

The Last March'

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of the
FARC in Cauca, Colombia

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Abstract

This thesis examines how Colombia has used its experience from previous processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), for the current DDR process of the FARC. It explains the position of DDR in relation to peacebuilding in Colombia and in the current peace process with the FARC. This thesis is split in two parts. In the first part, it analyzes two collective demobilizations in Colombia and the Colombian individual demobilization strategy, which has actively been used since 2002. Colombia has developed its DDR policy and programs over the past three decades and gained valuable expertise.

The second part of this thesis uses the 'determinants of success' from the first part to analyze the construction and implementation of the DDR program of the FARC in the department of Cauca. The indigenous community of Colombia has an indispensable but undervalued role in the peace process. The ignorance towards the indigenous community is one of the biggest threats for the success of the current Colombian peace process. A second main threat is the lack of trust and confidence in the Colombian state. Without addressing root causes like poverty, social inequality and corruption, the breeding ground for radicalization continues to exist, and it will only be a matter of time for conflict to reemerge.

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Political maps



Map of Colombia - Source: mapofworlds.com



Map of Cauca - Source: caucaextremo.com

Abbreviations and glossary

Abbreviations

ACIN	<i>Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca</i> – Association of Indigenous cabildos in North-Cauca.
ACR	<i>Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración</i> – Colombian Reintegration Agency.
ANUC	<i>Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos de Colombia</i> – National Association of Colombian Peasants.
AUC	<i>Las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia</i> – United Defense Forces of Colombia.
CELAC	<i>La Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños</i> - Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.
CEPAR	<i>Centro para la Paz y Reconciliación</i> – Centre for Peace and Reconciliation.
CODA	<i>Comité Operativo para la Dejación de las Armas</i> – Commission for the Operation of Disarmament.
CONPA	<i>Consejo Nacional de Paz Afrocolombiano</i> - Afrocolombian National Council of Peace.
CONPI	<i>Coordinación Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas</i> – National Coordination of the Indigenous people.
CRIC	<i>Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca</i> – Indigenous Regional Council of Cauca.
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.
DIPAZ	<i>Diálogo Intereclesial por la Paz</i> – Inter-Church Dialogue for Peace.
ELN	<i>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</i> – National Liberation Army.
FARC-EP	<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo</i> – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – The People’s army.
GAHD	<i>Grupo de Atención Humanitario al Desmovilizado</i> – Group for Humanitarian Attention to the Demobilized.
ICBF	<i>Instituto Colombiano Bienestar Familiar</i> – Colombian Institute for Family Wellbeing.
IDDRS	Integrated DDR Standards.
M19	<i>Movimiento 19 de Abril</i> – 19 th of April Movement.
MAPP-OEA	<i>Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz – de la Organización de los Estados Americanos</i> – Mission to support the peace process – Organization of American States.
MM&V	<i>Mecanismo de Monitoreo y Verificación</i> - Mechanism of Monitoring and Verification.
ONIC	<i>Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia</i> – National Indigenous Organization of Colombia.

PAHD	<i>Programa de Atención Humanitaria al Desmovilizado</i> – Program for Humanitarian Attention for the Demobilized.
SI	Socialist International
UN	United Nations.
UP	<i>Union Patriótica</i> – Patriotic Union; Political party of the FARC in the late '80s.

Glossary

<i>Bacrim</i>	<i>Bandas Criminales</i> – Criminal gangs. Acronym for post-demobilization groups, often filling up illegal markets abandoned by demobilized armed groups.
<i>Cabildo</i>	Indigenous council what can be considered the representative body for all domestic units in a <i>resguardo</i> .
<i>Hacienda</i>	Originated during the Spanish colonial times as a large rural estate which contains subsistence and commercial agriculture.
<i>Resguardo</i>	Territory owned collectively by indigenous communities on which communal as well as individual forms of ownership are present.

Introduction

After six years of negotiations, on November 24, 2016 Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC-leader Rodrigo Londoño¹ signed a historic peace deal. In this deal the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia², or FARC, agreed to a definitive ceasefire and abandonment of arms, bringing an end to fifty-two years of armed conflict in Colombia. The original deal was signed two months earlier, on September 27 in Cartagena, but was rejected by the Colombian people in the October 2 referendum. The 'new peace deal' is officially titled the "Final accord for the termination of conflict and the construction of a stable and durable peace"³. It addresses both the root causes of the conflict and the most atrocious consequences of the civil war in six chapters.⁴ As a proviso for political participation, the Colombian government requires full demobilization of the FARC within 180 days after the signing of the peace deal. Agreements on this primary objective are accorded in chapter three of the peace deal and include the establishment of a bilateral and definitive ceasefire, the disarmament of the FARC, and the reincorporation of FARC fighters into civil life. In academic and political circles the combination of these goals – with the objective to end armed conflict – is called the concept of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).

In their transition from war to peace, many countries have used the instrument of DDR to minimize the threat of ex-combatants towards this transition. Between 1992 and 2005, worldwide there have been thirty-seven DDR processes, with some countries unfortunately gone through more than one process (Stockholm Initiative, 2006).⁵ Initially considered a pure military issue, over time it became clear that demobilization alone was not enough to ensure reintegration into civil society, and a development focus was added to the process. According to the Stockholm Initiative (2006), DDR aims on both short-term security and long-term stability.⁶ To contribute to a safe and stable environment, it must annihilate the threat of violence and create the right conditions for long-term development. The growing importance of DDR in peacebuilding has led to the development of several international frameworks on DDR, such as the UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS). But despite these frameworks, the design and outcome of DDR programs differ per country and peace process. With the collective demobilization of left-wing guerilla groups in the 1990s, the right-wing

¹ Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, *nom de guerre*: Timoleón Jiménez, and nickname: Timochenko.

² *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*.

³ *Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera*.

⁴ 1) land and rural development issues; 2) political participation of the FARC; 3) ending the armed conflict; 4) the problem of illicit drugs; 5) victims of the conflict; and 6) implementation, verification and refrendation.

⁵ Twenty-four DDR processes in Africa, five in Latin-America (El Salvador, 1992-1996; Haiti, 1994-1996 & 2004-2007; Guatemala, 1997; and Colombia, 2003-2006), four in Asia, two in Europe, and two in Oceania.

⁶ The Stockholm Initiative is an initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden with the purpose to "present recommendations, guidelines and food for thought on how to create the best possible conditions for a DDR program to be implemented in a post-conflict environment" (Stockholm Initiative, 2006).

paramilitary AUC between 2003-2006, and the individual demobilization of guerillas from 2002 onwards, Colombia has gained valuable DDR experience. Hosting two of the three major international conferences on DDR – the Cartagena Congress in 2009 and the Santa Marta Summit in 2013⁷ – Colombia has taken a leading role in improving DDR processes in Colombia and abroad.

In the peace deal with the FARC, both parties agreed upon a period of 180 days in which the FARC gathers in twenty-six UN-controlled demobilization zones⁸ to lay down their arms and start the reintegration process. Three of these demobilization zones are located in one of Colombia's regions most affected by the conflict: the department of Cauca.⁹ This culturally diverse region with its violent history and home to many FARC fighters, is key to the success peace process.¹⁰ By January 31 all FARC-members in Colombia were expected to be in the demobilization zones in compliance with chapter three of the peace agreement. However, first official numbers estimate around three hundred FARC-guerillas have refused to demobilize. Some rebel commanders, especially those whose units are actively involved in drug-trafficking or illegal mining, have rejected the peace deal and refuse to hand in their arms (Symmes Cobb, 2017). This has been a prevalent and unfortunately not the only obstacle in previous DDR processes. Partly disarmament, lack of security, unsuccessful reintegration and recidivism are amongst other possible obstacles. To address the introduced subjects, I have formulated the following central research question: How has Colombia used its DDR experience to ensure a successful process of collective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FARC-guerillas in the department of Cauca?

Colombia's past DDR experiences can be used to improve Colombia's reintegration programs and serve as an example for other (post-)conflict countries in the world. In this thesis, I focus on the development of DDR policy in Colombia and the implementation of DDR in the current peace process with the FARC. To find an answer to my main research question I split my research in two parts. For the analysis of earlier demobilizations in Colombia in the first part of my thesis, I have conducted a literature review and interviews with the MAPP-OEA¹¹ – responsible for the demobilizations of the AUC between 2003-2006. In this part I hope to find an answer to the first two sub-questions: How did Colombian DDR policy develop since the 1980s? Which actors were involved in previous Colombian DDR processes and which factors influenced its success? To gain deeper insights in the experiences and involvement of the indigenous community in Cauca, I have chosen a qualitative research

⁷ First one was the Stockholm Initiative in 2006.

⁸ 20 *Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización* (ZVTN) and 6 *Puntos Transitorios de Normalización* (PTN). The difference is that the ZVTN's are areas and the PTN's just one camp.

⁹ See Political maps 1 & 2.

¹⁰ Cauca is ethnically and culturally diverse with 46,31% whites and mixed, 32,19% Afro-Colombians and 21,5% Indigenous. Whites and mixed are centered around Popayan, the Afro-Colombians near the coastal areas, and the Indigenous community in the North and North-East (Hristov, 2005).

¹¹ *Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz Colombia - Organización de los Estados Americanos.*

method. As a starting point in this second part, I used the ‘factors of influence’ that originated from the literature review in the first part. In this part I provide an answer to the third and fourth sub-question: Which actors are involved in the preparation and implementation of the demobilization of the FARC in Cauca and how have they been prepared? Which problems and difficulties are already visible in the first months of implementation and what will be the biggest future challenges?

Peacebuilding in Colombia

Peace cannot be achieved solely by signing a document or by shaking hands. “Ending war and building peace are two related but fundamentally different objectives” (van der Borgh, 2009; p. 314). Signing a peace agreement is an important step in a peace process but often just the beginning of a long period of peacebuilding. The peace deal with the FARC is a milestone in Colombia’s peacebuilding process and aims to end the armed conflict with the FARC in six months. The entire peace process that should lead to the political normalization of the country is expected to take at least ten years, but is challenged by powerful political forces and continued armed violence (Alsema, 2017a). In this period a state must restore a sense of security and create the right conditions for development to secure a durable peace. This transition goes not without new challenges and often involves a transformation of the nation’s political system and bureaucracy (van der Borgh, 2009). To safeguard the implementation of the peace deal with the FARC, President Santos has installed a ‘post-conflict cabinet’. This post-conflict cabinet consists of ministers whose departments are directly or indirectly involved with the implementation of the peace agreements.¹² They are responsible to carry out peacebuilding policy in the following years and are tasked to tackle the causes and aggravators of political violence and war that has dominated Colombia for more than fifty years (Alsema, 2017a). “What we have to do is to articulate and coordinate well, follow up [on the peace deal] as swiftly as possible so the people begin to feel the effects of peace, the effects of post-conflict.”¹³

With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the amount of peace operations increased. Herewith the question of recidivism – how to ensure that ex-combatants do not resort to renewed violence – has grown in relevance. The most popular answer has been the concept of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (Jonsson, 2015). Most practitioners agree that DDR is aimed to guarantee a non-recurrence of armed violence, reduce victimization, and promote durable reintegration. It is not a peacebuilding tool on itself, but an element of a larger process of

¹² The ministers forming the post-conflict cabinet are: Interior Minister Juan Fernando Cristo, Foreign Minister Maria Angela Holguin, Labor Minister Clara Lopez, Finance Minister Mauricio Cardenas, Defense Minister Luis Carlos Villegas, Agriculture Minister Aurelio Iragorri, Transport Minister Jorge Rojas, Mining Minister German Arce and Vice-President General Oscar Naranjo.

¹³ President Santos during the first meeting of his post-conflict Cabinet (Alsema, 2017a).

peacebuilding and dealing with the past. Accompanied by a wide set of social, economic and political measures, it must contribute to a sustainably improved security situation (Nussio, 2012b; Jonsson, 2015). This would mean a decrease in homicide rates and an increased sense of security within the population (ACR, 2014; Stockholm Initiative, 2006; UNDDR, 2006). In the construction of DDR, other parallel processes such as the issue of Security System Reform (SSR), justice and reconciliation, and community-based reconstruction must also be considered (Stockholm Initiative, 2006). The 'technical' aspects of disarmament and demobilization are molded in international policy guidelines like the United Nations Integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) and comparatively agreed-upon (Jonsson, 2015).

"The objective of the DDR is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and social economic dimensions. It aims to deal with a post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihood or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of the combatants, taking the combatants out of the military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support male and female ex-combatants and men, boys, women and girls associated with armed forces and groups, so that they can become active participants in the peace process." (UNDDR, 2014).

But despite international frameworks and standards, DDR programs and its effects are different per country, influenced by its domestic context and social demands (Arias, Herrera & Prieto, 2010; Jonsson, 2015). At the national level DDR programs on the one hand serve to "stabilize the post-conflict situation", while on the other hand "keeping the long-term peace-building agenda in mind" (SIDDR, 2006; p. 14). On the individual level the core purpose of DDR is to prevent 'remobilization' or recidivism of ex-combatants. In practice, DDR programs can strongly differ in terms of total enrollment and budget per participant, and in design and implementation (Jonsson, 2015). Colletta and Muggah (in Jonsson, 2015; p. 5) say the design of DDR programs can vary widely depending on macro- and micro-*determinants*: conflict drivers, type of conflict termination and governance capacity of the state on the one hand, and the absorptive capacity of society, character of the armed group and security-promoting incentives offered on the other.

