

Just Saints

***Iustitia* in the hagiographical works of Gregory of Tours &
Gregory the Great**

Bouke Sonnega
5718856

Supervised by Prof. Dr. Els Rose.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction.....	4
1.1 Introduction: of words, minds and eyes.....	4
1.2 The question and the outline.....	6
1.3 Chasing words, chasing virtue: an introduction.....	7
1.4 Merovingian hagiography & virtue.....	11
1.5 A first look at the sources: the authors and their work.....	17
2. Iustitia - A Theoretical Framework.....	22
2.1 Iustitia and the classical tradition: the roots of a virtue.....	22
2.2 Iustitia and early medieval intellectual culture - change and continuity.....	25
2.3 Sainthood and iustitia in the sixth century.....	29
2.4 The methodology: how to look for iustitia, how to interpret iustitia.....	32
2.5 On meaning, intention and time.....	36
2.5.2 What is a virtue? A possible answer.....	37
3. Gregory of Tours.....	40
3.1 An introduction to the source material.....	40
3.2 A short biography of Gegory of Tours and his world.....	42
3.3 Gregory of Tours: an analysis.....	46
3.3.1 Abraham the Abbot.....	47
3.3.2 The bishop Nicetius.....	53
3.4 A short conclusion.....	58
4. Gregory the Great.....	61
4.1 Gregory the Great: an introduction to the source material.....	61
4.1.2 The four books of the Dialogi.....	62
4.1.3 Speakers and listeners: the meaning of the dialogue.....	65
4.2 Gregory the Great: a short biography with focus on education.....	68
4.3 The Dialogues: an analysis.....	71
4.3.1 Iustitia, iustus and iniustus: justice, the just and the unjust.....	74
4.3.2 Book I: Inside and outside: Just, but not justice.....	74
4.3.3 Book II: The life of Benedict.....	79
4.3.4 Book IV: Iustitia, iustus, iniustus - the virtue, the just and the unjust.....	81
4.4 A short conclusion.....	85
5. Conclusion.....	88
5. Conclusion.....	88
6. Bibliography.....	92
6.1. Primary Sources.....	92
6.2. Secondary Literature.....	93

Appendices.....	98
Appendix I: Gregory of Tours.....	98
Appendix II: Gregory the Great.....	111

1. Introduction

1.1 Of words, minds and eyes.

“The past is a foreign country, they do things differently there”¹. This famous opening line from L.P. Hartley’s *The Go Between* is bordering on cliché, but as is the case with most clichés, there is truth contained within. This specific truth is especially relevant when speaking of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages. Generations of students, scholars and other interested people have been attracted to the ‘strangeness’ of these time periods.² In modern times, the *otherness* of these periods are still one of their greatest draws. Through all the written sources that remain to us, be they letters, capitularies, hagiographies or otherwise, we can catch glimpses of a world that is strange but recognizable, *other* yet familiar. We discern, roughly, the beginning of the contours that will later make up the cultural history of modern Europe. We see a familiar continent with familiar mountains, rivers and even cities inhabited by people who, for lack of a better word, think differently. People who lived in a society that is nothing like the one we know, communities where public life, duty and death flowed into each-other. But at the same time, glimpses of the world are not altogether alien - there are people there, but they do things differently.

This thesis at its core is an attempt to understand part of this ‘otherness’, the strangeness of the late antique and early medieval world. Specifically, it is an investigation into the mind of two writers that lived and worked at the turn of the sixth and seventh century: Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great. Two men who, apart from their first name, might at first glance appear to have little in common. One a politically engaged member of the clergy, a writer of history and hagiography - the other a bishop of Rome whose writing and thought influenced Christian thought throughout the entire Middle Ages. I would argue, however, that their writing is worthy of a comparative study - and I will explain why in the last subchapter of this introduction.³

¹ L.P. Hartly, *The Go Between*, (London 1953).

² This point is still prominent in the works of many historians. Janet L. Nelson begins her new biography on Charlemagne with emphasizing exactly this ‘strangeness’, see *King and Emperor* (London, 2019). Also, somewhat older but still very relevant especially to this thesis is the inaugural lecture of Peter Brown, see ‘Learning and Imagination’ in Peter Brown, *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity* (London, 1982).

³ See chapter 1.5.

This is a study into a single saintly virtue: *iustitia*, and how it appears in the hagiographical works of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great. A word that can be translated as ‘justice’, but in fact hides a spectrum of meaning and ideas within itself. Both authors use the word throughout all of their work - but the present study focusses on hagiography. I will analyze how the word appears in the hagiographical works written by these two authors. In what frequencies, and in what contexts, does *iustitia* and its derived forms appear, and what does that tell us about the ideas on sainthood of the authors?⁴ How do they use the term and what can we, by studying the use of this one virtue, learn about the imagination, the minds and the thought-world of these two early medieval writers?

The full extent of this question, the historiographical tradition in which it sits and the corpus of sources I intend to use will be explained in the upcoming paragraphs of this introduction - the first chapter of this thesis. In the second chapter, I will give a brief overview of the history of the term *iustitia*, tracing the word back to its antique roots up to its place in early medieval intellectual context. Also in the second chapter, I will set out the methodology, and argue how this method can be used to analyze the texts in the corpus, and what the results tell us about *iustitia* in the texts and minds of our two authors. In the third and fourth chapter of this thesis, the sources take center stage. Starting with Gregory of Tours, I will explore how he used the *iustitia* in his hagiographical works, and how we can read the term as written down by him. In the chapter that follows, the work of Gregory the Great will undergo the same treatment. In doing so, I will be able to enlighten just a part of the shadowy and mysterious world that is the realm of early medieval thought.

The ultimate aim of this thesis is not to explain a physical historical process. It is not about following these two ‘great men’ through their lives from event to event, although their biographies and backgrounds will be an important part of this investigation. It is not about using the sources to explain or investigate political or social issues of the day. Instead, it is about using a portion of the writings of these two men in an attempt to enter their thought-world. The aim is writing an intellectual history on a very small scale - a microhistory of ideas. Through an intensive study of the use of just one term - *iustitia* - and its use in the hagiographical works of the two Gregories, we will catch a glimpse of how they saw, ordered and judged the world around them, and how they used a word far older than them to do so.

⁴ In this thesis, the main sources are the hagiographical works of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great. A more precise explanation and a list of works follows later in this introduction.

1.2 The question & the outline

An investigation must always begin with a question. In this paragraph, I will explain the main question and further outline the structure of this thesis. The main question of this thesis can be formulated as follows:

How do Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great use the term 'iustitia' in their hagiographical works, and what does that tell us about their ideas on the meaning of this virtue?

This question deserves further explanation, in a structural, historiographical and methodological sense. In this section I will focus on the structural part of this explanation, explaining how this thesis is structured and how I intend to answer this question.

The first subquestion that needs answering is about *iustitia* and the historical background of this term. How did this word end up in the works of these two authors? What is the history of its meaning, and how can we interpret this word within the context of the thought world of the two Gregories? The entire second chapter is dedicated to this question. We will see how the term was used in classical antiquity, and how it remained relevant in the centuries that followed, albeit in a different and changing way. We will see how the term appeared in the education of the two men who would eventually become the authors of the works that are central to this study. Furthermore, the second chapter will address the problems one has to solve when attempting to 'chase the changing meaning of a word'. Here, I will explain exactly how I aim to study the use of *iustitia*, what methodologies I will use, and how these methods can eventually allow us to interpret something meaningful on the early medieval thought world.

Then, we turn to works of the two authors for the second and third question - which are essentially the same, only applied to different authors: how did *iustitia* appear in the hagiographical writings of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great, respectively? Chapters three and four will answer this question - one author at a time. These chapters will follow the same basic structure. First, we will explore the background and education of each author. This is important from an historiographical standpoint - to try and understand them in light of recent scholarship - but it also tells us how they might have come into contact with virtues such as *iustitia*, and how their education was important in their understanding of the term. In the second part of these chapters, we will zoom in

on some fragments in which the term *iustitia* (or some derived form) is used. Using extensive quotations and detailed analysis, it will allow to see how the word *iustitia* was used by our authors - and what (if!) patterns emerge in their usage of this word. These chapters will each end in a short conclusion, which will summarize the findings.

Finally, there is the conclusion, in which the main question will be answered. There, I will explain what we have learned and how the findings might give us some more insight in the intellectual and spiritual world of the early Middle Ages.

But - first things first. The rest of this introduction will be dedicated to exploring the historiographical tradition in which this investigation finds itself - followed by an explanation of the choice of the source material. The remainder of this introduction will be spent presenting the *raison d'être* of this thesis - explaining why it is a relevant investigation in the current academic climate, and explaining and clarifying why this hagiographical corpus is interesting terrain for a study such as this one. In addition to this, our two authors will get some introduction, and I will explain why their works are relevant.

1.3 Chasing words, chasing virtue: an introduction

This thesis aims to understand the meaning of one word in the mind of two authors. This means not only analyzing their texts and their output, but also their education and their intellectual world. How did *iustitia* come to live in the minds of our two authors - and what history is attached to this word? To understand how our early medieval men interpreted, worked with and used a word that was much older than they were, we must understand the history of the ideas attached to that word. In this paragraph, I will give an overview of recent scholarship interested in similar questions. The exact details and background of my methodology will be explained in chapter two.

On the one hand, I am indebted to the methodologies and insights from the field of historical semantics and *Begriffsgeschichte*, fields that are concerned with analyzing the change of meaning of words and concepts, and how a changing understanding of a concept is both a mirror of the society in which it is used and an agent of historical change⁵. This is a field that has seen much development

⁵ The field of *begriffsgeschichte* was pioneered by Reinhart Koselleck, and has seen many inventions since. See, for an introduction in English in cooperation with Koselleck: Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction* (New York, 1995), in particular the chapter 'Charting the History of

since its inception by Richard Koselleck in the 1970's. Where originally the field was primarily concerned with more modern political history and social theory, analyzing the use and changing meaning of words and terms as agents of political and social change, methodologies associated with these schools of scholarship have found their way into the early Middle Ages, where they allow for a deeper understanding of medieval thought.

These fields analyzing the changing meaning, use and power of concepts are greatly influential to this thesis. I want to interpret a term, a virtue, in an attempt to understand the thoughts and intellectual world of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great, and how they expressed these ideas in their hagiographical works. By studying the appearance of this one word - *iustitia* - I will study how ancient ideas are used in a changed religious, cultural and political environment, how a word is re-conceptualized in a different intellectual context. This investigation, too, makes a distinction between the word (*iustitia*) and the meaning attached to it. There is a difference between *iustitia* as it appears on paper, and the virtue that it signals. By looking for the word *iustitia*, I will examine the meaning of the word - understanding the virtue and concept that lies behind it. This overlaps with the aims of historical semantics and *begriffsgeschichte*.⁶ In recent years, this methodologies for chasing meaning by analyzing occurrence and context of words and terms in historical texts has seen some recent and interesting development. In chapter two, I will return to the exact methodologies in this field which I will also use in my thesis. For now, it is important to take note of the aim of this field, and how it has impacted and influenced thinking about the past.

Silke Schwandt recently published a study that, in a way, is closely related to the present one. In 'Virtus as a Political Concept in the Middle Ages' she traces the change of meaning (which she inventively calls the "semantic career") of the word 'virtus' in four different medieval text over the course of the middle ages.⁷ Using this specific methodology and focus, she was able to trace this 'semantic career' through time and geography, and in that way show the 'strength of medieval conceptualizations. They encompass many meanings in one term and therefore have this term maintaining its ambiguity'.⁸ The goal of this thesis is similar - although smaller in scope. Where Schwandt traced the word *virtus* and its career over the course of many hundreds of years, the focus in this thesis will remain on

Political and Social Concepts', 9 - 25.

⁶ Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction*, 9 - 10.

⁷ See Silke Schwandt, 'Virtus as a Political Concept in the Middle Ages', *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, 10.2 (2015), 71.

⁸ Schwandt, 'Virtus as a Political Concept in the Middle Ages', 89.

a subset of output from two authors who operated in a single time: the late sixth and early seventh century.

Another example is Els Rose, who in a recent article used a similar methodology - a methodology aimed on understanding and examining the meaning of a word by examining its use in a body of writing - to examine a broader theme: the influence of Christianity on the formation of civic identity in late antiquity and the early middle ages.⁹ Specifically, she traces terms originating in a context of Roman law and pertaining to a legal idea of ‘citizenship’ and notes the changing meaning of these terms in the context of Christian thought on community and what it meant to be a citizen.¹⁰ In her own words she looks for “traces of a prolonged and at the same time transformative use of vocabulary expressing and re-creating a discourse of citizenship and belonging to the civic community¹¹ [...]”. I quote this sentence in full, because it is very closely aligned with my own aims and ambitions in the present thesis. Here, too, I aim to trace the changing meaning of an idea, *iustitia*, that has its roots in antiquity. And here, too, we look at the vocabulary of two writers in an attempt to understand how this virtue is given substance and meaning within a Christian context - a context which by definition has to do with community and normativity. While my thesis has little (but not nothing!) to do with *civitas* in a legal way, the idea of a Christian community that shared convictions (or at least: ought to share these convictions) about what was good and what was not is present in every sentence.¹²

My thesis operates within this corner of historical investigations. As I said - it is the chase of a word and the changing ideas attached to this word that are central. It is about the meaning of a word, and how this meaning changed by social, intellectual and political circumstances, and in turn was influential on these very circumstances in which it was used. To use the words of Silke Schwandt: I aim to test the strength and examine the (re)conceptualization of the virtue *iustitia*. The scope of my thesis is smaller - the use of a single virtue in a small corpus - but the ideas on virtuousness that come through the use of this word are nevertheless part of a long tradition of change and adaptation. The sixth and seventh century and the size of the corpus before us do not allow us to speak of a *discourse* in the sense that it was meant by Koselleck and the pioneers of *begriffsgeschichte* - but it does allow for something of an intellectual micro-history - tracing a big idea to two

⁹ See Els Rose, ‘Reconfiguring Civic Identity and Civic Participation in a Christianizing World: The Case of Sixth-Century Arles’, in *Civic Identity and Civic Participation in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*, ed. by Els Rose and Brélaz Cédric, Cultural Encounters in Late Antiquity and The Middle Ages, Forthcoming, 2

¹⁰ Rose, ‘Reconfiguring Civic Identity’, 2.

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² The didactic nature of hagiography, along with its audience, will be further discussed in the next chapter.

medieval minds.

However, this is only part of the tradition in which this thesis stands - for it also is concerned with the intellectual history of the sixth and seventh century. It stands in a broader tradition of historiography concerned with the perseverance, continuity and change of pre-Christian ideas in the Middle Ages.

In a broad sense, the continuity and change in thinking about virtue was the topic of the dissertation of Jasmijn Bovendeert.¹³ Her dissertation undertakes the rather gigantic task of examining the evolution of thought about the four cardinal virtues (*iustitia, prudentia, fortitudo* and *temperantia*) from 500 to 1000. She focusses mainly on Bible commentaries from authors as diverse and removed in time as Augustine, Gregory the Great and Alcuin - it is an impressive and ambitious project. Gregory the Great is one of her main subjects, and she has interesting things to say on his many (and highly influential) Bible commentaries.¹⁴ It is important to note that the study of virtue and changing virtue in itself is not new - although the methodologies and the source material used are rather different. As mentioned, Bovendeert focusses on the more moralizing texts, and her scope is enormous - here, the focus lies on only one subsection of texts by two authors, and on one virtue within them.

The continuity and change of thinking about the virtues was also part of Matthew Kempshall's *Rhetoric and the Writing of History*. In this work on the connection between classical rhetoric and medieval history-writing, Kempshall has investigated and signalled the perseverance (one could argue he proved the 'strength of conceptualization') of ideas and virtues used by 'classical' Roman authors in the early Middle Ages.¹⁵ He has examined ideas of virtuousness, of 'good' versus 'evil' present in works of authors who wrote extensively about rhetoric like Cicero and Quintilianus, authors who were still of paramount importance in the education of the elite of the early Middle Ages. Especially in the first chapter of his study, he convincingly shows a connection through time, a line that passes through the works of Cicero and Quintilianus, but also through writers of history like Sallust and early Christian authors such as Augustine and Orosius. This might seem like a rather eclectic list of authors, but by casting a wide net he convincingly shows a continuity - if not in exact meaning, then in the durability of

¹³ Jasmijn Bovendeert, *Kardinale deugden gekerstend: de vier kardinale deugden vanaf Ambrosius tot het jaar 1000* (Nijmegen, 2007).

¹⁴ *ibid* 147 - 162

¹⁵ See especially the second chapter of Matthew Kempshall, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History, 400 - 1500, Historical Approaches*, (Manchester, 2012), 121 - 260.

the words themselves.¹⁶ Both Gregory the Great and Gregory of Tours were part of a schooled elite, an elite that received an education that in all probability confronted them with these classical and early Christian authors - if only in an abbreviated or 'edited' form.¹⁷ Both men followed an education which was exceptional (in the sense that it was only open to a few) and, in ways, similar. There is of course more to be said of our authors, and we will return to their works later in this introduction. In the chapters dedicated to them, we then will be ample room for discussion of their backgrounds and earlier interpretations of the place of virtue, and particularly *iustitia* in their works.

For now, this paragraph has shown both the context of this thesis and, I think, proved that this thesis can form a worthy addition to the study of virtue and thought in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages. For the research into 'virtue' or 'virtues' and their development has a rich tradition - but this tradition tends to treat 'the virtues' as one, and studies their change through time as if they are inseparable - which, in a certain sense, they are. In this thesis however, by focussing on one virtue, two authors and a corpus that has not been associated with virtue and moral thought, I aim to shed light on something of a microcosm of thinking about virtue - by seeing how two authors came across, interpreted and worked with one of them: *iustitia*. The focus on two minds will not only allow us to understand these individuals better, but will also teach us about the development of an idea, and the changing meaning of a word.

1.4 Merovingian hagiography & virtue

The hagiographical works of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great are the main corpus of sources in this investigation. Before we dive into the background of these works and the men who wrote them, I want to take some time to discuss the background of the genre and the historiographical interest it has seen in the past decades - especially when it comes to the research into the history of ideas.

But first - a definition. What exactly is 'hagiography'? The most inclusive definition would be "all material with saints as a subject".¹⁸ This definition comes from Anneke Mulder-Bakker, who argues that "hagiography is not a genre but a

¹⁶ The first section of the book by Matthew Kempshall explores this question in more detail: Kempshall, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History*, 124.

¹⁷ Editing and shortening ancient texts was common practice. See, among others, Kempshall, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History*, 124.

¹⁸ See Anneke B. Mulder Bakker, 'The Invention of Saintliness, texts and contexts' in Anneke B. Mulder Bakker (ed) *The Invention of Saintliness*, Routledge Studies in Medieval Religion and Culture (London 2002), 18

discourse”.¹⁹ All material (perhaps even non-written sources and oral traditions) concerned with communicating sainthood fall in this category if we take this definition as leading. Anna Taylor makes a similar argument, noting that ‘hagiography’ - the concept - is in fact not a medieval category or genre but, like so much of our academic vocabulary, an idea stemming from the nineteenth century.²⁰ In medieval reality, she argues, ‘hagiography’ was not a recognized category, and if we historians want to work with these sources we must take note of that fact, and treat them in a broader context than just ‘stories about saints’. She shows that historians working in the past thirty years have tried (and succeeded) to treat this category of sources with this broader scope in mind - with interesting results.²¹ This fits exactly in the approach this thesis takes, treating these stories about saints as a mirror of thinking about virtue in a broader context.

This thesis is concerned with a certain type of hagiography - the saint’s lives, the *vitae*. These are a genre of writing that concerns itself with saints and sainthood. This can be read in the broadest possible way - it is a genre that concerns itself with communicating the saintliness of the main subjects. This can be done in many ways, from the rather mundane (being pious and leading a humble life) to the exceptionally spectacular - with saints performing miracles and doing deeds that would not look out of place in modern action movies. This does not take away from the main goal of the genre: communicating the saintliness of the main subject, and arguing why he or she is worthy of veneration and how his or her life was an example to all.²²

This leads to a fairly simple definition, a definition also put forward by James Palmer in his recent overview and examination of hagiography as a genre, which he in a broad sense defined as “biographical and historical stories about saints”.²³ In the introduction to this work, Palmer goes into some detail about how these hagiographical works can be used as historical sources - arguing their importance when studying early medieval cultural history in the broadest sense. He notices, and this is extremely important for this thesis, the fact that early medieval historiography as written in Latin Europe was relatively homogeneous - it followed similar rules whether produced in Rome or Francia.²⁴ If compared to the political ‘newness’ and instability of a lot of the kingdoms in the Latin West, the

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ Anna Taylor, ‘Hagiography and Early Medieval History’, *Religion Compass*, 7.1 (2013), 1–14, 2

²¹ Taylor, ‘Hagiography and Early Medieval History’, 13 - 14.

²² For an extensive investigation on the position of hagiography in medieval society and its many functions see Jamie Kreiner, *The Social Life of Hagiography in the Merovingian Kingdom* (Cambridge 2014)

²³ see James T. Palmer, *Early Medieval Hagiography* (ARC, Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 2 - 3.

²⁴ Palmer, *Early Medieval Hagiography* (Amsterdam, 2018), 4.

homogeneity shown in hagiographical writing is at least remarkable, and points to shared ideas of saintliness and saintly virtue. Hagiography provides us with a “spyhole”, because it involves similar ideas and literary structures articulated in response to different political, social, cultural and religious circumstances”.²⁵

In the Latin West, hagiography can, with some charitable reading, be seen as a remarkably homogeneous group of sources that was nonetheless produced in circumstances that differed quite a bit in social, political and religious ways. The micro-Christendoms, as Peter Brown named them some years ago, knew remarkable amounts of local variety - variety in beliefs and religious rituals but also in the saints a community venerated.²⁶ Early medieval (western) Christendom left room for local variety and this definitely extended to the veneration of saints. Aside from a canon of ‘big names’ of martyrs and church fathers, there was ample room for the veneration of local saints - whose literary portrayal in hagiography nevertheless broadly followed the same rules in different parts of the West.

Let us now zoom in on virtue and hagiography - how can we examine ideas about living well through hagiography? The answer, of course, seems obvious: portraits of the lives of saints, specifically tailored to convincing the reader *why* the subject is worthy of veneration and a saintly status, spend a lot of their time telling about saintly and virtuous deeds - about doing good, and being a good Christian. This answer is true, but it deserves some more explanation. As Palmer notes and as we will see in the following chapters, hagiography concerns itself with an entire spectrum of themes: how to deal with marriage and sex, how to spend your wealth, and how to act when you come across someone in need.²⁷ Interestingly, the stories from the sixth and early seventh century - to bring the discussion the century that is the main focus here - took place on a different stage than the stories about martyrs who, as lone communicators of the faith against a large and overwhelming power, often paid of for their faithfulness with their lives.²⁸ In the sixth century, saints come from power themselves - part of powerful families, whether clerical or secular, and hagiography could even be used to cement the political power of certain political factions.²⁹ Hagiography in the sixth century was footed in society, communicating ideas, values and ideas about sainthood that

²⁵ Palmer, *Early Medieval Hagiography*, 3.

²⁶ See Peter Brown, *The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, A.D. 200-1000*, The Making of Europe, 10th anniversary ed (Chichester, 2013), 13 - 14.

²⁷ Palmer, *Early Medieval Hagiography*, 6.

²⁸ For an introduction to martyrs and their early medieval hagiography see the introduction to *Soldiers of Christ: Saints and Saints Lives from Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*, ed. by Thomas F. X. Noble and Thomas Head (Pennsylvania 1995).

²⁹ I explored the use of hagiography in establishing merovingian queenship in my own BA Thesis, Bouke Sonnega, ‘De Factie van God’ (BA Thesis Utrecht University, 2018).

resonated with their respective audiences.

There is one specific point I want to point out about reading hagiography - a point which can be summarized in a wonderful sentence from J.K. Kitchen: “Sin was as real to Gregory [of Tours] as dysentery”.³⁰ To us modern readers, concepts like sin, virtue, but also miraculous healings and illness, can seem somewhat contrived - obvious fabrications of the imagination used to prove a point. However, when we read these miracle stories and biographies, we must not question the reality of the events described. Of course, it is likely that rhetorical liberties were taken to prove a point, but these events were always within the realm of possibility - these were events that people actually held to be plausible. We must accept that “something about these stories must have been compelling - and it is up to us [modern historians] to find out what that was.”³¹ In chapters three and four we will explore this issue further in the specific context of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great, but regardless of author it is important not to be dismissive of these accounts of miracles.

Let us now examine whether or not there is a difference between ‘saintly virtue’ and ‘classical virtue’. As we have seen, the virtue of *iustitia* can be called ‘classical’ - it was part of an ethical system that existed long before Christianity came into view.³² So - what were these saintly virtues, virtues associated with sainthood? First of all, there is no set of virtues than can be seen as ‘exclusively saintly’. There is no checklist, so to speak, that had to be fulfilled before one reached sainthood. There are however, certain patterns that stood out. As said in the previous paragraph, the meaning of the virtue attached to the word signalling it, was not static. It changed with time. The ascetic virtues of the lonely holy man who positioned himself outside of Late Antique society as a hermit differed quite a bit from the virtues shown by the noblemen and queens who were very much part of the structure of power in sixth and seventh century Francia.³³ In the sixth (and seventh, for that matter) century, then, there is no formal definition of a saint - no centralized institution that has to ‘approve’ them, and there is no set-in-stone canon in which saints should fit.

These social aspects of hagiography - ‘social’ meaning the broadest possible

³⁰ J.K Kitchen, ‘Gregory of Tours, Hagiography and the Cult of Saints in the Sixth Century’, in *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition (Leiden., 2016), pp. 375–425. 376

³¹ Kitchen, ‘Gregory of Tours, Hagiography and the Cult of Saints’, 378.

³² The travel of *iustitia* through the ages is the subject of chapters 2.1 and 2.2. See also Kempshall, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History, 400 - 1500*.

³³ The late antique holy man has of course been wonderfully described by Peter Brown in Brown, *Holy man, Invention of Saintliness*,

context of society, politics, religious and other cultural aspects - are the main focus of an extensive study from Jamie Kreiner.³⁴ In her work, she examines and shows how hagiography functioned in the Merovingian kingdoms. She remarks on the persuasive nature of hagiography - and especially the fact that the saints' lives must have been taken seriously in order to be persuasive.³⁵ In other words - while the narratives about saints need not to be 'true' or a retelling of events 'as they happened' in the sense nineteenth-century historians would have liked, they did need to fit within a certain framework that made them plausible. From this follows that ideas about virtue and virtuous behaviour presented in hagiography must also have fitted in a framework of ideas which were recognizable as 'good'.

This leaves us at an interesting question which must be addressed - what makes a saint? It is interesting for us to start with a more modern definition, as noticed by Anneke B. Mulder Bakker. In the canon law of 1917, as quoted by Anneke B. Mulder-Bakker, something of a definition comes through in the text:

Canon 2104: In causis confessorum discuti debet dubium: an constet de virtutibus theologalibus Fide, Spe, Caritate tum in Deum tum in proximum, necnon de cardinalibus [virtutibus] Prudentia, **Iustitia**, Temperantia, Fortitudine, earumque adnexis in gradu heroico in casu et ad effectum de quo agitur;

in causis vero martyrum: an constet de martyrio eiusque causa et de signis seu miraculis in casu et ad effectum de quo agitur.

Canon 2116: Praeter virtutum heroicam aut martyrium, ad beatificationem Servi Dei requiruntur miracula eius intercessione patrata.³⁶

Canon 2104: In [canonization] procedures of confessors the question to be discussed is whether the Servant of God possessed, to a heroic degree, the theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and Love of God and neighbor, as well as the cardinal virtues, Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Fortitude, and related virtues, and whether this is certain enough to permit proceedings towards beatification. However, in the case of the canonization of a martyr, the question is whether his martyrdom is absolutely certain and whether it is known for sure that signs or miracles occurred, and whether all this is certain enough to permit proceedings towards beatification.

³⁴ Jamie Kreiner, *The Social Life of Hagiography in the Merovingian Kingdom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014)

³⁵ Kreiner, *The Social Life of Hagiography* 2 - 5.

³⁶ Canon law of 1917, 2104 as quoted and translated by Mulder-Bakker, see *The Invention of Saintliness*, 2. Emphasis on *iustitia* is mine.

Canon 2116: In addition to a heroic degree of virtue or martyrdom, another requirement for the beatification of a Servant of God is that miracles have been performed through his intercession.³⁷

Mulder - Bakker argues rightly that through this text a definition comes to us: a saint is a deceased person who once excelled in virtue.³⁸ Interestingly for this investigation is that, after the theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity (*Fides*, *Spes* and *Caritas*), the four cardinal virtues, including our *iustitia* are prerequisites for entering the process of beatification in the twentieth century. The most important prerequisite being, of course, that the person in question did not show these virtues some of the time, but all of the time, *in gradu heroico* - to a heroic degree.

In the Middle Ages - and especially in the early Middle Ages - these formal lists of 'prerequisites' must be set aside completely. Not that the virtues mentioned are not important, but the notion of a formal canon which one can enter after a thorough process is misleading at best and an anachronistic mirage at worst if projected on the early Middle Ages. This is not to say that virtue was not important - on the contrary. The saint as an imitator of Christ is broadly recognized as a defining characteristic of Saint's lives - Mulder-Bakker names 'the saint as an idol' as one of the four defining categories of sainthood in the Middle Ages.³⁹ This is a definition that feels like an open door (and in some ways it is) but it is an important aspect of the message these *vitae* want to communicate. What exactly these virtues were is more nuanced - sainthood could be associated with a spectrum of virtue, a spectrum that both included the four cardinal virtues and the three 'theological' virtues mentioned above. The accents could (and did) differ wildly, depending on the background of the subject and the story the author of a *vita* wanted to tell. An ascetic saint who renounced the wealth of his parents showed different qualities from the warrior-monk who went on a mission to convert 'pagans'. It is important that we do not let the nineteenth-century definition of sainthood as mentioned above cloud our judgement and interpretation of early medieval saints. The cardinal virtues, *prudentia*, *iustitia*, *temperantia* and *fortitudo* were important in the lives of all saints, but the accent could change. In the next chapter (2.2), I will further examine *iustitia* in connection to sainthood.

