Narratives of Citizenship

Social mobility amongst second generation young adults in Athens, Greece.

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Preface

"..the right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity itself."

Hannah Arrendt

"..and people are called Greeks because they share in our education (paideusis) rather than in our birth."

Isocrates

"What if we asked, instead of "Where are you from?" - "Where are you a local?"

This would tell us so much more about who and how similar we are."

Taiye Selasi

"I am a citizen of the world."

Diogenes

Since my teenage years, when I began to understand myself as a citizen with responsibilities and rights, I realized societies exist through inequalities. The randomness of a birth in a certain place troubled me and I am ever since fascinated by the politics around migration. I grew up in an era that Greece was becoming a developed country starting to receive big numbers of immigrants while in the meanwhile forgetting it was once a country of emigrants. The Greek society is one full of contradictions, where the global South and the global North fuse with each other in a way that is very intriguing to a student of International Development. Migration is a highly politicized issue and the Greek citizenship was until very recently a privilege for people that descended from Greeks according to the rights of blood. The Greek migration policies over the last two decades were mainly characterized by inertia that failed to acknowledge the changing social realities. Second generation, the children of migrants that settled in Greece, is a dynamic part of the Greek society that has been marginalized since its birth. Born and raised in the Greek education system and mentality, they grow up to become multilingual cultural agents with a restless drive to survive in a globalizing world with multiple paths and possibilities. The second

generation has human capital of great value that is at risk of being wasted by the constraints they face as second class citizens in Greece. It was imperative for me to study and shed light on the realities of the people of my generation that call Greece home but have been consistently seen as visitors.

Abstract

Migration and the new realities that it shapes is an ever-present concept that never seizes to be relevant. As it is with one of its products, the second generation, the generation that follows after the migrants settle somewhere. In a highly globalizing, mobile world, the issues of citizenship and rights within societies are becoming highly debated. In Greece, second generation is comprised by approximately 200.000 people who have yet no access to citizenship and in addition have restricted rights in relation to their Greek 'native' peers. This study investigates how lack of the Greek citizenship impacts the mobilities of the second generation young adults in Greece, particularly their educational and working opportunities. It does so by examining how second generation experiences the different types of mobilities, namely the physical, the socio-political and the economic mobility in relation to their parents' generation and their Greek 'native' peers. To investigate the issue at hand, the study gathers data through second generation narratives in Athens, Greece. There is a distinct gap in the existing research on migration in Greece which so far is mainly focused in the previous generations of migrants, the parents of the second generation. Recent changes in the Greek migration policy granted access to the Greek citizenship to second generation that is born or raised in the country and partakes in the educational system. The new law has yet to be implemented resulting in second generation lying in a perpetual limbo in a two speed society. All this under the immediate influence of an economy in an ongoing crisis with no visible signs of recovery. Second generation aspires to access equal rights looking beyond the national citizenship to an EU citizenship. The findings of the research are highly relevant in the regional context of Southern Europe and the broader EU context, where the existence of second generation with access to citizenship is being highly contested and hyper politicized over the last years.

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1. Introduction

> In Greece, there are up to 200.000 children and young adults born to immigrant parents. These youngsters are not recognized officially by the State, since they are not granted the Greek citizenship, which leads to their social exclusion and stigmatization as "others". Imagine if you were born and / or raised in a country that refused to recognize you as a citizen. Imagine if you could not issue an ID card in the country you were born and / or raised. Imagine if you needed a residence permit in order to reside legally in the country you were born and / or raised. Imagine if you didn't have the right to vote in the country you were born and / or raised. Imagine if you didn't have full access to the labour market of the country you were born and / or raised.
>
> (Generation 2.0 RED, 2015).

Beginning with the ongoing emigration of citizens over the course of the 20th century, Greece evolved into an immigration destination in the last three decades. The incoming immigration flows started in the 1980s, but picked up drastically in the beginning of the 1990s (Kasimis, 2012), when many former Eastern bloc citizens came to Greece seeking employment. Today approximately 1.35 million of Greece's population of eleven million come from other countries, or were born to immigrant parents, accounting for over 10 percent of the population, and 12 to 14 percent of the labour force (Gemi, 2014). Approximately 60% of the country's migrant population comes from neighboring Albania (Gemi, 2014). The overall migrant population is mainly employed in construction, agriculture and care (Maroukis, 2013). Due to the relatively recent arrival of migrants in Greece, the first cohort of second generation young adults from migrant backgrounds is now coming of age. Within this study, 'second generation young adults of migrant background' (henceforth referred to as second generation) indicates young people over 18 years old that are either native-born children of immigrant parents or foreign-born children who were brought to Greece before adolescence. This group consist of approximately 200.000 young adults (Generation 2.0 RED, 2015). Yet this generation is an invisible generation, since they had not until recently been recognised by the state as Greek citizens, in contrast to other Northern European countries' second generations, where integration policies for migrants were put in place some decades earlier (Cebolla-Boado & Finotelli, 2015). Some have argued that

200.000 in a population of 11 million is a small fraction of the population, and it is indeed 1.8% of the general population. But according to the Hellenic Statistical Authority, every sixth child born in Greece today is a child of immigrants, which amounts to 17% of the newborns in the country (ELSTAT, 2015). The lack of Greek citizenship has complex implications for these young people. They have no political rights, they hold the passports of their parents' country of origin, and are ultimately considered third country nationals. When they come of age, they are given renewable residence permits (see figure 1) like any newly arrived labour migrant (Triandafyllidou et al., 2014). However, they cannot be employed in the public sector or practice professions that require Greek citizenship, such as lawyers, doctors or engineers. In addition, Greece has been in extreme recession for the past six years, with severe socioeconomic impacts for people's livelihoods. These changes in the broader social, political, and economic context likewise affect the second generation, and are compounded by the restrictions of their lack of citizenship.

Figure 1: The breakpoint (Takou, 2015)

Moreover, both underage Greek 'natives' and second generation received the same treatment regarding their access to schooling until the age of 18 years old (see figure 1.). After the age of 18, the first group of individuals have the ability to continue their development normally, not only inside any chosen professional sphere but also in regards to the privileges that the educational system offers. In contrast, the second generation were until recently obliged to hold renewable permits for their 'temporary stay' in the country. In comparison to their peers who are recognized as citizens, this transition to adulthood leaves the second generation subject to an array of social restrictions that will undoubtedly limit their access to jobs, resources, and mobility, and directly impact their personal growth.

The children of migrants became visible in Greece as the first cohort of second generation began to attend secondary education (middle and high school), and in particular, when they started to excel in their school performance. This latter point is related to one of the national holidays in Greece is the *Ohi* day, which translates into 'no,' and which celebrates the Greek refusal to surrender to Mussolini in 1940. On this day, the public schools celebrate with a parade, and the best student of the school is given the honour of leading the parade and carrying the Greek flag. In 2000, Greek society was confronted for the first time with the possibility of a non-ethnic Greek carrying the flag. Odysseas Cenaj, an ethnic Albanian middle school student, was at the centre of the dispute over whether Albanians should be able to hold the Greek flag during school parades. After furious media debates and opposition by parents, Cenaj declined to carry the flag himself in order not to inspire massive protests in his hometown and across Greece. Cenaj took this action despite even the President of Greece supporting him publicly, using the famous quote by Isocrates, the Ancient Greek orator: "Greeks are those who take part in Greek education". Three years later, the same student, now aged 18 and still at the top of his class, was again confronted with the same issue. However, this time some 50 of his classmates occupied their school to protest the possibility of him carrying the Greek flag, and they were even backed by the parents' association of the school. Again, Cenaj was obliged to relinquish his right. When asked "did you feel like a foreigner while living in Greece?" Cenaj replied: "Of course I felt like a foreigner with the Greek flag incident, or whenever I had to go to a public authority. But in my everyday life with my friends and classmates I do not feel like a foreigner" (Iliadis, 2014). Eventually, Cenaj finished high school with high honours and left Greece to study in the US. While Cenaj's story has somewhat of a happy ending, many of his second generation peers face similar struggles without access to the same kinds of resources that are available to a high achieving honours student. His story marks the first time Greek society was forced to acknowledge the existence of the second generation, but also highlights the inability of existing migration management to actually integrate the children of migrants. This study investigates the mobilities experienced by the second generation as they come of age, and more specifically, how the lack of citizenship affects their educational and professional opportunities.

2. The Greek Context: from policies of deterrence towards attempts at integration

In a country with a rigid ethno-cultural conception of citizenship, Greek governments have been particularly hesitant to encourage the settlement and socio-political integration of migrant populations (Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2013). Greek migrant integration policies are still relatively under-developed due to only two decades of experience as an immigrant host country, and thus, significantly less experience in integrating migrants than northern and western European countries (Christopoulos, 2006). In the dominant discourse, migrants have been viewed as a convenient, but temporary, labour force that should return home as soon as the job is finished, and that are not welcome to stay or become part of the Greek nation (Maroukis, 2013). Nevertheless, immigrants actively participated in the public life of the country during this period, challenging economic, social, political and cultural stereotypes (Cebolla-Boado & Finotelli, 2015). In this respect, the immigrants proved that they intended to stay in Greece regardless of the narratives that their presence would or should be temporary. Among other factors, their determination to remain in Greece led to a change in state policies in early 2010, when a new citizenship law was introduced as part of a broader migration policy. This particular law would open up citizenship to the second generation, facilitate naturalisation for first-generation migrants, and give local voting rights to long-term residents (of 5 years or more) (Triandafyllidou, 2012 in Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2013).

Figure 2: Political map of the broader region of southeast Europe (Anonymous, 2011)

While these new policies seemed to represent a break with the past and demonstrate a concrete political will - only to tolerate but also to accept and accommodate ethnic and religious diversity - the prevalent narrative shifted towards conservatism and intolerance in the years following the introduction of the first law (Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2013). In general, the reforms on citizenship were treated with suspicion and were barely implemented, which culminated in a judgment against the new law as unconstitutional by the Council of State in November 2012 (Gemi, 2014). The 2010 bill declared all children born or schooled in Greece for at least 6 years, or whose parents were legal residents of Greece for at least 5 years, eligible for citizenship (Papaioannou, 2015). Entitled Act 3838, it was the first law to grand Greek citizenship to children of migrants, whether born or raised in Greece. Yet, for the majority of State Council judges, *jus sanguinis* was stronger than *jus soli*, since being born, raised, and schooled for at least 6 years in Greece was not an argument strong enough to prove the cultural and social integration of a child (Papaioannou, 2015). Unfortunately, during the preceding six years, public attitudes

towards migrants had worsened dramatically, following the official political discourse that centered on overt xenophobia and racism. This was not just a Greek phenomenon, as the rest of Europe was also experiencing a rise in popularity of extreme right-wing parties espousing anti-migration sentiment. Still, in the Greek context this has been expressed in much more extreme ways, with racist opinions on matters such as migration steering and dominating the public debates.

2.1 Socioeconomic conditions during the crisis

According to the census of 1981, 177.000 foreigners resided in Greece, most of whom were from Western Europe. By 2001 the census showed that 762.191 foreigners were residing in Greece, coming mainly from Albania (ELSTAT, 2001). At the beginning of the economic crisis in 2009, there were 620.000 foreigners on valid residence permits, 126.000 foreigners from other EU member states, and 48.000 asylum seekers, and by 2013 the number of valid residence permits holders went down to 537.237. These figures illustrate a drop in the numbers of the documented migrants (80.000 people) during the first four years of the crisis. These numbers continued to decrease, and by 2015 the Ministry of Interior reported the number of valid permit holders at 487.298.

