# Hitler Baut Auf!
Ideology and Technology in National Socialist Film.

A History and Philosophy of Science Master Thesis in 51.165 Words.
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Contents

1 Abbreviations

- DAF: Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Worker's front), NS-organization

- DNVP: Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National People's Party)

- KdF: Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy), NS-organization subordinate to DAF

- KPD: Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)

- HJ: Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth), NS-organization

- NS: National Socialism or National Socialist

- NSDAP: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers Party)

- OKW: Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces)

- REM: Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung, short: Reichserziehungsministerium (Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Culture)

- RfdU: Reichsstelle für den Unterrichtsfilm (Reichbureau for educational movies)

- RfVP: Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda)

- RWU: Reichsanstalt für Film und Bild in Wissenschaft und Unterricht (Reich Institution for Film and Imagery in Science and Education)

- SA: Sturmabteilung (Storm Detachment), original paramilitary militia of the NSDAP

- SD: Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service), institution akin to a secret police without executive powers. Famous for spying on the population and reporting the findings to high ranking government officials, so that they could evaluate the mood of the population.

- SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democrat Party of Germany)

- SS: Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron)

- VB: Völkischer Beobachter (Folkish Observer), the official NSDAP newspaper

2 Preface

Many people, me included, enjoy jigsaw puzzles. Assembling small pieces to one coherent whole is oddly satisfying to me, a sensation possibly aided by overcoming a tedious and sometimes frustrating process: Where is that missing piece? I was by no means a professional jigsaw-puzzler and my works were far removed from the official world record for the 'largest jigsaw puzzle', currently held by 1.600 students from the University of Economics of Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam). The puzzle consists of a staggering 551,232 pieces and, upon completion, spanned over 14x23m. A puzzle of that size is obviously far beyond a single person's reach. The students had to come up with a plan and work together.

It has been years since I last assembled a puzzle, yet I have not given up on puzzling, for I often think of writing history as completing a jigsaw puzzle. Historians must consider many minute details, pieces so to speak, and assemble them to a one coherent picture, a narrative is born. In a way history is the most flexible of all jigsaw puzzles, for two reasons. Firstly history is never complete. Over time new pieces turn up, adding to the puzzle and perhaps replacing old pieces. Secondly the finished picture might be interpreted in different ways. One historian might look at the same evidence, so assembled picture, and see a duck, whereas another sees a rabbit. Both above aspects find their way into this thesis. I will discuss previously overlooked pieces, i.e. movies, and see whether or not they fit into the images other historians have assembled. Ultimately I wish to assemble my own image. Of what though? I will be concerned with National Socialism. More precisely, how the interplay between ideology and backwardness on the one hand, and modernity and technology on the other can be seen in Nazi era moves. You may, or may not, agree with my interpretation; what's important is that there is, once again, a debate in a topic long lost to the jigsaw puzzle graveyard.

Just like each and every one of the 1.600 students from Ho Chi Minh City, I could not have assembled this puzzle on my own, so now I wish to thank my helpers. First of all I want to thank the ever available Dr. David Baneke, who supervised this thesis. Our occasional meetings were always a pleasure to attend and provided me with very insightful feedback, criticism and suggestions. Furthermore I would like to thank Dr. Hermione Giffard. She helped me start off the project with insights into historical work in general, pointers towards how, and where, to attain sources, and provided feedback on my ideas. Further I would like to thank my second reader, Prof. Dr. Bert Theunissen for taking the time to read this thesis. I also wish to express my gratitude towards the friendly employees of the Bundesarchiv, who both helped me during my stay in Berlin and swiftly answered my emails. Lastly I would like to thank you, dear reader, for taking the time to read this thesis.

3 Introduction: Historiography of National Socialism

Our puzzle is about National Socialism, modernity and movies. We could frame a multi-layered research question as follows. The question *How was ideology and technology depicted in National-Socialist-era movies?* stands in the fore. Then the obvious question arises: *What does that tell us about the National Socialist view of modernity?* As I will explain below, I will treat modernity in contrast to Blood and Soil ideology, which means that I will view technology, urbanization and industrialization as indicators of modernity. An answer to the latter question demands more than mere movie analyses can provide. We must branch out and locate the movies in a broader context: *How do the movies relate to the NSDAP's policies? How were the movies received? How did the NSDAP attempt to control the movie industry, and how did they make use of movies?* Finally, *What does all this mean for historiography?* Thus this thesis evaluates existing historiographical narratives, while arguing for my own distinct viewpoint.

The question of how National Socialism related to modernity was a hotly debated topic among historians of the past few decades. In this introduction I will elaborate on three distinct narratives with the goal to provide a framework for further discussion. But first some definitions are in order.

What exactly is *ideology*? I will employ a rather narrow definition of the term. Whenever I talk about ideological components of National Socialism (NS), two aspects stand in the fore: Racism, which we can group together with anti-semitism, and Blood and Soil. The latter praises the relationship between the land and the people, thus glorifying rural life. Blood and Soil comes with a rejection of modern values and developments, most prominently technological progress, urbanization and industrialization. This then is the base of our discussion around the contradiction between ideology and modernity. Here it should be noted that Blood and Soil often encompassed anti-semitism and/or racism. More specifically the Jews were connected to, even seen as the origin of, the undesirable modern developments. Then the question arises: Can Blood and Soil and anti-semitism be treated as distinct entities? Unfortunately there is no easy answer. In this thesis I have chosen to treat the two as separate for three reasons. Firstly an exhaustive discussion of anti-semitism in NS movies simply escapes the scope of this thesis. Secondly, and more importantly, the emphasis of this thesis is on how the Nazis viewed modernity. Blood and Soil is an open critique of modernity, while anti-semitism came in many forms and shapes and was not necessarily limited to the same type criticism. Lastly Blood and Soil used anti-semitism to pinpoint the reasons for why things were as they were, as an approval of its reactionary values. For our purposes the justification behind Blood and Soil matters less than the fact that they were opposed to modernity.

Modernity is an even more elusive concept - and as we will see later in this section ground for debate. At this point I do not wish to settle for a concrete

definition. However I do wish to provide a brief overview of the ideas most authors I discuss understand to be modern. Modernity works on many levels: Ideological and political, social and economic, but also on a cultural level. Technological progress related to industrialization is commonly seen as the backbone of modernity, as are the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, urbanization and globalization. Modernity is frequently connected to the future, or 'looking ahead', while embracing the New, meaning that, for instance, enthusiasm for new technologies is equated to 'being modern'. This peculiarity renders all sorts of criticism against it 'reactionary' and 'backwards', even if the critics did not think of themselves that way. Personally I would like to highlight two aspects I find important for the debate. Firstly I think we cannot underestimate the importance of practicalities, especially in regards to governmental use of technology. In this regard I think it is modern for a government to pragmatically use science and technology. This implies preference for applied science, but also enthusiasm for science and technology, which the government deems as a solution for a certain issue. Secondly I believe in the importance of actors' categories. The Nazis, for instance, thought of themselves as modern. Explaining that they were in fact not modern is bound to be difficult. For now our definition of modernity shall remain rather vague and I propose this solution: In NS ideology I see Blood and Soil ideology as reactionary on the one hand, and enthusiasm for technology as modern on the other. Perhaps it helps us to define modernity in contrast to Blood and Soil. Blood and Soil criticized urbanization, industrialization and technological progress/enthusiasm for technology - which we shall group under the banner of modernity.

The remainder of this document revolves around how ideology and modernity are depicted in movies. Even though much has been written about Nazi era movies, the question of how film related to the National Socialist view of modernity has remained largely un-addressed. I believe that movies represent a key factor in understanding the relationship between National Socialism and modernity for various reasons. First of all movies are a piece of technology, a modern invention, themselves. Did the Nazis embrace movies, or were they reserved in using this medium? Through this lens this thesis can be seen as a case study of how one specific piece of technology was *used*. Secondly we can understand movies as propaganda and, by contrasting film to Third Reich reality, we can learn what the Nazis envisioned of the future and thought of contemporary issues. Viewed through this second lens movies appear to be a window to NS-thought.

Both parts of this discourse require us to look further than simple movie analyses; vast economic, social and political background is necessary if we want satisfactory answers to our questions. I provide said background in the fourth section: After some methodological considerations (4.1), I will discuss late Weimar elections (4.2) in order to establish whether or not the NSDAP's main focus were rural areas. Thus we can determine whether or not we should expect the NSDAP to lean more towards Blood and Soil, which was supposed to speak for the farmer in a political and ideological context. This is followed by economic considerations with priority on agricultural policies after 1933 (4.3). Of special

interest here are how Blood and Soil and modern factors, like technology and technocracy, influenced policies; the main focus once again is on rural areas. The findings of 4.3 inspired my own narrative, which stands in contrast to other historiographical narratives. We will discuss this in subsection 4.4. Subsection 4.5 summarizes our findings thus far.

Section five constitutes the main part of this thesis. A brief introduction (5.1) starts off the section, but leaves us with the important question: What movies should we consider? Subsection 5.2 explains and justifies my choices, from which the structural composition of the remainder of section 5 can be derived. In brevity, I will address the following topics: The NSDAP's use of movies in general (5.3), Cultural movies (5.4), the German Weekly News Reel (5.5), official propaganda movies (5.6) and educational movies (5.7). Section 5 is where the main research questions will be addressed, i.e. how technology and ideology were depicted in film and how the NSDAP used movies. Thus I will also examine who produced the movies, what the intended reception was, how they were actually received and how they were used in a broader context. Finally a summary (5.8) will bring the results of all subsections together and thus conclude the section.

Section six features a case study of special interest for our purposes. The NSDAP made use of movie trucks in rural areas that didn't have any stationary cinemas. The mobile cinema is an interesting case study, for it attempted to carry modernity, symbolized by movies and trucks, to presumably reactionary rural areas. Thus we can expect the contrast between progress and backwardness to be the most apparent here. Again I introduce the topic (6.1) and provide some relevant background (6.2) before moving on to the discussion of the scarce evidence of such movie trucks (6.3). Finally some concluding remarks (6.4) are in order.

I will finalize this document in section seven. I have subdivided this section into a descriptive summary of my findings (7.1), a historiographical discussion (7.2). Finally closing remarks and pointers towards further research (7.3) round up our discourse.

Let's start with some historiography. I believe that every study of National Socialism should discuss anti-semitism to some extent - yet this is a discourse which seems far removed from the main goal of the present paper. Luckily general debates in the historiography of National Socialism often revolve around anti-semitism, allowing us to touch upon the topic by sketching out broader developments in NS historiography. As we shall see positions in debates about anti-semitism at times come with distinct views on the question of how the Nazis are to be located in modernity - and this is how they connect to this paper. So in what follows I will first touch upon general developments in the historiography of NS and then discuss the historiography of NS in regards to technology/modernity. The former mirrors what can readily be found in secondary literature. The goal of the latter is to establish a base for discussion for this thesis; thus I have grouped various authors together to create different styles of narratives. To be clear: In some cases I have done so based on my

interpretation of the authors in question.

One early movement in modern historiography was the *Mass Society Thesis*, which started to materialize as a counter-narrative to Marxist histories around the turn of the century. The goal was to describe the 'spiritually anomic, socially amorphous, and ideologically irrational tendencies of post-traditional European societies.'[1] Even though Mass Society Thesis has fin de siécle origins, it became important for explaining the rise of Nazism and fascism in 1930-1940 and then again after 1945, in the form of the idea that fascism was a reaction to modernity. The Mass Society Thesis views fascism is an extreme irrational response to industrialization and thus as a form of resistance to modernity. According to this view the National Socialists' reactionary/conservative values, like anti-semitism and Blood and Soil, have ideological autonomy. This means that they did *not* have merely instrumental value.[2] Thus the Nazis actually intended to destroy all Jews from the get-go (1920s); similarly Blood and Soil translates to the desire to de-urbanize and de-industrialize Germany in order to return to an agricultural society.

Mass Society Thesis later developed into the so called *Sonderweg* (Special Path) school of history, which became popular in the 1960s. In essence Sonderweg holds that the German 'path to modernity' was a unique one. With his 1959 study on World War I Fritz Fischer was an early proponent of Sonderweg, finding foreign political continuity between Bismarck and Hitler.[3] Other historians have expanded on Fischer's foreign political scope, tracing a peculiar 'German backwardness' from the Wilhelmine era to Hitler.[4] For these authors overarching themes in regards to this German backwardness include 'shallowness of Enlightenment in Germany; uncontested power of authoritarian statism; the consequent weakness of rationalist, liberal and emancipatory values among the German elite, and a broader openness to ideas of aggressive nationalism, anti-Semitism and civic quietism among the popular classes; the anti-modernist, often nihilist 'cultural pessimism' that characterized *fin-de-siécle* German thought; and the alleged susceptibility of the masses to seductive political mythologies and defensive bigotry.'[5]

Towards the end of the 1960s some authors have described the NSDAP (and

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[1] Caplan, J., *The Historiography of National Socialism*, p.552.

[2] Compare Nolte, E., *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*, Arendt, H., *The Origins of Totalitarianism.* and Bendix, R., *Social Stratification and Political Power.* and Kornhauser, W., *The Politics of Mass Society.*

[3] See Dahrendorf, R., *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland.* Also see Lepsius, M.R., *Demokratie in Deutschland as historisch-soziologisches Problem* and *Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur: zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft.* For further discussion see Blackboure, D., Eley, G., *The Peculiarities of German History* and Iggers, G., *New Directions in European Historiography.*, Ch3., especially pp.88-112.

[4] Compare Mosse, G., *The Crisis of German Ideology* and Shirer, W., *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.*

[5] The Historiography of National Socialism, p.553-554. For arguments against the Sonderweg interpretation see Ritter, G., *Europa und die deutsche Frage*; Blackbourne, D., Eley, G., *Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung* Also see Evans, R., *The myth of Germany's missing revolution* in New Left Review 149, pp.67-94.

Nazi Germany) as unorganized, chaotic and practically decentralized.[6] The crux of the argument lies in the power struggle within the NSDAP. An example of such would be frequent clashes between Goebbels, on the leftist-progressive side of the NSDAP and Rosenberg of the hard-line right-wing camp. Such analyses gave rise to further debates: Who was responsible for the Holocaust?[7] *Intentionalists* responded that the unfolding of the Holocaust was in accordance to Hitler's 'master plan'. Thus intentionalists view the Holocaust as a top-down event, i.e. orders have been passed down from Hitler all the way to the individual guard in Auschwitz.[8] Thus intentionalists view the Third Reich as highly centralized and Hitler's power unparalleled. *Functionalists* countered that mid and low ranking officials were not passively obeying orders, but actively contributed to the Holocaust.[9] Accordingly Hitler didn't have a grand scheme; in a sense Hitler's overzealous rhetoric solely gave the impulse for the Holocaust - the main responsibility lay with the lower ranks, which often acted autonomously and seized the initiative.[10]

The second half of the 1980s saw the Historikerstreit (historians' quarrel) in Germany, which emerged from Ernst Nolte's controversial article *Die Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will (The Past That Will Not Go Away)*.[11] Nolte argued that there was no moral difference between those crimes committed under Stalin and those committed under Hitler; even more controversially, Nolte stated that the Holocaust can be seen as a response to Soviet crimes. Nolte concluded that future German generations should not feel guilty about their history and instead search for historical moments of pride. Thus the Historikerstreit revolved around the comparative question of whether or not the crimes of Nazi Germany were exclusive in their 'evilness'. Or: Were Nazi crimes (and German history) unique? And so the Historikerstreit picked up the Sonderweg debate. The teleological Sonderweg interpretation, i.e. that developments in late 19th century Germany inevitably lead to Nazism, is an argument against Nolte, who held that the Holocaust was merely a reaction.[12]

Effectively the Historikerstreit lead to syntheses between various positions. A 'moderate view' reconciled the intentionalist-functionalist debate: Hitler did not have a 'master plan', but was the driving force behind the Holocaust, while low ranking officials contributed actively to the catastrophe.[13] In this light the Holocaust was a result of forces from top and bottom, so both high- and low-

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[6] See Mommsen, H., *Hitler's Stellung im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem.*

[7] Compare The Historiography of National Socialism, p.570-573.

[8] For intentionalist argumentation see Hillgruber, A., *Germany And The Two World Wars* and Hildebrand, K., *Monokratie oder Polykratie?*

[9] E.g. Broszat, M., *Der Staat Hitlers* and Mommsen, H., *Beamtentum im Dritten Reich.*

[10] For an overview of the debate see Kershaw, I., *The Nazi Dictatorship*, Ch.4, pp.59-79 and Hiden, J., Farquharson, J., *Explaining Hitler's Germany*, Ch.3, pp.59-82.

[11] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6.6.1986.

[12] For an overview of the Historikerstreit see The Nazi Dictatorship, Ch.9, pp. 197- 217; Evans, R., *In Hitler's Shadow*, Ch.II, pp.24-46 and Maier, C., *The Unmasterable Past.*

[13] Compare e.g. The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, Ch.4, pp.59-79 and Explaining Hitler's Germany, Ch.3, pp.59-82, which describes Hitler as the focal point of a web of competing power centers.

ranking officials.[14] Such syntheses usually argue that 'Hitler's 'intentions' are indispensable to explaining the course of development in the Third Reich. But they are by no means an adequate explanation in themselves.'[15] As for the Sonderweg controversy, Heinrich August Winkler concluded that there is in fact no 'normal path' to modernity; yet Germany did not differ from other European nations to an extent that would allow us to speak of a 'uniquely German' path.[16] Winkler thus reflects the Sonderweg's recent fall from grace, not only in regards to German history, but that of any nation: There is no standardized path to modernity, no 'model'.

Now we must ask what these 'historiographical schools' tell us about how National Socialism relates to modernity. Even though the connections are not always clear, some general aspects find their way into various historiographical narratives about NS and modernity; precisely these will be the topic of the remainder of this section. In order to simplify and further our overall task I will group various authors together. This means that I will focus on the similarities between authors I have categorized under one narrative. My aim here is not to erect straw men, but to arrive at some sort of essential viewpoints for further discussion.

Soon after the War most historians tended to distance themselves from the Nazis. For this purpose the Mass Society Thesis was useful, for it allowed historians to depict Nazi Germany as far removed from themselves, i.e. the West - the Nazis were depicted as modern day barbarians, as unenlightened. Thus this style of narrative reduces NS to an out-of-place phenomenon. What made the Nazis so otherworldly were not only their crimes against humanity, but also their emphasis on ideology, which presumably pre-determined genocide and war. As 'Anti-moderns' the Nazis hated progress and technology and hailed the rural life in Blood and Soil ideology. Therefore they embodied some kind of reactionary movement to modernity, thus the term Antimodernism.

This style of narrative defines modernity in terms of liberal democracy and rationality.[17] The fascist system of National Socialism obviously violated this in multiple ways. Firstly the third Reich was no democracy. Secondly the Nazis disregarded Enlightenment values, like 'anti-authoritarianism' or 'equality', which presumably are the corner stones of liberal democracy.[18] In terms of science and technology then, liberal democracies pursued both for their own sake, while the Nazis embraced them only to further their ideological goals - recall that in Mass Society Thesis ideological aspects are autonomous and seen at face value, so as the ultimate goals of NS. The fact that the Nazis did modernize Germany - evidenced by spectacular military victories, economic recovery, engineering projects such as the Autobahnen, etc. - was then explained as a

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[14]Also see Bessel, R., *Functionalists vs. Intentionalists: The Debate Twenty Years on or Whatever Happened to Functionalism and Intentionalism?* in German Studies Review 26, no.1 (2003), p.16.

[15]The Nazi Dictatorship, p.79.

[16]See Winkler, H.A., *Germany. The Long Road West*, Vol.1, p.1.

[17]Compare Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, p.22; Dahrendorf phrases the 'German question' as why liberal democracy was not more commonly accepted.

[18]Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, p.40.

mere byproduct of the Blood and Soil dream. So this style of narrative holds that for the Nazis technology was the means, and not an end in itself.[19] In other, more concrete, words this type of narrative attempts to explain NS as a product of the discrepancy between modern 'social world' (this often includes industry and economy) and anti-modern people, which 'blocked' Germany's path to modernity.[20] This means that for the narrative at hand industrialization is an insufficient criterion for modernity; the political dimension of liberal democracy must be fulfilled as well.[21]

This line of argumentation is indeed very common, even with historians of science and technology. David Schoenbaum argues that the 'revision of Versailles, in Nazi dimensions, involved at the very least the threat of force. But the threat of force in an industrial age presupposes industry, and there is, as Nazi society conclusively proved, no industry without an industrial society.'[22] He contrasts an ideological discourse with tables that supposedly proof industrialization of Germany, e.g. a table about changes in German occupational distribution from 1882-1933[23], and concludes that different social classes continued their struggle 'like men wrestling under a blanket'.[24] All the while, the entire system was held together by ideology, charisma and terror.[25] Schoenbaum describes the Nazis as anti-modern. He recognizes the industrial development of Nazi Germany, yet 'progress' or 'modernity' was not the driving seat - ideology was.

In his classic *Politics of cultural despair* Fritz Stern traces the roots of Nazi ideology to 'Germanic critics', who advanced cultural and social criticism based on loss of faith, the disunity of people, corruption of education and the decline of morality.[26] At first sight this is an even stronger claim: The Nazis not only accepted modernity as a necessity to advance their ideological agenda, as Schoenbaum claims, but rejected modernity entirely. Yet in essence Stern and Schoenbaum argue for one and the same point: Stern simply highlights the roots and final goal of NS, while Schoenbaum elaborates on how they went about getting there.

Dahrendorf's *Society and Democracy in Germany* asks why Germans did not embrace liberal democracy. Dahrendorf claims to write from a liberal viewpoint and brings up words such as 'therapy' in response to the illness of National Socialism.[27] This rhetoric makes evident that the author thinks of NS as a movement removed from modernity. In fact not only different, but inherently bad, an illness to be treated. So since Nazis did not embrace liberal democracy they were, by definition, anti-modern.

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[19] Also see Fritsche, P., *Nazi Modern*
[20] See Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, p.108.
[21] Compare Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche, p.369.
[22] Schoenbaum, D., *Hitler's Social Revolution*, p.276.
[23] Ibid., p.3.
[24] Ibid., p.275.
[25] Ibid., p.278.
[26] Stern, F., *The Politics of cultural despair*, p.27.
[27] Dahrendorf, R., *Society and Democracy in Germany*, p.385.

We have seen that Schoenbaum, Stern and Dahrendorf all distance themselves from National Socialism, they classify it as 'the other', 'the sick' - not modern, but a parasite upon modernity. From sociology to history these authors discuss a large array of topics connected to National Socialism and I would like to summarize in George Mosse's words, to which aforementioned authors surely would subscribe: 'What differentiated the Germany of this period from other nations was a profound mood, a peculiar view of man and society which seems alien and even demonic to the Western intellect.'[28] Technology (and other modern institutions) made possible the realization of the Nazi racial policies, and was thus important only under the umbrella of power politics. In other words ideology had autonomy, while technology/modernity was merely instrumental.

So, according to aforementioned authors, there are two defining factors of modernity. Firstly, and Dahrendorf makes this explicit, the authors define modernity in terms of liberal democracy and the Enlightenment. Secondly we have seen that this type of narrative seems to suggest that it is modern for technology, or the pursuit of technological/scientific progress, to have some sort of autonomy - or: Science/Technology is pursued for its own sake. The Nazis however met neither of the two parameters, making them anti-modern. With this argumentation in mind it should be apparent that this type of narrative is firmly rooted in Mass Society Thesis: Ideology has primacy and NS was a reaction to modernity.

In the remainder of this thesis I will refer to this narrative as the *traditional view*, precisely for its Mass-Society-Thesis-origins and the fact that it is the most antiquated narrative in the NS-modernity discourse.[29] To clarify I will borrow from Kornhauser: '[...] insofar as a society is a mass society, it will be vulnerable to political movements destructive of liberal democratic institutions; while insofar a society is pluralist, these institutions will be strong.'[30] Following this argumentation then, Germany became, under the Nazis, a mass society for it rejected pluralism. Kornhauser speaks 'traditional view lingo' - the Enlightenment concepts of pluralism and liberal democracy are to be cherished, while the Nazis outright rejected them.

Jeffrey Herf's 1984 work embraces Sonderweg in a different way. He brings Nazi Germany closer to the Federal Republic, resulting in above described chasm being smaller. Herf highlights that the Nazis did *selectively* embrace technology, which lead him to create the concept of *reactionary modernism*.[31] Thus

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[28] Mosse, G., *The Crisis of German Ideology*, p.1.

[29] N.B. in some aspects the traditional view reminds of the Sonderweg interpretation.

[30] The Politics of Mass Society, p.7.

[31] Some late 1960 publications offer narratives similar to Herf's, compare e.g. Moore, B., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, who considers Japanese fascism, Ch.5, pp. 228-313 or Organski, A.F.K., *Fascism and Modernization*, which describes fascism as '[...] part of the process of transition from a limited participation to a mass system [...].' (p. 41). However Herf was the first to make the thesis explicit, especially in the field of History of Science, and will thus be examined in detail. Other historians have adopted Herf's interpretation, Neocleous, M., *Fascism*, Ch.4, pp.59-74 or Cotoi, C., *Reactionary Modernism in Interwar*

Herf seeks to explain the cleavage between technological innovation (Autobahn, rocketry, radio, and such) and ideological backwardness (Blood and Soil, anti-semitism), instead of degrading modern aspects of NS as mere byproducts. Yet, so Herf, the desire of Germany staying 'true to its soul' stands in contrast with enthusiasm for technology - the idea is to reconcile the contradiction by appeal the category of conflicting values that is 'reactionary modernism'.[32] So Herf hopes to explain what he finds to be an issue in Schoenbaum and Dahrendorf by creating a new category.

On an abstract level the contradiction Technology - Blood and Soil translates to practice - ideology. Herf argues that Hitler's regime often acted according to ideological premises, which encompassed a range of modern values. In concrete terms, Herf defines 'reactionary' as reactionary to 'the principles of 1789 yet found in nationalism a third force "beyond" capitalism and Marxism. Along with Hitler, they [National Socialists] were cultural revolutionaries seeking to restore instinct and to reverse degeneration due to an excess of civilization.'[33] This means that just like advocates of the traditional view, Herf defines modernity in terms of the Enlightenment and values associated to it: Democracy, liberalism and pluralism. 'Reactionary' for Herf stresses the point that the movement was politically Right.

Herf describes reactionary modernists as modern in the sense that they (i) did advance technological progress (so a pragmatic level) and (ii) exclaimed the triumph of the spirit and will over reason (so an ideological/philosophical level).[34] So Herf understands the Nazis as modernizers, but also as irrational, as embracing new modes of thought and aesthetic. What does that mean in comparison to Schoenbaum and Dahrendorf? In essence Herf redefines what it means to be modern. Instead of purely relying on Enlightenment values and a vague concept of techno-enthusiasm, Herf makes the latter concrete - practical technological advance. At the same time Herf adds an ideological/philosophical layer to his definition of modernity. The Nazis embraced the new and attacked tradition, here reason. Yet for Herf the 'reactionary' part of National Socialism places the movement outside of modernity. This reasoning mirrors the traditional view, for the Nazis' *political* ideology is what demarcated them from modernity.

So does Herf's narrative removes the Dahrendorf-Schoenbaum contradiction, i.e. the conflict between ideology and technological progressiveness? I think not, for two reasons. Firstly Herf's definition of modernity merely adds the 'pragmatic' and 'ideological/philosophical' layer to the definition advanced by the traditional view. Instead of asking why the Nazis were moderns, we should ask why they were anti-moderns. Herf and the traditional view would answer in the same way, i.e. by reference to Enlightenment values. Secondly in Herf's writing it is ideology that is at the center of NS, as his example of 'Aryan

Romania: Anton Golopentia and the Geopoliticization of Sociology, in Nationalisms Today, pp. 125-154.

[32]Reactionary Modernism, e.g. p.7.

[33]Ibid., p.12; N.B. 1789 was when French Revolution started.

[34]Ibid., p.11-13.

physics' shows: The Nazis hindered German engineering by placing ideological constraints onto it.[35] Thus we can simplify Herf's thesis: The Nazis embraced technology/modernity, whenever it did not contradict their ideology. For Herf this ideology consisted of both modern and anti-modern values, so: The Nazis embraced technology/modernity, whenever it did not contradict the anti-modern parts of their ideology. Thus, similar to the traditional view, ideology and the Reactionary are the defining factor in Herf's analysis.

As a final remark I want to stress the importance of 'continuity' in Herf's analysis. He recognizes that the Nazis did not invent their ideology from scratch, especially folkish components. This leads Herf to the conclusion that the 'reactionary modern school of thought' has developed over many decades and ended in NS. That style of thought bears striking resemblance to the Sonderweg interpretation.[36] Let's let Herf have the last word: 'I called National Socialism in Germany a form of 'reactionary modernism' because its leaders combined a great enthusiasm for modern technology with a rejection of the Enlightenment and the values and institutions of liberal democracy. The anti-democratic right-wing intellectuals of the Weimar Republic and then the Nazi leadership, as well, embraced parts of modernity and rejected others.'[37] Still Herf creates a new category for the Nazis, effectively distancing himself from them.

The last narrative I'd like to discuss here, that of Thomas Rohkrämer, argues that Herf's methodology is problematic. In short Rohkrämer agrees with Herf that the Nazis cannot be understood as the simply anti-modern, i.e. that the traditional view is wrong. However Rohkrämer thinks that the concept of a 'reactionary modern tradition' should be abandoned and simply removes the 'reactionary' from the 'modern' label Herf attached to the Nazis: NS is now fully modern!

The argument is two-pronged. First, Rohkrämer holds that a rejection of Enlightenment thought and embrace of technology is not paradoxical, but instead was common practice all over Europe in the 20th century. Secondly Rohkrämer attempts to show that National Socialism had very diverse cultural roots, not just the 'reactionary modern' one. More precisely, '[National Socialism] was eclectic, drawing on many different traditions and reacting pragmatically to the circumstances of the time. As its attitude towards technology was mainly pragmatic, it could take many different forms. The attempt to maintain power and achieve its central policy goals largely determined its usage of technology, not a preconceived world view.'[38] Herf has mentioned *pragmatic* use of technology and Rohkrämer develops the point: The Nazis were *mainly pragmatic* in their

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[35]Compare Reactionary Modernism, p.200-202.

[36]For comparison see Wehler, H.-U., *Bismarck und Imperialismus*, which describes aggressive economic policies of Imperial Germany. Wehler's *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich* claims that German society and economy were modernized, but politics wasn't. This 'partial modernization' resulted in weak liberal values of German elites and consequently the Third Reich. Fritz Fischer argues that Imperial Germany deliberately started WWI due to imperial ambitions, which compares to the start of WWII, see Fischer, F., *Griff nach der Weltmacht*.

[37]Herf, J., *The Totalitarian Present*, in The American Interest. Accessed 5.6.2017.

[38]Rohkrämer, T., *Antimodernism, Reactionary Modernism and National Socialism*, p.49.

use of technology. Herf remained careful in his description of Nazi enthusiasm for technology, Rohkrämer holds that the Nazis *fully* accepted technology, and its use, and thus were modern.[39] This means that Rohkrämer's narrative puts the Nazis into our drawer, quite the outrage. And while some of us might not welcome our new neighbors, I deem it an important step to fully understand these troubled decades of history. Rohkrämer's approach is therapeutic. It helps accept the past, instead of rejecting it as 'a mistake of past generations'.[40]

Lastly Rohkrämer stresses the importance of centralization as a modern process that picked up steam during, and especially after, the first World War. Related to this Rohkrämer views technocratic ideas as especially modern, for their combination of central organization and scientific values in form of ruling experts. Rohkrämer views the Nazis as modern and in this sense then as highly centralized. In this particular regard Rohkrämer reminds of *Intentionalists* of the Holocaust debate (see above). In summary Rohkrämer classifies National Socialism as part of modernity. He does so by highlighting their enthusiasm for pragmatic technology and a strive for centralization and a neglect for their preferred political system.

Other historians have subscribed to Rohkrämer's interpretation.[41] One notable case is Roger Griffin. Griffin writes that fascism 'can be seen as proposing a radical alternative to liberal and socialist visions of modernity.'[42] This 'alternative' is based on criticism of liberalism and modernism that ultimately come with the loss of meaning. 'It [fascism] is thus an attempt to re-anchor modern human beings within that highly modern phenomenon, the totalitarian state (a term used positively by Italian Fascism) through consciously manipulated historical, national, and racist myths (all deeply modern ideological constructs).'[43] Griffin's definition of modernity helps us clarify further. Griffin thinks that no state is entirely modern (by definition of the traditional view), but rather a fusion between a global trend of 'modernization', i.e. ideological, technical, political, social, economic and cultural changes, with local traditions.[44] And it is precisely in this merger that defines modernity a la Griffin: 'In a sense, then, *every* ideological and spiritual product of a society affected by modernization cannot help but be a manifestation of modernity [...]'[45] This way the Nazis were modern, even though they rejected liberal democracy, one part of modernity.

Rohkrämer and Griffin seemingly have different interpretations of modernity. For Rohkrämer liberal democracy does not need to be embraced in order

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[39] Also see Antimodernism, Reactionary Modernism and National Socialism, p.45.

[40] At times Rohkrämer's argument reminds of Hannah Arendt's famous thesis of *Banality of Evil*, see *Eichmann in Jerusalem*.

[41] For authors seeing NS as a modernizing force, see Aly G. and Roth, K.H., *Die restlose Erfassung*, Zitelmann, R., *Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne*. Compare Harwood, J., *Styles of Scientific Thought*, which seems to claim that Nazis placed more emphasis on applied research, i.e. practical application, in contrast to basic research. Likewise applied researchers, who were trained in pro-modern schools, were more sympathetic towards NS. See Styles of Scientific Thought, e.g. pp.258-263, pp.274-283, pp.283-294.

[42] Griffin, R., *Modernity under the New Order*, p.32.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., p.27-28.

[45] Ibid., p.31.

to be modern, which correlates to Griffin's idea that not all aspects of 'modernization' must be embraced to be modern. Based off that I shall call this narrative the *modern view*. This narrative holds, most importantly, that the Nazis were modern. Modernity here is defined as follows: Liberal democracy must not necessarily be embraced (Griffin), while techno-enthusiasm is modern (Rohkrämer). Derivative of that technocracy and centralization are modern feats (Rohkrämer).

Now I would like to note that Rohkrämer's article is based on the life of two people, Walther Rathenau and Ernst Jünger - a flaw he openly points out. Thus the problem of induction holds, as in the difficulty to establish the General from but two cases. Luckily this is where my thesis connects to the authors discussed above: I wish to examine the portrayal of technology and ideology in movies in order to test the above historiographical narratives (not just Rohkrämer's). Once again, I will not settle for a concrete definition of what it means to be 'modern'. Instead I will compare my findings to *all* concepts involved in above definitions. Those shall be summarized as: Enlightenment thought and values, centralization, continuous tradition (in the sense of 'reactionary modernism'), whether technology is being used pragmatically or ideologically and the apparent contrast between enthusiasm for technology and Blood and Soil ideology.

In summary then I have sketched out the layout and motivations for this thesis. More importantly I described how historians interpreted the 'National Socialist' stack of puzzle pieces, and how new pieces were added while other discarded. With the upcoming movie analyses in mind, this historiographical dispute provides the backbone, a starting point and a goal, of each and every section. This means that I will refer back to this introduction in each intermediate conclusion, effectively placing the findings of each respective section in the very context outlined here.

I have presented some general historiographical developments, followed by three narrative styles. The first narrative, which I have dubbed the *traditional view*, holds that the Nazis were entirely anti-modern. I found that this was because these authors' definition of modernity rested on liberal democracy and the Enlightenment values presumably connected to that form of governance. As for science and technology, these authors would hold that it is 'modern' to pursue science and technological progress for their own sake, so that they are ends in themselves. The argument then goes, if I imagine correctly, that the ideological aims of the Nazis only unintentionally lead to technological progress, i.e. that science and technology were merely means to an ideological end, or unwanted byproducts.

Jeffrey Herf created the second historiographical narrative of importance to us. Herf has argued that National Socialism emerged from a continuous reactionary modern tradition, which he saw rooted in Imperial Germany. The reactionary part here, similarly to the first narrative, is the rejection of Enlightenment thought. However Herf finds that the Nazis did *selectively* embrace technology, making them modern in a sense. Herf thus reconsiders what it meant to be modern and clarifies the relationship between National Socialism

and technology. Yet Herf holds that ideology played a major role in NS and dictated its view of technology.

The third narrative I have elaborated on was the *modern view*, exemplified by Rohkrämer and Griffin. According to Rohkrämer, Herf almost got it right; however his critique of Herf lead him to believe that National Socialism *fully* embraced technology for practical reasons, while de-coupling his definition of modernity from the Enlightenment and liberal democratic ideals. Instead Rohkrämer uses *centralization* as a second defining factor of modernity. As a result of this Rohkrämer views the Nazis as one possible development in, and not as an alternative to, modernity. Griffin has a different conception of modernity: A fusion between global forces of modernization and local traditional values. Blood and Soil (and other reactionary aspects of NS) count towards the latter category. Griffin argued that the reactionary components of NS thus were children of modernity and were not intended to look back.

The upcoming section will detail how I intend to analyze the movies and provide some background information. Furthermore I will present *my own take on National Socialism* and demarcate it from the three narratives discussed above.