Many studies provide evaluations of previous DDR programs and focus on 'lessons learnt'. But Torjesen (2009) and Guistozzi (2012) note that more recent studies focus on how to address crucial political trade-offs in designing DDR programs (in Jonsson, 2015; p. 6). Political trade-offs on national level are for example, whether to co-opt ex-combatants into state structures and the political process or to exclude them, and how to distribute support between combatants, supporters,

receiving communities and victims. On the individual level, an important trade-off is what to do with leaders of insurgent groups. Dismantle the organization by removing the leadership can be a key to break up the armed group, but high- and mid-level commanders can also play a significant role in convincing their foot-soldiers to demobilize and participate in a peace process. These trade-offs are difficult and differ per country and sometimes even per region (Jonsson, 2015). The Colombian government has dealt with these sorts of trade-offs in different ways in the past, sometimes successful and sometimes with drastic consequences.

After the demobilization of the AUC, many scholars like Alexandra Guáqueta, Enzo Nussio and Ben Oppenheim have written critical evaluations about Colombian DDR policy and programs. Nussio called the demobilization of the AUC 'partly failed' and highlighted the existence of paramilitary post-demobilization groups. Guáqueta has written a historical analysis on reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now. And Oppenheim focused on ex-combatants and their diverse reasons to leave the insurgent group. Another well-known author is Michael Jonsson, who wrote his PhD dissertation about motivational change and divergence inside the FARC between 2002 and 2012, focusing on individual demobilizations. Parallel to an increase in academic research, went the creation of special DDR-related state institutions in Colombia, such as the Colombian Reintegration Agency (*Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración*; ACR). The ACR was the co-organizer of the Santa Marta Summit in 2013, where best practices on DDR were shared between practitioners from fifty-seven countries. An earlier DDR conference, the Stockholm Initiative in 2006, concluded reintegration programs must be twofold, with attention to ex-combatants on the one hand and affected communities on the other. Since the Stockholm Initiative the focus shifted more and more towards community-based reintegration. In the Santa Marta Summit, one of the central themes even was the change from "regional and national towards local reintegration" (ACR, 2014).

Despite the shift towards community-based reintegration, implications of DDR for the indigenous community in Colombia are still highly underexposed. There are but few articles discussing the involvement of the indigenous community in the reintegration process of the FARC. Even Enzo Nussio, the main author on DDR in Colombia, barely mentions the indigenous community as an actor in the reintegration process of the FARC. Therefore, in this thesis, I put special emphasis on the position of the indigenous community in the construction and implementation of collective DDR programs of the FARC. I want to find out if and how indigenous communities have prepared for the DDR process of the FARC and if they are supported in this process by national or international actors. By researching this in an early stage, signaled problems can be dealt with before tensions rise and conflicts in these areas reemerge.

Methodology and limitations

The qualitative part of my research is conducted in the department of Cauca in the south-west of Colombia. Using an anthropological bottom-up approach, I 'experienced' the DDR process myself by assembling and reflecting upon stories of (ex-)FARC combatants, victims of the conflict, Indigenous leaders and practitioners 'in the field'. The Colombian people form the key to a peaceful transition of society, with DDR as a crucial part in the larger peacebuilding process. I chose the department of Cauca because it reflects the ethnic and cultural diversity of Colombian society and because of its strong relation to the conflict. The Cauca department has the second largest population of Indigenous people in Colombia (only preceded by Guajira) with eight different ethnic groups including the Nasa (or Paeces¹⁴), Coconucos, Guambianos and the Yanacona. Its geography in combination with other social and economic factors form the roots of guerrilla activity of the first¹⁵ and second¹⁶ generation since the seventies (Muñoz, 2012). The FARC entered Cauca in 1964 and have traditionally had a great presence in especially the North and Occidental zones. Other left-wing guerrilla groups were present from the 1970s until their demobilization in the 1990s and right-wing paramilitary groups entered the territory from the 1990s onwards (Alsema, 2014; Indepaz, 2013). Although the indigenous authorities (*cabildos*¹⁷) have officially never chosen side in the conflict, almost 80% of the FARC guerrillas from this region have indigenous roots.¹⁸ Especially since the 1990s the FARC increased its recruitment of indigenous youth in Cauca. Many of them have deserted the FARC and returned to their communities in previous years, others are taking part in the current peace process and are awaiting the official start of the reintegration process in the UN-controlled demobilization camps.

For a consecutive period of six weeks I lived amongst the self-governing Indigenous Nasa people in the municipality of Caldono¹⁹, in the North of Cauca.²⁰ During this period I gathered the main part of my data. I was based in the indigenous territory (*resguardo*) of San Lorenzo de Caldono, with approximately 11.000 inhabitants out of a total of approximately 25.000, the biggest of six *resguardos* in this municipality.²¹ From this location I visited the demobilization camps in Pueblo

¹⁴ Paez is the name as introduced by the Spaniards. It is still used, but in the indigenous community, Nasa is more common in use.

¹⁵ Illegal armed groups founded in the seventies such as the FARC and the ELN.

¹⁶ Illegal armed groups founded in the eighties like M19 and the Armed Movement of Quintin Lame.

¹⁷ The indigenous community is organized in *cabildos*: democratically elected councils governing a piece of land: *resguardo*).

¹⁸ Interview gobernador Caldono, 11-03-2017; Conversation *secretario de gobierno* of Jambalo, 30-01-2017.

¹⁹ See political maps, number two.

²⁰ Municipality of Caldono is with 70,5% predominately inhabited by the Indigenous Nasa people. The other groups are whites and mixed: 28,9% and Afro-Colombians: 0,5% (Dane, 2005).

²¹ San Lorenzo de Caldono, Pueblo Nuevo, Pioyá, Las Mercedez, La Laguna-Siberia, La Aguada-San Antonio (Caldono-cauca.gov.co)

Nuevo and in Buenos Aires²², conducted interviews and performed tasks for my internship with PAX. My goal in the second part of my research was to find out which actors are involved in the preparation and implementation of the DDR of the FARC in Cauca and how they have or have been prepared. Therefore I conducted twenty-one randomly sampled interviews with people from four key-groups. Four interviews with government authorities (group 1); seven with indigenous authorities (group 2); seven with non-indigenous and non-governmental organizations (group 3); and seven with members – guerrillas and *milicianos*²³ – of the FARC²⁴ (group 4). They varied from thirty to ninety minutes per interview.²⁵ For political reasons it was not possible to conduct interviews with UN personnel. In the demobilization camp of the FARC in San Antonio, Pueblo Nuevo, I was only allowed to conduct interviews with FARC combatants appointed to me by the FARC's political commander. To ensure the relevancy of collected data, I made a topic list based on literature review and early observations before starting the interviews. I transcribed my interviews and coded them by using the 'factors' selected in the first part of my thesis.²⁶ Throughout my entire research period, observations were part of my data collection. I attended meetings in several cabildos about topics related to the peace process, such as victims' reparations and reintegration of returning ex-FARC-combatants. I also deliberately visited meetings about other themes such as a local justice execution and an assembly of farmers about coffee production. This helped me to create a better understanding of daily life in indigenous communities in Cauca. Besides observations and interviews, I used written sources as a source of primary data. These include the official document of the new peace deal, and periodic informs from the UN, the MAPP-OEA and the civil committee about the situation in and around the demobilization camps in Cauca.

The combination of my fieldwork and my internship at PAX gave me the opportunity to develop different perspectives on ideas and themes related to my thesis. For example in Bogotá, I met with journalists from the weekly magazines *Semana* and *Verdadabierta* and I was present during the signing of the new peace deal and its debate in Congress. In the department of Meta I assisted in a training about local conflict resolution and the strengthening of local government. During my stay in Cauca I have spoken with at least forty victims of the conflict in Caldono and five ex-FARC guerrillas who deserted the FARC in previous years. These conversations took place in the form of personal

²² Third demobilization camp is located in the municipality of Miranda, in the north of Cauca.

²³ There are differences between FARC guerrillas and FARC *milicianos*. If you enter as a guerrilla you are a member of the FARC for life, while as a *miliciano* you can be called for service at any time for a certain period but your military participation is not permanent.

²⁴ The group of FARC-respondents is in some ways diverse (ages, regions, ranks and roles within the FARC) and in some ways similar (all Nasa and comparable socio-economic backgrounds).

²⁵ See for a complete list of conducted interviews the bibliography.

²⁶ Transcripts and audios available on request, in presence of the author of this thesis, and in anonymity of the interviewees. To ensure their anonymity and security I will not share any of my transcriptions.

questionnaires and were part of two projects of PAX.²⁷ In Cauca I also visited several indigenous communities, such as the cabildos of Pioya, Jambaló, Corinto, Toribio and Buenos Aires.²⁸ Here I attended local meetings about the peace process and co-organized workshops about victims and transitional justice, and reintegration of returning ex-FARC combatants.

There are constraints that could bias my research. First, a peace process is unpredictable. The demobilization of the FARC is dependent on many actors and can be influenced by foreseen and unforeseen developments. The plebiscite on the 2nd of October has emphasized the necessity to be flexible and always prepare for unforeseen changes. After the signing of the revised peace deal, political turbulence, logistic problems and issues of insecurity created delay and required flexibility on all sides.²⁹ These circumstances affect me as a researcher and the necessity to be flexible led me to choose grounded theory as a guideline in my methodology. The grounded theory is aimed on maintaining a constant dialogue between empirical knowledge and theoretical generalization and concept building (Bentzon et al., 1998). It was important to constantly reflect upon my findings and the changing circumstances and use them to strengthen and develop my theoretical perspectives and concepts. Second, I conducted my research in an area scarred by more than fifty years of conflict. Some of my respondents have never known a life without war. Something for me, as an external researcher from a safe and peaceful country, is hard to imagine. Some respondents might have been reserved and cautious to talk about the FARC, their relation with or their time within the FARC. This requires empathy and deep understanding of their situation and I must be aware that, because of these differences, information can be partially or blurred. Third, the conflict is not over. President Santos hopes to end the armed conflict with the demobilization of the FARC but this will not withhold the political conflict from continuing; it might even harden. Political motivations could have prevented people to participate or to tell the full truth. To deal with these first two points, I started to build a network of key-informants already in the premature phase of my research. My internship with PAX helped me to get in touch with community members, regional organizations and members of the FARC. I also tried to create a sense of trust and confidence by living in Caldono instead of just temporarily visiting the area. A fourth bias could be the attitude of the community towards the peace process. Like all the municipalities in Cauca, in Caldono the majority of the voters voted in favor of the peace deal during the plebiscite on October 2, 2016. Their local turn-out was

²⁷ Project 1: Transitional Justice and Victims participation; project 2: *retorno a la casa* (free translation: returning home.)

²⁸ See political maps, number two.

²⁹ 1) The indirect ratification of the new peace deal led to a political discussion on the legitimacy of the peace deal; and 2) the unexpected 'no' in the referendum caused logistic and security issues around the FARC 'Demobilization zones'. Both led to a delay in the start of the demobilization of the FARC.

higher than the national turn-out.³⁰ Assuming there is a relation between the way people voted and their attitude against the peace process, the fact that my research is conducted in a 'peace-positive' area could be of influence to my results. As a fifth influence, I must add language as a possible distorting factor. To bridge the language barrier I have been studying technical terms and topic-related expressions from an early stage in my research. I also recorded every interview and had my transcripts checked by native Spanish speakers. When respondents of the indigenous community were not fluent in Spanish or had very strong accents, I made use of a translator. The sixth and last point is the timing and limited time available to conduct my field work. The time needed for a disarmed combatant to be reintegrated in civil life takes at least two years. Its effects will not become visible in years after, and to conclude if a DDR process has been successful or not requires an even longer period. Therefore, my aim is not to provide a detailed rapport on whether the DDR of the FARC has been successful or not. My aim is to find out how the Colombian government used its DDR experience in the preparation of the DDR programs of the FARC. I want to know which problems could become future threats towards the peace process if not addressed properly. To provide an answer to this question I was clearly on the right place at the right time.

Thesis outline

The first chapter starts with a historical context to create a better understanding of the roots and complexity of the conflict. It continues by analyzing the collective demobilization of five³¹ left-wing guerilla movements between 1989-1994, the collective demobilization of right-wing AUC paramilitaries, and the individual demobilization of both guerillas and paramilitaries from 2002 onwards. Chapter two focusses on the implementation of DDR programs in the department of Cauca. It introduces the actors involved in this process on different levels of society. The largely autonomous indigenous Nasa community add an extra layer of complexity to the collective demobilization of the FARC in this region. In this second part of the thesis, the factors from the first part of my research are compared with the agreements in the new peace deal and the perceptions of the current situation of actors on the ground in Cauca. This thesis concludes by recapturing the possible threats towards the peace process and by mentioning priorities for the future. It will also briefly discuss the impacts of future events on the peace process (such as the 2018 presidential elections) and the possibilities for future research relating to this thesis.

³⁰ Outcome of votes in Colombia: 49,78% in favor and 50,21% against with 37,43% turn-out; Cauca: 67,39% in favor and 32,60% against with 38,98% turn-out; Caldono: 79,84% in favor and 20,15% against with 43,35% turn-out. (Registraduría Nacional Del Estado Civil, 2016)

³¹ Some sources mention five and others nine. These numbers differ because four small splinter groups are by some seen as part of their original group and by others as a new group.

