

The End of an Affair?

The Danish-British Relationship in the EU and the Brexit

Britain must be at the centre of Europe

- Tony Blair to British Ambassadors in London, 2003.

The Danes need the EU and that that is the reason why Denmark must participate and play a strong role in the EU

- Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 2002.

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ABSTRACT

Denmark is considered a 'reluctant' and 'hesitant' European member state, ever since its accession to the European Community in 1973. Before and during its membership, Denmark found a partner in Britain. Both were reluctant towards transferring sovereignty, had a sense of 'superiority' in relation to the EU, shared significant opt-outs on the TEU and as a result were named 'the odd couple'. After 43 years of membership, the British electorate voted in favour of a Brexit in the summer of 2016. The partnership between Britain and Denmark, and to what extent Denmark is losing a key ally when Britain leaves the EU, is the subject of this thesis.

The small state theory explains why small countries like Denmark bind themselves to great powers like Britain. Denmark's approach towards European integration and during its membership has been characterized by 'shadowing' Britain. Denmark depended its European policies on the British European policies before and during its EU membership. The two countries also shared positions and approaches towards European integration between 2000 and 2008. Two more recent EU policies examined in this thesis, eastern enlargement and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, were highly prioritized by Denmark and in the academic literature the second is considered a consequence of the first. Using party manifesto's and public statements and speeches by the Danish and British Prime Ministers on these policies, the Danish and British approaches are analysed and compared. Support for eastern enlargement is explained by rationalists and constructivist approaches, used as tools to examine whether there have been similarities between the British and Danish arguments and approaches. The IR theory which distinguishes supranationalists from intergovernmentalists is used to examine the Danish and British support for the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty and their approach to the principle of subsidiarity. After comparing and analysing these approaches, it is clear that, with Britain leaving, Denmark is definitely losing a key ally. It seems, however, that the focus of the Danish shadowing has already started to shift to the EU, away from Britain. The 'odd couple' is breaking up.

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Denmark and the Brexit: The end of an affair?

Introduction

Saturday the 25th of March 2017 the European Union (EU) celebrated its sixtieth birthday. It was in 1957 that Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In its six decades of existence, the community developed into the EU with 28 member states at the time of writing. During the celebrations in March 2017, one of the member states was missing. In the summer of 2016 the British electorate voted in favour of an exit of Britain from the EU (known as ‘Brexit’), Britain officially denounced its membership on Wednesday March 29, 2017.¹

The question that immediately resonated after the British referendum was who would be next. As the EU has been unable to provide the required leadership throughout recent challenges like the economic crisis in 2007 and the migration crisis, criticism from its member states increased.² This criticism is fueled by the rise of the popularity of national radical right wing parties (rrwp). Not only UKIP in Britain, but also the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, Front National in France and Danish People’s Party (DPP) gained much influence in national politics.³ Anti-European integration and nationalism specifically opposed to the EU are two key features of these Western-European parties according to scholars Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. de Lange and Matthijs Rooduijn.⁴ In the countries mentioned above, the media immediately started framing their own national exits after the Brexit-vote. In the

¹ In this thesis, ‘the UK’ and ‘Britain’ are both used simultaneously and both mean Great Britain.

² Søren Leth and Niklas Mikkelsen, ‘The Consequences of Brexit on Danish Export. An application of the Gravity Approach’, *Aarhus University Department of Economics and Business Economics* (Aarhus 2016) 1.

³ At the time of writing, the Dutch national elections have taken place two and a half months ago. The Party for Freedom did not win the election, but it became the second largest party in the Netherlands with 20 seats in the Dutch Parliament. The French elections took place one month ago. Although Marine Le Pen did not become the new Prime Minister, she became second and showed that a large part of the French population is against European integration. Sources: Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, ‘Kiesraad stelt definitieve verkiezingsuitslag vast’ (version 21 March 2017), <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/nieuws/kamernieuws/kiesraad-stelt-definitieve-verkiezingsuitslag-vast> (25 March 2017); NBC News, ‘French Election: Marine le Pen Loses but Propels Far-Right to Mainstream’ (version 9 May 2017), <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/french-election-marine-le-pen-loses-propels-far-right-mainstream-n756716> (14 May 2017).

⁴ Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. de Lange and Matthijs Rooduijn (eds.), *Radical Right Wing Parties in Western Europe. Into the Mainstream?* (Abingdon 2016) 5.

aftermath of the British referendum, the media and the DPP in Denmark introduced 'Dexit'. The DPP pushed Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen to either seek a special UK-style deal for Denmark within the EU, or consider calling a Danish referendum on EU membership.⁵ Although Løkke Rasmussen in response stated that Denmark wants to stay in the EU, he appointed the Eurosceptic leader of Liberal Alliance, Anders Samuelsen, as Minister of Foreign Affairs last November.⁶

Denmark always had a special relationship with the European Community (EC) and since its accession to the EC/EU this relation has been subject to many research and debate. Among scholars of International Relations and Political Science there is a wide consensus that Denmark holds a special position towards European integration. In academic debates and articles Denmark has been portrayed as an 'outsider', 'anxious', 'reluctant', 'Eurosceptic' and a member of 'the other European Community'.⁷ Denmark is for example, the only country that in the previous century said 'no' to the EU in a referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on the European Union, TEU) and is granted many opt-outs. Alongside Ireland, Denmark is one of the countries that has had most referenda on European integration with the Europol-referendum as most recent example.⁸ The Danish electorate voted 'no' on changing the legal status on Europol, which would make it a supranational institution. And once again, Denmark

⁵ Ben Rosamund, 'Denmark and Brexit: An Ally Departing and Anticipations High' (version 6 July 2016), <http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-3627> (25 March 2017); Shifa Rahaman, 'DF to Løkke: Either promise a referendum or resign' (version 27 July 2016), <http://cphpost.dk/news/df-to-lokke-either-promise-a-referendum-or-resign.html> (25 March 2017); Alice Foster, 'What is Dexit? Will Denmark leave the EU next?' (version 26 August 2016), <http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/695496/Dexit-what-is-Denmark-exit-will-Denmark-leave-the-EU-referendum-Brexit-impact-Europe> (25 March 2017); Christian W., 'Farage's barrage: Denmark will leave the EU' (version 1 December 2016), <http://cphpost.dk/news/farages-barrage-denmark-will-leave-eu.html> (25 March 2017).

⁶ Greg Heffer, 'Sign of the times? Denmark appoints eurosceptic as new foreign minister' (version 29 November 2016), <http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/737753/EU-integration-Denmark-appoints-eurosceptic-Anders-Samuelsen-foreign-minister-Brexit> (26 March 2017).

⁷ The 'Other Europe' are the Nordic countries: Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark; See for example: Lee Miles and Anders Wivel, 'A Smart State Handling a Differentiated Integration Dilemma? Concluding on Denmark in the European Union', in: Lee Miles and Anders Wivel, *Denmark in the European Union* (New York 2014) Kobo-edition, chapter 16; Jens Henrik Haahr, 'European Integration and the Left in Britain and Denmark', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 30 (1992) 1, 77-100, here 77; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, *Opting Out of the European Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European Integration* (Cambridge 2014) 5; Morten Kelstrup, 'Denmark's Relation to the European Union', in: Lee Miles and Anders Wivel, *Denmark in the European Union* (New York 2014) Kobo-edition, chapter 2; Caroline Howard Grøn, Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel (eds.), *The Nordic Countries and the European Union. Still the other European Community?* (New York 2015) 1; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, 'Organized Duplicity? When States Opt Out of the European Union', in: Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, *Sovereignty Games* (New York 2008) 81-103.

⁸ Maja Kluger Rasmussen and Catharina Sørensen, 'Denmark – A Pragmatic Euroscepticism', *Building Bridges Paper Series* (2016) 3.

is getting a special deal from the EU, emphasizing its ‘yes, but...’ approach and its ‘awkward position’.⁹

Over 43 years of membership, Denmark has shared this ‘awkward position’ and ‘outsiderness’ with Britain.¹⁰ Besides – and because of – their reluctant attitude towards European integration, the two countries share opt-outs on the TEU. Britain and Denmark were granted reservations from the third stage of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Denmark’s alliance with the politics of Britain was already noticeable before its accession to the EU. Denmark’s route towards European integration has been characterized by ‘shadowing’ Britain, which was reflected in the foundation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).¹¹ When Britain filed its first application for EU membership in 1961, it only took a few hours for Denmark to also file for membership. When the British application was vetoed by the president of France, Charles de Gaulle, Denmark withdrew its application. Its parliament passed a resolution that Denmark would not join the European Economic Community without Britain.¹² In the early seventies, after three rounds of applications and after a change in France’s position, negotiations started again and were successful this time. On January 1 1973, Denmark entered the EU as the first Nordic country, simultaneously with Britain.¹³

Small state theory

Denmark’s relation with the EU is mainly characterized by the tension between on the one hand the fear of losing autonomy and on the other hand wanting to have influence on the international level and the fear of being left out of economic cooperation.¹⁴ Morten Kelstrup, professor Emeritus at the Centre of European Politics at Copenhagen University, calls this the *Danish Dilemma*, the Danish variation of the integration dilemma:

The dilemma which an actor, possibly a state, experiences when it is confronted with a new important step towards further integration. The situation might be that it has to choose between either at the one hand participating in the more intensified integration (with possible risk of being ‘entrapped’, being forced to accept decisions which it would otherwise reject) or at the

⁹ Liesbeth Kirk, ‘EU offers Denmark backdoor to Europol’ (version 8 December 2016), <https://euobserver.com/justice/136200> (26 May 2017); Howard Grøn, Nedergaard and Wivel (eds.), *The Nordic Countries and the European Union*, 2.

¹⁰ Rosamund, ‘Denmark and Brexit: An Ally Departing and Anticipations High’; Adler-Nissen, *Opting Out of the European Union*, 3.

¹¹ Howard Grøn, Nedergaard and Wivel (eds.), *The Nordic Countries and the European Union*, 17; Adler-Nissen, *Opting Out of the European Union*, 3.

¹² Adler-Nissen, *Opting Out of the European Union*, 3.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Kelstrup, ‘Denmark’s Relation to the European Union’, Kobo-edition, chapter 2.

other hand rejecting the new integration step (with the risk of being abandoned, left outside the integration process or losing influence within this).¹⁵

This dilemma between preserving national autonomy and seeking influence European affairs through active participation in the EU is mainly a struggle for small states, according to scholars Baldur Thorhallson and Anders Wivel.¹⁶ In the traditional international relations literature, small states are defined in terms of the possession or lack of power resources. This is measured by the GDP, population size and military expenditure. Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, and Caroline Howard Grøn and Anders Wivel define a small state as ‘the weak part in an asymmetric relationship.’¹⁷ A state can be weak in one relation, but simultaneously powerful in another. For example: Sweden is a small state in relation to the EU, but a great power in relation to the Baltic States. In addition, actions of great powers, for example the exit of Britain from the EU, has influence on- and can change the institutions and conditions for policy makers. When a small state like Denmark leaves NATO or the EU, this would mainly have consequences for the small state themselves.¹⁸

Because small states are the weaker player within the relationship and dependent on great powers, they try to influence great powers to further their national interests. That Denmark’s EU policies were shaped by the British perspectives towards European integration shows what in the academic literature on small states is called ‘shadowing’ or ‘binding’. Much research has been done on small states within the EU. For example, Laurent Goetschel’s *Small States Inside and Outside the European Union and Adapting to European Integration. Small States and the European Union*. However, these works mainly focus on how the EU influences small state policies and how small states adapt to the EU, and not how small states try to influence great powers or institutions. It is therefore appropriate at this point to introduce the small state theory, explained by Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel in the book *Small States in Europe* and by Lee Miles and Anders Wivel, editors of *Denmark in the European Union*.

Following the small state theory described by Miles and Wivel, small states do not have sufficient resources to pursue a broad political agenda with many different goals.¹⁹ Small states

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Baldur Thorhallson and Anders Wivel, ‘Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19 (2006) 4, 651-668, here 652.

¹⁷ Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, ‘Introduction’, in: Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel (eds.), *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities* (New York 2016) 3-14, here 5; Caroline Howard Grøn and Anders Wivel, ‘Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy’, *Journal of European Integration* 33 (2011) 5, 523-539, here 524.

¹⁸ Steinmetz and Wivel, ‘Introduction’, 6.

¹⁹ Miles and Wivel, ‘A Small State Handling a Differentiated Integration Dilemma?’, Kobo-edition, chapter 16; Steinmetz and Wivel, ‘Introduction’, 5.

are more dependent on strong international institutions and less able to influence the decision-making processes within these institutions. Therefore, small states seek to influence the actions of great powers upon which their security and survival ultimately depends while at the same time trying to preserve as much autonomy as possible.²⁰ Furthermore, the scholars argue that by strengthening multilateral relations, small states try to delimit the action space of great powers. This theory is supported by Steinmetz and Wivel, who also describe that small states try to ‘shadow’ great powers.²¹ This shadowing is described by Steinmetz and Wivel, and Grøn and Wivel as ‘binding strategy’. Small states bind themselves to great powers by formalizing their international affairs and strengthen multilateral relations in order to influence the actions of these powers.²²

Wivel furthermore argues that this ‘binding’ is one of the characteristics of a small state acting as a smart state. By presenting solutions as specific contributions to a general positive development for the entire institution, small states try to further their interests.²³ Great powers accept this shadowing, according to the theory, as they perceive small countries as weaker and therefore not as a threat to their power.²⁴ In other words, small states use their ‘weak’ status to achieve national interests.

Thorhallson and Wivel argue that this shadowing is one of the greatest challenges of small states.²⁵ According to these scholars it is expected of small states to favour institutionalization of interstate relations because all members of these institutions are subject to the same rules and sanctions.²⁶ Another reason for small states to be in favour of institutionalization is that institutions of regional economic cooperation allow small states to obtain benefits which are usually only available to great powers.²⁷ Within the EU, according to Grøn and Wivel small states traditionally rely on the European Commission, as the Commission is perceived as independent, technocratic and supranational counterweight to the power politics of the Council. The power of the Commission was weakened due to the increased use of quality

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Steinmetz and Wivel, ‘Introduction’, 9.

²² Steinmetz and Wivel, ‘Introduction’, 10. Howard Grøn and Wivel, ‘Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty’, 524.

²³ Anders Wivel ‘From Small State to Smart State. Devising a Strategy for Influence in the EU’, in: Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel (eds.), *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities* (New York 2016) 15-29; Anders Wivel, ‘The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States. Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as Security Actor’, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43 (2005) 2, 393-412; Steinmetz and Wivel, ‘Introduction’, 3-10.

²⁴ Wivel, ‘From Small State to Smart State’, 24-26.

²⁵ Thorhallson and Wivel, ‘Small States in the European Union’, 658.

²⁶ Ibid., 655.

²⁷ Ibid.

majority voting in the Council and a tendency towards cooperation between large states outside the formalized institutions of the EU which squeezes the influence of small states.²⁸ This intergovernmentalism limits the Commission's maneuvering space.²⁹ It is expected that small states are supporters of supranationalism instead of intergovernmentalism as intergovernmentalism diminishes the power of small states to further their interests.

The assumption

The small state strategy and the parallels between the Danish and British positions towards the EU support the idea that Denmark has been 'shadowing' Britain. The fact that the Danish media and politicians immediately started talking about a 'Dexit', shows that there is an assumed partnership between the two countries and Danish that it is expected that Denmark 'shadows' Britain into leaving the EU. According to political scientist Marlene Wind of Copenhagen University, 'without Britain, Denmark won't have the locomotive to tow Danish interests'.³⁰ These reactions to the Brexit show that it is at least expected that Brexit will have significant consequences for the Danish position within the EU. There seems to be a widespread consensus among scholars, politicians and the media that Denmark is losing a key ally within the EU.³¹ This thesis will critically look at this assumption. Did Denmark and Britain have similar political stances and parallel positions towards EU policies? Is it indeed true that both countries are on the same side of the debates on EU reform and EU policies?

