


# European neutrality and a Cold War

The concept of neutrality during the Cold War from the perspectives of Austria, Sweden and their relationship with NATO.



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## Abstract

Modern day discussions about the situation in Ukraine have sparked the debate over whether or not Ukraine should be neutral. This thesis addresses the concept of neutrality and the viability of neutrality in a conflict. By taking a look at two distinct neutrals during the Cold War, Austria and Sweden, a limited conclusion can be drawn on the use of neutrality. The hypothesis is that neutrality in 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century Europe is not a viable option if the avoidance of participation in armed warfare is the goal. This thesis approaches the hypothesis by defining neutrality as a concept and defining factors that would make a country neutral. It furthermore tries to find out what different versions of neutrality exist and how countries apply them. By using domestic politics, international relations and military planning the thesis will try to show how committed countries were to neutrality and how likely they were to remain neutral if escalation was to happen. Furthermore, the reliance of neutrality on the perception of the international community require a perspective from one of the sides involved in the conflict. In this thesis, a NATO vision of both countries will give an insight into the NATO perception of the likelihood that both neutrals could remain neutral during escalation of the Cold War.

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# 1. Preface

On the 24<sup>th</sup> of February 2014, Russia started the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The peninsula had been a part of Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union but was slowly being overtaken by unmarked Russian soldiers. These actions by Russia were immediately pointed out by Ukraine as being against international law with the Russian aim at trying to enlarge its sphere of influence and solidifying its strategic locations around the Black Sea. Putin, however, replies that the actions were undertaken to protect the Crimean people's right to self-determination.<sup>1</sup> The West looked on as the situation in Eastern Ukraine developed. Russia was trying out how far it could go in employing power politics, and the possibilities of a new Cold War seemed to be fading back into the mind of NATO. The invasion seems to be a reaction to the pro-EU and pro-NATO tendencies of Ukraine over the years preceding the incident. As such the question arises whether or not a decisively neutral Ukraine would be a way to de-escalate the situation in eastern Ukraine and the Crimea. The thought of a neutral Ukraine is not new, in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent NATO expansion into Eastern Europe it had been proposed, and now once again tensions in eastern Europe call for a neutral Ukraine.<sup>2</sup> The political tensions over the situation in Ukraine and along the borders of eastern Europe can be the start of a new Cold War.<sup>3</sup> As such it is interesting to take a look at neutrals during the Cold War, and the effectiveness of neutrality as a means to prevent a nation from getting involved in armed conflict. Although the Cold War never escalated into a European conflict, the possibility was there, and it is what both sides prepared for. It is also what the neutral powers would have prepared for. As such what this thesis will look at is the way in which two European neutrals, Austria and Sweden, prepared for such an event. By looking at these neutrals, the thesis will question whether or not neutrality during the escalation of the conflict was deemed feasible. By looking at the perceptions of Austria and Sweden on escalation and the perception of NATO towards either country, it is possible to derive a short study on the feasibility of both countries staying neutral in case of an

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<sup>1</sup> Office of the President of the Russian Federation, 'Direct line with Vladimir Putin' (version April 17 2014), <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796/> (May 3 2017).

<sup>2</sup> Iryna Maksymenko, 'Is neutrality a solution for Ukraine's security?', in: Viktor Stepanenko and Yaroslav Pylinskyi (eds.), *Interdisciplinary Studies on Central and Eastern Europe. Ukraine after the Euromaidan* (Bern 2015) 115-124, aldaar 115.

<sup>3</sup> Jeremy Shapiro, 'Reordering Europe?' (version January 11 2017), [http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/01/11/reordering\\_europe\\_112169.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/01/11/reordering_europe_112169.html) (June 10 2017).

escalation of the Cold War. In the end, neutrality as a concept is only effective if the neutral power can avoid warfare. This thesis contributes to the research on the concept of neutrality by questioning the feasibility of neutrality in the Cold War and the 20<sup>th</sup> century in general. This also means it provides a backdrop for research on neutrality as a viable policy in the future.

In this thesis, the European neutrals will be represented by case studies of both Sweden and Austria, two notable neutral powers during the Cold War. This is because both countries have different ideas of how to ensure their neutrality, something which will be discussed more in depth in the following chapters. Although NATO can be considered the best representation of the Cold War version of the West, United States, and the United Kingdom dominated the leadership of NATO. In this case, the large amounts of readily accessible source material of both the US and UK about NATO make the best choice as representatives of NATO in this thesis.

The first step in this thesis will be to define the concept neutrality and what it means to be a neutral country. The exact definition and rules concerning neutral countries and the way a neutral country should act were not always as clearly defined or accepted by countries. This meant that different visions could lead to miscommunications and possibly the end of a neutral country's neutrality. As such the first chapter will discuss two different versions of neutrality which the countries adopted. After defining the differences between Austrian and Swedish neutrality, it is of interest to discover how the countries would act about their neutral policies and the distinctively different ways in which they expressed their neutrality in the international sphere. The actions of a neutral, both public actions and covert actions, show how committed the countries were to maintain their neutrality and what their course of action was in the case of escalation. In the third chapter, we will look at NATO and their vision of these two European neutrals during the Cold War. After all, neutrality as a policy only works when it successfully manages to convince countries not to engage in conflict with the neutral country when a conflict escalates to armed conflict. The NATO perspective thus gives us insight into how convinced the West was of the neutrality of either country if escalation was to happen. By combining the different points of view of the countries during an escalation phase of the Cold War and relating them to the concept of neutrality, it is possible to show if neutrality was deemed viable in such a scenario.

The different neutral postures of Austria and Sweden have been a topic of discussion for a long time. Discussions have recently taken a turn towards both country's membership of the European Union, and the included Common Security and Defense Policy as signs of their non-

existent neutrality.<sup>4</sup> However, discussion about the two countries and their neutrality during the Cold War was also extensive. For one the differences in neutral policy would make both countries interesting to compare. Robert Dalsjö is a Swedish expert on the relations between NATO and Sweden during the Cold War. Dalsjö claims that Sweden and NATO had been in contact with one another.<sup>5</sup> Dalsjö writes that a large amount of small, covert actions and interactions show that Sweden was preparing for cooperation with NATO in the case of an escalation of the conflict. On the other hand, Lauren Ferreira-Pereira tells us that the concept of Swedish neutrality, which traces its roots back to the Napoleonic wars, was so deeply rooted in Swedish society that it was almost dogmatic in the perpetuation of neutrality in politics.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, Christine Agius recognized that the identity of Sweden had adopted the idea of neutrality and that the state as such had adopted to it.<sup>7</sup> Andrew Cottey, however, says that the continuance of neutrality throughout escalation of the conflict would be impossible.<sup>8</sup> Sweden was too ideologically similar to the Western European NATO countries to be able to maintain a completely independent position.

