
THE FULL CIRCLE OF TERROR



CONCERNING THE PARADOXICAL RELATION BETWEEN
THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER

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Master Thesis International Relations in Historical Perspective

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“We must smother the internal and external enemies of the Republic or perish with it;
Now in this situation, the first maxim of your policy ought to be
To lead the people by reason and the people’s enemies by terror.”

-Robespierre, 1794

“Our khilāfah has indeed returned with certainty
And likewise our state, becoming a firm structure.
And the breasts of the believers have been healed,
While the hearts of kufr have been filled with terror.”

-‘Adnani, 2014

ABSTRACT

As the Islamic State has risen to declare itself the sole legitimate state of the world, politicians and academics alike struggle to define the nature of this organization. Is it a state? Is it a terrorist organization? Is it something in between, or even something completely different? The few times that academics have tried to solve this problem they treated IS as the odd one out, using the standards of our current world system as supposedly objective frames to compose our perception of the Islamic State. This method often resulted in an unsatisfying definition that barely captures the unique relation between the Islamic State and the rest of the international order.

I argue that a different approach is needed to successfully describe the relation between the Islamic State and the contemporary international order. This paper offers such a new approach by bringing the rise of nationalism during the 'long 19th century' into the equation. When these two cases are brought together a certain paradox arises that provides crucial insights on the relation between radical, world-changing ideas and the political status quo of a particular international society. I maintain that only with these new insights a truly well-rounded perception of the Islamic State can finally be presented.

Following the introduction of the first chapter, chapter II kicks off by setting up the frameworks of the international order by using Daniel Philpott's book *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, a work that highlights the role of ideas in the political realm while simultaneously offering multiple models on the functioning of the international order. Then, in chapters III and IV, the cases of nationalism and IS are examined and placed within the models of the second chapter. These results are then combined in the fifth chapter where I introduce the concept of the '*Anti-Nation-State*' as a new description for the Islamic State, one that perfectly embodies the paradoxical relation between the organization and the Westphalian order.

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I – INTRODUCTION: THE STATE THAT IS NOT A STATE?

1.1: The ‘Un-Islamic Non-State’

At the end of June 2014 the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham declared itself the Caliphate reborn. From that moment onwards the former al-Qaida affiliate was to be known simply as ‘the Islamic State’ [IS], dropping its regional associations with Iraq and Syria. The declaration was made in the weeks following the capture of Mosul, the second-largest city of Iraq, signifying its military momentum at that time. A couple of days after the official announcement, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State and from then on proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim, held his first public sermon in the Great Mosque of Mosul addressing the Muslims of the Caliphate and beyond:

I was put to the test by this heavy responsibility with which I was entrusted. I have been appointed your wali, yet I am not the best among you, nor am I better than you. If you see that I am right, assist me, and if you see that I err, advise me and set me back on the right track. Obey me as long as I obey Allah, but if I disobey Allah, you are not obliged to obey me (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 2014).

Cole Bunzel from Princeton University argues that, through this statement, al-Baghdadi mirrored the accession speech of the sixth-century born Caliph Abu Bakr in an effort to echo the memories of the first-ever Caliphate (Bunzel, 2015, p. 31). Based on this historical and religious argument, the Islamic State declared itself the sole legitimate state of the world; urging all Muslims to forsake their illegitimate rulers and to emigrate to the Caliphate. Up until now, tens of thousands of people have adhered to the summoning, while at the same time many more got uprooted or lost their lives at the hands of the Islamic State. The rest of the world was quick to express its horror and condemn IS for its extreme ideology, graphic use of violence, and continuous violation of human rights. Moreover, the international community refused to recognize any claim to statehood made by the organization. Ban Ki-moon, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, even offered a memorable remark on the subject:

As Muslim leaders around the world have said, groups like ISIL, or Da’ish, have nothing to do with Islam, and they certainly do not represent a state. They should more fittingly be called the ‘Un-Islamic Non-State’ (Ban Ki-moon, 2014).

Ban Ki-moon's statement is one with a big resonance amongst the international community. In a letter written on September, 2014, 126 renowned Sunni scholars, including the Grand Mufti of Egypt, several scholars from Cairo's Al-Azhar University, the Nigerian Sultan of Sokoto, and the chair of the Indonesian Muhammadiyah, presented many religious arguments against the claims of IS. Their denouncement of the organization was fierce and concluded in a call to repent and return to 'the religion of mercy' (Heneghan, 2015). At the political level, the United Nations have explicitly condemned IS to be a terrorist organization, while at the same time a large coalition of countries, led by the United States, has supported the direct opponents of the Islamic State, including the Iraqi government and the peshmerga, through air-strikes and other military support (UN Security Council, 2013, Fantz, 2014). When, on 13 November, 2015, IS-aligned terrorists committed multiple assaults in Paris killing over 120 people, the animosity between the Islamic State and the international order was raised to an extraordinary level. French president François Hollande responded with passionate language, describing the attacks as an 'act of war' and branding IS as a barbaric army of jihadists that directly threatens the values of France and the rest of the world (Dearden, 2015).

Generally, the political response has been fairly straightforward. By describing IS as a barbaric terrorist organization and disavowing every claim related to religion and statehood, the organization is branded as a group of savages who are nothing more than a cancer to the international order that needs to be cut out as soon as possible. Still, inconsistencies are easily detected. Hollande's description of the Paris attacks as an act of war committed by a Jihadi army already implies a more grounded form of participation within the international society. Similarly, there have been many debates on how to actually name the organization. Calling the Islamic State by its self-claimed title is to many an indirect legitimization of its statehood. While other terms like 'Daesh' —a satirical spin to the Arabic acronym of ISIS— have been in use, terms like ISIS and the Islamic State still appear on a fairly common basis, showing that on many levels people remain uncertain on how to actually frame IS' nature (Guthrie, 2015).

On the academic side of the spectrum the topic is treated with similar inconsistency. While some authors adhere to describing IS as a terrorist organization with militant and mafia-like characteristics (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, p. xv), others practically avoid the topic altogether by simply referring to IS as a Jihadi movement (Gerger, 2016, p. 1). Of the multiple handbooks focusing on the Islamic State, only *ISIS: the State of Terror* by Stern and Berger (2015)

acknowledges the murky waters in which the Islamic State is wading. To clear up the often biased air around the term 'terrorism', the authors start by explicitly defining terrorists as "non-state actors who engage in violence against non-combatants in order to accomplish a political goal or amplify a message" (idem, p. 10). The question then arises: is the Islamic State a state actor or not? While Stern and Berger still conclude that the Islamic State should be considered a non-state actor, they do note that the organization is pushing the boundaries of the definition due to its claim to statehood, will to govern, and extraordinary infrastructures. Because of this, Stern and Berger settle the matter in their introduction by defining IS as "a hybrid terrorist and insurgent organization" all the whilst acknowledging that the definition is not perfect (idem, p. 11).

Beyond the recurring footnote or two, the relation between the Islamic State and the international society gets little attention amongst established authors on the subject. In one of the few texts critically dedicated to the topic, A.Y. Wickramasinghe (2015), specialized in the influence of faith on international affairs, remarks that there are profound problems with defining IS with so-called 'Westphalian' terms. The reason for this: the fundamental and universalistic idea in IS' ideology that only God —and thus the Sharia— is truly sovereign. In the world propagated by IS, the divide between internal and external affairs —crucial to the functioning of our international society— is vague at best. From this, Wickramasinghe draws a thought-provoking conclusion:

The Islamic State poses an interesting vision of the sovereign state that is both Westphalian and pre-Westphalian in nature. It demands recognition as a sovereign state while it seeks to create a new world order in which territorial lines are based on religious identity (idem, p. 160).

In this quote Wickramasinghe highlights one of the most fundamental aspects of the modern world system: that it rests on so-called 'Westphalian' principles, of which the existence of sovereign states is the most essential one. By observing that the Islamic State specifically collides with this Westphalian nature, I believe that Wickramasinghe has pushed the academic discussion on the relation between IS and the international society in the right direction. Still, I argue that the author has not yet managed to frame the problem with IS and the international order precisely right. This paper is an effort to actually do so.

To be able to successfully solve this issue I maintain that we also need to place our focus on the international society itself. So far, the Islamic State has been treated as an aberration, a unique oddity, to our status quo. Although the implication that this problem might also stem from our own way of framing is already present, it barely comes to the fore, and when it does, it often remains of a superficial nature. If we are to successfully describe the problematic relation between the Islamic State and the international order, the international order needs to be an active part of the equation. Therefore, the research question of this paper is formulated as such: how does the Islamic State relate to the contemporary international order and what does it tell us about the order itself?

1.2: Setting the Scene

To answer the research question, a theoretical and historical approach is needed that dissects the current international system and its Westphalian roots to lay bare the implicit shortcomings and biases that the Islamic State has been able to disturb. To accomplish this, I will make use of the constructivist theory of Daniel Philpott, professor in the fields of International Relations [IR] and Political Theory, as written down in his book *Revolutions in Sovereignty* (2001). The book argues for the existence of the so-called 'constitution of international society' and provides clear, adaptable, and applicable models to use for the case of the Islamic State. Philpott's work is often cited as the stereotypical narrative of a Westphalian world order and places a big emphasis on the role of ideas in the development of that order. While I believe that his work offers one of the best vocabularies to approach the research question of this paper, its emphasis on Westphalia also means that his work requires serious and critical evaluation before it can be reliably used.

Also, a careful analysis of the case of Islamic State through models of the contemporary international order alone will not suffice to really address the weak spot in the system that IS managed to hit. I claim that the real difference can be made by bringing in a historical analysis that compares the nature of the Islamic State to that of the movement that forcefully introduced the ideology of nationalism in France at the end of the 18th century and just as violently captivated the rest of the world during the 129 years that followed. My reasons for this are threefold. First, the principle of nationalism is arguably one of the most fundamental elements

of the contemporary international order, yet it remains practically unmentioned in Philpott's theory. An analysis of the history of nationalism is thus necessary to fully understand the contemporary order and its underlying ideas. Second, one will find that in the earlier stages of its history, the movement that introduced the idea of nationalism to the international arena had comparable motives, techniques, and reactions as the Islamic State has nowadays. A comparison between the histories of the two movements will allow us to place the rise of IS in a new and refreshing perspective. Finally, it is specifically the idea of nation-states that seems to be one of the most important ideological opponents of the self-proclaimed Caliphate. Addressing the Islamic State's relations to the rest of the world without addressing its views on the order of nation-states would thus be a futile and incomplete exercise.

By creating a synergy between Philpott's global models on the international society, the history of nationalism, and the contemporary works on the Islamic State, I claim that the problem of IS' framing can finally be solved. Not only does it result in new frameworks which can be set off against the case of the Islamic State, it also allows for critical reflection on the frameworks themselves. To achieve this, the bibliography of this paper mostly consists of — but is not limited to— secondary literature, allowing this work to stay true to its global scope. While arguments lurk around the corner that I brush over certain subjects with too much ease, it is a necessary act to make the multiple sections of this paper not spiral out of control. To quote the *New Society's* review on the back cover of Hobsbawm's *The Age of Empire* (1994a), a book used in the third chapter of this paper: "it takes far greater gifts — and far greater nerve — to simplify and to scintillate than to criticize and to complicate."

Four distinct chapters will follow to systematically address all the pillars of this research. Chapter II will be dedicated to the theory of Philpott and pay a lot of attention to his arguments, his specific vocabulary, and the several models he creates to frame all the different dynamics in the international world order. In this paper I will present two models that are strongly based on Philpott's dialectics and figures, but feature several alterations — both big and small— that will allow for a more systematic approach of the entire framework. The first model concerns the 'constitution of international society' and illustrates a certain blueprint of how the international society is, or should be, shaped. The second model, concerning 'the pathways of ideas', elaborates on Philpott's views on how ideas and material circumstances interact on multiple levels to, eventually, bring about the establishment of a new international

constitution. Still, charting Philpott's theory will not be sufficient enough to bring up a satisfying answer to the research question. Critical evaluations of his work need to be taken into account to expose the biases that affect the worldview of his Westphalian mindset. Therefore, the article "Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory" (2010) by Turan Kayaoglu will play a crucial role in the final section of this chapter.