The existing literature on the Danish and British positions within the EU have been mainly focusing on similarities between the countries, like the opt-outs and Danish and British Euroscepticism. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, professor at the Department of Political Science at Copenhagen University, has done significant research on the opting-out of Britain and Denmark. Her book *Opting Out of the European Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European Integration* demonstrates how Danish and British elites cooperated extensively and informally on getting the opt-outs. For example, Denmark used the British euro opt-out to get the same opt-out themselves.³² Euroscepticism is also a much debated subject within IR, European Studies and Political Science and because of their distrust towards the EU, Denmark and Britain

²⁸ Howard Grøn and Wivel, 'Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty', 535.

²⁹ Ibid., 524.

³⁰ Rick Noack, 'These Countries Could Be Next Now That Britain Has Left the E.U.' (version 24 June 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/23/these-countries-could-be-next-if-britain-leaves-the-e-u/?utm_term=.7bef1b09bd12 (28 June 2016).

³¹ Rosamund, 'Denmark and Brexit: An Ally Departing and Anticipations High'; Mette Elstrup-Sangiovanni, 'Brexit – The View from Denmark' (version 7 February 2017), <http://www.e-ir.info/2017/02/07/brexit-the-view-from-denmark/> (25 March 2017).

³² Adler-Nissen, *Opting Out of the European Union*, 3.

have often been subject of research on Euroscepticism. Catharina Sørensen, head of the Danish Think Tank Europa and specialized in Euroscepticism Studies, compared Danish and British Euroscepticism in her paper ‘Danish and British Popular Euroscepticism Compared: A Skeptical Assessment of the Concept.’³³ The book *The Nordic Countries and the European Union. Still the Other European Community?* by Caroline Howard Grøn, Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel provides a detailed overview on the Nordic countries’ relationship with the EU, giving special attention to the interdependence with Britain.

Taking the existing literature in account, it seems that the focus is mainly on the similarities between Denmark and Britain and mostly seek to confirm the assumed partnership within the EU and the Danish ‘shadowing’ of Britain. The interdependence is outlined historically by many scholars, but the existing research does not critically look whether the EU policies and arguments supporting or opposing EU policies have been similar as well. The idea of parallels of the EU policies of Britain and Denmark is mostly based on assumptions. The idea that Denmark should or would follow Britain became apparent in the reactions of the media and politicians and show that there is an idea of partnership. This thesis will also focus on the relationship between Denmark and Britain within the EU. In addition to the existing literature, this thesis critically examines whether the positions and arguments in the debates on two important recent EU policies, eastern enlargement and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, were in fact similar.

Research on the consequences of Brexit is very limited as the Brexit is not yet formally completed. It will take approximately two years to formalize the Brexit and therefore one can only speculate about the specific consequences of a Brexit for Britain, Denmark or the EU. However, there are signs that Denmark is one of the countries that will be influenced by the Brexit, not only economically. Politically, Denmark could lose a like-minded voice of a great power within the EU. A report of international NGO VoteWatch Europe shows that, in the beginning of 2016, Sweden, The Netherlands and Denmark are Britain’s closest allies when it comes to voting on European policies.³⁴ For a small state like Denmark, it is important to have a like-minded great power on its side to be able to influence EU policies. For example, with Britain leaving, the group of non-euro member states is shrinking, making Denmark an even lonelier ‘outsider’. Economically, Danish businesses worry as Britain is Denmark’s fifth-largest

³³ Catharina Sørensen, ‘Danish and British Popular Euroscepticism Compared. A Skeptical Assessment of the Concept’, *DIIS Working Paper* (Copenhagen 2004).

³⁴ Simon Hix, Sara Hageman and Dorn Frantescu, ‘Would Brexit Matter? The UK’s Voting Record in the Council and European Parliament’, *VoteWatch Europe* (2016) 1.

export market, worth almost €10 billion, and 53.000 Danish jobs are connected to these exports.³⁵ Scholars Søren Leth and Niklas Mikkelsen's research on the consequences of Brexit on Danish export state this will decrease by 3,4272.07 million USD in case of a Brexit.³⁶ Since Britain is the fifth economy in the world and a strong economic and political power within the EU, its decision will not only influence themselves, but the EU as a whole.³⁷

Structure of the thesis

The aim of this thesis is to critically examine the following hypothesis: *When Britain leaves the EU, Denmark will lose a strong ally within the EU.* This question will be examined by analysing the political stances of both countries on two important EU policies between 2000 and 2007: eastern enlargement and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. These two policies were important reforms of the EU in the beginning of the 21st century and were high on the Danish EU-priority list. Furthermore, according to scholars there is a crucial relation between the widening, eastern enlargement, and the deepening, the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, of European integration. Treaty reform is considered to be a consequence of enlargement.³⁸

The first chapter of this thesis concerns the historical context of the complicated relationship between Denmark and the EU and focusses on Denmark's shadowing of Britain before and during the first two decades of membership. The rationale for membership of both countries is explained by Henrik Larsen's essential cooperation discourse. The second chapter concerns the British and Danish policies on eastern enlargement by looking at statements made by the respective governments, using theories on why member states support eastern enlargement. Frank Schimmelfennig, Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen and Lars L. Skålnes all use different theories to explain eastern enlargement support. Following these theories, three measurements are used to compare the British and Danish arguments on eastern enlargement: moral duty and historical responsibility, geography and national interest. The central hypothesis of this chapter is that it is expected that both countries supported eastern enlargement based on as well moral duty as national interests, but according to their size and geographic proximity to the CEECs, the national interests will differ. Chapter three examines the Danish and British

³⁵ Confederation of Danish Industry, 'Potential Impact of Brexit. The Perspective of Danish Businesses', *Europaudvalget 2016-17* (Copenhagen 2017).

³⁶ Leth and Mikkelsen, 'The Consequences of Brexit on Danish Export', 1.

³⁷ The World Bank, 'Gross Domestic Product 2015', *World Development Indication Database, World Bank* (version 28 April 2017), via: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf> (3 June 2017).

³⁸ See for example: Sara B. Hobolt, 'Ever Closer or Even Wider? Public Attitudes towards Further Enlargement and Integration in the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 21 (2014) 5, 664-680; R. Daniel Kelemen, Anand Menon and Jonathan Slapin, 'Wider and Deeper? Enlargement and Integration in the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 21 (2014) 5, 647-663.

positions on the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. The main theories on European integration argue member states supported or opposed the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty with arguments based on the idea of reform after enlargement, the issue of sovereignty and national interests. Accordingly, these are the three measurements used in this chapter to compare the British and Danish positions. It is expected that both countries support the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, but that Denmark, as a small state, is expected to support the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty based on supranational arguments whereas Britain will be on the intergovernmental side of the debate. In chapter 4, the conclusion, both positions will be compared and analysed. Finally, this will lead to the conclusion whether the assumption that Denmark is losing a strong ally within the EU is true.

To examine the Danish and British positions on these two EU policies, this thesis will look at public statements by the Prime Ministers of Britain and Denmark, official government declarations and documents such as party manifesto's. When using public statements, it needs to be bared in mind that politicians could use specific rhetoric to serve hidden agendas and goals. There could be a difference between what is said in public and what is said behind closed doors or what has been actually been done by the governments. As it is too early to examine these differences as archives on recent policy issues are still difficult to access, this thesis is an important first step towards further academic research on this subject.

To be able to examine and analyse the positions of Denmark and Britain on eastern enlargement and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, it is necessary to understand the theories and debates why member states supported eastern enlargement and why member states supported the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. Before proceeding to the first chapter, these theories are outlined in the theoretical framework below.

Theories on eastern enlargement and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty

In literature on support for eastern enlargement, many scholars argue that norms have played an important part. Frank Schimmelfennig uses the theories of rational approach and constructivist approach to explain support for eastern enlargement. From a rationalist point of view, 'the logic of consequence', enlargement policies are mainly influenced by the interests of the member states. These interests are influenced by the expected costs and benefits of eastern enlargement. The constructivist approach, 'the logic of appropriateness', argues that eastern enlargement is supported by the member states because of a sense of 'appropriateness',

‘solidarity’ and the fact that the CEECs are seen as ‘part of the European family’.³⁹ According to Schimmelfennig, the constructivist approach is the best explanation, as members see the EU as an organization representing a liberal community. Enlargement is motivated by the wish to include those countries that share these liberal values and norms.⁴⁰ The TEU, Frans Andriessen’s quote and the Copenhagen Criteria illustrate this approach. Schimmelfennig states that the enlargement preferences were mainly influenced by the geographical position of the member states, with those bordering the CEECs as ‘drivers’ of enlargement.⁴¹

Schimmelfennig also introduces ‘rhetorical entrapment’, which rests on the notion that actors use rule-based arguments strategically.⁴² Member states had a self-interest in enlargement, strategically used normative arguments to shame the opponents of enlargement into accepting it.⁴³ By focussing on the moral duty, and to confront actors with past rhetoric other countries were shamed into compliance.⁴⁴ In documents like the Helsinki Declaration and article 2 TEU, Western states promised to promote democratic principles and human rights across the East-West division. With the ending of the Cold War, supporters of enlargement used these documents to put opponents in a corner.⁴⁵

Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjørnsen argue that the support for enlargement cannot be explained by rational approach. From an economic point of view, enlargement would not lead to much economic benefit. On the contrary, countries, like Denmark, who were net beneficiaries of the EU, would after the enlargement become net contributors. Countries who were depending on the CAP would receive less budgetary help after the eastern enlargement than before.⁴⁶ Instead, the scholars argue that support for enlargement is based on a sense of ‘solidarity’ and shared identity, norms and values. They argue that, once the eastern European countries were sharing these values, they ‘could not be left behind.’⁴⁷

³⁹ Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, *International Organization* 55 (2001) 1, 47-80, here 47-56.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., 50-52.

⁴² Lars S. Skålnes, ‘Geopolitics and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, in: Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), *Politics of European Union Enlargement* (London and New York 2005) 213-233, here 229.

⁴³ Helene Sjørnsen, ‘Introduction. Enlargement and the Nature of the EU Polity’, in: Helene Sjørnsen (ed.), *Questioning EU Enlargement. Europe in Search of Identity* (New York 2006) 1-16, here 5-6.

⁴⁴ Skålnes, ‘Geopolitics and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, 229.

⁴⁵ Sjørnsen, ‘Introduction. Enlargement and the Nature of the EU Polity’, 5.

⁴⁶ Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjørnsen, ‘The Importance of Solidarity: Denmark as a Promotor of Enlargement’, in: H. Sjørnsen (ed.), *Questioning EU Enlargement. Europe in Search of Identity* (New York 2006) 81-103, here 89.

⁴⁷ Riddervold and Sjørnsen, ‘The Importance of Solidarity’, 82.

In contrast to the theories mentioned above, Lars S. Skålnes argues that domestic (economic) interests and geographical proximity influence the position of member states towards enlargement. Member states who benefit from foreign investment in- and trade with Eastern Europe are expected to push for agreements that would increase economic interdependence. He argues that geographical proximity plays an important role in the support of countries for eastern enlargement. Countries that share a border with prospective members will favour enlargement, whereas countries further away should be less motivated.⁴⁸ Also Schimmelfennig states that greater geographical proximity makes countries more sensitive to negative developments in the region. This influences the interests in enlargement.⁴⁹

According to many scholars, like Kelemen, Menon and Slapin, and Schimmelfennig, widening of the EU goes hand-in-hand with deepening of the EU.⁵⁰ The 2004 enlargement indeed stirred the wish by the member states to reform the institutions of the EU. This resulted in the Lisbon Treaty. Kelemen, Menon and Slapin argue that the increase in the diversity of preferences within the enlarged EU make legislative negotiations more difficult, reducing the ability of the Union to tackle important problems. This approach is supported by the fact that the debates on a new treaty came exactly when the negotiations on enlargement ended.⁵¹

European Politics scholars Ian Bach, Stephen George and Simon Bulmer argue that enlargement was not the only reason to reform the EU. Besides enlargement, they argue that the need to connect the EU more closely to its citizens was a reason to reform the EU.⁵² This approach is supported by George Berman, who argues that the legitimacy of the EU depends upon its acceptance by its citizens. Therefore, it is in the EU's interest to preserve its image as a democratic institution, and thus reform.⁵³ This approach is supported by the Laeken Declaration, where importance was given to the role of national parliaments, and by the fact that the principle of subsidiarity became a much debated feature of the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty.

⁴⁸ Skålnes, 'Geopolitics and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union', 229.

⁴⁹ Frank Schimmelfennig, 'The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement. Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Decision to Expand to the East', *ARENA Centre for European Studies* 99 (1999) 15, 231.

⁵⁰ Kelemen, Menon and Slapin, 'Wider and Deeper?', 648-649.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ian Bache, Stephen George and Simon Bulmer, *Politics in the European Union* (Oxford 2011) 195.

⁵³ George Berman, 'Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States', *Columbia Law Review* 94 (1994) 2, 331-456, here 331.

European integration scholars made a division between supporters of a supranational and federal Europe and intergovernmentalists, the opponents of a federal Europe.⁵⁴ The supranationalists or federalists are in favour of transferring sovereignty to the EU, thereby increasing the EU's authority. The intergovernmentalists see the national parliaments of the member states as the most important actors and therefore want to limit the authority of the EU.⁵⁵ In the debates between the two groups in relation to the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, the principle of subsidiarity played an important role. This principle determines the formal balance of competencies between the EU and the member states. Used in the Lisbon Treaty, it opens up the European law-making processes to national parliaments: The Commission must send new proposals to national parliaments for their considerations.⁵⁶ The use of the principle of subsidiarity was propelled by the eroding EU legitimacy, discussions between intergovernmentalist and federalists and a rising concern on the growing distance between the public and the EU.⁵⁷ Member states have different perspectives of subsidiarity. In the view of the intergovernmentalists, subsidiarity acts as a shield against EU powers. This group considers the principle of subsidiarity as a tool to protect national competences and interests.⁵⁸ The federalists and supranationalists see subsidiarity as a tool to give more competences to the EU, as the EU is in their eyes the most effective institution.⁵⁹ According to scholars Kees van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek, the principle of subsidiarity can solve the 'trilemma' of the conflicting interests of the federalists, the protection of national interests wished by intergovernmentalists, and the need to conclude an acceptable treaty. They cynically called subsidiarity the 'Euroconcept all can admire by giving the meaning they want.'⁶⁰ Ronald Tiersky argues that subsidiarity can balance 'historic, nationalist and sovereignty-obsessed' member states with pro-integration objectives.⁶¹ This is supported by the fact that the adoption

⁵⁴ Frank Schimmelfennig and Berthold Rittberger, 'Theories of European Integration. Assumptions and hypotheses', in: Jeremy John Richardson (ed.), *European Union: Power and Policy Making*, (Abingdon 2006) 73-85, here 81.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ian Cooper, 'The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44 (2006) 2, 281-304, here 282.

⁵⁷ Steven Blockmans, Judith Hoevenaars, Adriaan Schout and Jan Marinus Wiersma, 'From Subsidiarity to Better EU Governance: A Practical Reform Agenda for the EU', *Centre of European Policy Studies Essay* 10 (2014), 1-13, here 2.