However, authors seem more agreeable in the case of Austria. Josef Kunz talks about the meaning of neutrality for Austria directly after the Austrian Declaration of Neutrality in 1955. This declaration was adopted by the Austrian parliament in 1955 following the retreat of NATO and Soviet troops from the country. Although not formally stated, the guarantee of a neutral Austria is what led to the withdrawal of troops in the first place. Kunz argues that Austria's maintenance of its neutral posture would have depended on the way in which it would interact in the international sphere and less on its ability to scare off invaders.<sup>9</sup> He mentions that the Proclamation was primarily a statement and did not find any support in international law. Andras Kovac made a similar argument for Austria as Agius did for Sweden.<sup>10</sup> The neutral position was of such great importance to the survival of Austria that neutrality became a part of the Austrian identity thus

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<sup>4</sup> Karen Devine, 'Neutrality and the development of the European Union's common security and defence policy', *Cooperation and Conflict* 46 (2011) 3, 335-369.

<sup>5</sup> Robert Dalsjö, 'The hidden rationality of Sweden's policy of neutrality during the Cold War', *Cold War History* 14 (2014) 2, 175-194.

<sup>6</sup> Lauren C. Ferreira-Pereira, 'Swedish military neutrality in the post-cold war: 'old habits die hard'', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 6 (2005) 3, 463-489.

<sup>7</sup> Christine Agius & Karen Devine, 'Neutrality: A really dead concept' A reprise', *Cooperation and Conflict* 46 (2011) 3, 265-284.

<sup>8</sup> Andrew Cottey, 'The European neutrals and NATO: ambiguous partnership', *Contemporary Security Policy* 34 (2013) 3, 446-472.

<sup>9</sup> Josef Kunz, 'Austria's Permanent Neutrality', *American Journal of International Law* 50 (1956) 2, 418-425.

<sup>10</sup> Andras Kovac, *NATO, Neutrality and the national identity: The case of Austria and Hungary* (Vienna 2003).

solidifying itself in Austrian politics. Both Kovac and Kunz argue that Austria's neutrality was safeguarded primarily because of political actions to strengthen it. James Sheehan, however, argues that the maintenance of Austrian neutrality depended chiefly on the disinterest of the larger powers.<sup>11</sup> Neither the Soviet Union or the United States would have liked to lose Austria to the other's influence, but it was not considered worth fighting over. Sheehan states: "In the end, after a decade of fruitless negotiating, neutrality turned out to be everyone's second choice."<sup>12</sup>

The discussion on the neutrality of both countries is still ongoing. The topic was always of interest to the countries involved in the Cold War. Sheehan even mentions that a block of neutral countries in Central Europe formed by Switzerland and Austria practically divides NATO into a southern and northern half, the implications of which would be in favor of the Soviet Union. It relies on the ability of the countries to remain neutral. As shown in the paragraphs above the concept of neutrality has several different interpretations and ideas. By taking the concept of neutrality, the application of it by the neutral countries and the perspectives of NATO it is possible to find out the feasibility of remaining neutral. First, we have to make sure how the concept of neutrality is defined.

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<sup>11</sup> James J. Sheehan, 'Postwar Austria from a comparative perspective', in: 'Austria's International Position after the End of the Cold War', ed. Gunter Bischof and Ferdinand Karlhofer, thematic edition, *Contemporary Austrian Studies* 22 (2013), 121-140.

<sup>12</sup> Sheehan, 'Postwar Austria from a comparative perspective', 131.



## 2. The concept of neutrality

Neutrality is an important concept in the realm of international relations. In day to day use neutrality can describe something as simple as mere apathy towards a certain discussion. On the other hand in international relations, it can be the difference between engaging in warfare or avoiding direct combat. The distinction between the uses of the concept of neutrality already points out the relatively problematic nature of the term. When looking at the concept of neutrality within the context of international relations and conflict, there seem to be different ways of defining the exact meaning of neutrality. This chapter will, therefore, focus on neutrality as a concept which possesses certain criteria for a country to be deemed neutral. Breaking with these criteria would mean a deviation from neutral policy. In the second chapter, these criteria compared to the actions taken by both nations show us to what extent neutrality would have been respected during escalation.

The different ways of describing neutrality can have a relatively big impact in the world of international relations. Declaring neutrality usually occurs in the case of a rising conflict. In most cases declaring neutrality happened by a simple act of the governing power of a country. In general, the neutrality of a country is considered to be its active absence from the conflict for which it has declared itself neutral. However, neutrality is not something that should be seen as a one-sided affair. For a neutral nation to stay neutral, a requirement was that the countries which are involved in the conflict, also respect that declaration of neutrality. Neutrality is a concept which cannot function if the warring nations disregard the adopted neutrality and invade or engage forces of the neutral country. More so, in the case of a perceived breach in the neutral position of the neutral country, it could lead to threats and possible conflict with one or more of the warring states. Such a breach means that simply declaring neutrality was not enough; the state also had to maintain it. In this chapter, we will take a look at the different ways neutrality is declared and what it means to be neutral and maintain neutrality.

### *Laws of Neutrality*

The legal basis and certain criteria of neutrality traces itself back to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Although warfare has changed over time, the following treaties are still the basis for rules

concerning neutrality.<sup>13</sup> In 1899 and 1907, two international conventions were held in the Hague. These peace conventions were the initiative of the Russian Tsar Nicholas II. During these conferences, the attending countries discussed the laws surrounding warfare. Some of the topics discussed were the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilians, but also the conditions of neutrality. More specifically in the 1907 convention, the fifth treaty specifically addresses the role of neutral powers during a land war (the thirteenth treaty addresses naval warfare). The preamble of the treaty reads:

With a view to laying down more clearly the rights and duties of neutral Powers in case of war on land and regulating the position of the belligerents who have taken refuge in neutral territory; Being likewise desirous of defining the meaning of the term "neutral," pending the possibility of settling, in its entirety, the position of neutral individuals in their relations with the belligerents.<sup>14</sup>

The treaties mainly address what a country can and cannot do during a war. As such the meaning of neutrality is expanded not just to what other countries should not do with regards to the neutral country, but also what expectations those countries had of the neutral power. The very first article of the treaty mentions that neutral powers are inviolable, the basic premise of neutrality.<sup>15</sup> More striking is what follows in Article five of the treaty. The fifth article requires the neutral power to ensure that belligerents do not use the neutral country to their benefit. Such benefits include the movement of munitions and men or the recruitment of soldiers in the neutral country.<sup>16</sup> On the contrary, article nine allows the neutral power to offer services and trade with the belligerent powers, provided that the neutral provided equal treatment to both parties.<sup>17</sup> These two articles require close observation by the neutral country. According to the Hague Convention, it is the task of the neutral power to observe breaches of the fifth article, but there is no direct power responsible for the observation and control of the ninth article. Thus belligerent powers can very easily make their definition of what is and isn't impartial. As such the neutral powers are always required to

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<sup>13</sup> Thomas Fischer, Juhana Aunesluoma and Aryo Makko, 'Neutrality and Nonalignment in world politics during the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18 (2016) 4, 4-11, aldaar 6.

