities to resist the institutionalisation of Airbnb was actively deterring change and creating barriers for change. Deterring is mostly performed by the market, non-users that resist or reject Airbnb, and regulatory bodies. For example in New York the hospitality industry has been actively deterring Airbnb, as can be seen in the following quote: *“The hotel industry has declared war on the short-term rental company by raising regulatory concerns, even as hotel executives have tried to play down the effect Airbnb has had on their businesses.”* (NYT18/04/2017). Furthermore, non-users are also establishing barriers for the use of Airbnb by seeking reasons which make Airbnb unattractive. One non-user mentions multiple reasons: *“Putting horror stories of swinging parties aside, there are still many reasons why people may be deterred from becoming hosts - from having to stop using the spare room as an offshoot of the airing cupboard, to the fuff of changing the sheets after each guest.”*

Deterring is focused on establishing barriers for use and thus predominantly influences the degree of legitimacy.

Demonising

Much of the resistance against Airbnb has been expressed by sharing negative stories about Airbnb. Demonising has been performed by the market, regulatory bodies, and by non-users. Much of this demonising has been done by writing about it in newspapers and using titles such as: *“If you want to hear a real Airbnb horror story” (G17/09/2016)*. In addition, ad campaigns have been created to communicate negative stories, for example: *“ShareBetter has a new ad it will run for a week starting Monday on broadcast and cable television accusing Airbnb of saying it wants to help the middle class while actually hurting the availability of affordable housing units in the city.” (DN24/10/2016)*. Demonising is an activity which is focused on creating negative associations with the new service. It is focused on influencing normative and cognitive institutions and the perception of Airbnb and by this influences the degree of legitimacy.

4.3.3 First Analysis of Institutional Work

It can be seen that not all institutional work activities are executed as much. Main activities can be identified that are used to stimulate and counteract institutionalisation of Airbnb. Furthermore, several activities predominantly influence the degree of legality or the degree of legitimacy. Advocacy and policing mostly influence regulative institutions and therefore influence the degree of legality. While other creating and maintaining activities regard the perception of Airbnb, thus normative and cognitive institutions and by this influence the degree of legitimacy. However, the degree of legality and legitimacy do interact. Changes in legality influence the public’s perception of Airbnb, for example a change in regulative institutions, such as the 60 day or 90 day rule, makes for more people to accept and use Airbnb as they then operate legally. While it also defines boundaries under which some activity on the platform becomes illegal, which negatively influences the degree of legitimacy. The degree of legitimacy can influence changes in regulative institutions as much resistance of the public is visible [and not actively communicated] to the government, which in turn causes changes in legality.

Furthermore, dynamics between creating and maintaining activity can be identified. With the introduction of Airbnb, mostly creating activity was performed as the service needed brand awareness. The growth that followed due to this creating activity provoked maintaining activity in order to resist change. Subsequently, more creating activity has been executed to react to the maintenance. For example, demonising often provokes defining, as so-called horror stories are defined as either a rarity, or as being taken care of.

Lastly, activities can be identified that can be both defined as educating and demonising. This activity is in the case of Airbnb, the construction of documentaries which feature negative and positive stories, such as the Tegenlicht VPRO ‘Sleeping Rich’ and the ‘Airbnb: Dream or Nightmare’ documentaries.

4.4 Role of the User

4.4.1 Executors of Activities

The institutional work activities that are documented are performed by several actors that are part of the institutional framework. These actors can be categorised in different groups which are similar for each of the cities. Six groups were identified; the platform, the users, the non-users, the market, regulatory bodies, and facilitators. The platform refers to Airbnb and it can be seen in Figures 9-11 that it is solely involved in creating activity.

Users refers to the people who use the platform, either as a host or a guest. This group involves innovators, laggards, and active users which are specified in Chapter 2. However, another category of

users has also emerged from the newspaper articles. These are categorised as expert users and are experts on the topic of platforms, the sharing economy or in particular home sharing and have a positive attitude towards Airbnb. While innovators, laggards, and active users are not necessarily users with already a legitimate position, expert users do have a legitimate position. The group of users is predominantly involved in creating activities [Figures 9-11].

