

Gender Equality and Radical Right Wing Populist Parties
A comparative study between the Netherlands and Sweden

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Preface

Equality is a term that I have been raised with. As a woman, with two older brothers at my side, I have been encouraged to see, and have, the same opportunities. At the age of 17 I began travelling abroad during my bachelor in journalism. I learned to acknowledge that the gender equality, which I had experienced, was not standard for everyone. This was also not the case in my own home country the Netherlands.

Fascinated and challenged by this, I began to read feminist books and articles and started following news about human and women's rights. In my third year, I decided to do a minor in gender studies, in Istanbul. From there, I decided to specialize in gender studies as a research journalist. During the last two years of my research master, Gender and Ethnicity, I have been focusing, more and more, on the growing right-wing political parties in Northern Europe. During my research internship in Gothenburg, I read a lot on gender equality and the ways this was implemented in governmental policies. The combination of gender equality and right-wing political parties began to fascinate me. What kind of gender equality is promoted by right-wing political parties? Especially, when keeping in mind the growing debate on Islam and migrants.

Of course, these questions have a lot to do with my own position. I am not neutral towards right-wing politics. Their campaigns against the Islam are not in line with my view of the world. However, I believe that negativity does not get someone any further. Therefore, I wanted to thoroughly analyze the SD and the PVV. Amongst other approaches, I wanted to work with transversal politics, challenging myself, and my own position as a researcher.

I would like to thank everybody who have helped me during this process. In particular, I want to thank Mia Liinason for the inspiration, which led me to start this thesis. I want to thank both of my supervisors Anne-Marie Korte and Mia Liinason for their support and feedback. I want to thank both of my parents for the support during my whole masters and especially my father during the last stressful, though productive, days, finishing my thesis. Last but not least, I want to thank Pieter Vullers for his mental support during the whole process.

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Introduction

At the moment, in Northern Europe, there is a growing support for nationalist right wing parties (Bornschieer, 2010; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2004). This movement is described, by Mudde (2007), as radical right-wing populism (RRP). In Sweden, the political party 'Sverigedemokraterna' (Sweden Democrats) got 13% of the votes in the latest national election. With this result, they became the third largest party in the Riksdag (Swedish Election Authority, 2015). In the Netherlands, the political party 'Partij voor de Vrijheid' (Party for Freedom) had similar results. They got 10% of the votes in the latest national election (Kiesraad, 2012). They also became the third largest party of the country.

Within the RRP movement, gender equality seems to be related to anti-immigration policies. RRP parties tend to produce a national identity, 'us' and to exclude others, 'them' (Siim, 2013; Mudde, 2007). This is related to the discourse 'Islamification' (Vossen, 2011). In this discourse RRP parties exclude Muslims. The axes of identity, in these dynamics, such as sexuality, religion, gender and ethnicity are intertwined.

Intersectional theory was coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989. (Crenshaw, 1989: 57) This theoretical approach highlights the importance of multiple axes of identity, which are always interconnected. Intersectional theory focuses on the unique location of someone's axes of identity and how these are interconnected. This means that these axes of identity are simultaneously constructed and related; they construct each other (Wekker and Lutz, 2001).

Transversal politics was developed by Nira Yuval-Davis (Yuval-Davis, 1997). It is a theory to enable to work with differences, instead of trying to overcome them. It emphasizes on 'rooting' and 'shifting'. To mobilize and move around (i.e. shifting) membership and identity (i.e. rooting), within a collective, enables to work with differences (Cockburn, 1999). Rooting and shifting, time and positioning are important concepts within this theory. This theoretical approach aims to find space, a common ground, which enables dialogue between opposed collectives. I will implement this approach into my thesis, to see whether there could be a dialogue between feminist movements and people, both men and women, in right wing political organizations, who advocate identity politics.

Gender equality has been conceptualized in three different ways, which relate to different strategies or policies used within politics. The most important one, which is implemented by the Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2015), is focused on

explicating, in all established norms and standards, of what is, or should be, female or male (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007: 23). This conceptualization is also called gender mainstreaming. However, feminist scholars have criticized it for the reason that it is excluding women's minorities. Furthermore, it was criticized for being based on the idea that both men and women have common interests and form homogenous groups (Borchorst, 2008; Borchorst and Siim, 2008). Therefore, in this thesis my understanding of gender equality will be broader. I will include a focus on sexuality, religion and ethnicity, because the policies within gender equality have these intertwined axes of identity. In my view, gender equality not only deals with economical and judicial equal rights for men and women, within a heteronormative framework. It includes the public and private sphere, as well as, equal rights for minorities, like, for example, LGBT and immigrants (Ibid.).

Sweden has been known for its gender equality policies, and has been presented as an example within Europe (Borchorst and Siim, 2008; Hübinette and Lundström, 2011). They take part in the discourse on 'women-friendliness', where gender equality becomes part of the national identity (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2013; Kantola, 2014). In the Netherlands, the debate on gender equality is less directly public, and mostly comes up in political debates on integration and Dutch 'women's rights' (Celis, Outshoorn, Meier and Motmans, 2012). Currently, it is not known whether, and if so, how, gender equality plays a role in the growing support for right wing parties (Meret and Siim, 2013; Mudde, 2007)¹. The aim of this study is to analyze what role gender equality plays in the policy of right wing parties, and, further, how this relates to the voters of these parties.

Research questions and hypotheses

The main research question of this thesis is:

What are the distinctive features of gender equality related policies in the radical right wing populist parties in Sweden (SD) and in the Netherlands (PVV), and how are these features related to the support of these parties?

This main question will be divided in several sub questions. These are:

¹ Within the latest stage of writing this thesis, a special issue ('Gender and Populist Radical Right Politics') was published posing similar research questions by the journal 'Patterns of Prejudice' on 15th of April 2015. However, because of the different focus (a comparison between the PVV and the SD), I have decided to not reflect on their research and findings. Though it must be noted that more and more research is done on the relation between gender equality and RRP parties within Europe.

- How do the political parties Sweden Democrats (SD) and the Party for Freedom (PVV) fit into the framework of emerging radical right-wing populism (RRP) movement?
- How is the concept of gender equality promoted and used within the campaigns of both parties?
- Which contextual points of interest could create space for dialogue between certain feminist movements and the RRP parties?
- In what kinds of discourses the notions of gender equality, promoted by the SD and the PVV, take part?
- In what way(s) the representation and promotion of gender equality, by the SD and PVV, relate to the identity and gender aspects of the voters?

The first two questions will be answered in Chapter 1. The other two will be dealt with in Chapter 2 and 3, respectively.

My hypotheses are:

- Both parties will fit in the movement of RRP. But, there will be differences based on the different political historical backgrounds of Sweden and the Netherlands, especially with regard to gender related policies. I expect this, because the political use of gender equality has played a prominent role in Sweden and Swedish policy much longer.
- I suspect that, in both of the parties, gender equality is used to identify the ‘nation’ and exclude others. In other words, to make a difference between ‘us’, being the national identity, and, ‘them’ being ethnic minorities.
- I suspect that the use of gender equality policies, by these parties, will be related to the discourses of Islamification, and women-friendliness.
- I suspect that these parties will attract support from rural areas, especially, rather than from cities.

Methods and methodology

This research will use different methodologies with an aim to bridge the gap between quantitative and qualitative data used in the Humanities, and especially within gender studies. This will mainly come together in chapter three, where I will do a categorical complexity intersectional analysis, bringing together the theory of intersectionality and quantitative data.

In the first chapter I will use textual analysis to analyze how gender equality is used in campaigns of the right-wing parties. I will use political documents, promotional material such as flyer's and campaign video's and news articles. From these data, I want to draw conclusions on how gender equality is promoted, specifically, by this political party. I will look at linguistic specifics, in other words: how is the concept spoken or written of, how many times and in which context. With these results I will finish this chapter with a comparison between the two parties to find differences and similarities.

In the second chapter, I will do a more specific contextual analysis. I will use new data, as well as the data of chapter one. I will try to analyze what kind of discourses they take part in. I will place the results in a larger ongoing debate on Islam and the 'war on terror'. Therefore, I will go more in-depth in my theoretical framework of transversal politics and the notion of nationalism. I will use the work of Cynthia Cockburn (1999) and Nira-Yuval Davis (1997).

Transversal politics is a concept that emphasizes on 'rooting' and 'shifting', in other words to mobilize and move around your own membership and identity (your differences) within a collective. This enables to work with differences (Cockburn, 1999). Transversal politics draws on one of the most discussed issues with positionality and intersectionality: how to work with differences and benefit from it, instead of letting the differences create new divisions. The theory also emphasizes that collective identities, which are lived by individuals as changeable and unpredictable, take shape and change relationally: "there is no thinkable specification of selfhood that does not have a reference to other people, known or imagined" (Cockburn, 1999: 212). Transversal politics has been used as a method within feminist groups to work together acknowledging the differences. It is also an approach to analyze a certain collective and to be able to find spaces of differences, or similarities, that could offer the possibility to intervene.

I will work with the concept of transversal politics in this thesis in different ways.

Firstly, I will explain it more thoroughly and relate it to the concept of nationalism and gender in the second chapter. I will position myself in this chapter, in relation to this theoretical approach. Afterwards, I will use it in the contextual analysis, when comparing the two political parties. Doing so, I want to find the different factors that play a role in the two collectives. From there, I will connect my analysis to larger debates, the debate on Islam in Northern Europe and the ‘war on terror’. In my final conclusion, I will offer suggestions of spaces that offer possibilities for dialogue between certain feminist movements and RRP parties.

In the third chapter, I will use a method that combines quantitative and qualitative data with the theory of intersectionality. This is a widely known and often used theory within gender studies. I will do this to answer the question in what way(s) the promotion of gender equality relates to the voters. Within this chapter I will use quantitative data from open data websites on the voters of latest elections in Sweden and The Netherlands. I will use this data in a ‘categorical complexity intersectional analysis’, a method coined by Leslie McCall (2005). This method is based on the theory of intersectionality. However, it uses fixed categories of axes of identity, such as race, class, and gender. Therefore, it is a model that, in one way, complicates the idea of intersectionality. However, in another way, it adds an intersectional scope over standard presentations of axes of identity used in quantitative research. It tries to bridge the gap between quantitative and qualitative data within gender studies. McCall describes this as: “Quantitative work that aims at unraveling the multiple and conflicting effects of race, class, and gender” (McCall, 2005: 1788).² This means that I will do a ‘complex categorical intersectional analysis’ with the quantitative data. I will use different categories with different axes of identity to find correlations with the promoted gender equality policies. For example, I will compare voters for the Party For Freedom and Sweden Democrats, within a certain sex, class, ethnic identity, or age.

After this, I want to do an ‘intersectional contextual analysis’, a methodology proposed by Nira Yuval-Davis (2006). This means an analysis, which would probe “beneath the single identity to discover other identities that may be present and contribute to the situation of disadvantage” (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 204). Combining these methods, categorical complexity and the contextual analysis, will enable me to work with quantitative data and

² Other work that might be used as examples, that McCall refers to as well, could be Irene Browne, (1999) *Latinas and African American Women at Work: Race, Gender, and Economic Inequality* and secondly Irene Browne and Joya Misra (2003) “The Intersection of Race and Gender in the Labor Market.” See bibliography.

intersectionality, without reproducing the existing categories. In this way, I will work with the existing categories but stay conscious of the dynamics that produced them. It will also mean that quantitative and qualitative data will overlap and complement each other within this research. In the conclusion of the thesis I will reflect on the pitfalls and the advantages of this method.

Chapter 1: the promotion of gender equality

In this chapter I will analyze the political parties Sweden Democrats (SD) and the Party for Freedom (PVV) and how they fit into the framework of the emerging radical right-wing populism (RRP) movement. Further, I will analyze *how the concept of gender equality is promoted and used within the campaigns of both parties*. The analysis will be based on campaign material from the parties. This includes programs, flyers and information from their websites. For the introduction to the parties I will use media sources as well to contextualize the primary material. A disclaimer is needed here with respect to the power of the media. I will further discuss this in the introduction of the SD. I will explain the ideological position of the specific media in footnotes. Firstly, in this chapter, I will start with an introduction to both parties. Secondly, I will introduce the concept of gender equality and how it has been used and evolved in national policies in Sweden and the Netherlands. Thirdly, an analysis of the programs of the SD and the PVV will be made. Finally, I will compare how the SD and the PVV use the concept of gender equality.

Introduction to Sweden Democrats and Party For Freedom

In the last decade, right-wing parties have been gaining more and more votes and support throughout Western-Europe (Bornschieer, 2010; Mudde, 2007). Both Sweden Democrats (SD) and Party For Freedom (PVV) take part in this emerge of right-wing parties. However, it is quite complex to categorize both of the parties. One of the mostly used concepts for this emerge is radical right populism (RRP).

This political movement is characterized by ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-establishment populism (Rydgren, 2004). Three viewpoints are key to this movement: 1: traditional norms are valued over abstract universal principles; 2: multiculturalism is bad for the national community and for the traditional norms; and 3: supranational decision making bodies, such as the European Union, should be countered (Vossen, 2011; Bornschieer, 2010). The RRP is also called national populism, radical right or radical right-wing populism (Vossen, 2011). In this thesis, I will use the concept of RRP.

Both the SD and PVV can be considered as RRP. However, the PVV has not been included that often in the category of RRP until now (Vossen, 2011). This is due to the changing ideology of Geert Wilders, the party leader, throughout the years. Wilders started working within a liberal party in 1998, promoting conservative liberal views. He changed

over time to more neoconservative views and finally to national populist views (Vossen, 2011). I will elaborate on this issue in the introduction of the PVV. The SD can also be seen as an extreme right-wing party, because of its history and the many (old) members that have connections with white power- and Nazi-organizations (Poohl, 2014 December³). Both of the parties are sometimes called racist because of their strong policies and campaigns against Muslims and the Islam, immigrants and other minorities. In this case, the SD is categorized more as nationalistic and the PVV more as belonging to neo-conservatism and national populism. The view on the PVV is colored by its political connections to, and support from, the United States. .

According to Fennema (2005), the reason why SD is considered to be more nationalist is that nationalism is more easily connected to racism. Racism is not a part of right-wing populist parties. Therefore, the PVV is seen more as a populist party:

“The party program of populism of the right is limited to promising the abolition of crime and unemployment and call for a halt to immigration. Even though they attack immigration policy, their main target is not the immigrants but politics in general. A populist party may become racist because it likes to provoke the ‘political correctness’ of the establishment. Populist parties should also be set apart from the extreme right, because they only share the anti-party and anti-establishment theme of the extreme right ideology. The similarity between extreme-right, racist and protest parties lies in the fact that they are the lepers in the political arena.” (Fennema, 2005: 12)

I agree that a populist party with strict immigration policies cannot be categorized as racist or extreme right wing. Nevertheless, I consider the PVV and the SD as extreme right-wing parties in the first place, because of their racist speeches and campaigns. Both of the parties not only campaign against immigration. More specifically, they promote a stop on immigration for a specific group of people. Because of their ethnicity and religion, these people are blamed for being responsible for the high rates of criminality. Therefore, I would call the political strategies of both parties, and the way they approach the voters, to be more “populist”. The concept of populim is, however, also considered as a vague concept by

³ Daniel Poohl is head of the Expo Foundation. Expo is an online source with an archive, ‘white paper’ on Sweden Democrats. Expo is based on the Expo Foundation, which is a privately-owned research foundation with the aim of studying and mapping anti-democratic, right-wing extremist and racist tendencies in society. Expo claims that it is not connected to any specific parties or political groups, but cooperates with all individuals and groups who share the foundation's platform. Financially it is supported by, amongst others, the Foundation Hela Sverige - Artister mot nazister.

political scholars such as Cas Mudde (Mudde, 2013). However, because of the quick changes in the political climate during the last years, it seems that published academic work cannot always keep up with the political developments. Therefore, these categorizations, populist or extreme-right wing, do not always seem to fit. As this analysis will show as well, both of the parties are difficult to categorize. Some approaches and viewpoints seem to fit within one category, others relate to different categories. Hence, to start with, I will give some more in-depth information on both parties. I will continue the discussion of classifying the parties thereafter.

The Sweden Democrats

Sverigedemokraterna (SD) was formed on the 6th of February in 1988. Since 2010 the SD has enough votes to be part of the Riksdag, the Swedish Parliament; the national decision-making counsel. From 2006 on, the party also won lots of seats in different city councils. In 1988, the main political goal was to oppose the immigration policies in Sweden, which SD saw as a “threat to our country, economically as well as socially”⁴ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011 June: 4). Now, besides immigration policies, the party’s most central concepts are family, homeland and the nation. It describes itself as a democratic, nationalist party and as a social conservative party with a nationalist foundation (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014 24th of February). Their inspiration comes from “the previous Swedish national conservatism in the last century” (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011 June: 4). Which parties are exactly meant here, is questionable. In the last years, it has been written in the media, that the SD wants to distantiate itself from its fascist, Nazi, and anti-Semitic, background. Several members have been expelled in 2001 because they were accused of being a Nazi. However, the connections and support of these kinds of Nazi and white power organizations are still ongoing. Recent statements that have been made by SD-members can still be seen as fascist or anti-Semitic. Within the Swedish welfare state, their aim is to combine fundamental social justice with traditional conservative ideas. For that reason, they do not see themselves fit in the classic left-right scale. For example, they can be seen as right wing when it comes to immigration policies. However, their views on animal rights, such as making animal rights legislation more transparent to strengthen the rights of animals, could be seen as a more left wing viewpoint.

Despite the party being known as racist, in their own ethical guidelines

⁴ “Sverigedemokraterna bildades den 6 februari 1988, i första hand som ett intresseparti för svenskar. Den enande faktorn var motståndet mot den förda invandringpolitiken, vilken man såg som alltför vidlyftig och därmed som ett hot mot vårt land, såväl ekonomiskt som socialt.”

(Sverigedemokraterna, 2011 June), they declare that the UN Declaration of Human Rights is key for their party. As a consequence, they strongly reject discrimination against people on the basis of gender, religion, political affiliation and/or ethnic background (Ibid.). After this declaration in the ethnical guidelines, an argument follows where the concepts of equality, identity, similarity and cultural differences get twisted. Firstly, it is written that ‘everyone is unique, but at the same time, more or less similar and depending on communities, where everyone should feel secure in their identity’. It is highlighted that these ‘communities’ are ‘deep-rooted original communities’, which cannot be replaced. It is not clear if these ‘communities’ refer to families. Then, secondly, the nation is defined as ‘a common culture’. Cultural boundaries may sometimes be sharp, sometimes blurry, but ‘just as human’: “we are more or less equal” (Ibid.: 4). Nevertheless, “to unite different cultures may end up in a clash and a conflict of the cultures basic value system” (Ibid.). According to the SD: “This should be prevented” (Ibid.).

After this paragraph, it is argued that the overall objective of the SD policies is to create a prosperous society, characterized by security, harmony and solidarity. To establish this the SD, with experience from Swedish history, focuses on a small-scale society, a functioning rule of law, a strong common identity and basic social justice. Keywords are trust, stability, security, continuity and care⁵ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011 June: 4). These key points are, as they recall, the basic values of SD.

From the beginning on, in 1988, the SD has been mostly in the news because of its connections to white power and (neo) Nazi organizations. A ‘strong common identity’ mainly comes up in these news articles where SD politicians promote racist points of views. Most of these are against Muslims, Jews and Swedish minorities such as the Sami. The connections to Nazi-organizations, members with a criminal record, and racist promotions and speeches, especially against Muslims and Jews, are the key events during the first years of SD. The first party executive contained members from groups such as the Nazi Nordic Reich Party and the Facist New Swedish Movement (Poohl, 2014 December). At that time, the local executive in Malmö consists of a former Waffen SS-volunteer and activists from Nazi organizations. The first elected party leader, Anders Klarström, was an activist in the Nazi Nordic Reich Party. He was sentenced for a death threat against a TV presenter (Ibid.).

In 1994, in the new party platform, the SD wants to shut down the department for

⁵ “Några nyckelord i partiets politik är förvaltarskap, stabilitet, trygghet, kontinuitet och omtanke.”

immigration and stop all immigration from ethnically distant cultures. Next to that, families that arrived after 1970 should return to their respective county, whether they have Swedish citizenship or not. Adoption of ‘non-Nordic- children’ should also be limited. In the same year, in a statement published in the SD Courier, the newsletter of the party, it is said that only Swedes have religious freedom and Muslims should pack their bags:

“With the gang of traitors that govern Sweden and the comfortable, lazy and cowardly that constitute the Swedish people, pretty soon anyone will be able to do whatever they want in this country. That is to say, unless we nationalists take over. If that happens, every Muslim can pack his bag and go home. We should have religious freedom, for the Swedish, but not for every single one who might wish to come here and intrude on our freedom.” (SD politician quoted by Poohl, 2014a, December)

At another public meeting in 1995 in Borlänge, a Sweden Democrat representative confirms this viewpoint by saying the following:

“We in The Sweden Democrats are for democracy and we are of course for religious freedom, but in Sweden the freedom of religion is limited to Swedes. [...] several of the so-called culturally enriched Muslims have been bestowed with Swedish citizenship by the foolish people in power.” (SD politician quoted by Poohl, 2014b, December)

In 1998, the second SD party leader Mikael Jansson meets with Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of French Front National. During the years thereafter, these two parties remain in contact and support each other. In 1999, the SD abandons the 70’s rule. This rule implies that anyone who arrived in Sweden after 1970 should leave the county. Representatives say that this viewpoint kept good forces from joining the party. In 2000, in the SD Youth League’s newspaper, Mattias Karlsson writes about the impossibility of integrating Muslims. He, again, refers to the point that religious freedom should only count for Swedes, because Islam upsets the calm of the society. Karlsson is now one of the party leaders of SD in the Swedish Riksdag. In 2004, the SD was sponsored by a well known anti-Semite; the Belgian Bernard Mengal. SD denied to have known that Mengal was anti-Semite. A summer before, a photo was released with Mengal and Karlsson together (Poohl, 2014 December).

In 2005, the present party leader Jimmie Åkesson was elected and a new 33 points program was adopted. It focused on immigration policy. One of the points stated that Sweden

would terminate the New York Protocol of 1967. This would mean that Sweden would only accept refugees from Europe. In the latest election in September 2014, Åkesson won 13 percent of the votes. Two days before the election, it became clear that he was a gambling addict. The question was raised whether he had been using money from the party for his addiction. Right after the election, Åkesson went on sick leave. In 2007 Björn Söder, a leading Sweden Democrat and MP, spoke out against 'sexual abnormalities' on the website of SD stating that LGBT people are not normal. In the view of Söder to be normal means 'to breed and bring the family name further' (Poohl, 2014 December). In 2009, one of the party's key politicians, Kent Ekeröth, starts an Anti-Islamification Fund to raise money against the 'Islamification' of Sweden. Based on a research of Expo, prior to the election of 2010, 45 SD candidates were linked to white power groups, within 23 of 233 municipalities. In 2012, two days before the trial of Anders Behring Breivik, Richard Jomshof publishes an article 'Muslims with the aim to take over Europe', where Islam is portrayed as a worse threat than Nazism. In the same year the party protests against the building of a mosque. The year after, 2013, Michael Hess is convicted for hate speech and his statement that there is a correlation between the number of immigrants from the Greater Middle East and the number of rape in Sweden. The statement is published and supported by the party (Poohl, 2014 December). In a later interview by the BBC, Åkesson simply says that these statements, such as the one of Hess, are 'exceptions' and every party has these kind of members. He also states that it is a fact that immigrants are more criminal than Swedes and that this fact, especially, shows in the numbers of violence and rape (Hardtalk, BBC News, 2013, 24th of May).

Last year, the SD started collaborating with the British UKIP and Italian Five Star Movement in the European Parliament. The latter is led by Beppe Grillo who is well known for spreading anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. The Swedish Committee Against Anti-Semitism criticized the SD for this choice of partners. Furthermore, second deputy speaker of the Swedish Parliament, Björn Söder claimed that Sami and Jews who do not abandon their ethnic identity are not part of Sweden. This resulted in a large debate in the media (Orrenius, 2014, 14th of December). Since the end of March 2015, Åkesson is back as the leader of the party. Mattias Karlsson who replaced him as party leader during his absence is still part of the leading group of the SD.

The Party For Freedom

Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) was founded in 2006 by Geert Wilders. Formally, it is a foundation with the title 'Foundation Geert Wilders'. This makes it possible for the party

leader to be the only official member of the party. This is unique in the Netherlands and it has been widely discussed whether this makes the PVV democratic or not. So far, it has not been forbidden and Wilders is still the only official member. In this way, Wilders avoids internal disagreements and can also decide exactly what the party promotes.

The party thus follows the ideology of Wilders. Therefore, I will introduce his political career briefly, to provide some more information on the background of the PVV. In 1998, Wilders became a parliament member of the VVD, a Dutch right wing liberal party. At that time it seems that Frits Bolkestein, who has been the chairman of the VVD, inspired Wilders (Vossen, 2011). According to an article by Koen Vossen, a Dutch historicist, Wilders acquired the stylistic way of speaking of Bolkestein: "...the self-presentation of the messenger as someone who has the nerve to break taboos and who is willing to face facts that among the population were already well known" (Vossen, 2011: 181). Bolkestein was one of the first politicians discussing multiculturalism in this way. At this point, the politics and ideology of Wilders can be seen as conservative liberalism.

The first change to this ideology happened when Wilders went to the United States, where he was inspired by neoconservative political organizations. This concept is, again, a vague concept, having many different definitions. In the United States it is seen as having a preference for a free market, a small government, preserving the traditional national values and the construction of a morally evil enemy, which should be countered (Vossen, 2011). In the Netherlands, this has been labeled as the 'new right wing' and stands "for criticism of the progressive hegemony in Dutch politics and in public debate, skepticism regarding the welfare state, permissive society, environmental policy, the consultation economy, and a growing concern with regard to the nature of Islam and the position of Muslims in Dutch society" (Vossen, 2011: 182).

The latest, and largest, change turns Wilders' ideology closer to that of RRP. More and more, Wilders promotes a radical form of Islamophobia. A good example is given with his well known and criticized movie 'Fitna'. Besides Muslims, Wilders is criticizing other minority groups more often as well. In addition, national values are more emphasized. In his parties program of 2010, he wanted that Flanders (the North of Belgium) would be reunited again with the Netherlands, as it used to be in the 18th century. Besides that, which is typical for RRP political movements, the PVV showed a strong position against the Europe Union, the decision making body of the Europe Union and the headquarters in Brussels.

In the latest program of the party (2012) the PVV describes itself as a pragmatic and patriotic party. One of the main goals is to get out of the Europe Union and leave the Euro. One of the arguments to leave the Europe Union is to gain decision-making power on immigration policies. It is argued that this is not xenophobic but, instead, patriotic and caring for our nation (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012). After this introduction in his program flyer, an info-graphic follows showing four maps of the Netherlands with the percentage of immigrants geographically in 2010 and then a prediction for 2020, 2030, 2040. It is also stated afterwards that there should be a free trade market, and free movement of persons through Europe, “except for Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian people [...]” (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012: 17). Immigration policies are connected within his program in every part: when he writes about the Netherlands as a welfare state, about the Dutch economy, and Dutch freedom. For example, one of the viewpoints made in the chapter on the Netherlands as a welfare state, is as follows: “No social benefits for people who wear the burqa or speak wretched Dutch”⁶ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012: 25). Another example, in the chapter on Healthcare, is similar: “For asylum seekers and illegal citizens only emergent help should become available”⁷ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012: 41).

One other clear viewpoint of the PVV is its support to Israel and against Palestine. As a teenager, Wilders stayed in Israel for approximately one year. He has visited the country up to thirty or forty times since then (Vossen, 2011). He has many political contacts there and gets financial support from some of those (Ibid.). A viewpoint that has been widely criticized by other Dutch politicians is that Palestine refugees should be no longer acknowledged as refugees. Hence, they are no longer welcome in the Netherlands. Wilders states that Palestines belong to Jordan (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012). Vossen argues that the support to Israel is the only way for Wilders to make a national RRP organization acceptable in the Netherlands. In this way, associations with fascism against Jews and a nationalist ideology easily linked to the Second World War are impossible (Vossen, 2011; Mudde, 2007).

Despite his support to Israel, the political meetings and network of the PVV, in the latest years, trouble this view that nothing can associate him to fascism. According to Vossen, “Wilders himself openly keeps aloof from most other parties in this family, such as the Front National, the British National party, Vlaams Belang and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs” (Vossen, 2011: 186). However, to reach his goal to leave the Europe Union and promote the

⁶ “Geen uitkeringen voor boerkadragers of wie belabberd Nederlands spreekt.”

⁷ “Voor (meerderjarige) asielzoekers en illegalen alleen acute hulp.”

anti-EU campaign, Wilders has started to collaborate with Lega Nord, Front National, Vlaams Belang and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs since 2013. He has held speeches for the French Front National and the Italian Lega Nord. Recently, he has supported Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) and gave a speech in Dresden in front of their supporters. It is known that well-organized neo-Nazi groups are included in the Pegida movement. The leader of the movement Lutz Bachmann had to resign because a photo was published of him looking like Adolf Hitler. At the moment he has been reestablished as the leader of Pegida. To conclude with, Wilders has not made any comments on these collaborations except that he sees all of them as patriots fighting for the sovereignty of their country (Wilders, 2014, 2nd of December).

The notion of nationalism

I would argue that the PVV and the SD are both nationalist parties. However, the PVV refers to itself as a patriotic party, and speaks out to ‘patriots’ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010). After defining the concept of nationalism and the nation, I will go into the differences of nationalism and patriotism and argue why I consider the PVV as a nationalist party.

Before defining nationalism, it is important to stress the fact that a definition of a ‘nation’ has been problematic for political scholars (Räthzel, 1995). A nation is often characterized by objective aspects, such as language, territory and cultural practices. However, this may become problematic. For example, several nations exist that have more than one language (Ibid.). According to Nora Räthzel, and what I would agree to, a nation, and national identities, are not ‘given’ and therefore cannot be objective: “They are rather social constructions, and historically very new constructions” (Räthzel, 1995: 162). Another important point regarding this definition is the power of these national constructions. It is not easy to convince people that their image of a nation is a recent historical construction (Ibid.). These national power relations are reproduced in different discourses, for example, through the media and through education: it shows in the process of societalisation⁸. A nation is based on the idea of an ideal type of a nation-state, for example, liberal or socialist, or based on any other political movement. In this nation, all citizens are members of the nation and share the same national collective identity (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). However, there are always groups that are not seen as members of this collective. These are mostly constructed as minorities (Ibid.).

⁸ Societalisation is the process of the becoming of individuals in society and how they are formed and constitute themselves as active members of the society (Räthzel, 1995).

A well-known concept of the nation that supports the earlier given definitions is imagined communities, coined by Benedict Anderson (Anderson, 1983): the nation is an “...imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited as sovereign” (Anderson, 1983: 6). He explains that by imagined, it means that the community is imagined: members and fellow-members of the same nation will most likely never know each other, although the nation is conceived as a ‘deep horizontal comradeship’. According to Anderson: “Communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined” (Ibid.). The nation is limited because it has boundaries. However, these do not coincide with the people living around them, although they are made by people (Ibid.). This last point and the point of Anthias and Yuval-Davis on the construction of minorities, stresses the importance of national power relations where certain national identities and characteristics are reproduced and others are excluded. Especially within nationalism, where identity plays an important role, these power relations are essential to the reproduction of the nation.

A key definition of nationalism is: *a political doctrine that wants to have an identical cultural and political unit*: “In other words, the core goal of the nationalist is to achieve a monocultural state” (Mudde, 2007:16). One of the processes to achieve this is, is called homogenization. This is achieved by having a specific national identity that only includes people from the ‘nation’ (Ibid.). For example, the promotion of the Jewish-Christian ‘Dutch roots’, by the PVV, automatically excludes anyone else of another religion. Nationalism is not universal, but it is the founding ideology of the present nation-states and the national borders (Mudde, 2007). Nationalism has a lot of different forms, ranging from ‘liberal’ nationalism, as found in conservative parties, to ‘radical’ nationalism. In my view, the SD and the PVV promote a more ‘radical’ form of nationalism, in which homogenization is the main goal.

The SD refers to itself as a nationalist party, but the PVV does not. The PVV describes itself as a conservative party. At their official website and in their program they describe themselves as being ‘patriots’. However, I view the PVV as a nationalist party. I will clarify this in the following. According to a study of Thomas Blank and Peter Schmidt on the national identity in the former East and West Germany, there is a difference between nationalism and patriotism. Nationalism, as already described above, idealizes the nation and its history, produces a feeling of national superiority and an uncritical acceptance by citizens for national authorities. It produces a homogenous national identity and along with that excludes social groups that do not fit within the national identity (Blank and Schmidt, 2003).

To counter that, patriotism does not idealize the nation but evaluates the nation through critical analysis, allows different views on the reconstructions of the nation's history, rejects uncritical acceptance of the state-authority and stops the support for the political system as soon as national goals are no longer seen as humanistic (Ibid.). Here I would argue that although the PVV calls out to 'patriots' and being a 'patriot', it does not fit to the category of patriotism. They seem to advocate a patriotic gender equality model where, for example, women have a more active role and are involved. However, the characterizations of patriotism according to Blank and Schmidt are not in line with the rest of the promoted program of the PVV.

The PVV promotes the Dutch history and the nation in the program, such as "for ages, we have been fighting against the sea and so we have transformed a swamp to a wealthy nation" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012: 11). With these kind of 'positive' notions on the Dutch history, the PVV idealizes the Netherlands and its culture. They produce a progress narrative of the nation, instead of a nostalgic traditional one, like that of the SD. Also, the fact that Geert Wilders is the only official member of the PVV, fits the uncritical acceptance of authority in nationalism and restrains any criticism within the party. Therefore, I would argue that the PVV is a nationalist party. The concept 'patriot' is used in the sense that it speaks for 'pride patriots' fighting for their nation, but not in a political sense where the citizens still have some power in, for example, constructing the history of its nation or criticizing the nation.

The notion of gender equality within Swedish and Dutch policies

Within the European Union (EU), gender equality has been a 'priority' since 1957 (European Communities, 2007). Achieving gender equality is one of the goals of the EU. It is seen as a key factor in: "meeting the economic, social and demographic challenges the European Union must face up to, and is essential to social cohesion, sustainable growth and the development of a quality society (European Communities, 2007: 7). Six priority areas to achieve gender equality are: 1: equal economic independence; 2: equal pay for equal work and work of equal value; 3: equality in decision-making; 4: dignity, integrity and an end to gender-based violence; 5: gender equality in external actions; and 6: horizontal issues (promoting non-discriminatory gender roles) (European Union, 2011: 2).

Although the EU has action plans and reports describing these areas, the overall 'European' notion of gender equality is seen as "generally vague" (Agustín and Sata, 2013:

63). The notion gets less abstract when it is approached within one nation, with a specific political framework. Research on gender equality and European policies has shown that

“the way in which gender conceptions are made and how gendered equality is addressed in national political discourse also have a direct effect on how these issues emerge in discourses of Europeanness” (Agustín and Sata, 2013: 76).

One can conclude from this that the European identity is created, based on the national context (Ibid.). Therefore, in this thesis, there will be a focus on the notion of gender equality within the national context of Sweden and the Netherlands. This national context will give a more specific definition of gender equality. Next to this I will give a short introduction in how the concept has been worked with and evolved within these national contexts and policies.

Gender equality in Sweden

National concept of gender equality

Sweden has been known, along with other Scandinavian countries, as “women-friendly” or “gender-equality-friendly” for many years, due to its achievements in gender equality policies and practices (Hübinette and Lundström, 2011). Internationally, Sweden has been promoted as a frontrunner in gender equality policies. In the latest Gender Inequality Index⁹, Sweden is on the lowest 4th place globally (United Nations Development Programme, 2014). This means it has one of the highest rates of gender equality. Gender equality is a national key principle in Sweden (Hübinette and Lundström, 2011; Borchorst and Siim, 2008). Through international development aid, Sweden has also been exporting these gender equality policies and its expertise in this field to other (‘Third World’) countries (Hübinette and Lundström, 2011). The Swedish expertise is seen as: “an export commodity, something to deliver to other parts of the world, including other European countries” (Tuori, 2007).