In these paragraphs, I have argued for both the relevance and originality of this thesis. The search for (the roots of) virtue in early medieval writing in itself is not

³⁷ *ibid*, trans Mulder-Bakker.

³⁸ Mulder-Bakker, see *The Invention of Saintliness*, 3.

³⁹ *ibid*, 9 -11, on the four 'categories' or 'uses'. I do not subscribe to this position of 'four categories' wholeheartedly, but I do think the 'saint as an idol' is a useful frame.

new - but looking for it in hagiography (and specifically in *vitae*) is. The study of hagiography is on the rise. The lamentation of Mulder-Bakker in 2002 that “the message seems to be that ‘true’ medievalists do not concern themselves with hagiography [...] little to no thought is given to the place of hagiography”⁴⁰ is no longer true - or at least historians are working hard on correcting this problem. One only has to look at the recent dates of some (most!) of the works cited in this paragraph to realize that the study of hagiography is hot. This study, trying to understand and analyze *iustitia* in hagiographical work, is part of this interest in hagiography. Where better to analyze the history of a concept than in a genre of work that was aimed at a wider audience, that was meant to convince an audience of someone’s sainthood? As we have seen in the previous paragraph, the study of semantics can be very enlightening when studying ideas about virtue. Applying this methodology and zooming in on a small corpus and two authors can, I think, lead to exciting insights when we are trying to understand thinking about virtue on a personal level - when trying to understand how Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great viewed and ordered the world around them. This paragraph, in addition, has shown that hagiography is particularly helpful when studying ideas about virtue, since communicating saintliness - virtue - is by definition how they operate. Hagiographical texts can be a treasure trove of ideas about good and evil ideas that, taking into account the ‘popular’ character of their audience as opposed to the more schooled background of certain Bible commentaries, can teach us a lot about the thought-world of certain communities. It is all the more interesting that hagiography has not yet often been used in investigations such as these.

1.5 A first look at the sources: the authors and their work

Why is it interesting to compare - or at least look at the works of these two authors in tandem? This paragraph briefly explores the historiography about the hagiography of both Gregory the Great and Gregory of Tours, and why it is interesting to compare one with the other.

Let us focus first on Gregory of Tours. There will be more room for a sketch of his biography in the chapter dedicated to him - let us for now focus on the nature and previous study of his hagiographical works.⁴¹ This immediately presents

⁴⁰ *ibid*, 5.

⁴¹ A distinction based on Alexander C. Murray (ed.), *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, (Leiden 2016), 599. The titles are: *Liber Vitae Patrum*, *Liber de passione et virtutibus Iuliani*, *Liber de virtutibus Martini*, *Liber in gloria martyrum*, *Liber de miraculis Andreae apostoli* and *Liber in gloria confessorum*.

us with an interesting problem. The difference between the historiographical *Histories* and his 'hagiographical works' may seem clear to the modern reader - but the line between the two is a lot less sharply defined than the two categories imply.⁴² We have touched on this point in the previous paragraph, that 'hagiography' is not a medieval category, and this counts doubly for the work of Gregory of Tours. In terms of style and perspective, the difference between the two is not clear-cut, and the distinction is made solely on the subject matter; a description of the political happenings of his time on the one side, and an exposition of sainthood and biographies on the other. In all his works, Gregory's own voice echoes through the pages. Whether he connects the saint in question to his own heritage, gives his own view on political proceedings or quotes entire speeches he may or may not have given in reality, in both the *Histories* and his hagiographical works, Gregory is not an absent narrator.⁴³ In this thesis, I do regard Gregory's hagiography as different from his other writings, specifically the *Histories*. This distinction is made on the subject matter, a distinction also used and accepted in recent scholarship.⁴⁴ However, and this will be discussed further in chapter two, it is important to note that the line between 'hagiography' and 'not hagiography' might be more blurred in the eyes of the early medieval reader - let alone for Gregory of Tours himself. As Kitchen argues: Gregory's *Histories* and his hagiography are connected. His hagiography connected the next world to the one he described in his *Histories* - and both words were equally 'real'.⁴⁵

As we can see in the footnote below the amount of miracle stories written by Gregory of Tours is quite extensive. This was by no means 'normal' - the output of Gregory of Tours amounts to an exceptional body of work if judged by sheer volume.⁴⁶ The production of all these works was an enormous task, especially if we take seriously all Gregory's mentions of travels to shrines he undertook, and witnesses he interviewed.⁴⁷ The saints of whom Gregory wrote appear to be quite diverse - they are men (and sometimes women) of many talents - they fed the hungry, returned stolen sheep, cured people of the most terrible afflictions. In the previous paragraph, we already briefly discussed the importance of reading hagiography not through the lens of modern scepticism, but to read them as much as possible in the context of the time they were written. Even within the context

⁴² Martin Heinzelmann, 'Gregory of Tours: The Elements of a Biography', in *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition (Leiden 2016), pp. 7–34, 8.

⁴³ *ibid.*

⁴⁴ There are many examples in the subjects and titles of the articles included in the *Companion to Gregory of Tours* from 2015.

⁴⁵ Kitchen, 'Gregory of Tours, Hagiography and the Cult of Saints', 382.

⁴⁶ Raymond Van Dam, *Saints and Their Miracles in Late Antique Gaul* (Princeton, 1993), 138.

⁴⁷ Kitchen, 'Gregory of Tours, Hagiography and the Cult of Saints', 377.

of medieval hagiography Gregory of Tours defended himself against possible detractors from his stories, making sure to mention his sources, or to construct a direct line between his account, an eyewitness and the saint in question.⁴⁸

The presence of Gregory in his writing, as an investigator, an actor and an apologist, makes it all the more suitable if we want to examine his thoughts on virtue and specifically on *iustitia*. If it is Gregory who speaks to us directly in an attempt to communicate sainthood, the pages in which he does so are an excellent place to look for ideas on virtue. Surprisingly enough, no such research has yet been done, especially when it comes to hagiography. The *Ten Books of Histories* have been the subject of intense scholarship ranging from the Gregory's political standings to his psychology.⁴⁹ But his hagiography is still, somewhat surprisingly, relatively uncharted territory for scholars researching medieval thought on virtue. In that sense, this thesis is a first.

This neglecting of hagiography in the study of medieval thought on virtue is not limited to Gregory of Tours. Gregory the Great, the other main actor in this thesis, suffers the same fate - and here the negligence of hagiography is even more pronounced. For of course, the moral thought of Gregory the Great has been studied extensively. Even his position on specific virtues as *iustitia*, *prudentia*, *fortitudo* and *temperantia* have been systematically studied by Leonard Weber, as far back as 1947.⁵⁰ In the previous paragraph we have already seen that more recently Jasmijn Bovendeert also researched the journey of 'the four cardinal virtues', and in her dissertation also paid attention to the writings of Gregory the Great.⁵¹ However, both these studies focus on different works of Gregory the Great; focussing on *Moralia in Job*, *In Hiezechielem* and *Librum I Regnum*, all but disregarding his hagiographical works and paying little to no attention to the *Dialogorum Libri Quattuor* which are the main focus of this study. A similar argument can be made for a relatively recent study by István Bejczy. In his enormous study on the history of moral thought in the Middle Ages, focused on the cardinal virtues, he too focusses on Gregory's more 'moralizing' work in an otherwise very insightful chapter.⁵²

⁴⁸ *ibid* 379.

⁴⁹ See for example E. T. Dailey, *Queens, Consorts, Concubines: Gregory of Tours and Women of the Merovingian Elite*, Mnemosyne Supplements. Late Antique Literature, volume 381 (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

⁵⁰ See Leonhard Weber, *Hauptfragen Der Moralthologie Gregors Des Grossen: Ein Bild Altchristlicher Lebensführung*, Paradosis: Beiträge Zur Geschichte Der Altchristlichen Literatur Und Theologie, 1 (Freiburg in der Schweiz, 1947).

⁵¹ Jasmijn Bovendeert, 'Kardinale deugden gekerstend: de vier kardinale deugden vanaf Ambrosius tot het jaar 1000' (Radboud University Nijmegen, 2007), 148 - 166.

⁵² István Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages: A Study in Moral Thought from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, 202 (Leiden 2011), see 31 - 33.

The influence of Gregory the Great on medieval religious life and thought in general has been extensively studied and shown. He enjoys a reputation as someone who managed to ‘secure’ the heritage of the church fathers, interpreting and building on the works of Augustine, Jerome and Ambrose in a way that could inspire later generations and ensure the transmission to the (early) Middle Ages.⁵³ When it comes to the virtues, Jasmijn Bovendeert summarizes this proces as follows: “Gregory the Great was of great importance in the formation of the tradition of the early medieval interpretation of [the four virtues]. Gregory provided new interpretations that [...] deeply influenced early medieval ideas about virtuousness.”⁵⁴ This is a view that is shared by many a scholar interested in early medieval moral thought. It is all the more interesting that one of the prime works communicating this moral thought by showing and telling how a saint ought to behave has attracted so little attention. This thesis is, again, the attempt to fix this.

This focus on hagiography opens up possibility of comparing two authors who both wrote at, more or less, the same time. The two Gregories of this thesis are at first glance not equals - especially not when it comes to their status in the ‘canon of influential thinkers’ - Gregory the Great of course far eclipsing his provincial namesake. I would argue that a study of Gregory of Tours ideas on virtue and *iustitia* is relevant here. As of yet, he seems to be regarded in different historiographical category than Gregory the Great. Gregory the Great is a thinker, an author and a great medieval mind who has been (and likely will be) studied for decades because of the great influence is ideas had on religious life and thought in the Middle Ages. Gregory of Tours, on the other hand, in historiography is first and foremost a writer of history - and a very political one at that. He is responsible the most important primary source material of sixth century Francia and therefore both his work and his personality have seen intensive study - and rightfully so. However, he has not seen the same intellectual scrutiny that the works of Gregory the Great have. So, in this thesis, I propose the following: let us not regard Gregory the Great as a ‘great thinker’ while not extending the same moniker to Gregory of Tours. Let us study them as equals - for they have more than one comparable quality. Both are members of elite families, both had great ecclesiastical and political careers, and both wrote the sources under scrutiny here in a very comparable way. They were at least partly of the same mind and shared a Christian identity. They both operated in the latin west, but their localities, the Roman, ecclesiastical sphere and the Merovingian political elite, differed greatly.

⁵³ Bovendeert, ‘Kardinale deugden gekerstend’, 162 - 163.

⁵⁴ *ibid*, 162 - 163, translation mine.

This also goes for their backgrounds - as we will see, the careers of the two men took place in completely different contexts, took them to different places and presented them with their own problems that needed solving. The relative homogeneity of hagiography (and specifically *vitae*) as a genre serves as a bridge - an expression of their shared identity, which makes the different approaches they take all the more interesting and relevant.

2. Iustitia - A Theoretical Framework

In this second chapter of this thesis, I will set out the theoretical and historiographical background of *iustitia*. We will chase the term from the depths of history, from classical antiquity and the bible - and finally see how the virtue which appears in the works of the two Gregories has roots that go further than their own background and imagination. After that, we will focus on the virtue *iustitia* in early medieval intellectual context. We will see how the virtue was part of a system of education and intellectual culture in the early medieval Latin West. Following that, our attention turns to *iustitia* and sainthood, and answers the question how this virtue was connected to early medieval sainthood. This all serves to get a clear picture of *what* I am investigating in this thesis. Then, we turn to the question of *how* - in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of this chapter I will explain the methodology I use when looking for and understanding *iustitia*. In the fourth section of this chapter will explain the technicalities of the methodology - the fifth section will engage with the epistemology of the question. Can one truly detect meaning and intention in a written word?

2.1 Iustitia and the classical tradition: the roots of a virtue

First, let us turn to the roots. Where does *iustitia* come from? And what part did *iustitia* play when our early medieval authors used the word in relation to sainthood? This is a question that is impossible to answer in a singular way - lamentably for philosophers and historians all around the world one cannot say who 'invented' the idea of *iustitia*. What we can do, however, is trace this virtue and the wider ethical system in which it existed. This first section serves as a short overview - an overview meant to give us some context and understanding about the intellectual tradition of the virtue.

When discussing '*iustitia*' in an early Christian context the mind (and historiography) immediately tends to wander to the four cardinal virtues that are a central theme in Christian moral thought. I will first examine the place of *iustitia* within this scheme of 'the four virtues'. But, as we will see, *iustitia* has a life outside of the other three - and in the second part of this chapter we will see that a reference to *iustitia* is not always a reference to the *iustitia* in the scheme of four.

First: the cardinal virtues: *iustitia*, *prudentia*, *fortitudo* and *temperantia*; justice, prudence, fortitude and moderation. These virtues were not always cardinal -

they have an extensive pre-Christian tradition. These four virtues that would later be coined ‘cardinal virtues’ by the early Christian authors first appear in the *Republic* of Plato. They existed in a system of ethical thought that was predominant around the Mediterranean in antiquity, and in a certain sense remained so until early modern times in western Europe.⁵⁵ It would lead too far to give a complete exposition on the history of virtue ethics in this chapter, but nonetheless it is important to give, however short, some historiographical background.

As said, the four virtues first appear as a ‘set’ in Plato’s *Republic*. After a long dialogue on the properties of a virtuous and ‘good’ state, they appear as a conclusion:

“Then I hope we shall find it in the following way,” I said: “I think that our state is perfectly good, if it has been set up in the right way.

“It must be,” he said.

“Then clearly we shall find that it is wise, courageous, temperate and just.”⁵⁶

This is the first mention of the four virtues together in the works of Plato, and to put it somewhat heavy-handedly, the first time in the written tradition of Western philosophical history. After Plato this scheme of ethical thought found a wide division and diversification in the most important ethical systems of antiquity. The virtues were the basis of antique virtue ethics in the Platonic and Stoic tradition.⁵⁷ This tradition was a predominant one, both in writing and in intellectual culture.⁵⁸ Interestingly, the ‘four virtues’ as a coherent scheme only appear in the bible once; in the Book of Wisdom, where it appears in a verse discussing the wisdom of Solomon:

Or if one loves righteousness,

whose works are virtues,

She teaches moderation and prudence,

⁵⁵ See Lemma on Virtue ethics by Rosalind Hurthhouse and Glen Pettigrove, ‘Virtue Ethics’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Stanford, 2018). <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/ethics-virtue/>, retrieved 15 - 9 - 2021.

⁵⁶ See Plato, *Republic*, Book 4 / 428, p 373

⁵⁷ István Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages: A Study in Moral Thought from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century*, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, 202 (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 1

⁵⁸ Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages*, 11.

righteousness and fortitude,

and nothing in life is more useful than these.⁵⁹

This Book of Wisdom was in all probability composed in Hellenized Jewish, and is dated somewhere in the first century AD.⁶⁰ This means there is a Greek link, which is interesting since this is the only time where the ‘four virtues’ appear in the Bible as a ‘set’. In the rest of the Bible, the scheme of the four virtues is not present in any moral or ethical context. This presented a problem for the church fathers who saw merit in this idea of ‘four virtues’ - and in the next chapter we will see how they tried to solve this problem.

If the aim is to ‘trace’ the virtues from antiquity to early Middle Ages, there is another important station in this far too fragmentary journey that we must stop at: a classical author who is important in the transfer of virtue and especially the four virtues as a scheme in Christian theology. The writings of Cicero, especially *De Inventione* and *De Oratore* were very influential, not only in their own time, but also in the education of the church fathers who would later incorporate the scheme of the four virtues into Christian theology.⁶¹ Especially *De Inventione*, a book Cicero wrote as a young man, was often copied and read in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages. It includes not only a handy definition of the virtues, but also a definition of each of the four cardinal virtues:

Virtue may be defined as a habit of mind in harmony with reason and the order of nature. Therefore when we have become acquainted with all its parts we shall have considered the full scope of honour, pure and simple. It has four parts: wisdom, justice, courage, temperance.⁶²

After explaining the virtue of wisdom, he further defines *iustitia* as follows:

⁵⁹ See Wisdom 8:7; et si iustitiam quis diligit labores huius magnas habent virtutes sobrietatem enim et sapientiam docet et iustitiam et virtutem quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus. The translation is that of the *New American Bible (Revised Edition)* to be found here: <https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Wisdom%206:22-11:1&version=NABRE>.

⁶⁰ Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages*, 22

⁶¹ This ‘incorporation’ is the main subject of the study from Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages* especially in the first half: pp 11 - 67. See also the dissertation of Jasmijn Bovendeert, ‘*Kardinale deugden gekerstend: de vier kardinale deugden vanaf Ambrosius tot het jaar 1000*’ (Radboud University Nijmegen, 2007) in its entirety and, less explicitly, Matthew Kempshall, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History, 400 - 1500, Historical Approaches*, (Manchester 2012), especially in chapter 1, pp 34 - 120.

⁶² Cicero, ‘De Inventione’, trans. by H. M. Hubbell (Harvard 1949), Book II, LII.

Nam virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus. Quamobrem omnibus eius partibus cognitis tota vis erit simplicis honestatis considerata. Habet igitur partes quattuor: prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam.

Justice is a habit of mind which gives every man his **desert** [due] while preserving the common advantage. Its first principles proceed from nature, then certain rules of conduct became customary by reason of their advantage; later still both the principles that proceeded from nature and those that had been approved by custom received the support of religion and the fear of the law. The law of nature is that which is not born of opinion, but implanted in us by a kind of innate instinct: it includes religion, duty, gratitude, revenge, reverence and truth.⁶³

From a philosophical standpoint, this might not be the most important text that Cicero wrote on rhetoric and the virtues. He wrote other works on moral philosophy and justice - but I have chosen to highlight this passage of *De Inventione* because of its great influence on Augustine, who copies it directly, and on the education of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages in general.⁶⁴ As said before, Cicero wrote a second, more lively work on the same subject at the end of his career, *De Oratore*, in which he denounces both *De Inventione* as ‘unfinished and crude essays which slipped out of the notebooks of my boyhood’.⁶⁵ However, the rather compact list and definitions from *De Inventione* might have made them the more practical work - and both works saw circulation, copying and extraction well into the Middle Ages.⁶⁶ As we will see in the next chapter, when it comes to *iustitia* and the virtues in general, Cicero was perhaps the most influential classical author of late antiquity - an author whose exposition and definition of the virtues were greatly influential throughout the Middle Ages.

2.2. Iustitia and early medieval intellectual culture - change and continuity

In the previous section, we have seen a very brief overview of the roots of *iustitia* in western moral thought. In this section, we shall skip over some three hundred years, and see how the idea of virtue and *iustitia* in general influenced the

⁶³ Cicero, ‘De Inventione’, trans. by H. M. Hubbell (Harvard University Press, 1949), Book II, LIII

Iustitia est habitus animi communi utilitate conservata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem. Eius initium est ab natura profectum; deinde quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitatis ratione venerunt; postea res et ab natura profectas et ab consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit. Naturae ius est quod non opinio genuit, sed quaedam in natura vis insevit, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veritatem.

I have emphasized the word *desert*, and substituted the word *due* in the translation. The edition opts for *desert* but, to be fair, this makes little sense to me. The word *due* seems to be a better option.

⁶⁴ This is a point emphasized by both Kempshall and Bejczy in aforementioned works. See Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages*, 1 - 17, where the influence of Cicero on the church fathers is discussed. See also Kempshall, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History*, 66 - 67. Specifically for Augustine, see also Peter Brown *Augustine, A Biography* (Cambridge, 1967), especially in the chapters discussing his youth.

⁶⁵ Cicero, ‘De Oratore’, trans. by E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham (Harvard University Press, 1942) I, II.5.

[...] *quoniam quae pueris aut adolescentulis nobis ex commentariolis nostris inchoata ac rudia exciderunt [...]*.

⁶⁶ Kempshall, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History*, 18

church fathers, whose writings were so important and influential in the Early Middle Ages. Also, we shall see that the *iustitia* as part of the four virtues, is not the only way *iustitia* can be framed - there are other ways to define and work with this virtue. In this section we explore how the church fathers negotiated 'new' and old ideas on *iustitia*.

How exactly the four virtues made their way into Christian moral thought as the 'cardinal virtues' is a subject that has seen some recent study.⁶⁷ Their survival as a 'set' is quite remarkable, considering that in the Latin West, there is no mention of the four virtues in any Christian writing before Ambrose, save for the work of Lactantius (ca. 240 - ca. 320), who quotes a stoic philosopher.⁶⁸ The enormous recent study by István Bejczy on the cardinal virtues in the (entire!) Middle Ages traces the 'appropriation' of these four virtues into Christian thought. He observes that "[...] Latin fathers passed down the four virtues in silence."⁶⁹ This silence is quite remarkable - the 'scheme' of the four virtues is virtually absent in Christian writing up until the fourth century, when Ambrose of Milan (340 - 397) began the work of Christianizing the virtues. The three most famous church fathers, Augustine, Jerome and Ambrose himself, wrote often about the virtues - being familiar with them from the stoic philosophers they read during the course of their education.⁷⁰ We saw the writings of Cicero in the previous chapter - and we find these exact lines copied by Augustine in a treatise called *De Diversis Quaestionibus*.⁷¹ This is not to say that this was his only definition or that he accepted them wholeheartedly - on the contrary - but to show that the writings of Cicero and other Stoics were an influence to be reckoned with on the church fathers - and that this influence extended to their writings and their thoughts.

István Bejczy notices how the church fathers and the patristic writers adapted the virtues into Christian thought and literature. The church fathers, he argues, saw virtue as a religious category - denouncing the stoic view that at least some degree of virtue was attainable through human behaviour - outside of a firmly defined religious sphere.⁷² Even so, the early attempts at Christianizing the four virtues never completely detached from this idea of virtue attainable through human behaviour. References to ancient teachings and ideas are scattered throughout the writings of the fathers of the church, both implicitly and explicitly. Above-

⁶⁷ The studies by Bovendeert and Bejczy, mentioned in the previous section are the most important ones, see footnote 60 on p 20.

⁶⁸ Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages*, 12.

⁶⁹ Bejczy, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages*, 11.

⁷⁰ *ibid*, 12.

⁷¹ *ibid*, 26.

⁷² *ibid*, 3 - 4.

mentioned Ambrose, but also Augustine and Jerome ‘Christianized’ the virtues - assimilated them and made them a uniquely Christian part of life. They redefined the virtues as a gift from God, and therefore only available to Christians. Religious thought prevails, and depending on the writer one will find explicit references to antique teachings and the value of preserving ancient systems of morality, or a fanatical rejection of classical philosophy in general, and a fiery defence of the Christian faith as the only possible route to virtue.⁷³ All these writings however, put the Christian faith on the foreground.

So, we could conclude that writing about the four virtues in the late antique west is a process of negotiation and assimilation. Successful attempts to incorporate an ancient (and tested!) moral scheme into a new, Christian framework - always putting Christianity first, but seemingly not wanting to throw away the baby with the bathwater. It is however important to notice that, as Bejczy argues, “neither Ambrose nor any other Latin father developed, or intended to develop a coherent virtue theory.⁷⁴” What we see then, is a process of negotiating old ideas with new intellectual contexts. Therefore, I think in our context the words ‘cardinal virtues’ might be misleading - in the sense that they do not refer to a coherent system of moral thought and ideas.

When mentioning the ‘cardinal virtues’, *iustitia* is always one of them. But it does not work like that the other way around - *iustitia* can also very much stand on its own in Christian writing - and it often does. As we have seen, the four virtues appear only once in the Bible as a ‘set of four’. The word *iustitia* appears 162 times in the vulgate.⁷⁵ It is of course not the intention to scrutinize all 162 mentions of *iustitia* in the Bible - although we will see that our authors often quote Bible passages in which the word *iustitia* is mentioned, and often appeal to the Bible when they want to make sure the reader understands the full extent of the virtue. This means that, while the scheme of the four virtues is important and our authors definitely understood and actively used this scheme, not every appeal to *iustitia* is an appeal to the cardinal virtues. The Bible offers other modes, forms and moral frameworks that too rely on virtue that do not mention or need ‘the four virtues’ - think of the Ten Commandments or the three ‘theological’ virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity (*fides, spes* and *caritas*).⁷⁶ There are more ways of engaging with *iustitia* than in the context of the cardinal virtues.

⁷³ *ibid*, 4.

⁷⁴ *ibid*, 13.

⁷⁵ This is in the entire Vulgate, both old and new testament, as found in the *Library of Latin Texts*. This only includes *iustitia*, not other word-forms.

⁷⁶ See Alister E. McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification*, 4th edn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019)., 1

Up to this day, there is a theological debate over what exactly *iustitia* means in a Christian context - and I will do my best to steer clear of that particular debate. However, it is important to note that this is an ongoing discussion - a discussion that has been going on for almost as long as Christianity. Sufficient to say is that *iustitia* is an inherent property of God.⁷⁷ The idea of a God that is inherently righteous, just, is as old as Christianity itself. What this idea of righteousness exactly entails, is less clear and has been the subject of an ongoing debate that now lasts more than 2000 years.⁷⁸ As theologian Alister McGrath puts it in *Iustitia Dei*, a work on the meaning and nature of justice and divine justification, ‘the primary source of Christian theological speculation is Holy Scripture.’⁷⁹ In this work, he chases the philological and semantics of *iustitia* and its Hebrew and Greek equivalents - showing that the term knows a tradition apart from the four virtues discussed above, and drawing attention to the fact that the idea of a ‘just’ or ‘righteous’ God is not necessarily connected to the idea of the four virtues - or the idea virtue ethics in general⁸⁰. His work is a contribution to a theological debate - so I will not go into the details of his argument in the modern debates, but nevertheless his semantical chase of *iustitia* is a welcome addition to our investigation.

McGrath argues that by the second century AD, the ‘Ciceronian’ definition of justice had become leading - a definition of an idea of justice that was normative in legal culture.⁸¹ The famous definition of *iustitia* as meaning ‘to give someone what they are due’ was, according to McGrath, the normative definition of *iustitia* in the time the church fathers mentioned above wrote their theses. However, he notes that this might not be the same *iustitia* that appears in the bible which, as he argues, is more concerned with ‘a covenant between God and humanity as determinative of ethical or legal norms[...].’⁸² There seem to be two fundamentally different understandings of *iustitia* at play - and the process of appropriation we have seen in the previous paragraphs is the early Christian attempt to negotiate between these two ideas of virtue.

It is probable that early Christian authors had a mixed form of *iustitia* in mind when they wrote about the virtues. On the one hand, they were influenced by the scheme of four - the cardinal virtues they knew from Cicero and other authors,

⁷⁷ McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, 8.

⁷⁸ McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, 7.

⁷⁹ *ibid*, 8.

⁸⁰ *ibid*, 10.

⁸¹ *ibid*, 16.

⁸² *ibid*, 17.

part of a scheme of ethics that was embedded in their cultural life. On the other hand, they were very much aware of *iustitia* in particular of being a divine attribution, something that could be ascribed to God and a virtue that had everything to do with faith. They were not promoting secular virtues lifted directly from an ancient system - they were trying to incorporate this system into the Christian faith - they were (successfully) attempting to appropriate this older moral framework into a Christian tradition.

2.3 Sainthood and *iustitia* in the sixth century

We have seen how *iustitia* was part of a recognized scheme of cardinal virtues. We have also seen that *iustitia* could exist outside this 'pattern of four' - instead existing in a tradition connected to biblical ideas of what *iustitia* was, defining the concept in a rather different way. In this paragraph we will explore *iustitia* in early medieval writing on sainthood. How did *iustitia* exist in the framework of hagiography and other forms of Christian writing in the sixth century?

We immediately run into a familiar issue: the issue of definition. For as we have seen in the introduction, hagiography is a relatively modern term - the medieval reader and author would not have made a clear distinction between 'hagiography' and other types of writing. Let us first examine a subsection of hagiography, the *vitae* or saint's lives, more closely - what kind of writings are they, and what are their underlying assumptions when it comes to virtue?

Matthew Kempshall argues that hagiography (which, in his case, means *vitae*) is in fact a form of historiography, in the sense that they collected events that are supposed to have happened, and to give a retelling of these events for people that were not there to witness them.⁸³ This might be stretching the definition of 'historiography' to a point where it becomes dangerously close to meaningless (for, then, what genre for writing can not be considered 'historiography?') but it does make an interesting point. Like most medieval historiography, the 'lessons learned from the past' are the prime message of the writing of history. There are good and bad examples to take our lessons from - and learning these lessons is extremely important. Most medieval history-writing had a very strong moralizing purpose - it

⁸³ Matthew Kempshall, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History, 400 - 1500*, Historical Approaches, Paperback ed (Manchester, 2012), 34

wanted to warn its readers about mistakes made.⁸⁴ This moralizing aspect of history-writing is not something the inhabitants of early medieval times invented - according to Kempshall it is part of a tradition going back at least to the writings of the Roman historian Sallust who framed his history-writing in a larger theme of the denouncement of corruption and greed in Roman public life.⁸⁵ His history writing was a narrative of corruption and the triumph of virtue over vice - the eventual triumph of virtuous people over the corruption and sloth that had made its home in Roman society.⁸⁶ His writing of history was an attempt to commemorate the morally good acts of great people - and so given a moral judgement not only on the past, but also a warning for the present. This moralizing type of history writing was predominant in the early Middle Ages, and Sallust is mentioned and praised by (among others) Augustine and Jerome, two authors we met in the last section.⁸⁷

If we accept this reading, and we accept that *vitae* are a form of historiography and would be regarded as such in the eye of the medieval reader - the moralizing aspect of *vitae* would not be exclusive to the genre of the saints lives. The idea to look upon the lives of those that preceded us in a moralizing way - distinguishing the good ones from the bad, praising the virtuous and denouncing the vicious, was a known *modus operandi* for medieval writers of history. Perhaps the writing of *vitae* was not so different from the writing of history - drawing on the past to set an example for the present, and to prove the excellent virtuousness of the saint in question. In any case, the idea to draw upon the lives of those that came before, and to exemplify and idealize their virtuous behaviour and use them as a mirror for behaviour in the present was well known in the Middle Ages - both in the writing of history and hagiography.

