

# A Nationalist and a Populist Walk Into a Bar...

And are too afraid to let anyone else in

*A Thesis on Nationalism, Populism, and Siege Mentality in the Netherlands*

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## Abstract

This thesis connects theories of three different concepts: nationalism, populism, and siege mentality. The theories are tested in an analysis of four cases in the political history of the Netherlands. These cases are subjected to a comparative research method, after which it is concluded that there is a correlation between the three concepts. The study finds that the presence of populism combined with certain characteristics of nationalism causes a political party to inspire siege mentality among the supporters of the party.

*And the problems with immigration, asylum, and terror? These words are not even mentioned in the letter Mr. Rutte sent to the scout. Energy transition is the order of the day. But we are talking about a serious problem. And that problem is called Islam. Not talking about it will not help. On the contrary, it is perilous. We have just commemorated the attacks in London. The latest in a long line. And our country is no safer. The threat of terror is greater than ever. And let me tell you: We cannot fix the problem with the Green Left (GroenLinks). For that, we need the PVV.<sup>1</sup>*

## Introduction

It seems as though in the Western world nationalism is becoming an increasingly popular ideology. Pursuing an isolationist agenda full of nationalism, Donald J. Trump managed to be elected as the 45<sup>th</sup> president of the United States of America. In Europe the British people voted to opt out of the European Union, after a campaign where so called ‘Brexiters’ warned the people about immigrants, how open borders threatened the nation, and that Great Britain was strong enough to make it on its own and did not need to be in the European Union. Sovereignty was one of the key words of the ‘leave’ campaign.<sup>2</sup>

On Europe’s mainland French former presidential candidate Marine Le Pen enjoys unprecedented levels of support. She has managed to make it through the first round of voting, losing in the second round to Emmanuel Macron. Le Pen is a member of the far-right Front National and their campaign was based on strong anti-Islam, anti-European Union, and general anti-

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<sup>1</sup> Outtake of a speech by Geert Wilders after the national elections of 2017 in which Wilders suggests his party will be the right choice to join the future coalition. <https://www.pvv.nl/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/9480-inbreng-geert-wilders-bij-het-debat-over-de-verkiezingsuitslag.html>, 25-05-2017

<sup>2</sup> John Rentoul & Ian Johnston, ‘EU Referendum: The Ten Worst Clichés So Far’ <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-the-ten-worst-clich-s-from-the-campaign-so-far-a6898701.html> 3 March 2017.

immigration rhetoric.<sup>34</sup> Neighboring country Germany will have federal elections later this year and is experiencing a rise in popularity of the anti-immigrant AfD at the expense of, among others, the ruling CDU party.<sup>5</sup>

In the Netherlands polls projected a big win for the PVV in the national elections of 2017.<sup>6</sup> The projections did not come true, as the VVD won the most seats in the House of Representatives for the third time in a row. The PVV came in second with twenty seats.<sup>7</sup> The PVV uses heavy anti-Islam and anti-immigration rhetoric, vowing to close down all mosques in the Netherlands and stopping every immigrant at the border. All of this can be read in their one page election program.<sup>8</sup> But it is important to notice that anti-immigration rhetoric is not a new phenomenon. In this thesis it becomes apparent, for example, that in the Netherlands the first party's whose main purpose was to oppose immigration into the Netherlands did so in the early 1980's.

These are a few examples of current trends in Western politics. Far-right parties seem to be gaining in popularity. Moreover, these parties express anti-immigration rhetoric and often try to convince the public that their country is suffering from immigration and Muslim residents. Often, this kind of rhetoric is paired with conservative nationalist expressions through which parties try to profile themselves as the defenders of the national identity.<sup>9</sup> But in profiling your own party as protector of the nation against the outside world, a picture of an unsafe outer world might arise. And when people believe that there is no safe place, except for within the nation, they might want to shut the rest of the world out. This is called a siege mentality.<sup>10</sup>

Siege mentality is a phenomenon that is most extensively described in the case of Israel and its conflict with Palestine. However, after thoroughly examining four different cases, I have found that siege mentality theory is applicable to other cases as well. The cases I have examined are political parties that have existed, or still exist, in the Netherlands. Each of these parties are right-

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<sup>3</sup> Reiss Smith, 'French Election 2017 Candidates: Meet Marine Le Pen, Francois Fillon, Macron and Hamon' <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/770623/French-election-2017-candidates-Marine-Le-Pen-Francois-Fillon-Emmanuel-Macron-Benoit-Hamon> 3 March 2017.

<sup>4</sup> Reiss Smith, 'French Election 2017 Polls: Will Fillon, Le Pen or Macron Win? Latest Polls and Odds' <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/735118/French-election-2017-results-latest-polls-odds-tracker-win> 3 March 2017.

<sup>5</sup> Joerg Forbrig, 'A Glimpse Into Germanys Political Future' <http://www.politico.eu/article/berlin-state-election-2016-alternative-for-germany-afd-cdu-spd-2017-election-angela-merkel/> 3 March 2017.

<sup>6</sup> 'Peilingwijzer' <http://peilingwijzer.tomlouwerse.nl/> 5 March 2017.

<sup>7</sup> 'Kiesraad Stelt Definitieve Verkiezingsuitslag Vast', <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/nieuws/kamernieuws/kiesraad-stelt-definitieve-verkiezingsuitslag-vast> 16 April 2017.

<sup>8</sup> 'Nederland Weer van Ons!' <https://pvv.nl/visie.html> 5 March 2017.

<sup>9</sup> Christina Schori Liang, "Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right" in *Europe for the Europeans; The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right*, ed. Christina Schori Liang (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016) 1-3.

<sup>10</sup> Ronald R. Krebs, 'Israel's Bunker Mentality: How the Occupation is Destroying the Nation', *Foreign Affairs* 90 (2001) 10-18.

wing and considered to be, or have been, controversial. A striking similarity between the parties I examined is that they are often called 'populist'. Populism is a kind of strategy used by political parties. Populist strategies are often aimed at swinging popular opinion in favor of a political party by using simple rhetoric, basic logic, and opposing 'the elite'.

### A Case Study

When reviewing theories on nationalism, siege mentality, and populism, evidence of a correlation between the phenomena was found. It is my theory that a combination of nationalist ideology in a right-wing party, combined with a populist strategy used by the party, inspires a siege mentality among citizens. Therefore I have analyzed four different cases in the Netherlands. By extrapolating a theory, on siege mentality, that is mainly applied to Israel, I will show that the theory is applicable to multiple cases. These cases that are studied are the Dutch political parties the *Boerenpartij*, *Centrum Democraten & Centrum Partij* (these two parties are reviewed as being one case), *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, and *Partij Voor Vrijheid*.<sup>11</sup> These four parties are right-wing, and generally considered to be populist, parties.<sup>12</sup> What is more, during the examination I found that each of these parties, in some way or another, shows signs of nationalist ideologies in their values and beliefs.

Each of the cases were present in a different era. The Farmers Party managed to surprise by gaining seven seats in the Dutch House of Representatives in 1967. Hans Janmaat, leader of the Centre Democrats and the Centre Party was stirring up political controversies throughout the 1980's and 1990's. Pim Fortuyn rose out of nowhere to the top of Dutch politics in the last months of 2001 and the first part of 2002, before being tragically shot on May 6 2002. And Geert Wilders has been, almost without a pause, a member of the Dutch House of Representatives ever since the elections of 1998. After forming his own party, the PVV, he has been a regular in The Hague and his PVV keeps its significant influence in Dutch politics.

For the analysis I will mainly focus on party programs from the political parties in the cases. I consider these party programs to be a reflection of the goal and mentality of the party. I will further include several other primary sources such as books published by party leaders, newspaper articles on the parties or the members of the parties, and political statements of appropriate agents within the parties. I deem all of these primary sources to be a reflection of the aims and mentality of the party, representative examples of the means of expressing and spreading the beliefs of the parties.

I have examined all of these cases to look for a correlation between the concepts nationalism, siege mentality, and populism. The method I have used is a case oriented comparative

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<sup>11</sup> The Farmers Party, Centre Democrats & Centre Party, List Pim Fortuyn, and the Party For Freedom.

<sup>12</sup> 'Populisme' <http://www.parlement.com/id/vhnnmt7l7vux/populisme> 5 March 2017.

method. I have used Mill's joined method of agreement and difference, therefore the analysis is variation finding. This method aims at identifying resembling factors in different cases, and identifying which factors do not appear in each case. This method will provide an insight into which factors determine the presence of a phenomenon in a case, and which factors will not determine a phenomenon.<sup>13</sup> I have used this method in order to best establish which factors regarding nationalism and populism need to be present in a case in order to establish if a political party inspires a siege mentality among voters.

### The Puzzle

In the context of the Israel-Palestine case, I have used three theories on siege mentality for my analysis. These three theories find various reasons for the existence of a siege mentality. Reasons for a siege mentality can differ from religiousness to cultural history of a group. But for this thesis I am not interested in the differences between the theories. It are the commonalities that are useful. The commonality in these three different theories on siege mentality is that a certain fear of 'other' groups impacts the country that the people having a siege mentality live in. And it is my believe that when populist political parties rely heavy on nationalism in order to win support, this inspires a siege mentality amongst the supporters of the populist political party. Therefore the aims of this thesis will be threefold: First, to identify in what way the selected cases in this study are populist. Second, to identify similarities and differences between the kind of nationalist ideologies within the parties. Third, to test if my hypothesis that nationalism combined with populism aims to inspire siege mentality is correct. To do so, I have examined in which way each of the cases has used nationalism in order to attract voters. I have also examined if there is a correlation between the use of nationalism in these parties and possible xenophobic and fear inspiring rhetoric.

I will answer the following research question: Which parties aim at inspiring siege mentality among supporters of the political parties in the cases? In order to answer this question, I looked at the presence of a combination of nationalism and populism in the cases. After examining theories on nationalism, populism and siege mentality I found that there is a correlation between the theories. The correlation is that a combination of populism and radicalized conservative nationalism in a political party inspires siege mentality among the supports of the political party. Different types of nationalism and their relation to populism and siege mentality will be described in the first section. This section will also provide a description of the concept populism. The section will then explain the motivation for political parties to inspire siege mentality. The second section will provide an analysis

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<sup>13</sup> Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method; Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2014) 39-42.



of four cases. These cases will be compared to each other through the aforementioned comparative method. This method is aimed at identifying which characteristics of the theories are present in these cases. I will then determine for each case whether they inspire siege mentality. To determine which factors cause a siege mentality, I will describe which factors are present in cases that do inspire siege mentality and are lacking in the cases that do not inspire siege mentality to be able to determine the combination of characteristics a political party needs to contain in order to inspire siege mentality.

## Theories and Case Selection

The term nationalism can be very complicated, and hard to define. As the nation is the centerpiece of nationalism, it is important to first answer the question 'what is a nation?'. In answering this question, Steven Grosby immediately unveiled the ties between nationalism and siege mentality. It is a question of the difference between 'us' and 'them'.<sup>14</sup> In this section I will first give an extensive analysis of the subject nationalism, guided by the works of several authors. Although Grosby's *Very Short Introduction* is very insightful, the book is not elaborate enough to give a full explanation. I will explain which theories are the most important for this thesis, and why these theories are important. Thereafter I will analyze the subjects populism and siege mentality. Lastly, I will connect the ties between nationalism, populism and siege mentality.

### Nationalism

Grosby provides his readers with a simple explanation of the term nationalism. He states that 'Nationalism refers to a set of beliefs about the nation'.<sup>15</sup> A nation is a group of people that is bound by common features, such as language, culture, or religion. The set of beliefs that Grosby mentions, defines who is part of the nation. Some may deem the nation belonging to those who speak the same language. Others believe it is not language that binds a nation together, but ethnicity and culture. Therefore, a nation is not necessarily the same thing as a country or a state, but a group of people that value the same commonalities, and by these commonalities define themselves as a nation.<sup>16</sup> For example, the Kurds view themselves as being a nation despite the fact that their would-be country, Kurdistan, is a region that spreads across different states.

Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman perhaps are the most accurate in their description of the difference between a state and a nation. They state that the term 'nation' is inherently ambiguous. The criteria for the definition of a nation can vary greatly, depending on what nation one is talking about and what one's interest is in the definition of a nation.<sup>17</sup> It is often that defining a nation coincides with the claiming of territory. But this is where the terms 'nation' and 'state' can get confused with one another. A state has to do with a sovereign territory. It has to do with authority within a confined area. On the other hand, the term 'nation' has to do with relations between a

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<sup>14</sup> Steven Grosby, *Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 1.

<sup>15</sup> Ibidem, 5.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem, 7-18.