However, there has been more and more criticism from ethnic minorities and women movements that the institutionalized gender equality discourse in Sweden is based on a normative white identity which excludes mainly migrants and ethnic minorities (Hübinette and Lundström, 2011; de los Reyes and Mulinari, 2005). In the view of the critics, gender equality is seen as part of a national identity owned by Swedish women and men. Migrants and ethnic minorities have to learn and adapt to this part of the national identity (Tuori, 2007). Often a remark about their religion, mostly Islam, is made with the argument that, for

⁹ This index is based on calculations in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market. For more information on this data, visit: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14_technical_notes.pdf

example, it withholds women's opportunities to become more emancipated. This comes forward in gender equality policy documents where migrant and ethnic minority women are specifically addressed in relation to violence. Men's violence against women is not addressed in detail, and is mostly related to religion, not specifically to the nation's identity. The implication is: Swedish women do not experience violence – migrant women do; Swedish men are less likely offenders – migrant men more often (Borchorst and Teigen, 2009). Within this institutionalized gender equality discourse in Sweden, based on a normative white identity, religion plays an important role. Within this normative identity, Swedes are perceived as secular and modern. This secularism is related to the ideal of women's emancipation. Moreover, in order to achieve gender equality, one must be secular. Migrant and ethnic minorities are perceived as religious and traditional; gender equality should be promoted (Siim and Borchorst, 2010).

Decision making bodies

Gender equality policy in Sweden is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. In April 2015 the minister responsible is Åsa Regnér. The ministry describes the aim of gender equality policy as to combat and change systems that preserve gender-based distribution of power (gender-based hierarchy) and to create more conditions for both women and men to be able to have the same opportunities and influence on their lives (Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2015, 12th of February). One main strategy is 'gender mainstreaming'¹⁰. It aims to introduce a clear gender perspective into all policy areas. Gender mainstreaming is applied to all political levels in Sweden: governmental, regional and local. Since 2009, there has been a new Discrimination Act. It combines different laws against specific forms of discrimination into one. The new law combats discrimination on the following grounds: sex, transgender identity or expression, ethnic origin, religion or other belief, disability, sexual orientation and age. Age and transgender identity or expression, are two new grounds within the Discrimination Act. The Equality Ombudsman (Diskrimineringsombudsmannen - DO) is a government agency that maintains the Discrimination Act.

One of the largest women's organizations in Sweden is the umbrella organization Sveriges Kvinnolobby (The Swedish Women's Lobby) established in 1997. It has 45 women's member organizations throughout Sweden. SWL promotes and lobbies for women's

¹⁰ In general within feminist theory, this approach has been criticized on several points. For example it assumes a homogenous group of women and it might not change anything in practice besides adding a gender perspective (which is mostly only 'women') in policy documents (Verloo, 2001).

rights and gender equality. It also represents Sweden in the European Women's Lobby and was one of the main organizers of the large conference Nordiskt Forum Malmö in 2014. At the moment, important topics on the agenda of the organization are: campaigns against surrogacy motherhood, in favor of individual parental leave; campaigns against the still existing gender pay gap; and campaigns against sexual exploitation abroad by Swedish tourists. With their campaigns and their contacts with the ministry, this organization tries to have influence on political decision making bodies, such as the government, and gain more women's rights and a better level of gender equality.

Gender equality in the Netherlands

National concept of gender equality

The Netherlands promotes itself as a nation leading in gender equality. According to a news article on the Dutch governmental website, the Netherlands has the highest rank in gender equality globally (Rijksoverheid, 2014, 31st of January). On the latest Gender Inequality Index, the Netherlands is on the lowest 7th place globally of gender inequality (United Nations Development Programme, 2014). This means it is in the top ten countries international with a high score of gender equality.

Gender equality is seen as achieved in the Netherlands (Celis, Outshoorn, Meier and Motmans, 2012). This tendency is most visible in the media with lots of articles published, stating that feminism is not needed anymore. These are written by both women and men. Nevertheless, many topics, such as women's political representation, have been contested against. Furthermore, since the emerging of more right-wing parties, discrimination in general has become more contested since 2002 (Ibid.). The idea that gender equality has been achieved and there is no or merely any discrimination in the society, adds up to the reputation of the Netherlands as being a 'tolerant' country. Yet, the concept of tolerance was part of a system of noninterference with other pillars before the de-pillarization that was in the mid-sixties (Van der Veer, 2006). Another outcome of the Dutch Emancipation Commission (Visitatiecommissie Emancipatiebeleid) is that gender mainstreaming has not been successful. Many civil servants and cabinets ignored a gender perspective (VCE, 2007).

Decision making bodies

In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science takes care of gender equality under the heading/caption 'women emancipation' (Rijksoverheid, 2015). One of the main priorities to achieve more gender equality is to strengthen the economic independence of

women and raise the percentage of employed women (Ibid.). Other topics that are discussed are safety of girls and women, fewer differences between boys and girls at school, and equal rights for LGBT people (Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, 2011, 31st of August).

In 1994, a common law against discrimination was established: the General Law on Equal Treatment¹¹. This law groups discrimination on basis of religion, political conviction, race, sex, nationality, sexuality, belief and marital status in one single framework. This was before intersectionality, with separate laws for age and disabilities, was introduced within the European Union (Celis, Outshoorn, Meier and Motmans, 2012). The ministries that are responsible for the implication of this law are the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of Security and Justice and the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations. The National Discrimination Expertise Centre (LECD-OM) advises the Public Prosecution Service (OM). This means that the department on gender equality is separated from the department on discrimination, human trafficking and for instance as well of that on minimum wages.

The Directorate for Emancipation (DE), which is part of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, has always been coordinating gender mainstreaming. Due to an attack on corporatism in the mid 1990s, lots of advisory boards and social organizations got cut. Some of the directorates that still exist, such as the DE, do not have a lot of power anymore (Celis, Outshoorn, Meier and Motmans, 2012). In fact the DE lost its coordinating role and focuses now only on specific gender policies, related to ethnicity and sexuality (Ibid.). It is therefore up to the other ministries if they apply any gender mainstreaming or not. According to an analysis of the Dutch Emancipation Commission (Celis, Outshoorn, Meier and Motmans 2012), it seems that besides the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (development aid), the Ministry of Defense and the responsible ministry of gender equality; Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences, very few policies with a gender or diversity perspective are produced (Celis, Outshoorn, Meier and Motmans, 2012). Thus the main criticism within the Netherlands has been that there is not much done on gender equality or with gender perspectives in policies. The idea that gender equality has been achieved, results in the same paradigm as discussed in the part on Sweden, where gender equality is part of the national identity. Through this a national identity is constructed. Gender inequality, therefore, automatically applies only to migrants and ethnic minorities.

Also for NGO's it has been hard to survive after the cut on financial support in the mid

¹¹ Algemene wet gelijke behandeling (AWGB).

1990's. This has hampered their influence at the political level. One of the larger Dutch women organizations is WOMEN Inc. It was established in 2005. In general, it is a platform for women creating network opportunities and meetings, and offering support to each other. The most important topics for this organization are financial income and health.

The use of gender equality within the parties

In this part of the chapter I will start with providing material from the Sweden Democrats (SD) and the Party For Freedom (PVV), and from the media, to make an analysis on how these parties promote the concept of gender equality. I will analyze their documents for the specific concept of gender equality. I will also look for topics that contain a gender perspective such as speeches done by the leaders of the parties. I will analyze the material through the perspective of feminist theory, for example, from feminist scholars such as Anette Borchorst, Birte Siim, Nira Yuval-Davis, Paulina de los Reyes and Joan W. Scott. I will first start with the SD and end with an analysis on the PVV.

Sweden Democrats

The latest election manifesto of SD is the one published online on the 25th of August 2014. It provides a program and views on several issues for the Swedish general elections on September 14th 2014. This program consists of 24 pages. It includes an introduction and viewpoints on safety; immigration policy; working conditions; social benefits for the unemployed; the labor market; health care; Sweden as a knowledge nation; defense; families and children; sustainability and energy; gender policy; Swedish culture; animal rights; European cooperation; independent Sweden; policy for support to vulnerable groups and infrastructure.

To analyze how the SD promotes the concept of gender equality, I am first going to focus on the part of gender policy in the program of the SD. This will clarify their view on gender policies and gender equality and will also give more information on some of the present laws and debates on gender equality and gender policy in Sweden.

The title of the page on gender policy is called 'A gender policy for the real people'¹² (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 17). After an introduction on their views, ten viewpoints on different gender policies are explained that should be either changed or withdrawn. With these 10 viewpoints, gender policy has one of the higher amounts of suggestions in comparison to

¹² "En jämställdhetspolitik för verklighetens folk."

other topics such as immigration policy and working conditions, social benefits for the unemployed, and defense with only four to five suggestions. Therefore it seems that gender equality and gender policies are important topics for SD. One should further take into account the page on families and children with four viewpoints.

At first glance the title seems vague. It is unclear what is meant by ‘the real people’. However, after analyzing the viewpoints, it seems likely that it refers to gender policies for a particular group of people. I will clarify this in the end. In the introduction it is said that the party wishes to work towards a Sweden where it is obvious that men and women have the same dignity and rights (Ibid.). Also, the party strives to a Sweden where no one is discriminated against because of their gender, ethnic background, age, sexual orientation, or their disabilities. Then it continues with the following sentence: “A Sweden where there is room for those who want to break the traditional gender patterns and where we at the same time not shame and blame those who want to live in accordance with such a pattern”¹³ (Ibid.). This sentence shows a lot on how the Sweden Democrats views gender equality and gender in general. First of all it produces a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’. ‘We’ refers to ‘us’, to the reader and the party members, who, assumingly, live by the traditional gender patterns. ‘Those’ refers to another group, ‘them’, people who want to ‘break’ those patterns. The reference to a ‘we’ constructs a specific identity that the SD promotes and one that is excluded. I will elaborate on this in the end.

Secondly, the emphasis is literally on ‘breaking traditional gender patterns’. This formulation provides little room to gender non-conformity. The SD focuses on a traditional binary view of gender, as can be read from the rest of the paragraph where only ‘men’ and ‘women’ are referred to. The paragraph ends with the sentence: “A Sweden where both men and women feel free, secure, and respected”¹⁴ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 17). This suggests gender is seen as very binary, placing gender non-confirming people in another group; in other words: not included.

This view continues in the ten viewpoints of the SD, where mostly women and men are seen as the subject. Only once are LGBT people mentioned: in the viewpoint that there should be an inquiry done into the need of special shelters for special groups such as LGBT people. Moreover, ‘individuals who want and need to break the traditional gender patterns’

¹³ “Ett Sverige där det finns utrymme för den som vill bryta mot traditionella könsmonster och där vi samtidigt inte skam- och skuldbelägger den som vill leva i enlighet med ett sådant mönster.”

¹⁴ “Ett Sverige där både män och kvinnor känner sig fria, trygga och respekterade.”

are mentioned in relation to gender pedagogy. This should only be available for those individuals (Ibid.). It is written as follows:

“A withdrawal of the taxpayer-funded support to the forms of gender pedagogy that seeks to change all children and young people’s behavior and gender identity rather than just help and understanding for those individuals who want and need to break the traditional gender patterns”¹⁵ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 17)

Here, progressive gender pedagogy is labeled as an institution that might change ‘all children’, whilst ‘all children’ do not need help, but only ‘those individuals’. The point that gender pedagogy does not have anything to do with specific support for gender non-confirming people, but only develops gender-neutral education, is overlooked. Here, the SD is actively arguing against the progressive non-gender binary pedagogy. It is only necessary for specific individuals, for individual change: “help and understanding for those individuals” (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 17).

In addition, on the website of the SD, it is stated that the SD is opposed to same-sex parenthood. The SD believes that it is in the best interest of the child to grow up with the biological parents, the father and the mother. Besides this primary material of the SD, a blog-post in 2007 written by second deputy speaker of the Swedish Parliament, Björn Söder, states that lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people are ‘sexual abnormalities’. He classifies them together with pedophiles and people who commit bestiality (Poohl, 2014 December¹⁶).

Although the ‘we’ used in this policy is somewhat ambivalent, it becomes clear from the sentence: “A Sweden where there is room for those who want to violate traditional gender patterns and where we at the same time not shame and blame those who want to live in accordance with such a pattern”¹⁷ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 17). It shows that ‘we’ refers to people living within binary ‘traditional gender patterns’. This ‘we’ represents a collective majority. The policies for gender pedagogy or support for breaking ‘traditional gender patterns’ are referred to people as individuals. It seems that the SD supports individual change within this policy but represents and regards itself as fitting into the traditional gender

¹⁵ “En indragning av det skattefinansierade stödet till de former av genuspedagogik som strävar efter att förändra alla barn och ungdomars beteende och könsidentitet snarare än att bara hjälpa och öka förståelsen för de individer som vill och behöver bryta mot traditionella könsmonster.”

¹⁶ The original blog post from sdkuriren.se has been deleted; this translation is from the project of Expo.

¹⁷ “Ett Sverige där det finns utrymme för den som vill bryta mot traditionella könsmonster och där vi samtidigt inte skam- och skuldbelägger den som vill leva i enlighet med ett sådant mönster.”

patterns.

Therefore, I conclude that in the title ‘A gender policy for the real people’, ‘real people’ refers to men and women of whom the majority fits into ‘traditional gender patterns’. LGBT people are excluded from this group of ‘real people’.

Other viewpoints that reveal more on how the Sweden Democrats promote gender equality are in favor of men and point against the Islam and against migrants who ‘violate’ women’s rights. I will start with these two points focusing on men. Scandinavia has been promoted as ‘women friendliness’, a concept coined by Helga Hernes (Hernes, 1987). Afterwards, this concept has been criticized by many other feminist scholars. They claim that it was based on a normative premise. For example, it did not include women’s minorities (Borchorst and Siim, 2008). Further critics were that the concept was based on the idea that both men and women have common interests and form a homogenous group (Borchorst, 2008). An important development from this concept has been a larger focus on the men’s role as a father and men policies within gender equality (Hobson, 2002). As a result, the question was raised whether these ‘women friendly’ states are still ‘men friendly’. This latter view also comes through in the two viewpoints on men on the page of gender equality of the SD.

The first viewpoint referring to men is as follows: “Increased support for the national shelters, establishment of special shelters for honor victims or victims of violence and the establishment of an inquiry into the need for special shelters for other groups such as LGBT people and men”¹⁸ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 17). It is exceptional to emphasize the need of shelters for men, in comparison to the ‘Action plan for combating men’s violence against women, violence and oppression in the name of honour and violence in same-sex relationships’ of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. Research from 2012 did show that almost an equal percentage of men is victim of physical assault, in comparison to women. However, much more women are victim of sexual coercion (Lövestad and Krantz, 2012).

Another survey from the European Union showed that, despite its gender equality policies, Sweden is one of the countries within Europe with the highest degree of male violence against women (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014). Of course, it remains a question whether men equally experience violence as women in their lives. This is especially so, because violence is a complicated concept due to its many forms. Thus, the

¹⁸ “Ett ökat stöd till landets kvinnojourer, inrättande av särskilda jourer för hedersvåldets offer samt tillsättandet av en utredning kring behovet av särskilda jourer även för andra grupper såsom HBT-personer och män.”

focus of the SD on shelters for men is exceptional when comparing it to the present action plan that focuses on women and LGBT people (Reinfeldt and Sabuni, 2007, 15th of November). It is also curious because the SD itself, next to this campaign of the program, has another campaign against men's violence against women. In the latter campaign they acknowledge that the rate of women as victims of violence is much higher than the rate of men as victims of violence. This report that starts with general numbers on violence, focuses on specific violence, such as honor related violence. Doing so, it connects violence to immigrants in Sweden (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014, 8th of September). Thus, the viewpoint on men's shelters remains a peculiar point in their program.

The second viewpoint focused on men is "A review of the Parental Code in order to make legislation regarding child custody more gender neutral and less discriminatory against men"¹⁹ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 17). Here, it is stated that the current legislation on child custody is discriminating men. I assume that their argument is that women, in many cases, easier get child custody. However, in the last revision of the Swedish Parental Code in 1998, joint custody has almost become obligatory (Hobson, 2002). In several recent cases the court overruled custody to the mother only and ruled for joint custody. This may also happen when one of the parents is opposed to it, because the principle behind it is that joint custody is in the best interests of the child (Ibid.). However, joint custody does not say anything on how the actual custody looks like. It can be that the father only has contact with the children every two-week's for one weekend. Therefore, it remains a bit unclear why SD finds it discriminatory. Sweden is one of the countries in Europe where joint custody is prioritized over child custody for the mother only. It could be that the SD, as well as for the other viewpoint, follows the trend to focus on men in gender equality and men's rights. In this case their viewpoints seem to be related to an anti-feminist movement called 'jämställdister'. They argue that feminists are discriminating men and 'gender equality' has gone too far (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2013).

Two viewpoints in the page on gender equality stand out because they're related to ethnicity and related to the strict SD policies on immigration. The first one is: "A tightening of penalties and increased efforts against genital mutilation, forced marriages and sexual and honor-related violence"²⁰ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014:17). This viewpoint stands out because

¹⁹ "En översyn av föräldraskapet i syfte att göra lagstiftningen rörande vårdnaden av barn mer könsneutral och mindre diskriminerande mot män."

²⁰ "En skärpning av straffen och ökade insatser mot könsstympning, tvångsgifte samt sexuellt och

instead of focusing on men's violence against women, it is focused on genital mutilation, forced marriages and sexual and honor-related violence, which all of them are related in the media and as well in older official reports of the Swedish government²¹ with 'patriarchal families' and 'migrants' (Thapar-Björkert, 2007; de los Reyes, 2003). Doing so produces two groups: Swedish women and other 'migrant' women who are victimized and need 'help'.

The other viewpoint which, indirectly, also refers to a specific group is as follows: "A withdrawal of all fiscal aid to all political and religious organizations that advocate or legitimize violence or negative treatment of individuals based on their gender"²² (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014:17). Of course this viewpoint is pointed towards 'all' political or religious organizations, though in context of the other viewpoints, the way they're written and other views in the program, it is only possible that this viewpoint refers to a specific group. Is it for example explicitly written in a flyer of the SD on women's safety that migrants of non-Christian religious groups are responsible for higher rates of violence based on gender, such as honor violence and rape (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014, 8th of September). Again, two groups are produced, one that has the Swedish ethnicity and another that is deviant: migrant, non-Christian, religious, i.e. Islamic.

This becomes very clear on the next page of the program discussing Swedish culture. On this page it is written that the SD is working for a Sweden characterized by a common, historically rooted, Swedish culture with cohesion and solidarity and where Swedish heritage is respected and kept alive (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014). What exactly is meant by Swedish heritage becomes clear in the viewpoints following this introduction. There it is said that Christian culture should be more supported with a raising fund, the preservation of church building and the establishment of a national church museum. Also, more effort should be made to make 'this culture and heritage' available for children (Ibid.).

From this page, I can conclude that Christianity is seen as part of the Swedish identity

hedersrelaterat våld."

²¹ In 2002 in a factsheet of the Ministry of Justice the issue on honor-related violence was described as "In addition to this fundamental cause of violence against women, there is a further dimension – girls and women in strongly patriarchal families living under threat or coercion" (Thapar-Björkert, 2007: 11). 'Patriarchal violence' (also the name of the official report on honor-related violence and violence against LGBT people of the Swedish government in 2005 (Johnsson-Latham, 2005) became the concept of honor-related violence. Scholars such as Paulina de los Reyes criticized this for producing a starting point for these girls and families as culturally, ethnically and religiously deviant in Sweden. Furthermore instead of seeing it as a structural problem, it is seen as an attribute that belongs to a certain group, specifically immigrants (de los Reyes, 2003).

²² "En indragning av allt skattefinansierat stöd till alla politiska och religiösa organisationer som förespråkar eller legitimerar våld eller negativ särbehandling av individer baserat på deras könstillhörighet."

as promoted by the SD. In those viewpoints where the SD supports the Christian culture, it speaks of it as its Swedish heritage. In addition to that, they want to maintain this Swedish culture and state that immigrants should adapt to ‘Sweden’ and not vice versa (Ibid.). Culture in this context represents a fixed homogenous group for both the Swedish culture and for the migrant culture as presented by the SD. These ‘cultures’ are fixed in their practices, outside of history, with no acknowledgment to a variation of practices or beliefs within, for example, a religion (Scott, 2007). For example, the Swedish culture is Christian and the migrant culture is Islamic, and the one should be cherished while the other one is responsible for violence against women. On the one hand, different kinds of views on women within movements of the Islam, do not seem to be possible to the SD. On the other hand, violence against women within the Swedish nation caused by Swedish men is overlooked as well.

In the viewpoints on gender equality for ‘the real people’ it becomes clear that most viewpoints are focused on a specific group: targeting the deviant migrant group as violent and breaking women’s rights, targeting non-confirming gender people as individuals and as exceptions, targeting men as a group that needs more support and producing an ‘us’ that is heterosexual, white, gender conforming, and Christian. The SD promotes gender equality in a way that more progressive developments are stopped. These include gender pedagogy and positive discrimination based on gender and ethnicity, such as voluntary political party quotas. A more traditional family and gender policy is cherished by the SD.

However, there is a contradiction here, whereas the SD is both ambivalent in being either traditional or progressive, although progressive in a limited way. This refers to the contradiction of their own description of being a ‘social conservative’ party. For example, their more progressive gender equality policies are based on individual change that contradicts an ‘us’, which represents an assumed majority that fits within the ‘traditional gender’ identity. There is a tension between their strong community based politics and their individualized view on gender equality. This results in gender becoming a question of choice and lifestyle, where one certain type of lifestyle and gender is prioritized over the other.

The Party For Freedom

For this analysis, I will use two programs of the PVV: one from 2010, before the general elections on the 9th of June 2010 and the second one from 2012, before the general elections on the 12th of September 2012. The first one is called ‘The agenda of hope and optimism’ and the second one is called ‘Their Brussels, our Netherlands’ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010;

Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012). The first one consists of an introduction and chapters on the following topics: safety, combatting the Islam and the mass-migration, democratization, a social Netherlands, health care, education, our culture, investments, foreign affairs, a better environment, a safe living and improved infrastructure, animals, farmers and fishers and a healthy financial basis.

The second one consists of an introduction and chapters on the following topics: ‘their Brussels’, ‘our’ economy; welfare state; freedom; safety; immigration policy; health care; quality of living; foreign countries and ‘our’ surroundings. Neither of them has a page on gender equality or gender policies. Therefore, I will go through other topics where gender equality related viewpoints or views are presented. I will start with the old program of 2010 and connect it to the program of 2012.

The program of 2010 focuses on the combat against the Islam, which is, according to the PVV, a consequence of the mass-migration (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010). Throughout the document the reader is spoken to as a ‘Dutch’ person, for example:

“The Dutch are a nation that has no equal. We are born of a revolt, a struggle for freedom. Our ancestors have transformed a swamp into something the whole world envies. Here, behind the dikes, a prosperity and solidarity has been reached that has no equal, with freedom for everyone and traditionally a tolerance towards people who are tolerant as well”²³ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010: 5).

In this short paragraph, being Dutch is already related to being solidary and ‘automatically’ being tolerant to everyone else, that is: “if they are tolerant as well” (Ibid.). This Dutch identity continues to be confirmed throughout the document. It produces an ‘us’ and another group, ‘them’. In this document the latter group clearly consists of Muslims; anyone defending²⁴ or believing in the Islam. Statements and views on gender policies are mentioned most of the time to reaffirm the established emancipated position of ‘us’ and claim that the Islam can damage those established positions. In the introduction this is already briefly mentioned as the following:

²³ “Nederlanders zijn een volk dat zijn gelijke niet kent. We zijn geboren uit een Opstand, een vrijheidsstrijd. Onze voorouders hebben een zompige moerasdelta omgevormd tot iets waar de hele wereld jaloers op is. Hier, achter de dijken, is een welvaart en een solidariteit bereikt die zijn gelijke niet kende, met vrijheid voor iedereen en met van oudsher een tolerantie tegen mensen die ook tolerant waren.”

²⁴ Left wing politicians are also being accused of defending the Islam and being guilty of leading our country to a multiculturalism failure (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010).

“Who thinks that the Islamization is just a one issue cannot count. The mass-migration has huge consequences for all kinds of fields in our country. ... it dispels Jews and gay’s and flushes years of women’s emancipation down the toilet”²⁵ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010: 6).

The PVV states that it will fight for the rights of women and gay people. Besides that, it will support the traditional Jewish-Christian and humanistic values of the Netherlands (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010).

In the second program, Wilders again speaks to the reader as us, as being patriots. We are “patriots” that should fight for the culture of the nation and “protect the nation” (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012). This protection is further reflected in the viewpoints of the PVV. For example, in the statement that the party will fight for gay’s- and women’s rights. It is also clear that the ‘we’ that is mentioned, is meant to be a male. This becomes clear in the way the paragraphs are written with the words ‘our rule of law’ and ‘discrimination of women’: “The Koran writes behavior that violates *our rule of law*, such as anti-Semitism, discrimination of *women*...”²⁶ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010: 13). Linguistically, when a word that describes the nation, for example the Netherlands or our national history (which is written in Dutch as: ‘fathernational’ history), is written, it is always ‘our’ nation. Meanwhile women’s rights or discrimination of women, or any sort of sentence where women’s issues are described, it is spoken about but never ‘our’ issue.

It seems here that men have the role of protecting the nation and women are the mothers of the nation, who are being protected. According to Nira Yuval-Davis, women’s membership in national and ethnic collectivities is of a double nature: “On the one hand, women, like men, are members of the collectivity. On the other hand, there are always specific rules and regulations which relate to women as women” (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 37). For example, the way women can be constructed within nationalism as mothers and as biological reproducers of ‘the nation’. However, this does not mean women are passive victims of a nationalistic ideology:

“Very often it is women, who are given the roles of the cultural reproducers of ‘the

²⁵ “Wie denkt dat islamisering een kewstie is van one issue kan niet tellen. De massa-immigratie heeft enorme gevolgen voor alle facetten van onze samenleving. ... Het verdrijft Joden en homo’s en spoelt decennia vrouwenemancipatie door de wc.”

²⁶ “De Koran schrijft gedrag voor dat strijdig is met onze rechtstaat, zoals antisemitisme, discriminatie van vrouwen ...”

nation’ and are empowered to rule on what is ‘appropriate’ behavior and appearance and what is not and to exert control over other women who might be constructed as ‘deviants’”, Yuval-Davis, 1997: 37).

This could ultimately lead to what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak describes as: “White men saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak, 1993: 93). In these cases, a form of nationalism crosses with feminism and colonial powers and white women take the role of nationalist feminists and perform colonial violence.²⁷ This construction of women’s membership, advocating as nationalist feminists, could be argued for in the program of the PVV. Cultural and religious practices of Muslim women are, consequently, criticized and rejected. It is argued that these practices and the Islam ‘flushes Dutch women’s emancipation down the toilet’ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010).

Moreover, a clear colonial pride is present in the programs of the PVV. Firstly, in both of the programs, it is written that the national canon should be obligatory in the curriculum at high-school. It also states: “our heroic national history should be placed ‘in the sun’”²⁸ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010: 33). This is a Dutch expression for saying it should have more ‘positive’ attention. Besides that, students should learn the national anthem and the Dutch flag should be present at school buildings. Secondly, under the topic ‘quality of living’, it is stated that the Dutch language should be defended, as well as the African language (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010). The latter is closely related to Dutch due to the colonial history of the Netherlands.

Thirdly, in the part ‘Their Brussels’ of the program of 2012, the Dutch nation is described as a trade nation: “being a nation that, as no other, throughout the ages, has been oriented internationally: “Our flag has been waving for ages on all continents and all sea’s of the world”²⁹ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012: 11). This sentence refers to the Dutch Golden Age in the 17th century where the Dutch East India Company (VOC) with its vessels ruled several trade routes from Europe to Asia and Africa. The construction of the Dutch being ‘internationally oriented’ comes from this time where Dutch colonizers traveled throughout the world by boats. The ‘so closely related’ African language is a colonial heritage of the Dutch.

²⁷ For example in the nineteenth century in Africa and India, Western women “used their campaigning skills to argue for the rights of indigenous women in colonies” (Lewis and Mills, 2003: 8), whom they saw as being oppressed by cultural and religious practices such as the veil and sati.

²⁸ “Onze heroïsche vaderlandse geschiedenis mag meer in het zonnetje worden geplaatst.”

²⁹ “Onze vlag wappert al eeuwen op alle continenten en alle wereldzeen.”

What exactly the membership of women is in the program of the PVV is complex because in both of the programs gender policies or gender equality is not spoken of except in short sentences where it is stated that women's rights and gender equality is something that the PVV 'fights' for (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012; Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010). However, it is clear that the PVV constructs a national identity that is white, Jewish-Christian, proud of its colonial history, and middle and (mostly) lower class. Wilders rejects the elite and refers to the reader with common lower class names³⁰. The identity further includes caring for elderly people, according to Wilders: "those who build the nation-state after the second World War" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012: 11). Furthermore, the membership of the men is more clear in his program, as men are spoken to as being patriots who should protect the Dutch nation, culture and heritage, including women's rights. Current gender policies, which support women against a context of gendered work division and discrimination of women on the labour market, should be changed or reversed. These include child benefits, spousal maintenance and positive discrimination or quota's (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010; Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012).

Another interesting axe of identity, sexuality, is referred to in different ways. Mostly it is written that the PVV fights for the rights of homosexuals (Ibid.). However, currently, there are many examples of patriotism related to heteronormative structures (Puar, 2011; Puar and Rai, 2002). I would like to argue that these structures are also visible in the campaign of the PVV. It is my view that the party is heteronormative, although the PVV promotes gay's rights. I will further clarify this view in chapter two.

Conclusion: a comparison of the analysis

In this chapter, firstly, I analyzed the political parties SD and the PVV and how they fit into the framework of the emerging RRP movement. Secondly, I analyzed how the concept of gender equality is promoted and used within the campaigns of both parties.

Both the SD and the PVV are political parties quite complex to categorize within a political movement. However RRP seems to fit both of the parties. Both of them value traditional norms over abstract universal principles. This is reflected mostly in the way the statements are written, for example: "A Sweden where environmental policy is based on the

³⁰ Throughout his program, Wilders gives examples of 'Henk and Ingrid' (which are typical Dutch lower class, provincial names) rejecting and blaming the elite. For example: "We cannot blame Henk and Ingrid. We should blame the left elite, who think the world looks like Woodstock" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010: 7). In Dutch: "De schuld ligt niet bij Henk en Ingrid. De schuld ligt bij de linkse elites die denken dat de wereld er uit ziet als Woodstock."

love and care of their own homeland”³¹ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 15). Another example can be found in the statement of the PVV against the governmental policies on the environment and on global warming. It is described as ‘climate hysteria’ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012: 29). The valuing of traditional norms can also be found in how both parties repeat the concepts of solidarity, safety and sovereignty in their programs (Ibid.).

With respect to the second key statement of an RRP, the PVV and the SD are very similar: multiculturalism is bad for the national community and for the traditional norms. Both parties want to put a stop to immigration, and accuse migrants and non-ethnic Dutch and Swedes of criminal activities, violating national culture and women’s rights (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014)(Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010; Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012). The PVV specifically attacks migrants from Islamic countries and Muslims. The SD is a little less specific in naming the migrants although they promote a discouragement of Islamism. According to the SD, the Islam is a totalitarian ideology (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 21). In the report on men’s violence against women, they mention Africa and the Middle-East as being the countries of which the immigrants bring a higher crime rate in Sweden (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014, 8th of September). Also for the SD, most of the statements against migrants are related to Muslims. For example, the one on giving higher penalties against genital mutilation, forced marriages and sexual and honor-related violence. The PVV views, just as the SD, the Islam as a totalitarian ideology (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012: 35). The third key statement of an RRP is to counter supranational decision making bodies. Both parties fit again with this. They both campaigned against the European Union and Brussels. Therefore, both parties can be viewed as radical right populist parties.

However, there are differences between the parties, especially in how they promote the concept of gender equality. Throughout this chapter, I have demonstrated that both parties promote a specific national identity. I analyzed how different axes of identity are being used related to gender policies and gender equality. This revealed several differences and also showed different strategies that both parties use. I will discuss this more in-depth in the second chapter.

Further, I have taken into account the differences between the historical backgrounds of the two countries. In Sweden, gender equality policies seems to be more broadly promoted. Gender mainstreaming is a common tool in different ministries. In the Netherlands, this seems

³¹ “Ett Sverige där miljöpolitiken tar sin utgångspunkt i kärleken och omtanken om den egna hembygden.”

to be lacking. One large difference is that the Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs describes the aims of gender equality much more focused to both men and women, whereas the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science clearly focuses on women. There, the main goal of gender equality is to strengthen the economic independence of women (Rijksoverheid, 2015). It seems that, in the Netherlands, because gender equality is seen as being achieved, not much is done anymore. NGO's do not get any financial support or political power. To the contrary, in Sweden, that also promotes itself as a frontrunner in gender equality policies, different campaigns and research on gender equality are still funded and promoted by the government.

This of course has huge consequences in politics and how gender related policies are spoken of. Therefore, it is not remarkable that the SD has a separate page on gender equality, discussing gender policies, and the PVV does not. Thus it may seem that gender related topics, such as gender equality and policies on family and children, are more important for the SD than for the PVV. This could also be one of the reasons why the SD shows an ambivalent position in gender equality policies. They have some limited progressive policies based on the individual, instead of only conservative ones representing a homogenous 'culture'. Overall, it seems that the SD promotes a more traditional non-progressive concept of gender equality in comparison to the PVV. For instance, the SD focuses on the private sphere and the family. Whereas the PVV promotes gender equality in relation to the 'Islamification', constructing an active women membership.

The PVV promotes the concept of gender equality through statements mostly aimed to reaffirm the established emancipated position of Dutch women and gays in contrast to that of Muslims. According to the PVV, Muslims can damage the acquired Western position. At the same time, they are not able to reach this position because of their cultural practices and beliefs. The PVV promotes a nationalist and colonialist view. Within this view women could have a membership with an active role in consequently criticizing and rejecting cultural and religious practices of Muslim women. The PVV seems to be more nationalistic here. In contrast to the SD, they do not promote to educate these people, or that migrants should adapt to the Netherlands. Contrarily, they only promote that 'we, the patriots' should protect the national culture and stop the Islamification (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012).

This is an interesting difference with the SD, also with regard to the categorization of the PVV. The PVV continues to use the term patriotism and seems to promote more

nationalistic views in order to reaffirm the established positions of gay's and women's rights opposite to those of Muslims. Heteronormativity, in relation to patriotism, and sexuality is a key issue here, which I will clarify in the next chapter. In comparison, the SD seems to be more heteronormative than the PVV. The SD wants to cut down on gender non-confirming institutional developments and promotes a traditional binary concept of gender equality whereas the PVV clearly states that it fights for gay rights.

To conclude this chapter, it is my hypothesis that the SD promotes a more traditional concept of gender equality, despite their support for 'individual choice on gender', with a binary view on gender and that the PVV advocates on a more 'patriot' and active way to fight for women's rights and the Dutch national culture, which seems to be less traditional or conservative. Sexuality is a key issue here. It is used as a strategy by the PVV within a heteronormative framework. In the next chapter I will make an in-depth analysis with additional information from the programs of the SD and the PVV in the context of 'nationalism' and 'the war on terror' to find further sustain for this hypothesis.

Chapter 2: the promotion of gender equality

In this chapter I will explain the notion of transversal politics, and the use of the concept within the field of gender studies. With this, I want to answer the question, whether there exists contextual points of interest that could create space for dialogue between certain feminist movements and the RRP parties. Further, I want to give an answer to the question in what kinds of discourses the promoted notions of gender equality take part. I will make a more in-depth analysis of the results of the last chapter and see how these promoted concepts are embedded in different discourses. Gender equality will be approached here by policies on gender equality, policies on family with a focus on nationalism and the role of women. These are not interchangeable terms. However, they are interconnected. Therefore, in my analysis, they will be evaluated together, in relation to different discourses.