Non-users refer to the resisters, rejecters, excluded users, and expelled users of the platform. Resisters, rejecters, and expelled users are the groups that perform most of the institutional work activities. Resisters are for example often neighbours or creators of user initiatives that experience hinder due to the use of Airbnb. Neighbours are in this case 'regular' resisters, while creators of user initiatives are often actors that already have a legitimate position. Rejecters are often former [active] users that have had a negative experience with either hosting or renting through Airbnb and subsequently did not want to use Airbnb again. These can be both 'regular' rejecters and rejecters with a legitimate position. Expelled users are the users that have abused or misused the platform in any way and have been deleted by the platform and do not have a legitimate position. This group is predominantly involved in maintaining activities and thus counteracting change.

The market consists of different types of players that are affected by Airbnb, of which the biggest are the housing industry [landlords, real estate agencies, etc.] and the hospitality industry [hotels, booking sites, travelling agencies, etc.]. These are predominantly executing maintaining activities. However, the market also contains competitors that offer similar services and are active in home sharing, this part of the market is more active in creating institutions.

The category 'regulatory bodies' comprises the [local] government and political parties that are involved in validating and enactment of regulative institutions. This category is therefore also involved in creating and maintaining institutions as can be seen in Figures 9-11. Opinions within these regulatory bodies can be diverse and both negative and positive towards Airbnb, which was for example the case in Amsterdam, described in Section 4.2.1.

Facilitators is a category that emerged from the media analysis. This group consists of actors that have created a business facilitating the use of Airbnb and lowering the thresholds for use. These facilitators are for example businesses that manage listings and bookings for hosts of Airbnb and arrange for the key exchange to happen. This category is involved in creating institutions and in particular the constructing of normative networks.




Figure 9. Overview of IW activities in Amsterdam performed per actor category.




Figure 10. Overview of IW activities in New York performed per actor category.




Figure 11. Overview of IW activities in London performed per actor category.

4.4.2 Activities of Users

In the process of institutionalisation of Airbnb it can be seen that users and non-users have performed institutional work activities. Figures 12-14 show that users perform mostly advocacy, theorising, and educating activities, while non-users mostly perform demonising activities and in lesser extent deterring activities. In the media analysis it is not always specified which types of users or non-users have performed the activities, it is either implicitly present in the newspaper articles or not present at all. Therefore, Figures 12-14 show the overall category and no distinction is made between the different types. However, some patterns can be identified in which type of user or non-user performs which activity.

As can be seen in Figure 12-14, users have been involved in advocacy activities. Especially in New York users have played a role in lobby activities, which is illustrated by the following quote: *"ABOUT TWO DOZEN New Yorkers who rent their homes out through Airbnb are going to the Democratic National Convention to plead the case for home-sharing to the state's elected officials."* (DN26/07/2016). Herein, it can also be concluded that hosts, and thus providers, were involved in advocacy. This can be explained by the fact that hosts are part of the institutional setting, while guests are only for a small period of time present in that particular institutional setting. Furthermore, the platform creates monetary value for the host. Consequently, hosts are more likely to engage in exerting pressure on the institutional setting. Implicitly it becomes clear that these are also the active users, as they actively and purposefully take part in activities to stimulate the institutionalisation of the platform.

Theorising is also a creating activity that is performed by users. However, this activity is mostly performed by the new emerged category expert users. This can for example be illustrated with the following quote of Warren Mead, the global co-lead for fintech at KPMG in an article of the Daily Telegraph: *"Technology is driving change in the broader economy and that needs to be addressed by financial services. For example, as we move to the so-called "gig" economy, where people work under short-term contracts or freelance, workers need access to lending products where traditional credit referencing techniques might fall short. Similarly, Uber drivers or Airbnb hosts need to be able to change their insurance cover between commercial and personal at the flick of a switch. The level of societal change we will see in the next five years demands a huge rewiring of the industry. This will impact the big players in traditional financial services, regulators, government and new entrants alike"* (DT31/03/2017). Expert users executing theorising activities, such as elaborating the consequences of home sharing, can be explained due to the fact that for the elaboration of chains of cause and effect with grounded arguments, specific knowledge on the topic is necessary.