<sup>14</sup> Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project, 'V. Laws of War: Rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of a war on land (Hague V) 18th October 1907', Preamble.

<sup>15</sup> Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project, 'V. Laws of War: Rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of a war on land (Hague V) 18th October 1907', Article 1.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem, Article 2 & Article 4.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem, Article 9.

take action and make sure that their outward posturing was one of strength to act against breaches of its neutrality as well as maintaining a balance between both conflicting powers as to not show a preference for either side. Only if the neutral can act according to those principles can it be unilaterally considered a neutral power. The maintenance of neutrality was not easy. However, a great deal of maintaining neutrality can also depend on the way neutrality is declared and interpreted by the international community. After all, neutrality was not guaranteed by not participating in the war and making sure one did not do anything to make it look like one did, it also required the foreign powers to respect neutrality. Although both Austria and Sweden have to adhere to the rules of neutrality as they were agreed upon in the Convention, the way in which each country adopted their neutrality was different.

### *Austria: The Swiss model*

One way in which neutrality can be solidified and communicated to the international community is through official legislature. Switzerland is the most prominent neutral power to have official legislature dictate its status as a neutral country, hence the Swiss model. The Swiss have been officially neutral since the 1815 Treaty of Paris where the major European powers signed the treaty stating that Switzerland was from that moment on a permanently neutral state.<sup>18</sup> These powers were now bound by international law to respect the neutrality of Switzerland. To ensure the nations of the world that Switzerland was to remain neutral at all times it was decided to include several provisions regarding neutral policy into their constitution. Although not officially declaring neutrality as the only possible resolution in international relations, the safeguarding of independence and neutrality the Constitution assigns it as a duty of the Federal Assembly.<sup>19</sup> In this case, the country is bound by legislature to be recognized as neutral and to act as a neutral.

Austria would adopt the form of legislative neutrality after the Second World War. The former Allied powers had trouble deciding what to do with Austria as they occupied the country the same way Germany was post-World War Two. The Soviet Union did not want to give up the occupation of Austria because it feared that an independent Austria would align with NATO given

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<sup>18</sup> Hathi Trust Digital Library; British and Foreign state papers. 'British and Foreign state papers (1815-1816)', 359-361. Accessed on: April 24<sup>th</sup> 2017. Retrieved from: <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.hj13eu>

<sup>19</sup> Federal Parliament of the Swiss Confederation, Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of April 18, 1999 (as amended up to February 12, 2017). Accessed on: May 11<sup>th</sup> 2017. Retrieved from: <https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/201702120000/101.pdf>

its strong western tendencies. The Austrian government decided that it would declare permanent neutrality in exchange for the end of occupation. Soviet and Allied forces withdrew from Austria after reaching an agreement that Austria would remain neutral. This agreement resulted in the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15<sup>th</sup> 1955, making Austria an independent country once more.<sup>20</sup> However permanent neutrality was not officially adopted until the 26<sup>th</sup> of October the same year. Austria's first new constitutional law was to declare itself permanently neutral and to require the government to safeguard the neutrality of the Austrian state.<sup>21</sup> The Austrian version of neutrality differs slightly from the Swiss version. As said earlier the Swiss never constitutionally declared to be permanently neutral but only obligated the government to protect the neutral foreign policy. The Austrian constitution, however, requires the country to be neutral by the very definition of the country and requires the government to ensure as much. These two slightly different variants, however, are bound in legislature and thus can be referred to as legislative neutrality.

### ***Sweden: Political neutrality***

On the opposite of legislative neutrality is political neutrality. In short, political neutrality is neutrality as a choice of foreign policy politics. In this case, the primary example is that of Sweden. Sweden's neutrality based itself on the public statements made by its government and the actions it has taken about international affairs.<sup>22</sup> In fact, the Swedish policy of neutrality was so successful that people often mistake the policy as being part of the constitution and being a permanently neutral country.<sup>23</sup> The position of Sweden as a neutral country, however, is something which is not set in legislature and can thus change from one day to another if the government wished to do so. This form of neutrality was the most common in the world. For example, countries

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<sup>20</sup> Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich. Published on July 30 1955; 39. Stück, Nr. 152. Wien. "State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria (Vienna, 15 May 1955)", p. 762-779; 803- 804. Accessed on: May 11<sup>th</sup>, 2017. Retrieved from: [http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/3/2/5c586461-7528-4a74-92c3-d3eba73c2d7d/publishable\\_en.pdf](http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/3/2/5c586461-7528-4a74-92c3-d3eba73c2d7d/publishable_en.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> Documents on American Foreign Relations. 1955. Dir. of publ. Zinner, Paul E. 1956. New York: published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers. "Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria (26 October 1955)", p. 162-163. Accessed on: May 11<sup>th</sup>, 2017. Retrieved from: [http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/670aa09c-4d4b-451a-84f2-23f2f9c8cb06/publishable\\_en.pdf](http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/670aa09c-4d4b-451a-84f2-23f2f9c8cb06/publishable_en.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> Katarina Brodin, Kjell Goldmann and Christian Lange, 'The policy of neutrality: Official doctrines of Finland and Sweden', *Cooperation and Conflict* 3 (1968) 1, 18-51; Jacob Westberg, 'Sweden's policy of neutrality', in: Igor Novakovic (ed.), *Neutrality in the 21<sup>st</sup> century-Lessons for Serbia* (Belgrade 2013) 49-54, aldaar 49-53.

<sup>23</sup> Westberg, 'Sweden's policy of neutrality', 44.

such as Finland and Yugoslavia were also political neutrals. Although several countries were somewhat pressured into adopting neutrality, they never implemented it as law. Because neutrality was not a law, it makes Sweden a tricky country to account for in the grand scheme of international relations. Although history has shown that Sweden actively maintained a neutral position in conflicts, the non-binding nature of its neutral policy makes for a more likely enemy as compared to those bound by legislature.

As the chapter shows there are different ways of approaching neutrality and the different ways in how neutrality is declared can have an impact on how nations treat a neutral country. Legislative neutrality binds a country by law whereas political neutrality allows a country to stop being neutral whenever its leadership feels like it. Though as long as a nation maintains that it is neutral, it has to adhere to the laws set up by the Hague conventions and deviations from those laws could put countries in a position where their neutrality can be questioned. As such, the two different ways of approaching neutrality make an interesting case for research into their approach to the Cold War. The way in which the countries would act both militarily and in foreign affairs can give an insight into just how committed the countries were to their neutrality and in whether or not the difference in neutrality is noticeable in the actions taken by the respective nations or whether they deviate from their neutrality. As such the most important criteria that can be derived is that a neutral country has to treat both sides of a conflict the same way. Although formally related to trade and access to the neutral country, equal treatment became a point of contention for everything relating the neutral country. As such the maintenance of neutrality heavily depended on balancing everything the country did as to not seem favorable to one ideology over the other.