The notion of transversal politics

In this part, I will explain my theoretical approach, the concept of transversal politics and how I will use it. Related to this, I will explain my own position regarding the use of the concept. I first got to use the concept of transversal politics in a seminar discussing ‘The Space Between Us’, written by Cynthia Cockburn in 1999. In her book, Cockburn works on the question how to work towards peace with differences. She does not want to overcome these differences, she rather wants to stress them but work in a way that they do not have to create an ending to an interaction or a dialogue. She puts this in practice with three organizations that have been through a period of conflict. Here she works with the term transversal politics which she defines as follows: a concept that emphasizes on 'rooting' and 'shifting', in other words to mobilize and move around your own membership and identity (your differences) within a collective ('a universal sisterhood'), to be able to work with differences (Cockburn, 1999).

Cockburn works on the concept of transversal politics coined by Nira Yuval-Davis (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Yuval-Davis defines the dialogue of transversal politics in relation to the dynamics of rooting and shifting, more specifically to time and positioning. Each positioning produces specific situated knowledge which opens up the space for a dialogue (Ibid.), This cannot be finished knowledge.

“Transversal dialogue should be based on the principles of rooting and shifting – that is, being centred in one’s own experiences while being empathetic to the differential positionings of the partners in the dialogue, thus enabling the participants to arrive at a

different perspective from that of hegemonic tunnel vision” (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 88).

Time and location are important aspects here. As I have worked with intersectionality throughout the years of my masters, I realized that axes of identity are historical, time-related, and dynamic. One should be careful with categorizations. Axes of identity should be approached in terms of locations, or spaces, where time changes the context. Thus, axes are not fixed but dynamic within context. Another concept for this is ‘translocational positionality’, coined by Floya Anthias (Anthias, 2008). Positionality refers to a social position and positioning (the category) and is relative to the context of the location. This aspect of time comes forward in transversal politics as well. However, the factor of time makes it impossible to categorize, because of the acknowledgement that everything is changing and nothing is fixed. In this line of thought, it leads to a postmodernist deconstructionist view and ‘a realization that everyone is different’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 126).

Nevertheless, as Yuval-Davis explains, identity is constructed across differences and thus there are constructions of political ‘units’ or ‘unities’; there are categorizations that make it possible to produce political structures (Yuval-Davis, 1997). With the acknowledgement that these are not fixed but dynamic, these categorizations will be used within my analysis, in relation to political structures. Yuval-Davis clarifies that these units exist of boundaries and if these boundaries are flexible and open, which they should be in transversal politics, exclusionary politics are not permitted (Ibid.). In this case, there is space to create a dialogue.

According to Yuval-Davis, transversal politics is based on three concepts. The first one, which relates to positioning, is viewpoint epistemology: the recognition that each view on the world differs because of a different viewpoint/positioning. Therefore, knowledge based on only one viewpoint is not complete. Yet, at the same time it is not false, as Yuval-Davis stresses (Yuval-Davis, 1999). With this concept Yuval-Davis refers to situated knowledge, coined by Donna Haraway in ‘The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective’ (Haraway, 1988). The concept of situated knowledge underlines the importance of acknowledgement of positioning and not being able to possess a complete ‘truth’: the impossibility of objectivity (Ibid.).

The second important concept is the “encompassment of difference by equality” (Yuval-Davis, 1999): “This means the recognition, on the one hand, that differences are important ... but on the other hand, that notions of difference should encompass, rather than replace, notions of equality” (Yuval-Davis, 1999: 95). She explains here that differences

should be recognized but not be used to create boundaries and be stressed. They should be seen as of equal value to each other without hierarchal positioning. One should include an “acknowledgement of their differential social, economic and political power” (Ibid.).

The third concept is based on “differentiation between positioning, identity and values” (Ibid.). By this she means that even though people belong to the same political group, they can have very different views based on certain axes of identity. This works also the other way around; people with similar axes of identity can belong to very different political groups or social communities. Following from these three concepts, Yuval-Davis emphasizes firstly, that it is important to remain aware of your position, especially when representing a group or community. Secondly, that it is not necessary, within a campaign or aiming to reach a specific goal, to work with members from one specific community or political movement. The main idea is that: “It is the message, not the messenger that counts. ... Each such a ‘messenger’, and each participant in a political dialogue, would bring with them the reflexive knowledge of their own positioning and identity” (Yuval-Davis, 1999: 96).

I will implement this strategy into my thesis, to see whether there could be a dialogue between feminist movements and people, both men and women, in right wing political organizations, who advocate identity politics. Whether there is a ‘space between us’ where a dialogue, or even a feminist intervention could be possible, and what kinds of messages could be possible to discuss or bring into question.

I want to look for this space for a dialogue and points of discussion, throughout my analysis in this chapter. I will go more in-depth on the discourses that are (re)produced by the SD and the PVV. I will analyze how they promote gender equality, and I hope to find a space where a dialogue could take place between the political views of these parties and women’s movements and or organizations. I acknowledge that women’s movements and or organizations are not making use of identity politics like the SD and the PVV. Key to find this space is to look for differences within the PVV program or that of the SD, and not to categorize them as a homogenous group. Therefore, I will thoroughly analyze their statements on gender equality and gender related policies and will relate them in this chapter with several discourses and compare them to each other, to see where and how there might be space within the Netherlands or Sweden to have dialogue on these nationalist views that both parties promote. In chapter three I will relate this concept not to the parties but to the voters. I will reflect on this theoretical approach in the conclusions of my thesis.

In-depth analysis of the promotion of gender equality: producing discourses

In this part I will focus on the main question of the chapter, namely what kind of dominant discourses the promoted notions on gender equality and gender policies (re)produce. To do this, I will further analyze the results of the last chapter and put them in a framework of discourses brought to gender studies by scholars such as Judith Butler, Birte Siim, Jasbir Puar and Nira Yuval-Davis. I will conclude this chapter with one of the leading discourses in the current globalization, specifically ‘the war on terror’. I will argue there that the ideologies and promoted gender policies and gender equality of both parties relate to this discourse. Firstly, I will introduce shortly the term discourse and how I will work with it, and how discourse is connected to power and knowledge.

Stuart Hall explains a discourse as a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way of representing – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic (Hall, 2006: 165). Michel Foucault calls this ‘discursive formation’:

“Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functioning’s, transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation” (Foucault, 1972 [1969]: 38).

With dispersion, Foucault means that the statements within a discourse do not need to be the same, but the relationships and differences between them must be regular and systematic (Foucault in Hall, 2006: 165). These discursive formations have certain rules that set which, for example, objects, statements and concepts are subjected to the particular discourse. This is what Foucault calls rules of formation (Foucault, 1972 [1969]: 38). These rules are produced by practice; discourse is produced by practice: the practice of producing meaning (Hall, 2006: 165).

A set of statements from a discourse, produce a certain knowledge that serves the interest of a particular group. An example could be the discourse of the ‘Orient’³². To be able to define statements within a discourse is a powerful tool, because from these statements

³² The ‘Orient’ is a term coined by Edward Said in his book ‘Orientalism’ which was published in 1978. The Orient is the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. It is also an integral part of European material civilization and culture. (Said, 2006 [1978]: 24)

knowledge is as well produced. On the other hand, to be able to have access to this knowledge also gives a certain power within the discourse. Therefore the relationship between power, knowledge and a discourse could be shown within a triangle in the following order: power, discourse, and knowledge. It should be noted that knowledge, power and discourses are interrelated and there is not one way from having knowledge to getting power and influencing a certain discourse, it is more complex: it is indeed a process, such as Foucault called a discursive formation, that includes many subjects that refer to certain objects, statements, concepts to a particular discourse (Foucault, 1972 [1969]: 38). An important question that should be kept in mind with discourses is the following: who benefits from the particular discourse?

Within the field of gender studies many scholars have made gendersensitive- and postcolonial analyses of current debates on global conflicts and the role of women within nationalism and conflict situations. In these analyses there are some dominant discourses that are reflected upon by several scholars active in gender studies and the postcolonial field. An example is the study on the relation between nationalism and women by Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). In the next part, I will reflect upon the analysis of the SD and the PVV made in chapter one. I will further analyze them along certain dominant discourses that are currently discussed within gender studies. I will end with an in depth analysis on the new shifts within SD and the PVV related to the ‘war on terror’.

Sweden Democrats

In the campaign of the Sweden Democrats, it seems that more traditional family values and gender equality policies are promoted. Within the framework of nationalism, one of the dominant discourses that connects to this portrayal, is the more traditional discourse where women take the role in the family as mothers and housewives and become more active within the private sphere. Although this view is criticized as being too simplistic, for instance, by the political scholar Cas Mudde, I would like to argue that the nationalistic ideology and the gender equality policies that the SD promotes, mostly links to this more traditional discourse.

Firstly, the SD promotes a very binary gender equality policy where people that are not within the binary heteronormative framework are seen as individuals and are excluded. This binary framework is based on the idea of the family, where a woman and a man are the heteronormative couple, with a more traditional ‘general’ view of a family. Gay couples or any other sort of couple or family with different gender-relations are not included in this

heteronormative view. This becomes very clear with the addition of the promotion of family policies on the website of the SD. There it states clearly “we do not consider it to be consistent with children's best to let same-sex couples and polyamorous groups adopt and inseminate and it should be up to the religious congregations themselves to decide whether ceremonies should be extended to other than two people of different sexes”³³ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2015).

Children are also important in these statements. They are included in views on education, family, and in gender equality by the SD. For example, when stating that children should not be part of any form of gender pedagogy (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014:14) or of any “experiment of gender theorists” (Sverigedemokraterna, 2015). Children are included in the view of the heteronormative family and are seen as an important investment in maintaining the Swedish culture and to pass on Swedish heritage. It is therefore not a surprise, that family policies are another key issue for the SD. They campaign for strong, independent families and the safety and well being of ‘our’ children (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 14). This means that it is not only a heteronormative couple, but the couple is also expected to have children and become in that sense ‘a family’. A number of statements within their promotion of family policies withdraw from current Swedish policies in the field of gender equality, for example, from both parents equally taking care of the children. The statements of the SD, therefore, promote more traditional gender-relations.

Another example of this is the withdrawal of gender quota. These obligate companies or political parties to reach a certain percentage of female members. This policy has been contested but also has been seen as productive by different scholars. These gender quota policies have been widely debated, because it showed that only having a ‘certain’ percentage does not mean that anything changes: ‘add women and stir’. Yet, it means that a certain number of women are working actively in a field where they might not have easily access otherwise. The SD wants to put an end to this policy and stop any form of positive discrimination. This will make it harder for women to have access to some of these functions (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 17).

Another example that portrays the promotion of this traditional discourse is the statement “to raise the level of maternity benefit and abolishing all coercion regulation

³³ “Bortsett från att vi inte anser det vara förenligt med barnens bästa att låta samkönade par och polyamorösa grupper adoptera och inseminera samt att det bör vara upp till de religiösa församlingarna själva att avgöra huruvida vigselakten skall utsträckas till att gälla även andra än två människor av olika kön.”

regarding which parent should be at home with the child”³⁴ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014: 14). By raising the maternity benefit and abolishing any regulations on the division of taking care of the child, it might be in more cases beneficial and easier to have the mother taking care of children. This would promote traditional gender-relations where woman are more active in the private sphere and men more active in the public sphere. Also, to live by the traditional gender-relations would become more publicly accepted. Although the SD promotes traditional gender-relations, it will not be likely to change quickly in Sweden, as it is one of the more successful countries in moving away from traditional gender-relations (Oláh, Bernhardt and Goldscheider, 2002: 34).

On the website of the SD, the latest updates on their policies shows an even larger promotion of traditional gender-relations. Firstly, they widely claim to believe that it is in the best interest of the child to grow up with the biological parents, as in mother and father, and are opposed to same-sex parenthood. Secondly, although they argue to support gender equality and equal rights, they claim that men and women have innate differences and complement each other and that they support an individualistic view where everyone can choose their own path in life: “If this then would prove to lead to men and women do not do everything the same way, in exactly the same extent, so we do not consider it as problematic”³⁵(Sverigedemokraterna, 2015). In other words, if an individualistic policy, without positive discrimination or policies specifically on fatherhood or parental leave, would be reinforced, and consequently more women would be active in the private sphere and less in the public sphere, it is ‘not problematic’ but logical because of the ‘differences between men and women’ who “do not do everything the same way” (Ibid.).

These traditional gender-relations where women are more active in the private sphere fit in the more dominant discourse on nationalism, on the role of women where they are mostly approached and symbolized as biological reproducers of the nation (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). However, in more recent research, this discourse has been criticized from outside of gender studies, for being too simplistic (Mudde, 2007). I will go further into

³⁴ “En höjd och avreglerad föräldrapenning. Sverigedemokraterna vill höja nivån på föräldrapenningen och avskaffa all tvångsreglering rörande vem av föräldrarna som skall vara hemma med barnet. Vår övertygelse är att landets föräldrar är bättre lämpade än politiker när det gäller att avgöra vad som är bäst för de egna barnen.”

³⁵ “Vår uppfattning är att det är helt upp till individen att välja sin egen väg i livet. Vi förespråkar en formell jämställdhet där varken kvinnor eller män skall särbehandlas på basis av sin könstillhörighet. Om detta sedan skulle visa sig leda till att män och kvinnor inte gör allting på samma sätt, i exakt samma utsträckning, så betraktar vi inte det som problematiskt.”

this and see in what way the campaign on gender equality by the SD fits in this particular discourse.

The SD promotes a majority of traditional gender-relations where women are more likely going to take care of the children. The only non-traditional statement by the SD on gender equality policies, is fighting for less discrimination against men when it comes to child custody. Within the campaign of the SD the woman is presented as a mother. On the website and in the program are several images and videos depicting young white women with children. One that stands out is the promotional video of the campaign against men's violence against women. It starts with several scenes where a woman is enjoying the family life in a typical Swedish red wooden house and cuddles with her child. This scene stops dramatically with dramatic music and a written text informing on the high rates of men's violence against women. Then it promises more security if you support the SD. This connects to the argument of Anthias and Yuval-Davis where women, as being mothers, biological reproducers and passing on the national culture, have to be protected. In this case, they specifically have to be protected against violence from 'foreigners' (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014, 8th of September). I will discuss this more in depth later.

According to Anthias and Yuval-Davis there are five major tendencies in how women participate in national processes in relation to the state:

“1. As biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities; 2. As reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic or national groups; 3. As participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture; 4. As signifiers of ethnic or national differences, as a focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic or national categories; 5. As participants in national, economic, political and military struggles (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 115).”

Although within the nationalistic ideology, women are not only active as mothers, motherhood is one of the key points here. Women pass on the collective national identity by having children and nurturing the children. In that sense they are providing the nation a future. Therefore, motherhood makes women seen as the biological reproducers of the collective, as well as creating the boundaries of the national collective, and as being responsible for passing on the national identity and its culture. All these tendencies are symbolized in the ideological discourse, for example as the concept of the mother and nation: the nation being a mother

nurturing and caring for her sons that in return will fight for- and defend the nation (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992).

One striking resemblance between the argument of Anthias and Yuval-Davis and the campaign of the SD is on the family policies. Anthias and Yuval-Davis argue that within nationalist ideologies, women are a central subject in the policies concerning family structures: “These include policies directed to the ideological or socialization role of the family and the centrality of women within it; population control to maintain or change existing demographic patterns in favour of the dominant ethnic subject is reproduced, such as marriage rules and the role of the mother in giving birth to national subjects” (Ibid.).

It seems that the statements and campaigns of the SD fit quite well within the argument of Anthias and Yuval-Davis and the more traditional discourse on gender equality and the woman’s role in nationalism. For example, how women are portrayed with children. They are presented as responsible for the ‘cultural and biological’ reproduction and become symbolic signifiers of the nation. However, there are some points such as the focus on men that make this discourse more complex. According to Cas Mudde, who did extensive research on radical right wing parties in Europe, this traditional discourse reduces women completely to motherhood and is too simplistic: it shows a too broad homogenous viewpoint on family policies that does not take all the differences within these parties into account (Mudde, 2007). Mudde provides a division between a ‘traditional’ view and a more ‘traditional modern’ view on the women’s role. In the first view women are reduced to mothers and motherhood. In the second view women can work but are mainly responsible for the home and for the family life (Ibid.).

According to Mudde, other small differences, within this traditional discourse, are how parties relate to feminism and gender equality, their viewpoints on abortion, on the promotion of women’s rights as a strategy to counter the Islam, and in how parties themselves deal with gender with regard to the number of female members within the parties. Empirical research has shown that the rate of female members in radical right wing parties is a little lower than in other political parties, but not a distinctive one. The only striking fact is that most leading female members in radical right wing parties are directly related to male members (Ibid.).

Some statements by the SD fit more to the ‘traditional modern’ view on the women’s role: the party explicitly writes about themselves as a promoter of gender equality, stating that every individual can choose his or her own path and that they promote women to work

fulltime (Sverigedemokraterna, 2015). It also promotes gender equality and women's rights, and has an extensive campaign against men's violence against women. However, this is mostly in relation to 'immigrants who do not share the same values'. Yet, the viewpoints within family policies and on gender equality show a greater focus on the traditional family. The woman is mostly portrayed as a mother, as well as in the video's and the photo material on the website of the SD. The withdrawal of gender quota, for example, could lead to less access to some specifically job area's for women. As a consequence, women could become more active in the private sphere and being more responsible for the family. Here, the SD could be seen more fitting to the 'traditional' view of RRP parties.


These viewpoints of the SD conform to the majority of radical right populist parties that Mudde describes with the more 'traditional view'. The majority of RRP in Europe is against gender quota (Ibid.). However, the argument behind the withdrawal of a gender quota, or positive discrimination in any other case, such as on ethnicity or age, can differ. One female representative of Vlaams Belang, the Belgian RRP, argued that gender quota's are "not necessary because 'we' (women) are not a poor minority and do not need gifts from men" (Mudde, 2007: 94). This argument thus has nothing to do with keeping women away from specific public spaces, although this could be a consequence.

It is therefore quite difficult to categorize the SD in either the 'traditional' or 'traditional modern' section. The specific points that Mudde pointed out where RRP parties differ, show different sides of the SD. On the one hand it promotes a more traditional view but on the other hand it promotes a more traditional modern view on gender equality and the woman's role. For example, in their viewpoint on abortion, the SD fits more in the 'traditional modern' category because they are not against it. In this respect, they differ from many other RRP parties in Europe. Yet, the SD is the only political party in Sweden, who wants to reduce the number of abortions by making it only possible until the 12th week. It is now possible up to the 18th week.

The last point, on female representatives in the SD, is interesting as well. Sweden is one of the countries, globally, with the highest record of women in parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015, April). There is no legal jurisdiction on gender quota, though there are voluntary political party quotas. This means that each political party can decide for herself if she wants a gender quota and what it will entail. For example, the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) has a 50% minimum quota for women on their party list (1993). The Green


Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna) has the same and so has the Social Democratic Party. The Moderate Party (Moderaterna) had the following rule: “Two women and two men shall be placed on the top four positions on the party list for the election to the European Parliament in 2009” (QuotaProject, 2015). Since 1993, the SD has a zipper system, where one sex alternates the other on the party list. Because of these internal regulations, Sweden has a higher percentage of female representatives in parliament. It is, therefore, interesting to see whether there is a difference of female representatives between the SD and other parties and if it is to accordance of the argument of Mudde that there are not a lot of women represented in RRP parties, though not much less than in other parties.

Based on public data from Sveriges Riksdag (Sveriges Riksdag, 2014, 21st of September), I have made two graphics. The first shows the number of seats in the parliament categorized by political party and the number of seats represented by women. The second graphic shows the percentage of female representatives in parliament in comparison with the number of seats that the party represents in total. The second graphic thus shows which party has the highest and the lowest percentage of female representatives according to the seats they have:



Graphic 1: The results are ordered in the highest amount of seats to the lowest amount of seats. The reddish bar shows the amount of seats represented by women of that political party.

Percentage of women in Swedish parliament categorized by political party



Graphic 2: The percentage of female representatives in parliament 2014 in comparison with the number of seats that the party represents in total. The Sweden Democrats has the lowest percentage, giving women less than a quarter of their seats.

The results of these calculations are contradictory to the argument of Mudde. In Sweden, on the contrary, the RRP party SD has the lowest percentage female representatives with quite a large difference in comparison to the other parties. It is the only party that has less than a quarter of the seats filled with female members. Especially, in comparison to Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party (which have the highest amount of seats together with the SD) the SD has a shockingly low percentage of female representatives, with a difference of at least a 24%. The average of female representatives in all of the parties is 41,45%, from which the SD differs with 19% below that amount.

According to these results and the viewpoints discussed before, the SD seems to fit mostly in the ‘traditional’ view on the women’s role and promotes and represents this ‘traditional’ view the most in the party and the campaigns. However, in the policies of the SD it shows that gender is not the main divider but sexuality and ethnicity are. Therefore, Mudde’s division of traditional and traditional modern mainly divided by gender and the role of women seems to be difficult to apply on the SD. The SD supports the idea of women’s liberation: they are allowed to work and to have an abortion. They support the view of women-friendliness in Sweden. This concept represents the Nordic welfare-states as states

based on a “premise of an idea of women’s common and collective interests” (Kantola, 2014: 7). This notion of women-friendly shapes specific national identities. In comparison to other non-Nordic countries these nations regard themselves as women-friendly. This is visible within the viewpoints of the SD in gender equality, where they sometimes seem to be traditional and other times traditional modern:

“On one hand, the party’s ideological core is suspicious of gender equality and its connection with feminism; on the other, gender equality constructed as a Swedish national trait is often seen as a fundamental boundary between ‘us and them’. Swedishness in this context is gender equality as a national characteristic” (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2013: 6).

This is related to the argument of the SD for less discrimination against men when it comes to child-custody. It applies to the viewpoints of the anti-feminist movement called ‘jämställdister’, based on the idea that gender equality has gone too far (Ibid.). This supports the view of the SD of heterosexual couples as harmonic and complementary.

It seems that ethnicity and sexuality are the main dividers. For example, the SD disregards white heterosexual men’s violence against women but specifically focuses on ethnic minorities as the assumed offenders of these crimes. They come from Africa and the Middle-East (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014, 8th of September). Moreover, they are against the adoption of children by LGBT people and approach LGBT people as individuals who ‘need to break’ traditional gender patterns (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014). These points confirm Mudde in that RRP parties do not share all the same traditional views. Also, these points show that within the party there might be traditional and more progressive views at the same time. For the SD this seems to be based on the women-friendliness view of Sweden, which produces some more traditional modern points focused on white heterosexual women and men. Therefore, ethnicity and sexuality seem to be the dividers where the SD becomes more traditional and nationalistic. The clear division of Mudde is thus not directly applicable to the SD and a more intersectional theoretical approach of Anthias and Yuval-Davis gives more insights in this case.

The Party For Freedom

As written in the introduction of this chapter, the PVV promotes its campaign as ‘being a patriot’ and speaks to its voters as ‘patriots’. However, it remains clear that the PVV fits in the nationalistic framework rather than in the patriotism framework. In the patriotism framework

the citizens have some power, for example in constructing the history of their nation or in criticizing their nation. One of the key elements here was the way the PVV portrays the Dutch national history and wants to establish nationalistic elements as part of education, such as the national anthem and the Dutch flag.

Although the PVV fits in the nationalistic framework as a RRP party, it has many important differences with the SD. On first appearance it seems that the PVV fits less likely in the ‘traditional’ discourse where women are mainly represented as mothers and related to motherhood. It seems that the PVV promotes more modern gender-relations and more modern gender equality policies. I will go through several viewpoints of the PVV, again, following the key elements of the nationalistic ‘traditional’ discourse with the arguments of Anthias and Yuval-Davis, and Mudde. This will show differences with the SD as well as differences within the dominant ‘traditional’ discourse.

The five tendencies of how women are represented and active within nationalistic collectivities by Anthias and Yuval-Davis, are applicable to the PVV in another way than to the SD. Firstly, the PVV is much less focused on the family and the role of the woman as being the mother. Those are not key aspects in the campaign and program of the PVV. Women are not mainly seen as the biological reproducers. Regulations about marriage and taking care of children seem to be less important. For example, the PVV does not have a page on gender equality policies or family policies. However, the policies that are related to these topics, do share similarities with the SD and the dominant ‘traditional’ discourse of RRP parties.

A first example of a gender policy related viewpoint of the PVV is the wish to withdraw positive discrimination in national policies as well as the withdrawal of gender quota. The PVV shares this viewpoint with the SD. In the Netherlands, the use of gender quota is less mainstream and known than in Sweden. Although in the Netherlands they have the same system of a voluntary political party quota. It is not known if any party has any quota. It seems that they do not have a precise regulation as some parties do in Sweden. It is said that some parties alternate between men and women on the national lists and also include other factors such as ethnicity (QuotaProject, 2015). Therefore, it seems that the PVV promotes this viewpoint mainly to withdraw positive discrimination of factors such as ethnicity and less likely on gender. Nevertheless, it would mean that women as well as ethnic minorities would have less access to certain job areas.

A second example is the cut of partner alimentionation from twelve to five years. The PVV thinks twelve years is too long to pay your ex-partner after a divorce and wants to cut this down to five years (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012). This is an interesting viewpoint regarding a ‘traditional’ discourse and gender equality policies because the Netherlands is known for its high rate of part time working women. According to research of the Dutch Central Statistics Bureau (CBS), almost half of all the employed women in the Netherlands between the ages of 15 and 64 work part time (Siermann, 2009, 22nd of July). Statistics of the same institute indicate that one out of three married couples end up having a divorce. Two third of these involves families with children where it is most likely that the woman has a part time job. These women will have more financial problems if the partner alimentionation of twelve years is cut to five years and they are stuck with a part time job. Although the PVV is not the only party in the Netherlands promoting this viewpoint, it does however relate to a more ‘traditional’ discourse where couples may end up not having a divorce because of a financial situation. This would be especially the case if one of the partners has a part time job and is, therefore, not financially independent. These are mostly women. Therefore, this viewpoint could have the consequence that women will get less independent. Moreover, a gender equality policy will be withdrawn and gender equality in general will get less. In the end this viewpoint could have the consequence of more traditional families where the woman will stay at home more often than a man.

A third example of a PVV viewpoint that relates to gender equality policies is contradictory to the ‘traditional’ discourse and is related to the campaign of the PVV against ‘Islamification’. It states that the PVV only wants to have child support for a maximum of two children per family. This is in contrast to the ‘traditional’ discourse where RRP parties promote having more children and giving more support to children and home staying mothers. It is also in contrast to the promotion of motherhood in the ‘traditional’ discourse of nationalism. To the contrary, this regulation gives less financial support to the families that wish to have many children. Summarizing, the PVV seems to be more ‘traditional modern’, as Mudde puts it, instead of ‘traditional’, where gender equality is very limited, and women are seen mostly as mothers.

However, there is a very specific gendered focus on women’s and gay’s rights in the campaign of the PVV, that is directly connected to the nationalist framework. The PVV does not promote women so much as mothers or having a traditional family, rather they are promoted as being the role-model of emancipation, in other words “as signifiers of ethnic or

national differences, as a focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic or national categories” (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 115). The women whom the PVV is speaking of in their program are ethnic Dutch women. They mark the boundaries of being a ‘Dutch emancipated woman’ and by that produce the other ‘foreign unemancipated woman’ at the same time. In the case of the PVV, the latter are Muslim women and women from ethnic minorities (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012).

Besides this representation and promotion, Dutch women are also being motivated to participate in the national struggle of maintaining the national Dutch ‘tolerant’ culture and emancipation: “as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles” (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 115). Consequently, women’s rights are being promoted throughout the program in contrast to the status and rights of Islamic and Muslim women, who put “our Dutch emancipation of women’s rights” in danger (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010). A more active women’s role is promoted in which they symbolize the emancipated modern woman and produce a contrasting image to Muslim women. As I have argued earlier, this could lead to the role of white Dutch women as national feminists performing a sort of colonial violence, where ethnic minorities are less worthy and, in this case, who should be emancipated. This relates to a dominant Eurocentric discourse where “... ‘our women’ (Western, Christian, white or ‘whitened’ and raised in the tradition of secular Enlightenment) are already liberated and thus do not need any more social incentives or emancipatory policies and ‘their women’ (non-Western, non-Christian, mostly not white and not whitened, as well as alien to the Enlightenment tradition), however, are still backward and need to be targeted for special emancipatory social actions, or even more belligerent forms of enforced ‘liberation” (Braidotti, 2008: 6).

This discourse is visible in many viewpoints of the PVV on Muslim women who wear the headscarf or the burka. The PVV wants to forbid wearing the burka and wants to put a tax on Muslim women who wear a headscarf (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012). It is classified as being ‘backwards’, ‘not modern’, against ‘women’s rights’ and making women ‘passive’. I will discuss this Eurocentric discourse more extensive in the next part ‘the war on terror’, related to the Islamification discourse. There, I will also discuss viewpoints against immigrants made by the SD. For now, I want to make clear that gender equality and the role of women in the PVV are being promoted quite differently than in the program of the SD, and less ‘traditional’, especially because women seem to have a more active than passive role and

motherhood is mostly absent. All the viewpoints of the PVV, discussed so far, relate more to what Mudde called a ‘traditional modern’ view of nationalism (Mudde, 2007).

A very interesting element in the program of the PVV is the way they promote gay’s rights besides women’s rights. This is in sharp contrast to the SD, which only promotes a traditional family and disapproves of homosexuals having children for instance. Many RRP parties are homophobic and many RRP parties from Catholic and Orthodox countries see homosexuality as “a threat to the survival of the nation” (Mudde, 2007: 68). The Netherlands is an exception in this case. Two RRP parties, in the 1990’s, did not have a clear viewpoint against homosexuality (Mudde, 2007). In the Netherlands, homosexuality has been promoted as part of ‘our Dutch tolerance’ and the Netherlands as a country is seen as a gay-friendly society (Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens, 2010). However, in the Netherlands, and within the nationalistic framework, there has been a shift regarding the viewpoints on homosexuality. In the 1990’s, there have been multiple articles and debates in the media where gay people were portrayed as ‘obsessed with sex’ and having a ‘horrendous lifestyle’ (Ibid.). There were several examples of columns written in national Dutch papers reflecting ‘deep disgust of male-to-male-love’ (Ibid.). Homosexuality seemed far from publicly accepted and part of the Dutch national identity.

Lately, within the framework of nationalism, homosexuality has become more widely accepted and even been included within the national identity that is promoted. An example of this can be found in the PVV, which promotes the voters and ‘patriots’ to fight for gay’s rights. These viewpoints on homosexuality, and the inclusion of these sexualities within nationalist identities are new within the framework of nationalism. However, as scholar Stefan Dudink argues as well, it would be wrong to argue that the framework of nationalist parties have changed and homosexuality is now widely accepted and part of the nation’s identity (Dudink, 2011). On the one hand, homosexuality is not anymore “the self-evidently nation’s Other, and found a place at the heart of definitions of the nation itself” (Dudink, 2011: 260). On the other hand, the discourse in which this shift takes place, are within the old framework of nationalism. A new strong identity of the nation is produced and with that a strong identity of the Other, who should be excluded, is produced as well. In other words: “the move from old to new nationalism is a move within the same old discursive field” (Ibid.).

Dudink refers here to the same old nationalistic discursive field where an axe of identity is included to exclude another certain axe of identity. In this case homosexuality is

publicly defended and seen as part of the national identity, because it is placed in contrast to the Islam. Thus, it is also part of the dominant discourse on ‘Islamification’ in which gay rights are not seen as accepted. What I argue here is that the PVV uses homosexuality and gay’s rights, in the same way as they do with women’s rights and emancipation. Their ‘modern’ viewpoints on these gender issues are primarily aimed to counter the Islam. The Islam is promoted as a threat for gay’s rights and women’s emancipation. Within the program of the PVV this is very clear as it states in one sentence: “We will defend our homosexuals against the rise of Islam”³⁶ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012: 45).

This shift in nationalism is also visible in the national media where, again and again, it is questioned whether imams should adapt to ‘Dutch tolerance’ and embrace homosexuals rights and homosexuality (Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens, 2010). In the 1970’s, the Netherlands gained a reputation as being the most “liberal nation in the world on issues of sexual morality” (Hekma and Duyvendak 2011: 625). Amsterdam was known as a place of sexual freedom and known as the friendliest gay city in Europe. Jan Willem Duyvendak describes this period as the sexual emancipation for women and gay men, who were no longer seen as criminals (Ibid.). In 2000, prostitution was legalized and in 2001, marriage for same-sex couples was realized. In both cases, the Netherlands was the first nation worldwide to do so. From this year on, the legal equality between homosexuality and heterosexuality was nearly equal. However, social equality was far from equal. In the beginning of the 2000’s, the media started to report on violence against LGBT people and related it to ethnic minorities, specifically Muslim minorities (Ibid.) There was shift in the media. Columns written by the same columnists speaking out against homosexuals and portraying them as ‘obsessed with sex’, changed. They started writing columns promoting gay’s rights and speaking out against the Islam, stating for example that ‘Islam is a sickness’ and gay rights were seen as ‘Western gains and ideals’ (Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens, 2010).

The promotion of gay’s rights and sexuality within the program of the PVV and within the discourse of ‘Islamification’ still relates to a heteronormative nationalism. It seems as if the PVV promotes homosexuality and thus would not have a heteronormative view. However, in my view, this is surely the case. As Dudink said before, it is nationalism with the same old discursive frames. Homosexuality could be seen as only a tool within this framework, a tool to promote the national Dutch identity. Scholar Jasbir Puar, specialized on this specific topic,

³⁶ “We verdedigen onze homoseksuelen tegen de oprukkende Islam.”

who made gender sensitive analyses of the tortures in Abu Ghraib prison, calls this shift in nationalism ‘homonationalism’:

“...understanding the complexities of how “acceptance” and “tolerance” for gay and lesbian subjects have become a barometer by which the right to and capacity for national sovereignty is evaluated...homonationalism is an analytic category deployed to understand and historicize how and why a nation’s status as “gay-friendly” has become desirable in the first place” (Puar, 2013: 336).

The conceptual framework of homonationalism was in response of Puar’s frustration with the standard of transnational feminists to approach the nation as heteronormative and the queer as ‘inherently an outlaw in the nation-state’ (Ibid.).

I agree with Puar that within this new shift of nationalism, homosexuality is included. It got a new place, as Dudink writes, and homosexuals can no longer be seen as outlaws. However, I do not agree that this cannot go together with heteronormative nationalism. In my view, the way in which homosexuality is promoted and being used as a tool does not promote any gay rights on a practical level. To the contrary, it represents a quite violent, negative and sexual portrayal of homosexuals and only re-affirms the heteronormative, publicly accepted, normative gender roles as it produces the ‘sexualized’ homosexual, and in contrast the ‘acceptable heteronormative gender-roles. I do agree that this discourse of homonationalism includes LGBT organizations, media, feminist organizations and that “like [the discourse of] modernity, homonationalism can be resisted and re-signified ... *we are all conditioned by it and through it*” (Puar, 2013: 336). I will further discuss this later on, in the chapter on ‘the war on terror’.

The PVV’s promotion of gay’s rights fits within the framework of ‘homonationalism’ and ‘Islamification’ where “the Arab world is relegated, apparently because of “Islam’s troubled relationship to homosexuality”, to the backward realm of acts” (Puar, 2011: 127). In the view of the PVV, the Western world is seen as modern because of its ‘acceptance’ towards homosexuality. My argument that homosexuality is here merely a tool within nationalism is based on the arguments of using punishment, violence and torture related with representations of homosexuality by RRP parties. Puar has written extensively on this topic, on the tortures in the prison Abu Ghraib where U.S. military used sexual torture “specifically violence that purports to mimic sexual acts closely associated with deviant sexuality or sexual excess such as sodomy and oral sex, as well as S/M practices of bondage, leashing and

hooding” (Puar, 2011: 115). Puar states that although some U.S. republican politicians were skeptical that the U.S. guards used specific torture methods particularly offensive to Muslim men, the torture in Abu Ghraib was completely justified from a military security perspective because it was so effective (Puar, 2011). Furthermore:

“The Bush administration claims that the torture was particularly necessary and efficacious for interrogation because of the ban against homosexuality in Islam. That “nakedness, homosexuality and control by a woman might be particularly humiliating in Arab culture” has been a sentiment echoed by many” (Puar, 2011: 125).