The idea of using past virtuous life as a mirror was well-established. But what about the virtues themselves? How did they, and especially *iustitia* turn up in early medieval hagiography - and specifically in the works of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great? Kempshall, again in *Rhetoric and the Writing of History*, pursues the influences of antique authors in the rhetorical education of early medieval writers - and shows that even in abridged or edited forms, the classical texts mentioned above by authors such as Sallust and Cicero were of great importance to the early medieval curriculum.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ For an analysis of early medieval writing of history see Matthew Kempshall, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History, 400 - 1500*, 20. To readers of the works of Gregory of Tours this very political nature might come at no surprise.

⁸⁵ Kempshall, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History*, 38.

⁸⁶ See Sallust's *Catalina*.

⁸⁷ Kempshall, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History*, 47.

These classical texts entered the medieval curriculum through the study of Grammar. This discipline was central to early medieval education. The study of the *ars grammatica* contained a substantially broader field than what we would today understand when we teach ‘grammar’ in schools. It was a field of study that included the rules of forming sentences and words correctly, comparable to our modern definition, but also included the study of ancient authors, texts and subjects - including philosophy, history and mathematics.⁸⁹ We have already met some of the most important authors in the previous paragraphs - and their writings and works were a central part of medieval education. However, their texts often were abridged, fragmented or re-implemented in the study of grammar.⁹⁰ For example, the works of Sallust mentioned above were transmitted not as ‘entire works’, but as a collection of 500 fragments. The works of rethors like Cicero and Quintillian suffered the same fate - often copied and transmitted in abridged versions.⁹¹

Especially Cicero’s *De Inventione* with its rather practical summary of the virtues, and his *Rhetorica ad Herennium* was often copied in the middle ages - and central to the corpus of the education of medieval speakers, writers and other privileged men.⁹² Evidence of this practice exists in the form of hundreds of manuscript fragments - scattered throughout Europe.⁹³ The transmission of Cicero is important for our investigation, since it so clearly mentions and explains the ‘cardinal’ virtues - as we have seen in the previous section. So, surviving by means of complete, abridged or re-purposed text - the virtues came to our subjects through education, through ancient texts, sometimes expanded or abridged, cut up, summarized or integrated into different texts. But can something be said about the virtue *iustitia* in itself? What position did it hold in early medieval intellectual culture - and how did it connect to sainthood in general?

The second question is perhaps best answered first - for *iustitia* in sixth century intellectual culture had a strong connection with faith - and especially ‘good’ faith. Who better to explain this to us than Augustine, who explicitly mentions *iustitia* connected to ‘faith’ in *De Civitate Dei*:

⁸⁹ *ibid*, 122.

⁹⁰ *ibid*, 122 - 124.

⁹¹ *ibid*, 140.

⁹² John O. Ward, *Classical Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: The Medieval Rhetors and Their Art 400-1300, with Manuscript Survey to 1500 CE*, International Studies in the History of Rhetoric, volume 10 (Leiden 2019), 3.

⁹³ Abovementioned work by John O. Ward serves as an excellent study in to the transference of the writing of Cicero in the middle ages.

They [the Romans, meaning pagans] observed that virtue must be divided into four species: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance. Now each of these has its own varieties, and so faith is classed under justice and it holds the chief place with all of us who know the meaning of the statement that ‘the just man lives through his faith’.⁹⁴

In this passage, Augustine explicitly equals - or at least he connects the virtues in a very specific way ‘faith’ with ‘justice’ - implicating that a ‘just’ man is automatically a faithful one and vice versa. This is an important indication that *iustitia* and good belief were one and the same - it is an example of the encapsulation of the virtues mentioned in the previous section. The passage shows that, at least in Augustine’s mind, to be a just man - to possess the virtue *iustitia* automatically meant that one was faithful - because, as the passage above implies, one can only be just if one lives through his faith.

This has an implication for the just saints we are looking for. If we follow Augustine, all saints are just by definition - for one cannot be truly faithful without being just. If this is the case in the text we will investigate remains to be seen - but for now, this fragment serves as proof of the interconnectedness between *iustitia* and faith. For Augustine, the two could not be separated.

2.4 The methodology: how to look for *iustitia*, how to interpret *iustitia*

The aim of this thesis is to look for the use of *iustitia* in the hagiographical works of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great. We have seen some of the historiographical background of this virtue, and how they came to be incorporated in Christian thought. Now, we turn our attention to questions of methodology: in this paragraph I will explain how I intend to look for *iustitia* in these works, and what I hope to find with this research. First, we will examine the historiographical tradition in which this investigation is set. Then, we will take a closer look at the exact methodology.

As we have seen in the introduction, the aims of this thesis place it in a tradition of similar research - research into the history of concepts and ideas. A

⁹⁴ Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* IV:20. Edition used: Augustine, *Concerning the City of God against the Pagans*, trans. by Henry Bettenson, Penguin Classics (London 2003), 158.

The Latin as it appears in the LLB: Augustinus Hipponensis - *De ciuitate Dei* (CPL 0313), ed. (B. Dombart / A. Kalb, 1955), lib. : 4, cap. : 20.

Quando quidem virtutem in quattuor species distribuendam esse viderunt, prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam; et quoniam et istae singulae species suas habent, in partibus iustitiae fides est maximum que locum apud nos habet, quicumque scimus quid sit, quod iustus ex fide vivit.

close relative is the German tradition of *Begriffsgeschichte*, a field of historical research that can be defined as the study of concepts, ideas and language, of ‘questions about the significance of change and continuity [...] about meaning in political and social languages.’⁹⁵ It is concerned not so much with etymologies (or, according to Reinhard Koselleck - one of the founders of the discipline - not at all concerned with etymology)⁹⁶ but with thought - with the change of meaning of concepts and the influence this meaning has on the development of history. It is more concerned with structural analysis of discourse or the study of *mentalité’s* than it is with understanding one or more individuals.⁹⁷ By chasing and analyzing concepts, *Begriffsgeschichte* tries, in my own words, to loosen certain concepts and words from their authors and study them as free-flowing agents in time - agents that in turn influence the way people categorize the world, and so change the world itself. Concepts can be used to influence a discourse - they can be used as instruments to make a distinction between what is right and what is wrong. The primary goal of *Begriffsgeschichte* is the research of the development of these concepts - how political and social use of concepts changed over time.

Scholars and students of historical semantics use comparable methodologies of slightly different aims. This is a broad field - but in general it can be said that the study of historical semantics is concerned with the history of words and concepts, but takes a somewhat broader scope - concerned with all questions that consider language and time.⁹⁸ The field allows for the study of change of meaning over centuries - as well as zooming in and studying changes in language over a shorter amount of time. The methodologies they present are related to the methodologies I will use - although my corpus is smaller and written closer together in time⁹⁹. My goal is both a focus on the concept and its history, and the question how the *iusiitia* was given meaning by two particular authors in a particular time. To understand our two authors, we must take account of how they came into contact with *iusiitia*, what it meant in the context they wrote and existed in, and how they negotiated this ancient idea in their own religious and intellectual reality.

There is a tension here - a tension that is partly of our own making. *Begriffsgeschichte*, historical semantics and the history of ideas are different things, different ideas of approaching history with different aims and different

⁹⁵ Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction* (New York 1995), 10.

⁹⁶ Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 10 - 12.

⁹⁷ Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, 11.

⁹⁸ *Current Methods in Historical Semantics*, ed. by Kathryn Allan and Justyna A. Robinson, *Topics in English Linguistics*, 73 (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2012). 1

⁹⁹ That is, based on some of the methodologies and ideas outlined in *Current Methods in Historical Semantics*.

methodologies. However - after coming so far, it might seem quite obvious that the research that I propose sits somewhere in a middle ground - combining elements of the first two schools - aimed at understanding the development and change of the meaning of words and concepts - and the last, which is concerned more with intellectual culture and the intellectual sphere in which these concepts were used. I am not the first one to encounter this problem. In the impressive monograph *Christianitas*, Tim Geelhaar identifies a similar problem when studying and analyzing the idea of *christianitas*, and how this concept meant different things in different contexts. However, he goes further - arguing that the study of these concepts can help us understand how people thought. He proposes a 'dialogue between the history of words and the history of ideas'.¹⁰⁰ He thus formulates a question that in his own words is 'positioned between church- and political history, between the history of language and the history of ideas and concepts'.¹⁰¹

My aim in this thesis is more or less the same - but on a significantly smaller level. By studying *iustitia* I too aim for a connection between the history of words and concepts and a more small-scale social history - to study the ideas behind a concept, but to limit the scope to the use of this concept by two authors in one field of writing. The goal here is, to again quote Geelhaar, 'not so much the study of a word, but the study of a word in history'.¹⁰² So - it is not about *iustitia* and the historical evolution of the concept - but how this concept existed in the mind of two authors, in a particular time and a particular place.

I think my methodology will allow for this research - by combining the more analytical tendencies of the above-mentioned fields with close reading. The time has come to explain this methodology, and how I intend to analyze the texts and how I then aim to understand the minds of their authors.

Allow me to shortly restate the aim of my research before I dive into the methodology. I want to analyze the use of the virtue *iustitia* in the hagiographical works of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great. These hagiographical works are my corpus - I listed the exact titles in the introduction. They form the trove in which I will search for the use and the meaning of *iustitia*. I want to mention very shortly the fact that the possibility of conducting research like this is relatively new - or at least it has been made much, much easier through the advent of digital databases of texts, databases that I will use with gratitude.

¹⁰⁰ Tim Geelhaar, *Christianitas: Eine Wortgeschichte von Der Spätantike Bis Zum Mittelalter*, Historische Semantik, Band 24 (Göttingen, 2015), 17.

¹⁰¹ Geelhaar, *Christianitas*, 17 - 18.

¹⁰² Ibid, 18.

The practicalities of the methodology are quite simple. The Library of Latin Texts (in the case of Gregory the Great) and the (e)MGH (for the works of Gregory of Tours) provide the raw (edited) versions of the texts under scrutiny.¹⁰³ Then I look how often the word *iustitia* appears in the text - making sure to include all its word-forms, varieties and its antonym, *iniustitia*, to see how they are used in relation to each other.¹⁰⁴ I have arranged these preliminary results in a simple overview - an overview from which we can see some rudimentary patterns arise - patterns to which we will return later.¹⁰⁵ The results are also organized in a more detailed way - per work, including the context in which they appear. This will allow for some close reading to understand how the word is used, what *iustitia* means within the context of the stories the authors wish to tell.

This methodology will allow me to analyze the results on two different levels. The 'raw results' of the search will allow for an analysis of certain patterns: how often is *iustitia* used when discussing certain subjects? Does it appear on its own, in relation to another virtue or its own antonym, or as a quote from the Bible? Then, we zoom in, which allows us for a closer read of the context in which the virtue is used. How does *iustitia* appear within the context of the surrounding sentences? How can we interpret its use when we use the scope of a single *vita*, a single chapter, a single sentence? This micro-analysis (or close reading) of these occurrences allows for a detailed examination and interpretation of *iustitia* in its direct context, within the context of the story that is being told and the message that is being sent.

This methodology has different aims than the *Begriffsgeschichte* or the historical semantics mentioned before. While it uses some of the same methodologies - the analysis of a semantic field, the search for the meaning and change of a concept - it is only partially concerned with the concept of *iustitia* as detached from its authors. The goal here is to analyze the use of *iustitia* in the works of two authors, and to do so, we must understand the intellectual context in which their writings were made, and in which they existed. Our two authors are in that sense a point in time, a point from where we can look back on the history of an idea, while analyzing how these two authors used this ancient idea in the context that they

¹⁰³ These are: Gregorii episcopi Turonensis, *Miracula et opera minora, Liber in gloria martyrum, Liber de Virtutibus Sancti Iuliani, Libri I-IV de virtutibus sancti Martini episcopi, Liber vitae patrum, Liber in gloria confessorum, Liber de miraculis beati Andreae apostoli, Passio sanctorum martyrum septem dormientium apud Ephysum*, (ed.) Bruno Krusch, MGH SRM 1.2 (Hanover, 1885; rev. rpt 1969), and Gregorius Magnus, *Dialogorum libri iu*, CPL 1713, SC, 260; 265 (A. de Vogüé, 1979).

¹⁰⁴ The detailed results are included in the appendix and the end of this thesis; chapter 7.

¹⁰⁵ All results and raw data are included in the appendix. For a broad overview, see appendix 1.1.

knew. Just as hagiography could function as a bridge between ‘Christianity’ as an abstract, larger-than-life idea and the specific dilemmas, occurrences and questions one might face in daily life, so this methodology might also result in a bridge. A bridge between the often abstract and great narratives of the change of words and the ideas attached to them and the impact of those ideas on history, and the smaller scope of two authors who learned, thought and wrote at a specific moment in time.

2.5 On meaning, intention and time. Or: can we understand what was meant when an author used *iustitia*?

Before we start, I feel that there is an important question that still needs an answer, an epistemological problem that must be addressed. For is it even possible to find out someone’s intention when they wrote down a word? Is it a feasible goal to search for *iustitia* as it existed in the thought world of two long-dead authors? Can we ever be sure what they meant when they wrote their texts - what they had in mind when they used certain words? This is an epistemological question, which can easily derail into a debate on the possibility of even knowing historical truth. However, I think it is worth our time to devote a short section to the epistemological assumptions made, to question what we can actually *know* from studying the sources in this particular way. Also, In the second part of this section, I will explain a personal definition of a ‘virtue’ is - to help make clear what exactly it is I am looking for.

As mentioned in the previous section, the aims of this research are different from the aims of the schools on which its methodologies are based. This is partly due to my own interest, but it is also a matter of source material available. Originally, the German *Begriffsgeschichte* focussed on the history of political concepts in the more recent past. The amount of studies that used these methodologies in pre-modern research is still somewhat low - although there is an increased interest.¹⁰⁶ However, the criticisms that can be aimed at *Begriffsgeschichte* are all the more pressing the further we go back in time. For - can we understand these concepts that rely so heavily on the context of their original Latin? Are our English translations and modern understandings enough to truly know how a concept was used and understood in the Middle Ages? Is it even possible to understand a single concept and the way in which it was used in the country that is so foreign to us, and where they do all things so completely different?

¹⁰⁶ See the aforementioned works by Silke Schwandt and Els Rose, for example.

Historians and scholars interested in *Begriffsgeschichte* and historical semantics, have run into this problem before. And, there is another problem that needs to be addressed. The further we go back in time, we encounter fewer sources, written by fewer people - reaching an audience that becomes smaller and smaller - or at least less clearly defined.¹⁰⁷ As we have seen, neither *Begriffsgeschichte* nor 'historical semantics' are singular fields with singular goals and aims - but they do share a focus on words, concepts, meaning and change in time. It is questionable if this is possible for the early Middle Ages - to say something about 'society' or 'political culture' based on the writings that exist - they are scarce, and often geographically spread out. I approach this question of 'understanding' in a different way.

I feel that it *is* possible to know some of the historical reality, or at least to approach it, by keeping both the corpus and the scope of the research small. While at first glance it may sound overly ambitious to 'try and understand the inner world of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great', I think it is a more modest ambition than to try and examine *iustitia* as a concept - detached from the source material. By limiting the investigation to two authors and the corpus they produced in the same genre - it is possible not only to do a relatively fair comparison, but make an analysis of how these two people thought about a virtue like *iustitia*. It allows for something that is akin to a micro-history of a concept - how did these authors come across these terms, how did they use it, and what does that tell us about their world-view.

Whether or not we can 'tell somebody's intention' remains to be seen - and I think it would be a sign of overconfidence were I to answer this question with a 'yes'. However, I think that this methodology, this micro-history of an idea, might bring us as close as we can. It will not allow us conclusions about 'society' or 'religion' - but will allow us a small window into the mind of two authors - and it might lead to a better understanding of how those minds functioned.

2.5.2 What is a virtue? A possible answer

Before we dive in to the source material itself, there is a final question that I feel must be addressed. For - knowing all this and taking what we have read into consideration - what exactly is a virtue? What do I mean when I talk about *iustitia*

¹⁰⁷ For problems and some solutions, see *Current Methods in Historical Semantics*, ed. by Kathryn Allan and Justyna A. Robinson, *Topics in English Linguistics*, 73 (Berlin 2012), 1 - 12.

in these early medieval works?

There is no singular answer to what a ‘virtue’ is - not in a medieval *or* modern context. Is it an action, a thought, or an idea? Therefore, it seems to me both important and intellectually honest to give a definition of my own - not because I think that is the right or only definition, but because, when writing on ethical subjects one always has to deal with his or her own ideas and prejudices. In this case, it seems to me that it is honest and important to shortly explain what I understand when I say ‘virtue’ - and what exactly it is I am looking for.

It was a system that revolved around the idea of virtue - which the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines as

A virtue is an excellent trait of character. It is a disposition, well entrenched in its possessor—something that, as we say, goes all the way down, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways.¹⁰⁸

Virtuousness then, is something that is entrenched in the person. It is more than just an action - it is a disposition, and the roots of the action, the intentionality behind it is of paramount importance when one wants to judge whether or not a certain person is virtuous. To take this even further - within this definition there is no such thing as a ‘virtuous action’ - virtuousness applies to the actor, to the disposition and the character of the one who performs the action. An action cannot be judged solely by its outcome - in other words, one can not be ‘accidentally virtuous’.¹⁰⁹ This is an important point to make, because it has some interesting implications for our investigation. Above-mentioned quote does not present us with a set-in-stone definition - that would be anachronistic - but it does bring forth an important aspect of ‘virtue’ which is as relevant now as it was in antiquity. When we look for *iustitia* in saint’s lives, we are in fact looking for the virtue *within* the saint. Not in his or her actions, which are a display, a manifestation of *iustitia*, but not *iustitia* itself. The virtue, as said, is an essential part of the saint - and it is exactly that point which must be conveyed. The manifestations of these virtues merely serve as proof for the existence of it - they are not the virtue itself.

What I am looking for when looking for the word *iustitia*, is the disposition of

¹⁰⁸ Rosalind Hursthouse and Glen Pettigrove, ‘Virtue Ethics’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Stanford, 2018), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/ethics-virtue/>, retrieved 15 - 09 - 2021.

¹⁰⁹ This is opposed from more modern schools of ethical thought like deontology and utilitarianism. An excellent introduction can be found in Martin van Hees, Thomas Nys, and I.A.M Robeyns, *Basisboek Ethiek* (Amsterdam, 2014), 179 - 195.

character that was meant by this word - or at least the ideas behind this disposition. I am looking for convictions on the nature of someone's character that lie behind it - and how these qualities manifested themselves in the saints as portrayed by our two authors.

3. Gregory of Tours

We turn our attention to the first of our subjects - Gregory of Tours (c. 538 - 594). This chapter will focus on several questions. First, let us meet the sources. Which works are central to this investigation, and why has my choice fallen on them? Thereafter, there will be a short biographical overview of the life of Gregory. The aim of this part is to put him into an intellectual context - in what kind of society did he operate, and what is there to know about his education? After that, we will turn to the sources themselves, giving a broader overview of the patterns and contexts in which *iustitia* appears, before zooming in on details, and analyze some remarkable fragments closely.

3.1. An introduction to the source material

Gregory of Tours wrote several hagiographical works in his lifetime. In the modern reception the *Liber Vitae Patrum (VP)*, *De Virtibus Sancti Martini Episcopi (VM)*, *De Passione et Virtibus Sancti Iuliani Martyris (VJ)*, *Liber de Miraculis Beati Andreae Apostoli (MA)*, *Liber in Gloria Martyrum (GM)*, *Liber in Gloria Confessorum* and the *Passio Sanctorum Martyrum Septem Dormientium (PS)*¹¹⁰ are in the academic reception and reputation somewhat dwarfed by his *Historiarum Libri X (Hist)*. The latter rightfully holds a reputation of the most important (and in many instances the only) source on early medieval Merovingian Francia.¹¹¹ The hagiographical works however, have seen nowhere near as much scholarly interest as the *Histories* - although this imbalance is somewhat in the process of being amended by recent scholarship, as seen in the introduction.

The focus here is on these ‘other works’ which I have earlier described as ‘hagiographical’. With the risk of repeating myself: it is important to make the point that what sources count as *hagiographical* is, to some degree, arbitrary. As mentioned in the introduction, ‘hagiography’ is not a medieval term - and it is used here to separate the works that are explicitly about sainthood from those that are not. However - it is important to keep in mind that this separation might be of my own making - rather than that of Gregory of Tours. It is unlikely that he himself

¹¹⁰ Titles and abbreviations are based on the list appearing in *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, ed. by Alexander C. Murray, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition Vol. 36, (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2016), on page 599 - 600.

¹¹¹ By means of a simple proof - the amount of articles in the recent *Companion* devoted to the *Histories* eclipses the studies of his ‘other works’.

saw his ‘hagiographical’ works as inherently different from his *Histories* - especially when it comes to the moralizing and ethical aspects of the work. In the last chapter of his *Histories*, Gregory presents us with a list of all his works - and makes no distinction between ‘hagiographical’ and ‘non-hagiographical’.¹¹² To Gregory, all his written works were part of the same corpus - a collection of works with a shared goal.

The distinction here means that the works are all about holy men and women. Some are long dead and fall in the category of martyrs - the people that died for their faith, often being tortured and killed in a rather terrible way by a pre-Christian Roman emperor (such as the *GM and GC*). Others, such as the *VP* focus on Gallic holy men and women that lived more recently - although this distinction is by no means clear-cut. One, the *PS*, is a translation or a re-write of a Greek original - although Gregory’s influence can be read in between the lines.¹¹³

As Giselle de Nie remarks in the opening comments of *Lives and Miracles*, a recent edition of some of the hagiographical works of Gregory of Tours on which I thankfully rely, these stories of saints and holy persons sometimes provide ‘documents of micro-history of sixth-century daily life’.¹¹⁴ These are the texts that will be the main focus of the analysis that follows later in this chapter. While I have made an overview of all the hagiographical works, which can be found in the appendix, the limited scope of this thesis forces me to make a choice - where to put my focus and attention.¹¹⁵ Since the intellectual context of the sixth century, and in particular Gregory’s thought world, is the main subject of this thesis, I feel that focussing on the texts that explicitly take part in contemporary (or near-contemporary) times, is the preferable option. For, when the goal is to catch a glimpse of Gregory’s mind in the time when he actually lived, it makes the most sense to study the stories he set in his own world. Often, Gregory does so explicitly - stating that either he himself was a witness to these events, or that he heard them first-hand from trustworthy sources.¹¹⁶ By doing this so explicitly, he places his holy men and woman in the world around him - he makes sure that they live in the same places, encounter the same problems and more-or-less are inhabiting the world as it is. This makes his use of *iusitia* in these stories all the

¹¹² Hist, X.31.

¹¹³ For an analysis, see William C. McDermott’s introduction with his translation of the *Seven Sleepers* in *Monks, Bishops, and Pagans: Christian Culture in Gaul and Italy, 500-700: Sources in Translation, Including the World of Gregory of Tours*, ed. by William Coffman McDermott and Edward Peters, Sources of Medieval History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), 198

¹¹⁴ Gregory of Tours, *Lives and Miracles*, ed. by Giselle de Nie, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, 39 (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2015). See Introduction, IX

¹¹⁵ For the overview of occurrences, see appendix 1.

¹¹⁶ There are many examples of this style throughout his work - we will run in to some in later chapters.

more reflective of his own outlook on the world around him. Therefore I will focus on the studies that are set in Gregory's time.

3.2 A short biography of Gregory of Tours and his world

In this paragraph I aim to do a few things. First, I will paint a rough sketch of a biography that will lead us from his birth and background, through his education and his ordination as a bishop. Then, we will slightly shift our focus to his worldview, and how his education might have influenced his ideas about faith.

Gregory does tell us a few tidbits on his education - tidbits fantastically compiled into the 'elements of a biography' by Martin Heinzelmann¹¹⁷. A complete biographical overview would be beyond the scope of this thesis - so I will limit myself to the parts that refer to his upbringing and his education - so that we may better understand his worldview.

Gregory of Tours was born into a family used to power and influence. After his father's death early in his life, he was raised by his uncle on his father's side, Gallus, who was then bishop of the city we know as Clermont Ferrand.¹¹⁸ Later, he would be educated by another bishop-to-be and friend of the family: Avitus. As mentioned before, it was not only Gallus who was bishop - there were others in his direct familiar line, on both his father's and his mother's side, that were either bishops, or stemmed from a line of 'senators', indicating a significant social standing.¹¹⁹ We know of this social standing because Gregory himself told us about it - he often mentions his familial connections in his *Histories*. In his hagiographical works, however, these connections are emphasized less. The above-mentioned Gallus is mentioned as his uncle in the *VJ* and *VP* - but in other works describing members of his family, Gregory is completely silent on the connection that he has to them.¹²⁰ According to Heinzelmann, this relative silence shows that Gregory, while attached to his family and aware and proud of his upbringing and social background, did not particularly emphasize these family connections in his

¹¹⁷ Martin Heinzelmann, 'Gregory of Tours: The Elements of a Biography', in *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 7–34.

¹¹⁸ See the introduction by William C. Durmont in *Monks, Bishops, and Pagans: Christian Culture in Gaul and Italy, 500-700: Sources in Translation, Including the World of Gregory of Tours*, ed. by William Coffman McDermott and Edward Peters, Sources of Medieval History (Philadelphia: 1975), 118.

¹¹⁹ Heinzelmann, 'Gregory of Tours: The Elements of a Biography', 17, also see the extensive genealogy included.

¹²⁰ Heinzelmann, 'Gregory of Tours: The Elements of a Biography', 8.

works - he has no 'special interest' in his family.¹²¹ He did however, place emphasis on being a part of this family, and by subtly referring to his own position in relation to the family members he writes about, he makes sure that we are aware of these connections.¹²²

His life however, was shaped for a large part by these connections and by the milieu he was born in. From a young age, he received a formal clerical education, an education that would shape his outlook and ideas on both the church and the world. Most of the biographical details of Gregory as the bishop of Tours come from the *Histories*, a work which paints this man of God as an active political agent and a prolific actor in the political sphere of the Merovingian kingdoms.¹²³ He portrays himself as a friend to the mighty and an active actor in the political and religious debates of his time.

Let us take a closer look at the formative years of Gregory of Tours, and examine some of the facts and theories about his education. Gregory received an 'ecclesiastical' education - an education in which the teachings of the church and the faith were central. However, Gregory himself laments the lack of classical authors in his education - he feels a gap in his own knowledge of 'grammar' - a term which we now know refers to a much broader spectrum of learning than just 'grammar' as we understand it today.¹²⁴ It is debatable how much Gregory actually knew of these 'ancient texts'. As we know, he grew up in a milieu where learning, reading and education was a given - there where, for a sixth century boy, a large amount of texts were around him. He knew and mentioned Virgil, but it is possible that other ancient texts only came to him in the form of excerpts.¹²⁵ His direct invocation of Martianus Capella as the master of the Seven Arts in the final pages of his *Histories* indicates that Gregory was well aware of the skills those Seven Arts were supposed to give - even if he found himself lacking.¹²⁶ On the other hand, he does invoke Pliny the Elder's *Ars Grammatica* in the introduction to the *Vita Patrum*, when he explains the at first sight grammatically somewhat clumsy title. So - he is not afraid nor too shy to invoke his education when he feels it is needed to prove a point.¹²⁷

¹²¹ *ibid.*, 9.

¹²² *ibid.* 9 - 10.

¹²³ The *Decem Libri Historiarum* is the prime example of this - and has often been read and studied through that angle.

¹²⁴ William C. Durmont *Monks, Bishops, and Pagans: Christian Culture in Gaul and Italy, 500-700*, 121.

¹²⁵ *ibid.*

¹²⁶ Hist. X.31

¹²⁷ *Prologus* to *VP*, 2.

In his writings, Gregory rarely mentions his ecclesiastical education - except in his prefaces where he, in true early medieval fashion, apologises for his meager rhetorical skills and syntax. While this might be true to some point - there are certainly indications that his education was broad, but not the most extensive - this must also be read as *topos* - a common literary form used in the prefaces of texts. When it comes to traces of his ecclesiastical education, there is mainly silence. Gregory barely mentions the Great Names we saw in the previous chapter - names like Jerome, Augustine and Ambrose.¹²⁸ While he does present himself as a man who enjoys and spends a lot of time studying, he does not explicitly reference the theologians that we tend to classify as 'influential'. It is therefore difficult to assess their direct influence on Gregory's thoughts, let alone his writings. He only references these authors if he quotes them directly.¹²⁹

However, this is not to say that Gregory was not aware of these authors - or has not studied them at all. That conclusion would be an *argumentum ex silentio* - an argument from silence - that would lead us astray. The silence on Gregory's part is contrasted by a poem by his contemporary and friend Venantius Fortunatus who, at Gregory's ordination as bishop of Tours, likened him to the greatest of church fathers, apostles and thinkers.¹³⁰ So while it is impossible to say anything definitive on the subject of his own education, this deliberate placement among the Church's finest does prove the reputation of the people in that list - and a proposed recognition of both the subject and the audience of the importance of this list. Not to say that all members of the audience knew *De Civitate Dei* inside-out, we can not even be certain that Gregory read it, but they did know the reverence of the names 'Ambrose' and 'Augustine' - they knew these people were important, influential and central figures in Christianity.

According to Martin Heinzelmänn, *De Civitate Dei* functioned as a model for Gregory's worldview.¹³¹ This is meant both in the philosophical sense - the idea that society embraces every living being, and that some live in accordance with God and some do not - and in a practical sense. Heinzelmänn argues that Gregory's *Histories* can be read as a mirror of *De Civitate Dei* - it mirrors the

¹²⁸ For a theological assessment of Gregory's work see Martin Heinzelmänn, 'The Works of Gregory of Tours and Patristic Tradition', in *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, ed. by Alexander C. Murray (BRILL, 2016), pp. 279–336.