Chapter one: An Unrequested Expertise

The civil war in Colombia is the longest and last lasting violent conflict in Latin America. Half a century of war left its marks with more than 220.000 people killed – of whom the majority civilians – and 5,8million internally displaced or fled the country.³² Since the 1980s several Colombian presidents have tried to use DDR as a tool to end the armed conflict and pave the road for peace. Some were more successful than others.³³ Besides collective demobilizations as result of a peace deal, DDR was also used as part of a counter-terrorism strategy to seduce individual combatants to demobilize. All three past demobilizations unfolded differently; none of them was perfect and all encountered difficulties. This chapter aims to find the factors influencing the success of a DDR process. To give an idea of how the current conflict developed, it will first provide a brief overview of Colombia's violent history. Then it consecutively analyzes the collective demobilization of five guerrilla groups in the 1990s, the collective demobilization of the AUC between 2003 and 2006, and individual demobilization from 2002 onwards. In the final paragraph of this chapter it is discussed how Colombian DDR policy developed over time and which factors during different stages of a peace process influence its success.

A brief history of conflict

From the early days of the republic of the 'United States of Colombia' in 1863 until the constitutional change of 1991, Colombia had a two-party system with the rivaling liberal and conservative party. The first civil war resulting out of this political rivalry was the Thousand Days War (1899-1902) with an estimated 100.000 deadly victims. The second civil war was *La Violencia* (1948-1957) and resulted in the dead of more than 300.000 people. In July 1957, former Conservative President Laureano Gómez and former Liberal President Alberto Lleras signed the 'Declaration of Sitges' in which they proposed a 'National Front'. They were hoping to unite the country after the devastating civil war and agreed on a power shift between both parties every four years. Although they booked progress in the first decade, the declaration did not manage to address structural societal changes as desired by the Colombian people. Some scholars even argue that with explicitly excluding new challengers, establishing a civilian elite-military alliance and redefining the military's role as the guarantor of

³² This number is disputed. Colombian government estimates the IDP's around 3,2 million, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates 5,8 million and the Human Rights and Displacement Consultancy estimates the IDP's around 4,9 million (UNRIC, a refugee in their own country).

³³ Between 1982 and 1986, President Belisario Betancur tried to demobilize insurgents by establishing a "National Rehabilitation Plan (*Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación, PNR*). Porch and Rasmussen (2008) provide several explanations for failure of this plan: inadequacy of state presence in the countryside, opposition to amnesty for guerrillas, popular fear of being left unprotected, leading to the rise of self-defense groups, and later the assassination of +-3000 members of the *Unión Patriótica*, the FARC's political party.

internal security, “the National Front established the context for the contemporary crisis of political violence and human rights violations” (Skjelsbaek and Smith, 2001; p. 146).

These internal developments coincided with the intensification of the Cold War. All over Latin America (and the world) revolutionary groups inspired by Marxism and Communism were emerging. Economic inequalities, social inclusion, the concentration of political power in the hand of a few, and the distribution of land were important international Communist points on the agenda and found their way into Colombian politics. Dahl (1971) and Robinson (1996) called the political structure between the liberals and conservatives a form of polyarchy, referring to a political structure in which a small elite rules and competes for power, and mass participation in decision making is reduced to the choice between two rivalling elite groups. This political elitist struggle for power and the exclusion of the masses has been an important factor in the rise of leftist radical political groups in the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these groups received aid in the form of money, arms or training from foreign communist powers like the Soviet Union or Cuba. But with the power of the Soviet Union declining in the 1980s, armed groups were ‘forced’ to seek for other more ‘dirty’ ways of financing. In this quest they often clashed over illegal interests with rising powerful drug cartels in for example Cali and Medellin. To counterbalance the increasing power of left-wing armed groups in the 1980s and 1990s and because of the lack of state presence, right-wing paramilitary groups emerged in different parts of the country (van de Sandt & Moor, 2014). Many of these paramilitary groups also got involved in the drug trade and worked together with the drug cartels. With both sides relying on drug money to fund their armed struggle, the coca production grew exponentially in the 1980s and conflict and crime combined claimed around 20.000 deaths per year (Guáqueta, 2007).

In this political turmoil, the following Presidents had the impossible task to reestablish order and at the same time address the root causes of the violent conflict. Three presidential candidates were assassinated by drug cartels before César Gaviria was elected into power in 1990.³⁴ With the dead of Pablo Escobar – leader of the Medellin Cartel – in 1993, and later the elimination of leaders of the Cali Cartel, Gaviria managed to break the power of the large drug cartels. Although this was perceived a small triumph, it could not stop the war in Colombia. A larger victory for peace was the incorporation of M-19 and four smaller guerilla groups in the successful peace process in the 1990s and the adoption of a new constitution that took effect in 1991 and replaced the outdated 1886 constitution. This new constitution was aimed to break the concentration of power in the hands of the Bogotá elites, create legal opportunities for the left, strengthen state presence, and address root causes such as poverty, inequality and underdevelopment (Guáqueta, 2007). Whereas the Gaviria

³⁴ The Liberal presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galán, was assassinated on August 18, 1989; the candidate of the Patriotic Union, Bernardo Jaramillo, was assassinated on March 22, 1990 – leading to the UP pulling out of the elections; Carlos Pizarro Leongómez from the AD/M-19’s party, was killed on April 27, 1990.

administration succeeded to transform M-19 and several smaller guerilla groups into unarmed political parties, they had no success with the FARC. Intensified military action and a new individual demobilization strategy, implemented by President Uribe in 2002, decreased the numbers of the FARC from 20.000 to 7.000 within twelve years. President Santos, former minister of Defense under the Uribe administrations, used this weakened position of the FARC to start peace negotiations. With experience from the AUC demobilizations, the Santos administration realized they needed a cohesive negotiation partner to address underlying socio-economic problems and move the country forward. After six months of exploratory talks, on August 26, 2012 both parties signed a general agreement³⁵ setting out the framework for future negotiations (Jonsson, 2015). The new peace deal, negotiated in Havana and signed in Bogotá on November 24, 2016, is a unique accomplishment and an important step towards peace in Colombia.

Demobilizations in the 1990s

Between 1990 and 1994 Colombia disarmed and demobilized five left-wing guerilla groups³⁶ and four smaller splinter groups³⁷, reintegrated an approximately 5000 combatants into civil life and transformed the former armed groups into political parties or movements. The groundwork was laid by President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) and implemented by his immediate successor, César Gaviria (1990-1994) (Jaramillo, Giha & Torres, 2009). The biggest of the five guerrilla groups and the first to demobilize was the April 19 Movement (*Movimiento 19 de abril*; M-19). During a ceremony on March 8, 1990, three days before they would first participate in the legislative and regional elections, M-19 laid down their arms. This took place under the observation of the Socialist International (SI) movement and national and international press in two demobilization camps in the departments of Cauca and Huila. M-19 declared that the abandonment of their weapons was a choice made in freedom and sovereignty and without pressure of the Colombian government. They chose this path because it did no longer coincide with their vision of a peaceful Colombia (De Pablos, 2016). Although all five armed movements and splinter groups were involved in separate negotiations and had separate peace accords, they took part in the same peace process.

The political context of chaos and conflict helped the reintegration of M-19 and smaller guerilla groups in the 1990s in several ways. The perception of conflict as a legitimate expression of

³⁵ Full name: General Agreement for the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace.

³⁶ The April 19th Movement (*Movimiento 19 de abril*; M-19), Workers' Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores*; PRT), Popular Liberation Army (*Ejército Popular de Liberación*; EPL), Quintín Lame Armed Movement (*Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame*; MAQL), Current Socialist Renewal (*Corriente de Renovación Socialista*; CRS) (Jaramillo, Giha & Torres, 2009).

³⁷ Comando Ernesto Rojas (*Comando Ernesto Rojas*; CER), Popular Militias of Medellín (*Milicias Populares de Medellín*; MPM), the Francisco Garnica Front (*Frente Francisco Garnica*; FFG) and the Independent Movement-Armed Comandos (*Movimiento Independiente-Comandos Armados*; MIR-COAR). Ibid.

social injustices created public support for the peace deal and the reintegration of the guerillas into the legal political system. People wanted institutional and political change and believed a transformation of left-wing armed groups into legal political actors could do something about this. The M-19 movement used this wide support for the peace process to frame itself as a political actor and by engaging in political discussions with the government. They became the core of the political party: Democratic Alliance M-19, and were later joined by the Popular Liberation Army (*Ejército Popular de Liberación*: EPL) and some members of the Workers' Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores*: PRT). They were accepted by society because they contributed to the strengthening of liberal political ideas and the improvement of human rights in the country. Their biggest triumph was their role in the creation of a new constitution in 1991, replacing the old constitution of 1886 and changing the bipartisan political system. They were especially successful in its initial stages but disappeared after they lost at the 1998 elections. The Current Socialist Renewal (*Corriente de Renovación Socialista*: CRS) initially wanted to become a political party but desisted; and the Quintin Lame Armed Movement (*Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame*: MAQL) never even tried. Political participation did take place, but in the form of policy making and public debate through political movements, social organizations, think tanks, NGOs and journalism. Individually and in groups the ex-guerillas found ways for legitimate political participation on local and national levels despite the ongoing war in Colombia. A number of former prominent M-19 members joined the first social leftists national party: *Polo Democrático* (PO) after its founding in 2003, and some of them are still active today (Guáqueta, 2007; Jonsson, 2015; Benavides Vanegas, 2005). Although none of the former armed groups survived as a political party, the political integration is considered generally successful. But political integration does not equal to political reform. Besides the historic constitutional reform, they could not match the goals of economic and social equality or the redistribution of political power. Former M-19 senator Vera Grabe wrote it as follow: "The Constitution reflects a new country." "But this does not mean that the traditional leadership and its political culture have been defeated" (Porch & Rasmussen, 2008; p. 524-525).

On academic nor political level there is consensus on the degree of success of the demobilizations in the 1990s. Successes can be attributed to the relatively small size of involved insurgent groups and the fact that many of their members were well educated and familiar with politics. This eased the reintegration process and reduced the need for state resources dedicated to DDR. An issue during the 1990s demobilizations was security. More than a thousand demobilized individuals were killed by so-called 'peace-spoilers', including drug-traffickers, paramilitaries, remaining guerilla groups and members of the security forces. The most famous – and very popular – individual killed, was presidential candidate and ex-M-19 guerrilla Carlos Pizarro. Another point of critique were the high levels of recidivism amongst former EPL members who joined other armed

groups after realizing the DDR program would not improve their personal status (Jonsson, 2015; Guáqueta, 2007; Porch & Rasmussen, 2008). According to Porch & Rasmussen (2008) the willingness of M-19 to lay down arms without having been defeated, seemed to break the taboo that demobilization was equivalent to surrender. Furthermore, the involvement of M-19 in the writing of the new constitution triggered other insurgent groups to initiate peace talks in the hope that they too would get the chance to reform Colombian politics to their ideals. In this way, the political transition of M-19 has positively contributed to peace in Colombia (Semana.com, 1997).³⁸

Demobilization of the AUC (2003-2006)

The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*; AUC) was founded as an umbrella organization in 1997, unifying right-wing paramilitary groups in Colombia. Acting as mercenaries for everyone that would pay them, the AUC became involved in the drug trade, kidnappings, brutal massacres and grave violations of human rights. The paramilitaries, especially during the time of their expansion between 1997 and 2002, are the main responsible group for war atrocities (Nussio, 2012b).

After previous failed attempts to negotiate peace with the FARC,³⁹ President Uribe (2002-2010) radically changed strategy by increasing military action against the FARC and starting negotiations with the AUC. In 2003 in Santa Fe de Ralito, both sides agreed on the objective of “re-establishing the monopoly of force in the hands of the state” (Nussio, 2011b; p. 1). In contrast to the current collective demobilization of the FARC, the AUC paramilitaries did not all demobilize at the same time but in ‘*bloques*’ between 2003 and 2006.⁴⁰ They first gathered in areas of concentration where they disarmed, their criminal records got checked, and the ones committing atrocities brought to trial.⁴¹ This process was monitored by the MAPP-OEA. After the demobilization period was concluded with an official demobilization ceremony, the ‘clean’ individuals started their period of reintegration into society. This process was managed by the Colombian Reintegration Agency (ACR) who supported collective and individual demobilized ex-combatants by providing legal, humanitarian and employment assistance.

³⁸ Interview CRIC, Popayan, 08-03-2017

³⁹ Both President Gaviria (1990-1994) and President Pastrana (1998-2002) tried to negotiate a peace agreement with the FARC during their presidency but failed in the effort.

⁴⁰ The structure of the AUC was horizontal and consisted of different *bloques*. A total of 36 demobilizations took place (MAPP-OEA, Popayan, 20-02-2017).

⁴¹ The commanders and soldiers found responsible for crimes received a reduced sentence under the ‘Justice and Peace Law’ (or law 975) of 2005. This controversial law was a part of the broader transitional justice system accompanying the AUC demobilization process, which remarkably enough came into force two years after the first demobilizations had taken place (Nussio, 2012b; Guáqueta, 2007).

The peace agreement with the AUC and its connected DDR process are highly criticized by scholars, practitioners and the Colombian public (Nussio, 2011b; Horswell, 2014). A common perception is that the talks between the AUC and the government were no peace talks but rather a “fake negotiation between allies” (Nussio, 2011b; p. 88). Others say there was no ‘peace process’, as this would presuppose negotiations between warring groups, while the paramilitaries had never attacked the national army (Chernick, 2008). In the contrary, there are many examples of local politicians cooperating with the paramilitaries, known as the ‘*parapolitica*’ scandals (Nussio, 2011b). In a report of Human Rights Watch (2000; p.8), a member of the paramilitaries put it this way: “a difference between drug traffickers, paramilitaries and the National Army practically didn’t exist”. This special relation between the negotiation partners caused scepticism from the beginning and undermined the legitimacy of the negotiations.