⁵⁸ Marc Wilke and Helen Wallace, 'Subsidiarity: Approaches to Power-sharing in the European Community', *Royal Institute of International Affairs Discussion Papers* 27 (1990) 1-42, here 38; Simona Constantin, 'Rethinking Subsidiarity and the Balance of Powers in the EU in Light of the Lisbon Treaty and Beyond', *CYELP* 4 (2008) 151-177, here 160.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Kees van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek, 'Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32 (1994) 2, 215-236, here 220.

⁶¹ Ronald Tiersky, 'Europe: International Crisis and the Future of Integration', in: Robert Tiersky (ed.), *Europe Today. National Politics, European Integration and European Security* (New York 2004) 3-20, here 3.

of subsidiarity into the Lisbon Treaty was cheered by both defendants of more authority at the community level, like France and Germany, and opponents of such development, for instance Britain.⁶² In the context of the EU, principles of subsidiary have been introduced precisely to quell fears of centralization. Both Britain and Denmark signed the first Constitutional Treaty despite reluctance to confess to a ‘federal state model’.⁶³ The pro-federalists, like the Frenchman Jacques Delors, used subsidiarity as a means of temporarily soothing these fears and to push the Lisbon Treaty forwards.⁶⁴

⁶² Van Kersbergen and Verbeek, ‘Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union’, 220.

⁶³ Frank Delmartino, Valérie Pattyn, ‘The Constitutional Debate in the European Union: A quest for new paradigm’, *Studia Europaea* 2 (2007) 2, 167-191, here 180.

⁶⁴ Andreas Follesdal, ‘Subsidiarity, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Constitutional Treaty of Europe’, *Journal of Social Philosophy* 37 (2006) 1, 61-80, here 65.

Chapter 1: Denmark's reluctance and the relation with Britain explained.

After World War 2, Denmark started 'shadowing' Britain. Since the accession of both countries to the EU they have often been presented as the 'odd couple' with significant reservations to the TEU.⁶⁵ Apart from the short period between the acceptance of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985 and the refusal of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, Denmark has been a pragmatic and reluctant member of the EC/EU. However, according to the Danish political scientist Uffe Balslev, Denmark is traditionally the strongest advocate of multilateralism.⁶⁶ Furthermore, the small state theory suggests that small countries like Denmark should be in favour of supranational institutions. Therefore, it is hard to understand why Denmark has been reluctant towards European integration. This chapter concerns the historical roots of the particular position Denmark took. Also, this chapter will examine the relationship of Denmark and Britain.

1.1 Sovereignty, balancing and superiority⁶⁷

Understanding Denmark's reluctant approach to European integration and the rejection of supranational institutions requires an overview of Denmark's '1864 syndrome', Danish neutrality during World War 1 and the Danish welfare state. These three elements have significant influence on the modern Danish national identity and Danish ideas of the nation and the state. In turn, this identity and ideas highly influenced the Danish position towards European integration and supranational institutions.⁶⁸

At the end of the 18th century, the Danish absolute state – the 'whole state' – consisted of Denmark, Norway and the Duchies Schleswig and Holstein. 1814 to 1864 were devastating years for the Danish whole state. Due to Denmark's engagement in the Napoleonic wars,

⁶⁵ Henrik Larsen, 'British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s: A Discourse Approach', *European Journal of International Relations* 5 (1991) 4, 451-483, here 451.

⁶⁶ Uffe Balslev, 'The Danish Case: International Involvement as the Small States' Remedy for Great Power Dominance', in: Laurent Goetschel (ed.), *Small States Inside and Outside the European Union. Interests and Policies* (Dordrecht 1998) 107-124, here 107.

⁶⁷ Besides the other resources noted in this paragraph, this paragraph used Bo Lidegaard's book *A Short History of Denmark in the 20th Century*. Source: Bo Lidegaard, *A Short History of Denmark in the 20th Century* (Copenhagen 2014) Google Play-edition, Prologue.

⁶⁸ Lene Hansen, 'Sustaining Sovereignty: The Danish Approach to Europe', in: Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver, *European Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic states* (London 2000) 50-85, here 57.

Norway was lost to Sweden in 1814.⁶⁹ Later, in 1848, the German-speaking majority of Schleswig-Holsteiner organized themselves against the whole state and between 1848 and 1851 the First Schleswegian war was fought. The underlying cause of this war was the rising sense of Danishness. This Danishness praised the glorious past and the Danish language, and was constructed against the ‘foreigners’ who were increasingly identified as ‘Germans’, mostly living in the Duchies.⁷⁰ The tension between the Danes and the Germans had been growing since the late 18th century when Danish bourgeoisie started to distinct the Danish identity. In response, the Schleswig-Holsteiner argued the two Duchies were a single political and economic unit.⁷¹ When Austria and Russia forced Prussia to accept to return the Duchies were to the Danish king, the war ended. Still, the problems continued and in 1863 the second Schleswegian war broke out. This time, Austria and Russia were not on Denmark’s side and on Prussia attacked Denmark. Denmark ended up losing Holstein, Lauenborg and Schleswig in 1864. This traumatic defeat and significant loss of country within fifty years led to an inward turn and romantic nationalism became a mass phenomenon in Denmark.⁷²

During World War 1, the trauma of 1864 is clearly noticeable. The Radical Liberal government believed it to be fatal, if Denmark would be forced to join the allies against Germany. Denmark held a very vulnerable position because of its small size, its important position as a bridge between Western Europe and Scandinavia, and as the gate keeper to the Baltic Sea.⁷³ The international nature of Denmark’s economy increased this vulnerability. Britain and Germany, both heavily involved in the war, were Denmark’s most important trading partners. Thus, World War 1 was not only a threat to Danish security, but also put pressure on its foreign trade and economy.⁷⁴ These threats resulted in a consensus among all political parties that Denmark should pursue a policy of neutrality.

During the entire war, Denmark managed to stay neutral, constantly balancing between Germany and Britain. Eric Scavenius, Foreign Minister at the time, used Britain’s and Germany’s independence on Danish supplies to maintain trade with both partners.⁷⁵ Regarding

⁶⁹ Hansen, ‘Sustaining Sovereignty’, 55-56.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 55.

⁷¹ Ibid., 56.

⁷² Ibid., 57.

⁷³ Karen Gram-Skjoldager, ‘The Other End of Neutrality: The First World War, the League of Nations and Danish Neutrality’, in: Johan den Hartog and Samuel Kruizinga, *Caught in the Middle. Neutrals, neutrality and the First World War* (Amsterdam 2012) 155-172, here 160.

⁷⁴ Gram-Skjoldager, ‘The Other End of Neutrality’, 160.

⁷⁵ Bo Lidegaard, *A Short History of Denmark in the 21st Century* (Copenhagen 2014) Google Play-edition, chapter 1; Klaus Carsten Pedersen, ‘Denmark and the European Security and Defence Policy’, in: Alyson J.K.

the security threat, a national compromise was reached in 1915. There had been discussion on the nature of the neutrality. The liberal and conservative parties considered neutrality as ‘passivity, but with a strong military defense’, whereas the left viewed neutrality as ‘the basic principle of non-violence’.⁷⁶ Eventually, consensus was reached on the belief that the presence of significant military defence would make Denmark more vulnerable to a British or German attack because they would want to get hold of the military resources in a strategically important Denmark.⁷⁷

The fact that Denmark maintained to uphold its neutral status and foreign trade, contributed to the Danish sense of superiority. This increased after World War 1 with the introduction of the welfare state. From 1864 onwards, the nation and the state became closely tied and the people were seen as the core of the nation. The ‘people’, the *Folket*, is the element of unity and links the state and the nation strongly together. The state is acting on behalf of the nation and is considered to be responsible for the well-being of the people.⁷⁸

As a consequence of the economic effects for Denmark during the war, Denmark developed a comprehensive welfare system.⁷⁹ The Social Democratic Party wanted control of the state in order to create a decent life for and protection of the working class. With the introduction of the welfare state, Danish nationalism became two folded. On the one hand Danish nationalism was about its nation, traditions and culture. On the other hand, it was about its state and the fear of the demise of the welfare state.⁸⁰

Altogether, there are three historical causes that explain the Danish approach to European integration. First of all, the disaster of 1864 and the following inward turn and nationalism, had led to a ‘wait and see...’ approach to European cooperation, fearing more loss of sovereignty and autonomy.⁸¹ Secondly, after maintaining its neutrality during World War 1, Denmark saw itself as superior to the rest of Europe and thought European integration could harm this position.⁸² Thirdly, this presumed moral superiority was increased by the introduction of the

Bailes, Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius, *The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy* (Oxford 2006) 37-49, here 40; Gram-Skjoldager, ‘The Other End of Neutrality’, 160.

⁷⁶ Gram-Skjoldager, ‘The Other End of Neutrality’, 158.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 160.

⁷⁸ Larsen, ‘British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s’, 460.

⁷⁹ Hansen, ‘Sustaining Sovereignty’, 51.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Pedersen, ‘Denmark and the European Security and Defence Policy’, 40.

⁸² Howard Grøn, Nedergaard and Wivel (eds.), *The Nordic Countries and the European Union*, 1.

Danish welfare state, which was, from the Danish point of view, also threatened by European integration.⁸³

1.2 Nordic cooperation or European cooperation? Following the UK.

When it comes to European integration, the Nordic countries have been a relatively coherent bloc. The Nordics – Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden – are all small states and considered themselves as ‘different from Europe’.⁸⁴ In the academic literature, this is called ‘Nordic exceptionalism’.⁸⁵ Denmark, like the other Nordics, was afraid losing advantages of the Scandinavian welfare models by cooperating closely with the rest of the EC/EU.⁸⁶

In the years after World War 2, European policy was of minor priority for the Danes.⁸⁷ After the war Denmark preferred to reconstitute the country as an independent and democratic state. Denmark had the desire to continue the former Danish neutrality and was an advocate of an ‘all European option’, including eastern European countries. The emergence of the Cold War undermined this policy.⁸⁸

One of the major players in post-war Western Europe who influenced the economic policies of the Nordics was Britain.⁸⁹ There are several reasons why Britain was a major consideration affecting Danish policies towards European integration during most of the post-war period. Britain constituted a major market with the Nordics and with Danish agricultural products in particular. In addition, the ‘superiority’ image discussed in the previous paragraph, also played a role in British policies towards European integration. The British sense of superiority rests largely on political grounds. Britain is proud of its political traditions and political stability in times the Continent experienced political turbulence. Britain perceived the Continent as a threat to its national policy, as most of Britain’s wars have originated on the continent.⁹⁰ Denmark and Britain shared a pragmatic and intergovernmental approach to international cooperation. Both countries were opposing a supranational, federal Europe and wanted European cooperation as interstate cooperation, i.e. cooperation between sovereign

⁸³ Hansen, ‘Sustaining Sovereignty’, 61.

⁸⁴ Howard Grøn, Nedergaard and Wivel (eds.), *The Nordic Countries and the European Union*, 1.

⁸⁵ Lykke Friis, ‘The Battle Over Denmark. Denmark and the European Union’, *Scandinavian Studies* 75 (2002) 3, 379-396, here 380.

⁸⁶ Friis, ‘The Battle Over Denmark’, 380.

⁸⁷ Kelstrup, ‘Denmark’s Relation to the European Union’, Kobo-edition, chapter 2.

⁸⁸ Kelstrup, ‘Denmark’s Relation to the European Union’, Kobo-edition, chapter 2; Howard Grøn, Nedergaard and Wivel (eds.), *The Nordic Countries and the European Union*, 17.

⁸⁹ Howard Grøn, Nedergaard and Wivel (eds.), *The Nordic Countries and the European Union*, 17.

⁹⁰ Sørensen, ‘Danish and British Popular Euroscepticism Compared’, 19.

nation states.⁹¹ This can be explained by the basic understanding of the state and the nation in both countries. Denmark and Britain are unitary states, which means the capital is the only political centre. A supplementary political centre like the EC/EU, would challenge their fundamental state structure. In Denmark, the element of this unity is the people. In Britain the parliamentary is sovereign and the element of unity. Herein lies an important difference. In both countries the challenges European integration would bring, were directed to another idea of state sovereignty. Denmark feared to lose its people's sovereignty, its autonomy and its culture. Britain feared to lose parliamentary sovereignty. Nevertheless, European integration would affect both unitary states, what both countries want to avoid.⁹²

Danish EU policy in the 1960s was subordinated to that of Britain and was characterized by the shadowing of British policies.⁹³ While the Six on the continent signed the Treaty of Rome, Denmark focused on their interdependence with Britain. Denmark firmly believed the British perspectives towards international trade and caution towards the development of a federal Europe were close to their own.⁹⁴ Like Britain, Denmark chose not to participate in early European cooperation, such as the ECSC. As a counter-reaction to the Treaty of Rome, Britain and the likeminded states Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal agreed to the 1960 Stockholm Convention which created the EFTA.⁹⁵ They hoped the EFTA could act as an economic heavyweight and would be capable of negotiating multilateral deals with the EEC.⁹⁶ Following the Stockholm Convention, the 1960s were a period of a political and economic separation between the EEC and the EFTA. Denmark was least enthusiastic about this and considered the EFTA as an 'iron curtain between our main customers', Britain and Germany.⁹⁷ Another reason why Denmark was sceptical about the EFTA was the fact that Britain did not see the EFTA as a permanent solution, which was proved by Britain's first application for membership already in 1961.⁹⁸ When Britain did apply for European membership in 1961, Denmark submitted its own entry applications the same day. Equally,

⁹¹ Nikolaj Petersen and Jørgen Elklit, 'Denmark Enters the European Communities', *Scandinavian Political Studies* 8 (1973) 8A, 198-213, here 198; Larsen, 'British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s', 460.

⁹² Larsen, 'British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s', 460.

⁹³ Hans Branner, 'Small States on the Side-lines: Denmark and the Question of European Political Integration', in: George Wilkes, *Britain's Failure to Enter the European Community 1961-1963: The Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations* (Abingdon 1997) Google Play-edition, chapter 9.

⁹⁴ Howard Grøn, Nedergaard and Wivel (eds.), *The Nordic Countries and the European Union*, 21.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 22

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

when the British application was vetoed by de Gaulle, Denmark withdrew its own application.⁹⁹ When Britain re-activated membership applications in 1964 and 1967, again Denmark followed.¹⁰⁰ During the negotiations, Denmark was awaiting the main negotiations between Britain and the Six and did not actively contribute in negotiations itself.¹⁰¹

In 1973, Denmark and Britain joined the EC. In both countries, membership has been controversial. The dominant discourse in both countries was the so-called *essential cooperation discourse*. In other words, membership and development of the EC/EU was legitimized by its utility for the state and the concrete interests that membership could fulfil. The arguments were mainly economic.¹⁰² Another argument in favour of integration was the security argument. Economic and political integration was seen as a precondition for a transformation of the traditional military rivalry between France and Germany. There was no emotional pull.¹⁰³

In Denmark, a country with such a high degree of nationalism, sense of superiority and *Danishness*, the absence of the emotional and cultural arguments was crucial for the Danish development towards European integration. In contrast to the political parties, the eurosceptics did use an emotional pull and mainly argued in terms of identity, framing participation as a threat towards Danish national autonomy, sovereignty and *Danishness*.¹⁰⁴ In 1972, Denmark organized its first EU-referendum on membership of the EC, where 63,3% voted ‘yes’. In Denmark the people are the sovereign and the parliament is obliged to actively involve them into EU policy. Britain did not organize a referendum on membership, as a referendum would undermine the parliamentary sovereignty. Nevertheless, three years later, in 1975, when it became clear that many British were not overly fond of their new European connection, a referendum was called. On election day, a two-third majority decided that Britain was to stay in the EC.¹⁰⁵

Thus, between 1945 and 1973, Denmark ‘shadowed’ Britain, a country that in their view represented the same perspectives on international trade and development of European integration. However, there were also important differences between Denmark and Britain.