### 3. Austria and Sweden, their politics and actions.

In the previous chapter, we have seen that there are a few ways to define neutrality. This neutrality and the perception of a country's neutrality all depend on how the government of such a country acts. In foreign politics, it is important to maintain a certain level of neutrality when interacting with countries embroiled in a conflict. In a way, countries are expected to behave in a certain way politically. However, when looking at the rules agreed upon in The Hague conventions, it does not specifically mention that a neutral should maintain a neutral vision in international politics. It is mainly limited to the military aspect of the concept of neutrality. The political actions of countries such as Sweden and Austria become interesting when looking at the Cold War because of the nature of the conflict. Because the Cold War was an ideological conflict that never went to war between the feuding powers directly, the political views and actions of the neutral countries were the only way for the two blocs to determine the neutrality of a country through non-covert information. Both countries had to act in such a way that it would not join or start a war unless attacked by one of the two blocs involved in the conflict. These actions that perpetuate the idea of neutrality can be seen as a neutrality policy.<sup>24</sup>

However, the world of international politics and conflict has a lot of gray areas and as such both Austria and Sweden had their plans for the eventual escalation of the conflict. It is entirely possible for the official public political position of the state to differ from the unofficial covert position of the state. An examination of the outward political positions of both nations by looking at their role international politics and the positions they take in regards to the two blocs, give insight to the overt position of the nations. The hypothesis is that there is a strong possibility that the actions of the country covertly will not support an entirely neutral position. Because these actions happen covertly, they do not have to damage their reputation as a neutral but can still show to what extent neutrality is seen as a success in the event of escalation. By comparing these actions to documents that show military and political strategic planning in regards to escalation, it is possible to detect tendencies of the countries to favor one of the two sides.

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<sup>24</sup> Fischer, Aunesluoma & Makko, 'Neutrality and Nonalignment in World Politics during the Cold War', 5.

### *National politics & the implications for neutral policy*

First off it is important to look at the overtly political actions and policies of the two countries. When talking about neutrality, the two countries had to act as if they were in fact neutral. An important aspect to consider when looking at these two countries is their distinctively western societies. Both Austria and Sweden were widely considered western countries by nature of their cultural and political institutions. Both countries had distinctively western political systems based on a democratic society with an economy based on the spirit of the free market and private ownership of goods. Looking at the division of the parties and their political ideologies give us an insight into the public perception of the different ideologies that were around during the Cold War. Because the Cold War was a conflict mainly based on ideology a strong political favor toward one or another ideology would be a factor in determining the viability of neutrality.

When looking at the political situation in Austria, we can see that the country voted mainly in the spirit of the western ideologies. Since the Second World War, the government of Austria has been dominated by the ÖVP and the SPÖ.<sup>25</sup> The ÖVP is the Austrian People's Party, a Christian Democratic party which has a mostly Christian and conservative ideology. The SPÖ is the Social Democratic Party. Although a socialist party the SPÖ is distinctively focused on reaching social equality through democracy like numerous other Western Social Democratic parties. The KPÖ, Communist Party of Austria, is the party that had endured direct Soviet support during the occupation of Austria following World War II.<sup>26</sup> Though the KPÖ never reached more than 5.28 percent of the vote and hovered somewhere between 1 to 3 percent in the elections following the Austrian State Treaty. Austrian politics seem to be in line with a lot of culturally western nations at the time.

Sweden observed a similar trend during the Cold War. The majority of the votes, approximately 45 to 50 percent would go to the SAP, the Social Democrat Party.<sup>27</sup> The three largest parties after the SAP would split about 40 to 50 percent of the votes. These parties were the Liberal Party, Centre Party, and Moderate Party. They are center to center-right parties by ideology. In Sweden, too the Communist Party never managed to get more than about 5.8 percent of the vote before the end of the Cold War. So here too it is possible to identify an electorate that aligns itself

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<sup>25</sup> Dieter Nohlen and Philip Stöver, *Elections in Europe: A Data handbook* (Baden-Baden 2010).

<sup>26</sup> William B. Bader, *Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955* (Stanford 1966) 195-196.

<sup>27</sup> Nohlen and Stöver, *Elections in Europe*, .

with non-communist views. In general, the internal politics seem to favor a liberal western democratic society.

### *Expressing neutrality through international politics*

It is the actions of the governments in the international sphere however that would create the perception other countries had of these states. Austria would try to show itself as a committed neutral country by acting like a nation that would serve as a negotiator and bridge builder between the East and West. Austria would join Finland in hosting the SALT negotiations and would host several summits between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. The SALT negotiations were the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, two bilateral conferences between the Soviet Union and the United States with the aims to decrease the number of strategic nuclear arms in the world. By hosting SALT II in Vienna, Austria showed itself as being a common ground on which both countries would agree to meet. Acting as a negotiator would make the Austrian state an interesting partner for both blocs and thus could solidify its neutrality by acting like one.

However, Austria would work closely with the Western European states in several international organizations. Making agreements and treaties with them about economic cooperation. Austria would firstly seek admission to organizations such as the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community.<sup>28</sup> These organizations were all based in the Western European community and focused on the economic cooperation between the member states. These organizations do not infringe on the idea of neutrality because they are strictly economic organizations. The Soviet Union criticized the Austrian application for the European Economic Community for being too closely aligned to NATO. Most members of the EEC were members of NATO, and the distinction between the two organizations was not something the Soviet Union would distinguish between. An interview with Manfred Scheich corroborates the suspicious view of the Soviets in regards to the Austrian

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<sup>28</sup> Council of Europe, Appendix - Resolutions (56) 1 to 14. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Published on September 5<sup>th</sup> 2012. "Resolution (56) 4 on the admission of Austria to the Council of Europe (8th March, 1956)". Accessed on: May 18<sup>th</sup> 2017. Retrieved from: [http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/11/15/e4e31b87-dcad-4574-bfb1-d0b787823e5f/publishable\\_en.pdf/](http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/11/15/e4e31b87-dcad-4574-bfb1-d0b787823e5f/publishable_en.pdf/); Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (Hereafter: CVCE), 'Austria and the European integration process – Chronology 1945-2006'. Accessed on: May 18<sup>th</sup> 2017. Retrieved from: [http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/austria\\_and\\_the\\_european\\_integration\\_process\\_chronology\\_1945\\_2006-en-74a26b48-396d-449b-8aea-5e081f2833e1.html](http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/austria_and_the_european_integration_process_chronology_1945_2006-en-74a26b48-396d-449b-8aea-5e081f2833e1.html)



negotiations on possible membership.<sup>29</sup> This led to a problematic situation in which Austria would not fully commit to negotiations with the European Community until 1989 and the eventual date of admission to the European Union would be 1995 together with Sweden and Finland, two other notable European neutrals.<sup>30</sup>