In the two subsequent chapters, chapters III and IV, I will provide historiographies of the rise of nationalism during the 'long 19th century' and the formation of the Islamic State. The chapter on nationalism relies on a large spectrum of secondary literature on the subject, of which the main works are provided by Eric Hobsbawm (1962, 1987, 1990, 1994a, & 1994b), Hagen Schulze (1996), and Palmer, Colton, and Kramer (2002), all renowned historians on early modernity, known for their ability to compact rather than to complicate. Chapter IV on the Islamic State has four secondary works as principal backbone. The first three are handbooks by Weiss and Hassan (2015), Gerger (2016), and Stern and Berger (2015), who are all experts in the field of terrorism, jihadism, and the Islamic State and whose works form the first generation of academic literature on the Islamic State. The fourth text is a paper by Cole Bunzel, "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State" (2015), which provides —better than the three handbooks— a clear overview of the group's ideology, its leading tenets, and its century-old origin. Considering its contemporary relevance, the chapter will also include several other sources, ranging from security and news reports, to propaganda published by the Islamic State itself.

Following their respective historiography, each chapter will end with a section where the cases are placed within the two models on the international order as provided in the second chapter. I have deliberately separated these processes from the preceding historiographies for two reasons. First, to keep the chronology and complex web of relations within the historiographies intact and comprehensible. Second, to make the incorporation of the historiographies a clear and retraceable process. This way, the bridge to the fifth and last chapter is also easily made. In this chapter, the four final models, two on each case, will be compared, from where the similarities and differences, together with Kayaoglu's and Wickramasignhe's remarks, can bring a definitive answer to the research question.

II – THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER

2.1: International Constitutions of Authority

In 2001, Daniel Philpott, professor at the University of Notre Dame and specialized in International Relations and Political Theory, published his book *Revolutions in Sovereignty*. In this book Philpott presents his own interpretation on how our contemporary system of sovereign states came into existence and how ideas played a central role in that process. Philpott and his book are a cornerstone of the constructivist tradition, the academic school in International Relations that emphasizes ideas and social constructs to disprove common realists accounts that solely use material causes to explain the political currents of the world. Philpott's narrative also places a big importance on the Peace of Westphalia and is, while certainly not new or revolutionary, often considered the quintessential description of the so-called Westphalian Society, making him an often returning object of both praise and criticism in academia (Ikenberry, 2001; Reus-Smit, 2003; Kayaoglu, 2010; Wickramasinghe, 2015). What makes his approach especially stand out —and instrumental for this paper— is the rich vocabulary he introduces to present his thesis. This vocabulary is of a highly conceptual degree, allowing for a deep understanding of the international world beyond its mere superficial dynamics. In the following three sections the multiple facets of Philpott's theory will be presented, thus providing the conceptual tools that can be used to analyze the cases of nationalism and the Islamic State further on.

Let us start with the most essential concept of his work: the so-called 'constitution of international society', a concept introduced by Philpott to portray the set of rules that determine the shape, content, organization, and rules of the international community:

International relations has always had a constitution, an order defining the very entities that rise, fall, ally, balance, negotiate, make war, and make peace, decreeing whether the world is organized into a system of states rather than a Holy Roman Empire, a European Union rather than a simple system of states, whether states may intervene in one another's affairs (Philpott, 2001, p. 6).

At its core, the constitution defines how authority, "the right to command and correlatively, the right to be obeyed" (idem, p. 16), is shaped within a certain international community.

Philpott's constitution of international society is —contrary to its domestic counterpart— not a single, explicit document, but rather an implicit structure of norms spread among, and woven together by, treaties, conventions, and customary law. These norms are only part of the constitution when they are, as Philpott writes, “both legitimate —that is, sanctioned by authoritative agreements— and practiced, generally respected by all polities that are powerful enough to regularly violate them” (idem, p. 12).

To clearly define a certain constitution at a set moment in history, Philpott uses a framework that ascribes three main features to each constitution. Calling these features ‘faces of authority’, Philpott aims to provide a global, yet well-rounded impression of how a certain constitution defines the international society (figure 1, p. 17). The first and most fundamental of these ‘faces’ prescribes the form of the legitimate polities that are part of the system. In his descriptions on the first face of authority, Philpott dedicates most of his attention to explaining the definition of ‘sovereignty’, defined by him as the “supreme authority within a territory” (Philpott, 2001, p. 16). However, it should be noted that, as a pure concept, the first face is not per definition linked to the idea of sovereignty. Going through his paragraphs on the first face of authority, we will find that Philpott only implies, never explicitly describes, three factors that together form the actual first face of authority.

The first factor concerns the ‘holders of authority’: the actors or bodies that are considered a part of the community. While nowadays these are generally conceived to be impersonal states representing their people through constitutional laws, global history shows many other potential candidates; ranging from aristocrats, caliphs, the Church, and the institutions of the European Union. The second factor defines a polity's rate of supremacy. The term ‘sovereignty’ implies the ultimate supremacy of the holder of authority, but that, too, is not a historical necessity; the prime example of which is the feudal organization of Medieval Europe where many kinds of authorities reigned, while, at the same time, none of them ever wielded the scepter of supremacy. The last factor concerns the ‘principle quality of authority’ that defines over which specific denominator people are divided amongst authorities. For the last couple of centuries territoriality has been fulfilling this role in favor of other principles such as tribal, feudal, religious, or familial ties (idem, pp. 15-19; figure 1, p. 17).

Figure 1:

THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS INTERPRETED AND ADAPTED FROM PHILPOTT'S THEORY (2001, CHAPTER 1)	
<u>FIRST FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	FORM OF PARTICIPATING POLITIES - Holder of Authority - Rate of Supremacy - Principle Quality of Authority
<u>SECOND FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP
<u>THIRD FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	PREROGATIVES OF THE POLITY

Having set the potential pool of polities that can join the international community, it is up to the second face of authority to define the rules of membership (figure 1). “The second face includes and excludes” (Philpott, 2001, p. 20) as it names the requirements that the members of the international society apply to welcome other polities amongst their ranks and recognize them as equals. These requirements go beyond the mere shape and mechanics of the polity —the first face of authority— and, instead, concern the normative features that the society imposes on its individual members. For example, after the Peace of Westphalia Philpott observes that member states were not only required to be a state in their appearance and functioning, but also to be grounded in Christianity. Back then, states like the Ottoman Empire or China were considered part of a ‘second system of states’, meaning they interacted with, but not participated in, the international society (idem, p. 14). Another example is shown when Philpott discusses the Revolution of Colonial Independence which finally allowed colonies to become an equal member of the international society. Before, members of the society —mostly the European colonizers— did not consider the colonized people as equals, thus allowing themselves to take direct possession of overseas territories not originally their own (idem, pp. 154-155).

The third face lists the different rights and duties a member of the international community has (figure 1). It is closely related to the second factor of the first face, but is

specifically used to elaborate on the exact structures of the international society. Philpott's prime example of one of the prerogatives that is covered by the third face is the right of non-intervention that was introduced by the Peace of Westphalia. Other examples include the right of diplomatic relations or the duty to hold true to signed treaties; *pacta sunt servanda* (Philpott, 2001, pp. 19-21).

2.2: Pathways of Ideas

Philpott's main thesis centers around the revolutionary changes that produced the modern constitution of international society, explaining how ideas played an essential role in its history ever since its birth at Westphalia. These changes are subsequently dubbed 'revolutions in sovereignty' which supposedly occur whenever the international society changes one or more of the faces of authority. Moreover, Philpott argues, all revolutions in sovereignty are preceded by 'revolutions in ideas'. Throughout his book, Philpott counters perceptions of history that solely acknowledge the materialist interests of politics and side-line the notion that ideas have both autonomy and power. To Philpott, a polity's interests are not merely determined by economic and military forces, but are just as much influenced and shaped by ideas on authority and, in a broader perspective, justice (Philpott, 2001, pp. 46-51).

In support of this theory, Philpott introduces his 'framework of ideas' that provides a two-step model to analyze the pathways that ideas take from their first architects to their eventual impact on the interests of politics (Philpott, 2001, pp. 48-51). The first step concerns the conversion of people to new identities. This happens through a process Philpott calls 'reason of reflection' which assumes that people form their identities by adopting certain ideas through a rational and autonomous process of internal reflection (*idem*, p. 51). Philpott notes that this does not imply that the conversion to new identities happens within a vacuum. Here, Philpott meets materialists halfway by describing 'circumstances of reflection' as important social, economic, technological, and institutional factors that can influence people in their conversion process:

I define [a circumstance of reflection] as an event, institution, discourse, or practice that helps ideas to develop, lends appeal to ideas' intrinsic propositions, assists the transmission of ideas, and encourage the perpetuation of ideas, all without imposing ideas on the individual's

identity, but instead leaving the ideas for the individual to adopt into one's own identity reflectively (idem, p. 53).

Just as influential as the circumstances of reflection, are the 'couriers of ideas'. This concept refers to a diverse selection of people and organizations that are able to spread their ideas over the rest of society: ranging from politicians, clergy, academics, merchants, and artists to governmental institutions, political parties, armies, lobbyists, labor unions, and protest movements (idem, pp. 67-70). Forwarded by the circumstances and couriers, ideas can create a 'crisis of pluralism' wherein multiple perceptions and convictions on the shape of the constitution of international society clash with each other (idem, p.58; figure 2, p. 20).


Whereas the first step is centered around the 'pathway of conversion', describing the process of individual reflection and conversion to identities, the second step, or the 'pathway to social power', describes how the converts are able to pressure the leading actors of the polity to actually change its interest in favor of a certain constitutional change of the international society. This happens through the utilization of, what Philpott calls, traditional political currencies: votes, taxes, reputational pressure, bureaucratic powers, and threats of rebellion and war. Thus, the converts are able to turn an intellectual, religious, or philosophical crisis of pluralism into a genuine political and social conflict. Once the parties have successfully persuaded or coerced the central authority of the polity —be it a parliament, government, or prince— the polity's interests in the international arena has finally changed to favor a new constitution (Philpott, 2001, pp. 57-58; figure 2, p. 20).

Philpott's model on the framework of ideas stops at the moment a polity's interest favors a change in the international constitution. However, since his theory is specifically meant to explain how ideas shape the international society, I maintain that a third pathway is needed to make Philpott's framework of ideas adaptable for new cases (figure 2, p. 20). The pathway that I have added to the final model directly follows the end of the second pathway, a polity's interest in a new constitution, and finishes with a change in the international constitution. Following Philpott's own descriptions of this process, this step is actually very similar to the pathway of social power where Philpott mostly describes the power game between actors that follows from their conversion to a certain idea. This time, however, the playing field is not set within the internal structures of the polity, but in the arena of the

international society. It is therefore that I define this last step as ‘the pathway of international power’, a direct continuation of the pathway of social power. Expanding on this idea, a couple of examples could be mentioned that would serve as political currencies on the international level: trade deals, economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, support of oppositional forces, and –most directly– war.

At the end of the pathway we find the ‘revolutions in the constitution of international society’: a change in one or several faces of authority. Throughout his book, Philpott solely refers to these revolutions with the term ‘revolutions of sovereignty’, but this definition is specifically linked to the international society that rose from the Peace of Westphalia. Therefore, to keep this model as conceptual as possible, I have replaced his term with one that has no historical connotations and purely describes the phenomenon as it is: a change in the international constitution (figure 2).

Figure 2:



2.3: Revolutions in Sovereignty

Using his own theoretical models of the constitutions of international society, Philpott provides a historical overview of the revolutions that, according to him, have led to the contemporary, global international society. Philpott's historic narrative of the modern constitution starts with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which abandoned the feudal system of Medieval Europe that was centered around the competition of multiple authorities like the Church, the Holy Roman Emperor, princes, and cities. Philpott calls this revolution the most significant to date as it functions as the foundation of the current international system:

Every subsequent revolution has revised Westphalia, geographically extending the states system, altering the criteria for being recognized as a state, curtailing the state's absolute sovereignty, all making Westphalia a benchmark, a standard, a subject that undergoes change, the thing to be revised (Philpott, 2001, pp. 32-33).