⁹⁹ Adler-Nissen, *Opting out of the European Union*, 3.

¹⁰⁰ Howard Grøn, Nedergaard and Wivel (eds.), *The Nordic Countries and the European Union*, 17.

¹⁰¹ Branner, ‘Small States on the Side-lines’, Google Play-edition, chapter 9.

¹⁰² Kelstrup, ‘Denmark’s Relation to the European Union’, Kobo-edition, chapter 2; Hansen, ‘Sustaining Sovereignty’, 64.

¹⁰³ Larsen, ‘British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s’, 456.

¹⁰⁴ Branner, ‘Small States on the Side-lines’, Google Play-edition, chapter 9.

¹⁰⁵ Sørensen, ‘Danish and British Popular Euroscepticism Compared’, 17.

Being an island, Britain saw itself less connected to the Continent than Denmark, which was geographically linked to the Continent. Nevertheless, taking the small state theory into account, Denmark did not only shadow Britain because of the similarities, but also because of the interdependence to survive economically and be able to indirectly influence the international stage. The next paragraph will look at the relationship between the two countries during the first thirty years of their membership.

1.3 Danish and British European membership 1973-2000

Britain and Denmark are traditionally the most reluctant EC/EU member states and have often been described as ‘the odd couple’.¹⁰⁶ Both countries have been in opposition of a supranational EU, are granted important opt-outs on the TEU and have the most Eurosceptic populations.¹⁰⁷

The British rationale for membership has been largely economic, based on the *essential cooperation discourse*, which sees European cooperation as essential and worth paying a price for and as a tool to further national interests.¹⁰⁸ On the ‘no’-side, the EU is considered to undermine the British parliamentary sovereignty.¹⁰⁹ Because of the parliamentary sovereignty, treaty changes and other developments on the European level are critically evaluated for their added economic benefit in comparison with increased political power for the EC/EU. As a result, Britain has often been reluctant in transferring policies to the EC/EU.¹¹⁰

Denmark also followed the *essential cooperation discourse*. When Denmark entered the EC, the arguments in favour of integration were mainly economic. The Danish EU-debate has unfolded between the ‘yes’-side, who thought of the EU as an intergovernmental, essential form of cooperation between sovereign nations, and an anti-EU group, which saw the EU as a new European super state, threatening Denmark’s sovereignty.¹¹¹ This economic, utilitarian approach failed to link membership to the Danish identity. Taking into account the Danish modern national identity and conception of the nation, this can be considered one of the core characteristics of Danish reluctance towards the EU, especially among its population.

In the mid 1980s, the Danish and British governments strongly supported the internal free-market, introduced in the SEA. The main difference between the Danish and British policies on

¹⁰⁶ Haahr, ‘European Integration and the Left in Britain and Denmark’, 77.

¹⁰⁷ Larsen, ‘British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s’, 451.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 457.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 465.

¹¹⁰ Sørensen, ‘Danish and British Popular Euroscepticism Compared’, 19.

¹¹¹ Hansen, ‘Sustaining Sovereignty’, 50.

the SEA, has been the Danish focus on welfare features, which does not apply for Britain.¹¹² In accordance with the people's sovereignty and because of the fact that plans for the Single European Market provoked Euroscepticism in Denmark, a referendum was called in 1986. A small majority of 56.2% voted in favour of the SEA and the formalization of the European Political Cooperation.¹¹³

At the end of the 1980s, in both countries a more positive attitude towards Europe arose and membership was increasingly accepted.¹¹⁴ The political elite in Denmark came to see European cooperation necessary for political reasons. Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen called it 'the project of peace', and at the beginning of the 1990s conceptions on the EC became more value based and mythological. Even the traditionally anti-European Social Democrats came to see the cooperation as essential.¹¹⁵ At the time, no parties were opposed to European membership, only the 'Movement against the EU' remained firm in their position. However, opinion polls showed that the population was strictly against further European integration.¹¹⁶ Also Britain added political and security arguments to the economic arguments. After Margaret Thatcher and her strict interstate cooperation discourse, the new Conservative Prime Minister John Major stated they should 'Bring Britain to the heart of Europe' and started a more active line in European integration.¹¹⁷

This pro-European period ended with the Maastricht Treaty of June 1992, which has been characterized as the pinnacle of Danish and British Euroscepticism. Both countries have been successful in opting out of the TEU, protecting their 'national bastions.'¹¹⁸ With the TEU, the EC development went against the fundamental features of Danish and British discourses on Europe and Denmark called a referendum.¹¹⁹ The debate prior to the referendum was mainly about whether the TEU implied a supranational development of the community.¹²⁰ The Danish government had already accepted the Treaty and it came as a shock the electorate voted 'no'. The result indicated that there was insufficient backing by the population for the new and relatively more pro-European policy of the Danish government.¹²¹ The referendum was

¹¹² Larsen, 'British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s', 459.

¹¹³ Kelstrup, 'Denmark's Relation to the European Union', Kobo-edition, chapter 2.

¹¹⁴ Larsen, 'British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s', 458.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 462.

¹¹⁶ Eurobarometer, in: Larsen, 'British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s', 463.

¹¹⁷ Larsen, 'British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s', 463.

¹¹⁸ Miles and Wivel, 'A Small State Handling a Differentiated Integration Dilemma?', Kobo-edition, chapter 16.

¹¹⁹ Larsen, 'British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s', 461.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 465.

¹²¹ Kelstrup, 'Denmark's Relation to the European Union', Kobo-edition, chapter 2.

followed by a short period of extreme confusion. Domestically, it was important to reach some kind of compromise. This resulted in the memorandum 'Denmark in Europe' of October 1992, in which all important political parties agreed upon the Danish EC/EU policy. On the one hand, they would accept the Maastricht Treaty. On the other hand, the EC member states had to accept four specified Danish reservations. With the Edinburgh Agreement of December 1992, the memorandum was accepted by the EC and in a new referendum the Danes voted 'yes'.¹²²

In Britain the population was not to be consulted due to parliamentary sovereignty. The struggle on Europe took place within the Parliament and within the leading Conservative Party. The debate was muted due to national elections in May 1992. With pressure from the Labour Party, all the political parties argued that the TEU was a 'treaty too far' and would undermine British sovereignty.¹²³ During the Maastricht negotiations the Major government tried to avoid the term 'federal' in the treaty and Britain commanded a reservation on the EMU, was against the social chapter and was opposed to the three pillar structure including JHA.¹²⁴ These opt-outs were one of the conditions to be met with, were the British government to give its approval of the treaty as a whole. The opt-outs were drafted to assure that the treaty was in line with a British conception of Europe and not challenged its constitutional institutions and conventions such as the parliamentary sovereignty.¹²⁵ A few years later, Denmark and Britain were granted additional opt-outs and opt-in possibilities for the Treaty of Amsterdam, regarding the EU law of the Schengen Agreement and the new 'Title IV', dealing with 'visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons'.¹²⁶ Both countries perceive the opt-outs as safeguards of national autonomy.¹²⁷ Because the opt-outs represent guarantees of continued autonomy and reaffirm the idea that the EU is just an interstate cooperation, they became nearly sacred. In the domestic debate, the opt-outs constitute bulwarks against European integration. In both Britain and Denmark, the government's domestic discourse on the opt-outs produce a fiction of national unity, a united domestic discourse.¹²⁸

¹²² European Parliament, 'European Council in Edinburgh. Conclusions of the Presidency', SN 456/92, (Edinburgh 1992); Kelstrup, 'Denmark's Relation to the European Union', Kobo-edition, chapter 2.

¹²³ Larsen, 'British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s', 470.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ The 'Protocol on certain provisions relating to the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland', was annexed to the Maastricht Treaty and spells out the details of the British opt outs. Source: Adler-Nissen, 'Organized Duplicity?', 82.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 83.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 82.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

After 1993, Denmark returned to its earlier policy of limited engagement and pragmatism. In the referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam, a small majority of 55.1 percent voted yes. Post 1995, with the majority of Nordic states in the EU, Denmark positioned themselves as clear ‘euro-outsiders’, preferring to ‘wait and see’ about joining the third stage of the EMU.¹²⁹ In spite of the British opt-out from the EMU, Britain attempted to take policy stances that brought Britain closer to the European core. For example, a detailed plan was published for later EMU accession. Britain’s ‘wait and see’ policy changed into a ‘prepare and wait’ policy.¹³⁰ Both countries remained in favour of the EU along intergovernmental lines and remained defending their national interest. After the Maastricht Treaty the pressures for a referendum emerged in Britain.¹³¹ During the general elections of 1997, the important political parties promised a referendum on the EMU. After 2000, the political elite started looking more at the public understanding of the EU and this understanding became a stronger factor in EU policy. Regarding the domestic environment on EU policy, it can thus be said that Britain came closer to Denmark.¹³²

During the first thirty years of membership, significant similarities can be seen between Danish and British European policies. Both countries first followed the *interstate cooperation discourse*, but when membership came closer switched to the *essential cooperation discourse*, seeing European cooperation as essential to further national interests. Britain and Denmark were both reluctant towards transferring sovereignty. In Denmark this sovereignty meant the people and the Danish identity, whereas in Britain European cooperation was seen as a threat to the parliamentary sovereignty. At the end of the 1980s, both countries showed a more positive attitude towards European integration. Both countries strongly supported the internal market introduced in the SEA and were in favour of a free market. However, Denmark had an extra focus on its welfare features. For both countries this positive attitude ended with the Maastricht Treaty, where Britain and Denmark both granted important opt-outs. Both countries see the opt outs as a protection of their national sovereignty. The opt-outs contribute to the image of Britain and Denmark as an ‘odd couple’ and ‘outsiders’. After Maastricht, Denmark turned to its earlier policy of limited engagement. In contrast, Britain’s ‘wait and see’ approach changed into a ‘prepare and wait’ policy.

¹²⁹ Kelstrup, ‘Denmark’s Relation to the European Union’, Kobo-edition, chapter 2.

¹³⁰ Larsen, ‘British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s’, 473.

¹³¹ Ibid., 474.

¹³² Ibid., 475.

A noticeable difference between the two countries concerning their European policies noticeable is Denmark's constant calling for referenda, whereas in Britain, in line with its parliamentary sovereignty, did not consult its population. Nonetheless, after 2000 the political elite started looking more at the public understanding of the EU and it can thus be said that also on this topic, Denmark and Britain came closer together.

Chapter 2: Eastern Enlargement

Ten new members joined the EU in 2004. The accession of the eight Central and Eastern European Countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia) and Cyprus and Malta is the biggest enlargement ‘bang’ in the history of European integration.¹³³ After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991, the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) expressed the wish to join the EC.¹³⁴ In response, the EC offered them the ‘Association Agreements’, which aimed at creating a climate of confidence and stability in favour of political and economic reforms in the CEECs, at establishing a free trade area and laid down the framework for cooperation.¹³⁵ The member states of the EC supported the aspirations of the CEECs. Particularly Germany and Denmark thought that a ‘united Europe’ must involve, respectively, Poland and the Baltic States. Enlargement in general was favoured also in Britain, Italy and Belgium.¹³⁶

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (TEU) is seen as the starting point of enlargement. Article 49 of the TEU states that ‘any European state which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.’¹³⁷ Also Frans Andriessen, vice-president of the EC at the time, declared in 1992 ‘the European Council should now confirm that it accepts the goal of eventual membership in the EU for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe when they are able to satisfy the conditions required.’¹³⁸ During the 1993 Copenhagen Council, it was agreed that ‘the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union.’¹³⁹ The Conclusions of the Copenhagen Council drew up the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’; the requirements for admission of the CEE candidate countries.¹⁴⁰ The criteria concerned

¹³³ Alexander B. Murphy, ‘The May 2004 Enlargement of the European Union: View from Two Years Out’, *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 47 (2006) 6, 635-646, here 635.

¹³⁴ Marc Maresceau, ‘On Association, Partnership, Pre-accession and Accession’ in: Marc Maresceau (ed.), *Enlarging the European Union. Relations Between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe* (London and New York 1997) 3-22, here 3.

¹³⁵ Peter Ludlow, *The Making of the New Europe. The European Councils in Brussels and Copenhagen 2002* (Brussels 2004) 15.

¹³⁶ Ludlow, *The Making of the New Europe*, 17.

¹³⁷ European Council, ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union’, *Official Journal of the European Union* (2008) Article 49. Article 2 refers to principles of democracy, liberty, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Source: European Council, ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union’, *Official Journal of the European Union* (2008) Article 2.

¹³⁸ Frans Andriessen, quoted in Ludlow, *The Making of the New Europe*, 18.

¹³⁹ Ludlow, *The Making of the New Europe*, 19.

¹⁴⁰ European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. Accession Criteria’ (version 6 December 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en (23 April 2017).

guarantees of democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and the countries must be able to take on the obligations of membership. In the following years, enlargement became one of the highest priorities of the EU. Eventually, during another Danish Presidency, the negotiations for enlargement were concluded and the ten countries joined the EU in 2004.

The next two paragraphs deal with the policies of Britain and Denmark on eastern enlargement. The approaches are structured according to the theories described in the introduction. These theories distinguished three different motivations and argumentations why countries supported eastern enlargement: moral duty, geography and national interest.

2.1 Britain and eastern enlargement

During the finalization period of the eastern enlargement, Tony Blair was Prime Minister of Britain. He is considered the most pro-European leader Britain has seen.¹⁴¹ His Labour-government was more pro-European than its predecessor and he wanted Britain at the heart of Europe *and* Europe at the heart of Britain.¹⁴² During the Blair years, Britain joined the Nordics and Germany in their support for the CEEC's desire to join the EU, with Britain playing a leading part in the enlargement process.¹⁴³

Britain held the Council Presidency from July to December 2005. The promotion of membership of the Balkans and other eastern European states was included in the agenda: 'Frequent calls for the enlargement process to be continued were among the immediate, and most powerful responses of both the EU's recent setbacks.'¹⁴⁴

Moral duty and historical arguments

Britain's position towards eastern enlargement was influenced by a sense of moral duty. The historic responsibility of the EU towards the CEECs is often mentioned. This illustrates the government thought the CEECs belonged to the EU. Britain supported the continuing enlargement of the Community as part of a desire to unite Europe: 'it is the basis for democratic

¹⁴¹ Simon Berlaymont, 'Tony Blair and Europe' (version 30 May 2007), https://www.opendemocracy.net/tony_blair_and_europe.jsp (21 April 2017).

¹⁴² Simon Berlaymont, 'Tony Blair and Europe' (version 30 May 2007), https://www.opendemocracy.net/tony_blair_and_europe.jsp (21 April 2017).

¹⁴³ Frank Schimmelfennig, 'The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement', 226.

¹⁴⁴ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Prospects for the EU in 2005. The UK Presidency of the European Union* (London 2005) 2-5.

consolidation and prosperity throughout Europe and it is a means of overcoming historic divisions which disfigured the continent during the Cold War.¹⁴⁵ Blair stated in 2000 that he considered the EU to be one of the ‘outstanding political achievements of the twentieth century.’¹⁴⁶ According to Blair, the EU contributed to the consolidation of peace and enlargement is a historic responsibility: ‘Europe is reunited again after the troubles of the 20th century.’¹⁴⁷ In his speech to the European Parliament in June 2005, Blair described the EU as a ‘union of values, of solidarity between nations and people, not just as a common market in which we trade, but a common political space in which we live as citizens.’¹⁴⁸ He continued that enlargement is an opportunity to strengthen the EU:

It would be a Europe confident enough to see enlargement not as a threat, as if membership was a zero sum game in which old member states lose and new members gain, but an extraordinary, historic opportunity to build a greater and more powerful union.¹⁴⁹

Furthermore, in a speech to the House of Commons, Gisela Stuart (Labour MP) stated: ‘For the Brits it’s about bringing back into Europe countries who they have always felt rightfully belonged to Europe.’¹⁵⁰ This illustrates the Labour approach towards eastern enlargement.