Besides the structural lack of DDR planning and preparations, there are three points of remark regarding the disarmament and demobilization of the AUC. The first is the claim that many of the demobilized were not really members of the AUC. This claim was fed because of the approximate number of combatants mentioned by AUC commanders before the start of the demobilization process: 15.000, and the actual number of demobilized after three years: 30.000-38.000.⁴² According to statements of former paramilitaries, many civilians and criminals had joined the DDR process to take advantage of the benefits. While international UN standards accept the participation of civilians in a DDR process, unclarity about the criteria for participation did contribute to low levels of legitimacy and caused skepticism (UNDDR, 2006; Nussio, 2011b). Secondly, as is not unusual with collective demobilizations, not all AUC members demobilized. At least two dissident fractions, the *Autodefensas Campesinas del Casanare* and the *Frente Cacique Pipintá*, and several individual dissident combatants have not entered the peace process. This excludes groups or members who did demobilize but later returned to armed struggle. Despite the evidence of non-demobilized AUC members, it is not known how many did not demobilize (Nussio, 2011b). As a third remark, observers claim the AUC has never handed in all their arms. They handed in a total of 18,051 weapons, creating a rate of 0.59 surrendered arms per demobilized person. There is no single DDR process with a total disarmament and compared to other DDR processes worldwide this is a fairly high-rate (Nussio, 2011b). Especially when you bear in mind that many of the demobilized were civilian members of the AUC.

It is difficult to measure the effect of DDR in terms of national security. When looking at the years during the demobilization of the AUC, it seems to have a partial positive effect on the improvement of the security situation. After the paramilitaries started with a ceasefire in 2002,

⁴² Exact numbers vary per source.

violence dropped parallel to the peace process. On national level the demobilization of the AUC coincided with a decrease in conflict intensity and a sharp decrease in crimes such as kidnappings, homicides and forced displacement. This changed after the conclusion of the collective demobilizations in 2006. A generalized perception is that violence shifted from the rural areas to urban areas where demobilized ex-combatants started to live after their demobilization. After an initial decline in violence, many cities showed increasing crime rates in the years after the AUC demobilization (Nussio, 2011b; Nussio, 2012b). Especially in areas with high levels of illegal activity and weak governance, violence rates were high (Howe, Sánchez, and Contreras, 2010). Despite all the criticism most scholars such as Bello Montes (2009), Restrepo and Muggah (2009) and Sanin and Peña (2012) conclude the net effect of the AUC demobilization on security was positive, others like Nussio (2011b) have their doubts.

While the AUC ceased to exist as an organization it was soon replaced by smaller armed groups, who used the remaining partly intact command-and-control structures of the AUC. Two important research institutes: The Conflict Analysis Resource Centre and Nuevo Arco Iris, call these groups neo-paramilitaries, referring to the membership of many former paramilitaries and their presence in former AUC controlled areas. The government calls them criminal gangs (*Bandas Criminales*; BACRIMS) or Armed Organized Groups (*Grupos Armado Organizados*; GOA's), trying to downplay the relationship with paramilitaries and highlighting their relation with drug trafficking.⁴³ The *Urabeños*, *Paisas*, *Rastrojos*, *Aguilas Negras*, and the *Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antisubversivo de Colombia*, are some of these 'post-demobilization' groups (Nussio, 2011b). In a survey conducted amongst 1100 ex-AUC combatants, 24% had engaged in recidivism or renewed criminal activity after their demobilization (Jonsson, 2015). The MAPP-OEA, observant during the AUC demobilization, says that more than half of the arrested demobilized persons were at the same time participating in the reintegration program of the ACR. There are several causes influencing these high levels of recidivism and the creation of post-demobilization armed groups. First, a barely existing peace agreement between the AUC and the Colombian state instigated unrest on both sides and created insecurity regarding the juridical situation of ex-paramilitaries. An estimated 19.000 ex-para's have been in a "juridical limbo" for years (Nussio & Howe, 2012; p. 9). Insecurity and dissatisfaction further increased after eighteen of their leaders were extradited to the United States against earlier agreements, providing reasons for ex-para's to distrust the government and resume their armed struggle. A second factor is the problem of security of the demobilized individuals. ACR figures show that between 2002 and 2010 almost 1400 ex-AUC members have been killed (ACR, 2013; in Jonsson, 2015; p. 18). Ex-AUC members often chose independent security strategies including joining armed

⁴³ Interview MAPP-OEA, Popayan, 20-02-2017.

groups. This tactic stems from a high level of distrust in formal state organizations and jeopardizes the success of a demobilization. Rebuilding trust in state institutions and legal protection mechanisms is therefore an important element in the success of a DDR process (Nussio & Howe, 2012). Third, the context of Colombia's continuing conflict must be considered. Normally DDR is used as a tool to end conflict. However, during and after the demobilization of the AUC, Colombia was still in war with several guerilla movements, drug cartels and criminal organizations. This context provided options for ex-combatants to return to conflict or engage in other illegal activities (Nussio, 2011b).

The demobilizations of the AUC are generally perceived as less successful than the demobilizations in the 1990s. Some people even refuse the account that demobilizations took place at all. Main criticisms include the non-transparent negotiation agendas, 'impunity' of paramilitaries, too little attention for victims and reparations, inflated numbers of demobilized combatants, lack of involvement of local governments and communities, and ongoing violence perpetrated by neo-paramilitary organizations involved in drug-trafficking (Nussio, 2012b; European Parliament, 2013; Jonsson, 2015). But, a positive effect is that both successes and failures of the AUC demobilizations contributed to the development of Colombian Reintegration programs and DDR policy. And compared to other countries, the DDR process of the AUC has almost completely been nationally owned. One of the main advices for Colombian institutions was to rethink measures that provide greater legitimacy for future demobilizations (Nussio, 2011b).

Individual demobilization

Besides the collective demobilizations in the 1990s, Colombia also had a program aimed for guerrillas of non-participant armed groups to demobilize individually. However, this program did not attract many guerrillas at the time and it took until the Uribe administration before individual demobilization became an effective tool in the war against the guerrillas (Jonsson, 2015). Parallel to the collective demobilizations of the AUC, President Uribe made the individual demobilization of armed guerrilla rebels into an important pillar of its counterterrorism strategy. To promote individual demobilization, the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs established some specific objectives. These include: encouraging the combatants to demobilize, prevent forced recruitment by armed groups, make the community sensible to the issue, gather intelligence, erode the moral of members of armed groups and offer good reintegration programs for the demobilized (CMFA, 2008; in Vianna de Azevedo, 2014; p. 4). In contrast to previous collective demobilizations, the individual demobilization strategy was implemented besides continuing and increasing military action against the guerrillas.

This demobilization strategy thanks its success for a large part to successful marketing campaigns. These campaigns were based on the belief that guerrillas, like anyone else, share a

universal desire for freedom. After noticing that peaks of individual demobilizations occurred during Christmas, in 2005 the Ministry of Defence of Colombia launched a campaign just before Christmas, called: "I will return home". As part of this campaign the army spread out millions of flyers in (expected) FARC territories with the message: "Guerrilla, demobilize this Christmas; your family, your country, life, freedom and new opportunities are waiting for you..." (Jinbed, 2005). Another campaign was "Operation Christmas", launched by the Ministry of Defence in 2010. Motion-detecting Christmas lights were attached on trees along paths in areas dominated by the FARC, accompanied by signs that read: "If Christmas can come to the jungle, you too can come home. Demobilize. At Christmas, everything is possible." In another campaign in 2013, mothers of FARC fighters provided images of their sons and daughters from when they were children, with the message: "Before being a guerrilla, you are my son/daughter". Just like previous campaigns these messages were spread out in FARC controlled areas (Ricks, 2016). The army also now and then broadcasted testimonies of individually demobilized guerillas to confirm that they were being treated well, encouraging more FARC members to desert their ranks and demobilize.

Between 2003 and 2014, military pressure in combination with the government demobilization strategy led to a reduction of FARC guerrillas from 20.000 to roughly 7.000, with a peak of individual desertions in 2007 (2.480) 2008 (3.027) and 2009 (2.128) (Mindefensa, 2014; in Vianna de Azevedo, 2014; p. 6). Defection was the main reason for the reduction of FARC troops in the 2000s and was heavily affecting the command-and-control structures of the FARC organization. Between 2007 and 2010, a combatant was almost three times more likely to defect the FARC than to die in combat (Jonsson, 2015). Other factors influencing the individual decision of FARC members to desert their ranks were ideological deviation, increased criminal activity, the harsh life as a FARC member (including: hunger, tiredness, fear, stress, isolation, loss of individuality, and physical or mental abuse by FARC commanders), missing their families and the desire to rebuild their lives (Vianna de Azevedo, 2014; Jonsson, 2015). In comparison to the main reasons to join the FARC, which were diverse, the main motives to leave the FARC were more uniform. A survey executed by the ACR amongst 694 deserted FARC combatants, showed that more than 43% of the respondents answered that their primary motive to desert was either 'to be with the family' or 'to regain liberty' (See: figures 2a & 2b). Another survey conducted by the Group of Humanitarian Assistance for the Demobilized (*Grupo de Atención Humanitaria al Desmovilizado*; GAHD), as part of the Ministry of Defense, showed that one-fifth of the respondents left the FARC because of different types of threats, mistreatment or fear. Two of the three most common reasons were 'mistreatment' and 'pressure from military operations' (Jonsson, 2015). So first, while security was barely mentioned as a reason to join the FARC it was a major motive for defection, and second, security concerns were more related to internal than external factors.

The transformation of DDR in Colombia

Although part of the same peace process, the demobilizations in the 1990s were the result of different peace accords and were executed in different ways. The main goal of the Colombian government was to disarm the guerrilla movements and to support them in their political transition. A cohering government strategy on DDR did not yet exist, neither did a cohesive government controlled reintegration program. Major changes in DDR policy came during the Uribe presidency (2002-2010). President Uribe drastically reformed the Colombian Demobilization program as part of the broader 'democratic security' strategy (Jonsson, 2015; Vianna de Azevedo, 2014). The Colombian DDR program was split in a Disarmament and Demobilization (DD) and a Reintegration (R) part. The Group of Humanitarian Assistance for the Demobilized (*Grupo de Atención Humanitaria al Desmovilizado*; GAHD) fell under the responsibility of the ministry of Defense and managed the disarmament and demobilization of combatants who exited their armed group (Jonsson, 2015).⁴⁴ The first government controlled program on the reintegration of ex-combatants was the Program for Reincorporation of ex-combatants into Civil Life (*Programa para la Reincorporación a la Vida Civil de Excombatientes y Alzados de Armas*; PRCV), which operated in the Ministry of Interior and Justice between 2003 and 2006. Once the rate of collective and individual demobilizations grew, the reintegration program was transferred to the newly created High Presidential Council for Reintegration. Since then, the Colombian reintegration program was transformed from a short-term reinsertion program to a long-term sustainable reintegration process. In 2011 its work was adopted by the Colombian Reintegration Agency (ACR). The ACR has its own legal status and autonomous equity. While far from flawless in its early years, the institutional transformation of the entity strengthened and developed reintegration policy in Colombia (ACR, history). Currently the Colombian reintegration program is one of the most developed and well-funded in the world. With its ambitious reintegration efforts, it provides economic assistance, vocational training, access to education, and psychosocial support, all aimed to prosper the reintegration of ex-combatants in civil life (Jonsson, 2015; Porch & Rasmussen, 2008).

Since 2006 the Colombian government has placed great emphasis on community reintegration and on the decentralized approach (Derks et al., 2011). This process has not gone smooth. Especially the lack of coordination and cooperation between the ACR, municipalities and local (Indigenous) authorities has been very limited. Reintegration programs are still often perceived as being "parachuted into communities without any real connection to local need" (Derks et al., 2011; p. 35). A report from the MAPP-OEA found that local authorities in some areas are "uninformed, uninterested and disconnected from the reintegration process" (MAPP-OEA, 2010, p.

⁴⁴ The GAHD was originally called: the Program of Humanitarian Assistance for the Demobilized (*Programa de Atención Humanitaria al Desmovilizado*; PAHD).

14). Another reason is the reluctance of the ACR to give resources to local municipalities to carry out projects with the help of other operators, such as national and international NGO's.

The first law providing a juridical framework for demobilizations of armed groups in Colombia was law 37/1982, backing the truces and demobilizations attempted by President Betancur in the 1980s. The negotiations failed, but the law laid the foundation for the agreements and successful collective demobilization of five guerilla groups in the 1990s. This law adapted to law 418/1997 and was later updated to law 782/2002, during the negotiations with the FARC and the ELN by President Pastrana between 1998 and 2002. These laws formed the foundation for the 'Peace and Justice law' (law 975) issued in 2005 by President Uribe and provided a legal framework for the collective demobilization of the AUC between 2003 and 2006. Individual demobilization was regulated by law 782. Despite several amendments, law 975/2005 has been criticized from the beginning. Main critique involves incoherence with international standards because of its soft terms and therefore creating a bad precedent for future negotiations with armed groups. Other critiques aim on little assistance or reparations to the victims and the 'impunity' for ex-paramilitaries because of reduced sentences for their crimes committed. To add up, the law does not give the authority to look for human rights violations, and the government never provided enough resources to investigate all the individual causes of the paramilitaries (Porch & Rasmussen, 2008; Vianna de Azevedo, 2014). With the presentation of a constitutional amendment that passed Congress in May 2012, 'the Legal Framework for Peace', President Santos has chosen to provide a more stabilize juridical framework during the FARC's demobilization, hoping to contribute to less recidivism (Nussio & Howe, 2012). This Legal Framework for Peace writes transitional justice into the constitution to allow for the prioritization of certain crimes and individuals that are to be investigated. This modification of normal legal practices applies to members of armed groups, but also state officials, individuals and companies who have committed crimes in context of the armed conflict (Dodwell, 2012).