As Puar states further on, these statements do presume some static normativity about gender roles and sexuality. She questions whether the acts of torture were specifically and only referential of gay sex, and whether it can be said that homosexuality has been employed as the ‘ultimate tool of degradation’ and a ‘military tactic (Puar, 2011). I would agree with Puar that it is too simplistic to see these acts of torture as only referring to ‘gay sex’. However, the portrayal of the torture, being discussed by politicians, militants and within the media, only refer to it as ‘gay sex’ and homosexuality. Therefore I would argue that the concept of ‘homosexuality’ in this case is used as a tool within homonationalism. Secondly, I would argue that these methods re-affirm heteronormativity within the nation that uses these methods as it portrays a very negative and strictly sexualized form of homosexuality.

The PVV promotes similar strategies as it mentions on page 31 in the program of 2012 that the party:

“would like to see a chain gang [prisoners wearing the same clothes on chains in a line] in the streets of the Netherlands. Working nicely next to the road in a happy pink suit. Because lots of scum is originative from shame cultures, it will have an extra strong effect”³⁷ (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012: 31).

The ‘happy pink suits’ clearly refer to homosexuality. The PVV wants to use this representation of wearing pink clothing, to punish Arabic people. Of course, this is not as extreme as the tortures in Abu Ghraib, but the practice and the thoughts behind it are the same. Sexuality, more explicitly, homosexuality, is used as a ‘tool’ to punish and humiliate Arabic and Muslim people. The PVV uses homosexuality within a negative connotation here. The effect it will have on Dutch homosexuals and the view on homosexuality in general is not

³⁷ “We zien graag de chain gang in het Nederlandse straatbeeld verschijnen. Lekker langs de weg aan het werk in een vrolijk roze pakje. Omdat veel tuig afkomstig is uit schaamtculturen hakt dat er extra in.”

mentioned at all. Also overlooked is the indirect re-affirmation of the clear position of heterosexuals. In this new shift of nationalism, sexuality plays an important role. The PVV is an example of a nationalistic party that uses sexuality as is in this new shift, the discourse of homonationalism. This seems a critical difference with the SD. The PVV seems to be more traditional modern and promoting gay rights. Nevertheless, as argued here, in the end, the PVV promotes traditional heteronormative views just as the SD. This new shift of homonationalism within nationalism seems to fit more to the 'traditional modern' view that Mudde explains. However, these 'new' strategies and the division of views related to ethnicity and sexuality, may make it difficult to categorize the PVV as either traditional or traditional modern. However, the dynamics of these nationalist discourses are in both cases not new. Throughout history and colonial times, violence has been articulated and defended, many times with the portrayal of the necessity to protect women and children (Puar, 2013). In the next part I will explain these new shifts more in relation to the discourse of 'Islamification'. Both parties take part in this discourse.

The growing right wings within Northern Europe and 'the war on terror'

In Northern Europe, during the last years, there has been a rise of RPP parties. Quite new RPP parties got lots of support, such as the Dutch Party For Freedom and the Finnish True Finn Party. Others gained more support in the last elections than years before, such as the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People's Party and the Norwegian Progress Party (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2015; Arter, 2010). In most northern European countries, during the European Parliament elections in 2014, these parties gained support with a program emphasizing on anti-immigration and anti-EU collaboration (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2015). The economical crisis is often used by economics as an explanation of the trend towards nationalistic politics (Ibid.). However, scholars have found different reasons for the recent rise of RPP's, of which not all refer to the economical crisis.

Within this interdisciplinary field of research, combining political science, gender studies, feminist theory and sociology, inequalities based on gender, race, ethnicity and religion start to being analyzed and related more and more within the growing trend of RPP parties. Different research projects from Birte Siim, a professor working within the field of social sciences on equality policies, showed that gender equality has become a key issue within the discourse on integration. RPP parties misuse gender equality against ethnic minority women (Siim and Borchorst, 2010; Meret and Siim, 2013; Siim, 2013). One example that Siim gives is how the Danish People's Party portrayed gendered issues, such as

forced marriages, in such a way that they were able to relate it to integration. By doing so, they legitimized more strict integration policies and immigration control (Ibid.).

At the end of this chapter, I want to reflect on the results of both of the analyses and put them in a broader framework: the discourse of ‘Islamification’, the ‘War on Terror’ and the nationalistic discourse that produces an ‘Other’. I argue this trend is visible throughout Northern Europe in politics and popular media. This broader framework and the discourse of ‘Islamification’ is also the largest similarity between the SD and the PVV. It forms a strategy within their programs. Both of the parties relate many gender equality policies to immigrants, and, more specifically, to the Islam.

Firstly, I will shortly repeat how both parties relate gender equality policies to the Islam and immigrants. Secondly, I will explain further how this relates to the ‘War on Terror’. I will show how the discourse of ‘Islamification’ works and which dynamics influence the discourse and how this relates to the discourse of the ‘Other’.

Within the statements on gender equality of the SD, a clear viewpoint is written on increasing a tightening of penalties and increased efforts against genital mutilation, forced marriages and sexual and honor-related violence (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014). It stands out because there are no other mentions of men’s violence against women, despite the fact that those numbers are quite high in Sweden. The statement is clearly directed to ‘migrant’ women. This example relates to the example that Siim gives of the Danish People’s Party, using its campaign against forced marriages to realize a more strict integration policy. In the campaign against violence towards women of the SD, ‘foreigners’ are seen as the main suspects for the high rate of violence against women. An example of this can be found in a paragraph within the flyer of this campaign on ‘foreign offenders’. There, it is argued that immigrants have higher rates of rape. It is stated there as well that “of course it is not immigrated Norwegians or other similar people” who are these ‘kind of immigrants’³⁸ In the following it is written that the police in Oslo has told the SD that in the last three years all rapes have been committed by non-Westerners: “mainly people originating from Africa and

³⁸ “Förekomsten av denna kulturellt motiverade brottslighet finns det stöd för i statistiken. BRÅ visade exempelvis i sin rapport 2005, Brottslighet bland personer födda i Sverige och i utlandet att gruppen, att ”invandrades barn” som BRÅ kallar dem, förekommer dubbelt så ofta som misstänkta för våldtäkt jämfört med svenskar. Vad gäller gruppen invandrare är dessa fem gånger så ofta misstänkta för våldtäkt än svenskar. Denna statistik är naturligtvis inte helt rättvis och säger inte så mycket eftersom att den klumpar ihop många olika invandrargrupper. Och det är naturligtvis inte invandrade norrmän eller andra liknande folk som står för denna nya kvinnosyn och detta fruktansvärda kvinnovåld” (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014, 8th of September: 21).

the Middle East”³⁹ (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014, 8th of September: 21).

In the same way, the PVV promotes to fight for women’s rights and gender equality in relation to the Islam and Muslims. Throughout the whole campaign and program, the Islam, Muslims, and also other (although less) ethnic minorities such as Eastern Europeans, are blamed to violate women’s and gay’s rights in the Netherlands. It is stated very clearly by both of the parties that cultural and religious practices of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East, related to the Islam, should be stopped and punished juridically, when they are continued within Sweden or the Netherlands (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014; Sverigedemokraterna, 2014, 8th of September) (Partij voor de Vrijheid 2010; Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012). These practices include gender-segregated swimming, the wearing of the headscarf and burqa, gender-segregated places in mosques, etc.

This discourse on ‘Islamification’, meaning that ‘European’ countries are in a transition to become more ‘Islamic’ countries, relates to the discourse of ‘War on Terror’. In the ‘War on Terror’ violent acts are justified in the same paradigms, such as the methods of torture in the Abu Ghraib prison. The paradigm that I mean here are the binaries: Europe – Middle East, modernism – traditionalism, secularism – religion (Islam), democracy – authoritarian (dictatorship), white ‘criminals’ – terrorists. This paradigm has been produced and reproduced within the discourse of the ‘war on terror’. This has led to a growing tension of Islamophobia (Puar, 2013; Asad, 2009). It has existed for a long time, just as the Eurocentric discourse in, for example, colonialism. In West-Europe, terrorism and fundamentalism are automatically connected with the Islam (Young, 2012). Within this discourse, Europe is automatically connected with modernity, secularism, democracy and terrorists are from outside of Europe. The Middle-East is automatically connected with traditionalism (such as ‘traditional’ cultural practices), Islam, authoritarian countries and terrorists. Within this paradigm, women’s rights and emancipation are easily related to ‘modern Europe’ and do not relate to ‘traditional Islamic countries in the Middle-East’. This is the portrayal which is being given in both of the campaigns of the SD and the PVV. A similar shift is visible in the media. In addition, according to several research institutes, in 2003 and 2006, 50% of Dutch citizens seem to express aversion to Islam and 80% believe that the integration of Muslim immigrants failed within the Netherlands (Mepschen, Duyvendak

³⁹ “2009 gick Hanne Kristin Rohde, ledare vid Oslopolisens våldsektion, ut och berättade att samtliga överfallsvåldtäkter i Oslo som kommit polisen till kännedom under de senaste tre åren (2006-2008) hade begåtts av icke-västerlänningar – främst personer med ursprung ifrån Afrika och Mellanöstern.”

and Tonkens, 2010).

Ultimately, it leads to the discourse of ‘Islamification’. Political parties such as SD and PVV are campaigning against it. They claim West-Europe should be protected from the Islam. After 9/11, Wilders became a strong supporter of the U.S. ‘war on terror’ including all its policy measures, such as the opening of Guantánamo Bay and the military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq” (Vossen, 2011: 183). According to Wilders, other countries that should be dealt with are Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran (Ibid.). Due to the wide spread of this discourse, and the public acceptance of this paradigm, it has become easier for politicians, such as Wilders, to express themselves in ways that would have been criticized a lot more, ten, fifteen years ago.

These dynamics of the discourse and the paradigm is useful within nationalism and RRP parties, because it helps to create a very strong national identity. By creating this national identity in contrast to the negative portrayal of ‘Islamic terrorists’ and the ‘traditional’ Islamic practices such as forced marriage or honor-killings, it produces a very negative Other. This Other should then be excluded from society. These type of politics are also called ‘identity politics’ where “individual identity has become equated with collective identity, whereas differences, rather than being acknowledged, have been interpreted by those holding the hegemonic power within the movement [or party] as mainly reflections of different stages of raised consciousness, while the difference between groups is perceived to be the authentic and important one” (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 127).

Identity politics related to the discourse of ‘Islamification’ and ‘war on terror’ are not only visible within RRP parties, but also within feminist movements, such as Femen. Femen is a woman’s movement from Ukraine. It started to work internationally, and within the same paradigm, portraying the Islam as ‘traditional’ and ‘patriarchal’ and promoting secularism.

Conclusion

In this chapter I wanted to answer in what kind of discourses the promoted notions of gender equality, in the SD and PVV, take part. Also, I wanted to answer the question, whether there exists contextual points of interest that could create space for dialogue between certain feminist movements and the RRP parties.

Firstly, I conclude that gender equality policies and policies related to minority groups, including homosexuals, from the SD and the PVV, play a key role within the nationalistic

framework they both use.

Secondly, both SD and PVV are ambivalent within the RRP framework suggested by Mudde. They both have traditional, heteronormative, and traditional modern views. Yet in a different way:

The SD is more traditional modern when it comes to gender policies. For example, in their view on abortion, they are more traditional modern than other RRP parties. This is related to the discourse of 'women-friendliness' in Sweden. With respect to gender equality they have a special focus on men's rights. This aligns with upcoming anti-feminist movements in Sweden. However, it is not specifically gender that is their main divider, but rather ethnicity and sexuality. With regard to these latter issues they are more traditional and heteronormative. For example, minority ethnic men are seen as violent sexual offenders, a threat to Swedish women. White heterosexual men's violence against women is neglected. In addition to that, ethnic minority women, described as 'immigrants', have to be protected from genital mutilation, forced marriages and sexual and honor-related violence (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014). In both cases women are victimized and have to be protected from ethnic men. As in other RRP parties, ethnicity is used within the discourse of Islamification.

The PVV is more traditional modern when it comes to sexuality and women's role in society. They promote gay's rights and an active women's role. They have a less clear position in gender policies than the SD. This fits with the general trend in the Netherlands of less attention for gender policies. Their position with respect to gender equality is more traditional. For example, this can be seen in their viewpoints against gender quota and positive discrimination. I argue that their traditional modern view on sexuality and women's role is secondary. They are subordinate to the primary aim of the PVV: to counter Islamification. These views are promoted as a strategy to exclude Muslims. The views on sexuality also take part in the discourse of homonationalism. The latter two discourses are strongly intertwined. Therefore, I argue that, in the end, the PVV promotes traditional heteronormative views, similar to those of the SD.

In answer to the main question of this chapter, the leading discourses in which the gender related positions of SD and PVV are embedded are: 1: traditional framework of nationalism; 2: Islamification; for the SD: 3: the discourse on 'women-friendliness' in

Sweden; and, for the PVV: 4: the discourse on homonationalism.

My second aim was to find similar points of interest that can create a dialogue between certain feminist movements and RRP parties. I assume that gender equality would be a central point of interest. A decrease of men's violence against women would be a more specified point of interest. This could be a starting point to have a dialogue and discuss the differences between the feminist movements and for example women's members of the SD or the PVV. Another interesting 'space' to have a dialogue would be the focus on LGBT rights and religion. This latter dialogue would open up the different dynamics that sexuality plays within the campaign of the PVV. It could also open up different views of LGBT rights within religion. This could create another discussion than the current discourse of Islamification in the PVV.

Chapter 3: a relation to the voters?

In this chapter I will continue with the results of the last two chapters but from a new perspective, specifically, that of the voters (i.e. supporters) of the PVV and the SD. I aim to answer in what way(s) the representation and promotion of gender equality by the SD and PVV relate to the identity and gender aspects of the voters. I will do this with a categorical complexity intersectional analysis, combining quantitative and qualitative data. This method has not yet been used much within gender studies. Therefore, I will start with a brief introduction to this method in the next part. In this analysis, I will use different axes of identity of the voters. Furthermore, I will collect geographical data. Gender equality will be approached here from a focus on family relations, occupation and education. I will also focus on the role of ethnicity and sexuality in relation to the gender equality policies of the SD and the PVV, since these play an important role. After this analysis, I will put the results in the context with the results of the last two chapters, in what Yuval-Davis calls an intersectional contextual analysis. I will reflect on the use of the method categorical complexity intersectional analysis in the final conclusion of my thesis.

So far, no research has been done on the relationship between the promotion of gender equality and the support of voters of the SD and the PVV. I believe this is important because of the key role gender equality plays in the campaigns of both parties. Empirical research has shown that that women vote far less than men for other European RRP parties (Mudde, 2007). In fact it is one of the only conclusions about the support of all RRP parties within Europe around 2005 (Ibid.). Besides gender, it showed that education and occupation were two important axes of identity in relation to the voters of RRP parties. How this could be related to promoted policies, and specifically to gender equality policies, remains a question. In my analysis, I will start from zero, firstly, collecting data on different axes of identity of voters of the SD and the PVV.

Categorical complexity intersectional analysis

Leslie McCall coins the method of a categorical complexity intersectional analysis in her article ‘The Complexity of Intersectionality’ (McCall, 2005). Throughout this article she writes about one of the issues with intersectionality⁴⁰ as a method in feminist research.

⁴⁰ Intersectional theory focuses on the unique location of someone’s axes of identity and how they are interconnected, which means that they are simultaneously constructed and related; they construct each other (Wekker and Lutz, 2001). This means that it is not possible to only speak of race or gender, an identity exists of more social divisions that influence each other: “Thus gender is always racialized and race is always gendered”

Specifically, she writes on how to work with categories of axes of identity without reproducing existing power structures and invisibilities. She divides three different methods of using intersectionality.

The first one is called the anticategorical approach: a methodology that deconstructs analytical categories (McCall, 2005). This approach is highly theoretical and philosophical. Categories are deconstructed throughout language, symbols and semiotics. This method is used mainly to deconstruct categories and reveal existing power structures. My criticism here is that this method works mostly with theory and not with quantitative data and that the outcome is always deconstructed. This makes it very difficult to have a more in-depth analysis by making use of the same categories as the ones, which are deconstructed.

The second method that McCall coins is called the intracategorical approach. It also has a weakness; it only focuses on one intersection: “the primary subject of analysis was typically either a single social group at a neglected point of intersection of multiple master categories or a particular social setting or ideological construction, or both” (McCall, 2005: 1780). This method relates to identity politics, where a single person, single ideology or a single identity represents a collective. It also relates to what Yuval-Davis calls ‘triple oppression’. There an identity is analyzed focusing on only one axe of identity. This concept means that several axes of identity are ‘pilled up’ on each other, which leads to multiple oppressions. Yuval-Davis argues that there is no such thing as suffering from oppression ‘as Black’, ‘as a woman’ and ‘as a working-class person’ (Yuval- Davis, 2006). Instead of that, these axes of identity are interconnected. They create a certain oppression all together and cannot be divided from each other.

The last method that McCall explains is the categorical complexity intersectional analysis, which she also calls the ‘categorical approach’ (McCall, 2005). This method works with quantitative data. It is not often used within feminist studies. It is often criticized for presenting ‘objective’ data without any context or positioning of the academic researcher that is responsible for the data, without presenting ‘situated knowledge’: as if the data were neutral (Haraway, 1988). Another point of criticism is the use of categories within this approach. These could reproduce power structures and reproduce invisibilities of the dynamics behind certain categories. McCall reflects on this point as follows: “If structural relationships are the focus of analysis, rather than the underlying assumption or context of the analysis,

(Anthias, 2008: 13). Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term ‘intersectionality’ in 1989 (Crenshaw, 1989).

categorization is inevitable” (McCall, 2005: 1786). I agree with this point. It is impossible to do an intersectional analysis without any categorization. However, the question is how to take responsibility for them? Throughout my analysis, I will use certain categories that are related to the documents I have analyzed of the SD and the PVV. These categories that are used are derived from public databases of the governmental institutions. I will clarify each category within the analysis by stating where it comes from and how the database refers to it.

Within a categorical approach, a comparative study is one of the most important points. That is why it is also very applicable to my thesis. I already have the starting point of comparing the SD and the PVV throughout my thesis. A simplistic example of a categorical approach works like this:

“The incorporation of gender as an analytical category into such an analysis assumes that two groups will be compared systematically—men and women. If the category of class is incorporated, then gender must be cross-classified with class, which is composed (for simplicity) of three categories (working, middle, and upper), thus creating six groups. If race-ethnicity is incorporated into the analysis, and it consists of only two groups, then the number of groups expands to twelve” (McCall, 2005: 1786).

As the example shows, it is quite easy to produce a long and complex analysis within a categorical approach. Therefore, McCall argues, it is not a popular method. Many academic researches focus only on one category within a single group (McCall, 2005). As she further explains, it is “not the intersection of race, class, and gender in a single social group that is of interest but the relationships among the social groups defined by the entire set of groups constituting each category” (McCall, 2005: 1787).

However, I do think it is difficult to analyze the relationships among ‘the social groups defined by the entire set of groups constituting each category’ solely on the basis of quantitative data. Therefore, the categorical approach will be a follow-up on results from my analysis in chapter two. It will be followed by a more in-depth intersectional contextual analysis, a method coined by Nira Yuval-Davis (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Combining these two methods and quantitative and qualitative data, I want to answer the questions on the relations between the voters and the promotion of gender equality of the SD and the PVV in Sweden and the Netherlands. I will also include the historical context and the acknowledgement of time and change. In this way I want to prevent to reproduce static categories that reproduce certain generalizations and power structures and I challenge the theory of intersectionality by


using categories and quantitative data.

I will start both of the analyses and the presentation of my findings of the data with how I gathered the data and explain the choices I made. Firstly, I will present the data. Afterwards, I will analyze the data and see if there are any correlations to the promotion campaigns of the SD and the PVV. As a final part of this chapter, I will compare them.


Voters for the Sweden Democrats

The SD currently has 49 seats in the Swedish Riksdag (which consist of 349 seats). In the last national election in 2014, they won 12.9% of the votes, which made them the third largest party in Sweden. Before I will begin collecting material on the voters, I will first do an analysis on where most of the voters of the SD live geographically. From there, I will continue with a more in-depth analysis on the voters and several axes of identity. Because these analyses get complex quite easily, I will only use data on the general elections for the Riksdag from 2014 and 2010.

The first data I present are the percentage of votes per municipality for the SD throughout Sweden in 2010 and 2014. Take into account that in some municipalities the SD has won a lot more votes than other. The data are calculated in relation to the voters in total in each municipality. Therefore, I will use the percentages per municipality. Doing so, it will produce a clear picture of the municipalities where the SD has a lot of support in relation to



1) SD Percentages in 2010, general elections




2) SD Percentages in 2014, general elections


the citizens living there. My calculations and findings are based on the elections results from the open database Swedish Election Authority⁴¹. All the results of the Swedish elections are published there. Throughout Sweden, in 2010 as well as in 2014, the highest percentages of votes to the SD were in the central and south part of the country:

It seems like there are almost no differences in percentages per municipality on votes for the SD between 2010 and 2014. It also looks like southern regions in Sweden have higher percentages than the central and northern part. When these dataset graphics are zoomed into, the differences still turn out to be minimal:

These datasets that I have analyzed, only show that in some regions the percentage has gone up, for example in the eastern part of Sweden. This is in line with the higher outcome for the SD in 2014, because in 2010 the SD won only 5.7% of the votes at the general elections. A large shift from votes from one region to another is not visible. It seems that the SD is mostly popular in southern parts of Sweden. Divided by counties, the two counties, with by far the highest percentages of votes to the SD, are Skåne and Blekinge. This is the case both in 2014 and in 2010. It should be noted that the party leader Jimmie Åkesson was born in Skåne and grew up in Blekinge. Therefore, it can be that he and the SD are more popular in



3) SD Percentages in 2010, general elections




4) SD Percentages in 2014, general elections

⁴¹ You can find the online archive and database here: <http://www.val.se>

those regions. The two counties where the percentage of votes for the SD grew the most are also within the counties top five with already the highest percentage of votes for the SD, namely: Skåne and Dalarna.

The counties with the lowest amount of percentage of votes for the SD were also the ones with the lowest difference between 2010 and 2014. These counties are: Stockholm, Västerbotten, Gotland and Göteborg. The results of these comparisons can be seen on the next page in the graph. I will now continue to do a categorical approach within the top five counties with the highest percentage of votes for the SD. These counties are Skåne, Blekinge, Dalarna, Gävleborg and Kronoberg.



To gather more information for the categorical approach, I want to specify the theme's related to the quantitative data. However, I am also limited by the data I gathered from the public

database that I use, called Statistics Sweden (Statistics Sweden, 2015)⁴². The categorizations that are used are based on the categorizations made by this database. I will clarify each category and clarify the choices I made in presenting the data. The theme's I choose to present with the data on these counties are the following: population in general, family, education and occupation.

McCall already stated that the categorical approach is not used much within social scientific research, because of the size and significance of each element. Therefore, there are divisions in specialties on gender, race and class with little overlap (McCall, 2005). This also comes forward in the data from the current database. Yet, I will analyze them in an intersectional way, trying to close that gap. Because of the size of the tables with the data, all of them will be included fully in the annex. Here, I will only show some shortened examples to clarify the use and the categorizations of the tables. The numbers of the annex comprising the fully published table, will be included in a footnote with every example that is given.

Datasets on population

Firstly, I will present data on the population in general in Skåne, Blekinge, Dalarna, Gävleborg and Kronoberg. I will try to relate this to the axes of identity that play a key role within the policies of the SD: gender, ethnicity and sexuality. However, the latter is difficult to analyze from these datasets because sexual orientation is not included as a categorization. Therefore, I will elaborate on the role of sexuality and how it might be related to these datasets in the analysis. The first category, which will be taken into account for all the data, is the geographical differentiation; i.e. by the five counties that I have just mentioned. In the first presentation of the data, in the theme of population in general, I will present the average age, divided by sex, time and region (the five counties)⁴³. Sex in this case means the binary of sexes, men and women. This categorization is produced by Sweden Statistics. The timespan covers the years 2013 and 2014. I have chosen these years because they are most recent and therefore, relate closest to the new program and support in the elections of 2014. The average age of Swedish men is 40.2 years in 2013, and 40.3 years in 2014. Most of the five counties have a similar average except Blekinge, Dalarna and Gävleborg. In these three counties average age is higher; around 42 years for men and 44 years for women.

⁴² Statistics Sweden is an administrative agency. They supply statistics for decision-making, debate and research. The Swedish government and different institutions mainly give projects and assignments to Statistics Sweden. For more information: <http://www.scb.se>

⁴³ See annex 1.

The second dataset, for the years 2013 and 2014, and in the theme of population in general, is on the citizens of the five counties divided by having a foreign or Swedish background. It further comprises eight age groups, sex and time. All of these categorizations, except time, are produced by Sweden Statistics. The definition of having a foreign background is the following:

“Persons who have foreign backgrounds are defined as persons who are foreign born, or born in Sweden with foreign born parents. Persons with Swedish background are defined as persons who are Swedish born with two Swedish born parents or Swedish born with one Swedish born parent and one foreign born parent (Statistics Sweden, 2015).”

The eight age groups are 0-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 and 65+. These are then divided by the sexes, again the binary sex division of men and women. And as a last division there is the timespan of 2013 and 2014, chosen to present the current situation in relation to the election of 2014. Here is a short example of what this table looks like⁴⁴:

Number of persons by region, foreign/Swedish background, age, sex and year

Region	Background	Age	Sex	2013	2014
Kronoberg	foreign	0-4 years	men	1229	1375
Kronoberg	foreign	0-4 years	women	1187	1259
Kronoberg	foreign	5-14 years	men	2305	2565
Kronoberg	foreign	5-14 years	women	2229	2455

This table shows the numbers of foreign and Swedish people divided by each region, by sex and age groups in 2013 and 2014. In general all people with a foreign background are minorities. The majority of the people have a Swedish background. Of the five counties in the analysis, the one where the most people with a foreign background live is Skåne. This holds, especially, for the age group of 25-34 years old and in both sexes. These findings might correlate to the campaign and gender equality policies of the SD, which focus on ethnicity and immigrants. For example, their campaign on the safety of Swedish women, where they accuse immigrant men from Africa and the Middle East of sexual violence (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014, 8th of September) might attract voters in Skåne, where the percentage of people with a foreign background was highest.

Besides Skåne in all other four counties, people with a foreign background, despite sex

⁴⁴ See annex 4.

people are of a Swedish background and 45 + of age. How these high percentages of elderly people relate to the focus on ethnicity by the SD would be an interesting question to answer in follow-up research. I will elaborate a little on this in the following analysis.

A second finding in the database divided on age and sex within the group of people with a Swedish background is that the age groups of 15-24, 25-34 and 35-44 all have a higher percentage of men than women. This is the case in all five of the counties. Sometimes, the difference is small (0,5%), but sometimes the difference is quite large (up to 2,5%). It does not seem to be such a big difference, but it occurs within all the counties within all the younger age groups. The difference between women and men with a foreign background from that same age group is not that large, 3036 men in Kronoberg and 3055 women. Thus, the larger difference is the difference between having a Swedish or a foreign background. This data could confirm the finding of Mudde, that men vote more than women on RRP parties (Mudde, 2007). It could mean that the higher percentage of Swedish men in these five counties relates to the higher percentage of men voting for the SD. However, I do not have the data on voting results divided by sex, ethnicity and age and therefore cannot support Mudde's point of view in a definite way.

Datasets on family

I will now continue with the presentation of data on the theme family. I will try to relate this to the policies of the SD on family and the traditional gender-patterns they promote. This theme contains of three datasets: on the status of marriage, on the number of children and the numbers of births with the age of the mothers. All three of them are divided as well in the categorizations of age, sex and region. Some of them have more categories, which I will clarify per dataset. The first one is on the number of children and young persons in percentage, by region, sex, age, family type, foreign or Swedish background, and year. The regions I have chosen are the five counties. The sex again consists of two: boys and girls. I have chosen for the total age group: 0-21 years, instead of the other one that was also published, i.e. 0-17 years. The category family type has three options: living with biological (or adoptive) parents, living with one biological (or adoptive) parent and one stepparent and living with single parents. This classification is based on the data from the population register of Statistics Sweden. The classification makes some exclusions and therefore the percentages in this data can only be seen as an estimation.⁴⁵ The categorization of having a Swedish

⁴⁵ Statistics Sweden acknowledges that in these classifications cohabitants without joint children are misclassified as single parents (Statistics Sweden, 2015). Therefore the number children/families with cohabiting

background or foreign is the same as in the last dataset.⁴⁶ The year I choose is 2013, which was the most recent dataset. Therefore, it relates the most to the current program and campaign of the SD. In the example⁴⁷ below, the number of percentages on the right is a hundred percent divided by sex. This means that all the different groups of boys in Kronoberg together are a hundred percent.

Region	Sex	Age group	Family type	Background	2013
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	foreign background	15,4
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	swedish background	61,4
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological parent and one step parent	foreign background	1,1
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological parent and one step parent	swedish background	3,6
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	single parents	foreign background	4,4
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	single parents	swedish background	14,1

Excerpt out of the full table: Children and young persons in percent by region, sex, age, family type, foreign/Swedish background and year (2013).

The first finding in this dataset is that the division by sex does not really make any difference, the differences are very minimal (0,2% maximally) between boys and girls. Taking into account, that these numbers are estimations because some children are excluded, these small differences have no meaning. Over all family types, children with a foreign background were a minority in all the counties. Skåne had the highest percentage with 25% of children with a foreign background. In Dalarna this percentage was the lowest, namely 12,9%. The average of percentage of children with foreign backgrounds in these five counties was 17,5%. As for the division by sex, where the differences were meaningless, it also seems that the division of children with a foreign background or a Swedish background over different family types is very similar. Therefore, this divider can also be neglected. For example, in Skåne the division of family types of children with a foreign background is as follows: 72% living with biological parents, 23% living with single parents and 5% living with one biological parent and a stepparent. For children with a Swedish background in Skåne it is almost the same: 74% living with biological parents, 21% living with a single parent and 5% living with a biological parent and a stepparent.

Thus, it seems that the category of family types is the most important division in this dataset. In all five counties the family type of a child with two biological parents is the majority, where Kronoberg has the highest percentage (78%) and Gävleborg (67%) the

parents are underestimated while the number of children/families with a single parent are overestimated. Secondly children not living at home, or living with other persons than the parents or in the age of 0-15 that incorrectly have been classified as living with single parents, are excluded from the data.

⁴⁶ Foreign background: children born abroad and children born in Sweden with both parents born abroad. Swedish background: children born in Sweden with one or both parents born in Sweden.

⁴⁷ See full table in annex 5.

lowest. The second family type is the child with single parents, where Gävleborg has the highest percentage (29%) and Kronoberg the lowest (18%). The family type of a child with one biological parent and a stepparent is the minority in all five counties with an average percentage of 6%. This data might relate to the promotion of the SD of traditional gender-patterns with traditional families. However, these data include homosexual couples. These would not fit in with the traditional gender-pattern as promoted by the SD. These data could relate to the view of the SD that it is best for children to grow up with both of the parents (Sverigedemokraterna, 2015), considering the low percentage of family types with single parents.

The second dataset⁴⁸ I am using for the theme family is the number of people in 2014 that got married, divorced or became widowers/widow. This is one of the categories, the others ones are: the five counties, fifteen age-groups from 19 years to 85+, and the binary sexes, men and women. Registered partnerships (same-sex couples) are included within this dataset. The Sweden Statistics from 2009 on does not make any difference between registered partnerships and ‘heteronormative’ marital status. This dataset was quite large. Therefore, I have selected the twenty largest changes based on the percentage in 2014. The percentages were calculated with regard to the total population in each county. In all the five counties, in the last year, there has been an increase in widowers from the age of 70. These were mostly women. The people that got married range from 20 to 49 years old, those having a divorce range from 35 to 49 years old, in all the five counties.

In the case of sex, women get married younger and get a divorce on a younger age than men and/or they get married/or divorced with men that mostly are around five years older. Possibly however, this difference is partly attributable to same-sex couples. However, men pass away earlier, while mostly only women are left as widower. Only in Dalarna there was this year a significant number of men becoming widow. In four counties, the largest change of marital status was found for elderly women that became widower. Only in Gävleborg a peculiar change in the last year was found in that a high percentage of men got married and had a divorce. This percentage was higher than that of women who became widower, or got married, or had a divorce. Gävleborg is exceptional in this case. In all the other four counties, women of all ages who got married or divorced, have a higher percentage than men. To conclude with, in all five counties, men and women getting a divorce form a

⁴⁸ See table in annex 6.

group with a lower percentage than that of men and women getting married. Next to the results of family types, this result could support the relation to the promotion of traditional gender-patterns by the SD in their campaign and in their gender equality policies. However, homosexual couples are included in these datasets. Therefore, the percentages of heterosexual couples fitting in the promoted traditional gender-pattern might be a bit lower than these datasets suggest.

The last dataset⁴⁹ within the theme family is on the age of both men and women of having a child, divided by region, age (in the range from -14 to +49) and time (2013 and 2014). One of the findings, here, is that the differences over the five counties are not large. The numbers come quite close to each other. The largest age-group (both sexes) is approximately 30 years old when they have a child in 2014. Kronoberg has the highest age here, with 32 years for both women and men. Blekinge has the youngest age here, with 28 years old for both women and men. The amount of teenage parents, below 20 years old, is quite similar as well in the five counties. In Dalarna the percentage of teenage parents compared to the total amount of parents in Dalarna in 2014, is the highest. Men of 19 years old form the largest group, followed by 20 years old men. Skåne has the highest amount of teenage parents. The percentage of the total number of people becoming parents in Skåne is smaller than other counties. In all of the counties, teenage parents, as well as 40+ parents, are minorities. The majority, in 2014, had children within the age range of 23 – 38 years.

Datasets on education

Data on education divided per county were not available, only online via Statistics Sweden in their visualization tool. Therefore, it was not possible to create a table. This hampered the categorical approach. The available visualization shows the percentage, divided by sex (men/women), of high-educated persons and low-educated persons.⁵⁰ One finding, here, is that women, overall, are very high-educated. The difference with the percentage of high-educated men is quite a large.. However, this finding is not specific for these five counties. It was shown throughout Sweden with similar differences. However, this finding could relate to the view of Sweden as women-friendly, and, consequently, be nourishing to anti-feminist movements. I will elaborate on this in the upcoming analysis.

⁴⁹ See annex 7.

⁵⁰ See annex 2.

Datasets on occupation

The last theme, occupation, will provide the final detailed information on the counties. I will relate this dataset to the traditional gender-patterns the SD promotes with some additional context in the upcoming analysis. The spreadsheet of this dataset is very extensive and therefore cannot be included in total in the annex. Only one county is presented there.⁵¹ This is because of the wide range of occupation groups in the categorization, and the wide range of age-groups (16-24 to 60-64), each of which is divided by sex (men/women). Statistics Sweden advised to be cautious with comparisons between years. Therefore, I have only chosen the year 2014. Ordered by the number of persons, and divided by sex and age, it seems that the data is not truly specific. The categorization ‘occupations unidentifiable’ is amongst some of the largest numbers in all five of the counties. Excluding this categorization, I have made a selection of the 25 largest occupations groups divided by age and sex.

In all of the five counties, the occupation area ‘Personal care and related workers’ got the highest numbers of persons in 2014. These are only women in the age-groups of 16-24 up to that of 60-64 years. In Gävleborg, most men are working in ‘Physical and engineering science technicians’, ‘Shop and stall salespersons and demonstrators’ and ‘Building frame and related trades workers’. In Dalarna, this is exactly the same. In Skåne, most men are working in ‘Shop and stall salespersons and demonstrators’, ‘Finance and sales associate professionals’ and ‘Computing professionals’. In Blekinge, most men are working as ‘Physical and engineering science technicians’, ‘Other machine operators and assemblers’ and ‘Building finishers and related trades workers’. In Kronoberg, most men are working in ‘Finance and sales associate professionals’, ‘Shop and stall salespersons and demonstrators’ and ‘Physical and engineering science technicians’. Especially the younger age-group (16-24 years) of men works in ‘Shop and stall salespersons and demonstrators’. The older age-group (45-49 years) men are mainly working in the area ‘Physical and engineering science technicians’.