There is no doubt that Blair and his government strongly emphasized norms and values like freedom, solidarity and democracy. In his speech accepting the Charlemagne Prize, Blair said: ‘The European ideal is best seen in terms of values rather than institutions... ..whereby representing those values to the outside world, we fulfil our global responsibility.’¹⁵¹

Geography

Britain’s pro-enlargement position is difficult to explain by geographic motifs, as central and eastern Europe is geographically far. Still, Britain strongly supported a much wider enlargement

¹⁴⁵ European Parliament, ‘The United Kingdom’s Government’s Memorandum of 2 March 1995 on the treatment of European defence issues at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference’ (version 18 September 1996), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-en_en.htm (21 April 2017).

¹⁴⁶ Tony Blair, cited in Richard Heffernan, ‘Beyond Euroscepticism: Exploring the Europeanisation of the Labour Party since 1983’, *Labour and Europe* (2001) 180-189, here 181.

¹⁴⁷ BBC News, ‘EU Enlargement ‘huge opportunity’’. Tony Blair has called the expansion of the EU a “tremendous opportunity” for Britain during the celebrations in Dublin to welcome the 10 new members’ (version 1 May 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3675659.stm (21 April 2017).

¹⁴⁸ The Guardian, ‘Full Text: Tony Blair’s speech to the European Parliament’ (version 23 June 2005), <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/jun/23/speeches.eu> (21 April 2017).

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Gisela Stuart MP, House of Commons, 25 July 2002, cited in: Christian Schweiger, ‘Britain’s and Germany’s interest in EU enlargement and reform’, *University of Derby* (2003), via: <http://hdl.handle.net/10545/582382> (3 June 2017).

¹⁵¹ Speech by Tony Blair accepting the Charlemagne Prize (13 May 1999), via: Jon Lunn, Vaughne Miller and Ben Smith, ‘British Foreign Policy since 1997’, *House of Commons Library International Affairs and Defence Section* (2008) 33.

and membership of countries which were considered to be beyond the margins of Europe. Peter Hain, Minister of Europe at the time, stated that the government sees Balkan countries as potential EU candidates.¹⁵² This can be explained on the one side by the aim to slow down deepening of the EU, i.e. further integration, and on the other by the fact that Britain itself is an island, and therefore its conceptions of what is Europe differ from the continent's conception.

National interest: widening instead of deepening, influence, (economic) stability and security
Britain has been a supporter of the widening of the EC. From 2000 onwards, Britain associated enlargement with reform and this is an important reason why they supported enlargement.¹⁵³ In his speech to the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 2000, Blair presented his vision of the future of the EU, and stated that the EU after enlargement should be 'open to reforming.'¹⁵⁴ The government hoped that the enlargement would make deepening more difficult. Illustrating the British anti-supranationalism, enlargement was regarded as a way to weaken the supranational aspects of the EU.¹⁵⁵ In the same speech, Blair proposed some changes to the EU institutions, and made clear he wanted more influence for national parliaments.¹⁵⁶ At a press conference after the 2004 Copenhagen Council, Blair stated that 'eastern enlargement would create a new Europe', showing the expectation enlargement would bring reform.¹⁵⁷ According to Britain, they shared this view on Europe with the CEECs, which was mentioned by Blair during the celebrations in Dublin to welcome the new members: 'the countries that are coming to Europe share our view of a Europe of independent nation states working together for the common good of all.'¹⁵⁸ This was again stressed by Blair in his speech in Warsaw in 2003, where he set out his views of Britain's new role in Europe as a 'staunch ally' of new applicants.¹⁵⁹ Blair pointed out the similarities between the countries positions: 'So: here we are, two similar nations, who

¹⁵² Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'The Case for EU Enlargement. Statement given by FCO Minister for Europe Peter Hain' (version 16 April 2002), www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?6136 (21 April 2017).

¹⁵³ Karin Milzow, *National Interests and European Integration. Discourse and Politics of Blair, Chirac and Schröder* (Hampshire 2012) 110; Simon Bulmer, 'New Labour and the European Union 1997-2007. A constructive partner?' (Working Paper Berlin 2008) 3-15, here 7.

¹⁵⁴ Tony Blair, 'Blair speech in Warsaw. British Prime Minister Tony Blair's speech to the Polish Stock Exchange in Warsaw 6 October 2000' (version 29 May 2001), via: <https://euobserver.com/news/2450> (3 June 2017).

¹⁵⁵ Skålnes, 'Geopolitics and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union', 216.

¹⁵⁶ Tony Blair, 'Blair speech in Warsaw. British Prime Minister Tony Blair's speech to the Polish Stock Exchange in Warsaw 6 October 2000' (version 29 May 2001).

¹⁵⁷ CVCE, 'Press Conference held by Tony Blair following the Copenhagen Council (16 December 2002)' (version 29 November 2013), via: http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/4/29/2dc11ba8-3b6d-49d1-8bd8-f3b74ab557d3/publishable_en.pdf (3 June 2017).

¹⁵⁸ BBC News, 'EU enlargement 'huge opportunity.' Tony Blair has called the expansion of the EU a "tremendous opportunity" for Britain during the celebrations in Dublin to welcome the 10 new members' (version 1 May 2004).

¹⁵⁹ Lunn, Miller and Smith, 'British Foreign Policy since 1997', 35.

share many of the same instincts, have common history and are now debating a common future.’¹⁶⁰

The Blair government approached enlargement as an opportunity to enhance security and economic stability for the entire Europe. Security and stability arguments were often used by the government to justify its support for the eastern enlargement. According to an article by the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which was commissioned by the government, enlargement would lead to a secure Europe: ‘The enlarged community of stable, prosperous democracies will help to ensure that Europe stays free of armed conflict and it responds effectively to threats from outside borders.’¹⁶¹ In the *2001 Labour Party Manifesto*, enlargement is considered the only way to overcome the problems facing Europe in that period: ‘without enlargement, Western Europe will always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass migration on its borders.’¹⁶²

In line with Britain’s support for a liberal and open market, the government supported eastern enlargement because it would open up Europe’s economy. Blair stated in 2005 that ‘it’s a contradiction to be in favour of liberalizing Europe’s membership but against opening up its economy.’¹⁶³ Economic arguments also prevail in other speeches by Blair. In his speech in Warsaw in 2000, he stated that open markets have played an important role in generating wealth and prosperity in the EU and that the creation of a market of half a billion consumers should not be doubted.¹⁶⁴ The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) also stated enlargement would have positive economic consequences. The FCO argued that after enlargement the EU would embrace a single market of ‘500 million people, the biggest single market anywhere in the world.’¹⁶⁵ According to the Minister for Europe, Keith Vaz, it would be ‘utterly stupid’ not to be involved and ‘crazy’ not to be at the heart of Europe. In other words, the FCO thought that there was no alternative but to participate and be in favour of eastern enlargement.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁰ The Guardian, ‘Full Text: Tony Blair’s Speech in Warsaw 30 May 2003’ (version 30 May 2003), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/30/eu.speeches> (24 April 2017).

¹⁶¹ London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ‘EU Enlargement’, *Enterprise Europe Network London* (London 2006) 5.

¹⁶² Tony Blair, ‘Blair speech in Warsaw. British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s speech to the Polish Stock Exchange in Warsaw 6 October 2000’ (version 29 May 2001).

¹⁶³ The Guardian, ‘Full Text: Tony Blair’s speech to the European Parliament’ (23 June 2005).

¹⁶⁴ Tony Blair, ‘Blair speech in Warsaw. British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s speech to the Polish Stock Exchange in Warsaw 6 October 2000’ (version 29 May 2001).

¹⁶⁵ Keith Vaz, ‘Speech by the Minister for Europe’, *Foreign Office Press Release* (December 1999).

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

For Britain, outsider of the Euro and Common Foreign and Security Policy, enlargement was a EU policy where they could show their leadership.¹⁶⁷ Enlargement was used by Blair to justify the government's wish to be at the heart of Europe. During a speech to British ambassadors, he stated that 'by 2004, the EU will consist of 25 nations... ..to separate ourselves from it would be madness.' And he goes on: 'Britain must be at the centre of Europe.'¹⁶⁸

2.2 Denmark and eastern enlargement

Eastern enlargement has been high on the priority list of the Danish government. Denmark's government was strikingly pro-Europe during the first years of the 2000s. Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (1998-2001) increased the Danish EU Policy and even attempted to remove the Danish opt-out on the euro through a referendum. Unfortunately for the pro-EU government, 53.2% of the electorate voted against.¹⁶⁹ In 2001, Anders Fogh Rasmussen's Liberal-Conservative minority government came to power. The government claimed it would pursue a more active EU policy. As the government was supported by the EU-sceptical DPP, the policy turned more defensive.¹⁷⁰

Denmark played a key role in the development of the eastern enlargement. Starting with its Council Presidency 1993, the decision to enlarge was made and the conditions for accession, the Copenhagen Criteria, were drawn. Four years later, during the Luxembourg Council, Denmark lobbied for enlargement to include all the CEECs and not only those selected by the European Council in their Agenda 2000 program (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus).¹⁷¹ In response to this '5+1 approach', Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Italy launched a competing idea, the Regatta Approach, arguing that the negotiations should be opened with all the applicants 'in order to secure the future stability of Europe.'¹⁷² In 2002 the European Council launched a revision of their earlier strategy. The 'New Enlargement Strategy Papers' aimed at ending the negotiations with all the CEECs and the accession of ten new members in 2004.¹⁷³ Denmark held the Council Presidency again in 2002. The course of the

¹⁶⁷ Milzow, *National Interests and European Integration*, 88.

¹⁶⁸ The Guardian, 'Full Tekst: Tony Blair's Speech. Address to British Ambassadors in London' (version 7 January 2003), <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/jan/07/foreignpolicy.speeches> (25 April 2017).

¹⁶⁹ Kelstrup, 'Denmark's relation to the European Union', Kobo-edition, chapter 2.

¹⁷⁰ Kelstrup, 'Denmark's relation to the European Union', Kobo-edition, chapter 2.

¹⁷¹ European Commission, 'Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Europe (1997)', http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/2004_and_2007_enlargement/160001_en.htm (23 April 2017).

¹⁷² Lykke Friis, "'The End of the Beginning" of Eastern Enlargement – Luxembourg Summit and Agenda-setting', *European Integration Online Papers* 2 (1998) 7, 1-15, here 10.

¹⁷³ Ludlow, *The Making of the New Europe*, 39.

accession negotiations was prioritized by the government and during the Presidency, the negotiations were completed and the date for full membership was set on 1 January 2004.

Moral duty and history

The Danish position towards enlargement was clearly stated by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen in 1999: ‘Co-operation and understanding must be the basis. No doubt the largest European task these years is the enlargement of the European Union with the Central and East European countries.’¹⁷⁴ Eastern enlargement was seen by the government as a ‘historic opportunity’ and as a ‘responsibility of the EU to share the peace, stability and economic benefits it brought.’¹⁷⁵ Both Nyrup Rasmussen and his successor Anders Fogh Rasmussen used arguments of historical and moral duties and responsibility towards the CEECs:

We now have the possibility of unifying Europe, which more than half a century suffered from an artificial partition. This is a historic opportunity, which we must grab. And we must all make an effort to ensure that it would succeed. – Nyrup Rasmussen¹⁷⁶

We are facing a historic window of opportunity to reunite our formerly divided continent and to create a stronger and more stable Europe. – Nyrup Rasmussen¹⁷⁷

Our common future of Europe is based on shared values... ..We have a historic and moral obligation to seize the present opportunity to create peaceful co-operation across the entire continent... ..That would be consistent with the aim of constructing Europe as a project of peace, stability and prosperity for the entire continent. – Fogh Rasmussen¹⁷⁸

After ninety years... ..we can finally close one of the most bloody and dark chapters in the history of Europe... ..a responsibility that puts us under an obligation. – Fogh Rasmussen¹⁷⁹

Denmark saw the CEECs as members of the European family, who shared the same values. Therefore, it would be the ‘best sign of solidarity’ to involve these countries in their project of European integration and cooperation.¹⁸⁰ Fogh Rasmussen stressed the historical importance of

¹⁷⁴ Statsministeriet, ‘Opening statement by Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Conference on Regional Cooperation in an Enlarged Europe 19 April 1999’ (version Statsministeriet 1999) via:

http://www.stm.dk/p_11051.html (21 April 2017).

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Statsministeriet, ‘Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Our Common Europe for the Future’ (version Statsministeriet 2001), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_7712.html (18 April 2017).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Priorities of the Danish Presidency – From Copenhagen to Copenhagen. DUPI-Conference, New members – New deal? (June 14, 2002)’ (version Statsministeriet 2002), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_7374.html 21 April 2017.

¹⁷⁹ European Parliament, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Outcome of the European Council (Brussels 24 and 25 October 2002)’ (version European Parliament 2002), via:

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20021106+ITEM-006+DOC+XML+V0//EN&query=INTERV&detail=3-040> (25 April 2017).

¹⁸⁰ Statsministeriet, ‘Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Our Common Europe for the Future’ (version Statsministeriet 2001).

eastern enlargement: ‘Enlargement of the EU marks the beginning of a new epoch in European history... ..Enlargement is the key for the future of Europe.’¹⁸¹ He argued it is the EU’s responsibility to ‘deliver in areas where we can solve problems together.’¹⁸² This responsibility is more often mentioned: ‘If we are genuinely serious about important values such as freedom, democracy and respect for the individual, we must also provide an active contribution to secure those values.’¹⁸³ Throughout his leadership, Fogh Rasmussen kept calling eastern enlargement a ‘historic decision’, the ‘final healing of Europe’, ‘nothing less than historic’ and as a ‘historic opportunity to unite our continent’.¹⁸⁴ Clearly, he considered eastern enlargement as Europe’s ‘global responsibility’ and as a ‘moral duty’.¹⁸⁵

Geography

Danish support for eastern enlargement can be explained by geography. Its proximity to the CEECs made enlargement of high priority in Denmark, as it considered its security to be dependent on this region. According to Nyrup Rasmussen ‘the issue of peace and security is at the very heart of all we are doing. It rests on basic premises, that you cannot remain secure, if your neighbours feel insecure.’¹⁸⁶ This was also illustrated by Denmark’s ‘neighbourhood policy’, the 2002 *Strategi for den Danske øststøtte*.¹⁸⁷ This strategy considered enlargement to be a requisite for Denmark’s national security and Denmark supported the eastern countries to stabilize and democratize.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸¹ European Parliament, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Outcome of the European Council (Brussels 24 and 25 October 2002)’ (version European Parliament 2002).

¹⁸² Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The Danish EU Presidency and the Enlargement Deal. Speech for the Danish Institute of International Studies’ (version Statsministeriet 2003), via:

http://www.stm.dk/p_11268.html (21 April 2017)

¹⁸³ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Address at the Opening Session of the Folketing on 7 October 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_11251.html (21 April 2017).