¹²⁹ In abovementioned article, this is examined in more detail, specifically pp. 282 - 284.

¹³⁰ See Venantius Fortunatus, *Carmina*, ed. Fr. Leo, (1881), lib. V:3, Lines 35 - 40:

laetus agat sub clave Petri, per dogmata Pauli / inter sidereos luce micante choros, / fortis Athanasius, qua clarus Hilarius adstant, / dives Martinus, suavis et Ambrosius, Gregorius radiat, sacer Augustinus inundat, Basilius rutilat Caesariusque micat.

¹³¹ See Heinzelmänn, 'The Works of Gregory of Tours and Patristic Tradition'.

structure of the seminal work by Augustine.¹³² Since this thesis is not about the *Histories* we do not have room to go into this further. However, it does show that not only did Gregory have knowledge of the work of Augustine - he also accepted his doctrine and his way of bringing that thought across.

This ties in with another point that needs to be made: Gregory's idea of 'saintliness' and 'sainthood'. I will paint some broad strokes in which we can place Gregory's ideas on sainthood and their context in sixth and seventh century Merovingian hagiography. Gregory was by no means the only person in the Merovingian kingdoms who wrote stories about saints - although he is one of the few authors of whom we still know the names. Hagiography was relatively popular in the sixth century - and in Merovingian Gaul in general.¹³³ It followed certain patterns, patterns we can also distinguish in the work of Gregory of Tours. In the work of Gregory of Tours, saints tend to be direct intermediates between the faithful and the Lord. Saints were as close one could get to God without addressing God himself. To pray to a saint was to pray to someone who had God's ear, and who could put in a good word in your behalf.¹³⁴

When it comes to identifying 'contemporary' saints, saints who lived close to or in Gregory's own time, he seems to have a preference for the ascetic saints - the lonely men who withdrew from society that we have seen before - although his defining characteristic of the saint is the working of miracles.¹³⁵ According to Gregory, the performance of miracles was the best way to identify the holy man, and the strongest argument to be made for his or her holiness. This is a pattern that is mostly seen in the *VP*, the work which contains biographies of saints that lived in around Gregory's time.¹³⁶

A final note, then, and a word of warning that everything I have discussed above puts us in a frame that is useful to this thesis - but it is not the entire story. True - Gregory put himself in a tradition of Christianity and Christian thinkers that had shaped his faith and his family - a tradition of Great Christian Men - but that was not the only tradition that influenced him. As William C. Dermont notes, there is another tradition which Gregory makes use of that might have been

¹³² Heinzelmann, 'The Works of Gregory of Tours and Patristic Tradition', 287 - 291.

¹³³ There is ample literature on Merovingian sainthood. For a short introduction, I find the introduction to *Soldiers of Christ: Saints and Saints Lives from Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*, ed. by Thomas F. X. Noble and Thomas Head (Pennsylvania 1995) to be informative.

¹³⁴ The saint as a direct intermediate between the faithful and God is a well known element of the cult of saints in early medieval times.

¹³⁵ Heinzelmann, 'The Works of Gregory of Tours and Patristic Tradition', 304.

¹³⁶ *ibid.*

undervalued up until this point: an *oral* tradition. For the purposes of this thesis I reinterpret the word ‘oral’ - for it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore two traditions of story-telling. What I can and will do, is make a distinction between the clerical tradition, the tradition of the aforementioned Christian thinkers, and a way of storytelling that is based on transmission. As I discussed, Gregory tends to make use of (literary) eye-witnesses and sometimes even himself as an actor in his hagiography. It is these two traditions that I will explore further in the rest of this chapter.¹³⁷

3.3. Gregory of Tours: an analysis

Now, we turn to the analysis of the source material - the core of this thesis. As I explained earlier, we will start from the outside and work our way in - first, we will see an overview of the occurrences of *iustitia* in all the hagiographical works of Gregory of Tours, before we will zoom in on more specific texts. Since the scope of this thesis is limited and the scope of the source material is rather large, the detailed analysis will mainly come from the biographies in the *Vita Patrum*, since the holy men and women portrayed there lived closest to Gregory, both in a geographical and temporal sense, and therefore Gregory’s negotiation between the the local and the universal, between everyday life and the eternal, is the most interesting when we want to know about his own world of thought.

So, we start with a graph - a graph which mentions the occurrences of the term in all the works under scrutiny:¹³⁸

	lust* (all forms)	iniust* (all forms)
<i>Liber Vitae Patrum</i>	16	2
<i>Liber de passione et virtutibus Iuliani</i>	10	6
<i>Liber de virtutibus Martini</i>	5	4
<i>Liber in gloria martyrum</i>	7	1
<i>Liber de miraculis Andreae apostoli</i>	2	0
<i>Liber in gloria confessorum</i>	9	2

¹³⁷ For more on these traditions see Durmont in *Monks, Bishops, and Pagans*, 120.

¹³⁸ For a more detailed account and the context of each occurrence, see appendix 1.

<i>Passio septem dormientium</i>	1	0
	50	15

This table shows both the occurrences of *iust** and *iniust** - which includes all word-forms of *iustitia* in the works. There are some patterns that stand out immediately - the word is used most in the *VP*, which contains twenty different biographies of sometimes more than one saint (which, for example, is the case in the first story about the brothers Lupicinus and Romanus). The *VM* contains fewer mentions of the word while being a considerably longer text than the *VP*, counting 45 chapters of variable length compared to the 20 chapters of *VP*.

Let us take a closer look at some mentions of *iustitia* and its variants in the *VP*. I judged it to be more interesting to explore some mentions in detail - quoting the material and surrounding sentences in an extensive way - so that we might see and study the context in which it appears. Below, I will discuss two separate stories from the *VP*. That might be a slightly small sample of all the occurrences mentioned above - but it does allow me to examine two of these stories in depth. The choice is made on the distinction I mentioned in the previous paragraph. The first story, the story of Abraham the Abbot, is an example of Gregory of Tours writing in a biblical tradition - engaging with *iustitia* in a way that can be traced back to the vulgate and the interpretations and writings of the church fathers.

The second story about Nicetius, bishop of Lyons, is a family affair - for Nicetius was Gregory's great-uncle. As we will see, this emotional distance (or rather: closeness) leads to a story that is based in traditions of transmission - explicitly making use of the short distance between Gregory and Nicetius. Gregory even mentions himself as an eyewitness to some of these events - both in intimate details from his childhood as in a more 'official' capacity as a deacon, later in life. I have chosen these two stories because I think they give an interesting insight in the use of *iustitia* and virtue in these hagiographical stories - showing both similarities and interesting differences.

3.3.1: Abraham the Abbot

The first time the full word 'iustitia' is mentioned as an ablative, is in the third chapter, the story of the holy Abbot Abraham. Gregory parallels his life's story to the ancient Abraham, especially when it comes to ascetic qualities - although the

Abraham of Gregory is definitely less of an ascetic. Gregory's Abraham was a bishop from afar - someone born on the banks of the Euphrates and, after some misadventure in Egypt he ended up in, of all places, Clermont. There, he founded a monastery and performed some miracles - miracles that mostly concerned consumables. Gregory seems to be aware that these few miracles are not the most spectacular. The mention of *iustitia* appears in the prologue, which shortly introduces the saint, and sets him in a biblical, specifically old-testament context:

Reliquit autem hic non solum terram propriam, sed etiam illam veteris hominis actionem, et induit novum hominem, qui secundum Deum formatus est in **iustitia**, sanctitate et veritate.

Ideoque cum se perfectum in Dei opere cerneret, non fuit dubius in fide petere, quod per vitam sanctam confisus est obtinere, per quem opifex caeli, maris ac terrae parva quidem numero, sed admiranda miracula operare dignatus est.

For this man [like the ancient Abraham - BS] left not only his own country but also the life of the old man, and put on the new man, who is fashioned according to God in justice, sanctity and truth. And therefore when he saw himself to be perfect in the service of God he did not hesitate to seek what he could obtain through a holy life - for through him, the maker of the sky, the sea and the earth deigned to work miracles which deserved admiration, though they be few in number.¹³⁹

This first mention of *iustitia* follows a direct citation of Genesis, where this Abraham is compared to his ancient namesake. It takes an important place - as an indirect description of God. This is visible especially in Latin. As said, the description is indirect. It is directed first at Abraham, the saint, who leaves his former life behind to become as God is, in justice, sanctity and truth. These virtues that surround *iustitia* are also interesting and important. Both *sanctitate* (sanctity) and *veritate* (truth) are connected to God - so, like *iustitia* they are descriptors of the Lord, albeit indirect. They are virtues, but not ones from the 'classical four' as we have encountered them in the previous chapters - nor are they the 'classical' virtues of the faith. These three virtues are almost direct quotation from the Bible - from the letters of Paul in Ephesians 4:23 and 24:¹⁴⁰

Renovamini autem spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem, qui secundum

¹³⁹ I have chosen to present both the latin and the english translation in the main text, since they are both equally important in this investigation. Both the Latin and the translation are from the edition by De Nie, unless otherwise noted: Gregory of Tours, *Lives and Miracles*, ed. by Giselle de Nie, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, 39 (Cambridge, 2015) this particular quote is from *VP*, Ch. 3, 3 - 4.

¹⁴⁰ Interestingly, De Nie does not refer to this verse in her edition.

Deum creatus est in iustitia, et sanctitate veritatis.¹⁴¹

In translation of the New International Version of the Bible:

to be made new in the attitude of your minds; and to put on the new self, created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness.

While Gregory's description is very much like the Bible verse, it is not the same - there is a very important difference in hierarchy. The original Latin Bible text does not speak of 'justice, sanctity *and* truth', but of 'true justice and [true] holiness'.

This is a perhaps small but very important difference - as many a translator can attest. It is, as I just said, a difference in hierarchy. The difference between 'true righteousness and true holiness' and 'truth and righteousness and holiness'. To write it down in a somewhat abstract way: it is the difference between xZ and xY , *and*, $X=Y=Z$. In Gregory's version, the virtue *veritate* is on the same level as the other two. In the vulgate, however, *veritatis* is a descriptor of the other two virtues.

However, writing them down as three ablatives and thus creating the three separate virtues *sanctitate*, *veritate* and *iustitia* was probably not Gregory's idea - these virtues appear in other places. They are mentioned by Augustine in this order in *Contra Faustum*. In this theological dialogue with Faustus the Manichee, Augustine puts the following words into his opponent's mouth:

[Paulus] Dicit ad ephesios: ut deponatis secundum priorem conversationem veterem hominem, qui corrumpitur per desideria erroris; renouamini autem spiritu mentis vestrae et induite nouum hominem, qui secundum deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis.

Vides ergo, quando creatur homo ad imaginem dei, uides hic et hominem ostendi alterum et natiuitatem aliam et alium nascendi modum. Nam cum exuite uos et induite dicit, tempus utique credulitatis significat; cum uero hominem nouum a deo creari testatur, tum indicat ueterem nec ab ipso esse nec secundum eum formatum. Et cum prosequitur dicens illum quidem fieri in sanctitate et iustitia et ueritate¹⁴² [...].

He [Paul] says to the Ephesians, "That ye put off according to your former conversation

¹⁴¹ Biblia Sacra Vulgata (BSV), Ep. Pauli ad Ephesios, 4:23, available on <https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Ephesios+4%3A24&version=VULGATE> (retrieved 16 - 9 - 2021). As far as I know, there are no variant readings that put these virtues in a different hierarchical order.

¹⁴² Augustinus Hipponensis, *Contra Faustum*, CPL 0321, CSEL, 25 (J. Zycha, 1891) lib. : 24, par. : 1, pag. : 719, linea : 9.

the old man, which is corrupt through deceitful lusts; and be renewed in the spirit of your mind; and put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and holiness of truth."

This shows that in the creation of man after the image of God, it is another man that is spoken of, and another birth, and another manner of birth. The putting off and putting on of which he speaks, point to the time of the reception of the truth; and the assertion that the new man is created by God implies that the old man is created neither by God nor after God. And when he adds, that this new man is made in holiness and righteousness and truth.¹⁴³

Here, Augustine does something interesting. When arguing the position of his Manichaean opponent, he lets Faustus misinterpret the Bible - or at least lets him interpret in a different way than the most strict interpretation of the verse would imply. He lets Faustus cite the correct verse, but in his interpretation the hierarchy of the virtues shifts. Where the Bible speaks of 'true virtues' (the xZ and xY-variant), in his exposition on what it means to be created in the image of God, and, more importantly, what exactly 'birth' or 'new birth' entails, Faustus mentions this renewal as 'made in holiness *and* righteousness *and* truth. So - as hierarchical equals, as $X = Y = Z$.

It is possible that this is reading too much into it - that Augustine made a stylistic choice in this letter and did not mean anything noteworthy by it concerning the virtues. It is also possible that he made his opponent intentionally make an error in interpretation - as a subversive way to weaken his position. Whatever his motive, he did write down these three virtues on an equal level - thereby changing the meaning of these virtues, or at least adds other level of possible interpretation.

The virtues also appear in the (pseudo?)-Augustinian *Liber de divinis scripturis sive Speculum*, where they appear in the exact same order, in a similar sentence that also is remarkably like the Bible verse quoted below.

[...]induite novum hominem, qui secundum deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate et veritate.¹⁴⁴

Assume the form of a new man, who is created after God in justice and holiness and

¹⁴³ Translated by Philip Schaff. *Augustine: The Writings Against the Manichaeans and Against the Donatists*. First Series, Vol. 4. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Available online here: <https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf104.iv.ix.xxvi.html>.

¹⁴⁴ Augustinus Hipponensis (pseudo) - *Liber de diuinis scripturis sive Speculum* (inc.: 'Audi Israel') (CPL 0384) cap.: 103, pag.: 629, lin: 14

truth.¹⁴⁵

Here, we see deviation from the Bible verse again, in the same way as we have seen before - the hierarchical structure of the three virtues is the same - they are put on the same level, emphasized by the *et* in the middle. Augustine then, seems to have played around with the order and the nature of these virtues. It is not the aim of this thesis to analyze Augustine's ideas, and to draw any conclusions on *his* thinking on the basis of just these two fragments goes way too far. However, this small chase does show how these things - a change of hierarchical order, and so a change of thought on virtue - might come to exist.

Let us try to take this chase even further - for we can go back one more step. Ambrose too mentions these three virtues in one of his writings, and it is so similar that it is worth quoting the passage from *De Spiritu Sancto (On the Holy Spirit)* in full:

Renascimur autem, quando interiore renovamur adfectu et exterioris hominis desideria vetusta deponimus. Et ideo ait iterum apostolus: Renovamini autem spiritu mentis vestrae et induite novum hominem, qui secundum deum creatus est in veritate et iustitia et sanctitate.¹⁴⁶

Now, we are born again when we are renewed in our inward affections and lay aside the old age of the outer man. And so the Apostle says again: 'And be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who, according to God, is created in truth, and justice, and holiness'.¹⁴⁷

This passage is part of a section that explores renewal and the possibility of spiritual renewal or rebirth - hence the mention of this specific Bible passage.¹⁴⁸ But here, again, the edition of *De Spiritu Sancto* places the virtues on a different hierarchical level from the Bible - again signified by the *et*.¹⁴⁹ Again, it is an interpretation of the Bible verse - which appears as a direct quotation in the edition but differs from the text as it appeared in the Vulgate.

Ambrose uses this passage in a piece on the renewal of the soul after the bodily death. So, he somewhat reinterprets this Bible text and the virtues therein - but he too keeps them focussed on God. He argues that the renewal of the spirit happens

¹⁴⁵ Translation mine.

¹⁴⁶ See Ambrosius, *De Spiritu Sancto*, CPL 0151, CSEL, 79 (O. Faller), lib. 2, cap. 7, par. 65.

¹⁴⁷ Ambrose and Roy J Deferrari, *Theological and Dogmatic Works: The Fathers of the Church, a New Translation*, v. 44 (Washington: Catholic University of American Press, 1963), 118 - 119.

¹⁴⁸ Abovementioned edition agrees.

¹⁴⁹ This is called a *Polysyndeton* - a literary style figure that means 'bound together'.

according to the image of God, which is in *veritate*, *justitia* and *sanctitate*. These are three qualities or virtues that define God, it is a similar indirect description like the one we have seen before. However, rather than projecting them on the life of this earth, he projects them on the nature of the immortal soul - and argues that a renewal according to these principles is possible - taking them to a somewhat more abstract and theoretical sphere.

Ambrose played around with these virtues, lifting them from the Bible, and interpreting and using them in an argument that was related to the subject of the verse, but also quite different, since it is related to the Holy Spirit, the soul and its immortal properties. This shows a willingness to interpret these virtues - to take them out of one context and put them in another - and to think about their meaning in a way that goes further than the context of the original verse might imply.

It is not the intention here to fully explain and understand the thoughts of either Augustine or Ambrose on these virtues in this context, but I believe this small investigation of these particular three virtues has taught us something. First, there is the quite obvious conclusion that *iustitia* was quite clearly and plainly connected to ideas about God and holiness, that *iustitia* was an essential part of men shaped in the image of God, and therefore of God himself. This is an indirect description, but a description nonetheless. Like the other two virtues mentioned, *sanctitate* and *veritate*, *iustitia* is descriptor of God.

The second observation is the fact that even the smallest detail can lead to a historical chase of the virtues. A simple passage leads us not only to the Bible, but to two of the most important Christian thinkers and writers of the Early Middle ages and late antiquity, and shows us the freedoms they had in making changes, in how to quote and interpret the Bible, and in the way they chose to interpret these quotes and use them in their writings and arguments. It also shows us that, as mentioned in the introduction, *iustitia* is by no means tied to the four cardinal virtues - there are other spiritual and intellectual contexts in which *iustitia* was used - and one of these contexts had the most gravitas: the properties of God.

Therefore, before we take a look what this means for Gregory's work, let us compare again the four phrases closely:

Vulgate (eph 4:24)	Gregory of Tours	Augustine of Hippo (<i>Contra Faustum</i>)	Amrose of Milan (<i>De Spirito Sancto</i>)
[...] qui secundum Deum creatus est in iustitia, et sanctitate veritatis. ¹⁵⁰	[...] qui secundum Deum formatus est in iustitia, sanctitate et veritate.	Et cum prosequitur dicens illum quidem fieri in sanctitate et iustitia et veritate	qui secundum deum creatus est in veritate et iustitia et sanctitate.

The chase we enjoyed and the results as seen above, show that Gregory probably did not come up with the section of the three virtues. He does not directly quote the Bible, and neither does he directly lift the sentence from either Augustine or Ambrose. He leaves out an *et*, which appears in all the other interpretations, but at the same time uses a different word-form than that of the Vulgate. This makes it likely that he was at least familiar with the works of Augustine and Ambrose - not in the sense that he knew these texts so well that he quoted them unconsciously, but with their thoughts and ideas about the possibility of spiritual renewal, and the origins and nature of men and, above all, God. It shows that, while it goes too far to see this as proof that he read those two authors, he was aware of the way these virtues were used in relation to God, the soul and the concept of birth and renewal, and he accepted their meaning and introduced a form of this in his own writing.

He took the virtues from their biblical and theological contexts, and implemented them in his hagiographical works set in his own time and place. He was very much aware of their descriptive qualities - the virtues functioning as an indirect description of God - and he used that as an argument for the holiness of his subjects. These people possessed these virtues - therefore possessed something that is holy. The fact that he does so not as a direct quotation but ‘in his own words’, hints at an internalized process - as an expression of his own ideas and reflections.

3.3.2: The bishop Nicetius

¹⁵⁰ Biblia Sacra Vulgata (BSV), Ep. Pauli ad Ephesios, 4:24. As far as I know, there are no (historical) variant readings that put these virtues in a different hierarchical order.

Let us now take a look at another example - the story of the Holy Bishop Nicetius of Lyons. This is an interesting story for a few reasons. First, it is about Gregory's great-uncle from his mother's side - so there is family involved. This makes the 'emotional distance' as short as can be - and therefore his use of the word *iustitia* might tell us more about how this specific virtue lived in his mind. Secondly, as we will see, the virtue appears two times in this (relatively long - with 40 modern pages) story. It appears as *iustitiae*, but also as its opposite, *iniuste*. Finally, there is an interesting name appearing in this story - a person called *Iusto* enters the stage. A name which might not be that unusual, but might be more purposeful than its first appearance may suggest.

First, an overview of the story. As I said - Nicetius is directly related to Gregory - he is his great-uncle from his mother's side. He mentions this personal connection - putting himself in the story as a witness to the subject's virtuousness and holiness in shows of chastity and miracles, which will not be further discussed here.¹⁵¹ He mentions in the prologue that an earlier *vita* exists, but that Gregory judged it incomplete. And in a perfect example of early medieval (false?) modesty he explains that he sets out to write a new version, which will include 'those [miracles] unknown to the earlier author' but in inferior ('rustic' or '*rusticiori stylo*') words.¹⁵²

The work then, follows a pretty standard chronological story - beginning at his birth, showing great piety from a very young age, piety maintained during a priesthood, an episcopate, his death, and some appearances thereafter. As in the previous story, Gregory here too emphasizes a certain degree of ascetic renouncement of earthly pleasures and wealth - making it very clear that Nicetius was coming from a political influential line of rich and wealthy senators. However the first chapter likewise makes it clear that 'becoming a bishop' was very much a political affair in the Early Middle ages. This point is repeated more explicitly in the third chapter, where Nicetius is made bishop of Lyons by Childebert, after the former bishop asked the king do to so.¹⁵³ An analysis of the political implications of this process is beyond the scope of this thesis, but I nevertheless found it interesting to mention, because it reminds us of the fact that the spheres we might anachronistically separate as 'religious' and 'secular' are intertwined in Gregory's time.

¹⁵¹ See, for example, *VP*, 2:4

¹⁵² See the last sentence of the *Prologus* to chapter 8.

¹⁵³ *VP*, 8, par. 1 and 3 especially.

Gregory follows the life of this holy man, which at some points is interwoven with his own, and gives accounts of miracles and virtuous deeds. Some of these deeds took place when he was still alive, and some only happened after his death. Let us now focus on the ones connected with the virtue *iustitia* - for there are two miracles where the virtue plays a great role.

The first occurrence of the word *iustitiae*, this time as a genitive, is in a rather action-packed and mysterious passage, in which our holy man catches a possessed deacon. When entering a church Nicetius, seemingly out of nowhere, tells off a deacon who is singing a psalm:

Et ille commotus, ait: "Sileat! Sileat! Nec praesumat canere **iustitiae** Inimicus!" Et dicto citius obpilato ore, siluit. Iussitque eum vocari ad se sanctus, et ait: "None praeceperam tibi ne ingrederis ecclesiam Dei? Et cur ausu temerario ingredi praesumpsisti? Aut cur vocem et canticis dominicis es aussus emittere?"

And he [Nicetius] became angry, saying: "Let him be quiet! Let him be quiet! Let the Enemy of justice not presume to sing!" And quicker than can be said, [the deacon's] throat was blocked, and he fell silent. The holy man then commanded the deacon to come to him and said: "Did I not order you no to enter the Church of God? And why have you rashly dared to enter? And why do you dare to send forth your voice in the Lord's songs?"¹⁵⁴

So, after the words of Nicetius, the throat of the deacon is blocked immediately - and he cannot sing or otherwise utter another word. The reader (like the surrounding clergymen in the story) is probably surprised by this sudden telling-off by our holy man that seems to come out of the blue. In the next lines it is revealed that our singing deacon is actually possessed by a demon. Nicetius 'recognized' the voice of the demon - and after he places his hands on the poor deacon, the demon is expelled and the deacon is restored to sanity.¹⁵⁵

Here, our virtue takes the shape of a genitive with *Inimicus*, which De Nie capitalized in both her edition and the translation, while the Library of Latin texts does not.¹⁵⁶ Like in the previous example, the *iustitiae Inimicus*, the 'enemy of justice', that is being praised by this song is a description that goes both ways. If the enemy of justice is the example of 'bad', then justice itself must be the 'good'.

¹⁵⁴ Both latin and translation from De Nie *VP* 8:4, p 115.

¹⁵⁵ *VP*, 8:4.

¹⁵⁶ Since the conventions of capitalization and meaning attached to it are more modern I did not think this very relevant.

The first thing we must take into stock is who this ‘enemy of justice’ or *Incimus iustitiae* is. For it is not the deacon, although the words come from his mouth. As is later revealed, the ‘enemy of justice’ is a demon - a demon that possessed the deacon and is expelled by Nicetius. Now, this is important if we want to discover who the ‘enemy of justice’ actually is, and, by the same indirect description we have seen before, who or what is *iustitia*.

If the demon is the true enemy of justice, then it follows that the enemy of that enemy is justice itself. In other words: from the ‘enemy of justice’ follows that God *is* justice - or at least that ‘justice’ is part of God. Notice here that it is not about a ‘just God’ but about ‘justice’ itself. The very meaning of the virtue is embedded in that what we call God. *Iustitia* is then a central part of the divine, and a virtue that, in a way, defines God. Without *iustitia*, God, would not be God. Although *iustitia* is not given a further definition here (or anywhere in this particular story) this is nonetheless a significant point - the fact that *iustitia* is part of the divine.

Equally interesting is the way this ‘enemy of justice’ is praised by our poor deacon - or at least by his mouth - for this is connected to the ideas about *iustitia*. He is singing a psalm, which is a way of worship. Earlier in the story this is emphasized by Gregory, who stresses Nicetius’ involvement with the education of young boys, so they

[...]be taught to read and to sing psalms so that they could join others singing and be able to participate in antiphons as well as in various meditations, as their spiritual devotions required¹⁵⁷.

This emphasis on singing and other forms of spoken worship is a pattern in this story. There is more than one instance where someone is either worshipping in the wrong way, or speaking evil, and therefore is offending God or His saints. The sentence ‘let the Enemy of justice not presume to sing!’ tells us that singing, again, was a very serious and accepted way of prayer and worship. Singing, in this fragment, was something that could and should be done out of pious commitment - it is a form of worship. And worshipping the wrong way, or from the wrong mouth, is a crime against justice, and God himself.

This connection between vocal worship and *iustitia* is also visible in the other occurrences. The next occurrence is in the form of a name. After his death and burial in a basilica, Nicetius returns from the afterlife flanked by two other bishops:

¹⁵⁷ VP, 8:2, lin. 2.

named *Iustus* (*Iusto* in the ablative) and Eucherius. He comes back to scold a priest, who is rather angry that Nicetius did not leave any earthly wealth or money to the church in which he was buried. This apparently greatly disappointed the priest of said church. According to Gregory he spent quite some time badmouthing Nicetius in public, proclaiming that “many used to say that Nicetius was insensitive. Now, this turns out to be true, for he has left nothing to the basilica in which he is buried!”¹⁵⁸ Nicetius’ sense of hearing apparently still very much functioning, he appeared to the priest the following night:

Sequenti autem nocte apparuit prebystero com duobus episcopis, id est **Iusto** et Eucherio, in veste flugenti, dicens ad eos: “Hic presbyter, sanctissimi fratres, blasphemis me obruit, dicens quia nihil facultatis scripserim templo huic qui requiesco. Et nescit quia quidquid pretiosius habui ibidem reliqui, id est glaebam corpus mihi!”. At illi dixerunt: “**Iniuste** fecit ut detraheret servo Dei!”. Conversusque sanctus ad presbyterum, pugnis palmisque guttur eius illisit, dicens: “Peccator conterende desine stulte loqui!”

In the night that followed, however, the bishop [Nicetius] appeared to the priest in a shining robe, together with two other bishops, Justus and Eucherius, and said to them: “This priest, most holy fathers, buried me under blasphemies when he said that I left none of my resources to this temple in which I rest. And he does not realize that I have left my most precious possession: the dust of my body!” And they said: “He disparaged a servant of God and acted unjustly!” And, turning to the priest, the holy man [Nicetius] pounded his throat with his fists, saying: “Sinner who deserves to be trodden underfoot, stop speaking such nonsense!”¹⁵⁹

This nightly ‘pounding of the throat’ left the priest in terrible torment and unable to speak for forty days; his jaws swollen and in so much pain he ‘had could scarcely swallow his saliva’. Only when he invoked the name of the confessor his pain and torment subsided - and he never spoke ill of Nicetius again.

In this fragment, we see the virtue of *iustitia* again connected to audible things and the spoken word. Here, it is used in the negative, again spoken by Nicetius as an accusation. The interesting point here, is the observation what exactly is *iniuste*, unjust, in this context. That qualification is pointed at the priest, who performed an ‘unjust act’. It is not so much the words that the priest spoke or the accusations therein that are the core of this ‘unjustness’, it is the act of speaking itself that gets this qualification. Like in the first example we have seen, *iustitia* is connected to an act that involves the spoken or the sung word.

The second point mirrors the ones we have seen earlier. We have seen in both

¹⁵⁸ *VP*, 8:5, lin 2.

¹⁵⁹ *VP* 8:5, lin. 3 and 4. Translation on p. 118.

the story of Abraham and the first fragment of this story, that *iustitia* is used as an indirect description of God. In doing so, Gregory makes *iustitia* an essential part of God - and this has quite far reaching implications in this fragment. For, when a priest (who, this time, is completely un-possessed) speaks ill of the holy Nicetius, he acts unjustly, *iniuste*. The implication then, is that an offence against Nicetius is also an offence against God, for all unjust acts go against God, by definition. *Iustitia* is again connected with God *and* the saint - and if the saint is just, he has a common property with God.