Besides the occupation area ‘Shop and stall salespersons and demonstrators’, all the other area’s of occupation are very much gender segregated. This was the case in all five counties. Men are dominant in finance, engineering and computer area’s. Women are dominant in personal care and related, pre-primary education and shops/restaurants. Thus it seems that men have a more successful career in areas that require a higher education, despite

⁵¹ See annex 8.

of the higher number of high-educated women. I will continue on occupation in relation to the gender equality policies of the SD with some additional context in the following analysis. This might show a relation between this dataset and the promoted gender-patterns of the SD.

Before analyzing these datasets within a more theoretical context, I will continue with presenting data on the voters for the PVV.

Voters for The Party For Freedom

Currently, the PVV has 12 seats⁵² of the 150 in the House of Representatives of the Dutch parliament. In 2012, during the latest national elections, the PVV won 10,08% (15 seats) of the votes. This is less than two years before in 2010. Then, the PVV won 15,45% (24 seats) of the votes. Nevertheless, in both years, the PVV turned out as the third largest party in the country by votes. The five counties where the PVV won the most votes have remained the same since 2010.⁵³ These five counties are Limburg, Flevoland, Zuid-Holland, Noord-Brabant and Zeeland. It should be noted that the party leader Geert Wilders was born in Limburg. Therefore it can be that he, and the PVV, is more popular in that county. In all of these five counties, the votes have dropped with almost a quarter from the percentage in 2010. Although the votes drop, also within the election for the European Parliament, the PVV is still one of the three largest parties.⁵⁴ I will focus with my analysis on these five counties. Further, I will focus on the same themes as in my analysis of the SD, i.e.: population in general, family, education and occupation. I will use statistics from the Dutch public database from the Central Bureau of Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, 2015)⁵⁵.

Datasets on population

Firstly, I will start with the theme population. I will relate the findings of this dataset to the role of ethnicity in the campaign of the PVV and the promoted gender relations of the PVV in the analysis. The divisions in this dataset are: regions (the five counties) and time (2011 and 2012, because they are most close to the elections). Sadly, the data provided by the CBS are not intersectional. The chosen categories age, sex (men/women) and more, do not divide each other but are additive to each other. Assuming that the divisions of sex and age are not equal (fifty, fifty), I cannot make any specific intersectional calculations with this data.

⁵² Because of several break-ups between members in the PVV, the PVV has only 12 seats left from the 15 they won in the last elections (Parlement en Politiek, 2015).


⁵³ See annex 3.

⁵⁴ These results are all based on the data provided by the Kiesraad, the Dutch central election office (Kiesraad, 2012).

⁵⁵ The Central Commission for Statistics (CCS) is an independent administrative body and provides the statistical information of the Dutch empire (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, 2015).

The categorical approach here is, therefore, limited to the three divisions: regions, time and the selected category.

The first division is sex, which, in the CBS public database, is also binary (men/women). In all five counties, this is almost exactly fifty/fifty in 2012. The second division is age with nine age-groups starting at younger than 5 years, up to 80 years and older. In Zeeland, Limburg and Noord-Brabant the largest age-group is 45-65 years old. All of these three have higher percentages, than the national percentage for that age-group (28%). In Flevoland and Zuid-Holland this is the second largest age-group after that of 25-45 years old. Especially in Limburg, the older age-groups are the majority, half of the there is older than 45 years. These findings are comparable to the findings on age in the datasets of Sweden. A question here could be what the relation of age is to the campaigns and the promoted gender equality policies of the SD and the PVV? This will be further discussed in the analysis.



The percentages of age-groups in Limburg, 2012. Calculated in regard to the total population in Limburg in 2012. One finding is that Limburg has a lot of elderly people.

The third division is marital status. In all five counties, the difference between married and not-married is very small. Both categories are around 44% of the population. Also, the percentage of divorce and widow(ers) is almost similar in all five counties. Flevoland has the lowest percentage (3,3%) of widow(ers) and Limburg has the highest (6,3%). Zuid-Holland has the highest percentage of divorce (7,6%) and Noord-Brabant (6,6%) has the lowest. The small difference between married and not-married status could mean that formal marriage is

less important in these counties. However, because of these datasets not being intersectional, it could also mean that the population has a high percentage of young people, who are not yet married .


The fourth division is the categorization of ethnic Dutch people and ethnic minorities (which are called ‘allochtoon’ by the CBS⁵⁶). This categorization is problematic, especially the division within the category of ‘allochtoon’, where there is the choice of ‘western allochtonen’, meaning western white immigrants, ‘Moroccan’s’, ‘former Dutch-Antillen and Aruba’, ‘Surinam’, ‘Turkey’ and ‘other non-western allochtonen’. Because I do not want to reproduce the problematic racial division within the concept of ‘allochtonen’, I have chosen to work only with the total amount of immigrants and the total amount of people with a Dutch nationality. The range is from 85% of people with a Dutch nationality (Zeeland) to 71% of people with a Dutch nationality (Zuid-Holland). This means that in all five counties people with a Dutch nationality are the majority. This majority comprises approximately three quarters of the population. This result is similar to that on ethnicity in the Swedish five counties. Again, this could show the importance of ethnicity within the campaigns of the SD and the PVV. I will elaborate on this in the analysis.

Datasets on family

I will now continue to present data on the theme family. This will be related to the traditional modern gender relations that the PVV promotes. These datasets, combined with the others, shows the variation of family types, age and education living in these counties. This could relate to the ambivalent positions of the PVV in family policies and the more traditional modern gender patterns. I will discuss this in detail in the analysis. Again these datasets are not divided by several categorizations, only by region and time and one category. The first dataset is on the type of living: one-person family, family without children and family with children. In 2012, in Flevoland, the percentage of families with children is the highest (43%) and in Limburg (32%) and Zeeland (32%) the percentage of families with children is the lowest. Zeeland and Limburg have the highest percentages (33%) of families without children in both years (2011 and 2012), while Flevoland and Zuid-Holland (both 26,5%) have the lowest. In Zuid-Holland the percentage of single person families is the highest (38%), followed by Limburg and Zeeland.

⁵⁶ ‘Allochtoon’ is a problematic concept for ethnic minorities in the Netherlands because it points to racial differences (Wekker and Lutz, 2001). An ‘allochtoon’ refers to a colored immigrant where as an immigrant from Germany would not be referred to so quickly as being an ‘allochtoon’ because the person would be white.

The second dataset, divided by region and time (2011 and 2012), contains data about the relative growing rate of the population⁵⁷. In the Netherlands, the average relative growing rate of the population is 2,9%. Flevoland has a high growth rate of 7,4%, followed by Zuid-Holland with 3,2%. Zeeland and Limburg have a growth rate below zero, with -0,9% and -1,1%. This means that the population is not growing but decreasing.



Percentage per family type (divided by three types) in the five counties, sorted on the percentage of families with children.

Datasets on education

I will now continue with presenting one dataset on education. The first one on education is divided by region (five counties), time (2011, 2012) and three categories of education (graduates in numbers of lower education, higher education and masters degree/doctorate). The five counties will be compared with respect to the number of graduates on the national level. The differentiation over the three categories of education is similar in these counties. In 2012, Zuid-Holland has the highest percentage of graduates at all three levels (all approximately 20%). Within the province, the highest percentage is of the category

⁵⁷ This is the relative growing rate in the population per 1000 persons per year in percent including the birth and death rate, calculated by the CBS (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2015).

graduate masters/doctorate. With an approximate 10% difference Noord-Brabant follows. The three lowest levels are found in Limburg, Flevoland and Zeeland. Flevoland and Zeeland are both below 5% in all the three categories of education. These outcomes are related to whether there are universities and education possibilities. In Flevoland and Zeeland there are no universities. However, it is interesting that there are such large differences between the counties. These differences seem to correlate with the percentages of votes for the PVV. This differs from the results on education in Sweden, where the counties have quite similar percentages. Data that would offer more insight into this, would be voting results categorized by education. This might further support the idea that the more ambivalent promotion of gender-patterns, leads to a more varied group of voters.

Datasets on occupation

The last dataset is on occupation. This dataset is divided by region (five counties) and time (2012) and categorized by four occupation areas. The latter are: 1: agriculture, forestry and fishing, 2: industry and energy, 3: commercial services and 4: non-commercial services. Related to the total amount of jobs in each county, I have calculated the percentages instead of the numbers divided by each category of occupation area. Commercial services are by far the category with the highest percentage of employees. Agriculture, forestry and fishing has the lowest percentages of all the categories in all the five counties. Non-commercial services are the most stable in all five counties, with approximately 30% of employees. The category of industry and energy shows the highest differences between the counties: Zeeland, Noord-Brabant and Limburg have an average of 19% of employees in this category. In Zuid-Holland and Flevoland this amounts to only 12%. It would be interesting here to have more categorizations, such as sex and, for instance, people with a foreign background (or immigrants). These categorizations could show if there are clear segregations between men and women and Dutch people and immigrants.

The datasets from the CBS were not intersectional and with different categorizations, and, therefore, limited. Thus, I have to finish the presentation with this dataset on occupation in the five counties in the Netherlands. From here, an analysis will follow on both of the presentations of the data and how they relate to the promotion of gender equality of the SD and the PVV. Afterwards, I will compare the findings on the data of the SD and the PVV. A reflection on the categorical approach will be included in the final conclusion of the thesis.

Intersectional contextual analysis

In this part, both the data presentations on the voters of the SD and the PVV will be contextualized in an intersectional contextual analysis (Yuval-Davis, 2006). The findings will be summarized and presented in a larger context. The relation of the voter population to the policies of gender equality of the SD and PVV will be analyzed and discussed.

After the municipality elections in 2010 in the Netherlands, Wouter van Gent and Sako Musterd, two researchers active in the area of social geography and development, did research on the campaign of the PVV. Specifically, they searched for correlation of the data with the living area of voters of the PVV in The Hague. They summarized three theses of Van der Brug and Fennema (2009), which explain the voting for ‘radical’ or ‘anti-immigrant’ parties. These are the ‘ethnic-composition thesis’, the ‘social-isolation thesis’ and the protest-vote thesis’ (Van Gent and Musterd, 2010; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2009). The first thesis means that there is a correlation between the voting on RRP parties and a shared discontent feeling within the lower class of white citizens, who feel threatened by the rising number of low-paid migrant workers. The second thesis, social isolation, assumes that there is a correlation between voting on RRP parties and people who live with an increased feeling of uncertainty. This is related to unemployment, decreased social benefits and debates on retirements. It is also related to a lost connection with politics in general, and the mainstream political parties. The latter are called to be the ‘elite’ by RRP parties. The third thesis, protest vote, states that people vote on RRP parties mainly out of protest and dissatisfaction with current policies of the government (Ibid.).

Although Van Gent and Musterd acknowledge that there does not exist a single identity or homogenous collective, that always votes on a RRP party, rather, that this is related to current situations and environment⁵⁸, they do find correlations between the living conditions and the voting on the PVV in The Hague, in line with these three theses. The thesis that is mostly supported by their analysis is the first: the ethnic-composition thesis. From their analysis, neighborhoods with lower (and middle) classes, especially families and elderly people (55+), would vote more on the PVV. Van Gent and Musterd argue that this is related to fear for the increase of low-paid migrants combined with uncertainties because of the economic crisis, a decrease in social benefits, and retirement and work. Lower-class families

⁵⁸ This kind of analyses is based on the idea that the living environment and the individual that is part of that space, influence and affect each other (Van Gent and Musterd, 2010).

would vote more on the PVV if there are a lot of ‘black’ primary education schools⁵⁹ or debates on the quality of education for children in their neighborhood (Van Gent and Musterd, 2010: 150).

Summarized, their outcomes were that neighborhoods with more elderly people had a higher degree of votes for the PVV; neighborhoods with more ethnic minorities had a strong influence on the voting, although not linear, not the actual percentage but related to if neighborhoods were mixed or more separated; neighborhoods with more lower-class families with ethnic Dutch children (0-17) would have a higher degree of voting for the PVV; and neighborhoods with higher-class families with a higher income and single person families or without children would have a lower degree of voting for the PVV.

Some of these outcomes, especially the higher age, are similar to the outcome of my analysis and I would agree that it seems that the older generation has a higher degree of voting for RRP parties, for example in Blekinge, Dalarna, Gävleborg and in Limburg. Another similarity is the higher degree of votes in neighborhoods with families with children, for example in Flevoland. Although my findings reveal the same tendencies, I cannot confirm one of the theses, because in my data nothing is said about the feelings or uncertainties of the people. One major axis of identity I miss in my analysis is the one of class, because this is difficult to analyze from the public data. Therefore, an important question related to my research cannot yet be answered in a definite way: how do these patterns of voting relate to the promoted gender equality policies? Are there possible correlations visible? I will further discuss these questions in the following two parts.

Voters for Sweden Democrats

The gender equality policies of the SD fit mostly within the traditional framework of RRP parties, where traditional gender-relations are promoted. This comes forward in their policies against same-sex couples adopting children, their argument that a family should consist of a father and a mother and that women and men are different and therefore it should not be wrong to make ‘different’ choices. These statements were connected to the role of women as mothers and signifiers of motherhood within a framework of nationalism, where women become more active within the private sphere (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). The SD promotes a national identity that is Christian, ethnic-Swedish, and heteronormative. Besides

⁵⁹ By this Van Gent and Musterd mean a school where the majority of the children enrolled are not ethnic-Dutch and most likely not white.

gender, ethnicity and sexuality were two of the main dividers in the policies on gender equality. Despite the intersectional datasets, sexuality is a categorization, which is not visible in the data. Homosexual couples are included within the data on family types in ‘biological parents with children’ and in the data on marital status. It is therefore not possible to relate the data to views on LGBT people by the SD in their gender equality policies.

However, ethnicity does come forward in the dataset on population. It shows that the county Skåne has the highest percentage of people with a foreign background. Skåne also has the highest percentage of voters for the SD. This could relate to the focus on ethnicity and immigrants by the SD in their gender equality policies and their campaign on women’s safety. Another finding, in Skåne, was the high percentage of elderly people. An interesting question would be if there is a relationship between the elderly people and the focus on ethnicity by the SD. Van Gent and Musterd showed that there was a relationship between elderly people and voting for RRP parties because of feelings of fear and uncertainty (Van Gent and Musterd, 2010). Is the factor of ethnicity for an elderly group of people more important than the factor of gender within the policies of RRP parties? I would argue that this is not the case; ethnicity and gender are here interrelated. An example would be the campaign of the SD of men’s violence against women, where women should be protected from immigrant men (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014, 8th of September). This is a gendered and racialized campaign, following their promoted gender-patterns of gender equality where women are represented as “biological reproducers” and “symbol of the ideological discourse” (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). It shows how, yet again, gender equality policies are used within a larger context to campaign against immigrants.

The dataset on family showed some possible correlations with the promoted traditional gender-patterns by the SD. In all five counties, the majority of the families had a traditional structure, a family with children with two parents, including homosexual parents. Kronoberg had the highest percentage, with 78%. The other part of the population was divided between families with a single parent or families with a parent and a stepparent. Interesting, here, is that these percentages are very similar in people with a Swedish background and in those with a foreign background. In both groups, the traditional family structure of two biological parents with children had the highest percentage. This suggests that the promoted traditional gender-patterns might relate with the voters. However, the similar family structures of people with a foreign background put this relationship into question. It would be hard to believe that people with a foreign background would vote on the SD, because of the similar family structure. In

this case, family structures might not play such a large role in the relation to the voters and the SD. Research from Mulinari and Neergaard has shown that female politicians from the SD were “mainly divorced, single mothers or with no children” (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2013: 4). Would these women still identify themselves with the traditional gender-patterns as promoted by the SD in their family and gender policies? It would, therefore, be interesting to know whether people categorized with a foreign background or a Swedish background would relate themselves to the traditional gender-patterns. And furthermore, it would be interesting to know how the identification is within the group of people with a foreign background in Sweden? The last question is important, considering that the categorization of people with a foreign background consists of people that identify themselves as Swedish. They could have different ideas about the SD.

The findings on education and employment showed that the percentage of high-educated people was higher in women than in men. This was not unique or the five counties, when compared to the other counties in Sweden. Also, it does not seem to correlate with the more traditional gender-relations promoted by the SD. However, there might a different relationship here. The overall percentage of high-educated women in Sweden might be in line with the concept of Sweden as a ‘women-friendly nation’ (Kantola, 2014). It fits some of the characterizations of the concept, namely, women’s agency, their active role and the discourse of the ‘working mother’ (Ibid.). As explained before, anti-feminist movements have started to focus on men and supported the idea that ‘gender equality has gone too far’. This is similar with some of the points of view of the SD, for example the one that men are seen as victims and in need for shelters (Sverigedemokraterna, 2014). In these five counties, it might be that these points of view and the idea that ‘gender equality’ has gone to far are supported. In all five counties, in the age group of 15 to 44 years, the percentage of men was higher than that of women. It might be that higher-educated women leave rural areas and move to larger cities, whereas lower-educated men stay behind. This, including the finding of Mudde, that more men vote on RRP parties than women (Mudde, 2007), might result in a higher vote for the SD in these counties. More support for this suggestion could be found by studying whether anti-feminist movements are popular in these counties and how men view the gender equality policies in Sweden.

The data on employment showed clear gender segregation. Women were mostly active within the area of personal care, primary education and shops and restaurants. Men were more occupied in area’s like engineering., where higher education seems to be important and carer

chances are better. This finding is in line with the more traditional family type, where women work more part-time than men, and have a more active role within the private sphere. This finding also comes forward in the research of Mulinari and Neergaard. They found that the women's members of the SD are mostly unemployed, on sick-leave, and lack a professional work identity (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2013: 4). This is in line with my finding of the segregated labor market, where women seem to work mainly in lower ranked jobs. To further support this argument, I would need more data on employment divided by sex and age, especially, with respect to the duration or working hours, and make more comparisons between these five counties and other counties that have a low percentage of votes for the SD.

Voters for The Party For Freedom

The PVV promotes more traditional modern gender policies. These are deviant to those of other RRP parties' policies. Examples are, the promotion of a family with a maximum of two children, and the protection of gay's rights. Besides that, the campaign of the PVV seems to be less focused on the family and the role of women. However, in my analysis, it shows that the PVV does have a specific role of the woman in mind. This is not a role in the private sphere but rather in the public sphere. Furthermore, the PVV does not promote a traditional family type and is not against same-sex marriages or adoption of children by gay couples. These policies could appeal to a more varied group of people divided by different axes of identity.

Therefore, contradictory to the analysis of Van Gent and Musterd, family types that can be related to voting on the PVV are not solely more traditional family types with children or elderly single families, but also family types with younger single individuals without children who have a more active role within the society. This could relate to the high percentage of voters in Zuid-Holland. Here the promotion of more traditional modern gender-relations seems to correlate with the highest percentage of single person families, a young average age, and the highest percentage of high-educated citizens. However, in this case, it was not possible to make a further intersectional analysis on sex, sexuality and ethnicity. The variation of voters appealed by the policies of the PVV is shown by the high percentage of voters in Flevoland, which differs a lot from Zuid-Holland. Both Flevoland and Zuid-Holland show a very high growing rate of the population, far above the national rate. Further, Flevoland has the highest percentage of families with children, when compared to the other five counties. In Flevoland, there are a lot of low-educated, young, families, seemingly, a more traditional family structure. Like in the discussion on the SD, more research on the

relationship between the voters and the gender equality policies of the PVV is needed. For example, by asking voters if they identify themselves with these policies.

In Limburg and Zeeland the growth rate of the population is below zero. Here, the percentage of families without children is highest. Also, average age is highest. It seems that these provinces have the eldest population. Similar as suggested in the analysis on the data of the SD, this elder population could relate to a higher support for the PVV. It is in accordance with the results of Van Gent and Musterd. There elderly people voted for RRP parties out of uncertainties and fear (Van Gent and Musterd, 2010). The relationships, here, between age and ethnicity remains questionable. Is the focus on ethnicity, rather than on gender, in the campaigns of RRP parties more appealing to an elderly group of people ?

Data on ethnicity ('allochtoon') show, however, that the majority (average of 80%) within all the five counties is ethnic Dutch. However, this does not say anything about race, nor about skin color, nor about second or third generation immigrants. The latter are formally ethnic Dutch, but often seen as foreign or 'allochtoon'. Thus, they might still be related to the 'fear and uncertainty' that Van Gend and Musterd describe (Ibid.). This issue needs further research. Besides this, more intersectional data are necessary. This could clarify the family structures, education and occupation divided by sex, age, ethnicity and class of supporters of the PVV.

The data on employment are equally limited, in that these are not divided by sex or age. Therefore, correlations to the gender equality promoted policies of the PVV cannot be fully clarified. The data shows that people with an agricultural employment form a minority and those with employment in commercial services are the majority. This does not seem to be correlated to the policies promoted by the PVV. More intersectional data could elucidate whether there would be gender segregation in occupations, as was shown to be the case in Sweden.

Conclusions: A comparison between the voters of the two parties

There are several outcomes in this chapter on the question in what way(s) the representation and promotion of gender equality by the SD and PVV relate to the identity and gender aspects of the voters, and how this differs for both parties. I will discuss them here and compare the outcomes of the SD and the PVV to each other.

The first analytical difference, as found in chapter two, between the SD and the PVV

was the categorical difference of a more traditional framework (SD) and a more traditional modern framework (PVV). This seems to be corresponding with the data related to the percentage of votes, where the PVV has a more varied group of voters and the SD a more similar group of voters. For the PVV this means that there are as well as young single person families as families with children and elder families without children, whereas for the SD the highest group of voters seems to exist of families with children and elder families. This could mean that a more clear promotion of gender equality within the campaign of the SD results in a more coherent group of voters. Similarly, the ambivalent position of the PVV on gender equality results in a more varied group of voters. However, these are assumptions based on the idea that there is a clear relationship between the voters and the gender equality policies of these parties.

Due to the limited nature of the data, these relations could not be substantiated in more detail. In addition, there was also a difference on intersectionality between the Dutch and the Swedish data. Most likely, this difference comes from the more gender mainstreaming approach in Sweden, where an intersectional approach is a must, and due to the lack of intersectionality in Dutch policies. However, both class and sexuality are difficult axes of identity in these datasets, because they are not fixed categories. Despite these limited data the analysis revealed some promising first results:

1. For the PVV this could mean that their policies related to gender equality with a more active role for women relates to a variation of voters: younger and elder and with different structures of families.

This was shown by the variation of citizens in the five counties. The county Limburg has a high rate of elderly people and a growth rate of the population below zero. In contrast, Zuid-Holland has a higher rate of younger people, higher educated people, and a higher average growth rate of the population. Furthermore, Flevoland represents younger people, lower educated, a high rate of families with children and a very high growth rate of the population.

2. For the SD this could mean that more traditional gender-related families are appealed by their gender equality policies. It might be that their campaigns mirror their voters, in the sense of 1: a traditional family structure of a heterosexual Swedish couple with children, 2: Swedish men working more and being more responsible for having a career and income, 3: Swedish women working less and being responsible for the children and 4: supporting the focus

more on Swedish men within gender equality, following the anti-feminist movements and having a higher percentage of Swedish men voting for the SD.

The traditional gender-relation pattern promoted by the SD seems to be mirrored with the data on employment, which is very gender segregated, and, where mostly men have the jobs that require a higher education. This is in accordance with the research done on women members of the SD, by Mulinari and Neergaard. They show that these women are less focused on a career and more focused on children and the family (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2013).

3. For both parties, and in line with the finding of Van Gent and Musterd (2010), there seems to be a relationship between elderly people voting for RRP parties and the factor of ethnicity. The SD and the PVV both have a high percentage of votes in counties with a high average of elderly people. 'Fear and uncertainty' is the explanation of Van Gent and Musterd for the high vote on RRP parties within these groups (Van Gent and Musterd, 2010).

These suggestions need further research. This research can be done along the following lines. For a further analysis of both parties it would be interesting to have more data, specifically divided by sex, which could show whether men or women vote on both of the parties. This could support the argument of Mudde that men vote more on RRP parties. It could also show whether Swedish men relate to the focus on men in gender equality, as promoted by the SD. It would be interesting, here, to do more research on anti-feminist movements within the five counties in Sweden, to further clarify this relationship. As for the PVV, it would be interesting to have more intersectional data, specifically on ethnicity and sexuality, as these are such important factors in their campaign.

It also showed from this analysis that it would be useful to make a more national comparison, where the counties would be compared to the national average. To analyze the effect of certain axes of identity on the voting, such as ethnicity and age, it would be useful to analyze smaller areas. The more the analysis is focused on a smaller specific geographical area, the more specific correlations between quantitative data and the qualitative data will become visible.

Conclusion

Reflection on the use of the categorical complexity intersectional analysis

In chapter three, I have worked with the method of McCall (2005): a categorical complexity intersectional analysis. This is an intersectional method working with quantitative data. However, these two aspects can be seen as contrasting to each other. This is because an intersectional approach acknowledges that positions are not fixed and knowledge is situated. Quantitative data does not seem to relate to this. Though by using McCall's method, I have positioned the data within a certain year or period. Furthermore, I have tried to be accountable for the data and expose where the data came from: situate the data. In the end, I would argue that this method can bring, in addition to qualitative data, some new perspectives to feminist research: in its limitations and in processing the data. I will discuss these points on a practical level and a theoretical level:

On a practical level, there are several findings I have made while using this method. Firstly, the method can become quite complicated. With an intersectional approach, and thus working with different axes of identity, charts can become very large. As McCall pointed out as well, it will be difficult to publish these charts in journals because of their extensive length.

Secondly, to have intersectional data, it is best to gather the data yourself. In this thesis I have used data from national open databases, which was limiting my research. The data of the Dutch open database was not intersectional. Because I had no additional data, I could not make or analyze it in an intersectional way myself. However, to gather quantitative data and place them in an intersectional chart would take a long time. Depending on the length of the charts, it would also be easy to lose overview and produce wrong results.

On a theoretical level, there were some findings in addition to the practical findings that also resulted in qualitative data. Firstly, I found some interesting differences between the databases of Sweden and the Netherlands. It seemed that an intersectional approach has been implemented more within Sweden, which was represented in their presentation of data in the national database. They were also more accountable for the categorizations they worked with, such as 'people with a foreign background' and the inclusion of LGBT people in 'marital status'. In the Netherlands, the lack of an intersectional approach resulted in unclear data. Furthermore, the categorization of 'allochtoon' was problematic and reproduced discriminative dynamics and as well unclear data.

Although these findings seem to be negative and pitfalls, they can be interesting for further feminist research, on for example methodological nationalism. This reflects on the naturalization of the nation-state within methodological research (Wimmer and Schiller, 2003). An interesting follow-up question for further research could be how data from national databases relate to discourses such as Islamification, or the process of Othering. Besides these points, the method has resulted in some suggestive relations between the promotion of gender equality and the voters, which could be further explored with qualitative methods.

Conclusions of the thesis

The main question of this thesis was: What are the distinctive features of gender equality related policies in the radical right wing populist parties in Sweden (SD) and in the Netherlands (PVV), and how are these features related to the support of these parties?

To answer this question I used an intersectional approach. This was necessary because, for example, frameworks using gender as the sole divider do not fit the SD, nor the PVV. Besides gender, sexuality, ethnicity and religion showed to be relevant dividers in the policies of both parties.

Both parties share distinctive features of gender equality related policies that can be described as partly traditional, heteronormative, and partly traditional modern. These shared features are:

- The wish to stop gender quota
- The wish to stop positive discrimination
- Reduce immigrant men's violence against women
- Protect immigrant women from genital mutilation, forced marriages and sexual and honor-related violence
- The view that Islam is a threat to current achieved gender equality
- Their policy is mainly based on heteronormative structures

Overall, it seems that the SD promotes a more traditional non-progressive, heteronormative, concept of gender equality in comparison to the PVV. Both SD and PVV are ambivalent within this framework. Yet in a different way:

The SD is more traditional modern when it comes to gender policies. This is related to the discourse of ‘women-friendliness’ in Sweden. With respect to gender equality they have a special focus on men’s rights. This aligns with upcoming anti-feminist movements in Sweden. However, it is not specifically gender that is their main divider, but rather ethnicity and sexuality. With regard to these latter issues they are more traditional. As in other RRP parties, ethnicity is used within the discourse of Islamification.

The PVV is more traditional modern when it comes to sexuality and women’s role in society. They have a less clear position in gender policies than the SD. Their position with respect to gender equality is more traditional. I argue that their traditional modern view on sexuality and women’s role is secondary. They are subordinate to the primary aim of the PVV: to counter Islamification. Their views on sexuality also take part in the discourse of homonationalism. The later two discourses are strongly intertwined.

The results of chapter 3 suggest, these features relate to the support of these parties in the following ways:

1. For the PVV this could mean that their policies related to gender equality with a more active role for women relates to a variation of voters: younger and elder and with different structures of families.
2. For the SD this could mean that more traditional gender-related families are appealed by their gender equality policies. It might be that their campaigns mirror their voters, in the sense of 1: a traditional family structure of a heterosexual Swedish couple with children, 2: Swedish men working more and being more responsible for having a career and income, 3: Swedish women working less and being responsible for the children and 4: supporting the focus more on Swedish men within gender equality, following the anti-feminist movements and having a higher percentage of Swedish men voting for the SD.
3. In both cases there seems to be a relation between elderly people voting for RRP parties and the factor of ethnicity and gender.

With these conclusions the main question of this thesis is answered. These answers give support for all my hypotheses, except for the last one dealing with the relationship between gender equality policies and the voters. Especially, with respect to this subject, further research is needed. Specific suggestions for further research will be given at the end of this

chapter.

One sub question that remains, is: whether there exist contextual points of interest that could create space for dialogue between certain feminist movements and the RRP parties. I used, transversal politics. I assume that gender equality would be a central point of interest. A decrease of men's violence against women would be a more specified point of interest. This could be a starting point to have a dialogue and discuss the differences between the feminist movements and for example women's members of the SD or the PVV. Another interesting 'space' to have a dialogue would be the focus on LGBT rights and religion. This latter dialogue would open up the different dynamics that sexuality plays within the campaign of the PVV. It could also open up different views of LGBT rights within religion, which would create another discussion than the current discussion within the campaign of the PVV.

Suggestions for further research

From this research I developed three main areas for further research:

1. Further research on the relationship between gender equality policies of RRP parties and their voters; for example, through additional information in the form of interviews, contextual information on a national level, and, data collected from voters. It would, especially, be interesting to have more data, specifically divided by sex, which could show whether men or women vote on RRP parties.
2. To analyze the effect of certain axes of identity on the voting, such as ethnicity and age, it would be useful to compare counties with the national average, and, to analyze the data within areas smaller than counties (i.e. cities, municipalities).
3. Another interesting angle for further research would be to study the relationship between the support of the PVV and the promotion of LGBT rights within the campaign of the PVV. A more specific follow-up question here would be: how do LGBT-people in the Netherlands relate to the campaign of the PVV?

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
Annex 1

Average age of the population by region, sex and year

Region	Sex	2013	2014
Kronoberg county	men	40,9	40,9
Kronoberg county	women	42,8	42,8
Blekinge county	men	42,1	42,1
Blekinge county	women	44,6	44,6
Skåne county	men	40	40
Skåne county	women	41,9	41,9
Dalarna county	men	42,6	42,7
Dalarna county	women	44,6	44,7
Gävleborg county	men	42,5	42,5
Gävleborg county	women	44,5	44,5
Sweden	men	40,2	40,3
Sweden	women	42,2	42,2

Graphic 1: Average age of the population.


Annex 2



Graphic 2: Percentage of low educated men and women and high educated men and women per county in Sweden, 2014.

The two most left pillars (light blue and green) are low educated men and women (in that order) and the two pillars following are (green/blue and brown) high-educated men and women.

Annex 3



Graphic 3: Percentage of votes in 2010 (blue) and 2012 (red) for the PVV divided per county in the Netherlands. Refers to page 82.