Philpott does not argue that the Peace of Westphalia was revolutionary in the sense that suddenly all the polities of the system turned into sovereign states while they did not exist before the signing of the treaty. Rather, he argues that it meant the definitive consolidation of the idea that it should be as such. It is from that moment on that sovereign states were the norm and that other actors like the Holy Roman Emperor and the Church lost their practical authority (idem, pp. 30-31).

Like any revolution in the constitution, the Revolution of Westphalia was preceded by a revolution in ideas: the Reformation. The ideas of Protestantism were propagated by many sorts of couriers of ideas, ranging from Luther and Calvin to the Huguenots and the Dutch rebels, and brought forth the delegitimization of the authority of the Emperor and the Church. This way, the Reformation transformed the religious ideals of the Protestants into a political challenge towards the constitution of feudality. Following the Reformation, different polities in Europe —either directly or indirectly influenced by the Protestant ideas— developed interest in a constitution of sovereign states (idem, pp 110-136; figure 3, p. 22). The subsequent Eighty- and Thirty Years' Wars —fought against the Catholic polities that defended the feudal status quo— split the international system of Europe into two opposing and warring parties (figure 4, p. 23).

Figure 3:

**WESTPHALIA'S PATHWAYS OF IDEAS
AS INTERPRETED AND ADAPTED FROM PHILPOTT'S MODELS AND ELABORATION
(2001, CHAPTERS 5, 6 & 7)**

I. PATHWAY OF CONVERSION



II. PATHWAY OF SOCIAL POWER

II.A REFORMATION FROM BELOW (GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS, TRANSYLVANIA)



II.B REFORMATION FROM ABOVE (SWEDEN, ENGLAND, DENMARK)



II.C THE POLITIQUE SOLUTION (FRANCE)



III. PATHWAY OF INTERNATIONAL POWER



Figure 4:

PHILPOTT: THE CORRELATION SUMMARIZED
(PHILPOTT, 2001, P. 111, TABLE 6.1)

<u>POLITY</u>	<u>INTEREST IN WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM OF SOVEREIGN STATES</u>	<u>REFORMATION CRISIS</u>
GERMAN PROTESTANT STATES	1520-1545	1520-1540's
GERMAN CATHOLIC STATES	NONE	WEAK, REMAINING MINORITY STATUS
NETHERLANDS (UNITED PROVINCES)	1581	1560's
SWEDEN	1540's	1520's
FRANCE	1620's	1560's-1598
SPAIN	NONE	NONE
ITALY	NONE	NONE
POLAND	NONE	MODERATE SPREAD OF PROTESTANTISM BUT NO SIGNIFICANT CRISIS
HABSBURG HUNGARY	NONE	MILD SPREAD OF PROTESTANTISM BUT NO SIGNIFICANT CRISIS
TRANSYLVANIA	1618	1550
DENMARK	1538	1520's & 1530's
ENGLAND	SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN PROTESTANTS SHORT OF ALL-OUT WAR 1560S-1648	1530's

After a long and devastating period, a solution to the conflict was finally found in the Peace of Westphalia which settled the authority of the German principalities to choose their own religion and recognized the independence of the Dutch Republic. Implicitly, yet most fundamentally, it established the constitutional principle of sovereignty that is absolute, territorial, and based on the prerogative of non-intervention (*idem*, pp. 30-33). Philpott acknowledges other historians who explain the consolidation of the sovereign states through the rise of the cities, capitalism, and the bourgeoisie, but rather argues these to be circumstances of reflection for the Protestant ideas to foster and shape the constitution to their own specific ideas of justice and authority (*idem*, pp. 144-149).

Besides the Revolution of Westphalia, Philpott mentions four other revolutions of sovereignty that he considers to be essential to the current state of affairs in the field of international relations: the minority treaties formed around the beginning of the 20th century, European integration following the Second World War, the global wave of colonial independence after 1960, and the rise of intervention politics at the hand of the United Nations since the end of the Cold War (figure 5, p. 25). Like the Revolution of Westphalia, the Revolution of Colonial Independence was one that strengthened the principles of Westphalia by changing the constitution's second face and making the scope of Westphalia a global one; allowing all the colonial states that were conquered by the Western colonizers to become an equal member of the Westphalian Society (idem, pp. 33-36). Whereas this revolution, together with the Revolution of Westphalia, is identified as part of a movement towards sovereignty, Philpott identifies the other three revolutions as part of a movement away from sovereignty; either by challenging the norm of non-intervention —as the minority treaties and the intervention possibilities of the UN did— or by the pooling of sovereignty in a supranational body —as seen during the creation and expansion of the European Union. Through the observation of these three revolutions, Philpott shows that the principle of sovereignty is facing more and more challenges as time moves forward (idem, pp. 36-43).

Figure 5:

PHILPOTT: MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS SINCE THE MIDDLE AGES
(PHILPOTT, 2001, P. 31, TABLE 3.1)

<u>REVOLUTION ON SOVEREIGNTY</u>	<u>REVISION OF FIRST FACE</u>	<u>REVISION OF SECOND FACE</u>	<u>REVISION OF THIRD FACE</u>	<u>GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES</u>
WESTPHALIA (1648)	STATES REPLACE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE	POLITY MUST BE STATE AND CHRISTIAN	GOVERNMENTS ENJOYS ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY; NON-INTERVENTION	EUROPE
MINORITY TREATIES (1878, POST WWI)	OVERSIGHT BY LEAGUE OF NATIONS	MINORITY AGREEMENTS NEW CRITERION	STATES SUBJECT TO OVERSIGHT OF MINORITY TREATMENT	EASTERN EUROPE
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1950-)	EU INSTITUTIONS 'POOL' SOVEREIGNTY	MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA EU STATES	STATES NO LONGER SOVEREIGN IN AREAS OF EU LAW	EUROPE
COLONIAL INDEPENDENCE (EARLY 1960'S)	NONE	COLONIES ARE ENTITLED TO STATEHOOD	NONE	GLOBAL
INTERVENTION (POST-COLD WAR)	UN ATTAINS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE	NONE	STATES SUBJECT TO OUTSIDE ENFORCEMENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES	POTENTIALLY GLOBAL

2.4: From Philpott's Westphalian Society to the Westphalian Order

The political and historical significance of 'Westphalia' as presented by Philpott is often cast into doubt. To start, there are those that question the historical significance of the Peace of Westphalia itself. They speak of the 'Westphalian Myth', arguing the narrative that portrays Westphalia as the foundation of the modern international society to be an anachronistic misconception. They argue, for example, that the Holy Roman Empire still persisted after the signing of the treaties and explain that many concepts related to Westphalian sovereignty and secularism only came to be named as such during the 19th century (Osiander, 2001; Beaulac, 2004). Furthermore, there is also the criticism coming from the structural realistic school as, for example, expressed by Stephen D. Krasner, IR professor at Stanford University and author of the book *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*:

Neither Westphalian nor international legal sovereignty has ever been a stable equilibrium from which rulers had no incentives to deviate. Rather, Westphalian and international legal sovereignty are best understood as examples of organized hypocrisy. At times rulers adhere to conventional norms or rules because it provides them with resources and support (both material and ideational). At other times, rulers have violated the norms, and for the same reasons (Krasner, 1999, p. 24).

By calling the Westphalian and legal norms of international relations a form of organized hypocrisy, Krasner is directly undermining the significance of Philpott's theory on the 'constitutions of international society', branding such constitutions as mere façades that barely influence the actions of political actors who, to Krasner, are primarily led by interests in material power.

This paper will not go too deep into the debate that is put forward by these two forms of criticism, for both arguments were not new to Philpott and already received several counterarguments in his book. Concerning the criticism posed by those speaking of the 'Westphalian Myth', I already mentioned Philpott's counterargument which states that Westphalia should not be considered an absolute moment in history where sovereign states appeared. Rather, it should be viewed as a pivotal turning point in history where the idea of the sovereign state, be it implicitly or explicitly, became the new norm of conduct (Philpott, 2001, pp. 30-31). Furthermore, I maintain that the historical correctness of the concept of the

'Westphalian Society', is not what is at stake here. What matters more is the idea the term is representing. The concept refers to a specific model of international relations, and it is this model and what it represents that is relevant to this paper. Its semantic correctness, while interesting and not to be neglected in discussing Westphalia, is not relevant in this case.

Concerning the form of criticism that declares Westphalia to be a hypocritical façade, it has already been mentioned that Philpott specifically wrote his book and designed his models to argue in favor of the opposite. His most specific counterarguments are found in the two main cases of his book: the Peace of Westphalia and the British and French paths of decolonization. With both cases Philpott illustrates how the specific ideas of religious freedom, secularism, and colonial independence came to shape the agendas of those actors that sought to change the international constitution. Here, Philpott puts forth counterfactual arguments, convincing his public that without these specific ideas, the structural realist school would never be able to explain how these changes occurred in the specific way and at the specific time that they did (Philpott, 2001, p. 258).

While I do not argue Westphalia to be a myth or a pure hypocrisy, I do argue there to be another problem with the model of the Westphalian Society that needs to be taken into consideration to fully understand the complex relation IS has with the current system. This observation is based on the criticism that is put forth by Turan Kayaoglu, a professor specialized in the intersection of religion, human rights, and IR theory, of in his article "Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory" (2010). In this article Kayaoglu examines the academic focus on the Westphalian Society: "countless references to these treaties have led to the formation of a framework for understanding international history and politics that I call the Westphalian narrative" (Kayaoglu, 2010, p. 193). According to Kayaoglu, the Westphalian narrative arose in the 19th century, 200 year after the actual event it is named after, at a time when European powers acquired global dominance and sought to legitimize their hegemony:

To this end I deconstruct the Westphalian narrative to suggest that it in part substantiates a perspective of European exceptionalism. This exceptionalism idealizes the European/Western order and elevates its ideas and ideals in international relations scholarship. [...] Western states *produce* norms, principles, and institutions of international society and non-Western states *lack* these until they are *socialized* into the norms, principles, and institutions of international society.

In this perspective, international society is a normative hierarchy assumed to reflect the natural division of labor in international relations (Kayaoglu, 2010, p. 194).

Kayaoglu specifically mentions Philpott's book as a prime example of the academic tradition that keeps the Westphalian narrative and its Eurocentric bias alive (idem, pp. 211-213).

Kayaoglu does not claim the narrative to be completely ahistorical or impractical. He acknowledges its use by the English School and constructivists to debunk structural realists and neoliberal accounts of history and mentions it as an acceptable and concise introduction to the history of international relations. Instead, he uses his article specifically to expose and challenge the normativity of the narrative, something that, according to him, has been ignored for far too long by the English School and constructivists like Philpott (idem, p. 195). Allowing this normativity to remain unnoticed would lead to, in his own words: "misdiagnoses of major problems of contemporary international relations" (idem, p. 193).

I do not consider Kayaoglu's theory an argument to abandon academic models on the Westphalian Society. Rather, it should be approached as an observation that political and academic points of view, biases, and models can be strongly intertwined. It is, in a sense, a continuation of the constructivist notion that the behavior of actors is influenced by the paradigms they are surrounded by. This time, however, the idea that is at stake is not the principle of secularism or freedom, but the Westphalian narrative itself. It is vital, therefore, to accommodate this observation in a paper that places the rise of the Islamic State in the frameworks of the Westphalian Society. To fully accomplish this, I introduce the concept of the 'Westphalian Order' as an upgrade for Philpott's 'Westphalian Society'. Whereas the term of the 'Westphalian Society' — as observed by Kayaoglu (idem, p. 205)— usually refers to the observed system and the idea that members of the society share a certain, Western set of rules, prerogatives, and values, the concept of the 'Westphalian Order' also takes into account that the Westphalian narrative, upheld by both politicians and academics, is a fundamental part of the power structures of the international society. Going back to the research question: "how does the Islamic State relate to the contemporary international order and what does it tell us about the order itself?", Kayaoglu's remarks thus specifically serve to show us that the problem and its solution are primarily found in the order's power structures upheld in both politics and academia.