<sup>17</sup> Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, *Nationalism; A Critical Introduction*, (London: Sage Publications, 2002) 2.

group of people, how people view themselves and their ties with other members of the same nation. It is therefore not necessary for a national identity to be confined to a state.<sup>18 19</sup>

This national identity is a part of the phenomenon nationalism. Spencer and Wollman define nationalism as an ideology that imagines a community in a certain way. Further characterizations of this ideology are the assertion of the primacy of the community over others, and the seeking of power in the name of the shared identity of the community. This community, that is now imagined as being different from other communities, is the nation. The national identity is what people perceive as the definition of someone being part of the nation. It is the reason why some people believe to belong to a nation and others do not.<sup>20</sup> People in the Netherlands who perceive themselves as member of a Dutch nation, for example, might find they are part of the Dutch nation because they speak the Dutch language and are born to parents who were also born in the Netherlands. In this case language and heritage are part of a national identity.

### Liberal Nationalism

This is where nationalism can become problematic. First of all, nationalism is not a static concept. Scholars have described many different kinds of nationalism. The, for this research, relevant kinds will be discussed, starting with liberal nationalism. Second, identifying oneself as belonging to a nation might cause friction for multiple reasons. Liberal nationalism is an ideology that states that every nation should have the right to self-determination. In this ideology the state is viewed as an actor that can be compared to an autonomous individual. In this perspective a nation has a free will and its own goals.<sup>21</sup> Thus a nation should be regarded as an autonomous individual and be granted the same rights. And as an individual has a right to self-determination, a nation should have one as well.<sup>22</sup>

Moreover, what is typical in liberal nationalism is that the individual should also be free to make its own decision. This seems like it is incoherent with nationalism. However, liberal nationalism states that national unity is needed to uphold liberal institutions. Without national unity 'the united political opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist'.<sup>23</sup> This right to self-determination can be problematic in different ways. For example, what happens when a community, that defines itself as a nation but lives as a minority in a state mostly inhabited

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<sup>18</sup> Spencer and Wollman, *Nationalism*, 2-3.

<sup>19</sup> Grosby, *Nationalism*, 21-26.

<sup>20</sup> Spencer and Wollman, *Nationalism*, 3.

<sup>21</sup> Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) 75.

<sup>22</sup> Spencer and Wollman, *Nationalism*, 6.

<sup>23</sup> Andrew Mason, "Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation", *Ethics* 109 (1999) 264.

by a larger nation, wants to gain independence? Should it then always be possible for this smaller nation to gain independence?<sup>24</sup> In the Netherlands there has been an influx of immigrants for a while, which is an important theme in most cases examined in this study, partially consisting of Arabs. Many Arab immigrants already have children, or even grandchildren, born in the Netherlands. These later generations often possess both the Dutch nationality, as well as the nationality of their (grand)parents. If this community starts to define themselves as a separate nation, should they be granted the right to self-determination and be given space to form a new state within the Netherlands? Note that this theory on nationalism is an ideal type. It is hardly possible that any case exists in the world which completely fits the description of a liberal nationalist nation. Despite these shortcomings, it is sometimes necessary for a theory to present an ideal type in order to make it analyzable.

### Minorities

This last question touches the subject of minorities within a nation. This is one of the subjects that lead some to view nationalism in politics as something negative, leading them to oppose nationalism as being *antinationalists*. As social scientist Andrew Mason puts it, antinationalist fear that promoting a shared identity also promotes minorities assimilating into the nation. They fear this can only be done through oppression.<sup>25</sup> This would mean for the Arab-Dutch community that they would have to completely denounce their Arab culture in order to become part of the Dutch nation. As long as they would have characteristics by which they would be defined as partially belonging to a different nation, they would not be accepted by the dominant nation of the country they live in (the Netherlands in this case).

However, Mason himself has a positive attitude towards nationalism. He points out the possible benefits of a shared identity. For one, Mason argues that a national identity can positively influence politics. As he points out, liberty and independence are strongly connected with the American national identity. That is why politicians in the United States of America would always do their best to uphold these values in governing the country.<sup>26</sup>

Mason then argues that having minorities within a nation does not necessarily mean assimilating these minorities through oppression. Mason states that minorities can benefit the nation by sharing different cultural views on certain problems. This way both groups can benefit each other. Mason then also states that both groups can coexist without one having to be assimilated by the other. If a certain degree of autonomy is granted to the minority, it can still be part of the bigger

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<sup>24</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1983) 106.

<sup>25</sup> Mason, "Political Community", 261.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem, 273-275.

nation but in its own way. As an example Mason refers to Jewish people that are not allowed to trade on Saturday. Creating a law that allows Jewish people to trade on Sunday will cause them to not trade on Saturday, while the other group will continue to trade on Saturday but will not do so on Sunday. By being allowed to trade on a Sunday, the Jewish minority is granted a small portion of autonomy, while it does not hurt the larger nation as the number of days both groups are trading remain the same.<sup>27</sup>

### Identity Through Shared Experience

Another problem that rises when dealing with national identity, nations, and the right to self-determination is the shared memories of nations. Often nations are legitimized through a national identity of shared memories and experience. Because a group of people has been together for many years they are bound by common history. Part of this common history is often about collective suffering, glorious milestones, or sacrifices made by the people. However, according to political scientist Arash Abizadeh, one of the necessary conditions for the existence of such a collective history is a selective memory. Abizadeh argues that the history of a nation becomes somewhat of a myth, as the history members of a nation use to legitimize their nation is usually the part of the history that motivates the existence of a nation. That is why nations willfully forget the parts of their history that reflects the nation in a negative way. As an example, for the French nation this would be the massacre of Saint Bartholomew. This purposefully creating history to legitimize a nation, according to Abizadeh, is why students of nationalism oppose the usage of nationalism in politics.<sup>28</sup>

In contrast to the liberal nationalism, which has been used to legitimize the right to self-determination and has promoted freedom, there is also a conservative kind of nationalism. Opposing the view that every nation should have the right to self-determination, conservatives used nationalism as a way of legitimizing their power over other nations. This meant, for instance, that the subjugation of colonies was justified by glorifying the own nation opposed to the subjugated nation.<sup>29</sup>

Inherent to conservative nationalism is also the justification of authority. In the conservative view it is the job of individuals to serve the state and its pursuit of power. In this regard it is the government that unifies the nation and is the keeper of the peace. The state watches over its people and protects them from other nations. But, the state can only keep the nation safe if they command its subject's loyalty. This view can lead to conflict between states, as other states are an inherent

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<sup>27</sup> Mason, "Political Community", 284-285.

<sup>28</sup> Arash Abizadeh, "Historical Truth, National Myths and Liberal Democracy: On the Coherence of Liberal Nationalism", *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 12 (2004) 292-293.

<sup>29</sup> Spencer and Wollman, *Nationalism*, 16.

threat to the nation. The state actually needs this threat, as it is through the threat of conflict that the state can command the loyalty over its subjects. If there is no threat and no reason for the state to protect its nation, why should the members of the nation continue to serve the state in its quest for power?<sup>30</sup> This theory bears resemblance to the theory on negative self-identity by Sezgin, which will be explained in the context of siege mentality.

### Radicalization

Broader theories on nationalism can be used as a gateway to more specific theories. Liberal and conservative nationalism are, however, some of the most basic and rudimentary theories on nationalism. That is why it is important to have analyzed the theories before I analyze the more specific kinds of theories on nationalism. As there are many different theories, some broad and others specific, I will not analyze all of them. This would be the task of a lifetime. Therefore, I am keeping to the theories that are important to my research.

Integral nationalism looks in many ways like national conservatism. But there is a difference between the two. Conservative nationalism is concerned with maintaining power and stability within a nation. Integral nationalism goes beyond maintaining power. It also builds its legitimacy more on a shared ideology than a shared history. The integral nationalist state seeks to continually expand its power to a point where members of the nation must give up their freedom for the sake of the state. The integral state requires all its citizens to share the same ideology and enthusiasm for this ideology. This way the integral nationalist state can justify any action in favor of this shared ideology.<sup>31</sup> This type of nationalism has been associated with authoritarian ideologies such as fascism.<sup>32</sup>

This integral nationalism is part of a somewhat more excessive theory on nationalism. This is the theory of defensive nationalism. This term is used to describe a kind of nationalism that implies a threat to an existing nation. We have seen in conservative and integral nationalism how in both types a kind of threat is perceived to the nation in order to legitimize the authority of said nation. This threat can be an ideology, but also a group of people. Defensive attributes of nationalism are deriving from the will to keep the own nation, or the ideology of the nation, intact. This does not necessarily mean defensive nationalism is the same as integral- or defensive nationalism.<sup>33</sup> Defensive nationalism is not a way of legitimizing the nation. It is a concern that the nation might stop existing

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<sup>30</sup> Spencer and Wollman, *Nationalism* 15-17.

<sup>31</sup> Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism; A Critical Introduction* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) 34.

<sup>32</sup> Johann P. Arnason, "Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity", *Theory, culture & society* 7 (1990) 232.

<sup>33</sup> David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses", *International Security* 21 (1996) 205.

as such if the threat becomes reality, and calls upon the members of the nation to do what they can to maintain their nation.<sup>34</sup>

In this thesis, I assume the existence of a Dutch nation. The cases that have been studied show evidence of appealing to a Dutch nationality. Because of the nature of a national identity, which exists when people believe it exists, it is regarded in this thesis as a fluid phenomenon. This means that characterizations of a national identity, and therefore the nation, may vary from person to person. The cases show that they are appealing to some kind of Dutch national identity, although the perception of what characteristics define the Dutch nationality may vary. Some cases, for example, refer to Dutch culture as being important to a cohesive society. Others prioritize Dutch language as characteristic of the Dutch nation. In any way, because the cases perceive the existence of a Dutch nation, the Dutch nation exists.

### Populism

The problem with the term populism is that no one yet has stated a clear definition of the phenomenon. Scholars do not yet agree on what populism is. Therefore, I will try to define the term 'neopopulism' or 'new-populism'. I will do this by reviewing literature on the subject of populism in order to try and find commonalities in existing theories on populism. With these commonalities I will state a working definition on populism with which I will conduct the research in this thesis.

Populism is defined by political scientist Margaret Canovan as a collection of movements who oppose mainstream politics and conventional political parties. These movements are generally on the right-wing spectrum of politics. Canovan argues that this type of 'new populism' is used by political parties to challenge current rule. Populist parties try to appeal to a wide audience by claiming the existing elite is not looking after the will of the people, they are only looking after themselves. Populist parties go on to use the media to make statements that reflect negatively on the current government. Generally, populist then go on to claim that they just state what others, the ruling elite, are not willing to say. They claim to just speak their minds, and in doing so they speak for the people. While using this kind of rhetoric, often used terms are 'freedom' and 'justice', something we will find in the cases that are examined in this thesis. These terms are often used because common people can easily identify with such terms.<sup>35</sup>

Political scientist Paris Aslanidis finds much common ground with Canovan in describing populism. He too sees a correlation between populist rhetoric and the dismissal of the ruling elite. Aslanidis claims that populists build on the conviction that individuals invested with political

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<sup>34</sup> Izabela Steflja, "Identity crisis in post-conflict societies: the ICTY's role in defensive nationalism among the Serbs", *Global Change, Peace & Security* 22 (2010) 243.

<sup>35</sup> Canovan, "populism", 242-243.

authority are deliberately failing to abide by the will of 'the people'.<sup>36</sup> In this area it is that Benjamin Arditi defines participation as one of the most important factors of populism. Arditi argues that in order to mobilize the masses behind your cause, you have to give them the feeling of participation.<sup>37</sup> This corresponds with the previous two authors. As the first two authors describe it is necessary for populist parties to create a feeling of unfairness caused by the ruling elite, the populist tries to convince the public that they can make things right by supporting the populist party in order to go against the establishment.

Based on the examined literature I will now establish a working definition of populism which I will use during the rest of this thesis. In my definition of populism a populist has to build support on the distrust of the ruling elite. In order to effectively create distrust, the populist uses simple terms to which large groups of people can relatively easily identify. Claiming that the populist will go against the establishment and, as opposed to the ruling elite, will satisfy the needs of the people. It is therefore that populist parties often make normative claims, without evidence to verify the claim. These claims are meant to provoke anti-establishment (and pro-party) feelings. This is where I deem populism and nationalism to be related. As the existence of a nation requires the belief that a nation exists, populist rhetoric can assume the existence of a nation, and thereby may aim to provoke nationalist feelings. Claiming the existence of a nation and stating that the party is acting for the good of the nation may persuade people that believe they belong to the same nation to support the populist party.

### Siege Mentality

The importance of identifying a trend of nationalism in political parties lies in another phenomenon. This phenomenon is usually called 'siege mentality.' Siege mentality has been most extensively described in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Therefore, to explain the concept of siege mentality, this research leans heavily on the Israel-Palestine case as an example to best explain the ins and outs of the concept. Several authors have made important contributions to the siege mentality theory. In this research, we distinguish three different types of siege mentality. All three focus on different aspects of the Israeli society, such as politics and culture.

The term siege mentality was coined by Daniel Bar-Tal. Alongside co-author Dikla Antebi, Bar-Tal wrote the article *Siege Mentality in Israel*,<sup>38</sup> which provides me with the most comprehensive, yet

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<sup>36</sup> Paris Aslanidis, "Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective", *Political Studies* 64 (2016) 96.