4 Methodology and Background

Everyone who ever started a difficult jigsaw puzzle was did some preparation beforehand, or wished they did. An easy way to guarantee smooth puzzling is to start with the outermost pieces in order to create a frame. This is what the present section does. The first subsection connects the historiographical discourse of the introductory section to this thesis by discussing the methodology of this thesis. The goal is to reveal the underlying thought processes of this thesis: What topics have been chosen and why? The second subsection asks whether the NSDAP was a farmer's party, which would presumably come with emphasis on Blood and Soil ideology. This ties into one of the main concerns of this thesis: Were the Nazis modern? This excursion is then followed by relevant economic context, roughly ranging from the depression era to the outbreak of war. With rural areas as overall focal point, agricultural developments and policies will stand in the foreground, while general developments deserve some attention as well. Finally I will introduce my own historiographical narrative of NS and compare it to narratives discussed in the previous section. In short: Subsection 4.1 recalls some of the challenges I have faced while puzzling and therefore allows you, dear reader, to reconstruct some of my contemplation. Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 form a knowledge base for the upcoming section - a frame for the puzzle. Section 4.4 is to make concrete my own view in contrast to what other historians have done. Subsection 4.5 will round up this section with a summary.

4.1 Overview: A good imagination and a pile of junk

This thesis confronted me with two major methodological issues. The first issue is rooted in the topic itself: Not only do we want to show how technology and ideology is depicted in movies, but also how these movies were *used*, meaning this thesis will necessarily be (at least partially) a use-based history of technology. Use-based histories of technology come with a concrete set of strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand they allow for novel insights, for they provide a new angle of attack on issues technological. I would argue that this new angle gives us a better account of history than traditional narratives can provide.[46] This stands in contrast to invention-based histories of technology. Those types of histories focus on the invention of a technology, or the inventor. The problem with this is that novel technologies usually take decades to become meaningful, not to mention a replacement for existing technologies; invention-based histories fail to acknowledge this entirely. This in turn fosters presentism, for invention-centric histories will tell the stories of technologies that proved to be important *in retrospect*, not necessarily for the historical actors at the time when the technology in question was invented. Following this line of argument, invention-based histories are prone to highlighting sensational novelties, rather than their useful counterparts. In World War II, for instance, horses contributed more to

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[46]'Better' here is not synonymous to 'more truthful'; whether it is possible to gain pure, i.e. objective, truths in the discipline of history at all should be discussed elsewhere.

the Nazi war effort than V2 rockets did.[47] Yet WWII histories surely mention the V2 more often than horses.

So why aren't all histories use-based? Well, people like sensational stuff - and historians are no exception. The New has a certain aura of fascination for many; moreover most people will agree that rockets are more interesting than horses. But that's not the point here. Another reason has to do with the big drawback of use-based stories: They are hard to write. This does not only have to do with lack of sources, but also with the fact that use-based technologies invite further, possibly unanswerable, questions, such as *why* a particular technology has become popular, but alternatives to it haven't, or how to define the impact of a technology. Furthermore use-based histories lack the clear structure that is a Given of invention-based approach. A use-based approach might find it troublesome to quantitatively determine the relevant time, space, historical actors, or resources committed to a cause.[48] Additionally histories that make objects the subject of investigation might lack the feeling of familiarity that person-based histories can create.

This brings us to the second methodological issue of in this paper. A use-based history of movies situated in the third Reich requires research in a vast amount of apparently unrelated topics. Subjects discussed in this paper include the Weimar-era votes, the organizational structure of the NSDAP, Nazi-era movies in general, the socio-economic situation of the rural areas in the third Reich, the practical setup of movie screenings, differences in use between war-time and peace-time, a contrast in use between state controlled instrument and private enterprise, (Nazi) propaganda and a comparison with similar technologies employed at that time. Given this variety, it is important to not lose track of our goal. The question *were the Nazis modern?* serves as a compass on our journey. The main part of this document, the analysis of movies, reflects these considerations.[49]

Above reasons might be the case why movies are an overlooked topic in the history of science and technology. This thesis attempts to fill the void. Propaganda, especially Nazi propaganda, should obviously not always be taken at face value. Yet I believe that movies still offers some insights into the desires, goals and visions of the producer. Intentional and actual reception of movies is not always clear. I will devote much space to background studies, which, I hope, sufficiently address this problem. Finally I would like to note that this study is not an all-encompassing elaboration of film in the Third Reich. This is partially due to spatial constraints, but also due to my point of view. I am historian of science - and not an art critic. As such my analyses might have shortcomings in regards to aesthetics, perspective, movement, acting (if applicable), cutting, etc. I will attempt to cover these aspects whenever relevant for our discourse and to the best of my abilities.

In subsection 5.2 I will define which movie genres are relevant to us. I will

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[47]Example from Edgerton, D., *Shock of the Old*, p. xii.

[48]For a more detailed discussion of use-based vs. invention-based histories, see Shock of the Old.

[49]Section 5.1 discusses methodology in regards to movies.

treat these genres in isolation to each other, but with reference to the narratives discussed in the previous section, as well as the background to be discussed in the remainder of this section. This way I hope to walk the line between narrow case study of one genre, which makes generalizations nearly impossible, and all-encompassing history of movies, which would exceed the scope of this thesis. This means I aim to be sufficiently broad to discuss all important topics and generalize, while being sufficiently deep to allow some insights into the NS-era movies.

In order to arrive at those generalizations I will reflect on each subsection, relating the respective findings to narratives discussed in the introduction and my own narrative, to be introduced later in this section. This approach results in a multitude of arguments, which then effectively corroborate or refute the narratives.

Finally it should be noted that most translations of original quotes are mine. In order to avoid confusion and to convey the full meaning of the quotes, I will always add the original German quotes.

4.2 Cleaning up the table: Nazis farming voters or Nazi voters farming?

This subsection is to investigate whether or not the NSDAP was traditionally a *farmer's party*, meaning 'the ideal-type Nazi voter in 1932 was a middle-class self-employed Protestant who lived either on a farm or in a small community'.[50] Before we treat the matter, a few bits of general party history should be of interest. The NSDAP started off as one of many splinter parties at the extreme edges of the diverse Weimar party landscape. After a failed coup attempt in November 1923, Hitler's consecutive arrest, cooperation with other nationalist and völkisch parties in both 1924 Reichstags-elections and a nation-wide ban, the NSDAP was finally reorganized in 1925, when Hitler was set free. Hitler swiftly broke ties with his völkisch allies in order to reorganize the party and consolidate his power. The first time the *new* NSDAP participated in the elections was 1928. So we should investigate the elections from 1928 until 1933, the year of Hitler's *Machtergreifung*.

Date	KPD	SPD	Zentrum	BVP	DDP	DVP	DNVP	NSDAP	Others	Voter Turnout
20-May-28	10.6	29.8	12.1	3.1	4.9	8.7	14.2	2.6	14.0	75.6
14-Sep-30	13.1	24.5	11.8	3.0	3.8	4.5	7.0	18.3	14.0	82.0
31-Jul-32	14.6	21.6	12.5	3.2	1.0	1.2	5.9	37.5	2.6	84.1
6-Nov-32	16.9	20.4	11.9	3.1	1.0	1.9	8.8	33.1	2.9	80.6
5-Mar-33	12.3	18.3	11.3	2.7	0.9	1.1	8.0	43.9	1.5	88.7

Figure 1: Reichstags election results, 1928-1933.

The table depicted in figure one shows the steady increase of the Nazi share of the vote. However historians do not agree on how this tremendous surge came about. This is due to the fact that no political opinion polls have been conducted

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[50]Childers, T., *The Nazi Voter*, p.4.

during the Weimar era, making it hard to determine the social composition of the NSDAP.

Many historians argue against the thesis that the NSDAP, at least in its early stages, was mostly supported by farmers. Thomas Childers voices one such opinion. In *Nazi Voter* he argues that the pool of Nazi supporters was extremely heterogeneous. Other Weimar-era parties operated along deeply rooted social, occupational and religious rules: The Catholics would vote Zentrum, the workers leftist parties, and so on. Childers attributes the Nazi success to the NSDAP's ability to bridge this gap to create a true mass party. Indeed, a comparison between the NSDAP's program of 1920 and 1925 clearly shows a shift from a pure worker orientation towards a broader outline with slight middle-class focus.[51] The focus on middle-class rhetoric, in addition to the vanishing Nationalist (DNVP) and liberal (DDP and DVP) vote leads Childers to conclude that the NSDAP-staple consisted of the old middle class, i.e. small farmers, shopkeepers and artisans.[52]

We find a similar line of argument in *Hitler's Wähler*. Here Jürgen Falter finds a radicalization of the middle-class from around 1928 onward, even though the Nazis were not too succesful in that year's election.[53] Yet the NSDAP was able to gradually increase their share of the vote in regional elections; one of the most drastic examples comes from Thuringia, where the Nazis managed to score 11.3 percent of the vote in 1929, compared to just 1.6 percent in 1927.[54]

But where was the NSDAP strongest? In May 1928 the NSDAP was strongest in Franken, Oberbayern, Pfalz and Weser-Ems, while Nazi Party was particularly weak in Ostpreussen, Frankfurt/Oder, Oppeln, Westfalen-Nord and Koeln-Aachen. Two years later, in 1930, the NSDAP was strongest in Schleswig-Holstein, Pommern, Breslau, Suedhannover-Braunschweig and Chemnitz-Zwickau with 24-28 percent, whereas they only managed to score 10-12 percent in Wuerttemberg, Oppeln, Niederbayern, Westfaen-Nord and Berlin.[55] During the next vote, in July 1932, Nazi record districts included Rothenburg with 83 percent, Neustadt/Aisch with 79 percent, Schotten with 83 percent, Neidenburg with 81 percent and Lyck with 80 percent. Vechta with 11.7 percent, Bocholt with 12.3 percent and Aschaffenburg with 16.5 percent saw some of the worst Nazi turnout.[56] Figure two below marks aforementioned locations of the 1932 elections.[57]

Interestingly in 1930 and 1932 Nazi bulwarks *and* soft spots lay in rural areas - the former in east Germany, the latter in the South (and in some urban regions, like the Ruhr). Additionally Falter finds that town size negatively correlated to the NSDAP vote; yet overall only about 47 percent of the 1933 NSDAP voters originated from towns of under 5.000 inhabitants.[58]

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[51] Nazi Voter, p. 45; also see Miller Lane, B., Rupp, L., *Nazi Ideology before 1933*.

[52] Nazi Voter, p.264.

[53] Falter, J.W., *Hitler's Wähler*, p.30.

[54] Ibid., p.33.

[55] Ibid., p.155.

[56] Ibid., p.35.

[57] See Appendix A for an overview of Weimar election districts.

[58] Hitler's Wähler, p.166-168. N.B. this number derives from a *regional* study for 1925-1933.

Figure 2: Nazi strongholds (brown) and soft spots (blue) in 1932.

In short: The NSDAP performed best and worst in rural areas. In order to shed some light on the issue, we must consider further factors. Falter finds that the biggest Nazi breakthroughs after 1928 took place in rural protestant areas. Indeed catholic small towns seem to have had the highest resistance towards NSDAP in general.[59]

Unfortunately too many cooks spoil the soup - and so it is with additional factors in a statistical analyses. Unemployment and the level of depth were higher in rural protestant areas than in their catholic counterparts, making those correlated factors.[60] Furthermore farms in the protestant north were 'big agriculture', whereas most farms in the catholic south were small family farms - so farm-size, the question of ownership and constitution of the workforce mattered too.[61]

What is important for us is that both Falter and Childers argue that the NSDAP-staple was much more diverse than originally assumed, with a middle-class percentile of around 40 percent. However, both authors do acknowledge the importance of rural areas for the Nazi victory. So in a sense Hitler was right when he said that the NSDAP ought 'not be a movement of a specific class or a specific vocation, [but] in the closest sense of the word a German Volkspartei.' [Keine Bewegung einer bestimmen Klasse oder eines bestimmenten Berufes, [aber] im hoechsten Sinne des Wortes eine deutsche Volkspartei.[62]

Also see Appendix B.

[59] For the confessional distribution of the German Reich, see Appendix C; for a socio-political history about rural Germany see Gerschenkron, A., *Bread and Democracy in Germany.*

[60] See Hitler's Wähler, pp.315-324.

[61] Ibid., pp.257-266

[62] Speech from 30.11.1928, in Zitelmann, R., *Hitler: Selbverstaedndnis eines Revolutionärs.,*

Finally a few words on the NSDAP's strategy are in order. Long before the 1930 success, NSDAP strategists, including Goebbels, widely discussed propaganda plans. In 1926 Goebbels planned to erect 'Nazi bulwarks' in a few urban areas. With these urban bulwarks as a base the NSDAP would expand their influence to surrounding rural areas.[63] However Hitler decided to take a different path and at first more thoroughly organized the party.[64]

Shortly after the 1928 elections, the Völkischer Beobachter (Folkish Observer, VB) noted that rural areas were easy propaganda targets, since large-scale events were a rarity there and thus created long-lasting impressions. The VB concludes that rural areas are profitable propaganda targets, for there the Nazis could conjure up good results with minimum effort.[65] The article heralded a new strategy, which would be a 'reverse-Goebbels': The establishment of rural strongholds, from where expansion to urban centers was possible.[66] These bulwarks were to be established by constant campaigning.[67]

So was the NSDAP a farmer's party? This subsection has shown that the NSDAP's staple was very diverse. Yet rural areas, especially those of protestant faith, contributed to the Nazi upswing in the early 1930s. This tied in with the NSDAP's propaganda strategy, which revolved around establishing rural bulwarks as a base for further expansion. However the NSDAP was a mass party, meaning it had to merge interests of different social classes and geographic areas. This allows us to assume that Blood and Soil ideology could have been used as a campaigning strategy in rural areas and did not reflect the NSDAP in its entirety.

4.3 Under Construction: The Third Way

This subsection investigates the economic reality in the late Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. An overview of the general economics serve as a starting point before we have a closer look at measures specific to rural areas and farmers. Finally some concluding remarks summarize the take-away lessons in regards to the main objective of this subsection, i.e. to establish a lens for the movie analyses in the following section.

In regards to general economic policies the NSDAP had little concrete plans when they came to power, so many policies seem make-shift and implementation was often flawed, which will become apparent in the latter part of this subsection. What the NSDAP did have were very broad outlines, or ideas, often connected to racial ideology and what they had promised in their election campaign. First of all there was the issue of unemployment, which ran rampant due to the economic crisis of the late 1920s. The second major issue was autarky. The NSDAP's preference for autarky was not, as often assumed, solely

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p.178.

[63] See Nazi Voter, p. 122; Also see Kampf um Berlin.

[64] See Orlow, D., *The History of the Nazi Party*.

[65] Aus der Bewegung, in VB 31.5.1928, in Nazi Voter, p.127.

[66] Nazi Voter, p.128.

[67] Also see Sheridan Allen, W., *The Nazi Seizure of Power*.

a 'lesson of the World War'. The real remnant of the first World War was the Europe-wide belief that modern war effort required industrial production.[68] Even though rearmament was an important part of Nazi economic policies, the autarky issue gained importance due to the economic crisis, which crippled import and export, making international trade unreliable.[69]

Before we delve into the role of rearmament in NS economic policies some definitions are in order. Overy correctly distinguishes between direct and indirect rearmament. The latter includes any industrial production that can be refurbished for war production, e.g. airplane manufacturing, automobile industry, etc., as well as the production of the resources required for weapons manufacturing - steel, rubber, oil, and such. Direct rearmament is literal rearmament, so arms production. Now it is important to realize that early NS projects were mostly indirect rearmament that benefited industry and employment rates; it was only in 1936 that Hitler pushed for direct rearmament by criticizing the current state of military production in a memorandum.[70] Hitler asked for concrete measures to be taken, as if the country were already at war.[71] In terms of organization this meant that the Wehrmacht lost it's say in most economic matters, with the NSDAP filling the void.[72] The memorandum gave rise to the famous four-year plan, which greatly increased military spending. The plan was reworked in 1938 to make the mobilization effort more concrete.[73]

It should also be noted that Hitler might not have expected War against the western allies after German aggression against Poland. German rearmament was to take until the mid 1940s and was far from complete in 1939. The Wehrmacht only had 1.800 aircraft available in April 1939, with 15.500 awaiting production.[74] But Hitler made another miscalculation, which could have been rooted in his poor understanding of economic principles and resource management: He ignored the mutual exclusiveness of large-scale military and civilian projects.[75]

This brings us to agricultural policies, the focus of this subsection. The NSDAP first targeted indirect, and from 1936 onward on direct, rearmament - so consumer goods fell short. Again, Hitler's 1936 memorandum allows for some insights: 'In face of the necessary defence against this danger [i.e. Marxism and Jewry], all other considerations are inconsequential and must entirely take the back seat! [Gegenüber der Notwendigkeit der Abwehr dieser Gefahr [i.e. Marxismus und Judentum] haben alle anderen Erwägungen als gänzlich belanglos in den Hintergrund zu treten!]'[76] However Hitler wanted to cover basic civil needs,

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[68] Overy, J., *War and Economy*, p.177-178.

[69] Roughly one fourth of Germany's population relied on trade in one way or another. See War and Economy, p.3.

[70] War and Economy, p.5-6.

[71] Ibid., p.185.

[72] Ibid., p.187.

[73] Petzina, D., *Autarkiepolitik*, p.119.

[74] War and Economy, p.196 and p.238-239

[75] Ibid., p.236-237.

[76] Quoted in Autarkiepolitik, p.49; also see Treue, W., *Hitlers Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan 1936*, p.184f

above all food - for which farmers were necessary.

As mentioned in section 4.2 peasants were an easy pickup for the NSDAP in the late 1920s. This had to do with the bad economic situation for farmers and the fact that the NSDAP reaped discontent other parties and farmer unions had sown. Towards the late 1920s the NSDAP was able to absorb some of the large rural interest associations, like the Land Volk Bund (Rural peoples movement).[77] Until 1930, when Walther Darré, a major Blood and Soil ideologue, joined the NSDAP, the party's agricultural program was surprisingly shallow.[78] The following paragraphs briefly investigate the implementation of Darré's ideas, the Erbhofgesetz (Land heritage law) and the settlement program, after the Machtergreifung. Afterwards I will cover the Erzeugungsschlacht (Battle of produce), another milestone of NS agricultural policy, and land-flight, one of the major socio-economic issues of the time.

The famous Erbhofgesetz was to tackle speculation. Under this law, which came in effect on 29. September 1933, roughly one third of all German farms were proclaimed Erbhöfe (hereditary farms), meaning that such estates could not be mortgaged or their property assigned; they had to be passed down from father to *one* designated heir. Now this heavily restricted the farmers financially and disallowed for their offspring to leave the farms, which is why the law was not very well received.[79] The Erbhofgesetz mirrors the Blood and Soil dream: A farmer passes their land to their offspring - the soil and blood become interwoven.

Interestingly only farmers in possession of an Erbhof could call themselves rightfully *Bauer*, which fit well within general NS attempts to raise the status of the peasantry. Even though this was not official policy, there are many examples corroborating just that, including attacks on derogatory literature and imagery against peasants, as well as positive reinforcement in the form of festivals, like the Erntedankfest (Harvest Thanksgiving Festival) or the Reichsbauerntag (Reich farmer's day).[80] However there was a thin line between appraisal and ridicule. Traditional garbs, for instance, were not trendy on the land any more than they were in cities. Understandably peasants could get upset by being portrayed wearing traditional clothing from a long lost era, which might suggest backwardness.[81]

The idea of the settlement program was to reverse the long-standing trend of East-to-West migration by re-settling farmers from West to East. However much of the eastern farmland was split up into a few large estates held by the Junkers (Prussian landed nobility). Thus the settlement plan foresaw that land would have been taken away from the Junkers and given to individual farmers instead. In the end the Junkers were able to hold onto their soil, so all that was left for the settlement program was bad soil, resulting in the program's failure.[82]

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[77]Farquharson, J.E., *The Plough and the Swastika*, p.11-12.

[78]Ibid., p.16

[79]Kershaw, I., *Popular Opinion*, p.42-43.

[80]Plough and Swastika, pp.203-204.

[81]Ibid., p.205-206.

[82]For further details see Ibid., pp.141-160

On 17. November 1934 the Erzeugungsschlacht was proclaimed - a fancy name for the simple goal of increased agricultural production as a first step towards agricultural autarky. The NSDAP has always advocated this point, but it should be noted that autarky more than a 'World War I lesson'. There was a very practical reason to advocate autarky: Germany's armament needed production materials, like rubber or steel, most of which had to be purchased from abroad. However Germany was extremely low on foreign currency due to the depression.[83] Now the plan was not to 'waste' currency on agricultural goods that could easily be produced in Germany. The first two years after the Erzeugungsschlacht was announced not much progress had been made. This can be attributed to the make-shift nature of the plan and chaotic organization, but the reason for the failure is another debate.[84] Around the time of Hitler's announcement that Germany needed new land in 1936, the Erzeugungsschlacht started paying off.[85] What happened? Apart from better management and recovering international trade, fertilizers played an important role to increase agricultural output.[86] The plan effectively cut fertilizer prices, which greatly increased their use. The 1932-33 total of 1,540,000 tons was almost doubled to 2,721,000 tons in 1938-39.[87]

All above measures intended to combat land-flight, for each was designed to bring about either monetary or social benefits for peasants. Again there were concrete reasons for the NSDAP to pursue this, apart from the 'Blood and Soil' dream. The wave of unemployment that followed the depression helped the NSDAP to power at least to some extend. Of course the Nazis realized that unemployment meant dissatisfaction with 'the system', so they devoted much energy to better the situation. Famous programs like the Autobahnen, but also often overlooked actions, like an increase of free time, come to mind.[88] Employment relates to land-flight in an odd way: Employment rates were actually higher in rural than in urban areas.[89] Thus unemployed peasants migrating to cities worsened unemployment data. Furthermore Hitler believed that reproduction rates were lower in cities. With this believe added to the unemployment issue, it is easy to understand why land flight was such an issue for the NSDAP. Not only would it foster dissent through unemployment, but also have a negative impact on birthrates.[90] *Landhilfe* was a related program, that forced urban youths of both genders to work in agriculture for some time.[91] Landhilfe was unpopular with both farmers, who preferred skilled labor, and participants, who

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[83]Less foreign money invested in Germany, less goods exported, etc.

[84]Plough and Swastika, p.167.

[85]Ibid., p.167-173.

[86]Germany now embraced bilateral trade treatises, i.e. trading goods for goods; see Ibid., p.178

[87]Bauerntum, published by the SS in 1942, p.49, quoted in Ibid., p.174

[88]More free time meant that individual workers would earn less, but companies employed more people to make up for lost hours. See War and Economy, pp. 40-45.

[89]Plough and Swastika, p.184-185

[90]Ibid., p.216

[91]This was not enforced by law, but turning down the 'offer' would have negative impacts on the individual, e.g. cancellation of unemployment benefits. War and Economy, p.46-47.

would rather earn money. The number of participants in Landhilfe, or similar programs, declined rapidly after employment rates recovered.[92]

Finally I would like to make mention of the NSDAP's attempt to push women out of work; this is unrelated to land flight, but does relate to employment. Large parts of folkish propaganda reflect this by advocating the 'traditional family', i.e. working man, housewife and multiple children. In short this can be seen as an attempt to bolster employment figures, for jobs abandoned by women would be taken by a previously unemployed man. Meanwhile housewives were not counted as unemployed.[93]

In conclusion it seems the believe that the Nazis prioritized armament is justified. However the distinction between direct and indirect rearmament is important. The latter was only important from 1936 onward, thus the period from 1933-1936 can be seen as somewhat removed from rearmament. Given that the NSDAP pursued autarky as early as 1933, especially in agriculture, allows for the conclusion that autarky and rearmament had two distinct political roots. Most direct armament plans were long-term, meaning that arms production was still in an infantile stage at the outbreak of war. The main agricultural policies were not only an attempt to raise production, but also to combat land-flight. Hitler's assumptions were mostly correct, especially in face of the bad employment situation in cities. To counteract the trend the NSDAP sought to make agriculture more profitable and raised the social status of the farmer by various means, including the Erbhofgesetz or festivities, such as the Erntedankfest. In reality fertilizers played a major role in the Erzeugungsschlacht, indicating that the NSDAP did not avoid modern means to raise production. Either way, most agricultural policies stemmed from Darré's work, which suggests Blood and Soil roots.

Policy implementation was very make-shift in nature, as evidenced by their early (or general) failures. This creates the image that the NSDAP was very pragmatic. Peasants were a dying class, but were desperately needed in the larger socio-economic context and were thus embraced. The overall goal was not to control the economy based on ideology: Industry was left mostly untouched, whereas Darré asserted much control over the agriculture. Oddly enough the Nazis combined state control, a leftist element, with folkish ideals, which can be seen as conservative-reactionary. This again raises the issue of what had primacy: Practicalities (here economic needs) or ideology? I believe this subsection has shown that clearly the former was the case, thus dismantling the traditional view of the NSDAP-technology relationship. This results in a new historiographical narrative, to be called the *pragmatic view*.

4.4 Pragmatic View: Clarifications and Comparison

In this subsection I will clarify the newly introduced *pragmatic view*, at the hand of one example, the Reichsautobahn project: How do our four narratives

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[92]War and Economy, p.46-47. Similar programs were e.g. the Hitleryouth's *Landdienst* or the Prussian *Landjahr*.

[93]Also see Ibid., p.49.

view this endeavor? Thus this section is not to be seen as an in-depth case study of the Reichsautobahn. I will restrain myself to the most basic historical facts; instead the focus is on the *interpretation* of the case, with the underlying issue of whether the Nazis were modern. In other words, a small and already assembled puzzle can be viewed from different angles and those are the main actors in this subsection. Evaluating which one is the best is of no concern here - we merely find the differences between each image and how they come about.

But first of all, what was the Reichsautobahn project? Essentially the project boiled down to the creation of long-distance highways throughout the Reich. Even though plans for such had existed in Weimar times, Hitler advertised the enterprise as his brain child and NS propaganda often used this to display its modern values.[94] Connecting to the personal cult around the Führer, Hitler famously and ceremoniously broke the ground at Frankfurt on 23. September 1933.[95] The Reichsautobahn served a variety of roles. Firstly the ever so prevalent reduction of unemployment again found its way into NS-propaganda. The Reichsautobahn created some 100.000 jobs - a considerable number, which the NSDAP often exaggerated.[96] Secondly the Reichsautobahn fit well into Nazi plans to motorize Germany. It should encourage the population to buy more cars, an aspect closely connected to the Volkswagen

Figure 3: Picnic in nature, made possible by the Autobahn. Source: Mythos Reichsautobahn, p.147

project. That better infrastructure and mechanization helped war preparations is evident - a mention shall thus be sufficient here. Yet we must be careful not to overestimate the Autobahn's value during the war.[97]

Thirdly there was spiritual value in the Reichsautobahn. This aspect was two-pronged. Germans were invited to find beauty in the Autobahn, the nature surrounding it, and the interplay between both. Furthermore the Autobahn was often advertised as a testament to the modernity of Germany, and indeed to modernity itself. As such the Reichsautobahn was a merger of economic, technological, aesthetic and psychological aspects.[98] The movie *Bahn frei!* (Make way!, 1935) makes this concrete. One scene describes the Autobahn as 'firmly entrenched, indestructible tie connecting technology and nature. [festgefügtes,

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[94] Compare Gruber, E., Schütz, E., *Mythos Reichsautobahn*, p.9.

[95] Ibid., p.43.

[96] See Ibid., pp.7-11 and p.38.

[97] Ibid., p.12.

[98] For general discourse see Mythos Reichsautobahn, p.21-22 and Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, pp.276-280. For examples of such orchestration in different forms of art and media, see Mythos Reichsautobahn, pp.104-121.

unzerstörbares Band, das Technik und Natur verbindet].'[99]

Let's see how our four narratives interpret the situation. First off the traditional view, which holds that all Nazi activities were ultimately rooted in ideology. At first sight the Autobahn, and how the NSDAP used it to advertise modernity, might seem to provide counter-evidence to the traditional narrative. However a proponent of the traditional narrative will consider that as a mere veil for the anti-modernism at root. She must argue that the Autobahn then was a mere tool, a necessity, for the next War, which was to enable Nazis' ultimate goal: Racial world dominance and the blood and soil dream. Surely the military had much liking in better infrastructure, but the extend to which the Autobahn was used during the war is questionable. Considering the other aspects of the Autobahn reveals how the traditional view seems to superimpose this 'ultimate Nazi goal': How to explain the aesthetic aspect of the project? The traditional view would hold that the goal here was to bring people closer to nature, thus nurturing their Blood and Soil spirit. While nature was part of the advertisement strategy, there was another side of the coin, i.e. technological progress. Moreover propaganda often focused on the interplay between Autobahn, as something modern, and nature. This seems to not bode well with the traditional view. Finally the traditional view would hold that the connection of Autobahn and unemployment was mostly a propagandistic construct. The argument would likely revolve around how, in comparison to other measures, the number of jobs created from the Autobahn project was negligible. This is a sensible argument, but it leaves out how the project was perceived by the public. The overall public mood is extremely important for politics, and 'hard facts' are sometimes not the most important factor in this. As a final thought then, a proponent of the traditional view must view a similar project, like the construction of the Interstate Highway System in the USA in the 1950s, in terms of 'modernity for modernity's sake'. Leaving out military considerations, that certainly played a role for the Interstate Highway System's construction, will be left out. Thus under the traditional view the Interstate Highway System is white, the Reichsautobahn black, where in reality both were grey. This boils down to one of the major problems with the traditional view: It describes modernity in terms of politics. In summary then, we see that by focusing on but one of a multitude of aspects, namely the ideological-military one, the traditional view has considerable blind spots, especially in areas that cannot directly relate to reactionary thinking. The cause of this is the presupposition that everything the Nazis did had an ideological root, with the opposite being the case in the enlightened West.

Moving on to Herf's narrative. Herf would see the Autobahn as an example of the Nazis selectively embracing technology. Contrary to the traditional view this would be unconditional, i.e. without much ideological baggage attached to it. Combating unemployment would be included in the form of a political necessity, so to uphold campaign promises and to lower discontent. Contrary

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[99]Quoted in Mythos Reichsautobahn, p.7.

to the traditional view, Herf has no problem seeing the Autobahn as modern infrastructure for both military *and civilian* purposes. In this sense Herf adds to the traditional view by neither overlooking the importance of the military aspect nor that of the civilian uses and purposes of the Autobahn. But can we see see the project as a 'selective embrace' of technology? Recall that Herf thinks the criteria for selecting technologies are ideological. One of Herf's prime examples comes from physics with the Nazi denial Relativity theory and embrace of 'Aryan Science'. In this sense the Nazis had no problem with the Autobahn, since it apparently did not directly violate NS ideology. However the aesthetic aspect of the Autobahn project, especially the idea of 'Autobahn and nature' hints at a fusion of romantic Blood and Soil ideas and modernity. I believe this is something Herf would have trouble accounting for. The case at hand is not an 'either or' situation, but shows that the Nazis sometimes embraced both romanticism and progressiveness. This shows that the Nazis placed more weight on modernity than Herf, for whom ideology takes primacy, assumes. Both romantic ideals of the beauty of nature and the homeland, as well as the achievement of an engineering feat, come together to create one image. This synthesis clearly runs against reactionary ideas of nature, for which Blood and Soil ideology stood for. In this sense then the Autobahn project exemplifies that Blood and Soil was indeed not the non-plus-ultra of Nazi thinking. Yet Herf's idea of a reactionary modern tradition could lead to a comparison of modernization during the Weimar Republic and the third Reich, with focus on the car. Even though this is a valid approach, it would only distract from the Herf's problem to reconcile romanticism and modernity in NS. In summary, Herf seems to provide a much more stable narrative, compared to the traditional view. His narrative can accommodate most aspects of the Autobahn-story, except that reactionary thinking might not have been the defining factor in the project.

For Rohkrämer National Socialism was fully modern; he focuses on pragmatic uses of technology and centralization as benchmarks of what it is to be modern. Thus Rohkrämer would emphasize that the Autobahn was meant to be a modernization project, especially in combination with Volkswagen. For Rohkrämer the involvement of unemployment would make the Autobahn a reaction to a practical issue; an engineering solution to an economic problem, a modern political approach. So Rohkrämer would see the Autobahn-Volkswagen-duo as the NSDAP has advertised them: As modernization projects. Taking sources (especially in this context) at face value is dangerous, but not necessarily wrong, if considered carefully. As far as military utilization of the Autobahn goes, Rohkrämer could focus on central planning. The interplay of various governmental sectors in the Reichsautobahn seems to be a fruitful investigation here. Rohkrämer would view the spiritual component of the Autobahn, just like its modernization aspect, as further corroboration that National Socialism made full use of science and technology; perhaps even more so than other political systems, the Nazis used their technical accomplishments to exhibit their modernity. The most problematic point for Rohkrämer, just like for Herf, is the interplay between Autobahn and landscape in aesthetics, for this connection is entirely removed from centralization and pragmatic use of technology. As

discussed above the Autobahn presents itself as a fusion between romantic and modern values. By focusing on the modern, Rohkrämer overlooks the romantic part of Autobahn propaganda. In this sense Rohkrämer and Herf both cover one side of the story; Herf the romantic, Rohkrämer the modern side. This reveals a certain weakness in Rohkrämer's narrative. If the Autobahn was truly modern, and not motivated by Blood and Soil at all, why was it advertised in combination with nature and not solely as monument to modernity? An answer to this question seems difficult. In summary then, Rohkrämer's approach includes all but one point, as Herf does. However while Herf focuses on ideological continuity, Rohkrämer highlights the modern aspects of National Socialism. Thus Rohkrämer and Herf share the same problem here, but each from a different angle. Furthermore he would bring central planning and state control to the table, effectively expanding on Herf's scope.

Finally we come to the pragmatic view, which holds that NS ideology, especially Blood and Soil, should be seen as a vehicle for progress. The pragmatic view would first construct a nexus of issues the Nazis wanted to solve with this project. In our example these would include firstly unemployment, secondly modernization, and thirdly international and national prestige. We have already discussed unemployment above, and the pragmatic view subscribes to what has been said so far: Rooting out unemployment to lower discontent was important to the NSDAP, especially as a freshly elected party. As for modernization, the pragmatic view would highlight the NS emphasis on economic self-sufficiency. A strong mechanical engineering industry is the backbone of any attempt to be self-sufficient; and since the Autobahn project was to boost that sector, it should be seen in this context. The same holds for military considerations. However the pragmatic view would not only investigate the importance of infrastructure for troop transport, but also the relationship between Autobahn, self-sufficiency, industry and rearmament. The aesthetic part would again be taken at face value: Autobahn - a monument to modernity and progress. This brings us to where the pragmatic view differs from aforementioned narratives. The pragmatic view pictures the fusion of technology and nature in Autobahn propaganda, the one grain of sand in both Herf's and Rohkrämer's cogs, simply as advertisement. The reactionary/romantic/ideological component we find in such propaganda, i.e. that of the beauty of nature, should then be seen as an attempt to make popular what the NSDAP deemed necessary. In our case people might have opposed the Autobahn project for its destruction of nature; such opinions could then be silenced by application of romantic propaganda. Overall then, the pragmatic view attempts to remove the contradiction between ideology and modernity in National Socialism by arguing that there was in fact no contradiction at all, that the Nazis fully embraced technology/modernity and, in order to sway critics, made use of romantic imagery in propaganda. And this is, according to the view at hand, what it means to be modern: Technology as reaction to practical matters.

The pragmatic view obviously differs from the traditional view in that it views ideology as a vehicle, not impulse, for NS policies. The primacy of things practical means that technology is not pursued as an end in its own. Technol-

ogy and Ideology both serve the Pragmatic. And this is where the pragmatic view differs from Herf. Herf holds that the Nazis embraced technology selectively. The pragmatic view would say that technology was embraced *fully*, as long as it served a certain goal. Some agreement between the pragmatic view and Herf could be found by tracing down this approach to technology through history; however I doubt that that would reveal one specific strain of 'reactionary pragmatic modernism'. But this shall remain subject for another time. The pragmatic view is perhaps closest to Rohkrämer, so we must tread carefully. Rohkrämer does recognize the importance of pragmatic circumstances and mentions this throughout his paper: '[National socialism was] reacting pragmatically to the circumstances of the time.'; or: '[National Socialists] did not challenge the existing order as fundamentally as somebody like Jünger and were *more* open to pragmatic compromises.'[100] Now here is the difference: While pragmatics plays an important part in Rohkrämer, it does not dictate the entirety of National Socialist acting - Rohkrämer remains unclear about the role of ideology in this. The pragmatic view on the other hand regards ideology, especially Blood and Soil, as an advertisement strategy. Yet it should be noted that the pragmatic view can be seen as a variant, or modification, of the modern view - they are not mutually exclusive in most regards.

In order to summarize, we have seen that the traditional view turned out to be too narrow for the case of the Reichsautobahn. Herf and Rohkrämer turned out to be quite similar, at least if seen in isolation of one case study; overall both were able to incorporate a large array of topics. However both Herf and Rohkrämer struggled with the peculiar idea of the Autobahn *in* nature, each for their own reason. The pragmatic view promises redemption in exactly this point, viewing it as mere support to an essentially modern system.