Determinants of success

Flaws in a DDR process become visible during different stages of its implementation. Reintegration of an insurgent group into the political arena or reintegration of its members into civil life, are – although sometimes overlapping – often preceded by the disarmament and demobilization phase. In the three main demobilizations in Colombia, problems occurring in this phase included partial disarmament, distorted numbers of demobilized combatants, dissident groups and individuals, the formation of post-demobilization groups, and increasing insecurity in areas formerly controlled by the demobilizing group. Problems with demobilizing persons and increasing insecurity can be minimized by drafting detailed agreements, installing control mechanisms and increasing cooperation with local actors. From the start of the government controlled demobilization and

reintegration program in 2003 till the end of 2014, more than 57.000 combatants have demobilized (25.000 individually and 32.000 collectively) of whom 47.944 (84%) entered the reintegration process (appendix, figure 1). Almost all 32.000 collectively demobilized ex-combatants are former members of the AUC. With 17.000 individual demobilizations, former FARC members form the second largest group of demobilized combatants (Jonsson, 2015). Of the 55.700 individuals who have entered the ACR demobilization program between 2002 and 2013, only 57,8% (32.200 persons) was actively enrolled or had successfully finished by 2013. It is difficult to distinguish results of the reintegration of the AUC or individual ex-combatants from the Colombian Agency of Reintegration (ACR). Because once entered, ex-combatants are considered a “Person in the Reintegration Process” and are no longer distinguished on their previous membership of an armed group.

On the individual level the core purpose of DDR is to prevent recidivism of ex-combatants. Recidivism is related to the economic, social and political reintegration of former combatants and has proven a recurrent problem in Colombia. Some remobilize and join another armed group while others get involved in criminal activities. Their involvement in illegal activities and their knowledge gained in their period within an armed group makes them interesting for recruitment or extortion by criminal organizations. The first factor influencing recidivism is related to the personal security of ex-combatants. Demobilized combatants face harassment, threats, displacement, and killings at the hands of newly emerged armed groups and because of personal grievances and reprisals (MAPP-OEA, 2010). This became painfully visible with the assassination of some 3000 members of the FARC’s political party *Union Patriótica* in the 1980s, the murder of 1000 ex-guerrillas after their demobilization in the 1990s, and killings of almost 1400 former AUC members between 2003 and 2010. When threatened or faced with violence, just few demobilized persons seek for the protection of the state. They most rather relocate or try to regroup with combatants of former armed groups (Nussio, 2012b). This could be because they are involved in illegal activities, do not want to attract attention, or are afraid of being stigmatized as ex-combatants. But the main reason is the lack of trust in the state and state institutions (MAPP-OEA, 2010, p. 14). After their demobilization, 18.000 ex-AUC members lingered in juridical processes for years. This juridical insecurity in combination with the extradition of eighteen AUC top-commanders to the Unites States – against earlier agreements – detracted the sense of trust in the state (FIP, 2009; in Nussio & Howe, 2012, p. 9). To minimize the change of recidivism, Nussio (2012b) and Jonsson (2015) underline the importance of legal protection mechanisms for ex-combatants and of programs to rebuild trust between the state and ex-combatants. As a second argument, Jonsson (2015) argues that the nature of a demobilization process contributes strongly to levels of recidivism. While guerillas took the personal decision to demobilize, often by risking their life; by contrast, paramilitaries were principally ordered to demobilize, whether they wanted or not, and were not risking any danger from their own

organization. And size matters. State institutions were much more able to gather personal information of individually demobilizing combatants than during the large collective demobilizations of the AUC (Jonsson, 2015). The relatively small group of rebels (+5000) taking part in the 1990s' demobilizations put little pressure on state budget, in comparison to the large group of demobilizing AUC paramilitaries (+37.000). A third explanation for different levels of recidivism is related to the nature and behavior of illegal armed groups. This explanation is based on the theory of Greed vs Grievance.⁴⁵ Nussio & Howe (2012) argue that recidivism within the FARC is less likely because of its vertical organized structure and its tough disciplinary culture. All wealth accumulated through illegal activities goes directly back to the organization. Obtaining personal wealth and desertion are strictly forbidden. People who joined the FARC were thus mainly driven by grievances such as social injustice and poverty. Because getting rich has never been part of their reasons to join the FARC or of their soldierly experiences, the risk of joining a post-DDR group for personal wealth is smaller than was the case with the AUC. Also, the vertical structure of the FARC with its top-down command structure makes them less vulnerable to dissident groups. This in contrast to the AUC, who, with a horizontal structure with strong local leadership and authority, were much more sensitive to dissident groups. An interviewee from the MAPP-OEA said most rank 'n file paramilitaries of the AUC just demobilized because they were ordered. But the Mid-Level Commanders (MLC's) were well positioned in the drug trade, had local contacts and knew exactly how it all worked. Based on a cost-benefit analysis they had way more to lose and were therefore less interested to lay down weapons and to reintegrate into civil life.⁴⁶ The Stockholm Initiative (2006) describes this 'greed-motivated' group as the subgroup most likely to experience loss in status and finance as the result of a demobilization process, and must therefore be considered potential spoilers. Nussio and Oppenheim (2014) and Zukerman Daly et al. (2014) both concluded that also ex-combatants who maintained links to commanders or other ex-combatants had a higher risk of recidivism. Both suggested that the ACR should try to reinforce positive social capital (to family members) while countering risk-generating social capital (to other ex-combatants and MLCs).

Guáqueta (2007) stresses the importance of political reintegration in a DDR process because power sharing within a democratic framework is the way to reduce the potential for renewed violence. The perception that M-19 was fighting for political ideals and not for private criminal interests positively contributed to their political reintegration (Palou and Méndez, 2012). The

⁴⁵ In literature on the causes of civil war, scholars use the theory of Greed vs Grievance to explain the reasons for people to join an armed group and participate in war. In short, Greed involves the argument that combatants in armed groups are economically motivated to better their situation. The argument of Grievance implies that people rebel for causes of identity, like social class or ideology. See for example: Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2004); Berdal, M. & Malone, D.M. (2000); Tate, W. (2009).

⁴⁶ MAPP-OEA, Popayan, 20-02-2017.

situation with the AUC was different. Political participation was not included in the peace deal, mainly because of its highly criminal character and image (Guáqueta, 2007). In comparison to ex-combatants in the 1990s, demobilized AUC-members and individually demobilized guerrillas have experienced social rejection when trying to reintegrate. The explanation might relate to the legitimacy of the armed groups and the peace process. During the demobilizations in the 1990s, reintegration was almost seen as a moral obligation because of their grievances and even as a positive contribution to social order and public debate given their ideals. In contrast, demobilized individuals from 2002 onwards encountered higher barriers in their process to re-enter Colombian society. This is mainly because of their war-time behaviour, grave violations of human rights, corruption and the involvement in illegal activities. The image of ideologically driven 'well-intended' rebels vanished since the 1990s and made place for an image of greed-driven criminals. Guerrilla movements nowadays are often labelled as terrorists, creating more political and legal challenges for the reintegration of their members (Guaqueta, 2007; Jonsson, 2015).

Chapter two: Preparing for peace

Who's involved in the peace process?

The international presence in postwar countries can be divided into two sorts of actors (van der Borgh, 2009). The first are actors who play a formal role in implementing the peace agreements. This could be with civil and military presence, and with or without a mandate from the UN. In eighteen of the thirty-seven DDR operations between 1992 and 2006 there was a UN-mandated peace support operation. This could be as a transitional authority or administration, as an observation and/or verification mission, or with a stabilization or security objective.⁴⁷ In the implementation of the peace deal with the FARC, several international organizations and foreign countries are appointed a role (appendix, figure 3). Formally involved in the implementation of the accords in chapter three of the peace agreement are the UN and the MAPP-OEA. The Colombian government asked the MAPP-OEA to monitor the security situation in former FARC areas and in FARC transition zones. They focus on developments in the drug trade, illegal mining, the formation of new armed groups, and the position of *milicianos*. They have a mandate for three years till the end of 2018, which might be extended (MAPP-OEA, 2014).⁴⁸ The current role of the MAPP-OEA differs from their role during the demobilization of the AUC. This can be explained first, because the role of the OEA during dictatorships in several Latin American countries like Chile and Argentine in the 1970s and 1980s has been controversial. And second, because the current relationship with Venezuela's leader Maduro, a 'partner' of the FARC, is at least complicated. This and several smaller incidents have questioned their neutrality and caused the FARC to demand for a more neutral party – the UN – to monitor and observe the implementation of made agreements. A special mission of the UN is deployed in Colombia with a mandate for six months. Together with representatives of the Colombian government and the FARC they are seated in the 'tripartite' Mechanism of Monitoring and Verification ('*Mecanismo de Monitoreo y Verificación*'; MM&V). In each of the twenty-six transition zones a group of thirty-five persons is located, composed of fifteen UN personnel, ten government officials and ten FARC-EP members. These teams are tasked to monitor the compliance of both parties in the implementation of the agreements related to the bilateral ceasefire and disarmament of the FARC. On the regional level eight teams are tasked with the Verification aspect.⁴⁹ In the Cauca

⁴⁷ Examples: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL); United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III); United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ); United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

⁴⁸ Interview MAPP-OEA, Popayan, 20-02-2017.

⁴⁹ Headquarters of these teams are in: Valledupar, Bucaramanga, Medellín, Quibdó, Popayán, Florencia, Villavicencio y San José del Guaviare.

department there are local teams in the municipalities of Caldono, Buenos Aires and Miranda, and a regional team in Popayan. The one national team is located in Bogotá. The majority of the UN force will be supplied by member states of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (*La Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños*; CELAC) (Acuerdo Final, p. 226 & 227). The second group of actors supports the peace process in a wide variety of ways. In Colombia, this group includes the governments of Cuba and Norway as guarantors, and the government of Venezuela as facilitator of logistics and as a companion. But also the US, the European Union, Switzerland and several local and international NGO's are in some way involved in the Colombian peace process (appendix, figure 3).

Besides international actors there are many local and national organizations in some way or another involved in the peace process in Colombia. I will limit myself on discussing those active or with special interest in Cauca and with relation to the DDR process. It is important to distinguish between four groups of local and national actors.⁵⁰ First group are the government authorities. In my research this includes the ACR, the regional government of Cauca, the municipality of Caldono, and the military and police. The second consists of indigenous authorities. On local level the cabildos, on regional level the Association of Indigenous cabildos in North-Cauca (*Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca*; ACIN) and the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (*Consejo Regional Indígena de Cauca*; CRIC), and on national level the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (*Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia*; ONIC). The third group includes civil society organizations, political movements, NGO's, and other non-armed groups. Many of them are working together within the civil committee (*Comité Civil*) of the MM&V. They have direct lines of communications with the MM&V and hold weekly meetings, but don't have a UN mandate nor are they linked to the government in any official way. They founded the civil committee by themselves and include among others the extreme leftwing political party *Marcha Patriótica* and organizations related to the church or to the Afro community.⁵¹ The fourth group involves armed and criminal groups, including the FARC. With the disarmament of the FARC, a powerful actor formerly involved in criminal activities disappears from the stage. This creates space for other armed and criminal groups to take over criminal markets such as illegal mining and the trade in illegal drugs, and could increase

⁵⁰ Interview Vicente Otero, Caldono, 24-02-2017.

⁵¹ Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres - Corporación COMUNITAR - Unidad de Organizaciones Afrocaucanas (UOAFROC) - Corporación Mujer Niñez y Juventud Nortecaucana - Red por la Vida y los Derechos Humanos del Cauca - Comité de Integración del Macizo Colombiano (CIMA) - Espacio Regional de Paz (ERPAZ) - Corporación Colectivo de Abogados Suyana - Movimiento Político y Social Marcha Patriótica Cauca - Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz - Comunidades Construyendo Paz en los Territorios (CONPAZ) - Red de Derechos Humanos del Suroccidente Colombiano "Francisco Isaías Cifuentes" - Diálogo Intereclesial por la Paz (DIPAZ) - Coordinación Étnica Nacional de Paz (CENPAZ) - Coordinación Nacional de Pueblos, Organizaciones y Líderes Indígenas (CONPI) - Coordinación Nacional de Organizaciones y Comunidades Afrodescendientes (CONAFRO).

insecurity in former FARC areas or in zones where the FARC is demobilizing. To gain a complete picture of the DDR process in Cauca, I conducted interviews with people from all four groups.⁵² I also gathered information from field observations in Cauca and periodic 'informs' provided by the MM&V⁵³, the civil committee of the MM&V⁵⁴ and the MAPP-OEA⁵⁵. These informs report on the (in)compliance of both parties and on the situation in and around the transition zones.

D-Day

In chapter three of the peace deal, the FARC and the Colombian government agreed on a scheme of 180 days in which the FARC must be fully disarmed and demobilized. This period starts with D-Day (Demobilization-Day) and continues with D-Day +1, D-Day +2, etc. In this period, all FARC units march to one of the twenty transition zones (*Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización*; ZVTN's) or six transition points (*Puntos Transitorios de Normalización*; PTN) spread out over fifteen departments in Colombia.⁵⁶ Once gathered, they are registered as demobilized FARC members and await clarity over their juridical situation. When all members have arrived, the FARC starts the disarmament of their organization, and FARC members are prepared to enter the reintegration process. After 180 days the FARC ceases to exist as a military organization, all FARC members have received clarity on their juridical situation, and the demobilization camps will be dismantled (appendix, figure 4).