<sup>37</sup> Benjamin Arditi, *Politics on the Edges of Liberalism; Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 58.

<sup>38</sup> The title refers to modern day Israel. Siege mentality is a phenomenon perceived by Bar-Tal and Antebi in today's Israeli society. However, the theory on siege mentality partly refers to the historical Jewish nation. Some phenomena from in this history are partially causing siege mentality today.



properly summarized, version of Bar-Tal's theory on Israeli siege mentality. In this article the authors explain that in modern times, Israel's siege mentality can be traced back in the history of the Jewish people. According to the authors, a history of persecution led to a tradition of identifying as a victim. This identifying as victims led to the existence of a mentality where Israeli citizens came to believe they were constant under threat of the outside world.<sup>39</sup> This history has, according to the authors, led to siege mentality being embedded in all aspects of Israeli life, and can be found in literature, films, etc.<sup>40</sup>

Bar-Tal and Antebi describe the Israeli government as being the most important 'enablers' of siege mentality.<sup>41</sup> They describe how Israeli foreign- and national policy are centered around privileging Jewish citizens over Arab citizens. The building of Jewish settlements on Arab territory also feeds the notion of the Jewish people having more rights than others, and therefore being special. Together with an historical notion of always being persecuted this leads to the notion of the Jewish people being different from others, but the siege mentality makes them believe that this specialness makes other groups wanting to harm them.<sup>42</sup> This believe of specialness relates to theory on conservative nationalism, as it glorifies the Israeli nation.

Where Bar-Tal and Antebi describe that siege mentality basically comes from a modern interpretation of the history of the Jews, it is Yüksel Sezgin who seems to think it is not a modern interpretation of history, but it is history itself that created the siege mentality in Israel. Sezgin argues that ever since the 1880's the modern Zionist settlers in Palestine have been aware of the complicated relations between Arabs and Jews. This led to the fact that the Israeli 'Founding Fathers' adopted a militarist and expansionist ideology as instrument to create a state and form its identity. Sezgin explains that because of this ideology, the Jewish nation soon began to perceive Palestinian Arab presence as a threat to the identity and the existence of the Israeli state.<sup>43</sup>

This created, as Sezgin calls it, a negative self-identity. Meaning that the Israeli national identity could only exist if the Palestinian did not. This resonates with the theory on conservative nationalism, which states that the state needs a threat from other nations to command loyalty of its subjects. At the same time the Palestinians developed a negative self-identity themselves. Both parties now couldn't fulfil their nation's self-identity, as long as the other party was still in play. This means that Sezgin's description of siege mentality is related to early postwar neo-Fascism in the

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<sup>39</sup> Daniel Bar-Tal and Dikla Antebi, "Siege Mentality in Israel", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 16 (1992) 50-51.

<sup>40</sup> Ibidem, 54-58.

<sup>41</sup> Ibidem, 58.

<sup>42</sup> Ibidem, 60-62.

<sup>43</sup> Yüksel Sezgin, "The Shift From War to Peace; Reconciliation of Sub-Identities and Overcoming Psychological Barriers in Israel", *Review of International Affairs* 1 (2002) 51.

same way that the Nouvelle-Droite movement is related to early postwar neo-Fascism, according to Bar-On. Siege mentality as described by Sezgin has the same defensive attribute that the Nouvelle-Droite movement has, namely the desire to protect the group from outside influences.<sup>44</sup>

Finally there is a third interpretation of siege mentality in Israel. Ronald R. Krebs uses the term *bunker mentality* while describing the same phenomenon. According to him bunker mentality ‘transformed a country transforming a country once brimming with optimism into an increasingly cynical, despondent, and illiberal place’. According to Krebs crucial for the forming of the bunker mentality is the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 1967. Israeli presence in those territories has shaped Israeli politics. The government, according to Krebs, is inducing a bunker mentality on its own people. Because of this induction of bunker mentality Israel is discriminating against Arabs. ‘The occupation has bred an aggressive ethnic nationalism that privileges the interests of Israel's Jewish citizens over those of its Arab citizens, who have come to feel that they will never be treated fairly in an Israel defined as a Jewish state.’<sup>45</sup>

The occupation, according to Krebs, has been the main reason Israeli politics are fractured. The question ‘what to do with the occupied territories?’ divided political parties. Some believed the land belonged to Israel in order to fulfil full divine command. Others thought that to annex the West Bank would give Israel more defensive depth. But there were parties who viewed that Israel would lose its Jewish identity, as annexing the West Bank would mean gaining a lot of Arab citizens.<sup>46</sup>

These theories on siege mentality show resemblances to theories on nationalism. All three different theories resemble conservative nationalism in its aim to empower the nation with the siege mentality. It has defensive attributes in its assumption that the nation needs the power to protect itself against “others”. Descriptions by Sezgin and Krebs are also concerned with integral elements in the assumption that Israeli citizens with a siege mentality assume superiority of their own nation above other nations. According to Krebs, the Israeli government is even making Israeli citizens give up a certain degree of autonomy so that the government would be able to defend the Israeli nation.

Both theories can also be linked to populism. As populism aims to provoke certain feelings, a combination of the theories suggests that provoking radicalized conservative nationalist feelings among citizens of a nation, these citizens would support the populist party that claims to defend this nation. These feelings that are provoked by populist-nationalist rhetoric inspire a siege mentality, as citizens with a siege mentality would believe in the greatness of the nation. Supporting an integral nationalist nature of the nation because of the siege mentality of supporters would make them inclined to give up autonomy so that the instigators of the siege mentality could better defend the

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<sup>44</sup> Sezgin, *The Shift from War to Peace*, 51-55.

<sup>45</sup> Krebs, “Israel’s Bunker Mentality”, 10

<sup>46</sup> Ibidem, 11-13.

nation. Furthermore, following the conservative nationalism theory that a government can use a perceived threat from other nations to command the loyalty of its subjects, inspiring a siege mentality could be used as a tactic by political parties to gain control over a nation.

Another bridge between theories is provided by Bernard Yack. He gives a description of the concept *popular sovereignty*. According to Yack, the popular sovereignty doctrine states that providing citizens with more direct means of engaging in politics, such as referenda to make political decisions, will stimulate nationalist feelings among the population. By involving subjects of a state more into political decision making, the people will feel more connected to the state. A closer connection to the state will inspire feelings of loyalty and the sense of belonging. This doctrine can be used to inspire people to support governments that involve a dominant nation in the state in the political process, therefore stimulating loyalty to this nation.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Bernard Yack, 'Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism', *Political Theory* 29 (2001) 518.

## De Boerenpartij

The Farmers Party, led by Hendrik “Boer<sup>48</sup>” Koekoek, was a typical right-wing populist party. The party was founded in 1958 and was organized around one charismatic leader who seemed to embody the entire party on his own. Boer Koekoek not a particularly charismatic person in the traditional sense of the word.<sup>49</sup> He had a heavy countryside accent and was famous for his simplified equations. It were these qualities that made him popular with common people.<sup>50</sup> Not only farmers<sup>51</sup>, but also other laborers took to his simple rhetoric and found in Koekoek a leader of the laborers and small business owners.<sup>52</sup>

The rise of the Farmers Party happened in an era of change for the Netherlands. The pillarized society<sup>53</sup> was crumbling and several movements rose to challenge the power of the traditional political parties. *Democraten 66*<sup>54</sup> was a liberal party that surprised by gaining 7 seats in their first election in 1967.<sup>55</sup> *Provo* was a social movement that challenged authority with their provocative attitude and actions.<sup>56</sup> Opposing traditional rule was no exception in the 1960's in the

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<sup>48</sup> Boer is the Dutch word for farmer. Hendrik Koekoek was a farmer himself and Boer Koekoek quickly became Koekoek's nickname.

<sup>49</sup> Charisma in political science is defined as a person being attractive or charming to win support - House, R. J. 'A 1976 Theory of Charismatic Leadership', In J. G. Hunt & L. L. Larson (Eds.), *The Cutting Edge* (Carbondale: University Press, 1977) 189-207. Max Weber used this concept as one of his classifications of political authority, in which he argues political authority can be derived from charismatic leadership. For further information see: Weber, M., *Economy and Society – Volume I* (eds.) Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (California: University of California, 2013)

<sup>50</sup> Koen Vossen, “Van Marginaal Naar Mainstream? Populisme in de Nederlandse Geschiedenis”, *Low Countries Historical Review* 127 (2012) 45-46.

<sup>51</sup> The leading Dutch dictionary, Van Dale, defines the term Boer (farmer) as someone leading an agrarian business.

<sup>52</sup> Stijn van Kessel and André Krouwel, “Van vergankelijke radicale dissidenten tot kwelgeesten van de gevestigde orde. Nieuwe politieke partijen in Nederland en de toekomst van de representatieve democratie” In *Democratie Doorgelicht, het functioneren van de Nederlandse democratie* ed. Rudy Andeweg and Jacques Thomassen (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2011) 6.

<sup>53</sup> Until the 1970's, the Netherlands was in a state of pillarization. People that shared a similar ideology, for example socialism, belonged to their own pillar. People living in a pillar would generally only interact with other people belonging to the same pillar. This spread across different segments of society. Pillars would have their own schools, publishers and newspapers. For example: Roman Catholic children would go to schools founded on Roman Catholic principles. It often happened that schools would not allow children with a different worldview to attend their school. For more information see Dekker, P., & Ester, P. 'Depillarization, Deconfessionalization, and De-Ideologization: Empirical Trends in Dutch Society 1958-1992', *Review of Religious Research*, (1996) 325-341.

<sup>54</sup> Commonly known as D'66, translated: Democrats 66. 66 refers to 1966, the year the party was founded.

<sup>55</sup> J.J. Vis, "De houdbaarheid van D'66." *Beleid en Maatschappij* 8 (1981) 326.

<sup>56</sup> Most of these actions were aimed at promoting anarchy. One of the most notable actions of Provo was protesting against the marriage between Princess Beatrix and Prince Claus (who was German). Rumours said that Provo was going to spike the water supply of police horses with the drug LSD on the day of the wedding. The police took preemptive measures and Provo did not poison the horses. However, they did protest by throwing smoke bombs. Police measures that ensued were widely regarded as excessive – Otten, M., 'Provo, Jongeren Protest en Jeugdstijl', *Groniek* 88 (1984) 32.

Netherlands. Thus the Farmers Party was not an anomaly in the wave of depillarization and opposition to conventional political parties, although the party would last for longer than the free spirited sixties.<sup>57</sup>

The Farmers Party was founded in by Koekoek, who already had some political experience, in 1959. Joined by a few local parties (de Vrije Boeren<sup>58</sup>) founded the previous year to participate in regional elections. Koekoek had a clear goal in his mind. He wanted all the farmers of the Netherlands to be as free from governmental control as possible. During the elections of 1959 the party failed to gain enough votes to hold a seat in parliament. However, four years later Koekoek managed to shine a bright spotlight on his party, in time for the elections of 1963.<sup>59</sup>

In 1963 three families had to be removed from their farms after failing to pay mandatory fees to the owners of the farms, *het Landbouwschap*<sup>60</sup>. The families had not paid these fees on principal grounds. Koekoek, in his quest to liberate the Dutch farmers from any other party seeking some kind of control over the farmers, came to the aid of the families with many of his followers (the Free Farmers). The police arrived at the farms with 200 armed men. A fight broke out between the Free Farmers and the police force. One of the farms caught fire and was destroyed, though the persons responsible for the fire were never found. Due to the violent escalation and negative attention the Landbouwschap decided to financially compensate the affected farmers. Hendrik Koekoek became known as the face of the protest and later the same year his party gained three seats in parliament.<sup>61</sup>

### Attacking the Elite

The party's program consisted of 15 points in 1963. Most of these points concerned eliminating or diminishing existing policies, as the party mainly criticized ruling parties in the government. Most of the statements that were made in the program are not specific and stated in a ambiguous way, leaving much to the imagination of what exactly the farmers party wanted to do. For instance, statement twelve said: 'the party wants to end discrimination and unilateral provision of information by multiple government agencies, whose goals are to make the life of a hard-working

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<sup>57</sup> Hans Righart, "Moderate versions of the 'global sixties': A comparison of Great Britain and the Netherlands", *Journal of Area Studies* 6 (1998) 88.

<sup>58</sup> Trans. The Free Farmers.

<sup>59</sup> Anthonie Lucardie and Gerrit Voerman, "Extreem-rechts in Nederland: De centrum-democraten en hun radicale rivalen I", *tijdschrift over vertegenwoordiging en democratisch bestuur* 5 (1990) 22.

<sup>60</sup> A sectoral organization under public law. These organizations controlled certain sectors of the Dutch economy, such as dairy production. The organizations were part of the Dutch government and had power to raise specific taxes for their own sector.

<sup>61</sup> Gerrit Dijkstra, Frits van der Meer, and Caspar van den Berg, "De Ondergang van de Bedrijfslichamen; Een Liberale Overwinning of Symboolpolitiek?", *Leiden University Repository* 4 (2015) 188.

independent entrepreneur harder.<sup>62</sup> This statement was obviously not so much a suggestion for an actual policy, but mainly an attack aimed at then existing policies.