4.5   Summary: Pragmatism is the new Ideology

In summary, the use-based approach to history brings several methodological dangers with it. Those must be taken into account in the remainder of this paper. However we have seen this approach is a valid way to add something new to the historiographical debate, while evaluating existing narratives. Section 4.2 examined whether or not the NSDAP was a 'farmer's party'. Even though we must concede that the NSDAP staple was much more diverse than that, the rural population, especially in the protestant north-east of Germany, proved to be vivid Nazi supporters from 1930 onward. A short excursion into Nazi propaganda strategy allowed us to expect use of film in *all* rural areas.

Section 4.3 investigated the economic context of this thesis. I have argued that the Nazis faced a number of difficult tasks as they assumed power: The treasury was empty, the economy in shambles and unemployment rates high. Nevertheless Hitler insisted on re-armament. At first this was done indirectly, much to the benefit of the economy. However many first attempts to tackle

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[100]Antimodernism, Reactionary Modernism and National Socialism, p.49 and p.48 respectively. My emphasis.

socio-economic issues, especially land-flight, failed. Towards the mid 1930s the economic situation started to stabilize. I have concluded that the Nazis were entirely pragmatic in their approach to economy, i.e. that their economic policies were not motivated by ideological considerations and often make-shift in nature. The combination of policies directed towards farmers, including attempts to raise their social status, ultimately served the purpose of combating land-flight and increasing efficiency in agriculture, which in turn was necessary for Hitler's grand scheme of things: Economic autarky, which was to support rearmament. Thus, I argued, ideology helped implement and justify what was necessary from a pragmatic standpoint. This sort of narrative would place pragmatics over all, and will thus be called the *pragmatic view*. Developing this point, and relating it to the other narratives, will be a central part of this thesis.

Subsection 4.4 was a brief evaluation of how our four historiographical narratives interpret the Reichsautobahn, fleshing out the differences between them.

5 Ideology and Technology in Movies of the Third Reich

Ein Staat, der sich innerlich festigen muß, ist eben mehr auf die Propaganda angewiesen, als ein Staat, der durch die Tradition imponiert.[101]

In this section we will fill in the puzzle frame we have created in the previous section by analyzing and contextualizing NS-era movies of various genres. Currently we are looking at a huge stack of puzzle pieces. I find it advisable to split up the heap. Subsection 5.1 does just that: What movie genres are important for our discourse? What makes a movie propaganda? The stacks we will create there determine these subsections: Cultural movies (5.3), News reel (5.4), Propaganda movies (5.5) and educational movies (5.6). Our discourse is held together by subsection 5.2, a brief history of the relationship between NSDAP and movies, and subsection 5.7, the summary.

5.1 Sorting the heap: Movie genres, propaganda and ideology

Unfortunately us humans are trapped in our four-dimensional perception of space-time: We cannot but go forward in time (for now at least). As the times change, so do the technologies we use. Luckily humans are fairly good at conceptualizing the New. As historians we must do the reverse. By conceptualizing the Old, we usually rely on categories historical actors used to employ. This subsection does not investigate a single puzzle piece, but rather looks at the heap in an attempt to draw a line between relevant and irrelevant pieces. We will brew a refreshing cocktail, part Old, part New, in order to draw that line.

Germans of the 1920s knew a distinction between *Kulturfilm* (culture film) and *Spielfilm* (feature film). Kulturfilm encompassed a large range of popular scientific topics and as such reminds of some modern day *documentaries*. However the genre remained ill-defined: 'From the cell division of amoeba to the titan Michelangelo, Kulturfilm treats everything Biology and Medicine, Science and Technology, Art and Literature, Ethnography and Geography research, and forges them, in its very specific way, into a bigger picture.' [Von der Zellteilung der Amoeben bis zum Titanen Michelangelo behandelt er alles, was Biologie und Medizin, Forschung und Technik, Kunst und Literatur, Ethnografie und Geografie erforschen, und vereinnahmt sie auf seine spezifische Art höhere Weltbetrachtung.][102] Even historical actors who employed the notion of Kulturfilm did not agree on one definition. Typically Kulturfilm was situated somewhere between pure entertainment (Spielfilm) and pure documentary

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[101]Die Zukunft des militaerischen Films, in Kinematograph, Nr.638, 26.3.1919, quoted in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.2, p.348.

[102]Hoffmann, H., *Und die Fahne führt uns in die Ewigkeit*, p.113. N.B. 'Titan Michelangelo' refers to the movie Michelangelo - Das Leben eines Titanen.

(Lehrfilm, i.e. educational movies).[103] The 1924 *Kulturfilmbuch*, for instance, does not categorize the movies it discusses, but it distinguishes between functional modes, e.g. educational Kulturfilm, entertaining Kulturfilm or Propaganda/Advertisement.[104] This suggests a certain proximity of Kulturfilm to propaganda; we shall return to this later.

The bigger picture, Kracauer calls it *Weltbetrachtung* in above quote, has its roots in the most important difference between Spielfilm and Kulturfilm. In German this is rather obvious. A Spielfilm is a scripted movie, in which actors play roles, or in German: In dem Schau*spieler* Rollen *spielen*. A Kulturfilm, on the other hand, displays reality, it documents the truth (here the English translation, 'documentary film', captures the essence more so than 'Kulturfilm'!). In other words, 'German Kulturfilme disenchant the Creation and cosmos.' [Die deutschen Kulturfilme entzaubern Schöpfung und Kosmos.][105] This means that Kulturfilm is surrounded by a certain shroud of objectivity. It comes to no surprise then, that the category 'Kulturfilm' usually also encompassed Lehrfilme. However for our purposes we will treat Lehrfilm separately. This is because in the third Reich educational movies were produced by the government, whereas Kulturfilm (largely) remained in private hands.

Weimar era Germans, and peoples of other nations for that matter, construed of propaganda differently than we do. Nowadays 'propaganda' carries a negative connotation, which it lacked during the time of our interest. Back in the days 'propaganda' meant 'political advertisement' and we might add 'of any form'. In 1931 Paul Rotha, a British documentary film-maker, writes that *every movie* is a form of propaganda. What he meant is that in international comparison, a movie of high quality, for instance, would symbolize high technological and creative standards of the nation it was produced in. Further he notes that it is of little relevance whether or not the viewer conceives said movie as propaganda. It will influence the viewer either way.[106] Even though for our present purposes it would be ill-advised to adopt such a broad definition and think of every movie as propaganda, we should realize that the relationship between film and propaganda was blurred. Case in point again is the Kulturfilmbuch of 1924, which includes a discussion of propaganda movies.

Film-theorist Siegfried Kracauer's thoughts help us define the issue more clearly. He said that 'everyone tends to believe that on-the-spot-recordings can't lie. But naturally they can. Assume a documentary movie is labelled unpolitical and does not contain any purposely staged scenes, but limits itself, how it should, to simply reproduce reality...however it can still omit certain aspects of any given situation in favour of other aspects and thus influence our attitude towards that situation. The shown recordings must be a selection of possible recordings.' [Jedermann ist dazu geneigt zu glauben, daß an Ort und Stelle aufgenommene Bilder nicht lügen können. Natuerlich können sie lügen.

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[103]Kreimeier,K., Ehmann,A., Goergen,J., *Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films in Deutschland*, Vol.2, p.29.

[104]Beyfuss, E., Kosowsky, A., (eds.), *Das Kulturfilmbuch*.

[105]Und die Fahne, p.113.

[106]Rotha, *Celluloid*, p.46, quoted in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.2, p.30.

Angenommen, ein als unparteiisch ausgegebener Dokumentarfilm enthält keine zweckvoll gestellten Szenen, sondern beschränkt sich darauf, wie er es sollte, schlicht die Realität zu reproduzieren...so kann er dennoch gewisse Aspekte einer gegebenen Situation auf Kosten anderer herausstreichen und dadurch unsere Einstellung zu ihr beeinflussen. Die gezeigten Aufnahmen müssen eine Auswahl möglicher Aufnahmen sein.'] [107] Kracauer distinguishes between the a-political Kulturfilm and the politicized Kulturfilm, i.e. a form of propaganda movie. He, like Rotha, notes that even the seemingly objective, a-political movie, can have an effect on the viewer's opinion.

Goebbels and Hitler seem to have had conflicting answers to the question whether or not propaganda should be overt or covert. Hitler was, at least publicly, of the opinion it should be overt. He explains in an interview with actress Toni van Eyck: 'Surely, I do want to use film as a propaganda tool, but in a way that every viewer knows that they see a political movie that night. [...] It disgusts me, when art is being used as a pretext to do politics. Either art, or politics. [Gewiß, ich will den Film auf der einen Seite voll und ganz als Propagandamittel ausnützen, aber so, daß jeder Besucher weiß, heute gehe ich in einen politischen Film. [...] Mir ist es zum Ekel, wenn unter dem Vorwand der Kunst Politik betrieben wird. Entweder Kunst oder Politik.]'[108] Mein Kampf sends similar signals: 'All propaganda has to be folksy and has to adjust its intellectual standard to the receptiveness of the most limited of those it seeks to address.' [Jede Propaganda hat volkstümlich zu sein und ihr geistiges Niveau einzustellen nach der Aufnahmefähigkeit des Beschränktesten unter denen, an die sie sich zu richten gedenkt.][109] Hitler deems it important to keep propaganda simple, i.e. understandable, and open. This goes well with other opinions on how to amplify the effects of propaganda. An article in *Der Deutsche Film* writes: '[If a screening] receives orchestration according to the movie's content, its impact will be stronger and its sense for the real, the precious and the beautiful specifically called forth. [[Wenn ein Film] seinem Inhalt entsprechende Umrahmung erhält, wird seine Wirkung vertieft und der Sinn für das Echte, Wertvolle und Schöne durch den äußeren Hinweis besonders geweckt.][110] And indeed NS-organizations like the Hitlerjugend (Hitler youth, HJ) have used movies in such a way.

Unlike the Führer, Goebbels promoted the use of both overt and covert propaganda. In a letter from 15.12.1930 he states that 'for our [i.e. the Reichsfilmstelle] purposes, production will be confined to movies, which, overtly or covertly, promote the movement; be it with N.S. photographic reports, factual films (rally movies), advertisement films for special occasions or feature films with concrete or hidden tendencies. [Für unsere Zwecke beschränkt sich die Produktion auf Filme, die verhüllt oder offen fuer die Bewegung werben; sei es nun durch N.S. Bildberichte, Tatsachenfilme (Reichsparteitagfilme), Werbefilme

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[107]Kracauer, S., *Theorie des Films*, p.220.

[108]Quoted in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.183

[109]Compare Hitler, A., *Mein Kampf*, p.197

[110]Sachsze, H.J., *Filmpublikum von morgen*, in Der Deutsche Film, 1937/2, quoted in Und die Fahne, p.103.

zu besonderen Anlässen oder Spielfilme mit krasser oder getarnter Tendenz.]'[111] Due to heavy censorship it is hard to find movies from the Third Reich era that do not have some sort of, in Goebbels's words, political 'tendency'.[112]

This simplified excursion into how some historical actors construed of move genres and propaganda helps us create a more accurate framework. From above we can conclude that our conceptual framework must not only include what is shown on screen, but also the producer's intention, viewer reception and the setting of the screening. This nexus helps us define what a propaganda movie is: A political movie that was either produced or commissioned by or for the NSDAP. In most cases, such movies were perceived as propaganda and often presented accordingly. As such propaganda moves are a vital part of this study, for they allow us some insights into how the Nazis envisioned a depicted topic. At first glance Spielfilme (feature film) seem to be most suitable for propaganda purposes, for they allow for more control in the making, and therefore almost guarantee the desired result - here: propaganda. In Reality however, objectivity seems to have outweighed the potential benefits of a script. As we have seen, a skilled director may bend reality to her, or her client's, will. This means that genuine and staged recordings can produce the same audio-visual effect on the screen. Yet the audience can perceive a genuine recording as more objective, resulting in an additional psychological effect on the viewer. Thus I will omit feature film that is not specifically propaganda from this thesis.[113] We will treat Lehrfilm as 'the most objective' genre, for it was to show the workings of a depicted process or action. Kulturfilm takes a place in between the the former and the latter, while the Wochenschau represents a special case as the most regular and popular form of film propaganda of the time.[114] In summary:

- Kulturfilm: Privately produced movie in between objective and staged.

- Propaganda Movie: Staged movie intended for political purposes.

- Lehrfilm: Objective movie used for educational purposes.

- Wochenschau: State controlled news-reel, supposedly propaganda (staged) and objective simultaneously.

- Spielfilm: Staged movie for entertainment only. Omitted in this thesis.

In this subsection we set out to define various genres. I suggested making distinctions based on objectivity and producer. I used the same criteria to define whether or not a movie is to be seen as propaganda. According to my definition a movie was propaganda if it had no intend of objectivity and was commissioned or

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[111]Hanna-Daoud, T., *Die NSDAP und der Film bis zur Machtergreifung*, p.79.

[112]The Spielfilm *Nana*, for instance, was banned due to the undesired image of soldiers in the film. Frankfurter Zeitung, 22.7.1934, quoted in Wulf, J., *Theater und Film im dritten Reich*, p.307.

[113]Many books treat Spielfilm in the third Reich, e.g. Albrecht, G., *Nationalsozialistische Filmpolitik* or Hake, S., *Popular Cinema of the Third Reich*.

[114]For a history of the documentary genre, see Winston, B., *Claiming the Real*.

produced by the NSDAP. If a party-external movie was shown in an appropriate setting, i.e. at an NSDAP event, we may speak of a propagandistic use of the movie in question, but not a propaganda movie. This means that we should consider viewer reception, the setting of the screening and the question of *why* the movie was presented like such in the upcoming subsections.[115] I will analyze each genre individually in order to avoid overlap and provide a clearly defined array of arguments for our historiographical debate.

5.2   Total Cinema: NSDAP and Film

The purpose of this subsection is to examine how the NSDAP used movies from the mid 1920s until the end of the War. With the remaining subsections in mind, it is most important to determine how the NSDAP attempted to control the movie industry, what topics were most prevalent in the movies themselves, who was in control of the NSDAP movie apparatus and what inhibited NS movies before 1933. This subsection can thus be seen as an attempt to form a framework of politics and ideology for the movie analyses to follow.

Nazi propagandists made attempts to assimilate film for their purposes when the NSDAP was still very premature. As early as 1921 Hitler showed World War I movies at SA-events (SA: Sturmabteilung; Storm Detachment) with the intention to further the *Dolchstoßlegende* and therefore radicalize, militarize and indoctrinate SA-men.[116] In the early 1920s however the NSDAP did not possess the financial means to produce their own movies and was thus limited to *displays* of party *external* productions.

The first *official* NSDAP party movie was *Im Zeichen des Hakenkreuzes* (Characterized by the Swastika, 1924).[117] Interestingly, early party movies already contained elements that were to reach perfection in NS-productions more than a decade later. Such include the image of Hitler as 'the leader', military marches and Fahnenweihe.[118] But there were some major differences between early and mature NS-film too. Unlike later productions (most famously Triumph des Willens), the 1927 rally movie placed much emphasis on the SA, not Hitler.[119] Early NSDAP movie screenings were relatively small in scale, possibly due to the lack of interest; certainly there was a financial aspect as well. Thus the NSDAP solely used movies for party-internal purposes.[120] In 1927, the Reich-

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[115]Some historians, like Hoffmann, construe propaganda to be *every* movie with political tendencies. See e.g. Und die Fahne, p.126.

[116]NSDAP und Film bis Machtergreifung, p.45-46.
The Dolchstoßlegende was the myth that the German army remained undefeated during WWI, only to be 'stabbed in the back' (Dolchstoß) by politicians at home, who signed the 'dictate' of Versailles. This was a common make-belief most right-wing parties adhered to.

[117]There were two earlier unofficial party movies. See NSDAP und Film bis Machtergreifung, p.44-45.

[118]Fahnenweihe (literally: Flag-consecration) was a ritual during which Hitler sanctified new flags with the 'Blutfahne' (blood flag), a flag that was used in the failed 1923 coup. During the coup the flag became soaked with the blood (Blut) of the dying SA-members, hence the name.

[119]NSDAP und Film bis Machtergreifung, p.44-45.

[120]Compare Ibid., p.59-60.

spropagandaleitung, the NSDAP's propaganda department, justified using film as a medium: 'To disregard the Volk's preference for colorful images, sensations and cinema would mean to ignore an important way to advertise our movement. [Die Vorliebe des Volkes für bunte Bilder, Sensationen und Kino außer Acht zu lassen, hieße eine wichtige Einwirkungsmöglichkeit zur Propagierung unserer Bewegung nicht benützen.]'[121] Even though neither shocking nor unique, the statement heralded the expansion of NSDAP movie efforts. There was a movie of the 1929 rally, as well as a film adaptation of Joseph Goebbels' book *Kampf um Berlin*, also dated 1929. Contrary to what the 1927 article announced, the 1927-1929 productions were not intended to be shown in public cinemas and thus not directed towards the 'Volk'.[122]

The 1929 rally film foreshadows professionalization of NS-film-propaganda. The movie was announced in the Völkischer Beobachter (1.8.1929): 'During the rally only operators wearing the 'N.S.-Film' armband with Reichsleitung-stamp are allowed to film beyond barriers and in closed rooms ... Since the rally-movie shall be one of the most important instruments of propaganda for the movement, all party comrades are called on to cooperate (make way, etc.) in order to easy the operators' heavy burdens. [Während des Reichsparteitages sind alle Filmaufnahmen innerhalb der Absperrungen und in geschlossenen Räumen einzig den durch Armbinde 'N.S.-Film' mit Stempel der Reichsleitung tragenden Operateuren gestattet... Da der Parteitag-Film eines der wichtigsten Propagandamittel der Bewegung darstellen soll, werden alle Pg. [Parteigenossen] aufgefordert durch Entgegenkommen (Platzmachen usw.) den Operateuren ihre schwere Arbeit zu erleichtern.]'[123] The resulting movie was shown during party-events, like the annual closure ceremony of the student association NSDAP in Munich on 22.7.1930, or the SA flag-commissioning in Leipzig on 30.1.1930.[124] For the 1930 rally an advertising movie for cinemas and party events was planned, but never realized since the rally was cancelled. Professionalization of NS movies was well underway at this point, but a nation-wide, centralized organization of Nazi film propaganda was still lacking. On 1.11.1930 the Reichsfilmstelle (Reich movie bureau) was created under the Reichspropagandaabteilung to tackle this issue.

The next stepping stone of NS-film was the establishment of 16 'Landesfilmstellen' (state movie posts) in 1932. These were to distribute/lend movies, just like the Reichsfilmstelle in Berlin. Since the party had become mainstream in 1930, spreading out lending institutes meant financial benefits in the form reduced transportation costs. Later that year, the number of Landesfilmstellen was reduced to 10, and then 8. Furthermore the Landesfilmstellen and the Abteilung Film (under the Abteilung für Volksbildung, Department for Volkeducation) now held the sole right to create party movies - amateur productions were no longer allowed.[125] 1932 finally saw an increase of NSDAP productions,

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[121] Quoted in Ibid., p.56.

[122] Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.505.

[123] VB 1.8.1929, quoted in NSDAP und Film bis Machtergreifung, p.57-58

[124] Ibid., p.60

[125] For a detailed description of this process, see Ibid., pp.143-204.

since the party now had more financial means.[126] For the July 1932 election campaign the NSDAP produced the following movies:[127]

- Zuversicht und Kraft (Confidence and Strength), with Gregor Strasser

- Deutsche Wehr, deutsche Ehr (German army, German glory), with Hermann Goering

- Stadt und Land (City and landscape), with Walther Darré

- Federgeld-Inflation, with Gottfried Feder

- Parole: Führer, with Adolf Hitler

- Zinsknechtschaft (Interest Slavery), with Gottfried Feder

- Bauer in Not (Farmer in Distress), with Walther Darré

- 14 Jahre System (14 years System)[128], with Joseph Goebbels

- Kirche und Staat (Church and Nation), with Adolf Wagner (Gauleiter of upper Bavaria)

The selection of topics becomes evident in the movie titles and reflects the NSDAP's election campaign: Militarization, Blut und Boden, critiques on Capitalism and the Weimar government. Furthermore the movies reflect the NSDAP's gravitation towards persona-cult - every movie features one NSDAP figurehead.

In September 1932 Goebbels assumed power over NS-movie efforts, due to yet another re-organization effort - the Abteilung Film was made part of the Propagandaabteilung. For the November election campaign of 1932, the NSDAP published three movies: *Hitler über Deutschland* (Hitler over Germany) treats Hitler's use of the airplane to quickly travel from stage to stage all over the country. *Das junge Deutschland marschiert* (The young Germany marches) and *Hitlerjugend in den Bergen* (Hitler youth in the mountains) pick youth and group dynamic of 'the movement' as central issues. Moreover the aforementioned movies intended for the July 1932 election were re-use in November.[129]

After the Machtergreifung, the Abteilung Film moved to the newly found Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda and thus remained under Goebbels' control. From hereon out movie propaganda experienced a stable period without organizational changes. Due to the vast amount of resources made available after the Machtergreifung, NS film propaganda made large strides.

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[126]Compare Quaas, Warum haben wir noch keine nationalsozialistische Film-produktion? in Der Deutsche Film, 15.5.1932, quoted in NSDAP und Film bis Machtergreifung, p.138-139.

[127]NSDAP und Film bis Machtergreifung, p.150-151

[128]Nazis referred to the Weimar Republic as 'System'.

[129]NSDAP und Film bis Machtergreifung, p.194-197.

After Hitler's rise to power Goebbels sought to consolidate his influence over party internal film-making, as well as the large German movie industry. In his famous 1933 speech, just after the Machtergreifung, Goebbels announced that 'the German film has no proximity to reality. It lacks contact to real occurrences in the Volk.' [Der deutsche Film hat keine Wirklichkeitsnähe. Er ist ohne Kontakt zu den wirklichen Vorgängen im Volke.]' However not all is lost: 'the government wishes to go hand in hand with film-makers [...]. [Die Regierung will mit der schaffended Filmwelt Hand in Hand gehen [...].'[130] Naturally the governmental (Goebbels') hand only reached out to movie-makers that did not oppose NS-ideology in person or movie. Others simply didn't pass the ever stricter censorship or were banned from working in the film industry respectively. Many directors and actors, especially Jewish ones, were affected and left Germany for good, mostly for the U.S.[131] Four years later, on 5.3.1937, Goebbels spoke on the annual meeting of the Reichsfilmkammer, a public institution for the movie industry, somewhat akin to medieval guilds: '[...] but I am of the opinion, that the purely economic tendencies pressure, and outweigh, the artistic element of film in such a grave way, that nowadays one can rightfully speak of the industry of film, instead of the art of film. [[...] aber ich bin doch der Meinung, daß die rein geschäftlichen Tendenzen die künstlerische Element im Filmwesen in einer derart gefahrdrohenden Weise bedrängt [sic], und überwuchert haben, daß man heute mit größerem Recht von der Filmindustrie als von der Filmkunst sprechen kann.]'[132] From those speeches we can derive the following: Goebbels preferred movies that were closer to reality, i.e. he preferred Kulturfilm over Spielfilm. Thus we can expect that NS-ideology manifested itself in Kulturfilm (and educational movies), rather than Spielfilm. The second quote reveals that Goebbels' scare tactics, in the form of laws and decrees, censorship and bans, were for the most part ineffective. The movie industry apparently did not meet Goebbels' expectations, even after four years of Nazi rule. But what did he demand? Goebbels wanted 'Wirklichkeitsnähe', an elusive concept. Literally he wanted movies to be 'realistic', or in our terms 'objective', but 'Wirklichkeitsnähe' can also be construed much more broadly. Does a feature film based on real events count? What about a staged scene with 'real people' (no actors)? Additionally Goebbels demands movies to be 'artistic' and 'aesthetic', unleashing a hellfire of vagueness. What Goebbels wanted was, in his words *stählerne Romantik* (steely romanticism); yet he was unable to make concrete what that implied.

The issue exemplifies that announcements of cultural-political measures are indeed important to us historians, but must not be taken at face value, i.e. equated to their execution. Effectively it took Goebbels another four years to centralize the German movie industry. He did this via his man Max Winkler, who was charged with the foundation of the Cautio-Treuhandgesellschaft (Cautio Holding company). Needless to say cooperation was secretly an instrument of the RfVP and thus Goebbels. Its task was to gradually buy stocks of all

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[130]Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.70-71.
[131]Compare Ibid., p.88-92.
[132]Ibid., p.71.

major German movie companies. By 1941 Goebbels held the majority of the stocks, de facto nationalizing the movie industry. Large companies, like Tobis, Bavaria, or the Ufa-AG, still operated somewhat independently and used their own logos in their productions, e.g. their news reels, but were now part of the state-controlled Ufa-Film GmbH, which was founded on 10.1.1942.[133]

Dr. Joseph Goebbels

Reichsminister: Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda			Präsident: Reichskultur-kammer	Reichsleiter: Reichspropagandaleitung der NSDAP
Filmabteilung: „Vertretung der Belange der Filmpolitik"	Reichsfilminten-dant: „Wahrung der Belange der Filmkunst"	Reichsbeauftrag-ter für die deut-sche Filmwirt-schaft: „Vertretung der Belange der Film-wirtschaft"	Reichsfilmkammer: „Stän-discher Aufbau" = „Erfas-sung der einzelnen"	Amtsleitung Film: „Führungs- und Er-ziehungsaufgaben der Partei"
Reichspropaganda-ämter in allen Gauen			Beauftragte in allen Gauen	Gaufilmstellen in allen Gauen
- Prüfung von Film-vorhaben (Reichs-filmdramaturg) - Prüfung der Film-besetzung (Kontin-gentstelle) (Filmnachweis) - finanzielle Unter-stützung der Film-wirtschaft (Film-kreditbank) - Freigabe fertiger Filme (Filmprüf-stelle) (Oberprüf-stelle) - Wochenschauen (Deutsche Wochen-schau-Zentrale) - zentraler Filmver-leih (Dt. Filmver-trieb) - Filmausfuhr			1. Allgemeine Verwaltung 2. Kultur und Politik 3. Künstlerische Betreuung des Filmschaffens (Film-nachweis) 4. Filmwirtschaft (Filmre-visions-Ges.) (Kontin-gentstelle) (Filmkredit-bank) 5. Fachschaft Film 6. Fachgruppe Filmpro-duktion 7. Fachgruppe Inländischer Filmvertrieb (5 Bezirks-gruppen im Reich) 8. Fachgruppe Filmtheater (11 Bezirksleitungen im Reich) 9. Fachgruppe Film- und Kinotechnik 10. Fachgruppe Kultur-, Werbefilm- und Licht-spielstoffe	1. Amtsleitung 2. Produktion 3. Dramaturgie 4. Organisation 5. Presse und Funk 6. Kulturfilm 7. Schulfilm 8. Jugendfilm 9. Verleih 10. Ausland 11. Lichtbild

Figure 4: Goebbels' sphere of influence from Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.79.

What did this mean for each genre? Due to the ever tightening grip of censorship on Spielfilm, this genre was long under indirect control of the government. As for the other genres, Kulturfilm was hard to control, since it relied on a large variety of directors, many of whom produced their films independently. In 1940 the Deutsche Kulturfilm Zentrale (from 1942 onward: Sonderreferat Kulturfilm under the Reichsfilmintendant) was founded, which was to centralize the myriad small Kulturfilm-makers. The results in regards to state control were mixed.[134] The Wochenschauen experienced profound change. Before Goebbels' centralization efforts four Wochenschauen existed. These were consolidated to the Deutsche Wochenschau in June 1940. Lehrfilm was traditionally a genre controlled by the government and thus highly centralized. However Lehrfilm in the third Reich was controlled by the education ministry, i.e. not Goebbels.

In summary, after a turbulent period of reorganization, NS movie propaganda finally stabilized after the Machtergreifung. Early NS activities were limited to amateur productions and screening of 'appropriate' movies at party internal events. Until 1930 the NSDAP did not have a centralized institution for film propaganda. With growing political influence, NS movies became more organized and professional. The early sluggish period that lasted until 1931-32, when Goebbels took control of party propaganda, and thus of most movie efforts. After the Machtergreifung there was a first large wave of NS-movies, while

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[133]Ibid., p.76-77 and p.93-94.
[134]See Ibid., p.99-100.

Goebbels nationalized the large film companies and became the most powerful player in the field.

Now I wish to conclude this subsection with some remarks relevant for our historiographical discourse. This section made evident that financial matters were the main inhibitor for the NSDAP's movie project - full-scale movie propaganda was realized as soon as there was sufficient funding. NSDAP propagandists utilized movies already in the early 1920s. At first 'suitable' party external productions were shown, then the NSDAP released their own amateur productions. This seems to be an argument against the traditional view: Movies, i.e. a technology, was embraced throughout the history of the NSDAP. Furthermore we have seen that NS film was subject to continuous professionalization and centralization, which is in accordance to Rohrkrämer's view. Yet one cannot help but notice the makeshift, almost chaotic, nature of NS movie production, distribution and general organization before the 'Goebbels-era'. So to what extend was the NSDAP's movie effort centralized? An elaborate answer to this question demands further considerations. How do we define 'highly centralized'? What year did the NSDAP become just that? Answers to these question are unfortunately out of the scope of this subsection; for now it should be noted that the NSDAP's movie efforts, especially in the early stages before 1933, were fairly chaotic. This point then, in combination with the economic inhibitor, may very well speak for the pragmatic view: The Nazis utilized movies however and whenever they could; they were pragmatic about the use of movies. At first glance the topical continuity from early amateur productions to professional productions post Machtergreifung seems to speak for Herf. However Herf's continuity refers to NS in comparison to a broader intellectual climate, our case refers to developments within the NSDAP.

Yet I think this subsection cannot make a striking point in regards to historiography. While I would like to note that the pragmatic view seems to best account for the developments outlined here, the main goal here was to provide the most general background for further consideration in what follows. We have seen that there is merit in focusing post-1933 productions. This is due to the relative lack of reorganization and, more importantly, the fact that the NSDAP became immensely powerful towards the mid and late 1930s, enabling professionalization and thus might come closest to reflect NS ideals and values, or: how the Nazis perceived modernity and tradition. The remainder of this section thus mostly treats film post Machtergreifung.

5.3   Cultural Turn: Development of Kulturfilm

For many film-makers Kulturfilm was a testing ground, not only for novel recording technologies, but also avant-garde styles of directing. As far as recording technology is concerned, the major breakthroughs came in the 1920s and are of little importance for our purposes.[135] The average Kulturfilm was short and due to the Reichsfilmkammer decree of 1934 mandatory part of cinema program, the

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[135] See Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.2, pp.301-409.

result being a stable demand for Kulturfilme. More importantly, the majority of Kulturfilme were made in the Reich, making them resistant to foreign political turbulence. Between 1933 and 1938 around 50 to 60 percent of all cinema movies were of German production. Roughly half of the remainder were U.S. imports.[136] When German-American relations heated up due to the war, Goebbels decided to ban US film during a RfVP conference on 12.1.1940, thus furthering demand for German productions, much to the benefit of Kulturfilm.[137]

These were not the only factors that worked to the benefit of Kulturfilm. The avant-garde style of many Kulturfilm directors left much room for interpretation and was thus easy for the Nazis to utilize. The a-political style of Walter Ruttmann, for instance, brings material objects into the spotlight. Ruttmann's movies and his relationship to the NSDAP were often debated. In our case he provides a good starting point for a discussion of the Kulturfilm genre, due to his remarkable focus on technology and modernity before and after the Machtergreifung. Two examples will make this evident. Berlin: Die Sinfonie der Großstadt (Berlin: Symphony of a Metropolis, 1927) and Deutsche Panzer (German Tanks, 1940) both display modernity in an a-political way; the latter movie however has obvious propagandistic value, for it aestheticises German weapon manufactures.

Berlin comes in five acts, resembling the classic dramatic structure. The movie bristles with enthusiasm for technology, which can already be seen in the introduction: Scenes of and from within a train to Berlin, followed by an array of shots of buildings and a few recordings from within industrial facilities. Trains, trams and train stations frequent the screen and so do other industrially oriented motives, like chimneys, production machinery, and the like. While prominent throughout the movie, this imagery especially dominates the first three acts. In act four we see people and animals of all kinds (Zoo animals and pet animals) eating. Thus act four suggests the plethora of wealth and consumption an industrial society allows for. Notably restaurant shots feature dishwashers - an open display of how technology operates in the background, perhaps even constitutes the backbone of everyday life in consumerism.

Towards the middle of Act four chaos emerges. Rapid changes of scenery and fast pace music come together to create a feeling of uneasiness and disorientation. During the entire 'chaotic phase' but one tram finds it's way onto the screen, and only for a short amount of time. The virtual absence of technology during the chaotic phase suggests a contrast between disorganized humans and organized machines. Machines continue in their given ways *ad infinitum* and thus establish order, while human orbits are easily disturbed. The chaotic part features multiple shots from inside of what appears to be a roller-coaster or a carousel. These recordings speed up over time, furthering the atmosphere of disorientation. These recordings might either simply be a visualization of confusion and aid the overall tension, but could as well mean that it was technology that started the chaos, or at the very least is at the center of the disturbance.

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[136]Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.104.
[137]BArch R55/2001b.

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As mere passengers of a roller-coaster, humans (represented by the viewer) have no control over what happens, the speed, direction or duration of the ride. Translated to technology in general, we can interpret this as a case for humans losing control over the technology they have created, and now dependent on. This is kind of metaphor became very common during the rise of nuclear power after the War, but Berlin can, in this light, be seen as an early voice of concern alongside Charlie Chaplin's famous *Modern Times.*


Figure 5: Berlin: Montage of various ads.

In Act five Berlin nightlife is shown as order returns. Apart from social activities, e.g. cinema, dances, bars, etc., advertisement in the form of flashy electronic billboards is seen often throughout the act. Have the people of Berlin overthrown their man-made god, regained control over the roller-coaster? I don't think so. Technology is still omnipresent and, in the form of advertisement, makes human its servants, servants that live to consume. The many advertisements are layered upon each other, again reminding of overabundance consumerism brought with it. Up until here technology has been depicted as symmetric, most notably in the many train-related scenes. This symmetry seems to have been lost in the 'age of advertisement'. While this is an aesthetic loss, it is a gain for the human-technology relationship: Technology is now as asymmetric as humans are, thus easing the communication between man and machine. Yet in comparison to act four a role reversal seems to have taken place. In act four it is humans who consume, aided by technology. In act five it is technology that thrives due to the consumption.[138]

Figure 6: Berlin: Symmetric trains and asymmetric humans

Either way I think the movie, especially the chaotic scene and its aftermath, should not be over-interpreted. At face-value, *Berlin* clearly shows a fascination for technology of all kinds; from trains and trams to industrial machines and advertisement. *Berlin* expresses a fascination of technology by showing its ubiq-

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[138]See Appendix D. for more images.

uitous on the one hand, and displays the importance of technology for society on the other. Apart from the chaotic intermezzo Berlin throws a positive light on technology, while being wise enough to hint at dark side of technological progress. Humans are forced from the driving seat to the passenger seat, represented by trains and the roller-coaster/carousel. Yet I advise caution with the latter interpretation: 'Hints at' should not be confused with 'intends to display', or even 'convincingly argues for'.

In a wider context *Berlin* reflects the 'golden 20s', a period of prosperity and political stability. This is due to the generally uplifting atmosphere of the movie as well as the wealth and abundance on screen. The large quantity of trains and train stations, both crowded with (presumably) commuters, suggests high employment rates. Restaurant scenes, window shopping and advertisement all advocate the rise of consumerism and overall prosperity. Meanwhile Ghettos or the unemployed are not featured in the movie.

Deutsche Panzer is a short film about German tank production. A pan shot of tank barrels provides the kick-off. Humans make their first entry in form of an engineer behind a drawing board. Most parts of the movie consist of machines for milling, fusing, and other purposes, or tank assembly by workers. Throughout the movie machines of the plant seem to lead their own lives. One shot shows a worker 'supervise' a machine: He wipes off some metal shavings. What else he does, if anything, is unknown to us, since the scene cuts off right after the wiping. This gives the impression that the machine essentially runs on its own and only needs minor attention every now and then.

Most of the running machines are in rotary motion, which adds something calm and symmetric, almost eternal, to their advances. In this aesthetic regard machines in *Deutsche Panzer* remind of those in *Berlin*. This representation of machinery then creates an image of order and longevity. Taking the argument one step further, the machine provides more than just symbolic order. It structures the worker's lives, demands the engineers' attention and dominates, literally structures, the image of the plant.

Figure 7: Deutsche Panzer: Worker cleans machine.

One peculiar scene features workers' Nachwuchs (offspring) during free-time, which mostly consists of collective sports. This scene obviously stands out for there isn't any concrete relation to tank production here; instead the scene reminds of common NS sports program and youth organizations. Harking back to the worker-machine relationship we must ask what this offspring is meant to do. Merely clean machines, as their parents did? This line of thought clearly develops a power relations over generations. The machine keeps on turning and demands generations of humans to serve it, to clean it; here the machine is in power, the human reduced to a slave. Later on workers assemble tanks, but once more the machine takes primacy in the imagery. It looks as if the work-

ers merely stand aside the towering metal giants, again visually reinforcing the overall power relation.

Deutsche Panzer is fairly a-political in what it displays. The only mention of contemporary political events in the movie is when workers pause to listen to a radio broadcast praising German workers as crucial for military victories. However this simply captures plant reality at the time, thus rather reflecting the documentary-like approach of Kulturfilm instead of propaganda: Workers regularly gathered to listen to the news on the radio, especially during the war.[139] Interestingly it is not a fellow human who addresses the workers, but a piece of technology (a loud speaker). This furthers the aforementioned master-slave relation, for the workers believe the voice of the loudspeaker, seem proud of its praise.