III – THE RISE OF NATIONS

3.1: On Nations and Nationalism

The idea of the nation is one of the most powerful ideas still to be observed in the field of politics. Contemporary events like the crisis in Ukraine, the rise of far-right populists in Europe and the United States, the British departure from the European Union, and the regional tensions in Catalonia, Scotland, and Ireland cannot be understood without considering the ideological force of nationalism as both an influential factor and a power of its own. It is remarkable then, that an ideology so deeply rooted in the modern Westphalian Order is never narrated by Philpott as part of one of his revolutions in either ideas or sovereignty. The ideology does make a sudden appearance in Philpott's treatment of the Revolution of Colonial Independence where he assigns an important role to the anti-colonial nationalist movement. Here, he states that the nationalistic ideology of the movement motivated its members to fight not just for political or economic emancipation, but for the absolute independence of the colonies (Philpott, 2001, p. 161). To Philpott, it was one of the main revolutions in ideas that lead to the eventual revolution in sovereignty that was consolidated by the 1960 General Assembly Resolution: the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People*, which stated that:

All peoples have the right to self-determination [...] any attempt at the total or partial disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and the principles of the United Nations (UN General Assembly, 1960).

Philpott's argument is based on the — what Kayaoglu would describe as Eurocentric— assumption that earlier, European forms of nationalism served to inspire the anti-colonial nationalists (Philpott, 2001, pp. 191-197), yet his narrative is lacking any form of recognition of how that ideology was able to grip the constitution of the colonizers in the eras before 1960. Instead, Philpott only makes the observation that the Revolution of Westphalia undermined the medieval supremacy of royal dynasties in favor of territorial states, implying that nationalism only came into existence as the eventual affirmation of the territorial state (idem, pp 91-92). While Philpott is right in connecting the existence of territorial states with nationalism and observing the problematic relation that both concepts have with dynastic

rulership, I argue that this line of thinking is too simplistic and serves to undervalue the role and power of nationalism in the history of the Westphalian Order.

So, the question then arises how nationalism should be placed within the models of Philpott. To start, the concepts of 'nationalism' and 'the nation' need be examined, for both have a history of strong subjective, political, and time-dependent connotations. While the term 'nationalism' still serves to define a broad spectrum of sentiments in politics, its definition within the fields of sociology and political history is fairly uncontested. For this paper, I will follow Eric J. Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner, respectively a historian and a sociologist both specialized in 19th century nationalism, who define nationalism to be: "primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 1983, as cited in Hobsbawm, 1990, p.9). Nationalism, following this definition, is first and foremost an ideology centered around the political emancipation of the nation and, ultimately, the creation of the nation-state.

Concerning the concept of the 'nation', the scope of interpretations is big and, often, conflicting. Nenad Miscevic (2008), professor in philosophy, identifies two archetypes of definitions that lie at the roots of the most prominent nationalistic movements in history. First, there is the civic, liberal, or 'voluntaristic' definition, usually attributed to French philosopher Ernest Renan, which states the nation to be a large community of free and equal citizens where loyalty, consent, and mutual solidarity are the only criteria for potential members to join (idem, pp. 94-96; Renan 1882/1992). The second definition is what Miscevic defines as 'universalistic culture-based nationalism' in which the nation is not just seen as a large political and social unit, but as a natural and universal phenomenon. This idea finds its roots in post-Enlightenment Romanticism and is most famously defined by J.G. Herder:

Every nation carries its center of happiness within itself, like a ball its center of gravity [...] The most natural state is One people with One national character (Herder, 1774/2004).

It is through this notion that nationalism can turn into a vivid and fanatic ideology, for it is through the universality of the nation that every different aspect of politics and culture is suddenly framed to be a reflection of the national identity. On top of that, it turns away from the voluntaristic principle by presuming that people are born within their nation. Suddenly, it is considered a fundamental part of their DNA —or more romantically: their soul— and

therefore it would be impossible for outsiders to join the community of the nation (Miscevic, 2008, pp. 88-90).

For most modern historians and sociologists the nation is not considered an essential quality of the universe, but an ideological concept specifically propelled by the rise of nationalism during the 'long 19th century'. A period covering the French Revolution of 1789 to the end of the First World War in 1918, the long 19th century is the era in which the nation-state rapidly grew to dominate the political landscape. On the one hand, scholars attribute this to the radical social changes brought forth by the Industrial Revolution. The most well-known thesis in this area is offered by Ernest Gellner (1983) who argues that the rise of capitalism, together with new technological innovations, and a growing military competition between states, demanded a homogeneous population that could be mobilized *en masse* by a centralized state apparatus. States thus had to be turned into nation-states with a single language and a unified set of values and rituals so that communication between all the different levels and institutions of society would remain fast and efficient (Gellner, 1983). Historians like Anderson and Palmer, Colton, and Kramer assert this thesis by pointing at the large impact technologies like the steam engine, the improved printing press, and the telegraph had in reducing the relative distance between large parts of the world; making travel, trade, and the exchange of ideas more frequent and easier than ever before (Anderson, 1986, pp. 66-79; Palmer, Colton & Kramer, 2002, p. 509). This made the idea of the nation, as an identity that transcended local communities, much more susceptible than in times where communication between distant settlements was rare at best.

On the other hand, scholars explain the rise of nationalism during the 19th century by highlighting the influence of the Enlightenment. Inspired by the ideas of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment was an intellectual movement among authors, bourgeoisie, and aristocrats that promoted the idea of the universal equality of mankind. Well-known thinkers of the Enlightenment such as Voltaire, Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Rousseau used this principle to promote their idea of 'the social contract', arguing that monarchs — as mere individuals equal to their subjects — had no natural or divine right to their crown. Instead, they were servants to the public cause; the principle that, according to the rational laws of the Enlightenment, embodied the will of the true sovereign: the people (Schulze, 1996, pp. 72-91; Taras, 2008). It was this movement that explicitly began

to promote the principles of individual rights and liberties, and most of all: democracy. Here, the idea of the nation also entered the fray, becoming the larger embodiment of all those liberal principles combined:

The nation and democracy became two sides of the same coin, the nation-state turned out to be the appropriate contemporary setting and the guarantor of democracy and parliamentary rule (Schulze, 1996, pp. 200-201).

The Enlightenment, together with all the different facets of the Industrial Revolution, had a big impact on the course of politics throughout the long 19th century, starting with the outbreak of the French Revolution.

3.2: The Long 19th Century

It is the glory of France to have announced, by the French Revolution, that nations exist by themselves (Renan, 1882/1992).

While this century-old statement by Renan is highly patriotic and biased, many contemporary historians actually give it quite some academic merit (Hobsbawm, 1962, pp. 73-77; Schulze, 1996, pp. 153-156; Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin, 1999, p. 65). The French Revolution of 1789 started out as the revolution of the Third Estate, the body of the Estates General that did not belong to either the clergy of the First Estate, nor the aristocracy of the Second. When the royal government of France was hit by a severe financial crisis, King Louis XVI summoned for the Estates General to assemble and to approve of new financial reforms. However, the representatives of the Third Estate, mostly consisting of the bourgeoisie and fueled by the ideas of the Enlightenment, resented the power monopoly of the two upper Estates. After long protest, the Third Estate decided to separate itself from the Estates General and rename itself the 'National Assembly'. Later, on July 14, 1789, Parisian mobs of lower class workers and peasants, stirred by the news coming from the Estates General, the economic depression, and rising food prices, stormed the Bastille. This event paralyzed the King and the two upper Estates, after which the Assembly managed to gain control of the government. Not long after, the National Assembly issued the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*, proclaiming that: "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights". The document was a clear statement by

the Assembly on how it wanted to fundamentally reform the French state apparatus according to the enlightened principles (Hobsbawm, 1962, pp. 76-89; Palmer et al., 2002, pp. 343-357).

The French Revolution marked the beginning of a long period of chaos in Europe. The enlightened message of the revolutionaries was, after all, a universal one and many political factions across Europe that sought to change their own status quo started to express their sympathy. The Revolution thus found much opposition with the ruling European monarchs. International tensions rapidly started to rise between France and the rest of Europe, which pushed the National Assembly, already wrought by continuous in-fighting, in the hands of radical factions. On August 10, 1792, the Jacobins seized power and founded the French Republic, declaring to the rest of Europe that the French armies would aid all the peoples who wished to revolt for the sake of their own liberty. Soon, the French Republic found itself at war with all of Europe. The Jacobins set a landslide of revolutionary armies in motion that raged across the continent, conquering new territory for France and establishing satellite states according to the Revolutionary example. All the while, France itself remained in utter turmoil. In an effort to suppress opposition and create the ultimate centralized state, the Jacobins started their infamous Reign of Terror, executing everyone whom they considered an enemy of the Republic (Hobsbawm, 1962, pp. 89-98; Palmer et al., 2002, pp. 363-377).

Within three years, the Reign of Terror had backfired on its original initiators, signaling the failure of the radical Jacobin attempt to end the internal chaos of France. France had to endure several more regime changes until, at last, Napoleon Bonaparte seized power. Even though Napoleon ended up proclaiming himself the new emperor of France, his new regime remained loyal to many of the Revolutionary ideals, continuing the Jacobin efforts to spread the doctrines and institutions of the Enlightenment in both France and the rest of Europe. During this period, the ideology of nationalism spread like wildfire, not only among the patriots supporting the Napoleonic forces, but also amongst the growing opposition in the conquered territories. In the end, it was Napoleon's march on Moscow that proved France's expansion fatal and allowed the other European powers to cast the French forces back to their original territories. For a little while, the royalists managed to bring the continent back under their own control, only to find out soon that the forces of nationalism were not to be quelled so easily (Palmer et al., 2002, pp. 374-425; Hobsbawm, 1962, pp. 116-117).

Hagen Schulze observes that following the French Revolution the principle of the nation-state started its century-long path of consolidation. In his book *States, Nations and Nationalism* (1996) he defines two different paths that the European polities took during the 19th and 20th century to transform themselves into the nation-states as we now generally know them. The first part describes the process of what Schulze calls 'state to nation' and was followed by mostly western polities: France, Britain, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and the Scandinavian countries. Here, a central state had already been forming over the course of a couple of centuries, with even early notions of nationalism slowly developing over time. When the French Revolution hit, liberal nationalism was able to get a firm grip on the state, forcing these institutions —either by radical revolutions or slow-paced reforms— to dedicate themselves to the nation. As shown by the Congress of Vienna, royalists actively tried to fight these changes. Yet, promoted by the continuous industrial dynamics that empowered both the bourgeoisie and the working-class, the nation always found a way to come back and consolidate itself even deeper. Monarchs explicitly came to rule by the blessing of their nation and not by divine intervention. By the turn of the century all of these states had been turned into nation-states, either as a republic or as a constitutional monarchy where the crown explicitly reigned by the grace of its people and was limited in its power by other democratic institutions (Schulze, 1996, pp. 200-204).

The second path defined by Schulze concerns the process of 'nation to state' as observed in Germany and Italy during the 19th century and Eastern Europe during the 20th century. In the case of Germany and Italy there never truly had been a stable, unified state in modern history. But, when the influences of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution reached these regions, they created a spark of nationalism that transcended the local political borders and promoted the idea of a culturally and politically unified region. Similar to the processes in the western countries, this spark was able to ignite multiple factions within Central Europe; from scholars, writers, and artists, to the working class, the bourgeoisie, and even the aristocrats. Soon, powerful actors —Bismarck in Germany and Garibaldi in Italy— used the massive support for national unification within these different factions to create a large, powerful, and uniform state (idem, pp. 225-230). During this time period nationalism transformed into a powerful and dominant force. Propelled by post-Enlightenment Romanticism, the ideology attained its universal and fanatic character, elevating the nation to

a divine status. Every aspect of society —from art and architecture to language, religion, and politics— became subject to the dogmas of nationalism. More and more, the nation-state came to attain totalitarian characteristics, a process that started with the French Revolution, but only managed to attain seemingly perfection by the turn of the century (idem, pp. 231-264; Hobsbawm, 1987, pp. 142-164; Leerssen, 2006).