June 1, 2017 heralds D-Day +180, and none of these goals have yet been met. In the contrary, instead of dismantling the demobilization camps, not one of the camps is even finished being built. This delay is mainly caused by political and logistical problems. Originally D-Day was planned the day after the signing of the peace deal on November 24. But the FARC refused to start the process of demobilization before the Congress would approve the 'amnesty law', providing amnesty for several political crimes like rebellion against the state.⁵⁷ This law was approved one month later on December 29, after which the last march to the transition zones could finally begin. Another factor causing delay is the construction of the demobilization camps. Some people accuse the government of tactically delaying the work to demoralize FARC members, leading them to desert, and thus weaken the FARC's future political organization.⁵⁸ A more common explanation is the financial deficit caused by political insecurity after the rejection of the peace deal in the referendum on October 2,

⁵² See for a complete list of conducted interviews the bibliography.

⁵³ MM&V provides weekly communiques and monthly informs; <https://colombia.unmissions.org/documentos>

⁵⁴ The civil committee of the MM&V provides monthly informs.

⁵⁵ MAPP-OEA provides monthly communiques and quarterly and semi-annual informs; <http://www.mapp-oea.org/documentos-publicos/>

⁵⁶ A transition point includes one demobilization camp while a transition zone hosts two or more camps.

⁵⁷ For example: illegal use of weapons and use of uniforms. Amnesty is not applicable with crimes against humanity or other crimes as defined in the Rome Statute (Acuerdo final, 2016; p. 148).

⁵⁸ Interview DIPAZ, Santander de Quilichao, 22-02-2017.

2016. Money to build the demobilization camps and to train personnel was mainly coming from international donor funds under the condition of a mutual accepted peace agreement. When money from an emergency fund was exhausted, the construction of the camps was temporarily stopped. The construction was further delayed due to bad communication with local communities and barely existing infrastructure in the remote locations where the camps were to be build.⁵⁹

The incompleteness of the demobilization camps is directly related to a delay in the disarmament of the FARC. FARC combatants in San Antonio, Pueblo Nuevo, said: “if the government fails to comply the agreement ... we will not hand in our arms”.⁶⁰ During most of my interviews with FARC combatants they kept their weapons close-by if not in their hands. Their weapons have become part of their identity, providing them with security and status. Five of the seven interviewed guerrillas admit it will be difficult to hand in this personal item, their weapon, as one of their most valuable possession. They also emphasize that they will obey to the disarmament, because “the FARC does comply with the agreement” and is committed to “peace for the Colombian people”.⁶¹ It is impossible to say if the FARC will indeed hand in all their arms and weaponry. On the one hand, the FARC repeatedly expressed their commitment to peace in Colombia. Just like M-19 in the 1990s, they emphasize the voluntariness of their disarmament. For an effective political transition a successful DDR process is hence in their interests. On the other hand, the assassination of 3000 members of the FARC’s political party *Union Patriótica* in the late 1980s, remembered as ‘the red dance’, is still fresh in their memories and causes fear amongst many FARC combatants (Palomino, 2014; Guaquéta, 2007). “If they order their troops to hand in their arms they will listen. But on top level they have probably thought something out, like a reserve depot or something.”⁶²

In the demobilization camps the FARC’s military structure is mostly intact. During daily political classes they collectively study the peace agreement or receive education in FARC ideology.⁶³ The FARC leadership tries to maintain influence over their members and to prepare them for a political transition. It will complicate the reintegration of individual ex-guerrillas when they continue to be surrounded by ex-companions. But on the other hand, total dismantlement may lead to “fragmentation and further increases [ex-combatants’] vulnerability to remobilization or engagement in illegal activities” (Nussio and Howe, 2012; p. 5). Control of the FARC leadership in the demobilization camps is necessary to preserve the unity of the organization and prevent a chaotic situation. “We have seen with the demobilization of the AUC that it is important not to lose control

⁵⁹ Interview MAPP-OEA, Popayan, 20-02-2017.

⁶⁰ Interviews guerrillas/*milicianos* FARC, Pueblo Nuevo, 22/23-02-2017.

⁶¹ Interview FARC guerrilla, Pueblo Nuevo, 22-02-2017.

⁶² Interview MAPP-OEA, Popayan, 20-02-2017.

⁶³ Interview FARC guerrillas, Pueblo Nuevo, 22/23-02-2017.

over demobilized combatants”.⁶⁴ First official numbers estimate around 300 FARC-guerrillas have refused to demobilize. Splinter groups have received the nickname ‘FARCRIMS’ and alliances with other armed groups have already been reported (El Espectador, 2016). But, Colombian General Alberto Jose Meija argues, these dissidents form less than 5% of the FARC, a percentage way below an average of 20% in other DDR processes (Acosta, 2017).

Security and trust

The FARC has created ‘war economies’ based on coca cultivation or drug trafficking, which could attract other criminal groups after its collective demobilization. Illegal markets (drugs, mining, security provision, etc.) do not just disappear after the demobilization of the FARC. It is possible that FARC commanders ‘sell’ their markets to the ELN, post-demobilization or criminal groups, or that these groups try to recruit former FARC guerrillas with experience in illegal activities (Nussio & Howe, 2012; International Crisis Groups, 2009). After the demobilization of the AUC, violence and crime rates in areas with weak state presence increased. To prevent other armed actors to seize control over former FARC territories in this peace process, the government promised to increase territorial control and strengthen local governance (Acuerdo final, 2016; p. 77-97). However, five months in the implementation phase, the Colombian ministry of Defense is repeatedly blamed to be too slow and too inefficient in moving into former FARC territories. This incompletion by the state caused a power vacuum and allowed other armed groups to violently make their entry in certain ex-FARC areas. In pamphlets signed by the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (*Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia*; AGC) a.k.a. ‘Los Urabeños’, the attempt to consolidate power in former FARC territories is confirmed: “We have arrived in Guaviare to control, organize and recuperate territory from the FARC drug traffickers. We will first do a social cleansing” (Alsema, 2017b). Also in North-Cauca pamphlets from the neo-paramilitary group ‘Aguilas Negras’ are circulating (appendix, figure 5). In the resguardos of Caldono the Indigenous Civil Guard has increased controls and patrols after these threats.⁶⁵ In the first four months of 2017, forty-one human rights activists have been killed, of whom then in Cauca. The UN high commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, calls this increase compared to last year, very alarming (UN, 2017).

Despite this increase in violence, a bimonthly Gallup poll on March 2, 2017 found that the main problem facing Colombian citizens today is not security or economic stability but in fact corruption. Thirty per cent cited corruption as the biggest problem, followed by economic stability and power (24%) and public security (18%). These numbers correspond with a historical high

⁶⁴ Interview MAPP-OEA, Popayan, 20-02-2017.

⁶⁵ Interview *gobernador suplente* Pueblo Nuevo, Caldono, 09-03-2017; Interview *Guardía Indígena*, Caldono, 23-03-2017; Interview *gobernador* Caldono, 11-03-2017

disapproval rating of Congress (79%) and historical low approval rating of the current President Santos (24%). Recent corruption scandals like the Odebrecht case⁶⁶ negatively influence the popularity of Colombian politicians and trust in the public administration (Johnson, 2017). But recent corruption scandals should be viewed within a context where corruption has been part of the Colombian society for many decades already. As in many departments from the 1990s onwards, Colombian security forces started working together with paramilitaries in their fight against the guerrillas. Mostly this cooperation was established on local or regional levels, but it is known that sometimes orders came from upper hand as far as the former President Uribe himself. "It was all the same. First you had the military standing there in their uniforms, then they disappeared and a bit later they reappeared in paramilitary outfits and starting slaughtering everyone".⁶⁷ Well-known examples of state terror in cooperation with paramilitary forces are the disreputable '*falsos positivos*'. By dressing up civilians as guerrilla fighters the army wanted to raise the 'body count', creating more legitimacy for the internal war and take in more money from the US through plan Colombia (HRW, 2000; Van de Sandt & Moor, 2014). This and other military missteps during the war have created a sense of hate and distrust towards the military and police forces, representing the 'evil' Colombian state. Another reason confidence in the Colombian state is low, is the negligence of areas like Cauca and the absence of investments in basic social and economic services. "For us it is hard to trust a government promising change, while failing to provide basic services, failing to provide security, and ignoring so many of its people for decades".⁶⁸ Rebuilding trust and confidence in the Colombian state are crucial to the success of the peace process. To do so, root causes such as corruption, poverty and social inequality must be acknowledged and addressed on national political level in the very near future.

The indigenous community and the peace process

The indigenous population of Cauca has historically been the subject of economic exploitation, political and cultural oppression, and military violence by the state and illegal armed groups. Despite the intensification of armed confrontation in the 1990s and 2000s and increased military presence of state and insurgent groups, indigenous organizations in Cauca – the ACIN and CRIC – have refused to choose a side in the armed conflict. However, many individuals have joined guerrilla movements in past decades. Before the demobilizations in the 1990s they were mainly active within M-19 and Quintin Lame; but from the 1990s onwards many joined the FARC or the ELN. The official indigenous response to violence has been one of peaceful resistance, in the hope that this increases the

⁶⁶ Allegations of involvement in the 2014 presidential campaign in Colombia.

⁶⁷ Interview FARC guerrilla, Pueblo Nuevo, 22-02-2017.

⁶⁸ Conversation with Caldonio habitant, February 2017.

legitimacy of their struggle for autonomy. Since the creation of Indigenous organizations like the CRIC and ONIC, their position within the Colombian state has improved. With peaceful and persistent collective action they have recovered a large part of their ancestral territories, elevated the level of literacy and cultural awareness, and revived many aspects of indigenous culture. One of the mayor accomplishments was the new Constitution in 1991, recognizing the Colombian state as a multicultural and multi-ethnic state (Hristov, 2005).

An improvement of the peace process with the FARC in comparison to previous peace processes, is the involvement of different groups in society during the negotiations in Havana. The peace negotiations had a strong purpose of reconciliation to bring previous conflicting groups together. Although it is a big step forward to include these groups in the negotiations process, critics say the involvement of some groups has been mainly symbolic. To ensure the representation of ethnical interests in the peace agreement, three organizations united in the Ethnic Commission for Peace and the Defence of Territorial Rights (*Comisión Étnica*). These organizations are the ONIC, the Afrocolombian National Council of Peace (*Consejo Nacional de Paz Afrocolombiano*; CONPA) and the National Council of Traditional Indigenous Authorities of Colombia⁶⁹. Their first main goal was to defend ethnical territorial rights and the construction of peace in their territories. The result of four years of negotiations is rather disappointing. In chapter six of the final peace agreement, one paragraph of only four pages is devoted to safeguarding ethnical interests in the implementation of the peace agreements. This paragraph, called the 'ethnical chapter', includes considerations, principals and safety measures. Furthermore, for each of the six chapters in the peace deal it includes a small section with specific agreements related to ethnic rights and territories. The section related to chapter three of the peace deal, 'Ending the Conflict', includes just two sentences. The second main goal of the Ethnic Commission was to emphasise the importance of involvement of ethnical groups in the peace process. On national level they participate in debates, forums and congresses to position the Ethnic Commission as an important political actor in the peace process. On regional and local levels they try to create awareness among indigenous and Afrocolombian communities about their role and their rights in the peace process. This work is still in its primary phase. During conversations with indigenous authorities in several cabildos and resguardos in Cauca, I noticed most were aware of the existence of the Ethnic Commission but did not yet know how this could benefit them.

Strikingly, the indigenous community was not involved in determining the location of the different transition zones where the FARC would gather and demobilize. This was negotiated between the Colombian government and the FARC. They did have the power to prevent a camp from

⁶⁹ *Gobierno Mayor de Autoridades Tradicionales Indígenas de Colombia.*

being built in indigenous territory. In Caldono, the final vote highlighted the division within the indigenous community in the municipality of Caldono, with an equal count of three votes in favour: resguardos of San Lorenzo de Caldono, Pueblo Nuevo and Pioyá, and three against: resguardos of La Laguna-Siberia, Las Mercedes and La Aguada-San Antonio. With two of the three largest resguardos voting in favour, including the resguardo of Pueblo Nuevo where the camp would be build, the installation of the transition zone in the municipality of Caldono was accepted. The government made oral agreements with the cabildos of Caldono in which they promised them money, aid for developments projects and investments in the infrastructure.⁷⁰ However, the ONIC doubts the value of these agreements since they have not been written down.⁷¹

The ACR is still in negotiation with the FARC leadership to design a customized reintegration program adapted to FARC's wishes and the profile of its members. This program should be less urban focused but must be adjusted to their rural background and indigenous identity. The main economic activity in the Cauca: agriculture, requires land. Therefore, in the development of employment and educational projects, official state and international bodies must be very careful given the uncertainty over the true ownership of the land. Indigenous authorities in Caldono, Buenos Aires and Jambaló estimate that around 80% of the FARC in Cauca has indigenous roots.⁷² Many combatants (50% to 65%) joined the FARC under the age of 18,⁷³ come from poor areas with high levels of unemployment, and lack good education and job experience. To signal rising tensions on time, the ACR must decentralize their approach and improve close cooperation with local government and indigenous authorities (Nussio & Howe, 2012; Johnson and Jonsson, 2013; Derks, et al., 2011). This sounds logical in theory, but proves to be harder in reality. While the indigenous community is clearly a crucial factor in this process, they are not involved in the negotiations about the design of reintegration programs. Indigenous leaders on local level said they had never even heard of the ACR.⁷⁴ With reintegration as a key stone of building peace in Colombia, this ignorance towards the indigenous community is rather shocking.