Figure 8: Deutsche Panzer: Aesthetic depiction of a milling machine.

The fact that the movie displays tank production in an aesthetic manner underlines the a-political nature of the movie. The radio scene as well as that of the 'offspring' remind of National Socialism, but should be seen as a rather objective representation of plant life - Ruttmann seems to withhold judgment about what he shows. However for the same reason *Deutsche Panzer* can readily be used as propaganda, especially in the right setting.[140] This is for two reasons, firstly an aesthetic one and secondly a value-related one. While Ruttmann's original intention might have been to find beauty in technology (see *Berlin*), the NS-interpretation could find beauty in *tank production* and glorification of the home front. For Ruttmann the focus is on processes and modernity, for the Nazis on the outcome. Secondly while the scenes do not judge plant life, an announcer could readily describe the scenes in ideologically laden terms - or as an ideal to strive for.

In this respect *Deutsche Panzer* is characteristic of Kulturfilm: Neither intentionally political, nor critical of NS-ideology. Here it should be noted that not only Kulturfilm possessed such flexibility, but NS-ideology did as well, since it was able to ascribe at least some ideological meaning to most movies, even if originally they meant to be mere documentaries. This becomes especially relevant in movie sessions during NS-events (Deutsche Panzer was also shown at youth events), for those often featured an announcer, who possibly was able to streamline the audience's attention and thoughts while interpreting the movie. We have seen that *Deutsche Panzer* has plenty of room for such; a comparison between a well-oiled machine and what the Nazis called a healthy Volkskörper (Peoples Body), seems quite intuitive and is certainly not a far-out interpre-

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[139]For instance Klemperer, V., *Lingua Tertii Imperii* (LTI) , p.338.

[140]Public events, including NSDAP-movie-events, often featured announcers. At times announcers were even discussed in the RfVP, e.g. see BArch NS18/591, pp. 10-13. Announcers could easily provide a political framework for movies.

tation.[141] Especially the scenes where the 'Nachwuchs' partakes in sportive activities, in combination with the smoothly running machinery, seems to underline this ideological feat.[142]

Interpretations aside, *Deutsche Panzer* must be seen in context of the war and arms production. This background creates a contradiction: War production as seen in *Deutsche Panzer* has Ruttmann's characteristic shroud of eternity and order to it, whereas in reality German arms production has only picked up in pace around 1940 (see subsection 4.3). Thus the movie has further importance to the Party, i.e. that of a dexterous bluff. The movie seems to suggest tank production, here in the form of a highly modernized, machine-based, process has been going on *forever* and will continue *ad infinitum*, while in reality large scale tank production was a novelty. With this in mind it is easy to comprehend why *Deutsche Panzer* was used by the Party - both domestically and in foreign politics. For the former the purpose was to convey confidence to *us*, for the latter to demoralize *them*. This brings an entirely practical aspect to the table, and while I do not claim this to be the sole motivation behind the NSDAP embracing the movie, it certainly played a role in that regard.

At this point it seems natural to acknowledge that the NS-regime and foreign political tensions, especially in the second half of the 1930s, did have an overall impact on Kulturfilm. Recall Goebbels' 1933 criticism that German film lacked connection to contemporary and national issues. This lack of topics certainly does not apply to the Ufa-Kulturabteilung, a main Kulturfilm producer. Ever since its foundation in 1918, the Kulturabteilung covered national affairs. After all the German government had contributed 25 million Goldmark to the foundation of the Kulturabteilung.[143] After Goebbels' speech however, the Kulturabteilung increasingly produced movies with political and/or ideological content.[144] Some prominent examples include: Bei den deutschen Kolonisten in Südafrika (With German colonists in South Africa, 1934), das deutsche Erntedankfest 1934 auf dem Bückeberg (The German harvest festival on the Bückeberg, 1934), Strassen ohne Hindernisse (Roads without obstacles, 1935), Metall des Himmels (Metal of the Sky, 1935), Flieger, Funker, Kannoniere (Airmen, radio operators, gunners, 1937), Die Bauten Adolf Hitlers (Adolf Hitler's buildings, 1938), Das Wort aus Stein (The word of stone, 1939), Flieger zur See (Aviaters at sea, 1939), Deutsche Waffenschmieden (German armories, 1940), Helden in Spanien (Heroes in Spain, 1938) and Ostraum - Deutscher Raum (Eastern region - German region, 1940). We find a large array of topics here, from African colonies to tradition, militarization and the Spanish civil war.[145]

These were but a few examples of how Kulturfilm discussed NS-related is-

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[141]N.B. 'Healthy Volkskörper' not only implies racial hygiene, but also individual health: The Nazis campaigned against smoking and promoted sports, the latter of which became an extremely popular motif in movies. Leni Riefenstahl's *Olympia* brings out the aesthetics of well-trained bodies and sports.

[142]See Appendix E. for more images.

[143]Und die Fahne, p.113-114; N.B. The name 'Kulturfilm' originally meant Kulturabteilung-productions and later denominated the genre.

[144]Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.134.

[145]Ibid., p.134-136

sues. One of the most evident examples comes from nature-oriented Kulturfilm. The plot of the movie *Das Erbe* (The Inheritance, 1935) starts out in a movie studio. A young assistant witnesses a fight to the death between two beetles in a terrarium. The assistant has many questions about the occurrence and in order to answer them an experienced nature film director invites her to the projection room. There they watch a movie about the mating habits of a large range of plants and animals, from roses and orchids to birds, dogs and horses. This is to promote the idea of 'survival of the fittest'. At the end of the movie the young assistant asks: 'So the animals literally have a racial policy? [Dann treiben die Tiere also eine regelrechte Rassenpolitik?]' The director replies: 'In certain respect, yes. However this selection happens more in accord to instinct. [In gewisser Hinsicht, ja. Allerdings geschieht diese Auslese mehr instinktmäßig.]' Darwinistic elements were not uncommon in nature movies of the time; in fact many nature films from the 1920s picked up that theme, for instance Von Insekten die "ins wasser gingen" (Of insects that "went into the water" 1921), Natur und Liebe (Nature and Love, 1927) and Werden und Vergehen (Becoming and Decay, 1929).[146] However *Das Erbe* goes one step further. The assistant breaks the boundaries between nature and mankind by applying the political term *Rassenpolitik*. The movie this as a starting point of its attempt to justify sterilization measures and racial policies of the NSDAP. Interestingly the movie seeks to do so by reference to science, here in the form of pseudo-scientific racial theory. Furthermore the actors in the movie are depicted as stereotypical scientists with white lab coats. So the movie perpetuated racism, but from a scientific standpoint.[147]

This was a novel development. Nature-Kulturfilme in the 1920s refused to add the *social* to the Darwinism. The director's reply hints at the differences between the original Darwinism and NS-ideology: What we find in nature is only applicable to mankind *in certain respect*. Whereas animals solely rely on natural selection, so NS-ideology, the racial roots of mankind raise them above such. The perfect German race has its roots in the North, where it has been forged in a harsh fight against nature itself.[148] Hitler categorizes the races of man into Kulturbegründer (culture-orginator), Kulturträger (culture-bearer) and Kulturzerstörer (culture-destroyer). Only the Aryan race creates culture; all other races


Figure 9: Das Erbe: Kalikak family tree. White circle represent healthy (vollwertige) individuals, black circles low-grade (minderwertige) individuals.

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[146]See Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.2, p.185.

[147]See Appendix F. for more images.

[148]See Hermand, J., *Der alte Traum vom neuen Reich* and Zernack, J., *Anschauungen vom Norden im Deutschen Kaiserreich* for further discussion.

merely use/modify/bear Aryan culture or destroy it.[149] Darwin on the other hand assumes an equal starting point for all races. Thus the example of Das Erbe has shown how Kulturfilm picked up existing trends in nature documentaries, here Darwinism, and modified them according to NS-ideology.

Other biology-related movies explicitly justified NS-ideology and polices, e.g. the 1935 Nürnberger Rassengesetze, a set of anti-semitic laws, and the sterilization program, both of which were controversial.[150] Alles Leben ist Kampf (All Life is a Fight, 1937) makes clear reference to the idea of a Volkskörper, Erbkrank (Hereditary Ill, 1936) shows disturbing images from asylums while displaying their upkeep costs. Movies like *Erbkrank* did not invite for debate, but intended to stir up disgust in the audience under the shroud of rational thinking. Goebbels explicitly wanted to paint a black-and-white image.[151]

We have seen that the NS-regime only marginally controlled Kulturfilm in the previous subsection. The Reichsfilmkammer decree of 1934 and the ban on movie imports increased demand for Kulturfilme, but the genre was left largely untouched. The case of Walter Ruttmann was to exemplify that some directors changed focus without losing their style: For Ruttmann modernity and technology as such were central, whether manifested in weapons production or the metropolis. The Ufa-Kulturabteilung historically treated topics of national interest, so the Machtergreifung, in simplified terms, meant more of the same for the Ufa. Kulturfilme like *Das Erbe* explicitly supported NS-policies. *Das Erbe* and *Berlin* demonstrated that there was a large foundation, here in the form of Darwinism and techno-enthusiasm, the Nazis could build upon. This means that Kulturfilm was divided on political issues. Yet the movies discussed in this subsection painted a positive image of technology. In general the NSDAP was able to bend Kulturfilm, here exemplified by nature- and technology-themed movies, to their will, either by re-interpretation of the content or by re-invention of traditional topics.

Now how does this translate to our historiographical debate? I believe this subsection speaks against the *traditional view*. First of all most Kulturfilme, and indeed all of those discussed here, revolved around technology or modernity in one way or another. In our examples we found a-political techno-enthusiasm in *Berlin* and political science-enthusiasm in *Das Erbe*. A proponent of the traditional view would have to attempt to describe such movies either as propaganda, interpret them in an ideological light, i.e. that the movies' techno-enthusiasm was merely accidental, artistic, or stylistic, or hold that they in fact criticized modernity. The cases of *Berlin* and *Deutsche Panzer* a 'darker' interpretation is possible, yet I have explained that this is most likely an over-interpretation. In both examples the enthusiasm clearly stands in the fore. Moreover I have described some Kulturfilme as void of political judgment, under consideration of a possibility of a political interpretation. *Deutsche Panzer* gives a prime example for this; here I have ascribed the few political elements of the movie to

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[149]Mein Kampf, pp.317-324

[150]See SD-report 15.1.1942 in Boberach, H. (ed.), *Meldungen aus dem Reich*, p.208.

[151]See Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.559.

the directors pursuit of objectivity. And objectivity is key here: The director intended to capture what happened without evaluating the imagery. This then could be done by NSDAP announcers. Thus my argument: Seeing *Deutsche Panzer* as propaganda is misunderstanding the film. This brings us to a final point. Given that 'pure propaganda' interpretation is impossible in many cases, coupled with the fact that enthusiasm for modernity and technology was widespread in the genre allows us to conclude that such subjects did not find their way on screen by accident; instead Kulturfilm explicitly discussed modernity and, in most cases, took a progressive stance. These points should sufficiently refute the traditional view.

Politically laden Kulturfilme, like *Das Erbe*, stood in a long tradition of a movie industry that embodied conservative values and thus seem to corroborate *Herf's view*. But we must ask: Does Herf's concept of 'continuity' apply here at all? I would argue that Kulturfilm was a prime example of just that. The Ufa-Kulturabteilung received funding from a rather conservative government, leading figures were ex-military and many of its early productions touched upon national topics. Under the Nazis then many Kulturfilm-makers continued their work relatively undisturbed, which suggests at least some kind of compatibility between them and NS. However the example of *Das Erbe* has shown a clear break in the involvement of scientific theories, in this case from Darwinism to social Darwinism (and finally pseudo-scientific NS-ideology). Thus there seems to have been a break with tradition - not in the form of more or less enthusiasm for science and technology in movies (or movies as a medium for that matter), but of how science ought to be used. *Das Erbe* blurs the boarders between ideology and science: Animals are committed to Rassenpolitik. This leaves us with Herf's selective embrace of technology. I have describe Kulturfilm as a genre of innovation and experiment, coupled with general enthusiasm for modernity, which suggests a full embrace of science and technology. In other words: Technology was not embraced selectively here.

My last argument for full embrace of technology clearly speaks for the *modern view*. Yet the NSDAP did not do much to directly control the entirety of Kulturfilm, a fact that stands in conflict with Rohkrämer's second defining factor of modernity - centralization. So here we find a contradiction: In Kulturfilm topics technology was fully embraced, i.e. something modern, whereas the genre was not strictly centrally controlled. This seems to be check-mate. In defense of Rohkrämer we could muster an argument by highlighting the role of the Deutsche Kulturfilm Zentrale, which was however not very effective at achieving centralization. We could then say that the attempt counted more than the result, but with the example of Goebbels' unrelenting assault on other sectors of the movie industry in mind (e.g. see subsections 5.2 and 5.4), this argument doesn't seem to hold up. Thus Rohkrämer's narrative is locked in a contradiction and cannot adequately account for Kulturfilm. The only way to reconcile the situation is to remove 'centralization' as a modern criterion, which is certainly possible. However, as it stands, Rohkrämer must hold that Kulturfilm was not modern. This then is problematic, for this genre was generally techno-enthusiastic and embraced modern film-making techniques.

The *pragmatic view* can pick up precisely where Rohkrämer fails by explaining why Kulturfilm was not centrally organized. There was simply no pragmatic need for the NSDAP to intervene much in Kulturfilm, for two reasons: Firstly the ambiguous nature of Kulturfilm made it open for interpretation. The NSDAP could easily achieve this interpretation given the framework of NS-events, which usually featured an announcer. Secondly, since a number of Kulturfilm-makers were traditionally on the conservative side of things (see Ufa), the Nazis only had to make slight changes. Again the example of *Das Erbe* seems appropriate to exemplify the point. Kulturfilm has been a fertile ground of scientific (and nationalistic, in the case of the Ufa) values that the NSDAP could cultivate with ease. The combination of flexible NS-ideology and ambiguous Kulturfilm seems to have resulted in an outcomes already desirable to the NSDAP and thus needed little supervision. Furthermore movies like *Das Erbe* explicitly refer to racial policies. In this light then *Das Erbe* seems to be closer to an advertisement, or justification, than a documentary/Kulturfilm. Yet the movie looks to science in order to justify racism, which speaks for an embrace of science, instead of folkish Blood and Soil values. For these reasons I think the pragmatic view appropriately captures the essence of Kulturfilm, a techno-enthusiastic and modern genre utilized, but not heavily restricted, by National Socialism.

5.4 Connect Four: Deutsche Wochenschau Edition

In this subsection we will have a look at the Wochenschau, a weekly newsreel. In Weimar times four Wochenschauen existed, the Ufa-Tonwoche, the Tobis-Wochenschau, the Deulig-Tonwoche and the Fox Tönende Wochenschau. Before the Machtergreifung the Wochenschauen were very international in scope. Between 30.1.1933 and 11.3.1933 the Deulig-Tonwoche, for instance, was composed of: 41.8 percent news from all over the world (Wissenswertes aus aller Welt), 17.5 percent Sports news, 13.2 percent Culture and Fashion, all things military 13.2 percent, contemporary politics 8.8 percent, economics 4.4 percent and entertainment 2.2 percent.[152] After the Machtergreifung the Wochenschau quickly became the most prominent propaganda vehicle of the film world and the international focus of the Wochenschau started to vanish. On 3.11.1938, when the Wochenschau was already a fairly popular part of film culture, the NSDAP made the institution a mandatory part of movie screenings, ensuring a stable demand for the genre. Cinema program then consisted of Kulturfilm, Wochenschau and Feature Film.

Many large companies, including all Wochenschau-producing ones, were nationalized in 1939; but Goebbels needed more time to fully control film. First of all Goebbels arranged some leadership changes: Dr. Schützler of the Ufa, for instance, 'abdicated' so that the Ufa Wochenschau was now produced by Goebbels' man Heinrich Roellenberg.[153] The first few steps of nationalization didn't bring about too many changes for the four Wochenschauen. Apart from

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[152] Und die Fahne, p.187.
[153] Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.214-215.

some personnel changes, the different Wochenschauen were forced to exchange film material. For larger events only film teams from one company would be permitted to record. Afterwards they sent the material to the other three companies, so that those could compile their Wochenschau.[154] This way the government could easily direct what was being filmed and what not. This might seem somewhat restrictive, but was common practice elsewhere, including the USA.[155] In January 1939 the Deutsche Wochenschauzentrale was set up under the leadership of Fritz Hippler. Its task was to organize the work of the four different Wochenschauen, including the selection of topics that were to be addressed.[156] Goebbels' personal involvement with the Wochenschauen increased too. From September 1939 onward, he would view every single Wochenschau before release.[157] Needless to say, Hitler had to last say in the matter. Only if the Leader and the Minister gave their blessings, the Wochenschauen could be screened. In June 1940 the four Wochenschauen were officially consolidated to the *Deutsche Wochenschau*. From November 1940 onward the Deutsche Wochenschau was produced by the Deutsche Wochenschau GmbH, under supervision of the Abteilung Film of the RfVP and the OKW. The latter was involved due to the inclusion of war-related footage.

This brief history of the Wochenschau exemplifies that the NSDAP's early attempts to control the Wochenschauen rapidly increased after the outbreak of the War. With increasing NSDAP control news about foreign affairs, e.g. reports on natural disasters, political news, and the like, gradually declined and the minimal entertainment segments were cut even shorter, soon to be left out entirely.[158] There were two main reasons for this. The obvious one was that the international flow of information came to an abrupt halt due to the War. Secondly, and more importantly, the NSDAP used the Wochenschau to present the Reich at its best. Fritz Hippler, Reichsfilmintendant responsible for the Wochenschau in the 1930s, recalls that 'what mattered most, could not be dubious in a totalitarian state. It did not differ from what can be demanded of every advertisement company, even today: To serve the desired dispositions bite-sized and attractively wrapped, so that everyone can swallow them as delicacies and process them to the desired motivations. [Worauf es ankam, konnte in einem totalitären Staat kaum zweifelhalt sein. Es war nichts anderes, als was von jeder Werbefirma auch heute noch verlangt wird: erwünschte Tendenzen in ansprechender Verpackung so mundgerecht zu servieren, daß sie von jedermann mit Appetit als Leckerbissen geschluckt und zu gewünschten Motivationen verarbeitet werden.]'[159] Even though Wochenschau topics were influenced by the NSDAP and WWII, this guideline held strong throughout the years. The Wochenschau did not report on Nazi crimes, such as the burning of books, forced

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[154]Ibid., p.215.
[155]See Ibid.
[156]Ibid., p.645-646.
[157]Ibid., p.215.
[158]See Ibid., p.645.
[159]Hippler, F., *Die Verstrickung*, p.140

labour, concentration camps or sterilization efforts.[160]

Even so, the Deutsche Wochenschau stressed its objectivity over and over again. In this context the PK (Propagandakompanie, propaganda company, RfVP employees who filmed at the front lines) were mentioned quite often. Wochenschau-makers claimed to bring the war to the people at home. Heinrich Roellenberg found that 'one of the best means to build the necessary bridge from the front to the homeland is, without a doubt, the Wochenschau. Thus it was an almost self-evident measure of the national-socialist government to directly, and most rationally, control this important propaganda instrument at the outbreak of war. [Eines der stärksten Mittel, die notwendige Brücke von Front zur Heimat zu schlagen, ist ohne Zweifel die Wochenschau. Es war daher beinahe eine selbstverständliche Maßnahme der nationalsozialistischen Staatsführung, bei Kriegsausbruch deses wichtige Propaganda-Instrument in rationellster Organisation unmittelbar zu steuern.]'[161] Moreover the Wochenschau attempted to be as up-to-date as possible. Before the War and nationalization of the movie industry, the combined production of the four Wochenschau-creating companies Ufa, Tobis, Bavaria and Deulig, was around 400 copies per issue, to be shared by almost 5.500 cinemas. There was a certain hierarchy. City dwellers would get to see the Wochenschau first, then the copies would be passed on to the surrounding countryside. This fact is not sufficient to conclude that rural areas were relatively ill-informed about the most recent events; after all newspapers and the radio were much more common than movies. However rural residents did complain about the unavailability of the Wochenschau.[162] This might hint at the success of the 'see for yourself' type of news that the Wochenschau attempted to be. The fact that under Nazi control the total number of Wochenschau copies was increased dramatically, to around 1700 per issue, suggests that the NSDAP did hold the Wochenschau in high regards.[163]

After the turning point in the War the Wochenschauen seemed to break the original promise of objectivity in an increasingly obscure manner. Goebbels explained that 'news-policy in times of war is a means of war. One uses it to wage war, not to circulate information. [Die Nachrichtenpolitik im Krieg ist ein Kriegsmittel. Man benutzt es, um Krieg zu führen, nicht um Informationen auszugeben.']'[164] Goebbels doesn't seem to think of the Wochenschau as news, but in terms of propaganda; thus he doesn't deem objectivity to be important for the Wochenschau. Additionally the reality of destroyed German cities represented a stark contrast to Hippler's 'delicacies'; and so the Volk gradually lost its trust in the objectivity of the Deutsche Wochenschau.

We can distinguish between three phases in the style of the Deutsche Wochenschau. These illustrate how closely the Wochenschau and its reception was tied

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[160]Compare Und die Fahne, p.137.

[161]Roellenberg, H., *Von der Arbeit an der Deutschen Wochenschau*, in Der Deutsche Film, Sonderheft 1940/41, quoted in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.646.

[162]Compare SD report 18.10.1939, in Meldungen, p.10.

[163]Kreimeier, K., *Die Ufa-Story*, p.359.
For a detailed discussion of the Wochenschau, see Hoffmann, K., *'Nationalsozialistischer Realismus'*.

[164]Goebbels, J., *P.K.*, quoted in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.647.

to the military situation.[165]

(i) September 1939 - Winter 1941: Victory Wochenschau. Successful Blitzkrieg, few German setbacks. The most popular image during this time was advancing infantry. 'It [Statistics] asserts that the number of [cinema] visitors nearly doubled from June 1939 to this June, even though this year's feature film program mostly consisted of reprises. [Sie [Statistik] stellt fest, daß die Besucherzahl im Juni dieses Jahres sich gegenüber des Juni 1939 fast verdoppelt hat, obgleich in diesem Jahr im Spielfilmprogramm zum größten Teil Reprisen eingesetzt waren.[166] The reception in this period was good; in fact so good that statistics itself explained the surge in the number of cinema goers as the Wochenschau's doing. There are multiple SD reports on how the Wochenschau evoked ovations. Especially the rural population was happy about the increased availability of news and movie technology that partially came with the increase of the copies in circulation. However parts of the rural population did criticize that some of

Figure 10: A crowd in front of the cinema 'Alhambra' awaits a Wochenschau screening, in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.647

the shown material was still very old - up to two months![167] In such cases we can hardly speak of 'news'. Yet this further illustrates that the rural population 'lagged behind' the towns folk in regard to news and demanded more film and testifies the Wochenschau's success.

Generally speaking the German population expected (local) news to cover *all* war-related events. In January 1940 the SD reported on some cases in which the population was agitated due to the lack of news stories about such events, e.g. people saw military airplanes crash nearby, which local papers did not report.[168] Thus the population at large, especially rural population, expressed an unquenched thirst for news and elucidation, while conflicts between news (or here: their absence) and eye-witness reports rattled the population. However it should be noted that such instances were seldom in the first phase. The population mostly felt well-informed about the war, e.g. about the occupation of Norway or the Ostfront (eastern front).[169] Throughout this first phase there were virtually no doubts about military victory. Major concerns were the *duration* of the War,

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[165]For discussion of the phases see Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.675-689.
[166]Vor allem: Die Wochenschau, quoted in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.675-676.
[167]See SD-reports of 18.10.1939, in Meldungen, p.10.
[168]SD-report, in Meldungen, p.37.
[169]See SD-report from 15.4.1940, in Meldungen, p.60.

especially after the outbreak of war against the USSR.[170]

Figure 11: UfA-Tonwoche Nr.506 (15.5.1940): Infantry as a popular motif in the Wochenschau. Here: Marching, crossing a river, boarding a transport plane, fighting.

(ii) Winter 1941-Stalingrad 1943. The War slows down, German defeats accumulate and increase in frequency, allied bombings destroy German cities. Popular motifs are daily routines of troops. Interestingly the Wochenschau starts to ignore civilian life almost entirely. Reports on public appearances of the Führer and large-scale sport-events were exceptionally void of any military content. Other 'civilian' topics were weapons manufacturing or soldiers on furlough.[171] Propaganda-strategic differences between Hitler and Goebbels begin to surface in this period. On 3.6.1942 Goebbels writes in his diary that 'the Führer demands a little more than we can accomplish from the Wochenschau. The Wochenschau is not in the position to produce a complete documentary film every time. It can only use currently available material. [Der Führer verlangt von der Wochenschau etwas mehr, als wir leisten künnen. Die Wochenschau ist nicht in der Lage, jedes Mal einen fix und fertigen Dokumentarfilm zu liefern. Sie kann nur das Material verwenden, das ihr augenblicklich zur Verfügung steht.]'[172]

Wochenschau reports on the battle of Stalingrad are a great example of how Goebbels' and Hitler's ideas of the Wochenschau's purpose have diverged by the end of phase two. Goebbels' diary entry of 21.1.1943, roughly two weeks before the German surrender in Stalingrad, reads: 'Naturally the main topic is the situation in Stalingrad. We must gradually get acquainted with the thought to inform the German Volk about the situation there. This should have happened a long time ago, but until now the Führer was always opposed to it. But eventually we cannot continue this way, only informing the German Volk when ... it's all over. [Das große Thema ist natürlich die Lage in Stalingrad. Wir müssen uns nun allmählich mit dem Gedanken vertraut machen, das deutsche Volk über die dortige Situation zu unterrichten. Das hätte eigentlich schon längst geschehen können; aber bisher war der Führer immer noch dagegen. Schließlich und endlich aber können wir die Dinge nicht so weit treiben lassen, daß wir dem deutschen Volke erst ... sagen, wenn alles vorbei ist.][173] Hitler, who had the last say, apparently disagreed. In autumn 1942, roughly half-way through the battle of Stalingrad, the Deutsche Wochenschau had reported that the Wehrmacht had successfully captured Stalingrad. In the end this just heralded phase three, in

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[170]E.g. see SD-reports of 3.5.1940, 16.6.1941, 24.7.1941, 4.8.1941, 21.8.1941, 8.9.1941, in Meldungen p.65, p.153, p.165, p.167, p.170, p.174 respectively.

[171]Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, p.676.

[172]Goebbels' Tagebuch, quoted in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, p.677.

[173]Reuth, R.G. (ed.), *Joseph Goebbels Tagebücher 1924 -1945*, p.1875

which such false claims would become the norm in the Wochenschau.

These party-internal conflicts in combination with increasing doubts about the Wochenschau's objectivity fell on a fertile soil, consisting of a lack of reports on casualties and victories on the eastern front. The population lost trust in the Wochenschau, a trend especially drastic in rural areas.[174] Thus the Wochenschau lost its claim to objectivity and truth and so the population started to look for other news sources, like foreign radio or army post.[175] Sometimes the truth was readily derivable from official news: That the German army in Stalingrad was 'attacked from all sides' necessarily meant that they were surrounded, but was not mentioned explicitly.[176] Towards the end of this phase a much more pessimistic atmosphere was prevalent in Germany, mostly due to the *prolonged* War and concealment on the part of the government in combination with the harsh reality that included, among other hardships, the destruction of many German cities.

(iii) Post-Stalingrad until the end of the War: The final phase. Here we find calls for perseverance and fear-mongering. One main characteristic of this phase was the desperate attempt to defend the Reich and the interconnected mobilization of the Volkssturm. Individual performance, which hasn't been much of a topic in earlier phases, assumes primacy.

Reports and reality keep diverging in this phase. The Deutsche Wochenschau Nr. 651 (10/1943) reported on Goebbels' famous total-war-speech. Remarkable about this particular Wochenschau is that Goebbels himself can only been seen for 1.5 minutes. The other 4.5 minutes we see the masses Goebbels addressed that day, mostly cheering. Cheering and applause in fact make up roughly half of the report on the speech. In the speech Goebbels asked a total of four questions, the last of which was the infamous one. The Wochenschau was cut so that the total war question came first, followed by the others, chronologically correct this time. The large proportion of audience suggests that it was the people who postulated the four points while Goebbels merely passively reacted to the crowd, giving a voice to the Volk's demands.[177]

In phase three there were virtually no reports about bombing raids, the harsh civilian life (shortages and the like) or the holocaust.[178] In some areas this lead to a sharp decrease in the popularity of the Wochenschau. A special Wochenschau screening in the Ufa-palace in Stuttgart in March 1943 attracted merely 25-30 viewers, in a cinema in Vienna roughly 40 percent of the movie-goers left after the feature film to avoid the Wochenschau and around one fifth of the visitors of a cinema in Katowice mirrored their Viennese counterparts.[179] These developments clearly show the population's mistrust.

As mentioned above, the Deutsche Wochenschau quickly lost credibility after

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[174]See SD-reports from 8.9.1941, 13.11.1941 and 16.8.1943, in Meldungen p.174, pp.191-192 and pp.428-429 respectively.

[175]SD-reports of 22.1.1942 and 8.7. 1943, in Meldungen p.211 and p.419 respectively.

[176]SD-report from 18.1.1943, in Meldungen p.337.

[177]Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.679.

[178]Ibid., p.688

[179]See SD-report of 4.3.1943, in Meldungen, p.368.

Stalingrad. Extensive bombings and a flood of refugees from eastern Germany must have shattered trust in the Wochenschau: 'Bad news' have become a part of everyday life, but never made their way into the Wochenschau. The fact that the Führer himself, the only person that could boost morale even in the most desperate situation[180], made less and less appearances in the Deutsche Wochenschau in the last year of the War surely added to its dwindling trustworthiness.[181] Goebbels' diary entry of 14.5.1942 reads: 'I believe that in the upcoming weeks and months our propaganda must recognize its main purpose, [i.e.] not to spread illusions [...]. The more realistic the German Volk views the situation in the war, the easier it can cope with the tough problems ahead of us. [Ich glaube, unsere Propaganda wird in den kommenden Wochen und Monaten ihre Hauptaufgabe darin sehen müssen, keine Illusionen zu verbreiten [...]. Je realistischer das deutsche Volk die Kriegslage betrachtet, umso eher wird es mit den noch vor uns liegenden schwierigen Problemen fertig werden.]'[182] He was, again, unable to convince Hitler of his strategy, as we shall see in the upcoming examples.

The Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.747 (2/1945) of January 1945 reports that village by village is being captured as tank brigades are destroyed (who captures and destroys is not mentioned), at a time when the Soviets have long been in control of East Prussia and the Western Allies massed troops by the Rhine. One month later, Wochenschau Nr.751 (6/1945) and Nr.752 (7/1945) are optimistic: On this soil Germany must and will turn the tides of War for the better of Europe's destiny. [Auf diesem Boden wird und muß Deutschland für Europas Schicksal die Wende erzwingen]'

Wochenschau Nr. 754 (9/1945) summarizes the two main propaganda strategies employed in the Wochenschauen: Distraction and deception.[183] The first report in said issue is about the USA: A violent confrontation between striking workers and the police. The commentary says that 'in an American industrial city workers who protest against low wages are beaten up. In Germany the policeman's truncheon vanished after [the NSDAP] came into power. [In einer amerikanischen Industriestadt werden die gegen die geringen Loehne protestierenden Arbeiter zusamengeschlagen. Seit der Machtübernahme ist in Deutschland der Polizeiknüppel verschwunden.]'[184] Since Wochenschau reports on foreign events have become quite a-typical by 1944, we must highlight a few things. First of all the footage shown actually stems from Chicago of the late 1930s.[185] Furthermore the bad situation for US-workers is immediately contrasted to the greatness of the Reich; 'look how bad the capitalists treat their people. ... So don't complain!' seems to be the message here. A very questionable strategy, for already in 1942 the SD reported that reports on domestic issues of other countries, especially the USA, were recognized as distraction and

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[180]See LTI, Ch.XVIII, Ich Glaube an Ihn, pp.161-185
[181]See Segeberg, H. (ed.), *Mediale Mobilmachung*, pp.151-178.
[182]Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.677.
[183]'Distraction' here not in the sense of 'Escapism'.
[184]Und die Fahne, p.225.
[185]Ibid.

usually disliked.[186]

The second report of Nr.754 is from the Western Front. 'These are the mercenaries of an ambitious US-general, who once again missed the mark. [...] As in the East, German soldiers here fight steadfast, as long as they're still breathing. The majority of the German army has crossed the River with all heavy weapons.[Das sind die Söldlinge eines ehrgeizigen USA-Generals, der abermals dicht an seinem Ziel vorbeiging. Wie im Osten kämpfen hier deutsche Soldaten unerschüttert, solange Atem in ihnen ist. Das Gros der deutschen Armeegruppe hat mit allen schweren Waffen den Strom überschritten.]'[187] Again the image of the US is quite negative. The general is ambitious, but incompetent. He sacrifices his 'mercenaries' for no reason. The Germans hold the line.[188] This failure in combination with the German army crossing a river clearly implies that the Germans are advancing. However the report makes no mention in *what direction* the German army crossed the River - they were retreating.[189]

The phantasm of Wunderwaffen, ill-defined high-tech weapons that should turn the tides of war in favour of the Reich, was very popular in the Wochenschau, especially in the later stages of the war. The V2, which the Germans used to very little effect against the UK was mentioned three times in rapid succession, namely in Nr.723 (30/1944), Nr.725 (32/1944) and Nr.737 (44/1944). The same goes for the 'Ein-Mann-Torpedo', a one-man submarine that was supposed to sink the royal navy and starve out the English. It found its way into Nr. 732 (39/1944), Nr.734 (31/1944 and Nr. 735 (42/1944). Combined the few issues between Nr.723 and Nr.737

Figure 12: Deutsche Wochenschau Nr. 732: Ein-Mann-Torpedo.

mentioned the V2 or the Torpedo six times, so roughly half the time. Technological warfare in general seems to have captured the attention of the population throughout the war. Aviation played a big part in this.[190] Except for stunning displays of German aircraft in various editions of the Wochenschau, Germans increasingly became scared of gas-attacks from the air. For many this seemed to be the logical next step from the phosphor-based firebombs Great Britain had been using.[191] This danger relates to Allied bombing raids, which increasingly depressed the German population, and in some cases fostered hatred towards the U.S. and especially Great Britain. The NSDAP quickly picked this up and came up with the buzzword *Vergeltung* (vengeance), which trans-

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[186]SD-report of 19.11.1942, in Meldungen, pp.319-321.

[187]Und die Fahne, p. 226.

[188]This of course means US-soldiers. However 'mercenary' adds the derogatory implication that they fight for money, not honor/values/the fatherland. This again is a critique of Capitalism.

[189]Und die Fahne, p.226.

[190]SD-report from 4.3.1943, in Meldungen, p.366.

[191]SD-report from 24.5.1943 and 1.7.1943, in Meldungen p.396 and p.415 respectively.

lated into plans, or promises, to either destroy British cities, invade the island, or both. The concept was received very well, and as the Luftwaffe failed to protect German cities, many Germans felt that Vergeltung was the only option left - part 'an eye for an eye', part 'offense is the best defense'.[192]

Interestingly new war technologies were often discussed in relation to the Western Allies and mostly in the context of Vergeltung. As early as 1940 rumors about novel war technologies circulated in the form of some sort of sailplane.[193] The spread of such rumors positively correlated with the decrease of perceived objectivity of the Wochenschau and the destruction of German cities. Please note that it is uncertain how some of these rumors came about.[194] However such rumors were wide-spread in 1943, when all kinds of new weaponry was discussed, even in the public sphere: New Guns with range of 200, 400 or 600km were to shell England from bases in northern France. These guns were sometimes called 'stratospheric guns' (Stratosphärengeschütze). Furthermore new ways to propel munition, like compressed air or rocketry, atom bombs of immense destructive power and such a size, that only one piece could be transported at a time and have, as well as new six-engine bombers and transport-planes with enough loading capacity for two tanks, were commonly talked about.[195] Similarly many believed that Great Britain had developed new technologies, e.g. infra-red-rays, high-frequency-rays, or sound locators, which presumably helped detect German submarines and thus explained the missing reports on successful German U-boat raids.[196] Generally speaking Germans believed that their new technologies would only turn the tides of War if they were combined with an invasion of Great Britain, for which some believed 1.000 Japanese fighter planes were made available.[197] This suggests that the German population did trust war technologies, but not blindly. Boots on the ground were still deemed necessary for decisive victories. This human aspect of the Vergeltung seemed to have gotten the upper hand as time, and thus desperation, progressed.

In summary, the Wochenschau has come a long way under NS-rule: From four internationally oriented Wochenschauen in Weimar times and early Nazi Germany to a highly centralized and monitored institution with national-militaristic emphasis. Most of the organizational changes the Wochenschau experienced came in the first year of the War. Under NS-control the Deutsche Wochenschau moved away from entertainment and international reports. Instead things military became the focus; civilian life was almost entirely emitted. Likewise technology was only depicted in the context of War: Tanks, trucks, artillery and guns on the front, weapons manufactures at home. During times of Axis advances the Wochenschau was fairly truthful, whereas it spread lies or unclear information at the later stages of the war. From this we concluded that Hitler must

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[192]See SD report from 18.10.1943, in Meldungen, p.440-441.

