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Community benefits schemes for onshore wind projects in the United Kingdom

Evaluating communities' perceptions of procedural justice



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Community benefits schemes (CBS) are an essential part of the United Kingdom (UK) governmental policy which aims to stimulate public support for onshore wind projects, which allow communities to share in the economics benefits associated with these. However, the development and implementation of CBS by project developers has been criticised, with claims of bribery mooted by scholars and communities alike. Accordingly, this research took a procedural justice perspective and argued that should the development and implementation of CBS pertain more closely to procedural justice ideals then communities would be more likely to perceive the development and implementation of CBS as fair, thus resulting in the greater public acceptancy of onshore wind projects. Using conditions from Leventhal and Thibaut and Walker, procedural justice was conceptualised and an analytical framework to evaluate the levels of perceived procedural justice proliferated by CBS was designed. The research utilised interviews with, and surveys completed by representatives of communities, to come to the understanding that CBS can be successful in stimulating public support for onshore wind projects. However, an alarming paradox was discovered. On the one hand, the community representatives reported no evidence of bribery; conversely, a number of them admitted that the CBS had exerted a significant impact on community members' opinions regarding the onshore wind projects. Therefore, it is suggested that the very motivations behind CBS can be considered deviant, this despite many communities not experiencing them in this way. Accordingly, it is suggested that Renewable UK and the UK Government take the necessary actions to formalise CBS within UK law, thus empowering communities. Furthermore, it is also advised that CBS be marketed in such a way that communities are clear that payments are compensation for the negative effects of onshore wind projects or other types of developments which may in the future also utilise CBS.

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Executive summary

The provision of community benefits schemes (CBS) in the United Kingdom (UK) has been touted as one of a number of strategies proposed to aid in the fostering of public support for onshore wind projects, amid a serious political drive to decarbonise the UK's economy. CBS are described by the UK wind industry as a way of ensuring that a proportion of the benefits associated with onshore wind projects go directly to the communities that host them. Accordingly, CBS are a voluntary policy instrument, which entails the provision of financial payments from project developers to the communities that host the onshore wind projects, for the estimated 25 year lifespan of the onshore wind projects. However, CBS have been criticised in the academic literature, with suggestions that they are akin to bribery, that community groups have little say regarding their delineation, and indeed, some scholars have questioned the motivations behind project developers' use of CBS. One prominent angle taken by researchers of CBS has been to suggest that the need for justice for the communities that host the onshore wind projects would be a more appropriate rationale for providing CBS. Thus, this piece of research postulated that if the development and implementation of CBS were to pertain to procedural justice ideals, then it may better help stimulate the public support for onshore wind energy which would subsequently aid in the quest to decarbonise the UK's economy.

Accordingly, procedural justice postulates that should people view the procedures by which allocation decisions are made as fair; then they are subsequently more likely to view the outcomes of those decisions as fair, irrespective of whether or not the outcomes are in their favour. Moreover, this piece of research was concerned with procedural justice as perceived by community groups which have received CBS. Thus, perceived procedural justice was conceptualised by combining two prominent theories of procedural justice: the Leventhal criteria (Leventhal, 1980), and the control model for procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker, 1975), leading to five conditions which are required for it to be conceived: bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability, ethicality, and process control.

Therein, the fundamental aim of the research was to assess as to what extent the development and implementation of CBS, pertains to the conditions for procedural justice. To achieve this, a mix-methods approach was adopted. Procedural justice was operationalised by means of 25 indicators, and a perceived procedural justice ranking scale to rank community groups' perceptions of procedural justice was derived. Subsequently, surveys were completed by community groups which had received CBS, allowing the community groups' perceptions of procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of CBS to be ranked on the perceived procedural justice ranking scale. Significantly, 10 indicators were excluded from the analysis on account of the fact that the community groups deemed them to be of limited relevance. This therefore reaffirmed what is stated in the literature, in that some conditions for procedural justice are more relevant in certain contexts than in others. Meanwhile, follow up interviews were conducted with some of the survey respondents, these served to elucidate as to the reasons why certain conditions for procedural justice, were ranked higher or lower on the perceived procedural justice scale, after the analysis of the surveys.

The analysis of the surveys completed by the community representatives serves to make two main claims. Firstly, the level of procedural justice proliferated by CBS appears to have increased over time, quite likely due to the gradual increase in government and wind industry-led policies backing the development and implementation of CBS to adhere to the conditions for procedural justice. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the: population size of the affected community group, the size of the onshore wind project, the value of the community benefits scheme, whether or not the community group are the only community group receiving community benefits from a particular onshore wind project, and the structure of the community benefits scheme affect the level of procedural justice proliferated by a community benefits scheme. Accordingly, providing that the time period in which two or more CBS were agreed upon is the same, it would be expected that on average, the levels of perceived procedural justice proliferated by the CBS would be similar, irrespective of any variation in the aforementioned characteristics of the community group or the CBS themselves.

The mean perceived procedural justice ranking score for the surveyed CBS was 3.56 out of a possible attainable score of 5. This is a positive score, especially considering the fact that bribery and a lack of community influence over the design of CBS have been common criticisms of CBS. However, the interviews with the representatives of the community groups provided a valuable insight here. Indeed, whilst the community groups sampled in the surveys and the interviewees reported no evidence of bribery on the behalves of the project developers, if a macro-level approach is taken, it can be considered that CBS as an entire policy is legal bribery, depending upon how much cynicism is applied. Moreover, a number of the community representatives suggested in the interviews that their communities' opinions regarding CBS and the onshore wind projects themselves were directly impacted upon by the amount of benefits they were receiving. Thus, a paradox was identified. Accordingly, depending upon the perceiver, CBS can be viewed as a policy for providing and enhancing procedural justice; or on the contrary, a policy which aims to proliferate onshore wind projects by paying off any would-be community opposition. Accordingly, CBS can be interpreted as wrong, even though a lot of communities do not experience them in this way.

Taking this in to account, caution is urged from the perspectives of Renewable UK and the UK Government who are party to the formulation of policy regarding CBS; even more so, given that CBS have been suggested to be utilised for new nuclear power stations and for fracking. The evidence regarding CBS within the onshore wind industry suggests that CBS can aid the UK Government in its quest to proliferate new nuclear power stations, and help to make fracking commercially viable, but at a tall cost. That is to say; even if the majority of community groups do not perceive community benefits to be akin to bribery, does this make it right for the UK Government to proceed with this?

Accordingly, this piece of research calls for the formalisation of CBS within the legal framework of the UK. The formalisation of its institutions would make communities entitled to demand payment from a project developer, thus empowering them in the sense that they would have the option to say no to the project if they could not agree on a level of community benefit payment. Additionally, CBS should be framed by Renewable UK and the UK Government as a form of compensation for the negative effects of a particular energy development; thus, this would be viewed as them being honest regarding the true motivations behind CBS.

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List of acronyms

CBS	Community Benefit Schemes
DECC	Department for Energy and Climate Change
DTI	Department for Trade and Industry
MW	Megawatt
NIMBY	Not In My Back Yard
NIRIG	Northern Ireland Renewables Industry Group
PFR	Partnerships for Renewables
SSE	Scottish and Southern Energy
UK	United Kingdom

1.1 Problem analysis

1.1.1 An introduction to procedural justice

Environmental justice refers to the equitable distribution of environmental impacts (Gross, 2007). Kuehn (2000) discussed the fact that since the 1980s, environmental justice has grown to encompass both the distribution of outcomes (distributive justice), and the fairness of the procedural making process (procedural justice). Konovsky (2000, p.492) mirrored this, in stating that procedural justice refers to ‘...how an allocation decision is made.’ A number of conceptualisations of procedural justice exist within the literature; these share many similarities, yet there are also noticeable differences. Thibaut and Walker (1975) introduced the notion of process control, whilst Leventhal (1980), conceptualised procedural justice by means of a set of rules, these yielded the tangible conditions of: bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability, ethicality representativeness and consistency. Interestingly, Leventhal (1980) stated that individuals judge seven aspects of a procedure against the procedural justice conditions; this leads to 42 possible combinations over which procedural justice judgements can be made. These seven aspects are: selection of agents, setting of ground rules, gathering information, decision structure, appeals, safeguards and change mechanisms. Allan Lind and Tom Tyler have also theorised greatly about procedural justice, their most influential contribution being their group-value theory (Lind and Tyler, 1988). To this end, MacCoun (2005) discussed the fact that it is more relevant to focus on procedural justice as opposed to distributive justice, because fair procedures will in turn lead to fair outcomes. Maguire and Lind (2003) also supported this notion, arguing that authorities involved in decision making procedures for which public support is required, should ensure that the decision making process satisfies the public’s perceptions of justice and fairness. Similarly, Van den Bos et al. (2014), argued that should decision making procedures be viewed as just and fair by the public, then they are more likely to view the outcomes as fair and just. These viewpoints mirror the gradual shift in focus from distributive justice to procedural justice within the justice literature, which is described by Tyler and Blader (2003a). Consequently, this piece of research focused on procedural justice.

The role that the public’s perceptions of procedural justice can have on enhancing the social acceptability of governmental decisions is a relatively unexplored topic (Van den Bos et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the environmental justice literature emphasises the need for procedural justice in decision making processes to ensure fair outcomes (see: Gross, 2007; Hall et al., 2013; Kerr et al., 2017 Smith and McDonough, 2001). The need for procedural justice in decision making processes is also mirrored more generally across the board, in legal settings (see: Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler, 1989), and also in organisational culture settings (see: Brockner et al., 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). To this end, it becomes evident that procedural justice offers both an interesting and relevant lens for examining an issue which is topical at the present, namely the provision of community benefits schemes (CBS) by onshore wind project developers in the United Kingdom (UK).

1.1.2 *The need for CBS in the UK*

The UK Government has placed particular emphasis on the development of onshore wind projects in its efforts to decarbonise the economy due to internal and external political pressures (DECC [Department for Energy and Climate Change], 2011; European Commission, 2015). This is owed to the fact that onshore wind has become increasingly affordable, whilst the UK has some of the best wind resources in Europe (DECC, 2012; Renewable UK, 2017a); however, a major dilemma remains. This refers to the fact that, at the local level, community opposition to onshore wind projects is high (Jones and Eiser, 2010). Indeed, initial research in the early 2000s put this high level of public opposition down to NIMBYism (not in my backyard) (Cass et al., 2010); however, more recent analyses, including those of Devine-Wright (2009) and Eltham et al. (2008), have put it down to a manifestation of several different factors.

CBS are one of a number of strategies proposed to aid in fostering local-level, community support for onshore wind projects in the UK (Walker et al., 2014). According to Renewable UK, the trade association of wind power operators in the UK, CBS are a way of ensuring a proportion of the benefits associated with onshore wind projects, go directly to the communities that host them (Renewable UK, 2013). CBS entail the provision of some form of benefit for the communities affected by onshore wind projects (Bristow et al., 2012; Renewable UK, 2013). These payments most often involve the project developer creating a community benefit fund, in to which they pay a predefined sum of money per Megawatt (MW) installed per year to the affected community. However, lumped sum payments, payments linked to the annual profits of the onshore wind project, in-kind benefits, such as the provision of education or job creation (DECC, 2014a), and local ownership in the form of shares bought or given to the community by the project developers are also common practice (Centre for Sustainable Energy et al., 2009). Since 2002, the amount of benefit offered by project developers has gradually increased, from a typical fee of £1000 per MW installed per year to upwards of £4000 per MW installed per year (Bristow et al., 2012) and up to £5000 per MW installed per year from 2014 onwards (DECC, 2014a).

Therein, this research defines a community benefits scheme as, the provision of a package of benefits by a project developer to a community group, as defined by the project developer, in response to the development and operation of an onshore wind project within the geographical area of that specific community group, as is defined by the project developer. Moreover, community benefits is used synonymously with community benefits schemes(s). Therein, a community group refers to the stipulated beneficiaries of a specific community benefits scheme, as is specified in the community benefits registers¹ of England (Renewable UK, 2017a), Scotland² (Local Energy Scotland, 2017), and Wales³ (Welsh Government, 2017). Community groups are subsequently served by community representatives for the purposes of this research. Accordingly, a community representative is defined as the person from each community group whom directly participated in

¹ The community benefits register of England can be viewed online at:
<http://www.communitybenefitsregister.org/>

² The community benefits register of Scotland can be viewed online at:
<http://www.localenergyscotland.org/view-the-register/>

³ The community benefits register of Wales can be viewed online at:
<http://gov.wales/topics/environmentcountryside/energy/renewable/wind/register/?skip=1&lang=en>

the research. In addition, a project developer refers to any company which has created an onshore wind project, and has subsequently funded a community benefits scheme, as stipulated in the community benefits registers of England, Scotland, and Wales.

An important thing to be aware of is the fact that CBS are a voluntary mechanism, entirely distinct from compensation schemes (Aitken, 2010), in which the developer of an onshore wind project may offer the local community some form of payment (financial or otherwise), which according to the UK government, is a way of sharing the value of wind energy (DECC, 2014a). The offering of CBS has become popular amongst developers of onshore wind projects in the UK, particularly because they are envisaged as a way of fostering support for onshore wind projects and subsequently accelerating planning consent (HM Government, 2009).

Questions have however, been raised as to how far CBS go towards changing the public's perceptions regarding onshore wind projects (Walker et al., 2014). Indeed, Aitken (2010), in a longitudinal analysis of a rural wind farm in Scotland, revealed that CBS were perceived by many people as a bribe, and this in fact served to create distrust between the community and the project developer. This notion of bribery is also something uncovered in a study by Cass et al. (2010). Meanwhile, Evans et al. (2011) questioned whether CBS are offered by project developers for the 'right reasons'. In addition, Cowell et al. (2011), in a study of three onshore wind projects in Wales, inferred that, unless communities possess some sort of control over the design of the onshore wind projects, then CBS will not achieve social acceptability. Bristow et al. (2012) studied the impacts of CBS across 28 windfarms in Wales, and deduced that as the proliferation of CBS increases, so does the aura of confusion surrounding what constitutes the affected community in a geographical sense. This was proven in some cases to create social injustice, as communities claiming to be affected by the onshore wind projects received no community benefits packages. This subsequently relates greatly to the message of Cowell et al. (2012), who discussed the fact that justice should be seen as an acceptable rationale for providing CBS as opposed to creating social acceptability, and in this light, the provision of CBS would be viewed as a social obligation, rather than a matter of choice.

1.1.3 Knowledge gap

It is clear from past experiences that the ways in which CBS have been provided by onshore wind project developers to the communities affected by onshore wind projects, is not sufficient for stimulating the large-scale public support for onshore wind energy that is required. The studies discussed above, highlight three main areas of concern for communities: perceptions of bribery on the behalves of project developers (Aitken, 2010), a lack of a say over the development and implementation of CBS (Cowell et al., 2011), and communities claiming to be affected by an onshore wind project, not being included in the community benefits package by the project developer (Bristow et al., 2012). To this end, there is a gap in the literature concerning how public support for CBS can be procured. Or in the mould of Van den Bos et al. (2014), how decisions by project developers can be legitimised. Procedural justice literature offers both an innovative and promising means of filling this gap. Recent publications in the realm of CBS also support this notion. Recently, best practice guides for the delivery of CBS, based upon previous experiences have been issued by the governments of England and Scotland, in consultation with Renewable UK (see: DECC, 2014a; Local Energy Scotland, 2013). Whilst in Wales and Northern Ireland, Renewable UK has supported

the development of best practice recommendations, alongside the relevant wind industries (NIRIG [the Northern Ireland Renewables Industry Group], 2014; Welsh onshore wind developers in: PFR [Partnerships for Renewables], 2013). The best practice guide for England highlights six principles which it is recommended that project developers adhere to when administering CBS to communities; these principles are based upon predominately procedural justice literature, and are depicted in figure 1-1 (DECC, 2014a). The best practice guides and recommendations for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, also draw attention to the importance of procedural justice principles (see: Local Energy Scotland, 2013, pp.7-26; NIRIG, 2014, pp.19-20; Welsh onshore wind developers in: PFR, 2013, p.2). Procedural justice focuses on the fairness of the procedural making process (Kuehn, 2000), and postulates that should decision making procedures be viewed as just and fair by the public, then they are more likely to view the outcome as fair and just. (Van den Bos et al., 2014). Thus, it was postulated that should the conditions for procedural justice discussed by Thibaut and Walker (1975) and Leventhal (1980) be adhered to by project developers when developing and implementing CBS, then community groups would be more likely to view the outcome of the community benefits provision as just and fair, subsequently making it more likely that the general public would support the onshore wind project (Van den Bos et al., 2014). Therefore, it became a question of ascertaining whether the procedures in relation to the provision of CBS by onshore wind developers, exhibit characteristics of procedural justice.

In addition, this research also aimed to contribute towards plugging a gap within the theoretical debate concerning what constitutes procedural justice and how best to operationalise it in the empirical reality. Accordingly, Colquitt et al. (2001) discussed the range of operationalisations of procedural justice previously utilised in the academic literature, including the utilisation of: process control, Leventhal criteria, measures of informational and interpersonal justice, and a mixture of process control, Leventhal criteria and informational and interpersonal justice criteria. These different operationalisations stem from two main streams of procedural justice theory (Konovsky, 2000): instrumental theories, which spawned process control (Thibaut and Walker, 1975) and the Leventhal criteria (Leventhal, 1980), and relational theories, which spawned informational and interpersonal justice criteria (Bies and Moag, 1986), as well as the group-value model of procedural justice (Tyler and Lind, 1980). Therefore, this research aimed to contribute towards filling the aforementioned gap in the literature, by synthesising existing theory in order to define procedural justice in the context of CBS, and subsequently operationalise it.

Principles of best practice

Timely

All parties should consider and communicate how they can contribute to the process of providing community benefits in a timely fashion. Developers should state their approach to community benefits at the point that details of the proposed development are made public, to allow the community time to consider how and when they wish to engage in negotiations

Transparent

Transparency and integrity should be a priority in both establishing and administering community benefit schemes for all parties involved. Details of community benefit packages agreed should be included on the English Community Benefit Register, once available, by both developers and fund administrators.

Constructive

All parties involved should engage in a positive manner and aim to create and strengthen relationships based on mutual trust. All participants should focus on creating a positive legacy which generates tangible benefits in the area local to the development.

Inclusive

All parties should look to involve a wide range of local stakeholders and help to identify and engage people in the community. Developers should follow best practice engagement techniques set out in Community Engagement for Onshore Wind Developments: Best Practice Guidance (2014) in an attempt to include the full range of potential stakeholders. They should apply consistency in their approach to engagement and should cooperate with other developers in an area, where appropriate, to enable better strategic outcomes.

Fair

Good governance in the way community benefit packages are distributed and managed should always be applied, with the interest of the community as a whole at the heart.

Unconditional

The offer of community benefits should not be dependent upon support from the community for the wind development, or the granting of consent by the local planning authority. Contributing to community benefit discussions must not affect an individual or organisation's right to express a view on the development proposals. Objecting to, or supporting, the development should not affect an individual's/group's/organisation's right to discuss community benefit proposals.

Figure 1-1 The best practice principles for the implementation and delivery of CBS in England (DECC, 2014a, p.14)

To this end, a policy evaluation of CBS was conducted. A policy evaluation is necessary in order to assess whether a programme has improved the social conditions it aims to improve. For a programme to be successful, it must bring about a degree of measurable, positive change (Rossi et al., 2014).

1.2 Societal relevance

The research is relevant in a societal capacity because it highlights ways in which the public's support for onshore wind projects could be enhanced, specifically by addressing the ways in which CBS are provided to community groups by onshore wind project developers. The project also focuses on procedural justice, since the literature supports the notion that an increase in procedural justice would not only likely increase public acceptancy of windfarms (Gross, 2007), but it would also foster a fairer society. Thus, the research project has the potential to benefit two main groups: the communities affected by CBS and the onshore wind project developers who implement CBS. The UK Government will benefit indirectly, since increasing the public acceptancy of wind energy projects sits well with its goal of decarbonising the economy. Thus, in analysing and evaluating CBS through a procedural justice lens, this research enables a realisation of the conditions for procedural justice that are evident, which conditions might be lacking to a degree, and how the situation could be improved.