Although politics seem to balance themselves between neutrality and a slight favor of the West over the East, the military had to prepare for an attack from both sides if it were to adhere to the country's stance of neutrality. Austria's national defense plan, therefore, expected an invasion of Austria from the west to be mainly that of a preventative nature; NATO would violate Austrian neutrality to prevent it from falling to the Soviets and weakening the NATO front.<sup>31</sup> However, a supposed more credible threat was an invasion coming from the Czechoslovak and Hungarian side. The Prague Spring of 1968 would create such a situation of unease, and the Austrian military predicted a possible infringement of its territory. The government had not ordered the military to prepare special defensive measures for such a situation.<sup>32</sup> In fact, the Austrian government was convinced that the best way to guard its neutrality would be through diplomatic relations and provide the world with a useful neutral as compared to an armed neutral that relies on scaring off a possible invasion. So much so, that the Austrian defense budget was the lowest of the neutral European countries with approximately 1% of the gross national product.<sup>33</sup> If the countries were to adhere to neutrality, the military would have had to be distinctively balanced in their approach

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<sup>29</sup> Interview Manfred Scheich: reactions in Moscow to Austria's rapprochement with the European Communities, online video, CVCE

[http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/interview\\_with\\_manfred\\_scheich\\_reactions\\_in\\_moscow\\_to\\_austria\\_s\\_rapprochement\\_with\\_the\\_european\\_communities\\_hildesheim\\_2\\_november\\_2009-en-2ce24eb4-6474-4493-a5c3-87d2283e95ef.html](http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/interview_with_manfred_scheich_reactions_in_moscow_to_austria_s_rapprochement_with_the_european_communities_hildesheim_2_november_2009-en-2ce24eb4-6474-4493-a5c3-87d2283e95ef.html)

<sup>30</sup> Walter Carlsnaes, 'The compatibility of EU membership and neutrality', in: Bill McSweeney (ed.) *Moral Issues in International Affairs: Problems of European Integration* (London 1998) 117-138, there 127.

<sup>31</sup> Horst Pleiner and Andreas W. Stupka, 'Alone but yet together: on military strategy of a neutral nation state in the new Europe as shown by the examples of Austria', *Vojno Delo* (Belgrade 2010) 54-77.

[http://www.odbrana.mod.gov.rs/odbrana-stari/vojni\\_casopisi/arhiva/VD\\_2010-let0/05.%20Alone,%20But%20Yet%20Together%20-%20On%20the%20Military%20Strategy%20Of%20a%20Neutral%20Nation%20State%20In%20the%20New%20Europe%20As%20Shown%20By%20the%20Example%20Of%20Austria,%20Plajner%20H.,%20Stupka%20A...pdf](http://www.odbrana.mod.gov.rs/odbrana-stari/vojni_casopisi/arhiva/VD_2010-let0/05.%20Alone,%20But%20Yet%20Together%20-%20On%20the%20Military%20Strategy%20Of%20a%20Neutral%20Nation%20State%20In%20the%20New%20Europe%20As%20Shown%20By%20the%20Example%20Of%20Austria,%20Plajner%20H.,%20Stupka%20A...pdf)

Pg. 62.

<sup>32</sup> Ibidem, 64;

Rastislav Bachora, 'Austrian security and defence doctrine: the changing process of Austrian security policy and the impacts on political interests', in: Róbert Ondrejcsák, Marian Majer and Vladimir Tarasovic (eds.) *Panorama of Global security environment 2010* (Bratislava 2010) 217-235.

<http://cenaa.org/analysis/austrian-security-and-defence-doctrine-the-changing-process-of-austrian-security-policy-and-the-impacts-of-political-interests/>.

<sup>33</sup> Global Security, 'Austria – Military spending' (version 19<sup>th</sup> of October 2014),

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/at-budget.htm> (accessed 25<sup>th</sup> of May 2017).

to national defense, both in planning for an attack from either side as well as where they sourced their arms.

Looking closely at the military itself we can see that the equipment of the Austrian Bundesheer largely depended on a mixture of equipment from NATO countries and neutral countries with very little to nothing coming from the Soviet Union. Whereas the Austrian companies Steyr and Glock manufactured most of the small arms in use by the Bundesheer, the main service rifle during much of the Cold War was a Belgian designed rifle. Interestingly the rifle was chambered in the NATO standard round. Most heavy equipment of the Austrian Armed Forces after the 1955 Austrian State Treaty included an assortment of US made M47 and M60 Patton tanks, German Jaguar anti-tank vehicles and some smaller Austrian made equipment.<sup>34</sup> The Austrian air force on the other hand largely depended on Swedish made SAAB Draken fighters. The Austrian military is not particularly NATO aligned in its strategic planning or by excessive use of NATO equipment. However, the lack of any Soviet equipment in the Austrian arsenal as compared to NATO equipment is noticeable yet doesn't necessarily mean anything more than just needing a source for military equipment Austria could not manufacture themselves. The favor for NATO equipment is not particularly surprising as the ideological similarities seem to carry over into the military and political decision making regarding the military, however small they may be.

### ***A policy of deterrence***

In the case of Sweden, we should look at a more defined militarily active neutrality that is less dependent on their political role in the international sphere. In short the Swedish tried to portray a negative-positive neutrality.<sup>35</sup> This form of neutrality policy depends on the ability of Sweden to convince other countries that an invasion of Sweden would bring more negatives with it than positives. The Swedish approach differs from the Austrian approach in that the Austrians wanted to convince the belligerent parties of the benefits that a neutral Austria would have for example in the form of a negotiator. What this meant for the Swedish was that it would not invest as heavily in cooperation and diplomatic relations as the Austrians would and instead rely on a more heavily militarized version of armed neutrality. Sweden would rely on the idea that escalation of the conflict would involve combat in all of Europe and as such a war with a well-armed and prepared

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<sup>34</sup> Global Security, 'Austria – Bundesheer modernization' (version 3<sup>rd</sup> of august 2017), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/at-bundesheer-modernization.htm> (accessed 25<sup>th</sup> of May 2017).

<sup>35</sup> Efraim Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States* (London 1988) 155-157.

Sweden would not be beneficial compared to Sweden as a neutral. As Robert Dalsjö mentions, Sweden knew that it would not be able to remain neutral during a third world war.<sup>36</sup> Reasons for this would be the strong cultural links to the West and the possible subsequent toleration or indifference to NATO overflights and use of the Baltic Sea during escalation. However, by maintaining its strong adherence to a policy of neutrality in peace, it hoped to avoid being the target of an initial nuclear strike.

A 1994 report by the Swedish Commission on neutrality has some interesting information regarding the relations between NATO and Sweden.<sup>37</sup> The report mentions that in the case of a third world war Sweden would only get involved by nature of a Soviet invasion. The report says that the entirety of Swedish strategy depended on a threat from the east with no genuine consideration of a threat from the NATO side. Noteworthy points in the report talk about preparatory measures taken by the Swedish military and government for cooperation with NATO in the event of escalation. One of these measures was the adoption of a NATO-based Identify Friend Foe systems, systems used in anti-aircraft weapons to recognize friend from foe. Although not bought directly from NATO the model used was that of British design and later of American design.<sup>38</sup> A copy of such a model would still denote NATO aircraft as friendly. Another measure was the extension of several military airbases along the Swedish coast. The report states that the extension of the runways would not have made sense for the Swedish air force as they did not possess aircraft that would require runways of this length.<sup>39</sup> The reason for the extension adopted by the Commission was for the possible use by larger NATO bombers in their approach and return from striking the Soviet heartland.