[193]SD-report from 16.4.1940, in Meldungen, p.68.

[194]The government might have started some (which was not unheard of), or perhaps people picked up clues from speeches that mentioned weapon development.

[195]All examples in the SD-report from 1.7.1943, in Meldungen, p.414.

[196]Ibid. p.415-416

[197]SD-report from 1.7. 1943, in Meldungen p.414.

have overpowered Goebbels, since Herr Doktor promoted honesty (objectivity) in the Wochenschau. In a sense technological feats and oddities, in combination with the idea of Vergeltung, were a life-line for propaganda. Even though the population grew increasingly skeptical towards the Wochenschau, reports about 'Wunderwaffen' never ceased to spark rumors about amazing technologies and their use for Vergeltung, thus raising morale and re-establishing trust between government and population. However it should be noted that Goebbels might have reacted to SD-reports by guiding the Wochenschau's attention on these technologies. However this seems questionable. The example of the Chicago-strike mentioned above showed that SD-reports not necessarily had an impact on propaganda strategies. Lastly I wish to point out that Blood and Soil was very much absent in the Wochenschau, while (war) technologies were directly related to trust, power and reliability.

Now for our historiographical debate, starting with the *traditional view*, i.e. the belief that Blood and Soil ideology was central to National Socialism. There are two aspects here that I would like to discuss. Firstly the question: Can we view the Wochenschau as a 'byproduct of blood and soil ideology'? As such the Wochenschau would be a mere propaganda tool, which it arguably was. However then the question arises why the Wochenschau was so important to the NSDAP. Could traditional, a-technological, means of propaganda not do the same job? If we take equating Wochenschau to mere propaganda for granted, should the Wochenschau not focus on the folkish, instead of technological feats? The fantastic display of Wunderwaffen seems to suggest that the Wochenschau clearly did not promote Blood and Soil. But what did it promote then? Was it a mere tool, meant to raise morale in order to win the war, which was fought for Blood and Soil ideology? Even if we take this for granted, the Wochenschau chose to cover Wunderwaffen and not just the individual soldier, the hero fighting for the fatherland. In short there seem to be two arguments against the traditional view. It is obvious that the Wochenschau, as a piece of technology, was a key propaganda institution - especially during the War. But the Wochenschau also seemed to promote the use of technologies and equated them to power; in the case of the Wunderwaffen perhaps even as a savior. Thus this line of thought seems to bring up a few problems for the traditional view. Now, secondly, I would like to address the Wunderwaffen. The traditional view must see those as a means to win the war, which was in turn motivated ideologically. I believe that this section has shown that there was much more to the concept of Wunderwaffen and Vergeltung than just that: I have argued that the Wochenschau consciously picked up Wunderwaffen in order to reestablish public trust. Thus this subsection has rendered the traditional view rather ineffective.

Now for *Herf's* two major points, i.e. that of continuity and that of selective embrace of technology. Herf's account does not hold up in the case of continuity, simply because the four Weimar Wochenschauen had little resemblance to the Deutsche Wochenschau after 1941. But is this a valid comparison? After all the NSDAP had no influence on the Wochenschau at all prior to 1933. I think yes. Herf explicitly compares NS-ideology to party-external movements.

And my argument here does the exact same thing: Comparing NS-influenced Wochenschau to their Weimar counterparts. Now a few words on the 'selective embrace' of technology. This subsection has shown that the NSDAP had major influence on the Wochenschau, especially after the outbreak of World War II. This came with a heavy emphasis on military technology in the Wochenschau, which lead to a neglect of civilian matters. Therefore we can truly speak of a selective embrace of technology. The Wochenschau depicted war technologies positively and barely touched upon civilian technologies. However we should not forget the context of this emphasis. We have seen that the Wochenschau was closely tied to the War, both in regards to objectivity and reception. The Wochenschau was, after all, a newsreel. As the War expanded, it increasingly influenced Germans at home - so the Wochenschau should cover this extensively. This means that perhaps this function, combined with the War-context, was responsible for the selection of military technologies over their civilian counterparts. This then shakes up Herf's point. In my understanding of Herf it is ideology and NS-values that motivated the selection. But I think the example of the Wochenschau has shown that there was more behind the selection process.

Either way there was a selection which speaks against the *modern view*, a la Rohkrämer. However we can easily remedy the situation by viewing the Wochenschau as news reel, not as a mirror to NS-ideology. This can be done by explaining the Wochenschau's focus on military technology by reference to the War, thus arguing that this focus does not mean that civilian technologies were neglected in general, but just didn't make the news. After all the War was from its beginning an important topic for the public. This then partially mirrors my argument against Herf in the previous paragraph. While these arguments could be pursued further, they seem unsatisfactory, since the goal of this subsection was to treat the Wochenschau in isolation. And we have seen that there was a selection. My criticism in the previous paragraph was not that there was no selection, but that there were reasons other than ideological ones that lead to the selection. On the other hand the fact that the Wochenschau was centrally organized to a crass extend corroborates Rohkrämer, who argued that Nazi Germany was highly centralized and thus modern. This goes well with the overall spirit of the Wochenschau. The Wochenschau promoted objective and fast news coverage through 'propaganda companies' and increased the copies in circulation. The latter aspect was especially beneficial for rural areas, where the demand for recent Wochenschauen was not always met. Even though Griffin's definition of modernity, i.e. a fusion between global modernizing forces and local tradition, is not applicable here, we could very much view the Wochenschau as a modern phenomenon, here actualized in the form of enthusiasm for technology and novelties - news on film instead of the newspaper.

The *pragmatic view* avoids issues Rohkrämer and Herf have, which revolve around the idea of selectively embracing technology. The pragmatic view would explain the Wochenschau's focus on things Military as merely War-related. Since its close ties to the War, the function of the news reel altered over time, from promoting victories to concealing defeats. And this is where the Wochenschau's secondary function, that of a propaganda tool, came to the fore. Due to

this development the Wochenschau lost its claim to objectivity, which fostered distrust in the population. The case of the Wunderwaffe then is of special importance, for it represented the NSDAP's attempt to reconcile public distrust towards the Party by appealing to new technologies. Notably in this context is that War technologies were a hot topic in the public, a discourse reflected by the Wunderwaffen-coverage. Thus the case represents pragmatic solutions to a concrete issues: News about the War and later on public distrust. In light of the pragmatic view another layer of depth would be added to the centralization-aspect: The importance of streamlining news outlets, especially during the War. Thus the pragmatic view not only deals with centralization and enthusiasm for technology as 'something modern', but focuses around explanations as to why those were necessary. In summary then the pragmatic view alone had no problem explaining this subsection's findings.

5.5 Unmasked: Propaganda Movies and Feature Film

In this subsection we will look at some propaganda movies, i.e. movies that were commissioned by or produced by the NSDAP. If we simply look at 'Nazi propaganda' in its entirety, we will find major inconsistencies in the depiction of technology. With our definitions at hand this paradox can readily be solved by tracing down the concrete origin of a movie in question. Different governmental departments had different agendas, which changed over time. Darré, far-right leader of the Reichsnährstand (Reich food estate), tended to push his Blood and Soil ideology in the movies he was involved in, meaning that we must expect a negative image, or an absence, of technology in those. Robert Ley, the leader of the DAF (Deutsche Arbeitsfront, German Labour Front), on the other hand would advance the exact opposite image in a combination of 'beauty at the workplace' and industrial progress. However the majority of propaganda movies fell under Goebbels' jurisdiction.

The DAF was founded in Mai 1933 as a replacement for unions, which were dissolved shortly before that. It accommodated a small movie department lead by Otto Geiger.[198] DAF movie production reflected it's main purpose of being a centralized worker's union. The movie *Schiff ohne Klassen* (Ship devoid of Classes, 1938) exemplifies this. The movie is about the Wilhelm Gustloff, the first DAF/KdF cruise ship. The KdF (Kraft durch Freude, Strength through Joy), a sub-division of the DAF, aggressively advertised their holiday programs, especially cruises and vacations abroad. In reality most trip were made inside the Reich, while workers were generally underrepresented.[199] The political tone of *Schiff ohne Klassen* is already evident in the title, which skillfully fuses the saying 'We're all in the same boat' with a reference to the Reich as a classless society; this has always been one of the NSDAP's main points.

As far as content goes, *Schiff ohne Klassen* focuses on pleasurable experiences aboard the Wilhelm Gustloff. The movie begins with the ship leaving the

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[198] Film-Kurier, 294, 16.12.1938, in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.253.

[199] Compare Benz, W., Graml, Weiß, H., Graml, H. (eds.), *Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus*, p.551.

harbor. Here we find one of the few images of a concrete piece of technology in the movie: The engine is starting. After that we see people eating in the dining area. One worker calls his coworkers in the modern-looking factory at home. He tells them about how great the food is while reading out the menu. For the 3 minute-long call the passenger is charged five Reichsmark. The low prices baffle him: 'Only five Mark? That's just like on land!' 'Yes', the cashier replies, 'these are KdF-fees.' The image here implies that the KdF not only enables luxury for the worker, but also the use of technologies at affordable rates - here the telephone.

The remainder of the movie shows off the sun deck, a large array of sports (home trainers, swimming, boxing, etc.), shore leave and dancing. The movie ends with fireworks, followed by a final full view of the Wilhelm Gustloff, as seen from an airplane. Technology plays a rather subordinate role in the movie; entertainment clearly takes primacy in the 21 minute long short film. However from the engine in the beginning, to the occasionally shown control room, the telephone, the factory at home and airplane in the end, technology establishes itself as a ubiquitous enabler of the entertainment on display. Due to the focus on the low prices and entertainment the movie takes on the characteristics of advertisement more than once. Thus the Wilhelm Gustloff appears as modern, spectacular and luxurious, yet simultaneously affordable.[200]

Figure 13: Schiff ohne Klassen: Focus on entertainment, here: Food, dance, gym and fireworks.

Schiff ohne Klassen was meant to be for workers by workers. Hans Heinrich, member of the DAF movie department, recalled: 'For a long time we were undecided on the question: Actors or not. We used a worker. The scene fit. It had atmosphere. No actor has such hands and such a face, nor such a walk, from which one can recognize hard daily labor. [Wir haben lange gezögert in der Frage: Schauspieler oder nicht. Wir nahmen einen Arbeiter. Die Szene saß. Sie hat Atmosphäre. Solche Hände und ein solches Gesicht, einen solchen Gang, aus dem man die täglich schwere Arbeit erkennt, hat kein Schauspieler.][201] So Heinrich's team valued the authenticity of an actual worker, or 'objectivity' in our terms.

Other DAF productions include Norwegenfahrt "Kraft durch Freude" (Trip to Norway "Strength through Joy", 1934), Heimat und Boden (Home and Soil, 1939), Schönheit der Arbeit (The beauty of work, 1934), Licht (Light, 1936), Heimat im Werk (Home in the Factory, Otto Geiger, 1939), Arbeiter - heute (Worker - today, 1935). DAF productions generally revolved around the more

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[200]See Appendix G. for more images.
[201]Die Deutsche Arbeitsfront zeigt..., quoted in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, p.278.

spectacular KdF events, or the modernization of the (industrial) workplace. Schiff ohne Klassen fit well into the successful KdF advertisement campaign, which will be elaborated on later in this document.

The DAF's emphasis on progress and utilization of technology stood in contrast to the Blood and Soil ideology of Walther Darré and Alfred Rosenberg. It is unclear how much influence Darré had on overall movie production, presumably not much. Darré's Stabsamt des Reichsbauernführers (Bureau of the Reich farmer leader) did have the right to produce and commission movies, but was not very active in doing so. The only productions/commissions I could trace are Blut und Boden. Grundlagen zum Neuen Reich (Blood and Soil. Fundamentals of the new Reich, 1933), Altgermanische Bauernkultur (Old-Germanic famer's culture, 1933/1934) Die Stadt der Verheißung (The town of promise, 1934/1935) and Die Saat geht auf (The seed bears fruit, 1934/1935). One cannot help but notice that all of these movies were released between 1933-1935, which implies that Darré had little to no influence on movies after 1935 and might mean that Blood and Soil has fallen out of favor soon after the Machtergreifung.

The movie *Blut und Boden* displays the struggle of a Weimar-era farmer. A peasant family sits together. The elders explain to the children that their family has owned the farm for hundreds of years, but now, due to economic circumstances, they might have to sell the farm. The movie displays this as more than a personal tragedy: The Weimar government 'forced' the farmer off the land, which is why the peasant families moved to the cities. However, so the movie, birthrates in cities are so low, that Berlin, a metropolis of 4 million, will shrink in population to 90.000 by 2050. Thus the issue of land flight is of critical importance to for the nation. Needless to say

Figure 14: Blut und Boden: Pedestrians struggle to cross the street.

the movie depicts cities as chaotic and degenerate, and farm life on the other hand as idyllic. There we find no cars nor trams, only horse-drawn plows, soil and happiness. Thus the movie 'demands' (literally, in the commentary) the resurrection of the German peasant. The final shots show just that: A farm under construction.[202]

The movie reflects general NSDAP propaganda: The Machtergreifung miraculously swept away peasant troubles and class conflict; now harmony, wealth and values on the farm were restored, which disregards the fact that concrete measures undertaken were often ill-received (see subsection 4.3). Darré commented: 'The past, farmer-destroying time has not been able to breed any actors that could truly and essentially represent the German farmer with his rough edges and endless joy about the holy function he fulfills, without any instructed empathy. [Die vergangene, bauernzerstörerische Zeit habe keinen

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[202]See Appendix H. for more images.

Schauspieler hochzuechten können, der aus innerer Selbstverständlichkeit heraus den deutschen Landmann mit allen Ecken und Kanten, mit seiner tiefen Freude an dem heiligen Amt, das er betreue, ohne schulende Einfühlung wahrhaft und wesentlich zu gestalten vermöge.]'[203] With the findings of subsection 4.3 in mind, the Nazis were quick to change their overall propaganda strategy. The emphasis shifted from rabble-rousing[204] to stressing social harmony (compare Shiff ohne Klassen).[205] As discussed above, before 1933 the Party's undertakings in regards to movies were very limited in extent and mostly confined to lending, not producing, movies. In face of this, hard-line Blood and Soil demagogues, like Darré and Rosenberg, and their movies, like the aforementioned Bauer in Not (Farmer in Misery, clearly intended to agitate the rural population) did not fit into NS movie propaganda post Machtergreifung.[206] This might explain the lack of Darré-influenced productions after 1934/1935.

Party-external Kulturfilm reflected this. Movies about rural areas were generally void of political statements, especially of mutinous nature, while the beauty of the landscape moved into the spotlight. Examples include Verträumte Winkel am Neckar und Main (Dreamy corners at Neckar and Main, 1942), Kurenfischer (1941), Heuzug im Allgäu (Hay-haul in the Allgäu, 1941), Ein Landbriefträger (A rural postman 1941) to name but a few.

Other movies depicted large cities, with all their progress and technology, as an entity *in* nature. Picking up the classic theme of past-to-present, such movies would show how cities were rooted in nature, and grew over time to get entangled with their natural surroundings. Stuttgart, die Grossstadt zwischen Wald und Reben (Stuttgart, Metropolis between Forest and Vines, 1935), Weltstadt Berlin (Cosmopolitan City Berlin, 1938), Hamburg: Deutschlands Tor zur Welt (Hamburg, Germany's Gate to the World, 1939) are some examples of such an approach. Similarly, Wilfried Basse's 1936 Vom Korn zum Brot (From grain to bread) blends manual labor and machine labor into one process - a novelty. Traditionally movies had focused one

Figure 15: Manual labour, especially in rural context, remained a popular motif in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.314

or the other. Another one of Basse's movies, Ein Tag auf einer fränkischen Dorfstrasse (A day on a street in a franconian village, 1939), paints an idyllic and romantic picture of a franconian village. The timelessness of the village pro-

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[203]Berliner Illustrierte 24.11.1933, in Theater und Film, p.374.

[204]N.B. the clear agitative tone in above quote, well after the Machtergreifung.

[205]Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.506.

[206]Other great examples for this 1933 rift are the movies Deutschland gestern und heute (1936), Gebt mir vier Jahre Zeit (1937), Jahre der Entscheidung (1939), all of which promote social harmony. In Gebt mir vier Jahre Zeit, for instance, airplanes, ships, trains and highways symbolize progress. Agrarian work is depicted as manual labour; a tractor can only be seen once for a few seconds.

hibits the use of any technology, meaning the movie makes no mention of it whatsoever. These examples were to show that Kulturfilm about rural areas was caught somewhere between the Blut und Boden ideology and the idea of technology and progress going hand in hand with nature and tradition.[207]

Finally it should be noted that most of what falls under my conception of propaganda (see subsection 5.1) avoided discussion of technology and modernity almost entirely. Famous examples include Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph des Willens (Triumph of the Will, 1935), Jud Süß (Jew Süß, 1940) and it's unofficial successor Der ewige Jude (The eternal Jew, 1940), Feldzug in Polen (Campaign in Poland, 1940), S.A. Mann Brand (S.A. man Brand, 1933) or Hitlerjunge Quex (Hitler Youth Quex, 1933). Most of these movies emphasise national socialist ideology. So it happens that the individual stands in the foreground in almost all cases. S.A. Mann Brand and Hitlerjunge Quex showcase social injustice brought upon Germany by the communists or capitalists; the heroic NS-organizations (S.A. and H.J. respectively) fight to the death against such 'terror' in order to restore 'German virtues'. Triumph of the Will centralizes Hitler. As such, Hitler (and sometimes other high party members) have the monopoly on the use of technology. Hitler uses the airplane to descend from the skies in the famous first scene of the movie. Then stands in a driving car, which elevates him above the surrounding masses - both physically and in regards to status. Then we see several speeches. The microphone gives Hitler the power to make himself heard by thousands.

Jud Süß is an antisemitic, pseudo-historical feature film. Apparently Goebbels found that there must be more supply of antisemitic material, so he ordered the production of Der ewige Jude, a documentary-style movie directed by Hippler. The movie intended to be shocking. It made use of footage from ghettos in occupied areas, compared Jews to rats, and the final scene depicts kosher butchering. The commentary of the last scene condemns the events as barbaric as the animals bleed to death. Perhaps such scenes were a little too violent for the public. Der ewige Jude was relatively unpopular compared to the successful Jud Süß. An SD-report reads: 'The repulsiveness of the displayed as such, and especially the butchering scenes, have been repeatedly been orally mentioned as main reasons against watching the movie. [...] It has often been stated that 'Jud Süß' has already depicted the Jewry convincingly, so that this new, crass evidence in the documentary shown directly thereafter was unnecessary. Die Widerlichkeit des Dargestellten an sich und vor allem die Schlachtszenen seien dementsprechend immer wieder als Hauptgrund gegen den Besuch des Filmes gesprächsweise zum Ausdruck gekommen. [...] Häufig sei geäußert worden, 'Jud Süß' habe das Judentum bereits so überzeugend dargestellt, daß es dieser neuen, noch krasseren Beweismittel in dem unmittelbar danach aufgeführten Dokumentarfilm nicht mehr bedurft habe.'][208] As a final remark, both movies contrast the Jews to the worker: Workers create value, while the Jews selfishly hoard money and goods produced by others. Farmer fit this metaphor too, for they produce not

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[207]Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, pp.309-319.
[208]Quoted in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.564.

only sustains the farmer, but also feed the rest of the population.

The much-celebrated Feldzug in Polen is a highly interesting case for our analysis.[209] The film was a Party production and was meant to be a documentary of the War in Poland. The VB rhapsodised: 'Contemporary history itself wrote the script, the leaders of the Volk and Wehrmacht were the directors, and the main actor was the German soldier, the unknown fighter on the eastern front, whose commitment made it possible to add another glorious chapter to German history. [Die Zeitgeschichte selbst schrieb das Manuskript, Regisseur war die Führung des Volkes und der Wehrmacht, und Hauptdarsteller der deutsche Soldat, der unbekannte Kämpfer an der Ostfront, durch dessen Einsatz es möglich wurde, der deutschen Geschichte ein neues Ruhmesblatt anzufügen.][210] The movie was extremely popular in both stationary and mobile cinemas.[211] Moreover it has even been used to intimidate other European nations, such as the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium or Romania.[212] But was the 'unknown soldier' really the main actor of this movie?

Content-wise Feldzug in Polen first justifies the War. Poland, the 'Raubstaat' (literally robber state) unjustly took German land after WWI; German people in Poland are treated poorly - their farms being burned is the most recurring example of this in the movie. All the while the 'puppet master' England controls the world, but denies German expansion. After some shots of marching soldiers of various nationalities, a build-up of German armoured vehicles is shown. The commentary states that the Wehrmacht makes ready for 'the counter-attack'. And

Figure 16: Feldzug in Polen: Tanks on the offense.

so the tanks and trucks start moving and form an endless stream, all the way to the horizon.

Apart from those tanks and trucks, artillery, motorbikes and horses all contribute to this 'counterattack'. Only later we see common infantry on the march. This clearly hints at the speed that came with novel weapons technologies. Later on the movie shows some bridges in ruins, allegedly destroyed by the retreating Poles in an attempt to slow down the German advance.

But to no avail: We see a tank driving trough fairly high water (it is unclear whether or not this scene is staged). The commentary states that engineers attempt to build bridges. Where there is no time for such, the heavy vehicles would simply drive through the rivers. Even though the truth of that statement is highly questionable, the scene pictures German technology, here in the form of a tank, as unstoppable: Not even mother nature can slow it down. Feldzug in

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[209] Compare SD-report 4.2.1940, in Meldungen, p.47.

[210] VB 6.2.1940, quoted Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.626.

[211] Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.626.

[212] Ufa-Story, p.359.

Polen features a large amount of aerial views, taken from fighters and bombers. In one outstanding scene the camera assumes the point of view of a dive-bomber on a bombing mission. Scenes like these gave the audience the impression of being at the frontline. Later in the movie we see soldiers sleeping on trucks; this creates a contrast between human and machine: Slow vs. fast, unable to cross rivers vs. unstoppable, tired vs. restless. Naturally no propaganda movie can miss Hitler, and so Feldzug in Polen shows the Führer inspecting troops more than once, for instance during the final scene, which displays the German victory parade. This scene then suggests that Hitler reigns supreme over men and machine alike.[213]


Figure 17: Feldzug in Polen: 'Tank crosses river'.

In a way *Feldzug in Polen* reminds of the Wochenschau. Individual scenes are very short and connections between different cuts seem jumpy, visually and thematically speaking. This is because the movie was in fact a compilation of Wochenschau material. The movie reception was great, even though viewers sometimes debated on how to react to the movie: Ovation or serious discussion?[214] In regards to technology then Feldzug in Polen does parallel the Wochenschau. There is broad enthusiasm for technology, a certain fascination for the power of it, especially in contrast to human flaws. The most striking aspects here are the already mentioned picture that technology is unweary, quick and unstoppable. In this way Feldzug in Polen consciously acted as propaganda, for it ascribed these images to German technology and, by making it the main subject of the movie, transplanted it to the entirety of the Wehrmacht.

In a political and economic context Feldzug in Polen is similar to Deutsche Panzer, for their similar connection to economic considerations that I have outlined in subsection 4.3. The overemphasized use of war technologies in Feldzug in Polen seems to hit the same foreign and domestic point as Deutsche Panzer, just less abstract: Feldzug in Polen attempts to demonstrate the superiority of the German war machinery quite literally. The keyword 'unstoppable' comes to mind, a warning a la 'resistance is futile' to neutral countries and enemies, and a reinforcement for the German popula-

Figure 18: Feldzug in Polen: View from inside of an attacking airplane; visible gunfire.

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[213]See Appendix I. for more images.

[214]SD-report from 4.2.1940, in Meldungen aus dem Reich, p.47.

tion. Similarly to the first World War, many Germans expected the second World War to last but a few months, which SD-reports discussed in subsection 5.4 show. Feldzug in Polen might have contributed to this wrong mindset. What can be said with certain clarity is that the muscle on display in Feldzug in Polen was bluffed; military production was far behind schedule, as subsection 4.3 demonstrated.

Propaganda movies, especially those that address agriculture and/or technology, were characterized by what I called the 1933 rift. This was due to tensions between NSDAP leaders. On the one hand Robert Ley and his DAF promoted technological progress and on the other hand Rosenberg and Darré condemned it in favour of Blut und Boden propaganda. Goebbels was in control of most of the movie production in the Reich and personally disliked Rosenberg. Blut und Boden ideology seemed to have died out rather quickly in movies after 1933; I have determined a change of NS-propaganda strategy and personal quibbles as the main cause for this. Still there was no unified picture of technology. Large parts of official party propaganda, e.g. Eternal Jew, Triumph of the Will, virtually omitted the topic. *Feldzug in Polen* did paint a positive image of technology, especially if seen in contrast to humans. But we mustn't over-interpret this; after all *Feldzug in Polen* is a propaganda movie about the War. Still, I believe, the machine dominates *Feldzug in Polen* while the human, here subordinate to tanks, trucks and airplanes, could have taken the lead as well. Thus we can hold that Goebbels shared Ley's enthusiasm for technology, rather than Darré's and Rosenberg's Blood and Soil dreams.

Now for our historiographical debate. Spielfilm-like propaganda movies, like Jud Süß, Hitlerjunge Quex, and most importantly Blut und Boden reinforce the *traditional view*, which held that ideology took primacy for the Nazis. While many such films are not intended to make a statement about technology/modernity at all, Blut und Boden explicitly refers to the ideology of the same name, presented as the solution of all socio-economic problems. This movie depicts technology as the traditional view lays it out: An unwanted byproduct, ultimately to be reversed by National Socialism. However this leaves out other examples, most notably Feldzug in Polen, in which technology is portrayed as crucial and powerful tool. A proponent of the traditional view would have to explain this by reference to the Nazis' war goals. Those must be described as rooted in Blood and Soil. But this leaves us with the question of why Feldzug in Polen portrayed technology as it did; instead the individual German soldier, as a symbol of Blood and Soil, could have been the main focus of the movie. Furthermore the ebb of movies in spirit of Blut und Boden after 1934/1935 and the related change in NS propaganda strategy seems to reveal what the true purpose of this ideology was: A fishing net for voters. The traditional view cannot account for this decline; should the NSDAP not foster movies like Blut und Boden in order to bring the Reich closer to the Blood and Soil dream?

Parts of this subsection invite comparison with subsection 5.3, in which I have sketched out elements of early NSDAP propaganda movies, e.g. the personal cult around the leadership. Such continuity reminds of *Herf*, who located

the Nazis in a reactionary modern tradition that selectively embraced technology. Yet the continuity we found here is distinct from Herf's point. This is because we currently deal with NS-internal developments, Herf deals with the development of NS at large. As for Herf's selective embrace of technology it should be noted that the movies discussed in this section seem to not have fully embraced technology: The movie Blut und Boden clearly stands in contrast to Feldzug in Polen and Schiff ohne Klassen in this regard. But is this really selective embrace of technology? I think not: Feldzug in Polen praises military technology, Schiff ohne Klassen advertises civilian technology and Blut und Boden denounces all technology. Herf's concept of selective embrace cannot explain this variety, i.e. fails to describe propaganda film on a generalized base.

This same variety presents a problem for *Rohkrämer's* narrative, so that the Nazis were modern due to their general embrace of technology and centralized power structure, as well. In the previous paragraph I have argued that propaganda film did not selectively embrace technology; but neither did it fully embrace technology. We find two, or perhaps three, different types here: Schiff ohne Klassen embraces civilian technology, Feldzug in Polen embraces military technology and Blut und Boden does not embrace any technology. Again this is a problem of generalization. If we simply hold that the Nazis fully embraced technology, movies like Blut und Boden seem inexplicable. Rohkrämer could interpret the diminishing influence of Blut und Boden as NS turning towards full embrace of technology, but that would leaves us with the question: Why? It should be noted that our examples, other than Darré-influenced productions, did represent a full embrace of and enthusiasm for technology, for both military and civilian purposes. Propaganda in the third Reich was strictly controlled by Goebbels, with a few exceptions. While this seems quite natural for state propaganda, there was nevertheless a very high degree of centralization in this genre. The latter point then can be seen as corroboration for Rohkrämer.

The question remains: How can the NSDAP both embrace and reject technology simultaneously? The *pragmatic view*, which describes Blood and Soil as merely instrumental, might hold some answers. Here it is crucial to consider a broader background. Blut und Boden was still closely connected to Weimar era propaganda, meaning the emphasis of this movie lies on agitation. Under the pragmatic view we must also consider how the NSDAP's early economic policies, especially those directed towards agriculture, were received. Subsection 4.3 outlined these, and how unpopular they were. In this light then we can understand Darré's movies past Machtergreifung as a renewed promise towards disillusioned farmers, who contributed to the NSDAP's electoral success and yet experienced no changes to the better after 1933. This way we can argue that the movie Blut und Boden was not concerned with future plans for Germany, but should be understood as a continued election campaign for disillusioned farmers. As for Feldzug in Polen and Schiff ohne Klassen we can say that technology was fully embraced. However an important reason behind the over-exaggeration of war technology in the former must be seen in context of the Wehrmacht's actual striking power and mechanization, which lacked far behind what the movie suggests. However bluffing strength was important as a foreign-political tool

of power, and a domestic reassurance. Almost from the get-go the population feared the War would take long (see SD-reports in subsection 5.5). Creating an image of an unstoppable, mechanized Wehrmacht thus might be an attempt to comfort the population. As for propaganda movies like Jud Süß, which didn't pick up the debate about technology/modernity whatsoever, the pragmatic view can note that these kinds of movies were intended to entertain and, more importantly, prepare the ground for more radical racial policies. Overall then, I believe that the pragmatic view sufficiently accounts for propaganda movies.

5.6 Propaganda minus Goebbels: Educational Movies

In this subsection we will have a look at educational movies, Lehrfilm. Obviously there was only a relationship between the NSDAP and Lehrfilm from 1933 onwards, when the Party has had some influence on the educational system. Thus the story of this subsection begins in that year; connections to the Weimar era will be made whenever necessary.

The key institution for Lehrfilm was the Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung (Short: Reichserziehungsministerium, denote REM. English: Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Culture), lead by Bernhand Rust. Rust was working in the fields of politics and education in Weimar times and joined the NSDAP in 1925. Just like Rust, the REM was an artifact of Weimar times, even though it was founded on 1. May 1934. The REM's tasks were traditionally performed by the Reichsinnenministerium (Reich Ministry of the interior) and then transferred to Goebbels' RfVP in 1933. As apparent from this history, the REM was the result of a restructuring effort, taking over education matters from the RfVP and was based on the Preußisches Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung (Prussian Ministry of Science, Art and Culture). Only in 1935 the ministry was renamed to 1935 Reichs- und Preußisches Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung, indicating its national efforts. 1938 then, the REM assumed its final name, shedding the Prussian part of the label. For our purposes the the most relevant sub-division of the REM is the Reichsstelle für den Unterrichtsfilm (Denote: RfdU. English: Reichbureau for educational movies), which was founded on 26. Juni 1934 by Bernhard Rust. On 6. February 1935 a special division, the Abteilung Hochschule (Division for Academia), was founded, which absorbed the substantial assets of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Filme (German Society for Scientific Movies). Thus the Abteilung Hochschule was not only concerned with movies for higher levels of education, but also for scientific research. The RfdU was renamed in 1940 and was from then on known as Reichsanstalt für Film und Bild in Wissenschaft und Unterricht (Denote: RWU. English: Reich institution for Film and Imagery in Science and Education).[215]

When the RfdU was founded, Berhand Rust declared that '[film should] take the place of books as equal educational material, wherever motion picture may make a more striking impression on the child. [[Der Film] als gle-

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[215]See Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, pp.463-468.

ichberechtigtes Lehrmittel überall dort an die Stelle des Buches usw. treten [soll], wo das bewegte Bild eindringlicher als alles andere zum Kinde spricht.'[216] But who defined what kind of subjects fell into that category? When does a movie make a more striking impression than a book? Rust highlighted that especially the newly introduced subject of Rassen- und Volkskunde (Racial and Folk science) would make good use of educational film. This subject was obviously ideologically laden and was introduced to schools purely for purposes of indoctrination. From here we could assume that Lehrfilm was to merely support ideological motives. Yet in a historical context it seems that Rust merely gave in to long-standing demands. The inclusion of movies in education and a centralized organization of curricula was in fact demanded since the 1920s.[217]

This seems contradictory to two facts. Firstly Rust's ministry was able to produce movies independently of Goebbels: Educational movies did not have to undergo the usual process of pre-censorship and approval by Reichsfilmdramaturgen.[218] Instead educational movies did undergo a certain certification process by the RfdU. Interestingly movies with overt political content often did not receive such certificate, meaning they were not allowed to be shown as educational movies. Such movies included Erbgesundheitslehre (hereditary health lessons), Deutsche Rassenkunde (German racial science), Die Rasse und ihr Einfluss auf Kultur und Heldentum (Race and its impact on culture and heroism) and Vom Zusammenbruch Deutschlands zur nationalen Wiedergeburt 1918-1933 (From Germany's collapse to the national rebirth 1918-1933). Secondly in comparison to the RfVP, the REM was, due to its history, not composed of veteran Party members.[219] From here it seems intuitive to conclude that educational movies were far removed from NS propaganda and thus to expect a lack ideological components in the genre.

Surprisingly in 1934 barely any party-related productions made their way into the RfdU-catalogue.[220] This seemingly stands in conflict with Rust's ideas of how educational movies should be used. However many educational movies did come with ideological and political content. We might then explain this with an attempt Rust's to limit Goebbels' influence in his field. In previous sections I have explained that Goebbels was enthusiastic about modern ideas, such as technology, and, as a self-proclaimed movie connoisseur, was open to novel styles of film-making. At the same time Goebbels wanted clear-cut distinctions between propaganda and entertainment. Rust's move towards a *synthesis* of propaganda and education (instead of entertainment) clearly sets his produc-

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[216]Quoted in Ibid., p.463.

[217]Indeed an argument can be made that this particular sector would have been centralized without any Nazi influence, especially in the face of international counterparts to the REM, e.g. the British Film Institute in Great Britain (Founded 1933) und the Italian L'Unione Cinematogaphica Educativa (Founded 1924). See Ewert, M., *Die Reichsanstalt für Film und Bild im Unterricht (1934-1945)*, p.255-256 and Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.465.

[218]Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.464.

[219]Goebbels often boasted how 'his ministry' consisted of only 'old fighters'. Die Reichsanstalt für Film und Bild, p.121-131.

[220]Mitteilungsblatt 1934, p.9-14, in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.470.

tions apart from the propaganda minister's work.

Before discussing a few educational movies, I believe some general remarks about the German educational system of the 1930s and 1940s are in order. First of all there was an idea of knowledge through experience. Experience here is to be understood as a combination of traditional intellectual learning and practical 'learning-by-doing'. In this sense educational movies fulfilled the role of either advertisement, or of a manual. In the former case we can see movies about rural life, or industrial plants, not only as invitations for students to either try the respective professions, but also as suggestions for field trips. The second role was fulfilled by the ever so popular educational movies about handicrafts.[221] These types of movies encouraged students to try out depicted crafts for themselves, for their style allowed students of all ages to follow depicted processes with ease. Educational movies were often characterized by slow pace, close-ups, absence of logical and optical jumps (which require inferences to understand) and a resulting impression of continuity.[222] Moreover educational movies were often even shorter than Kulturfilme, usually 10-15 minutes. The reason for this is to be found in their application in school: First the movie should be seen, then the teacher would answer questions, followed by a repetition of the movie and a final discussion - all in one lesson of 45 minutes.[223]

Educational movies were silent movies with very scarce commentary. The teacher was supposed to comment on the movie on base of information brochure, which usually came with the movie.[224] Thus I think the teachers had more power than the movies, for they could ascribe sense to the imagery. Note that this focus on verbal means of communication and interpretation is very much in line with Hitler's preference for spoken communication and announcers at party-related screenings. For us historians this means trouble, for the crucial classroom discussions are forever lost to history, thus rendering the recreation of what educational movies meant for German society impossible. Anyways it should be noted that said brochures often promoted National Socialist tendencies.[225] At the same time this process strengthened the teachers' authority over the children, who had to look to them to make sense of the Lehrfilme. That authority was a concrete part of NS-ideology must not be revisited here. Kurt Zierold, president of the RfdU, explained '[...] that these movies were nothing on their own, but everything lies with the educator, who must complement the movies, and not least from a rational side. [[...] daß diese Filme nichts aus sich sind, sondern alles nur in der Hand des Pädagogen, der die Filme ergänzen muß, und zwar nicht zuletzt nach der rationelen Seite.][226]

Lastly educational movies promoted community spirit, or Volksgemeinschaft.

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[221]Examples include: Wir basteln einen Bauernhof (We handicraft a farm), Faltarbeiten aus Papier I-II (Foldingworks of Paper), das Einbinden eines Buches (Binding a Book), see Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.485.

[222]Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.474.

[223]Ibid., p.475

[224]Ibid.

[225]Ibid., p.476

[226]Zierold, K., *Bestimmungen über Film und Bild in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, p.16, quoted in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.472.