In addition, there are a large number of pending permits - roughly 100.000 - that can be attributed to the economic crisis. This can be attributed to the fact that many permits could not be renewed due to lost jobs and the related decrease in family incomes below the minimum standards required for renewal. As well, the number of valid permits has decreased over the years of the crisis, and notably a significant number of Albanians have returned to their country (Papastergiou & Takou, 2015). According to estimations, there are hundreds of thousands people with invalid permits; both because of the crisis and due to their legal status, they are subsequently exposed to a new process of social marginalization. These people are well into the process of integration, but for now this progress has been halted.

In addition to migrants with valid permits, there are the "omogeneis"[1], the EU-citizens, the stateless, the refugees, the refugee applicants, and the undocumented. According to estimations of the Hellenic Migration Policy Institute, in 2013 there were 350.000 undocumented residents in Greece, though many of this number have already left to reach other European countries (Maroukis, 2013). The 2011 census showed a severe declining trend of the migrant population, in a total population of 10.815.197, 199.101 were EU citizens (where Bulgaria and Rumania belong now), 708.003 were third country nationals and 4.825 were stateless or of unknown citizenship (ELSTAT,2011).

Acquisitions of Greek citizenship after the introduction of the act 3838/2010 in categories				
	2011	2012	2013	2014
Naturalization of *Omogeneis*	12,616	13,495	22,574	15,791
Naturalization of Foreigners	930	1,149	1,866	2,019
Birth/Studies in Greece (3838)	3,103	5,543	529	0
Because of Birth/recognition	946	928	1,917	2,029
Underage children of the naturalized	1,627	622	3,337	1,990
Total	19,222	21,737	30,223	21,829

Table 1. Acquisitions of Greek citizenship. Source: Ministry of Interior, published on 20/3/2015.

According to Eurostat's data, in 2013 there were 862.400 foreigners residing in Greece. Of this number, 659.300 people were citizens of non-EU member states and 203.100 people were EU citizens. There is no data for the past two years but this tendency seems to

[1] "Omogeneis", "*ομογενείς*" are persons who do not have the Greek citizenship but are considered to be "ethnically" Greek by the Greek administration (coming usually from countries of the former USSR and Albania). The concept of *omogeneis* is a Greek peculiarity. After the geopolitical changes between 1989 and 1991, a large number of people, mainly from the former USSR and Albania, that were defined as *omogeneis* returned back to Greece. By today, many of them have been granted the Greek citizenship after waiting for many years.

continue as the crisis sharpens. According to the latest statistics from the Ministry of Interior, 9.175 of the second generation acquired citizenship with the previous citizenship law in the period 2010-2013 before its being ruled unconstitutional (see figure 1). When it comes to the first generation, the rate of naturalizations for foreigners, and in particular third country nationals, has remained consistently very low. For instance, in 2013 the percentage of permit holders that achieved naturalization was only 0.03% of the total.

The significant rise in the numbers of foreign born people over the last decades stems from the fact that the state refuses to naturalize migrants living and working in Greece, thus maintaining the category of 'migrant' for many years. It is quite indicative that in the period between 2003 and 2010, 54.500 people became Greek citizens through naturalization and they were almost exclusively "omogeneis" (Papastergiou & Takou, 2015). Whilst during this same period, Austria granted citizenship to 184.000 people, the Netherlands to 226.000 people, Belgium to 272.000 people and Germany to 916.000 people, which reduced considerably the number of migrants in the respective countries. Thus, if Greece had followed a citizenship policy closer to her European counterparts, the number of migrants would be lower due to ongoing naturalization of this population, but more importantly, the country would reap great social and economic benefits from a better integration plan for migrants and their children, the second generation (Papastergiou & Takou, 2015).

2.2 Impact of Economic Crisis on Youth

According to a 2014 report conducted by UNICEF on child well-being in rich countries impacted by the economic crisis, the 2008 recession hit young people and children extremely hard. Using official data to rank the impact on children from the 41 countries in the European Union (EU) and/or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) between 2008 and 2013, the study reports multiple detailed perspectives on how the recession has affected children in the developed world. It also emphasizes that unemployment among adolescents and young adults has a significant long-term effect of the recession. Amongst those aged 15-24 years old, unemployment has increased in 34 out of the 41 countries. Youth unemployment and underemployment have reached troubling levels in many countries, resulting in UNICEF calling it an epidemic.

Foremost, the epidemic of youth unemployment has spread in countries of the Mediterranean region like Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Croatia Portugal and Italy (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Change in youth unemployment rate, 2008-2013 (UNICEF Office of Research, 2014)

By having an increase in excess of 25%, Greece is placed at the bottom of the table, and thus, seen the largest increase in unemployment of the countries surveyed. It is particularly striking that before the recession, youth unemployment in the country had already fallen steadily from 2004/2005 to 2007/2008. This trend was reversed when unemployment rose from a 20% in 2008 -which was already high- to more than 50% in 2013. In Greece and Spain, the pattern is particularly dramatic, with half of all young job seekers unable to find a job, which according to UNICEF has further repercussions on the countries' economy. One of the challenges that arises from these trends is the sustainability of national pension plans. Thus it is not only the youth that are dramatically affected by this epidemic, but all sectors of society.

Absolute difference in anchored poverty change (2008–2012) between children in migrant households and other children in Europe (percentage points)

Total child poverty rate decreased
Total child poverty rate increased/stayed the same

Source: EU-SILC.
Notes: Data for 2011 are used for Belgium and Ireland. Countries with insufficient case numbers of children in migrant households excluded.
Bars are changes in absolute poverty with positive values indicating a worsening among children in migrant households relative to other children.

Figure 4: Difference on impacts on migrant households (UNICEF Office of Research, 2014)

It should be noted that Greece was severely affected by the economic recession in many different ways. Throughout the report, Greece, Croatia and Spain are consistently placed in the bottom third across all the different dimensions of well-being, which highlights "how badly they have been hit by the recession" (UNICEF Office of Research, 2014, p.13). Greece also suffered a dramatic rise of the absolute number of poor children. More specifically, the proportion of children who are income poor and severely deprived[2] has tripled in Greece, rising from only 6.2% in 2008 to 17.9% in 2012. The poverty rates for children in migrant households has increased 35%, while all other households with children in the country saw a 15% rise in the same time period. Thus, households of migrants experienced an absolute difference of 20% in comparison to the rest of the households (see table in figure 4). While Greece hosted the largest increase in child poverty more generally, it is important to highlight that children in migrant households suffered disproportionately (UNICEF Office of Research, 2014)

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[2] According to UNICEF material deprivation is an indicator that showcases the satisfaction of basic needs beyond pure monetary measures. Material deprivation in combination with income poverty create a more complete insight into the impact of the recession on households with children

The Greek economy has been shrinking for the past six years at a level that has not been seen in any advanced capitalist market economy since the Great Depression in the 1930s. Since 2008, Greece's real GDP has fallen by 26%, while depressed demand, wage and pension cuts, and high unemployment have all led to a considerable rise in banks' holdings of non-performing loans (OECD, 2016). Human rights are directly affected by the new realities that were introduced in the country. The SAPs[3] that the governments have executed per the guidance of MoUs[4] signed between the Greek state and the international lenders[5] are not only ineffective policies, but they are rolling back basic labour rights that had been established in the country for decades (Salomon, 2015). In this environment everyone in the country was, and continues to be, affected, especially social groups with precarious positions such as migrants and their children.

In 2015, OECD reported the official unemployment rate of Greece as second worst at 24.7%, while youth unemployment exceeded 50% (OECD, 2016).

Unemployment rate, 2015 Q3
As a percentage of the civilian labour force

Note: The data for OECD countries refer to harmonised unemployment rates. OECD is a weighted average.
Data refer to Q1 2015 for Kazakhstan; Q2 2015 for Argentina (selected urban areas), Morocco and Saudi Arabia; 2014 for China (registered unemployment rate in urban areas); and 2011-12 for India.
Source: OECD database on Short-Term Labour Market Statistics (https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=35253) and OECD estimates based on national labour force surveys.

Figure 5: General unemployment rate (OECD, 2016)

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[3] Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) are economic policies for developing countries that have been promoted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the early 1980s by the provision of loans conditional on the adoption of macroeconomic policies that limit public expenditure and promote market competition.
[4] Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
[5] The institutions participating in the Greek Programme are the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB).

When it comes to the migrant employment rate, Greece comes third from the bottom of all OECD countries. A mere 53.4% of foreign born persons aged 15-64 years old were employed in 2015. Thus, only half of the migrant population in Greece was officially employed. In addition, long term employment rate is the percentage of persons unemployed for more than a year, as a percentage of the total unemployed; in this, Greece comes first at 73.7%, while the OECD average stands at 32.7%. But even for the people that are still employed, Greece comes second behind Turkey in poor working conditions. More specifically, 57.2% of the working force experiences job strain[6] and poor quality working conditions. This is quite high if we take into account that the OECD average is at 35.1%, or that the Netherlands has just 26.6% of workers who reported experiencing job strain.

Migrant employment rate, 2015 Q2
As a percentage of foreign born persons aged 15 to 64

Note: OECD is an unweighted average.

Data refer to Q4 2014 for Canada, Mexico and New Zealand; to 2013 for Chile; and to Q4 2011 Israel.

Source: OECD database on Migration Statistics.

Figure 6: Migrant employment rate 2015 (OECD, 2016)

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[6] Job strain is defined to occur when workers face more job demands (such as time pressure or health risks) than the number of resources they have at their disposal (such as work autonomy or good workplace relationships) to accomplish their job duties.

2.3 Citizenship bill of 2015

This environment of unprecedented socio-political and economic crisis, alongside a notable increase in irregular migrant and asylum seeker arrivals from Asia and Africa via Turkey since 2007, has formed a national context where immigrants have been increasingly demonised and securitization policies increasingly implemented. Since 2009, Greece has seen a rise of extreme right-wing forces (*Chrisi Avgi*), who gathered approximately 7% of the national vote in the elections of 2012, ranking 5th in the Greek parliament. While job opportunities were becoming scarcer and existing national policies failed to address these issues, migration was represented as the main socio-economic problem in the dominant right-leaning political discourse. During the last three years, anti-immigrant rhetoric and xenophobia have seeped into mainstream discourse, while neo-Nazi discourses and practices have been tolerated to a large extent by both the official political establishment and by public opinion (Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2013). In both elections of 2015, the neo-Nazi and fascist party gathered 6.3% and 7% of the general vote, entering the parliament as the third party in power.

As of January 2015, the citizenship issue again entered into public debate, when a new left government was elected and proclaimed its will to re-open the subject. When the minister of migration took office, she (*Tasia Christodoulopoulou*) pledged to produce a new citizenship bill. The bill was approved in June 2015 by a vote in the parliament, however it has yet to be implemented.

> ### Citizenship bill (Hellenic parliamentary vote on 09.07.2015)
>
> 4 categories
>
> According to the draft bill, access to the citizenship will be granted to all children who have successfully completed the compulsory education (primary & high school – 9 years) (1) or the secondary education (junior and senior secondary school – 6 years) (2) or have graduated from secondary school and have a degree from a Greek University or a Technical institution (3). Moreover, it gives the possibility to minors (4) born in Greece, having with at least one of the parents has been a legal resident of the country for at least 5 years before their birth, to apply when commencing primary school.
>
> (Papaioannou, 2015)

In an interview conducted by the author, the program manager of Generation 2.0 commented on the new act and on its non-applicability so far. She highlighted the improvements, including the provision of the citizenship for minors, which "is very

important because it enables the substantive acceptance of these children by the Greek society, since they can start school as equals." She further added that

> Greek society is by now de facto multicultural and access to equal rights for all the children that are born or grow up in Greece is a necessary requirement for social cohesion and prosperity. I find it incomprehensible that someone must live on a residence permit (that has an expiration date) in the country you are born.

When we discussed the possible shortcomings of the new act, she voiced some concerns about the applicability of the provisions on the total population of second generation. The lawmakers that handled the bill have admitted that the provisions of the new bill will cover 70 - 80% of the second generation population. The delimiting of who is covered by the law has led Generation 2.0 to highlight the need for further improvements in order to be more inclusive "in relation to children with disabilities that weren't able to finish the obligatory education and for children that hold no passports."