¹⁸⁴ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The Prime Minister’s Speech at the Reception for Bulgaria’s and Rumania’s EU-Memberships’ (version Statsministeriet 2007), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_11173.html (21 April 2017); Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Speech at the European Conference 2006 in Frederiksdal on May 19, 2006’ (version Statsministeriet 2006), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_11188.html (21 April 2017);

Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Priorities of the Danish Presidency – From Copenhagen to Copenhagen. DUPI-Conference, New members – New deal? (June 14, 2002)’ (version Statsministeriet 2002).

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Statsministeriet, ‘Opening statement by Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Conference on Regional cooperation in an Enlarged Europe 19 April 1999’ (version Statsministeriet 1999).

¹⁸⁷ Translation: ‘Strategy for the Danish Eastern Support’, today formulized as: ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’. Source: Udenrigsministeriet, ‘Europæiske Naboer’, <http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/lande-og-regioner/europa/europaeiske-naboer> (24 April 2017).

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

National interests: security, stability and influence

The geography arguments show the first national interest why Denmark supported eastern enlargement: security. Denmark considered it to be necessary to its own national security. Fogh Rasmussen gave much attention to the fact that the EU is the reason that Europe experienced two generations without war. He underlined that ‘enlargement is our best guarantee for a Europe with political strength and economic strength... . . . it is the ultimate aim to create a stable and peaceful continent of Europe.’¹⁸⁹ The government presented the strategy *En verden i forandring – Regerings bud på nye prioriter i Danmarks Udenrigspolitik* in 2003.¹⁹⁰ This strategy considered Denmark’s security and prosperity as the most important features of Danish Foreign Policy and dependent on the eastern enlargement. From the government’s perspective, the EU is a key player when it comes to long term political, social and economic stability and security in Europe.¹⁹¹

According to the government, eastern enlargement would also have positive consequences for the relationship with Russia: A good relationship with Russia is according to the government, one of the main conditions for security in Europe.¹⁹²

Denmark strongly supports that the European Union press ahead with the task of improving and deepening the Union’s relations with Russia in the economic field... . . . we see Russia as a member of a common European space, which will include totally and free trade.¹⁹³

When talking about the relationship with Russia, the arguments were mainly economic and in relation to security. One of the priorities of the Danish Presidency in 2002 was to expand cooperation and promote integration with Russia. Fogh Rasmussen stated that the Presidency would formulate new policies towards CEECs that ‘must stimulate a healthy political and

¹⁸⁹ Statsministeriet. ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Prime Ministers speech in Poland: Poland and Denmark in the European Union (2 July 2003)’ (version Statsministeriet 2003), via http://www.stm.dk/p_11259.html (21 April 2017); Statsministeriet, ‘Address by the Prime Minister of Denmark Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington (May 9 2003)’ (version Statsministeriet 2003), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_11262.html (21 April 2017); Statsministeriet, ‘The Prime Ministers speech at the reception on the occasion of the Enlargement of the EU. Confederation of Danish Industries’ (version Statsministeriet 2004), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_11260.html (21 April 2017).

¹⁹⁰ Engels: A Changing World – The Government’s Vision for New Priorities in Denmark’s Foreign Policy June 2003. Source: Statsministeriet, ‘Regerings Publikationer 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003), http://www.stm.dk/p_5601.html (24 April 2017).

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Statsministeriet, ‘Opening statement by Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Conference on Regional cooperation in an Enlarged Europe 19 April 1999’ (version Statsministeriet 1999).

¹⁹³ Statsministeriet’ Speech by Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Summit of the Baltic Development Forum Sint Petersburg 23 September 2001’ (version Statsministeriet 2001), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_11064.html (21 April 2017).

economic development in these countries... ..to promote the cooperation and integration between Russia and the EU.’¹⁹⁴

Although security and stability arguments are more apparent, internal market and free trade were also reasons why the government supported enlargement. Both Nyrup Rasmussen’s and Fogh Rasmussen’s governments followed the EU’s statement that enlargement is beneficial for both the EU’s and the applicant states’ economy.¹⁹⁵ Interestingly, the arguments were about sharing and economic growth for the whole of Europe. Nyrup Rasmussen stated in 1999 that in a new and enlarged EU, there ‘will be a widespread need for coordinating economic policies.’ The competition would be stronger, which would, according to Nyrup Rasmussen, increase productivity in all countries: ‘One of the most important factors behind this development will be a strong increase in trade between existing and future members of the Union. I firmly believe that enlargement constitutes a win-win situation.’¹⁹⁶ Fogh Rasmussen continued this approach: ‘the European Union will be one of the largest economic powers in the world. We have created better opportunities for flourishing trade, more investments and economic growth.’¹⁹⁷ His government saw the EU as one of the main contributors to their economic progress and therefore, the government stressed that membership of the EU will also bring this to the CEECs, who will experience the same positive developments.’¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless, Fogh Rasmussen emphasized that the EU is about more than ‘just economic cooperation.’¹⁹⁹

According to the government, the perspective of EU membership has worked as an effective catalyst for reform and therefore it supports enlargement. The report on the Danish Foreign Policy stated that enlargement is seen by the government as a ‘crucial engine for reform’ for the countries that want to join the EU.²⁰⁰ It speeded up the progress of the countries towards democracy and stability and the EU needs to continue to do so: ‘reforms must continue and the

¹⁹⁴ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Priorities of the Danish Presidency – From Copenhagen to Copenhagen. DUPI-Conference, New members – New deal? (June 14, 2002)’ (version Statsministeriet 2002).

¹⁹⁵ European Commission, ‘Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Europe (1997)’.

¹⁹⁶ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Priorities of the Danish Presidency – From Copenhagen to Copenhagen. DUPI-Conference, New members – New deal? (June 14, 2002)’ (version Statsministeriet 2002).

¹⁹⁷ Statsministeriet, ‘Address by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Prime Minister of Denmark, at the Ceremony of Signature of the Accession Treaty (Athens, 16 April 2003)’ (version Statsministeriet 2003), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_11266 (21 April 2017).

¹⁹⁸ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Prime Ministers speech in Poland: Poland and Denmark in the European Union (2 July 2003)’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005* (Copenhagen 2006) 6.

EU must maintain its pressure for changes also in countries where the reform movement has not emerged yet.’²⁰¹

Another argument of the Danish enlargement policy is the idea that it could strengthen Denmark’s position within the EU.²⁰² Both Nyrup Rasmussen and Fogh Rasmussen emphasized that accession of the CEECs can strengthen Denmark’s position because more small states are entering the EU:

Being small states dependent on the outside world... ...we know the value of working together with other countries. – Nyrup Rasmussen²⁰³

Denmark can have a greater impact on developments. We can gain an influence that far exceeds the relative size of Denmark. – Fogh Rasmussen²⁰⁴

In this chapter, the British and Danish policies on eastern enlargement have been outlined. Altogether, it is clear that both countries used arguments based on moral duty and historical responsibility. Support for enlargement can for both countries be explained by geography, even though Britain isn’t close to the CEECs. National interests like security, stability and economic prosperity also played a huge part in supporting eastern enlargement. Denmark pays more attention to the positive effects of enlargement for the whole of Europe. The next chapter will discuss British and Danish policies on the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Statsministeriet, ‘Opening statement by Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Conference on Regional cooperation in an Enlarged Europe 19 April 1999’ (version Statsministeriet 1999).

²⁰³ Statsministeriet, ‘Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Our Common Europe for the Future’ (version Statsministeriet 2001).

²⁰⁴ Statsministeriet, ‘Danish EU Policy after the Presidency. Speech by the Prime Minister at the Institute for International Studies’ (version Statsministeriet 2003), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_11272.html (21 April 2017).

Chapter 3: Lisbon Treaty

After the enlargement, the member states acknowledged that the enlarged EU needed to reform. This acknowledgement was fuelled by concerns about the low level of public support for the EU. The Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001 confirmed these concerns, as the electorate rejected the Nice Treaty by a vote of 53.87 per cent to 45.13 per cent with a low turnout of only 32.9 per cent.²⁰⁵ After this setback, a process towards a constitution started with the Laeken Declaration in 2001, where heads of government agreed to set up the *Declaration on the Future of Europe*. This declaration committed the EU to make its decision-making procedures more democratic and transparent, to prepare the ground for a European Constitution and set up the Convention on the Future of Europe.²⁰⁶ The Convention consisted of representatives of national governments and parliaments from the member states and the accession states and representatives of the EU institutions. Subsidiarity and national parliaments were topics on the agenda of the Convention. The Convention's mandate, stated in the Laeken Declaration, was 'to clarify, simplify and adjust the division of competence between the Union and the Member States' and that national parliaments might be given a role to focus on this division through 'preliminary checking of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.'²⁰⁷ The Convention produced the draft Constitution, which was amended at the Intergovernmental Conference in 2004. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) was signed by all 25 member states in October 2004 and would replace the existing treaties, were it not rejected by referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005.²⁰⁸

After the rejection, EU officials sought a resolution to the crisis and the European Council of June 2005 called for a period of reflection.²⁰⁹ The eighteen states that had ratified the Constitutional Treaty wanted to retain as much of it as possible and those who were opponents needed to be reconciled. This period resulted in the 'new constitution', the Lisbon Treaty, and came into working in 2007. Most of the provisions of the TCE were incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty. The three-pillar structure was removed and two new high-profile positions

²⁰⁵ Bache, George and Bulmer, *Politics in the European Union*, 195.

²⁰⁶ European Parliament, 'What the EU Constitution Does. A 14-point critical summary', *The National Platform EU Research and Information Centre Dublin* (Ireland 2005) 1-40, here 4, via: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/inddem/docs/papers/14\\$20point%20summary.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/inddem/docs/papers/14$20point%20summary.pdf) (27 April 2017); Bache, George and Bulmer, *Politics in the European Union*, 195.

²⁰⁷ European Council, 'Presidency Conclusions European Council Meeting in Laeken. Annex I: Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union', SN 300/1/01 REV 1 (2001) 19, 21; Cooper, 'The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity', 287-288.

²⁰⁸ Bache, George and Bulmer, *Politics in the European Union*, 195.

²⁰⁹ Bache, George and Bulmer, *Politics in the European Union*, 211.

were created: a ‘permanent’ President of the European Council that would serve up to four years and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.²¹⁰ Whereas the Constitutional Treaty aimed to replace the TEU and the TEC, the Lisbon Treaty did not and more controversial aspects like the term ‘constitution’ were dropped.²¹¹

This chapter looks at the Danish and British approaches towards the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. The measurements used are based on the theories described in the introduction of this thesis. According to these theories, there are three main debates on the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, showing the different motives for member states to support or oppose the new Treaty: reform after enlargement, the issue of sovereignty and national interests.

3.1 Britain and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty

In Britain the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty was often attacked as a deliberate attempt to create a ‘super state’ or a ‘country called Europe’ with its own citizenship, laws and symbols.²¹² However, Hain stated that ‘[the Treaty] is good news for Britain’. Blair also often emphasized that the treaty was good news for Britain.

Let me be clear: The Convention’s end product – a draft Constitutional Treaty for the European Union – is good news for Britain.²¹³

Britain’s wishes for the draft text were to simplify the Union’s instruments by streamlining them and defining them more clearly; more democracy, transparency and efficiency by making it clear where the Union can and cannot act; reinforcing the role of national parliaments in policing the principle of subsidiarity; providing greater openness in the meetings of the Council of Ministers, replacing the TEU’s ‘three pillar system’ with a single Treaty structure, and setting up a Chair of the European Council.²¹⁴

²¹⁰ Bache, George and Bulmer, *Politics in the European Union*, 211-212.

²¹¹ Bache, George and Bulmer, *Politics in the European Union*, 213.

²¹² Clive H. Church and David Phinnemore, *Understanding the European Constitution: An Introduction to the EU Constitutional Treaty* (New York 2006) Francis and Taylor E-Library edition, 12.

²¹³ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ‘A Constitutional Treaty for the EU. The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference 2003’ (version 2003) 3, via: https://www.eerstekamer.nl/eu/documenteu/cm5934_visie_regering_vk_en/f=/vgjtncka7qn2.pdf (9 May 2017).

²¹⁴ Official statement of The UK Government, in: Select Committee on the European Union, ‘The Future of Europe – The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty. With Evidence and Government responses to earlier reports’, *House of Lords 2002-03, 41st report* (London 2003) 10.

Reform after enlargement

After enlargement, it was felt that the rules laid down for six member states in the 1950s could make the EU ineffective. This led to the idea that EU powers should be clarified by reform.²¹⁵

The importance of a new treaty as a consequence of enlargement is mentioned by Jack Straw, Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to him, the EU has constantly been involving and adding new layers of complexity to its treaties. The treaty was necessary because the EU must become ‘more coherent and easier to understand... ..institutions must be reformed to be efficient and effective in an EU of 25 or more’.²¹⁶ In the foreword to *The British Approach to the European Intergovernmental Conference 2003*, presented to the Parliament by the Secretary of State and Commonwealth Affairs, Blair notes that the ‘modernization of Europe’s decision-making structures is essential to make it a success.’²¹⁷ Blair stated that

the objective for Britain... is a Europe that is strong, effective and democratic. This requires a strengthening of Europe at every level: Council, Commission, Parliament and Court. And the test we should apply to each issue is not whether it tills the balance towards national Governments or European Government. But rather in each case: does it strengthen Europe; does it make it more effective; does it make it more democratic?²¹⁸

This statement shows that the government considered the Treaty to be important because it clearly stated in which areas the governments stays sovereign. The strengthening of Europe does, according to this quote, not necessarily meant ‘weakening’ of Britain. The government recognized that a new treaty that makes the EU more effective is essential for the future of the well-being of the British citizens.²¹⁹ The main topic of the *2005 Labour Manifesto* was reforming Europe: ‘make Europe work better for Britain’ and ‘maintain the position as a leader in the European Union.’ The new treaty ‘ensures that the new Europe can work effectively’. In the same year, Britain held the Council Presidency, and they would ‘work to promote economic reform, bear down on regulation.’²²⁰ The government saw a ‘great opportunity’ in the treaty to make the EU more efficient, simpler to understand, more accountable to the European and national Parliaments and better prepared to function effectively with 25 and more members.²²¹

²¹⁵ Church and Phinnemore, *Understanding the European Constitution*, 12.

²¹⁶ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *A Constitutional Treaty for the EU*, 14.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

²¹⁸ European Council, ‘Speech by the Prime Minister The Right Honourable Tony Blair MP. The Future of Europe: Strong, Effective, Democratic’, (Cardiff 2002).

²¹⁹ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *A Constitutional Treaty for the EU*, 16.

²²⁰ Labour Party, *Manifesto 2005: Britain Forward, not back* (2005), 84, via:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/13_04_05_labour_manifesto.pdf (28 April 2017).

²²¹ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *A Constitutional Treaty for the EU*, 16.

The issue of sovereignty

A returning problem for Britain and several other member states was the transfer of power to the EU. To ‘sell’ the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty to his government, Blair regularly stressed that the Treaty is not the constitution of a federal super state: ‘The Convention text spells out that the EU is a Union of nation states and that it only has those powers which the Governments have chosen to confer upon. It is not and will not be a federal super state.’ He continued with the legitimization of this document by saying that the text is reinforcing the power of national parliaments in the EU, and that it ‘proposes a new position of full-time President of the European Council, which will mean greater accountability to national governments as well as greater efficiency.’²²² Straw acknowledged the spill-over effect the former primarily economic cooperation had on the EU to also work together in other spheres. But, ‘this joint work ... has complemented, not replaced the work of national governments... it has required new EU Treaties.’²²³

In his speech to the House of Commons, Blair stated that ‘The new treaty will confirm for the first time, explicitly, that national security is the sole responsibility of the member states’. That in this speech Blair primarily focused on what sovereignty Britain kept, illustrates that he knew that British electorate still is distrustful towards the EU.