One of the more interesting points was made in the first statement of the program. It said that the party wanted a more prominent role for the royal family in maintaining a strong constitutional state, based on Christian values. This showed the party valued religion as being part of the state. Wanting a stronger role for the royal family can be considered to be monarchist.<sup>63</sup> This is, however, the statement was not clearly defined. Suggesting a more prominent role does not necessarily suggest a stronger role. Therefore, this is not enough to define nationalism within the party. But a nationalist sentiment did show in the fourteenth point, where the document stated that the party wanted 'to uphold well populated rural areas, with an authentic farmers culture, in order to benefit the national existence of the Dutch people in the far future'.<sup>64</sup> There were no further nationalist statements in the party program of 1963. This means that nationalism at that time did not play a big role in the philosophy of the Farmers Party. Further populist sentiments were revealed in the critique of the government.

### Gaining Seats

Four years after winning the first seats in 1963, the party program of the Farmers Party had visibly changed. Koekoek wanted his party to expand and had clearly made an effort to appeal more like a professional political party instead of the protest party they were in 1963. Instead of just a list of fifteen statements, the party program for the elections of 1967 addressed ten themes and explained their desired policy within these themes. The first of these themes was *basic principles* in which the document immediately explained that the party based its program on God's sovereignty, from which the Dutch government derived its power. Second, the document expressed the party's desire to reinstate the royal family as rulers over the Netherlands, being more obvious monarchist than in the previous program. The document then explained the view of the party that the Dutch government's primary objective was to uphold the Christian values on which the Dutch society was based (according to the Farmers Party).<sup>65</sup>

The only other time a possible nationalist statement was made in the document is when, in the section 'finance', the party expressed its wish to stop funding culture that may harm the Christian fundamentals of the Dutch society. It was, unfortunately, not further explained what the party means

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<sup>62</sup> Boerenpartij, *Wat de Boerenpartij Wil; Urgentieprogram 1963*, 1963. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/4c5c0d9b5eee8>, 29-05-2017.

<sup>63</sup> Idem.

<sup>64</sup> Idem.

<sup>65</sup> Boerenpartij, *Urgentieprogram 1967*, 1967, pp. 129. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/4c5c0bfd2fb7d>, 29-05-2017.

by 'culture that may harm the Christian fundamentals'. The importance lies in the connection between culture and the (Christian) fundamentals of the Dutch society.<sup>66</sup> Apparently the Farmers Party did value culture as an agency to bind the Dutch people together, suggesting traces of nationalism in the party's ideology. However, the evidence suggests that nationalist sentiments are monarchical and religiously driven. There is no evidence of the Farmers Party pushing for a notion of superiority of Dutch culture, let alone suggesting other nations are out to harm the Dutch nation. Thus, despite evidence of populism and some evidence of nationalism, there is no evidence of the party trying to inspire siege mentality.

### The Party and the Media

In the media the Farmers Party was plagued by coverage of controversies. Even before the most successful election results of 1967, when the party gained seven seats in parliament, the party was already dealing with internal struggles. A large part of newspaper articles that mentioned the party describe squabbles between party members. Throughout the years there have been concerns of ex-Nazi's within the party. Several members were accused of having been part of the Dutch Nazi party the *Nationaal Socialistische Bond*<sup>67</sup>.<sup>68</sup> One prominent member of the party, J. Postma, had been convicted of treason after he sold out two Dutch men to the Germans. After this information had been made public, Postma was expelled from the party.<sup>69</sup> The expulsion of Postma came after the Adams Affair, where it was discovered that party member Adams had been part of the NSB. After this affair, Koekoek promised to cleanse the party of Nazism. This was not enough for many party members. The expulsion of Postma proved that Adams was not the only bad apple and caused members to leave the party.<sup>70</sup>

It was despite all the negative attention that the Farmers Party managed to gain seven seats in the Dutch Parliament. Still, soon after winning four more seats than the party did in 1963, the party would soon be destroyed from within. In 1968, one year after the elections, second in command Evert Jan Harmsen split from the party whilst maintaining his seat. Three other parliamentarians from the Farmers Party joined Harmsen and formed the new party *Binding*

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<sup>66</sup> Boerenpartij, *Urgentieprogram 1967*, 130-131.

<sup>67</sup> Commonly known as the NSB, the only political party allowed in the Netherlands during the occupation from 1940 to 1945.

<sup>68</sup> Koekoek over de kwestie Adams, *Gereformeerd gezinsblad / hoofdred. P. Jongeling*. Rotterdam, 27-09-1966. Delpher Online Database, <http://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010568898:mpeg21:a0008>

<sup>69</sup> Nieuwe Onthullingen over NSB Verledens, *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*. Groningen, 28-09-1966, p. 1. Delpher Online Database, <http://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010869885:mpeg21:p002>

21-04-2017

<sup>70</sup> Idem

*Rechts*<sup>71</sup>. Because the parliamentarians do not lose their seat after they split from a political party in the Netherlands, the Farmers Party was now down to three seats. This blow proved to be devastating, as the party would never really be taken seriously again.<sup>72</sup> This proves the populist nature of the party, as it was based mainly on one strong leader. As soon as the leadership began to waver, the party collapsed. It also marks a change in nature for the party.

### Changing Course

During the 1971 elections the party went back to a party program made up just of statements, this time addressing twenty points. Though the party only managed to win one seat in parliament, some of the statements show an interesting change in the party's philosophy.<sup>73</sup> Next to the usual populist remarks and defense of Christianity, the party came out in favor of emancipation of the Dutch colonies. The party proclaimed that the (now former) colonies of the Netherlands should be granted independence for their right to self-determination.<sup>74</sup> This statement has liberal nationalist characteristics, as liberal nationalism valued the right to self-determination for nations. However, when it comes to the Dutch people, the party showed a more conservative vision. Statement seventeen said that the Netherlands should not attract foreign workers 'as long as there is unemployment, a housing shortage, the space in the Netherlands is needed for its own people, and the economic benefits do not outweigh the many problems that come with about 80.000 foreign workers'.<sup>75</sup>

It is not likely that this change in rhetoric caused the drop from seven seats in 1967 to one seat in 1971, as it was probably the negative attention in the media that discredited the party. However, during the elections in 1972, after the coalition in the House of Representatives collapsed, the party climbed back up to three seats. The party used almost the same party program, except for the fact that statement seventeen no longer contained a number of foreign workers.<sup>76</sup> It just read: 'the many problems that come with foreign workers'.<sup>77</sup> Although it is just a detail, it is an important difference. Instead of opposing a large number of foreign workers, the party was now opposing any

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<sup>71</sup> Binding *Rechts* was an extreme right-wing party that failed to win any seats during the national elections of 1971. A part of this party returned to the Farmers Party in 1973.

<sup>72</sup> Vossen, "Van Marginaal naar Mainstream", 45-46, 50.

<sup>73</sup> Boerenpartij, *Urgentieprogram 1971*, 1971, pp. 1. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/4c5ac90e5a633>, 29-05-2017

<sup>74</sup> Idem.

<sup>75</sup> *Urgentieprogram 1971*, pp 1-2.

<sup>76</sup> Jacques Thomassen. "Politieke veranderingen in Nederland." (2000) 21

<sup>77</sup> Boerenpartij, *Wat de Boerenpartij Wil; Urgentieprogram 1972*, 1972, pp. 2. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/4c5ac69bdaa17>, 29-05-2017



foreign worker. For the elections of 1977, the last elections to produce a seat for the party, the party program remained exactly the same as it was in 1972.<sup>78</sup>

Newspaper coverage shows that throughout the seventies the Farmers party remained a protest party. The party usually voted against propositions that were supported by the biggest parties, while seeing little support for their own proposition.<sup>79</sup> Based on the media coverage of the Farmers party and the party programs the Farmers party used to gain the attention of voters I can conclude that the party was first and foremost a populist party. Within the philosophy and rhetoric of the Farmers party there were few traces of nationalism. The traces of nationalism I found seemed to have been an instrument of the party's populism, used to gain attention and attract voters with commonalities and simple rhetoric.

It is, however, noteworthy that the type of nationalism that is traceable throughout the history of the Farmers party has changed. In the beginning, the Farmers party used a more general type of monarchism in their party program. Desiring a stronger role for the royal family, and thus a monarchist nature for the Dutch government, suggests a wish for a more authoritative leadership. This resonates somewhat with integral nationalism, that calls for a strong authoritative leadership. However, the Farmers Party did not show enough evidence for idealizing Dutch culture, therefore the party is not considered to be integral nationalist in this study.

Later, after the most successful period, the party changed to different types of nationalism. When it came to other countries, the party was in favor of liberal nationalism, supporting the right to self-determination. But, when speaking of the Netherlands, the party was in favor of conservative nationalism, putting the needs of the Dutch before the needs of others. It is possible that after the internal struggles and a decline in support, the party decided to change course and by showing less nuanced nationalism tried to attract a new base of voters. However, the evidence does not suggest that the party was inspiring siege mentality. It is likely that both the nationalism and populism was mainly used to resonate with a voters base. Especially nationalist sentiments were not strong in enough, however, to claim that it was a particular defensive kind of nationalism aimed at empowering the Dutch nation at the cost of other.

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<sup>78</sup> Boerenpartij, *Wat de Boerenpartij Wil; Urgentieprogram 1977*, 1977. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/4c5ac66385105>, 29-05-2017

<sup>79</sup> "Boerenbedrog", *Leeuwarder courant : hoofdblad van Friesland*". Leeuwarden, 26-03-1974. Delpher Online Database, 01-06-2017, <http://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010619600:mpeg21:a0136>

## *Hans Janmaat, the Centrumpartij, and the Centrum Democraten*

After the decline of the Farmers party and Hendrik Koekoek, the next controversial populist in Dutch politics was Hans Janmaat. Janmaat's political history started as when he was a member of the *Katholieke Volkspartij*<sup>80</sup>, the mainstream catholic party. After being part of the *Democratisch-Socialisten 1970*<sup>81</sup> for a while in 1980, he became leader of the new party *de Centrumpartij*<sup>82</sup>.<sup>83</sup> Despite the name and the party's slogan, which was 'Niet Links, Niet Rechts' (Not Left, Not Right), this was an extreme right-wing populist party. Founded in 1980 to compete in the national elections the next year, they failed to win a seat in parliament at first. During these elections the Farmers party also failed to gain a seat in parliament, ending the Farmers party's presence in the House of Representatives. The government that was formed after these elections would not last long and new elections in 1982 gave the CP the opportunity to win one seat in the House of Representatives. Party leader Janmaat became a parliamentarian as member of the CP, but left the party in 1984 and took the party's only seat with him.<sup>84</sup>

The CP was, unlike the Farmers Party, more than a populist protest party. Despite the usage of the same kind of language as the Farmers Party, the CP did not use the same kind of simple logic. The longest party program of the Farmers Party consisted of three pages. The CP used the same program in 1981 and 1982, which consisted of 32 pages and a much more detailed description of the political goals and aims of the CP.<sup>85</sup>

The rise of Janmaat in Dutch politics was paired with hard times for the Netherlands. Throughout the 1980's the Dutch economy struggled with a high unemployment rate.<sup>86</sup> Claiming to stand up for the economic needs of the Dutch, Janmaat found supporters among lower educated young males in the cities and older people from the countryside. These groups were probably among the ones that struggled the most financially. Janmaat found a group to blame for the economic struggles of some Dutch people: immigrants taking jobs Janmaat felt belonged to the Dutch. This

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<sup>80</sup> Commonly known as KVP, literally translated: Catholic People's party.

<sup>81</sup> Commonly known as DS'70, literally translated: Democratic Socialists 1970.

<sup>82</sup> Literally translated: Centre Party.

<sup>83</sup> Meindert Fennema and Wouter van der Brug, "Nederlandse anti-immigrantenpartijen in Europees perspectief", In F. van Tubergen, & I. Maas (editors), *Allochtonen in Nederland in internationaal perspectief*, ed. F. van Tubergen, & I. Maas (Special Issue van Mens en Maatschappij; Nr. 81, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006) 13.

<sup>84</sup> Ibidem, 7-9.

<sup>85</sup> De Centrumpartij, *Partijprogramma Samengevat in 10 Punten*, 1983. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/4c614598386ae>, 29-05-2017

<sup>86</sup> Johan Graafland, "On the causes of hysteresis in long-term unemployment in the Netherlands", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 2 (1991) 155.

message resonated with his voters.<sup>87</sup> This message of delegitimizing immigrants in the workforce of the Netherlands is conservative nationalist with defensive elements. It was aimed at empowering what the party perceives as the Dutch nation at the cost of people belonging to other nations.