The process of acquiring citizenship is spread throughout a fragmented public administration ranging from departments in the national, regional, and local government, such as the ministry of Interior, the insurance funds, the police, the Directorate for Secondary Education, and the Aliens and Migration Directorate (municipal agency). Generation 2.0 has diagnosed several issues with the current system, and offered possible solutions to the limits on naturalization and citizenship: "The ministry of Interior can dictate how the law should be interpreted by sending circular letters to the respective agencies but it cannot enforce its implementation … This results in cases of officials doing as they wish when they wish …[and] this can only be solved if the ministry publishes more detailed circular letters containing every possible subcases with which the official can come across, so no individual official has the space to interpret the law in different ways."

On top of the misinterpretations by public officials, the public administration is severely understaffed and this can be easily observed in Athens. For instance, the Directorate for Secondary Education in Athens is responsible for 3.500 school units, but has a very small number of staff. Half of the Greek population lives in Athens, and thus, most migrants and their children as well. Generation 2.0 estimates that there are approximately 50.000 potential beneficiaries of the citizenship law in Athens at the moment. That is a huge number of people applying simultaneously, let alone the fact that there is no electronic

database to handle the procedures. The program manager further reports a piece of recent information that highlights the slowness of the process: "we hear that now an applicant needs to wait 4 months for an appointment to apply for a certificate that proves they graduated high school from the Directorate agency, this is quite indicative."

After the restrained joy over the approval of the citizenship act, the organization is now on 'standby' to see it finally implemented, but after nine months, none of the policies have been put in practice yet. Generation 2.0 admits that they make complaints and publicize these issues, "but there is not much more we can do." They are disappointed and they do not accept the prevailing excuse that there is no money to support implementing the law. In the end, the program manager adds that "it seems like they do not want to put the law in force," and acknowledges the current reality is one where "now we also have the refugee crisis and that is the priority for the ministry."

2.4 Views on citizenship

Before an analysis of this study's findings, it is crucial to talk about how the views on citizenship and "Greekness" evolved during the last 20 years in the Greek society. It is important for the reader to be familiar with the different perspectives on, and the dominant approaches to, the issues surrounding citizenship in order to understand the context in which the views of the interviewed second generation were formed.

Figure 7: Elementary pupil in a school parade in the 2000s (Anonymous, n.d)

The Greek media continues to cover school parades on national holidays, and often focuses on the 'different' students such as students of African descent or this past year's favourite, a student wearing a hijab.

Figure 8: School parade in 2015, what most media outlets highlighted (Anonymous, 2015)

This brings us to year 2013, when a stateless athlete called Giannis Antetokounmpo, who was born and raised in Greece, acquired Greek citizenship in record time - and not just for Greek standards - due to his athletic brilliance and achievement. This example was highly indicative of the attitudes towards the second generation by the state, given the fact that 2013 was also the year that the previous bill was declared unconstitutional, and the aspirations of thousands of hoping people were put on hold by being denied access to Greek citizenship. Giannis Antetokounmpo is a classic "second-generation" example: born in Athens in 1994 to Nigerian parents, Antetokounmpo did not have Nigerian nationality, as he had never been to the country. In addition, he could not acquire Greek citizenship even after 19 years in Greece, and thus he, along with his three brothers, was stateless. He started playing basketball when he was young and he grew up to become an exceptional player. In 2013 his name was entered into the NBA (National Basketball Association) draft and he was selected fifteenth overall by the Milwaukee Bucks in the U.S.A. His high draft number - the highest ever for a basketball player from Greece – is even more remarkable given that he had previously played for a minor basketball league in Greece due to his lack of documentation and citizenship. Less than two weeks after the draft, Antetokounmpo was officially granted full Greek citizenship due to the intervention of the prime minister. The law was already in place, and the government did not have to invent it in order to claim this great athlete for the Greek national basketball team. Still, the law was implemented selectively and as an exception because of the 'celebrity'-like exposure of this case. For the reader to fully grasp the hypocrisy of the then government, the Prime Minister *Antonis Samaras* stated in the conference of his party that "our country suffered an unarmed invasion by hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants. Neither our society nor our economy is able to bear them. Our cities can no longer remain under a state of occupation" (Papastergiou & Takou, 2015). Less than one week later he met with Antetokoumbo at the Prime Minister's office to congratulate him for his athletic achievement.

Figure 9: The prime minister in the PM's offices with G. Antetokoumpo and his parents, after Antetokoumpo became a Greek citizen in 2013 (Anonymus, 2013)

As the latest *Eurobarometer* highlights regarding European views on migration, xenophobia seems to be spreading in broader ways than a neo-Nazi party entering the parliament or 'some socially marginalised' opinions in Greece and other European societies. *Eurobarometer* is a survey that the European Commission commissions annually to canvass the main concerns of European citizens. *Eurobarometer 84,* was undertaken between 7-17 November 2015, and involved 1,002 Greek citizens in a total poll of 27,681 citizens across the 28 EU Member States. The latest survey showcases there is an anti-immigration sentiment rising throughout the European continent. In particular, 75% of Greeks feel negative about immigration of people from outside the EU, which is higher than the already high European average of 59% (see figure). Remarkably at the same time, 85% of Greeks believe that Greece must help the refugees, much higher than the 65% average of EU citizens.

Furthermore, the survey covers the population's satisfaction with the life they lead and their feelings about the future. On the happiness scale, Greeks come in last of all the EU members

states, with only 40% expressing satisfaction of their current state, in contrast with countries like the Netherlands and Finland that poll at 95%. Given the grim reality, only 10% of Greeks believe that conditions in the future will improve, while almost half of the population (45%) believes their lives will get worse, in comparison to the 11% average of the EU who are likewise pessimistic about the future (European Commission, 2015). It is also worth noting that 1 in 2 Greek citizens state they do not feel like an EU citizen, while the European average is 34%. So half of the Greek population does not have strong feelings of belonging with the European Union (European Commission, 2015).

Figure 10: Positive and negative views about immigration from countries outside of EU (European Commission, 2015)

In Greece in 2015, the Migration minister defended the changes in the Nationality code that opened up citizenship to the second generation, calling them necessary for democracy in general and not strictly about the second generation. She framed it as a necessary obligation of the country towards its population. This is an excerpt from the announcement of the introduction of the law in the Greek parliament made by the Minister of Interior:

> We want for the children to acquire citizenship while they are still children, because social conscience is formed during childhood [and] consequently the national

identity too. This way, these children that go to school with our children, are friends with them, often don't speak another language, don't know or don't want to know the homeland of their parents, are also our children. They have every reason to be Greek citizens (Kostaki, 2015).

Almost every piece of drafted legislation and policy initiatives by the government is posted in a blog-like platform prior to their submission to parliament. The platform is called *opengov* and functions as an electronic deliberation, where citizens and organisations can post their comments, suggestions, and criticisms article-by-article. The previous citizenship law collected a total of 3403 comments back in January of 2010, while the current law, which was uploaded in May of 2015, only received 712 comments (that shows a 79% decline, which is impressively sharp). The number of people commenting is an indication of how much interest a piece of legislation evokes within civil society, and the higher the number of comments the higher the investment by individuals and organizations in the matter at hand. While I was participating in the 11 days of deliberation, it was evident that a majority of the comments where opposed to the new law and communicated in very aggressive ways. That is true also about the deliberation of the previous law in 2010. The difference of the numbers shows a significant decline of people that felt inclined to preoccupy themselves with the new bill. It seems that the intense focus on preserving the old rule of law *(jus sanguinis)* had faded over the 5 years that passed between the two laws. More people seemed to become familiar with the concept of being a Greek citizen without necessarily being "ethnic" Greek. This change is optimistic but not ideal. Still, the majority of the comments are xenophobic and approaching forms of hate speech that in other democracies in the West usually exist as marginalized exceptions, not as a majority view. Real, uncensored comments from the *opengov* deliberation are displayed in the following text box. They are testimonies of the prevalent views held on the possibility of citizenship acquisition by the second generation. The selection represents the most dominant views represented in the deliberation.

"The law lies towards the right direction, since what is happening nowadays with people being born and living here and are not considered Greeks like us is inconceivable. I would add that it is relatively conservative, dictates many requirements but it is still a first move. If the requirements could be relaxed a bit, I would agree even more with the bill. I hope the government does not back down from the bill, it will be very disappointing."

"Dear Greek people,

you have the luck to be facing a second generation that was longing from the beginning for an integration in the Greek society and education. This fact constitutes a great accomplishment for modern Greece and recognising these children as Greeks is the least you can do. Personally, after many years of anticipation to acquire the Greek citizenship I concluded that regardless of the outcome, I feel and I will keep feeling Greek. All of you that don't understand this, just take a look at the second generations of countries like Germany, Sweden or even the US."

"New measures should be enacted that will test if the prospective Greek citizen can prove that loves this land more that the average Greek citizen. Usually most are interested in the Greek passport to go to Europe. We haven't seized to be a bridge (for transit). At least, in the case they want to use us to go abroad they should pay a guarantee of 2000 euros to the state in case they leave in the first 5 years of the acquisition or in case they break the law severely. Excluding access to public benefits would be also an important mean to find out who really wants the citizenship for such reasons."

"Greece is the only country in the European Union that does not grant the Greek citizenship to children that grew up or finished school in Greece. Why? If she wants to be part of the EU she has to start functioning at last as a European country in practice not only in words. I am from Albania, I grew up here and I have graduated from a Greek university. Why should anyone consider I don't deserve the Greek citizenship? On what grounds am I less from someone that just randomly happened to be born Greek?"

"I am not a racist, but with such high unemployment rate in Greece if all these foreigners get the citizenship it is best for the Greeks to emigrate. That is because most of the employers hire foreigners. I know this by experience, I am a driver, unemployed for 2 years and wherever I go I see Albanians and Bulgarians working as drivers, I have even seen a Pakistani. They do the same jobs for half the money. Nobody can't say Greeks are not looking for jobs because it is a lie. As a country that has a problem with an intense migration coming from the East, we shouldn't give citizenships to foreigners that easily away. The government should consider these issues and not make changes based on ideology."

"You could have held a referendum. For sure, you won't hold one because you know that 90% of the people would be against this law."

"There is no reason for them to get the Greek citizenship. It is more than enough they live and grow up in Greece. There is a difference between hosting for a certain period and making someone a Greek just like that. We have many misconceptions. Greece belongs to Greeks as every country to the descendants of its past inhabitants does. No (Greek) emigrant in Australia, Germany, US is Australian, German, American, they are Greeks and only Greeks."

"With this kind of laws, you are fishing for votes you are not doing politics. You are traitors of the nation. I wish that your children will meet second generation jihadists and be treated accordingly. You are not taking as an example what is happening in the surrounding countries and I wish that you will be the first to be harmed by it because it is not our fault."

The comments in the text box were submitted by citizens on the electronic deliberation of the new citizenship bill in 2015.

Although there is an abundance of studies regarding different aspects of migration in the Greek context, there is a clear gap in the literature regarding the second generation and its

issues in Greece. In the following chapter, this study attempts to bridge parts of this existing gap in scholarly production.

3. Citizenship and mobilities in a Southern European context: theoretical framework

The theoretical framework used in this study does not aim at developing a new theory, it aims to highlight the absence of studies regarding the second generation and citizenship attribution in the Greek context. The existing literature (Crul et al., 2012, Thomson & Crul, 2007, Crul and Vermeulen, 2003) on relevant issues manifested in other European countries, can provide a framework in which to contextualize issues of the second generation and citizenship. Departing from the vast pool of migration studies that is dedicated to the second generation, I investigate how it is studied in the European context. The importance of citizenship and the experiences of citizenship accumulation are highlighted through a short review of different integration policies in European countries.