The concept originated during World War I and in essence entailed breaking down class conflict to unite the (German) people. The NSDAP would later refurbish the concept to include racial premises. The movies were financed by each and every school kid, with a mandatory 20 cents contribution per quarter and 1 Mark for students in higher education.[227] Moreover educational movies adapted to their target audiences. Children in rural areas got to watch movies of industrial processes and city life, while schools in big cities displayed rural activities and landscape.[228] Thus educational movies attempted to bridge a social gap between the city and the farm by making the respective *other* known.

Even though Goebbels had no influence on Lehrfilm, the genre readily gave itself to propaganda. Rust states that 'the new government [literally: state] has overcome the psychological inhibitors towards technological novelties of the film, and is willing to commission film for its Weltanschauung. This must specifically happen in schools, in fact directly in lessons. [Erst der neue Staat hat die psychologischen Hemmungen gegenüber der technischen Errungenschaft des Films völlig überwunden, und er ist gewillt, auch den Film in den Dienst seiner Weltanschauung zu stellen. Das hat besonders in der Schule, und zwar unmittelbar im Klassenunterricht zu geschehen.'[229] But what exactly was this Weltanschauung?

Just like other movie genres, educational movies featured both folkish and modern imagery. We will start looking at examples of the former. Schwälmer Bäuerin am Spinnrad (Schwälmish peasant woman at the spinning wheel, 1936), Das Herdfeuer im Niedersächsischen Bauernhaus (Fire in the hearth in a lower Saxon farmhouse, 1937) or Hochzeit am Tegernsee (Wedding at the Tegernsee, 1937) all had obvious folkish character, in the form of farm work, rural life and traditional customs.[230] Tradition was one of the most popular themes of folkish oriented educational movies, examples being Der Leonhardiritt in Tölz (1937), Markgröninger Schäferlauf (1937), Schwäbisch-alemannischen Narrentreffen in Oberndorf (1936), Rottweiler Fasnet (1936).[231] Volkstum im Schwarzwald (1936) revolves around a small town in the black forest, as the title suggests. Nothing spectacular is being shown, technology is virtually absent in this movie. However the movie allows for some interesting inferences. Females in Volkstum im Schwarzwald wear nothing but fine traditional garbs, even the girls in school, or women in the kitchen adhere to this. This is obviously a somewhat unrealistic depiction that was more intended to display the clothes themselves than rural life in a realistic manner. Similarly, the uncomfortable sides of rural life, such as hard farm work in the mountains, are absent in the movie. One of the few displays of hard work, a scene of women doing laundry (by hand, of course), is introduced with the commentary 'Waschfest mit Glotterwasser' (washing-fest with Glotter-water; The movie showed the geographical region 'Glotter-valley').

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[227] Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3., p.465.

[228] Ibid., Vol.3, p.464.

[229] Ministerialerlass, 26.6.1934, p.21, quoted in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.463.

[230] Also see Grunsky-Peper, K., *Deutsche Volkskunde im Film.*

[231] See Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.490-491.

That these women perceived this tedious process as a 'fest' is highly questionable.[232] Given this outlook it comes as a surprise that only 1.5 percent of all RWU films for higher education listed in the 1944 catalogue were categorized as folkish.[233]

Mädel im Landjahr is another great example of a folkish Lehrfilm. 'Landjahr' was a form of 'Landhilfe', which we discussed in subsection 4.3. The movie shows a group of girls of different ages working on a farm. Mädel im Landjahr covers all aspects of rural life: Upon the girls' arrival they help with the harvest, stuff cloth-sacks with hay for blankets, do sports, wash themselves, harvest some more, cook, eat together and even indulge in what seems to be some sort of learning. The girls gather around a map, which is set up on a lawn, while a teacher points

Figure 19: Mädel im Landjahr: Order during Shoe-inspection

at it. In the same scene the girls write in small books - I suppose this represented learning some sort of skill, like book-keeping. Then the girls bake and eat some bread. Notably bread had symbolic value for the Nazis, who have been campaigning with the slogan *Arbeit und Brot* (work and bread) in Weimar times. Self-sustenance (in regards to food) swings with the same slogan, as well as the movie: Scenes showing food consumption more than once succeed harvest-related shots, clearly suggesting that the girls on the farm live entirely self-sufficient. The girls harvest, make flour, bake bread and eat together.

Technology is absent in this movie. All work is manual labor, from cooking to crochet and harvest; the produce is hauled with a horse-drawn carriage. Even the bread-baking scene barely shows the archaic oven, which can barely be counted as 'technology' and certainly not as 'modern'. The only other piece of technology shown is a wooden spinning wheel that the girls make clothes with - again this does not qualify as modern by any means. Finally the girls gather around a fire, a reference to Nazi cult.

The movie focuses on folkish-traditional activities for women, e.g. crochet, washing and cooking. In this sense then *Mädel im Landjahr* advocates traditional gender roles, at least for females, in a typical folkish-rural setting. Moreover the girls often line up in military fashion, e.g. upon arrival or during sports. One striking scene is some sort of shoe-inspection, which clearly reminds of military practices. Furthermore *Mädel im Landjahr* clearly emphasizes nature and simplicity. A surprising amount of activities are shown in an open-air setting, including learning and crochet. Compared to Volkstum im Schwarzwald, *Mädel im Landjahr* features less traditional garbs, even though the girls in the latter movie always wear some sort of uniform. Naturally the idea of a Volksgemein-

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[232] See Ibid., p.492
[233] Ibid., p.489

schaft finds its way into the movie, since none of the girls ever does anything alone. The girls work as a team, as a Volksgemeinschaft. In the washing scene one girl's naked back is shown, a surprising amount of nudity one might think. However this connects to biological metaphors in NS-rhetoric, as well as the aesthetic of the healthy human body, an image famously found in Leni Riefenstahl's *Olympia.*[234] Overall *Mädel im Landjahr* clearly romanticizes prominent NS values as well as rural life and thus seems to promote Blut und Boden ideology.[235]

Figure 20: Mädel im Landjahr: Outdoors Education

In the following paragraph I would like to explore how *Mädel im Landjahr* relates to our findings of subsection 4.3. There are two main points of importance here, which have to do with a distinction between the girls' tasks in the movie. Those can be broadly categorized into work in the field, such as helping with the harvest, and work at home, like baking bread and fabricating clothes. Field work directly relates to what the Landjahr and Landhilfe was supposed to be, namely an attempt to provide cheap labor to increase productivity and efficiency in agriculture. The fact that the movie romanticizes these tasks fits in well into overall attempts to combat land-flight by advertising the beauty of farm work. This was especially important, since youths generally disliked the Landjahr. Household chores shown in *Mädel im Landjahr* clearly advocate the folkish idea of the housewife. This (from a folkish perspective) ideal role for the woman ties in with the NSDAP's attempts to whitewash unemployment rates: Recall that housewives were not unemployed. So here we find two very practical issues, land flight and unemployment. In light of this *Mädel im Landjahr* seems more like an advertisement for unpopular policies, rather than a way to convince kids of Blut und Boden. However *Mädel im Landjahr* did portray rural life as rather backwards, perhaps more than it actually was. This way the movie did not deliver the objectivity it, as an educational movie, promised.

In conclusion *Mädel im Landjahr* is a Blut und Boden classic, for it features virtually every folkish point the Nazis ever made. However there were two pragmatic sides to the movie, firstly the struggle to advertise and justify unpopular policies, here the Landjahr, and secondly the omnipresent concern with unemployment. Those issues, I argue, must be seen as the root of the romantic Blut und Boden ideology seen in *Mädel im Landjahr.*

The largest category in the aforementioned 1944 RWU-catalogue was medicine. Now that does not necessarily mean that such movies were entirely scientific and decoupled from Nazi ideology, which understood itself to be biological/natural. Educational movies could make racial points and thus bring racial ideology to

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[234]The Nazis often spoke of the Volks*körper* (Folk-body) which could be cleansed of or treated against foreign influence.

[235]See Appendix J. for more images.

biology lessons in schools.[236] This is especially noticeable in the Abteilung Hochschule, which *increased* its productiveness throughout the years. On the eve of war, the Abteilung listed 157 own productions. Given its foundation was in 1936, this brings it to an average of roughly 40 films per year. At the end of the war, the Abteilung Hochschule had produced 508 films (keep in mind these include research movies) in total, more than doubling its output. More specifically, the 1940 catalogue of the Abteilung Hochschule lists 404 movies, 132 of which were categorized as medicinal, 90 fell under Technology and 89 under zoology.[237] I have mentioned that zoological movies can make a racial-political point in the section about Kulturfilm and will not rephrase this here.[238] From the medical movies, gynecology and obstetrics each accounted for 15 movies, while surgery lead the list with 24. The former two relate to the Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses (Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring) and other racial-political Nazi points in rather obvious ways and can thus be seen as an attempt to raise birthrates.

Not all RfdU productions were folkish in character. Some explicitly discussed technology and industry, e.g. Das Steinkohlenbergwerk (The black coal mine, 1935), Abbau von Steinkohle (Mining black coal, 1935), Erzbergwerk (Ore mine, 1936), Vom Erz zur Schiene (From ore to rail, 1936), Kokerei (Coke oven plant, 1938) and the 1936 miniseries Hochofen (Blast furnace) I-III, Stahlwerk (Steel works) I-III and Walzwerk (Roller mill) I-II.[239] In these movies the machine often takes the spotlight. In *Vom Erz zur Schiene*, for instance, the few workers depicted seem to blend into the background. It follows that the workers' contribution to the production effort seems unimpressive: The

Figure 21: Vom Erz zur Schiene: Dark, un-emotional setting

production process is depicted as almost automatic. The movie starts with casting of steel blocks. A few men stand aside and watch the machinery; we see workers shovelling what seems to be coal for but a few seconds. The machine then automatically picks up hot steel and lifts it to the mill, where it is flattened out. It is unclear if this process is entirely automated - if someone controls the process, they are not shown. The movie is scarce on commentary and only names the respective processes, like 'casting' or 'milling', without elaborating on them at all. This leaves ample room for classroom discussion, which was possibly informed by a brochure unavailable to me.

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[236] Schmidt, U., *Medical Films, Ethics and Euthanasia in Nazi Germany*, p.147, in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.464-465.

[237] See Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.478.

[238] For zoological Lehrfilme, see e.g. Kohlweissling (1935) and Entwicklung des Kohlweisslings (1939).

[239] Compare Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.482

In classic Lehrfilm-style *Vom Erz zur Schiene* comes silent in black and white and is mostly composed of machine close-ups. Thus the movie itself is rather unspectacular. Opposed to movies like Deutsche Panzer fact that manual labor takes the backseat does not necessarily make a concrete point about the relationship between technology and mankind. After all the viewer is supposed to learn about the workings of the machine here. However contrasting the movie to some Kulturfilme discussed earlier does allow for some further insights. Deutsche Panzer and *Vom Erz zur Schiene* both focus on technology in the form of production machinery, while minimizing human screen time (especially *Vom Erz zur Schiene*). However compared to Deutsche Panzer, *Vom Erz zur Schiene* looks less uplifting. This is partially due to the lack of music, but the scenes are also less well-lit. Deutsche Panzer features some close-ups of workers, the men listening to a radio-address or sporting youths, *Vom Erz zur Schiene* does not.

Lacking any such anchor of happiness, *Vom Erz zur Schiene* paints a stale, dismal and lifeless image of steel production. This last aspect was perhaps unintended, after all technology-laden Lehrfilm was intended mostly for rural population, and was meant to raise some interest in, or understanding of certain aspects of city life - here industrial production.[240] Furthermore that aspect can be explained by appeal to objectivity. *Vom Erz zur Schiene*, and indeed educational movies in general, attempted to 'objectively' show industrial processes, thus we find a focus on machines and dark atmosphere: This was simply how the plant looked like, or so the argument goes.[241]

Figure 22: Vom Erz zur Schiene: Automatic Processes

Kokerei is another great example of technology in Lehrfilm. In the beginning we see an aerial view of a large coking plant. A rail car pulls up next to the plant and picks up hot coke, which spills forth out of the oven, and transports it to the next facility. This is followed by the main part of the movie, which shows a different rail car picking up coal and dumping it into the oven. But this time the inner workings of the plant are explained. We see a fairly well made animation-overlay, that is to allow for a cross section view of the plant. This was commonplace in the Lehrfilm genre, however the lack of description in the form of text of sound might add to the confusion of the viewer instead of enlightening them.

The movie ends how it started: A rail car picks up the hot coke from the oven and carries it away. *Kokerei* is even more extreme in its human-technology imagery than Vom Erz zur Schiene, for it features three (!) workers, two of which merely seal the steaming holes of the oven after the car threw coal in, and one

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[240]Compare Reichwein, A., *Der Film in der Landschule*, p.70-80, in Geschichte des dokumentarischen Films, Vol.3, p.464.

[241]See Appendix K. for more images.

being the conductor of the rail car. Even though those are crucial roles in the coke production process, the distribution of screen time suggests otherwise. One of the main differences between *Kokerei* and Vom Erz zur Schiene is that the former chooses to depict the plant at large, while the latter focuses on specific machines and processes inside the plant. The desolate atmosphere however is the same in both movies. In *Kokerei* this comes, as in Vom Erz zur Schiene, from the absence of the worker and therefore any emotion. In comparison *Kokerei* is well-lit, but features many shots of smoke-spewing chimneys. The red-hot coke is transported by seemingly automatic rail cars, which suggests that the material transported is alien, perhaps even hostile, to humans. Only steel can thrive in such circumstances, which suggests that machines are more powerful than those who created (or operate, or watch) them.[242]

Figure 23: Kokerei: Rising Smoke

In the case of Lehrfilm we should think of the Folkish and the Modern-Technological not as absolutes, but in terms of a scale. Not all Lehrfilme confined themselves to either extreme, but rather sought a place somewhere in between. The movies In der Windmühle (In the Windmill, 1934), Kohlenschleppzug auf dem Mittelrhein (Coal tug and tow on the middle Rhine, 1936) or Handweberei I+II (Hand-weaving mill, 1936) fit this category.

In der Windmühle shows a man and a boy (presumably father and son) mounting a horse-drawn carriage. They load it with sacks (presumably grain) and drive it through an idyllic rural scenery, where the windmill is located. Upon arrival the movie depicts the various working mechanisms of the windmill, which constitute the main part of this Lehrfilm. Naturally a windmill was not automated, so a windmill worker (perhaps the owner) is frequently seen turning cranks, maintaining the windmill, or carrying bags of raw material and produce. In the end father and son pay the windmill worker and drive their carriage back home. Is a windmill technology? Yes and no. In the movie at hand the windmill clearly stands out of its surroundings in three ways. Firstly there is a social aspect, father and son depend on the windmill to produce flour and so they have to engage in trade with the windmill owner/worker. Secondly the windmill is breaks up the otherwise untouched landscape. Thirdly the windmill seems to be the only one piece of machinery seen in the movie, perhaps even the lives of the actors, who use horse-drawn carriages for transport. Thus the way In der Windmühle depicts the windmill, as a technology, is clearly distinct from explicitly folkish movies, like Mädel im Landjahr. However, as mentioned before, the process shown here requires a large amount of manual labor, which demarcates In der Windmühle from industrially oriented movies discussed above. Finally a windmill is, after

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[242]See Appendix L. for more images.

all, not the most modern piece of technology.[243]

Figure 24: In der Windmühle: Romantic depiction, a classic folkish element

In respect to the depiction of idyllic rural life In der Windmühle is even more drastic than Mädel im Landjahr. This is due to panorama shots of the landscape surrounding the windmill, which highlight the beauty of nature. In a way In der Windmühle connects to the gender roles - stay-at-home woman and working man - by simply not depicting the former, thus passively reinforcing these roles. More concretely, by focusing on the work-bound father and son, the movie seems to raise a similar point as the Erbhofgesetz, which has been discussed in subsection 4.3. The son learns his father's craft in an idyllic setting, and will presumably take over at some point. Very folksy. The conclusion about the *necessity* of peasants in face of land-flight and the broader economic context has already been established in the paragraphs about Mädel im Landjahr. Said conclusion also holds for In der Windmühle and shall not be re-iterated here, since the line of argument would be an excact replica. In short, land-flight might have been a practical concern behind In der Windmühle.

Kohlenschleppzug auf dem Mittelrhein depicts, as the name suggests, coal transportation on the Rhine. The shots in this movie are rather confused, which makes the story hard to reconstruct without the help of an information brochure. This comes from the fact that the movie often switches perspective, from on-board views of the ships involved, to panorama-like shots from above (the river flows through a valley, so those shots are taken from the adjacent mountain top). The problem with the latter is that the Rhine has always been an important waterway and thus there are many ships seen in such shots - which one is the coal transport? As for the on-board shots nothing spectacular happens. We see the crew hoisting the anchor, the captain behind the steering wheel, or a worker shovelling coal for some reason. The most interesting part here is a shot of laundry on a line to dry, a part of sailor life one would not expect to see in a movie. This also shows the movie's attempt to objectively capture life on the ship with documentary-style precision. The panorama shots suggest imagery that occurred in some of the city movies, i.e. a blend of technology, or modernity, and nature. The ships peacefully drifting through nature also suggests some relationship in regards to scale: Ships are small and Nature is big; the boats, here two in tug-and-tow-fashion, make up a larger transport unit, while at the same time they are part of the one scenery that is nature. Overall Lehrfilm in between the extremes, here represented by Kohlenschleppzug and Windmühle, depicted technology rather archaic and intertwined with nature and manual labor. Thus this category perpetuated the Nazi-made myth of a

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[243]See Appendix M. for more images.

German Volksgemeinschaft, in the sense of harmonious co-existence of folkish values and modern values, most effectively.[244]

This brings us to the conclusion of this section. A recap of the institutional side of Lehrfilm revealed a reorganization effort shortly after the Machtergreifung. At the end of this process the RfdU emerged as a department of the REM under Bernhard Rust. This is the reason Lehrfilm was independent of Goebbels; however Lehrfilm, as a governmental institution, still seemingly contributed to Nazi propaganda and indoctrination. There was a large variety of topics in Lehrfilm, partially due to the RfdU-division Abteilung Hochschule, which produced movies for 'research purposes' and for institutions of higher education.

Figure 25: Kohlenschleppzug: Confusing Panorama blends ships into their surroundings

Generally speaking the RfdU showed enthusiasm for technology, i.e. movies, for this novel technology was coupled with the regime's 'new ideas': Rust associated Lehrfilm with topics like racial science and the genre was complementary to some of the more controversial Nazi laws, e.g. the infamous Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses. More specifically there was no unified picture of modernity in Lehrfilm. Folkish Lehrfilm was essentially void of technology and depicted rural tradition in an exorbitant, unrealistic manner, which clearly delimits if from the heroic, yet more realistic, style of folkish Kulturfilm. Technological Lehrfilm on the other hand often showed industrial processes in an automated fashion. The imagery here is far from heroic and often creates a gloomy atmosphere. Given the target audiences for these categories, industrial movies for rural population and folkish movies for town-folk, we should conclude that the intention was not to depict one or the other in a bad light. Instead, I think, the idea of Volksgemeinschaft was central here. This translates to fostering understanding and fascination for both lifestyles. Lehrfilm in between the extremes most successfully underlined the Nazi ideas of a Volksgemeinschaft and the harmony of man/technology and nature, that of rural and city population and that of the Old and the New. Furthermore Lehrfilm cemented a culture of authority and of the dominance of the spoken word with the duality of silent movies and class discussion lead by the teachers. Learning by experience seems to have been central for Lehrfilm, which encouraged field trips and imitation of shown processes, the former further fostering the Volksgemeinschaft.

This brings us to our historiographical debate. The *traditional view*, which depicted the Nazis as anti-modern, seems to be the big winner in this subsection. Many of our findings directly relate to NS-ideology: The romantic folkish content of movies like Mädel im Landjahr, classroom discussions based on authority

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[244]See Appendix N. for more images.

and Rust's explicit claims to use educational movies for National Socialism. But then we must take Rust's quotes at face value, and this is highly problematic here. Even though Rust wanted to use educational movies for 'propaganda', we must not understand that to be synonymous to Blut und Boden. Movies like In der Windmühle and Vom Erz zur Schiene depicted factories as rather gloomy, not because the intention was to denounce them, but to show the working process unaltered, objective if you will, to the rural population. The idea was to show such movies in rural areas: The propaganda component was the creation of a Volksgemeinschaft, not praising rural life as such. In the case of Mädel im Landjahr I have argued that the movie did bear artistic resemblance to romantic Blut und Boden, but seemed to be based on practical socio-economic issues. As the catalogues showed, not many educational movies promoted racial- and Blood-and-soil-ideology. Still, educational movies had clear propaganda-intent. However I have argued the most important aspect of this propaganda was Volksgemeinschaft, to be understood as a bridge between urban and rural culture. So: Propaganda, yes. Blood and Soil, no. Thus this subsection seems to support the traditional view on the surface - on a closer look it actually does the opposite.

What about *Herf's* view, so reactionary modern tradition and selective embrace of technology? Rust's push for movies in schools was gladly accepted by educational experts who have demanded a better organization and technological innovation in schools for a decade. This clearly represents some sort of continuity in educational matters. I believe Herf captures this development accurately: The NSDAP picked up existing sentiments and assimilated them in their movement. But do movies in schools really reflect some sort of reactionary modern spirit? Perhaps. Taken at face value Rust's intentions translate into 'technology for indoctrination'. Yet I have described educational movies to foster Volksgemeinschaft, not Blood and Soil, so we should be reserved about the implementation of Rust's plans. Now I think this subsection has shown that Herf's 'selective embrace of technology' was not the case. Generally speaking movies, as a technology, were accepted in the classroom, even welcomed. This means that in this regard no selection took place. The reception of the movies heavily depended on classroom discussion and I have concluded that their purpose was to create a Volksgemeinschaft. Thus both city life and rural tradition was to be embraced simultaneously. I could not find a selective process behind this. In Herf's defense we could argue that folkish educational movies omitted agricultural technologies, like tractors or fertilizers, while other educational movies embraced industrial production. This seems to be selective embrace of technology. But I think this argument does not hold up, for it seems that omitting agricultural technologies from movies stands in contrast to what I have found in subsection 4.3, i.e. that fertilizers were used extensively in order to up production. So we must ask why movie content and reality diverged in this aspect? In a sense then Herf can only accurately describe the former, not the latter - but not why there was a divergence.

Now for the *modern view.* Did the Nazis fully embrace technology, as Rohkrämer holds? The fact that educational movies were used at all seems

to confirm this. But was technology fully embraced in educational movies? In a sense yes. Movies like Kokerei and Vom Erz zur Schiene explicitly treat technology. Kohlenschleppzug auf dem Mittelrhein depicts the ship as peacefully sailing through nature. While technology is absent in Mädel im Landjahr, it is certainly not frowned upon. Yet the problem is that Lehrfilme say relatively little about the NS-view of technology on their own. I have attributed the gloomy outlook of some technical movies to their intended objectivity and described folkish Lehrfilm, like Mädel im Landjahr, as mere advertisement. We can note that industry was embraced in the sense that these movies were intended to foster the Volksgemeinschaft, i.e. to promote city-oriented lifestyle in rural areas. So if we understand folkish Lehrfilm as advertisement for socio-economic policies and take city-oriented Lehrfilm as promoting technology, we do get the image that the Nazis fully embraced technology. Now it seems contradictory to promote industry one the one hand and combating land flight on the other. Yet it is not. Assuming the underlying goal was to combat land flight, it makes sense to depict the atmosphere in industry gloomy and especially void of workers. This seems to suggest that working in industry is not only depressing, but also that there aren't actually that many jobs there. An effective statement, sine the main reason for land flight was farmers looking for employment in towns. What can be said with certainty is that Lehrfilm was fairly un-enthusiastic about technology. Still this argument can only be made certain by recovering the classroom discussions. Thus this subsection does suggest that Rohkrämer was right, but does not provide any hard evidence for this. Finally educational movies were centrally organized by the RfdU. This seems to confirm Rohkrämer's point, but taken in the larger context of 'movies in general', we found that educational movies stood out: They were controlled by Rust, not Goebbels. Thus Rohkrämer's 'centralization' needs some re-definition. If investigated on their own, as we have, educational movies must be seen as a centralized effort. In comparison to other genres Lehrfilm is an outlier. This, again, neither provides evidence for Rohkrämer, nor does it refute him.

Lastly we should discuss the *pragmatic view*. Here must ask not what educational movies portrayed, but *why* they did so. I have argued that the economic situation outlined in 4.3 provides an answer to this question. Some policies the NSDAP implemented as early as 1933 were unpopular - those were the same policies that Lehrfilm then related to, and usually sought to justify or glorify. The fight against land-flight and unemployment comes to mind. Mädel im Landjahr was the most obvious example for how Lehrfilm related to politics, simply because the movie covers almost all mentioned policies. Thus Mädel im Landjahr, with all its romantic folkish ideals, becomes mere advertisement under the pragmatic view. The remainder of educational movies should be seen in the same light, the argument for which I have given in the previous paragraph. But it was not only socio-economic considerations that motivated Lehrfilm. The concept of Volksgemeinschaft was important too. This did not mean oppression of urban or rural lifestyle, but rather an embrace of both sides, a form of communication. Some Lehrfilm, that between the extremes of the scale, exemplified this most clearly. As such Lehrfilm can be seen as ideologically motivated, but

certainly not by Blood and Soil.

5.7   Summary: A Puzzle(d) Interpretation

In this section we analyzed a few puzzle pieces and investigated whether they refute or corroborate existing views of the overall puzzle. In the following I will very briefly summarize the most important points of each subsection. A more detailed discussion of the findings, and how they relate to the historiographical debate follows in the conclusion of this thesis.

Subsection 5.1 provided us with the knowledge necessary to divide the heap of pieces into smaller stacks, five to be precise. I have recommended, and used, (perceived) objectivity and who produced the movies as criteria to define genres, leading to the following categories: Spielfilm and propaganda movies (not objective), Kulturfilm (somewhat objective) and Lehrfilm (highly objective). I treated the Wochenschau as a special case, for it was supposed to cater both ends of the spectrum. Furthermore I highlighted the importance of the difference between intentional reception of a movie and it's actual reception, the former depending on the producer, the latter in the viewer.

In the previous section we have already assembled a one-piece-wide frame for our puzzle. Section 5.3 has added another row of pieces to that frame in the form of a general outline of the relationship between the NSDAP and movies. Most notably I have argued that the NSDAP had a long-standing tradition in regards to the use of movies. The Machtergreifung amplified the quantity and quality of NS movies, but did not influence the basic set of values - some of which could be commonly found in the movie industry of the Weimar Republic. Over time the NSDAP quickly solidified, organized and centralized its movie effort. I have concluded that Rohrkrämer's narrative and the pragmatic view account for these developments well, noting that the NSDAP made use of movies in an unrestricted and mostly centralized manner.

I have categorized Kulturfilm as 'partially objective' in subsection 5.2, and the examples of subsection 5.3 illustrated this. The ambiguity of Kulturfilm meant that it could readily convey a political message - even if not intentionally political. This does not mean that no Kulturfilm had political intention. Even so, movies like Das Erbe pushed the boundaries of established topics of interest, here Darwinism, to new Nazi-inspired levels. As a genre Kulturfilm often depicted technology and modernity, and mostly in a positive light. Kulturfilm came under the control of the NSDAP relatively late and state-control was relatively minor. I have concluded that none of the original three narratives could account for such developments. Ultimately I argued that the pragmatic view prevailed.

As far as centralization and control go the Wochenschau, the main actor of subsection 5.4, was the exact opposite of Kulturfilm. Once the NSDAP had assumed control over the previously independent quadruple of Wochenschauen, they made changes at a rapid pace. Important changes included the consolidation to the Deutsche Wochenschau that came with a switch from international and civilian to national and military topics. Towards the middle of the War,

when the German offensive started slowing down and German cities lay in ruins, the Wochenschau increasingly adhered to Hitler's strategy of 'illusion and distraction'. People started noticing discrepancies between reality and Wochenschau and became increasingly unwary of the situation and lost trust in the government. In contrast to that the concept of Vergeltung was well received and often was discussed in combination with new technologies and Wunderwaffen. I have concluded that these technologies constituted a life-line for the relationship between the NSDAP and the public. Finally I attributed the pragmatic view with the correct image of the Wochenschau.

In subsection 5.5 we had a look at some propaganda movies. One might expect to find pure ideological mumbo-jumbo in this category, but most of the movies discussed here promoted technology, both for military and civilian purposes. I have explained the absence of Blut und Boden ideology with a change in political context: Blut und Boden inherently created social tension - something the NSDAP claimed they had abolished in 1933. In general the movies discussed here held a positive image of technology for political purposes, both foreign and domestic. In my conclusion I stressed that the pragmatic view can account for this genre adequately.

Lehrfilm, the subject of subsection 5.6, was controlled by Rust, who was keen on the use of movies for educational purposes. Educational movies that were often void of any meaning, which was supposed to be superimposed during classroom discussions. As for the content of Lehrfilm we find a mixture of ideological components in some movies, while others draw a seemingly trist image of technology. I have mentioned that all this would corroborate the traditional view, if it weren't for the findings of subsection 4.3., which show that educational movies were really supposed to justify, or advertise, unpopular policies. I have thus argued that the pragmatic view prevails in explaining these findings.

6 The Mobile Cinema as a Case Study

I like to think of this section as a contrast to what I have done in the rather abstract former part of the document. Instead of contextualizing, analyzing and interpreting movies, I will now address how the Nazis made *use* of movies, at hand of a case study of the mobile cinema. Initially the organization Kraft durch Freude (KdF) organized movie trucks. Thus the first subsection is to provide some background on the KdF, with special attention to what this organization thought of technology. Afterwards we will turn to the mobile cinemas themselves. Since sources on this are rather scarce, the second subsection will make use of a variety of primary sources and a few secondary sources to address the following questions: When did the NSDAP first use mobile cinemas? How many movie trucks existed? What movies were shown? And how the the outbreak of World War II influence the mobile cinema? The inferential nature of this subsection is one problem, but there is a second one as well: A majority of the primary sources are newspapers, some of which were official NSDAP mouth pieces. We must take heed.

Before we delve into the subject I would like to note that the NSDAP effectively raised mobile cinemas from the dead. Movie trucks were popular around the turn of the century, but became obsolete once stationary cinemas sprung up everywhere and World War I limited international mobility in Europe. Originally mobile cinemas were private enterprises that frequented fairs, carnivals or other festivals all over Europe. Without going into much detail, festival-culture can be connected to the (catholic) church, due to their occurrence on holidays.[245] Notably mobile cinemas were more popular in industrially developed areas, which were open-minded in regards to cultural and technological novelties. Rural areas were unpopular with mobile cinema operators, due to prevalent conservative attitudes and weak infrastructure.[246] With this historical background in mind, it is advisable to point out that 'mobile cinema' (in our case) does not refer to actual 'cinemas on wheels', but rather a vehicle carrying movie equipment, which is to be detailed later on. The equipment was brought from place to place and set up for local movie screenings. There have been a few exceptional cases during World War II, in which the trucks had to surrender to harsh environmental circumstances (mountainous terrain, winter, etc.). The men then transported the movie equipment via train or horse.[247]

6.1 Kraft durch Freude: Strength through technology?

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[245]Pinter, J., *Kinogeschichte des Burgenlandes*, p.39.

[246]Kieninger, E., *Das 'Klassische Wanderkino' 1896-1914*, p.248f, quoted in Kinogeschichte des Burgenlandes, p.40. Also see U. Jung, M. Loiperdinger, *Geschichte des Dokumentarischen Films in Deutschland, Vol.1*, pp.101-119.

[247]Sorge, E., *Einsatz des RWU-Films "Deutsche Grönlandexpedition Alfred Wegener" bei den Soldaten im Osten*, in Film und Bild, Nr.1, 15.1.1941, BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.7-8 and Mirnigg, R., *Tonfilmwagen mit 1 PS*, in Die Innere Front, Nr.69, 22.3.1942 in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.6

The question of who organized mobile cinemas of the Reich is not an easy one to answer. However the German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront, DAF) and specifically its sub-organization Strength through Joy (Kraft durch Freude, KdF) took on the lion's share of the work. Unfortunately historians often discuss the KdF's touristic traits. I will only mention these in passing, while focusing on slightly overlooked KdF activities, i.e. the localized ones. This is to establish a base of comparison between other KdF activities and the mobile cinema, for lack of direct sources about the mobile cinema. The second goal here is to find out what the DAF/KdF's

Figure 26: Movie truck stuck in the snow. Eastern Front, roughly 1941-1942. Source: BArch NS 5/VI 19250

view on technology and modernity was, and what possible intentions behind employing mobile cinemas were.

The KdF consisted of various departments, the most important of which were: Amt Feierabend (Office for After-Work Activity), Amt für Reisen, Wandern und Urlaub (Office for Travelling, Hiking and Vacation), Amt 'Schönheit der Arbeit' (Office 'Beauty of Labour'), Sportamt (Office for sports) and the Deutsches Volksbildungswerk (Office for Popular Education). Traditionally historians concerned with the KdF place much emphasis on Amt Reisen, Wander und Urlaub, and rightfully so.[248] Until the outbreak of war this office was the KdF flagship in many regards, including turnover (KdF events were not free, but relatively cheap!), popularity and propaganda function.[249] Foreign trips, especially cruises, were often picked up by KdF propaganda.[250] Historians frequently point out that participants of spectacular cruises were not, as the KdF claimed, mostly workers.[251] Yet it seems that the propaganda was effective; for a worker of the mid 1930s the mere idea of the KdF enabling activities previously exclusive to the (upper) middle class sufficed. Interviews conducted on the subject matter confirm this. Most interviewees had a working-class background and did not participate in cruises or trips abroad, but still remembered the vivid advertisement for such, as well as the prospect of one day being selected for either.[252] The interviewees did reference other DAF/KdF activities 'closer to home', like improvements at the workplace, or sports, only in passing.

I claim that by focusing on the Spectacular, in this case mostly cruises,

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[248] See Baranowski, S., *Radical Nationalism in an International Context* or Semmens, K., *'Travel in Merry Germany': Tourism in the Third Reich.*

[249] Reisen, Wandern und Urlaub accounted for roughly 80 percent of the total KdF revenue before the War. In 1940 this figure dropped to 3 percent, with Amt Feierabend accounting for over 80 percent of KdF revenue.

[250] See the movie *Schiff ohne Klassen.*

[251] In 1938 the official number of cruise participants was 120.000, which dwarfed compared to the 7 million partaking in short-distance trips, see NSG KdF, p.286-287. Compare Howing, S., *Die Illusion eines guten Lebens*, p.115

[252] Illusion eines guten Lebens, p.33-35.

we leave out an important part of the KdF's work. This partially has to do with politics: After the outbreak of war the Amt Reisen, Wandern und Urlaub collapsed for obvious reasons. Another reason is of psychological nature and has to do with dazzling events being more memorable than 'the usual'. A more complete picture thus demands attention to less spectacular events and technologies, here represented in the form of movies and mobile cinemas. This ties in with Edgerton's point to which I have subscribed in subsection 4.1.

The KdF was founded in November 1933 and existed until 1945. It was part of the DAF, which replaced unions shortly after the Machtergreifung and was thus supposed to be an organization for the worker, i.e. the industrial worker. Given this framework the KdF was supposed to provide a balance between work and recreational activities. Naturally there was a set of concrete political ideas behind this. Firstly the NSDAP recognized the importance of the working class and was afraid of unrest in the wake of the union-dissolution. Secondly the KdF supposedly made 'bourgeois activities', like travelling, available to the proletariat, thus raising the social status of the latter. This not only helped purport the idea of a classless *Volksgemeinschaft*, but was expected to raise morale at the workplace and therefore increase productivity.[253]

Robert Ley, DAF-leader (therefore also in control of the KdF), summarized the new organization's tasks as '1. Realization of the Volksgemeinschaft, 2. Physical training of the working man, 3. Getting to know the fatherland via trips on vacation and weekends [1. Verwirklichung der Volksgemeinschaft, 2. Die körperliche Ertüchtigung des arbeitenden Menschen 3. Das Kennenlernen des Vaterlandes durch Ferien- und Wochenendfahrten].[254] In this case (1) revolves around the conflict of capital and labour in industry. The National *Socialists* opposed capitalism, but also distinguished themselves from Marxism by adding a racial-national spin to their Weltanschauung. The resulting phantasm of Volksgemeinschaft was supposed to be a classless society, which the KdF was to create by enabling bourgeois entertainment for workers. Robert Ley explains: '[...] unfulfilled desire breeds envy. But if a person is allowed to share in the goods of life, they won't be filled with hate and envy, but with happiness and gratitude.[[...] unerfüllte Sehnsucht erzeugt Neid. Wenn der Mensch aber selber an den Gütern des Lebens teilhaben darf, wird er nicht mehr von Haß und Neid erfüllt sein, sondern von Glück und Dankbarkeit.]'[255] Whether or not (or to what degree) the KdF was successful in creating a Volksgemeinschaft is a rather complicated question and escapes the scope of this thesis. However it should be noted that the KdF obviously did little to resolve the original economic reasons for the existence of class conflict.[256]

Now I would like to further elaborate on the concept of Volksgemeinschaft. For that purpose I will consider two examples of different KdF enterprises, in-plant and touristic. The former sought to overcome class differences by equating

[253]Buchholz, W., *Die Nationalsozialistische Gemeinschaft "Kraft durch Freude"* (denote NSG KdF), p.3-4

[254]Arbeitertum, Folge 19, 1.12.1933, p.4 in NSG KdF, p.8.

[255]NSG KdF, p.11.