Looking at the sourcing of military equipment provides a decisively neutral view of Sweden. Sweden has a large homegrown weapons industry ranging from small arms to aircraft and ships. Again, a NATO country provided the main service rifle. The Swedes used a domestic version of the German G3 for much of the Cold War; it too was chambered in the NATO standard

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<sup>36</sup> Dalsjö, 'The hidden rationality of Sweden's policy of neutrality', 175-176, 178.

<sup>37</sup> Fredrik von Arnold & the commission on neutral policy, 'Had there been war... Preparations for the reception of military assistance 1949-1969' (Stockholm 1994).

<sup>38</sup> von Arnold, 'Had there been war', 213-217.

<sup>39</sup> Ibidem, 222-225.

round.<sup>40</sup> Except for its service rifle, the entirety of the Swedish Armed Forces was and still is, equipped with materiel made on Swedish soil by Swedish companies.

When comparing the two countries with each other, it is quite clear that they handled their neutrality in different ways. Austria tries to actively promote itself as a neutral country which would bridge the gap between east and west. The Austrians therefore actively rely on their diplomatic relations and international presence with barely any reliance on their military power. Sweden, on the other hand, was not as actively involved in trying to bridge the gap between east and west in the diplomatic sphere. Instead, Sweden deterred a violation of its sovereignty by trying to show that it was willing to fight and make it tough for whoever decided to invade. On the other hand, the Swedish military shows a more direct link with NATO regarding interactions and preparation for a Soviet invasion. As such there are two different applications of neutrality during the Cold War. Whereas they both had a different way of establishing their neutrality (political neutrality and legislative neutrality), they also had different ways of expressing their neutrality and trying to maintain it. Sweden opted for the negative-positive neutrality policy of deterring the violation of neutrality by a show of force. Austria, on the other hand, would try to appease both sides and convince them of the usefulness of a neutral and independent Austria as mediator.

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<sup>40</sup> Global Security, 'Sweden - Industry' (version 21<sup>st</sup> of December 2015), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/industry-se.htm> (accessed 26<sup>th</sup> of May 2017).

#### 4. NATO, Sweden, and Austria.

The two preceding chapters discussed the concept of neutrality and the cases of Austria and Sweden. This chapter will look at Austria and Sweden from NATO with a focus on the United States and the United Kingdom. In the first chapter, we spoke about neutrality as being dependent on the interaction between states. Neutrality depends as much on the actions of neutral states as those more actively involved in the conflict. By using intelligence reports, military sources and diplomatic sources it is possible to paint a picture of the NATO perception of these two neutral countries. Possible escalation of the conflict required intense military and diplomatic planning which would require vast amounts of information. This information can give some insight as to the military and foreign affairs officials' perception of the situation and their recommendation as to how to approach the two countries during a live conflict.

Although NATO was and is an alliance between many different countries with a wide variety of different perspectives the choice to focus on the United States and the United Kingdom can give us a detailed overview of at least the military side of the story. Although formally all nations contributed to the defense of Europe and, by NATO military strategy, the defense of Germany was a key factor in such a scenario.<sup>41</sup> However, most of the NATO military forces in Germany, which included German, US, and Canadian forces, were under US and UK command. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and his deputy were in charge of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The SACEUR has always been the U.S. General assigned as the US commander of their European forces. The deputy has always been a British or (West-)German general.<sup>42</sup> These assignments show that the defense of Europe was something that both the US and UK heavily invested in. Such an investment meant that support by the government regarding intelligence would be plentiful. This interest in the defense of Europe also makes it a high priority for diplomatic affairs.

##### *The survival of Austrian neutrality*

As said before, neutrality is dependent on the actions of all states involved; this means that the Soviet perception of the neutrals contributed to the NATO vision of the neutrals by the threat to

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<sup>41</sup> Jan Hoffenaar, Dieter Krüger and David T. Zabecki, *Blueprints for Battle: Planning for War in Central Europe, 1948-1968* (Potsdam 2012) 5, 21-22.

<sup>42</sup> Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (Hereafter: SHAPE), 'Leadership staff' (version January 2017), <http://shape.nato.int/page1165579> (accessed: 27<sup>th</sup> of May 2017); SHAPE, 'Military command structure' (version January 2017), [http://shape.nato.int/military\\_command\\_structure](http://shape.nato.int/military_command_structure) (accessed: 28<sup>th</sup> of May 2017).

the neutrality of Sweden and Austria. The case of Austria is especially interesting in this situation as it was located directly in the European heartland with the possibility of giving Soviet and NATO troops a possible surprise factor if passed through. As such, after the signing of the Austrian state treaty and the proclaimed neutrality of Austria both countries would have evaluated the possibility of a violation of Austria's neutrality in favor for strategic military goals. Since this paper evaluates the NATO vision towards Austria, it is interesting to look at a US report on a possible attack. In 1956 the United States Intelligence Advisory Committee produced a report on the 'likelihood of Soviet violation of Austrian neutrality.'<sup>43</sup> This report was released on the 6<sup>th</sup> of November 1956 approximately one year after the Austrian Declaration of Neutrality and more importantly during the ongoing Hungarian Revolution. This is interesting because it shows a distinct interest in the survivability of Austrian neutrality and questions the ability of Austria to resist possible Soviet aggression in the wake of possible border security problems along the Austrian-Hungarian border. The report, however, deems it possible that the crossing of Hungarian across the border could be seen by the Soviet Union as an act in violation of Austria's neutrality. It also states that it would be highly unlikely to see anything more than border incursions. In this situation, a highly volatile situation was going in Hungary, yet a Soviet incursion was not deemed likely. In this scenario, a Soviet invasion would have been to retaliate against Austria for aiding Hungarian rebels. Another intelligence report mentions the capabilities of Warsaw Pact forces and their actions in the event of an escalation.<sup>44</sup> The report mentions Austria, Germany and southern Europe as the main targets of the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak forces around 1959-1960 and later reports show a route through Austria as a possible attack route on Italy.<sup>45</sup> In these cases, the NATO intelligence committees did

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Central Intelligence Agency Library (Hereafter: CIA), Special National Intelligence Estimate, 6<sup>th</sup> of November 1956, Likelihood of Soviet violation of Austrian neutrality. Accessed on: May 28<sup>th</sup> 2017. Retrieved from: [https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0000269463.pdf](https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000269463.pdf)