3.1 Second generation studies

The second generation as a research topic has attracted a lot of attention in migration studies in both North America and Europe. Therefore, a big theoretical debate about assimilation and integration developed. On the one hand, American studies (Portes and Rumbaut, 2005, Portes and Zhou 1993) have dominated the international scholarly production, in particular with the development of theoretical models to explain the position of the second generation in society (Thomson & Crul, 2007). On the other hand, European scholars (from countries like Germany, the Netherlands, France and the UK) have caught up trying to develop theories that would better explain the issues of second generation in the European national and cross-national context. Second generation studies are approached differently by the two schools of thought. To further elaborate on this issue, the origins of the immigrant population between North America and Europe are quite different. In the United States, scholars are mainly focusing their studies on underage Mexicans and Asians, whose families are considered to be labour migrants from diverse backgrounds (Thomson & Crul, 2007). That is not the case on the European side, where second generation young people in different countries have more diverse ethnic backgrounds and come not only from families of labour migrants, but also from families that come from ex-colonies of the receiving countries. Another factor that contributes to this difference is that Europe consists

of different nation states that form different national contexts, in which the second generation is embedded. During the previous decade second generation became a heated topic in the public debate in different European Union member states, where the integration of these populations in the receiving countries became a subject of contestation. For instance, in the Netherlands multiculturalism was the Dutch integration model since the beginning of the 1980's when the 'Minority policy' was introduced, but this was put into question in the beginning of the 2000's. The high rates of Dutch-Moroccan second generation dropping out of school and high crime rates within the community were the main focal concerns in the debate (Thomson & Crul, 2007). A complementary discourse grew in Germany, where the Turkish second generation is seen as an isolated community living parallel to and disconnected from the rest of the German society. In countries like France and the UK, the migrants' related concerns took an even more controversial turn, when both societies were highly shocked by incidents of social unrest and violence in which second generation communities. In France, it was the riots in the suburbs of Paris (the riots were caused by the death of two second generation teenagers in a car accident during a police chase, which occurred in a suburb that predominantly second and third generation reside in) that put the assimilationist French model into doubting concerns, while the British had to deal with second generation youth being involved in terror acts in the UK (Thomson & Crul, 2007).

In the particular case of Europe, many scholars (Crul and Vermeulen 2003b; Doomernik 1998; Eldering and Kloprogge 1989; Fase 1994; Heckmann et al. 2001; Mahnig 1998) consider the national context of each state as an important factor in integration processes. That resulted in the production of cross national research highlighting the differences among European countries and their different social structures and institutions, thus making the varying effects of their policy approaches more visible. This European perspective of the importance of the national context has majorly contributed in the international theoretical debate as well (Thomson & Crul, 2007).

The most complete product of European research on second generation is the TIES survey, a cross-national comparative research that was carried out in the continental North-Western Europe (in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland). TIES was conducted from 2007 to 2008 and compares second generation adults (between eighteen

and 35 years old) from Turkey, Morocco, and the former Yugoslavia in fifteen different cities in eight European countries (Crul et al., 2012). Neither southern European countries nor the UK were a part of these surveys, yet it is clear that such surveys and their findings contribute to more informed policy making. That is another reason why Greece is an important case study and more research on these issues must be done. Especially, if we take into account the country's failure to introduce coherent immigration management and integration policies until 2010. Scholars have already suggested how lacking such policies has a negative impact on the second generation in Greece (Gogonas, 2010; King and Mai, 2009 in Vathi, 2015). The TIES findings conclude that the socio-economic position of the second generation in Europe is difficult to understand (Crul et al., 2012). On the one hand, a significant number of the second generation remains in the margins of their society, non-active on the labour market, unemployed or stuck in unskilled jobs. This group does not seem to have upward social mobility in relation to their parents (Crul et al., 2012). On the other hand, more than half of the second generation population has established a middle class position, moving higher up in relation to their parents. This is quite impressive in the span of just one generation, considering the fact that only the "bad" examples tend to be emphasized by the media and the political discourses in the respective countries. The survey's findings point out that institutional practices in place can potentially foster upward social mobility. By institutional practices they refer to examples such as starting schooling early and selecting between vocational and academic tracks in a later stage, which proved critical for academic success amongst second generation. In addition, an inclusive apprenticeship system provides a better transition to working life. These vocational and educational schemes that actively encourage students to complete their education are quite important due to the high unemployment rates that are prevalent among early school leavers (Crul et al., 2012).

3.2 Citizenship

This section looks at the legal aspects of the institutional structures regulating citizenship. According to international law, besides a defined territory with established borders, a state also needs a permanent population. Nation states grant citizenship to their inhabitants in the form of privileges. Some of the privileges of citizenship range from exclusive access to

public positions, to participation in democratic elections, to the possibility to benefit from welfare-state arrangements (Vink & de Groot, 2010). In an era of high mobility of populations, an individual's legal relationship with a state is crucially important, especially for the individuals that are on the move and do not have these kind of privileges in their countries of destination. A citizen is a member of a political community who enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of this membership (Christopoulos, 2006). Thus, nation states regulate the acquisition and loss of citizenship through specific sets of legal rules, although relevant provisions may also be found in the constitution or lower administrative decrees (Vink & de Groot, 2010).

Universally, a person obtains citizenship at their birth via descent (*jus sanguinis*), birthplace (*jus solis*), or later through residence or marriage (Vink & de Groot, 2010). When it comes to how states decide who gets to be part of their political constituencies, there are two main trends in national policies that have developed in Northern and Western Europe during the last two decades. Within the first trend, the notion that immigrants are here to stay prevailed, and thus citizenship became a tool for a better integration of immigrants in the receiving society. This tendency was expressed both in migration policies within countries of the North and West in the 1980s, as well as on a broader European level as the nationality discussion raged throughout the 1990s, taking into account integration as an essential issue. Within the second trend, citizenship acquired significance as an identity status over the course of the 1990s, in an era of extreme politicisation of immigration. These two trends had contrasting impacts on the different policies' substance (Vink & de Groot, 2010). Some countries like the Netherlands had more fluid citizenship policies, meaning they changed the policies frequently; in comparison, other countries like Germany had more moderate changes by adopting *jus solis* in 2000 and restricting the possibilities of acquiring dual citizenship (parents' citizenship and German). The Dutch experience is an indicative example of the volatility that dominated the citizenship policies. During the 1990s, the Dutch official approach on dual citizenship took a more liberal turn, only to return back to its initial, exclusively restrictive one (Van Oers et al. 2006: 406-9 in Vink & de Groot, 2010). As shown from the examples of Germany and the Netherlands, the integration of second generation is a field where policies are experimented with, both in different national contexts as well as on the broader European level. Nevertheless, the different assumptions and findings of the

European scholars are not to be generalised, since "European countries start from fundamentally different positions at the beginning of the 1990s in terms of citizenship policy and migration experience" (Vink & de Groot, 2010, p. 715). Northern European countries had, in this sense, preceded with policies of integration, while South European countries were still focused on developing and maintaining strong links with their large emigrant communities (diasporas) (Joppke. 2005 in Vink & de Groot). Greece is a relevant example of this process and "has been criticized for its marked lack of integration policies, commonly thought of as a product of a mono-cultural (prevailing *jus sanguinis*) and mono-religious (prevailing Orthodox Church) national self-understanding" (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2009 in Cebolla-Boado & Finotelli, 2015, p. 81). European practices around citizenship highlight what different people can and cannot do and achieve within a given society. This brings us to the last part of the theoretical framework, which focuses on mobilities and more particularly social mobility amongst second generation.

3.3 Social mobility and second generation

This study uses social mobility to capture the progress of second generation young adults in Greek society. There are limited sources and studies that address the case of Greece and the social mobility of its second generation. This can be mostly attributed to the fact that integration policies were practically non-existent until 2007, and the citizenship attribution was only attempted unsuccessfully first in 2010, and then again in 2015. The main motivation for migrants that came to Greece was a better life and a search for an upward socioeconomic mobility for their families (Gemi, 2014). Mobility is closely tied to assessments of existing integration processes of the second generation in migration studies. The study understands mobility as something closely related to the second generation's integration, opportunities, and barriers in Greece. That is why this study uses D'Andrea et al.'s (2011) definition of mobility:

> As both predicament and opportunity, new globally-related mobilities do not mean free movement in a 'flat world', but rather index a complex of actual, potential, uneven and disabled possibilities that are unequally actualized across multiple domains and fractures of social life (D'Andrea et al., 2011, p. 150).

Two types of social mobility are distinguished, namely horizontal and vertical mobility. The first relates to moving within one's social status while the second refers to moving towards a higher or lower status than previously occupied. Part of mobility is the intergenerational transmissions that occur between the older and the younger generation, either in the family or within the ethnic group in a given society. Vertical mobility is linked with intergenerational mobility, where the social mobility is the difference between a person's current income, wealth, or occupation and the same indicators within the family in which they were raised (Beller & Hout, 2006). Social mobility is intrinsically entangled with the concept of inequality in a given societal context, and can serve as a very useful indicator to highlight the degree of inequality. Research on the upward social mobility among the children of the migrants can offer further insights to this concept for the general population as well. It can help researchers discover to what extent and how new social groups obtain the social positions they aspire to occupy (Crul, 2015). The number of children of labour migrants experiencing upward social mobility is increasing in Europe in spite of the significant barriers that they have to overcome to succeed (Vathi, 2015).

The second generation in Greece appears not to reach its full potential because they are constrained by the existing legal provisions and social structures, and lately, by the severe economic crisis. The aim of this study in regards development studies is to look into the impact that the absence of citizenship has on the second generation and its mobilities. In addition, it intends to open up further possible policy changes beyond the citizen bill that might inspire solutions for the existing situation. It is important to look at the lack of citizenship not only as a human rights and inequality issue, but also as a factor that creates a bundle of outcomes that severely constrains the development of the members of the second generation in Greece.

Research question:

How are the mobilities of second generation young adults from migrant backgrounds related to the lack of citizenship?

Sub-questions:

- *How is Greek citizenship regulated in relation to second generation?*

- *How does the lack of citizenship affect their educational/training choices?*

- *Does citizenship impact their economic mobility and working choices?*

- *How is second generation's socio-political mobility linked to the absence of citizenship?*

- *In which ways does the lack of citizenship influence their physical mobility?*

- *Which factors explain differentiation in the impact of the lack of citizenship on mobilities?*

- *How does the lack of citizenship shape second generation young adults' plans for the future?*

Key concepts and their operationalization

Mobilities:

Physical mobility

Physical mobility derives as a result of the legal rights second generation holds with or without the Greek citizenship. Here, it is used to investigate the extent to which the second generation moves in and out of the country with the legal documents they hold either with the purpose of travelling or for migration.

Economic and socio-political mobility

Economic mobility is used to operationalize the socio-economic characteristics of second generation regarding their options in the labour market and the change in their income. Socio-political mobility, in this case intergenerational, can be upward or downward, moving from one social status to another. It also encompasses the political participation that the second generation practices.

In order to answer the research question, the study differentiates the second generation from their parents' generation. What are their socio-economic characteristics, their goals

and aspirations, and how do they achieve them, if possible? To answer these questions, we would also have to look at the structural constraints the second generation faces.

Citizenship

The citizenship is defined as the privileges you have as an inhabitant of any particular state. More specifically, citizenship entails rights and obligations. Some of the rights include political rights, voting rights, and working rights. In this regard, members of the second generation who are yet not endowed with the citizenship are not allowed to work amongst the country's Public Sector, or to practice certain professions that require the citizenship, such as doctors, teachers and lawyers.