To get these messages across, Nicetius does not appear on his own, but flanked by two of his predecessors, one of whom is called *Iustus*. Let us focus shortly on this *Iustus*, one of the two bishops that appear together with Nicetius. Eucherius and *Iustus* are, first and foremost, predecessors of Nicetius. Both were bishop of Lyons in the fourth century, and both held a reputation for their ascetic life. *Iustus*, whose name encapsulates part of both the letters and the meaning of *iustitia*, was especially famed for his humble lifestyle. As bishop, he was present at the council of Aquileia in 381, where he showed himself a staunch opponent of Arianism. Later in life, after a murder committed in his church, he left his see and chose to live as a hermit.¹⁶⁰ The fact that it is *this* bishop, with *this* name that appears with Nicetius to reprimand a priest for unjust acts, would be too happy a coincidence to have nothing to do with the virtue. While he (and Eucherius) have no acting role in the story and are seemingly just there as a confirmation of the now saintly status of Nicetius, the fact that someone called 'the just' appears in a punishment of an unjust act is significant. It is another way to connect *iustitia* with sainthood - and therefore, God.

3.4 A short conclusion

We have now seen a closer analysis of two fragments from the *Vita Patrum* in an attempt to understand something of Gregory of 'Tours' ideas and worldview concerning *iustitia*. What preliminary conclusions can we draw from the observations made in this chapter?

First, there is the way that Gregory uses *iustitia*, and how he applies it to the saints he writes about. He shows remarkable freedom and creativity, by using *iustitia* as it appeared in its biblical context, and apply it to the saint he is writing

¹⁶⁰ More details can be found in his own *Vita*: see *Life of Saint Justus, Bishop of Lyon* Philip Beagon, David Lambert, Cult of Saints, E06326 - <http://cls.history.ox.ac.uk/record.php?recid=E06326>

about. The biblical three-span of *iustitia*, *sanctitate* and *veritate* is both changed in hierarchy, and changed in subject - they are virtues that now apply to the saint in question. In playing with these virtues, Gregory acts in a longer tradition of church fathers who have thought about virtue, and who have written about these biblical virtues in a way that is separated from their original context. By applying them to a saint, Gregory goes even further. By emphasizing, like the Bible verse he bases himself on, that man is created in the image of God, he gives both a description of the saint *and* God. In that way, he connects the saint to God via *iustitia*, *sanctitate* and *veritate*. The second story follows a similar strategy - albeit a bit more covered. There, the 'enemy of justice' is a demon - and therefore *iustitia* is a descriptor of God himself - God is justice - or at least, justice is an essential part of God. When later in the story a non-possessed priest speaks unjustly of the holy man - the implication is that he also speaks unjustly of God. The saint and God are of the same virtuousness - they share a virtue. And so, the descriptor *iustitia* is lifted by Gregory from its classical and biblical contexts, and made into something new, something that can be a descriptor of both God himself and the saint in question.

This connection of *iustitia* and the biblical tradition is clearly visible in the first story we have seen - the story of Abraham. In the second story, the story of his great-uncle Nicetius, we see a different aspect of *iustitia* - and a different aspect of dealing with virtue in general. Here, *iustitia* is not coupled to either a Bible verse or a classical idea - but to spoken acts. Whether it is a demon singing a psalm or a priest complaining about the stinginess of the dead - the act of speaking or singing, whether in false praise or wrongful damnation, is considered unjust - *iniuste*. So, if God is just by definition, the way that we humans can perform unjust works is by speaking ill of God, by uttering words that go against the divine, and by singing psalms with our hearts in the wrong place.

All this shows a certain creativity - a definition of *iustitia* that goes beyond the biblical tradition and seems quite unrelated to the cardinal virtues that we have seen in the introduction. Gregory uses this idea of divine *iustitia*, of *iustitia* as a descriptor of God, and uses it to argue for his subjects' holiness. It shows that he was familiar with the virtue, and that he saw fit to use it as a descriptor of saintliness. This familiarity likely came from his education - an education which, as we have seen, consisted for a large part of clerical thought and other religious writings. However, we can also look at Gregory as a figure who is between two intellectual traditions - two traditions of transferring knowledge and ideas, the picture shifts. On the one hand, he is aware of his background - and he defines his own background as learned, elite men from the time tended to do. He loved Virgil,

he quoted Martianus Capella, referred to Pliny the Elder and so he put himself into a tradition of 'great learned men', Christian or Christianized by later generations, and did so sometimes explicitly, but often implicitly.

On the other hand, Gregory is standing in a tradition of transmission - of telling and retelling stories, and preventing them from being forgotten. This is not a history of philosophical or theological treatises, but one of telling and retelling through his own accounts or those of eye-witnesses. This, too, is a tradition that shines through his way of storytelling, when he refers to friends, contacts and other witnesses of the events he is describing. The story of Nicetius is a prime example of this tradition. The way he weaves *institia* through that narrative shows a creativity in marrying these two traditions - the tradition of the Learned Men and the tradition of telling and retelling - two different literary forms, used to communicate different ideas. It is this creativity that makes Gregory of Tours stand out as an author - and his dynamic interpretation of *institia* is all the more interesting because of it.

4. Gregory the Great

The second Gregory is a greater Gregory, or at least he has become such in historiography. Gregory the Great (around 540 - 604) was, if we take the accepted estimate of 538, two years younger than Gregory of Tours, and so they were contemporaries. We have explored some of their similarities in the introduction, now I want to emphasize their difference. They never met, and as we will see their backgrounds were completely different. In this chapter, I will explore the *Dialogi*, the main hagiographical work of Gregory the Great, and the main source in this thesis. After that, there is a short biographical overview, focussing in particular on Gregory the Great's education and background. And then finally an analysis of the source material.

4.1 Gregory the Great: an introduction to the source material

First, let us take some time to reflect on the historiographical position of Gregory the Great. He is one of the most studied figures in late antiquity and the Early Middle ages - for no small part because he can act like an historiographical bridge between these two time periods. His *Regula Pastoralis* and the *Vita Benedicti* (the Life of St. Benedict, which is part of the *Dialogi*) were greatly influential in the Middle Ages in the formation of and thought on monastic life - an influence which has been the subject of many a study.¹⁶¹ On the other hand, Gregory's education, his influences and, to a certain extent, his career-path, were decidedly late-antique. According to R.A. Markus on whose *Gregory the Great and his world* I thankfully can rely, we must see Gregory the Great as 'belonging to two worlds' - the world of the ancient patristic Christian writers like Augustine and Ambrose, and the world of his medieval successors.¹⁶² This division between the ancient world on one side and the medieval one on the other is always, to some extent, artificial - but it does allow us to see a process of negotiation - a process of adapting older and established ideas not for an unknown 'medieval future' but for the world Gregory lived in.

The *Dialogi* (*Dial*) are somewhat unique within the context of Gregory the

¹⁶¹ The articles printed and works cited in *A Companion to Gregory the Great*, ed. by Bronwen Neil and Matthew Dal Santo, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, 47 (Leiden ; Boston: 2013) give only an idea of the wide range of studies Gregory the Great and his work has played a major part in. They range from biographies to the studies on the history of thought and the workings of medieval power. Every thinkable angle is possible.

¹⁶² R. A. Markus, *Gregory the Great and His World* (Cambridge ; 1997), XII.

Great's work. Compared to the more theological and normative works of the *Moralia in Job* or the highly influential *Regula Pastoralis*, the hagiographical nature of the *Dialogi* can be seen as an anomaly - and perhaps this is the reason that up until this day some scholars are not convinced that they are actually written by Gregory the Great, but rather by a pseudo-Gregory. Most famously argued by Francis Clark in 1987, this position doubts the attribution of all but the first part of the *Dialogi*. He argues that all books with the exception of the first are authored by an impostor who tried to present the entire four books as written by Gregory the Great.¹⁶³ This is a continuation of an academic debate that has raged since the sixteenth century - so I must concede that it is not a question I will be able to answer here - but for this investigation I will view them as genuine, as truly written by Gregory, which is also the position of most modern scholars on the topic.¹⁶⁴

Let us take a closer look at the work in the context of the writings of Gregory the Great. The *Dialogi*, presumably written between July 593 and November 594,¹⁶⁵ consist of four books, each book a report of a conversation of Gregory with Peter, a deacon. In these dialogues, Gregory argues that saints must have been present in Italy as well as in other places. Stephen Lake has suggested that this was a deliberate construction of an equivalent to the more exotic ascetic saints from the east, and the more recent stories of the Gallic saints. In works of Gregory of Tours we saw an example of this production of Gallic sainthood - and the idea that Gregory the Great wrote the *Dialogi* not as a specific response to Gregory of Tours but as his way of giving expression to the wider tradition he was part of, would make for a rather poetic theme in this investigation.¹⁶⁶ The four books that make up the *Dialogi* are each different in character and content, and this is the subject of the next section.

4.1.2 The four books of the *Dialogi*

The four books that make up the *Dialogorum libri quattuor* each have a distinct character and tone - but it is especially the fourth book that differs from the other three. Here, I will present an overview of these books, and argue why book IV must be seen in a different light.

¹⁶³ See Francis Clarke, *The Pseudo - Gregorian Dialogues*, (Leiden, 1987).

¹⁶⁴ See Stephen Lake, 'Hagiography and the Cult of Saints', in *A Companion to Gregory the Great*, ed. by Bronwen Neil and Matthew J. Dal Santo (Leiden, 2012), 225

¹⁶⁵ Lake, 'Hagiography and the Cult of Saints', 227.

¹⁶⁶ For the argument see Lake, 'Hagiography and the Cult of Saints', 227.

Book one and three of the *Dialogi* present a collection of shorter saints' lives and miracle stories - in content quite similar to the compact stories that Gregory of Tours presented us. The second book is a longer and more complete biography of Benedict of Nursia, and, contrary to the stories that appear in the other books, is a detailed account of a life, from birth to death. The stories in the other books are similar in scope to those we have encountered in the previous chapter - smaller in scope, with a focus on the miracles and acts that made the saint in question worthy of remembrance.

This immediately becomes apparent when reading the first pages of the first book. Peter, Gregory's pupil and partner in conversation for the next four books, laments the lack of saints and miracle-workers in their own land. He has heard of virtuous people, he says, but not of saints or holy men.¹⁶⁷ Gregory replies that there most certainly are - and starts to tell Peter about their lives. What follows is a recounting of the lives of different local saints, all inspired by 'his own observations or good, reliable witnesses'.¹⁶⁸ What follows is a justification - why it is as worthy of one's time to study scripture as it is to devote your time to the study of the lives of the holy men. Via the mouth of Peter, Gregory tells us that 'the amount of edification to be gained from a description of miracles is just as great [as studying scripture]. An explanation of Scripture teaches us how to attain virtue and how to persevere in it, whereas a description of miracles shows us how this acquired virtue reveals itself to those who persevere in it.'¹⁶⁹

The miracles which will be discussed in the following books, then, are the embodiment of virtue - they are what can happen if a virtuous person persists, and as such they are a physical manifestation of virtue itself. However, Gregory stresses that it is not the saint himself that performs the miracles, but it is God - through the virtue expressed by the saint.¹⁷⁰ What follows is a retelling of these miracles. In the first story we meet Honoratus, who stops a rock tumbling down a mountain mid-fall, preventing it from crushing a monastery.¹⁷¹ Then, we meet Libertinus, a student of the former saint, who manages to revive a dead child by invoking the name of his former master. A miracle that, according to Gregory, can be attributed to both Libertinus prayers and Honoratus' virtue - stressing again the eternal nature of virtue, and the power of virtuous men both in life and in death.¹⁷² This theme of holiness, and particularly miracles, recurs in almost all

¹⁶⁷ Dial. I.Prologue (P).7.

¹⁶⁸ Dial. I.P.8. English translations are taken from Gregory the Great, *Dialogues*, trans & ed. Odo John Zimmermann, The Fathers of the Church, v. 39 (Washington, D.C, 2002), unless noted otherwise.

¹⁶⁹ Dial. I.P.9.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ The story as told in Dial. I.1.

stories in the first book. More stories follow, and we will look at two of them in more detail in the next chapter.

The general form of the first book however, is exemplified by these two stories and the way they grip into each other. All books take the form of a long-form dialogue with no clear separations between chapters. Stories flow into each other, sometimes because Peter asks for more, sometimes because Gregory seemingly spontaneously thinks of another story that would fit here. This makes for a continuous narrative in which different characters appear and disappear - quite different from the more structured approach of Gregory of Tours.

This form of dialogue is the main support for the story in all four books. The second book, however, deals only with one saint: Benedict. Perhaps Gregory's most famous hagiographical work, this life is also a dialogue - although Peter gets remarkably less room for interjection. It is mostly Gregory telling of the saint, with his partner encouraging him with requests for more details of further explanation.¹⁷³ Gregory stitches together different events in the saint's life, taking again the different miracles as the most important signifier of holiness. These miracles include wetting the ground so that crops will grow¹⁷⁴, hitting lazy monks with his staff to exorcise the devil and turn their thoughts to the heavens once more¹⁷⁵ and changing the weight of heavy rocks so they can be moved by a few men.¹⁷⁶ These stories are intertwined with some exposition of a didactic nature - quoting the scripture, and arguing that Benedict 'possessed the spirit of the savior'¹⁷⁷ This continues the pattern of theological and didactic statements that are then proven with extensive stories about miracles and acts.

The third book is similar to the first in terms of topics and constructions - it offers a description of various saints and their lives, framed as a didactic dialogue.

The fourth and last book however, diverts from this formula. It is still a dialogue, but it is concerned primarily with questions on the soul, the afterlife and death. As Lake observed, this book is more of an exposition on a theme - saints are present but are not the 'primary characters' of the stories - and miracles are all but absent, especially the more spectacular and flashy ones encountered in the first and third books.¹⁷⁸ It also repurposes some stories and ideas also found in the

¹⁷³ See for example the responses of Peter in Dial. II.3 & II.4.

¹⁷⁴ Dial. II.5.

¹⁷⁵ Dial. II.4.

¹⁷⁶ Dial. II.9.

¹⁷⁷ Dial. II.8.

¹⁷⁸ Lake, 'Hagiography and the Cult of Saints', 228.

Homiliae in Evangelia.¹⁷⁹ Lake argues that this points to Gregory's personal preference. The length (book four is the longest), change of style and the carefulness with which the subject is approached and argued, may point to the fact the Gregory saw this book as the most important.

The fourth book has a different character than the first three. Here, the core of the book are Gregory's ideas on the soul, death, and especially heaven, hell and purgatory - a theme that is also prominent in *Moralia in Job*, from which the fourth book repurposes certain passages.¹⁸⁰ The fact that the center of gravity of this book lies with Gregory's ideas about these themes, the focus of the entire book changes. It is still a dialogue, and there are still events in the lives of holy men that are being discussed, but even more than in the previous books these stories are there to prove and expand on Gregory's teachings - they do not stand alone in isolation, they are part of a greater point to be made. This has a great and interesting impact on this investigation - an impact that will become clear later in this chapter.

4.1.3 Speakers and listeners: the meaning of the dialogue

Apart from the content, let us now take a look at the form, because the form of the dialogue is not coincidental. It was a literary form, closely connected to works of teaching and education, with a tradition that goes back to antiquity. Classical authors like Plato, Cicero and Aristotle were renowned for the form of the dialogue - and many a writer followed their example of getting their points or ideas across in dialogue form.¹⁸¹ For an educated man like Gregory the Great this form was a very deliberate choice. If the goal is instructing people, arguing a point in an educational way, the dialogue was still the way to go - educated readers would instantly recognize the form and its intentions.¹⁸² The fact that the *Dialogi* is the only work of Gregory that exists entirely of this form, suggests that he had this purpose in mind - that he intended this as a didactic work, as stories that were meant to be read to a wider audience consisting mostly of monks, nuns and other members of the clergy- an audience that deserved saintly examples in their own environment.

¹⁷⁹ For example in Dial. IV.15.

¹⁸⁰ For example: Dial. IV.46, Lin. 59 - 69 is also found in *Moralia in Job*: lib. : 34, par. : 19, linea : 79

¹⁸¹ See Alex J Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance* (Philadelphia, 2014) for an overview.

¹⁸² Lake, 'Hagiography and the Cult of Saints', 229.

This brings us to the question of audience and environment: the places in which these miracles appear somewhat mirror the political situation of the era. Gregory's miracles tend to happen in areas that were under the political control of Rome or the Exarchate of Ravenna.¹⁸³ In 1984, Joan M. Petersen has studied Gregory's sources and network. Her findings show that the stories that Gregory tell us almost all take place in this, to him, familiar political sphere. She argues that these locales show the places where Gregory's informants and witnesses came from, that it shows part of Gregory's network and connections.¹⁸⁴ However, I would argue that it also shows the opposite - it shows the world that Gregory knew, the world that Gregory placed his miracles in. If he wanted to prove that Italian saints *did* exist, and that they did perform miracles, he would have set them in a world that is believable - a world that is true to his own experience. Therefore, the stories show us the world through Gregory's eyes.

The mix of the dialogue form and the hagiographical works is somewhat rare - and points to a certain idea that Gregory the Great had in mind. Again borrowing from Stephen Lake: "Gregory narrates his stories not for their own self-evident exemplary character, but in order to illustrate his teaching: the stories are therefore subordinate to his didactic purpose".¹⁸⁵ So - we must see these stories as constructed arguments from the ideas that Gregory wants to teach us, not as self-contained stories that speak for themselves. This is especially prevalent in the fourth book, where the stories are clearly interwoven in a larger narrative - in support of a greater point that Gregory wanted to make. This makes the text relatively unique - the only other work that seems to have a similar, clear didactic aim of the *Vita Patrum* we have studied in the previous chapter - as Gregory of Tours includes a short prologue with some of the texts, laying out their didactic framework.¹⁸⁶

Aforementioned Joan M. Peterson compared the two Gregories in her *The Dialogues of Gregory the Great in their Late Antique context* as well - focussing on the nature of miracles and pondering the question whether they ever were in contact with each other. Like Lake, she argues that this is unlikely. However, similarities between the works of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great do point towards a general template - a selection of *exempla* of miracle stories that were prominent in late antiquity. The two men shared a literary heritage, without, in all probability,

¹⁸³ For an interesting study of Gregory's sources and influences on the *Dialogi*, see Joan M. Petersen, *The Dialogues of Gregory the Great in Their Late Antique Cultural Background*, Studies and Texts, 69 (Toronto 1984), 4 - 5 .

¹⁸⁴ Petersen, *The Dialogues of Gregory the Great*, 4.

¹⁸⁵ Lake, 'Hagiography and the Cult of Saints', 231.

¹⁸⁶ *ibid.*

having been in direct contact with each other.¹⁸⁷

The comparison between the two authors, and specifically the *Dialogi* and *Vita Patrum* is interesting to make. As Lake noticed, the didactic nature of both works is unique in the sixth century.¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, the practice of very deliberately placing saints and holy men in the geographical environment of the author and the public is also a rare phenomenon in the sixth century, and the fact that both Gregories decided to write hagiographical works set in their direct environment is remarkable, and makes them fit for further comparison. Especially in the context of this investigation - getting to understand the way these authors related to the world around them - this placement of holy men and women near them, both in a geographical sense and in a literary sense by using eyewitnesses, is an interesting similarity.

There are also arguments to be made on the ground of content. As mentioned before, there is a certain similarity in the way our two authors present their holy men: as people excelling in virtuousness and pioussness, and workers of miracles.¹⁸⁹ Already we have seen that this similarity is not coincidental - since they both are likely to have worked from late antique exempla.¹⁹⁰ The miracles both authors describe show similarity - as we have seen (and will see), they are miracles of healing, exorcism of demons, of miraculous appearance of food or of protection from physical harm. This is not an exhaustive list - but their miracle stories do follow a pattern - a pattern that is common to early medieval stories of contemporary saints.¹⁹¹ However, their aims might be slightly different. Gregory the Great wrote for an audience of clergymen - an audience that might be more diverse than the singular term might suggest - with the aim to give them examples within their own frame of reference - holy men to identify themselves with. Whether they read the books themselves or heard them being read at dinner. Gregory of Tours, as Petersen argues, also had another aim in mind: the construction of religious centers, particularly those connected to his own diocese of Tours and the church of Saint Martin.¹⁹² This is not to say that one author went all the way in one direction and the other author went in the other direction - but to stress that intentions were perhaps more blurred than they first appear.

¹⁸⁷ For a comparison of the style of two authors see chapter five of Petersen, *The Dialogues of Gregory the Great*, 130 - 140.

¹⁸⁸ Lake, 'Hagiography and the Cult of Saints', 230 - 231.

¹⁸⁹ Petersen, *The Dialogues of Gregory the Great*, 122.

¹⁹⁰ *ibid.* 130.

¹⁹¹ *ibid.* 131.

¹⁹² *ibid.* 131.

All these things combined make the *Dialogi* an excellent and interesting source for this investigation. It presents the ideas of Gregory the Great, but the didactic nature of the work means that these ideas are explicitly placed in a believable world - in the world as he experienced it. Add to that the fact that there are few other hagiographical works of this nature and that the *Vita Patrum* is as close as we can get to a similar work within the time-frame chosen, this also makes for an opportunity to compare how the two authors used *institia* in their works, which is the main aim of this thesis.

4.2 Gregory the Great: his world and his background

It is impossible to sketch a full biography of Gregory the Great. The exceptionally large body of (self-penned) textual evidence from the time of his papacy notwithstanding, there is simply too little evidence to sketch a 'walk of life' in the traditional sense - we simply cannot follow Gregory's steps from the cradle to the grave. We have to make do with the scraps of evidence that are available.¹⁹³ In this chapter, I will sketch some background of the world Gregory the Great grew up in, and present some details on his education. Then, I will give Gregory a place in the politics and scope of his world - so that we might understand him better.

The boy who was to become Gregory the Great grew up in a time of unrest. He was born in Rome, around the year 540. He was born into a family used to power and wealth - although probably not into 'one of the foremost senatorial families', as our friend from the previous chapter Gregory of Tours, tells us - we will see more of Gregory of Tours on Gregory the Great later in this chapter.¹⁹⁴ The Rome Gregory the Great grew up in must have been an unsettling place. The reflections of the Roman Empire were everywhere, both in the crumbling buildings and the crumbling political institutions. However, this was a time of war, of plagues, of flooding rivers.¹⁹⁵ His early years took place in a time where sickness and plague had a significant impact on the morale and spirituality of the world around him.¹⁹⁶

Politically, things did not look much better. After a decade of relative peace under Ostrogothic rule, chaos returned to the Italian peninsula. Wars were fought,

¹⁹³ R. A. Markus, *Gregory the Great and His World* (Cambridge 1997), 2.

¹⁹⁴ See the *Histories*, X.1.

¹⁹⁵ Markus, *Gregory the Great and His World*, 4.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.* Markus explains this argument further on pages 4 - 5.

the reunification-effort of emperor Justinian was in full swing when Gregory was a young boy, and by the time Gregory reached adulthood Rome had been under siege different times - both from the Goths and the armies trying to recapture the city. A lasting peace in Italy would not happen during Gregory's lifetime. This all happened simultaneously (although these developments were strictly related to the events mentioned before) with a general shift in power from the civilian to the military, from the secular to the clerical. As the plagues, wars and other misfortunes lingered on, horizons narrowed - the vast Empire was no more, and with it supply lines, trade routes, and other options vanished. Power became a more localized affair - the possibilities of life were now measured on a local or regional scale, rather than the scale of Empire.¹⁹⁷

I paint this picture because I believe it is necessary to understand the world Gregory grew up in. It was a world under stress - a society that felt the world cracking down upon it. From all sides - political, plague, war - the world seemed to close in on them, and the future was an uncertain place. Spirituality then, must have been a necessary place of solace and hope - especially for those as aware of the past as Gregory's family. This picture is rather grim, and it is somewhat nuanced by the life that Gregory himself lived - the life of someone whose career took him overseas, to the courts of other Empires, through monasteries and finally to the episcopal see in Rome. The world was in a sad state, perhaps, but it was not *so* sad that it prevented the likes of Gregory the Great from having a great career that took him many miles from home, and for him to produce writings that would be influential in Western Europe for centuries to come.

Let us look at Gregory's heritage in a bit more detail. The fact that he was born into an elite family is certain - although theories that he might be the son of one of the more famous senatorial families are now disputed.¹⁹⁸ His family owned several estates, and was already prominent in the church when Gregory was born - his great-great-Grandfather was pope Felix III, and several other members of his family held positions in the church.¹⁹⁹ Gregory himself would opt for a more conservative career path, becoming Prefect of Rome in 573 - a position often occupied by members of the aristocratic Roman families.²⁰⁰ After this period of secular public service he retreated into a monastery, only to be employed again in the service of the church in 579. He was sent to the capital of the Eastern Roman

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. 7- 8. Also, see Carole Ellen Straw, *Gregory the Great: Perfection in Imperfection*, Transformation of the Classical Heritage, 14 (Berkeley, 1988), 2 - 4.

¹⁹⁸ Straw, *Gregory the Great: Perfection in Imperfection*, 4.

¹⁹⁹ Markus, *Gregory the Great and His World*, 14.

²⁰⁰ *ibid*, 15.

Empire, Constantinople, as the official papal legate, and learned a great deal about politics at the court of the emperor - functioning as an envoy to the pope of Rome, as well as a spiritual guide to some of the people at court.²⁰¹ He was recalled to Rome around 585 and withdrew again to a monastery, opting again for a life of silent meditation and prayer before being elected pope in 590 - a position he would hold to his death in 604.

If we try to reconstruct the formative years of this remarkably cosmopolitan member of the Roman aristocracy, we run into some trouble. It is almost impossible to say something definitive about his education. Several of the *Vitae* written about him in the centuries after his death mention an extensive training in grammar, rhetoric and dialectic - but Gregory himself does not himself mention his training in detail.²⁰² The schooling attributed to him by his biographers might be part of a literary topos. However, if we take into account the background of his birth, his later positions both secular and clerical and, most importantly, his works, we can definitely see the influence one might expect to see when studying the works of an educated man from late-antique Rome. They hint towards education in grammar, an understanding and knowledge of at least some classical authors (hence the form of the dialogue) and an understanding of the theological ideas and positions of his time.²⁰³

One of the most important biographical accounts of the early papacy of Gregory the Great comes from the pen of Gregory of Tours who, in his *Histories*, gives us some details on Gregory's ordination and the circumstances surrounding it. Framed as an eyewitness account from a deacon who just returned from Rome, Gregory of Tours describes a city tormented by flood, pestilence and sea-snakes who swam up the Tiber.²⁰⁴ Then, he gives us a lengthy speech Gregory the Great supposedly gave at the account of his inauguration - an unwilling inauguration, as the early medieval literary tradition prescribes, for according to Gregory of Tours the new pope did not fancy the job at all, but accepted the responsibility under overwhelming pressure of the people. Gregory of Tours ends his account with the only connection between the two Gregories: he recalls that 'his deacon' - the one giving the account - received relics from Gregory the Great when he was still a deacon, just before his ordination.²⁰⁵

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Straw, *Gregory the Great: Perfection in Imperfection*, 5.

²⁰³ Markus, *Gregory the Great and His World*, 34.

²⁰⁴ See Gregory of Tours' *Histories*, X. 1.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

What can we know about Gregory the Pope? A theme that is prevalent throughout Gregory's writing and also appears multiple times in the *Dialogi*, is how much he would have preferred a simple life of meditation, reflection and prayer. He complains that he is 'drawn into worldly affairs' more than once - and while these 'worldly affairs' might suit him, he would have much rather withdrawn into a life of prayer and solitude.²⁰⁶ He later described his years in the monastery as his happiest - and the tale of his reluctance to accept the bishopric even reached the ears and pen of Gregory of Tours, who lived and worked half a world away. While these themes of unworthiness and hesitance to accept any worldly power are well known themes in the Early Middle ages and part of a certain established topos, I would argue that the number of times Gregory the Great mentions these things as well as the fact that these stories made it all the way to Merovingian France indicates that there is some level of truth in them. The struggle between the worldly and the heavenly, the secular and the divine was one of the most important themes in Gregory's life.

Before we turn to the text, I want to make a small note on the nature of the papacy in the sixth and seventh century. The bishop of Rome, the pope, was not necessarily an authority in early medieval Europe - he was certainly not the point of theological gravity that anchored a system of thought. The pope was definitely an authority - but it was an authority that looked eastward instead of westward. When it comes to theological debates and regional variances in Christianity, of which there were many, the pope did not necessarily act as the ultimate authority. He was a voice, important but distant, and a voice that might not have all that much influence in the Merovingian kingdoms occupied by the other Gregory.²⁰⁷ When we compare these two authors, we must not see them as a teacher and a student, but as two voices, connected but distant, acting in the same religious sphere.

In the next section, we will examine the *Dialogi* more closely - and zoom in on two fragments which will focus on these elements - the world in which Gregory lived, and his personal struggles to make sense of it.

4.3 The Dialogues: an analysis

²⁰⁶ He does so in several places - most notable to us in the prologue of the first book of the *Dialogi*.

²⁰⁷ See 'The Papacy in the Age of Gregory the Great', in *A Companion to Gregory the Great*, ed. by Bronwen Neil and Matthew J. Dal Santo (Leiden, 2013), pp. 1-27 and Chris Wickham, *The Inheritance of Rome: Illuminating the Dark Ages, 400-1000* (New York, 2010), 171 - 172.

We have arrived at the part of this thesis where I will analyze the *Dialogi*.²⁰⁸ I will present the number of occurrences of the term *iustitia* in all its forms. I will take a similar approach as I did in chapter three: first I will present a graph that charts the occurrences of the term and its forms in the four books. This leads to some interesting points and problems that must be addressed before we can go further. Then, we will again look into some fragments in more detail - examining the occurrences of *iustitia* and its forms in the context in which they appear. This, again, will allow us to get as close as one could to Gregory's thoughts and ideas he attached to the term *iustitia*.