1.3 Research objective and research questions

The research objective of this piece of research is to help improve the provision of community benefits schemes (CBS) which aim to stimulate public support for onshore wind projects in the United Kingdom (UK), by making an analysis and assessment of the levels of perceived procedural justice that active CBS have proliferated, whilst simultaneously offering explanations as to why this might be the case.

This leads to the central research question:

To what extent do the development and implementation of CBS in the UK meet the five conditions for procedural justice? The five conditions for procedural justice being: bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability, ethicality, and process control.

The five conditions for procedural justice subsequently served as the criteria by which CBS as a policy was evaluated. As a means of answering the central research question, the following sub-questions were derived. Each sub-question refers to a part of the research framework presented on page 10, and therefore, a chapter of the thesis.

1. What criteria are useful for evaluating CBS as a policy, based upon the procedural justice literature? (Chapter 2: the delineation of an analytical framework)
2. What level of perceived procedural justice is proliferated across the sampled CBS, according to the perceived procedural justice ranking scale? (Chapter 4: Empirical analysis and results)
3. What explanations can be deduced from the interviews with the community representatives as to why certain conditions for procedural justice scored lower than others? (Chapter 4: Empirical analysis and results)
4. What do we learn from integrating the results from the surveys with the results from the interviews with the community representatives, with regards to how the development and implementation of CBS might better stimulate procedural justice in the future? (Chapter 5: Discussion and conclusion)

1.4 *Scientific relevance*

This piece of research aimed to connect to debates on policy practices, specifically regarding the suitability of CBS for promoting the large-scale, public acceptance of onshore wind projects. The research creates added value, in the sense that examining CBS via a procedural justice lens is an innovative approach to addressing a relevant issue. Moreover, Cowell et al. (2012) argued that CBS should be treated as a way of stimulating justice, especially in contexts when the communities are socially and economically deprived, not merely as a way to get the community 'on side'.

Whetten (1989) discussed the fact that a theoretical contribution must supplement the existing 'what', 'how', 'who', and 'why' factors of an existing theory. Thus, the research endeavoured to make a significant contribution to the procedural justice literature by attempting to plug the aforementioned gap in the theoretical knowledge base. Previously, relatively little work attempting to address the components of procedural justice as perceived by its recipients has been conducted (Blader and Tyler, 2003a). However, it can be said that conceptualisations and subsequent operationalisations of it, have generally belonged to two broad theoretical groups: instrumental and relational (Colquit et al., 2001). Accordingly, chapter 2 of this thesis presents a critical discussion of the different conceptualisations and operationalisations of procedural justice in the literature, which subsequently leads to its conceptualisation for this piece of research. Critically, a means of measuring procedural justice is developed and empirically tested. Thus, in the mould of Whetten (1989), this satisfies the 'what' criteria for contributing towards theory development by suggesting how procedural justice as a phenomenon, should be conceptualised. This creates added value from the perspective of the academic literature, because more than forty years have passed since Thibaut and Walker (1975) first published their work highlighting the importance of procedural justice, and despite several attempts (see: Blader and Tyler 2003a and Colquitt et al., 2001), no overarching theory of procedural justice has become wholly acknowledged and accepted within the academic community. This piece of research attempted to synthesise the existing theory in order to take one small step closer towards an overarching theory of procedural justice, via the creation of a perceived procedural justice scale to measure procedural justice as perceived by community groups whom are the recipients of CBS.

The use of a perceived procedural justice ranking scale with five indicators of procedural justice is an innovative idea. Van Den Bos et al. (2014) utilised a similar scale to measure perceived procedural justice; however, their work only adopted three indicators of procedural justice. Therefore, the development and subsequent testing of the perceived procedural justice ranking scale was an advancement of the efforts of Van Den Bos et al. (2014), meaning that procedural justice could be measured more accurately empirically. On the next page, the research framework is presented and elucidated upon.

1.5 Research framework




Figure 1-2 A schematic representation of the research to be conducted

The research framework is split in to three parts which each represent one of the chapters of this thesis: the derivation of an analytical framework (chapter 2), empirical analysis and results (chapter 4), and discussion and conclusion (chapter 5). An outline of the work conducted in each of these parts and its contribution to the thesis is presented in chapter 1.5.

1.5.1 *The derivation of an analytical framework*

A thorough analysis of the procedural justice literature is presented in chapter two. The analysis includes four of the most influential theories of procedural justice, and culminates in a synthesis of two of the most preeminent theories of procedural justice (Leventhal 1980), (Thibaut and Walker 1975), which was utilised in order to conceptualise procedural justice within the context of this research and to derive the conditions which were used to evaluate CBS. Furthermore, a desk-study of community benefits scheme material, including the community benefits registers of England, Scotland and Wales (see: Local Energy Scotland 2017; Renewable UK, 2017b; Welsh Government, 2017), and UK Government policy regarding CBS in the shape of the best practice recommendations for project developers (see: DECC, 2014a; Local Energy Scotland, 2013; NIRIG, 2014; Welsh onshore wind developers in: PFR, 2013), was utilised alongside the procedural justice theory in order to delineate indicators for the procedural justice conditions. Additionally, chapter 2 introduces the perceived procedural justice ranking scale upon which CBS are evaluated. In addition, chapter 2 further elucidates as to the importance of procedural justice in decision making procedures. To achieve this, Scopus and Google Scholar were utilised to find relevant scientific articles and prominent authors, such as: Kees van den Bos, Gerald Leventhal, Allan Lind, Tom Tyler, and Steven Blader.

1.5.2 *Empirical analysis and results*

In order to evaluate the CBS, two approaches were followed. One approach was quantitative in nature; this aspect of the research is encapsulated in the research framework on the left-hand side. The quantitative aspect of the research served to evaluate CBS at the national level, utilising mathematical means. The quantitative aspect of the research aimed to take in to consideration as many CBS as possible, utilising the community benefits registers of England, Scotland and Wales as data sources (Local Energy Scotland 2017; Renewable UK, 2017b; Welsh Government, 2017). The other approach taken was qualitative in nature. The qualitative aspect adopted non-mathematical means of research in the form of interviews with community representatives. This aspect of the research is encapsulated in the research framework on the right-hand side. The qualitative aspect of the research entailed the selection of five case studies. A number of criteria were formulated to select the case studies. These are discussed in chapter 3.

The quantitative approach utilised the community benefits registers of England, Scotland, and Wales (Local Energy Scotland 2017; Renewable UK, 2017b; Welsh Government, 2017) as sources of information from which the cases which were studied, were derived. Each of the cases was composed of one survey completed by one community representative. Explanations as to the methodological choices made here are presented in the methodology (chapter 3). As previously stated, the CBS were evaluated on a perceived procedural justice ranking scale; this is introduced in chapter 2. The perceived procedural justice ranking scale ranked each condition for procedural justice, as ascertained from Leventhal (1980), and Thibaut and Walker (1975), in terms of its

prominence regarding a particular community benefits scheme case. The scale utilised is a five-point scale (1-5), with one being the lowest score attainable and five being the highest. Van den Bos et al. (2014) also used a five-point scale when measuring perceived procedural justice. The indicators which were derived from the literature were utilised as a means of ascertaining as to what extent the conditions for procedural justice were evident in the CBS which were studied. This resulted in an evaluation of CBS in terms of the levels of perceived procedural justice that they have proliferated at the individual level. From the sub-total of all of the individual results, a national mean was derived. The results of the analysis from the quantitative aspect subsequently served to make claims about the levels of perceived procedural justice proliferated by CBS at the national level.

The assessment of the sampled CBS in the quantitative aspect facilitated the necessary discussions in order for five community representatives to agree to take part in the study. These discussions formed the basis of the case selection in the qualitative aspect, thus resulting in five qualitative case studies. In addition, an interview with a local governmental official was also conducted. This is elucidated upon further in chapter 3. The interview questions posed were drawn directly from the community representatives' answers to the survey questions posed in the quantitative aspect, which specifically addressed the conditions for procedural justice, by asking questions directly relating to their indicators. The interviews with the community representatives were subsequently analysed using QSR NVivo, specifically by utilising open and axial coding. This facilitated a deeper analysis of community groups' perceptions of procedural justice as it allowed the respondents to divulge as to why they answered the survey questions the way they did, thus adding an explanatory element to the research. The results of the interviews with the community representatives were analysed according to the five conditions for procedural justice; therefore, this facilitated comparisons between the cases in terms of how evident each of the conditions for procedural justice were.

As a means of forming a fully substantiated answer to the central research question the results of the quantitative and qualitative aspects were confronted with one-another. Accordingly, the results from the interviews with the community representatives were utilised as means of offering explanations as to the reasons why certain conditions for procedural justice were more or less evident than others.

1.5.3 Discussion and conclusion

In the discussion, CBS as a policy are evaluated at the national level; this therefore formulates the answer to the central research question. The final evaluation consists of the most important research findings concerning each of the five conditions for procedural justice, and contributions to the procedural justice theoretical debate. Lastly, Renewable UK, alongside the UK Government is party to the administering of guidelines for the provision of CBS across the UK. Therefore, the evaluation conducted was utilised to make recommendations to Renewable UK and the UK Government regarding how CBS might better stimulate large-scale public support for onshore wind projects in the future.

1.6 Thesis outline

In chapter 2, the derivation of an analytical framework, a synopsis of the most prominent and influential works within the procedural justice literature takes place. This leads to the conceptualisation of procedural justice for the purposes of this research, including the delineation of five conditions for procedural justice which are used to evaluate CBS: bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability, ethicality, and process control. Additionally, a series of indicators for each of the conditions are drawn from the procedural justice and the community benefits scheme literature. These served as a means of evaluating as to what extent each of the conditions for procedural justice was evident in the both the survey sample and the five interviews with the community representatives, as well as the interview with the local governmental official. Chapter 3 is the methodology. This consists of the following parts: research strategy, case selection, data collection, and data analysis. Chapter 4 introduces the empirical findings and results of the research, whilst chapter 5 represents the discussion and conclusion. This is comprised of the evaluation of CBS in so far as it is discussed as to what extent the development and implementation of them meets the conditions for procedural justice. Additionally, chapter 5 discusses the contribution of the research towards fulfilling the aforementioned research gap, as well as discussing: the limitations pertaining to the methodology, directions for future research, and providing policy recommendations to Renewable UK and the UK Government.

2 *The derivation of an analytical framework*

In order to assess as to what extent the development and implementation of CBS in the UK meet the conditions for procedural justice, it was first necessary to clarify the conceptualisation of procedural justice relative to the context of this piece of research; and secondly, to decipher what conditions must be evident in order for procedural justice to exist. Thus, this chapter of the thesis is specifically aimed at answering sub-question number one:

What criteria are useful for evaluating community benefits schemes as a policy, based upon the procedural justice literature?

As a means of answering this sub-question, the chapter commences by outlining three different, yet fundamentally important theories of procedural justice, each of which has stood the test of time with regards to its standing amongst current procedural justice scholars. The three theories are: the control model of procedural justice, conceptualised by Thibaut and Walker in 1975, the theory of procedural justice judgements, (known as the Leventhal criteria), coined by Gerald Leventhal in 1980, and the group-value model of procedural justice, presided over by Allan Lind and Tom Tyler in 1988. Next, a fourth, more recent theory, aiming to build towards the formal conceptualisation of procedural just is discussed. This theory is known as the four-component model of procedural justice, and was mooted by Steven Blader and Tom Tyler in 2003 (Blader and Tyler, 2003b). Subsequently, the four theories are discussed in terms of their merits within the procedural justice literature, alongside their merits for inclusion in the analytical framework utilised to evaluate CBS, this taking in to account the context of CBS. The chapter culminates in the conceptualisation of procedural justice in terms of the conditions that are necessary for it to be conceived, followed by the presentation of an analytical framework which details the necessary indicators for each of the conditions. These conditions subsequently serve as evaluation criteria in order to answer the central research question:

To what extent do the development and implementation of CBS in the UK meet the five conditions for procedural justice? The five conditions for procedural justice being: process control, bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability and ethicality.

2.1 *Four theories of procedural justice*

2.1.1 *The control model of procedural justice by Thibaut and Walker*

The origins of procedural justice can be traced back to Thibaut and Walker (1975), who confronted justice literature with the study of process, within the legal setting, creating the control model of procedural justice. Thibaut and Walker (1975, in: Lind and Tyler, 1988) explained procedural justice from the perspectives' of individuals who found themselves in a dispute, and subsequently turned to a third-party in order to settle the dispute. Having turned to the third-party, individuals would then wish for the dispute to be solved equitably and humanely, whilst hoping to retain some notion of control over their outcomes. Thus, the individuals would pay great attention to the procedure which determined the mediation by the third-party (Thibaut and Walker, 1975, in: Tyler, 1989). Moreover, a procedure is defined as something which distributes outcomes (Leventhal, 1980). The fact that individuals are predominantly concerned with their own outcomes leads to the underpinning

assumption of the theory; the individual being desperate to control their own outcome subsequently relinquishing decision control and instead choosing to exert a measure of control by hoping to influence the process (Thibaut and Walker, 1975, in: Lind and Tyler, 1988). Indeed, process control refers to the delivery of evidence, whilst decision control refers to participants' control over the delivery of evidence (Tyler, 1989).

In their seminal work, Thibaut and Walker (1975) conceptualised what is known as the fair process effect (or voice effect), whereby people will often view a procedure as fair, so long as they had input regarding the process by which that procedure was determined (Blader and Tyler, 2003a; Colquitt et al., 2001; Tyler, 1987). According to Lind et al. (1990), this line of reasoning belongs to a body of procedural justice theory known as instrumental theory, whereby scholars endeavour 'to explain procedural justice phenomena with reference to the perceiver's assumptions about the outcomes that various procedures would generate' (p.952). The voice effect can be explained by the fact that people who are given a chance to voice their views, believe that this voice will enable them to better control their outcomes, as they may be able to persuade the decision maker to choose an outcome more in their favour (Lind et al., 1990). Research subsequent to that of Thibaut and Walker (1975) has highlighted the greater significance of process control; this is important, even when not linked to decision control (Blader and Tyler, 2003b; Tyler, 1989).

2.1.2 Six rules for fair procedures: the Leventhal criteria

Leventhal (1980) can be credited with the accolade of extending the notion of procedural justice beyond the legal setting (Colquitt et al., 2001). Indeed, his conceptualisation of procedural justice is much broader than that of Thibaut and Walker (Tyler, 1989), increasing the understanding of what people utilise to make assessments of procedural justice greatly (Konovsky, 2000). In his seminal work, a theory of procedural justice judgments, Leventhal (1980) identified six rules that a procedure would have to meet if it is to be deemed as fair. These rules go beyond the control model conceptualised by Thibaut and Walker (1975). Thus, according to Leventhal (1980), procedures should: be applied consistently across different peoples over time (consistency), be bias-suppressed (decision making roles should be separated from personal advocacy) (bias-suppression), be based upon the best and most accurate information available (accuracy), be modifiable in the face of new, relevant information (correctability), be representative of the values and concerns of different groups (representativeness), and conform to personal standards of ethicality (ethicality). In addition to this, Leventhal (1980) discussed the fact that individuals make judgements of fairness regarding seven procedural components: selection of agents, setting of ground rules, gathering information, decision structure, appeals, safeguards and change mechanisms. According to Leventhal (1980), the seven procedural components are all located in the sequence of events which lead to the distribution of a reward. Individuals can, in theory, judge any of the seven procedural components by means of any of the six procedural rules, leading to 42 possible combinations. The sequence of events begins with the selection of agents and culminates with change mechanisms (Leventhal, 1980). Please see table 2-1 for a description of each procedural component.

Procedural component	Description of procedural component
Selection of agents	'The sequence of events begins with procedures for choosing the persons or agents who serve as decision makers or information collectors in the allocative process. These individuals may be elected, or selected by higher authorities' (p.22).
Setting ground rules	'The sequence next involves procedures for informing potential receivers about the nature of available rewards and what must be done to obtain them. Performance goals and evaluation criteria must be defined and communicated to the receivers' (p.22).
Gathering information	'Next come procedures for gathering and utilising information about the prospective receivers of reward before distributing. It is usually necessary to evaluate the recipients. For this purpose, reliable information about their behaviour must be obtained. In addition, it may be necessary to develop criteria for deciding which types of information constitute usable evidence' (p.22).
Decision structure	'The next set of procedures defines the structure of the final decision process by which reward or punishment is allocated. This factor is especially important in the case of collective action decisions because the structure of a group decision process may be quite complex. A variety of procedural arrangements are possible when decisions are made by a group or committee, or by a succession of individuals located at progressively higher (or lower) levels in the social system' (pp.22-23).
Appeals	'Social systems usually have some form of grievance or appeal procedures that give dissatisfied individuals, and their sympathisers, an opportunity to seek redress. They may attempt to modify either the distribution of reward itself, or actions taken at earlier stages in the allocative process. The appeal procedures may be highly structured and formal, or quite informal' (p.23).
Safeguards	'Some procedures serve as safeguards which ensure that agents who administer the allocative process are performing their responsibilities with honesty and integrity. Other procedures deter opportunistic Individuals from obtaining rewards or resources by Illicit means. In either case, the procedures involve monitoring behaviour and applying sanctions when required' (p.23).
Change mechanisms	'A final let of procedures involves methods for changing procedures that regulate the allocative process. The methods for changing procedures may profoundly affect the stability of distribution policies over time, and the possibility of correcting unfair situations' (p.23).

Table 2-1 Descriptions of the seven procedural components of procedural postulated by Leventhal (Leventhal, 1980, pp.22-23).

2.1.3 The group-value model of procedural justice by Lind and Tyler

A third body of procedural justice literature, known as relational theory was proposed by Lind and Tyler (1988). Indeed in 1988, they introduced their group-value model of procedural justice (Lind and Tyler, 1988). Within the group-value model, people are concerned with regard to their long-term social relationships with authorities. To this end, people care about non-control issues, such as: the neutrality of the decision making procedure, trust in the third-party making the decision, and evidence concerning their social standing within the group. Though more recently, Folger and Cropanzano (1998) made the assertion that the notion of trust is not just relevant to interactions with third-parties, rather anyone with whom an individual is mutually interdependent. Subsequently, the group-value model posits that these group-value issues will ‘...have an effect on reactions to experiences that is independent of the influence of...the distribution of control’ (Tyler, 1989, p.831). The major assumption of group-value theory is that people psychologically value being a part of a group, in the sense that interactions within the group are socially rewarding. Indeed, a group can refer to a family, a body of colleagues, a group of friends, or a political organisation comprised of its members (Tyler, 1989). The group-value model posits that procedures represent the norms by which a group operates and therefore makes decisions (Lind et al., 1990). When these procedures adhere to the central values of the group, procedural justice is proliferated (Tyler, 1994). The group-value model suggests that group members, whom are afforded a chance to voice their views, are valued members of the group enacting the procedure. Therefore, people value voice as it suggests that their views are worth listening to. Subsequently, procedures that deal status in this way are viewed in a positive light, irrespective of their ultimate impact on the outcome of the decision making process (Lind et al., 1990). Contrary to the instrumental theory of Thibaut and Walker (1975), which posits that the sole cause of the voice effect is the belief that voice will lead to a more favourable outcome, the relational theory of Lind and Tyler (1988), suggests that the voice effect occurs solely due to the individual status-enhancing ramifications of being able to express one’s views (Lind et al., 1990).

Blader and Tyler (2003a) offer anecdotal evidence which brilliantly highlights the differences between the control model and the group-value model in terms of how procedural justice is accounted for. Regarding a hypothetical performance review at work, the control model emphasises the fact that an employee would evaluate their review process according to how much opportunity they are afforded to give their views, thus allowing them to substantiate their level of performance. This opportunity would be valued by the employee because it may enable them influence the outcome of the review, possibly resulting in a pay raise. Conversely, the group-value model dictates that the employee would evaluate their review process in terms of what it reveals about their relationship with their company. Thus, the employee would aim their attention towards whether their manager treated them respectfully, whether their performance review was unbiased, and whether their manager took the review seriously. This anecdote shows that depending on which of the control model or the group-value model is selected, employees will evaluate procedures using different sets of criteria (Blader and Tyler, 2003a).