While the nation-state prospered in Western and Central Europe, Eastern Europe was confronted with the rise and consolidation of multinational empires controlled by powerful royal dynasties: the Habsburgs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Romanovs of the Russian Empire, and the Ottomans of the Turkish Empire. While their state organization was not significantly different from their Western and Central European cousins, their founding principles were. The fundamental legitimacy remained with the ruling dynasties and was never —despite some moderate forms of nationalization— forfeited to the idea of a singular and united nation (Palmer et al., 2002, pp. 509-511; Mazower, 1998, pp. 43-51). Growing conflicts of imperialism began to escalate at the start of the 20th century, which soon led to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. While the war was not fought over the conflicting principles between nation-states and royal dynasties, it still ended up sealing the conflict's fate:

The First World War and the collapse of Europe's old continental empires signaled the triumph not only of democracy but also —and more enduringly— of nationalism. With the extension of the principle of national self-determination from western to central and eastern Europe, the Paris peace treaties created a pattern of borders and territories which has lasted more or less up to the present (Mazower, 1998, p. 40).

With the signing of the Treaties of Paris, the principle of the nation-state became the new and absolute standard for polities in the world (Hobsbawm, 1994b, p. 31). The legitimacy of absolutist monarchs was practically annihilated. In the turbulent and chaotic decades that followed many new ideas on how the world should be ordered came to rise and fall. Yet, the idea of the nation —whether promoted by liberals, fascists, or even communists— had already risen to a point where it had become an unquestionable cornerstone of the modern world.

3.3: The Revolution of Paris

The long 19th century had a big impact on the Westphalian Order. First, with the passing of the French Revolution, the principles of popular rule and the nation found its way to the international arena and directly challenged the legitimacy of the absolutist monarchs that dominated Europe up until then. Secondly, by conquering many parts of the world, Europe was able to expand the borders of its international society across the globe, with large parts of Africa and Asia falling under the direct sway of the European colonizers, and the Western Hemisphere even birthing a couple of fully or partly recognized members of the Westphalian Society. The question then becomes: how to fit this history into the theory and models of Philpott as presented in the first chapter? To keep this as thorough and systematic as possible, I will apply the assessments of nationalism in sections 3.1 and 3.2 to each of the two models on the international constitution as presented in the previous chapter, so that, in the end, there is a clear overview of all the information required for the upcoming comparison with the Islamic State.

Figure 6:


NATIONALISM'S INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTION		
<u>FIRST FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	FORM OF PARTICIPATING POLITIES - Holder of Authority - Rate of Supremacy - Principle Quality of Authority	SOVEREIGN STATES - State - Absolute - Territoriality
<u>SECOND FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP	THE POLITY IS A STATE & REPRESENTS A NATION
<u>THIRD FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	PREROGATIVES OF THE POLITY	WESTPHALIAN PREROGATIVES

The first model concerns the faces of authority (figure 6) and will help to specify in what area the ideology of nationalism proposes a change to the constitution of international society. Originally, Philpott portrays nationalism only as an ideology that affirmed the principle of the sovereign and territorial state as established by the Revolution of Westphalia

(Philpott, 2001, pp. 91-92). Because of this, the idea gets little attention in his book and is never credited with its own revolution of sovereignty. To me, this is a mistake. Yes, it is true that the idea of the nation is one born out of the territorial state and even serves to further consolidate it. However, by promoting the idea that the state should be an embodiment of the nation — and not the tool of an absolute monarch— nationalism imposes, I claim, a radical amendment to the second face of authority. The idea of the nation was based on the egalitarian principles of the Enlightenment, making its scope universal. Once a polity was fully transformed into a nation-state, it —implicitly or explicitly— became rested on the principle that other states should just as equally be representing a nation. The hostilities between Revolutionary France and the rest of Europe are a prime example of this. Since the second face of authority concerns the normative requirements of polities to join the international society, the ideology of nationalism directly challenged this face of the Westphalian constitution. The first and third faces of authority remain untouched by the principles of nationalism as these principles were explicitly born out of the Westphalian system of territorial states and, as mentioned, even served to further consolidate them (figure 6, p. 36).

Because nationalism proposes a revision to the constitution of international society, it immediately becomes the core of a new revolution in ideas. But how did this revolution in ideas unfold in the case of nationalism? To answer this question we need to place the history of the long 19th century within the frames of the second model concerning the pathways of ideas (figure 7, p. 38). Filling in the first part of this model, the pathway of conversion, is relatively straightforward. Of course, the list of potential circumstances of reflection and couriers of ideas could be very elaborate, but for the sake of clarity, only the most fundamental contributors should be mentioned for now. Here, the observations made at the end of section 3.1 provide us with the most essential answers, turning the Industrial Revolution and its different aspects into the most exemplary circumstance of reflection and making the thinkers of the Enlightenment the primary couriers of ideas. To round it up, some noteworthy propellers found throughout section 3.2 can also be placed into the model; these being the economic crisis that influenced the French Revolution and the multiple factions that actively helped to spread the principles of nationalism (figure 7, p. 38).

Figure 7:



The second pathway is trickier. As Philpott already showed in his treatment of the Peace of Westphalia, there is not just one assignable path that leads to a polity adopting a certain constitutional interest. In an effort to keep the theory as clear and global as possible, Philpott narrowed his treatment of Westphalia down to three different paths, based on either the outcome of the path or the specific role of actors during the process (figure 4, p. 23). For the pathways of nationalism I specifically decide to narrow the pathways down based on Schulze's description concerning the different processes of nation-state formation. While I could just as easily make a distinction between the bottom-up or top-down pathways, the distinction between 'state to nation' and 'nation to state' is much more relevant to the topic, and also poses a bigger challenge to the actual structures of the model. Reason for this is that the second process of nation-state formation, 'nation to state', concerns polities that did not exist at the start of their process, making their pathway an interesting mash between domestic and international dynamics. While the political currencies of the 'state to nation' pathway mostly concern internal factors derived from my earlier assessment of the French Revolution and Schulze, the 'nation to state' pathway also includes currencies like war and diplomacy as normally witnessed on the international scale of events (figure 7, p. 38).

The third pathway concerns the international struggle between polities on the principles of nationalism. This conflict commenced the moment the National Assembly assumed power over France and started to exert its influence, both diplomatically and militaristically, over the rest of Europe. The end of this pathway —the result of which is a revolution in the constitution of international society— is then to be found at the moment the idea of nationalism became a fully consolidated and unavoidable principle: the Treaties of Paris at the end of the First World War (Mazower, 1998, p. 41). Following Philpott's example of naming the revolutions, it is only fitting for this revolution to be named the Revolution of Paris, carrying not only the name of the city where the principle of nationalism was consolidated at the world stage, but also the name of the city where the principle was introduced to the international arena more than a 100 years before (figure 7, p. 38). Having determined all the variables for the Revolution of Paris, a revision of Philpott's third model, the overview of all the big revolutions in sovereignty since Westphalia (figure 3, p. 22), only seems a fitting way to conclude this chapter (figure 8, p. 40).

Figure 8:

**MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS SINCE THE MIDDLE AGES
REVISED**

<u>REVOLUTION ON SOVEREIGNTY</u>	<u>REVISION OF FIRST FACE</u>	<u>REVISION OF SECOND FACE</u>	<u>REVISION OF THIRD FACE</u>	<u>GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES</u>
WESTPHALIA (1648)	STATES REPLACE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE	POLITY MUST BE STATE AND CHRISTIAN	GOVERNMENTS ENJOYS ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY; NON-INTERVENTION	EUROPE
MINORITY TREATIES (1878, POST WWI)	OVERSIGHT BY LEAGUE OF NATIONS	MINORITY AGREEMENT NEW CRITERION	STATES SUBJECT TO OVERSIGHT OF MINORITY TREATMENT	EASTERN EUROPE
TREATIES OF PARIS (POST WWI)	NONE	POLITY MUST BE STATE AND REPRESENT A NATION	NONE	WESTERN DOMINATED WORLD
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1950-)	EU INSTITUTIONS 'POOL' SOVEREIGNTY	MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA EU STATES	STATES NO LONGER SOVEREIGN IN AREAS OF EU LAW	EUROPE
COLONIAL INDEPENDENCE (EARLY 1960'S)	NONE	COLONIES ARE ENTITLED TO STATEHOOD	NONE	GLOBAL
INTERVENTION (POST-COLD WAR)	UN ATTAINS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE	NONE	STATES SUBJECT TO OUTSIDE ENFORCEMENTS OF HUMANRIGHTS PRACTICES	POTENTIALLY GLOBAL

IV – THE REBIRTH OF THE CALIPHATE?

4.1: Paving the Road

A little more over 200 years after Robespierre and the Jacobins set up the totalitarian Reign of Terror in the name of reason and human liberty, another group came to the fore pronouncing the creation of a totalitarian regime entrenched in the principle of terror. This time, however, the core ideals had nothing to do with the principles of the Enlightenment. They explicitly opposed them. Generally known as the Islamic State, the organization – as mentioned in the introduction – has posed an incredible challenge to the international order. To fully understand the relation between IS and the Westphalian Order we need a closer look at both the history of the organization and the ideology that has driven it. Only then can the case of the Islamic State be incorporated into the two models as was done in the previous chapter.

While the organization rose to prominence on the world stage during the summer of 2014, its first iteration can be traced back to 2004, with the founding of al-Qaeda in Iraq [AQI], an affiliate of the terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden. Founded in 1988, al-Qaeda is generally defined as “a global Salafi Sunni militant jihadi organization” (Stern & Berger, 2015, ix), and is most notoriously known for the attacks of 9/11. While the organization was founded amidst the turmoil of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, its aspirations were of a global scope from the very start (Mendelsohn, 2016, p. 20). Cole Bunzel defines al-Qaeda’s – and later IS’ – ideology as Jihadi-Salafist, a combination of two very specific schools of Islamic political thought: Jihadism and Salafism. The Jihadi tradition is traced back to the first half of the 20th century when the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood “emerged in response to the rise of Western imperialism and the associated decline of Islam in public life” (Bunzel, 2015, p. 7). After the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate the call to re-establish an Islamic State based on the Sharia became a central – although not necessarily immediate – ambition of the Brotherhood and subsequent other jihadi traditions. Salafism, the second stream, is a strict theological Sunni movement that calls for the purification of the faith. The school birthed a strong sentiment against both the Shi’a and Middle-Eastern democrats for their ‘sinful reverence’ of the Prophet’s family and the democratic institutions that – according to the Salafists – try to compete with ‘God the Divine Legislator’. The two streams found each other at the end of the 20th century with the advance of radical scholars who not only preached for the re-

establishment of the Caliphate, but also for extreme and violent measures to achieve it (*idem*, pp. 7-9). Inspired by this tradition, al-Qaeda considers itself a vanguard of the jihadi movement, using terrorist attacks in both the Middle-East and the West to gather worldwide attention for the Jihadist call and awaken the Muslim community from its perceived 'slumber' (Schmid, 2014, pp. 5-9).

In an effort to realize these goals, al-Qaeda adopted a system of trans-national franchises, resulting in the establishment of different affiliates in the Middle-East and beyond (Mendelsohn, 2016, pp. 61-77). The Iraqi franchise became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, and was formed out of a group led by the radical Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who pledged loyalty to bin Laden in 2004. A year before the founding of AQI, the United States launched an attack on Iraq to dethrone the Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein. Soon after the invasion, the US turned against Hussein's Ba'ath party by removing over 100,000 civil servants and military officials from office. This, together with the US' empowerment of Shi'a politicians, turned the country into a highly potential recruiting ground for al-Qaeda, who could feed on both anti-US and anti-Shi'a sentiments to strengthen the appeal of its Jihadi-Salafist ideology (Stern & Berger, 2015, pp. 17-21). While Zarqawi proved a valuable asset for al-Qaeda's hold on Iraq, it immediately became clear that the relation between the two was not perfect. Zarqawi had a firm grip on AQI and usually upheld more radical beliefs and brutal practices than the central organization (*idem*, p. 22; Bunzel, 2015, pp. 13-16). The countless brutalities, including suicide bombings and beheadings, led to a decline in the organization's appeal and success. This decline kept its pace over the years, only growing more severe with the death of Zarqawi and the organization's rebranding to the Islamic State of Iraq [ISI] in 2006 (Stern & Berger, 2015, pp. 25-31; Gerges, 2016, pp. 91-97).