Figure 11: Theoretical framework, conceptual model (Takou, 2015)

4. Methodology

The main objective of this research is to investigate how the mobilities of the second generation are shaped by growing up in Greece without Greek citizenship. In particular, I asked those interviewed about their family backgrounds, their life stories, their decision-making when they were coming of age, their studying and working options, and finally their plans for the future. This required that the study be carried out through a qualitative approach. Qualitative methods have a more flexible and holistic character in comparison to quantitative methods (Desai and Potter, 2006). Since I look at the subjective experiences of people, the qualitative approach is more appropriate as it questions the possibility of 'objectivity,' and instead aims to understand "differing and often competing 'subjectivities' in terms of very different accounts of 'facts', different meanings and different perceptions" (Desai and Potter, 2006, p.118). Along with the literature and policy review, interviews and participant observation were used in order to collect empirical data and answer the main research question. Interviews were chosen because of the wide range of information they are able to collect (Desai and Potter, 2006). In particular, interviews had a 'semi-structured' form, following guidelines with suggested themes, but leaving space for the respondents to develop their answers (Desai and Potter, 2006). The choice to conduct interviews over questionnaires for instance, is justified by the kind of data I wanted to extract in relation to narratives and perceptions. It is necessary to build trust and confidence between the researcher and the key informants in the given social context. The existing conditions in Greece, where the dominant discourse is characterized by widespread xenophobia and racism, affects deeply how the second generation is perceived and treated. This factor is taken into account as it could impact the openness and responses of the interviewees given that I am not second generation. Through this type of interview, I ensured that the areas considered

Interview guidelines with three main themes:

Personal history: Family background/parents' origins, occupations and income/family integration/schooling/household/class/living conditions

Coming of age (18+): transition/residence permit/education (/training) choices/income/working options/travelling/civic participation

Future plans: citizenship/career/family/remain in Greece

necessary to answering the research questions were covered; but, more importantly, also provided a space where the people interviewed had the opportunity to add their own thoughts and concerns on the topic (Desai and Potter, 2006). As well, "when you ask people to reveal their inner thoughts and actions to you, you may be opening them up to a degree of suffering: perhaps recalling troubling experiences. Moreover, you are also asking them to risk the public disclosure of what they have confided in you, and you are strictly obligated to honour their confidences" (Babbie, 2013, p. 355). Participant observation was carried out by taking part in the everyday activities of the partner organization, Generation 2.0, for two months in Athens. Generation 2.0 for Rights, Equality, & Diversity (Generation 2.0 RED) is a youth organization that combines research and social action to promote rights, equality, and diversity and to combat racism, xenophobia, and discrimination. They identify themselves as the New Generation of Greek Citizens, people of various ethnic backgrounds born and/or raised in Greece (Generation 2.0 RED, 2015). The sample was selected through a snowball sampling technique, and through my presence at the office of the organization and at related social events and projects, I was able to meet young people to interview that were second generation. In order to collect data with the highest validity, the sample has certain parameters that ensure that it is as representative as possible. The sample consists of 12 people, equally divided from both sexes, and the respondents are also demographically representative of second generation in Greece in terms of age, migrant origin and socio-economic characteristics. This strategy prevents exclusion bias and allows for a variety in the narratives rather than a one-sided representation of the general population of second generation.

The interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed, translated from the Greek language to English and coded for the analysis. Content analysis was chosen to analyse both the notes from the participant observation and the transcripts of the interviews. The analysis of the coded interviews was executed manually. The coding of the interviews was done thematically, where each theme corresponds to the identified concepts of the study. The interview guidelines were created to respond to the definitions of the key concepts.

4.1 Generation 2.0 on the citizenship and equal rights

Generation 2.0 for Rights, Equality & Diversity is an NGO engaged with issues diversity and human rights in Greece and is the only second generation organization that exists in the country. While I was there I had the chance to closely observe their everyday activities, participate in some of their projects, and learn about the history of the organization and the migrant communities in Athens. Through the existing networks of the organization I was able to find and contact the respondents of my sample. In addition, the programs manager of the Generation 2.0 was a key informant to my research, which is why I also interviewed her about the latest developments on the citizenship bill.

Generation 2.0 for Rights, Equality & Diversity was originally founded as *Second Generation* in 2006 by a group of young activists that were the children of migrants. The group was started with the goal of pursuing social justice for a new generation of youth in Greece. By 2010, the group obtained a more mixed profile when Greek 'natives' began to join. It was officially recognized as an NGO in 2013, merging with the *Institute for Rights, Equality & Diversity (i-RED)*, which was an independent research institute in Greece with an international orientation that built on EU and international networks. The organization promotes a vision of Greece as multicultural, multiracial, and inclusive of all forms of diversity by bringing together people of Greek and migrant descent for social and political events.

Furthermore, the main objective of the organization is to campaign for the rights of vulnerable social groups, like the migrants and the refugees, through social action and research. Their main focus of is supporting better integration of children and young people with migrant origins (second generation), as well as immigrants and refugees into Greek society. By undertaking different actions and campaigns, they are trying to make issues that concern second generation youth visible to the Greek public. Their latest campaign was related to citizenship and started after the previous bill (Act 3838/2010) was deemed unconstitutional. The name of the campaign was 'Equal citizens,' and it claimed the rights of citizenship for all children born and / or raised in Greece to migrant parents. The organization also provides 3 main services: counselling to migrants and refugees in their

offices, educational programs about diversity in schools, and cultural mediation and counselling services at the Immigration Office in Athens.

Their campaign is acknowledged as successful in making second generation issues visible to a wider part of the society, and led to a 2015 initiative by the Minister of Migration to reform the Citizenship law and address the demand for equal rights for the children of migrants born and growing up in Greece. The organization also participated in deliberations with policy makers of the Ministry of Migration when the citizenship bill was being finalised in the spring of 2015. They provided law makers with insights from the migrant community on their needs and problems, and gave their recommendations on changes that would strengthen the bill in foresight of the previous experience of the citizenship law that was rejected by the judicial court.

Upon the introduction of the new citizenship bill (act 4332/2015) the organization viewed the changes as promising and as a big step forward in the process of normalizing all the issues that second generation faces due to a lack of the Greek citizenship. The organization has taken initiatives since then to inform the second generation of the supporting documents that they need in order to apply for the citizenship and the public agencies they need to visit before the application. In addition, Generation 2.0 organized a public event where officials from the agencies that handle the applications informed the interested parties (individuals, migrant groups and organizations, the media) on the course of the law being adopted and implemented.

Risks and Limitations

Lastly, the proposed research entails some risks and limitations. This study is the basis of my Master thesis (30EC) in Sustainable Development. One of the possible risks is the circumstances that prevail in Greece in this period. The fieldwork and data collection was carried out in the capital of Greece, Athens, which is nowadays ridden by economic, political and refugee crises simultaneously. The prevailing circumstances in the field might create potential practical obstacles regarding the communication with the individuals in terms of the respondents' availability and the necessary time for building trust between the

researcher and the respondents. Moreover, the overall downward social mobility that citizens from every social group have been experiencing due to the economic crisis over the last six years has to be taken into account. Finally, the identity of the researcher, being a Greek citizen, has to be taken into consideration regarding subjectivity and familiarity with the societal context.

5. Findings

5.1 Introducing the respondents and their socioeconomic characteristics

My sample is comprised of a total of 12 respondents. Their parents came to Greece from Afghanistan, Albania, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and the Philippines. There are six females and six males, all in their 20's or early 30's, with an average age of 26 years old. Two of them came initially to Greece with their families as refugees, one from Iran and one from Afghanistan. Five of them came from Albania. Eleven out of the twelve hold passports of their parents' origins country, and one managed to acquire citizenship with the previous citizenship law before it was deemed unconstitutional. They are considered by the state as third country nationals; these third countries are all neither EU nor western countries, but rather less developed countries as classified by Eurostat. Marina, the respondent from Afghanistan who has acquired citizenship, was included in the sample, because she still grew up and became an adult without Greek citizenship. Thus she was socialized during the important years of schooling without Greek citizenship or the probability of acquiring it.

Nine out of the total twelve were born outside of Greece, 8 of them in the country their parents came from, and one in Turkey on the way from Afghanistan to Greece. 8 out of the 9 born abroad were brought by their parents to Greece at a young age, mostly as toddlers and elementary school pupils, while only one came in high school. Three of the respondents currently live abroad studying or working, in the UK, Belgium, and Serbia. All of their households were situated in working class neighbourhoods.

I met with all of respondents in Athens, Greece. All the respondents meet the criteria that the law requires in order for someone to be entitled to apply for the Greek citizenship. A brief description of the respondents' lives, families and how they ended up in Greece follows below.

Name	Gender	Age	Ethnic origin	Education level	Occupation/status
Ervin	M	21	Albania	High school	Photojournalist (free-lance)/ student
John	M	25	Albania	Dance diploma	Dancer
Anuk	F	28	Albania	Bachelor	Maters' Student (Anthropology)
Arleta	F	26	Albania	Bachelor	Photographer/ unemployed
Lydia	F	29	Albania	Vocational Training Institute	Insurance consultant (free-lance)
Marina	F	21	Afghanistan	High school	Student (Radiology)
Samir	M	25	Egypt	High school	Interpreter (>1 year contract)
Paul	M	32	Iran	Bachelor	Naval engineer (contract)
George	M	25	Morocco	High school	Student (Medicine)
Claire	F	28	Nigeria	Bachelor	Yoga instructor (free-lance_
Vera	F	27	Philippines	MA	Editor in publishing (contract)
Peter	M	27	Kenya/Nigeria	High school	Actor/animator (free-lance)

Table 2. Overview of the respondents and their socioeconomic characteristics.

Ervin was born in Albania and came to Greece when he was 2 years old. His parents separated, and he was raised by a single mother. He studied photography and now is studying journalism in college. He works with news agencies as a photographer. A year ago he managed to move out of his mother's house and lives by himself.

John was born in Albania and came to Greece with his mother, joining his father who was already working there. His father works in construction and his mother is in the services sector, in fast food restaurants. After graduating high school, he entered the Greek National School of Dance, from which he graduated successfully. He is 25 years old and works as a dancer with a dance company based in the UK.

Anuk was born in Albania and came to Greece with her mother because her father was working in Athens. Her father worked as a mover and her mother cleaning houses. A friend

of the family took care of her until the end of elementary school when she re-joined her parents. She studied political sciences in Athens and now she is doing a master's of anthropology in Belgium. She is 28 years old.

Arleta was born in Albania and came to Greece when she was 5 years old with her mother and brother to find her father who was already there working. They first came because her brother needed a medical procedure that they could not access in Albania. She studied photography at university and has also studied abroad on an Erasmus exchange. She is 26 years old and lives with her family.

Lydia is 29 years old, she was born in Albania and she came to Athens with her family when the civil war broke out in 1997. She studied marketing in a college but she became interested in insurance when her father fell sick and wasn't entitled to any benefits because of his migrant status. She is a self-employed professional working as an insurance consultant with a multinational corporation. She lives with her family.

Marina was born in Turkey where her family had sought refuge from the war in Afghanistan. Her parents decided to come to Greece because her younger sister has a rare disease and the treatment would be more accessible in a European country. She is finishing her studies in radiology, currently doing an internship with a university hospital in Athens. She plans to take the exams to enter the medical school and become a doctor. She is 21 years old and she acquired the citizenship with the previous bill after she finished high school. She still lives with her family.

Samir was born in Egypt, he is 25 years old and he came to Greece with his mother to reunite with his father when he was 4 years old. After his parents separated, his mother returned to Egypt and he stayed with his father in Greece. Because his dad worked in ferries, a friend took care of him while he was in elementary school. He works as interpreter of Arabic with the IOM on a Greek island in a refugee program.

Paul came with his family from Iran as refugees fleeing the Islamic revolution. His family is Assyrian and they are Christian. His father is working and his mother is a housewife. He is 32 years old and works as a naval engineer. His job requires a lot of mobility, as he constantly needs to travel to shipyards around the world with short notice. He lives with his family.