The chart that follows charts all the occurrences of *iustitia* and *iniustitia*, in all different word-forms in the fourth books of the *Dialogi*. This chart also charts the occurrences of *iuste* and *iniuste* - an important and significant difference, which will be further explained below. First, let us take a look at this chart, because it immediately shows an interesting pattern:

	lust*	Iniust*
<u>Liber I</u>	5	0
<u>Liber II</u>	3	0
<u>Liber III</u>	4	0
<u>Liber IV</u>	41	5
Total	53	5

The first thing that immediately catches the eye is the surge of occurrences in the last book compared the first three books. The fact that the fourth book is longer (it occupies about a third of the total length) than the other three books explains only a small part of this difference. The explanation is found in the content: as mentioned in the previous chapter, the fourth book differs greatly from the first three. The occurrences of the term *iust** and *iniust** are a signifier of exactly the nature of this difference.²⁰⁹

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the fourth book of the *Dialogi* is of a

²⁰⁸ This analysis will be based on the following Latin edition: Gregorius Magnus, *Dialogorum libri iv*, CPL 1713, SC, 260; 265 (A. de Vogüé, 1979), as available via the Library of Latin Texts. I rely on two translations, one in English: Gregory the Great and Odo John Zimmermann, *Dialogues*, The Fathers of the Church, v. 39 (Washington, 2002) and one in Dutch: Gregorius de Grote, trans. & ed, G. J. M Bartelink, and Gerard Mathijssen, *Dialogen: het leven van Benedictus en andere heiligen* (Nijmegen: 2001).

²⁰⁹ For more data and the context in which these words appear, see the enclosed graph in the appendix.

different character. It is a more theoretical work, concerned with death, resurrection and the nature of the soul, rather than a collection of miracle-stories. It is exactly this subject (the soul, death and entry to heaven) that is responsible for this surge in occurrences. The occurrences appear concentrated in the second part of the fourth book - and even then they are often located within a few lines of each other, sometimes with multiple occurrences in one line.²¹⁰ How the subject and the term *iustitia* (and its forms) relate will be further investigated in the next subchapter - for now, it is sufficient to note that the number of occurrences of *iustitia* and the subject of fourth book are inherently related - and that this will prove to be invaluable to understand Gregory's thoughts on *iustitia*. We must start, however, at the beginning.

To say something meaningful about Gregory's ideas on *iustitia* and its derived forms, we must dive deeper into the source material. The two major themes I have touched on in the previous chapter will inform the choice of the fragments I will examine. First, we will look at two fragments from a single chapter in the first book. In this chapter, Gregory discusses a man named Equitius. Equitius is a pious man, who as a child rejects 'temptations of the flesh' and instead turns to prayer. This allows him to climb to the highest post of several different religious communities - consisting of men and women. This is an interesting story to examine, since this is the work that is placed closest to the world Gregory knew. Written probably for a clerical audience familiar with monastery life, Gregory will have drawn on his own experiences of that world. In these stories, he places the saints in his own world - this is as close as we can get to seeing and judging the world through his eyes. Another reason to choose this story is the relative similarity to the works of Gregory of Tours. As we have seen, the *Vita Patrum* is as close as one gets to some stories from the *Dialogi* when it comes to subject and setting - and this makes them exceptionally fit for a comparison.

After that, there is time for a short fragment of Book II. In his *Life of Benedict*, probably the most well known part of the *Dialogi*, there are few mentions of *iustitia*. I have chosen one of these occurrences to inspect - since here, Benedict is placed in a long line of other, Biblical saints connected with the virtue - so it is an interesting opportunity to examine how the virtue is connected with biblical sainthood in this book.

Finally, I will examine a more lengthy fragment from the fourth book. Again, there are two main reasons for this. The first can be seen at a glance - as shown in

²¹⁰ For the details of book IV, see the appendix 2.5

the table above, the fourth book has by far the most occurrences of *iustitia*. In this fragment, no less than six occurrences appear - five versions of *iust** and one of *iniust**. This is the densest cluster of appearances in all of the *Dialogi* and that fact alone makes it interesting. The second reason comes from a point discussed in the previous chapter - the suggestion that the themes of death, the soul and eternal life were closest to Gregory's heart. If we combine this suggestion with the number of occurrences of *iustitia* in the fourth book, the picture emerges that the virtue of *iustitia* must have been important to Gregory, because apparently it was an important part of the subject he was discussing.

4.3.1 *Iustitia, iustus* and *iniustus*: justice, the just and the unjust

Before we turn to the stories, we must take one last step - a very important last step. As we can see in the appendix, there actually are not that many mentions of *iustitia* in the *Dialogi*.²¹¹ More often, the word appears in another form. Not as the virtue, *iustitia*, but as the adjective *iustus*, and forms derived from that term. In the fragments we will study - and in the rest of the *Dialogi*, as can be seen in the appendix - Gregory not often refers to the virtue of *iustitia* itself, but he rather refers to persons or God. He talks about the just, the unjust, and forms related to these terms. He writes about 'the just', the possessions 'of the just' and the tricks and evil of the 'unjust'. Gregory differentiates the virtue - the ideal of *iustitia* - from the acts and the people doing them; the *iusti*. We will see examples of this in the stories we will explore further - and further examine the implications of this separation of the Virtue - capital 'V' - and the acts of persons acting in spirit of it.

4.3.2 Book I: Inside and outside - just, but not justice

The first two fragments we explore come from the same story. In this story, Gregory introduces us to the abbot Equitius from the province of Valeria. Equitius was an exceptionally pious man. From an early age he showed this piety - especially when it came to besting the 'temptations of the flesh'. He showed a great resilience to these temptations from a young age - which led him to be 'castrated by an angel', which led him to be relieved of all temptation - living in a body that appeared to be sexless.²¹² Next, we find him as an abbot at the head of several communities, both made up of men and women.

²¹¹ See appendix, 2.1.

²¹² *Dial.* I.4.1: *ac si sexum non haberet in corpore*. As an aside: this seems an interesting view on gender.

As an abbot, Gregory has Equitius performing several miracles. Most of them are related to driving out the devil from possessed members of the clergy, or reconciling demons-in-disguise. He recognizes a deceiver, a ‘magician’ by the name of Basilius who came to Valeria dressed as a monk, and sought entry into Equitius’ community. Not long after he was allowed to do so, a nun ‘endowed with a beauty that corrupts the flesh’²¹³ got sick with a rather suspicious fever, a fever which caused her to call out for exactly this newcomer, the magician Basilius, to heal her. Equitius banished Basilius from the community and promptly - the nun was healed.²¹⁴ Here, Equitius is shown to have the talent to know right from wrong, deceiver from genuine monk. *Iustitia* is not a part of this story, but is nonetheless nicely fitting and expanding on a theme that we will return to when discussing one of our fragments.

Another example of his ability to recognize the devil from a nun, is the rather wonderful history in which he cures a nun who was possessed by the devil after ‘greedily’ eating some fresh lettuce without blessing her food beforehand.²¹⁵ He expelled the demon from her body - and the demon was never to be seen again. Here, too, the miracle is one of expelling evil, of recognizing right from wrong, possessed from pure, and having the means to do something about it.

However, this fragment does not contain any spectacular miracles performed by the saint - rather, it is part of a more mundane story of earthly wealth and earthly fame. After aforementioned miracles, Gregory tells us that the fame of Equitius rose rather quickly. His sermons drew more and more people, and they came from far to listen to this ‘zealous and fiery preacher’ who travelled around the countryside in poor clothing, on the cheapest horse that was to be found in the monastery stables.²¹⁶ This was all much to the annoyance of the clergy of Rome, who saw a threat in this popularity and convinced the pope (a predecessor of Gregory who remains unnamed) to have Equitius brought to Rome to school this ‘rustic and unlettered man’ who ‘claims the teachings of the lord for himself’.²¹⁷ The elite members of the Roman clergy wanted to tell Equitius who was boss.

A man by the name of Julianus is sent out to fetch Equitius from his abbey. This takes longer than planned. Julianus, who at first was not impressed by the

²¹³ Gregory the Great, trans. & ed. Odo John Zimmermann, *Dialogues*, The Fathers of the Church, v. 39, p 17.

²¹⁴ *Dial.* 1.4:3 - 1.4:6.

²¹⁵ *Dial.* 1.4:7.

²¹⁶ *Dial.* 1.4:10.

²¹⁷ *Dial.* 1.4:11.

poorly clothed Equitius, gets overcome by fear when he spends time in his company, fear that renders him almost unable to speak.²¹⁸ That night, the bishop in Rome gets overcome by a similar fear - he sees a vision of Equitius as a servant of God, a servant who the pope has ordered to be taken away unjustly. He promptly orders a messenger to Julianus and Equitius - the holy man is to be set free, and not to be bothered again.²¹⁹

The selected fragment follows this story directly - it is a reflection on what we have learned in this story. A story that contains themes of wealth versus poverty - of the simple, virtuous 'rustic' life versus the corrupting qualities of life in the city - a life in wealth, and a life concerned with concerns over worldly power and influence. The contrast between the simple, poorly clothed Equitius who rides through the country, on the cheapest horse to be found, spreading the word of God and the clergy in Rome who are threatened by his sudden popularity and even convince the pope to send for Equitius, to show the poor and noble preacher who is boss. The reflection that we will see in the following passage ponders this - the corruption of wealth, and the error of judgement that the pope made. They are made in Gregory's voice, who educates Peter on the value of earthly fame and honor in comparison to the value one has in the eyes of God:

Cognosce igitur, Petre, in quanta Dei custodia sunt, qui in hac vita seipsos despiciere noverunt; cum quibus **intus** civibus in honore numerantur, qui despecti **foris** hominibus esse non erubescunt; quia e contra in Dei oculis iacent, qui apud suos et proximorum oculos per inanis gloriae appetitum tument. Unde et quibusdam veritas dicit: 'vos estis qui **iustificatis vos** coram hominibus. Deus autem novit corda vestra, quia quod hominibus altum est, abominabile est ante deum.'²²⁰

Now mark well, Peter, how those who have learned to despise themselves in this life enjoy the protection of God. Since they are not ashamed to accept dishonor among men, they receive a spiritual rank among most honorable citizens. On the other hand, God sees how truly despicable those men are who, moved by a desire for the empty glory of this life, plume themselves with greatness in their own and in their neighbours' eyes. It is to such men that Christ says: 'you are always courting the approval of men, but God sees your hearts; what is highly esteemed among men is an abomination in God's sight.'²²¹

First, a note on the translation. In this chapter I will quote the English

²¹⁸ *Dial.* 1.4:14.

²¹⁹ *Dial.* 1.4:16.

²²⁰ *Dial.* 1.4:18, lin 215.

²²¹ Translation by Odo John Zimmermann, *Dialogues*, p 23. Here, I take issue with several of the translators choices. First, there is the translation of *iustitia* mentioned in the text. Also, there is the translation of *veritas* with *Christ*. *Veritas* here is a reference to Christ, but I think 'Truth' with a capital letter would be a better translation - perhaps with a clarification.

translation of Odo Zimmerman. This translation is widely available, and seems to be the foremost and most read modern English translation of the *Dialogi*.²²² I do, however, have a few disagreements with this translation. One of these disagreements immediately presents itself in this fragment - and it is connected with the prime aim of our investigation. I do not quite agree with the translation of *instificatis vos* as 'courting for the approval [of men]'. While it does get the message across, I feel this translation is rather free for the purpose at hand. A translation that stays closer to the original meaning of *instificatis vos* might be: *you try to justify yourselves in the eyes of others*. The citation of Christ that Gregory uses is a direct quote from scripture - and the New International Translation of the Bible also translates it as such:

You are the ones who justify yourselves in the eyes of others, but God knows your hearts. What people value highly is detestable in God's sight.²²³

The translation here also opts for *justify yourselves* for *instificatis vos* and that seems to be the option that is closest to the original. Also, it is the translation that is most useful in the current context. In this passage, Gregory warns Peter that what is held in high esteem here, is not what is held in high esteem by God. He warns of the pursuit of 'empty glory' and how God detests people who put earthly glory and the esteem of their neighbours above the esteem and praise of God himself. *Iustificare*, here, is not used in a positive light. *Iustificatis vos*, 'to justify yourselves', is meant as a justification of not just your acts and thoughts, but of oneself as a whole. *Iustificatis vos* is presenting oneself as just, as presenting oneself as possessing the virtue of *iustitia* through deeds and acts - while in truth the person in question knows this to be false. *Iustificare* is to pass off the sum of all behaviour and thoughts, your complete person, as it were - as the embodiment of *iustitia*.

While the verb *instificatis vos* only appears once - with the virtue *iustitia* only referenced directly once - the shadow of the virtue hangs over this fragment in its entirety. The entire theme of the passage is about appearing to oneself and to others as one thing, while in the eyes of God being something else. This is another angle, an angle that Gregory the Great uses more often in his writing - and an angle that again seems to get lost in the English translation. It is the difference or contrast between *intus* (inside or within) and *foris* (outside, or without) which I have also highlighted in the Latin. Here, it is used to contrast that what is considered to be shameful and dishonourable among men, might be considered virtuous and just by God. The words *intus* and *foris* are used here to differentiate that what happens

²²² See the list of translations and editions in the *Companion to Gregory the Great*, p 390.

²²³ New Revised Standard Version, Luke 16.15.

inside the community of man from that what happens outside. It is used to differentiate between the judgement of people, and the judgement of God.

This means a few things. First - the direct mention of *instificatis vos* is meant as the opposite of a virtue. Here, it is an action of deceit, of deceiving oneself that the sum of all the actions one takes are virtuous, are just, while he or she knows that they are not. It is here an act of deceit of the self, that is willful, a choice to ignore the truth for the sake of appearing more virtuous to oneself. This deceit is the central theme of this passage. While the virtue of *iustitia* is only alluded to once, its meaning hangs over all these lines. It is used to contrast that what is held in high regard among men, with that what is held in high regard by God, the most important theme of this fragment.

This is further explored a few lines later. Peter remarks that it is strange that even the pope, the most holy man alive, can be so easily deceived about the true nature of Equitius. The pope was convinced that our holy man was a troublemaker, a 'rustic' man who suddenly became very popular and rose above his station. He judged Equitius not as a holy man, but a threat, a threat to his own authority - perhaps.²²⁴ Peter wonders about this rather massive error of judgement - but Gregory argues that this is not something to be amazed about. Again drawing on scripture, he mentions that no-one less than David was also deceived:

An menti excidit quod David, qui prophetiae spiritum habere conseverat, contra innocentem Ionathae filium sententiam dedit, cum verba pueri mentientis audivit? Quod tamen quia per David factum est, et occulto dei **iudicio iustum** credimus, et tamen humana ratione qualiter **iustum** fuerit non videmus.²²⁵

Have you forgotten that it was David's reliance on the untruthful words of a servant that caused him to pronounce sentence against the innocent son of Jonathan? And David had the spirit of prophecy. But, since David did this, we can be sure that in God's secret judgement he acted justly, even though we cannot see the justice of it with our human eyes.²²⁶

It is the last sentence that is most interesting to us, and there is a lot to unpack. The argument, summarized, is that it is ultimately not up to people to judge what is just and what is not - only God's eyes can see what is just and what is not - and it is not for man to define 'just' from 'unjust'. Gregory argues that even David, who had the spirit of prophecy, could not always distinguish between just and unjust.

²²⁴ *Dialogues*, trans. Zimmerman, 23.

²²⁵ *Dial.* 1.9:19, lin. 225.

²²⁶ *Dialogues*, trans. Zimmerman, p 23 - 24.

Then it would be unrealistic and even dangerous to set such an expectation of ourselves. If even a prophet cannot see the full extent of God's plan, then neither can we, pope or no pope. This could be read as a rather cheap way to bail out one of Gregory's predecessors. Even if he made a wrong judgement he ultimately made the right one. But there is more to it - it tells us something about *iustitia* and especially about being just or unjust. Not only is it not up to us what is just and what is not, the virtue is not for us to understand. Only God can know what ultimately will turn out to be just.

Iustitia then, especially distinguishing the *iustus* and the *iniustus* as the earthly acts related to the virtue of *iustitia*, is solely the domain of the Lord. It has to do with foresight - with actions and consequences. Only the Lord can ultimately see what is just and what is unjust, and that also means *what will turn out to be just* and *what will turn out to be unjust*. In this story, *iustitia* is not a property of the saint. It is not even clearly defined as a property of God. It is, however, something that can only be defined by God - only He can see what is just and what is not, and we can only guess. It is not the saint that gets defined by his *iustitia*, for *iustitia* is a virtue that only exists with God. By doing acts that are in line with that virtue, just acts, *iustus*, the saint may perform miracles through the external virtue that he channels through him - but the holy man is not the virtue itself.

4.3.3 Book II: The life of Benedict

This theme of *iustitia* not being a virtue one can possess, but rather as an external idea that exists only in the eyes of God as an ethical judgement on just or unjust acts, appears again in the second book. In the life of Benedict there are only three mentions of the virtue. The first, in the second chapter, comes from the mouth of Peter, as a response to Gregory who just recounted and commended Benedict for his ability to ward off 'temptations of the flesh' - temptations that are extremely common and dangerous for anyone under the age of fifty.²²⁷ Peter answers:

Fateor, placet quod dicis. Sed quia prolati testimonii claustra reserasti, quaeso ut de **vita iusti** debeas ea quae sunt inchoata percurrere.²²⁸

Which our tradition translates as

I like the way you interpreted that passage. Now that you have explained what it means, I

²²⁷ After 50, you are apparently in the clear. see *Dial.* II.2:4 - 2:6.

²²⁸ *Dial.* II.2:5, lin 42.

hope you will continue with the account of the holy man's life.²²⁹

This, again, strikes me as a rather free translation. The *vita iusti* - life of the Just - is nowhere to be found - but instead translated as *holy man's life*. Also, the 'unlocking the barriers of the story' is translated as the rather less poetic 'explained what [the passage] means'. The meaning of this *vita iusti* however, is worth looking at a little closer, since it nuances the findings found in the first book. Here, the life of the holy man is the *vita iusti*. This combination of words, the 'just life' is used as a descriptor of the life of the holy man - *iustitia* is connected to the life lived by the holy man itself.²³⁰

This is further established a few chapters and spectacular stories later - again by way of Peter, who reflects on some of the miracles performed by Benedict's during his lifetime, as just told by Gregory. He notices how some of these miracles mirror some of those from the Bible:

Nam in aqua ex petra producta Moysen, in ferro vero quod ex profundo aquae rediit Heliseum, in aquae itinere Petrum, in corui oboedientia Heliam, in luctu autem mortis inimici David video. Ut perpendo, vir iste **spiritu iustorum** omnium plenus fuit.²³¹

The water streaming from the rock reminds me of Moses, and the iron blade that rose from the bottle of the lake of Eliseus. The walking on the water recalls saint Peter, the obedience of the raven, Elias, and the grief at the death of an Enemy, David. This man must have been filled with the spirit of the just.²³²

Here, *iustorum* appears as a genitive with *spiritu*. So, this man [Benedict] must, according to Peter, be filled with the spirit of *all* the just - the *omnium* is left untranslated in the edition, but I nevertheless think it is an important detail. The spirit of *all the just* - that means that *spiritu iustorum*, here, is a description of the spirits of the holy men as an embodiment of *iustitia* - it is a description of the biblical figures so well known to Peter, Gregory, and - we may assume - all the people in the monasteries who were the intended audience of these dialogues. So, for a saint to be filled with the spirit of the just, means that he is filled with the same light that filled his saintly predecessors - names that were enshrined in the Christian past, and examples of Christian virtue and, in short, models for 'Christianity' as an idea.

²²⁹ *Dialogues*, trans. Zimmerman, 61.

²³⁰ In the dutch translation 'the Just' is even capitalized - emphasizing this meaning of the saint as The Just even more. See Gregorius de Grote, trants & ed, G. J. M Bartelink, and Gerard Mathijsen, *Dialogen: het leven van Benedictus en andere heiligen*, 83.

²³¹ *Dial*, II.8:8, lin. 72.

²³² *Dialogues*, trans. Zimmerman, 72.

To understand these stories, we have to differentiate between *iustitia*, ‘the virtue’ and the other forms we have come across. The virtue of *iustitia* functions almost as an abstract idea - an idea of perfect justice that is only known to God. The virtue itself is unattainable and, frankly, unknowable for those dwelling on earth. What is possible, however, is living a just life and doing just acts. Saints, in these fragments are *iusti* - just people with just spirits who do just acts. They are not themselves the embodiment of the virtue - but their acts are done in spirit of *iustitia*. Even if it is only God who can ultimately see what is just and what is not. The saints are just, perfectly so, even, but they are the embodiment of the higher virtue of *iustitia* - and only God can see who and what is up to that standard.

4.3.4 Book IV: *Iustitia, iustus, iniustus* - the virtue, the just and the unjust

Now, we turn to Book IV - which is the key to understanding Gregory’s thoughts on *iustitia*, on the *iustus* and the *iniustus*. Book IV is the longest and most theoretical of all the dialogues. While it takes up about a third of the length of the *Dialogi* in total, it is responsible for slightly over 77% of the occurrences in all of the *Dialogi*. The fragment we are about to read has no less than six occurrences. As in the previous fragments, these occurrences are all straightforward. Often, Gregory speaks of *iustus*, and *iniustus*, just and unjust people - but he does not always mention the virtue as *iustitia*.²³³

The fragment we are about to read, appears near the middle of the *Dialogi*. Up until this point, we have heard several stories and read several of Gregory’s more philosophical expositions. The philosophical and theoretical nature of the fourth book is immediately apparent from the introduction, where Gregory questions the nature of belief, constructing an argument that is almost epistemological in nature.²³⁴ He ponders the limits of the senses, and the need for belief in invisible things and the grounds on which one can accept what is true and what is not.²³⁵ He ponders the place of man in the hierarchy of angels, men and beasts, and the nature of their souls and their spirits. Man, he argues, is a cross between the angels who are eternal spirits not clothed with flesh, and animals, who are mere flesh but do not possess souls. It is exactly this undying soul which is central to this work. These are subjects that were also addressed in the first books²³⁶ - but not as an

²³³ See the appendix, 7.2.4.

²³⁴ *Dialogues*, trans. Zimmerman, 189 - 190.

²³⁵ *Dial.* IV.2

²³⁶ See for example *Dial.* II.XXXV, in which Benedict sees the soul of bishop Germanus being carried away by angels.

explicitly central theme, which it is here.

The first chapters of the fourth book tell the reader about the moment of death, and what happens on that doorstep between life and what comes after. First, Gregory recounts how people have seen the soul of the recently departed on their way to the heavens - a 'spiritual experience', not seen by the naked eye but by faith.²³⁷ Then, stories follow about the moment of death for the dying. Gregory recounts how the spirits of saints and heavenly music accompany the soul as it leaves the body - protecting the dying from fear and pain.²³⁸

Then, the conversation turns to the entrance of the souls of the departed into heaven - the age-old question of who is allowed in, who is not, and what happens to the souls in between. Peter opens this discussion with the last lines of chapter 25:

[Peter] Sed nosse velim si nunc ante restitutionem corporum in caelo recipi valeant **animae iustorum**.

[Gregory] Hoc neque de omnibus iustis fateri possumus, neque de omnibus negare. Nam sunt quorundam **iustorum animae**, quae a caelesti regno quibusdam adhuc mansionibus differuntur.

In quo dilationis damno quid aliud innuitur, nisi quod de **perfecta iustitia** aliquid minus habuerunt? Et tamen luce clarius constat quia **perfectorum iustorum animae**, mox ut huius carnis claustra exeunt, in caelestibus sedibus recipiuntur.

Quod et ipsa per se veritas adtestatur, dicens: ubicumque fuerit corpus, illuc congregabuntur aquilae, quia ubi ipse redemptor est corpore, illuc procul dubio colleguntur et **animae iustorum**.²³⁹

—

[Peter] I should like to know whether the souls of the just are received into heaven before they are finally reunited with their bodies.²⁴⁰

[Gregory] We cannot affirm or deny this of all the elect for there are just souls who are

²³⁷ *Dial. IV.P.*

²³⁸ For example *Dial. N.15* and 16.

²³⁹ *Dial. IV.25:2* and *Dial. IV.26:1*, lin. 1 - 6.

²⁴⁰ *Dialogues*, trans. Zimmerman, 217 - 218.

delayed somewhere outside heaven. The delay imposed on them seems to indicate that they are still lacking in perfect justice. Yet, nothing more is certain than that the souls of those who have attained perfect justice are received into the kingdom of heaven as soon as they leave the body.

Christ Himself is our witness when He says, 'It is where the body lies that the eagles will gather.'¹ For, wherever our Redeemer is bodily present, there the soul of the just will gather.²⁴¹

Here, the *iustorum animae*, the souls of the just, makes a grand entrance. It is not the first time the term is mentioned in the work, but it does kick off the large number of occurrences.²⁴² From this point on, ideas on the immortality of the soul and especially the judgement one receives after death is the primary theme of the book. Some of Gregory's expositions and explanations even overlap with ideas found in *Moralia in Job* and *Homilia in Evangelia*, sometimes even directly quoting passages.²⁴³ Because of constraints in subject, available space and time I will only concentrate on the *Dialogi* here - but it is important to be aware that certain passages show overlap with the other writings of Gregory the Great - especially where the soul and questions about heaven, hell and the resurrection are concerned. They are passages that deserve attention to research the place of *iustitia* in the philosophical web of Gregory the Great - but not here, now, in this investigation.

In this fragment, Peter wonders what happens to the souls of the just (the holy men and women) that have departed from this world. Are souls received into heaven before the resurrection, and what are the criteria for entrance? It is already established and understood by Peter that the point of discussion is the souls of the Just, the souls of holy men and women. So, he wonders, what happens to these souls?

The answer can be viewed as somewhat disappointing, for Gregory makes it clear that even the souls of the just (as in - the holy men and women) might experience some delay on their way to heaven. It is only the souls belonging to the perfectly just (the *perfectorum iustorum animae*), the souls that are just to a perfect degree (*perfecta iustitia*) that are allowed in without delay. The other souls, whether they be just or not, might be subject to some waiting before they are allowed to

²⁴¹ *ibid*, 118.

²⁴² See appendix, .2.4.

²⁴³ Compare, for example, *Dial. IV.46*, Lin. 59 - 69 and *Moralia in Job*, Book 34, par. : 19, lin: 79 on the nature of hell, purgatory and redemption. They are the same.

enter. These ‘souls of the just’, the *iustorum animae*, are central to both the question and the answer. In terms of occurrences, it is the most prevalent one in the fragment, with four of the five occurrences. Peter asks about these souls of the just and, in his answer, Gregory repeats the words three times in his answer - all the time talking about the souls of the just. The main point of the answer revolves around the perfect justice, the *perfecte iustitia* and the people who possess souls that live up to this perfect justice, the souls of the perfectly just, the *perfectum iustorum animae*. These are the only souls that gain entry right away - and they are few in number. Even the souls of the ‘regular’ just, the *iustorum animae*, might need to wait to enter.

The *iustorum animae*, the souls of the just, are the souls of the saints. In this fragment, Gregory tells us that even saints might have some blemishes on their soul, and are not allowed direct entry into heaven. An exception is made for the souls of the perfectly just - who have reached a state of perfect justice, *perfecta iustitia*. This is an ideal - a threshold that is only met by the very few. This means that even the saints from the *Dialogi*, with all their virtuous acts and deeds, might not have gained entrance to heaven at once, since even the souls of the just are not necessarily *perfectly* just. Perfect justice here, is an abstract idea. It is an ideal that cannot be reached easily, and whether or not it is reached is only for God to decide. Gregory leaves us with an important idea: between the souls of the *iusti* and the *iniusti*, there is a rather large grey area - an area that even most saints occupy. There is an entire spectrum of being just or unjust, and even those in the possession of the most perfectly just souls are not allowed entry at once.

Gregory the Great does not directly apply this idea to a saint. That is to say - it is a general idea, that applies to all and every one of the saints, but he does not immediately provides an example of a holy man or woman who had to do some form of punishment after their death to become ‘just’ again. He does however, offer an example of such punishment in a living man. He tells the story of ‘a man of God’ who was sent to Samaria. He was ordered not to use or touch any food. He did so anyway, and was promptly attacked and killed by a lion. However, after his death, the lion dared not touch his body. The death of the man of God was the punishment - and it was this encounter with a lion that was the punishment for his sins. After that, his ‘body, again, became that of a just man’ - and the lion did not attack him anymore, but guarded the body of this now again just man.²⁴⁴ This story takes the more abstract ideas of just souls, perfectly just souls and waiting on entry to heaven and puts them in a more worldly environment. A man of god, a

²⁴⁴ *Dial.* IV.26.

just man, does something unjust: he eats food even though he promised he would not. He is immediately punished and through this rather unpleasant punishment he is cleansed of sin - and he is a just man again.

It is this theme that is central to Gregory's ideas on justice. One has to attain perfect justice to enter heaven - and the only one who can judge whether or not justice is perfect, is God, who himself is perfectly just. However, Gregory acknowledges this is somewhat of a high and unrealistic bar - even most holy men and women are not perfectly just in their thoughts and behaviour. Therefore - there is the option of redemption, of punishment for unjust acts that taint the soul - to become just again after that punishment. A chance to attain this perfect justice, and gain entry to the heavens.

4.4 A short conclusion

We have seen a diverse image of *iustitia* in the works of Gregory the Great - so diverse it would be proper to repeat our aim: an investigation into the meaning of *iustitia* in the hagiographical works of Gregory the Great and Gregory of Tours, in an attempt to examine what the virtue meant to them.

Iustitia has an important place in the *Dialogi*, but not as a descriptor of the acts of the saints. As is evident by the distribution of the occurrences, they appear little when describing the acts and lives of the saints. Whether describing the lives of many, as Gregory does in book one and three, or the life of one particular saint, *Iustitia* does not appear often - and when it does it appears not as a descriptor or qualification of the acts of saints. Instead, it is used as an abstract term, referring to the judgement that only God can give. Whether it is about *iustificatis*, justification, or the trouble that even the most venerable biblical figures had, *iustitia* is something that only God can understand and act on, and only God can truly understand the difference between *iustitia* and *iniustitia*. The virtue itself seems to have little impact on the saint's lives themselves - they do not act *iuste* or *iniuste* - at least they are not described as such.