4.2: The State of Terror

When, in May 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was named the new leader of the Islamic State in Iraq, the organization was practically in shambles. Baghdadi's ascension, however, marked the start of the organization's revival. With most of the group's leadership killed in action throughout the preceding months, Baghdadi seized the opportunity to bring in fresh, yet experienced blood. His gaze turned to the skilled military veterans of the Ba'ath party and a

large amount of Sunni tribes who had all endured surprisingly new levels of suppression under the policies of Iraq's Shi'a Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki. The Ba'ath veterans brought in a lot of military expertise, which, together with the support of the Sunni tribes, allowed ISI to radically boost its activities (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, pp. 116-130; Stern & Berger, 2015, pp. 33-45).

While Baghdadi was increasing his foothold in Iraq, something else began to stir in the west that caught his attention. 2010 marked the start of the now famously known 'Arab Spring' in which many Middle Eastern countries faced mass protests against their dictatorial regimes. In Syria, these protests were violently put down by president Assad, an undertaking which rapidly escalated into a full-blown civil war. Almost two years into the conflict, on April 9, 2013, Baghdadi announced the merger of ISI with one of the major factions fighting in Syria: *Jahbat al-Nusra*, an organization that publicly had remained unaligned with other jihadist organizations but was originally set up with Baghdadi's support. Apparently, the announcement surprised the leaders of both al-Qaeda Central and al-Nusra who immediately spoke out against Baghdadi and proclaimed al-Nusra to be an official al-Qaeda affiliate. Heading into this new conflict heads-on, ISI took the opportunity to reform its narrative; embracing a less forgiving and more radical interpretation of core Salafist principles. Central in these reforms was the adoption of a new name: the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham [ISIS], which upheld its new claims over Syria and symbolized the delegitimization of al-Nusra and al-Qaeda proper. The ties between al-Qaeda and Baghdadi's organization were thus completely severed, pitting the former allies against one another (Gerger, 2016, pp. 175-190; Stern & Berger, 2015, pp. 39-44).

Almost immediately, ISIS managed to gain the upper hand. Its continuous success on the battlefield yielded not just a lot of new resources and war assets, but also a vast territory stretching both Syria and Iraq (idem, p. 44). Having conquered actual lands and populations to control, ISIS seized the opportunity to bring its narrative to the next level. On June 29, 2014, ISIS proclaimed itself to be the Caliphate reborn, an echo of the Muslim empire that was once founded by the Prophet Muhammed himself (idem, pp. 112-117):

The time has come for the ummah of Muhammad (peace be upon him) to wake up from its sleep, remove the garments of dishonor, and shake off the dust of humiliation and disgrace, for

the era of lamenting and moaning has gone, and the dawn of honor has emerged anew. The sun of jihad has risen ('Adnani, 2014).

Through its claim, ISIS —now IS— directly challenged the authority of al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups who would not acknowledge Baghdadi as their new Caliph:

Void is the legitimacy of all emirates, groups, administrations, and organizations to which his [i.e., Baghdadi's] authority extends and his army comes ('Adnani, 2014, as cited in Bunzel, 2015, p. 31).

This absolute black and white claim of the Islamic State forced the global jihadi scene to pick sides, unleashing a fierce debate amongst Jihadi scholars. Central to the debate was the concept of *bay'ah*, a religious oath of loyalty that is pledged between leaders —not groups— and requires renewal when either of the two leaders is eliminated. Whereas a new, younger generation of scholars mostly supported the claim of Baghdadi, the more established, senior generation did not, calling IS' actions an outright act of defiance (Bunzel, 2015, pp. 25-30; Stern & Berger, 2015, pp. 178-187).

In the end, the affiliates of al-Qaeda never aborted ship, but still did IS succeed in setting up its own new network. Around the end of 2014, IS announced the existence of multiple *wilayah*, provinces, in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, and Algeria, with new claims following suite over the succeeding years. The network of provinces proved an evolution over al-Qaeda's system with a clearer, all-encompassing vision and a more strict control over the affiliates' activities. The diversity amongst the multiple *wilayah* is big, with some 'provinces' being nothing more than a couple of renegade neighborhoods, camps, or other networks, while, at the same time, provinces like those in Syria and Iraq come very close to resembling actual functioning states. By branding its affiliates —whatever their size— as 'provinces', IS primarily tried to further its narrative of being a global and universal state that disregards the borders of the old world system (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 51; Gerger, 2016, pp. 222-224; Caris & Reynolds, 2014; Lia, 2015).

IS' aspirations should be considered a unique combination of local insurgency, global ambitions, and a universalistic rhetoric, something that is especially well reflected in its infamous media strategy. On the eve of the Caliphate-proclamation, IS unleashed its 'electronic brigades' on the world, utilizing a broad spectrum of social media dynamics to

spread propaganda on the internet that contained both utopian visions of the Caliphate and explicit material showcasing the mass executions of hostages and labelled ‘infidels’. Media and politicians all over the world —but especially the West— responded in horror, unwittingly daring the Islamic State to up its game. Following the global attention and air-strike retaliations from the international anti-IS coalition, the Islamic State turned to terrorism, calling upon lone wolves, dormant cells, and specially trained recruits to commit as much savagery as possible:

If you can kill a disbelieving American or European —especially the spiteful and filthy French — or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be (‘Adnani, 2014, as cited in Davidson, 2014).

Since September 2014, many attacks occurred in both the Middle-East and the West, which, by July, 2016, had caused over 1200 casualties (Stern & Berger, 2015, pp. 147-176; Gerger, 2016, pp. 44-45; Yourish, Watkins, Giratikanon & Lee, 2016). Thanks to these strategies, IS managed to obtain one of the biggest stages in the Western-dominated, international arena:

The Islamic State would —for now— remain, and it had placed its unedited and unfiltered message in front of exponentially more people than al-Qaeda ever dared dream. Jihadist propaganda had had a history measured in decades, but it had long been obscure and limited to an audience of mostly true believers. Suddenly, the stuff was everywhere, intruding on phones, tablets, and computers of ordinary people who were just trying to go about their daily business online. (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 125).

Like so many aspects of the Islamic State, its media and terrorism strategies can be considered a clever refinement of al-Qaeda’s approach; derived from the same Jihadi-Salafist principles, but tuned to a new era of news consumption and technological developments.

Something that has gone by relatively underappreciated in the works of Bunzel, Gerger, and Stern and Berger is the Islamic State’s fierce and specific denouncement of nationalism. On the same day as IS declared itself the Caliphate reborn, the organization also published an English video titled: *The End of Sykes-Picot*, that further elaborated this principle. In the video, an IS spokesperson declares the breaking of the Iraqi-Syrian border, saying it is

only the first of many barriers to fall. The video is drenched in anti-nationalistic symbolism as it portrays the Islamic State's black flag fluttering high over a conquered Iraqi barracks while their spokesperson poetically pronounces that: "we are above all other flags. There is no nationality. We are all Muslims. There is only one country" (al-Hayat, 2014). One year later, IS releases its tenth issue of the digital magazine *Dabiq*, an issue that was specifically dedicated to the Caliphate's relation to the international order. In it, a similar statement is made in the foreword:

The call to defend the Islamic State —the only state ruling by Allah's Sharia today— continues to be answered by sincere Muslims and mujahidin around the world prepared to sacrifice their lives and everything dear to them to raise high the word of Allah and trample democracy and nationalism. In contrast, the jihad claimants in Sham [= al-Nusra] and other regions are prepared to sacrifice the principles of the religion and wage war against the Islamic State in defense of a jāhili nationalism coated with a thin veneer of 'Sharia', knowing full well that should they succeed in taking any territory from the Khilāfah, that territory would no longer be ruled by Allah's pure Sharia (Islamic State, 2015, p. 4).

To IS, nationalism —a form of severe idolatry— symbolizes one of the key cornerstones of what is wrong with the current world order. The belief stems directly from the jihadi tradition of the 20th century that formed in the wake of Western imperialism, but is now —more than ever before— explicitly articulated:

Come O Muslims to your honor, to your victory. By Allah, if you disbelieve in democracy, secularism, nationalism, as well as all the other garbage and ideas from the West, and rush to your religion and creed, then by Allah, you will own the earth ('Adnani, 2014).

The Islamic State's narrative of the Caliphate should not just be considered a constructed myth to legitimize its vie for power in the world. Reports on the internal affairs of the Islamic State portray a grim image of a would-be totalitarian state that tries to regulate every aspect of the society it controls. Men and women are trained and used according to their assigned gender role, children are indoctrinated with the violent IS doctrines, Sharia police forces and courthouses oversee the strict implementation of IS' interpretation of the Islamic law —banning even the smallest forms of 'decadence' such as drinking, smoking, and listening to music— and multiple ministries oversee certain civil aspects such as housing, food distribution, medical services, economic administrations, and electricity systems. The quality

of the services are reported to be abysmal, and where IS fails to satisfy the people living under its banner, it uses executions, torture, and other fear-inducing techniques to keep everyone under control (AIVD, 2016; Caris & Reynolds, 2014; Hawramy, Mohammed & Shaheeh, 2015; Birke, 2015). Together with its global terrorism strikes, the reports prove that the strict Jihadi-Salafist idea of the Caliphate runs through every layer of the organization, dominating not only its interaction with rivals like al-Qaeda, Assad, the Iraqi government, and the West, but also its control over captured territories and the structure of its institutions. While not recognized by the international community, the Islamic State has, for some time now, taken the actual shape of a 'State of Terror', using fear as a tool to implement its totalitarian and Sharia-driven view of society.

4.3: The Envisioned Revolution of the Worldwide Caliphate

As has become clear in the two previous sections, the Islamic State has presented itself as an organization that explicitly rose to challenge the Westphalian constitution of international society. The challenge has laid bare many complex, yet fundamental issues with the current international order. To be able to systematically chart these issues in the next chapter, this section will focus on placing the preceding information on the Islamic State within the two primary models of the international order. This will be done in the same manner as in the previous chapter, thus providing us with multiple sets of information that allow for a thorough analysis on the subject at hand.

The first model focusses on the Caliphate's envisioned constitution of international society and the three faces of authority, and is, in this case, also the more complicated one. The observations of Wickramasinghe and Kayaoglu already hinted at the troublesome nature of placing a non-European vision of politics within the frameworks of a European-based model. Regardless of the exact contents of the final model, the tricky nature of this global approach will almost certainly lead to a result that is not completely waterproof. However, as the Islamic State has specifically risen out of, and in reaction to, the Westphalian Order, I maintain that the two are not as irreconcilable as the authors might suggest. All things considered, I am convinced that this exercise will prove to be an invaluable piece of this paper's puzzle.

Starting with the setup of the first face of authority, the notion of the previous paragraph immediately comes into play. The first face concerns the form of the participating polities, and actually has multiple ways to be approached. The reason for this is the unique interplay between the all-powerful Caliph and the issue of what should be considered the basic polity of the constitution. The first potential setup would state that the Islamic State as a whole forms the standard polity. This idea would align directly with the political narrative of the Islamic State, but would also bring in the issue that has been mentioned by Wickramasinghe: once you recognize the Caliphate as the only possible polity, it destroys the entire notion of the an international community. In this situation there is only one polity to speak of, thus obliterating the separation between internal and external dimensions that is so crucial to the constitution of international society. While I consider this an interesting, and instinctively trustworthy option, it ignores the real diversity and complexity of IS' projected system as shown in its execution of the wilayat system (Caris & Reynolds, 2014; Lia, 2015).