The language in the party program of the CP, however, was still much the same kind of populist rhetoric as the Farmers Party had used. In the program the CP accused the then incumbent government of *struisvogelpolitiek*<sup>88</sup>, stating that the mainstream political parties created a culture of taboo to avoid having to take responsibility for using ‘means of terror and slander to shut down the CP as political opponent’. These kinds of accusations and using simplified metaphors is typical for populism, as it was a very normative attack on the government.<sup>89</sup>

Another parallel with the Farmers Party becomes apparent on page four of the CP’s program. The program stated that national symbols, such as the royal family, the Dutch flag, and the lion as symbol for the Netherlands, show that the Netherlands are more than just ‘a social economic organization that finds it reason to exist in the promotion of the physical and mental needs of an arbitrary number of social groups that will put the needs of their own group before the needs of the country’. As a way of underlining the unity of the Dutch people, the CP wanted to reinstall a yearly prayer at the opening of the national assembly. This prayer, according to the CP, had to be reformulated in the spirit of both Christianity and humanism.<sup>90</sup>

A parallel with the Farmers Party comes to mind. Both parties used a somewhat religious motivation for Dutch nationalism. But at the same time a difference between the Farmers Party and the CP comes forward. Where Koekoek saw a role for the royal family in the government, the CP described the royal family as a symbol of the Dutch people and the Netherlands. As the program then stated that it is the duty of the Dutch government to serve the Dutch people based on the right to self-determination<sup>91</sup>, the CP showed its conservative nationalist nature, stating that the government should put the needs of the Dutch before the needs of others.

Perhaps the most important parallel between the Farmers party and the CP was the aim of introducing a law that enables binding referenda on important political decisions.<sup>92</sup> This way the Dutch people would have gotten more political power than just electing representatives into the government. The people would have gained a more direct role in decision making, thus introducing a

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<sup>87</sup> Peter Scheepers, Rob Eisinga, and Jan Lammers, “Het Electoraat van de Centrum Partij/De Centrum Democraten in de Periode 1982-1992” *Mens & Maatschappij* 68 (1994) 375-377.

<sup>88</sup> Literally translated: Ostrich politics. A Dutch expression mockingly used to accuse parties of burying their heads in sand.

<sup>89</sup> Centruumpartij, *Partijprogramma Samengevat*, pp. 2.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibidem*, 4.

<sup>91</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibidem*, 5.

form of popular sovereignty. This shows that both parties followed the popular sovereignty doctrine, and its principle that popular sovereignty breeds nationalism.<sup>93</sup> The Farmers Party only introduced this into their party program for the first time in 1971<sup>94</sup>, at the same time they started using more nationalist rhetoric.

### Changing Loyalty

Initially, the CP was not taken seriously and major political parties would generally ignore the party. But, after a regional department of the CP gained nine percent of the votes in a regional election in the city of Almere, the 'three big parties', the *Christelijk Democratisch Appèl*<sup>95</sup>, *Partij van de Arbeid*<sup>96</sup>, and the *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*<sup>97</sup> decided to change their tactics and started to confront the CP during debates and responded to statements from CP members outside of the House of Representatives. The three big parties were disturbed by the perceived radicalization of the Dutch people, as they did not think it possible that so many people would support such a radical party.<sup>98</sup> However, the CP would not become big enough to make a lasting political impact on the Dutch society. In October 1984 Janmaat split from the CP, taking their only parliamentary seat with him. He founded a new party, the *Centrum Democraten*, and radicalized even more. The CP became a more extreme party as well, ramping up xenophobic and integral nationalist rhetoric. However, the CP would not get a seat in the House of Representatives again.<sup>99</sup> Janmaat was ridiculed and shunned. Journalists and politicians alike did not take him serious. During his speeches in the House of Representatives many politicians and journalists walked out. The ones that remained seated would purposefully look busy doing other things to show that Janmaat was ignored.<sup>100</sup>

The CD took part in the national elections for the first time in 1986, but did not win any seats. In 1989 the party won one seat and saw the return of Janmaat to the House of Representatives, where he remained until the elections of 1998.<sup>101</sup> Similar to the CP and the Farmers party, the CD saw Christianity and humanism as the foundation for a righteous Dutch society. The first point in the party program stated the introduction of a law for binding referenda, another similarity to the CP and

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<sup>93</sup> Yack, 'Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism', 518.

<sup>94</sup> Boerenpartij, *Urgentieprogram 1971*, pp. 1.

<sup>95</sup> Commonly known as CDA, translated: Christian Democratic appeal.

<sup>96</sup> Commonly known as PvdA, translated: Labor Party.

<sup>97</sup> Commonly known as VVD, translated: People's party for Freedom and Democracy.

<sup>98</sup> Grote partijen willen ware gezicht CP tonen MASKER AF VAN CENTRUMPARTIJ. *De Telegraaf*, 26-09-1983. Delpher Online Database 21-04-2017, <http://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011205710:mpeg21:a0115>

<sup>99</sup> Jaap van Donselaar, "Post-War Fascism in the Netherlands", *Crime, Law and Social Change* 19 (1993) 96-97.

<sup>100</sup> Chan Choenni, "In Stelling Tegen Politiek Rascisme", *Beleid en Maatschappij* 3 (1993) 110

<sup>101</sup> Fennema and van der Brug, "Nederlandse anti-immigrantenpartijen in Europees perspectief", 9.

Farmers Party.<sup>102</sup> The second section, on culture, revealed the integral nationalist nature of the CD, stating that the Dutch government should not subsidize any form of non-Dutch culture in the Netherlands.<sup>103</sup> The integral nationalist ideology praises its own culture above others. Integral nationalist policy is aimed at getting the people enthusiastic about their own culture. The proposed policy by the CD seemed to be doing just that.

The document went on to condemn marriage between Dutch and non-Dutch people. It blamed the government for ill-considered policy that caused 'many young persons to make ill-considered choices in terms of their life partner. The government must provide any means necessary to end the marriage, on request of the Dutch spouse, and to send the non-Dutch partner back to their country of origin.'<sup>104</sup> This statement was not only integral nationalist but also populist. It was a clear verbal attack aimed at the government. Besides attacking the government in a verbal way, this is a normative statement without any factual evidence as to why these choices are "ill considered", which is evidence of a populist nature of the party.

Throughout the document similar remarks about non-Dutch people were made. It stated, for example, that it should be mandatory for employers to only hire Dutch people, except for when there are no Dutch applicants. It also stated that the social system in the Netherlands should aim to help Dutch people as it was 'in the first place meant for our own population'.<sup>105</sup>

The party program of the CD in 1994 had much the same spirit as the program in 1989. It started by stating that the program was based on the unity of the Dutch people, and was based on the Dutch history and the culture that has grown from this history.<sup>106</sup> This is an example of legitimizing the nation through common history. I also consider it a populist remark as the party did not specify what this Dutch culture entails and was most likely meant to resonate with people who identify with the Dutch nationality. The rest of the program was much the same as the program from 1989, keeping the same points about intercultural marriage and subsidies for non-Dutch culture.<sup>107</sup> The core values and beliefs of the party remained integral nationalist and the language was still populist.

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<sup>102</sup> Centrum Democraten, *Concept Partijprogramma 89-93*, 1989, pp. 10-11. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/50b6246e83f39>, 29-05-2017

<sup>103</sup> Ibidem, 12

<sup>104</sup> Ibidem, 12-13.

<sup>105</sup> Ibidem, 15.

<sup>106</sup> Centrum Democraten, *Oost West Thuis Best*, 1993, pp. 6. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/50b6246e83f39>, 29-05-2017

<sup>107</sup> Ibidem, 14.

The party program used in the elections of 1998, where the CD would not win any seats, shows a few important changes, despite containing much of the same remarks and rhetoric. Wat immediately stands out is the slogan on the first page of the program that reads 'Trouw aan rood wit blauw!'<sup>108</sup> Literally translated it says 'Faithful to red white blue', referencing to the Dutch national flag and underlining the nationalist identity of the party with apparent banal nationalism. Another addendum was a preface written by Janmaat himself. In this text Janmaat painted a very dark picture of the Dutch society in 1998. Janmaat stated that the Netherlands had become chaotic and violent. In his opinion it was the only option of the Dutch to vote for the CD in order to fix all the problems the Netherlands faced. This being a populist tactic of trying to scare people into voting for the CD.<sup>109</sup>

This program also saw the slogan 'Vol = Vol'<sup>110</sup> (full means full), a phrase often used by Janmaat in speeches and interviews, printed in the party program. At this point Janmaat had already been convicted on grounds of racism for using this kind of language in public.<sup>111</sup> The rest of the document was very similar to the previous party programs, showing the party had not changed its course and stood by its integral nationalist nature.

The trend of shunning and ridiculing Janmaat continued. Despite winning three seats in the House of Representatives in 1994, the CD did not make a lasting impact on the Dutch society or political climate. The evidence does suggest that the CP and CD tried to inspire siege mentality among the supporters of the party. The party did so through a combination of making nationalist statements in populist fashion. Most statements, such as suggesting intercultural marriages are ill considered and that only Dutch culture should be funded by the government, thus glorifying own culture over others, fall in the radicalized conservative nationalism category. The CP and CD even show evidence of an integral nationalist ideology in both parties. The parties are clearly trying to appeal to what they perceive as the Dutch nation by glorifying the nation. However, the ridiculing and ignoring of Janmaat shows that this tactic was not regarded as an acceptable tactic by the rest of the political landscape of the Netherlands.

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<sup>108</sup> Centrum Democraten, *Trouw aan Rood Wit Blauw*, 1998, Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/50b6246e83f39>, 29-05-2017

<sup>109</sup> Ibidem, 4-5.

<sup>110</sup> Ibidem, 6.

<sup>111</sup> Fennema and van der Brug, "Nederlandse anti-immigrantenpartijen in Europees perspectief", 9.

## *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*

Of all the populist politicians from the Netherlands, Pim Fortuyn was probably the one who stood out most. In some ways he was very comparable to Hans Janmaat. He was a born provocateur, stirring up debates and inciting political drama. Like Janmaat he was dismissed by his own party. And like Janmaat he then created a new party that was more successful than the party he had been dismissed from.

But there was a big difference between Fortuyn and Janmaat. Fortuyn was charismatic and able to resonate with the people. But he was everything but a typical politician. Fortuyn had publicly come out as a homosexual and was known for his flamboyant lifestyle. He owned lots of expensive clothing, and had a personal butler and a private chauffeur. He was destined to be a controversial figure when he entered the Dutch politics, but many liked him for just that.<sup>112</sup>

Fortuyn became the leader of right-wing party Leefbaar Nederland (Livable Netherlands) in November 2001. The next elections would be held in May 2002, so he did not have a long period to make a name for himself to attract the attention of voters. But Fortuyn chose the offensive by attacking the then incumbent government as hard as he could. He was a known critic of Islam, and in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks Fortuyn was able to muster up supporters. But he had to part ways with his party on the 9<sup>th</sup> of February 2002. In an interview with the newspaper *De Volkskrant* Fortuyn had argued that the Islam is a backwards<sup>113</sup> culture, and the anti-discrimination article had to be removed from the constitution. According to Fortuyn, this rule intervened with the freedom of speech.<sup>114</sup>

### *A Swift Change*

With merely three months before the elections and no party, Fortuyn was quick to establish his own party on the 11<sup>th</sup> of February. His new party was called *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, or LPF. Producing a fierce campaign, Fortuyn kept attacking the then incumbent government. That same year in March Fortuyn published a book called *De Puinhopen van Acht Jaar Paars*, or *The Wreckage of Eight Purple Years*. In the book Fortuyn attacked what was called the Purple Coalition, a parliamentary coalition

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<sup>112</sup> Joop J.M. Van Holsteyn and Galen A. Irwin, "Never a Dull Moment: Pim Fortuyn and the Dutch Parliamentary Election of 2002", *West European Politics* 26 (2003) 44-47.

<sup>113</sup> The Dutch word for backward is *achterlijk*, which in Dutch can also mean stupid. Many people felt that Fortuyn was wrong for insulting an entire culture. Fortuyn stated that he had meant to say that Islam was not as developed as other cultures, and he did not mean to call them stupid.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibidem*, 45-46.

between the leftist Labor Party, the Rightist VVD and the liberal D'66.<sup>115</sup> In undoubtedly populist fashion, Pim Fortuyn paints a harsh picture of what he felt the past eight years had been like. It was his promise to repair the damage he felt the Purple Coalition had done to the Netherlands.<sup>116</sup>

One of the allegations by the LPF was that the police apparatus had become ineffective and criminal activity was ruling in the streets. However, professor Maurice Punch published a research in 2006 which was ordered by the Dutch police. Punch stated that indeed mid 1990's the police in the Netherlands was in trouble and described a state of disorientation and tiredness. But, according to Punch, the police managed to reorganize and the police become more recognizable in the streets and more assertive. Several positive changes provided more unity and new signs of fervor.<sup>117</sup>

Reading the bylaws of the Political Association List Pim Fortuyn, it becomes immediately clear how Fortuyn intended to clean up after the Purple Coalition. The second article section 1 mentioned that the goal of the LPF was to 'intensively involve the Dutch people in all sorts of public administration and public organization, in short: to return the country to the people'.<sup>118</sup> The party program for the elections of 2002 also immediately shows the populist nature of the LPF. On the first page the party started attacking the Purple Coalition. The document stated that the Coalition had left the Netherlands with 'soaring criminality and great deficiencies in education and healthcare'.<sup>119</sup> A bit further, on the same page, the document listed a few issues that the LPF claimed are created by the Purple Coalition. Some of these issues are very interesting for this research. For example the issue of 'a lot of criminality, which had left the citizen feeling unsafe in the streets and at home', but also 'a policy of tolerance does not protect the stakes of citizens', 'excessive immigration in an overcrowded country', and "a split society because of socio-cultural backwardness that is mostly present in larger cities."<sup>120</sup>

Each of these points were populist remarks, as they attack the then incumbent government without providing any further explanation or evidence. There are also some signs of nationalism, although these signs are not obvious or very explicit. The program mentioned that 'it is worth it to be

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<sup>115</sup> This coalition had lasted from 1994 until the elections of 2002, although a political crisis led to the fall of the coalition on April 16<sup>th</sup> 2002. As the elections were already scheduled for May the same year, the elections went ahead as planned.