Social reintegration: tensions within the indigenous community

Indigenous authorities in Cauca, the CRIC and the ONIC, express the intention to autonomously design reintegration programs for returning FARC guerrillas, but have thus far not done so. The CRIC

⁷⁰ Interviews ONIC, *gobernador* Caldono, *gobernador* Pueblo Nuevo.

⁷¹ Interview with Milena from the ONIC, Bogotá, 21-03-2017.

⁷² Interview *gobernador* Caldono, 11-03-2017; Conversation with the secretario de gobierno of Jambalo on 30-01-2017; Interview vice-*gobernador* of Pueblo Nuevo (Buenos Aires), 06-03-2017.

⁷³ All demobilizing FARC minors will be treated as victims of the conflict and pass a different reintegration program, called: '*Camino diferencial de vida*' (a different road of life) (El Tiempo, 2017).

⁷⁴ Interview *gobernador* Caldono, 11-03-2017; Interview *gobernador suplente* Pueblo Nuevo, Caldono, 09-03-2017.

and ONIC both say they are willing to support local communities, but respect their autonomy and are reluctant to design and implement programs top-down. "Social reintegration must occur locally and corresponding programs must be designed, or at least finetuned, by local authorities."⁷⁵ But on local level indigenous authorities seem to struggle with the definition and goals of reintegration. Some prefer to call it social reincorporation ('reacceptance') or are still discussing to what end reintegration is necessary or whom it must include. To understand the nature and complexity of this discussion about reintegration, it is important to explain the relation between the FARC and the indigenous communities in North-Cauca.

The seven thousand guerrillas currently in the demobilization camps are registered by the UN and will soon receive juridical clarity about their situation. This is considered a first and necessary step to start the reintegration into civil life. However, besides this group of guerrillas, there is an equal amount of *milicianos*, of whom the majority have not reported themselves in the demobilization camps. If they are not on the UN lists, they are not registered by the government as demobilized and will still be recognized as rebels in the future. Another group undergoing the same fate, are ex-FARC members who have individually demobilized in recent years. The indigenous authorities of San Lorenzo de Caldono estimate this group involves approximately ninety people (on a population of approximately 11.500). The indigenous authorities of the neighboring resguardo of Jambaló estimate that in past years between two and three hundred people (on a population of approximately 17.500) have returned without reporting their demobilization to government authorities.⁷⁶ The uncontrolled return of ex-FARC members could cause rising tensions within the communities and increase levels of insecurity locally. In the design of reintegration programs, it is there for important to not only involve the 7000 registered FARC guerrillas, but also these two groups of people with former or current connections to the FARC organization. Several NGO's like PAX are enrolling pilot programs in indigenous territories to characterize this group of demobilized ex-FARC members. The pro-FARC camp is not outspokenly against the characterization of previous returned ex-FARC guerrillas, but they do have two important motives to prevent characterization and reintegration efforts of the indigenous community.

First, recruiting minors is forbidden under international law and perpetrators of this crime can be tried at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.⁷⁷ The Colombian Family and Welfare Institute indicated that 50% to 65% of the FARC members joined the group under the age of eighteen (Nussio and Howe, 2012). Especially in last years the (forced) recruitment of minors increased.

⁷⁵ Interviews CRIC, Popayan, 08-03-2017; Interview ONIC, Bogotá, 21-03-2017.

⁷⁶ Conversation with the *secretario de gobierno* of Jambalo on 30-01-2017.

⁷⁷ Under United Nations agreements, all persons under the age of eighteen part of an armed group, fall under the concept of 'child soldiers'. Their recruitment is forbidden under international UN laws and regulations (UN, 2007). Colombian laws forbid the recruitment under the age of sixteen.

According to the Colombia's child welfare agency (ICBF), since 1999 nearly 3,700 children have been recruited by the FARC of whom a fifth was aged fifteen (Verdad Abierta, 2015). Most of these minors come from indigenous or Afro-Colombian communities and were living in remote jungle areas (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017). With the installation of the Truth Commission and Transitional Justice Court in mind, the FARC tries to prevent the revelation of their mass recruitment of minors in past decades.

The second motive is about social and political influence in indigenous territories. By characterizing former FARC guerrillas and *milicianos*, the cabildos can regain influence over indigenous people belonging to this group. ACR research amongst 320 ex-FARC guerrillas who joined the group between 2002 and 2012, show that only 11,3% said their main motive was ideology. More popular motives were forced recruitment (15%), influence of friends (15%), a lack of job opportunities (14,4%), to carry arms or a uniform (12,8%), or family conflict (11,3%) (appendix, figure 2a).⁷⁸ With these numbers in mind it is highly questionable whether the FARC will manage to keep control over its members after their demobilization. This is one of the main reasons the FARC prefers collective reintegration projects and wants to start '*proyectos productivos*'. "This is part of their strategy to maintain the FARC's unity and prevent the organization from falling apart."⁷⁹ FARC-members in the demobilization camp in Pueblo Nuevo confirm this, but added one note: "The government wants to weaken our future political organization by undermining our unity. It is thus our task to remain strong and united".⁸⁰ In all four of my interviews with FARC-*guerrillas*, they expressed their intention to stay connected to the FARC's political organization and contain bonds with other FARC members. They preferred to live together in special communes or neighborhoods. This could however be influenced by the fact that I was only allowed to talk with FARC combatants appointed to me. All three of the *milicianos* of the FARC whom I interviewed, expressed the intention to return home to their wife or family and to pick up civil life.

Besides control over their former and current members, the FARC is convinced to have strong support within the indigenous communities in North-Cauca; this is precisely the reason why three of the twenty-six transition zones are in this area. When the peace deal between the government and the FARC was signed, the FARC started organizing conferences in communities in North-Cauca to educate the people about the peace deal and the consequences of implementation.⁸¹ They have also already started with increasing their political activity in indigenous communities in

⁷⁸ Related to the Greed vs Grievance theory as introduced on page 30, this ACR research shows that besides grievances and peer influence are main motives for individuals to join armed struggle. Arguments of greed, such as improving personal security or gaining more status, played a minor role (appendix, figure 2a).

⁷⁹ Interview MAPP-OEA, Popayan, 20-02-2017.

⁸⁰ Interview FARC, Pueblo Nuevo, 22/23-02-2017.

⁸¹ Interview gobernador suplente Pueblo Nuevo, Buenos Aires

North-Cauca with, as they call it: “socialization of the Colombian people”.⁸² But conversations with the indigenous people and leaders of Caldono show that support of the FARC is not for granted. The gobernadores of the cabildos of San Lorenzo de Caldono and Pueblo Nuevo both emphasize the authority of the cabildos in indigenous territory.⁸³ “An indigenous living in our community has to apply to our authority and laws, no matter if that person is ex-FARC or not”.⁸⁴ I attended two meetings of the civil committee of the MM&V in Caldono and spoke to one employee of the MAPP-OEA in the field office in Popayan who previously attended meetings of the FARC in Caldono. During these meetings, local interest in the FARC’s political ideas and plans was limited. “Their story contained the message that they’ve always fought for the rights of the farmers and the community and that they wanted to continue with this fight as a political party. It contained very little humility and pardon. It was not accepted well by the community.”⁸⁵ Especially since the 1990s, the FARC has mainly been a military organization. This did result in strong control in certain areas, “but when you remove the weapons from a military organization, they must make some serious efforts in their political transformation to maintain influence in these areas”.⁸⁶

Political reincorporation of the FARC

Just like M-19, the FARC repeatedly mentions their intention to continue politically and emphasizes their devotion to peace in Colombia. M-19 seemed to have broken a taboo by demobilizing without being defeated. They continued, or at least tried to, as political actors. During conversations with members of the FARC it was constantly emphasized that they had not surrendered or would cease to exist. In this context, demobilization is different from surrender because the political fight will continue. “The battle is not over. We are only changing the weapon from arms to words.”⁸⁷ The FARC is strongly aware opinion still equals disarmament and demobilization to defeat. To ensure their political participation it was important for them to negotiate a guarantee of a certain number of seats in congress for the next eight years in the peace agreement.

The FARC’s leadership realizes there is much work to do to become a meaningful political actor in Colombian politics. For the elections in 2018 and 2022 the peace deal gives them guaranteed political representation, but in 2026 they must win on their own strength. M-19 booked some serious victories during the elections of 1990 and gained seats on different political levels. But the absence of political legitimacy of the FARC will create a challenge. Although their popularity has increased from

⁸² Interview FARC, Pueblo Nuevo, 22-02-2017.

⁸³ Interview *gobernador* Caldono, 11-03-2017; Interview *gobernador suplente* Pueblo Nuevo, Caldono, 09-03-2017.

⁸⁴ Interview *gobernador suplente* Pueblo Nuevo, Caldono, 09-03-2017.

⁸⁵ Interview MAPP-OEA, Popayan, 20-02-2017.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Interview FARC, Pueblo Nuevo, 23-02-2017.

4% since the start of the peace negotiations in 2012, to 17% in April 2017, still 77% of the Colombian people disapprove the FARC (Alsema, 2017c). The FARC possibly faces another storm of bad publicity with the installation of a Truth Commission in 2018, when the FARC's disgraceful human rights record will be exposed. To counter this, they have turned the propaganda machine to full mode. Their leaders have started tweeting, they give interviews on national news channels, and created an alternative news network. They have also just unleashed a series of one-minute commercials on key-socialist topics like healthcare and corruption. In one of these commercials they formulate it this way: "With the peace deal, we change the way of our fight. From now on, with the power of words, we will work to change the current public healthcare system in Colombia. FARC-EP. Peace. With Social Justice."⁸⁸ With this strategy they do not only try to get the public behind the peace deal, but also behind their ideology of "21st Century Socialism" (Alsema, 2017c). Nussio and Howe (2012) argue that this repositioning of the FARC within the left of the political spectrum and the creation of political awareness, are two important aspects in the FARC's political reincorporation in Colombian society.

⁸⁸ Original Spanish text: "*Con los acuerdos de paz, cambiamos nuestra forma de lucha. Ahora, con el poder de las palabras trabajaremos para cambiar el actual modelo de salud pública en Colombia. ... FARC-EP. Paz. Con justicia social.*"

Conclusions

Over the past three decades Colombia has developed its DDR policy in a unique way. It has used DDR as a tool to end armed conflict in two large collective demobilization processes. The first with five guerrilla groups in the 1990s and the second with the paramilitary AUC between 2003 and 2006. From 2002 onwards, Colombia has also used DDR programs as a counterterrorism strategy to demobilize individuals of different armed rebel groups. After the demobilization of the AUC, Colombia has institutionalized the reintegration process with the establishment of the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR). This government agency has standardized reintegration programs for demobilized individuals, and is currently negotiating a collective reintegration program for the FARC. Achievements, shortcomings and lessons learned of previous DDR processes serve as important knowledge for future DDR processes in Colombia and abroad. Colombia uses this 'unrequested expertise' by hosting international conferences to exchange knowledge and experience with other nations and international actors. It is creating a leading role in developing and improving DDR programs for post-conflict countries worldwide.

There are several main factors (or determinants) crucial in the success of a DDR process in Colombia. The first factor is the type of conflict termination and the terms of peace negotiations. The disarmament of M-19 practically coincided with their political transition. Their peace agreement and those of the four other guerrilla movements in this period were mostly political agreements. The demobilization of the paramilitary AUC was different. A peace agreement did barely exist and the AUC had no intentions to continue politically. Disarmament of one of the main actors in the armed conflict and restoring military authority was the main government objective. The demobilization of individuals belongs to a separate category. They did not demobilize because of a peace agreement but because of individual decisions. The peace deal with the FARC includes agreements on their disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, but is largely about political reforms. It is not only aimed to end armed conflict, but also to contribute to peacebuilding in Colombia by addressing root causes like poverty, corruption and social inequality. A second factor is the international and domestic political and normative context. During the demobilizations in the 1990s, the armed conflict was generally perceived as a legitimate expression of social injustices. This created public support for the peace deal and contributed to the reintegration of former combatants into civil life. Over the past two decades, the public stance towards the armed conflict has changed and support for the FARC had sunk to 4% at the start of the negotiations. The image of grievance-driven rebels changed after the 1990s when left-wing guerrillas got more and more involved in drug-trafficking and used violence against civilians to reach their political goals. This shift of public opinion on the intentions of insurgents, from grievances to greed, has changed the legitimacy of the peace process and created

more difficulties for the reintegration of former combatants into civil life. The third factor is the size, nature and behavior of the armed group. In the 1990s five relatively small guerrilla movements demobilized in a timespan of five years. The group of AUC paramilitaries was more than seven times this size and demobilized within four years. A larger size of demobilizing combatants put more pressure on state budget and requires more time for juridical investigations. This creates insecurity with demobilized combatants and can contribute to higher levels of recidivism. Besides the fact that the FARC is much smaller than the AUC, it has a vertical hierarchy, is better organized, and is more 'ideology-based' than the AUC. The structure of the FARC's organizations is largely intact in the current demobilization camps and combatants receive ideology classes every morning. Like most groups in the 1990s demobilizations, and in contrast to the AUC, the FARC has a post-conflict plan. They have high interests in a successful DDR process because of their political transition. Maintaining the FARC's unity and preventing the organization from falling apart is necessary for a successful political transition into a meaningful political actor.