There is, however, another option. An option that, I argue, is still based on the propagandized visions of IS, but has more respect for the political reality behind the ideological image. This is the idea that not the Islamic State as a whole, but the underlying wilayat is recognized as the primary polity. The all-powerful Caliph should, in this case, be considered a supranational – for the lack of a better term – holder of authority that maintains power over all the different provinces. This setup ties well into the reports on the inner functioning of the Islamic State. The provinces are, after all, still separated over territorial boundaries and are, on top of that, governed by a strict and hierarchical chain of command (Caris & Reynolds, 2014; Lia, 2015). In this sense the political structure of the Islamic State still resembles that of its Westphalian opponent, even though its propaganda might be suggesting otherwise. Radically different, of course, is the absolute power of the Caliph. But, as Philpott's historiography of the Westphalian Society has shown, the international order is not per definition hostile towards supranational institutions that take away parts of the sovereignty of the primary polity. The Caliph, then, is suddenly very comparable to an all-powerful, monarchical version of the European Union or the United Nations. Bringing this all back to the first face of authority, this option provides two holders of authority: the wilayat and the Caliph (figure 9, p. 49).

Figure 9:

THE CALIPHATE'S 'INTERNATIONAL' CONSTITUTION		
<u>FIRST FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	FORM OF PARTICIPATING POLITIES - Holder of Authority - Rate of Supremacy - Principle Quality of Authority	THE CALIPHATE - Provinces & Caliph - Absolute - Territoriality & Religion
<u>SECOND FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP	THE POLITY IS A PROVINCE & IS LOYAL TO THE SHARIA AND CALIPH
<u>THIRD FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	PREROGATIVES OF THE POLITY	BAY'AH & MIX OF SHARIA-BASED AND WESTPHALIAN PREROGATIVES

Concerning the other two factors of the first face of authority, I claim that the rate of supremacy should still be labelled as 'absolute' since the Islamic State's structure is still based on a strict and hierarchical chain of command that trickles down from the Caliph to the most local institutions of the province. Although religion could be considered a sensible principle quality of authority, I maintain that it is still not fully the case with the Islamic State, despite its own claims. Reports on the internal structure of IS have already illustrated how IS took over many institutional organizations of the Syrian and Iraqi governments, including their regional subdivisions. Wickramasinghe's statement that the Islamic State "seeks to create a new world order in which territorial lines are based on religious identity" (idem, p. 160), provides the right perspective. Together with the quasi political-religious position of the Caliph, I argue religion to be a secondary quality of authority, still subordinate to territoriality (figure 9).

The second and third face of authority are mostly reliant on IS' interpretation of the Sharia. Central to the second face, as shown by the conflict with al-Qaeda and 'Adnani's statements in 3.2, is the unquestionable loyalty to the Caliph. This also translates to the third face where the notion of bay'ah has proven to be an important cornerstone of the 'diplomatic' relations between the different provinces and levels of the Islamic State. Still, it should be noted that due to its use of the old Iraqi and Syrian state structures, and even its claim to statehood, IS' third face still contains several Westphalian principles. Since IS has proven incapable of


completely cleansing its world vision of the Westphalian paradigms it is born out of, the third face of authority has turned into a unique mixture of prerogatives where Sharia-based principles dominate the surface but Westphalia-originating standards keep swirling underneath (figure 9, p. 49).

Next up, then, is the model on the Pathways of Ideas (figure 10, p. 51) that charts the path taken by the idea of the Caliphate to eventually realize its own revolution in the constitution of international society. The first pathway, the pathway of conversion, starts with the ideology itself: the Islamic State's interpretation of Jihadi-Salafism. From there the first two sections of this chapter provide multiple factors that influenced people to be converted to the ideology. Three factors haven proven to be crucial circumstances of reflection: the first two, the political situation in Iraq and the Syrian civil war, allowed the Islamic State to convert many people to its cause and conquer swathes of territory. The third circumstance of reflection, the internet and social media, allowed IS, more than any other jihadi organization, to reach a global audience, strengthening its universal narrative and global agenda. Subsequently, there are four different groups that have been crucial in spreading the Jihadi-Salafist principles that can thus be labelled couriers of ideas: the Jihadi-Salafist scholars, the Islamic State's military, the electronic brigades, and finally, the terrorists in foreign countries who managed to give the Islamic State and its ideology – more than any other single courier in history – an enormous amount of attention (figure 10, p. 51).

The second pathway, the pathway of social power, sees a diverse group of converts bundle their powers to eventually found the Islamic State as it is; a polity that is not recognized by the international society, but has still managed to imitate a fully functioning polity in every other way. At the core of the legion of converts is the group that was founded by Zarqawi and joined al-Qaeda only to deflect from it again in the wake of the Syrian civil war. In the meantime, this group flirted with Sunni citizens to join their ranks and attracted ex-Ba'ath soldiers and generals to solidify its military might. Using its global stage, the Islamic State also managed to recruit tens of thousands of foreign fighters, a group that still forms one of the most important backbones of the organization. From there on, the converts used strategies of warfare and insurgency to establish the Islamic State as we know it today. The political currencies in this case are binary ones: one either dies opposing IS or joins ranks by swearing an oath of fealty. At the end of the pathway I specifically replace 'the Islamic State' with the

abbreviation of ISIS to make clear that this stage of the model specifically refers to the single polity that has been founded in the former territories of Syria and Iraq, ignoring potential ties with affiliates abroad (figure 10).

Figure 10:



It is in the third pathway that these ties with the affiliates have a better place. The separation between the domestic and international pathway is not a perfect one, but one can nonetheless be made between the local polity in Syria and Iraq and the global activities that follow suite. Terrorism and the global jihadi networks that have decided to join the Islamic State can thus be considered the first steps in Baghdadi's efforts to create the worldwide

Caliphate. Here too, the political currencies remain of a binary nature. As a state or group you either recognize the authority of the Caliph, or die opposing it. Of course, the Islamic State is still far from realizing its global goals, for which the final line of this pathway is only partially filled out (figure 10, p. 51). Considering the current pressure that the Islamic State is experiencing from outside forces, one can already assume that the revolution will not even come close to completion in the foreseeable future.

V – FACING THE PARADOX

5.1: Comparing Constitutions

Having placed both cases within the frames of the two models, we are finally able to make systematic comparisons between the Islamic State and one of the most fundamental pillars of the Westphalian Order: the principle of the nation-state. The first section concerns the constitutions of international society and is thus mainly focused on the ideals themselves, rather than their manifestations in the world. At first glance the two constitutions (figure 11) show many differences: IS has replaced the sovereign state by a combination of the wilayat and the Caliph, religion appears as a secondary quality of authority, and the dogmas of IS' interpretation of the Sharia have spread to dominate the second and third face of authority. Yet, when looking beyond these differences, there are actually a lot of similarities popping up as well. Like nationalism, the Islamic State is aiming for a world that is subdivided in territorial polities wherein authority is channeled over a strict and absolute hierarchy steadily leading up to the highest institution. And although the Caliph overrides the sovereign aspect of the polities, this is –as mentioned before– not a radical departure from the current possibilities of the Westphalian system. Rather, it is a unique, cultural, and ideological blend of supranational and monarchical elements that either now, or in the past, have even been a part of the Westphalian discourse.

Figure 11:

COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS		
	<u>NATIONALISM'S CONSTITUTION</u>	<u>THE CALIPHATE'S CONSTITUTION</u>
<u>FIRST FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	SOVEREIGN STATES: - State - Absolute - Territoriality	THE CALIPHATE - Provinces & Caliph - Absolute - Territoriality & Religion
<u>SECOND FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	THE POLITY IS A STATE & REPRESENTS A NATION	THE POLITY IS A PROVINCE & IS LOYAL TO THE SHARIA AND CALIPH
<u>THIRD FACE OF AUTHORITY</u>	WESTPHALIAN PREROGATIVES	BAY'AH & MIX OF SHARIA-BASED AND WESTPHALIAN PREROGATIVES

Two essential observations are to be made in comparing the cases of nationalism and the Caliphate. The first one is that all the differences between the two constitutions can be traced back to the differences in their core philosophies. Whereas nationalism vies for a world where the polities find their legitimacy in the enlightened principle of the social contract, the Islamic State vies for a world where the polities are grounded in the Sharia and their loyalty to God. This fundamental principle of the Islamic State is thus mostly rooted in the second face of authority which accounts for the normative standards of the international order. However, the principle has also spilled over to the other two faces of authority that, subsequently, have been transformed into a unique blend of Jihadi-Salafist principles — as seen in the presence of the all-powerful Caliph— and Westphalian power structures like the territorial and hierarchical state organizations that were already present in the conquered territories of the Islamic State. All in all, we can say that IS has adopted the skeleton of a Westphalian nation-state to institutionalize an ideology that aims to be Westphalia's antithesis.

The overall comparison between the two constitutions is uncanny, as if IS' idea of the Caliphate is a black echo of that of the nation-state. This is where the second observation comes into play. For underneath their differences and similarities there is one fundamental characteristic they have in common: both are grounded in a universalistic and, potentially, totalitarian ideology. Take the nation-state that thrived around the end of the long 19th century and place it next to the Islamic State, and we see two quasi-totalitarian polities that try hard to dominate every aspect of the political and day-to-day lives of their citizens. The nation-state at the start of the 20th century was certainly not as extreme and terrorizing as the Islamic State is nowadays, but we only need to look at the fascist and communist nation-states of the mid-20th century to witness the totalitarian potential of nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1994b; Mazower, 1998). Like the Islamic State, these states did not shy away from radical and violent means to impose their totalitarian worldview, making the overall comparison all the more persuasive.

5.2: Comparing Pathways

Moving on to the pathways of ideas, many more resemblances come to the surface. Of course, a one-on-one comparison between the history of the Islamic State and the long 19th century, or

even just the French Revolution for that matter, can quickly be considered an anachronistic exercise. However, when specifically placed within the frameworks of the model on the pathways of ideas, recurring patterns can rightfully be observed (figure 12, pp. 56-57).

Starting with the couriers of ideas, the similarities start with the fact that both narratives are grounded in a long, yet specific, scholarly tradition that, for decades, questioned the status quo of the international order. As many thinkers of the Enlightenment turned towards the dynastic *droit divine* that dominated Europe, the jihadists tradition came to bloom after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, yearning for a homeland that was not dominated by the West and its social frameworks. In both cases the ideas held a certain hostility towards the hegemon of their respective international order —be it monarch or imperialists— making it an appealing narrative for those negatively affected by, or simply not agreeing with, the status quo. As the ideas began to circulate, other couriers joined the fray. Here, we see that the two ideologies relied on both non-violent and violent couriers to spread their worldview. Whether you were a neo-classicist painter, a member of IS' electronic brigades, a general in Napoleon's army, or a terrorist committing an assault in far-off lands, you exercising your profession —or sporadic occupation— helped to spread the imagery and reasoning of your ideology to a new, and potentially influenceable, audience (figure 12, pp. 56-57).

Turning our gaze then to the circumstances of reflection, we can see in both instances an important role for political and social crises that helped to strengthen the appeal of the narrative. As France was thrown into an economic and political crisis, it were the stories of the Enlightenment and the nation that could convince the revolutionaries that the French aristocracy was not in the right place to govern them. Similarly, when Iraq was invaded by the United States and governed by Shia politicians, it was the narrative of Jihadi-Salafism that suddenly contained an explanation for the suppressed Sunni and Ba'ath veterans on what was wrong and what could be done to fix it. Furthermore, the technological circumstances of both time periods strongly align with their respective narrative: the nation could only prosper in a time when steam engines and telegraphs were able to bridge the gap between local communities, while at the same time the global Caliphate could only be taken serious as such when the entire world had been able to witness its propaganda on the internet and social media (figure 12, pp. 56-57).

Figure 12:

COMPARING PATHWAYS (1)

NATIONALISM'S PATHWAYS OF IDEAS

I. PATHWAY OF CONVERSION




II. PATHWAY OF SOCIAL POWER


II.A STATE TO NATION (WESTERN EUROPE)



II.B NATION TO STATE (CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE)




III. PATHWAY OF INTERNATIONAL POWER



COMPARING PATHWAYS (2)

THE CALIPHATE'S PATHWAYS OF IDEAS

I. PATHWAY OF CONVERSION



II. PATHWAY OF SOCIAL POWER



III. PATHWAY OF INTERNATIONAL POWER



Together, the circumstances of reflection and the couriers of ideas created a unique interplay that allowed both narratives to convert entire groups, bringing us to the second pathway of ideas (figure 12, pp. 56-57). Here, the resemblances continue to pile up. To start, the observation can be made that neither ideology was confined to one specific audience. In both cases, the multiple groups that were converted brought in a lot of material, military, and social power, thus allowing both ideologies —despite their radical stance towards the hegemony— to trample along the pathway of social power and establish a polity that had an interest in their revolutionary constitution of international society.