George was born in Athens to Moroccan parents, who came to Greece in the late 80's to work. His mother works in the hospitality industry and his father did all kinds of manual jobs and now runs small businesses in Athens and in Morocco. George successfully entered Greek university to study nursing, but realised that he wanted to become a doctor so he is currently in medical school in Serbia. He is 25 years old, and he has also worked seasonally to save up for studying but he is mainly supported by his family.

Claire was born in Nigeria and was raised by her grandmother, while her parents were in Europe working. She came to Greece to reunite with her family when she was 15. She graduated from a Greek public high school and enrolled in the university and studied speech therapy. Her parents managed to acquire the Greek citizenship and now live in the UK, where they went to work because of the economic crisis. She is 28 years old and currently works as a yoga instructor because there are no jobs in her field of studies. She lives with roommates and her family still supports her from the UK.

Vera was born in Athens to Philippine parents that came to Greece to work. Her father is an accountant and her mother was a nurse and came to Greece through an employment agency. Her parents were very eager for her to explore all her options in education so she finished high school in Greece and went to college in the US where she has extended family. After her studies, she came back to Europe and did a masters' in migration management in Spain. She is 27 years old and works as an editor in a publishing house in Athens. She still lives with her parents saving up money to further train in her field.

Peter was born in Athens to a Kenyan mother and a Nigerian father. He was stateless for almost all his life, though he managed to get Nigerian citizenship 3 years ago when the Nigerian embassy in Athens upgraded their system for the procedures. He is now 27 years old and was raised by a single mother along with 5 other siblings. He started working as an actor when he was in high school and hasn't stopped since and he is self-taught. He lives with a roommate since he got the Nigerian passport and could rent something in his name.

5.2 Mobility

"I was given two opportunities in life, once when I was born in Albania and one when my parents brought me to Greece."

Mobility as a concept in this study is approached through three different aspects, namely the economic, the physical and the socio-political mobility. I take into account the data I collected and compared it to the data respondents gave me about their parents. I also use the overall statistics about their parents' generation, along with statistics about their Greek 'native' peers as a background to determine their mobility. Based on the testimonies of the respondents, I collected data on the different dimensions of the mobilities. Respondents were asked about their experiences regarding their household and their parents' socio-economic characteristics, their schooling and education, their employment history, and their current livelihoods. The findings regarding mobility are analysed in three thematic sections, divided into their schooling years, their transition into adulthood, and their working experiences.

5.2.1 Enrolment/graduation
Parental aspirations

The sample consists of members of migrant families, where the parents were mostly low skilled labourers in different sectors of economy. The parents of the respondents initially came to Greece to seek a better life for themselves and their families. The recurring theme throughout all the narratives is that parents want their children to make something out of their lives and hope their children will have better opportunities and live in more progressive environments in comparison to their own circumstances as migrants. According to their parents, education for second generation is central to the improvement of their lives. Parents use their own difficulties and experiences as lessons for their children, to guide them to better themselves and accomplish more. "You are not going to be another construction worker like us" is a common phrase many children heard growing up. Some

parents were more eager to support their children's education and guide them towards achieving a higher social status. Marina talks about her father - who has been working as a technician since they came to Greece - and how happy he is that she and her siblings are studying in the university. She repeats his most impressionable words: "he says I work like a slave in businesses of other people, I will never be able to become the boss of me but you will become bosses of yourselves through studying." Vera attributes her parents' views on the importance of education to the Philippine culture and mentality.

But, the strong focus on education also created stress and pressure on the second generation when they were growing up, as Anuk and John point out. Anuk describes the environment she grew up in as one, where "it was very important that I would enter university" and she adds that "they would scare me off that if I don't study I won't do anything with my life. They used to say to me if you don't study you will become like us, a cleaner or something similar. This created tensions at home and depressed me." However, she credits this mentality to the Greek society at large and not her environment in particular. John also talks about how his parents pressured him a lot to focus on education and how they were 'investing in him' to study French, English, and other extracurricular activities after school.

The notion of "education is key" is attached in their upbringing, and in the case of George, Claire and Vera, it is also about following in their parents' footsteps, as they too had studied, albeit with less access to educational resources and opportunities. George remembers how "especially my father would say to me 'go to the university, don't become another construction worker'. He acknowledged his father advice and followed it, after all his father had also studied so he knows better. Marina is confident of her family's support for her studies because she also compares it with the cultural environment of her extended family in Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan. My parents believe that even a girl has the right to education, provided that this is what she wants. "And becoming a doctor needs many years of studies" she points. She recounts her dad telling her that he can and will support her for as long as she wants to study.

Ervin and Peter had a slightly different upbringing when it comes to their parents' focus on education. Their parents were content with just the basic education until high school. Ervin highlights how his dad was suggesting he should work when I was in puberty. In the case of

Peter, he finished the night version of high school because he worked regularly while in school. But Ervin felt differently from his parents: "I always wanted to improve myself through education, because I understood I would stand better in society this way. To be a proper person is important." Education is again a means to gain a better life, but this time the focus emerges from the child and not the parent.

Studying choices

The majority of the respondents had or are currently attending higher education at a university level. In Greece, all high school graduates participate in the national exams and have the right to access all education institutions, provided they have the adequate grades to gain admission. This also applies to the second generation with the exemption of institutions that require the Greek citizenship. This is the only restriction they have to deal within their study choices.

In Greece a minimum of 9 years of education is obligatory for all children. Every child has the right to enrol in the public school system regardless of their nationality or the legal status of their parents. By the end of high school everyone is required to participate in the national entrance exams and a significant percentage of the students enters the public universities. The success and failure lies on whether they manage to enter the university of their choice or not. For instance, 104.616 candidates participated in the national exams in the school year of 2014-2015 and a total of 70.305 succeeded to enter in the Greek universities. So, a 67% of the students graduating high school entered a higher institution of education (European Commission, 2015).

All the respondents have attended and successfully graduated from 12 years of schooling. 10 out of 12 proceeded to studies beyond high school. More specifically, 8 are graduates of higher education and 2 of vocational training institutions or colleges. Finally, two of the 10 graduates have studied at a master's level. When the sample is compared to their parents' generation, the second generation has a distinct upward mobility regarding education. On the other hand, when it is compared with the statistics of educational attainment in 2014, 39% of the Greek adults aged 25-34 held a higher Education Degree, below the OECD's

average of 41% (OECD, 2015). In comparison, 50% of my sample holds already a degree from an institution of higher education.

In some cases the lack of citizenship played a significant role in what a respondent chose to study, as is the case for Paul, who had the dream to become a pilot or something related to aeronautical engineering, which requires Greek citizenship since he had to enter the Greek Air force academy. Paul describes the moment he realized: "my wings were crushed as they say. I was so disappointed I didn't pay attention to my grades anymore and when I finished a professor of mine filled my applications for the universities." Military, Naval, Air force academies along with Police and Fire fighting academies and the Merchant Marine Academy require Greek citizenship from their prospective students. All the aforementioned academies have university status. The military academies do not only produce cadets and officers for the army, but have a range of other departments - from engineering to medicine - amounting to a total number of 35 different schools or faculties. This case highlights the obstacles created by the lack of citizenship. For Peter, the obstacles were equally high for whatever he would have wanted to study because he was stateless and was aware he would not be able to enrol anywhere without papers. However, despite this understanding, he participated with his peers in the national exams to graduate high school.

Five of the of the respondents stated that their parents committed to support them financially for the duration of their studies, while the remaining five with post-high school degrees did not, or could not, rely on their family's support. Although the first five had the security of their parents support, three of them also had different kinds of jobs while studying. Thus the majority of the total 10 that are studying or have already finished with their studies had to work to support themselves in school.

Vera and George were advised by their families to study abroad. Vera had to choose between staying in Greece or going to the US or the Philippines for further studies. Her father advised her against attending a Greek university because of the famous problems (strikes, irregularity, and no organization). George initially entered the Greek university, namely to be become a nurse. "I came into contact with the realities of the medical professions in the hospitals where we would have internships and I realized that the medical science is interesting and decided I wanted to become a doctor... My father suggested I should go abroad to study and that they would support me to do that. I started doing

applications, I was accepted in Montreal, Canada but the fees were very expensive and that is why I went to Slovakia, where I was accepted also. The fees in Slovakia are the same for EU and non-EU citizens."

While in high school John was thinking of becoming a chef, as an alternative plan "in order not to become another construction worker." At the same period, he became interested in dancing and at 18, was surprised and excited when he realised for the first time that dancing could be a job. Almost all of the respondents that have undertaken studies after the basic education, have been at least partly supported economically by their families in order to study.

5.2.2 Transitioning to adulthood
Residence permit complications (costs, delays, inconsistencies)

All the respondents grew up with the legal status of third country nationals, which entailed holding a residence permit to live in the country. Until graduating from high school they had access to permits for student purposes, which had to be renewed every year at the cost of 150€ in administrative fees. Besides the administrative fees, the renewal produced additional costs for the family budget in the form of the supporting documents they were required to present. For instance, the birth certificate which in the case of the respondents born outside of Greece had to be obtained from the country of origin. The Greek state has a policy to consider certificates valid only six months after they are issued. For instance, all the respondents from Albania were born there. The additional costs for the certificate would amount to 250€ each year for someone to travel back and forth to Albania, translate it into Greek, bring it to the Greek consulate for notarization, and only then was it valid in Greece. Any administrational procedure that requires a birth certificate in Greece thus needs the procedure to be repeated at least once a year.

When second generation students enrol in a higher education institution, a permit for studies is again required; those that did not matriculate to universities had to switch to a work permit to remain legally in the country. This changed in the case of my respondents, as the second generation residence permit was established in 2013 in reaction to the dismissal of the 2010 citizenship law. Currently all the respondents hold this type of permit. The duration of the permit is 5 years and the fee was set at 300€.

Every time I interviewed someone the conversation became heated when this topic came up. Everyone had complaints, and an overall discontent towards the system of the residence permits, the conditions in the public offices, and the speed of the state fulfilling its obligations towards them. It was all about queues, permit delays, and disappointing encounters with unprofessional representatives of the state. In addition, some of them like Paul, Samir, Vera, and George have experienced not holding a valid permit for periods ranging from one year to 3 years due to administrative mistakes or complications. So, in

addition to Peter - who was stateless hence undocumented until the 24th year of his life – other respondents experienced being undocumented in the country for some period of time in their adult lives.

Anuk recalls the situation at the migration office as "unbelievable", with queues she could not see the end of, people fighting with each other, and others fainting on the sidewalks from the heat. Waiting in queues in the migration offices is something every respondent has experienced, either from a very young age or when they became older. In addition, everyone has incidents of being treated with indifference, given wrong information, or experienced even more severe forms of discrimination. All of the respondents described negative experiences with representatives of the state, police officers, or officials in offices as common behaviour towards them and their parents and not exemptions of the rule. Especially Paul, who is the oldest of the sample: "police officers were mostly very poor at handling these processes, they were nervous, threatening the migrants and created a climate of fear and conflict."

Most of the respondents, with the exception of Claire, Marina, Ervin and George, remember vividly accompanying their parents to the migration offices starting when they were young children. In the first years of the families in Greece, the parents were also learning Greek along with their children. The parents, however, did not have access to schools, so they learned mostly through their jobs first and their social cycles, and television was also an effective way for the newcomers to familiarize themselves with the language. Paul and Vera remember how they acted as interpreters for their parents who did not speak Greek when they were in elementary school. Paul recollects how stressful it was for the household and for him because he did not understand the legal language from the documents. "But the police were addressing them, we interpreted. From a point and on when I was 15 I took charge, filling the applications." At this time, there were no interpreters to facilitate the necessary conducts migrants were required to have during their permit applications.