Number of persons by region, foreign/Swedish background, age, sex and year

Region	Background	Age	Sex	2013	2014
Kronoberg	foreign	0-4 years	men	1229	1375
Kronoberg	foreign	0-4 years	women	1187	1259
Kronoberg	foreign	5-14 years	men	2305	2565
Kronoberg	foreign	5-14 years	women	2229	2455
Kronoberg	foreign	15-24 years	men	2798	3055
Kronoberg	foreign	15-24 years	women	2415	2624
Kronoberg	foreign	25-34 years	men	3246	3361
Kronoberg	foreign	25-34 years	women	2956	3143
Kronoberg	foreign	35-44 years	men	2759	3036
Kronoberg	foreign	35-44 years	women	2893	3033
Kronoberg	foreign	45-54 years	men	2445	2537
Kronoberg	foreign	45-54 years	women	2423	2529
Kronoberg	foreign	55-64 years	men	1647	1718
Kronoberg	foreign	55-64 years	women	1753	1833
Kronoberg	foreign	65+ years	men	1785	1864
Kronoberg	foreign	65+ years	women	1976	2057
Kronoberg	swedish	0-4 years	men	4316	4312
Kronoberg	swedish	0-4 years	women	4151	4096
Kronoberg	swedish	5-14 years	men	8455	8534
Kronoberg	swedish	5-14 years	women	7893	8032
Kronoberg	swedish	15-24 years	men	9974	9654
Kronoberg	swedish	15-24 years	women	9375	8971
Kronoberg	swedish	25-34 years	men	8440	8540
Kronoberg	swedish	25-34 years	women	7537	7642
Kronoberg	swedish	35-44 years	men	8950	8801
Kronoberg	swedish	35-44 years	women	8095	7987
Kronoberg	swedish	45-54 years	men	9866	9813
Kronoberg	swedish	45-54 years	women	9204	9240
Kronoberg	swedish	55-64 years	men	9953	9733
Kronoberg	swedish	55-64 years	women	9598	9361
Kronoberg	swedish	65+ years	men	16429	16820
Kronoberg	swedish	65+ years	women	18874	19148
Blekinge	foreign	0-4 years	men	650	716
Blekinge	foreign	0-4 years	women	606	718
Blekinge	foreign	5-14 years	men	1180	1399
Blekinge	foreign	5-14 years	women	1129	1321
Blekinge	foreign	15-24 years	men	1532	1702
Blekinge	foreign	15-24 years	women	1215	1326
Blekinge	foreign	25-34 years	men	2069	2193
Blekinge	foreign	25-34 years	women	1648	1739
Blekinge	foreign	35-44 years	men	1609	1768
Blekinge	foreign	35-44 years	women	1740	1827
Blekinge	foreign	45-54 years	men	1470	1569
Blekinge	foreign	45-54 years	women	1434	1518
Blekinge	foreign	55-64 years	men	991	1029
Blekinge	foreign	55-64 years	women	1206	1227
Blekinge	foreign	65+ years	men	1197	1246

Blekinge	foreign	65+ years	women	1424	1473
Blekinge	swedish	0-4 years	men	3574	3555
Blekinge	swedish	0-4 years	women	3309	3300
Blekinge	swedish	5-14 years	men	7321	7401
Blekinge	swedish	5-14 years	women	6707	6790
Blekinge	swedish	15-24 years	men	8419	8200
Blekinge	swedish	15-24 years	women	7281	7069
Blekinge	swedish	25-34 years	men	6774	6916
Blekinge	swedish	25-34 years	women	6007	6054
Blekinge	swedish	35-44 years	men	7798	7587
Blekinge	swedish	35-44 years	women	7331	7233
Blekinge	swedish	45-54 years	men	9056	9003
Blekinge	swedish	45-54 years	women	8215	8268
Blekinge	swedish	55-64 years	men	8502	8358
Blekinge	swedish	55-64 years	women	8572	8329
Blekinge	swedish	65+ years	men	15245	15522
Blekinge	swedish	65+ years	women	17546	17801
Skåne	foreign	0-4 years	men	10393	10787
Skåne	foreign	0-4 years	women	9968	10336
Skåne	foreign	5-14 years	men	18248	19463
Skåne	foreign	5-14 years	women	17528	18598
Skåne	foreign	15-24 years	men	21248	22033
Skåne	foreign	15-24 years	women	20913	21132
Skåne	foreign	25-34 years	men	29241	30394
Skåne	foreign	25-34 years	women	29234	30307
Skåne	foreign	35-44 years	men	26028	27413
Skåne	foreign	35-44 years	women	25515	26479
Skåne	foreign	45-54 years	men	21417	22322
Skåne	foreign	45-54 years	women	21127	21982
Skåne	foreign	55-64 years	men	14743	15386
Skåne	foreign	55-64 years	women	15812	16337
Skåne	foreign	65+ years	men	15018	15594
Skåne	foreign	65+ years	women	18025	18665
Skåne	swedish	0-4 years	men	30306	30308
Skåne	swedish	0-4 years	women	28761	28847
Skåne	swedish	5-14 years	men	53770	54940
Skåne	swedish	5-14 years	women	50913	51959
Skåne	swedish	15-24 years	men	59951	58275
Skåne	swedish	15-24 years	women	58112	56573
Skåne	swedish	25-34 years	men	55456	55974
Skåne	swedish	25-34 years	women	54515	55223
Skåne	swedish	35-44 years	men	59183	58838
Skåne	swedish	35-44 years	women	57021	56765
Skåne	swedish	45-54 years	men	62509	62737
Skåne	swedish	45-54 years	women	61290	61355
Skåne	swedish	55-64 years	men	58459	57445
Skåne	swedish	55-64 years	women	58116	57290
Skåne	swedish	65+ years	men	95830	98064
Skåne	swedish	65+ years	women	115419	117087

Dalarna	foreign	0-4 years	men	1005	1150
Dalarna	foreign	0-4 years	women	989	1094
Dalarna	foreign	5-14 years	men	2078	2304
Dalarna	foreign	5-14 years	women	1944	2190
Dalarna	foreign	15-24 years	men	2358	2677
Dalarna	foreign	15-24 years	women	2033	2182
Dalarna	foreign	25-34 years	men	2548	2800
Dalarna	foreign	25-34 years	women	2569	2747
Dalarna	foreign	35-44 years	men	2221	2413
Dalarna	foreign	35-44 years	women	2726	2833
Dalarna	foreign	45-54 years	men	2138	2209
Dalarna	foreign	45-54 years	women	2370	2494
Dalarna	foreign	55-64 years	men	1702	1795
Dalarna	foreign	55-64 years	women	1936	1956
Dalarna	foreign	65+ years	men	2199	2260
Dalarna	foreign	65+ years	women	2834	2916
Dalarna	swedish	0-4 years	men	6455	6478
Dalarna	swedish	0-4 years	women	6096	6106
Dalarna	swedish	5-14 years	men	12925	13023
Dalarna	swedish	5-14 years	women	12449	12545
Dalarna	swedish	15-24 years	men	15351	14673
Dalarna	swedish	15-24 years	women	13919	13182
Dalarna	swedish	25-34 years	men	12752	13070
Dalarna	swedish	25-34 years	women	11459	11785
Dalarna	swedish	35-44 years	men	13732	13504
Dalarna	swedish	35-44 years	women	12842	12651
Dalarna	swedish	45-54 years	men	16442	16318
Dalarna	swedish	45-54 years	women	15772	15576
Dalarna	swedish	55-64 years	men	17376	16916
Dalarna	swedish	55-64 years	women	16836	16401
Dalarna	swedish	65+ years	men	27833	28630
Dalarna	swedish	65+ years	women	31460	32025
Gävleborg	foreign	0-4 years	men	1042	1186
Gävleborg	foreign	0-4 years	women	1001	1166
Gävleborg	foreign	5-14 years	men	2279	2598
Gävleborg	foreign	5-14 years	women	2211	2471
Gävleborg	foreign	15-24 years	men	2872	3218
Gävleborg	foreign	15-24 years	women	2471	2709
Gävleborg	foreign	25-34 years	men	2794	3144
Gävleborg	foreign	25-34 years	women	2755	3022
Gävleborg	foreign	35-44 years	men	2455	2727
Gävleborg	foreign	35-44 years	women	3062	3271
Gävleborg	foreign	45-54 years	men	2326	2465
Gävleborg	foreign	45-54 years	women	2565	2716
Gävleborg	foreign	55-64 years	men	1534	1665
Gävleborg	foreign	55-64 years	women	1713	1794
Gävleborg	foreign	65+ years	men	1711	1781
Gävleborg	foreign	65+ years	women	2169	2256
Gävleborg	swedish	0-4 years	men	6340	6270

Gävleborg	swedish	0-4 years	women	6178	6089
Gävleborg	swedish	5-14 years	men	12758	12864
Gävleborg	swedish	5-14 years	women	11896	12070
Gävleborg	swedish	15-24 years	men	14968	14279
Gävleborg	swedish	15-24 years	women	14009	13387
Gävleborg	swedish	25-34 years	men	12377	12802
Gävleborg	swedish	25-34 years	women	11142	11606
Gävleborg	swedish	35-44 years	men	13986	13545
Gävleborg	swedish	35-44 years	women	13181	12793
Gävleborg	swedish	45-54 years	men	16933	16730
Gävleborg	swedish	45-54 years	women	15845	15683
Gävleborg	swedish	55-64 years	men	16987	16603
Gävleborg	swedish	55-64 years	women	16478	16058
Gävleborg	swedish	65+ years	men	27749	28386
Gävleborg	swedish	65+ years	women	32183	32637

Children and young persons, percent by region, sex, age, family type, foreign/Swedish background and year

Region	Sex	Age group	Family type	Background	2013
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	foreign background	15,4
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	swedish background	61,4
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	foreign background	1,1
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	swedish background	3,6
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	single parents	foreign background	4,4
Kronoberg	boys	0-21 years	single parents	swedish background	14,1
Kronoberg	girls	0-21 years	living with biological parents	foreign background	15,6
Kronoberg	girls	0-21 years	living with biological parents	swedish background	61,4
Kronoberg	girls	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	foreign background	1,1
Kronoberg	girls	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	swedish background	3,3
Kronoberg	girls	0-21 years	single parents	foreign background	4,5
Kronoberg	girls	0-21 years	single parents	swedish background	14
Blekinge	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	foreign background	10
Blekinge	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	swedish background	63,3
Blekinge	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	foreign background	0,8
Blekinge	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	swedish background	4,4
Blekinge	boys	0-21 years	single parents	foreign background	3,2
Blekinge	boys	0-21 years	single parents	swedish background	18,3
Blekinge	girls	0-21 years	living with biological parents	foreign background	10,2
Blekinge	girls	0-21 years	living with biological parents	swedish background	63,5
Blekinge	girls	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	foreign background	0,8
Blekinge	girls	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	swedish background	4,3
Blekinge	girls	0-21 years	single parents	foreign background	3,2
Blekinge	girls	0-21 years	single parents	swedish background	18
Skåne	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	foreign background	18,1
Skåne	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	swedish background	55
Skåne	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	foreign background	1,3
Skåne	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	swedish background	3,6
Skåne	boys	0-21 years	single parents	foreign background	5,9
Skåne	boys	0-21 years	single parents	swedish background	16,1
Skåne	girls	0-21 years	living with biological parents	foreign background	18,1
Skåne	girls	0-21 years	living with biological parents	swedish background	55,1
Skåne	girls	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	foreign background	1,3
Skåne	girls	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	swedish background	3,6
Skåne	girls	0-21 years	single parents	foreign background	5,8
Skåne	girls	0-21 years	single parents	swedish background	16,2
Dalarna	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	foreign background	8,6
Dalarna	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	swedish background	60,2
Dalarna	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	foreign background	0,8
Dalarna	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	swedish background	5,4
Dalarna	boys	0-21 years	single parents	foreign background	3,5
Dalarna	boys	0-21 years	single parents	swedish background	21,5
Dalarna	girls	0-21 years	living with biological parents	foreign background	8,7
Dalarna	girls	0-21 years	living with biological parents	swedish background	60,9
Dalarna	girls	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	foreign background	0,8
Dalarna	girls	0-21 years	living with one biological parent	swedish background	5,3
Dalarna	girls	0-21 years	single parents	foreign background	3,5

Dalarna	girls	0-21 years	single parents	swedish background	20,8
Gävleborg	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	foreign background	9,3
Gävleborg	boys	0-21 years	living with biological parents	swedish background	57,6
Gävleborg	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological par	foreign background	1
Gävleborg	boys	0-21 years	living with one biological par	swedish background	5,6
Gävleborg	boys	0-21 years	single parents	foreign background	4,3
Gävleborg	boys	0-21 years	single parents	swedish background	22,3
Gävleborg	girls	0-21 years	living with biological parents	foreign background	9,6
Gävleborg	girls	0-21 years	living with biological parents	swedish background	58,5
Gävleborg	girls	0-21 years	living with one biological par	foreign background	0,9
Gävleborg	girls	0-21 years	living with one biological par	swedish background	5,4
Gävleborg	girls	0-21 years	single parents	foreign background	4,1
Gävleborg	girls	0-21 years	single parents	swedish background	21,4

Newly married, divorced and widowed by region, marital status, age, sex and year

Region	Status	Age-group	Sex	2014
Kronoberg	married	-19 years	men	9
Kronoberg	married	-19 years	women	19
Kronoberg	married	20-24 years	men	59
Kronoberg	married	20-24 years	women	111
Kronoberg	married	25-29 years	men	159
Kronoberg	married	25-29 years	women	213
Kronoberg	married	30-34 years	men	191
Kronoberg	married	30-34 years	women	170
Kronoberg	married	35-39 years	men	143
Kronoberg	married	35-39 years	women	120
Kronoberg	married	40-44 years	men	106
Kronoberg	married	40-44 years	women	70
Kronoberg	married	45-49 years	men	72
Kronoberg	married	45-49 years	women	53
Kronoberg	married	50-54 years	men	45
Kronoberg	married	50-54 years	women	31
Kronoberg	married	55-59 years	men	34
Kronoberg	married	55-59 years	women	22
Kronoberg	married	60-64 years	men	18
Kronoberg	married	60-64 years	women	7
Kronoberg	married	65-69 years	men	9
Kronoberg	married	65-69 years	women	9
Kronoberg	married	70-74 years	men	6
Kronoberg	married	70-74 years	women	1
Kronoberg	married	75-79 years	men	1
Kronoberg	married	75-79 years	women	0
Kronoberg	married	80-84 years	men	0
Kronoberg	married	80-84 years	women	0
Kronoberg	married	85+ years	men	1
Kronoberg	married	85+ years	women	0
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	-19 years	men	0
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	-19 years	women	0
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	20-24 years	men	0
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	20-24 years	women	1
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	25-29 years	men	0
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	25-29 years	women	1
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	30-34 years	men	1
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	30-34 years	women	0
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	35-39 years	men	0
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	35-39 years	women	4
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	40-44 years	men	2
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	40-44 years	women	4
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	45-49 years	men	5
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	45-49 years	women	8
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	50-54 years	men	2
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	50-54 years	women	6

Kronoberg	widowers/widows	55-59 years	men	7
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	55-59 years	women	17
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	60-64 years	men	11
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	60-64 years	women	27
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	65-69 years	men	21
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	65-69 years	women	32
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	70-74 years	men	30
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	70-74 years	women	56
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	75-79 years	men	25
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	75-79 years	women	79
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	80-84 years	men	25
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	80-84 years	women	90
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	85+ years	men	51
Kronoberg	widowers/widows	85+ years	women	88
Kronoberg	divorced	-19 years	men	0
Kronoberg	divorced	-19 years	women	1
Kronoberg	divorced	20-24 years	men	4
Kronoberg	divorced	20-24 years	women	14
Kronoberg	divorced	25-29 years	men	33
Kronoberg	divorced	25-29 years	women	35
Kronoberg	divorced	30-34 years	men	46
Kronoberg	divorced	30-34 years	women	62
Kronoberg	divorced	35-39 years	men	48
Kronoberg	divorced	35-39 years	women	63
Kronoberg	divorced	40-44 years	men	82
Kronoberg	divorced	40-44 years	women	66
Kronoberg	divorced	45-49 years	men	60
Kronoberg	divorced	45-49 years	women	73
Kronoberg	divorced	50-54 years	men	42
Kronoberg	divorced	50-54 years	women	33
Kronoberg	divorced	55-59 years	men	23
Kronoberg	divorced	55-59 years	women	21
Kronoberg	divorced	60-64 years	men	20
Kronoberg	divorced	60-64 years	women	15
Kronoberg	divorced	65-69 years	men	14
Kronoberg	divorced	65-69 years	women	4
Kronoberg	divorced	70-74 years	men	8
Kronoberg	divorced	70-74 years	women	6
Kronoberg	divorced	75-79 years	men	5
Kronoberg	divorced	75-79 years	women	2
Kronoberg	divorced	80-84 years	men	3
Kronoberg	divorced	80-84 years	women	1
Kronoberg	divorced	85+ years	men	1
Kronoberg	divorced	85+ years	women	1
Blekinge	married	-19 years	men	3
Blekinge	married	-19 years	women	9
Blekinge	married	20-24 years	men	32
Blekinge	married	20-24 years	women	58
Blekinge	married	25-29 years	men	112

Blekinge	married	25-29 years	women	167
Blekinge	married	30-34 years	men	149
Blekinge	married	30-34 years	women	140
Blekinge	married	35-39 years	men	126
Blekinge	married	35-39 years	women	94
Blekinge	married	40-44 years	men	73
Blekinge	married	40-44 years	women	71
Blekinge	married	45-49 years	men	62
Blekinge	married	45-49 years	women	61
Blekinge	married	50-54 years	men	52
Blekinge	married	50-54 years	women	47
Blekinge	married	55-59 years	men	35
Blekinge	married	55-59 years	women	23
Blekinge	married	60-64 years	men	22
Blekinge	married	60-64 years	women	17
Blekinge	married	65-69 years	men	15
Blekinge	married	65-69 years	women	5
Blekinge	married	70-74 years	men	7
Blekinge	married	70-74 years	women	3
Blekinge	married	75-79 years	men	1
Blekinge	married	75-79 years	women	2
Blekinge	married	80-84 years	men	2
Blekinge	married	80-84 years	women	0
Blekinge	married	85+ years	men	0
Blekinge	married	85+ years	women	0
Blekinge	widowers/widows	-19 years	men	0
Blekinge	widowers/widows	-19 years	women	0
Blekinge	widowers/widows	20-24 years	men	0
Blekinge	widowers/widows	20-24 years	women	0
Blekinge	widowers/widows	25-29 years	men	0
Blekinge	widowers/widows	25-29 years	women	0
Blekinge	widowers/widows	30-34 years	men	0
Blekinge	widowers/widows	30-34 years	women	1
Blekinge	widowers/widows	35-39 years	men	2
Blekinge	widowers/widows	35-39 years	women	2
Blekinge	widowers/widows	40-44 years	men	0
Blekinge	widowers/widows	40-44 years	women	3
Blekinge	widowers/widows	45-49 years	men	3
Blekinge	widowers/widows	45-49 years	women	9
Blekinge	widowers/widows	50-54 years	men	5
Blekinge	widowers/widows	50-54 years	women	9
Blekinge	widowers/widows	55-59 years	men	8
Blekinge	widowers/widows	55-59 years	women	20
Blekinge	widowers/widows	60-64 years	men	13
Blekinge	widowers/widows	60-64 years	women	40
Blekinge	widowers/widows	65-69 years	men	24
Blekinge	widowers/widows	65-69 years	women	43
Blekinge	widowers/widows	70-74 years	men	22
Blekinge	widowers/widows	70-74 years	women	62

Blekinge	widowers/widows	75-79 years	men	24
Blekinge	widowers/widows	75-79 years	women	71
Blekinge	widowers/widows	80-84 years	men	31
Blekinge	widowers/widows	80-84 years	women	76
Blekinge	widowers/widows	85+ years	men	48
Blekinge	widowers/widows	85+ years	women	60
Blekinge	divorced	-19 years	men	0
Blekinge	divorced	-19 years	women	0
Blekinge	divorced	20-24 years	men	8
Blekinge	divorced	20-24 years	women	10
Blekinge	divorced	25-29 years	men	16
Blekinge	divorced	25-29 years	women	27
Blekinge	divorced	30-34 years	men	29
Blekinge	divorced	30-34 years	women	36
Blekinge	divorced	35-39 years	men	45
Blekinge	divorced	35-39 years	women	59
Blekinge	divorced	40-44 years	men	51
Blekinge	divorced	40-44 years	women	59
Blekinge	divorced	45-49 years	men	63
Blekinge	divorced	45-49 years	women	59
Blekinge	divorced	50-54 years	men	35
Blekinge	divorced	50-54 years	women	36
Blekinge	divorced	55-59 years	men	29
Blekinge	divorced	55-59 years	women	17
Blekinge	divorced	60-64 years	men	22
Blekinge	divorced	60-64 years	women	10
Blekinge	divorced	65-69 years	men	10
Blekinge	divorced	65-69 years	women	4
Blekinge	divorced	70-74 years	men	4
Blekinge	divorced	70-74 years	women	1
Blekinge	divorced	75-79 years	men	0
Blekinge	divorced	75-79 years	women	2
Blekinge	divorced	80-84 years	men	1
Blekinge	divorced	80-84 years	women	0
Blekinge	divorced	85+ years	men	0
Blekinge	divorced	85+ years	women	0
Skåne	married	-19 years	men	18
Skåne	married	-19 years	women	117
Skåne	married	20-24 years	men	334
Skåne	married	20-24 years	women	677
Skåne	married	25-29 years	men	1250
Skåne	married	25-29 years	women	1516
Skåne	married	30-34 years	men	1405
Skåne	married	30-34 years	women	1336
Skåne	married	35-39 years	men	1033
Skåne	married	35-39 years	women	808
Skåne	married	40-44 years	men	670
Skåne	married	40-44 years	women	540
Skåne	married	45-49 years	men	552

Skåne	married	45-49 years	women	441
Skåne	married	50-54 years	men	355
Skåne	married	50-54 years	women	282
Skåne	married	55-59 years	men	273
Skåne	married	55-59 years	women	184
Skåne	married	60-64 years	men	203
Skåne	married	60-64 years	women	107
Skåne	married	65-69 years	men	135
Skåne	married	65-69 years	women	65
Skåne	married	70-74 years	men	53
Skåne	married	70-74 years	women	34
Skåne	married	75-79 years	men	28
Skåne	married	75-79 years	women	10
Skåne	married	80-84 years	men	12
Skåne	married	80-84 years	women	4
Skåne	married	85+ years	men	4
Skåne	married	85+ years	women	1
Skåne	widowers/widows	-19 years	men	0
Skåne	widowers/widows	-19 years	women	0
Skåne	widowers/widows	20-24 years	men	0
Skåne	widowers/widows	20-24 years	women	2
Skåne	widowers/widows	25-29 years	men	2
Skåne	widowers/widows	25-29 years	women	4
Skåne	widowers/widows	30-34 years	men	3
Skåne	widowers/widows	30-34 years	women	8
Skåne	widowers/widows	35-39 years	men	8
Skåne	widowers/widows	35-39 years	women	14
Skåne	widowers/widows	40-44 years	men	7
Skåne	widowers/widows	40-44 years	women	29
Skåne	widowers/widows	45-49 years	men	17
Skåne	widowers/widows	45-49 years	women	46
Skåne	widowers/widows	50-54 years	men	24
Skåne	widowers/widows	50-54 years	women	57
Skåne	widowers/widows	55-59 years	men	41
Skåne	widowers/widows	55-59 years	women	87
Skåne	widowers/widows	60-64 years	men	79
Skåne	widowers/widows	60-64 years	women	164
Skåne	widowers/widows	65-69 years	men	137
Skåne	widowers/widows	65-69 years	women	290
Skåne	widowers/widows	70-74 years	men	179
Skåne	widowers/widows	70-74 years	women	410
Skåne	widowers/widows	75-79 years	men	191
Skåne	widowers/widows	75-79 years	women	451
Skåne	widowers/widows	80-84 years	men	209
Skåne	widowers/widows	80-84 years	women	494
Skåne	widowers/widows	85+ years	men	341
Skåne	widowers/widows	85+ years	women	469
Skåne	divorced	-19 years	men	0
Skåne	divorced	-19 years	women	6

Skåne	divorced	20-24 years	men	52
Skåne	divorced	20-24 years	women	164
Skåne	divorced	25-29 years	men	217
Skåne	divorced	25-29 years	women	336
Skåne	divorced	30-34 years	men	424
Skåne	divorced	30-34 years	women	492
Skåne	divorced	35-39 years	men	491
Skåne	divorced	35-39 years	women	568
Skåne	divorced	40-44 years	men	556
Skåne	divorced	40-44 years	women	577
Skåne	divorced	45-49 years	men	537
Skåne	divorced	45-49 years	women	560
Skåne	divorced	50-54 years	men	429
Skåne	divorced	50-54 years	women	355
Skåne	divorced	55-59 years	men	286
Skåne	divorced	55-59 years	women	187
Skåne	divorced	60-64 years	men	194
Skåne	divorced	60-64 years	women	121
Skåne	divorced	65-69 years	men	116
Skåne	divorced	65-69 years	women	61
Skåne	divorced	70-74 years	men	53
Skåne	divorced	70-74 years	women	29
Skåne	divorced	75-79 years	men	16
Skåne	divorced	75-79 years	women	16
Skåne	divorced	80-84 years	men	9
Skåne	divorced	80-84 years	women	2
Skåne	divorced	85+ years	men	5
Skåne	divorced	85+ years	women	3
Dalarna	married	-19 years	men	5
Dalarna	married	-19 years	women	17
Dalarna	married	20-24 years	men	67
Dalarna	married	20-24 years	women	103
Dalarna	married	25-29 years	men	165
Dalarna	married	25-29 years	women	217
Dalarna	married	30-34 years	men	223
Dalarna	married	30-34 years	women	210
Dalarna	married	35-39 years	men	157
Dalarna	married	35-39 years	women	160
Dalarna	married	40-44 years	men	143
Dalarna	married	40-44 years	women	123
Dalarna	married	45-49 years	men	121
Dalarna	married	45-49 years	women	89
Dalarna	married	50-54 years	men	85
Dalarna	married	50-54 years	women	84
Dalarna	married	55-59 years	men	62
Dalarna	married	55-59 years	women	44
Dalarna	married	60-64 years	men	45
Dalarna	married	60-64 years	women	18
Dalarna	married	65-69 years	men	19

Dalarna	married	65-69 years	women	11
Dalarna	married	70-74 years	men	11
Dalarna	married	70-74 years	women	7
Dalarna	married	75-79 years	men	6
Dalarna	married	75-79 years	women	0
Dalarna	married	80-84 years	men	1
Dalarna	married	80-84 years	women	1
Dalarna	married	85+ years	men	1
Dalarna	married	85+ years	women	0
Dalarna	married	-19 years	men	0
Dalarna	widowers/widows	-19 years	women	0
Dalarna	widowers/widows	20-24 years	men	0
Dalarna	widowers/widows	20-24 years	women	0
Dalarna	widowers/widows	25-29 years	men	1
Dalarna	widowers/widows	25-29 years	women	1
Dalarna	widowers/widows	30-34 years	men	2
Dalarna	widowers/widows	30-34 years	women	2
Dalarna	widowers/widows	35-39 years	men	0
Dalarna	widowers/widows	35-39 years	women	3
Dalarna	widowers/widows	40-44 years	men	1
Dalarna	widowers/widows	40-44 years	women	1
Dalarna	widowers/widows	45-49 years	men	3
Dalarna	widowers/widows	45-49 years	women	7
Dalarna	widowers/widows	50-54 years	men	6
Dalarna	widowers/widows	50-54 years	women	11
Dalarna	widowers/widows	55-59 years	men	10
Dalarna	widowers/widows	55-59 years	women	25
Dalarna	widowers/widows	60-64 years	men	19
Dalarna	widowers/widows	60-64 years	women	37
Dalarna	widowers/widows	65-69 years	men	41
Dalarna	widowers/widows	65-69 years	women	84
Dalarna	widowers/widows	70-74 years	men	46
Dalarna	widowers/widows	70-74 years	women	107
Dalarna	widowers/widows	75-79 years	men	56
Dalarna	widowers/widows	75-79 years	women	129
Dalarna	widowers/widows	80-84 years	men	52
Dalarna	widowers/widows	80-84 years	women	110
Dalarna	widowers/widows	85+ years	men	100
Dalarna	widowers/widows	85+ years	women	118
Dalarna	divorced	-19 years	men	0
Dalarna	divorced	-19 years	women	0
Dalarna	divorced	20-24 years	men	9
Dalarna	divorced	20-24 years	women	37
Dalarna	divorced	25-29 years	men	46
Dalarna	divorced	25-29 years	women	65
Dalarna	divorced	30-34 years	men	66
Dalarna	divorced	30-34 years	women	76
Dalarna	divorced	35-39 years	men	92
Dalarna	divorced	35-39 years	women	114

Dalarna	divorced	40-44 years	men	94
Dalarna	divorced	40-44 years	women	105
Dalarna	divorced	45-49 years	men	105
Dalarna	divorced	45-49 years	women	95
Dalarna	divorced	50-54 years	men	71
Dalarna	divorced	50-54 years	women	56
Dalarna	divorced	55-59 years	men	49
Dalarna	divorced	55-59 years	women	39
Dalarna	divorced	60-64 years	men	32
Dalarna	divorced	60-64 years	women	21
Dalarna	divorced	65-69 years	men	26
Dalarna	divorced	65-69 years	women	15
Dalarna	divorced	70-74 years	men	9
Dalarna	divorced	70-74 years	women	4
Dalarna	divorced	75-79 years	men	9
Dalarna	divorced	75-79 years	women	2
Dalarna	divorced	80-84 years	men	1
Dalarna	divorced	80-84 years	women	2
Dalarna	divorced	85+ years	men	0
Dalarna	divorced	85+ years	women	0
Gävleborg	married	-19 years	men	4
Gävleborg	married	-19 years	women	11
Gävleborg	married	20-24 years	men	63
Gävleborg	married	20-24 years	women	104
Gävleborg	married	25-29 years	men	167
Gävleborg	married	25-29 years	women	238
Gävleborg	married	30-34 years	men	228
Gävleborg	married	30-34 years	women	209
Gävleborg	married	35-39 years	men	194
Gävleborg	married	35-39 years	women	169
Gävleborg	married	40-44 years	men	149
Gävleborg	married	40-44 years	women	121
Gävleborg	married	45-49 years	men	118
Gävleborg	married	45-49 years	women	92
Gävleborg	married	50-54 years	men	87
Gävleborg	married	50-54 years	women	73
Gävleborg	married	55-59 years	men	71
Gävleborg	married	55-59 years	women	53
Gävleborg	married	60-64 years	men	62
Gävleborg	married	60-64 years	women	38
Gävleborg	married	65-69 years	men	32
Gävleborg	married	65-69 years	women	22
Gävleborg	married	70-74 years	men	13
Gävleborg	married	70-74 years	women	4
Gävleborg	married	75-79 years	men	6
Gävleborg	married	75-79 years	women	0
Gävleborg	married	80-84 years	men	0
Gävleborg	married	80-84 years	women	1
Gävleborg	married	85+ years	men	0

Gävleborg	married	85+ years	women	0
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	-19 years	men	0
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	-19 years	women	0
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	20-24 years	men	0
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	20-24 years	women	1
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	25-29 years	men	1
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	25-29 years	women	0
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	30-34 years	men	0
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	30-34 years	women	3
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	35-39 years	men	1
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	35-39 years	women	2
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	40-44 years	men	4
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	40-44 years	women	7
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	45-49 years	men	1
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	45-49 years	women	10
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	50-54 years	men	3
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	50-54 years	women	20
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	55-59 years	men	7
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	55-59 years	women	21
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	60-64 years	men	17
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	60-64 years	women	45
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	65-69 years	men	50
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	65-69 years	women	86
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	70-74 years	men	52
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	70-74 years	women	114
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	75-79 years	men	52
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	75-79 years	women	111
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	80-84 years	men	67
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	80-84 years	women	128
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	85+ years	men	81
Gävleborg	widowers/widows	85+ years	women	108
Gävleborg	divorced	-19 years	men	0
Gävleborg	divorced	-19 years	women	0
Gävleborg	divorced	20-24 years	men	10
Gävleborg	divorced	20-24 years	women	31
Gävleborg	divorced	25-29 years	men	35
Gävleborg	divorced	25-29 years	women	67
Gävleborg	divorced	30-34 years	men	84
Gävleborg	divorced	30-34 years	women	89
Gävleborg	divorced	35-39 years	men	98
Gävleborg	divorced	35-39 years	women	113
Gävleborg	divorced	40-44 years	men	94
Gävleborg	divorced	40-44 years	women	129
Gävleborg	divorced	45-49 years	men	124
Gävleborg	divorced	45-49 years	women	87
Gävleborg	divorced	50-54 years	men	77
Gävleborg	divorced	50-54 years	women	81
Gävleborg	divorced	55-59 years	men	56
Gävleborg	divorced	55-59 years	women	40

Gävleborg	divorced	60-64 years	men	40
Gävleborg	divorced	60-64 years	women	15
Gävleborg	divorced	65-69 years	men	40
Gävleborg	divorced	65-69 years	women	12
Gävleborg	divorced	70-74 years	men	9
Gävleborg	divorced	70-74 years	women	9
Gävleborg	divorced	75-79 years	men	2
Gävleborg	divorced	75-79 years	women	2
Gävleborg	divorced	80-84 years	men	2
Gävleborg	divorced	80-84 years	women	1
Gävleborg	divorced	85+ years	men	0
Gävleborg	divorced	85+ years	women	0

Live births by region, age of mother, sex and year

County	Age	Sex	2013	2014
Kronoberg	-14 years	men	0	0
Kronoberg	-14 years	women	0	0
Kronoberg	15 years	men	1	0
Kronoberg	15 years	women	0	0
Kronoberg	16 years	men	1	0
Kronoberg	16 years	women	0	1
Kronoberg	17 years	men	0	0
Kronoberg	17 years	women	1	2
Kronoberg	18 years	men	5	0
Kronoberg	18 years	women	0	5
Kronoberg	19 years	men	3	6
Kronoberg	19 years	women	5	9
Kronoberg	20 years	men	14	11
Kronoberg	20 years	women	7	15
Kronoberg	21 years	men	26	16
Kronoberg	21 years	women	18	17
Kronoberg	22 years	men	24	26
Kronoberg	22 years	women	30	35
Kronoberg	23 years	men	44	45
Kronoberg	23 years	women	42	45
Kronoberg	24 years	men	38	51
Kronoberg	24 years	women	33	44
Kronoberg	25 years	men	57	43
Kronoberg	25 years	women	57	52
Kronoberg	26 years	men	74	72
Kronoberg	26 years	women	69	58
Kronoberg	27 years	men	79	70
Kronoberg	27 years	women	72	78
Kronoberg	28 years	men	71	81
Kronoberg	28 years	women	64	71
Kronoberg	29 years	men	93	79
Kronoberg	29 years	women	67	66
Kronoberg	30 years	men	92	79
Kronoberg	30 years	women	69	81
Kronoberg	31 years	men	80	80
Kronoberg	31 years	women	76	65
Kronoberg	32 years	men	65	82
Kronoberg	32 years	women	67	82
Kronoberg	33 years	men	76	75
Kronoberg	33 years	women	73	52
Kronoberg	34 years	men	49	77
Kronoberg	34 years	women	64	49
Kronoberg	35 years	men	45	56
Kronoberg	35 years	women	54	48
Kronoberg	36 years	men	54	43
Kronoberg	36 years	women	49	48
Kronoberg	37 years	men	34	27

Kronoberg	37 years	women	38	27
Kronoberg	38 years	men	26	28
Kronoberg	38 years	women	29	30
Kronoberg	39 years	men	16	19
Kronoberg	39 years	women	9	20
Kronoberg	40 years	men	19	18
Kronoberg	40 years	women	11	13
Kronoberg	41 years	men	8	24
Kronoberg	41 years	women	4	15
Kronoberg	42 years	men	15	3
Kronoberg	42 years	women	6	5
Kronoberg	43 years	men	2	3
Kronoberg	43 years	women	3	1
Kronoberg	44 years	men	0	5
Kronoberg	44 years	women	3	3
Kronoberg	45 years	men	2	0
Kronoberg	45 years	women	2	2
Kronoberg	46 years	men	2	0
Kronoberg	46 years	women	2	1
Kronoberg	47 years	men	0	1
Kronoberg	47 years	women	0	0
Kronoberg	48 years	men	0	0
Kronoberg	48 years	women	1	0
Kronoberg	49+ years	men	1	0
Kronoberg	49+ years	women	0	0
Blekinge	-14 years	men	0	0
Blekinge	-14 years	women	0	0
Blekinge	15 years	men	0	0
Blekinge	15 years	women	2	0
Blekinge	16 years	men	1	0
Blekinge	16 years	women	0	0
Blekinge	17 years	men	1	2
Blekinge	17 years	women	3	1
Blekinge	18 years	men	3	1
Blekinge	18 years	women	3	2
Blekinge	19 years	men	7	5
Blekinge	19 years	women	10	4
Blekinge	20 years	men	10	15
Blekinge	20 years	women	6	9
Blekinge	21 years	men	10	16
Blekinge	21 years	women	12	14
Blekinge	22 years	men	22	28
Blekinge	22 years	women	19	19
Blekinge	23 years	men	43	34
Blekinge	23 years	women	32	23
Blekinge	24 years	men	37	34
Blekinge	24 years	women	47	32
Blekinge	25 years	men	58	54
Blekinge	25 years	women	32	40

Blekinge	26 years	men	51	57
Blekinge	26 years	women	38	58
Blekinge	27 years	men	45	51
Blekinge	27 years	women	47	60
Blekinge	28 years	men	57	61
Blekinge	28 years	women	54	63
Blekinge	29 years	men	46	61
Blekinge	29 years	women	44	55
Blekinge	30 years	men	56	50
Blekinge	30 years	women	45	41
Blekinge	31 years	men	66	49
Blekinge	31 years	women	38	57
Blekinge	32 years	men	44	50
Blekinge	32 years	women	34	54
Blekinge	33 years	men	49	46
Blekinge	33 years	women	36	45
Blekinge	34 years	men	51	48
Blekinge	34 years	women	51	49
Blekinge	35 years	men	40	39
Blekinge	35 years	women	31	33
Blekinge	36 years	men	35	27
Blekinge	36 years	women	30	35
Blekinge	37 years	men	24	36
Blekinge	37 years	women	27	20
Blekinge	38 years	men	21	20
Blekinge	38 years	women	27	28
Blekinge	39 years	men	16	16
Blekinge	39 years	women	18	13
Blekinge	40 years	men	14	11
Blekinge	40 years	women	5	14
Blekinge	41 years	men	7	8
Blekinge	41 years	women	6	9
Blekinge	42 years	men	5	6
Blekinge	42 years	women	5	6
Blekinge	43 years	men	1	1
Blekinge	43 years	women	1	2
Blekinge	44 years	men	1	0
Blekinge	44 years	women	0	2
Blekinge	45 years	men	1	0
Blekinge	45 years	women	0	0
Blekinge	46 years	men	0	0
Blekinge	46 years	women	0	0
Blekinge	47 years	men	0	0
Blekinge	47 years	women	0	0
Blekinge	48 years	men	0	0
Blekinge	48 years	women	0	0
Blekinge	49+ years	men	0	0
Blekinge	49+ years	women	0	0
Skåne	-14 years	men	0	1