Looking at the multiple pathways of social power there are two peculiar similarities to be observed. The first one involves a specific political currency: terror. The concept of terror is one with a long history and a wide ray of interpretations, but in the context of this paper, the term specifically refers to the fear-inducing means used to both spread and impose a totalitarian worldview on society. Interestingly enough, the origins of the term is found in the Jacobin regime of the French Revolution: the Reign of Terror. IS' implementation of the political currency shows many resemblances, as it is not only being used to rapidly impose their universalistic worldview on society, but also to quell internal unrest as the polity faces aggressive opposition at its borders. On top of that we see that the Islamic State fiercely utilizes the closely linked tactic of terrorism, an act mostly focused outwards as it is used to efficiently spread a polarizing message to large portions of the international order (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 10; Schmid, 2014, pp. 5-9). Suddenly, we see that the principle of terror is coming full circle: where it once helped Revolutionary France to establish a world of the Enlightenment and of nations, it came back more than 200 years later in an effort to tear that same world down.

The second similarity concerns the fact that in both timelines polities were not just converted, as is the standard in Philpott's original descriptions, but they were actually created as the converts fought to defy the old, established borders of their international order. In the case of nationalism, I am specifically referring to the 'nation to state' process as is witnessed in Central and Eastern Europe. In these cases, European borders were constantly redrawn along the norms of the nation. First, by German and Italian nationalists who sought to create a mighty, new state for their, so far, unrepresented nation. And, second, by the Eastern European nations that, following the end of the First World War, were unshackled from their imperial chains. While ISI' venture into Syria could arguably be considered a case of pure

opportunism, this explanation barely justifies the large rapture this move caused with al-Nusra and al-Qaida. Only by bringing AQI's —and later ISI's— radical philosophy into the equation, can such a curious action be explained. Therefore, I argue that this observation does not only illustrate that the Islamic State is far from the first in Westphalia's history to dispute the established borders of the international order, but that it also serves —in the larger scheme of things— as an argument for Philpott's constructivist reasoning: only by acknowledging that ideas, for the sake of their intrinsic value, have influence on the course of international politics, can these complex processes be fully understood.

All the similarities and differences mentioned so far build upon the previous section wherein the conclusion was drawn that the Islamic State is following the blueprints of the Westphalian nation-state to propel a world system that would get rid of those very same nationalistic principles. However, when we examine the two pathways of international power, a new, yet important, difference between the two comes to the fore (figure 12, pp. 56-57). This begins with a quite obvious observation: whereas nationalism has already completed its path towards the revolution of the international constitution a century ago, the Islamic State is only at the infant stages of realizing such global revolution. Of course, the Islamic State only rose to prominence three years ago, so technically it still has 126 years to catch up to its nationalist example. However, few people would actually consider this a serious possibility at this time. Analyzing the international political currencies of both movements explains why. To start, the initial revolutions of nationalism occurred at the heart of the international order, with France being one of the most powerful and influential polities at the end of the 18th century (Palmer et al., 2002, pp. 343-344). When the National Assembly managed to take control of the French government, it immediately launched the nationalist ideology to a prominent position in the international order. In later stages, this pattern kept returning. Even new-found nation-states like Germany were, at that specific point in history, amongst the biggest powerhouses of the international order. Now, at the start of the 21st century, the Islamic State is far from a considerable world power, nor does it hold many potential currencies to seriously press its ideology onto the rest of the world. Furthermore, when looking at the social and political position of the converts, there is also a sharp contrast to be detected. As described in the historiography of the long 19th century, nationalism was primarily imbedded in two social groups —the bourgeoisie and the working class— which were present in almost every society,

and, throughout the century, would enjoy a rise in prosperity and relative power as the social, economic, and technological circumstances kept changing to their advantage. When it comes to the Islamic State, the same can hardly be said. More and more, the Caliphate is facing a growing opposition, all the whilst its pool of potential recruits remains limited. For sure, the Islamic State and its affiliates are a force to be reckoned with on several regional scales, but its narrative remains too narrow and too extreme to ever attract the political currencies needed to bring about a global revolution in the constitution of international society.

5.3: The Anti-Nation-State

Earlier in this paper I quoted Philpott on why he considered the Revolution of Westphalia to be so crucial:

Every subsequent revolution has revised Westphalia, geographically extending the states system, altering the criteria for being recognized as a state, curtailing the state's absolute sovereignty, all making Westphalia a benchmark, a standard, a subject that undergoes change, the thing to be revised (Philpott, 2001, pp. 32-33).

Placing this quote next to the conclusions of the previous two sections, we can see the paradox arise. For the Islamic State is both revising and continuing Westphalia, just as much as it is trying to destroy it. It is a unique phenomenon that, in my opinion, can barely be captured in terms like proto-states, insurgencies, terrorists, or even barbarians, for the simple fact that all of these terms imply a very one-dimensional relation with the Westphalian Order. If there should be any applicable term for the Islamic State that is able to represent its multiple facets, I argue that it is the '*Anti-Nation-State*'. This concept captures perfectly the conflicting nature of the Islamic State that —in shape, means, and history— resembles a totalitarian nation-state, all the whilst its core philosophy denies the right for nation-states to exist.

So, what to make of the Anti-Nation-State? What does it tell us about the international system we are living in at this moment? Most fundamentally, the rise of the Islamic State reminds us of the fact that the international order as we know it —one of competing and cooperating nation-states— is loaded with presumptions that are easily forgotten and that its identity is strongly interwoven with the order's hegemony. The order is a construct created in

times when European actors not only got attached to the idea of the nation, but also in an era when those actors began to conquer and dominate the rest of the world. It reminds us that 19th century Europeans created a global, international society where they were the hegemons that came to dictate the frames and the narrative of that society. When the Islamic State rose, it rose to challenge the power of that Western hegemony, including its Westphalian narrative. Although IS' advancements over the pathways of ideas show that —for the time being— we do not have to worry about an actual Revolution of the Worldwide Caliphate, they also show that the idea will not disappear for anytime soon. So long as the international order is shaped in such a way that certain circumstances make narratives like those of the Islamic State susceptible, people will keep finding reasons to convert themselves to such an extreme ideology.

The paradox also sheds light on certain statements that connect the Islamic State to notions of backwardness. These statements are often invoked; whether by politicians like Hollande who frequently referred to the 'barbaric' nature of IS (Dearden, 2015), or by scholars like Wickramasinghe who considered parts of IS' nature to be 'pre-Westphalian' (2015, p. 160). At first sight these statements make sense. They follow the Islamic State's own narrative that it has re-established the pre-Westphalian Muslim empire, and also refer to IS' inhumane, gruesome —and thus pre-enlightened— practices. However, when something is so intrinsically connected to Westphalian paradigms and blueprints, the assumption is problematic at best. These 'barbaric' practices are, after all, strongly intertwined with the Islamic State's media strategy, connecting them to a very specific moment in history when people can receive —in an instant— videos and images from all over the world. Those portraying the practices of the Islamic State as something from the past, thus ignore how much the organization is actually grounded in the present. The parallel with the nation-state is, again, not far away. Many authors describe the nationalist compulsion to ground the ideology of the nation in a certain historical mythology. Yet, that same mythological narrative would not have been imaginable without the technological possibilities of the 19th century (Anderson, 1986, pp. 66-79; Gellner, 1983). Just as much as the introduction of the nationalist narrative to Westphalia cannot be considered pre-Westphalian in nature, so, too, can the narrative of the Caliphate not be considered to be pre-Westphalian either. The paradox of the Anti-Nation-State shows that the distinction between pre-Westphalian, Westphalian, and, for that matter,

post-Westphalian is a fallacy. Instead, we should define the Islamic State primarily as something that is both Westphalian and anti-Westphalian.

VI – CONCLUSION: THE FULL CIRCLE OF TERROR

This paper set out with the following research question: how does the Islamic State relate to the contemporary international order and what does it tell us about the order itself? From the start it was clear that the Islamic State hit a weak spot in the functioning and the narratives of the international order. So, in an effort not to fall into the same pit traps as other authors, more was required than just a thorough analysis of the Islamic State itself. With the help of Philpott's theory on the international society and some critical adjustments, a clear framework was created that could not only lay bare the complex relation of the Islamic State with the contemporary world order, but also allow us to make historical comparisons for new and crucial insights. Comparing the rise of the Caliphate with that of the 19th century nation-states revealed the paradox that has always troubled previous efforts to define the Islamic State. This paradox is the paradox of the Anti-Nation-State: a polity that, in many aspects, has the shape and form of a nation-state, all the whilst it bears the black flag that explicitly symbolizes the nation's destruction. As nationalism has been shown in this paper to be one of the most fundamental pillars of the contemporary Westphalian Order, the Islamic State's nature can be considered to be both Westphalian and anti-Westphalian at the same time.

To get to this conclusion, the constructivist theory of Philpott proved to be essential. His theory offered a specific framework of the international world where reality is shaped by the unique interaction between autonomous ideas, social constructs, and economic, political, and technological realities. Still, Philpott's theory was not to be taken for granted, for multiple biases lurked underneath his descriptions. Here, Kayaoglu's notions on Eurocentrism and the Westphalian narrative helped to approach Philpott's work with the right mindset. Kayaoglu's article shed light on the academic aspects of the Westphalian Order, teaching us that the narrative of how the international world is shaped, is just as autonomous, influential, and imposing as political ideologies that tell us how the world ought to be. More than anything else is this paper a reminder that our international order is one specifically constructed and narrated by Western hegemons, and that academics, if they are not careful enough, can become an important, yet unaware reinforcement of that hegemony.

By using this specific global approach, I was able to coherently incorporate subjects as divergent as the Peace of Westphalia, the Enlightenment, the French and Industrial

Revolutions, the US invasion of Iraq, and the Jihadi-Salafist ideology of the Islamic State. The downside to this approach, however, is that many other aspects had to be side-lined. There is still a large pool of subjects whose examination through the lenses of ‘international constitutions’ and ‘pathways of ideas’ would contribute to an even better understanding of the Islamic State, the Westphalian Order, and its nationalistic roots. These subjects range from the American Revolution, the history of the 20th century, fascism, communism, human rights, the Ottoman Caliphate, and the –so far unmentioned– nationalistic ideology of Pan-Arabism. Further research into any of these topics, and specifically approaching them with the frameworks as set up in this paper, would certainly bring about an even more convincing argument for the findings related to the paradox of the Anti-Nation-State.

At the time of writing, the Iraqi government, supported by Iraqi Kurdistan and the international anti-IS coalition, is fighting to recapture the city of Mosul, the place where, three years before, the rebirth of the Caliphate was so pompously proclaimed. The projected future for the Islamic State is a dark one and the apocalypse that they are so zealously awaiting might come sooner for them than they realize. Thus, these developments could raise the question of why the Islamic State still needs to be studied so eagerly. I maintain, however, that now is as crucial a time as any to draw the right lessons from these events. Kayaoglu warned for “misdiagnoses of major problems of contemporary international relations” (Kayaoglu, 2010, p. 193), and looking at the rhetoric of people like Wickramasinghe, Hollande, and Ban Ki-moon, or, even more extreme, the exclamations of right-wing populists like Donald Trump and Geert Wilders, it is clear that these misdiagnosis are still widely spread. Especially to the latter I would say: yes, ideologies form a power of their own, but that should not be an excuse to prophesize a certain, and almost apocalyptic, ‘Clash of Civilizations’. This paper has shown that ideas, besides their own autonomous influence, just as much require social, economic, and technological circumstances to successfully convert people. In the case of the Islamic State these circumstances are deeply interlinked with Westphalian power structures, making the statement of Kayaoglu all the more relevant. Of course, the Islamic State is getting close to defeat and might not be on our minds anymore in ten years. However, as long as the real circumstances that make people convert to Jihadi-Salafism are not dealt with, the idea of the Caliphate will certainly come back and try to make terror come full circle again.

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