2.1.4 The four-component model of procedural justice by Blader and Tyler

It is well documented that there exists a significant level of ambiguity regarding the conceptualisation of procedural justice, as well as other types of justice (Cropanzano et al., 2002; Colquitt et al., 2001). Blader and Tyler (2003a) made a significant contribution towards reducing the level of ambiguity via the presentation of their four-component model of procedural justice. The four-component model is heavily embedded within the organisational change and management context, and as such; the model conveys procedural justice from the perspectives' of employees working for an organisation (Blader and Tyler, 2003a). The four-component model of procedural justice is depicted in table 2-2.

		<i>Source of justice concern</i>	
		Rules of the group (formal)	Actions of the supervisor (informal)
<i>Type of justice concern</i>	Quality of the decision making processes	Formal quality of decision making	Informal quality of decision making
	Quality of treatment	Formal quality of treatment	Informal quality of treatment

Table 2-2 The four-component model of procedural justice (Adapted from Blader and Tyler, 2003a, p.117).

The four-component model initially distinguishes between two types of justice concern. The first type of justice concern refers to how decisions are made; this is represented in the group-value model by neutrality (Blader and Tyler, 2003a). The issue of bias is also a concern in the control model of procedural justice, since individuals turn to a third-party in order for their disputes to be mediated (Blader and Tyler, 2003a; Thibaut and Walker, 1975, in: Tyler, 1989). In addition, bias-suppression is one of the six procedural rules discussed by Leventhal (1980). These types of concerns include, whether decisions are made in a consistent fashion, and whether decisions are made with due care (Blader and Tyler, 2003a). The second type of justice concern pertains to the quality of treatment. In the group-value model, this is represented by social status recognition, whilst Bies and Moag (1986) drew attention to this in their work on interactional justice. Leventhal (1980) also drew attention to this by means of his ethicality rule. Quality of treatment pertains to issues such as concern for individuals' rights, and dignity (Blader and Tyler, 2003a).

According to Blader and Tyler (2003a), there are two sources from which procedural justice judgements are made. The first source concerns the official rules and procedures of the organisation; these are known as formal bases. The second source concerns the experiences that employees have with specific authoritative figures within the organisation; these are known as informal bases. Formal bases are constant over time as organisational culture changes very slowly; however, informal bases are dynamic in the sense that they are dependent upon the relationship between the perceiver and the authoritative figure (Tyler and Blader, 2003a). Thus, the four-component model distinguishes itself from earlier conceptualisations of procedural justice because it goes beyond examining the impact of formal rules on people's perceptions of fairness. Instead, it takes in to account the impact that the enforcement of rules by group authorities has on people's perceptions of fairness, as well as the interpersonal relationships between people and authorities. Blader and Tyler (2003b) conducted two studies in order to test the prediction of the four-component model of procedural justice, both of these confirming the model.

2.2 Instrumental versus relational models of procedural justice

In the process of delineating their model, Blader and Tyler (2003a) addressed a number of key debates within the literature, including the instrumental versus relational debate. Blader and Tyler (2003a) discussed the fact that of the two models, the relational model has garnered more support generally, though they also acknowledged the fact that the instrumental model has also received significant support. Indeed, Lind (2001), Blader and Tyler (2003b), Joy and Witt (1992) and Tyler (1989) are all proponents of the relational model. Conversely, Leventhal (1980), Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002) and Colquitt et al. (2001) are proponents of the instrumental model.

Whilst the four-component model of procedural justice is grounded in relational theory (Blader and Tyler, 2003a and Blader and Tyler, 2003b), a large body of work acknowledges the fact that both instrumental and relational models are of significance. Indeed, Lind et al. (1990) empirically assessed whether the voice effect could be attributed to instrumental or relational factors. Their results showed that both instrumental and relational factors are at play. According to Tyler and Lind (1992), instrumental and relational models of procedural justice often overlap regarding predicted relationships between variables; however, the way in which they explain the relationships between these variables differs. Tyler and Lind (1992, p.143) utilised the following common procedural justice variables as an example: 'outcome favourability, control (aggregated from process control and decision control), neutrality, trust and standing.' Instrumental theories suggest that outcome favourability and control are the strongest determinants of whether a procedure is viewed as fair, since control over decisions is what people want from procedures. Conversely, relational models suggest that relationships within the procedure have a stronger bearing on the overall assessment of whether the procedure is viewed as fair or not. Therefore, from the perspective of relational models, notions of neutrality, trust and standing would be the strongest determinants of whether a procedure is viewed as fair or not (Tyler and Lind, 1992). Shapiro and Brett (1993) also assessed whether instrumental or relational factors are at play when accounting for people's perceptions of procedural justice. Their results replicated those of Tyler and Lind (1992). Thus, according to Konovsky (2000), it becomes a question of somehow combining the instrumental and relational models as opposed to being in favour of one or the other.

2.3 The relevance of (perceived) procedural justice in the context of CBS

Essential to this piece of research is the notion that justice and fairness play a critical role in people's assessments of social situations (Van den Bos and Lind, 2002). This research focuses specifically on perceived procedural justice, a term utilised in social psychological research to explain people's perceptions of fairness relative to how they are being treated (Konovsky and Cropanzano, 1991). This differentiates from objectivised justice, in the sense that objectivised justice is justice encapsulated solely within legal systems (Van den Bos et al., 2014).

Specifically speaking, this research is concerned with how citizens of communities which have been recipients of CBS in the UK, feel that they have been treated by project developers who have developed and subsequently implemented CBS. The significant body of procedural justice literature offers an invaluable means of examining communities' perceptions of procedural justice in relation

to this development and implementation. Indeed, a significant issue pertinent to justice literature concerns the ways in which people are likely to respond in situations where they believe they have been treated unfairly by an authority. Whether or not people feel that they have received procedural justice, can greatly affect their attitudes, feelings, beliefs and behaviours (Tyler and Lind, 1992; Van den Bos and Lind, 2001). Procedural justice judgments have been shown to be important for determining whether authorities will be obeyed (Lind et al., 1993). Research has shown that being treated in an unbiased, just and fair manner by authorities leads to the greater acceptancy of authoritative decisions (Maguire and Lind, 2003; Van den Bos and Lind, 2001). Indeed, Lind et al. (1993) highlighted that within the federal court setting, defendants were more accepting of the authoritative decision when they felt as though they had received procedural justice. Conversely, people who feel that they have been treated unfairly are more likely to harbour feelings of dissent regarding the authorities (Van den Bos and Lind, 2002). This has been evidenced particularly in organisational culture settings (see: Huo et al., 1996 and Lind, 2001). This has great relevance for investigating the public's (lack of) acceptancy of onshore wind power in the UK. However, to facilitate this understanding, it was first necessary to consider which components of Thibaut and Walker's (1975) control theory, Leventhal's (1980) theory of procedural justice judgments, Lind and Tyler's (1988) group-value model and Blader and Tyler's (2003a) four-component model of procedural justice, are most relevant for assessing the levels of perceived procedural justice proliferated by CBS. This discussion culminates in the establishment of five conditions, which according to this research are all necessary for, and combine to form procedural justice.

2.4 Coming to a conceptualisation of procedural justice in the context of CBS

Colquitt et al. (2001, p.437) discussed the fact that 'the conceptualisation, measurement and analysis of...justice depend in large part on a given study's research question, as well as the sample or setting used to examine it.' Thus, it was important that the procedural justice conditions selected for this piece of research were the ones that best fitted the way in which CBS are developed, negotiated and subsequently implemented within communities across the UK. Chapter 2.4.1 outlines this process so as to inform the debate regarding the conceptualisation of procedural justice.

2.4.1 The delineation of CBS outlined

The first step in the process of delineating a community benefits scheme requires the definition of the affected community. According to van der Horst (2007), the definition of the affected community is a hotly debated issue. Indeed, Bristow et al. (2012) defined a community as an evolving space, where divergent groups of interest can all find their place. Bristow et al. (2012) went on to discuss the difference between communities of place, a community defined by its geographic boundaries, and communities of interest, divergent communities with potentially multiple interests. Therefore, from the perspective of the project developer, these potentially divergent interests among community members are something to bear in mind when delineating the affected community (Bristow et al., 2012).

The centre for sustainable energy et al. (2009) conducted research in order to advise the UK Government regarding its policy concerning CBS. It concluded that the geographical distribution of

community benefits should vary depending on location-specific contexts, including the level of proximity to the onshore wind project, noise pollution, and the number of residents in the area. Thus, according to Bristow et al. (2012), the definition of community in relation to CBS is flexible. Building upon this, the best practice guidance for the delivery and administering of CBS in England, highlights the fact that the community and the project developer are expected to make a concerted effort to involve any stakeholders with vested interests (DECC, 2014a). Therefore, to summarise, whilst guidance exists, the exact way in which the affected community is delineated, differs from case-to-case. Nevertheless, discussions usually involve the project developer, community groups and on some occasions, the local governmental authority (Centre for sustainable energy et al., 2009).

An important thing to note is the fact that not all communities will form one community group; indeed, multiple community groups can be formed (DECC, 2014a). This means that more than one community group can be the stated beneficiary of the community benefits associated with an onshore wind project. However, it is the project developer's decision as to what portion of the benefits is allocated to each community group, meaning that the community groups are not in direct competition with each other whilst trying to obtain community benefits. Therein, each community group is able to negotiate with the project developer the terms of their community benefits scheme (Local energy Scotland, 2017).

The next step after the delineation of the affected community concerns the negotiation of the community benefits themselves. According to the best practice guidance for the delivery of community benefits in England (DECC, 2014a) communities are expected to understand what is being offered by the project developer, and subsequently envision what they could do with the benefits. During the first stage of the negotiation process, it is recommended that community groups select a body to represent them in the negotiation process, a so-called community liaison group. These groups can include: local businesses, local residents, and other council officers or parish councillors (DECC, 2014b). This is an important step as it formally separates community benefits negotiations from discussions concerning the obtainment of planning permission for the onshore wind project; this is necessary to ensure that members of the community can object to the onshore wind project, but still partake in any community benefits discussions (DECC, 2014a).

Onshore wind projects, by their very nature are not something which can be discussed and implemented overnight. Indeed, the complexities of the pre-planning consent phase mean that negotiations regarding onshore wind projects' CBS can last for up to six years. Thus, whilst the best practice guidance for the delivery and administering of CBS in England stipulates that project developers and community groups should do their utmost to build a positive working relationship, the individual figures responsible for the negotiations are likely to change during the process of the negotiations (DECC, 2014a; DECC, 2014b).

2.4.2 Instrumental or relational models of procedural justice: which are most relevant for evaluating procedural justice in the context of CBS?

Taking the message of Colquitt et al. (2001) into account, the fundamental argument regarding the conceptualisation of procedural justice utilised in this piece of research centred upon whether instrumental, relational or a combination of both dichotomies were most appropriate for evaluating the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by CBS. The preeminent place to start this debate was the potential for conflict regarding the central assumption of group-value theory (Lind and Tyler, 1988) and the four-component model of procedural justice (Blader and Tyler, 2003a), namely the fact that both theories assume that people care more about their relations with the group in which they identify, compared to the outcomes of decisions made by authorities leading the group (Blader and Tyler, 2003a; Blader and Tyler 2003b; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Lind, 1990). Moreover, according to Joy and Witt (1992), the group-value model assumes a long-term view in that people are willing to forgo a short-term reward for a delayed, longer-term reward. This notion of longevity also holds for the four-component model of procedural justice.

Regarding the development and implementation of CBS, it is documented that the individuals conducting negotiations are likely to change throughout the duration of the negotiations, since they take place over a period of up to six years (DECC, 2014a). This therefore led to the question: how can one forge an identity for him or herself within a group, whose members including the authoritative figure are often subject to change? In addition to this, the very nature of community benefits scheme negotiations is outcome-based; the community representatives want the most satisfactory package of benefits for their community.

Moreover, it is claimed by some scholars that specific aspects of the group-value model and the four-component model, belong to another strand of justice, namely interactional justice (Cropanzano et al., 2002). Indeed, Cropanzano et al. (2002) discussed the notion of interactional justice, which refers to the quality of interpersonal treatment between individuals. According to Colquitt et al. (2001, p.427), interactional justice is envisaged along two dimensions: ‘...the degree to which people are treated with politeness, dignity and respect by authorities or third parties in executing procedures...’ and ‘explanations provided to people that convey information and why procedures were used in a certain way...’. The first dimension is very similar to the notion of social standing in the group-value theory of Lind and Tyler (1988), whilst this dimension is also represented by the quality of treatment aspect in the four-component of procedural justice (Blader and Tyler, 2003a).

According to Colquitt et al. (2001), a hot literary debate has ensued with regards to whether procedural justice and interactional justice are separate entities, or whether they are part of the same construct. Indeed, Folger and Bies (1989) refer to procedural justice as the formal aspect of an allocative procedure, whereas interactional justice refers to the informal, social aspect of the allocative process. The merits of treating procedural justice and interactional justice as separate entities, are warranted according to Cropanzano et al. (2001), especially because research has shown that they can be distinguished from one-another empirically (see: Ambrose and Schminke, 2003; Colquitt et al., 2001 and Cropanzano et al., 2001).

This therefore led to the desertion of the group-value model and the four-component model with regards to the conceptualisation of procedural justice to be utilised in this thesis. The relatively short-term nature of community benefit scheme negotiations as well as the potential for consistent personnel changes within the negotiating teams (DECC, 2014a), suggests that communities are less likely to care about their long term relationship with the project developers in comparison to what the group-value and four-component models of procedural justice predict. In addition, there is ambiguity regarding whether these two models should be treated as part of the procedural justice literature, or as components of the interactional justice literature (Ambrose and Schminke, 2003; Colquitt et al., 2001 and Crompanzano et al., 2001).

2.4.3 The merits of the control model of procedural justice and the Leventhal criteria for evaluating procedural justice in the context of CBS

Regarding the six rules for fair procedures identified by Leventhal (1980), the consistency rule could immediately be discarded from consideration. CBS are mostly negotiated on a one-time basis, and therefore, communities have no way of knowing how consistent a project developer is regarding the manner in which it develops and implement CBS in communities. Thus, they cannot easily perceived consistency. This therefore left five of the rules for fair procedures identified by Leventhal (1980): bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability, representativeness and ethicality, as well as decision control and process control identified in Thibaut and Walker's (1975) control theory of procedural justice.

According to Tyler (1989), the representativeness rule prescribed by Leventhal (1980) is equivalent to the notion of control discussed by Thibaut and Walker (1975). However, one distinction that can be made is the fact that the representativeness rule specifically refers to '...the outlook of important sub-groups in the population of individuals affected by the allocative process' (Leventhal, 1980, p.30). When this is considered relative to the context in which CBS are negotiated, it can be said this is not truly reflective of the community benefits context. Moreover, the selection of a community liaison group or other similar body to represent the community group in the negotiations culminates in the creation of a community action plan, which details what the community wants to achieve from the negotiations (DECC, 2014a). Therefore, the community group is envisioned as one whole entity. Consequently, the representativeness rule was disregarded from consideration. In addition to this, only process control was adopted as one of the conditions for procedural justice utilised in this research. This is because research has shown process control to be significantly more important than decision control (Tyler, 1989; Tyler, 1987).

2.4.4 The conceptualisation of procedural justice outlined

Therein, for the purposes of the research conducted for this thesis, procedural justice was conceptualised according to a mixture of Leventhal (1980) and control model criteria (Thibaut and Walker, 1975) criteria. It is not uncommon for researchers to utilise a mixture of different theories when conceptualising procedural justice (Colquitt et al., 2001); indeed, Lind and Tyler (1988) refer to this as an indirect combination measure.

Procedural justice condition	Source
Process control	Thibaut and Walker (1975)
Bias-suppression	Leventhal (1980)
Accuracy	Leventhal (1980)
Correctability	Leventhal (1980)
Ethicality	Leventhal (1980)

Table 2-3 Procedural justice and the conditions required for it to be conceived

2.5 Analytical framework

This chapter commenced by discussing four influential theories of procedural justice, each of these pertaining to either the instrumental or relational strand of procedural justice theoretical research. Next, the ongoing debate surrounding whether instrumental or relational theories best explain people's perceptions of procedural justice was introduced. This subsequently led to the nuance that the conceptualisation of procedural is highly ambiguous, and indeed, should be dependent upon the specific context of a given piece of research and indeed its research questions and objectives (Colquitt et al., 2001). Subsequently, the process by which CBS are developed and implemented was briefly outlined so as to inform the debate. Following on from this, procedural justice was conceptualised based upon the theoretical insights, but also taking in to account the practical reality of CBS. On the next three pages, the analytical framework for the evaluation of CBS is presented. This highlights each condition for procedural justice, the procedural component which is being evaluated by the community representative (where applicable), and its necessary indicator(s).

Procedural component which is being evaluated by the community representative	Conditions for procedural justice				
	Indicators for four procedural justice conditions pertaining to six procedural components				
	Bias-suppression	Accuracy	Correctability	Ethicality	Indicator for process control
Selection of agents	Neutrality on the behalf of the representative of the project developer (Leventhal, 1980, p.25).	<p>Readily available information concerning the background and credentials of the representative of the project developer (Leventhal, 1980, p.27).</p> <p>For example: evidence that the representative of the developer had previous experience with CBS (Leventhal, 1980, p.27).</p>	<p>Opportunities for the community group to appeal to the project developer regarding its choice of representative (Leventhal, 1980, p.30).</p> <p>For example: community groups may wish to do this if they feel that the representative of the developer unjust in their actions or biased in any way</p>	<p>Project developer's representative selected on moral and ethical grounds (Leventhal, 1980, p.22+p.33).</p> <p>For example: whether or not the representative of the project developer was selected on merit as opposed to their ability to influence the process through some deviant means such as, having contacts in the community or local authority</p>	<p>Voice of the community group</p> <p>Voice refers to the extent to which the community group was able to voice its opinions (Blader and Tyler, 2003a) to the project developer in the process whereby the community benefits were developed and implemented by the developer</p>
Setting of ground rules	Early notification of the availability of a community benefits scheme by the project developer (DECC, 2014a, p.15).	<p>The provision by the project developer of the necessary instructions for the community to go about obtaining community benefits (Leventhal, 1980, p.22).</p> <p>For example: making sure company policies regarding CBS are clearly stated at the time planning proposals for the onshore wind project are made public (DECC, 2014a, p.24)</p>	<p>Opportunities for the community group to appeal what was expected of them in order to obtain community benefits (Murdoch and Abram, 1994, in: Bristow et al., 2012)</p> <p>For example: whether or not the business plan of the developer allowed for responses to communities' requests (DECC, 2014a, p.28).</p>	<p>Project developer's expectations of the community group pertained to high moral and ethical standards (Leventhal, 1980, p.22+ p.33).</p> <p>For example: what is expected of the community group in order to receive community benefits must be within their intellectual and knowledge-based resources (Shucksmith, 2010). Financial-based resources are also included here (Smith et al., 2008).</p>	

Gathering information	Consultation with the community regarding the nature of the community set to receive the community benefits, by the project developer (DECC, 2014a, p.26).	The use of relevant information concerning the nature of the community by the project developer (Bristow et al., 2012, p.1116).	Opportunities for the community group to influence who the beneficiaries of the community benefits would be (DECC, 2014a, p.26).	Ethical and moral information-gathering procedures of the project developer (Leventhal, 1980, p.33)
	For example: whether or not the project developer consulted the community before delineating who the beneficiaries of the community benefits scheme would be in a geographic sense (DECC, 2014a, p.26).	Relevant information could include: parish boundaries, established geographic boundaries, and information about communities of place as opposed to the developers pre-conceived definitions of the community (Bristow et al., 2012, p.1116).	For example: whether or not the project developer utilised information provided by the community in order to delineate who the beneficiaries of the community benefits scheme would be (DECC, 2014a, p.26).	For example: no evidence of bribery or spying (Aitken, 2010, p.1839; Friendland et al., 1973, in: Leventhal, 1980, p.33).
Decision structure	Opacity regarding the project developer's decision making rationales (DECC, 2014a, p.14).	The utilisation of the best available information in the decision making process by the project developer (Leventhal, 1980, p.27).	Opportunities to appeal against the decision making process of the project developer (Leventhal, 1980, p.29).	Ethical and moral decision making rationales on the behalf of the project developer (Leventhal, 1980, p.33).
		For example: by consulting and utilising information from third-parties (DECC, 2014a, p.14) and/or utilising information provided by the community group (DECC, 2014, p.24).	For example: the provision of opportunities to change the developer's mind	For example: ensuring that the preferred approach of the community group was taken (DECC, 2014a, p.37)
Appeals	The ability to contest decisions made by the project developer to an independent body (Leventhal, 1980, p.25).	The inclusion of new information in any appeals processes (Leventhal, 1980, p.27).	Easy access to appeals procedures (Leventhal, 1980, p.30).	Ethical and moral appeals procedures (DECC, 2014a, p.14; Leventhal, 1980, p.30).
	For example: the local council or parish council (DECC, 2014a, p.37).	Appeals processes can also be to the project developer as well as an independent body	For example: little time, money and effort expenditure (Leventhal, 1980, p.30).	For example: transparency in how the appeals procedures work (DECC, 2014, p.14).