<sup>116</sup> Hostein and Irwin, "Never a Dull Moment", 46-47.

<sup>117</sup> Maurice Punch, "Van 'Alles Mag' naar 'Zero Tolerance': Policy Transfer en de Nederlandse Politie", Politie en Wetenschap Verkenningen (2006) 3.

<sup>118</sup> LPF, *Statuten Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, 2002, pp.1. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/4c4d51167f2f6>, 29-05-2017

<sup>119</sup> LPF, *Zakelijk Met een Hart*, 2002, pp.1 Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/4c728d4bb21cb>, 29-05-2017

<sup>120</sup> Idem.



Dutch'<sup>121</sup>, although this was just part of larger sentence and therefore easily overlooked as being a nationalist statement. This statement was made in the context of stopping immigration to the Netherlands. The LPF deemed a stop on immigration necessary to make it possible for the foreigners already living in the Netherlands to fully integrate in Dutch society.<sup>122</sup>

### Signs of Othering

A bit further in the program the party addressed the theme of integration into Dutch society a bit more detailed. The party stated that many groups in the Netherlands have a socio-cultural disadvantage. According to the statement this disadvantage existed because these groups do not stem from a Jewish-Christian-Humanist culture. These groups, according to the statement, caused friction in the Dutch society, especially in the larger cities. The LPF suggested that they could solve many problems caused by minorities by investing in their regular and cultural education.<sup>123</sup> These remarks implicate a sense of superiority of the Dutch culture over non-Western cultures present in the Netherlands. By claiming members of non-Western cultures should be (re)educated, the LPF was feeding Nationalist sentiments by the process of othering.

The othering goes even further. In the same segment, the party program dismisses other cultures as undesirable. The document mentioned that the Netherlands should be protected from some aspects of non-Western cultures, such as female genital mutilation, honor killings, and the general repression of women. According to the statement, especially the repression of women in Islam is very undesirable in the Netherlands, as everybody living in the Netherlands should be treated equal, regardless of race, gender, or sexuality.<sup>124</sup> Although these remarks are not necessarily offensive, they do paint a one-sided picture of other cultures. By only mentioning negative aspects of different cultures, the LPF creates an even divide between Western and non-Western cultures. It also should be noted that Islam is the only non-Western culture that was specifically targeted in the document, providing readers with a distinct enemy.

Another theme that holds some non-explicit nationalist remarks was the European Union. The program stated that the LPF was in favor of European cooperation in context of the European Union, praising the EU as a contributing factor to peace and stability in Western-Europe. However, it is noted that the European cooperation should not be at the expense of Dutch sovereignty.<sup>125</sup> This view resonates with conservative nationalism. Although the statement is not necessarily of defensive nature as there is no clear suggestion to empower the Dutch nation to oppose mingling by others, it

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<sup>121</sup> Idem.

<sup>122</sup> LPF, *Zakelijk Met een Hart*, 1.

<sup>123</sup> Ibidem, 5.

<sup>124</sup> Idem.

<sup>125</sup> Idem, 7-8.

asserts the maintenance of a degree of autonomy at the cost of further empowering the European Union.

Official party documents from the time that Pim Fortuyn was still party leader do not necessarily reveal an outspoken nationalist vision of the LPF. But, equally important to official party documents is the appearance of Pim Fortuyn himself in the media and in public. In true populist fashion the LPF was centered around the persona of Pim Fortuyn. He was the embodiment of the LPF. His thoughts and opinions were the thoughts and opinions of the LPF.<sup>126</sup> And looking at books Fortuyn has written and statements he made in interviews and debates, a much more divisive character than the party documents reveal comes to light.

*De Puinhopen van Acht Jaar Paars* came out in March 2002 and was widely regarded as the unofficial party program by the LPF.<sup>127</sup> Very much like a very elaborated party program, the book deals with political themes in a very structured way. Fortuyn first described what the then incumbent government had done wrong within these themes, and how Fortuyn would act if he was elected into the Dutch government.<sup>128</sup> The book was clearly a populist approach to gain the attention of the voters. But what stands out as important for this research is the theme on immigration policy. Fortuyn stated there is a division between the Islam and our (what Fortuyn calls a modern) culture. He then warned that 'modernity is trying to triumph in the Islamic world, just as the Islam is trying to triumph in our culture'<sup>129</sup>. The latter, according to Fortuyn, was a danger to "our" society and might even cause a civil war. Fortuyn did stress that he was not trying to inspire hatred towards foreigners, it was but a warning.<sup>130</sup> But despite Fortuyn's claim, it seems as though he was trying to induce a siege mentality in his readers, probably to scare people into voting for him. It could be that Fortuyn was being led by his own siege mentality, but taking his populist-nationalist political tactics in consideration the scaring people reasoning is more likely.

Besides the book *De Puinhopen van Acht Jaar Paars* Fortuyn has published various other works. One of those books is called *De Islamisering van de Nederlandse Cultuur* (*The Islamization of the Dutch Culture*). According to the summary on the back of the book, the core of Fortuyn's argument was that the culture of the Islam and its values and beliefs are the direct opposite of the values and beliefs of modern Western culture.<sup>131</sup> But reading the book it looks a lot like a nationalist attempt to argue a pro-Dutch nation case. Fortuyn has often dismissed claims that he was nationalist

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<sup>126</sup> Hostein and Irwin, "Never a Dull Moment", 60-61.

<sup>127</sup> Van Holsteyn and Irwin, "Never a Dull Moment", 59.

<sup>128</sup> Van Kessel and Krouwel, "Van vergankelijke radicale dissidenten tot kwelgeesten van de gevestigde orde", 8-9.

<sup>129</sup> Pim Fortuyn, *De Puinhopen van Acht Jaar Paars*, (Rotterdam: Karakter Uitgevers, 2002) 159.

<sup>130</sup> Idem.

<sup>131</sup> Pim Fortuyn, *De Islamisering van de Nederlandse Cultuur*, (Rotterdam: Karakter Uitgevers, reprinted 2016) summary on the back of the book.

or even racist or xenophobic. It is, however, not surprising these allegations have been made. In his book, Fortuyn was othering by continuously referring to 'The Dutch people' and making remarks about 'our history', for example stating that 'Because of a lack of interest in our own identity and the being of our society, our native culture is impending to be pushed into a defensive.'<sup>132</sup> This statement was not only clearly dividing Dutch culture from other cultures, it also heavily implies that Dutch culture was under some form of attack, implying either the siege mentality of the author or an attempt to induce siege mentality amongst the readers. Or both.

### Life Post Fortuyn

Various other sources do not provide any further important information on Pim Fortuyn or his LPF. Fortuyn was a populist, and in his own way inspired conservative nationalism amongst his followers. This made him a controversial political figure, even more than Hans Janmaat. But the controversies somehow worked to his advantage, where it just made an outcast out of Janmaat. Polls showed the LPF would win 19 to 25 seats in parliament and *De Volkskrant* prophesized that Fortuyn would become the next prime minister of the Netherlands. *De Volkskrant* wrote this in an article on May 6<sup>th</sup>, 2002. This was the same day that Fortuyn was assassinated<sup>133</sup>. He would not live to see his party win 26 seats.<sup>134</sup> Despite the big victory and *De Volkskrant*'s prophecy, the CDA won 43 seats and would provide the next prime minister.

The LPF became a part of the new government's coalition but soon fell apart. Being a populist party, the LPF was structured around one strong leader, Pim Fortuyn. After his death, the party was characterized by internal fighting. The fighting became bad enough for many members to leave the party. On October 16<sup>th</sup>, 86 days after the installation of the government, prime minister Balkenende announced the resignation, citing a lack of faith in the LPF by the CDA and VVD, the third member of the coalition.<sup>135</sup> The elections of 2003 saw a win of just 8 seats for the LPF, the second and last time the party would win any seats in the Dutch parliament.<sup>136</sup>

This case shows strong evidence of both nationalism and populism. The LPF and Fortuyn made it clear that they were on a mission to oppose the elites of the then incumbent government.

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<sup>132</sup> Fortuyn, *De Islamisering van de Nederlandse Cultuur*, 7.

<sup>133</sup> Fortuyn was assassinated on 6 May 2002. He was shot by Volkert van der Graaf, who was an environmental activist before the assassination. He stated he shot Fortuyn because he believed Fortuyn to be a "growing liability for the Netherlands" – "Van Milieuactivist tot Politiek Moordenaar", *De Volkskrant* 26 March 2014 Accessed 19-06-2017. <http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/van-milieuactivist-tot-politiek-moordenaar~a3622719/>

<sup>134</sup> "Opiniepeiler: LPF grootste, Pim premier", *De Volkskrant*, May 6 2002 Accessed 01-06-2017. <http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief/opiniepeiler-lpf-grootste-pim-premier~a639442/>

<sup>135</sup> The political crisis that led to the resignation of the government is now known as the LPF-Crisis.

<sup>136</sup> Van Kessel and Krouwel, "Van vergankelijke radicale dissidenten tot kwelgeesten van de gevestigde orde", 9-10.

Normative provocative statements were used often to discredit the Purple Coalition. The type of nationalism that is evident in this case is at least conservative. Defensive elements can be found in Fortuyn's warning that Islam was dangerous to the Dutch culture and in the statement that stimulating the education of Dutch culture could solve problems caused by minorities. However, these statements are not strong enough to create an image of an entirely unsafe world outside of the Dutch nation. In order to inspire siege mentality, the statements would have to be aimed at multiple 'other' groups. Although Fortuyn states that Islam is directly opposite from Western culture, the statement is not implying strongly enough that the Islam should therefore be feared.

## *Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom*

Out of all the political figures examined in this research, it is Geert Wilders that is most successful. He has been a member of the House of Representatives since 1998. A decline in seats for the VVD, of which Wilders used to be a member, saw a brief interlude in 2002. However, the coalition would last shorter than three months, and after the elections of 2003 Wilders returned to the Dutch parliament. Wilders returned to the House of Representatives being still a member of the VVD, but in 2004 he split from the party to remain independent in the House as *Group Wilders*.<sup>137</sup> In 2005 Wilders published a 'declaration of independence'.<sup>138</sup> The document was written by Wilder's himself as independent member of the House of Representatives, and was structured like a party program, stating the vision and goals of *Groep Wilders/De Partij voor de Vrijheid*.<sup>139</sup>

### *Declaration of Independence*

Wilders' declaration of independence holds both nationalist and populist rhetoric. The first three sentences of the document stated: "Geert Wilders presents his broad program for an improved Netherlands. Goal: giving the country back to its citizens and starting a frontal assault on the elite. In this declaration, Wilders argues for harsh but fair measures designed to make the Netherlands what they used to be: free, prosperous, and independent".<sup>140</sup> These remarks can all be described as populist. Not only by making vague promises such as making the Netherlands independent (which it has been since the end of the German occupation in 1945), but by metaphorically attacking 'the elite' and literally promising to attack the elite. Throughout the document, Wilders stated that the then incumbent government had done a very bad job at governing.<sup>141</sup> As it is not clearly explained what was going wrong, nor was any evidence given, this can be seen as a populist tactic by Wilders himself to promote him as a savior.

Besides populism, there are many traces of Eurosceptic nationalism in the document as well. In a segment about his views on the European Union Wilders stated that "The sale of Dutch stakes and the Dutch identity is visible in the way politicians hand over sovereignty to a caste of bureaucrats

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<sup>137</sup> Koen Vossen, "Classifying Wilders; The Ideological development of Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom", *Politics* 31 (2011) 181-184.

<sup>138</sup> PVV, *Onafhankelijkheidsverklaring*, 2005. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, [http://pubnpp.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/root/beginselprogramma/pvv2005/PVV\\_begprog2005.pdf](http://pubnpp.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/root/beginselprogramma/pvv2005/PVV_begprog2005.pdf), 29-05-2017

<sup>139</sup> Wilders' one-man independent party until 2006 was known as Group Wilders, but Wilders was already planning to enter the coming elections with the new party the PVV.