Educating is the activity which is the most performed by users and by all type of users. This activity has enhanced awareness of Airbnb. A large part of the growth of Airbnb and the changes in normative and cognitive institutions can be attributed to mouth-to-mouth advertisement and the educating of actors in skills for and knowledge about Airbnb use. For this, educating by innovators and early adopters, both providers and consumers, has been important in the early stages of Airbnb and is illustrated with the following quote: *"Chan is one of hundreds of New Yorkers, and others across the country, trying to make a few bucks by using a San Francisco-based Web site called AirBnB.com to sublet odd spaces such as couches, boats, cabins and even rooftops."* (DN21/07/2009). However, also in later stages educating has been a much used activity to create awareness about how to use the service, which is illustrated with this quote: *"New Yorkers who welcome strangers into their homes by becoming Airbnb hosts have found that the experience can be at turns nerve-racking, humorous and sometimes embarrassing. But for some determined hosts, it has proved profitable enough to replace more traditional revenue streams"* (NYT09/04/2017).

Non-users are mostly active in demonising activities and by that resisting change. The types of non-users that are most active are the resisters, the rejecters and for a smaller part expelled users. A demonising activity by a resister is for example illustrated by the following quote about Airbnb rentals:

“This all sounds great, but what if you live in a high-rise rental apartment in Manhattan (like me) when the elevators are filled with foreign tourists rolling in large suitcases, clogging the lobby, the doormen and the hallways, maids walking through halls changing beds, etc.? This has recently been happening in my building when a large number of private apartments were taken over as “corporate” and subleased to visitors (original owners not present as host). This is no one-man operation. Fortunately it has stopped due to other tenant complaints. But even if visitors sub-rent an apartment, they can easily disturb, even frighten the rest of the tenants who also pay to live there but receive no profit from this.” (NYT04/05/2014).

It can also be seen that active non-users start initiatives to actively counteract change. For example in Amsterdam and New York multiple initiatives have been founded, such as the Inside Airbnb Project [started by a resister], subletspy.com [started by a rejecter], and Pretpark020 [started by multiple resisters]. These initiatives are either focused on creating more transparency in the new service [Inside Airbnb Project and subletspy.com], while Pretpark020 mostly communicates negative stories about the service, and thus participates in demonising. By this, the initiative also creates insight in the service, however is more actively mobilising resisters. As an example the following quote illustrates the reason of the founding of subletspy.com: *“A techie entrepreneur whose Chelsea pad was trashed after he rented it on Airbnb and it was used to host an orgy has launched a website to help landlords crack down on illegal subletters” (DN04/04/2016).*




Figure 12. Overview of IW activities by users in Amsterdam.




Figure 13. Overview of IW activities by users in New York.




Figure 14. Overview of IW activities by users in London.

4.4.3 First Analysis of the Role of Users

In the Figures 9-11 it is striking that the number of activities performed by users is higher than the number of activities performed by the platform in London and Amsterdam, while the platform performs more activities than the users in New York. When taking into account the timeline of activities performed, this may be due to the fact that New York was early in enforcing restrictive laws, which resulted in the platform becoming more active to create more freedom. While in Amsterdam and London collaboration, rules, and regulations resulted in legalisation of Airbnb. Moreover, it may be due to the fact that Airbnb has learned from practices in New York and changed its strategy for London and Amsterdam.

It can be seen that the activities that are performed most, are also the activities in which users and non-users are mostly engaged. These activities, theorising, educating, and demonising are also relatively easy activities to engage in, as it is, for greater part, the expression of an opinion which asks for a small amount of effort. Moreover, with these activities it is easier to reach a broader and greater public and therefore influence the degree of legitimacy. Advocacy is a more time consuming activity and it focuses solely on the government, this makes the barrier to engage in advocacy higher. Consequently, it can be seen that the platform facilitates advocacy for users and lowers the barriers to engage in this activity, by for example arranging transportation [New York; lobby activity up state] or providing an easy way to communicate your opinion to the government through the platform [Amsterdam; compulsory registration].

Advocacy influences predominantly the degree of legality as this is aimed at mobilising regulatory support, however indirectly also influences the degree of legitimacy. On the other hand, activities that predominantly influence the degree of legitimacy, indirectly influence the degree of legality as regulatory bodies represent the public opinion.

The lack of engagement of users and non-users in activities, such as defining, enabling work, policing, and deterring can be explained by the fact that users and non-users do not have the authorisation to define boundaries of and on the platform, create authorizing agents and divert resources, enforce rules, and establish coercive barriers.