Safeguards	<p>The recordation of discussions between the community group and the project developer (DECC, 2014a, pp.20-21).</p>	<p>Procedures to appraise the project developer's representative (Leventhal, 1980, p.28).</p> <p>For example: record keeping of behaviour or facts about how the community benefits were distributed (Leventhal, 1980, p.28).</p>	<p>Procedures to report inappropriate behaviour by the representative of the project developer to more senior figures within the project developing company (Leventhal, 1980, p.23)</p> <p>For example: unprofessional behaviour, such as insults or slander, and the provision of senior management's contact details in order to report this</p>	<p>Ethical and moral safeguarding procedures of the project developer (DECC, 2014a, p.14; Leventhal, 1980, p.23).</p> <p>Safeguarding procedures include: the recordation of discussions between the community group and the developer (DECC, 2014a, pp.20-21), record keeping of the behaviour of the project developer's representative (Leventhal, 1980, p.28), and procedures to report any inappropriate behaviour by the project developer's representative (Leventhal, 1980, p.28)</p>
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Table 2-4 A framework for evaluating whether the delineation and implementation of CBS pertains to the conditions for procedural justice

A framework for evaluating whether the development and implementation of CBS pertains to the conditions of procedural justice is encapsulated in table 2-4. On the left-hand side, six procedural components discussed by Leventhal (1980) are presented. The seventh procedural component, mooted by Leventhal (1980), change mechanisms, was omitted, as it was assumed that community groups would not make procedural justice judgements based upon the existence or lack of procedures for changing the allocation process, since the negotiation of CBS is most often a one-time process, therefore meaning any changes to these procedures would not affect the community at hand. This mirrors the message of Leventhal (1980), who discussed the fact that some procedural components and procedural rules will be more important than others, depending on the given context. Referring back to chapter 2.1.2, Leventhal (1980) highlighted the fact that people can judge any of the procedural components, which are located in the sequence of events which lead to the distribution of reward, via any of the conditions for procedural justice. In other words, the six components of the procedure presented in the table, can be judged by any of the four conditions for procedural justice, leading to 24 possible combinations, and therefore, the delineation of 24 indicators across these four conditions for procedural justice. Leventhal (1980, pp.25-35) utilises examples of how each procedural component can be judged by any of the conditions for procedural justice. These examples were utilised, mainly in combination with the best practice guides for the delivery on CBS in England (DECC, 2014a), in order to embed the theoretical insights of Leventhal (1980) within the community benefits scheme context, thus deriving the 24 indicators. The article(s) that each indicator was derived from, as well as the relevant page number(s,) are stated. In addition to this, examples are provided for some indicators as a means of providing clarity. In the right-hand column, process control can be found. In the procedural justice literature, process control is often accounted for by the indicator; voice (see: Greenberg, 1986 and Joy and Witt, 1992). This refers to the extent to which people are able to voice their opinions to the decision-maker in a scenario in which reward is due to be allocated (Lind et al., 1990). Accordingly, voice was selected as the indicator for process control.

In addition to this, five hypotheses theorising about potential relationships between five individual factors and the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by CBS were generated. In addition, a further factor was tested for, though no hypothesis was derived. Indeed, the first hypothesis focuses on whether time has the ability to impact on the level of perceived procedural justice that it might be expected for a community benefits scheme to generate; thus, the first hypothesis was:

H₁ CBS which were agreed between community groups and projects developers closer to the present day, will exhibit higher levels of procedural justice than those agreed earlier in time.

This hypothesis was constructed based upon the knowledge that over the past decade or so, the UK Government has paid increasing attention to CBS. This is reflected through various policy interventions, such as a toolkit for the delivery of CBS targeted at project developers (Centre for Sustainable Energy et al., 2009), as well as the best practice guides for the development and implementation of CBS in England and Scotland (see: DECC, 2014a; Local Energy Scotland, 2013), and the best practice recommendations for the development and implementation of CBS in Northern Ireland and Wales NIRIG, 2014; Welsh onshore wind developers in: PFR, 2013). Moreover, these various policy documents pertain largely to procedural justice ideals. Thus, it was anticipated that

the uptake of these policies would be reflected in the fact that CBS inception closer to the present date, would proliferate higher levels of perceived procedural justice than ones accepted longer ago.

The remaining four hypotheses relate to certain characteristics of the community or the onshore wind projects themselves. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is as follows:

H₂ Communities which are larger in terms of population size will have higher perceptions of perceived procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of CBS, compared to communities which are smaller in terms of population size.

The reasoning behind this hypothesis is the fact that there is a significant body of literature which supports the suggestion that groups with larger and more varied skill sets generally have more power in decision making processes compared to less skilled groups (Foucault, 1998: in Kerr et al., 2017; Shucksmith, 2010). Thus, it stands to reason that larger populations of people will, generally speaking, have a larger array of skill sets compared to smaller populations. Thus, it was necessary to test for this empirically.

This leads to the third hypothesis:

H₃ As the size (MW) of an onshore wind project increases, so will the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by the relative community benefits scheme.

The assumption behind this hypothesis is the fact that project developers would be expected to invest more time, human, and financial resources in to negotiating CBS for larger onshore wind projects, which in turn are worth more money to project developers, since poor or non-existent community liaison has been shown to increase the likelihood of planning proposals being refused by local authorities (DTI [Department of Trade and Industry], 2005).

This leads to the fourth hypothesis:

H₄ As the value of a community benefits scheme (£/year) increases, so will the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by that community benefit scheme.

The fourth hypothesis was built upon the same assumption as the third hypothesis, owed to the fact that the size of an onshore wind project (MW) and the value of its community benefits scheme are directly proportional to one-another, since the value of the community benefits scheme is calculated based upon the size of the onshore wind project in most cases (DECC, 2014a).

Lastly, the fifth hypothesis is:

H₅ Communities which are the only communities receiving community benefits from a particular onshore wind project, will have higher perceptions of procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of CBS, compared to communities which are not the only communities receiving community benefits from an onshore wind project.

Accordingly, the fifth hypothesis is based upon the assumption that if a project developer were to negotiate community benefits with multiple communities at any one moment, their human resources may be stretched, meaning that the level of, and quality of their engagement with the

affected communities would be lower. This assumption was based on the notion that the amount of human, organisational, and social capital that a company holds, directly impacts on its ability to be innovative (Subramaniam and Youndt, 2005). Moreover, innovation refers to the creation of new services, products, and work practices (Van de Ven, 1986). Thus, CBS are considered as a service provided by project developers.

Lastly, it was also empirically tested as to whether the structure of a community benefits scheme affects the level of procedural justice proliferated by it. No hypothesis was generated regarding this, as there was no evidence to suggest that any particular community benefits structure may be more effective than others in stimulating procedural justice. Conversely, there was no evidence to suggest that all structures stimulate equal levels of procedural justice.

The hypotheses were empirically tested for via the analysis of the surveys completed by the community representatives, whilst the methodology (chapter 3) elucidates as to how this was done.

Figure 2-1 is a schematic overview of the analytical framework. Thus, across the top, the five conditions for procedural justice are stipulated, whilst the theories to which they pertain are also indicated. As discussed in chapter 2.1.2, people make judgements across seven procedural components (Leventhal, 1980). Each of these procedural components aside from change mechanisms, which was previously omitted, is presented on the left-hand side of the model. 25 indicators for procedural justice are stated in the model. Process control has one indicator, whilst bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability and ethicality each have six indicators; each of which pertains to one of the six procedural components. Accordingly, table 2-4 and figure 2-1 represent the answer to sub-question one:

What criteria are useful for evaluating community benefits schemes as a policy, based upon the procedural justice literature?

In order to answer this sub-question, a thorough review of the procedural justice literature was confronted with an analysis of how CBS are developed and implemented; this resulted in the conceptualisation of procedural justice in the context of this research. Moreover, the conditions for procedural justice identified are: bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability, ethicality and process control. In order to account for the relative existence or absence of each condition for procedural justice, 25 indicators were identified, after reviewing key procedural justice and community benefits literature. Bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability, and ethicality are empirically tested for across the six components of a procedure, as per Leventhal (1980), thus accounting for 24 of the indicators. The remaining indicator was utilised to empirically test for process control. Thus, the 25 indicators served as a tangible means of ascertaining as to what extent the development and implementation of CBS pertains to the conditions for procedural justice. In chapter 3 the methodology is presented. Included in the methodology is the operationalisation of the indicators.



Figure 2-1 An overview of the conditions for procedural justice, including the procedural component which is being evaluated, and the relative indicators

3 Methodology

This chapter outlines the research methodology employed for this research. Accordingly, there are two main foci; the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the research which was conducted. Thus, the chapter commences by presenting the research strategy utilised to conduct the research, followed by the justification of the case selection. Lastly, the data collection methods and data analysis methods are presented. Each of these items are discussed in order for the quantitative aspect of the research, followed by a likewise discussion for the qualitative aspect of the research.

3.1 Quantitative aspect

3.1.1 Research strategy

The central research question of this research is:

To what extent do the development and implementation of CBS in the UK meet the conditions of procedural justice?

To answer this question, evaluative knowledge was critical (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2010). This knowledge was generated via the quantitative aspect of the research. Specifically speaking, the analytical framework presented in chapter 2 was utilised as a means of ascertaining this knowledge. The quantitative aspect of the research made use of online surveys administered via a popular online survey hosting website. Verschuren and Doorewaard (2010) mooted that a survey approach is appropriate when aiming to make generalisations about a population, because surveys can easily be distributed to large numbers of people, therefore providing a significant sample. Furthermore, Holton and Burnett (1997) discussed the fact that the ability to make generalisations about larger populations from a sample of the population is the greatest strength of quantitative research methods. In order to design the survey, it was first necessary to operationalise the indicators for each of the conditions for procedural justice. The operationalisation of the indicators is presented below. Each indicator was operationalised by delineating a statement from it, which the representative of each of the community groups surveyed, was asked to answer. As can be seen, the answer to each statement is representative of a number on a five-point scale. This numerical scale formed the basis of the perceived procedural justice ranking scale, five being the highest score attainable and one being the lowest. An important consideration here was the fact that bias suppression, accuracy, correctability and ethicality each have six indicators, whereas process control only has indicator. In order to take this in to account, a weighted average score for each condition for procedural justice was calculated. The mean ranking of CBS as a policy is presented on the perceived procedural justice ranking scale in the analysis and results (chapter 4),

Thus, representatives of the community groups were asked to respond to each of the statements in one of the following ways:

- Completely disagree (1)
- Partially disagree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Partially agree (4)
- Completely agree (5)

An important notion when interpreting the ranking of a community benefits scheme on the perceived procedural justice ranking scale, concerns the fact that anything above 3 is deemed as a positive score, whereas anything below 3 is deemed as a negative score. Scores become increasingly positive the closer they are to 5, which represents the statement answer, 'completely agree'. Conversely, scores become increasingly negative the closer they are to 1, since this represents the statement answer, 'completely disagree'.

Indicator	Operationalisation
Bias suppression	
Neutrality on the behalf of the representative of the project developer	The representative of the project developer was impartial throughout the community benefits negotiations
Early notification of the availability of a community benefits scheme by the project developer	The project developer notified us of the availability of a community benefits scheme early enough for us to gain the maximum level of benefit from the subsequent negotiations
Consultation with the community regarding the nature of the community set to receive the community benefits, by the project developer	The project developer consulted the community when deciding who the beneficiaries of the community benefits scheme would be in a geographic sense
Opacity regarding the project developer's decision making rationale	The project developer's decision making rationale was open
The ability to contest decisions made by the project developer to an independent body	We could contest decisions made by the project developer to an independent body such as (but not limited to) the local council/local government official
The recordation of discussions between the community group and the project developer	The discussions between the community and the project developer concerning community benefits were always recorded
Accuracy	
Readily available information concerning the background and credentials of the representative of the project developer	There was an abundance of information regarding the background and credentials of the employee negotiating on the behalf of the project developer
The provision by the project developer of the necessary instructions for the community to go about obtaining community benefits	The project developer provided the community with enough information, instruction and guidance regarding what the community must do in order to obtain community benefits
The use of relevant information concerning the nature of the community by the project developer	The information used by the project developer in the negotiations regarding the nature of the community was relevant For example: the use parish or commonly accepted community boundaries when defining the community as opposed to some ad-hoc measure
The utilisation of the best available information in the decision making process by the project developer	The project developer utilised the best available information in the decision making process, including where appropriate, the expertise of third parties and information provided by the community
The inclusion of new information in any appeals processes	Any appeals processes had provisions for the inclusion of new and relevant information
Procedures to appraise the project developer's representative	Procedures existed within the organisation of the project developer to appraise the employee leading the negotiating on the developer's behalf

Correctability	
Opportunities for the community group to appeal to the project developer regarding its choice of representative	It was possible to appeal to the project developer regarding its choice of decision maker in relation to the community benefits
Opportunities for the community group to appeal what was expected of it in order to obtain community benefits	It was possible to ask the project developer to reconsider its expectations regarding what the community must do in order to obtain community benefits
Opportunities for the community group to influence who the beneficiaries of the community benefits would be	It was possible for the community to influence who the beneficiaries of the community benefits would be
Opportunities to appeal against the decision making process of the project developer	It was possible to appeal against the process the project developer used to make decisions
Easy access to appeals procedures	Any appeals procedures were easy to access
Procedures to report inappropriate behaviour by the representative of the developer to more senior figures within the project developing company	It was possible to report any inappropriate behaviour by the employee negotiating on the behalf of the project developer to a more senior management figure
Ethicality	
Project developer's representative selected on moral and ethical grounds	The employee negotiating the community benefits on the behalf of the developer was selected on ethical grounds
	For example: they were chosen on merit as opposed to their ability to influence the process through some deviant means, such as by having contacts in the community or local authority
Project developer's expectations of the community group pertained to high moral and ethical standards	The project developer's expectations of the community were within the community's intellectual, knowledge-based, and financial-based resources
Ethical and moral information-gathering procedures of the project developer	The project developer's information gathering procedures were fair
	For example: no spying, invasion of privacy or deception
Ethical and moral decision making rationales on the behalf of the project developer	The project developer's decision making rationales were fair
Ethical and moral appeals procedures	Any appeals procedures were fair
Ethical and moral safeguarding procedures of the project developer	Procedures which held the developer accountable were fair
Process control	
Voice of the community group	We were able to voice our opinions to the project developer adequately before the community benefits were finalised

Table 3-1 The operationalisation of the conditions for procedural justice

3.1.2 Case selection

The quantitative aspect of the research aimed to evaluate the level of perceived procedural justice stimulated by CBS in the UK, whilst also empirically testing the hypotheses introduced in the previous chapter. E-mail addresses were found for 167 community groups pertaining to 167 separate CBS. Thus, e-mails were sent to each of these community groups. Of these 167 community groups, 45 completed surveys; this is a survey response rate of 27%.

3.1.3 Data collection

Regarding the obtainment of the procedural justice theoretical knowledge, online databases, such as Scopus and Google Scholar were utilised in order to gather secondary data. Secondary data sources included: academic journal articles, UK Government documents, reports produced by community groups, and reports produced by the wind industry. Search items included: 'procedural justice', 'interactive justice', 'environmental justice', 'procedural fairness', 'organisational justice', 'justice', 'wind energy', 'community benefits', 'community benefit schemes' and 'onshore wind'. Literature is an important data source, in the sense that it can provide relevant information to guide and facilitate the research project (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2010).

The community benefits registers' of England, Scotland and Wales are available online. These lists stipulate the provider of each community benefits scheme, as well the community group which is the beneficiary. E-mail addresses for many community groups are provided, whilst others were found via an internet search. In light of this, e-mails were sent to all of the community groups in the UK for whom contact details could be found, and they were subsequently asked to fill in an online survey.

3.1.4 Data analysis

The data from the surveys was analysed using Microsoft Excel software. This facilitated the performance of descriptive and inferential statistics. The inferential analyses endeavoured to empirically test the five hypotheses and one other factor which it was postulated, may affect the levels of perceived procedural justice proliferated by CBS.

3.2 Qualitative aspect

3.2.1 Research strategy

The qualitative aspect of the research aimed to provide an in-depth analysis of the types of issues that arise regarding CBS at the community level. In order to facilitate this, a comparative-case study approach was adopted. A comparative-case study is an approach used to compare several interrelated cases. Specifically, a hierarchical case study approach was adopted. This is where several cases are selected and analysed on an individual level, before being analysed simultaneously to draw further explanatory nuances (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2010).

The qualitative aspect utilised the 25 indicators for the conditions for procedural justice identified in the analytical framework, adopting one question for each of the 25 statements. The interview questions were subsequently grouped in to five categories, each of these representing one of the conditions for procedural justice. The grouping of the interview questions in to these categories was

of both logical, and methodological value, since such a grouping can help to build a good rapport with the interviewee (King and Horrocks, 2010). Furthermore, a fundamental aspect of the research concerned the delivery of explanatory nuances regarding why levels of perceived procedural justice can vary between different community benefits scheme cases. Thus, this required explanatory knowledge (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2010), which was generated by the means of semi-structured interviews with community representatives and a local governmental official from across a number of cases.

3.2.2 Case selection

The interviews with the 5 community representatives and the local governmental official aimed to offer explanatory nuances as to why perceptions of procedural justice differ across the CBS studied via the surveys. An additional aim of the interviews was to further test the hypotheses identified in chapter 2, as well as the additional factor with no hypothesis. Thus, it was preferential to select CBS: inceptioned at different points in time, that reflect the range in size of onshore wind projects, that reflect the range in size of the affected communities, that reflect the overall range in values of the CBS, and cases whereby the affected communities were the only communities receiving community benefits, and cases where the opposite applied. In addition, it was preferential to select CBS that reflect the different structures of community benefits (payment per MW installed per year, lumped sum payment(s), and education and/or job creation).

3.2.3 Data collection

In order to select the cases studies, it was necessary to source data concerning individual CBS. To achieve this, data sources searched included: the community benefits registers of England, Scotland, and Wales, community groups' minutes, public notifications by the project developers and the community groups, project developers' websites, and community groups' websites. The selection of the cases subsequently facilitated the collection of primary data. This was in the form of semi-structured interviews conducted with the representatives of the community groups and a local governmental official.

When undertaking a case study approach, a small sample is taken, and it is possible that the sample may not be representative of the wider group. Therefore, it was proposed to apply strategic sampling (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2010). Initially, community groups were approached based upon the criteria outlined above. However, due to a low response rate, this approach was abandoned, the ramifications of which are discussed in the limitations section of the discussion (chapter 5.1.2). Instead, each of the community groups which had completed a survey was e-mailed, asking if it would like to take part in an interview. 5 responded, so therefore 5 interviews were conducted. In addition, a local governmental official with great experience regarding CBS was approached and subsequently participated in an interview. 3 of the interviews took place in Scotland during April 2017, whilst 3 of the interviews took place via telephone.