<sup>44</sup> Parallel History Project (Hereafter: PHP), NATO Records, NATO Military planning, Planning and threat assessments, Special Intelligence Estimate, 1<sup>st</sup> of February 1959, Soviet/satellite military courses of action in Europe through 1960. Accessed on: May 28<sup>th</sup> 2017. Retrieved from: [http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/18458/ipublicationdocument\\_singledocument/9d2ade93-a453-4a92-856a-db8c0a3db040/en/590201\\_Special\\_1.pdf](http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/18458/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/9d2ade93-a453-4a92-856a-db8c0a3db040/en/590201_Special_1.pdf)

<sup>45</sup> Ibidem, pg. 3, 29; PHP, NATO Records, NATO Military planning, Planning and threat assessments, USAREAR Intelligence Estimate – 1961. Accessed on: May 28<sup>th</sup> 2017. Retrieved from: [http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/18706/ipublicationdocument\\_singledocument/40563b60-38f9-4a4c-8db5-b31bda3810c4/en/6101\\_USAREUR\\_3.pdf](http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/18706/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/40563b60-38f9-4a4c-8db5-b31bda3810c4/en/6101_USAREUR_3.pdf); NATO Archives, Military Committee, Formal documents of the international planning team of the standing group, Area Planning Guidance General, 11<sup>th</sup> of March 1957. Accessed on May 28<sup>th</sup>. Retrieved from: [https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/0/100517/IPT\\_131\\_36\\_DRAFT\\_REV\\_ENG\\_PDP.pdf](https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/0/100517/IPT_131_36_DRAFT_REV_ENG_PDP.pdf).

not think Austria would be able to remain neutral during a Soviet escalation of the conflict. These expectations would later be revealed as somewhat accurate when at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup>-century newspapers reported that Warsaw Pact plans for nuclear war revealed plans for attacks on Austria.<sup>46</sup>

From the diplomatic point of view, the United States Department of State seems to acknowledge the Austrian policy as described in the previous chapter. In a document on the assessment of Austrian neutrality, the Department of State acknowledges that the Austrian government tried to strengthen their neutrality by acting as a mediator between East and West.<sup>47</sup> The report also recommended that the US should aim to influence Austria through trade, the UN, and international programs. An interesting document seeing as in 1957 the attitude of Eisenhower was primarily that of hostility and condemnation of neutrals, something that would not change until Kennedy was elected.<sup>48</sup> Another report mentions that Austria was considered an integral part of free Europe and a symbol of resistance to the Soviets.<sup>49</sup> A third report mentions that Austria had a strong interest in European free trade and had cooperated with East-West trade blocks.<sup>50</sup> The views put forward on the relationship between, in this case, the United States and Austria in the reports are favorable. The reports see the newly created Austrian state as a western country and therefore a country well established in its sphere of influence.

All in all, in the case of Austria the NATO partners expected that during escalation it would be quite likely that Austrian neutrality would be violated by the Soviet Union to create an extra element of surprise and open another angle of attack. However, in the early Cold War it also agreed that although Austria was neutral, its fairly recent adoption of neutrality and relatively young state allowed for political pressure to help it move into a more western sphere of influence.

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<sup>46</sup> Neil Tweedie, 'Vienna was top of Soviet nuclear targets list', the Telegraph (version 1<sup>st</sup> of December 2001), <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/austria/1364037/Vienna-was-top-of-Soviet-nuclear-targets-list.html> (28<sup>th</sup> of May 2017).

<sup>47</sup> Gale Primary Sources, United States Declassified Documents Online (Hereafter: USDDO), Department of State, Neutralism in Austria detailed. Accessed on May 28<sup>th</sup> 2017. Retrieved from: <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/4v2HfX>.

<sup>48</sup> Robert McMahon, 'US national security policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy', in: Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge 2010) 288-311, there 301-302, 306.

<sup>49</sup> Gale Primary Sources, USDDO, National Security Council, Paper regarding U.S. policy toward Austria. Accessed on May 28<sup>th</sup> 2017. Retrieved from: <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/4v2RW3>.

<sup>50</sup> Gale Primary Sources, USDDO, OCB report on Austria. White House, 5 Feb. 1958. <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/4v2RL6>.



### *A cooperative military yet problematic public identity*

The case of Sweden was slightly different because it did not neighbor the Soviet Union or any of the Warsaw Pact countries directly. The location of Sweden at the center of Scandinavia and especially its large coastline along the Baltic Sea make it an important country when trying to establish control over the Baltic Sea. As shown before the major threat to NATO was assessed as coming through the center of Europe, mainly Germany. This made Austria a target because it could provide the Soviet Union with a surprise element. Sweden, however, would not be as threatened because the expected Soviet attack through Germany would not have benefited as much from an invasion of Sweden. A NATO intelligence report mentions the strategic importance of Scandinavia.<sup>51</sup> The report interestingly states that the Swedes would most likely have joined the NATO cause in the event of an attack on another Scandinavian country. The report was so convinced by the alignment of Sweden to NATO during escalation that plans for the defense of Sweden should be integrated.<sup>52</sup> However, the National Security Council also mentions that Sweden's membership of NATO was not essential for the defense of the West.<sup>53</sup> Most advantages the NSC mentions would come from the ability to project airpower more efficiently and improve early warning systems. However, they mention that similar goals can be reached by similar systems in neighboring NATO countries and could complement these.

Where the military side of NATO and particularly the United States wants to try and integrate Sweden and possibly seek contact, the civilian government recommended something that was not as inclusive. A report by the Department of State details the neutralist sentiments in Sweden and gives out advice on how to deal with it.<sup>54</sup> Their advice was to steer away from trying to include Sweden in NATO and overtly trying to appease the Swedish government. However, a document on the U.S. policy towards Scandinavia mentions that the U.S. should, if necessary alone, come to the aid of Sweden during Soviet aggression.<sup>55</sup> Although no reasons are given in the

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<sup>51</sup> NATO Archives, Military Committee, Formal documents of the international planning team of the standing group, Area Planning Guidance General, 11<sup>th</sup> of March 1957, pg. 19. Accessed on May 28<sup>th</sup>. Retrieved from: [https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/0/100517/IPT\\_131\\_36\\_DRAFT\\_REV\\_ENG\\_PDP.pdf](https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/0/100517/IPT_131_36_DRAFT_REV_ENG_PDP.pdf)

<sup>52</sup> Ibidem, 20.

<sup>53</sup> Gale Primary Sources, USDDO, National Security Council, Paper regarding U.S. policy toward Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Accessed on May 28<sup>th</sup> 2017. Retrieved from: <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/4v2eW0>.

<sup>54</sup> Gale Primary Sources, USDDO, Department Of State, Neutralism in Sweden detailed. Accessed on May 28<sup>th</sup>. Retrieved from: <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/4v2Xh2>.