Figure 15. Overall role of users in IW by summing AMS, NY, and LDN.

4.5 Analysis of Results

Overall patterns can be identified by combining the previous parts of Chapter 4. These patterns are discussed in the order of the theoretical framework from Section 2.5.

The initiator of institutional change is Airbnb by introducing the new home sharing service. It operates at the intersection of fields, as the service taps into the housing supply, but also offers an alternative service to the hospitality industry. Furthermore, users with different social positions also engage in institutional change. Both users with a legitimate position in the market, such as expert users engage in institutional change, as well as 'regular' citizens without a legitimate position. These users engage in institutional change individually and collectively, and by one's self or due to mobilisation efforts on behalf of Airbnb. Moreover, facilitators can also be seen as organisations that contribute to institutional change. These facilitators respond to the new service of Airbnb and create a market around Airbnb. Therefore, they operate from the periphery of the field and create a more central position for Airbnb.

Degree of institutionalisation was for Airbnb an opportunity as the use of platforms for offering services is rather new and platforms are not yet much regulated. The technology itself is a condition to which Airbnb has responded and the familiarity of the technology, the use of smartphones, online transactions, and frameworks of reviews, have enhanced the adoption of Airbnb. Degree of heterogeneity is a condition of Airbnb to be able to operate in a grey area and use smart framing to argue that laws did not apply to them. However, this high degree of heterogeneity made the rules for users ambiguous and unclear, which created doubt as to which use of Airbnb was legal or illegal. Jolts and crises have created reasons for users to adopt the new service. One of the most used arguments to adopt the service has been to be able to make ends meet. These jolts and crises are amongst other the economic crisis, high rents, and high cost of hotels. Moreover, the discontent with the hospitality service of the hospitality industry has also been a condition that enhanced the engaging in home sharing services. Culture has been in favour of Airbnb in London and Amsterdam. Different reasons thus have led to the engagement of users or of Airbnb in institutional change. While for Airbnb conditions such as institutional context and technology were drivers, users were driven by the promise of added value in the form of financial and social capital. This added value was in demand due to crises and discontent. Both organisation and user were thus driven to engage in institutional work activities.

Consequently, different institutional work activities were performed. Users and the platform are predominantly involved in creating institutions, while non-users and market players are predominantly involved in maintaining institutions. Regulatory bodies play in both creating and maintaining an important role. It can be seen that a large part of theorising and educating has been executed by the users. Where theorising especially has been executed by expert users, with an already legitimate and established position in the market, educating has been executed by the 'regular' user, both hosts and guests. These activities have been executed in order to change normative and cognitive institutions, and by this making the society more accustomed to the new service. It can also be seen that demonising is for a large part executed by non-users, and is aimed at creating a negative perception of the new service with the society. Educating, theorising, and demonising are predominantly the expression of an opinion, for which sometimes more specific knowledge is needed, but is easy to engage in, and I therefore define them as low barrier activities. Another activity in which users engage is advocacy. I define advocacy as an activity with a high barrier as it is a time consuming activity for which specific knowledge of the service is needed, which raises barriers. This activity has been performed by the 'regular' host of the platform. Most often these hosts are mobilised by the platform, as the platform lowered barriers. However, hosts also engage in advocacy as they obtain most social and financial value out of positive changes in their institutional context. Maintaining activities such as policing are mostly performed by the market and regulatory bodies. This activity is time consuming, authority is needed to perform policing and is therefore a high barrier activity.

The changes the institutional work activities bring about in the institutional context are bilateral. On the one hand activities can influence the degree of legality, on the other hand they can influence the degree of legitimacy. It can be seen that activities such as educating, theorising, and demonising, thus low barrier activities, predominantly influence the degree of legitimacy. These activities are aimed at influencing society and accustoming the society to the new service, or negatively influence the society's perception of the new service. While activities such as advocacy and policing predominantly influence the degree of legality as they are aimed at mobilising regulatory support or enforcing rules and regulations.

Differences in changes in the degree of legitimacy and legality in the three cities can also be identified. The differences between Amsterdam and London, in the cities in which Airbnb is most legalised, can mainly be explained by the difference in the structure and power of the local government. The London local government does not have much power to create rules and regulations as these are enforced on the national and regional level. The Amsterdam local government has more freedom in creating restrictive rules and regulations. This also explains the type of activities being performed. In London it is harder to execute high barrier activities that influence the degree of legality, as the national and regional government are harder to reach. In London overall less maintaining activities are performed, but the one activity that is performed most is demonising. While in Amsterdam both activities with high barriers and low barriers are performed such as policing and demonising.