All three of the analyzed previous DDR processes enrolled in a different way. The Colombian government and the FARC have designed a very ambitious 180-days schedule to disarm the FARC, officially end armed conflict and start the reintegration of former FARC combatants into civil life. Problems in the previous two collective demobilizations included partial disarmament, distorted numbers of demobilized combatants, dissident groups and individuals, the formation of post-demobilization groups, increasing insecurity in areas formerly controlled by the demobilizing group and high levels of recidivism. The government and the FARC have minimized the risk for these sorts of problems to appear in several ways. First, in contrast to the two previous collective demobilizations, they have drafted detailed agreements on the period of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (chapter three) and on the implementation and verification of the agreements (chapter six). Second, they have installed several control mechanisms. During the DDR process the UN is tasked to monitor the disarmament and verify the compliance of both parties to the peace deal. The MAPP-OEA is mandated to monitor the security in and around the twenty-six demobilization areas in Colombia. A third way to minimize problems in this phase of the agreement is cooperation with local actors. During the Santa Marta Summit in 2013 community reintegration and a decentralized approach were key topics. However, cooperation between the ACR, municipalities, and local (indigenous) authorities is still very limited. In north-Cauca one of the main actors is the indigenous community. Both on local and national level the indigenous community has barely been involved in the construction and implementation of DDR policy.

The lack of involvement of local communities and ethnic minorities in Colombia is one of the main threats to a successful peace process. Local indigenous leaders estimate that 80% of the FARC in the demobilization camps in Cauca has indigenous roots. Despite this fact, on national level they

are excluded in the negotiation about the collective reintegration program of the FARC, and on local level they were excluded in the determination on the location of the demobilization camps. Local indigenous authorities have very little knowledge about government policy or programs concerning reintegration. Many have never even heard of the ACR as an organization. A second future danger to the peace process are the rising tensions in indigenous communities. Pro-FARC and Anti-FARC authorities are involved in a battle of influence. The FARC knows it needs the indigenous communities for a successful political transition and is already involved in active 'socializations' to influence the population with their ideology and political ideas. Increasing political activity of the FARC is also a distorting factor in a successful reintegration process of FARC-combatants. It will cause 'conflicting loyalties' among former and current indigenous FARC-members. It is very important for the government to monitor possible rising tensions within these communities and to establish communication lines with local and regional indigenous authorities. A third future danger is an unsuccessful political reintegration of the FARC. If the organization of the FARC disintegrates to soon, this could lead to the existence of splinter groups (FARCRIMS) or the recruitment of former FARC members by other armed groups. External factors are for example the presidential elections in Colombia in 2018 – since not all candidates agree to necessary political reforms – and the availability of external funds to finance the peace process.

In future research it is important to include the role of the indigenous community in the peace process. The indigenous community is a key actor in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the FARC, but also in the prevention of remobilization and recidivism. The lack of confidence of the indigenous community in the state and state institutions is underexposed in DDR literature on Colombia but was clearly visible and sensible during my fieldwork in Cauca. Without restoring trust and confidence in local communities and addressing root causes like corruption, poverty and social inequality, you can temporarily end armed conflict by disarming an armed group, but you don't create peace or take away the reasons of grievance people joined the conflict in the first place. Without providing the prospect of prosperity the people will continue to distrust the state and be easy targets for existing criminal or political armed groups. Only if embedded in a wider peacebuilding framework, DDR will reach its full potential and can be the key to a successful peace process.

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Interviews

Government authorities (group 1):

Mayor of Caldono, 03-03-2017.

*Personería*⁸⁹ of Caldono, 03-03-2017.

*Defensor del pueblo*⁹⁰ de Caldono, Popayan, 09-03-2017.

Senior adviser of the ACR, Bogotá, 23-03-2017.

Indigenous authorities (group 2):

Gobernador suplente Pueblo Nuevo (Caldono), 09-03-2017

⁸⁹ Civil law officer of the municipality.

⁹⁰ Ombudsman.

Senior adviser of the CRIC, Popayan, 08-03-2017.

Employee of the Human Rights council of the ONIC, Bogotá, 21-03-2017.

Gobernador of the cabildo of Caldono, 11-03-2017.

Vice-gobernador of Pueblo Nuevo (Buenos Aires), 06-03-2017.

Member of the *Guardia Indígena* of Caldono, 23-03-2017.

Non-indigenous and non-governmental organizations (group 3):

Employee at the field office of the MAPP-OEA in Popayan, 20-02-2017.

Former employee of MAPP-OEA (and former M-19 member), Bogotá, 18-11-2016.

Employee of DIPAZ, Santander de Quilichao, 28-02-2017.

Employee of CONPI, Bogotá, 14-03-2017.

Employee of *Mesa de Víctimas Caldono*, 01-03-2017.


Members of the FARC (group 4):

Four guerrillas and three *milicianos* near the demobilization camp of San Antonio, Pueblo Nuevo, 22/23-02-2017.

Transcripts and audios available on request, in presence of the author of this thesis and in anonymity of the interviewees.

Appendix

Figure 1: collective and individual demobilizations in Colombia from 2003 to 2014.⁹¹



⁹¹ http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/Documents/colombia_en.pdf

Figure 2a. Motives for enlistment with Farc in 2002-2012. N=320. Source: ACR.

Motive	Survey response	Primary	Secondary
Ideology	<i>Affinity with ideology of the group</i>	11.3	5.0
Greed	<i>Lack of job opportunities</i>	14.4	10.9
Belonging		30.9	20.3
	<i>Influence of friends</i>	15.0	13.4
	<i>Family tradition</i>	2.2	1.3
	<i>Influence of partner</i>	2.5	1.9
	<i>Family conflict</i>	11.3	3.8
Security		7.2	6.3
	<i>Security</i>	3.8	2.8
	<i>Revenge</i>	1.9	2.5
	<i>Resentment against the army</i>	1.6	0.9
Other		36.3	57.5
	<i>To carry arms and a uniform</i>	12.8	11.3
	<i>Forced recruitment</i>	15.0	7.8
	<i>Other</i>	8.4	38.4
Total		100.0	100.0

Figure 2b: Motives for defection from Farc in 2002-2012. N= 694. Source: ACR.

Motive	Survey response	Primary	Secondary
Ideology		12.2	7.8
	<i>Lack of ideology</i>	7.8	4.9
	<i>Injustices against the population</i>	4.5	2.9
Greed	<i>Unfulfilled promises</i>	5.0	2.4
Belonging		24.2	21.0
	<i>Because of compañeros who demobilized</i>	4.0	1.7
	<i>To be with the family</i>	20.2	19.3
Security		20.3	9.2
	<i>Difficulties in combat</i>	4.5	1.3
	<i>Mistreatment</i>	2.3	2.9
	<i>Threats against you</i>	6.6	2.7
	<i>Threats against the family</i>	3.6	0.9
	<i>Assasination of a family member</i>	3.3	1.4
Other		38.0	59.5
	<i>For believing in the program of the state</i>	3.5	3.0
	<i>Regain liberty</i>	23.2	26.1
	<i>Commander's orders</i>	1.0	0.4
	<i>Other</i>	10.4	30.0
Total		100.0	100.0

Figure 3: Involvement of international actors. Source: *Acuerdo Final*.

Acuerdo	Instancia de acompañamiento internacional
1. Hacia un Nuevo Campo Colombiano: Reforma Rural Integral	- Unión Europea - FAO - Vía Campesina - PNUD
2. Participación política: apertura democrática para construir la paz	- Unasur - Suiza - Instituto Holandés para la Democracia Multipartidaria - NIMD - Centro Carter
3.2 Reincorporación	- Unión Europea - UNESCO - PNUD - OCLAE (Organización Continental Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Estudiantes) - OEI
El Gobierno Nacional coordinará la revisión de la situación de las personas privadas de la libertad, procesadas o condenadas, por pertenecer o colaborar con las FARC-EP.	- Oficina del Alto Comisionado de Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos
3.4 Lucha y desmantelamiento de las organizaciones criminales	- UNODC - Estados Unidos
3.4 Unidad especial de investigación	- Estados Unidos - Unión Europea
3.2 Garantías de seguridad y personal	- Estados Unidos - Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos
4. Solución al problema de las Drogas Ilícitas	- UNODC - Comisión Global de Drogas
5. Víctimas Derechos Humanos de las víctimas	- Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos - CICR - ICTJ - ACNUR - Suecia
Unidad de búsqueda de desaparecidos	- Suecia - CICR - ICMP
Enfoque de Género	- ONU Mujeres - Representante del Secretario General para violencia sexual en el conflicto - Federación Democrática Internacional de Mujeres - Suecia

Figure 4: Timeline DA of FARC. Source: *Acuerdo Final*.

D-Day, day of ratification of the peace deal by the Colombian Congress. From this day UN / CEPAL mandate takes full effect. D-Day refers to the start of the FARC's disarmament and demobilization process.

On D-Day + 1 the FARC and the military share coordinates of the location of troops. FARC will present a list of fighters and weapons including locations of antipersonnel mines (*Minas Antipersonal*; MAP) to be demobilized in each of the 26 zones. Colombian security forces begin positioning their troops to allow safe passage of demobilizing FARC guerrillas.

D-Day +5: FARC front and unit commanders will move to demobilization camps and FARC members will bring their individual weapons to these camps.

FARC-members living with their families instead of in a camp, but with weapons, will demobilize on D-Day + 7. In the period from D-Day +7 till D-Day + 30 FARC will hand in all their heavy weaponry.

From D-Day + 10 till D-Day + 60 under international coordination the FARC explosives that cannot be transported to demobilization camps will be detonated.

All FARC guerrillas will be in the demobilizing zones at D-Day + 30.

On D-Day + 90, 30% of the weapons must be handed in, on D-Day + 120, 60%, and one month later the full disarmament of the FARC must have taken place. This can be extended with 30 days if necessary. After the full disarmament of the FARC the FARC will 'cease to exist' as a military organization.

By D-Day + 150, all former guerrillas will either have received amnesty or been charged with war crimes. This can also be extended with a period of 30 days.

D-Day + 150 till D-Day + 180: all FARC arms will be removed from UN camps. The end of this period is marked by the dismantling of the camps.

Figure 5: pamphlets of neo-paramilitary group 'Black Eagles' (*Aguilas Negras*) circulating in Cauca.

COMUNICADO A LA OPINION PUBLICA.

Señores: **Gobernacion del Cauca, Defensori Del Pueblo, Naciones Unidas, Alcaldias, Personeros, fFiscalia y policia, medios de comunicaci3n. Tengan un atento saludo.**

El grupo paramilitar aguilas negras que opera durante a1os en el departamento del cauca ha venido realizando acciones que permiten erradicar a castro chavistas y a todos aquellos que han sido impulsores del proceso de paz que ha sido una farsa para el pais, queremos por medio de este comunicado dejar claro a todos y a todas que unestro accionar sera agudizado en los municipios antes menconados en diferentes comunicados donde tenemos ya identificados lideres y defensores de derechos humanos que se han opuesto al desarrollo y a la mineria la cual es una de nuestra base de financiacion, hemos llegado a pactos con los diferentes grupos organizados y ya se encuentran distribuidas las zonas del deparatamento es por ello que insistimos y insistiremos en erradicar a aquellas personas que sigan realeizando denuncias que permitan obtaculizar nuestras actividades, tambien queremos dejar claro a las autoridades y a los medios de comunicaci3n que si existimos ya es hora de que reconozcan nuetra operatividad, ademas les recordamos que muchas de las muertes ocasionadas hemos sido nosotros estas muertes han sido selectivas y todos los que estan en nuestro listado tabien son selectivos, por otro lado manifestamos que el atentado recibido el se1or guardia indigena fuimos nosotros y se les demostro que aunque lo protegan tarde o temprano caera pues no descansaremos hasta cometer nuestro hecho de asesinato. Tambien ratificar que las personas mensionadas Deyanira Pe1a, Andres Felipe Posu, Edis Laso, Hector Marino y Esperanza estan siendo buscados y ya estan ubicados en cada uno de sus municipios, ellos estan declarados objetivo militar pero lo hemos hecho publico porque de acuerdo a nuestras investigaciones han realizado una serie de denuncias ante organismos nacionales y inyernacionales.

Como grupo paramilitar hemos hecho alianzas con otros que operan en el pais ya que tambien tenemos como objetivo ser una sola organizaci3n y difundir nuestro ideal dia a dia. Estamos otorgando recursos a peque1os grupos de sicarios tambien para que realicen las muertes y asi demostramos a todos en este pais que si existimos porque muchos han creido que es mentira.

Seguiremos con nuestro accionar y lograremos nuestros propositos ense1ando asi que estamos hablando enserio.

**ÁGUILAS NEGRAS
AUTODEFENSAS UNIDAS DE COLOMBIA
AUTODEFENSAS GAITANISTAS DE COLOMBIA**



26 De Diciembre De 2016

Bajo Nuestro Fuego, declaramos objetivo militar a las siguientes personas ya que se oponen al desarrollo de la region ademas por sus continuas denuncias que tienen que ver con mineria ilegal. Ya estamos casados y por ello los buscaremos hasta debajo de las piedras, hemos difundido diferentes panfletos donde salen sus nombres con el objetivo que ellos asimilen y se den cuenta que no estamos de acuerdo con lo que hacen, pero ya epezaremos a actuar, ya los tenemos ubicados a cada uno de ellos y por ello accionaremos todo nuestro brazo militar. Le vamos a demostrar que no estamos jugando y que hablamos encerio.... Tambien le demostraremos a las fuerzas del estado que sí existimos y que las muertes que han sucedido en los ultimos meses en el cauca las hemos ocasionado nosotros en asocio con diferentes grupos paramilitares que empezamos a ocupar y seguiremos ocupando espacio. Muerte y patria. Queremos dejar claro que nuestras alianzas estan dirigidas a un solo objetivo lograr un cauca una colombia sin FARC, sin milicianos, sin colaboradores sin defensores de derechos humanos. Ya tienen precio **\$ 4.000.000** pesos por quien nos entregue su cabeza



Andres Felipe Posu, Villa Rica, NORTE DEL CAUCA