[256]Also see Ibid., p.29-32.

everyone in the plant. Workers and managers alike would take part in a communal event, e.g. a soccer match. The intent was to break down the hierarchy that existed during work hours.[257] While this does not *actually* remove friction between the worker and capital, it allows for a shift in perception: Workers see themselves closer to their superiors.[258] Touristic activities had the same baseline. Foreign travel was not just a memorable experience, but visiting countries with a lower standard of living and/or alien cultures could create feelings of happiness about the wealth at home, or supremacy over different cultures.[259] Short-distance trips often featured private lodging, which encouraged Germans from different regions to get the know each other.[260]

Given this politically laden agenda many KdF activities seem like ideological lightweights. From aforementioned KdF departments, only the Deutsches Volksbildungswerk was charged with direct political indoctrination.[261] For this purpose a large spectrum of activities was made available. From Kulturfilm-screenings to trips to museums or artist's workshops, all sorts of cultural education was available; even courses on racial issues were given. However not everything the Volksbildungswerk did was ideological indoctrination. The office also provided courses on foreign languages, including Italian, Russian, English, Polish, Spanish, French, and other skills - courses on the use of typewriters, math and spelling.[262] Thus I would advise not to over-interpret the ideological role of the Volksbildungswerk. The focus clearly was on *Bildung* and not so much on *Volk*. Moreover this department accounted for only 0.3 percent of KdF's total revenue in 1936, to increase to 2.0 percent in 1939 - still far from substantial.[263] That being said our concern should be to determine *which* movies the Volks-bildungswerk screened; unfortunately I have not been able to acquire sources on this. In general the Volksbildungswerk revolved around learning useful skills and cultural education, while courses on 'racial issues' represented the minority. I believe we can infer that the Volksbildungswerk was open towards a broad range of Kulturfilm and Lehrfilm, not just the ones that addressed racial issues.

The second office of interest is Amt Feierabend, which focused on entertainment after work. Amt Feierabend embraced theater, opera, concerts, Varieté, 'bunte Abende' (evenings of music and entertainment) and *film*. Overall 'film' represented a small amount of the total amount of events and participants of Amt Feierabend activities. In 1938, for instance, there were 3.586 film events with 857.402 participants - compared to 19.523 theatre events with 7.478.633 participants.[264] Amt Feierabend had a concrete agenda for rural areas, which made the following points (among others): Rural recreational activities mean fighting land-flight, they should not be akin to the entertainment of 'townies'

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[257] Illusion eines guten Lebens, p.76.
[258] Illusion eines guten Lebens, p.7 and Tenfelde, K. (ed.), *Arbeiter im 20. Jahrhundert*, p. 350-351.
[259] 'Travel in Merry Germany', p.133-136.
[260] Tourism and Cultural Change, p.133.
[261] NSG KdF, p.4.
[262] NSG KdF p.239-243 and Illusion eines guten Lebens p.122.
[263] NSG KdF, p.230.
[264] NSG KdF p.273.

and instead help to 'sustain volkish life'.[265] This division seems to have been justified, but apparently the implementation was unsuccessful at times. The propaganda ministry frequently discussed the impact of party-related events. Occasionally we find Goebbels discuss complaints about event quality: Rural folk critized the 'vulgar nature' of the announcers' jokes or that dancers wore too little clothing.[266] In light of that I would argue that rural population was, generally speaking, slightly more conservative in regards to entertainment, compared to their town-dwelling counterparts, but not entirely opposed to these forms of entertainment.

Finally I would like to devote a few lines to an organizational issue the KdF faced. The problem, as so often with NS-organizations, stems from personal power struggle. The KdF took on a large amount of what could be classified as 'cultural' in nature: Theatre, Museum, Art exhibitions, etc., making the KdF the DAF's culture department. This created a dispute between Rosenberg, who oversaw cultural matters with his bureau Amt Rosenberg, and Ley. In short Rosenberg sought to control everything Cultural, while Ley claimed that the KdF equated culture to propaganda and thus should be related to the Propaganda Ministry under Goebbels. Further Rosenberg, a main proponent of the NSDAP's right wing and blood and soil ideology, disagreed with the KdF's policies, especially the modern elements of it. In the end Rosenberg's criticism lead to the dismissal of KdF leader Dressler-Andress in 1937/38, but Goebbels' and Ley's sphere of influence remained untouched.[267] For our purposes this conflict, especially Rosenberg's unsuccessful attempts to increase his influence, further corroborates the open-mindedness of the KdF in regards to technology and modernity.

In summary, this subsection provided some background information on what the KdF was, how it was structured and what kind of work it did. In regards to movie efforts not much could be said *directly*, other than that they played a relatively minor role, both in terms of propaganda and numbers of participants. For KdF propaganda foreign tourism was the most important topic, which seems to have been an effective tool. The movie Schiff ohne Klassen fits this category, and displayed technology in a very positive light (see subsection 5.5). The KdF departments that employed movies were the Amt Feierabend and the Deutsches Volksbildungswerk. I have suggested that, even though the Volksbildungswerk did have an ideological goal, it was open towards various forms of modern entertainment and education - including movies. Amt Feierabend openly embraced modern forms of entertainment. There was also a personal conflict between Rosenberg and Ley/Goebbels. The former wanted to bring cultural matters, KdF included, under his control and opposed modern elements in the KdF program. In the end Rosenberg's criticism remained mostly unheard and provoked but minor changes. Generally speaking the KdF was meant to contribute to the creation of a Volksgemeinschaft and provide sufficient balance between work

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[265]NSG KdF, p.265-266 and Illusion eines guten Lebens, p.112-113.

[266]See e.g. BArch NS 18/591, p.10-12.

[267]For more detail on the debate, see NSG KdF pp.6-15. Compare Illusion eines guten Lebens, pp.110-112.

and free time. I have omitted a discussion about whether the KdF succeeded in doing so.[268]

The omnipresent concept of Volksgemeinschaft might have merely disguised what was actually at stake, i.e. productivity at the workplace, and a replacement for worker unions under the NSDAP's umbrella. But we should consider what Volksgemeinschaft meant. Per definition Volksgemeinschaft is not mutually exclusive to Blood and Soil. Both can swing with a racial statement. Interpreted as complementary concepts, we must understand Volksgemeinschaft as racial community of all Germans, who, as a people, prefer the farm life over the degenerate city. On this reading then the farm is the fixed point for Volksgemeinschaft. Volksgemeinschaft was a core KdF goal, yet there is no evidence that that was to be brought about without using technology. Quite the opposite: All KdF departments used technology to the fullest, from modern cruise ships to movie projectors. Even the Deutsche Volksbildungswerk, which was heavily defined by ideology, made use of movies. In this sense then the Nazis *used* Volksgemeinschaft and Blood and Soil in a mutual exclusive manner. Volksgemeinschaft looked to the city; it was to be modern and technologically progressive. Finally I would like to point out that many KdF activities, especially tourism within German borders, connect to the NSDAP's overall attempt to combat land-flight, as well as to raise the image of the farmer. I have have already mentioned that tourism sought to bring people together. Prime tourist traps for city dwellers were often agrarian areas due to the beautiful landscape, e.g. the Black Forest the Alps, etc. These areas could then not only benefit from more tourism in an economic way, but also in a socio-hierarchical way.

6.2 Movie-blitz: Mobile cinemas and their use

Mobile cinemas were, generally speaking, organized by the KdF. In case of troop entertainment during the war, Ley (DAF/KdF) and Goebbels (RfVP) arranged for the RfVP to take over movie screenings for the troops, while the KdF retained every other form of troop entertainment.[269] Thus the outbreak of World War II provides some structure for this subsection. Concrete changes in the use of mobile cinema are sometimes hard to date. I will first elaborate on civilian use of the mobile cinema before, and then during the War; and secondly I will touch upon how mobile cinemas entertained troops.

When did the NSDAP first use movie trucks? One of the earliest sources I located is an 1936 article in Der Deutsche Film, so from a time the KdF was already large and influential. Even so, nothing speaks against the application of movie trucks before 1936. It is entirely possible that national newspapers, like Der Deutsche Film, simply failed to cover movie trucks any earlier. And why would they? Movie trucks were anything but a novelty and the world of film revolved around large urban centers, not backwater rural areas without stationary cinema. To illustrate the point: In 1938 5.411 cinemas existed in 2.640

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[268]For an argument for the KdF's success, see Aly, G., *Hitlers Volksstaat*. A counter-argument can be found in Illusion eines guten Lebens.
[269]BArch NS 18/591.

cities. Those numbers might be misleading - cities of over 100.000 population accounted for 55 percent of the movie industry's revenue. On the other hand, 48.200 of 51.000 small towns (Gemeinde) had no local cinema.[270] Not diving too deep into what-if-territory, I think it is safe to say that it is entirely possible that mobile cinemas could have been featured in the early stages of the KdF, i.e. 1933. This does not hold for pre-1933. In section 5.2 I have noted that the NSDAP was always keen on using movies, but due to financial restrictions movie production was at first non-existent and then rather sporadic until 1933. Thus it is highly questionable whether or not NSDAP movie trucks existed before 1933 at all. However there is a slight chance of that being the case, mostly due to the NSDAP's propaganda strategy as discussed in section 4.2: Before the party became mainstream, it put much emphasis on campaigning in rural areas.

But just how many movie trucks were there? I have found an estimate that in 1942 more than 1.500 'mobile film companies' were employed - I presume each 'company' had one truck.[271] The same source estimates that in 1942/1943 2.5 million Hitlerjugend members attended 18.250 movie events in rural areas without stationary cinemas. In cities 24.100 'mobile events' took place, with 8.355.000 visitors.[272] Thus urban screenings were much larger in scale, but similar in number. Der Deutsche Film estimates that until 1936 'thousands' of mobile screenings took place with as many as 100 million participants.[273] This allows us to conclude that the first estimate, i.e. roughly 11 million HJ-participants of mobile events in 1942/43, should be a fairly correct.

Let's have a closer look. Above numbers state there were 1.500 trucks for about 42.000 events in 1942/43. The exact time-frame of this measurement is unclear, but on average each truck should have hosted between 14 (assuming a two-year period) to 28 (assuming a one-year period) events annually. An awfully low number. As for the average number of participants we arrive at roughly 140 for rural events and 340 for their urban counterparts, i.e. an overall average of 240. Here I would like to note that the actual average might have been slightly lower, and generally should have depended on the type of the event. Der Angriff (6.1.1938) speaks of 800 mobile events for 90.000 participants, i.e. an average of 112 participants per event.[274] By contrast a different newspaper article from 1938 celebrates the first anniversary of a movie truck in the Bavarian Gau 'Ostmark'. The article assumes that the truck in question visited 350 companies, with 60.000 attendants; the average number of participants per event was thus 170.[275] The average number of participants seems to be in accord with the first estimate, since the Bayrische Ostmark (nowadays Niederbayern, Oberpfalz and Oberfranken, see Appendix O.) was predominantly rural.

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[270] Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p.104. Also see Lowry, S., *Pathos und Politik. Ideologie in Spielfilmen des Nationalsozialismus*, p.15.

[271] Und die Fahne, p.105.

[272] Und die Fahne, p. 105.

[273] Belling, C., *Die Filmarbeit der NSDAP*, in Der Deutsche Film, 4/1936 (Okt.), p.364, quoted in Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p.507.

[274] Der Angriff, Nr.5, 6.1.1938 in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.18.

[275] Bayrische Ostmark, Nr.55, 7.3.1938 in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.14.

However there was a big discrepancy in terms of how many events a single movie truck hosted; the newspaper article in question estimates almost one event per day, which is far more credible than 14-28 per year we started off with. Now what went wrong in the first estimate? Either the estimated number of trucks was far too high, or the events counted wrongfully. I think the latter was the case: First of all the estimate only encompasses HJ-events. Secondly the first estimate is for 1942/43, so war time, while the latter are for (and from) 1937/38. It is entirely possibly that the first estimate is far lower considering the number of events per truck, since movie trucks could have been 'conscripted' for troop entertainment - we will come back to this later. For our current purposes the point shall be this: 1.500 mobile cinemas is an all-right estimation of how many movie trucks existed. Thus the 1936 estimate of the Deutsche Film,

Figure 27: Top: Make-shift setup of a mobile screening. Bottom: A movie truck with trailer. Source: Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p.508

100 million participants, seems justified. Given the estimate is over three years, this means there were 33.3 million participants per year. Putting this into perspective: That number could be reached with less than 1.000 trucks, each hosting a screening 300 days a year, with an average number of 120 participants. Finally it should be said that the number of mobile cinemas grew over time. Speculations aside, Goebbels pointed out that 'too little' was being done in regards to culture on the countryside during a RPL conference dating 8.1.1940. Thus he promptly arranged for the production of 400 more mobile cinemas.[276] Goebbels' real intentions unbeknown to us, it could have been possible that those trucks were destined for the Wehrmacht instead of the civilian population.

In the following paragraphs I would like to briefly go over the practical setup of the mobile cinema. First of all it should be noted that the equipment of different trucks varied. Some trucks came with a small kitchen, but this should have been the exception.[277] The basic equipment of each truck consisted of a movie projector and a portable screen, as well as speakers. The latter could also be used to set up 'concerts', both in- and outdoors.[278] Some mobile cinemas came with their own power generator, which lessened dependency on local sources of electricity. This was especially important in rural areas with poor

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[276]BArch R55/2001b.

[277]Die Filmarbeit der Deutschen Arbeitsfront, in Der Deutsche Film, 5/1936 (November), p.152 in Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p.254 and Nationalzeitung, Nr.328, 27.11.1935, in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.24.

[278]Der Angriff, Nr.5, 6.1.1938 in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.18.

power supply.[279] *Das rollenede Freilichttheater*, a newspaper article, describes the luxurious equipment of the large mobile cinema 'Sachsen': The screen of 6x8 meter dimensions was lit by a 6.400 Watt projector with 45 meter range. One large loudspeaker was used as a sound system for talkie-screenings. The 'Sachsen' furthermore carried a radio receiver and four mushroom loudspeakers, which could be used for public broadcasts for up to 100.000 participants. The truck's inventory also included a microphone. Interestingly the article lists two modern 'Ernemann-Theaterkameras', a 'Schallplatten-Schreibgerät' (vinyl recording device) and the possibility to connect to the post office line in order to both receive and send information.[280]

This suggests that the 'Sachsen' not only hosted movie screenings and public radio events with an announcer (thus the microphone), but was capably of producing information, e.g. recordings of crowds for propaganda movies or the Wochenschau. The post office line could have been used to communicate with party headquarters while an event took place, or perhaps to provide the public with news. Mobile cinemas usually had to be requisitioned at the Gaufilmstelle. The owner of a company would register for a movie event. When the truck arrived, the applicant solely had to provide some space and seats, the truck's crew took care of everything else.[281]

What movies were shown during mobile screenings is uncertain. However mobile cinemas did mirror their stationary counterpart in showing Kulturfilm, Spielfilm and Wochenschau. In accordance with section 6.1, part of the program consisted of DAF-movies. Various newspaper articles mention DAF-productions shown in mobile cinemas, including: Licht (Light, 1936), about the importance of proper illumination of the workplace and Spiel der Freude (Game of Joy, 1936/1937), about company-facilitated sports activities.[282] More examples are Leinen Los! (Cast Off!, 1936), a movie about open sea sailing, Urlaubsfreuden (Pleasures of vacation, 1937), a KdF-movie akin to Schiff ohne Klassen, and Wir und das Werk (Us and the Plant, 1937), which shows how workers and leadership of an East-German firm work together to build a swimming pool for all employees.[283] A screening in honor of Hitler's birthday featured the propaganda movies Gebt mir vier Jahre Zeit! (Give me four years time!, 1937) and Festliches Nürnberg (Festive Nuremberg, 1937), the 1937 Nazi rally movie, as well as the Wochenschau.[284] This list of movies is obviously far from complete, but allows us to conclude that the mobile program mirrored that of stationary cinema in regards to genres, but seemed to have leaned towards DAF/KdF-productions. This means that it is likely that mobile cinemas did not denounce technology,

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[279]Nationalzeitung, Nr.328, 27.11.1935 in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.24.

[280]Das rollende Freilichttheater, in Der Freiheitskampf, Nr.109, 21.4.1938 in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.13.

[281]Bremer Zeitung, 4.2.1937, Nr.33 in BArch, NS 5 VI/19250, p.20.

[282]DAF.-Tonfilme rufen den Arbeiter, in Nordische Rundschau, Nr.114, 17.5.1938, in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.12.

[283]Schwaibold, H., *Das Gute Beispiel* im Film, in Bremer Zeitung, Nr. 299 31.10.1937 in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.22.

[284]Das rollende Freilichttheater, in Der Freiheitskampf, Nr.109, 21.4.1938 in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.13.

but promote it - even in rural areas.

More specifically the mobile cinema can be seen in context of the Jugend-filmstunden (Youth-film-hours), which have been enforced by law in 1934. Organized by the HJ, the Jugendfilmstunden included classic NS elements, such as singing and flag-cult, but also movie screenings. Local cinemas had to host these once or twice a month. However if there were no local cinemas, mobile cinemas were used to set up projectors in bars, city halls, or schools.[285] Many NSDAP events, including the Jugendfilmstunden, featured an announcer, which is probably why the 'Sachsen' had a microphone on board. Part of the announcers' job was to comment on the movies. This is yet another example of the NS 'culture of the spoken word' and correlates to how classroom discussions of Lehrfilm (see section 5.6).[286] As for the program in general, mobile screenings would take on this form: In the morning movies for children were shown; sometimes entire school classes attended. The program then shifted to more mature content. In the afternoon adolescents watched movies and in the evening it was the adults' turn.[287]

Figure 28: Children gather around a KdF movie truck. Source: Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p. 255

Either way, the NSDAP did not only use mobile cinemas for official party events, as would be the case for HJ or DAF meetings, but also in a wider context.[288] When Hitler kick-started the Autobahn project, the KdF provided mobile cinemas to entertain involved construction workers.[289] The NSDAP did

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[285]Häcker, W., *Der Aufstieg der Jugendfilmarbeit*, in Das junge Deutschland. Amtliches Organ des Jugendführers des deutschen Reiches, Heft 10, p.235, quoted in Und die Fahne, p.105.

[286]Compare Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p.507.

[287]*Fahrende Kinos*, in Wochenblatt Schlesien, 18.4.1936, in Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p.507; original source: BA-R 8034 II Nr.2803, p.158.

[288]DAF-events are an obvious addition. The use at DAF-meetings is explicitly mentioned in Der Angriff, Nr.5, 6.1.1938 in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.18.

[289]NSG KdF, p.268.

not only deploy movie trucks in Germany, but also in 'occupied areas'. During peace time movie trucks toured Austria and the Sudetenland: 'Just a few days after the re-disposition of the retaken German land, today the movie trucks of the Gaufilmstellen carry film into isolated alpine valleys and mountain villages of the Ostmark, into the quiet, reanimated small towns of the Sudetenland, and into the cities of the new Gaue. [Wie schon wenige Tage nach Rückgliederung des wiedergenommenen deutschen Landes tragen nunmehr heute die Tonfilmwagen der Gaufilmstellen den Film in die abgeschiedenen Alpentäler und Bergdörfer der deutschen Ostmark, in die stillen, von neuem Leben erfüllten Ortschaften des deutschen Sudetenlandes und in die Städte der neuen Gaue.][290] This venture was apparently very successful: A SD report of 4.2.1940 noted that new 'Ostgaue' (Eastern Provinces) Hohensalza and Graz (both in Austria) wanted more cinemas - the former had presently no stationary cinema, the latter had five, each of which was sold out days in advance of screenings.[291]

As far as reception goes, the rural population seemed to have enjoyed mobile cinemas. Already days before the arrival of a movie truck villagers discussed the upcoming event: 'It is always a great occasion, when one of the movie trucks, which the Gaufilmstelle employs day in day out in Silesian small towns without cinemas, finds its way into one village. Already days before the event, the upcoming talkie constitutes the topic talk of the day of the village commune. [Es ist immer ein großes Ereignis, wenn einer der Tonfilmwagen, die Tag für Tag von der Gaufilmstelle in den kinolosen Ortschaften Schlesiens eingesetzt werden, in einem Dorfe seinen Einzug hält. Schon in den Tagen vor der Veranstaltung bildet der kommende Tonflm das Tagesgespräch der Dorfgemeinde.][292] The SD report of 3.4.1941 describes mobile cinemas as very popular in rural areas. This partially had to do with the lack of other forms of entertainment in these areas.[293] This complaint is two-pronged. First of all, we often find high demand for cinema in rural areas, coupled with criticism that the land was neglected in regards to film culture.[294] Secondly SD-reports discussed in section 5.4 make mention that the rural population grew weary of the news situation during the War, i.e. the lack of up-to-date news - at times a Wochenschau would be 2 months old when first shown on the land. Thus we could assume that mobile cinemas were not only welcomed as entertainment, but also as a source of information, e.g. in the form of the Wochenschau.

Yet the mobile cinema also served as a propaganda tool. Aforementioned SD report (3.4.1941) explicitly notes that the popularity of movie trucks and the absence of other media make them a perfect tool for indoctrination. In this context it should be noted that the personality cult around Hitler, which was one of the most prominent NS propaganda tools, was less effective in rural

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[290]Fischer, H., *Der Film als Propagandawaffe der Partei*, quoted in Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p.507.

[291]In Meldungen, p.48.

[292]*Fahrende Kinos*, in Wochenblatt Schlesien, 18.4.1936, in Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p.507; original: BA-R 8034 II Nr.2803, p.158.

[293]SD report quoted in Und die Fahne, p.105; original: BA Koblenz R 58/159.

[294]Also see Nationalzeitung, Nr.328, 27.11.1935 in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.24.

areas. Many farmers did not possess radios and weren't able to attend large rallies in cities, where Hitler frequently spoke. Instead rural folk relied on local events and media to form an opinion.[295] Finally I would like to point out that mobile cinemas, as well as the mission statement of the KdF, i.e. the creation of a Volksgemeinschaft, can easily be connected to what I have discussed in section 4.3, most importantly the NSDAP consistent attempts to combat land flight. Mobile cinemas would as such join the fray by providing rural areas with something new and cultural that was much in demand. One newspaper article even points this out.[296] In conclusion it is easy to see why mobile cinema, as a flexible form of local propaganda and apparent equalizer between the urban and the rural, was important for the NSDAP.

What we have discussed up until now was the civilian use of the mobile cinema, which did not change substantially after the outbreak of World War II. In the following I will investigate how the mobile cinema was used in context of World War II.

First of all it should be noted that troop entertainment in general fell under the Reichspropagandaleitung (RPL). An agreement between OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) and RPL from 17.6.1943 states that the Hauptamt Film (RPL) is to provide entertainment for troops using their organization, equipment, film copies and also *car fleet*. The latter, of course, refers to mobile cinemas. The idea was that 'all Wehrmacht units in quarters without cinemas and in fighting position will be visited by talkie-trucks in such a way, that every single soldier might see a movie and the latest Wochenschau every 14 days. [In kinolosen Unterkunftsbereichen und in Gefechtsstellungen befindliche Einheiten

Figure 29: Driver unloading his movie truck. Eastern Front, roughly 1941-1942. Source: BArch NS 5/VI 19250

aller Wehrmachtsteile werden durch Tonfilmwagen so bespielt, dass der einzelne Soldat nach Möglichkeit alle 14 Tage einen Film mit neuester Wochenschau sieht.]'[297] Mobile cinemas have been used for troops shortly after the outbreak of the war.[298] But who organized them? Above quote, dated 1943, implies that the RPL possessed mobile cinemas. Perhaps the KdF and RPL shared the mobile cinemas after the outbreak of the War, which would support above discussed discrepancy in estimated numbers of movie trucks.

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[295] Plough and Swastika, p.42 and Popular Opinion, p.48.

[296] Bremer Zeitung, Nr. 299 31.10.1937 in BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.22.

[297] BA-NS 18 Nr. 356 p.16-18, quoted in Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p.507.

[298] See Belling, C., *Politische Betreuung durch den Film*, in Der Deutsche Film, 9/1940 (March), in Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p.507.

The KdF was not involved in troop entertainment after 1939, but remained in control of mobile cinemas for the civilian population.[299] Thus the KdF did not directly participate in any war related activities. However some equipment was 'drafted': Cruise ships, for instance, were used as hospital ships or training ships for the navy.[300] How exactly the outbreak of war influenced movie trucks themselves is unclear, apart from the above outlined divided responsibility based on audience. Perhaps new trucks were built for the RPL, perhaps the existing fleet was split up between RPL and KdF and perhaps a bit of both.

Recall that mobile cinemas found use whenever Germany annexed new territory. This tradition was to continue during the war. A 1941 Film Kurier article describes this: 'The first talkie-trucks rolled over polish roads shortly after the occupation, and so the first feature films and Wochenschauen have been shown to the German soldiers in operational cinemas. [Bald nach der Besetzung rollten die ersten Tonfilmwagen über die polnischen Landstraßen wurden in betriebsfähigen Filmtheatern den deutschen Soldaten die ersten Spielfilme und Wochenschauen gezeigt.]'[301] The article hints at the major new task of the mobile cinema: Troop entertainment near the front lines.

Mobile cinemas seem to have been fairly popular with the soldiers. Even a seemingly boring educational movie, Deutsche Grönlandexpedition Alfred Wegener (German Greenland expediton Alfred Wegener) found favor with the troops.[302] In general the program for soldiers was a mix of various genres, with each screening featuring the Wochenschau. Notably the soldiers not always enjoyed educational movies - they obviously preferred entertainment in their free time, i.e. feature film. Some soldiers criticized the educational movies as 'complete nonsense' and 'a waste of their precious free time'.[303] An understandable reaction; after all some Lehrfilme were directed at school kids, rather than grown men. In this case Lehrfilm was used for entertainment, but it should be noted that mobile cinemas also possibly served the purpose to explicitly educate troops. In order to set up educational courses for medics in 1940, the SS entered a contract with the RfdU, which allowed the SS to use RfdU movies.[304] Naturally such courses did not necessarily rely on mobile cinemas. However in aforementioned context it is a possibility that medics received make-shift training near the front lines.

The extend to which mobile cinemas found application for this purpose is unclear. An RfVP, division 'East', estimate of costs from July-September 1943 lists 80.000 RM for projectors (24.300 under 'military', 56.700 under 'civilian'), 900.000 RM for civilian sound trucks and 385.000 RM for 'film'.[305] Troop entertainment was partially paid for by the OKW, meaning the relatively low

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[299]Compare BArch NS 18/591.

[300]NSG KdF, p.225 and Illusion eines guten Lebens, p.31. Also see: Niven, B. (ed.), *Die Wilhelm Gustloff* and Schön, H., *Die KdF-Schiffe und ihr Schicksal*.

[301]Filmwirtschaft im Generalgouvernement in Film Kurier 13.2.1941, in Theater und Film im 3. Reich, p.346.

[302]Film und Bild, Nr.1, 15.1.1941, BArch NS 5 VI/19250, p.7-8.

[303]Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, p.487.

[304]Ibid.

[305]BArch R 55/567, p.103.

number here might be misleading.[306] Notably the sound truck budget is the second highest on the list, only dwarfed by the 1.230.000 RM for 'brochures, fliers and posters'. A sound truck could easily be refurbished to a movie truck, but whether or not this was done at all is unclear. However the relatively large budget for civilian sound trucks, in combination with troop support being a split responsibility between the RfVP and OKW, allows for the assumption that movie trucks took up a fairly large part of the budget.

In summary the mobile cinema was a diverse institution that served varying target groups and purposes. The number of mobile cinemas before and during the war was roughly 1.500, each of which performed around one screening per day. Equipment differed. A projector, a screen and loud speakers constituted the essentials, while some trucks came with microphone, radio receiver, or even a kitchen. So movie trucks were also radio stations or loudspeaker wagons and thus beyond film. The mobile program seems to have mirrored its local counterpart, consisting of Kulturfilm, feature film and Wochenschau; yet we found a prevalence for worker-focused DAF productions in mobile screenings, suggesting the mobile cinema was an attempt to modernize rural labor. One of the NSDAP's most effective propaganda strategies, the personal cult around Hitler, was ineffective in rural areas. Farmers heavily relied on local sources, partially due to the unavailability of anything else. In this sense the mobile cinema, as a tool of propaganda, was centrally controlled and could simultaneously influence rural peoples on a local base. Moreover the rural population often felt 'left behind' in regards to news and culture (see subsection 5.4). The mobile cinema seems to have been an intuitive way to combat this trend, and thus land flight. Generally speaking the mobile cinema was well received by urban and rural citizens, as well as soldiers. Finally the mobile cinema fit well into general NS propaganda strategy and the KdF's goal to create a Volksgemeinschaft. The latter was to bridge the class gap - here bringing the Urban and the Rural closer together. The mobile cinema has shown that the Nazis understood the concept of *Volksgemeinschaft* in terms of the city: Trucks were to carry urban culture to the land. Since the trucks themselves were a piece of technology we can conclude that the Nazi understanding of *Volksgemeinschaft* had little to do with Blood and Soil. Instead it was the dream of a society explicitly brought about by the use of technology - a society based on technological progress and urban culture.

6.3 Summary: The mobile cinema as a symbol of Volksgemeinschaft

In this subsection we've had a look at an interesting case study: The NSDAP practically revived the mobile cinema and integrated it into party culture. The NS-use of the mobile cinema shares a set of similarities and differences with the original private use. While mobile cinemas around the turn of the century sought out industrial areas, the NSDAP used the movie trucks to mostly, not

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[306] BArch R 55/567, p.100-102.

but not exclusively, cater areas that had no local cinema - so predominantly rural areas. Yet the NSDAP firmly implemented mobile cinemas into party culture, tying into the point of the importance of the setting of any screening I have raised throughout this thesis. Thus a mobile screening during the third Reich shares, in spirit, the festive character of a mobile screening on a fin de siécle fair.

In subsection 6.1 I have described the organization KdF, its structure and the type of work it did. Generally speaking movies seemed to not have been the KdF's primary occupation: KdF propaganda emphasized tourism and other local forms of culture, e.g. theater, drew more participants. Still the KdF embraced movies. Based on that and an inner-party power struggle in which Rosenberg was defeated, I have concluded that the KdF's mission statement, the creation of a Volksgemeinschaft, must be seen as quite distinct from hard-line Blood and Soil ideology.

Subsection 6.2 devoted attention to the actual trucks and how they were used. Examining the trucks' equipment I have noticed that a few items, most importantly microphone and radio receiver, fit well into general NS event culture, especially the emphasis on the spoken word. The radio gained special importance in rural areas, which traditionally were relatively unimpressed by the personal cult around Hitler.

The mobile cinema served a large array of functions. The civilian population at home, in occupied areas and German soldiers were its guests. Overall the mobile cinema was well received; the rural population at times critized party events for their 'city-like character', but I have not found equivalent criticism about the movie trucks. Troop entertainment, with and without mobile cinemas, fell under the sphere of influence of the RPL, resulting in a split responsibility in terms of the mobile cinema.

Mobile cinemas featured a Kulturfilm, a feature film and a Wochenschau, thus mirroring local cinemas. However it is to be expected that mobile cinemas, due to their connection to the KdF, over-represented DAF-productions, which viewed technology in a positive light (compare subsection 5.5). In a peculiar way the mobile cinema can be viewed as a bridge between rural and urban areas, as an attempt to bring city-culture to the land. The good reception of mobile cinemas in rural areas suggests that this venture was fairly successful.

Let us come to our historiographical debate. Proponents of the *traditional view* would base their argument on the ideologically laden mission statement of the KdF, i.e. the aspect of the creation of a Volksgemeinschaft. Then it must be shown that the KdF either did not use technology to pursue this goal, or that the use of technology was merely a 'byproduct' of chasing ideological goals. The former is obviously not applicable here. As for the latter, I have described how various KdF departments used movies and other technologies, e.g. the mobile cinema, cruise ships, etc., for their purposes. Here two points speak against the traditional view: Firstly I have argued that KdF events are, except for a few exceptions, to be seen as cultural education and entertainment, not ideological indoctrination. Thus the KdF employed technologies for these goals. Secondly I have argued that the KdF was far removed from Blood and

97

Soil idealists, like Rosenberg. I found that Rosenberg came to criticize the KdF for he saw the organization as a competitor in cultural matters - one with very different sets of values. While Rosenberg strove for Blood and Soil, the KdF attempted to entertain and, in the case of the popular mobile cinema, bring urban entertainment to rural areas. While I believe this argumentation is sufficient to refute the traditional view, we could even concede this point to one of its advocates: The creation of a Volksgemeinschaft was, ideologically, the KdF's ultimate goal. While this is a sensible objection, I would answer that the concept of Volksgemeinschaft is qualitatively different from Blood and Soil. The former is suppose to bring about social cohesion in existing circumstances; in our case the spread of movies to the countryside helped with this, for this endeavour intended to even out a cultural and technological gap between town and land. Blood and Soil on the other hand despised urban culture, here movies, and intended to reverse the trend of urbanization.

Moving on to *Herf's* narrative. The present section unfortunately does not provide a firm argument for any sort of continuity. Before I provide an argument: Is it justified to compare private use of the mobile cinema with 'public' use? Given that Herf speaks of a broader culture of reactionary modernism, from which NS presumably arose, I think yes. Now it can be said that the mobile cinema under the NSDAP took over a 'festive spirit' from fairs at the turn of the century. However this seems a little far-fetched, since, as I have attempted to show, the use of the mobile cinema fit into the distinct NS-culture. Furthermore NS mobile cinemas were predominantly intended for the rural population, meaning a reversal of the fin the siécle target audience. Similarly this section was not able to confirm Herf's selective use of technology. Subsection 6.2 has found that all KdF departments, no matter their field of responsibility, made full use of technology - ranging from cruise ships to movies. The fact that movie screenings were not as popular as other activities is of little relevance here and can most likely be explained by the higher cost compared to e.g. a game of soccer. The case of the mobile cinema, as discussed in subsection 6.3, seems to provide a similar argument. Not only the equipment of the movie trucks, which not solely consisted of projector and screen, reflects this. Movies shown in mobile cinemas were not exclusive to one or another genre; however DAF-productions took primacy. DAF-productions were in essence highly supportive of modern workplaces of all kinds, meaning that the movie content did not selectively embrace one form of technology over another.

Let's now consider the *modern view*. I the previous paragraph I have described how the section at hand speaks against Herf's concept of selective embrace of technology. The very same line of argumentation corroborates Rohkrämer's point that the NSDAP fully embraced technology. Considering centralization, which Rohkrämer sees as a modern feat, the findings of this section suggest that the NSDAP was highly modern. The mobile cinema was in all iterations (organized by RPL or KdF) a governmental institution, and as such was centrally controlled. However if we examine the mobile cinema in contrast to stationary cinemas, we find crucial differences. Recall that Goebbels sought to strictly control the movie industry in general (see subsection 5.3).

Apart from producing movies, Goebbels also determined cinema program and censored movies that displeased him. Yet the individual cinema owner still had considerable freedom in what movies they chose to display. The mobile cinema on the other hand allows for stricter control of this. Additionally the mobile cinema provided the opportunity to directly and indirectly control the target audience as well. Announcers would constitute an example of direct influence, while age-categorization in mobile screenings is a case of indirect control. The latter may have allowed the NSDAP to tailor content to specific target audiences. Thus we could say that the mobile cinema was highly centralized.

Finally let's consider the *pragmatic view*, an argument for which must show that the use of the mobile cinema was not motivated by ideology, but instead by practical issues. I have previously shown that the chasing a Volksgemeinschaft is different from Blood and Soil - even though both concept fall into the category of the Ideological, they dictate a different stance towards technology/modernity. I have previously argued that the KdF was far removed from Blood and Soil ideology and the argument must not be rehearsed here; we should rather be concerned with the question: To what extend did the concept of Volksgemeinschaft influence the KdF? An answer to this question seems difficult, but, based on the findings of subsection 6.2, we can say that the concept was indeed a KdF pillar. However in the very same subsection I have explained that most KdF activities had no direct relation to it, not to mention that the KdF did nothing to address the roots of class conflict. Thus we could say that Volksgemeinschaft might have been nothing more than a mission statement, a justification for the KdF. But then we must ask: What were the real motivations behind the KdF? The pragmatic view would define various aspects, propagandistic, socio-cultural and economic in nature. Making the argument concrete, we will here consider the case of the mobile cinema. Firstly the propaganda function is quite evident. Rural folks preferred local news outlets, which the mobile cinema could provide. This approach added the benefit that the NSDAP could easily control and streamline this channel of information. Likewise the mobile cinema tackled the problem of news in rural areas being out-of-date (see subsection 5.5), which constitutes a cultural problem. As far as socio-economic aspects go, we must again consider land flight. Adding to economic despair, the lack of news and entertainment might have motivated farmers to move to cities. The mobile cinema was thus to help combat land flight by bolstering the supply of entertainment and cultural novelties on the land. Finally the reference point for Volksgemeinschaft was the Urban, which translates to modern peoples community, to be established by the pragmatic use of technology - here the mobile cinema.

7 Conclusion

This is the ultimate section of this thesis. I will first summarize our findings (7.1), then recap the historiographical discourse (7.2). Some reflections and pointers towards further research (7.3) finalize the project.

7.1 All the pieces: Factual summary

This subsection is to provide a descriptive summary of the puzzle we assembled.