In New York Airbnb is least legalised and is in most cases illegal. This may be due to the fact that it is one of the first cities in which Airbnb situated and the service was therefore newer and less familiar which resulted in stricter regulations from both local and state government. Moreover, New York struggled with a housing crisis, and Airbnb tapping into the housing supply, has made New York cautious of allowing Airbnb. Consequently, most activities that aim at creating institutions at the legal level are performed here.

Changes in the degree of legitimacy and legality, however do not happen in isolation, they also influence each other. Changes in legality influence the degree of legitimacy, as changes in legality define boundaries for use, which enables use. For example, the compulsory registration in Amsterdam, a change in legality, is expected to create more legitimacy and is by some users welcomed and creates more use, as this assures that activity on the platform is legal. Changes in legitimacy also influence changes in legality, as much resistance and approval provokes action on the part of regulatory bodies. Namely, the government represents the voice of the public, when there is much resistance from the public, the government will create restrictive rules and regulations. While, when the public welcomes the new service, the government will create favourable rules and regulations.

5. Conclusion

This thesis has focused on institutional change due to home sharing platforms, in particular users of home sharing platforms. In this, home sharing platforms are infrastructures which enable users to order or provide access to homes in exchange for payment. The aim of this thesis was twofold. First of all, the aim was to extend institutional theory by theorising what characteristics and conditions are relevant in the case of institutional work by [non-]users of a platform. Moreover, the aim was to provide a better view on what [non-]users engage in institutional change activities, why they perform activities that contribute to or hinder the institutionalisation of a platform, and how these activities of users influence institutional change.

The main finding of this study is that there is indeed an important role for the user of a platform. Users engage in institutional change mostly due to jolts and crises which enable the need for change. Users also engage in these activities as they obtain both social and financial capital by using the platform. A first distinction can be made in the type of user that engages in institutional change; regular users and users with a legitimate position in the market. A second distinction can be made in the type of institutional work activities they engage in; low barrier activities and high barrier activities. Activities with a low barrier are mainly activities which are not time consuming and often involve the expression of an opinion. Activities with a high barrier are more time consuming for which specific knowledge of the service is necessary. Thirdly, a distinction can be made between activities that influence the degree of legality and activities that influence the degree of legitimacy. Activities focused on influencing the degree of legitimacy are mainly aimed at accustoming the society to the new home sharing service. While activities influencing the degree of legality are aimed at mobilising regulatory support.

Combining these three distinctions, it is seen that activities with lower barriers predominantly influence the degree of legitimacy and are executed by all categories of users and non-users. Activities with higher barriers predominantly influence the degree of legality and are performed by providers. Providers engage in these activities as they obtain most value from changes in this particular institutional setting. However, often the barriers to engage in these high barrier activities are lowered by the platform.

Moreover, there is an interaction between legality and legitimacy. As changes in legality define boundaries for use and provoke reaction on behalf of the users. While changes in the degree of legitimacy in the form of resistance from non-users as well as approval by users, provoke reaction on behalf of regulatory bodies.

6. Discussion

Limitations

This study has focused on the case of Airbnb in Amsterdam, New York, and London, therefore generalisability is limited. The three cities have seen different development paths and different institutional outcomes, however similarities can be identified for the three cities. The study is therefore generalizable to Airbnb, in lesser extent generalizable to home sharing services, as it remains unclear whether other home sharing platforms use the same strategy. Airbnb is for example the only social travelling website collaborating with municipalities. When generalising to P2P service platforms, caution should be taken as these platforms operate in different institutional contexts, therefore other enabling conditions may hold, which may result in different activities to be executed. However, the role of users remains the same regarding low and high barrier activities.