<sup>140</sup> PVV, *Onafhankelijkheidsverklaring*, pp. 1.

<sup>141</sup> Ibidem 1-14.

in Brussels. The new European Constitution is putting the Dutch sovereignty on sale.”<sup>142</sup> A bit further in the same segment it was stated that “Our sovereignty as a nation – as country that knows full well how to solve its own problems – is getting squandered.”<sup>143</sup> So Wilders did not even try to hide the nationalist nature of his party. He was directly referring to the Dutch nation and how he thinks the identity of this nation was in danger.

Much like the LPF, Wilders’ declaration of independence singles out Muslims. By stating, for example, that “Islam and democracy are irreconcilable”<sup>144</sup> and that Wilders was “resisting the misuse by groups of Muslims of rights and liberties of our constitutional state.”<sup>145</sup> Wilders was othering by creating a division between Muslims and “us” (Dutch people). Like the LPF, Wilders stated that the culture of Muslims cannot be mixed with Dutch culture. But Wilders then went a step further, claiming that Muslims willfully take advantage of certain aspects of the Dutch culture. Therefore, the type of nationalism that defines Group Wilders and later the PVV seemed to be integral nationalism. Wilders was not only claiming that the Dutch nation is better than others, he was accurately targeting other groups and was making them out to be inferior to the Dutch culture.

The rest of the document was written in much the same style. Some statements stand out and should be noted, such as the suggestion that the Dutch government should be able to strip (Islamic) radicals of their basic rights, even before committing a crime.<sup>146</sup> Just the intention of committing a crime against the fundamental rights of the Dutch people should be enough. Wilders did not state what he means by stripping radicals of their basic rights. He also suggested that people with a double nationality who commit a violent crime should be stripped of their Dutch nationality and removed from the Netherlands.<sup>147</sup>

### *Ups and Downs*

In 2006 the PVV participated for the first time in the national elections. Under the leadership of Geert Wilders the party could not match the success of the LPF. This could have multiple reasons. Some people claim that the success of the LPF in 2002 was thanks to Fortuyn getting shot and therefore people voted out of compassion for the LPF, not because of their political beliefs.<sup>148</sup> This is however not likely, since polls showed a massive win for the LPF even before the death of Fortuyn.<sup>149</sup> It is more likely that anti-Muslim sentiments were a bit stronger in 2002, as Fortuyn used

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<sup>142</sup> PVV, *Onafhankelijkheidsverklaring*, pp. 5.

<sup>143</sup> PVV, *Onafhankelijkheidsverklaring*, pp. 5.

<sup>144</sup> Ibidem, 9.

<sup>145</sup> Idem.

<sup>146</sup> Idem.

<sup>147</sup> Idem.

<sup>148</sup> Ian Bruff, “The Netherlands, The Challenge of Lijst Pim Fortuyn, and the Third Way”, *Politics* 23 (2003) 156.

<sup>149</sup> “Opiniepeiler”.

the aftermath of the events on 9/11 to spread his message. In 2006 the event was further in the past, and therefore not as engaging as it had been in 2002. Another possible explanation is the failure of the LPF as soon as they became part of the government. Perhaps most people who voted for the LPF did not want to vote again for a populist right-wing party.

In any case, the PVV did win a respectable nine seats in the house of commons. Then, after four years of enthusiastic opposition against the coalition led by the CDA, the PVV won 24 seats in the national elections of 2010. After negotiations explored the possibility of different coalitions, it was decided that the coalition would consist of the VVD and the CDA. This meant that the coalition would rule without a majority, as the two parties together owned 52 out of the 150 available seats in the House of Representatives. Wilders' PVV was added to the coalition, bringing 24 seats to make a total of 76. However, the PVV was not officially part of the coalition. The PVV would, however, give its parliamentary support to the two ruling parties. This 'minority government' lasted until the end of April 2012, when the PVV withdrew its support for the coalition after failed negotiations over the budget plan.<sup>150</sup>

The elections that followed saw a drop in seats for the PVV, as they went from 24 to 15.<sup>151</sup> Years later, just before the elections of 2017, the PVV had regained their popularity. For some time they were projected to become the largest party with up to 30 seats. This would be at the expense of the then incumbent parties VVD and PvdA. Those parties did lose many seats, going from 41 to 33 and from 38 to 9 respectively. The loss of the VVD was, however, not big enough for the PVV to become the biggest party. The PVV went to 20 seats and became the second biggest party.<sup>152</sup> Despite their numbers, they are unlikely to become a part of the new coalition. Both the VVD and CDA, the two parties most likely to become a part of the new coalition, have expressed they do not want to work with the PVV after the minority coalition failed in 2012. Since the PVV withdrew its support, the VVD and CDA do not trust the PVV as a trustworthy party.<sup>153</sup>

The rise, fall, and rise of the PVV have been a rocky road. Leader Geert Wilders has been the target of lawsuits over his controversial remarks and has been convicted, without punishment, for stimulating discrimination. The conviction was in December 2016, nearly two years after the incident that caused the lawsuit. After a big win for the PVV in regional elections in The Hague, Wilders gave a

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<sup>150</sup> Chris Aalberts and Dirk-Jan Keijser, *De Puinhopen van Rechts; De Partijen van Pim, Geert, Rita en Hero* (Delft: Eburon, 2015) 15.

<sup>151</sup> Ibidem, 16.

<sup>152</sup> *Kiesraad Stelt Definitieve Verkiezingsuitslag Vast*, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/nieuws/kamernieuws/kiesraad-stelt-definitieve-verkiezingsuitslag-vast-01-06-2017>

<sup>153</sup> Avinash Bhikhie, *VVD en CDA Willen Niet Met PVV om de Tafel*, <http://www.nu.nl/verkiezingen-2017/4560714/vvd-en-cda-willen-niet-met-pvv-tafel.html> 01-06-2017

speech during which he asked the audience: “Do you want more or less Moroccans in the Netherlands?” After the audience started chanting: “Less, less, less!” Wilders replied with: “Then we will make that happen.”<sup>154</sup> Although Wilders was no stranger to controversial remarks, and often targeted members of Arabic communities and the Islam, he had crossed the line according to many. The party rally was likened to the Nazi-Party of Hitler. People claimed that the PVV is fascist and compared his expressed will to make less Moroccans in the Netherlands happen to the wish for less Jewish people by the Nazis.<sup>155</sup> The incident is still relevant in national politics this day, as the VVD has stated recently that the only way they would even consider negotiations with the PVV to form a coalition is if Wilders retracts the statements he made during the speech.<sup>156157</sup>

Stirring up controversies seems to be a political strategy to gain attention and attract potential voters. Using controversial rhetoric, Wilders has gotten attention from media around the world. He often tweets his thoughts on Islam, stating after the attack in Manchester on 22 May 2017 that “Islam is to blame for Manchester. Not "extremism". Not "Islamism". Not "radical Islam". Just Islam.” He also stated, on Twitter, that “They hate and kill us. And nobody protects us. Our leaders betray us. Again. Close our borders. Deislamize our nations! Now!”<sup>158</sup>

At the ten year anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Wilders gave a speech at ground zero. There were protests over plans to build an Islamic Centre near the place where the twin towers stood. In his speech, Wilders claimed that “nobody was hurting Islam, until Islam started hurting others” and ended his speech by chanting “no mosque here.”<sup>159</sup> Although politicians in The Hague were expecting worse controversial remarks in his speech<sup>160</sup>, Wilders was showing a trend of delegitimizing Islam as a peaceful religion. He was creating an image of the Islam as being a threat to freedom and to the Western world. He was depicting the world as unsafe, as long as Islam exists in it. But Wilders was not only creating a picture of Islam as a general threat to the world. He is specifically creating an image of Islam as a threat to the Netherlands as well. In a 2006 interview with the *Volkskrant* he stated that his goal was to “Stop the tsunami of Islamization in the Netherlands.” He

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<sup>154</sup> Marcel Haenen, *Wilders Schuldig aan Aanzetten tot Discriminatie, Geen Straf*, <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/12/09/volg-hier-het-vonnis-in-minder-minder-zaak-tegen-wilders-a1535780> 01-06-2017

<sup>155</sup> Bauke Schram, *PVV is Gevaarlijker dan NSB, Wilders Heerst als Führer*, <http://www.elsevierweekblad.nl/nederland/achtergrond/2016/09/pvv-is-gevaarlijker-dan-nsb-wilders-heerst-als-fuhrer-35418> 01-06-2017

<sup>156</sup> At this time, there still is no new coalition since the national elections of 2017. With 20 seats the PVV would be an interesting partner for the coalition, but many parties avoid having to work with the PVV.

<sup>157</sup> Bas Paternotte, *Mark Rutte blijft er bij: Geen kabinet met PVV als Geert Wilders zijn uitspraak niet terugneemt*, Accessed 01-06-2017.

<sup>158</sup> Geert Wilder, <https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/867055480170000384> Accessed 01-06-2017

<sup>159</sup> ANP, *Toespraak Wilders hindert formatie niet*, <http://www.nu.nl/politiek/2331933/toespraak-wilders-hindert-formatie-niet.html> Accessed 01-06-2017

<sup>160</sup> Idem



describes how a neighborhood he has lived in for fifteen years, Kanaleneiland in Utrecht, has deteriorated during the time he has lived there and says that the deterioration was because of minorities becoming majorities. When asked if the deterioration was due to Islam he answered: “Of course.”<sup>161</sup>

### National Socialism?

Party programs by the PVV show a similar trend, although there is some difference. In 2006 the program titled simply *Verkiezingspamflet* (electoral manifesto) was still targeting Islam, but in a less radical way. The program put more emphasis on nationality of some Muslims by singling out Moroccans and Turk, stating the party wants a “halt to immigration by non-Western foreigners (Moroccans and Turks) for a period of five years.”<sup>162</sup> It did mention Islam specifically, but only talking about ‘radical Islam’ instead of targeting the religion as a whole.<sup>163</sup>

The program of 2006 also expressed the wish to close the borders to Eastern-European workers<sup>164</sup>, implying his nationalism was not specifically anti-Islam nationalism, but pro-Netherlands nationalism. Further evidence of pro-Netherlands nationalism is found in the desire to “make the Netherlands strong and vital again”<sup>165</sup> and the program’s plan to make “History and national identity a prominent part of the curriculum of schools”.<sup>166</sup>

The type of nationalism was defined in the program as well. One of the most prominent desires of the PVV was to give the power to the people. Section five of the program was entirely dedicated to the subject “Direct democracy: more influence by the citizens” in which the program explains how they want to give more political power to citizens.<sup>167</sup> This is in consonance with the tendency of all the cases to show signs of working according to the popular sovereignty doctrine. The PVV has also been accused of having a National Socialism ideology. In a 2012 MA thesis by a student graduating at the University of Amsterdam, the PVV has been compared to the Nazi party. Melissa M. Vargas, author of the thesis, concludes that the rhetoric and othering of the Nazi Party and the PVV is strikingly similar.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> Geert Wilders (PVV) ‘De tsunami van de islamisering stoppen’ <http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief/geert-wilders-pvv-de-tsunami-van-de-islamisering-stoppen~a795840/> Accessed 01-06-2017

<sup>162</sup> PVV, *Verkiezingspamflet*, 2006, pp. 3. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/4c750f6f78d2c>, 01-06-2017

<sup>163</sup> Idem.

<sup>164</sup> Ibidem, 4.

<sup>165</sup> Ibidem, 1.

<sup>166</sup> Ibidem, 3.

<sup>167</sup> Ibidem, 4.

<sup>168</sup> Mellissa M. Vargas, “Creating Europe’s ‘Other’, Propagandas of Discrimination by Hitler’s National Socialist German Worker’s Party and Wilders’ Freedom Party”, (MA Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2012).

However, discrimination against Jewish people by the National Socialist was based purely on ethnicity. The PVV does not base its othering on race, but on ideology and religion. The PVV does have many characteristics of a Fascist ideology. Fascism is closely related to integral nationalism. And fascism promotes, among other things, authoritarian leadership with harsh punishment for those who break the rules, and putting the nation above all else. The PVV has shown both of these characteristics by stating in party programs that they want to denaturalize people that break the law and have more than one nationality, and sending “back” the offender to the origin of his other nationality stripped of his Dutch citizenship. Another integral nationalist characteristic found in the PVV is foundation for nationalism on a history of culture, as the PVV has expressed its will to have a second golden age.<sup>169</sup> This statement shows a clear nationalist nature. It is a perfect example of legitimizing the existence of the Dutch nation by referring to the history of the Dutch nation.