However, this is not to say that *iustitia* is not important - on the contrary. The argument can be made that *iustitia*, in Gregory's view, is the defining virtue of God. It is certainly His defining characteristic. In the fourth book, which handles about the nature of the soul and especially about death, heaven and resurrection, the number of occurrences skyrockets. Here *iustitia* - and with it an entire semantic

field containing words that refer to justice and the division between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ - is mentioned often. It is always mentioned in connection to the soul - it is souls who can be just, and it is God who can ultimately decide which is just and what is not. Even the souls of saints have (small) blemishes on them - it is God who is *iustitia* itself.

It is the distinction between *iustitia* and *iniustitia* that ultimately paves the way to heaven (and eventual resurrection) or to hell. God is the only one who can make that decision. Saints surely are just, and do definitely possess *animae iustitiae*, but they are not examples of the virtue itself - they simply possess it to a very large extent. So saints are just by definition - but it is not *iustitia* which makes them just. It is their acts of piety, their devotion, their general ‘good deeds’ which eventually leads to them possessing a just soul - and entrance to heaven.

The observation that this idea of *iustitia* is of a highly abstract and theological nature has already been made - and this makes that the debate on what ‘hagiography’ is, exactly, becomes relevant its head again. For if *iustitia* is not as much something that can be performed by a holy person and later used as proof for his or her divinity, but rather as an abstract descriptor of an ideal, of a perfect soul that is unattainable except for the Lord - where does that leave an investigation that aims to understand the virtue in the context of the mind of a single author? Gregory the Great’s use of *iustitia* shows the mind of a theologian and a thinker concerned with ideas on the soul and the nature of death - not of an author proclaiming this virtue in holy men and women, and seeing in it an argument for sainthood. *Iustitia* is the domain of God - it is the potential of the just soul that resides within us all and which comes from God. It is not an action which can be performed - but rather, good deeds can be the reflection of a just soul. Gregory’s *Iustitia* is Christian virtue itself - it shows the potential of a soul, an ideal, which can be realized if one works hard enough.

This is a theme of sin and redemption. Of the possibility for a just man or woman to taint their justness with sin, and to become just again through a punishment of God. *Iustitia* is an ideal, an ideal over which God decides. God is the judge, and the only one who can decide whether or not one is just and if so, to what degree.

Another point is the question of audience. In the introduction to this chapter I mentioned the consensus that Gregory wrote for a more learned audience of clergymen, so that they may recognize themselves in examples from their own

environment, and perhaps memorize some of these stories to use in sermons to a more general audience. I think this is true, but I do want to add another observation: perhaps, we historians have too narrow an interpretation of this 'clerical audience' and I think the *Dialogi* and the place of a complicated concept like *institia* shows that within this group of people, there was quite a lot of diversity in terms of background and education. The fragments we have seen quite deliberately connect the 'high philosophy', the abstract and complicated ideas on virtue and justice to everyday situations. This is exactly the 'placing holy men in their own environment' - not just the spectacular stories of miracles, but the presence of virtue itself.

5. Conclusion

Is it possible to see through the eyes of men who died so long ago, who lived in such an alien world and whose values were so entirely different from ours? In this thesis, I have tried to do so. By extensively studying occurrences of *iustitia* in the hagiographical works of Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great, we have at least caught a glimpse of their minds and the world which they occupied.

The time has come to answer the main question: *How do Gregory of Tours and Gregory the Great use the term 'iustitia' in their hagiographical works, and what does that tell us about their ideas on the meaning of this virtue?* We have seen two authors who used the word *iustitia* and its forms referring to the virtue, using their understanding of the virtue to tell their readers about sainthood. However, they did so in different ways.

Gregory of Tours showed a snapshot of Merovingian France. It might be a bit reductive to qualify his stories in the *Vita Patrum* as 'short stories', but in a sense they certainly be read as such - stories that as a side-effect of their didactic and miraculous nature are 'slices of micro-history' that show readers a glimpse of daily medieval life. Within these slices of daily life, ideas about sainthood and specifically *iustitia* are to be found. Gregory of Tours shows great creativity re-applying an idea of *iustitia* that is primarily anchored in the Bible. We have seen how the Merovingian bishop worked with these virtues, and how the tradition of writing and thought found in the writings of church fathers like Ambrose or Augustine helped him engaging with *iustitia* (and the other biblical virtues *sanctitate* and *veritate*) in a creative manner - he thought about these virtues, and placed them in his own theological framework. *Iustitia*, for Gregory of Tours, was a central virtue of the saint - for it was a central virtue of God himself. He uses the virtue as a descriptor of God - *iustitia* as an essential part of the Lord. Gregory of Tours then uses this virtue to connect the saints to the Lord. By emphasizing several times that mankind is created in the image of God and that the saints are the 'best' examples of mankind, he implies that the saints possess this justice as well. *Iustitia* then, is not only a descriptor of God, but also of the saints - they are just by definition.

Gregory of Tours' ideas about *iustitia* and sainthood are informed by a tradition of late-antique church authors, but he shows remarkable creativity when applying and reapplying their ideas. The tradition of story-transmission, stories based on eye-witness-accounts of close relatives and sometimes even Gregory of Tours

himself is alive and well in the way he gives shape to his hagiographical stories. His use of *iustitia* shows the workings of a creative mind, using concepts from his education and the tradition he is in, and applies them in his own work, the work which most reflects his own world.

On the other hand, Gregory the Great takes a different approach. His idea of *iustitia* is far more theological and abstract. The virtue plays almost no role in the life of the saints themselves. Saints do no 'just acts'. Their souls and actions can be judged to be just, but only by God. And the justification of your own actions is a sin - for it is beyond humans to judge between what is just and what is not. Even King David could not do so. *Iustitia* is not something that any living man or woman can truly understand, possess, or work with. People, even saints, cannot be perfectly just and can certainly not judge what is perfectly just in themselves or others. Still, *iustitia* is at the center of Gregory the Great's ideas about divinity and holiness in general. But contrary to Gregory of Tours, who reapplies biblical and theological ideas, Gregory the Great creates his own web of thought around *iustitia*. The virtue is central to his ideas on sainthood and holiness, but it is not so much something that is consciously practiced by the saint. *Iustitia* is Judgement of God, and only He possesses this perfect judgement - He is the highest of all judges. Saints come close - and are the most just people in heaven, and are closest to the Lord, but they do not themselves possess this perfect justice.

In Gregory the Great's writings, *iustitia* is not something that can be practiced. Rather, by practicing good works, saints (and other people) might make their souls more just, so that God may in the end accept them into heaven. *Iustitia* is connected to the potential of holiness and virtuousness. Miracles that might be performed by a saint are a residue of this pure virtue - and this virtue can only be fully understood by God.

I said in the beginning that virtue meant, to me, a disposition of character. This is not what *iustitia* means in the writings of Gregory the Great as we have seen them. Here, *iustitia* is abstract - it is not a disposition of character belonging to a human, but a property of the divine - which no human can ever reach. The best humans (saints) can do, is living their lives, in both actions and thoughts, in accordance with this ideal. But we are unable to ever attain it - even the most holy must do some penance and have some blemishes on their record. *Iustitia* is a property of God - one we may attempt to mirror, but not copy. God is the embodiment of *iustitia*, and in our behaviour, we can attempt to mirror aspects of this virtue. The saints approach this 'being just' the most, Gregory the Great refers to them as 'the just',

but they are not embodiments of perfect justice.

Now, what are the differences between these two visions on *iustitia*. First, there is the highly biblical frame of reference these two men have. This might seem obvious, but it is surprising nonetheless. In the introduction, I have painted a sketch of the Christianization of the four cardinal virtues by authors like Ambrose and Augustine. The investigation into hagiography, however, has painted a different picture: a picture of *iustitia* in a biblical context, a virtue that can either stand on its own (as it does in the works of Gregory the Great) or appears in tandem with other biblical virtues. The ‘scheme of four’, as introduced in chapter one, does not exist in the fragments discussed by either author - or in any of the investigated works, for that matter. Now, this does not mean that ‘cardinal virtues did not exist’, but it certainly proves that there was room for thought on virtue and ethics outside of that scheme. The ‘four virtues’ definitely were not the only way to think about virtue - there was a possibility of thinking creatively and dealing with *iustitia* and virtue in one’s own way.

This investigation has also shown the difference between two minds. On the one hand, there is Gregory of Tours, who takes the biblical virtues and applies them to sainthood in his own way, permitting himself more than a little creative room in the process. On the other hand, there is Gregory the Great, whose ideas on *iustitia* are part of a larger theological and ethical system. He inserts pieces from his own philosophical reflections on the soul and on ethics, and inserts them in his saints’ lives - thereby making those stories part of his web of interconnected theological and ethical thoughts. These two approaches to the virtue we have seen are radically different, and show not only the creativity and intellectual prowess of the two Gregories, but is also proof of variety in thought, and the possibility to give expression to this variety.

Any investigation into virtue is of course also an investigation into ethics, and I feel that these results are proof of an important idea. There is a great variety of ethical thought in the Christianity of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages - and hagiography is an excellent vehicle to get these ideas across. The framework of virtue is the leading one in separate good from evil - and who better than saints to either model for these virtues, or show us the way to virtue in the afterlife? This research was limited in scope, I studied *some* texts from *some* works. More research could be done - either on these authors, with these virtues in these works, or on other authors and works altogether. For example, the data included in the appendix is enough for more research on this subject and a more thorough comparison in a

bigger project. Also, I think it would be interesting to single out Gregory the Great, and use the data to compare how he communicated his ideas on *iusititia* in his hagiography compared with his other writings, to better understand his web of thought. This methodology of historical semantics coupled with close reading and a form of micro-history has been proven effective in achieving the main goal: understanding this strange country where they do things so differently a little better - one hagiographical story at a time.

6. Bibliography

6.1. Primary Sources

Latin

Gregorii episcopi Turonensis, *Historiarum libri X*, (eds.) B. Krusch and L. Levison, MGH SRM 1.1 (Hanover, 1951, rpt 1993).

Gregorii episcopi Turonensis, *Miracula et opera minora, Liber in gloria martyrum, Liber de Virtutibus Sancti Iuliani, Libri I–IV de virtutibus sancti Martini episcopi, Liber vitae patrum, Liber in gloria confessorum, Liber de miraculis beati Andreae apostoli, Passio sanctorum martyrum septem dormientium apud Ephysum*, (ed.) Bruno Krusch, MGH SRM 1.2 (Hanover, 1885; rev. rpt 1969).

Gregorius Magnus, *Dialogorum libri iv*, CPL 1713, SC, 260; 265 (A. de Vogüé, 1979).

Translations

Gregory of Tours, *Lives and Miracles*, translated and edited by Giselle de Nie, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, 39 (Cambridge, 2015) This edition includes *The Life of the Fathers, The Miracles of the Martyr Julian & The Miracles of Bishop Martin*.

McDermott, William Coffman, and Edward Peters, eds., *Monks, Bishops, and Pagans: Christian Culture in Gaul and Italy, 500-700: Sources in Translation, Including the World of Gregory of Tours*, Sources of Medieval History (Philadelphia 1975)

Gregory of Tours, *Glory of the Martyrs*, translated and edited by Raymond Van Dam, Translated Texts For Historians, 3 (Liverpool, 1988)

Gregorius de Grote, *Dialogen: het leven van Benedictus en andere heiligen*, trans. & Ed. G. J. M Bartelink and Gerard Mathijssen (Nijmegen, 2001).

Gregory the Great, 'Dialogues', trans Odo John Zimmermann, *The Fathers of the Church*, v. 39 (Washington, D.C, 2002).

Other primary sources, translations and editions

Augustine, *Concerning the City of God against the Pagans*, trans. by Henry Bettenson, Penguin Classics

(London; New York, 2003)

Augustinus Hipponensis, *Contra Faustum*, CPL 0321, CSEL, 25 , ed. J. Zycha, (1891)

Augustinus Hipponensis, *De civitate Dei*, CPL 0313, CC SL, 47; 48, ed. B. Dombart / A. Kalb, (1955)

Ambrosius, *De Spirito Sancto*, CPL 0151, CSEL, 79 (O. Faller),

Biblia Sacra Vulgata, version available on <https://www.biblegateway.com/versions/Biblia-Sacra-Vulgata-VULGATE/> (retrieved 20 - 9 - 2021) which is based on the Clementine Text Project, which in turn is based on the Clementine text edited by A. Colunga and L. Turrado (Madrid, 1946)

Cicero, *De Inventione*, trans. by H. M. Hubbell (Harvard, 1949)

Cicero, *De Oratore*, trans. by E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham (Harvard, 1942)

Life of Saint Justus, Bishop of Lyon, ed. Philip Beagon, David Lambert, Cult of Saints, E06326 - <http://csla.history.ox.ac.uk/record.php?recid=E06326> (Retrieved 22 - 9 - 2021)

New International Version of the Bible, as available on biblegateway: <https://www.biblegateway.com> (retrieved 21 - 9 - 2021)

Plato, *Republic*, trans. by Christopher Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy (2013)

Venantius Fortunatus, *Carmina*, ed. Fr. Leo, Auct. ant. 4, 1, 1881, (1881)

6.2. Secondary Literature

Allan, Kathryn, and Justyna A. Robinson, eds., *Current Methods in Historical Semantics*, Topics in English Linguistics, 73 (Berlin, 2012)

Angenendt, Arnold, *Das Frühmittelalter: die abendländische Christenheit von 400 bis 900*, Christentum und Gesellschaft (Stuttgart Berlin Köln, 1990)

Bejczy, István, *The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages: A Study in Moral Thought from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, 202 (Leiden, 2011)

Bovendeert, Jasmijn, 'Kardinale deugden gekerstend: de vier kardinale deugden vanaf Ambrosius tot het jaar 1000' (Radboud University Nijmegen, 2007)

Brown, Peter, 'Enjoying the Saints in Late Antiquity', *Early Medieval Europe*, 9.1 (2003), 1–24

———, 'Introduction: Christendom, c. 600', in *Cambridge History of Christianity*, ed. by Thomas F. X. Noble and Julia M. H. Smith (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 1–18

———, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire*, The Curti Lectures, 1988 (Madison, Wis, 1992)

———, *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity* (London, 1982)

———, *The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, A.D. 200-1000*, The Making of Europe, 10th anniversary rev. ed (Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA, 2013)

Cameron, Averil, *The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity, 395-700 AD*, Routledge History of the Ancient World, 2nd ed (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, 2012)

Dailey, E. T., *Queens, Consorts, Concubines: Gregory of Tours and Women of the Merovingian Elite*, Mnemosyne Supplements. Late Antique Literature, volume 381 (Leiden, 2015)

Dal Santo, Matthew, ed., *Debating the Saints' Cult in the Age of Gregory the Great* (2012)

Esders, Stefan, 'Gallic Politics in the Sixth Century', in *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, ed. by Alexander C. Murray (2016), pp. 427–61

Esders, Stefan, Yitzhak Hen, Pia Lucas, and Tamar Rotman, eds., *The Merovingian Kingdoms and the Mediterranean World: Revisiting the Sources*, Studies in Early Medieval History (London, UK; New York, NY, 2019)

Fouracre, Paul, 'Francia in the Seventh Century', in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. by Paul Fouracre (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 371–96

———, 'Frankish Gaul to 814', in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. by Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 85–109

Fouracre, Paul, and Richard A. Gerberding, eds., *Late Merovingian France: History and Hagiography, 640-720*, Manchester Medieval Sources Series (New York, 1996)

Geelhaar, Tim, *Christianitas: Eine Wortgeschichte von Der Spätantike Bis Zum Mittelalter*, Historische Semantik, Band 24 (Göttingen, 2015)

Goldhill, Simon, *The End of Dialogue in Antiquity* (Cambridge, UK; New York, 2008)

Green, Bernard, 'The Theology of Gregory the Great: Christ, Salvation and the Church', in *A Companion to Gregory the Great*, ed. by Bronwen Neil and Matthew J. Dal Santo (2013), pp. 133–56

- Hees, Martin van, Thomas Nys, and I.A.M Robeyns, *Basisboek Ethiek* (Amsterdam, 2014)
- Heinzelmann, Martin, 'Gregory of Tours: The Elements of a Biography', in *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition (Leiden, 2016), pp. 7–34
- , 'The Works of Gregory of Tours and Patristic Tradition', in *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, ed. by Alexander C. Murray (2016), pp. 279–336
- Hen, Yitzhak, 'The Church in Sixth-Century Gaul', in *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, ed. by Alexander C. Murray (2016), pp. 232–55
- Hen, Yitzhak, and Matthew Innes, eds., *The Uses of the Past in the Early Middle Ages* (Cambridge, UK; New York, 2000)
- Humphries, Mark, 'Italy, A.D. 425–605', in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, ed. by Averil Cameron, Bryan Ward-Perkins, and Michael Whitby (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 525–51
- Hurthouse, Rosalind, and Glen Pettigrove, 'Virtue Ethics', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Stanford, 2018), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/ethics-virtue/>, retrieved 15 - 09 - 2021.
- Kempshall, Matthew, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History, 400 - 1500*, Historical Approaches, Paperback ed (Manchester, 2012)
- Kitchen, J.K, 'Gregory of Tours, Hagiography and the Cult of Saints in the Sixth Century', in *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition (Leiden, 2016), pp. 375–425
- Koselleck, Reinhart, and Keith Tribe, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*. (New York, 2005)
- Kreiner, Jamie, *The Social Life of Hagiography in the Merovingian Kingdom* (Cambridge, 2014)
- Lake, Stephen, 'Hagiography and the Cult of Saints', in *A Companion to Gregory the Great*, ed. by Bronwen Neil and Matthew J. Dal Santo (Leiden, 2013), pp. 225–46
- Leyser, Conrad, 'The Temptations of Cult: Roman Martyr Piety in the Age of Gregory the Great', *Early Medieval Europe*, 9, 3 (2000), 289
- Marenbon, John and Marenbon J Staff, *Early Medieval Philosophy (480-1150) an Introduction* (London; New York, 2002)
- Markus, R. A., *Gregory the Great and His World* (Cambridge, 1997)

———, ‘The Sacred and the Secular: From Augustine to Gregory the Great’, *The Journal of Theological Studies*, 36.1 (1985), 84–96

McDermott, William Coffman, and Edward Peters, eds., *Monks, Bishops, and Pagans: Christian Culture in Gaul and Italy, 500-700: Sources in Translation, Including the World of Gregory of Tours*, Sources of Medieval History (Philadelphia, 1975)

McGrath, Alister E., *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification*, 4th edn (New York, 2019)

Moreira, Isabel, *Dreams, Visions, and Spiritual Authority in Merovingian Gaul* (Ithaca, 2000)

Mulder-Bakker, Anneke B., ed., *The Invention of Saintliness*, Routledge Studies in Medieval Religion and Culture (London; New York, 2002)

Murray, Alexander C., ed., *A Companion to Gregory of Tours*, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, VOLUME 63 (Leiden; Boston, 2016)

Neil, Bronwen, ‘The Papacy in the Age of Gregory the Great’, in *A Companion to Gregory the Great*, ed. by Bronwen Neil and Matthew J. Dal Santo (2013), pp. 1–27

Neil, Bronwen, and Matthew Dal Santo, eds., *A Companion to Gregory the Great*, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, 47 (Leiden; Boston, 2013)

Novikoff, Alex J., *The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance* (Philadelphia, 2014)

Palmer, James T., *Early Medieval Hagiography* (2018)

Petersen, Joan M., *The Dialogues of Gregory the Great in Their Late Antique Cultural Background*, Studies and Texts, 69 (Toronto, 1984)

Reimitz, Helmut, ‘After Rome, before Francia: Religion, Ethnicity, and Identity Politics in Gregory of Tours’ Ten Books of Histories’, in *Making Early Medieval Societies*, ed. by Kate Cooper and Conrad Leyser (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 58–79

Richter, Melvin, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction* (New York, 1995)

Rose, Els, ‘Reconfiguring Civic Identity and Civic Participation in a Christianizing World: The Case of Sixth-Century Arles’, in *Civic Identity and Civic Participation in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*, ed. by Els Rose and Bréaz Cédric, Cultural Encounters in Late Antiquity and The Middle Ages, Forthcoming

Schwandt, Silke, 'Virtus as a Political Concept in the Middle Ages', *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, 10.2 (2015)

Sonnega, Bouke, 'De Factie van God' (BA Thesis Utrecht University, 2018)

Straw, Carole Ellen, *Gregory the Great: Perfection in Imperfection*, Transformation of the Classical Heritage, 14 (Berkeley, 1988)

Taylor, Anna, 'Hagiography and Early Medieval History', *Religion Compass*, 7.1 (2013), 1–14

Van Dam, Raymond, 'Merovingian Gaul and the Frankish Conquests', in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. by Paul Fouracre, 1st edn (2005), pp. 193–231

———, *Saints and Their Miracles in Late Antique Gaul* (Princeton, N.J., 1993)

Ward, John O., *Classical Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: The Medieval Rhetors and Their Art 400-1300, with Manuscript Survey to 1500 CE*, International Studies in the History of Rhetoric, volume 10 (Leiden; Boston, 2019)

Weber, Leonhard, *Hauptfragen Der Moralthologie Gregors Des Grossen: Ein Bild Altchristlicher Lebensführung*, Paradosis: Beiträge Zur Geschichte Der Altchristlichen Literatur Und Theologie, 1 (Freiburg in der Schweiz, 1947)

Wickham, Chris, *Framing the Early Middle Ages: Europe and the Mediterranean 400-800*, First published in paperback (Oxford 2006)

Wickham, Chris, *The Inheritance of Rome: Illuminating the Dark Ages, 400-1000* (New York, 2010)

Wood, Ian., *The Merovingian Kingdoms, 450-751: Ian Wood* (London; New York, 1994)

Wood, Ian, 'Reform and the Merovingian Church', in *Religious Franks: Religion and Power in the Frankish Kingdoms: Studies in Honour of Mayke De Jong*, ed. by Rob Meens (Manchester, 2017)

Appendices

Appendices

Here, I will present all the raw data collected for this investigation. I will do so in order of appearance in the investigation: first Gregory of Tours, then Gregory the Great.

Appendix I: Gregory of Tours

A.1.1 Forms of *iustitia* in the Hagiography of Gregory of Tours

	lust* (all forms)	iniust* (all forms)
<u><i>Liber Vita Patrum</i></u>	16	2
<u><i>Liber de passione et virtutibus Iuliani</i></u>	10	6
<u><i>Liber de virtutibus Martini</i></u>	5	4
<u><i>Liber in gloria martyrum</i></u>	7	1
<u><i>Liber de miraculis Andreae apostoli</i></u>	2	0
<u><i>Liber in gloria confessorum</i></u>	9	2
<u><i>Passio septem dormientium</i></u>	1	0
	50	15

A.1.2 Forms of *iustitia* in *Vita Patrum*

Chapter / Life	iust* (all forms - occurrences)	iniust* (all forms & occurrences)	Context
Cap. 1, <i>Sanctis Romano Atque Lupicino Abbatibus</i> , pp. 663 - 668, 667.	1		Qui respondit: "Agros et vineas non accipiemus, sed, si placet potestati vestrae, aliquid de fructibus deligate. Quia non decet, monachos facultatibus mundanis extolli, sed in humilitate cordis Dei regnum iustitiamque eius exquerere". At rex, cum audisset haec verba, dedit eis praeceptionem, ut annis singulis trecentos modios tritici eiusdemque mensurae numero vinum accipiant et centum aureos ad comparandum fratrum indumenta.
Cap. 2, <i>De Sancto Illidio Confessore</i> , pp 668 - 671, 671.	1		Quos assumens, involvit dignis linteis et iuxta morem sarcofago clausit; oppletamque criptam altius collocavit. In hoc loco et meritis et nomine lustus requiescit, qui fuisse huius gloriosi pontificis fertur archidiaconus.
Cap. 3, <i>Incipit de Abraham Abbate</i> , pp 672 - 673 672.	1		Reliquit autem hic non solum terram propriam, sed etiam illam veteris hominis actionem, et induit novum hominem, qui secundum Deum formatus est in iustitia , sanctitate et veritate. Ideoque cum se perfectum in Dei opere cerneret, non fuit dubius in fide petere, quod per vitam sanctam confisus est obtinere, per quem opifex caeli, maris ac terrae parva quidem numero, sed admiranda miracula operare dignatus est.
Cap. 4, <i>De Sancto Quintiniano</i> , pp 673 - 677, 673.	1		Unde nos, qui nunc sumus in corpore positi, aspicere debemus, quae operatus est Deus in sanctis suis, in quibus tamquam in splendidum candidumque ac levigatum meritis tabernaculum diversisque virtutum floribus adornatum resedens, extensa dexterae maiestate, dignatus est per eos miseratione propria perficere quae petissent, sicut nunc per beatum Quintianum, de quo sermo futurus est, mentis nobilis generositate fulgidum iustitiae opus plerumque conplevit. Ergo non nos more pecorum carnis sectatio ad terrena submergat ac depremat, sed potius sanctorum exemplis inlecti, prudenter intellegentes quae Dei sunt, spiritalis nos opera ad caelestia ac sempiterna sustollat; neque in nobis mens ab inpudicis actionibus victa luxoriet, sed aeternitatis pro meritis vindicans solum victrix sapientia regnet.

<p>Cap. 7, <i>De Santo Gregorio Episcopo</i> , pp 686 - 690, 686 & 687.</p>	<p>2</p>		<p>Egregiae sanctitatis viri, quos palma perfectae beatitudinis e terris editos evexit ad caelos, hi sunt, quos aut non fictae caritatis vinculum ligat aut elymosinarum fructus ditat aut flos castitatis adornat aut martyrii agonizatio certa coronat; in quibus ad inchoandum perfectae iustitiae opus illud fuit studium, ut inprimis corpus sine macula praeparatum habitaculum Spiritui sancto praeberent et sic ad reliquarum virtutum excelsa contenderent; atque ipsi sibi persecutores facti, dum in se sua peremebant vitia, tamquam martyres probati, peracto cursu agonis legitimi, triumpharent. (686)</p> <p>Igitur sanctus Gregorius ex senatoribus primis, bene litteris institutus, Agustidunensis civitatis comitatum ambivit; in comitatu autem positus, regionem illam per 40 annos, iustitia comitante, correxit; et tam severus atque districtus fuit in malefactoribus, ut vix ei ullus reorum possit evadere. Coniugem de genere senatorio habens Armentariam nomine, quam ad propagandam generationem tantum dicitur cognovisse, de qua et filios, Domino largiente, suscepit. (687)</p>
<p>Cap. 8, <i>De Sancto Nicetio Lugdone nsi Episcopo</i> , pp 690 - 702, 694 & 695.</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>Quodam autem mane, cum surrexisset ad matutinas sanctus Nicetius, spectatis duabus antephonis, ingressus est in sacrarium, ubi dum resederet, diaconus responsurium psalmum canere coepit. Et ille commotus, ait: "Sileat, sileat, nec praesumat canere iustitiae inimicus". Et dicto citius, obpilato ore, siluit; iussitque eum vocari ad se sanctus et ait: "Nonne praeceperam tibi, ne ingredereris ecclesiam Dei? (694)</p> <p>Sequenti autem nocte apparuit presbitero cum duobus episcopis, id est Iusto atque Eucherio, in veste fulgenti, dicens ad eos: "Hic presbiter, sanctissimi fratres, blasphemias me obruit, dicens, quia nihil facultatis scripserim templo huic quo requiesco; et nescit, quia quidquid pretiosius habui ibidem dereliqui, id est glebam corporis mei". At illi dixerunt: "Iniuste fecit, ut detraheret servo Dei". (695)</p>

Cap. 12, <i>De Aemelian o Heremita et Brachion e Abbate,</i> pp 711 - 715, 711	1		Quantum disciplina caelestis se custodientibus praebeat, quantumque non custodita negligentibus inrogare debeat, per os psalmografi Spiritus sanctus pandit: Adprehendite, inquit, disciplinam, ne quando irascatur Dominus, et pereatis a via iusta . De bonis autem Salamon ait: Disciplina pacis erit super eum.
Cap. 14, <i>De Sancto Marto Abbate,</i> pp 717 -720, 720.	1		Ipse autem iam aetate nonaginaria, bono desudans certamine, consummato cursu vitae, servans in Deo fidem, ad illam coronam iustitiae , quam in illa retributionis die redditurus est ei Dominus, conmigravit. Dehinc cum summo honore ablutus dignisque vestimentis indutus, infra oratorium monasterii est sepultus.
Cap. 15: <i>De Sancto Senoch Abbate,</i> pp 720 - 724, 721	1		Verumne est ergo, quia omnia quae geruntur in mundo cuncta sint vanitas? Unde agitur, ut sanctos Dei, quos nullus libidinum aestus exussit, nullus concupiscentiae exagitavit stimulus, quos nullum luxoriae caenum nec in ipsa, ut ita dicam, cogitatione temptavit, aestu temptatoris elati, visi sunt sibi esse iustissimi , et ob hoc iactantiae coturnosae perflati supercilio, saepius corruerunt. Factumque est ita, ut, quos non valuit maiorum criminum gladius trucidare, levis vanitatis fumus addictos facile pessumdaret, sicut et ipse ille de quo nunc nobis sermo futurus est, cum multis virtutibus florisset, pene in illo arrogantiae baratro obrutus occubuit, si eum non exhortatio fratrum fidelium attenta recuperasset.
Cap. 16: <i>De Sancto Venantio Abbate,</i> pp 724 - 727, 724.	1		Haec autem ab eius maiestate quaerebant sancti percipere, poscentes iugiter, ut ipse insinuaret cordi, ipse perficeret in opere, ipse loqueretur in ore; quo facilius purgata mens cogitatione, eloquio, actione, cogitaret sancta, loqueretur iusta , operaretur honesta.