The data used for this study have covered much of the topic. The municipality reports, the user initiatives reports, and the interviews were a useful addition to the newspaper articles and have added some nuance to the articles found in the newspapers. This nuance has been of added value because the newspapers are prone to their political backgrounds and position and have expressed different views. For example, the New York Times, the Daily Telegraph, and the Telegraaf were much more positive in relation to Airbnb, while the Daily News, the Guardian, and the Parool were predominantly negative in relation to Airbnb. This may have led to more documented maintain activities or more documented create activities. In order to obtain a more comprehensive view on institutional change and the perception of the platform documented in newspapers, at least one more newspaper could be added to the collection for each city. Furthermore, it would be fruitful to also obtain insight in the communication between Airbnb and the hosts in for example the form of e-mails to understand how Airbnb relates to its users. To some extent, this has been covered as it was identified in which cases Airbnb communicated to its users, however the content of this communication has not been uncovered in this study. This would therefore be a useful addition in future research.

The developments regarding Airbnb are much discussed and opinions change daily, which makes the repeatability of the study more difficult. However, as the approach and process have been elaborately discussed, a study with the same timeframe should uncover similar results. Furthermore, services such as Airbnb are transforming current structures and daily operations. Therefore it is crucial for academia, policymakers, and the market to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics between institutional change and P2P service platforms.

Theoretical Implications

Few studies have been performed to understand institutional change from an innovation or technology point of view (Mair & Reischauer, 2017). This study has focused on Airbnb, a platform offering an innovative service by using technology, and therefore innovation and technology are central in this study. As this focus is relatively new in literature, several frameworks have been combined in order to make institutional change theory applicable to innovative technology platforms. This study has been the first to combine Battilana's (2009) enabling conditions, with Lawrence and Suddaby's (2006) institutional work framework, and different categorisations of users (Constantiou et al., 2016; Rogers, 2010; Von Hippel, 1976; Wyatt et al., 2003) to be able to explain institutional change due to platforms and its users.

The results of this thesis add to Battilana et al. (2009) in several ways. Battilana et al. (2009) has urged the need for more research into the interaction between the organisation initiating change and the individual actor. This study has functioned as an initial exploration of the interaction between platforms as organisations and users as individual actors. One of the preliminary findings of Battilana et al. (2009) was that actors at the intersection of fields create a vision and mobilise support in order to initiate institutional change. The results of this thesis show that platforms mobilise their users,

create a vision and make certain promises, which thus corresponds with the findings of Battilana et al. (2009). Moreover, this study adds to institutional entrepreneurship literature as it theorises what actor characteristics and field characteristics are relevant in the case of institutional change by users.

Furthermore, many similarities can be found for the three cities. While the differences in institutional setting and field conditions have resulted in different development paths and institutional outcomes. For each of the cities enabling conditions such as jolts, crises, degree of heterogeneity, and degree of institutionalisation played an important role. However, the conditions that differed were culture and structure and power of governments. An already open culture towards innovation and sharing services has resulted in more positive changes in the degree of legality and legitimacy from the platform's point of view. Furthermore, the structure and power of governments was of importance in the process of institutional change, as this enabled either more maintaining or more creating activities. Lastly, enabling conditions that directly influenced citizens have enhanced the adoption of the service, these can predominantly be categorised as jolts and crisis. This thesis has thus found both similarities and differences with enabling conditions of Battilana et al. (2009). Future research can focus on these differences in enabling conditions and the role of enabling conditions for users of platforms.

This study has found that in the case of Airbnb few disrupting activities have been performed. Future research can focus on other organisations as this may depend on the type of strategy and the values of the organisation studied. Institutional work activities found in this study have either focused on changing regulative institutions or focused on changing cognitive and normative institutions. Therefore, the distinction made between the degree of legality and the degree of legitimacy has proved to be a just distinction. Furthermore, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) stress the need for further research into the dynamics and relations regarding institutional work. This thesis found a distinction between high and low barrier institutional work activities that influence different institutions. In order for this framework to be able to be applied to platforms and its users, future research can investigate the importance of the distinction between high and low barrier activities. Moreover, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) state that creating activities in the field of institutional entrepreneurship are performed by a wide range of actors that have resources and skills as well as actors that constitute a more supporting role. This study shows similar results, in which actors with a more supportive role are Rogers' (2010) late adopters and laggards and the actors more actively contributing to creating institutions are not only users with resources and skills, but also 'regular' users; which are innovators, early adopters, active users, and both providers and consumers.