The data was collected via means of semi-structured interviews. According to Barriball and While (1994), semi-structured interviews are an advantageous method of data collection for a number of reasons. For example: they can make up for poor response rates in surveys (Austin, 1981, in: Barriball and While, 1994, p.329), they are particularly suited for the discovery of attitudes, values

and beliefs (Smith, 1975, in: Barriball and While, 1994, p.329), and they can facilitate comparability by ensuring that all of the interviewees answer all of the questions (Bailey, 1987, in: Barriball and While, 1994, p.329). Each of these three advantages was of importance for this research, particularly the second one regarding the third sub-question:

What explanations can be deduced from the interviews with the community representatives as to why certain conditions for procedural justice scored lower than others?

This sub-question clearly required the obtainment of explanatory knowledge in the form of the attitudes, values and beliefs of the community representatives (Smith, 1975, in: Barriball and While, 1994, p.329). Thus, the semi-structured interviews were a necessary compliment to the surveys. A further reason for the utilisation of semi-structured interviews was the fact that they are open-ended in nature. This therefore allowed the interviewees to divulge a great depth of information. In addition, this also facilitated probing (Turner, 2010). Probing is important as it enhances the reliability of the data (Barriball and While, 1994). Probing facilitates the elaboration, clarification and completion of answers to questions (Patton, 1990; Rubin and Rubin, 1995, in: King and Horrocks, 2010, p.53).

An ethical concern was the need to gain full consent from the interviewees before any interviews could commence (King and Horrocks, 2010). In order to achieve this, a consenting statement explaining the nature of the interview, and what the data would subsequently be used for, was read at the commencement of each interview. These steps are all recommended by McNamara (2009). When posing the interview questions, it was necessary to adhere to two guidelines recommended by McNamara (2009): a neutral questioning style and the clear wording of the questions. The interviews were subsequently recorded electronically, something which King and Horrocks (2010) state is preferable to note-taking. It was anticipated that since community groups are small and work very closely together, perceptions of procedural justice among members would not differ greatly. Therefore, only one member of each community group was interviewed.

3.2.4 Data analysis

The data from the semi-structured interviews was transcribed verbatim and then analysed in QSR NVivo, via an open coding process. Open coding allows the researcher to look for concepts and categories in the data, which form the basic unit of analysis (Research Rundowns, 2009). Subsequently, the text from the interviews was coded according to the indicators of each condition for procedural justice.

4 Empirical analysis and results

The previous three chapters have each contributed in their own right towards the facilitation of the empirical analysis and results presented in the current chapter. Firstly, the analysis and results pertaining to the quantitative aspect of the research, namely the surveys completed by the representatives of community groups, are introduced. This serves to answer the second sub-question:

What levels of perceived procedural justice are proliferated across all of the CBS in the UK, according to the perceived procedural justice ranking scale?

This sub-question is answered by applying the analytical framework formulated in chapter 2, to the context of CBS, by means of 45 surveys completed by representatives of community groups which have received CBS. Initially, some descriptive statistics of the sample are provided, before the ranking of the CBS on the perceived-procedural justice ranking scale is presented. Following this, analysis is presented regarding each of the five hypotheses introduced in chapter 2. Subsequently, the analysis and results pertaining to the qualitative aspect of the research are presented. This serves to answer the third sub-question:

What explanations can be deduced from the interviews with the community representatives as to why certain conditions for procedural justice scored lower than others?

This sub-question is answered by applying the analytical framework to the five case studies aforementioned in the methodology. Accordingly, analysis is presented for each condition on an indicator-level basis. This chapter therefore aims to provide a level of understanding as to what extent the five conditions for procedural justice are exhibited across CBS.

4.1 Quantitative results and analyses

As of the 19th of March 2017, the community benefits registers of England, Scotland, and Wales, harboured 273 distinct onshore wind projects which each have an associated community benefits scheme. Of these 273 onshore wind projects, it was possible to obtain the contact information for the relevant community groups for 167 of them. These are denoted as surveyable onshore wind projects in Table 4-1 below.

Country within the UK	Number of surveyable onshore wind projects with associated CBS	Number of unsurveyable onshore wind projects with associated CBS
England	58	30
Scotland	96	48
Wales	13	28
Great Britain	167	106

Table 4-1 The number of surveyable and unsurveyable onshore wind projects with associated CBS in England, Scotland, and Wales

Table 4-1 highlights the number of surveyable onshore wind projects with associated CBS in England, Scotland, and Wales, as well as the number of unsurveyable onshore wind projects with associated CBS in each of these countries. The number of surveyable onshore wind projects with associated

community benefits, 167 represents 61% of the total number of onshore wind projects with associated CBS in the community benefits registers of England, Scotland and Wales.

Following this, 167 community groups, each receiving community benefits from at least one onshore wind project, were contacted via e-mail, asking if they would like to take part in the survey associated with this piece of research. Out of the 167 community groups, 45 completed surveys. This represents a response rate of 27%. Significantly, none of the survey respondents stemmed from community groups in Wales. The notion of the number of survey responses as well as the location of the surveyed community groups within the UK is important in terms of the generalisability of the research. Thus, the data presented in table 4-1 is relevant for the discussion (chapter 5).

4.1.1 Descriptive analyses of the surveyed CBS

The brief descriptive analyses of the CBS which were surveyed, presented in chapter 4.1.1, aim to provide an overview of the data sample in terms of the five factors which it was hypothesised, may affect the levels of perceived procedural justice proliferated by CBS: the time period in which the community benefits scheme was agreed between the project developer and the community, the size of the onshore wind project (MW), the population size of the community receiving the community benefits scheme, the value of the community benefits scheme (£/year), and whether or not the surveyed community was the only community receiving community benefits from the onshore wind project at hand. In addition to this, descriptive insights are also presented concerning one other factor, regarding which no hypothesis was formulated, namely the structure of the CBS.

Table 4-2 highlights the frequency of survey answers across the five factors which it was hypothesised, may affect the levels of perceived procedural justice proliferated by CBS, as well as one additional factor. Regarding the time periods in which the surveyed CBS were agreed upon, the median time period was 2011-2014, whilst 80% of the CBS surveyed were agreed upon from 2007 onwards. Regarding the data concerning the size of the onshore wind projects from which the surveyed CBS pertain to, there is a spread in so far as the responses are relatively evenly distributed across the five size-ranges. As far as the population size of the affected communities is concerned, the median size-range of the surveyed community groups is 501-1,000. The median fee received annually by the surveyed community groups from community benefits was in the range of £10,001-£20,000, though there was considerable variation. In terms of whether or not the surveyed communities were the only communities receiving community benefits from the given onshore wind project, there is a relatively even split between yes (42.22%) and no (53.33%). Lastly, regarding the structure of the surveyed CBS, two types of structure were clearly the most common, namely, annual lumped sum and payment per MW installed per year. This data is relevant for chapter 4.1.3, where claims regarding the five hypotheses are made.

	Category	Frequency
Periods in time when CBS were agreed upon	Before 2003	1
	2003-2006	4
	2007-2010	12
	2011-2014	20
	2015-2017	8
Size of onshore wind project (MW)	<5	6
	6-20	12
	21-50	12
	51-100	11
	>100	4
Community population size	<500	7
	501-1,000	17
	1,001-5,000	11
	5,001-10,000	7
	10,001-20,000	2
	>20,000	1
Annual fees received by community (£/year)	<£2,000	2
	£2,001-£5,000	4
	£5,001-£10,000	10
	£10,001-£20,000	8
	£20,001-£50,000	5
	£50,001-£100,000	6
	>£100,000	10
Whether or not the community was the only community receiving benefits from the given onshore project	Yes	19
	No	24
	Unknown	2
Community benefit structure	Annual lumped sum	20
	Payment/MW installed/year	13
	Education and/or job creation	1
	Payment linked to the project's annual profits	2

Table 4-2 The frequency of different survey answers across the five factors which it was hypothesised, may affect the levels of perceived procedural justice proliferated by CBS

4.1.2 The ranking of CBS on the perceived procedural justice ranking scale

The perceived procedural justice ranking scale described and explained in chapter 2 was designed as a means of evaluating community groups' perception of procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of CBS. Below, a UK mean perceived procedural justice ranking scale is presented; subsequently, the relative contributions of each of the five conditions for procedural justice: bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability, ethicality, and process control, are elucidated upon.

Figure 4-1 represents the mean ranking of the surveyed communities' perceptions of procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of CBS on the perceived procedural justice ranking scale. The mean ranking is 3.56 out of a possible attainable score of 5. It is important to beware of the fact that scale starts at 1, which was the lowest possible attainable score, corresponding with the survey response, 'completely disagree'. Furthermore, 3 can be considered as a neutral score, since it corresponds with the survey response, 'neither agree nor disagree'.

Consequently, anything above 3 can be deemed to be positive, with increasing positivity the closer the score is to 5, which corresponds with the survey answer ‘completely agree’. Thus, the mean perceived procedural justice ranking score of 3.56 is considered as a relatively good score, meaning that across the survey sample, community groups responses were on average closer to ‘completely agree’, than ‘completely disagree’. This was higher than expected, given that the community benefits scheme literature is somewhat damning of CBS, highlighting issues including: bribery (Aitken, 2010; Cass et al., 2010), a lack of community influence regarding the development and implementation of CBS (Cowell et al., 2011), communities claiming to be affected by an onshore wind project not being included in the relative community benefits scheme (Bristow et al., 2012), and claims that project developers do not offer CBS for the correct reasons (Evans et al., 2011). The ramifications of this score are further elucidated upon in the discussion (chapter 5).




Figure 4-1 The mean ranking of the surveyed communities' perceptions of procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of CBS on the perceived procedural justice ranking scale

The mean ranking score was calculated by initially calculating a mean score for each of the indicators. The indicators were subsequently grouped together relative to the conditions for procedural justice from which they pertain to, as is specified in the analytical framework (table 2-4). The grouping of the indicators facilitated the calculation of mean ranking scores for each of the five conditions for procedural justice, from which the overall mean ranking score was attained.

It is critically important here to discuss a significant, but necessary deviation away from the methodology for calculating the mean ranking of the surveyed communities' perceptions of procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of CBS, stated in chapter 3.1.1. The surveys completed by the respondents from communities contained 25 questions, pertaining to 25 separate indicators for procedural justice. However, due to a significant number of respondents being unable to answer 10 of the 25 questions, the indicators represented by these questions were omitted from the analysis as a mean ranking score could not be calculated utilising surveys with different numbers of completed questions.

Condition for procedural justice	Procedural component which is being evaluated	Indicator omitted from analysis
Bias-suppression	Safeguards	The recordation of discussions between the community group and the project developer
Accuracy	Appeals	The inclusion of new information in any appeals processes
	Safeguards	Procedures to appraise the project developer's representative
Correctability	Selection of agents	Opportunities for the community group to appeal to the project developer regarding its choice of representative
	Decision structure	Opportunities to appeal against the decision making process of the project developer
	Appeals Safeguards	Easy access to appeals procedures Procedures to report inappropriate behaviour by the representative of the developer to more senior figures within the project developing company
Ethicality	Selection of agents	Project developer's representative selected on moral and ethical grounds
	Appeals	Ethical and moral appeals procedures
	Safeguards	Ethical and moral safeguarding procedures of the project developer

Table 4-3 The indicators omitted from the analysis, including the conditions for procedural justice from which they pertain to and the procedural components which are being evaluated

Table 4-3 shows the indicators which were omitted from the analysis due to incomplete survey questions. One indicator was omitted for the condition, bias-suppression, two for accuracy, four for correctability, and three for ethicality. In addition, the indicators omitted related to four procedural components: safeguards (4 occasions), appeals (3 occasions), selection of agents (2 occasions), and decision structure (1 occasion). In order to account for the difference in the number of indicators for each condition for procedural justice, a weighted average score for each condition of procedural justice was calculated, giving equal weight to each condition. The ramifications of this omission are scrutinised in the discussion and conclusion (chapter 5).

Figure 4-2 highlights the mean ranking of the surveyed communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice. The most noticeable observation regarding the rankings is the relatively low range in values across the five conditions. Indeed, bias-suppression is the lowest ranked condition with a mean score of 3.22 followed by: accuracy (3.46), process control (3.58), correctability (3.63), and lastly, ethicality (3.90). Taking in to account the perceived procedural justice ranking scale, the mean score for each condition can be classified as being positive since each of the scores is over 3. This is an important finding as it highlights the fact that the community groups' perceptions of procedural justice are reasonably positive generally speaking, and certainly not overtly negative. However, this leaves two fundamental uncertainties or questions: what kinds of practices on an individual case level accounted for these scores, and why are there differences

between the scores for each procedural justice condition? Chapter 4.2 addresses both of these uncertainties by providing evidence in the shape of interviews with five community representatives and one local governmental official. Prior to this, chapter 4.1.3 empirically tests the 5 hypotheses.




Figure 4-2 The mean ranking of the surveyed communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice

4.1.3 Hypothesis testing: what factors affect communities' perceptions of procedural justice?

Chapter 4.1.3 presents data relevant to the five hypotheses which were introduced in the analytical framework (chapter 2); each hypothesis relating to a different factor which in some way, may affect the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by the development and implementation of a community benefits scheme. The five factors are: the time period in which the community benefits scheme was agreed between the project developer and the community, the size of the onshore wind project (MW), the population size of the community receiving the community benefits scheme, the value of the community benefits scheme (£/year), and whether or not the surveyed community was the only community receiving community benefits from the onshore wind project at hand. Additionally, data is also presented regarding a sixth factor, namely the structure of the community benefits received by a community. Accordingly, each hypothesis and relevant factor is taken in turn and the relevant nuances are presented.

H_1 CBS which were agreed between community groups and projects developers closer to the present day, will exhibit higher levels of perceived procedural justice than those agreed earlier in time.




Figure 4-3 The average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across different ranges in population size of surveyed communities

Figure 4-3 shows the average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across different ranges in population size of surveyed communities. The grey bars represent the number of survey responses for each time period. The solid red line represents the average scores across all of the conditions. Regarding the average across all of the conditions, for CBS agreed before 2003, the average score is 4. This decreases to a very poor score of 1.98 for CBS agreed in the time period 2003-2006. For CBS agreed in the period 2007-2010, there is a significant increase in average score to 3.26, which whilst positive, is by no means a desirable score. The increasing trend continues, albeit not as steeply for CBS agreed in 2011-2014 (3.72), and for CBS agreed in 2015-2017 (4.02). A score of 4 corresponds to the survey answer, 'partially agree', meaning that on average, community groups' perceptions of procedural in relation to the development and implementation of CBS are generally quite positive for CBS agreed upon between 2015 and 2017. The average scores for each of the five conditions for procedural justice follows the average for all of the conditions relatively closely. The only slight deviation away from this concerns process control. Process control scores an average of 3.85 for the time period 2011-2014, and 3.75 for the time period 2015-2017, a decrease of 0.10. Nevertheless, if the time period, before 2003, which is only based upon one survey response is excluded, the relationship between communities' perceptions of procedural justice and the period in time in which CBS were agreed, at least appears relatively linear in nature. That is to say, an increase in communities' perceptions of procedural justice would be expected over time, based upon the results of this data sample. Accordingly, H_1 is accepted.

Practically speaking, this trend is undoubtedly positive, and shows clearly that gradual progress has been made since the early 2000s. Perhaps this trend is a response to a growing awareness of what the development and implementation of CBS should entail from the perspectives' of the UK

Government, project developers, and Renewable UK, brought about by an increase in academic and policy-focused research. One notable policy guidance report was commissioned by the former UK ministry, the DTI, and produced by the Centre for Sustainable Energy et al. (2009) in 2007, whereby a toolkit for the delivery of CBS, targeted at project developers was published (and updated in 2009). More recent and more prominent policy documents are the best practice guides for the developments and implementation of CBS in England and Scotland produced by the governments of England and Scotland in consultation with Renewable UK (DECC, 2014a; Local Energy Scotland; 2013), as well as the best practice guidance issued for Northern Ireland and Wales (NIRIG, 2014; Welsh onshore wind developers in: PFR, 2013).

H₂ Communities which are larger in terms of population size will have higher perceptions of procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of CBS, compared to communities which are smaller in terms of population size.




Figure 4-4 The average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across different ranges in population size of surveyed communities

Figure 4-4 shows the average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across different ranges in population size of surveyed communities. The grey bars represent the number of survey responses for each population size range. The solid red line represents the average score across all of the conditions. For communities of less than 500, the average score is 3.37, this rises to 3.67 for communities of 501-1,000. For communities of 1,001-5,000, the average score decreases to 3.17, before increasing to 3.49 for communities of 5,001-10,000. The trend of an increase in average score is maintained for communities of 10,001-20,000 (3.93) and for communities of more than 20,000 (4.40). The average scores for each of the five conditions for procedural justice mirror the trend of the average for all of the conditions rather closely; aside from the fact that correctability falls from an average score of 3.41 for communities of 1,001-5,000, to 3.14 for communities of 5,001-10,000. The averages for each of the other conditions, as well as the overall average, rise between 1,000-5,000 and 5,001-10,000. When considering the number of survey responses for each population size range, 10,001-20,000 and >20,000 only

received 2 and 1 survey responses respectively. Accordingly, this data could not be considered when making generalisations about the community benefit scheme population as a whole. When analysing the lines on the graph representing each of the conditions for procedural justice between the population size ranges of <500, up to and including 5,000-10,000, it can be seen that there is no upward trend in terms of average scores across, but rather fluctuations in average scores. Thus, based upon this data set, H_1 is rejected.

H₃ As the size (MW) of an onshore wind project increases, so will the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by the relative community benefits scheme.




Figure 4-5 The average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across different ranges in size (MW) of surveyed onshore wind projects with community benefits

Figure 4-5 depicts the average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across different ranges in size (MW) of surveyed onshore wind projects with community benefits. The grey bars represent the number of survey responses for each range in size of onshore wind project. The solid red line represents the average scores across all five conditions for procedural justice. Regarding the average across all of the conditions, the average score for onshore wind projects <5 MW is 3.43. This increases to 3.91 for onshore wind projects in the size range of 6-20 MW. For onshore wind projects in the size range of 21-50 MW, there is a significant decrease in average score to 3.01. Following this, the average score increases again to 3.80 for onshore wind projects in the size range of 51-100 MW, before decreasing again to 3.02 for onshore wind projects >100 MW. The average scores for each of the five conditions mirror the average scores across all of the conditions relatively closely, each exhibiting an m-shaped curve. The only deviation away from this concerns correctability. For onshore wind projects <5 MW in size, the average score for correctability is 3.92, this decreases to 3.75 for onshore wind projects in the size range of 6-20 MW. Notably, the other four conditions exhibit an increase in score between these two different size ranges. The graph clearly shows that there is not an increase in average score relative to an increase in the size of an onshore wind project across the different conditions for procedural justice. The

highest average score across all of the conditions is for the size range 6-20MW, something which would not be anticipated if H_3 was true. Therefore, based upon this data sample, H_3 is rejected.

H_4 As the value of a community benefits scheme (£/year) increases, so will the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by that community benefit scheme.