Cap. 17: <i>Vitae Sancto Nicetio Treverorum Episcopo</i> (c. 525 c. 566), pp 727 - 733, 730.	2	1	Unde adversus eum saepius odii virus exarsit, quod tam veraciter multorum facinora publicaret. Nam plerumque se persecutoribus ultro obtulit et gladio exserto cervicem praebuit, sed nocere eum Dominus non permisit; voluit enim pro iustitia mori, si persecutor fuisset infestior. Agebat enim: "Libenter moriar pro iustitia ". Sed et Chlotharium regem pro iniustis operibus saepius excommunicavit, exiliumque minitanti numquam est territus. (730)
Cap. 19: <i>De Beata Monegunde</i> , pp. 736 - 741,737.	2		Quintus enim iam fluxerat abscessionis eius dies, quod haec religiosa neque farinam consuetam neque aquam acceperat; sed perstabat immobilis et fixa manens in Christo, in quo quisque locatus, nec venti turbine nec fluctuum impulsione dilabatur; nec sibi illa, de mortali cibo vitam, sed de verbo Dei, sicut scriptum est, putabat inferri, commemorans illud Sapientiae Salamoniacaе proverbium, quia: Non necabit Dominus fame animam iusti , et illud, quia: iustus ex fide vivit. Sed quoniam corpus humanum absque aesu terreno sustentari non quaeit, prostrata in oratione, petiit, ut, qui manna populo esurienti de caelo lymphasque sitiienti produxit e saxo, ipse quoque alimentum, quo parumper corpusculum fessum confortaretur, dignaretur indulgere.
Total	16	2	

A.1.3 Forms of *iustitia* in *Liber de passione et virtutibus Iuliani*.

Chapter / Page & Line in eMGH. Titles from ed. De Nie (2015)	iust* (all forms and occurrences)	iniust* (all forms and occurrences)	

Cap. 1, p 563, lin 17 - 23. <i>Prologus</i>	5		<p>Magnum in nobis quodam modo igniculum ad iustitiae suae adipiscendam semitam pietas divina succendit, cum dicit: Oculi Domini super iustos, et aures eius ad preces eorum; ostendens, quod qui iustitiam ex toto corde dilexerit, cum deprecatus fuerit, audiatur a Domino.</p> <p>Utinam quisque nostrum, cum haec cantare coeperit, statim sprætis mundi scandalis, neglectis concupiscentiis vanis, derelictisque semitis pravis, iustitiae viam expeditus et sine impedimento saecularium actionum conaretur inreperere.</p> <p>Per hanc enim viam Abel iustus suscipitur, Enoch beatus adsumitur, Noe reservatur, Abraham elegitur, Isaac benedicitur, Iacob dilatatur, Ioseph custoditur, Moyses sanctificatur, David praedestinatur, Salomon ditatur, tres pueri inter incendia rorolenta vaticinantur, Danihel inter innocuas bestias pascitur.</p>
Cap. 1, p 563, lin 29. <i>Prologus</i>	1		<p>Scilicet dum infirma curant, mortua suscitant, praesentia contemnunt, futura desiderant, tortores dispiciunt, poenas non sentiunt, ad caelestia regna contendunt.</p> <p>Quod procul dubio virtute propria non obtenerent, nisi per viam iustitiae rectissime incedentes a Domino audirentur. Sic et inclitus martyr Iulianus, qui Viennensi ortus urbe Arvernus datus est martyr, ab hoc igne succensus, haec concupivit ac mente tota desideravit.</p>
Cap. 14, p 570, lin 13. <i>De Sigvaldo pervasore.</i>		1	<p>Tunc Sigivaldus cum rege praepotens cum omni familia sua in Arverna regione ex regis iussu migravit. Ubi dum multorum res iniuste competeret, villam quandam, quam gloriosae memoriae Tetradius episcopus Biturigensis basilicae sancti Iuliani reliquerat, sub specie obumbratae commutationis avidus pervadit; sed mense tertio, postquam adgressus est, correptus a febre et sine sensu effectus, declinavit capud ad lectulum.</p>
Cap. 15, p. 570, lin. 26. <i>De pastoris malitia.</i>		1	<p>Pastor vero quidam non strinuitate, sed nomine Ingenuus genere, dum in multis rebus contra basilicam sancti martyris iniuste ageret, ad hoc levitas eius, inimico incrassante, convaluit, ut colonicas basilicae concupiscens, quae agro eius erant proximae, pervadere non timeret.</p>

Cap 16, p. 571, lin. 10. <i>De contumacia Becconis.</i>	1		Quid etiam ad Becconis comitis confutandam superbiam beatus martyr sit operatus, evolvam. Hic cum actiones ageret publicas et elatus iactantia multos contra iustitiam adgravaret, casu contigit, ut dimissum accipitrem diu per diversa vacantem perderet; similiter, ut unus de servientibus basilicae sancti Iuliani accipitrem alium, dum per viam ambularet, quasi vagum invenit.
Cap 17, p 571, lin. 35. <i>De diacono qui oves basilicae absultit. Foei.</i>		1	Accidit autem quadam vice, ut saltus montenses, ubi ad aestivandum oves abierant, circumiret atque pascuaria quae fisco debebantur inquireret. Cumque diversos spoliaret iniuste , conspicit eminus greges, qui tunc sub nomine martyris tuebantur, ad quos levi cursu evolans, tamquam lupus rapax diripit arietes. Conturbati atque exterriti pastores ovium, dicunt ei: "Ne, quaesumus, contingas hos arietes, quia beati martyris Iuliani dominio subiugati sunt".
Cap. 17, p 571, lin. 40, <i>ibid.</i>	2		Quibus ille haec inridens respondisse fertur: "Putasne, quia Iulianus comedit arietes?" Dehinc ipsos verberibus adfectos, quae voluit abstulit; ignorans miser, quod, qui de domibus sanctorum aliquid aufert, ipsis sanctis iniuriam facit, ipso sic Domino protestante: Qui vos spernit, me spernit, et qui recipit iustum , mercedem iusti accipiet. Contigit autem, ut post dies multos, non religione sed casu conferente, ad vicum Brivatinsim properaret, proiectusque humo ante sepulchrum, mox a febre corripitur et tanta vi caloris obprimitur, ut neque consurgere neque puerum evocare possit.
Cap. 19, p 573, lin 2. <i>De eo qui propter triantem periuravit.</i>		1	Post quattuor vero aut eo amplius horas ad sensum regressus, quod iniuste repetebat publica confessione patefecit, et sic sanus abscessit.

Cap. 21, p 582, lin 17. <i>De eo qui caballum in festivitatem perdidit.</i>		1	Nullum dehinc indicium repperiens, anxius atque maestus ad sepulchrum sancti regreditur, ibique causas doloris ac meroris exponens, aiebat: "Ad tua, sanctae, limina veni, nihil aliud quam parvitas meae vota deferre; nihil iniuste abstuli, nihil gessi indignum tuae solemnitati. Cur, inquam, perdidisti rem meam? Rogo, ut restituas amissum, ut necessarium reddas".
Cap. 46a (or 45), p 582, lin. 17 <i>De puero ad ariosos ducto, et alio per virtutem sancti sanato.</i>	1	1	Tum ego eis inquit: "Accedite ad martyris tumulum et aliquid exinde ad aegrotum deportate, et videbitis magnalia Dei atque cognoscetis, quid sit inter iustum et iniustum et inter timentem Deum et non servientem illi"
Total	10	6	

A.1.4 Forms of *iustitia* in *Liber de virtutibus Martini*

Book / Chapter / Line (in eMGH). Titles from edition ed. De Nie (2015)	iust* (all forms and occurrences)	iniust* (all forms & occurrences)	Context

Lib. 1, Cap. 2, p. 588, lin. 7 (<i>Quod eandem vitam beatis Paulinus versu composuit</i>)	1		<p>Quoties etiam ad beatum sepulchrum oleum fuisset positum, referunt eum vidisse adauctum. Sanctus vero Perpetuus episcopus, merito beati discipulus praedicandus, ampullam cum oleo ad sanctum tumulum detulit, ut eum virtus iusti infusa sanctificaret.</p> <p>Et erasum a marmore, quo sancta membra teguntur, pulverem liquore permixtum in tantum oleum redundavit, ut vestimenta sacerdotis nectareo efflagrans odore oleagina unda perfunderet.</p>
Lib. 1, Cap. 11, p. 595, lin. 15 (<i>De rege Gallicae populoque conversis</i>)	1		<p>At ille intellegens, non ante sanari posse filium, nisi aequalem cum Patre crederet Christum, in honorem beati Martini fabricavit miro opere ecclesiam, expeditamque, proclamat: "Si suscipere mereor viri iusti reliquias, quodcumque praedicaverint sacerdotes, credam".</p>
Lib. 1, Cap. 29, p. 602, lin. 19 - 20 (<i>De Chariberto rege, qui res ecclesiasticas pervasit</i>).	2	1	<p>Tamen stabularii iram Dei intellegentes, paucos extra terminum loci, quos adsequi potuerunt, expellunt sanosque recipiunt, nuntiantes regi, rem illam iniustissime reteneri, et ideo haec fuissent perpeSSI, addentes: "Dimitte eam, et erit pax tibi".</p> <p>Qui furore repletus sic dixisse fertur: "Sive iuste sive iniuste redebeatur; regnante me, hoc basilica non habebit".</p>
Lib. 1, Cap. 30, p. 602, lin 31 - 32 (<i>De Eustachio Pictavensi</i>)	1	1	<p>Simili conditione beatus confessor in rebus sibi iniuste ablatis apparuit. Eustochius quidam cum plerumque contra iustitiam sanctum Eufonium episcopum de hereditate Baudulfi cognati sui pulsaret, qui heredem basilicam sancti Martini instituerat, commotus ab eo per assiduas iniurias beatus pontifex aliquid ei de rebus illis reddidit.</p>
Lib.3, Cap. 41, p. 642, lin 19. (<i>De catenis super puellam confRACTIS</i>)		1	<p>His diebus puella quaedam iam ex libertis parentibus procreata, a filiis patroni, confracta libertate, ad iugum servitutis addicitur; unde factum est, ut, illa non adquiescente iniustis dominis quicquam operis exercere, catenis et conpedibus vinceretur.</p>

Lib. 4, Cap. 35, p. 658 lin. 26:		1	Hii autem cum nobis in obviam venientes adpropinquarent, ut primum sancti basilicam homo vinctus aspexit, statim solutae sunt manus eius, exiliensque de caballo in quo sedebat, pedes nostros arripuit, exponens, se iniuste damnari.
Total	5	4	

7.1.5 Forms of *iustitia* in *Liber in gloria martyrum*

Book / Chapter / Line (in eMGH).	iust* (all forms and occurrences)	iniust* (all forms & occurrences)	Context
Cap. 3, p. 489, lin. 9.	1		Igitur Iudaei furore succensi, falsis accusationibus circumdantes lustum , tradiderunt morti et crucis adfixione damnaverunt.
Cap. 26, p. 503, lin. 17.	1		Iacobus apostolus, qui et frater Domini vocitatus est, ab ipso domino nostro Iesu Christo episcopus dicitur ordinatus. Post cuius gloriosam ascensionem, dum viam iustitiae Iudaeis errantibus aperire conatur, de pinna templi praecipitatus, alliditur, effusumque fullonis fuste cerebrum, spiritum reddidit, sepultusque est in monte Oliveti, in memoriam, quam sibi ipse prius fabricaverat, et in qua Zacchariam ac Symeonem sepelierat.
Cap. 27, p. 504, lin. 6.	1		Nec moratus effectus, si petitionis tantum iusta proferatur oratio.
Cap. 33, p. 508, lin. 34.		1	Post duarum fere horarum spatium cum ad liquidum putaretur spiritum exalare, apertis oculis crimen fatetur, se iniuste fatigasse homines vel proclamasse noxios declaravit; sicque laxatis insontibus, manifestato nocente, virtus beati perpatuit.

Cap. 80, p. 542, lin. 25.	2		Factis rei veritas adprobetur; succendatur igni aeneus, et in ferventi aqua anulus cuiusdam proiciatur. Qui vero eum ex ferventi unda sustulerit, ille iustitiam consequi conprobatur; quo facto, pars diversa ad cognitionem huius iustitiae convertatur. Intellege itaque et tu, heretice, haec pars nostra, Spiritu sancto adiuvante, compleverit; nihil in sancta Trinitate dissonum, nihil esse dissimile, fatearis".
Cap. 105, p. 560, lin. 3.	1		Cumque in hoc colore iustae vitae duraret, immensas opes a multis suscipiebat; congregabat aurum cotidie, et quod devotio christiana pro redemendis porregebat captivis, oculis abdebat occultis; et quae dabantur inopum necessitatibus profutura, iniquis marsupiis condebantur.
Cap. 105, p. 561, lin. 1.	1		Te unum desiderii pessimi iaculum sauciat, cum Christi martyrem exturbare a iustitiae tramite nec turbo verborum praevaluit nec catasta!
Total	7	1	

7.1.6 Forms of *iustitia* in *Liber de miraculis Andreae apostoli*

Book / Chapter / Line (in eMGH).	iust* (all forms and occurrences)	iniust* (all forms & occurrences)	Context
Cap. 11, p. 832, lin 18.	1		Quibus ait apostolus: "Nolite, filioli, nolite seduci, nolite decipere hos iuvenes, quibus potest fructus apparere iustitiae ; sed magis paenitentiam agite, quia deliquistis in Dominum, ut proximos sanguine velletis coniugio copulare.

Cap. 23, p. 839, lin. 39.	1		Haec eo dicente, perrexit proconsul ad praetorium; sanctus vero apostolus iussit corpus exhiberi in medium, et accedens, ait: "Rogo, benigne domine Iesu Christe, ut resuscitetur haec mulier, et cognoscant omnes, quia tu es dominus Deus solus misericors et iustus , qui non pateris innocentes perire".
Total	2	0	

A.1.7 Forms of *iustitia* in *Liber in gloria confessorum*

Book / Chapter / Line (in eMGH).	iust* (all forms and occurrences)	iniust* (all forms & occurrences)	Context
Cap. 22, pag. 762, lin. 24 - 27.	2		Impletumque est illud quod psalmographus, Spiritu sancto influente, cantavit: Cum ceciderit iustus , non conlidetur, quia Dominus firmat manum eius. Et iterum: Non negabit Dominus animam iusti . Deinde ad castrum Cainonensim urbis Turonicae veniens, monasterium collocavit.
Cap. 30, p. 766, lin. 17.	1		Magna enim gratia est, si sacerdotium digne custodiatur in actu. Si enim homini iniquo ac persecutori iustitiae tantum contulit sacerdotium, ut prophetiam meriretur, id est Caiphae, qui prophetavit unum oportere mori de populo, ne gens tota periret; quanto magis timentibus Deum et sanctae ac purae sacerdotium custodientibus tribui potest a maiestate divina, ut etiam iuxta Iacobum prosit infirmis cum oratione visitatio sacerdotis, et plerumque conferat praesidium sola tantum euglogiarum porrectio eius ex manu secundum illud quod apud Arvernus gestum in aduliscentia mea in veritate cognovi.

Cap. 36, p.770, lin. 18.	1		Est ibi et sepulchrum ipsius sancti Venerandi episcopi, a quo haec aedes nomen accepit, sub analogio conpositum, super quod caput per fenestellam quique vult inmittit, precans quae necessitas cogit, obtenitque mox effectum, si iuste petierit.
Cap. 38. p. 771, lin. 25.	2		Mysticum, ut opinor, hic ignis continet sacramentum, et tenebrae sensus mei eum intellegere non queunt, qualiter apparens lumen tantum praebet nec quemquam aduret; unum tantum scio, quod iustis aut super iustos apparent ista.
Cap. 70, p. 788, lin. 23.	1		Aquinsibus igitur est concessus inclitus adleta Mitrias, vir in corpore iuxta historiam actionis magnificae sanctitatis, et licet conditione servus, liber tamen iustitiae . Qui, ut ferunt legentes certaminis eius textum, peracto cursu boni operis, a saeculo victor abscessit, saepius se in caelis degere virtutibus manifestis ostendens.
Cap. 70, p. 789, lin. 4.		1	Tempore igitur quodam, cum Franco episcopus huius municipii ecclesiam gubernaret, Childericus, qui tunc primus apud Sigibertum regem habebatur, villam eius competit, dicens, quia iniuste ab Aquinsi ecclesia reteneretur.
Cap. 71, p. 790, lin 7.	1		Datur enim intellegi, verum Israhelitam hunc esse. Nam illis inter muros aquarum aquae non sunt pernicies, sed salutis; et circa huius iusti tumulum nix decidens non humoris causa est, sed honoris.
Cap. 75, p. 792, lin. 25.	1		Erant enim ambo iusti et in elymosinarum semina ac vigiliarum tolerantiam valde prumptissimi. Interea propter illam, ut diximus, saeculi dignitatem Simplicius, decedente Egemonio, a populis elegitur; sed a Deo pro castitatis et sanctitatis gloria destinatur.

Cap. 78, p. 794, lin. 6.		1	Qui cum ab episcopo ac loci abbate crebro conventus fuisset, ut quae iniuste pervaserat redderet, parvi pendens verba quae audiebat, pertinaci direpta defensabat intentione. Denique causa extitit et non devotio, ut Remensim urbem adiret; properat ad sancti basilicam.
Total	9	2	

A.1.8 Forms of *iustitia* in *Passio septem dormientium*

Chapter / Line (in eMGH).	iust* (all forms and occurrences)	iniust* (all forms & occurrences)	Context
Cap. 11, p 768, lin. 9	1	0	Haec audiens Theodosius imperator, surrexit a cilicium, et extendens manus suas ad Deum, ait: "Gratias ago tibi, domine Iesu Christe, sol iustitiae , qui dignatus es tenebras mortalium tuae veritatis luce respergere; gratias tibi ago, qui non permisisti lucernam confessionis meae tetrus assertionum caliginibus obvelari".
Total	1	0	

Appendix II: Gregory the Great, *Dialogorum Libri IV*

A.2.1 Forms of *Iustitia* in *Dialogorum Libri IV*

	iust*	Iniust*	
<u>Liber I</u>	5	0	
<u>Liber II</u>	3	0	
<u>Liber III</u>	4	0	

Liber IV	41	5	
Total	53	5	

A.2.2 Forms of *Iustitia* in *Liber I*

Chapter / Line	lust*	Iniust*	Context
Cap. 4, lin. 215	1		Unde et quibusdam veritas dicit: vos estis qui iustificatis vos coram hominibus. Deus autem novit corda vestra, quia quod hominibus altum est, abominabile est ante deum.
Cap. 4, lin. 225	2		An menti excidit quod David, qui prophetiae spiritum habere consueverat, contra innocentem Ionathae filium sententiam dedit, cum verba pueri mentientis audivit? Quod tamen quia per David factum est, et occulto dei iudicio iustum credimus, et tamen humana ratione qualiter iustum fuerit non videmus.
Cap. 9, lin. 109.	1		Et cum ad iracundiam sanctus uir trahitur, quis alius ad irascendum nisi eius templi inhabitator excitatur? Tanto ergo metuenda est ira iustorum , quanto et constat quia in eorum cordibus ille praesens est, qui ad inferendam ultionem quam voluerit inualidus non est.
Cap. 9, lin. 183.	1		Quem mater sua frequenter increpare consueverat, dicens quod iustum non esset ut ipse inops pauperibus vestimenta largiretur.
Total	5	0	

A.2.3 Forms of *Iustitia* in *Liber II*

Chapter / Line	lust*	Iniust*	Context
----------------	-------	---------	---------

Cap. 2, Lin. 42.	1		Fateor, placet quod dicis. Sed quia prolati testimonii claustra reserasti, quaeso ut de vita iusti debeas ea quae sunt inchoata percurrere.
Cap. 8, lin. 72.	1		Nam in aqua ex petra producta moysen, in ferro vero quod ex profundo aquae rediit heliseum, in aquae itinere petrum, in corui oboedientia heliam, in luctu autem mortis inimici David video. Ut perpendo, vir iste spiritu iustorum omnium plenus fuit.
Cap. 33, lin. 54.	1		Nec mirum quod plus illo femina, quae diu fratrem videre cupiebat, in eodem tempore valuit. Quia enim iuxta iohannis vocem deus caritas est, iusto valde <i>iudicio</i> illa plus potuit, quae amplius amavit.
Total	3	0	

A.2.4 Forms of *Iustitia* in *Liber III*

Chapter / Line	lust*	Iniust*	Context
Prologue, Lin. 3	1		Sicut enim bonorum facta innotescere citius similibus solent, senioribus nostris per iustorum exempla gradientibus praedicti venerabilis viri celebre nomen innotuit, eius que opus admirabile ad eorum se instruenda studia tetendit.
Cap. 18, Lin. 25	1		Ex qua re collegitur, quia ignis in quo iactati fuerant, qui eorum uestimenta non contigit, eorum uincula consumpsit, ut uno eodem que tempore in obsequium iustorum et haberet flamma virtutem suam ad solacium et non haberet ad tormentum.
Cap. 34, Lin. 32	1		Quae suspirans a patre terram inriguam petit, quia a creatore nostro cum magno gemitu quaerenda est lacrimarum gratia. Sunt namque nonnulli, qui iam in dono perceperunt libere pro iustitia loqui, oppressos tueri, indigentibus possessa tribuere, ardorem fidei habere, sed adhuc gratiam lacrimarum non habent.

Cap. 37, Lin. 196	1		Hinc etenim propheta ait: iustus perit, et nemo est qui recogitet in corde suo; et viri misericordiae colleguntur, quia non est qui intellegat.
Total	4	0	

A.2.5 Forms of *Iustitia* in *Liber IV*

Chapter / Line	Iust*	Iniust*	Context
Cap. 1, Lin. 10.	1		Ex cuius videlicet carne nos in huius exilii caecitate nati, audimus quidem esse caelestem patriam, audimus eius cives angelos dei, audimus eorundem angelorum socios spiritus iustorum perfectorum, sed carnales quique, quia illa inuisibilia scire non valent per experimentum, dubitant utrumne sit quod corporalibus oculis non vident.
Cap. 5, Lin. 30.	1		Haec autem quae esse credimus nisi sanctos angelos et spiritus iustorum ?
Cap. 11, Lin. 10.	2		Eius namque oculos per quadraginta annorum spatium continuae caecitatis tenebris pressit, nullum ei lumen vel extremae uisionis aperiens sed quia nemo in verbere illius gratia se destitute subsistit, et nisi isdem misericors pater, qui poenam inrogat, patientiam praestet, mox per impatientiam peccatum nobis auget correptio peccatorum, fit que modo miserabili ut culpa nostra, unde sperare debuit terminum, inde sumat augmentum, idcirco nostra deus infirma conspiciens, flagellis suis custodiam permiscet, atque in percussione sua electis filiis nunc misericorditer iustus est, ut sint quibus postea debeat iuste misereri.

Cap. 12, Lin. 40.	1		Quod plerumque contingit iuſtis , ut in morte ſua ſanctorum praecedentium uisiones accipiant, ne ipſam mortis ſuae poenalem ſententiam pertimeſcant, ſed dum eorum menti internorum ciuium ſocietas oſtenditur, a carnis ſuae copula ſine doloris et formidinis fatigatione ſoluantur.
Cap. 24, Lin. 11.	2		Cum ſcriptum ſit: iuſtus quacumque morte praeuentus fuerit, iuſtitia eius non auferetur ab eo, electi, qui procul dubio ad perpetuam uitam tendunt, quid eis obest, ſi ad modicum dure moriuntur?
Cap. 25, Lin. 8 - 11	2		Qui enim occidendi auſum habuit, de occiſi cadavere comedendi licentiam non accepit, quia iſ qui culpabilis in vita fuerat, punita inoboedientia erat iam iuſtus ex morte. Leo ergo, qui prius peccatoris uitam necauerat, cuſtodiuſt postmodum cadaver iuſti .
Cap. 25, Lin. 13.	1		Sed noſſe uelim ſi nunc ante reſtutionem corporum in caelo recipi ualeant animae iuſtorum .
Cap. 26, Lin. 2 - 8.	4		Hoc neque de omnibus iuſtis fateri poſſumus, neque de omnibus negare. Nam ſunt quorundam iuſtorum animae, quae a caeſteſti regno quibusdam adhuc manſionibus differuntur. In quo dilationis damno quid aliud innuitur, niſi quod de perfecta iuſtitia aliquid minus habuerunt? Et tamen luce clarius conſtat quia perfectorum iuſtorum animae, mox ut huius carnis clauſtra exeunt, in caeſteſtibz ſedibus recipiuntur. Quod et ipſa per ſe ueritas adteſtatur, dicens: ubicumque fuerit corpus, illuc congregabuntur aquilae, quia ubi ipſe redemptor eſt corpore, illuc procul dubio colleguntur et animae iuſtorum .

Cap. 26, Lin. 20.	2		Si igitur nunc in caelo sunt animae iustorum , quid est quod in die iudicii pro iustitiae suae retributione recipiant?
Cap. 29, Lin. 1.	2	1	Si esse sanctorum animas in caelo sacri eloquii satisfactione credidisti, oportet ut per omnia esse credas et iniquorum animas in inferno, quia ex retributione aeternae iustitiae , ex qua iam iusti gloriantur, necesse est per omnia ut et iniusti crucientur.
Cap. 31, Lin. 28.	1	1	Et quia Iohannem papam adfligendo in custodia occidit, Symmachum quoque patricium ferro trucidavit, ab illis iuste in igne mitti apparuit, quos in hac uita iniuste iudicavit .
Cap. 36, Lin. 11 - 16.	2		Ad horam nero mortis veniens, mysterium dominici corporis et sanguinis accepit, vocatosque fratres coram se psallere praecipit, quibus tamen antiphonam ipse per semetipsum de semetipso inposuit, dicens: aperite mihi portas iustitiae , et ingressus in eas confitebor domino. Haec porta domini, iusti intrabunt per eam. Cumque coram eo adsistentes fratres psallerent, emissa subito et producta voce clamavit, dicens: "urse, veni".
Cap. 37, Lin. 76.	1	1	Haec vero erat in praedicto ponte probatio, ut quisquis per eum iniustorum vellet transire, in tenebroso foetentique fluvio laberetur, iusti vero, quibus culpa non obsisteret, securo per eum gressu ac libero ad loca amoena peruenirent.

Cap. 38, Lin. 18 - 22	2		<p>Ex rerum, Petre, imaginibus pensamus merita causarum. Per pontem quippe ad amoena loca transire iustos aspexit, quia angusta valde est semita quae ducit ad uitam, et foetentem fluvium decurrentem vidit, quia ad ima cotidie defluit carnalium hic putredo vitiorum.</p> <p>Et quorundam habitacula foetoris nebula tangebatur, quorundam vero ab ea tangi non poterant, quia sunt plerique qui multa bona opera faciunt, sed tamen adhuc carnalibus vitiis in cogitationis delectatione tanguntur, et iustum valde est ut illic nebula foetoris obsideat, quos hic adhuc carnalis foetor delectat.</p>
Cap. 46, Lin. 5.	1		Nam cum veritas dicat: ibunt hii in supplicium aeternum, iusti autem in vitam aeternam, quia verum est quod promisit, falsum procul dubio non erit quod minatus est deus.
Cap. 46, Lin. 12.	1	1	Si falsum est quod minatus est, ut ab iniustitia corrigeret, etiam falsa est pollicitus, ut ad iustitiam provocaret.
Cap. 46, Lin. 18.	1		Scire velim quomodo iustum sit ut culpa, quae cum fine perpetrata est, sine fine puniatur.
Cap. 46, Lin. 26 - 29.	3		<p>Ad magnam ergo iustitiam iudicantis pertinet ut numquam careant supplicio, qui in hac uita numquam voluerunt carere peccato.</p> <p>[PETRUS]Sed nullus iustus crudelitate pascitur, et derelinquens servus a iusto domino idcirco caedi praecipitur, ut a nequitia corrigatur.</p>

Cap. 46, Lin. 35 - 36.	2		Quia autem iustus est, ab iniquorum ultione in perpetuum non sedatur. Sed iniqui omnes aeterno supplicio deputati sua quidem iniquitate puniuntur, et tamen ad aliquid ardebunt, scilicet ut iusti omnes et in deo videant gaudia quae percipiunt, et in illis respiciant supplicia quae evaserunt, quatenus tanto magis in aeternum divinae gratiae debitores se esse cognoscant, quanto in aeternum mala puniri conspiciunt, quae eius adiutorio uicerunt.
Cap. 46, Lin. 53	1		Et quomodo pro illis tunc orabitur, qui iam nullatenus possunt ad iustitiae opera ab iniquitate conmutari?
Cap. 46, Lin. 59 - 69.	5	1	<p>Quae nunc etiam causa est ut non orent sancti homines pro hominibus infidelibus impiis que defunctis, nisi quia de eis utique, quos aeterno deputatos supplicio iam noverunt, ante illum iudicis iusti conspectum orationis suae meritum cassari refugiunt?</p> <p>Quod si nunc quoque viventes iusti mortuis et damnatis iniustis minime conpatiuntur, quando adhuc aliquid iudicabile de sua carne se perpeti etiam ipsi noverunt, quanto districtius tunc iniquorum tormenta respiciunt, quando ab omni uitio corruptionis exuti ipsi iam iustitiae vicinius atque arctius inhaerebunt.</p> <p>Sic quippe eorum mentes, per hoc quod iustissimo iudici inhaerent, vis districtionis absorbet, ut omnimodo eis non libeat quicquid ab illius internae regulae subtilitate discordat.</p>
Cap. 48, Lin. 1.	1		Sed plerumque de culpis minimis ipse solus pauor egredientes animas iustorum purgat, sicut narrari de quodam sancto viro me cum frequenter audisti, qui ad mortem veniens vehementer timuit, sed post mortem discipulis in stola alba apparuit, et quam praeclare sit susceptus indicavit.

Cap. 57, Lin. 50.	1		Quidam namque monachus, iustus nomine, medicina arte fuerat inbutus, qui mihi in eodem monasterio constituto sedule obsequi atque in assiduis aegritudinibus meis excubare consueverat. Hic itaque, languore corporis praeuentus, ad extremum deductus est.
Cap. 57, Lin. 59.	1		Sed praedictus iustus , cum iam se ad extremum peruenisse cognouisset, eidem copioso fratri suo quia occultos tres aureos haberet innotuit.
Total	41	5	