For the user categorisation different frameworks were used, as a framework with a categorisation of users of platforms was non-existent. While the framework constructed for this study was a useful starting point, further research should include two types of users; expert users and facilitators. Expert users are the users that have specific knowledge about the platform and the context these platforms operate in. Facilitators are the users that have created a business out of supporting the initiator of institutional change. Future research can test whether these categories are indeed present in different cases with different platforms. Similarly to Constantiou et al. (2016) this thesis shows the importance of early users and active users. Constantiou et al. (2016) theorises that these users are of importance for the success of platforms, while this study shows their exact activities and influence on the degree of legality and legitimacy, which in turn influences the success of a platform.

Moreover, the user categorisation constructed in this thesis is of added value to the understanding of the role of users for platforms. Langley and Leyshon (2016) have found that users are "*crucial to a platform's capacity to cultivate and capture value*" (p. 12). This thesis adds to this by deepening the understanding of how users cultivate and capture value for platforms.

Practical Implications

The results of this thesis have several practical implications for the market, government, and society. The market herein consists of both organisations that are affected by the introduction of platforms as well as peer organisations offering similar services. Firstly, organisations that are affected by the platform may gain insights in strategies and activities for coping with and reacting to institutional change. They can learn about which activities are useful to execute when institutional change is initiated that is not in favour of their operations. Secondly, peer organisations gain insights in which activities are most useful when initiating change, particularly which activities create legitimacy and which create legality. They can learn how they can deploy their users. For example it creates insights in which activities have high barriers to perform and need a lowering of barriers for users to engage in, when the platform deems it necessary that this particular activity is performed by its users. Moreover, the results of this thesis create an understanding for policymakers in the process of institutional change due to platforms. This enhances the capability to draft policies that regulate these new services, create a level playing field, maintain social satisfaction and protect their citizens. Lastly, the results of this thesis educate the society in changes that occur in their beliefs, routines, perceptions, and established practices and by this prepare for the institutionalisation of P2P service platforms. This enables the knowledge for society on how to actively play a part in these changes and influence these changes by performing either activities which are time consuming or on the contrary activities which are relatively easy to perform. On the other hand, it educates users in how they are 'used' to initiate institutional change in favour of these P2P service platforms.

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Appendix A

Interview Questions

Context/first level/enabling conditions

1. What are the reasons for the introduction of platforms such as Airbnb?
 - a. To what extent did specific events contribute to this introduction? To what extent did users of Airbnb contribute to this introduction? And how would you classify these users?
2. What are the reasons for the quick growth of Airbnb?
 - b. To what extent did specific events contribute to this growth? To what extent did users of Airbnb contribute to this growth? And how would you classify these users?

Creating institutions

3. What activities are executed to stimulate the transition of Airbnb from the informal (being illegal and illegitimate) to the formal economy (being legal and legitimate)?
 - a. How can you explain this process?
 - b. Who executed these activities? To what extent are these activities executed by the users of Airbnb? And how would you classify these users?
 - c. What arguments are used?

Position Airbnb relative to institutions

The following questions can be answered with yes or no. When the answer is no, go to question 6.

When the answer is yes, go to question 11.

4. Does Airbnb fit with (at time of introduction and currently):
Legality (regulative institutions):
 - a. Laws?
 - b. Regulation?
5. Does Airbnb fit with:
Legitimacy (normative and cognitive institutions):
 - a. Established practices?
 - b. Norms and values?
 - c. Beliefs?

When institutions do not fit (the answer to the previous questions was no):

6. Why not?
7. Have there been any activities to change the institution?
 - a. Can you explain this process?
 - b. Who executed these activities? To what extent are these activities executed by the users of Airbnb? And how would you classify these users?
 - c. What arguments are used?
8. Has there been any resistance when changing this institution?
 - a. Can you explain this process?
 - b. Who executed these activities? To what extent are these activities executed by the users of Airbnb? And how would you classify these users?
 - c. What arguments are used?
9. What are the actions taken to cope with this resistance?
10. What was the effect of the resistance?

When institutions do fit (the answer to the previous question was yes)

11. Have there been any activities to actively maintain the institution?
 - a. Can you explain this process?
 - b. Who executed these activities? To what extent are these activities executed by the users of Airbnb? And how would you classify these users?
 - c. What arguments are used?

12. What was the effect of the maintenance of the institution?

Concluding remarks

13. Do you have any important remarks related to this topic?

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