Marina, Claire, Ervin, John and George had no experience of the migration offices until they became adults because their parents took care of it. All of them were shocked with the "chaos," as Ervin puts it, when they attempted it for the first time. George realised the problems he would face in managing his permits in the future; he finally understood why his

parents would complain about the permit process throughout his childhood, and why his father acted as if he had won the lottery when he actually got the permit each time.

All the respondents estimated that their parents have spent thousands of euros on administrative fees and other costs in order to provide permits for each member of the family over the course of the two decades that all respondents have been in Greece. John characteristically calculated that his parents have spent "a crazy amount of money of at least 30.000 euros over the years for the permits." They all believe that it is a very profitable business for the state to preserve this regime of permits for migrants.

Ability to travel

All the respondents had little or no experience of traveling outside of Greece while they were growing up, and when they did travel it was to their parent's country of origin. This was a result of several factors: sometimes it was the legal status of their parents (loss of permit, mix up with papers), sometimes it was because the family could not afford to or did not want to go back, and sometimes it was because their own documents hindered them from going places. All the respondents held residence permits for studying purposes while in school. Before the policy changes in 2007 and 2010, these permits had more restrictions, as Arleta mentions: "back then we were so stuck in Greece, we couldn't even visit Albania whenever we wanted to, there was specific dates and fixed duration only during school holidays, i.e. Christmas, Easter, and some days in the summer….So you were like a prisoner in Greece or you opted of leaving and loosing rights." Arleta, along with John, Paul, Claire and Vera, compared their situation in Greece with their extended families in other countries of Europe or the US and Canada. All of them had examples of their family members having access to citizenship in other countries and that made their situation feel even more unjust.

In addition, due to the problematic function of the migration offices, they often found themselves only with a paper certificate to serve as a proof they had a residence permit. This was a Greek bureaucratic 'patent' that was in place of the official residence permit that should be attached to your passport. It was a 'bridge' to the official permit, and read something in the spirit of 'you are entitled of a residence permit, the migration office owes

it to you.' Whilst having this document-receipt did not allow them to leave Greece and safely come back, it did allow them to travel to their country of origins. The original permit would take months and in some cases they were even issued upon or after their expiration. Anuk remembers how she would end up with a temporary paper and the real permit would take up to 6 months to be issued. This experience of receiving the permit later is an experience every respondent had (besides Peter that started having a permit very recently because of this statelessness), despite the fact the law required the permit should be issued within 3 months.

There are respondents that have more vigorously pursued physical mobility outside of Greece for work and study purposes, especially John, Vera and Paul. As they hold "weak" passports, they always plan ahead, adapting their travel choices according to visa restrictions and limitations. John pointed out how "it was quite hard to get a working visa with the Albanian passport, before I was hired, I couldn't even go for an audition to London, but I was very lucky that they held one in Amsterdam and I could go." Anuk faced also difficulties during her application for doing a master's and the bureaucratic procedures for a visa in Belgium, "which I wouldn't have to go through if I already had the Greek citizenship". Vera also had to navigate structural restrictions over which places she could go for studies according to what kind of visas or permits she could acquire. While Paul is affected by his Iranian passport, which, in his opinion, is a peculiar passport because of the globally created image of the 'Iranian terrorist'.

The second generation has limitations in comparison to their Greek peers. With the adoption of the second generation permit, they can travel freely within the Schengen area the same way the Greek citizens can. However, since they are not EU citizens they need visas for the countries that are not in the Schengen zone and also are limited to stay in Schengen zone countries as visitors for a maximum of three months. When it comes to travelling outside of the zone it is more difficult for the second generation because they are likely to be faced with extra costs because of the visa. Since they are still holding passports from less developed countries that require visa applications before the trip or on arrival. Greek passports have more access visa-free to countries outside the EU than the passports of the countries that comprise the migration population and second generation of Greece. For instance, the Philippines passport has visa-free access to 61 countries, the Nigerian to 45

and the Moroccan to 59 while the Greek one has visa-free access to 171 countries (UNWTO, 2016).

It is also interesting how Marina considers her ability to travel to Turkey to see family in comparison to her parents, who haven't been naturalized yet and still hold permits. "Me and my siblings when we want to travel abroad, we can pack our suitcases and we are ready, my parents can only leave Greece if my father gets a signed permission by his employer, buy visas and on top they can leave the country for a limited amount of time of three weeks."

In summary, regarding freedom of mobility within the Schengen zone and outside of it, the second generation has a visa-free ability to travel within the zone but with time restrictions (maximum of 3 consecutive months visiting), though this differs outside Schengen depending on what passport they hold. So, they certainly face more difficulties with extra costs, possible visa rejections, and more time preparation in comparison to someone with Greek citizenship.

5.2.3 Working experiences

Jobs and economic emancipation

Working opportunities in Greece are getting scarcer and scarcer in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. Greece has also a very developed informal sector for manual labour which also has been hit by the crisis. Both the formal and the informal sector of the economy have shrank significantly in the last 6 years. This has created a lot of stress on the labour force and a mass emigration of young people towards the rest of the EU, as well as the US and Australia. In 2015 the youth unemployment rate surpassed 50%, and the general unemployment was at 25% in an economy that lost over 26% of its GDP over the last 6 years. Nowadays, some economists call Greece a failed state (Salomon, 2015).

The majority of the sample has had informal, and so uninsured, low skilled jobs since their teenage years, primarily in order to contribute to the household or not to burden their parents. The sample follows the general trends of employment in the country nowadays. Half of the sample is formally employed either by working free-lance or in short term contracts. One is unemployed, three are students and two of them do informal/uninsured jobs on an irregular pace. No one of the six respondents that are currently formally employed expressed any feelings of security for the short-term future about their contracts. It is safe to say they all have precarious livelihoods.

There are also restrictions deriving from the lack of Greek citizenship regarding working rights in Greece and the rest of the EU member states. In Greece, the biggest distinction that sets second generation apart from their Greek 'native' peers is their exclusion from the public sector and from a set of professions that require the citizenship from their members. So due to the lack of Greek citizenship they have no access to employment as civil servants and employees in the public sector; additionally they have no access to the professional associations or to a professional license to be doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, engineers, professors and teachers in public schools.

Besides the different professions that require the Greek citizenship, the respondents have no working rights in the rest of the EU member states as Greek citizens do with their current status as holders of the second generation permits. Notably, this type of permit is a recent

development and before that the respondents had only two choices - a permit for working purposes and a permit for studying purposes - when they came of age. Additionally, the permits for studying purposes had restricted working rights limited to part time employment. But not all forms of studies were recognized as sufficient for a study permit. This was the case for Lydia, who had different kind of jobs while growing up, and has worked since she was 15, first for some extra pocket money and after she turned 18, because of the permit requirements. "I had to work during my studies because if you are a student of a college, you are not entitled a permit for study purposes as the university students but a working permit." She is currently self-employed and works in cooperation with a Multinational Corporation as an insurance consultant.

The five respondents with Albanian origins, along with Samir and Peter, pointed out that they were raised "with the mentality by my parents, to make my own money and contribute in the household. As Anuk recollects: "we could find small jobs back then with my friends, to make some pocket money and not burden our families. I also worked while I was studying, most jobs I had were under the counter (without insurance)." Peter and Samir started doing small jobs when they were in middle school, Peter at 12 and Samir at 14. Samir helped out his mother in her shop, and Peter worked for a flower shop at the cemetery. Samir remembers: "I never had an insured job, I was always paid informally and I did many different jobs. Right now I got my first "formal" job. I was hired as an interpreter from IOM (International Organization for Migration) because of the growing refugee crisis." Samir has gained new confidence with his current job, which allows him to live by himself. He is an interpreter for Arabic and foresees there will be jobs for him in the future because of the influx of refugees and migrants. Peter has done many different jobs of manual labour, all uninsured because until recently he was stateless. He admits that when he was 12 his mother had some issues with him working because of his age, but after she saw he could work and go to school she accepted it, because he was also helping out in the household. "I was restless child, I wanted to learn different things." Paul jokes how his permit issues are even part of his CV. He has lost a lot of job opportunities because of his passport, which has caused discomfort at his work places over the years. "With a Greek passport I would have no such problems, I would concern my employer just once getting a visa for 10 years and never again."

Five of the twelve people I interviewed, still live in the same household with their family. From the remaining seven, three live currently abroad with roommates and four have moved out of their family home in Athens. Between the last four, two of them live by themselves and two with roommates. All of the respondents that live with their parents stated that they did not make enough money from their jobs to live by themselves. In the case of the respondents living abroad, John is economically independent and Anuk and George are mainly supported financially by their families to study. In summary, four respondents (Peter, Samir, Ervin and John) are economically independent from their families and live by themselves or with roommates, and the remaining 8 are also financially supported by their families.

Peter and Claire live by themselves with roommates in Athens. On the one hand, Peter considers himself economically independent from his mother since he was a teenager. He even earned more money than his mom at different times and he still helps her out. "Now with the crisis life is weird, it is hard but we have to live, to go on and to try for our best." On the other hand, Claire in not fully financially independent right now- her parents, who live and work in the UK, help her out. Because she was independent for the past several years, it is quite troubling for her that she is again in need of her parents' support at the age of 28. The respondents are also concerned with how the overt xenophobia expressed by segments of the Greek population might impact their work opportunities. Especially with the emergence of the economic crisis, these tendencies became more unobstructed on their everyday interaction in the public sphere and were also distinctly expressed through job ads that were asking "only for Greeks". This, in combination with the unprecedented decline of available employment positions, created even more difficulties for the second generation.

5.3 Identity and citizenship

In order to understand which factors affect their mobilities differently, it is necessary to look at their preformed identities as second generation without Greek citizenship. This includes their perspectives on self-identity, but also how they feel they are perceived in the Greek society, in the countries of origin, or in other countries abroad. The majority of the sample has loose connections with the countries of origins. They feel like strangers in the country of origins and they feel they are seen as foreigners in Greece. They draw a line between society and the state or the governments, and do not feel accepted by the state in contrast to feeling accepted by the society. Most respondents perceive the two biggest gains of citizenship as access to voting rights and more freedom in traveling abroad. In regards to their future plans, most would like to explore their options in Europe, but ideally they want Greece to be their base.

5.3.1 Views on the state

"In Greece it is not acceptable to say I am from Greece just because I grew up in Greece."

The staggering majority of the sample expressed quite negative opinions about the Greek state during the interviews. When they were asked if they feel accepted in Greece, 10 out 12 replied they did not feel accepted, and named the Greek state and the inequalities it perpetuates, as the main reason. There is a big distrust of the state on behalf of the second generation. Moreover, they feel that the state profits from their families' presence in Greece in terms of how much money they spent on their residence permits over the last decades. John: "In the dancing "world" I feel fully accepted, I never experienced any kind of discrimination, let alone I was treated even nicer because of my migrant background. I feel socially accepted in Greece. When it comes to the treatment of the state, I think it could have been better." John calls it "a bitter experience" and he continues: "it is very disappointing when I realize that my parents spent half of their hard earned money to have valid permits, in a country where they spent more than 25 years of their lives." In addition

to the migration policies, different respondents had different negative incidents to mention with a state representative, be it a police officer, a public official at the migration office, or a local government officer. Paul: "Socially I had few to almost none racist incidents towards me, in contrast I was treated numerous times with racism by public administrators." Similarly, Anuk reflects: "I grew up in Greece, this is the place I know and this place has no intention acknowledging me as one of its own. I am talking about the institutions. I am not accepted by the state, of course nobody asks me so far to go but if you interpret all the procedures and policies related to migration you realize there is no intention by the state to consider you equal to Greek citizens." A very important aspect of the social identities of our target group is the way they are confronted in their everyday lives with the question "where are you from". Peter until recently stateless, is the only one that identifies as 'exclusively' Greek: "I am Westerner, not an African, I meet people from Africa and they ask me where I am from and I reply Greece. Greece is all I ever known." Claire considers herself a Greek-Nigerian while George and Samir say they are Greek and their origins are Morocco and Egypt respectively. Vera jokingly mentions that sometimes she pretends to be a tourist in the streets of Athens when people approach her. Vera and Anuk also point out that they do not feel comfortable answering the question with "Greece". "When they ask me where I'm from I say I'm from the Philippines. My identity was shaped this way that I always identified with the Philippines. I cannot bring myself to say that I'm from Greece, like other people do. I don't know why, because I was born and raised here, I speak the language." She continues: "People react with curiosity when I say sometimes I come from Greece, because people are 'stuck' to associate certain features and colour skin with a place. Sometimes I feel closer to the Philippines and sometimes I feel closer to Greece. My cousins in the US identify as Americans and then add the Filipino origin, if they are asked about their background, here I can't imagine myself saying I'm Fillipino-Greek, at least not yet. Maybe I will call my child this way." While Anuk goes even further and says: "..To some extent, for better or for worse you can't consider yourself differently in Greece. I grew up in a country that reminded me constantly that I am not part of this society. So I don't see how I can consider myself differently. This reminder was coming from the institutions but also the society, where you were constantly confronted with the question 'where are you from' that focuses on your origins…But I think there needs to be a freedom of self-determination for my generation."