Figure 4-6 The average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across different ranges in value (£/year) of surveyed CBS

Figure 4-6 depicts the average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across different ranges in value (£/year) of surveyed CBS. The grey bars represent the number of survey responses for each range in value of community benefits scheme. The solid red line represents the mean scores across all of the conditions. For CBS valued <£2,000 the average score is 3.47, this increases to 3.73 for CBS valued in the range of £2001-£5,000. For CBS valued in the range of £5,001-£10,000, there is a decrease in average score to 3.47, followed by further decreases in average score for the size ranges of £10,001-£20,000 and £20,001-£50,000, which scored 3.37 and 2.99 respectively. The average score for CBS in the value range of £50,001-£100,000 is significantly higher at 3.51, whilst the score for CBS valued at >£100,000 is higher still at 3.82. The trend displayed by the average values for accuracy follows that of the average of all the conditions very closely, whilst the average score for bias-suppression increases and decreases at the same range in values as the average for all of the conditions, though the scores are on each occasion lower. Regarding correctability, there are some significant fluctuations in terms of its corresponding average scores. The lowest average score for correctability, 2.75, is for CBS valued at <£2,000. For the range in values, £2001-£5000, the average score is significantly higher at 4. For the range in values, £10,001-£20,000, the average score is lower at 3.06. Conversely, for CBS valued at >£100,000 the average score for correctability was 4.11. The average scores for process control exhibit larger disparities still. For CBS valued at <£2,000, the average score for process control is 3, rising to 3.88 for CBS valued at £10,001-£20,000, but decreasing significantly to 2.66 for CBS valued at £20,001-£50,000. The average score for process control subsequently peaks at 4.22 for CBS valued at

>£100,000. The average scores for ethicality are higher than those of any other condition at each range of values, aside from £10,001-£20,000 and £20,001-£50,000, where the averages of process control and correctability are higher respectively. Nevertheless, there are still significant fluctuations in the scores for ethicality. For instance, the highest average score it achieved was 4.50 for CBS valued at <£2,000, whereas it attained a low average score of 3.33 for CBS valued in the range of £20,001-£50,000. The average scores across all of the conditions resemble a v-shape on the graph if CBS valued at <£2,000, of which there are only two, are excluded. This does not resemble the linear pattern which would be expected if communities' perceptions of procedural justice were to increase relative to community benefit value increasing. Accordingly, based upon this data sample, H_4 is rejected.

H₅ Communities which are the only communities receiving community benefits from a particular onshore wind project, will have higher perceptions of procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of CBS, compared to communities which are not the only communities receiving community benefits from an onshore wind project.




Figure 4-7 The average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across whether or not the surveyed communities are the only communities receiving community benefits from the onshore wind project at hand

Figure 4-7 shows the average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across whether or not the surveyed communities are the only communities receiving community benefits from the onshore wind project at hand. The grey bars depict the number of survey responses for each answer. The solid red line represents the average scores across all of the conditions. Regarding the average scores across all of the conditions, the average score for unknown is 3.70, for no, the average score is 3.39, and the average score for yes is 3.65. Very noticeably, each of the other conditions aside from ethicality follows the same trend, in that the average scores attained were higher for yes than no. As a result of all of the conditions for procedural justice aside from ethicality, having received higher average scores when the surveyed

communities were the only communities receiving community benefits from the onshore wind project at hand, H₅ is accepted based upon the sample in this study.




Figure 4-8 The average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across the different structures of surveyed CBS

Figure 4-8 shows the average ranking of communities' perceptions regarding the five conditions for procedural justice across the different structures of surveyed CBS. The grey bars represent the number of survey responses for each of the different kinds of community benefits structure. The solid red line represents the average score across all of the conditions. Regarding the average scores across all of the conditions, lumped sum payment(s) attains 3.62. For payments per MW installed per year, the average score is 3.70; this decreases to 3.57 for payment(s) linked to the profits of the onshore wind project. For community education or job creation, the average score is 2.13. Lastly, for other types of community benefit structure, the average score is 3.08. The lines on the graph representing the averages for each of the five conditions for procedural justice, generally follow the same trend as the line for the average across all of the conditions. The average scores for payments per MW installed per year and lumped sum payment(s) are very similar; however, there is a substantial decrease in average score for payment(s) linked to the profits of the onshore wind project, and even more so with regards to community education or job creation. The only differentiation away from this trend concerns accuracy. Accuracy has a lower average score for payments per MW installed per year, 3.58, than it does for payments linked to the profits of the onshore wind project (4.38). Each of the other four conditions exhibits the opposite of this regarding these two types of community benefit structure. When analysing the graph, it is evident that lumped sum payment(s) (20) and payments per MW installed per year (13), are the most common types of community benefit structure within the survey sample. The data in the graph shows that there is very little difference between the average scores for each of these two types of community benefit structures across all five conditions for procedural justice. Therefore, based upon the sample, it can be stated that regarding these two most common types of community benefit structure, the type of benefit structure does not influence communities' perceptions of procedural justice differently to the other type of community benefit structure.

The significance of the findings outlined in chapter 4.1.3 is considered in the discussion and conclusion (chapter 5). Next, the analysis pertaining to the interviews is presented.

4.2 Qualitative results and analyses

This sub-chapter aims to build on the analyses presented in chapter 4.1 by presenting data which was gathered through five interviews with community representatives from across five different community benefits scheme cases. In addition, a sixth interview was conducted with a local governmental official who has significant experience in dealing with CBS. Moreover, it endeavours to answer the third sub-question:

What explanations can be deduced from the interviews with the community representatives as to why certain conditions for procedural justice scored lower than others?

Accordingly, nuanced insights regarding the types of explanations that could account for differences in the levels of perceived procedural justice across different cases, including why some conditions for procedural justice may in some cases score higher or lower than others, are presented.

4.2.1 Bias-suppression




Figure 4-9 The mean ranking scores for the five indicators of the procedural justice condition, bias-suppression

Figure 4-9 shows the mean ranking scores for the five indicators of bias-suppression across the 45 surveys. The subsequent mean ranking scores are: neutrality of the project developer's representative (3.51), open decision making rationales of the project developer (3.18), community could suggest who/which areas should benefit (3.22), early notification of benefits availability by the project developer (3.38), and the ability to contest decisions to an independent body (2.80).

Neutrality of project developer's representative

The mean ranking score for the indicator, neutrality of the project developer's representative was the highest mean score for any indicator pertaining to bias-suppression; however, it was still slightly under the mean perceived procedural justice ranking score for the data set (3.56). The first, second and third community representatives all neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement delineated from this indicator; yet when asked why they answered the question this way, they all explained in their own way that they were not sure as to what extent that the project developer's representative could be neutral, given that they worked for the project developer (Interview 1; interview 2; interview 3). The fifth community representative who partially agreed with the statement added further sustenance to this notion, in stating: 'obviously she went to considerable lengths to try and meet the expectations and requirements that were expressed from within the community, she was after all an employee of Scottish and Southern Energy, and as far as they were concerned, this was clearly a commercial enterprise, so whilst they were prepared to go to some lengths to meet our requests, other things were obviously a step too far' (Interview 6). Thus, the mean ranking score of 3.51 can at least partly be explained by the fact that a certain number of survey respondents were sceptical of the capacity of project developers' representatives to be completely neutral. However, this does not provide a thorough explanation, since some community representatives did score 5 on this indicator.

Open decision making rationales of project developer

The mean ranking score for open decision making rationales of the project developer (3.18) is below the overall perceived mean procedural justice ranking score (3.56). Across the interviews, the community representatives appeared satisfied to some extent regarding the project developers' decision making rationales being open; however, there are some quibbles concerning the level of engagement with the communities on the behalf of the project developers. Indeed, one community representative discussed how a project developer was supportive of the idea to establish a community development trust in order to manage the community benefits payments received by the community, but was unwilling to fund the establishment of the trust, instead insisting that the community should pay. The community representative was not satisfied with this response, and went on to exclaim: 'so they've [the project developer] explained, but not really in an engaged way' (Interview 1). Further evidence of a lack of engagement by a project developer was heard during the second interview, whereby the community representative explained that he did not think that the project developer was completely open about the reasons behind its decisions, and indeed it was a 'more sort of this is the way it is kind of thing' (Interview 2), as opposed to the community receiving an explanation as to the reason behind a particular decision. This particular community representative felt that the community group should have been more involved in the decision making, since '...we are the machinery that actually deals with the grants' (Interview 2), and that the community would have benefited more had the project developer been more proactive in terms of its engagement with the community. Contrary to this, the fifth community representative was satisfied with the level of engagement offered by the project developer. He explained that on the whole, the project developer was open in answering questions put to it; however, there were '...situations where we were getting an answer that I didn't think we expected' (Interview 6).

Furthermore, the local governmental official revealed that from his experience, community groups were more accepting of decisions if they were aware of the reasons behind them, in particular, legal reasons (Interview 5).

Community could suggest who/which areas should benefit

Only one of the community representatives claimed to have been afforded the opportunity to suggest to a project developer as to who or which areas should benefit from the community benefits; however, when asked as to the manner in which his community was afforded this opportunity, his answer did not sufficiently answer the questions, and so no real insights were provided (Interview 6). None of the other community representatives were consulted by the project developers to suggest who or which areas should benefit from the community benefits. Despite this, the fourth community representative claimed that he was satisfied with the fact that the respective community benefits scheme encompassed all of those people and areas affected by the onshore wind project, citing that the beneficiaries owned all of the land upon which the onshore wind project was built (Interview 4). In addition, the second community representative claimed that 'we live in a very remote part of Scotland and therefore the construction of the turbines caused minimal impact and disruption' (Interview 2). Conversely, the first community representative discussed the fact that when the project developer first mooted the concept of community benefits, it already had a firm idea of the community council areas that should benefit. Asked whether he thought the community benefits encompassed all of those people affected by the onshore wind project, he stated: '...the town of [name removed], approximately 10,000 population and large parts of the town you can see the blades of the turbines up on the hills, but no community benefits go to [name removed]...' (Interview 1). In addition, the same town was also, according to him, affected by the construction of the onshore wind project (Interview 1). Based upon the evidence from interviews 1 and 2, it can be suggested that the extent to which an onshore wind project with associated community benefits is located in a rural or more urban area, may affect whether or not all of those affected by an onshore wind project, are included as recipients of a community benefits scheme. Clearly, in urban areas where multiple community council area boundaries meet, and where a larger number of residential and business premises are within viewing proximity of the onshore wind project, there are more factors to take in to account when deciding who or which areas should receive community benefits. If project developers were to afford communities the opportunity to suggest how they might be affected by an onshore wind project, then this could perhaps help better inform their decisions. Though the first community representative made a cautionary point regarding this, in stating '...but I think it's very difficult to ask people whether they want some money, because they'll immediately say yes' (Interview 1).

Early notification of benefits availability by project developer

The early notification by the project developer of the availability of community benefits attains a low score of 3.38; however, the community representatives who took part in the interviews seemed very satisfied regarding this indicator. The first respondent discussed the fact that his own and the neighbouring community council were made aware of the availability of community benefits after the planning proposals for the onshore wind project were accepted, and that this was a satisfactory outcome (Interview 1); whilst the second, third and fourth community representatives simply stated

that the timing of the notification of the availability of community benefits produced satisfactory outcomes for them (Interview 2; Interview 3; Interview 4). Conversely to the experience of the first community representative, the local governmental official explained that from his experience, it is more ideal for communities to be informed of the availability of community benefits as soon as the ‘...developer decides to formally pursue the project.’ Accordingly, this allows community members time to form a coherent plan as to what benefits would be most suitable for them. This was the case with the fifth community representative, who stated that he was fairly sure that community benefits were mooted prior to the planning proposals for the onshore wind project being accepted (Interview 6). This is something recommended in the best practice guides for the delivery of CBS in England and Scotland (DECC, 2014a; Local energy Scotland, 2013). However, the local governmental official also discussed the fact that he was aware of some cases where the project developer had waited until it had planning permission before notifying the community regarding the availability of community benefits. In his own words: ‘at this point all the power is with the developer as they are not legally required to pay benefits, and they have permission to build the windfarm regardless’ (Interview 5). Whilst it is only possible to speculate, perhaps in some of the surveyed onshore wind projects with community benefits cases, this was the situation, and it subsequently resulted in the communities’ scoring on this particular indicator for procedural justice being lower than it could have been had the project developers given the communities more time to form coherent plans.

The ability to contest decisions to an independent body

The ability to contest decisions to an independent body scored particularly lowly (2.80); however, the interviews with the community representatives are able to shed some light regarding this. One community representative, when asked why he completely disagreed with the fact that the community could contest any decisions made by the project developer to an independent body, simply replied: ‘there’s no outside body. Nobody holds any power over the developer’ (Interview 1). Following this line of thought, another community representative stated: ‘erm, I wonder who the independent body would be’ (Interview 3). Additionally, one community representative explained the fact that he strongly disagreed with the statement by saying: ‘since we were entering in to a joint venture, there wasn’t really anyone who we could appeal to, since it was our own choice to do so’ (Interview 4). The discussion with the local governmental official revealed that communities are able to seek advice from the local government regarding how to better negotiate a favourable community benefits package; however, project developers do not have to take this on board if planning permission for the onshore wind project has already been consented (Interview 5). Another community representative mirrored this notion, in discussing how the community group could contest decisions to the local council, though he did not believe this made it fairer for the community as the local council could ‘...pretty well dictate what’s going to happen rather than have an open discussion’ (Interview 2). Therefore, it appears as though the low score of 2.80 can be explained by the fact that the project developers are in the most powerful position, particularly once planning permission has been consented. Additionally, the notion that CBS are voluntary offerings on the behalf of project developers is also likely significant, since legally project developers do not have to offer any community benefits and any offerings can legally be on their terms.

4.2.2 Accuracy




Figure 4-10 The mean ranking scores for the four indicators of the procedural justice condition, accuracy

Figure 4-10 presents the mean ranking scores for the four indicators of the procedural justice condition, accuracy. Accordingly, the mean ranking scores are: abundance of information regarding the credentials of project developer employees (2.64), sufficient information, instruction and guidance from the project developer (3.64), relevant information used regarding the nature of the community (3.96), and utilisation of best available information by the project developer (3.60).

Abundance of information regarding credentials of project developer representative

The mean ranking score for the indicator, abundance of information regarding the credentials of project developer's representative is particularly low (2.64); in fact, it is the lowest average score across all of the procedural justice indicators. One factor which contributed to this low mean score, at least in one case, was the lack of familiarity of the project developer to the community group. The fourth community representative completely disagreed with the statement linked to this indicator in the survey he completed. However, this is explained by the fact that the project developer in this particular case was a company from outside of Europe which had never operated in the UK before, and therefore it was deemed '...a bit of a risky venture' by the community group (Interview 4). Additionally, the first community representative also completely disagreed with the statement linked to this indicator. Whilst not citing why he completely disagreed, he did offer an informative comparison between the community benefits scheme being discussed and a recent community benefits scheme that his community had received as a result of an offshore wind project. When asked about whether he thought it was necessary for the representative of the project developer to have had previous experience with CBS, he stated that 'it's extremely helpful to have that experience... you tend to see a lot more information, in a more open manner and arguably might have a little bit more of a say in terms of how things play out' (Interview 1). Taking this in to account,

it can be suggested that the low mean ranking score for this indicator could also be attributed a lack of experience in negotiating CBS on the behalf of the project developers.

Sufficient information, instruction and guidance from the project developer

The mean ranking score for sufficient information, instruction and guidance from the project developer is 3.64; this is 0.08 above the overall mean perceived procedural justice ranking score, so it can be considered as relatively high within the context of the results for the indicators. Three of the interviews highlighted one significant thing, and that concerns the fact that whilst each of community representatives partially agreed with the statement pertaining to this indicator, they each thought that the project developers could have been more proactive in terms of how willing they were to help and engage with their communities. The first community representative, when discussing the fact that his community wished to establish a community development trust to manage the community benefits the community was receiving, stated ‘...I don’t know what I need to do to make that happen’, before going on to suggest that the project developer should pay to establish it, since it would ‘...help us establish a really long term, viable arrangement’ (Interview 1). Mirroring this, the fifth community representative also discussed a willingness within his community to establish a community trust, so as to ‘...sustain work in the community and thereby helping people become sustainable’ (Interview 6). However, in this case, the project developer was currently unwilling to facilitate the establishment of such a community development trust (Interview 6). Not dissimilar to this, the second community representative discussed the fact that he thought that the project developer could have done more to engage with the community. When asked how he thought they could have done this, he replied: ‘well I think just meetings with us, meetings with the community council, before decisions were taken. We had very little face to face contact’. So whilst the mean ranking score for sufficient information, instruction and guidance from project developers was good, the evidence from the interviews suggests that community groups indeed value, and want better engagement from project developers.

Relevant information used regarding the nature of the community

The mean ranking score for relevant information used regarding the nature of the community is high at 3.96. The interviews with the community representatives offer an interesting insight as to why this could have been the case. Both the first and third community representatives explained that the respective project developers had utilised existing community council boundaries to define the areas set to receive community benefits (Interview 1; Interview 3), whilst the fourth community representative stated that the community owned the land upon which the onshore wind project was constructed, making community benefit allocation straightforward (Interview 4). Thus, at least in these three cases, clear, pre-established geo-political boundaries were utilised by the project developers as means of stipulating which areas would receive community benefits. It seems quite likely that this will also have been the case across many of the other surveyed onshore wind projects with associated community benefits, since the mean ranking score was high at almost 4.

The mean ranking score attained by the indicator, utilisation of best available information by the project developer is 0.04 above the mean procedural justice ranking for the entire data sample at 3.60. The interviews with the community representatives highlighted four distinct characterisations of practice with regard to project developer-community group engagement, suggesting that project developer practices vary considerably regarding the extent to which the best available information is utilised.

The first community representative who neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement relating to this indicator, discussed the fact that the project developer approached his community council and a neighbouring community council, to inform them that their communities would receive £5,000 per MW of electricity produced per year by the onshore wind project set to be built in their communities. The two community councils then agreed between themselves as to how to split the annual payment (Interview 1). Thus, the project developer took a back-seated approach. According to the community representative, 'there were no disagreements between us and them' (referring to the other community council) (Interview 1). The community representative admitted that both communities were very happy with the outcome; however, it is important to question how the community representative would have felt regarding the project developer taking a back-seated approach, had the two community councils not reached an agreement harmoniously. If this had been the case, then perhaps the community representative would have scored lower on this indicator.

The second characterisation of practice was revealed by the second community representative, who partially agreed with the statement pertaining to this indicator. He described how the project developer had liaised with the local government, of which his community council is a subsidiary; however, the project developer did 'not really' use any information provided by the community in a constructive manner (Interview 2). Thus, in this case study, the project developer was willing to utilise information provide by a third party, (the local government) but not by the affected community. Had the project developer done so, then the community representative would have likely scored higher on this indicator.

The third characterisation of practice was unveiled by the fifth community representative, who partially agreed with the statement pertaining to this indicator. He discussed the fact that his community was able to voice its concerns to the project developer regarding the fact that a significant amount of forest, which the community had planted, would have to be felled in order for the onshore wind project to be constructed. The project developer subsequently responded to this by making the timber available as firewood to every household in the community for free (Interview 6). Thus, in this case study, the project developer utilised information provided by the community, but did not consult any third parties.

The fourth characterisation of practice was uncovered during the discussion with the fourth community representative. The fourth community representative completely agreed with the statement relating to this indicator. When asked whether the project developer consulted the community and third parties when presiding over the community benefits to be offered, he replied

‘yes, I think both. They relied on us to get all of the permissions sorted...so we [the community group] were their nice warm and fluffy interface between them and the community’ (Interview 4). The evidence from the fourth community representative is in contrast to the first, second and fifth case studies, in the sense that the project developer utilised both the input of the community groups and also that of third parties.

4.2.3 Correctability




Figure 4-11 The mean ranking scores for the two indicators of the procedural justice condition, correctability

Figure 4-11 highlights the mean ranking scores for the two indicators pertaining to the procedural justice condition, correctability. Accordingly, the mean score for possibility of community to influence who should benefit was very high (4.07), whereas the mean score for possibility to ask the project developer to reconsider community expectations was below the mean perceived procedural justice ranking across all of the surveys at (3.20).

Possibility of community to influence who should benefit

The mean ranking score for the possibility of the community to influence who should benefit, is the joint-highest of any indicator (4.07). The fourth community representative, who partially agreed with the statement relating to this indicator, discussed the fact that because his community owned the land upon which the onshore wind project was to be built, there ‘wasn’t much use for us to try and influence [who would benefit]’ (Interview 4). This was because the community benefits received came in the form of rental payments to the owners of the land (Interview 4). Conversely, in the fifth case study, information provided by the community directly influenced the beneficiaries of the community benefits. As previously stipulated, the fifth community representative, who partially agreed with the statement pertaining to this indicator, discussed the fact that through community pressure, the project developer provided free firewood to every household in the community from the forest which was felled to make way for the onshore wind project (Interview 6). Generally speaking, the community representatives who were interviewed told of having a significant level of autonomy in terms of whom and what the community benefits could be spent on. Indeed, the second community representative stated that: ‘we try to give the majority of the grants providing that they can justify it’ (Interview 2). Reaffirming this notion, the third community representative discussed the fact that ‘...each [grant] application has to demonstrate community benefit.’ Thus, the

evidence from the interviews suggests that communities are given relative freedom in terms of how they can distribute the community benefits that they receive, whilst the evidence from the fifth community representative highlights the fact that in some cases, project developers can be adaptive to a community's wishes. This subsequently explains why the mean ranking score for the possibility of the community to influence who should benefit was so high.