In section three I have outlined the debate about how National Socialism related to modernity and technology. By grouping various authors together I found three viewpoints. The first, which I have dubbed the *traditional view*, described National Socialism as entirely *anti-modern*, mostly for their rejection of Western liberal democracy and Enlightenment values. I argued that authors subscribing to the traditional view would hold that it is modern to pursue science and technology as an end, whereas the Nazis used technology only as a means to pursue their ideological ends. By contrast *Jeffrey Herf's* narrative located the Nazis in a 'reactionary modern' tradition. Herf holds that the Nazis were reactionary to Enlightenment values, but somewhat modern through their *selective use* of technology and novel modes of thinking. Thus Herf views the Nazis as partially modern. Herf's narrative has been revised by a few authors, which I have grouped together as the *modern view* - the Nazis were in fact modern. Rohkrämer argued that the National Socialists *fully embraced* science and technology in a *centralized* manner. Reflecting upon these developments we noticed that National Socialism became increasingly intertwined with modernity; this came at the 'cost' of redefining what it means to be modern. Enlightenment values became less important for the narratives, while practical use of technology became more prevalent. I have elaborated on my own narrative, the *pragmatic view* in subsection 4.4. I hold that the Nazis were modern for they *pragmatically embraced technology*. Ideology then was a mere vehicle for progress, an advertisement strategy if you will. We could summarize this in the following, simplified, manner:

- Traditional view: NS was not modern. Technological progress as byproduct of ideological goals. Definition of modernity based on liberal democracy and Enlightenment.

- Herf: NS was partially modern. Nazis selectively embraced of technology and had a root in reactionary ideas from the turn of the century. Modernity defined by Enlightenment; pragmatic use of technology only somewhat modern.

- Modern view: NS was fully modern. Modernity defined by centralization and pragmatic use of technology.

- Pragmatic view: NS was fully modern. Modernity defined by pragmatic use of technology. Blood and Soil as vehicle for modern policy-making.

After these considerations we started working on our puzzle. I found it wise to start with a framework, which section four provided. In subsection 4.1 I have discussed Edgerton's concept of use-based histories of technology. I have summarized the strengths and weaknesses of this approach and explained how this thesis relates to them. The take-away lesson here was that existing narratives often neglect the use of technology. Thus, by investigating how the Nazis *used* movies and how technology and ideology were depicted in movies, we can examine the efficiency of the four historiographical narratives outlined above. The following subsection, 4.2, had a look at the early voter base of the NSDAP. The classic assumption that the NSDAP was a protestant farmer's party was debunked. The NSDAP constituency was very broad, with the working class being underrepresented. With that in mind, the NSDAP was still strongest in protestant rural areas, especially from 1930 onward, and weakest in catholic rural areas and industrial centers. So would it make sense to focus propaganda on rural areas? I have argued: Yes. This had to do with the NSDAP's 'bulwark-strategy'. Furthermore I have noted that a diverse voter base corroborates Rohrkrämer's view. Subsection 4.3 was an investigation into the socio-economic situation of the late Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. I have argued that the plethora of agricultural policies were only ideological on the surface, but rooted in practical economic issues, most importantly unemployment, land-flight, trade and rearmament. Translated to a historiography of technology, we gained a fourth narrative: The *pragmatic view*. Subsection 4.4 then compared the pragmatic view to the three narratives outlined in the introduction.

Section five filled in the framework built in the previous two sections by covering roughly two decades of German film, from the 1920s until 1945. In subsection 5.1 we lived through the classic struggle every historian must face: What is important and how do we define it? With the overall purpose of this thesis, i.e. the examination the relationship between National Socialism and Technology and Modernity, in mind, I argued that a distinction between Kulturfilm, Lehrfilm and Spielfilm is the way to go. I based this on (perceived) objectivity and producer. Considering this the Deutsche Wochenschau demands special attention, for it seems that it conformed to both extremes of the scale. I further suggested that all movies produced or commission by the NSDAP are to be seen as propaganda, whereas a-political movies may have been used for propagandistic purposes. For the latter interpretation via an announcer/commentator and the setting of the screening were central.

In subsection 5.2 I have argued that, firstly, even though the Machtergreifung amplified Nazi movie efforts, especially production and control of the movie-making industry, I described it as a mere enabler and not the major turning point of Nazi productions, and indeed German film as such. We have seen that the Nazis have discussed the use of propaganda movies in the early stages of the party, so when financial limitations restricted activities to lending movies. From 1928-1933 a professionalization and organization of NS-film took place; in the end Goebbels assumed control over most of the apparatus. This represents the second point of importance here: central planning. These two aspects, that of centralization and the long history of NS-movie efforts, lead me to the conclusion

that the Nazis *fully made use* of movies. Propaganda played a big role in the NS-movie effort, both before and after 1933. At all times the Nazis were very pragmatic about the use of movies, incorporating the medium into their overall campaigning strategies whenever possible. The implementation however was often makeshift, sometimes even chaotic.

The analysis of Kulturfilm in subsection 5.3 has revealed that some movies, like Ruttmann's *Deutsche Panzer* or *Berlin* were probably not intended to convey an explicit political message, but both (Deutsche Panzer more so than Berlin) were open for poltical re-interpretation by the Nazis. This has to do with the genre's documentary-like approach: As a 'mirror of reality' the movies could often be interpreted differently. Other cultural movies, like *Das Erbe*, built on traditional Kulturfilm topics, here Darwinism. However Das Erbe re-invented the genre by bridging the gap between human and nature, therefore directly connecting to the social-darwinistic element of NS-ideology. In comparison to other movie genres Kulturfilm often displayed science and technology. The image of technology in the movies analyzed in this subsection was always positive, especially in Ruttmann's productions. Depending on the interpretation of the movies, a negative image of technology can be constructed, but seems far fetched at times. The aforementioned ideological ambivalence of most movies of this genre made it prone to interpretation, and was made possible with announcers during screenings or given right setting, e.g. a party event. The same ambivalence allowed many Kulturfilm-makers to continue their work after the Machtergreifung relatively untouched; centralization of the genre took place very late, in comparison to other categories. Based on the findings of this subsection I concluded that neither of the three original historiographical narratives hold up for Kulturfilm. Rohkrämer came closest, given the large spectrum of technology-laden topics and the enthusiastic attitude towards the subject of the Kulturfilme discussed. Rohkrämer weakness was the lack of Nazi efforts to centrally control Kulturfilm, which can be explained away with the nature of the genre, i.e. that small firms and many different directors accounted for the lion's share of Kulturfilm production. With this in mind I concluded that the *pragmatic view* correctly accounts for Kulturfilm.

Subsection 5.4 covered the Wochenschau. Nazi influence over the Wochenschau began after the Machtergreifung and started out rather sluggish. It took Goebbels many years to consolidate the movie industry (and thus the Wochenschauen); the outbreak of the War greatly sped up this procedure. The *Deutsche Wochenschau*, a fusion of the four previously independent Wochenschauen, emphasized national and militaristic topics. The Deutsche Wochenschau went through three phases, which were closely tied to the War. In the beginning the Wochenschau was a well-received and trustworthy news outlet. After Stalingrad the population gradually lost trust in the Wochenschau and we found some propaganda-strategic discrepancies between Goebbels and Hitler. The latter had the last say and so the Wochenschau became a prime tool for illusion and distraction, still hiding in its shell of objectivity. The population noticed this, especially the contrast between harsh reality in a destroyed country and what Germans call Hurra-Patriotismus (patriotism/chauvinism merged

with war-enthusiasm) and the lack of any 'bad news' in the Deutsche Wochenschau, contributed to this. In the later stages of the War the Wochenschau repeatedly reported on 'novel war technologies', either planned or already in use. Those technologies were usually mentioned in the context of Vergeltung. Thus high-tech weaponry was supposed to fight the Western Allies, mostly the U.K., not the Soviets and could have been an immediate response to British bombing against which many German felt helpless. As the war progressed, rumors about Vergeltung shifted towards a combination of technology and invasion, indicating that the population slowly lost their faith in military technology. I interpreted the population's interest in weapons-development and the fact that the Wochenschau reported on this, as a restoration of the population's trust in the government, for rumors about said technologies remained strong in an atmosphere of mistrust. I have argued that these findings corroborate the *pragmatic view*.

In order to understand NS-propaganda movies, the topic of subsection 5.5, we need to understand the conflict between technological progress and Blut und Boden ideology in context of the Machtergreifung. In the DAF production *Schiff ohne Klassen* and the propaganda movie *Feldzug in Polen* technology takes a central, but at times concealed, role. Blut und Boden ideology found its way into but a few propaganda movies. I believe this is because agitative propaganda fell out of favour shortly before the Machtergreifung. This process has, I believe, started when the NSDAP became a mass party and therefore had to cater a broader voter-base (see section 4.2). This development, at least in movies, became overt after the Machtergreifung, for there the NSDAP bulked up its movie efforts. Popular propaganda movies like Jud Süss or Triumph of the Will do not treat technology as a separate entity, while folkish ideas often find their way into propaganda in an idealized, romanticized way. As for the movies that did feature technology, the range of topics was extremely broad. The examples here depicted both the civilian and military technologies. Generally speaking technology is depicted not only in a positive light, but equated to power. The NSDAP, or its representatives, are then to be seen as the masters of technology. I have concluded that the pragmatic view best describes these developments.

Subsection 5.6 examined educational movies. Lehrfilm was, unlike most of the rest of film, not controlled by Goebbels. However this didn't mean that educational movies were not intended for propaganda purposes, quite the opposite was the case. Rust, who was in charge of Lehrfilm, fully made use of movies in the classroom and openly formulated the effort to be propaganda. Generally speaking educational movies were short silent movies and were intended to be discussed in the classroom. This way the teacher could ascribe meaning to the film. For this purpose information brochures, which often included National Socialist ideas, were made available. There was a large spectrum of the depiction of technology in educational movies, similar to what can be found in propaganda movies. Some Lehrfilme, like *Mädel im Landjahr* depicted folkish ideas, idealized self-sufficiency and manual labor and glorified the simple and traditional, thus representing one extreme on the folkish-progressive-scale. On the other

side of this scale we find movies like *Kokerei* or *Vom Erz zur Schiene*. These movies depict mostly automated industrial processes in a dull and depressing manner, suggesting a negative image of industry. However I believe this to be somewhat misleading, for educational movies of this type were intended for the rural population and to bridge the social gap between city and farm. In this way educational movies attempted to create a Volksgemeinschaft. This very goal can most readily be seen in movies in between the extremes of technology and folksiness, like *Kohlenschleppzug auf dem Mittelrhein*. So in a sense educational movies were ideologically motivated and truly were 'propaganda': Not for Blood and Soil, but for Volksgemeinschaft. I have concluded that these findings corroborate the *pragmatic view*.

Section 6 treated the mobile cinema as a case study for the use of movies. The first subsection (6.1) was about the DAF/KdF, which organized the mobile cinema. Sources about the movie trucks are rare, so I have discussed the KdF on a more general level. Overall I found that the KdF embraced technology by using movies and depicting technology as positive in their movies. I have established that the concept of Volksgemeinschaft was of central importance for the KdF. Thus, I argued, Volksgemeinschaft is to be understood as *modern* peoples community and to be brought about by technological means. Subsection 6.2, about the mobile cinema, reflected this. I found that mobile cinemas fit very well into the Nazi preference for oral communication, were important sources of entertainment and news, fit well into the overall propaganda strategy and promoted technology, modernization and communal spirit. Lastly the mobile cinema can be seen in context of the ever prevalent battle against land flight, for which reason I have interpreted this case study as corroboration for the *pragmatic view*.

7.2   Looking at the pieces: Historiography

In what follows we will take a step back from the puzzle. Then we compare the image we see with the by now familiar historiographical narratives. Which narrative best describes the image?

Unfortunately I have not found any evidence for the *traditional view*. Quite the opposite; every subsection seemed to refute this narrative. So let us have a brief look at some of those arguments. Kulturfilm intentionally, not accidentally, portrayed technology in a positive light. Many Kulturfilme were relatively ambiguous about ideology and politics, meaning the Nazis were able to interpret the movies in accordance to their ideology. But the movies themselves often were a-political. Das Erbe represents a special case. The movie seeks to provide scientific arguments for racism, not Blood and Soil; so in a sense it promotes science. The Wochenschau did not promote Blood and Soil either. Instead the news-reel emphasized war technologies, which seems to have been well received by the public. The same can be said about propaganda movies. In this genre we actually encountered some genuine promotion for Blood and Soil ideology. Yet those examples stem from the period of 1933-1935. So if Blood and Soil was so central to NS, why were such movies not produced after that? Even

worse, other examples of propaganda movies related technology with power, in a positive sense. Educational movies seemed to corroborate the traditional view, but as soon as we located them in a broader context, they seemed more like advertisements for unpopular policies - and not an illustration of Nazi goals. In summary the traditional view seemed to have failed.

Herf's narrative, which describes the Nazis as reactionary moderns, who embraced technology selectively, fared better than the traditional view. Was there really some kind of continuity from imperial Germany to the Third Reich? Certainly for some aspects of Kulturfilm, especially in regards to depicted topics - Darwinism in Das Erbe, for instance. Yet I have argued that this case does not exemplify 'continuity' as per Herf. However 'continuity' is well in line with my assumption that the Machtergreifung did not represent a major shift for Nazi film, exemplified by propaganda film. Finally there seemed to have been continuity in Lehrfilm, which has been demanded since the 1920s and finally implemented by the NSDAP.

More importantly I have noted that a personal conflict between NS-ideologists, basically Blood and Soil against techno-enthusiast, found its way into NS movies, with the latter coming out on top. This would clearly speak against Herf, for he couldn't account for a multi-faceted NS-ideology, or the question: If Blood and Soil is based on gradual development of 'reactionary modernism', how do we account for the techno-enthusiastic Nazis, which clearly dominated movies? The point is that NS was not a movement with but one intellectual root.

Herf's idea of selective embrace of technology was hard to trace. Neither Kulturfilm nor propaganda movies selectively embraced technology. I have found some selective embrace of technology in the Wochenschau, but have explained that by reference to War-related news - meaning the Wochenschau did not embrace military technology for ideological reasons. Lehrfilm can be interpreted to fit the selective category. But that left us with the question of *why* that was. More precisely, why, for instance, fertilizers were important in reality, but not in movies.

The *modern view*, i.e. the belief that the Nazis were moderns who fully embraced technology and were centrally organized. As far as centralization results were mixed. Kulturfilm was relatively un-centralized. Wochenschau and propaganda movies were the exact opposite. Whether or not Lehrfilm was centralized depends on our definition of the term. Educational movies were solely produced by the ministry of education, so in that sense the genre was centrally controlled. But Goebbels resided over the majority of the remainder of movies. Since Lehrfilm did not fall under Goebbels' task area, it can be seen as an outlier and in that sense not centralized. Either way there are some issues here. Firstly there were many disputes within the NSDAP, e.g. the case of Rosenberg vs. Ley (see subsection 6.2). Such cases suggest the NSDAP was an organization with various power-centers. Secondly the fact that NSDAP policies were often makeshift and sometimes their implementation was almost chaotic.

Now did the Nazis fully embrace technology? Kulturfilm certainly did and so did propaganda movies. The latter case is a little more complex and required some interpretation, due to the variety of the genre; yet propaganda movies generally equated technological progress to power gain. Lehrfilm was embraced in the classroom, but on the screen things looked differently. Our examples showed that industrial production was commonly depicted as gloomy. I have interpreted this as an attempt to combat land flight and not criticism of modernity. The Wochenschau selectively embraced technology, but held military technologies in very high regard. This means that Rohkrämer's theory that the Nazis fully embraced technology is too shallow and evades the question *why* a certain technology was embraced.

The *why question* is what the *pragmatic view* answers. I have introduced this view in subsection 2.3 in context to economic policies, which - I argued - were based upon a set of specific problems: Most prominently land flight and unemployment. But can we translate this idea to technology and ideology? I think yes. The pragmatic view prevails where above summarized narratives fail, because it does not deal in absolutes. The matter of fact that Kulturfilm was not centralized was an issue for Rohkrämer. In the pragmatic view this means that there was no need to do so. Kulturfilm was relatively ambiguous and could be interpreted in accordance with NS. We should not ask why Kulturfilm was not centralized, but why it should have been. As far as the Wochenschau goes, I have highlighted its role as a news outlet. This explains why the Wochenschau was mostly concerned with military technologies. One of the practical issues for the Wochenschau was that of public distrust towards the government. There was an attempt to ease the tension by appeal to Wunderwaffen, which clearly suggests that the Nazis were enthusiastic about technologies. Propaganda movies equated technology with power. The pragmatic view added the reason behind this. Arms production was well behind schedule at the time Feldzug in Polen was released. Thus the movie served the purpose of intimidating enemies, and reinforcing trust at home. The pragmatic view understands Lehrfilm, which seemingly promoted Blood and Soil, as an advertisement for unpopular policies - Landjahr, Erbhofgesetz, etc. In this sense such movies are merely an artistic appropriation of Blood and Soil.

Finally I think the pragmatic view accounts for the findings of this thesis best, which is mostly due to its flexible nature and actively adds to the content by describing *why* technologies were embraced. The latter breaks disciplinary boundaries, making this paper a plea for interdisciplinary histories (of technology). The questions of *why* a certain technology was depicted positively stands in the fore. Generally speaking then, the pragmatic view described the Nazis as techno-enthusiasts; however they were so for pragmatic reasons. Thus this general statement might not hold in specific instances. Additionally this narrative explains Blood and Soil oriented productions, just like the techno-enthusiasm, as a response to practical issues. As a final remark I would like to consider the concept of Volksgemeinschaft. I have argued, most specifically in context of the mobile cinema, that Volksgemeinschaft is to be understood as modern peo-

ples community. The means to reach this Volksgemeinschaft was technological progress and modernization of backward areas. As such Volksgemeinschaft reverses the direction of Blood and Soil by looking to the city. Volksgemeinschaft means making the farm more like the city.

You might wonder if my narrative is too broad, or relativizes everything. A critic might argue that I have not addressed technologies, or technological developments, in detail. But this was not my aim. My goal was to investigate how movies, as a technology, were *used* and how movies mirror the Nazi view of modernity and ideology in what they depict. This invites us to not only ask *how* things were, but also *why* that was the case. The only way to sufficiently answer this question is to look beyond science and technology; we must look at how a technology was used in an interdisciplinary context. And I have done just this.

There is one considerable blind spot I will acknowledge: The negative sides of the Reich. War crimes, anti-semitism and racism remained largely un-addressed in this thesis. I wish to point out that this is not necessarily a methodological fallacy, but due to the fact that movies usually did not depict the dark side of the Reich, making them ill-suited for such an endeavour in the first place. As far as anti-semitism and racism goes we must recall that this thesis set out to analyze technology, as a proxy for modernity, and Blood and Soil ideology. In order not to over-complicate things I have reduced the latter to its criticism of modernity, i.e. industrialization, urbanization and technology - and not racial considerations.

7.3 Hitler Baut Auf: Reflections and Further Research

This brings us to the question: Can we generalize these findings? In this thesis I was concerned with the question of how Blood and Soil ideology, as a proxy for anti-modernism, and technology, as a symbol of modernity, were depicted in National Socialist movies. The narrative I proposed holds that Blood and Soil was of merely artistic value, while technology was generally embraced. Beyond the content of movies, the fact that movies were an important medium in the Third Reich exemplifies the latter point.

I think the methodology I have applied here indeed gives us a satisfactory image of movies of the era. I was concerned with four specific genres of film: Kulturfilm, Wochenschau, propaganda movies and Lehrfilm. I have made this selection based on objectivity, which translates into credibility. The Wochenschau, propaganda film and educational movies were to explicitly speak to the public; Kulturfilm was a genre that discussed modernity and technology in detail and thus deserved some attention as well. Additionally I have analyzed general developments in the relationship between film and the NSDAP, as well as a case study of the peculiar resurrection of the mobile cinema. Each section featured examples from a spectrum of depiction of technology, from Blood and Soil-type rejection to enthusiasm. But did I cherry-pick the movies? Quite frankly the most important issue in my selection was availability. Surely I have made a selection, but I was keen on encompassing all aspects of each genre.

Can this thesis make claims beyond movies? I believe my methodology can. The goal of the analyses was to corroborate, or falsify, historiographical narratives, which were generalized historical views. Furthermore we should not underestimate the value of movies, especially for a regime that was so keen on controlling this medium. Movies that were not in line with the NSDAP's program were banned. Examples discussed here underwent a strict selective process. Approved movies thus were, as per definition, in line with NS-thought. Lastly I have drawn some valid generalized conclusions, e.g. about centralization within the party (and later the government), or how to understand the concept of Volksgemeinschaft. However some more troublesome aspects of the Third Reich, e.g. Aryan Science, genocide, or oppression and violence have been omitted from this thesis. A truly general history must touch upon these issues, which is impossible to do within movies: Film had a blind spot for the dark side of the Reich.

Finally a few words on definitions are in order. I attempted to leave strict definitions out of the stories I told in each subsection, as I understand definitions of modernity and tradition vary from author to author. Yet in a sense our historiographical debate resulted in a preference of certain definitions over others. Perhaps not everyone will agree to this approach and I think this is a good. I chose an unorthodox approach to the history of science and technology not just to assess its value, but to open up larger debates in historiography and, in this case, the question: What is the role of definitions in history?

These are not the only issues that invite further research. I have proposed an interdisciplinary approach to the history of science and technology. However the topic of this thesis was but one nation. An international comparison of the same topic and era, using the same methodology, seems advisable. This could further our understanding of the relationship between governance/politics, ideology and science. It could be fruitful to group governments of similar ideologies together: Italy could be paired with Germany, the UK with the USA, and so on.[307]

Stating the obvious, my analyses of each movie could have been far more extensive. While I have focused on the display, interpretation and implication of technology and ideology in the movies, I have said little about aesthetics. For some movies this aspect was key - Triumph des Willens comes to mind. Moreover I did not address the popularity of movies. Different movies could be compared based on copies made, estimated number of viewers, or their life-span in the cinemas. This way we could investigate how certain topics were received. The same goes for the number of movies produced. Exactly how many 'techno-enthusiastic' movies were produced? How many Blood and Soil movies?

NS-ideology often related to Nordic ideals. These usually included some kind of mysticism and anti-christian dogma.[308] No movies with mystic content have

[307]For examples see Chapman, J., *The British at War*, Koppes, C., Black, G., *Hollywood goes to War*, Taylor, R., *Film Propaganda. Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany* or Reeves, N., *The Power of Film Propaganda*.

[308]See Geschichte des Dokumentarfilms, Vol.3, Almgren, B., Hecker-Stampehl, J., Piper, E., *Alfred Rosenberg und die Nordische Gesellschaft* and Hermand, J., *Der alte Traum vom*

been discussed here, but they should prove to be a fruitful addition, especially in contrast to the movies we have analyzed. Similarly party-independent feature film has been omitted in this paper and could prove to be a valuable source in the attempt to probe public opinion and a more general approach to movies in the Third Reich. Furthermore a discussion of feature film could help determine the importance of entertainment, especially technological entertainment, before and during the second World War.

Unfortunately NSDAP-productions before 1933 have only found marginal mention in this paper and should be analyzed in-depth, contrasted to later productions and, most importantly, interpreted in context of contemporary movies from rival parties. The SPD, for instance, has been producing professional propaganda movies years before the Nazis did.[309] Were there any similarities between the two parties? How closely did the respective types of movies correlate to the parties' programs?[310]

Around the time in question it was fairly common to publish books about popular movies. A comparison between the content or reception of those books and the respective movies could turn up interesting results: At times the NSDAP depended on an announcer, or in the case of Lehrfilm on classroom discussion, to ascribe meaning to movies, which would be impossible in case of the written counterpart. Thus researching these books could result in an even clearer image of the subject, or perhaps refute what I have written.

Hitler baut auf, or so the campaign promise went. This thesis was not just an empty promise. We have constructed, built, a history of National Socialism, firmly rooted in historiography. Now I hope you, dear reader, have enjoyed this puzzle as much as I did and that this thesis serves as food for thought, base for discussion, methodological inspiration, or perhaps even encouragement for further research.

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neuen Reich.

[309] For SPD movies see, e.g. Was wählst du? (1927), Im Anfang war das Wort (1928), Bau am Staat (1929), Lohnbuchhalter Kremke (1930), Dem deutschen Volke (1930).

[310] E.g. Murray, B., *Film and the German Left in the Weimar Republic.*

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9 Filmography

- 14 Jahre System

- Abbau und Förderung von Steinkohle (RfdU, 1936)

- Abbau von Steinkohle (1935)

- Alles Leben ist Kampf (Living is Fighting, W. Hüttig, H. Gerdes, 1937)

- Altgermanische Bauernkultur (W. Ruttmann, 1933/1934)

- Arbeiter - heute (L. Fürst, 1935)

- Bahn frei! (W. Marzahn, 1935)

- Bau am Staat (1929)

- Bauer in Not (Farmer in Distress, H. Ewald sen., 1932)

- Bauerntöpferei (E. Puchstein, 1934)

- Bei den deutschen Kolonisten in Südwest-Afrika (Ufa, 1934)

- Berlin: Die Sinfonie der Großstadt (W. Ruttmann, 1927)

- Bilder aus dem Leben der Ameise (Ufa and Bavaria, 1936)

- Blut und Boden. Grundlagen zum neuen Reich (W. Ruttmann, R. von Sojevskii-Jamrowski, H. von Passavant, E. Th. Bruger, 1933)

- Das Einbinden eines Buches

- Das Erbe (The Inheritance, C. Hartmann, 1935)

- Das Herdfeuer im Niedersächsischen Bauernhaus (H. Cürlis, 1937)

- Das deutsche Erntedankfest 1934 auf dem Bückeberg (K. Waschneck, 1934)

- Das junge Deutschland marschiert (1932)

- Das Wort aus Stein (K. Rupli, 1939)

- Deutsche Panzer (German Tanks, W. Ruttmann, 1940)

- Deutsche Rassenkunde

- Deutsche Wehr, deutsche Ehr

- Deutsche Waffenschmieden (W. Ruttmann, 1940)

- Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.651 (10/1943)

- Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.723 (30/1940)

- Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.725 (32/1944)

- Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.732 (39/1944)

- Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.734 (31/1944)

- Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.735 (42/1944)

- Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.737 (44/1944)

- Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.747 (2/1945)

- Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.751 (6/1945)

- Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.752 (7/1945)

- Deutsche Wochenschau Nr.754 (9/1945)

- Deutschland gestern und heute (1936)

- Dem deutschen Volke (1930)

- Der ewige Jude. Dokumentarfilm über das Weltjudentum (F. Hippler, 1940)

- Der Leonhardiritt in Tölz (H. Böhnisch, 1937)

- Der Stichling und seine Brutpflege

- Die Bauten Adolf Hitlers (W. Hege, 1938)

- Die Rasse und ihr Einfluss auf Kultur und Heldentum

- Die Saat geht auf (H. von Passavant, 1934/1935)

- Die Stadt der Verheißung (H. von Passavant, P. Beyer, 1934/1935)

- Ein Landbrieftrger (W. Hart, E. Hart, 1941)

- Ein Tag auf einer fränkischen Dorfstrasse (W. Basse, 1939)

- Entwicklung des Kohlweisslings (1939)

- Erbgesundheitslehre

- Erbkrank (1936)

- Erzbergwerk (RfdU, 1936)

- Faltarbeiten aus Papier I-II

- Federgeld-Inflation (H. Ewald sen., 10932)

- Feldzug in Polen (F. Hippler, 1940)

- Festliches Nürnberg (1937)

- Flieger, Funker, Kannoniere (M. Rikli, 1937)

- Flieger zur See (M. Rikli, 1939)

- Gebt mir vier Jahre Zeit! (Tobis, 1937)

- Handweberei I+II (W. Basse, 1936)

- Heimat im Werk (O. Geiger, 1939)

- Heimat und Boden (O. Geiger, 1939)

- Helden in Spanien (Heroes in Spain, F.C. Mauch, P. Laven, J. Reig, C. Jughans, 1938)

- Heuzug im Allgäu (W. Prager, 1941)

- Hitler über Deutschland (1932)

- Hitlerjugend in den Bergen (S. J. Lutz, 1932)

- Hitlerjunge Quex. Ein Film vom Opfergeist der deutschen Jugend (H. Steinhoff, 1933)

- Hamburg: Deutschlands Tor zur Welt (Ufa, 1939)

- Hochzeit am Tegernsee (Von Dix, 1937)

- Hochofen I-III (1936)

- Im Anfang war das Wort (1928)

- Im Zeichen des Hakenkreuzes (1924)

- In der Windmühle (K. Schneider, 1934)

- Jahre der Entscheidung (H Weidemann, C. Junghans, L. Bühle, 1939)

- Jud Süß (V. Harlan, 1940)

- Kirche und Staat (Church and Nation, H. Ewald sen., 1932)

- Kohlenschleppzug auf dem Mittelrhein (W. Basse, 1936)

- Kohlweissling (1935)

- Kurenfischer (C. Patrix-Dreyer, 1941)

- Leinen Los! (H. Heinrich, 1936)

- Licht (S. Noldan, O. Geiger, 1936)

- Lohnbuchhalter Kremke (M. Harder, 1930)

- Markgröninger Schäferlauf (1937)

- Modern Times (C. Chaplin, 1936)

- Mädel im Landjahr (H. Cürlis, 1936)

- Metall des Himmels (W. Ruttmann, 1935)

- Michelangelo - Das Leben eines Titanen (C. Oertel, 1938)

- Norwegenfahrt "Kraft durch Freude" (Trip to Norway, DAF, 1934)

- Ostraum - Deutscher Raum (W. Buhre, 1940)

- Parole: Führer (H. Ewald sen., 1932)

- Rottweiler Fasnet (1936)

- S.A. Mann Brand (F. Seitz sen., 1933)

- Schiff ohne Klassen (O. Geiger, 1938)

- Schwäbisch-alemannischen Narrentreffen in Oberndorf (1936)

- Schwälmer Bäuerin am Spinnrad (W. Basse, 1936)

- Schönheit der Arbeit (S. Noldan, 1934)

- Spiel der Freude (O. Geiger, 1936/1937)

- Strassen ohne Hindernisse! Ein Film über die Reichsautobahnen (M. Rikli, 1935)

- Stadt und Land (City and landscape, H. Ewald sen., 1932)

- Stahlwerk I-III (RfdU, 1936)

- Steinkohlen-Bergwerk (RfdU, 1935)

- Stuttgart, die Grossstadt zwischen Wald und Reben (W. Ruttmann, 1935)

- Triumph des Willens (L. Riefenstahl, 1935)

- Urlaubsfreuden (E. Scholl, O. Geiger, 1937)

- Volkstum im Schwarzwald (1936, H. Retzlaff)

- Verträumte Winkel and Neckar und Main (O. Trippel, 1942)

- Vom Erz zur Schiene (M. Weid, 1936)

- Vom Korn zum Brot (W. Basse, 1936)

- Vom Zusammenbruch Deutschlands zur nationalen Wiedergeburt 1918-1933

- Walzwerk I-II (1936)

- Was wählst du? (1927)

- Weltstadt Berlin (L. de Lafergue, 1938)

- Wir basteln einen Bauernhof (19??)

- Wir und das Werk (1936)

- Zinsknechtschaft (H. Ewald sen., 1932)

- Zuversicht und Kraft (H. Ewald sen., 1932)

10 Appendix

A. Weimar-era Wahlkreise (electoral districts). [311]

Wahlkreiseinteilung Deutschlands 1924–33

VII 13 34 35 IV 6
14 VIII 15
XII 17 IX 16 10 VI
23 18 III 2 3 II 5 4
22 19 11 29 28 8 V 7
20 X 12 30 XV 9
XI 21
33 26 XIV
zu XIV 27
31 XVI 25 XIII
32 24

Wahlkreis-verbände:
I Ostpreußen
II Brandenburg I
III Brandenburg II
IV Pommern-Mecklenburg

V Schlesien
VI Sachsen-Thüringen
VII Schleswig-Holstein-Hamburg
VIII Niedersachsen
IX Westfalen
X Hessen
XI Rheinland Süd
XII Rheinland Nord
XIII Bayern Südost
XIV Bayern Nordwest
XV Sachsen
XVI Württemberg-Baden

Wahlkreise:
1 Ostpreußen
2 Berlin
3 Potsdam II
4 Potsdam I
5 Frankfurt/Oder
6 Pommern
7 Breslau
8 Liegnitz
9 Oppeln
10 Magdeburg
11 Merseburg
12 Thüringen
13 Schleswig-Holstein

14 Weser-Ems
15 Ost-Hannover
16 Südhannover-Braunschweig
17 Westfalen Nord
18 Westfalen Süd
19 Hessen-Nassau
20 Köln-Aachen
21 Koblenz-Trier
22 Düsseldorf Ost
23 Düsseldorf West

24 Oberbayern-Schwaben
25 Niederbayern
26 Franken
27 Pfalz
28 Dresden-Bautzen
29 Leipzig
30 Chemnitz-Zwickau
31 Württemberg
32 Baden
33 Hessen-Darmstadt
34 Hamburg
35 Mecklenburg

B. Correlation between NSDAP-vote and town size. Source: Hitler's Wähler, p.168

Tabelle 6.10: Die NSDAP-Wähler nach der Gemeindegröße

(a) Von 100 Wahlberechtigten der nachstehenden Ortsgrößenklasse haben NSDAP gewählt . . .

	0–5000	5–20000	20–100000	über 100000
RTW 1928	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.0
RTW 1930	14.6	15.8	15.7	14.4
RTW 1932J	(34)	(32)	(29)	(28)
RTW 1932N	(31)	(26)	(25)	(23)
RTW 1933	43.8	37.3	36.6	33.3

(b) Von 100 NSDAP-Wählern kamen aus Gemeinden mit

	0–5000	5–20000	20–100000	über 100000
RTW 1928	39.2	13.6	15.7	31.4
RTW 1930	41.2	13.4	14.5	30.9
RTW 1932J	(45)	(13)	(13)	(28)
RTW 1932N	(47)	(12)	(13)	(27)
RTW 1933	47.2	12.2	13.1	27.5
Alle*	42.0	12.7	14.1	31.3

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[311]Source: `https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_der_Wahlkreise_und_Wahlkreisverb%C3%A4nde_der_Weimarer_Republik`, accessed 10.8.2017

C. Religious dispersion in the German Reich.[312]

KONFESSIONSKARTE DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES.

[312]Source: www.retrobibliothek.de/retrobib/seite.html?id=5180693&imageview=true, accessed 10.8.2017

D. Berlin. Sinfonie einer Großstadt.

Figure 30: Rollercoaster-scene in the chaotic part of the movie.


Figure 31: Crowds in Berlin streets.

Figure 32: Symmetrical machine-based production.

Figure 33: Window-shopping in Berlin.

Figure 34: A crowded train station.

E. Deutsche Panzer

Figure 35: An engineer designs tanks.

Figure 36: Machine-based production process.

Figure 37: Machine based production process.

Figure 38: The worker's children do sports.

F. Das Erbe

Figure 39: The team films a bug fight.

Figure 40: An asylum depicted in Das Erbe.

Figure 41: Layers of close-ups of the mentally ill seek to shock the viewer.

Figure 42: Deformed person as a shocking result of bad 'racial hygiene'.

Figure 43: Healthy workers as a result of proper 'racial hygiene'.

G. Schiff ohne Klassen

Figure 44: Set sails! The ship is leaving harbor.

Figure 45: An animation shows the route.

Figure 46: The worker calls his colleagues back home.

Figure 47: Shore leave: Passengers get to see a castle.

Figure 48: A depiction of the sundeck.

H. Blut und Boden. Grundlagen zum neuen Reich.

Figure 49: The farmer works his field.

Figure 50: Food is scarce in the city.

Figure 51: People struggling to cross the street, a criticism of urbanization and motorization.

Figure 52: Urbanization means Volkstod.

Figure 53: The rebuilt farm with swastika-banner.

Figure 54: The family has abundant food on the farm.

I. Feldzug in Polen

Figure 55: An animation shows German advances.

Figure 56: German soldiers visit a church, suggesting that they respect culture and religion.

Figure 57: The Führer speaks to a soldier in person.

Figure 58: Mobility is key.

Figure 59: Victory parade.

J. Mädel im Landjahr

Figure 60: A girl stuffs a sack with hay, to be used as bed.

Figure 61: The girls eat together.

Figure 62: Geography lesson outdoors.

Figure 63: The girls work together to fetch water.

K. Vom Erz zur Schiene

Figure 64: Gloomy atmosphere in the seemingly automated plant.

Figure 65: A worker in the plant.

L. Kokerei

Figure 66: Aerial view of the plant.

Figure 67: An animation shows the inner workings of the plant.

Figure 68: Workers seal the oven under harsh conditions.

Figure 69: Coke transported away from the plant.

M. In der Windmühle

Figure 70: Close-up of the wind mill

Figure 71: Father and son atop their carriage.

Figure 72: The process of making flour.

N. Kohlenschleppzug auf dem Mittelrhein

Figure 73: The ship's captain.

Figure 74: The ship passes an idyllic-looking town.

Figure 75: A worker on the ship.

O. Cover of Kurt Trampler, Bayerische Ostmark. Aufbau eines Grenzlandes (Munich, 1934), showing where the Gau 'Bayrische Ostmark' is located.[313]

[313]Source: https://www.buchfreund.de/Bayerische-Ostmark-Aufbau-eines-Grenzlandes-Trampler-Kurt, 55738505-buch, accessed 10.8.2017