5.3.2 Self-identity in relation to society from early age until now.

"..in the street someone would shout at me go back to your country."

The sample has Greek as their main language and nobody feels they are incredibly fluent in the language their parents speak. They grew up at least bilingual in households that a fusion of Greek and their parents' languages were spoken. Paul, Peter, Samir, Ervin, George and John even consider Greek their mother tongue in comparison to their parents' languages. The majority of the sample, namely 8 out of 12, felt uncomfortable talking in their parents' language with their parents in public while they were growing up and chose not to do it. That derived from their fear not to perceived as a *xenos* (=foreigner) by strangers. But many admit that even in their familiar environments, they did not disclose their migrant background in their childhood and puberty years out of fear of being seen differently.

The four out of five respondents with Albanian origins were baptized while going to elementary school in Greece, and provided with a Greek-Christian name that would not set them apart, and "make them less foreign". Their parents saw it as another manifestation of how their child belonged in the Greek society. Greek orthodox religion is intrinsically connected with 'Greekness'. All but one of the respondents have somehow reclaimed their original Albanian names, and consider their baptism and Orthodox name an effort to belong that they have grown out of. Lydia was baptized when she was 12 by her middle school teachers and Anuk by the woman that took care of her. Lydia wanted to be baptized in order to participate in the church visits with her school. In the case of John, he used a Greek sounding name similar to his original name even before he was baptised because he did not like the way people mispronounced his Albanian name. He admits that "this haunted me until high school and I knew that if I said my real name they would immediately understand I was foreign, so by using the Greek name maybe I wanted to hide my origins during these young ages."

Experiences away from Greece

Some of the respondents seem to have no tight connections to their respective countries of origin. Some of them haven't been back since they left because they were not able like Claire, or did not want to like Paul, who is wanted in Iran for not fulfilling his army duties, although he was only 3 years old when his family fled the country. "It is ironic I hold their passport, it doesn't express me, they are an Islamic state", Paul doesn't hesitate to add.

Or in the case of Peter, who has never been to either Nigeria or Kenya where his parents come from. He was recently able to travel to France for work though, and he found himself feeling more comfortable being there than in Athens. "It was a cultural shock for me, it was like a crazy dream, after all these hardships I've been through in Greece. Overnight from being stateless, in insecurity, officially marginalized in Greece so many years I end up in France drinking champagnes after work. Everyone thought I was French, I never thought if I have my papers on me when I exited the house, I felt so much freedom in a foreign place. I felt free in a foreign country which is unbelievable. Here I still think every time I go out if of my house to have my permit on me, I never forget it, it is as necessary as the keys of the house." Vera has been to the Philippines on many occasions, she even had to stay there for some months after she finished her studies in the US because she did not have a valid permit to return to Greece anymore. She wouldn't choose to live there long-term though, because she finds the mentality in the country too conservative from what she is used to in Athens. When she talks about how comfortable it felt living in places like the US or Spain Vera's words coincide with Peter's. "There are a lot of people from Asia in California and people that look like me, so I was more comfortable there." Arleta talked also about how studying abroad through the Erasmus program helped her see herself differently in Greece. She is more confident since her return, she feels liberated to be herself because she had the opportunity to travel and have access to different countries which she thinks altered her mentality and "broadened the way I saw myself, my identity." When it comes to respondents that originate from Albania, they show a more close relationship with the country, which can be attributed also to the physical proximity -Greece and Albania are neighbours. Still, back in Albania they are considered Greeks and in Greece Albanians.

All the respondents have pending applications for the Greek citizenship. They are highly sceptical towards the state and their probability of acquiring the Greek citizenship. Given the volatility of migration policies in Greece, they are not at all certain the citizenship law will be implemented in the end. As Ervin points out: "people don't believe it yet." They felt while growing up and most of them keep feeling disenfranchised by the way they were seen by the governments. And until some years ago they never imagined it would ever be possible for them to get the Greek passport.

They have experienced great amounts of stress related to their documents, their parents' documents or their secure presence in Greece. They all share a certain sentiment of saturation when it comes to their current legal status and still feel exposed and uncertain about their presence and rights in the country in the future. It appears to be imperative to them to gain access to equal rights. But, there are also feelings of hope though always mixed with realism. Thus, they are cautious regarding the possibility of the citizenship until they see it actually happening.

Moreover, the anticipation has being building up over the last years, since the emergence of the previous citizenship law back in 2010. Paul and Lydia, who are older, feel that "enough is enough" and they need to get it "by all means". They experience it as a limbo, as being stuck. There is also the issue of the longevity of the law, all of them mentioned a possible change if more conservative political parties came in power. As Anuk says: "I find it very possible that the citizen bill will change, it is proven historically that every government that comes makes some change in the migration policies, it is a way of each government to show its ideological background. I am sure that if the right wing government gets elected they will change such an open citizenship policy."

Arleta is more confident than the others that "this time the law will be fully implemented and I will get the citizenship". While George also thinks at some point the procedures for the citizenship have to work but it might take two or three years more, especially now with the refugee crisis. In the end, he concludes that "you can never know with the Greek state." There is a fatigue that characterizes them, a helplessness in regards to changing their legal

status. After they apply for the citizenship, "it is beyond their power". In addition, there is also the stress because of the crisis. In the possibility of the acquisition they prioritize it in the following three main reasons: Firstly, to be able to vote and have equal rights. Secondly, to be more free to move and travel. And thirdly to stop worrying about, the costs and renewals of the residence permit and their current passport. In Peter's words: "I will be able to live simpler, the way the rest live around me. There are things that everyone takes for granted, this doesn't apply to everyone in our society."

5.3.3 Future plans

With regard to second generation's future plans, all of them have three things in common. Firstly, they have strong emotional bonds with the country, Greece is "their friends, their family, and a familiar environment". Secondly, the economic crisis has impacted everyone. Prospects are not ideal and as their Greek 'native' peers, they aspire to explore their options abroad either for work or further studies. But nobody wants to leave the country indefinitely and the dominant feeling is that Greece is their country and the place they want to return to. Thirdly, all their plans are filtered through the uncertainty of their current legal status and the feeling of being stranded in Greece, in a limbo with little real options.

According to second generation studies, the naturalization of the first generation migrants indicates their successful integration and strong ties with the country. Some of the parents have already the Greek citizenship through the naturalization process, namely Paul's and Claire's' or have applied for it like Arleta's and John's parents. Claire's parents are the only ones that don't live in Greece anymore. Quite interestingly, the above mentioned respondents although they called Greece their home and would ideally have it as a base if it wasn't for the crisis, seem to be also eager to try their luck abroad. Most of the parents want to remain in Greece and the minority, namely three of them will probably return to their countries after they go into pension, according to their children. Marina that now has the citizenship would like to study abroad and return, because Greece "is a country that fed me, brought me up, provided me with everything why abandon it?"

6. Conclusions

The main research question of this study inquires how the mobilities of second generation young adults of migrant background relate to the lack of citizenship. This was answered with the assistance of the 7 sub-questions. To begin with, the Greek citizenship is regulated in relation to second generation through the new citizenship act and its four provisions that has been voted since the summer of 2015, but has not being implemented yet, putting second generation in the same perpetual cycle of residence permits as they were before the introduction of the new law. As this study shows, there is a clear need for structural changes in the ways the Greek state operates towards issues of migration management and the second generation in particular. The policies of deterrence of the past may have improved with a more rational approach of policies of integration but the main problems do not seize to exist. The rational approach that is now part of the spirit of the law has still to be put into practice.

Further, the different mobilities of the second generation are affected in various degrees. With respect to economic mobility, which was approached through educational and training choices, and working opportunities the study finds that the lack of citizenship does not affect access to basic obligatory primary and secondary education. However, when it comes to choices beyond basic education, the absence of the Greek citizenship makes certain types of studies prohibitive. Moreover, when it comes to working choices, various types of professions cannot be legally practiced without the Greek citizenship. That being said, my sample has a distinctive upward mobility in relation to their parents' generation in terms of education and working choices. But the overall economic circumstances of the country renders them still not self-sufficient without the support of their families. Regarding physical mobility, second generation has more freedom to move outside of Greece and within the EU in comparison to their parents but has restricted mobility in comparison to their Greek 'native' peers that hold Greek passports. In the area of socio-political mobility, the respondents still do not have any kind of voting rights either on local, regional or national level; in addition to this, they do not have access to activities involving the exercise of public authority. These result in their political and social marginalization and makes them practically second class citizens. Lastly, their plans for the future are firmly connected with

the acquisition of citizenship, but also with the socio-economic developments that will take place in Greece. Growing up in Greece, second generation was socialized with the same mentality as their Greek 'native' peers that has created feelings of entitlement to the same rights. They do not accept not having equal rights while they have more obligations than their 'native' peers. For second generation access to the Greek citizenship means having an EU citizenship. That means having the ability to decide and do as the rest of the society they feel part of.

7. Discussion

A study of this size has certain limitations in terms of reliability. The sample of this study has well defined limits despite being quite representative of the composition of second generation population and big enough to provide well-grounded insights in an array of realities of the second generation in Greece right now. It can also serve as a reminder of what repercussions unequal access to citizenship might create to social groups. It is also a relatively 'young' second generation in respect to other European second generations. The main limitation of this research is that it fails to address other factors that affect the mobilities of second generation. That is because it is centred on the absence of citizenship, which is now the most crucial factor in the Greek context. With this approach the data that were gathered are successfully showcasing one way mobilities can be impacted, but there are also more ways. Second generation studies within the broader migration studies field are a field that does not seize to develop and change following the ongoing migration trends around the globe. That is also the case on the different types of mobilites. Moreover, further research on second generation in Greece has to be undertaken, because there is a clear research gap in the topic. This qualitative approach can serve as a small introduction into the current affairs around second generation in Greece. Hopefully, it will also engage more researchers to get acquainted with such issues and study them further. The three different types of mobility that are used in this study provide a comprehensive image of the struggles second generation without citizenship is confronted with. At the same time, the background data on their 'native' peers provide some insights in the opportunities they would potentially have with a citizenship. It is important though to take into account how all aspects of social and economic life get nuanced by the economic crisis. Finally, issues of citizenship and integration are quite relevant globally and they will continue to be as long as people keep migrating. The findings of the study are highly relevant in the regional context of Southern Europe and across the broader EU context, where second generation with access to citizenship has being conceptualized with identities such as unintegrated, prone to terrorism and 'non-European' over the last years. The status of the second generation in other EU member states has been highly contested and hyper politicized by employing this kind of identities as a justification. And this study stands as an alternative example to give

some different perspectives on further policy improvements that will enable instead of inhibit the prosperity of the second generation.

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