Skåne	-14 years	women	1	0
Skåne	15 years	men	0	0
Skåne	15 years	women	0	2
Skåne	16 years	men	4	3
Skåne	16 years	women	3	0
Skåne	17 years	men	4	2
Skåne	17 years	women	13	7
Skåne	18 years	men	18	18
Skåne	18 years	women	23	16
Skåne	19 years	men	47	44
Skåne	19 years	women	36	36
Skåne	20 years	men	71	78
Skåne	20 years	women	85	72
Skåne	21 years	men	136	104
Skåne	21 years	women	137	101
Skåne	22 years	men	184	160
Skåne	22 years	women	177	142
Skåne	23 years	men	257	244
Skåne	23 years	women	232	239
Skåne	24 years	men	286	338
Skåne	24 years	women	285	278
Skåne	25 years	men	347	375
Skåne	25 years	women	387	374
Skåne	26 years	men	419	438
Skåne	26 years	women	384	430
Skåne	27 years	men	490	467
Skåne	27 years	women	434	462
Skåne	28 years	men	510	502
Skåne	28 years	women	496	499
Skåne	29 years	men	516	580
Skåne	29 years	women	508	541
Skåne	30 years	men	591	589
Skåne	30 years	women	532	542
Skåne	31 years	men	603	570
Skåne	31 years	women	574	497
Skåne	32 years	men	625	566
Skåne	32 years	women	551	526
Skåne	33 years	men	523	569
Skåne	33 years	women	541	492
Skåne	34 years	men	504	525
Skåne	34 years	women	500	484
Skåne	35 years	men	420	437
Skåne	35 years	women	382	449
Skåne	36 years	men	371	379
Skåne	36 years	women	347	364
Skåne	37 years	men	299	309
Skåne	37 years	women	276	294
Skåne	38 years	men	216	257
Skåne	38 years	women	255	236

Skåne	39 years	men	192	209
Skåne	39 years	women	182	181
Skåne	40 years	men	140	151
Skåne	40 years	women	109	124
Skåne	41 years	men	93	94
Skåne	41 years	women	84	92
Skåne	42 years	men	57	59
Skåne	42 years	women	53	48
Skåne	43 years	men	38	31
Skåne	43 years	women	39	42
Skåne	44 years	men	18	25
Skåne	44 years	women	15	14
Skåne	45 years	men	11	15
Skåne	45 years	women	10	12
Skåne	46 years	men	1	3
Skåne	46 years	women	5	6
Skåne	47 years	men	2	0
Skåne	47 years	women	3	2
Skåne	48 years	men	0	0
Skåne	48 years	women	0	1
Skåne	49+ years	men	1	1
Skåne	49+ years	women	1	2
Dalarna	-14 years	men	0	0
Dalarna	-14 years	women	0	0
Dalarna	15 years	men	0	0
Dalarna	15 years	women	0	0
Dalarna	16 years	men	0	2
Dalarna	16 years	women	1	1
Dalarna	17 years	men	1	1
Dalarna	17 years	women	2	1
Dalarna	18 years	men	7	5
Dalarna	18 years	women	7	6
Dalarna	19 years	men	4	14
Dalarna	19 years	women	8	6
Dalarna	20 years	men	18	9
Dalarna	20 years	women	24	12
Dalarna	21 years	men	35	20
Dalarna	21 years	women	35	32
Dalarna	22 years	men	50	43
Dalarna	22 years	women	44	45
Dalarna	23 years	men	53	65
Dalarna	23 years	women	54	56
Dalarna	24 years	men	73	61
Dalarna	24 years	women	62	80
Dalarna	25 years	men	56	98
Dalarna	25 years	women	77	80
Dalarna	26 years	men	92	88
Dalarna	26 years	women	92	91
Dalarna	27 years	men	113	103

Dalarna	27 years	women	72	99
Dalarna	28 years	men	95	114
Dalarna	28 years	women	84	93
Dalarna	29 years	men	108	110
Dalarna	29 years	women	90	93
Dalarna	30 years	men	84	88
Dalarna	30 years	women	73	95
Dalarna	31 years	men	93	110
Dalarna	31 years	women	76	101
Dalarna	32 years	men	86	92
Dalarna	32 years	women	104	98
Dalarna	33 years	men	83	75
Dalarna	33 years	women	94	95
Dalarna	34 years	men	49	86
Dalarna	34 years	women	71	78
Dalarna	35 years	men	49	62
Dalarna	35 years	women	55	64
Dalarna	36 years	men	65	62
Dalarna	36 years	women	49	37
Dalarna	37 years	men	45	44
Dalarna	37 years	women	40	38
Dalarna	38 years	men	37	34
Dalarna	38 years	women	22	32
Dalarna	39 years	men	32	43
Dalarna	39 years	women	32	17
Dalarna	40 years	men	17	31
Dalarna	40 years	women	23	22
Dalarna	41 years	men	13	14
Dalarna	41 years	women	19	15
Dalarna	42 years	men	10	9
Dalarna	42 years	women	11	9
Dalarna	43 years	men	6	8
Dalarna	43 years	women	7	5
Dalarna	44 years	men	5	7
Dalarna	44 years	women	4	6
Dalarna	45 years	men	0	1
Dalarna	45 years	women	2	1
Dalarna	46 years	men	0	0
Dalarna	46 years	women	2	2
Dalarna	47 years	men	0	0
Dalarna	47 years	women	0	0
Dalarna	48 years	men	0	0
Dalarna	48 years	women	0	0
Dalarna	49+ years	men	0	0
Dalarna	49+ years	women	0	0
Gävleborg	-14 years	men	0	0
Gävleborg	-14 years	women	1	0
Gävleborg	15 years	men	1	0
Gävleborg	15 years	women	1	0

Gävleborg	16 years	men	2	2
Gävleborg	16 years	women	1	2
Gävleborg	17 years	men	2	2
Gävleborg	17 years	women	2	6
Gävleborg	18 years	men	3	3
Gävleborg	18 years	women	5	3
Gävleborg	19 years	men	10	14
Gävleborg	19 years	women	10	12
Gävleborg	20 years	men	26	32
Gävleborg	20 years	women	29	19
Gävleborg	21 years	men	40	33
Gävleborg	21 years	women	44	29
Gävleborg	22 years	men	59	58
Gävleborg	22 years	women	44	44
Gävleborg	23 years	men	63	47
Gävleborg	23 years	women	59	66
Gävleborg	24 years	men	65	74
Gävleborg	24 years	women	65	70
Gävleborg	25 years	men	73	99
Gävleborg	25 years	women	69	82
Gävleborg	26 years	men	84	94
Gävleborg	26 years	women	85	79
Gävleborg	27 years	men	92	96
Gävleborg	27 years	women	80	97
Gävleborg	28 years	men	86	94
Gävleborg	28 years	women	108	110
Gävleborg	29 years	men	94	100
Gävleborg	29 years	women	92	93
Gävleborg	30 years	men	93	109
Gävleborg	30 years	women	75	75
Gävleborg	31 years	men	89	64
Gävleborg	31 years	women	100	83
Gävleborg	32 years	men	86	93
Gävleborg	32 years	women	85	92
Gävleborg	33 years	men	71	87
Gävleborg	33 years	women	73	84
Gävleborg	34 years	men	68	62
Gävleborg	34 years	women	59	83
Gävleborg	35 years	men	58	56
Gävleborg	35 years	women	57	68
Gävleborg	36 years	men	55	37
Gävleborg	36 years	women	46	48
Gävleborg	37 years	men	51	51
Gävleborg	37 years	women	47	39
Gävleborg	38 years	men	37	31
Gävleborg	38 years	women	47	41
Gävleborg	39 years	men	32	33
Gävleborg	39 years	women	34	18
Gävleborg	40 years	men	12	30

Gävleborg	40 years	women	29	19
Gävleborg	41 years	men	17	14
Gävleborg	41 years	women	15	21
Gävleborg	42 years	men	13	5
Gävleborg	42 years	women	8	7
Gävleborg	43 years	men	10	5
Gävleborg	43 years	women	5	10
Gävleborg	44 years	men	4	4
Gävleborg	44 years	women	7	3
Gävleborg	45 years	men	1	0
Gävleborg	45 years	women	0	1
Gävleborg	46 years	men	0	0
Gävleborg	46 years	women	2	2
Gävleborg	47 years	men	0	1
Gävleborg	47 years	women	1	0
Gävleborg	48 years	men	1	0
Gävleborg	48 years	women	0	0
Gävleborg	49+ years	men	0	0
	49+ years	women	1	0

Annex 8

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

Occupation	Age-group	Sex	2013	2014
514 Personal	16-24 years	women	1283	1270
528 Personal	55-59 years	women	1190	1190
524 Personal	45-49 years	women	1181	1177
526 Personal	50-54 years	women	1154	1145
530 Personal	60-64 years	women	1024	1003
522 Personal	40-44 years	women	1032	988
516 Personal	25-29 years	women	846	844
520 Personal	35-39 years	women	867	832
518 Personal	30-34 years	women	804	813
523 Shop and	16-24 years	women	686	736
351 Finance a	45-49 years	men	392	415
522 Shop and	16-24 years	men	411	393
349 Finance a	40-44 years	men	376	378
347 Finance a	35-39 years	men	333	355
525 Shop and	25-29 years	women	320	337
321 Physical a	45-49 years	men	325	332
513 Personal	16-24 years	men	300	324
319 Physical a	40-44 years	men	308	321
353 Finance a	50-54 years	men	296	318
317 Physical a	35-39 years	men	335	313
914 Helpers ir	16-24 years	women	334	296
323 Physical a	50-54 years	men	277	288
355 Finance a	55-59 years	men	275	284
345 Finance a	30-34 years	men	281	272
712 Building f	16-24 years	men	263	267
844 Motor-ve	50-54 years	men	277	264
846 Motor-ve	55-59 years	men	258	264
340 Pre-prim	40-44 years	women	256	261
713 Building f	16-24 years	men	264	260
842 Motor-ve	45-49 years	men	272	259
342 Pre-prim	45-49 years	women	262	257
219 Computin	35-39 years	men	256	254
848 Motor-ve	60-64 years	men	245	252
831 Metal- an	45-49 years	men	224	244
240 Primary e	35-39 years	women	236	243
327 Physical a	60-64 years	men	235	243
315 Physical a	30-34 years	men	241	242
714 Building f	25-29 years	men	231	241
325 Physical a	55-59 years	men	228	240
357 Finance a	60-64 years	men	239	240
346 Pre-prim	55-59 years	women	231	239
838 Assemble	45-49 years	men	234	233
725 Building f	50-54 years	men	223	232
527 Shop and	30-34 years	women	215	230
352 Finance a	45-49 years	women	206	229

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

515 Personal	25-29 years	men	199	224
723 Building f	45-49 years	men	205	221
533 Shop and	45-49 years	women	205	217
715 Building f	25-29 years	men	214	217
524 Shop and	25-29 years	men	197	212
718 Building f	35-39 years	men	199	211
830 Assemble	25-29 years	men	225	211
344 Pre-prim	50-54 years	women	217	210
829 Metal- an	40-44 years	men	221	210
529 Shop and	35-39 years	women	212	209
834 Motor-ve	25-29 years	men	196	209
716 Building f	30-34 years	men	197	208
242 Primary e	40-44 years	women	204	207
221 Computin	40-44 years	men	191	204
348 Finance a	35-39 years	women	189	204
343 Finance a	25-29 years	men	189	202
217 Computin	30-34 years	men	220	200
724 Building f	50-54 years	men	199	200
4 occupations	25-29 years	men	163	200
531 Shop and	40-44 years	women	204	197
717 Building f	30-34 years	men	166	196
827 Metal- an	35-39 years	men	212	196
338 Pre-prim	35-39 years	women	219	195
720 Building f	40-44 years	men	185	195
722 Building f	45-49 years	men	183	193
840 Motor-ve	40-44 years	men	199	192
326 Nursing a	25-29 years	women	176	191
350 Finance a	40-44 years	women	198	191
838 Motor-ve	35-39 years	men	185	191
726 Building f	55-59 years	men	187	187
832 Motor-ve	16-24 years	men	195	187
346 Finance a	30-34 years	women	173	186
836 Assemble	40-44 years	men	217	184
244 Primary e	45-49 years	women	174	183
727 Building f	55-59 years	men	184	183
729 Building f	60-64 years	men	205	183
133 Other spe	45-49 years	men	186	182
141 Managers	45-49 years	men	172	182
719 Building f	35-39 years	men	180	182
721 Building f	40-44 years	men	194	181
430 Other offi	45-49 years	women	199	179
833 Metal- an	50-54 years	men	160	179
834 Assemble	35-39 years	men	215	177
836 Motor-ve	30-34 years	men	196	176
840 Assemble	50-54 years	men	161	173
338 Nursing a	55-59 years	women	175	171

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334	Nursing a	45-49 years	women	176	170
132	Productio	45-49 years	men	159	168
526	Shop and	30-34 years	men	164	167
238	Primary e	30-34 years	women	178	166
413	Stores an	16-24 years	men	180	165
328	Nursing a	30-34 years	women	157	164
733	Machiner	45-49 years	men	172	164
927	Helpers a	55-59 years	women	149	164
250	Primary e	60-64 years	women	182	163
313	Physical a	25-29 years	men	157	163
332	Nursing a	40-44 years	women	160	163
143	Manager:	50-54 years	men	170	162
223	Computin	45-49 years	men	136	161
423	Numerica	45-49 years	women	167	160
340	Nursing a	60-64 years	women	151	159
348	Pre-prim	60-64 years	women	148	158
832	Assemble	30-34 years	men	167	158
825	Metal- an	30-34 years	men	163	156
421	Stores an	40-44 years	men	151	155
517	Personal	30-34 years	men	138	154
923	Helpers a	45-49 years	women	150	154
728	Building f	60-64 years	men	155	153
842	Assemble	55-59 years	men	154	153
336	Pre-prim	30-34 years	women	146	152
535	Shop and	50-54 years	women	145	152
731	Metal mo	45-49 years	men	161	152
925	Helpers a	50-54 years	women	161	151
139	Manager:	40-44 years	men	169	149
336	Nursing a	50-54 years	women	148	149
737	Machiner	55-59 years	men	145	149
725	Machiner	25-29 years	men	142	147
729	Metal mo	40-44 years	men	135	146
131	Other spe	40-44 years	men	146	145
419	Stores an	35-39 years	men	156	145
423	Stores an	45-49 years	men	158	145
130	Productio	40-44 years	men	138	144
354	Administ	45-49 years	women	138	144
417	Stores an	30-34 years	men	141	144
733	Metal mo	50-54 years	men	131	144
344	Finance a	25-29 years	women	128	143
136	Productio	55-59 years	men	147	142
429	Numerica	60-64 years	women	152	142
428	Other offi	40-44 years	women	165	142
519	Personal	35-39 years	men	139	142
828	Assemble	16-24 years	men	185	141
137	Productio	55-59 years	women	135	140

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135 Other spe	50-54 years	men	130	140
352 Administri	40-44 years	women	139	140
426 Other offi	35-39 years	women	157	140
539 Shop and	60-64 years	women	147	140
835 Metal- an	55-59 years	men	142	140
727 Metal mo	35-39 years	men	137	138
928 Helpers ir	55-59 years	women	139	138
248 Primary e	55-59 years	women	137	137
530 Shop and	40-44 years	men	147	137
415 Stores an	25-29 years	men	148	136
432 Other offi	50-54 years	women	148	136
823 Metal- an	25-29 years	men	144	136
334 Pre-prim	25-29 years	women	140	134
729 Machiner	35-39 years	men	139	134
844 Assemble	60-64 years	men	132	134
133 Productio	45-49 years	women	132	133
425 Numerica	50-54 years	women	123	133
919 Helpers a	35-39 years	women	134	133
250 Business	40-44 years	women	144	132
929 Helpers a	60-64 years	women	140	132
358 Administri	55-59 years	women	135	131
427 Numerica	55-59 years	women	147	131
537 Shop and	55-59 years	women	135	131
360 Administri	60-64 years	women	132	130
436 Other offi	60-64 years	women	134	130
735 Machiner	50-54 years	men	133	130
330 Nursing a	35-39 years	women	130	129
523 Personal	45-49 years	men	141	129
723 Machiner	16-24 years	men	150	129
147 Managers	60-64 years	men	126	128
137 Other spe	55-59 years	men	125	127
145 Managers	55-59 years	men	140	127
252 Business	45-49 years	women	120	127
356 Administri	50-54 years	women	131	127
425 Stores an	50-54 years	men	123	127
134 Productio	50-54 years	men	133	126
427 Stores an	55-59 years	men	118	123
434 Other offi	55-59 years	women	142	123
138 Productio	60-64 years	men	115	121
350 Administri	35-39 years	women	121	120
528 Shop and	35-39 years	men	119	120
837 Metal- an	60-64 years	men	109	120
913 Helpers ir	16-24 years	men	97	120
835 Agricultur	25-29 years	men	114	119
921 Helpers a	40-44 years	women	136	119
131 Productio	40-44 years	women	113	118

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316 Computer	30-34 years	men	123	117
341 Finance a	16-24 years	men	104	116
354 Finance a	50-54 years	women	91	114
525 Personal	50-54 years	men	120	114
527 Personal	55-59 years	men	110	114
220e Architec	35-39 years	men	106	113
248 Business	35-39 years	women	121	113
532 Shop and	45-49 years	men	124	113
727 Machiner	30-34 years	men	111	113
128 Productio	35-39 years	men	104	112
521 Personal	40-44 years	men	103	112
917 Helpers a	30-34 years	women	110	112
129 Other spe	35-39 years	men	111	111
723 Metal mo	25-29 years	men	114	111
215 Computin	25-29 years	men	107	110
251 Business	45-49 years	men	105	110
314 Computer	25-29 years	men	100	109
429 Stores an	60-64 years	men	113	109
422 Cashiers,	16-24 years	women	141	109
513 Housekee	16-24 years	women	128	109
837 Agricultu	30-34 years	men	100	109
246 Primary e	50-54 years	women	108	108
731 Machiner	40-44 years	men	116	108
916 Helpers ir	25-29 years	women	90	108
135 Productio	50-54 years	women	117	107
342 Finance a	16-24 years	women	77	107
356 Finance a	55-59 years	women	121	107
725 Metal mo	30-34 years	men	127	107
841 Agricultu	40-44 years	men	90	107
421 Numerica	40-44 years	women	124	106
735 Metal mo	55-59 years	men	116	106
348 Administi	30-34 years	women	110	105
930 Helpers ir	60-64 years	women	120	104
534 Shop and	50-54 years	men	112	102
833 Agricultu	16-24 years	men	122	102
254 Business	50-54 years	women	105	101
318 Computer	35-39 years	men	98	101
529 Personal	60-64 years	men	105	101
913 Helpers a	16-24 years	women	115	100
238 Nursing a	55-59 years	women	112	99
358 Finance a	60-64 years	women	92	98
426 Office sec	55-59 years	women	89	98
6 occupations	30-34 years	men	90	98
424 Office sec	50-54 years	women	87	97
422 Other offi	25-29 years	women	127	97
926 Helpers ir	50-54 years	women	111	97

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137 Managers	35-39 years	men	115	96
236 Primary e	25-29 years	women	87	95
257 Business	60-64 years	men	92	95
327 Health as	30-34 years	women	100	93
139 Productio	60-64 years	women	84	92
241 Secondar	40-44 years	women	99	92
832 Wood-pr	40-44 years	men	94	92
320 Compute	40-44 years	men	88	91
829 Other ma	16-24 years	men	69	90
525 Housekee	50-54 years	women	79	89
737 Metal mo	60-64 years	men	83	89
834 Wood-pr	45-49 years	men	90	89
843 Agricultu	45-49 years	men	78	89
129 Productio	35-39 years	women	77	88
325 Health as	25-29 years	women	85	88
424 Other offi	30-34 years	women	92	87
924 Helpers ir	45-49 years	women	87	87
739 Machiner	60-64 years	men	99	86
821 Metal- an	16-24 years	men	96	85
831 Other ma	25-29 years	men	63	85
139 Other spe	60-64 years	men	87	84
255 Business	55-59 years	men	94	84
256 Business	55-59 years	women	84	83
312 Compute	16-24 years	men	98	83
536 Shop and	55-59 years	men	89	83
826 Wood-pr	25-29 years	men	85	83
830 Wood-pr	35-39 years	men	91	83
932 Manufact	16-24 years	men	105	83
234 Nursing a	45-49 years	women	79	82
833 Other ma	30-34 years	men	54	82
922 Helpers ir	40-44 years	women	88	82
222e Architec	40-44 years	men	78	81
253 Business	50-54 years	men	77	81
322 Compute	45-49 years	men	90	81
225 Computin	50-54 years	men	80	80
232 Nursing a	40-44 years	women	79	80
236 Nursing a	50-54 years	women	81	80
246 Business	30-34 years	women	93	80
249 Business	40-44 years	men	88	80
422 Office sec	45-49 years	women	85	80
240 Nursing a	60-64 years	women	83	79
239 Secondar	35-39 years	women	80	78
228e Architec	55-59 years	men	71	77
242 Secondar	45-49 years	men	73	77
243 Secondar	45-49 years	women	64	77
246 Secondar	55-59 years	men	84	77

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258 Business	60-64 years	women	65	77
423 Client info	16-24 years	women	87	77
847 Agriculture	55-59 years	men	78	77
8 occupations	35-39 years	men	62	77
839 Agriculture	35-39 years	men	88	76
915 Helpers a	25-29 years	women	80	76
517 Protective	25-29 years	men	61	75
538 Shop and	60-64 years	men	77	75
931 Other sal	50-54 years	men	56	75
227 Computin	55-59 years	men	75	74
245 Business	30-34 years	men	79	74
419 Numerica	35-39 years	women	82	74
515 Housekee	25-29 years	women	68	74
245 Secondar	50-54 years	women	72	73
5 occupations	25-29 years	women	75	73
428 Office sec	60-64 years	women	78	72
226e Architec	50-54 years	men	76	71
415 Mail carri	16-24 years	men	58	71
132 Other spe	40-44 years	women	65	70
134 Other spe	45-49 years	women	66	70
329 Health as	35-39 years	women	67	70
839 Other ma	45-49 years	men	70	70
238 Health pr	60-64 years	men	67	69
230 Nursing a	35-39 years	women	60	69
247 Secondar	55-59 years	women	69	69
714 Painters,	16-24 years	men	71	69
720e Painters	35-39 years	men	64	69
845 Agriculture	50-54 years	men	63	69
224e Architec	45-49 years	men	72	68
227 Health pr	30-34 years	women	70	68
238 Secondar	35-39 years	men	62	68
262 Public ser	55-59 years	women	68	68
318 Physical a	35-39 years	women	67	68
521 Housekee	40-44 years	women	67	68
527 Housekee	55-59 years	women	68	68
824e Wood-p	45-49 years	men	74	68
839 Assemble	45-49 years	women	70	68
918 Helpers ir	30-34 years	women	72	68
247 Business	35-39 years	men	83	67
260 Public ser	50-54 years	women	61	67
837 Other ma	40-44 years	men	59	67
135 Directors	55-59 years	men	60	66
220 Computin	35-39 years	women	72	66
218e Architec	30-34 years	men	73	66
240 Secondar	40-44 years	men	67	66
346 Administi	25-29 years	women	69	66

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721 Metal mo	16-24 years	men	77	66
836 Wood-pr	50-54 years	men	74	66
229 Computin	60-64 years	men	57	65
237 Secondar	30-34 years	women	76	65
256 Psycholog	35-39 years	women	66	65
335 Health as	50-54 years	women	52	65
337 Health as	55-59 years	women	65	65
355 Social wo	40-44 years	women	57	65
512 Housekee	16-24 years	men	73	65
523 Housekee	45-49 years	women	68	65
131 Directors	45-49 years	men	66	64
127 Productio	30-34 years	women	58	64
248 Secondar	60-64 years	men	68	64
260 Psycholog	45-49 years	women	66	64
517 Housekee	30-34 years	women	57	64
249 Secondar	60-64 years	women	75	63
252 Psycholog	25-29 years	women	53	63
324 Nursing a	16-24 years	women	73	63
425 Client infr	25-29 years	women	65	63
427 Client infr	30-34 years	women	76	63
431 Client infr	40-44 years	women	76	63
828 Wood-pr	30-34 years	men	77	63
133 Directors	50-54 years	men	58	62
224 Computin	45-49 years	women	57	62
244 Secondar	50-54 years	men	66	62
241 Primary e	40-44 years	men	49	62
420 Other offi	16-24 years	women	84	62
920 Helpers ir	35-39 years	women	71	62
934 Manufact	25-29 years	men	84	62
316 Physical a	30-34 years	women	75	61
353 Social wo	35-39 years	women	60	61
416 Mail carri	16-24 years	women	60	61
942 Manufact	45-49 years	men	56	61
142 Managers	45-49 years	women	60	60
331 Health as	40-44 years	women	62	60
10 occupatio	40-44 years	men	54	60
256 Writers a	45-49 years	women	55	59
258 Public ser	45-49 years	women	52	59
262 Psycholog	50-54 years	women	48	59
351 Social wo	30-34 years	women	52	59
433 Client infr	45-49 years	women	64	59
514 Housekee	25-29 years	men	62	59
716e Painters	25-29 years	men	53	59
7 occupations	30-34 years	women	54	59
140 Managers	40-44 years	women	66	58
230e Architec	60-64 years	men	60	58

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357 Social wo	45-49 years	women	66	58
516 Housekee	30-34 years	men	47	58
254 Public ser	35-39 years	women	54	57
724e Painters	45-49 years	men	58	57
843 Assemble	55-59 years	women	64	57
835 Other ma	35-39 years	men	51	57
828e Wood-p	55-59 years	men	50	56
849 Agricultu	60-64 years	men	54	56
936 Manufact	30-34 years	men	55	56
229 Health pr	35-39 years	women	53	55
264 Public ser	60-64 years	women	41	55
254 Psycholog	30-34 years	women	69	55
349 Social wo	25-29 years	women	55	55
359 Social wo	50-54 years	women	54	55
416 Stores an	25-29 years	women	45	55
427 Other offi	40-44 years	men	52	55
826e Wood-p	50-54 years	men	52	55
838 Wood-pri	55-59 years	men	62	55
935 Other sal	60-64 years	men	45	55
222 Computin	40-44 years	women	52	54
256 Public ser	40-44 years	women	38	54
320 Physical a	40-44 years	women	51	54
353 Administr	45-49 years	men	48	54
422 Stores an	40-44 years	women	57	54
424 Stores an	45-49 years	women	49	54
841 Other ma	50-54 years	men	44	54
127 Other spe	30-34 years	men	43	53
130 Other spe	35-39 years	women	48	53
236 Secondar	30-34 years	men	47	53
319 Computer	35-39 years	women	44	53
421 Other offi	25-29 years	men	61	53
424 Cashiers,	25-29 years	women	59	53
722e Painters	40-44 years	men	54	53
136 Other spe	50-54 years	women	41	52
264 Psycholog	55-59 years	women	52	52
333 Health as	45-49 years	women	64	52
429 Client infr	35-39 years	women	54	52
736 Electrical	50-54 years	men	51	52
233 Health pr	45-49 years	women	45	51
263 Public ser	60-64 years	men	53	51
361 Customs,	60-64 years	women	62	51
417 Numerica	30-34 years	women	53	51
726e Painters	50-54 years	men	54	51
740 Electrical	60-64 years	men	55	51
822e Wood-p	40-44 years	men	53	51
930 Other sal	45-49 years	women	52	51

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938 Manufact	35-39 years	men	50	51
940 Manufact	40-44 years	men	62	51
252 Public ser	30-34 years	women	52	50
414 Stores an	16-24 years	women	57	50
423 Other offi	30-34 years	men	52	50
718e Painters	30-34 years	men	56	50
730 Electrical	35-39 years	men	53	50
837 Assemble	40-44 years	women	72	50
932 Other sal	50-54 years	women	55	50
236 Health pr	55-59 years	men	56	49
239 Primary e	35-39 years	men	61	49
324 Compute	50-54 years	men	47	49
339 Health as	60-64 years	women	50	49
428 Stores an	55-59 years	women	48	49
421 Cashiers,	16-24 years	men	54	49
529 Housekee	60-64 years	women	53	49
841 Assemble	50-54 years	women	52	49
915 Helpers ir	25-29 years	men	32	49
135 Managers	30-34 years	men	52	48
252 Writers a	35-39 years	women	54	48
734 Electrical	45-49 years	men	54	48
835 Printing-,	45-49 years	men	46	48
929 Other sal	45-49 years	men	56	48
216e Architec	25-29 years	men	37	47
241 College, u	45-49 years	men	46	47
254 Writers a	40-44 years	women	50	47
359 Customs,	55-59 years	women	58	47
361 Social wo	55-59 years	women	43	47
840 Wood-prc	60-64 years	men	64	47
933 Other sal	55-59 years	men	52	47
9 occupations	35-39 years	women	35	47
225 Health pr	25-29 years	women	39	46
244 Business	25-29 years	women	50	46
258 Psycholog	40-44 years	women	43	46
429 Other offi	45-49 years	men	53	46
435 Client inf	50-54 years	women	43	46
519 Housekee	35-39 years	women	49	46
726 Electrical	25-29 years	men	54	46
732 Electrical	40-44 years	men	39	46
845 Other ma	60-64 years	men	54	46
129 Directors	40-44 years	men	58	45
137 Directors	60-64 years	men	53	45
228 Nursing a	30-34 years	women	56	45
321 Compute	40-44 years	women	52	45
426 Stores an	50-54 years	women	54	45
823 Rubber- a	16-24 years	men	46	45

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944 Manufact	50-54 years	men	44	45
138 Managers	35-39 years	women	46	44
425 Other offi	35-39 years	men	53	44
736 Blacksmi	55-59 years	men	35	44
738 Electrical	55-59 years	men	57	44
232 Health pr	45-49 years	men	41	43
249 Primary e	60-64 years	men	51	43
314 Physical a	25-29 years	women	44	43
415 Numerica	25-29 years	women	44	43
521 Protectiv	35-39 years	men	41	43
728 Electrical	30-34 years	men	51	43
843 Other ma	55-59 years	men	44	43
126 Productio	30-34 years	men	68	42
322 Physical a	45-49 years	women	41	42
351 Administr	40-44 years	men	48	42
418 Stores an	30-34 years	women	36	42
519 Protectiv	30-34 years	men	40	42
824 Wood-pr	16-24 years	men	57	42
838 Other ma	40-44 years	women	36	42
934 Other sal	55-59 years	women	45	42
228 Health pr	35-39 years	men	35	41
239 College, u	40-44 years	men	37	41
237 Primary e	30-34 years	men	30	41
311 Physical a	16-24 years	men	37	41
315 Comput	25-29 years	women	34	41
347 Business	30-34 years	women	37	41
518 Housekee	35-39 years	men	39	41
732 Blacksmi	45-49 years	men	36	41
833 Rubber- a	45-49 years	men	37	41
919 Other sal	16-24 years	men	33	41
927 Other sal	40-44 years	men	42	41
12 occupatio	45-49 years	men	39	41
235 Health pr	50-54 years	women	40	40
245 College, u	55-59 years	men	37	40
243 Primary e	45-49 years	men	32	40
236 Other tea	16-24 years	women	5	40
351 Business	40-44 years	women	32	40
419 Other offi	16-24 years	men	55	40
422 Client infr	16-24 years	men	35	40
439 Client infr	60-64 years	women	43	40
724 Building f	45-49 years	women	31	40
825 Rubber- a	25-29 years	men	30	40
144 Managers	50-54 years	women	28	39
231 Health pr	40-44 years	women	42	39
237 Health pr	55-59 years	women	36	39
250 Writers a	30-34 years	women	49	39

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253 Public ser	35-39 years	men	28	39
261 Public ser	55-59 years	men	41	39
326 Computer	55-59 years	men	41	39
332 Pre-prim	16-24 years	women	37	39
349 Business	35-39 years	women	29	39
351 Customs,	35-39 years	women	37	39
418 Office sec	35-39 years	women	35	39
437 Client infr	55-59 years	women	47	39
728e Painters	55-59 years	men	39	39
930e Doorkee	60-64 years	men	35	39
946 Manufact	55-59 years	men	38	39
011 Armed fo	16-24 years	men	45	38
226 Computin	50-54 years	women	37	38
240 College, u	40-44 years	women	33	38
248 Other tea	50-54 years	women	37	38
259 Public ser	50-54 years	men	43	38
348 Social wo	25-29 years	men	34	38
435 Other offi	60-64 years	men	38	38
724 Electrical	16-24 years	men	32	38
830e Wood-p	60-64 years	men	44	38
845 Assemble	60-64 years	women	36	38
936 Other sal	60-64 years	women	37	38
237 College, u	35-39 years	men	35	37
257 Public ser	45-49 years	men	33	37
517e Other pe	25-29 years	women	40	37
515 Protectiv	16-24 years	men	45	37
830 Metal- an	40-44 years	women	28	37
832 Metal- an	45-49 years	women	23	37
948 Manufact	60-64 years	men	34	37
234 Health pr	50-54 years	men	43	36
234 Primary e	16-24 years	women	29	36
244 Other tea	40-44 years	women	34	36
255 Writers a	45-49 years	men	30	36
515e Other pe	16-24 years	women	38	36
842 Other ma	50-54 years	women	25	36
218 Computin	30-34 years	women	41	35
250 Other tea	55-59 years	women	35	35
243 Business	25-29 years	men	27	35
347 Administr	30-34 years	men	21	35
359 Administr	60-64 years	men	35	35
350 Social wo	30-34 years	men	29	35
420 Stores an	35-39 years	women	40	35
431 Other offi	50-54 years	men	33	35
433 Other offi	55-59 years	men	37	35
520 Housekee	40-44 years	men	31	35
730e Painters	60-64 years	men	40	35

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730 Blacksmith	40-44 years	men	35	35
925 Other sales	35-39 years	men	27	35
16 occupation	55-59 years	men	40	35
226 Health pr	30-34 years	men	39	34
246 College, u	55-59 years	women	32	34
240 Other tea	30-34 years	women	33	34
255 Public ser	40-44 years	men	38	34
266 Psycholog	60-64 years	women	33	34
349 Administr	35-39 years	men	38	34
357 Administr	55-59 years	men	38	34
351 Police off	35-39 years	men	37	34
352 Artistic, e	30-34 years	women	27	34
429 Mail carri	55-59 years	men	34	34
621 Market g:	45-49 years	men	43	34
625 Market g:	55-59 years	men	35	34
738 Blacksmith	60-64 years	men	27	34
827 Rubber- a	30-34 years	men	32	34
835 Assemble	35-39 years	women	48	34
840 Other ma	45-49 years	women	30	34
912 Helpers a	16-24 years	men	40	34
127 Directors	35-39 years	men	32	33
219e Architec	30-34 years	women	24	33
239 Health pr	60-64 years	women	38	33
242 College, u	45-49 years	women	31	33
247 Primary e	55-59 years	men	33	33
252 Other tea	60-64 years	women	27	33
323 Comput	45-49 years	women	29	33
353 Business :	45-49 years	women	26	33
349 Artistic, e	25-29 years	men	29	33
627 Market g:	60-64 years	men	32	33
827 Food and	16-24 years	men	41	33
833 Assemble	30-34 years	women	40	33
830 Other ma	16-24 years	women	25	33
921 Other sal	25-29 years	men	23	33
943 Manufact	45-49 years	women	32	33
224 Health pr	25-29 years	men	27	32
243 College, u	50-54 years	men	32	32
248 Writers a	25-29 years	women	35	32
251 Writers a	35-39 years	men	36	32
259 Writers a	55-59 years	men	26	32
363 Social wo	60-64 years	women	33	32
420 Office sec	40-44 years	women	44	32
417 Mail carri	25-29 years	men	24	32
426 Cashiers,	30-34 years	women	41	32
424 Client infr	25-29 years	men	25	32
816e Wood-p	25-29 years	men	39	32