Entwined with the sovereignty issue is the lack of democratic support from EU citizens. The Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty responded, according to the government, to a growing awareness that the EU had lost support from the public and from its member states.²²⁴ The Union must be more open and easier to understand. ‘This is the test of the EU’s legitimacy’, Blair noted.²²⁵

Before Britain’s 2005 Council Presidency, Blair spoke to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 23 June 2005. In this speech, he offered a new vision for the EU and for the first time, he questioned whether the constitutional debate had brought Europe closer to the people:

And as ever, the people are ahead of the politicians... ultimately, people always see politics more clearly than us. Precisely because they are not daily obsessed with it.²²⁶

According to Straw, the EU needed a clearer statement of what it does, why it does it and how to solve the lack of democratic support. ‘Its legal structure should be made easier to understand.

²²² Ibid., 3.

²²³ Ibid., 14.

²²⁴ Church and Phinnemore, *Understanding the European Constitution*, 12.

²²⁵ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *A Constitutional Treaty for the EU*, 14.

²²⁶ Ibid.

And Europe's citizens and business should know what powers national governments have conferred on the EU, and what powers they kept for themselves.²²⁷

National interest: Economic arguments, influence and security

Economic arguments to support the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty were often presented. Straw stressed that membership is essential to the prosperity of Britain: 'it makes us part of one of the largest single markets of the world... our prosperity depends on this market.' This economic interest is also focused on global and international influence which is apparent from Straw's statement that 'we can act alone or with non-EU partners... we are a leading global player and constantly looking outside the EU.'²²⁸ However, this economic prosperity and international influence is dependent on EU membership:

Outside the EU, we would have less, not more, control of our economy – because to continue to trade with the Union, we would still have to be bound by its rules. But we would end up with much less say in shaping them.²²⁹

He continued 'the UK should be at the heart of the EU, shaping the agenda and advancing our objectives.'²³⁰ Especially in relation to the US, Blair argued: '...America wants Britain to be a strong ally in a strong Europe. The stronger we are in Europe, the stronger our American relationship.'²³¹

In his speech to the House of Commons, Blair made it clear that British international influence is dependent on EU membership. Therefore, he pursued an active membership and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty:

Over the past ten years, Britain has moved from the margins of European debate to its centre. This is absolutely right for Britain. ... Britain has for a decade been in a leadership position in Europe. That is exactly where we should stay.²³²

This new role is also mentioned in the *2001 Labour Manifesto*: '**Isolation from Europe does not help anyone**. So we chose to engage constructively in Europe... Today, Europe is

²²⁷ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *A Constitutional Treaty for the EU*, 14.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ The Guardian, 'To withdraw is not patriotic. Tony Blair's Ghent Speech' (version 23 February 2000), via: <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2000/feb/23/emu.theeuro1> (3 June 2017).

²³² Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'Prime Minister Tony Blair's House of Commons Statement on the EU Treaty' (London 26 June 2007) via: The National Archives, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20071002204233/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/Preview&c=Page&cid=1139992024177> (9 May 2017).

moving in a direction that is good for Britain and good for Europe.²³³ It is stressed that Britain is ‘better respected abroad’ when it is a strong member of the EU.²³⁴ The Labour Party clearly wanted Britain to ‘engage fully in Europe, help enlarge the European Union and make it more effective, and insist that the British people have the final say on any proposal to join the Euro.’²³⁵ This shows that Britain was in favour of the new Treaty, because it sees European engagement as a way to keep its influence internationally and in Europe.

According to the *2005 Labour Manifesto*, the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty ensured that ‘Britain keeps control of key national interests like foreign policy, taxation, social security and defence’ and that ‘it strengthens the voice of national parliaments and governments in EU affairs.’²³⁶

3.2 Denmark and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty

Already in 1999 Nyrup Rasmussen acknowledged the need for reform: ‘there is a need for making the decisions and institutions more efficient. Otherwise we risk paralyzing the EU.’²³⁷ He stressed that the EU must make more use of national parliaments, because they are much closer to the citizens.²³⁸ The aim of Fogh Rasmussen’s government during the negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty was ‘to maintain the opt-outs’.²³⁹ Consequently, the proposed Constitutional Treaty contained four protocols dealing with the Danish opt-outs.²⁴⁰

All majority parties signed a new political agreement *Denmark in the enlarged EU* in 2004. It specified common views relating the Constitutional Treaty. The agreement, the ‘new national compromise’, signified that the government once again needed to find the right balance between a desire for active participation and influence in the EU and the need to preserve a high degree of Danish autonomy towards the Danish population.

In 2005, the government prepared for a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, which would be combined with a referendum on modifications to the Danish reservations. Yet the

²³³ Bold in original. Labour Party, *2001 Labour Party General Election Manifesto*, (version 2001) via: www.labourmanifesto.com/2001/2001-labour-manifesto.shtml (28 April 2017).

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Labour Party, *Manifesto 2005: Britain Forward, not back* (2005), 84.

²³⁷ Statsministeriet, ‘Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Our Common Europe for the Future’ (version Statsministeriet 2001).

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Miles, *Denmark and the European Union*, Kobo-edition, chapter 15.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

referendum was cancelled after the Constitutional Treaty was rejected in the Netherlands and France. Later, it was decided not to have a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.²⁴¹

Reform and development after enlargement

Reform and democratic development were the main reasons why Denmark supported the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty:

After the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 member states, we need a new set of rules for the co-operation. They are included in the new draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for the EU. The new Treaty makes clear what the EU is, and what the EU is not.²⁴²

The Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty was seen by the Foreign Ministry as a right and democratic framework for an enlarged and efficient Europe.²⁴³ Fogh Rasmussen stated in his speech ‘Europe after the Enlargement’ that with the eastern enlargement, ‘the door to the Europe of the Yalta Conference is closed’ and the ‘door to the Europe of the future’ has opened.²⁴⁴ The most important challenge after enlargement was to ‘define the character of a European Union with 25 or more member states.’ He stated that the negotiations in the Convention on the future of the EU and the IGC ‘are key elements in this process.’²⁴⁵

On the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, the 2006 *Venstres Partyprogram* stated that it supports a more effective decision-making process for quicker implementation of new policies were needed and that they supported the fact that the Treaty stands for more open-decision making process and more openness and democracy.²⁴⁶ Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller argued the enlargement made it necessary for the EU to reform its decision-making processes in order to have the capacity to act. According to Stig Møller, the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty united all the values of the EU – freedom, security, and justice for the European citizens, promote security, stability and development among our neighbours on the continent and in the wider

²⁴¹ Kelstrup, ‘Denmark’s Relation to the European Union’, Kobo-edition, chapter 2.

²⁴² Statsministeriet, ‘Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Address at the Opening of the Session of the Folketing on 7 October 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁴³ Friis Arne Petersen, ‘*The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 2004*’ in: Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005*, (Copenhagen 2005) 5-28, here 5.

²⁴⁴ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Europe after the Enlargement. Speech at the College of Europe, Napolin, Poland 28 February 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_11270.html (21 April 2017).

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Vertaald vanuit het Deens: Venstre Partyprogram, source: Venstre, *Venstre Principprogram: Fremtid I Frihed og Fællesskab* (2006) 43, via: <http://www.venstre.dk/politik/principprogram> (3 June 2017).

world – and ‘the Treaty enables an enlarged EU to meet the new global challenges in an efficient, democratic and sustainable way.’²⁴⁷

The Danish government paid much attention to the reform of the EU Council Presidency:

The existing rotation arrangement will have to be adjusted and improved in any circumstance if it is to continue in an enlarged EU... .The advantage is that large and small countries are given equal status...²⁴⁸

Fogh Rasmussen continued: ‘I can see a number of arguments in of an elected President. It will create continuity. And it may ensure clarity and balance in relation to the EU Commission.’²⁴⁹ For the government it was crucial that the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU would be enhanced in the coming years and this could be achieved with the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty.²⁵⁰ Denmark clearly expected the treaty would bring reform: ‘The enlarged EU must be able to function effectively and attend to the interests of the people of Europe. Which is why many of the proposals of the Constitutional Treaty are so absolutely right.’²⁵¹

Sovereignty and subsidiarity

In line with Denmark’s reluctance towards integration, sovereignty issues determined their support for the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. Fogh Rasmussen often stressed that the EU must be a union of nations working together and ‘the EU should respect the national identity of the member states.’²⁵² The *2006 Venstres Partyprogram* argued that the EU is an ‘association of independent European nations that have decided to solve a number of tasks jointly.’²⁵³ It stated furthermore that the EU must be developed in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and

²⁴⁷ Per Stig Møller, “Why Values are crucial in the EU.” Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller at the ‘Conference on the Role of Values in a Reunited Europe (25 October 2004)’ via: Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005* (Copenhagen 2005) 140-146, here 141.

²⁴⁸ Statsministeriet, ‘Danish EU Policy after the Presidency. Speech by the Prime Minister at the Institute for International Studies’ (version Statsministeriet 2003); Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Europe after the Enlargement. Speech at the College of Europe, Napolin, Poland 28 February 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Europe after the Enlargement. Speech at the College of Europe, Napolin, Poland 28 February 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁵¹ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Speech at the European Conference 2006 in Frederiksdal on May 19, 2006’ (version Statsministeriet 2006).

²⁵² Statsministeriet, ‘Danish EU Policy after the Presidency. Speech by the Prime Minister at the Institute for International Studies’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁵³ Venstre Government, *Venstres Principprogram* (2006) 43; Vertaald uit het Deens: EU er en frivillig sammenslutning af selvstændige europæiske nationer, som har besluttet at løse en række opgaver i fælleskab.’ Venstre Government, *Venstres Principprogram* (2006) 43.

the starting point should be that decisions are made as close to the citizens as possible.²⁵⁴ Some tasks can be solved in small communities, other should be taken care of by the nation states, and finally there are tasks which are best solved jointly between several countries.²⁵⁵ The government saw the EU as a body to solve cross-border issues ‘such as terrorism, international crime, environmental problems and a common energy policy.’²⁵⁶ It continued to stress that the EU must respect big and small states and their independence. Fogh Rasmussen saw the nation state as ‘the basis on which to build the future.’²⁵⁷ He did not believe that the EU was based on a federal approach:

The EU is not a federal state. On the contrary, the EU is based on voluntary co-operation between independent states... .. to perform jointly the tasks that they are not able to perform separately.²⁵⁸

He acknowledged that the EU must be strengthened, but he argued that the strength of the EU lies in the strong community of nation states: ‘It is an EU rooted in peoples and nation states.’²⁵⁹

According to Fogh Rasmussen, the most important part of the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty was the division of competences between the EU and the nation states.²⁶⁰ Fogh Rasmussen wanted to see this in the new treaty: ‘this division must be more clearly than the case in the present treaty.’²⁶¹ Fogh Rasmussen would also like to see a stronger role for national parliaments: ‘...it could be achieved by a number of parliaments notifying the Commission that they consider a proposal to be in conflict with the principle of subsidiarity.’²⁶² Emphasized is that Denmark will continue to support greater involvement of national parliaments, and

²⁵⁴ Venstre Government, *Venstres Principprogram* (2006) 43.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Vertaald: EU skal løse grænseoverskridende problemer som bl.a. terrorbekæmpelse, international kriminalitet og miljøbeskyttelse og en fælles energipolitik.’ Venstre Government, *Venstres Principprogram* (2006) 43.

²⁵⁷ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Europe after the Enlargement. Speech at the College of Europe, Napolin, Poland 28 February 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003); Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Address at the Opening Session of the Folketing on 7 October 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁵⁸ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Europe after the Enlargement. Speech at the College of Europe, Napolin, Poland 28 February 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003); Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Address at the Opening Session of the Folketing on 7 October 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁵⁹ Statsministeriet, ‘Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Address at the Opening of the Session of the Folketing on 7 October 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003); Statsministeriet, ‘Danish EU Policy after the Presidency. Speech by the Prime Minister at the Institute for International Studies’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁶⁰ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Europe after the Enlargement. Speech at the College of Europe, Napolin, Poland 28 February 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁶¹ Statsministeriet, ‘Danish EU Policy after the Presidency. Speech by the Prime Minister at the Institute for International Studies’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁶² Ibid.

therefore the governments stands firmly behind a constitutional treaty as it ‘remains a very good treaty as it contains the right elements to move the enlarged EU forward.’²⁶³

Fogh Rasmussen did not mention the opt-outs very often, but when he did, it was clear that he wanted to abolish the opt-outs because ‘Denmark has no influence on important areas.’²⁶⁴ To retain the opt-outs in key policy areas, especially after enlargement would be an ‘untenable situation.’²⁶⁵ That he also always mentioned that the new treaty preserves the opt-outs and that they can only be abolished after a referendum, shows that it was still a sensitive subject.²⁶⁶

In extension of the sovereignty issue lies the lack of democratic support. One of the EU’s main challenges was to connect the European project to the citizens, called the ‘peoples challenge’ by Fogh Rasmussen and he supported the new treaty because it could solve this problem:

An EU that delivers results in relation to the challenges presented to us by globalization is a precondition for popular support... ..New treaties, stronger institutions and a better decision-making process are a means to that end.²⁶⁷

According to Fogh Rasmussen, one of the most important features of the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty was that ‘each interested citizen will find it far easier to relate to and understand.’²⁶⁸ The context of ‘constitution must be regarded as an expression of the wish to lay down and clarify the rights of citizens and member states in relation to the EU.’²⁶⁹ Fogh Rasmussen justified his support for the new treaty by the fact that it would provide clear and precise rules for transparency and democratic control in the EU will be incorporated. The individual, the national parliaments and the European Parliament would, according to Fogh Rasmussen, have the opportunity to directly follow and monitor the legislative work of the Council.²⁷⁰

²⁶³ Statsministeriet, ‘Address by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen at Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments in Copenhagen June 30, 2006’ (version Statsministeriet 2006), via: http://www.stm.dk/p_11184.html (21 April 2017).

²⁶⁴ Statsministeriet, ‘Danish EU Policy after the Presidency. Speech by the Prime Minister at the Institute for International Studies’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Statsministeriet, ‘Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Address at the Opening of the Session of the Folketing on 7 October 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003); Statsministeriet, ‘Danish EU Policy after the Presidency. Speech by the Prime Minister at the Institute for International Studies’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁶⁷ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Speech at the European Conference 2006 in Frederiksdal on May 19, 2006’ (version Statsministeriet 2006).

²⁶⁸ Statsministeriet, ‘Danish EU Policy after the Presidency. Speech by the Prime Minister at the Institute for International Studies’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

National interests: Economic and influence arguments

The government did not pay much attention to economic arguments and even stated that the economic aspects are not the goals and aims of the EU. Stig Møller stated that ‘the means have been economic. But the aim is still a peaceful and united Europe. That aim is now closer than ever before.’²⁷¹

Fogh Rasmussen stated that the challenges of the EU are the fulfilment of the Lisbon process and the negotiations on how to make Europe the most competitive economy in the world. According to Fogh Rasmussen, ‘reforms of our economies, strengthening of our competitiveness and structural reforms are necessary if Europe shall be able to compete on the global markets in the future.’²⁷² However, ‘the traditional main task of the EU is the internal market, trade policy, competition policy and state aid control. The liberalization of our markets must continue, and it is crucial to ensure effective competition...’²⁷³

In contrast to the minimal use of economic arguments, the possibility to increase Denmark’s influence was mentioned more often. According to the government, the EU represents the ‘most important international framework for Denmark.’²⁷⁴ According to Stig Møller, the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty is important for Denmark, because it provides influence and security for small countries:

the EU ensures the absence of traditional great power politics in Europe. It ensures that we will not return to the familiar zero-sum game of the past, where big military powers carved up Europe into different spheres of influence... This is why we need to preserve the EU.²⁷⁵

This balance between smaller and bigger countries was also stressed by Fogh Rasmussen: ‘From now on we are all equal. New members and old. Large countries and small.’²⁷⁶ He

²⁷¹ Stig Møller, ‘Why Values are crucial in the EU’, 140.