<sup>55</sup> Gale Primary Sources, USDDO, White House, Paper regarding U.S. policy toward Sweden in the event of a general war with Soviet Bloc countries. Accessed on May 28<sup>th</sup>. Retrieved from: <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/4v2eM1>.



document as to why the proposal seems to be written with the help of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This would insinuate that, since they are a decidedly military organ, it would be to ensure strategic advantages as opposed to feeling the obligation to support another western style democracy. In the international sphere, Sweden and the United States have had their differences. In 1973, for example, the Swedish prime minister compared the bombings of North Vietnam to the Holocaust.<sup>56</sup> This resulted in a strain on the relationship and showed the United States that although considered a Western democracy Sweden would not blindly support U.S. foreign policy.

So when comparing the NATO view of both countries, it is interesting to see that the military intelligence and planning were of the opinion that Austria was most likely to be attacked because it would allow the Soviet Union easier access into both Germany and Italy. It never wanted to include Austria in its defensive planning. Most likely their reasoning would have been that the Austrian military would not have been capable enough to provide meaningful resistance in the lowlands around Vienna to have a NATO plan integrated with Austrian defense planning. The opposite is true for Sweden. In this case, the strategic importance of Sweden and Sweden's military capabilities in the case of war made it a useful ally when looking at military documents. The United States and NATO were interested in trying to integrate Swedish planning into NATO planning. As such NATO was interested in cooperating with Sweden but less so with Austria. In the civilian political sphere, however, the roles were reversed. The United States Department of State tried to influence each country into believing it was a natural ally of NATO and the West, this was seen as troublesome in the case of Sweden and doable for Austria. The long-standing neutrality of Sweden was securely embedded in the identity of the country. This meant that open and covert advances to pressure Sweden to shift towards the NATO sphere of influence were deemed problematic. Swedish resistance to pro-NATO propaganda would cause an unwanted backlash. Austria, on the other hand, seemed to be an early Cold War target for US efforts to influence Austrian opinion. By trying to get Austria integrated into Western European society and the United Nations it hoped to achieve a decisively pro-Western sentiment. As such we can see a difference in the approach of NATO and the United States to the two different nations and their respective forms of neutrality.

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<sup>56</sup> Alvin Shuster, 'Swedish chilliness toward U.S. is limited to Vietnam' (versie 8<sup>th</sup> of January 1973), [http://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/08/archives/swedish-chilliness-toward-us-is-limited-to-vietnam-shocked-by.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/08/archives/swedish-chilliness-toward-us-is-limited-to-vietnam-shocked-by.html?_r=0) (28<sup>th</sup> of May 2017).



## 5. Conclusion

With the world continuously changing and the possibility of a new Cold War floating around once again, insights into the Cold War have gained track. Important to the Cold War was the obvious division between East and West but often forgotten are those nations in between, in the case of this thesis quite literally. Austria and Sweden provide two very interesting case studies of what it can mean to be a neutral country and in return provide cases of how NATO viewed these two different types of neutrality. The consensus in the literature is that neutrality in the Cold War was a tricky subject which resulted in different visions of neutrality but also in widely varying and contradictory actions, even within a single country. This thesis aims to add to the discussion by comparing two distinctively different European neutrals and the viability of their neutrality in the case of escalation. The use of Austria and Sweden can test the viability of neutrality by providing two different scenarios and how their different approaches would have made any difference in the viability of neutrality during the escalation of the conflict.

Differences in neutrality can be found in the way in which a country positions itself between the two powers. In the cases of Austria and Sweden, legislative and political neutrality represent the countries respectively. Austria was bound by its laws to remain neutral whereas Sweden chose to be neutral by political policy. These versions describe the origins of their neutrality, the way in which both countries chose to apply their neutrality in the international sphere differs as well. Whereas both countries would be bound by the laws set up in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 they would not directly apply in a conflict which had not gone to the phase of armed combat. As such there was no requirement to resist violations of its neutrality. This shows in the different approaches once again. Sweden had a tradition rooted in armed neutrality, something which the country heavily invested in during the Cold War. Armed neutrality is the act of demonstrating one's neutrality by strengthening their defenses against attackers. By showing the world that Sweden would fight back in the case of aggression and by ensuring a highly trained and well-equipped force to do so, it could convince powers of the incredibly high cost of an invasion of Sweden. Austria, on the other hand, did not try to dissuade other countries from invasion through military strength but rather tried to prove the usefulness of the Austrian state as a neutral party. By engaging as a mediator and neutral party in international affairs, it hoped to achieve a position that would benefit both parties in the conflict.

However actual policies, especially those enacted covertly, give us a great insight into the expectations of both countries what would happen to their neutral status in the event of the escalation of the conflict to armed conflict. With the Cold War being an ideological conflict, the politics of both countries provide some insight into their alignment with one of the ideologies. Both states had communist parties, yet neither of them managed to get a share of the votes large enough to make any meaningful impact. Social Democrats, were the most popular parties in both countries much like the rest of Western Europe. Although still ruled by social parties the political situation was thus not very favorable for the Soviet Union but made it easy to take up position between the relatively conservative politics of the US and the communist ideologies of the Soviet Union.

However, on the military front, a slight favor for NATO is seen in both countries. Austria adopted a decent amount of NATO standard and equipment for its armed forces and expected an invasion of its territory to come primarily from the Soviet side. These seem to be in line with the political line, where both can be seen as neutral although slightly favoring towards the NATO side of conflict. Sweden on the other hand was slightly more tricky because their equipment and policy do not convey the same message. The equipment of the Swedish Army was practically entirely domestically produced. Something which would instill confidence in Sweden as a neutral party because it would not have to rely on supplies from either bloc. The report of the Commission on Neutrality shows that covertly Sweden was preparing its military and systems for integration with NATO. This provides us with the conclusion that overtly both countries acted in different ways as a neutral country. Covertly, especially Sweden, sought to align itself with NATO in the case of escalation.

The NATO perspective of the situation seems to corroborate a similar conclusion. Austria was deemed especially vulnerable to an attack from the Warsaw Pact, whereas Sweden less so. Two reasons make up this difference. One, Austria was of more strategic importance for a Soviet attack on the NATO heartland of Germany and Italy. Secondly, Austria was less well armed and easier to overrun with its land bordering the Warsaw Pact states as compared to the Baltic Sea between Sweden and its nearest Warsaw Pact member. It is this weak position of Austria that would lead NATO to decide on leaving it out of their strategic plans and instead prepare for Soviet invasion with the idea that Austria would fall. Sweden, on the other hand, made a potential ally during escalation of the conflict. However, it would still rely on a form of Soviet aggression

through Scandinavia for Sweden to consider aligning itself with NATO. So whereas Austria was too weak to be of use to NATO, Sweden was strong enough but without direct Soviet threat would most likely have maintained its neutrality from the NATO perspective.

In the end, NATO expected that an escalation of the Cold War in Europe would most likely result in the violation of the neutrality of Austria. Furthermore, the neutrality of Sweden would be reliant on the Soviet dealings in the Scandinavian region, and attacks on neighboring countries of Sweden would result in Swedish alignment with NATO. In the end, neutrality seems to be a concept that ties into so many different aspects of politics, defense, global affairs and ideology that in a world as connected as in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century, remaining entirely neutral is nearly impossible.

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