Possibility to ask project developer to reconsider community expectations

Regarding the possibility to ask the project developer to reconsider community expectations, the fifth community representative completely agreed with the statement relating to this indicator. He explained the fact that during community liaison meetings with the project, '...various expectations were expressed. Sometimes we, the local opinion prevailed a little bit and it stimulated a little bit of change...' (Interview 6). However, he also drew attention to the fact that whilst the community had some level of influence in the community benefit discussions, '...the format that the community benefits discussions took, that was largely controlled by Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE)' (Interview 6). Additionally, the first community representative stated that he partially he agreed with the statement pertaining to this indicator. He discussed the fact that whilst it was not formally written down in a business plan or in a policy document, '...it was all to do with what [name removed], the developer's representative thought was reasonable' (Interview 1). Whilst not explicitly saying so, this does insinuate that to some extent, the project developer's representative allowed for some concessions regarding what was expected of the community in order for them to gain access to community benefits. The interview with the second community respondent also unveiled a willingness on the behalf of the project developer to change its expectations of the community, though only in a minor way. The community representative explained that the project developer would invite anyone from his community council to attend meetings in order to gain a better understanding of what was happening, 'but the way things are done is that the developer has very much the upper hand and would not change much of what they had started' (Interview 2). The experiences in these three cases studies replicate the message told by the local governmental official, who explained that 'in general, communities are able to have their suggestions heard though, what the community wants may not be in line with what the developer planned so there's a limit to how much it can be influenced' (Interview 5). Therefore, it is possible to suggest that the low average score for this indicator could quite likely be attributed to the rigidity of project developers' plans and an unwillingness to diverge greatly away from them.

4.2.4 *Ethicality*

Figure 4-12 depicts the mean ranking scores of the three indicators pertaining to the procedural justice condition, ethicality. The mean score for fair decision making rationales was 3.73, for fair information gathering procedures the mean score was 3.91, and for expectations of the community within intellectual, knowledge-based and financial-based resources, the mean score was 4.07. Each of these mean scores can be considered high in relation to the mean perceived procedural justice ranking score of 3.56.




Figure 4-12 The mean ranking scores for the three indicators of the procedural justice condition, ethicality

Fair decision making rationales

Regarding the indicator, fair decision making rationales, the second community representative completely agreed with the corresponding statement. He reaffirmed this belief during a discussion on the topic, stating that he believed that the community had not been adversely affected in any way, and that he had no quibbles with the way that the project developer had gone about its course of action (Interview 2). The local governmental official's rhetoric on the matter was also generally positive. He stated that project developers are usually willing to listen to what communities have to say; however, he also emphasised that sometimes project developers place strict criteria on what community benefits can be used for, meaning that these things may not be completely in line with a community's desires (Interview 5). The fourth community respondent implicitly reaffirmed this, arguing that although the project developer was fair, '...they were obviously very driven' (Interview 4). The fifth community representative partially agreed with the statement pertaining to this indicator; however, when asked to explain why, his answer was somewhat cynical. He argued that '...as we were dealing with a big corporation which is doing this purely as a commercial enterprise, so their expectations of a small community are never quite going to match up with the criteria that large corporations work by' (Interview 6). Taking in to account the experiences of the interviewees, it appears as though project developers can often be very forthright in terms of what they can and cannot do for communities in the context of CBS. If the project developer's and the community's aspirations for the community benefits are aligned, then communities are probably more likely to perceive the project developer's decision making rationales as fair. Conversely, if their aspirations are divergent, then perhaps communities are more likely to perceive the decision making rationales of a project developer less favourably.

Fair information gathering procedures

Regarding the indicator, fair information gathering procedures, which scores above average at 3.91, the local governmental official discussed the fact that project developers do not always share their information gathering procedures. However, he explained that in an ideal situation, the project developer should ‘...hold publicised consultations which are a fair way of gaining the public’s opinion on the proposed projects’ (Interview 5). Evidence from the interviews with the community representatives suggests that the extent to which publicised meetings were held between the project developers and the affected communities, varied. Aside from the fourth community representative who neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement formulated from this indicator, each of the community representatives completely agreed with the statement. The fourth community representative reported that the project developer did not hold publically accessible meetings, instead choosing to communicate solely with the community council which acted on the community’s behalf (Interview 4), which could perhaps account for the score of 3 on this indicator. The third and fifth community representatives both discussed the fact that people from their communities were afforded the chance to attend meetings at various stages of project development with the two respective project developers (Interview 3; Interview 6). Meanwhile, the first community representative without saying so explicitly, insinuated that there has been a constant and ongoing dialogue between the community and the project developer (Interview 1). This is in contrast to the story told by the second community representative, who emphasised the fact that he wished the project developer had utilised more face-to-face contact rather than contact mainly via writing (Interview 2). Nevertheless, there was no evidence of any illicit information gathering procedures such as bribery or spying, so whilst in some situations, the community representatives may not have been satisfied with the frequency or quality of meetings with the project developers, it at least seems as though that on the whole, project developers are fair in the way they gather information about communities.

Expectations of community with intellectual, knowledge-based and financial-based resources

The mean ranking score for this indicator is very high at (4.07). The discussions with the community representatives regarding this were on the whole, quite positive. Indeed, the fifth community representative who partially agreed with this statement, explained that his community is lucky because ‘...they’re [the project developer] doing all the management and it’s just distributed through the panel’ [the community council] (Interview 6). In addition, he also emphasised the fact that the negotiation process was not overly time consuming, ‘...because most of us [the community councillors] could see that there was going to be benefit from it...’. Meanwhile, the third community representative explained that he works for one of the biggest funding organisations in the UK, and that from this experience, he could state that the people from the community involved in the community benefit negotiations were ‘...fairly astute...’ (Interview 3), though he could not say as to what extent their knowledge was sufficient enough (Interview 3). The second community representative partially agreed with the statement relating to this indicator; however, he emphasised the fact that the administration associated with the community benefits placed a certain amount of pressure on the community council (Interview 2). Conversely, the fourth community representative partially disagreed with the statement relating to this indicator. Indeed,

he was of the opinion that a lack of human resources impacted upon the community's ability to gain the maximum level of benefit. When referring to the community benefits negotiations, he exclaimed that '...in my opinion, we didn't spend enough time and effort pushing back on them saying no, you can't have that, no you can't have that' (Interview 4). Moreover, the project developer had expensive lawyers, whereas the community only had one lawyer, who had to spend a lot of time presiding over documents which '...wasn't a pleasant job...'. Another issue raised concerned the concept of the negotiators' personalities. The community representative acknowledged the fact that the project developer's negotiator was very driven and forthright with his thoughts, whereas the community was not used to such a personality (Interview 4).

The experience of the fourth community representative is likely not very representative of the survey sample, given that the mean score for this indicator was 4.07. Nevertheless, the second community representative admitted that the community benefits administration was a significant burden on the community council in terms of time, so there is at least some evidence to suggest that community's resources can be stretched at times by the demands of negotiating and administering community benefits.

4.2.5 Process control

Voice

The mean ranking score for voice which is the sole indicator for process control is 3.58; this is almost identical to the mean perceived procedural justice ranking for the whole survey sample of 3.56. During the discussions with the community representatives, it became clear that overall; there was a great sense of satisfaction with regards to how the communities believed they were able to voice their opinions to the project developers. For example, the first community representative made the point that '...it would be true to say that developers will be always open to hearing the opinion of the community...' (Interview 1), though he also acknowledged that this does not necessarily mean that the community's opinions will be taken on board (Interview 1). The third community representative's words were equally assuring on the matter; indeed, he stated that '...it is a good fund. We get the opportunity to influence how it works through our various review meetings...' (Interview 3). The second community representative was also very positive; agreeing when asked if he thought that the project developer had done everything they could for the community to have an input. Interestingly though, he also reported that the level of opportunity for the community to voice its opinions had increased over time (Interview 2). The fifth community representative who completely agreed with the statement pertaining to this indicator, made an interesting assertion on the matter, arguing that '...they're [the local people] quite laidback about most things. If it doesn't directly involve them they don't get involved and it's difficult to get them involved' (Interview 6). He went on to discuss the fact that even though the project developer arranged public meetings, '...generally speaking, attendance at the public meetings was relatively small' (Interview 6). The local governmental official made a significant point on the matter, arguing that 'the notion of voice for the community is important, especially if they objected to the windfarm and it got planning permission anyways. It softens the blow...if the community feels they have a real say in what benefits they get' (Interview 5). Accordingly, the discussions with the community representatives do not offer much insight with regards to why voice only scored 3.58, since the community

representatives all perceived that they were able to voice their opinions readily to the project developers. It can only be speculated that in some of the cases sampled in the surveys, communities were not offered sufficient platforms to voice their opinions to project developers; this could quite likely be due to a lack of contact, either fact-to-face or via telephone or post.

5 Discussion and conclusion

The discussion commences by reporting the most significant findings of the research, as well as the ramifications of these in terms of procedural justice theory. Next, the limitations and possible directions for future are presented. This subsequently leads to a discussion of the practical implications of the research, followed by the conclusion.

5.1 Discussion

5.1.1 Research findings and theoretical insights

This piece of research aimed to help improve the provision of CBS which aim to stimulate public support for onshore wind projects in the UK by making an analysis and assessment of the levels of perceived procedural justice that active CBS have proliferated, whilst simultaneously offering explanations as to why this might be the case.

Consequently, a policy evaluation of CBS was completed, which aimed to address the following central research question:

To what extent do the development and implementation of CBS in the UK meet the five conditions of procedural justice? The five conditions of procedural justice being: bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability, ethicality, and process control.

As a means of answering the central research question, it was first necessary to ascertain what conditions are most appropriate for evaluating CBS. Accordingly, chapter 2 presented a thorough review of some of the most pre-eminent theories of procedural justice, whereby procedural justice was conceptualised by means of five conditions that must all be present for it to exist: bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability, ethicality, and process control. These were the conditions most applicable for this study based on the context of CBS. However, it is important to state that other conditions not included in this conceptualisation, such as the consistency rule from Leventhal's criteria (1980), or indeed, conditions from relational theories such as those put forward by Lind and Tyler (1988), and Blader and Tyler (2003b), are likely also to be relevant for evaluating perceived procedural justice in other contexts.

To gain insight regarding the level of perceived procedural justice across the sampled CBS, as was the goal of the second sub-question, the five conditions for procedural justice were operationalised via the 25 indicators. Five hypotheses were generated which aimed to address whether any of the following five factors: the size of the onshore wind project (MW), the population size of the community receiving the community benefits scheme, the value of the community benefits scheme (£/year), and whether or not the surveyed community was the only community receiving community benefits from the onshore wind project at hand, may affect the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by the development and implementation of CBS.

Positive developments over time

The first hypothesis states that CBS that were agreed upon recently will exhibit higher levels of perceived procedural justice than those agreed upon earlier in time. Since the relationship between communities' perceptions of procedural justice and the period in time in which the sampled CBS were agreed appears relatively linear in nature, the first hypothesis was accepted. The fundamental aim behind the first hypothesis was to assess whether progress concerning the development and implementation of CBS has been made, and based upon the sample employed in this research, this certainly seems to be the case. Accordingly, it at least appears as though national governmental policy interventions, such as a toolkit for the delivery of CBS targeted at project developers (Centre for Sustainable Energy et al., 2009), and the best practice guides for the development and implementation of CBS in England and Scotland (DECC, 2014a; Local Energy Scotland. 2013), aimed at stimulating the development and implementation of CBS to adhere to the conditions for procedural justice, have to some extent been successful. This cannot be stated for absolute certainty, given that an increase in perceived procedural justice could also be attributed to project developers' learning by doing, which is where an organisation's knowledge improves over time as individuals within that organisation learn from experience (Probst et al., 1996, in: Amin and Cohendet, 2000). Thus, this could result in project developers altering their approaches to the development and implementation of CBS, based on feedback from communities.

Characteristics of the communities and onshore wind projects

The 4 subsequent hypotheses relate to certain characteristics of the community or the onshore wind project. The second hypothesis states that communities which are larger in terms of population size will have higher perceptions of procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of CBS, than communities which are smaller in terms of population size. The reason this hypothesis was mooted, was because there is a significant body of literature which supports the notion that larger groups with more varied skill sets, generally have more power in decision making processes compared to groups with less varied skill sets (Foucault, 1998 in: Kerr et al., 2017; Kerr et al., 2017; Shucksmith, 2010). Consequently, it would be expected that, generally speaking, larger populations would have larger arrays of skill sets. Thus, it was important to test for this empirically in order to assess as to what extent project developers treat different populations of community groups equally. The third and fourth hypotheses relate to certain characteristics of the onshore wind project. Moreover, the third hypothesis states that as the size of an onshore wind project increases, so will the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by the relative community benefits scheme. The fourth hypothesis states that as the value of a community benefit scheme increases, so will the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by that community benefits scheme. The assumption behind the third and fourth hypotheses was the idea that project developers would invest more time, human, and financial resources in to negotiating CBS for larger onshore wind projects, which in turn are worth more money to project developers, since poor or non-existent community liaison has been shown to increase the likelihood of planning proposals being refused by local authorities (DTI, 2005). In addition, larger onshore wind projects generate higher value CBS, since the value of a community benefits scheme is linked to the size of an onshore wind project (DECC, 2014a). Accordingly, these hypotheses served to assess whether project developers act

differently when implementing different types of projects, as was a sixth factor, namely the structure of a community benefits scheme, which did not have a related hypothesis.

In actual fact however, the second hypothesis was rejected. Indeed, based upon the sample employed in this piece of research, there is no evidence to suggest that the population size of the affected community impacts on the level of perceived procedural subsequently proliferated by the community benefits received by that community. In addition, the third and fourth hypotheses were also rejected. This means that no link could be found between the size of an onshore wind project and the level of procedural justice proliferated by the associated community benefits scheme, or the value of a community benefits scheme and the level of procedural justice proliferated by it. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the structure of a community benefits scheme affects the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by that community benefits scheme.

One reason as to why these hypotheses may have been rejected, and why there is no evidence to suggest that the structure of a community benefits scheme affects the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by an onshore wind project is the fact that policy makers have made significant attempts to improve the process by which CBS are developed and implemented (Bristow et al., 2012). One notable policy guidance report was commissioned by the former UK ministry, the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), and produced by the Centre for Sustainable Energy et al. (2009) in 2007, whereby a toolkit for the delivery of CBS, targeted at project developers was published (and updated in 2009). More recent and more prominent policy documents are the best practice guides for the development and implementation of CBS in England and Scotland produced by the governments of England and Scotland in consultation with Renewable UK (DECC, 2014a; Local Energy Scotland; 2013), as well as the best practice guidance issued for Northern Ireland and Wales (NIRIG, 2014; Welsh onshore wind developers in: PFR, 2013). Whilst at the regional level, the Highland Council, which is the regional-level government for a large part of Scotland, insisted that from 2011 onwards, project developers must pay a minimum of £5,000 per MW installed in community benefits payments (Highland Council, 2013). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that onshore wind project developers have developed their own sets of standards for the delivery and implementation of CBS. In 2011 (and updated in 2013), Renewable UK, the trade association for wind power in the UK, with the support of the UK government, launched its Community Benefits Protocol, whereby project developers committed to providing ‘...real and tangible...’ community benefits for new onshore wind projects in England above 5MW in size (Renewable UK, 2013). So whilst the Community Benefits Protocol only applies to onshore wind projects with associated CBS which were incepted in England after 2011 (Renewable UK, 2013), there is enough evidence to demonstrate the fact that the wind industry has made strides to standardise its practices. Furthermore, the notion that project developers have developed their own sets of standards for the development and implementation of CBS was also mooted in the interviews with the community representatives.

The fifth hypothesis states that communities which are the only communities receiving community benefits from a particular onshore wind project, will have higher perceptions of procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of CBS, compared to communities which are not the only communities receiving community benefits from an onshore wind project. Accordingly, the

fifth hypothesis was based upon the assumption that if a project developer were to negotiate community benefits with more than one community at a time, their human resources may be stretched (Subramaniam and Youndt, 2005), meaning that the level of, and quality of their engagement with the affected communities would be lower. Accordingly, the evaluation of the fifth hypothesis was a further way of ascertaining as to what extent project developers treat different communities equally to one-another, as per the first hypothesis. Moreover, the fifth hypothesis was accepted, meaning that it can be suggested that on average, a community's perceptions of procedural justice relative to the development and implementation of a community benefits scheme, are likely to be marginally higher when that community is the sole community receiving community benefits from that particular onshore wind project; compared to if other communities are also beneficiaries.

Claims regarding the hypotheses

The empirical testing of the five hypotheses as well as the analysis of the sixth factor, subsequently serves to make two main claims, the first claim stemming from the confirmation of the first hypothesis. This relates to the fact that the level or perceived procedural justice proliferated by CBS appears to have increased over time, quite likely due to the fact that there has been a gradual increase in government and wind industry-led policies backing the development and implementation of CBS to adhere to the conditions for procedural justice (for example: DECC, 2014a; DECC14b, Centre for Sustainable Energy et al., 2009). Moreover, the second claim stems from the rejection of the second, third, and fourth hypotheses, the confirmation of the fifth hypothesis, and the fact that it was ascertained that the structure of a community benefits scheme does not impact on the level of procedural justice proliferated by it. As previously stated, there is no evidence to suggest that project developers approach community benefits negotiations differently based upon: the population size of the affected community, the size of the planned onshore wind project, the value of the community benefits scheme, or the structure of the community benefits scheme. Moreover, whilst the fifth hypothesis was accepted, the levels of procedural justice proliferated in the cases where the surveyed communities were the only communities receiving community benefits from the onshore wind project at hand, is only 0.26 higher than when this was not the case; a reasonable amount, but not vastly higher. Therefore, the second claim concerns the fact that based upon this data sample, on average it should be expected that different community groups, whether they be classified according to their population size, or whether or not they are the only community group receiving community benefits from a particular onshore wind project, will have similar perceptions of procedural justice, providing that the CBS they are basing this perception on were agreed upon in the same time period as one-another. This claim also stands for communities receiving community benefits from differently sized onshore wind projects, differently structured CBS and differently valued onshore wind projects.

These two claims subsequently facilitate a broader suggestion. Accordingly, they suggest that project developers are only partly achieving consistency when developing and implementing CBS. Referring back to the analytical framework (chapter 2), Leventhal (1980) stated that procedures must be applied consistently across different peoples over time. However, consistency was not utilised in the conceptualisation of procedural justice in the context of this research, because the very nature of

community benefits negotiations means that communities cannot easily perceive consistency since they are unlikely to have an accurate idea of what has happened in other communities. Nevertheless, it appears as though project developers are applying the procedures for developing and implementing CBS consistently across different communities, but not over time, as the increase in perceived procedural justice over time demonstrates.

Relative weighting of the procedural justice indicators

An appropriate notion to discuss here is one of the theoretical insights stimulated by this piece of research. This concerns the fact that of the original 25 indicators for procedural justice, 10 were excluded from the final analysis because they were deemed by the community groups to be either not applicable or alternatively, they did not know the answers to these statements. Furthermore, the 10 indicators which were excluded pertained to four procedural components which were being evaluated: safeguards (4 occasions), appeals (3 occasions), selection of agents (2 occasions), and decision structure (1 occasion). Therefore, in the context of CBS, safeguards, followed by appeals is the procedural component which is least relevant, whereas gathering information and the setting of ground rules are the most relevant, given that none of the indicators omitted from the final evaluation of CBS are related to these procedural components. This is confirmatory of the message of Colquitt et al. (2001) and Leventhal (1980), who discussed the fact that some of the conditions for procedural justice may be more relevant than others in different contexts, and indeed, certain combinations of conditions and procedural components may be more relevant in different situations. Accordingly, it is suggested here that one of the reasons as to why no fixed conceptualisation of procedural justice has been garnered, despite over 40 years of research, is a result of the fact that the definition of procedural justice is fluid; changing depending upon who perceives it, and in what context they perceive it.