### Radicalization

Throughout the years, the rhetoric the PVV has used in its party programs has become more radical. In 2006 the PVV proposed a ban on building new mosques in the Netherlands.<sup>170</sup> In 2017 the PVV proposed to close down all the existing mosques in the Netherlands.<sup>171</sup> The allegations against Islam are no longer against radical Islam. Moroccans are often targeted, with the 2010 program asking “why are they even here? Who let them in?” and stating that because of the welfare state “Henk and Ingrid<sup>172</sup> are paying for Ali and Fatima<sup>173</sup>.”<sup>174</sup>

Another sign of radicalizations is shown through the desire expressed in the 2006 program to ban “wearing headscarves in public functions”<sup>175</sup> and the desire expressed in the 2017 program to ban “Islamic headscarves in public functions.”<sup>176</sup> But, although the PVV is increasingly ramping up negative expression towards Islam, the PVV has targeted other foreign groups as well. We have already seen the desire to close the borders for Eastern-European workers. The PVV also made the headlines in early 2012, when the party put up a website commonly known as *Het Polenmeldpunt*, a hotline for people to complain specifically about grievances about Eastern-European people living in

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<sup>169</sup> PVV, *Verkiezingspamflet*, pp. 1.

<sup>170</sup> Ibidem, 3.

<sup>171</sup> PVV, *Concept Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2017-2021*, 2016. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://pubnpp.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/root/verkiezingsprogramma/TK/pvv2017con/PVV2017-2021con.pdf>, 01-06-2017

<sup>172</sup> Common Dutch names.

<sup>173</sup> Common Arab names.

<sup>174</sup> PVV, *De Agenda van Hoop en Optimisme*, 2012, pp. 5. Repository Publicaties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/dbi/4c333c0b343fc>, 01-06-2017

<sup>175</sup> PVV, *Verkiezingspamflet*, pp. 4.

<sup>176</sup> PVV, *Concept Verkiezingsprogramma*.

the Netherlands. The website states that Eastern-European 'mass immigration' has caused disturbances, pollution, suppression on the labor market, and integration and housing problems.<sup>177</sup> By targeting different kinds of groups that, in the vision of the PVV, do not belong to the Dutch Nation, the PVV is creating an image of the world as being very unsafe. There are many more examples that can be provided, but the message remains the same: The world is unstable, unhealthy, and unsafe. Only by strengthening the Dutch nation and closing this nation off the Dutch are safe. Within the nation, anyone who steps out of line and does something that may harm the nation should be punished and preferable deported. Anyone that does not come from a culture of Jewish-Christian-Humanist tradition is dangerous and should be avoided.

The PVV is deliberately stimulating a siege mentality among the people that they see as being part of the Dutch nation. Evidence is found most prominently in the rhetoric by the PVV and Geert Wilders. The rhetoric that is used is divisive, glorifies the ingroup, and tries to shut out anyone not belonging to the ingroup. The evidence for this claim is found in degrading rhetoric, such as calling religious headscarves "head rags" and calling Moroccan youth "street terrorists". The hotline designed for complaints about a specific group of people creates a gap between the Dutch nation and this group of people as it implies that there are reasons to assume this group causes more problems than other groups. By stimulating this divisive thinking they are able to profile themselves as the only party willing to protect the nation, thus scaring voters into voting for the PVV.

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<sup>177</sup> *Meldpunt Midden en Oost Europeanen*, [web.archive.org/web/20121128015542/http://www.meldpuntmiddenennoosteuropeanen.nl/](http://web.archive.org/web/20121128015542/http://www.meldpuntmiddenennoosteuropeanen.nl/) Accessed 01-06-2017.

## *Conclusion*

The answer to the research question “which parties aim at inspiring siege mentality among supporters of the political parties in the cases?” has presented itself through my analysis. The political parties the Farmers Party and the List Pim Fortuyn do not show evidence of having tried to inspire siege mentality among the supporters of these parties. The Centre Party, Centre Democrats, and the Party For Freedom do show that they have tried (and the PVV is still trying to) inspire siege mentality among their voters. The characteristics present in these latter cases, and therefore characteristics that are evidence of a political party trying to inspire siege mentality, are radicalized conservative nationalist sentiments. These sentiments contain defensive elements and are often resembling to integral nationalist sentiments. These characteristics were lacking in the cases that do not inspire siege mentality. Overlapping characteristics in all cases were general conservative nationalist sentiments. Therefore only characteristics of radicalized conservative nationalism are evidence of a political party inspiring siege mentality.

It should be noted that each case represents a different era in Dutch history. The Farmers Party was a product of the more free spirited sixties, a time in which parties protesting the status quo of the Netherlands were no anomaly. Hans Janmaat was a product of a longer period of high unemployment rates, and the feeling that the Dutch government was responsible. Pim Fortuyn rose to fame with his anti-Islamic rhetoric, riding on the anger over 9/11. The PVV and Geert Wilders are a part of a Western return to nationalism.

Bear in mind that there are different explanations for the cause of siege mentality. Therefore, any conclusion from this study will only be relevant when examining political causes for siege mentality. This means that, when concluding that political parties do inspire a siege mentality, this not necessarily means that a country where siege mentality allegedly is widely present, such as Israel, the political parties of this country are responsible. There are many different factors, such as a common history and religion of the Jews, that may contribute to a siege mentality in Israel. This also means that, if the conclusion is that a political party inspires siege mentality, the country the political party is a part of is not necessarily experiencing a siege mentality among its citizens. It means that the political party could be actively contributing to the existence, or the emergence, of a siege mentality.

With this study I have examined whether factors of nationalism or populism, or a combination, present in a political party is causing said party to inspire siege mentality. In the analysis of each case I have found an interesting pattern which I will now discuss. Each of the cases I have examined show populist factors. Important factors of the definition of populism this research has used are being anti-establishment, using normative statements, making

allegations without facts to back these allegation up, and regarding the self as being anti-elite. Each of the four cases displayed these factors. All parties in this study used normative statements and allegations to attack the government and the elite, often without providing evidence that supported their allegations. This rhetoric was used in party programs, interviews with news outlets, in political debates, in published books, and on social media (which was only available in the era of the PVV). But the evidence shows that not each examined political party inspired siege mentality. Therefore, I have concluded that being a populist party alone is not the cause of siege mentality inspiring rhetoric. I did conclude that, among the examined cases, there are parties that have inspired, or are still inspiring, siege mentality. The factors that were present in the cases that did show evidence of inspiring siege mentality where nationalist factors.

The Farmers Party did not show any specific signs of nationalism. It is to be expected that a political party is nationalist to a certain degree, as they need to appeal to the nation that they want to elect them. The sources I have used in this study show that the Farmers Party was not based on a clear type of nationalism. The party was mainly founded to protest taxes for entrepreneurs. The main goal of this party was to lower these taxes which they thought were unfair and blamed the government for bullying small business owners. As the party was mainly populist without a clear and strong presence of an identifiable nationalist ideology, the party did not inspire siege mentality in any way.

Hans Janmaat, and the CP and CD, were populist. This case does not only reflect characteristics of populism, but also characteristics of a clearly identifiable type of nationalism. Both the CP (whilst Janmaat was the leader of this party) and CD show signs of an integral nationalist ideology. The language in the statutes and party programs of these parties was often xenophobic and resonated with integral nationalism. The CD has even stated they viewed intercultural marriage as a negative phenomenon in the Netherlands, showing a very negative attitude towards people that they felt did not belong to the Dutch nation. The combination of radicalized right-wing nationalism and populism unveils strong indications of trying to impose a siege mentality. The nature of many statements and the way in which these statements are made creates an uneasy picture of people who, as the CP and CD viewed, did not belong to the Dutch nation. The parties and leader Janmaat did not hesitate to make it look like many problems<sup>178</sup> in the Netherlands were caused by non-Dutch people. In doing so, a view of the world outside of the Dutch nation is being defined as something that is to be feared and which should not be let into the Dutch nation. It is entirely possible that Hans Janmaat himself had a siege mentality and he was trying to convince the Dutch nation of his own

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<sup>178</sup> As most of these perceived problems lack explanation or evidence, these phenomena the parties stipulate as problems are not necessarily perceived as existing problems by other members of the society in the Netherlands.

perceptions. It is also possible that the creation of a siege mentality was used as a tactic to scare people into voting for the CP and CD, as these parties defined themselves as the parties that would protect the Dutch nation from the outside world. Any which way, the data suggests that a combination of radicalized, mainly integral, nationalism and populism caused the CP and CD to feed a siege mentality among people living in the Netherlands.

Although List Pim Fortuyn showed similar populist tendencies as the other cases, and there is evidence of nationalism within the party, there is not enough evidence to claim this party fed a siege mentality. One of the characteristics of siege mentality is that one with a siege mentality perceives at least multiple groups from the outside world as a threat to the nation. The LPF, and Fortuyn himself, focused mainly on blaming Muslims for perceived problems in the society in the Netherlands. Now, if the perception of a threat is great enough, I would say it is possible to have a siege mentality because of a perceived threat by just one group outside of the nation. However, this perceived threat would have to be much worse than a smaller perceived individual threat from many other groups. In other words, many groups posing a small threat would be more stimulating for a nation to draw back and dig in than only one group in the outside world posing a bigger threat. And the believe that the LPF was spreading, that Muslims pose a threat to the Dutch nation, is not the believe of a big enough threat to feed a siege mentality. The LPF did show some signs of nationalism, even of more radical conservative nationalism. However, nationalist remarks, such as calling a different culture backwards and presuming superiority of the own culture, are not strong enough in the case of the LPF to create a feeling of complete unsafety. Therefore, there are not enough signs to say this party fed a siege mentality.

The PVV, a party that is still prominently present in today's politics of the Netherlands, is both populist and radical nationalist. The combination of statements and the manner in which claims are stated shows that this party is actively trying to feed a siege mentality among citizens of what this party perceives as the Dutch nation. Party programs, as well as party leaders Geert Wilders' rhetoric, are aimed at creating an image of the Netherlands as being under constant threat. The PVV makes an effort to create a superior image of the Dutch nation over nations with different cultures. Not only Muslims and Arabs are targeted, but any region that produces immigrants that want to move to the Netherlands becomes victim of dehumanizing allegations. The fear that is created by the PVV overlaps in multiple facets of the Dutch society. According to the PVV the Dutch nation should be aware of "others" coming to the Netherlands to take jobs that belong to Dutch people, are a threat to what the PVV perceives as Dutch culture, and aim to terrorize and attack the Dutch nation. Statements such as calling religious headscarves "head rags" and calling Moroccan youth "street terrorists" contribute to the dehumanizing of other cultures, as well as glorifying the culture of the Dutch nation. Equal to the case of the CP and CD, additional research is required to investigate

whether the party leader is trying to convince the public of his own genuine fear, or if the creation of a siege mentality is a tactic to scare people into voting for the party. What is apparent, is that a combination of populism and radicalized, integral, nationalism **are** feeding a siege mentality among people of what the PVV perceives as the Dutch nation.

### Limitations and Recommendations

This research has provided answers to questions regarding nationalism, populism, and siege mentality. However, many questions still remain unanswered. By focusing only on siege mentality in relation to politics, the conclusions of this thesis provide a better understanding of the relationship between politics and siege mentality. However, existing literature on siege mentality focusses on many different aspects, of which politics is just one of many. This thesis did not focus on other important aspects such as education or culture.<sup>179</sup> Therefore, any conclusion that is drawn from this research relates to the political aspect of siege mentality only. To gain a full understanding of a possible presence of siege mentality among the entire Dutch society, additional research on these other aspects is required.

The results that show parties that fed, or are still feeding, a siege mentality do not necessarily mean that supporters of these parties have a siege mentality. This research has not focused on the supporters bases of the investigated parties. The conclusion is that certain parties did or do make an active effort to feed a siege mentality. An investigation of surveys that show the reason why people support certain parties could provide an understanding of the question whether having a siege mentality is the reason people support siege mentality feeding parties. But there could be many other reasons for people to support these parties.

This research has been an effort to take siege mentality out of its original context, which was siege mentality in Israel. The theory on siege mentality has been applied to a different case to see whether the theory might be universally applicable. As the research shows that at least a part of the theory is applicable to other cases. However, further research on multiple different cases is required to see if the theory really is universally applicable. This research has shown that the theory is applicable to Dutch politics. This does not mean the theory is applicable to any other state or country. It does suggest that it is worthy of further investigating the subject of siege mentality. Further research to elaborate further on the subject of siege mentality could provide a better understanding of certain conflicts or provide a better understanding of radicalizing societies. Therefore, this research has contributed to broadening the horizon of siege mentality theory. By

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<sup>179</sup> This thesis does focus on the perception of Dutch culture by certain politicians. However, some theories focus on how certain books, films, or songs contain evidence of fear of other cultures. This thesis is limited to evidence of fear of other cultures in politics only.

connecting the theory on siege mentality to theories on nationalism and populism, this research has provided a different view on each of these theories. The relationship of these theories could be investigated even further. This research has focused only on parties with clear signs of populism, therefore it is worth investigating whether populism is a prerequisite for political parties to feed siege mentality. The data suggests that radicalized nationalism is one of the prerequisites, as the cases that did not show radicalized nationalism also did not show signs of feeding siege mentality. The data also suggests that a combination of populism and radicalized nationalism is a prerequisite, although it would be interesting to investigate cases without evidence of populism but with evidence of radicalized nationalism. Although, it remains to be seen whether such cases exist, as the literature implies that radical nationalism is usually paired with populism.



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