²⁷² Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The Danish EU Presidency and the Enlargement Deal. Speech for the Danish Institute of International Studies’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁷³ Statsministeriet, ‘Danish EU Policy after the Presidency. Speech by the Prime Minister at the Institute for International Studies’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

²⁷⁴ Ulrike Federspiel, ‘The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 2006’, in: Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2007* (Copenhagen 2007) 13-30, here 25.

²⁷⁵ Per Stig Møller, ‘Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller at the Conference "A Free Market Vision For Europe" at CEPOS (Copenhagen 9 november 2005), in: Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen (eds.) *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006* (Copenhagen 2006) 182-188, here 187.

²⁷⁶ Statsministeriet, ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Europe after the Enlargement. Speech at the College of Europe, Napolin, Poland 28 February 2003’ (version Statsministeriet 2003).

stressed the Danes needed the EU and ‘that is the reason why Denmark must participate and play a strong role in the EU.’²⁷⁷

This chapter looked at the British and Danish policies towards the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. Interestingly, both countries were strongly supporting the new treaty, in spite of federal fears. They both saw a chance to reform the EU and to gain more influence. The main difference that appeared is that Britain saw the EU as a platform to influence world politics, where Denmark wanted to try to influence the EU itself. The next chapter will more comprehensively compare the two policies of both countries.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

Conclusion

As the policies of Denmark and Britain on eastern enlargement and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty have now been outlined, this chapter compares the positions of the two countries and connect them, using the theories described. Eventually, this leads to the final conclusion and an answer to the main research question.

4.1 Analysing the approaches towards eastern enlargement

Denmark and Britain have both been advocates of eastern enlargement.

On the one hand, the pro-enlargement arguments of both countries seem to be constructivist, based on solidarity, a sense of duty and the historic responsibility to reunite Europe. Both governments stated that it is their ‘moral duty’ and responsibility to share the economic prosperity and freedom gained by EU membership with the CEEC’s. Both countries saw the EU as a ‘union of values’ and support eastern enlargement because this would unify the ‘European family’. That both countries used these arguments, support the theory of Riddervold and Sjørusen, which claims enlargement support is mainly based on a sense of solidarity and the sharing of European norms and values.

On the other hand, when looking more closely, it becomes clear that rationalist arguments, based on national interests, were also frequently mentioned. British support for eastern enlargement was based on the calculation that extensive widening of the EU would prevent further deepening of integration, and in addition the idea that the new member states share this view. Britain stated that enlargement will bring a win-win situation to both the old and the new members, as enlargement will bring more stability and security to Europe. Whereas Britain’s support for enlargement is largely based on national interests of slowing down deepening of the EU and cannot be explained by geographic proximity, the Danish support is based on national security interest, highly influenced by its geographic proximity to the CEECs. Denmark assumed that enlargement is the catalyst of economic and political reform, which was, according to the government, a prerequisite for stability and security in the entire EU. Following this line, Denmark stated that its domestic security depends on the stability of its neighbours. This is emphasized by its ‘neighbourhood policy’, which was an important feature of its foreign policy. The fact that Denmark’s proximity to the CEEC’s has been an important motive of its support for enlargement, confirms Skålnes’ theory that geographic proximity explains why countries are favouring eastern enlargement. However, this theory does not explain British enlargement support. Another rationalist argument both countries used is the assumption

enlargement will strengthen their position within the EU. After enlargement, Britain for itself pretended a leading role. Denmark looked upon itself as a leader of the new small states, being able to influence EU policies together. The Danish support for eastern enlargement can also be explained by their desire for continuing the traditional Danish neutrality.

In contrast to the theory of Sjørnsen and Riddervold, that rationalist approaches do not explain support for eastern enlargement, this thesis shows that Denmark and Britain both used rationalist arguments to support eastern enlargement. The strong presence of these arguments based on national interests, puts to question the sincerity of the constructivist, moral arguments. Analysing the British and Danish statements, it becomes clear they both had significant self-interest in enlargement. At the same time, they gave plenty attention to the moral obligation and historic responsibility of eastern enlargement. According to Schimmelfennig's theory, arguments based on moral obligations are used as 'rhetorical entrapment' by countries that had a self-interest in enlargement. I.e., countries who were initially opposed to enlargement, are shamed into supporting enlargement by using moral arguments. The quantity of the constructivist arguments on the one hand, and the clear national interests on the other hand, indicates Denmark and Britain used these arguments strategically to entrap the opposing countries into accepting eastern enlargement.

4.2 Analysing the approaches towards the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty

According to IR theories, a division between EU member states exists: the anti-federalist and intergovernmentalist on the one hand, the federalists or supranationalists on the other. Particularly in debates on the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty this division played an important role, as both groups understood the Treaty according to their own preferences. Analysing Danish and British approaches towards the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, both countries clearly belong to the same group, that of the intergovernmentalists. Firstly, they both strongly focused on the idea the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty will strengthen the position of national parliaments within the EU and does not diminishes national sovereignty. Secondly, Britain paid much attention to the notion that the new Treaty is not a federalist project. As well the Danish government often stated that the EU should 'not be a federal state, but a strong community of states' and that Denmark supported the new Treaty, implying that it is not a federal state. Thirdly, both countries supported the intergovernmentalist's interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity, namely that this principle is protecting the national governments against EU power. This is a confirmation that both countries have an intergovernmental approach on

Europe. In their opinion, the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty provides the national parliaments with a powerful tool to check new EU legislations. Lastly, both countries supported the Treaty because it strengthens the Council, which is seen as the most intergovernmentalist constitution within the EU.

Furthermore, what the high degree of intergovernmentalism and the statements of the government show, is that, especially among its citizens, both countries still had to deal with a reluctant attitude towards EU integration. Denmark and Britain were constantly justifying their membership. Both Prime Ministers often mentioned that the new Treaty brings the EU closer to its citizens and that it is easier to understand for the interested citizen. According to the two governments, the use of subsidiarity ensures decisions are made ‘as close as possible to the citizens’, and therefore they support the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. As well they justified their membership by the notion its international influence is dependent on the EU. Blair often mentioned Britain needs the EU to maintain any influence on the international stage. More specific, Blair argued the US only considers Britain relevant when a member of the EU. Therefore, Britain needed to be at the heart of the EU and needed to support the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. In Denmark’s case, full engagement within the EU and ratifying the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty was seen as a prerequisite to have any influence within the EU. Nyrup Rasmussen and his successor Fogh Rasmussen have both shown their willingness to reconsider the opt-outs in order to gain more influence on important EU policies.

Enlargement seems to have persuaded Britain and Denmark that a more regularized and constitutional approach was for the best. But whereas Kelemen, Menon and Slapin and Schimmelfennig argue the new Treaty is solely a consequence of the widening of the EU, this thesis shows the need to connect more closely to its citizens also has to be taken seriously into account. This confirms the theories of Bach, George and Bulmer, and Berman. Also in the case of the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, national interests, influence and national sovereignty, were important motives why both Denmark and Britain supported the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty.

Despite the many similarities between British and Danish approaches, there has been one significant change in the Danish ‘shadowing’: it seems Denmark shifted from binding itself to Britain, to binding itself to the EU. It is obvious Denmark became aware it needed to influence the EU, and that the EU was considered the most important actor on which its security is dependent. Denmark considered itself as a ‘leading power’ in relation to the new smaller members that joined the EU. This confirms the theory that small states are the weak part in an asymmetric relationship: while being weak in one relationship, while being strong in another.

4.3 Comparing Danish and British EU policy

As shown in the first chapter, small states like Denmark tend to shadow great powers like Britain. Small states are more influenced by actions of great powers than the other way around. Accordingly, when a great power exits the EU, this may have far-reaching consequences for the smaller member states who shadow this more powerful state. This thesis showed that, for a long time, Denmark has been shadowing Britain and based its foreign and European policy on Britain's. The small state theory and the shadowing of Britain together give rise to the assumption that Denmark will leave a key ally when Britain leaves the EU. The reactions in the Danish media and by Danish politicians that Brexit will lead to Dexit, shows that there is still an idea that Denmark (should) follow Britain. Until now, research on this relationship have only strengthened the idea of partnership as it focused mainly on the similarities between Britain and Denmark. After explaining Denmark's reluctance towards the EU, its special relationship with Denmark and after analysing the British and Danish political stances on more recent EU policies, this conclusion will critically look whether the assumed hypothesis that *Denmark will lose a strong ally within the EU when Britain leaves* is right.

Already before membership, Denmark was reluctant towards European integration. This hesitant approach is explained by three historical causes, shown in chapter one. The disaster of 1864 led to an inward turn and rise of nationalism, fearing loss of sovereignty and autonomy. Fear of being forced into a war with Germany again, was an incentive for Denmark to maintain neutral during World War 1. As Denmark managed to stay neutral, this created a sense of superiority, increased by the introduction of the extensive welfare state. From the Danish point of view, European integration threatens their welfare state.

Although Britain and Denmark have different historical explanations for their sense of superiority, fear of losing sovereignty and reluctance towards the EU, both countries had similar positions towards EU membership and integration. After World War 2, Denmark started shadowing Britain, resulting in membership of the EFTA and a similar 'yes, but no' game with important reservations on their membership. This resulted into a simultaneous accession to the EU. During their membership, both countries followed the *essential cooperation discourse*: they considered European cooperation to be essential to promote their national interests. Both countries remained reluctant towards transferring sovereignty, but at the end of the 1980s they became more positive towards European integration. However, during the negotiations on the

Maastricht Treaty (considered a high point of the special relationship between Britain and Denmark) the reluctance reappeared and both countries gained important opt-outs on the TEU. Looking at more recent EU policies, both Denmark and Britain continued their similar approaches towards eastern enlargement and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, shown earlier in this chapter.

There have been differences between British and Danish approaches and arguments, but these were highly based on their different characters as a nation. Both countries find in eastern enlargement and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty a chance to reform the EU and gain more influence. Denmark's aspirations are more limited than Britain's aspirations. Being a small state, Denmark considers itself as a leader of a group of smaller nations within the EU, whereas Britain, historically and traditionally a great power, sees itself as a natural leader of Europe. Because of the Danish geographical proximity to the CEECs, security is an important national interest why Denmark supported eastern enlargement. Looking at British arguments, security played no role. The expectation formulated in the introduction that both countries supported eastern enlargement based on as well moral duty as national interests, but that these national interests will differ according to their size and geographic proximity to the CEECs, is correct.

It was also expected that there would be a difference in which sides the countries take in the debates on European integration. Denmark, as a small country, was expected to be a supporter of international institutions and supranationalism as collaborating with smaller countries would give them more influence. Also, international institutions limit the manoeuvring space of great powers. Because of this last fact, it is expected that Britain is opposed to supranationalism. The analysis of the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty shows that Denmark is, against expectation, a supporter of intergovernmentalism. This shows their high value of sovereignty and their shadowing of Britain.

It can be concluded that Denmark loses an important ally when Britain leaves the EU. For decades, they shared a reluctant approach, opt-outs, similar arguments and positions towards European integration and EU policies. This thesis showed that in recent EU policies there are still important similarities. Mainly, both countries were firm supporters on eastern enlargement and the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. But also both countries lost their sense of superiority, as they came to see the EU as a prerequisite for their international influence, their national stability and (economic) security. In addition, both countries belong to the group of intergovernmentalists, trying to keep as much power as possible at the domestic level. They share the intergovernmentalist interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity as a shield against

EU interference. Lastly, both countries still have to deal with a high degree of Euroscepticism among their citizens, which results in a constant need to justify their membership. In debates, both governments put much emphasis on keeping sovereignty and focused on motivating why they need to be at the heart of Europe.

According to the small state theory, smaller states should not be intergovernmentalist, as the intergovernmentalisation of the EU resulted in great powers discussing policies outside the Commission. Small states should also be opposed the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty as it diminishes the power of the Commission, the most important ally of small states within the EU. Accordingly, for Denmark to join this group and to support the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, does not add up to the expectations of small state behaviour. This indicates Denmark still considered it more important to keeping sovereignty and remained shadowing Britain, hoping through this great power to influence the EU. A mitigating circumstance could be that Denmark's smart state strategy seems to have changed, the focus being shifted from influencing a great power like Britain to influencing the EU itself. This is strengthened by the fact that Denmark is increasingly depending its security, stability and prosperity on Europe and sees opportunities as a leader of a group of nation states.

Besides all the parallels, this thesis showed a fundamental difference between Denmark and Britain. When looking at the rhetoric used in statements on national sovereignty, the difference between Danish liberal nationalism and Britain's parliamentary sovereignty comes to surface. Where Denmark focused on a EU 'as close to the citizens as possible', Britain focused on the strengthening of the role of the national parliaments. It is remarkable that, even though this significant difference, both countries have made similar choices, had similar political stances towards European integration and were on the same intergovernmentalist side of the European integration debates. This shows an important similarity between the two countries and perhaps one of the reasons why they consider each other like allies. Namely, both countries highly value their sovereignty, derive their national identity from this and are afraid European integration will diminish this, resulting in a distrusting attitude towards European integration. Al together, a Brexit will split up the 'odd couple', marking the end of a remarkable affair.

This thesis used public statements and it needs to be bared in mind that governments may specific use rhetoric to achieve other goals. Schimmelfennig's rhetorical entrapment already shows governments use rhetoric tricks as means to influence others and have hidden agendas.

We don't know what has been discussed within and between the governments behind closed doors.

The eastern enlargement and Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty have been heavily interwoven policies, which resulted in many similarities between the positions of Denmark and Britain. Looking at other EU policies, for example terrorism or immigration, it could result in different positions, or less similarities. Bare also in mind that during the period examined in this thesis, both Britain and Denmark had extremely and before un-known pro-European governments. In the years after the Blair-period and the Rasmussen-periods, the economic crisis struck and this puts questions on whether the EU is able to solve huge problems like these. It would be interesting to examine even more recent EU policies, after 2008, to see whether in that period Danish and British EU policies were alike. Building on this thesis, it would be interesting to examine the relationship between Denmark and Germany. As shown in the first chapter of this thesis, these countries share a complicated and often painful history. Because Denmark shares borders with Germany, and Germany is already a leading country within the EU, it is worthwhile examining whether within the EU these countries may work together or share positions and whether Germany could be a substitute great power for Denmark to shadow after Britain's exit from the EU.

The EU just started the official Brexit negotiations so it is still too early to talk about concrete consequences. One of the European policies where Denmark will most likely suffer from the Brexit, is the EMU. Denmark and Britain are the only countries within the EU that have an opt-out on the euro. The new member states that do not have the euro yet, have at least the prospect of one day entering the Eurozone. When Britain leaves the EU, Denmark will lose a great like-minded partner and the group of non-euro countries will significantly decline. This will make Denmark an even lonelier outsider. Another policy area where Brexit will probably have consequences is the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Denmark, Britain and Ireland are now share opt-outs on this policy, but Britain and Ireland have an 'opt-in' possibility to opt-in on a case-to-case basis. When Britain leaves, Denmark will be the only country with a rigid opt-out on this policy area. It will be interesting to see what the consequences of the Brexit in these policy areas for Denmark.

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