Scoring of the procedural justice indicators

The interviews with the community representatives provided a valuable insight with regards to why some conditions for procedural justice scored lower than others on the perceived procedural justice ranking scale. Indeed, bias-suppression is the lowest scoring condition for procedural justice on average. The voluntary nature of CBS, where the project developer acts as the decision-maker, had a significant bearing on three of its indicators: neutrality of the project developer's representative, the ability to contest decisions to an independent body, and community could suggest who/which areas should benefit. The ability of the project developer's representative to be neutral was questioned by a number of the community representatives as well as the local governmental official. This is confirmatory of what Leventhal (1980) suggested, in the sense that the failure to remove the project developer or the project developer's representative from judicial roles, resulted in lower levels of perceived fairness. In line with this, it was stated that project developers hold a significant amount of power with regards to community benefits negotiations, and therefore, the ability to appeal to an independent body is often very limited. Moreover, none of the community representatives reported being able to suggest to a project developer as to who or which areas should receive community benefits. This is also linked to the voluntary notion of CBS, since the project developers were free to stipulate the community of benefit. This claim is supported by Kerr et al. (2017), who claimed that in order to optimise community benefit provision; power must be transferred to the community.

Accuracy is the second lowest scoring condition for procedural justice on average, with abundance of information regarding the credentials of the project developer's representative scoring the lowest of any of the 15 indicators included in this analysis. Regarding the indicator, sufficient information, instruction and guidance, the need for project developers to be more proactive in terms of how willing they were to engage with community groups, particular concerning the establishment of trust funds to manage the community benefits was highlighted by two of the community representatives. Relevant information used regarding the nature of the community scored highly at 3.96, this was reflected by the fact that, generally speaking, the project developers utilised clear geo-political boundaries in order to establish who would receive community benefits. Interestingly, the interviews with the community representatives highlighted four distinct characterisations of practice with regard to the utilisation of the best available information: a project developer taking a back-seated approach and allowing two communities to come to an arrangement regarding how the community benefits would be split between them, a project developer which liaised solely with the local government, a project developer which liaised solely with the community group, and a project developer which liaised with both third parties and the affected community. Significantly, the community representative who reported that the project developer had consulted third parties and the community group was the only community representative who completely agreed with the statement for that indicator. This notion is corroborated by Reed (2008), who established that increased stakeholder participation can enhance the quality of decisions by considering more thorough information inputs (Reed, 2008).

Correctability is the second highest average scoring condition for procedural justice (3.63); this can be attributed to the fact that the possibility of the community to influence who should benefit scores very highly (4.07). Generally speaking, the community representatives discussed the fact that they were afforded a significant amount of autonomy in terms of whom and what the community benefits could be spent on, which could likely have contributed to this high score. Conversely, the possibility to ask the project developer to reconsider community expectations scored lowly (3.20), this despite the fact that a number of the community representatives reported that their communities were able to persuade the respective project developers in to making some, albeit minor concessions. This is corroborated by the local governmental official, who explained that in general, there is a limit to how much communities are able to influence project developer's plans. This subsequently relates to the message of Leventhal (1980), who discussed the fact that people harbour greater perceptions of fairness in situations where they have the chance to appeal decisions that have been made. Thus, it is suggested here that the low score is reflective of the often rigid nature of project developers' plans.

Ethicality is the highest average scoring condition for procedural justice (3.90). The community representatives on the whole were very positive in terms of their opinions as to whether they thought that the project developers' decision making rationales were fair, though the local governmental official explained that sometimes project developers place strict criteria on what community benefits can be used for. Moreover, the community representatives were positive about the fairness of the project developer's decision making procedures; to this end, there was no evidence of any illicit information gathering procedures such as bribery or spying. Fair information gathering procedures on average scores highly (3.91). This can be explained by the fact that there

was a general consensus among the community representatives that there had been a constant and ongoing dialogue between their community groups and the respective project developers; however, one community representative wished there had been more face-to-face contact with the project developer. The mean ranking of, expectations of the community within intellectual, knowledge-based and financial-based resources is very high (4.07). On the whole, the community representatives' responses were mixed regarding this indicator, with two of the community representatives claiming to be completely satisfied that the project developers' expectations were reasonable. On the other hand, one of the community representatives explained that the administration demands of the community benefits could be quite demanding. Even more critical was another community representative, who emphasised the fact that his community's lack of human resources impacted on its ability to gain the maximum level of benefit, citing the fact that the community only had one lawyer, who spent a great deal of time presiding over documents. Thus, there is at least some evidence to suggest that community's resources can be stretched at times by the demands of negotiating and administering community benefits.

The mean ranking score for process control (3.58) placed it as the middle scoring condition for procedural justice. During the discussions with the community representatives, it became clear that overall; there was a great sense of satisfaction with regards to how the communities believed they were able to voice their opinions to the project developers. Accordingly, the discussions with the community representatives do not offer much insight as to why the sole indicator for process control, voice only scored 3.58, since the community representatives all perceived that they were able to voice their opinions readily to the project developers. It can only be speculated that in some of the cases sampled in the surveys, communities were not offered sufficient platforms to voice their opinions to project developers. This could be due to a lack of contact with the project developers, or a lack of opportunity for communities to raise their views despite contact with the project developers, since the notion of voice is underpinned by the assumption that voice enables people to better control their outcomes, as they may be able to persuade the decision maker to choose an outcome more in their favour (Lind et al., 1990).

Identifying a paradox

The mean perceived procedural justice ranking score for the surveyed CBS was 3.56 out of a possible attainable score of 5. This is a positive score, especially considering the fact that bribery (Aitken, 2010; Cass et al., 2010) and a lack of community influence over the design of CBS (Cowell et al., 2011), have been cited as common criticisms regarding the development and implementation of CBS. Indeed, Friedland et al 1973, in: Leventhal (1980) discussed the fact that procedures involving bribery are perceived as being unfair. However, this research suggests that this may not always be the case. Indeed, whilst the community groups sampled in the surveys and the community representatives who were interviewed reported no evidence of bribery on the behalves of the project developers, if a macro-level approach is taken, it can be considered that CBS as an entire policy is legal bribery, depending upon how much cynicism is applied. This mirrors the message of Cass et al. (2010), who suggested the fact that the offering of financial benefits could force people to question project developers' motivations. To this end, three of the community representatives suggested that the amount of money that their communities were receiving in community benefits

payments, had directly impacted on their community members' opinions regarding the CBS, as well as the onshore wind projects themselves. That is to say, the CBS made people less antagonistic regarding the onshore wind projects. Moreover, two community groups who did not wish to be interviewed stated via e-mail correspondence that they preferred to call community benefits, 'community bribes'. The experiences of these two community groups is in tandem with the message of Evans et al. (2011), who questioned whether community benefits are offered for the correct reasons. Indeed, two of the community representatives were of the opinion that the project developers were offering community benefits to further their own commercial interests as opposed to really wanting to help the community groups.

Thus, this leads to the creation of a paradox, in so far as the consensus amongst the community representatives interviewed was that there was no evidence of bribery; whilst conversely, there is evidence to suggest that financial incentives played a role in shaping their beliefs regarding community benefits and indeed, onshore wind projects themselves. Therefore, depending upon the perceiver, CBS can be viewed as a policy for providing and enhancing procedural justice; or on the contrary, a policy which aims to proliferate onshore wind projects by paying off any would-be community opposition. Thus, CBS can be interpreted as wrong, even though a lot of communities do not experience them in this way. Indeed, when referring back to the identified research gap, which states that there is a lack of knowledge regarding how best to procure public support for CBS, and ultimately, support for onshore wind projects themselves, the call by Cowell et al. (2012), that justice should be seen as an acceptable rationale for providing CBS as opposed to making onshore wind projects more socially acceptable, is an interesting one. This piece of research has shown that the level of procedural justice proliferated by CBS has gradually increased over time, and that this has created a certain amount of satisfaction within communities; however, considering the notion of bribery, there are questions regarding the underlying motivations behind CBS. Thus, these two perspectives are important in terms of the practical recommendations to Renewable UK and the UK Government which are presented in chapter 5.1.3.

5.1.2 Limitations and directions for future research

It must be stated here that there are several limitations pertaining to both the methodology, and also the scope of the research. Firstly, the limitations relating to the methodology are presented, followed by the limitations relating to the scope of the research.

Methodological limitations

An initial limitation pertaining to the methodology concerns the fact that when the mean perceived procedural justice ranking score was calculated, the scores for some conditions for procedural justice were calculated utilising more indicators than others. Indeed the mean ranking score for bias-suppression used 5 indicators, accuracy 4, correctability 2, ethicality 3, and process control 1. However, equal weight was given to each condition in the calculations. This therefore means that some indicators were able to influence the mean perceived procedural justice ranking more so than others, thus biasing the results. This was an unanticipated methodological decision, since it could not be anticipated that 10 of the indicators would be deemed irrelevant by many of the community representatives. This does though provide a possible angle for further research. That is to say, this decision could have been mediated if the relative importance that the community representatives

placed on each condition's contribution to procedural justice had been known. Therefore, it is suggested that future research focuses on how people perceive procedural justice and particularly as to how peoples' perceptions of what constitutes procedural justice may vary depending upon the context of the allocation process they are evaluating, as per Leventhal (1980). This knowledge would facilitate a method of calculating perceived procedural justice which perhaps better reflects the relative weight of each indicator.

A related methodological limitation concerns the fact that even though 10 indicators were excluded from the analysis due to incomplete surveys, these 10 indicators were not always irrelevant to every survey respondent. Thus, the analysis excluded some indicators that were in some cases relevant to certain community representatives; however, this was necessary in order to calculate the community representatives' mean perceptions regarding each of the indicators and therefore, the conditions for procedural justice. In order to mediate this, more qualitative case studies could have been completed. This would have facilitated an investigation as to community representatives' perceptions regarding some of the less important indicators which were excluded from this analysis. However, due to the time constraints pertaining to this piece of research, this was not possible.

Another limitation regarding the methodology stems from the fact that the community representatives who were interviewed were not selectively sampled. Ideally, selective sampling would have been employed, since this better allows the researcher to establish whether causal relationships exist (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2010), and would therefore have allowed the five hypotheses to be tested via the interviews. However, due to it being difficult to find willing research participants, the criteria which would have been utilised to select participants, were not utilised. Whilst this limitation could not have been mediated entirely, had more time been permitted for this piece of research, then more personalised e-mails could have been sent to potential research participants as opposed to general e-mails which were sent to a list of potential research participants; this may have encouraged greater participation.

Scope related limitations

Regarding the limitations pertaining to the scope of the research, the research was only able to include community benefits schemes cases for which data was easily attainable. Indeed, table 4-1 highlights the fact that of the 273 community benefits scheme cases detailed in the community benefits registers of England, Scotland and Wales, e-mail addresses could only be found for the relevant community groups for 167 of these. Of these 167, 45 community representatives completed surveys. This could have biased the results in the sense that more recent and better recorded community benefits scheme cases were analysed. Moreover, had the surveys been shorter in length, this could likely have increased the response rate (Steele et al., 1992); however, this would only have been possible had procedural justice been operationalised in a more simplistic manner, likely reducing the reliability of the results. In addition, an important notion linked to the number of survey responses concerns the generalisability of the research. Indeed, it is important to consider how non-response bias affects the generalisability of the research (Blair and Zinkhan, 2006). If the community benefits scheme cases for which it was not possible to find contact information for are included, this means that 16.5% of the population was surveyed. Bartlett et al. (2001) recommend a survey sample of approximately 22% for a population of 27 in order for the

results to be statistically significant. Nevertheless, the results still act as a genuine indicator of the overall situation, and the interviews with the community representatives and the local governmental official acted as a means of triangulating the data, thus increasing the generalisability of the research (Olsen, 2004).

A further limitation concerns the fact that all of the onshore wind projects with associated CBS which were surveyed were situated in England and Scotland only. Northern Ireland does not have a community benefits register, therefore meaning it was not possible to gather the relevant data. Conversely, Wales does have a community benefits register, however; none of the relevant community groups pertaining to 13 onshore wind projects responded to requests to participate in the research. In addition to this, the 5 community representatives who were interviewed were all based in Scotland, as was the local governmental official; this has the potential to bias the findings. Even though the best practice guidance and recommendations for the development and implementation of CBS for each of the four home nations pertains to the same procedural justice criteria (DECC, 2014a; Local Energy Scotland, 2013; NIRIG, 2014; Welsh onshore wind developers in: RWE N Power, PFR, 2013), the uptake of the policy could potentially be different in each country. Furthermore, there may be different social and cultural conditions which shape community groups' perceptions of procedural justice differently to one-another. Thus, it is suggested that the results are most valid for Scotland and England, though the general concerns brought up by the community representatives are also likely to be true for Wales and Northern Ireland.

Generally speaking, the 5 community representatives' experiences regarding CBS were more positive than the mean experience, as is evidenced by their procedural justice ranking scores; indeed four of the community representatives' perceptions of procedural justice were higher than the mean ranking score from across the surveys. Accordingly, this represents a further limitation in so far as the insights are likely not completely representative of the wider survey context. Nevertheless, the main goal of a case study approach is to provide in-depth insights regarding a particular phenomenon (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2010), which is what this research has achieved by providing an analysis of the types of explanations that can explain why some conditions for procedural justice scored lower than others. To this end, it is suggested that one avenue for future research, could be to focus more so on the negative effects of CBS, with a particular emphasis on exploring claims of bribery. This would endeavour to develop a balanced understanding of the level of, and forces behind procedural justice as conceived by CBS.

5.1.3 Practical implications

One of the fundamental goals of this piece of research was to make suggestions to Renewable UK and the UK Government regarding how CBS might better stimulate procedural justice in the future. This piece of research has subsequently highlighted that bias-suppression is the worst performing condition for procedural justice; in particular, efforts should be made to ensure that project developers' representatives are perceived as being neutral by community groups. Moreover, project developers should be more willing to seek the advice of third parties and community groups, thus facilitating a larger pool of available information upon which decisions can be made (Reed, 2008). In addition, greater flexibility in the development plans of project developers would likely increase

perceived procedural justice, since community groups are only able to influence these in a minor way. Lastly, more provisions should be made for community groups to voice their opinions to project developers, since the results show that, in some cases, this is lacking.

Perhaps of greater significance to Renewable UK and the UK Government than the aforementioned recommendations, is the conceptualisation of CBS as not only a policy for stimulating procedural justice, but as a policy which advocates bribery in a legal capacity. Thus, whilst CBS have the potential to stimulate procedural justice, the very motivations behind them are deviant. This is due to the fact that they likely make onshore wind projects more widely accepted, not because community groups necessarily want them, but because they cannot afford to turn away the offer of community benefits, and so therefore, they do not protest against them.

This notion is beneficial for the wider context of the energy sector. Indeed, it was announced in 2013 that communities in the UK could benefit from hosting new nuclear power stations (UK Government, 2013), whilst UK Oil and Gas announced that communities will be awarded 1% of the profits should potential fracking sites become commercially viable (UK Oil and Gas, 2013). Accordingly, it has to be questioned as to what extent CBS are an appropriate policy instrument to foster public support for these large-scale developments. On the one hand, based upon the example of CBS in the onshore wind sector, there is clear evidence to suggest that CBS can aid the UK Government in its goals to stimulate the growth of more nuclear power stations, and potentially, make fracking commercially viable, and in the process, provide communities with an array of economic benefits. However, this would be achieved under very deviant, and some might say, downright wrong pretences. Even if the majority of community groups do not perceive community benefits to be akin to bribery, does this make it right for the UK Government to proceed with this?

CBS pertaining to the onshore wind sector have set a potentially dangerous precedent; therefore, it is suggested here that in order to make the provision of CBS less deceitful, the institutions and arrangements pertaining to them should be formalised legally. The formalisation of the institutions and arrangements would subsequently make communities entitled to demand payment from a project developer, thus empowering them in the sense that they would have the option to say no to the project if they could not agree on a level of community benefit payment (Kerr et al., 2017). Furthermore, strong emphasis should continue to be placed on the conditions for procedural justice when advocating policy for the development and implementation of CBS. However, CBS should be framed by Renewable UK and the UK Government as a form of compensation for the negative effects of a particular energy development; thus, this would be viewed as them being honest regarding the motivations behind CBS. In this scenario, the community would then be able to command a certain level of community benefit payment from a project developer, whilst a project developer could also pull out of any potential deal, if the fee became too high (Kerr et al., 2017). This would ultimately give the community the final say on the go-ahead of the project.

5.2 Conclusion

This piece of research set out to assess the extent to which the development and implementation of CBS, pertains to the conditions for procedural justice. In doing so, two main claims were conceived. Firstly, it can be stated that the level of perceived procedural justice proliferated by CBS appears to have increased over time, quite possibly due to a gradual increase in government and wind industry-led policies backing the development and implementation of CBS to adhere to the conditions for procedural justice (for example: DECC, 2014a; DECC, 2014b), and also possibly by project developers learning by doing (Amin and Cohendet, 2000). The second claim relates to the fact that there is no evidence to suggest that project developers approach community benefits negotiations differently based upon: the population size of the affected community, the size of the planned onshore wind project, the value of the community benefits scheme, or the structure of the community benefits scheme. Moreover, there is some, yet relatively minimal evidence to suggest that communities can expect to perceive greater levels of procedural justice when they are the only community receiving community benefits from a particular onshore wind project. Therefore, regarding CBS that are inceptioned in the same time period, it is suggested that the levels of perceived procedural justice proliferated by these CBS, will be similar, despite any differences in: the population size of the affected community, the size of the onshore wind project, the value of the community benefits scheme, whether or not the community is the only community receiving benefits from a particular onshore wind project, and the value of the CBS.

This piece of research opted for a mix-methods approach; thus evaluating community groups' perceptions of procedural justice in relation to the development and implementation of CBS on the one hand, whilst also gaining insights as to why certain conditions for procedural justice are more evident than others on the other. Thus, the research contributes to the literature in so far as it is confirmatory of previous research, which dictated that procedural justice facilitates the greater acceptancy of authoritative decisions (see: Gross, 2007; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Maguire and Lind, 2003; van den Bos et al., 2014).

This research builds on previous research regarding CBS, in the sense that previous research has criticised the development and implementation of CBS, particularly on the grounds of bribery, and the motivations behind project developer's decisions to offer community benefits (see: Aitken, 2010; Bristow et al., 2012; Cass et al., 2010; Evans et al., 2011), without properly evaluating the current state of affairs. Accordingly, this research evaluated CBS, which subsequently led to the questioning of the applicability of CBS as a policy to promote the social acceptability of onshore wind projects, and indeed other kinds of energy developments, arguing that even though CBS are successful in achieving this, they can be perceived by some as a form of bribery. Accordingly, it is suggested that the UK Government and Renewable UK undertake the necessary legal steps to formalise the provision of CBS, thus empowering communities and allowing them to dictate the level of community benefit they will receive, as well as giving them the final say on whether the project goes ahead (Kerr et al., 2017).

The research has opened several avenues for future research. One avenue of importance concerns the conceptualisation of procedural justice. Indeed, a valuable piece of research would be one which further elucidates as to how the type of context in which people perceive procedural justice affects

the combination of conditions they use, and how much weight they place on each condition, when evaluating procedural justice. Additionally, an exploratory research project might consider the possibility of utilising CBS in the mould mooted by this piece of research, in other sectors of industry, such as for the development of landfill sites, or for the constructions of new airports. CBS are an interesting, yet extremely complex policy, with a myriad of known and unknown consequences. Accordingly, a concerted effort must be made to harness the benefits, whilst distilling notions of bribery and discontentment.

6 References

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