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826 Power-pr	45-49 years	men	38	32
828 Power-pr	50-54 years	men	30	32
843 Motor-ve	45-49 years	women	27	32
928 Other sal	40-44 years	women	32	32
939 Manufact	35-39 years	women	28	32
146 Managers	55-59 years	women	31	31
230 Health pr	40-44 years	men	33	31
238 College, u	35-39 years	women	35	31
244 College, u	50-54 years	women	33	31
235 Secondar	25-29 years	women	44	31
352 Business :	45-49 years	men	26	31
349 Customs,	30-34 years	women	27	31
430 Stores an	60-64 years	women	34	31
833 Printing-,	40-44 years	men	34	31
837 Printing-,	50-54 years	men	28	31
261 Writers a	60-64 years	men	29	30
347 Artistic, e	16-24 years	men	22	30
427 Mail carri	50-54 years	men	35	30
430 Mail carri	55-59 years	women	23	30
525 Protectiv	45-49 years	men	32	30
820e Wood-p	35-39 years	men	40	30
831 Assemble	25-29 years	women	35	30
935 Manufact	25-29 years	women	25	30
933 Transport	16-24 years	men	23	30
234 Secondar	25-29 years	men	30	29
249 Writers a	30-34 years	men	33	29
253 Writers a	40-44 years	men	31	29
324 Physical a	50-54 years	women	26	29
345 Administr	25-29 years	men	33	29
347 Customs,	25-29 years	women	24	29
350 Police off	30-34 years	women	27	29
347 Social wo	16-24 years	women	20	29
611 Market g:	16-24 years	men	31	29
734 Blacksmi	50-54 years	men	33	29
829 Rubber- a	35-39 years	men	21	29
837 Rubber- a	55-59 years	men	26	29
943 Transport	45-49 years	men	27	29
140 Other spe	60-64 years	women	28	28
246 Other tea	45-49 years	women	26	28
250 Public ser	25-29 years	women	29	28
251 Public ser	30-34 years	men	26	28
326 Physical a	55-59 years	women	25	28
325 Nursing a	25-29 years	men	23	28
348 Business :	35-39 years	men	23	28
352 Social wo	35-39 years	men	29	28
418 Mail carri	25-29 years	women	22	28

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430 Cashiers,	40-44 years	women	30	28
522 Housekee	45-49 years	men	29	28
814 Metal-pr	25-29 years	men	30	28
832 Power-pr	60-64 years	men	30	28
828 Metal- an	35-39 years	women	27	28
829 Printing-	30-34 years	men	28	28
836 Other ma	35-39 years	women	20	28
926e Doorkee	50-54 years	men	26	28
138 Other spe	55-59 years	women	27	27
235 College, u	30-34 years	men	29	27
248 College, u	60-64 years	women	26	27
235 Primary e	25-29 years	men	31	27
317 Comput	30-34 years	women	39	27
358 Business :	60-64 years	men	23	27
349 Police off	30-34 years	men	27	27
356 Artistic, e	40-44 years	women	16	27
436 Cashiers,	55-59 years	women	23	27
523e Other pe	40-44 years	women	23	27
518 Protectiv	25-29 years	women	21	27
818e Wood-p	30-34 years	men	37	27
830 Power-pr	55-59 years	men	24	27
836 Metal- an	55-59 years	women	25	27
834 Chemical-	50-54 years	men	21	27
839 Motor-ve	35-39 years	women	15	27
18 occupatio	60-64 years	men	30	27
355 Business :	50-54 years	women	22	26
344 Administr	16-24 years	women	31	26
523 Protectiv	40-44 years	men	27	26
628e Forestry	55-59 years	men	28	26
826 Metal- an	30-34 years	women	26	26
841 Printing-	60-64 years	men	26	26
919 Helpers ir	35-39 years	men	23	26
136 Managers:	30-34 years	women	24	25
251 Special ec	60-64 years	women	24	25
238 Other tea	25-29 years	women	15	25
257 Writers a	50-54 years	men	31	25
354 Business :	50-54 years	men	22	25
422 Mail carri	35-39 years	women	19	25
431 Mail carri	60-64 years	men	26	25
832 Chemical-	45-49 years	men	23	25
837 Wood-pr	50-54 years	women	29	25
827 Printing-	25-29 years	men	27	25
845 Motor-ve	50-54 years	women	23	25
915 Garbage c	16-24 years	men	28	25
945 Manufact	50-54 years	women	25	25
14 occupatio	50-54 years	men	33	25

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328 Computer	60-64 years	men	28	24
345 Business	25-29 years	women	20	24
346 Business	30-34 years	men	20	24
350 Business	40-44 years	men	24	24
355 Customs,	45-49 years	women	21	24
356 Social wo	45-49 years	men	24	24
420 Mail carri	30-34 years	women	31	24
426 Mail carri	45-49 years	women	18	24
524 Housekee	50-54 years	men	20	24
516 Protectiv	16-24 years	women	22	24
623 Market g	50-54 years	men	26	24
714 Building f	16-24 years	women	24	24
726 Blacksmi	30-34 years	men	25	24
816 Metal-pr	30-34 years	men	23	24
822 Metal-pr	45-49 years	men	21	24
834 Metal- an	50-54 years	women	16	24
835 Rubber- a	50-54 years	men	25	24
831 Wood-pr	35-39 years	women	15	24
835 Wood-pr	45-49 years	women	30	24
829 Food and	25-29 years	men	22	24
923 Other sal	30-34 years	men	17	24
941 Manufact	40-44 years	women	26	24
935 Transport	25-29 years	men	23	24
939 Transport	35-39 years	men	26	24
11 occupatio	40-44 years	women	27	24
13 occupatio	45-49 years	women	14	24
125 Productio	25-29 years	women	21	23
128 Other spe	30-34 years	women	27	23
148 Managers	60-64 years	women	27	23
221e Architec	35-39 years	women	24	23
236 College, u	30-34 years	women	18	23
258 Writers a	50-54 years	women	25	23
260 Writers a	55-59 years	women	25	23
328 Physical a	60-64 years	women	24	23
355 Administi	50-54 years	men	27	23
358 Social wo	50-54 years	men	26	23
351 Artistic, e	30-34 years	men	28	23
432 Cashiers,	45-49 years	women	24	23
831 Printing-,	35-39 years	men	21	23
916 Helpers a	30-34 years	men	21	23
247 College, u	60-64 years	men	30	22
242 Other tea	35-39 years	women	25	22
248 Archivists	30-34 years	women	18	22
255 Psycholog	35-39 years	men	22	22
324 Health as	25-29 years	men	14	22
353 Artistic, e	35-39 years	men	22	22

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419 Mail carri	30-34 years	men	18	22
424 Mail carri	40-44 years	women	29	22
618 Animal pr	35-39 years	men	11	22
728 Building f	55-59 years	women	20	22
839 Printing-,	55-59 years	men	27	22
829 Assemble	16-24 years	women	29	22
832 Other ma	25-29 years	women	18	22
844 Other ma	55-59 years	women	22	22
835 Motor-ve	25-29 years	women	23	22
917 Helpers ir	30-34 years	men	26	22
929 Garbage c	55-59 years	men	22	22
937 Transport	30-34 years	men	25	22
941 Transport	40-44 years	men	25	22
13 Armed for	25-29 years	men	14	21
228 Computin	55-59 years	women	21	21
223e Architec	40-44 years	women	17	21
313 Compute	16-24 years	women	21	21
337 Nursing a	55-59 years	men	22	21
341 Life scien	60-64 years	women	17	21
357 Business :	55-59 years	women	19	21
357 Customs,	50-54 years	women	25	21
347 Police off	25-29 years	men	25	21
354 Social wo	40-44 years	men	22	21
412 Numerica	16-24 years	men	9	21
428 Cashiers,	35-39 years	women	28	21
619 Market g:	40-44 years	men	21	21
718 Building f	30-34 years	women	7	21
745 Food pro	30-34 years	men	19	21
829 Wood-prc	30-34 years	women	28	21
918e Doorkee	30-34 years	men	21	21
133 Managers:	25-29 years	men	25	20
230 Computin	60-64 years	women	19	20
217e Architec	25-29 years	women	21	20
250 Archivists	35-39 years	women	21	20
254 Archivists	45-49 years	women	16	20
260 Archivists	60-64 years	women	15	20
250 Psycholog	16-24 years	women	19	20
312 Physical a	16-24 years	women	22	20
325 Compute	50-54 years	women	19	20
323 Health as	16-24 years	women	17	20
341 Pre-prim	45-49 years	men	17	20
353 Customs,	40-44 years	women	25	20
360 Social wo	55-59 years	men	22	20
362 Social wo	60-64 years	men	19	20
416 Office sec	30-34 years	women	24	20
434 Cashiers,	50-54 years	women	21	20

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525e Other pe	45-49 years	women	23	20
728 Blacksmi	35-39 years	men	24	20
818 Metal-pr	35-39 years	men	19	20
824 Metal-pr	50-54 years	men	23	20
814 Wood-pr	16-24 years	men	27	20
830 Chemical	40-44 years	men	20	20
834 Rubber- a	45-49 years	women	25	20
835 Food and	40-44 years	men	21	20
945 Transport	50-54 years	men	19	20
947 Transport	55-59 years	men	16	20
227 Nursing a	30-34 years	men	17	19
249 Special e	55-59 years	women	21	19
262 Writers a	60-64 years	women	23	19
263 Psycholog	55-59 years	men	21	19
344 Business :	25-29 years	men	11	19
353 Police off	40-44 years	men	16	19
359 Police off	55-59 years	men	20	19
355 Artistic, e	40-44 years	men	21	19
413 Numerica	16-24 years	women	25	19
414 Numerica	25-29 years	men	15	19
420 Numerica	40-44 years	men	16	19
425 Mail carri	45-49 years	men	17	19
526 Housekee	55-59 years	men	20	19
527 Protectiv	50-54 years	men	19	19
626 Animal pr	55-59 years	men	16	19
724 Blacksmi	25-29 years	men	20	19
825 Printing-,	16-24 years	men	23	19
834 Printing-,	40-44 years	women	19	19
845 Locomoti	55-59 years	men	17	19
926 Helpers a	55-59 years	men	22	19
928e Doorkee	55-59 years	men	18	19
213 Computir	16-24 years	men	36	18
226 Nursing a	25-29 years	women	11	18
229 Nursing a	35-39 years	men	15	18
249 Other tea	55-59 years	men	19	18
251 Other tea	60-64 years	men	18	18
265 Psycholog	60-64 years	men	21	18
325 Safety an	45-49 years	men	16	18
335 Agronom	55-59 years	men	16	18
327 Nursing a	30-34 years	men	20	18
335 Pre-prim	30-34 years	men	11	18
337 Pre-prim	35-39 years	men	20	18
361 Police off	60-64 years	men	22	18
422 Numerica	45-49 years	men	13	18
432 Mail carri	60-64 years	women	25	18
628 Animal pr	60-64 years	men	13	18

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716 Building f	25-29 years	women	19	18
726 Building f	50-54 years	women	20	18
824 Power-pr	40-44 years	men	17	18
828 Chemical	35-39 years	men	21	18
833 Food and	35-39 years	men	14	18
846 Other ma	60-64 years	women	20	18
833 Motor-ve	16-24 years	women	19	18
837 Motor-ve	30-34 years	women	27	18
914 Helpers a	25-29 years	men	21	18
924e Doorkee	45-49 years	men	19	18
919 Garbage c	30-34 years	men	22	18
921 Garbage c	35-39 years	men	13	18
927 Garbage c	50-54 years	men	19	18
933 Manufact	16-24 years	women	26	18
225e Architec	45-49 years	women	16	17
235 Other tea	16-24 years	men	7	17
247 Legal prof	30-34 years	women	15	17
252 Archivists	40-44 years	women	17	17
323 Safety an	40-44 years	men	14	17
333 Nursing a	45-49 years	men	16	17
416 Numerica	30-34 years	men	12	17
521e Other pe	35-39 years	women	21	17
615 Market g	30-34 years	men	20	17
613 Animal pr	16-24 years	women	13	17
949 Manufact	60-64 years	women	17	17
127 Legislator	60-64 years	men	17	16
124 Productio	25-29 years	men	17	16
233 College, u	25-29 years	men	16	16
234 College, u	25-29 years	women	16	16
245 Primary e	50-54 years	men	19	16
246 Archivists	25-29 years	women	13	16
253 Psycholog	30-34 years	men	13	16
321 Optical ar	40-44 years	men	12	16
337 Agronom	60-64 years	men	14	16
339 Pre-prim	40-44 years	men	14	16
356 Business	55-59 years	men	15	16
428 Mail carri	50-54 years	women	22	16
519e Other pe	30-34 years	women	16	16
529 Protectiv	55-59 years	men	12	16
618e Forestry	30-34 years	men	14	16
626e Forestry	50-54 years	men	12	16
826 Metal-pr	55-59 years	men	14	16
822 Power-pr	35-39 years	men	17	16
831 Rubber- a	40-44 years	men	27	16
836 Rubber- a	50-54 years	women	15	16
838 Rubber- a	55-59 years	women	14	16

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838 Printing-,	50-54 years	women	10	16
831 Food and	30-34 years	men	16	16
834 Other ma	30-34 years	women	12	16
841 Motor-ve	40-44 years	women	18	16
916e Doorkee	25-29 years	men	13	16
920e Doorkee	35-39 years	men	8	16
937 Manufact	30-34 years	women	21	16
15 occupatio	50-54 years	women	18	16
17 occupatio	55-59 years	women	11	16
231 Nursing a	40-44 years	men	15	15
247 Writers a	25-29 years	men	15	15
335 Nursing a	50-54 years	men	14	15
331 Life scien	35-39 years	women	11	15
345 Pre-prim	55-59 years	men	10	15
348 Other tea	60-64 years	men	11	15
348 Police off	25-29 years	women	13	15
350 Artistic, e	25-29 years	women	23	15
358 Artistic, e	45-49 years	women	16	15
359 Artistic, e	50-54 years	men	20	15
428 Numerica	60-64 years	men	20	15
617 Market g	35-39 years	men	17	15
742 Potters, g	45-49 years	men	15	15
744 Potters, g	50-54 years	men	21	15
746 Potters, g	55-59 years	men	22	15
747 Food pro	35-39 years	men	11	15
749 Food pro	40-44 years	men	12	15
820 Metal-pro	40-44 years	men	18	15
824 Chemical-	25-29 years	men	19	15
827 Wood-pro	25-29 years	women	14	15
924 Other sal	30-34 years	women	14	15
233 Primary e	16-24 years	men	15	14
248 Legal prof	35-39 years	men	14	14
249 Legal prof	35-39 years	women	12	14
258 Legal prof	60-64 years	men	20	14
262 Religious	60-64 years	men	12	14
251 Psycholog	25-29 years	men	13	14
257 Psycholog	40-44 years	men	10	14
327 Optical ar	55-59 years	men	14	14
331 Nursing a	40-44 years	men	18	14
339 Nursing a	60-64 years	men	13	14
346 Other tea	55-59 years	men	10	14
359 Business :	60-64 years	women	12	14
352 Police off	35-39 years	women	16	14
354 Police off	40-44 years	women	13	14
354 Artistic, e	35-39 years	women	30	14
357 Artistic, e	45-49 years	men	14	14

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431e Library a	60-64 years	women	16	14
423 Cashiers,	25-29 years	men	9	14
527e Other pe	50-54 years	women	10	14
520 Protectiv	30-34 years	women	14	14
528 Protectiv	50-54 years	women	12	14
613 Market g	25-29 years	men	15	14
617 Animal pr	30-34 years	women	10	14
614 Forestry a	16-24 years	men	12	14
720 Building f	35-39 years	women	9	14
754 Wood tre	50-54 years	men	14	14
838 Metal- an	60-64 years	women	6	14
833 Wood-pr	40-44 years	women	15	14
839 Wood-pr	55-59 years	women	16	14
918 Helpers a	35-39 years	men	14	14
926 Other sal	35-39 years	women	19	14
125 Other spe	25-29 years	men	16	13
245 Special ec	45-49 years	women	12	13
247 Special ec	50-54 years	women	12	13
245 Other tea	45-49 years	men	15	13
317 Optical ar	30-34 years	men	11	13
325 Agronom	30-34 years	men	14	13
327 Agronom	35-39 years	men	12	13
331 Agronom	45-49 years	men	14	13
326 Health as	30-34 years	men	13	13
337 Life scienc	50-54 years	women	11	13
339 Life scienc	55-59 years	women	17	13
414 Office sec	25-29 years	women	11	13
426 Numerica	55-59 years	men	13	13
528 Housekee	60-64 years	men	14	13
522 Protectiv	35-39 years	women	14	13
524 Protectiv	40-44 years	women	13	13
624 Animal pr	50-54 years	men	10	13
715e Painters	16-24 years	women	10	13
748 Potters, g	60-64 years	men	14	13
826 Chemical-	30-34 years	men	12	13
838 Chemical-	60-64 years	men	11	13
828 Food and	16-24 years	women	11	13
836 Food and	40-44 years	women	12	13
922e Doorkee	40-44 years	men	16	13
925 Garbage c	45-49 years	men	16	13
931 Garbage c	60-64 years	men	12	13
920 Other sal	16-24 years	women	12	13
947 Manufact	55-59 years	women	15	13
130 Directors	40-44 years	women	10	12
134 Managers	25-29 years	women	12	12
216 Computin	25-29 years	women	15	12

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233 Nursing a	45-49 years	men	8	12
258 Archivists	55-59 years	women	16	12
327 Computer	55-59 years	women	12	12
325 Optical ar	50-54 years	men	14	12
317 Safety an	25-29 years	men	10	12
321 Safety an	35-39 years	men	15	12
331 Safety an	60-64 years	men	17	12
332 Health as	45-49 years	men	10	12
329 Life scien	30-34 years	women	13	12
333 Pre-prim	25-29 years	men	11	12
347 Pre-prim	60-64 years	men	12	12
347 Other tea	55-59 years	women	10	12
355 Police off	45-49 years	men	8	12
357 Police off	50-54 years	men	18	12
526 Protectiv	45-49 years	women	13	12
530 Protectiv	55-59 years	women	12	12
625 Crop and	50-54 years	men	8	12
629 Crop and	60-64 years	men	21	12
616e Forestry	25-29 years	men	14	12
624e Forestry	45-49 years	men	17	12
722 Building f	40-44 years	women	16	12
741 Food pro	16-24 years	men	15	12
812 Metal-pro	16-24 years	men	20	12
820 Power-pr	30-34 years	men	9	12
824 Metal- an	25-29 years	women	14	12
824 Rubber- a	16-24 years	women	8	12
839 Rubber- a	60-64 years	men	18	12
840 Rubber- a	60-64 years	women	13	12
843 Locomoti	50-54 years	men	14	12
920 Helpers a	40-44 years	men	17	12
922 Helpers a	45-49 years	men	9	12
924 Helpers a	50-54 years	men	9	12
921 Helpers ir	40-44 years	men	10	12
917e Doorkee	25-29 years	women	12	12
923 Garbage c	40-44 years	men	13	12
931 Mining ar	16-24 years	men	11	12
132 Directors	45-49 years	women	13	11
243 Other tea	40-44 years	men	9	11
256 Archivists	50-54 years	women	13	11
258 Administi	45-49 years	men	14	11
259 Administi	45-49 years	women	8	11
261 Psycholog	50-54 years	men	9	11
329 Safety an	55-59 years	men	13	11
336 Health as	55-59 years	men	8	11
327 Life scien	25-29 years	women	10	11
343 Administi	16-24 years	men	11	11

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346 Social wo	16-24 years	men	11	11
361 Artistic, e	55-59 years	men	8	11
363 Artistic, e	60-64 years	men	11	11
418 Numerica	35-39 years	men	9	11
429e Library a	55-59 years	women	11	11
430 Client infr	40-44 years	men	10	11
531 Protectivi	60-64 years	men	10	11
612 Market g:	16-24 years	women	9	11
618 Market g:	35-39 years	women	17	11
624 Market g:	50-54 years	women	7	11
627 Crop and	55-59 years	men	13	11
630e Forestry	60-64 years	men	10	11
743 Food proc	25-29 years	men	18	11
748 Food proc	35-39 years	women	9	11
827e Wood-p	50-54 years	women	13	11
822 Chemical-	16-24 years	men	11	11
841 Wood-prc	60-64 years	women	13	11
836 Printing-,	45-49 years	women	15	11
847 Motor-ve	55-59 years	women	15	11
849 Motor-ve	60-64 years	women	15	11
928 Helpers a	60-64 years	men	14	11
917 Garbage c	25-29 years	men	9	11
921 Agricultu	16-24 years	men	18	11
126 Legislator	55-59 years	women	9	10
231e Architec	60-64 years	women	6	10
237 Other tea	25-29 years	men	8	10
247 Other tea	50-54 years	men	14	10
245 Legal prof	25-29 years	women	12	10
249 Archivists	35-39 years	men	10	10
248 Public ser	16-24 years	women	5	10
249 Public ser	25-29 years	men	10	10
257 Administi	40-44 years	women	13	10
329 Optical ar	60-64 years	men	10	10
327 Safety an	50-54 years	men	9	10
323 Agronom	25-29 years	men	7	10
333 Agronom	50-54 years	men	11	10
329 Nursing a	35-39 years	men	11	10
335 Life scienc	45-49 years	women	9	10
336 Other tea	30-34 years	men	11	10
338 Other tea	35-39 years	men	10	10
340 Other tea	40-44 years	men	8	10
341 Other tea	40-44 years	women	7	10
346 Customs,	25-29 years	men	11	10
356 Police off	45-49 years	women	9	10
424 Numerica	50-54 years	men	9	10
427e Library a	50-54 years	women	11	10

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

423 Mail carri	40-44 years	men	9	10
425 Cashiers,	30-34 years	men	10	10
438 Cashiers,	60-64 years	women	19	10
426 Client infr	30-34 years	men	20	10
428 Client infr	35-39 years	men	13	10
524e Other pe	45-49 years	men	7	10
620 Market g	40-44 years	women	10	10
622 Market g	45-49 years	women	8	10
615 Animal pr	25-29 years	women	10	10
623 Animal pr	45-49 years	women	15	10
617 Crop and	30-34 years	men	11	10
715 Building f	25-29 years	women	8	10
740 Potters, g	40-44 years	men	19	10
745 Craft prin	45-49 years	women	11	10
744 Food pro	25-29 years	women	11	10
758 Wood tre	60-64 years	men	9	10
760 Garment	60-64 years	women	10	10
828 Metal-pr	60-64 years	men	9	10
830 Rubber- a	35-39 years	women	11	10
832 Rubber- a	40-44 years	women	11	10
837 Food and	45-49 years	men	11	10
838 Food and	45-49 years	women	10	10
842 Food and	55-59 years	women	7	10
914 Doorkeep	16-24 years	men	12	10
919e Doorkee	30-34 years	women	10	10
929e Doorkee	55-59 years	women	10	10
931e Doorkee	60-64 years	women	7	10
19 occupatio	60-64 years	women	8	10
15 Armed for	30-34 years	men	12	9
25 Armed for	55-59 years	men	10	9
125 Legislator	55-59 years	men	10	9
241 Special ec	35-39 years	women	5	9
250 Special ec	60-64 years	men	6	9
239 Other tea	30-34 years	men	16	9
241 Business	16-24 years	men	9	9
251 Legal prof	40-44 years	women	8	9
259 Religious	50-54 years	women	4	9
260 Religious	55-59 years	men	15	9
259 Psycholog	45-49 years	men	12	9
323 Optical ar	45-49 years	men	8	9
330 Health as	40-44 years	men	7	9
338 Health as	60-64 years	men	12	9
333 Life scien	40-44 years	women	9	9
345 Other tea	50-54 years	women	9	9
360 Customs,	60-64 years	men	15	9
434 Client infr	50-54 years	men	7	9

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

531e Other pe	60-64 years	women	7	9
620 Animal pr	40-44 years	men	6	9
621 Crop and	40-44 years	men	7	9
620e Forestry	35-39 years	men	8	9
719 Building f	35-39 years	women	6	9
743 Precision	50-54 years	men	6	9
755 Food pro	55-59 years	men	6	9
825e Wood-p	45-49 years	women	8	9
836 Chemical	55-59 years	men	10	9
830 Food and	25-29 years	women	10	9
834 Food and	35-39 years	women	16	9
847 Locomoti	60-64 years	men	8	9
923 Helpers ir	45-49 years	men	9	9
915e Doorkee	16-24 years	women	6	9
933 Mining ar	25-29 years	men	8	9
126 Other spe	25-29 years	women	7	8
239 Nursing a	60-64 years	men	7	8
243 Special ec	40-44 years	women	6	8
250 Legal pro	40-44 years	men	10	8
257 Legal pro	55-59 years	women	6	8
254 Religious	40-44 years	men	12	8
256 Religious	45-49 years	men	7	8
258 Religious	50-54 years	men	6	8
318 Safety an	25-29 years	women	5	8
331 Pre-prim	16-24 years	men	6	8
337 Other tea	30-34 years	women	9	8
339 Other tea	35-39 years	women	14	8
343 Other tea	45-49 years	women	6	8
344 Other tea	50-54 years	men	14	8
343 Business	16-24 years	women	8	8
427 Cashiers,	35-39 years	men	7	8
616 Market g	30-34 years	women	9	8
614 Animal pr	25-29 years	men	11	8
621 Animal pr	40-44 years	women	9	8
622 Animal pr	45-49 years	men	10	8
625 Animal pr	50-54 years	women	2	8
619 Crop and	35-39 years	men	6	8
723 Building f	45-49 years	women	7	8
730 Building f	60-64 years	women	8	8
717e Painters	25-29 years	women	6	8
722 Blacksmi	16-24 years	men	13	8
749 Potters, g	60-64 years	women	6	8
743 Craft prin	40-44 years	women	7	8
742 Food pro	16-24 years	women	12	8
750 Food pro	40-44 years	women	10	8
753 Food pro	50-54 years	men	10	8

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754 Garment	45-49 years	women	9	8
821e Wood-p	35-39 years	women	8	8
829e Wood-p	55-59 years	women	7	8
818 Power-pr	25-29 years	men	7	8
822 Metal- an	16-24 years	women	9	8
830 Printing-,	30-34 years	women	9	8
832 Food and	30-34 years	women	9	8
839 Food and	50-54 years	men	6	8
840 Food and	50-54 years	women	9	8
927e Doorkee	50-54 years	women	10	8
922 Other sal	25-29 years	women	8	8
945 Mining ar	55-59 years	men	6	8
949 Transport	60-64 years	men	10	8
21 Armed forc	45-49 years	men	7	7
123 Legislator	50-54 years	men	9	7
134 Directors	50-54 years	women	7	7
123 Productio	16-24 years	women	7	7
229e Architec	55-59 years	women	8	7
246 Legal prof	30-34 years	men	11	7
252 Legal prof	45-49 years	men	5	7
255 Legal prof	50-54 years	women	6	7
246 Writers a	16-24 years	women	7	7
261 Administr	50-54 years	women	7	7
262 Administr	55-59 years	men	5	7
264 Administr	60-64 years	men	9	7
316 Optical ar	25-29 years	women	7	7
319 Safety an	30-34 years	men	9	7
324 Safety an	40-44 years	women	6	7
326 Agronom	30-34 years	women	8	7
328 Health as	35-39 years	men	7	7
334 Health as	50-54 years	men	8	7
343 Pre-prim	50-54 years	men	9	7
350 Customs,	35-39 years	men	5	7
358 Customs,	55-59 years	men	11	7
360 Artistic, e	50-54 years	women	7	7
412 Office sec	16-24 years	women	5	7
421 Mail carri	35-39 years	men	9	7
432 Client inf	45-49 years	men	9	7
436 Client inf	55-59 years	men	11	7
511 Travel att	16-24 years	men	7	7
514 Other per	16-24 years	men	5	7
516e Other pe	25-29 years	men	6	7
626 Market g	55-59 years	women	9	7
619 Animal pr	35-39 years	women	6	7
615 Crop and	25-29 years	men	6	7
624 Crop and	45-49 years	women	3	7

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

622e Forestry	40-44 years	men	8	7
730 Metal mo	40-44 years	women	9	7
747 Precision	60-64 years	men	7	7
747 Potters, g	55-59 years	women	12	7
738 Craft prin	30-34 years	men	5	7
744 Craft prin	45-49 years	men	7	7
746 Food pro	30-34 years	women	6	7
758 Garment	55-59 years	women	11	7
817e Wood-p	25-29 years	women	6	7
826 Rubber- a	25-29 years	women	5	7
828 Rubber- a	30-34 years	women	4	7
825 Wood-pr	16-24 years	women	5	7
842 Printing-,	60-64 years	women	6	7
835 Textile-, f	40-44 years	women	6	7
17 Armed for	35-39 years	men	5	6
121 Legislator	45-49 years	men	6	6
124 Legislator	50-54 years	women	8	6
136 Directors	55-59 years	women	5	6
122 Productio	16-24 years	men	7	6
214 Architect:	16-24 years	men	11	6
233 Life scien	50-54 years	men	8	6
237 Life scien	60-64 years	men	6	6
232 Secondar	16-24 years	men	3	6
242 Business	16-24 years	women	11	6
256 Legal pro	55-59 years	men	7	6
245 Writers a	16-24 years	men	5	6
255 Religious	40-44 years	women	3	6
254 Administ	35-39 years	men	4	6
263 Administ	55-59 years	women	6	6
265 Administ	60-64 years	women	5	6
315 Optical ar	25-29 years	men	7	6
320 Optical ar	35-39 years	women	5	6
332 Agronom	45-49 years	women	4	6
323 Nursing a	16-24 years	men	1	6
342 Other tea	45-49 years	men	10	6
348 Customs,	30-34 years	men	8	6
348 Artistic, e	16-24 years	women	3	6
362 Artistic, e	55-59 years	women	8	6
514 Travel att	25-29 years	women	6	6
526e Other pe	50-54 years	men	3	6
713 Building f	16-24 years	women	8	6
725 Building f	50-54 years	women	7	6
734 Metal mo	50-54 years	women	6	6
745 Potters, g	50-54 years	women	7	6
741 Craft prin	35-39 years	women	6	6
742 Craft prin	40-44 years	men	6	6

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

751 Food prod	45-49 years	men	9	6
752 Food prod	45-49 years	women	3	6
750 Wood tre	40-44 years	men	9	6
752 Wood tre	45-49 years	men	6	6
756 Wood tre	55-59 years	men	8	6
831e Wood-p	60-64 years	women	5	6
829 Chemical	35-39 years	women	3	6
826 Printing-	16-24 years	women	9	6
832 Printing-	35-39 years	women	8	6
840 Printing-	55-59 years	women	9	6
839 Textile-, f	50-54 years	women	5	6
841 Food and	55-59 years	men	6	6
843 Food and	60-64 years	men	7	6
842 Agricultu	40-44 years	women	3	6
921e Doorkee	35-39 years	women	6	6
923e Doorkee	40-44 years	women	8	6
925e Doorkee	45-49 years	women	3	6
923 Agricultu	25-29 years	men	6	6
925 Agricultu	30-34 years	men	5	6
935 Mining ar	30-34 years	men	4	6
936 Transport	25-29 years	women	5	6
944 Transport	45-49 years	women	5	6
12 Armed for	16-24 years	women	4	5
23 Armed for	50-54 years	men	5	5
27 Armed for	60-64 years	men	2	5
122 Legislator	45-49 years	women	4	5
128 Legislator	60-64 years	women	7	5
132 Managers	16-24 years	women	10	5
228 Life scienc	35-39 years	women	4	5
230 Life scienc	40-44 years	women	6	5
231 Life scienc	45-49 years	men	3	5
235 Life scienc	55-59 years	men	5	5
235 Nursing a	50-54 years	men	6	5
237 Nursing a	55-59 years	men	4	5
231 College, u	16-24 years	men	5	5
233 Secondar	16-24 years	women	3	5
248 Special ec	55-59 years	men	4	5
241 Other tea	35-39 years	men	9	5
253 Legal prof	45-49 years	women	5	5
254 Legal prof	50-54 years	men	5	5
251 Archivists	40-44 years	men	4	5
250 Religious	30-34 years	men	6	5
263 Religious	60-64 years	women	5	5
260 Administi	50-54 years	men	5	5
319 Optical ar	35-39 years	men	5	5
324e Ship and	45-49 years	men	4	5

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

326e Ship and	50-54 years	men	5	5
315 Safety an	16-24 years	men	4	5
328 Agronom	35-39 years	women	1	5
329 Agronom	40-44 years	men	5	5
335 Other tea	25-29 years	women	8	5
342 Business :	16-24 years	men	5	5
360 Religious	50-54 years	men	4	5
425 Office sec	55-59 years	men	3	5
512 Travel att	16-24 years	women	5	5
520 Travel att	40-44 years	women	5	5
525 Travel att	55-59 years	men	4	5
526 Travel att	55-59 years	women	4	5
522e Other pe	40-44 years	men	8	5
530e Other pe	60-64 years	men	6	5
612 Animal pr	16-24 years	men	5	5
613 Crop and	16-24 years	men	4	5
622 Crop and	40-44 years	women	3	5
623 Crop and	45-49 years	men	4	5
721 Miners, sl	45-49 years	men	5	5
721e Painters	35-39 years	women	6	5
723e Painters	40-44 years	women	4	5
722 Metal mo	16-24 years	women	3	5
728 Metal mo	35-39 years	women	4	5
724 Machiner	16-24 years	women	3	5
725 Electrical	16-24 years	women	2	5
731 Precision	16-24 years	men	4	5
737 Precision	35-39 years	men	6	5
739 Precision	40-44 years	men	7	5
741 Precision	45-49 years	men	6	5
738 Potters, g	35-39 years	men	12	5
743 Potters, g	45-49 years	women	8	5
746 Craft prin	50-54 years	men	6	5
819e Wood-p	30-34 years	women	6	5
843 Textile-, f	60-64 years	women	6	5
841 Locomoti	45-49 years	men	6	5
848 Agricultu	55-59 years	women	3	5
925 Helpers ir	50-54 years	men	2	5
929 Helpers ir	60-64 years	men	7	5
922 Agricultu	16-24 years	women	11	5
933 Agricultu	50-54 years	men	8	5
935 Agricultu	55-59 years	men	2	5
936 Agricultu	55-59 years	women	5	5
118 Legislator	35-39 years	women	4	4
128 Senior off	60-64 years	men	3	4
125 Directors	30-34 years	men	3	4
131 Managers:	16-24 years	men	7	4

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

215	Physicists	30-34 years	men	2	4
222	Physicists	45-49 years	women	1	4
214	Computin	16-24 years	women	2	4
227e	Architec	50-54 years	women	5	4
226	Life scien	30-34 years	women	3	4
227	Life scien	35-39 years	men	2	4
232	Life scien	45-49 years	women	4	4
234	Life scien	50-54 years	women	2	4
236	Life scien	55-59 years	women	3	4
232	College, u	16-24 years	women	4	4
239	Special ec	30-34 years	women	5	4
244	Legal prof	25-29 years	men	3	4
255	Archivists	50-54 years	men	4	4
255	Social sci	45-49 years	women	2	4
261	Religious	55-59 years	women	4	4
253	Administri	30-34 years	women	6	4
256	Administri	40-44 years	men	3	4
329	Computer	60-64 years	women	6	4
318	Optical ar	30-34 years	women	6	4
322	Optical ar	40-44 years	women	2	4
320e	Ship and	35-39 years	men	2	4
330e	Ship and	60-64 years	men	6	4
322	Safety an	35-39 years	women	4	4
330	Safety an	55-59 years	women	3	4
332	Safety an	60-64 years	women	5	4
325	Life scien	16-24 years	women	6	4
334	Life scien	45-49 years	men	3	4
354	Customs,	45-49 years	men	2	4
356	Customs,	50-54 years	men	6	4
419e	Library a	30-34 years	women	5	4
421e	Library a	35-39 years	women	3	4
429	Cashiers,	40-44 years	men	5	4
431	Cashiers,	45-49 years	men	1	4
521	Travel att	45-49 years	men	3	4
522	Travel att	45-49 years	women	2	4
523	Travel att	50-54 years	men	3	4
527	Travel att	60-64 years	men	5	4
528	Travel att	60-64 years	women	4	4
529e	Other pe	55-59 years	women	7	4
532	Protectivi	60-64 years	women	4	4
614	Market g:	25-29 years	women	5	4
628	Market g:	60-64 years	women	3	4
616	Animal pr	30-34 years	men	8	4
627	Animal pr	55-59 years	women	4	4
616	Crop and	25-29 years	women	4	4
626	Crop and	50-54 years	women	3	4

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

713 Miners, sl	25-29 years	men	1	4
715 Miners, sl	30-34 years	men	4	4
717 Miners, sl	35-39 years	men	3	4
721 Building f	40-44 years	women	7	4
719e Painters	30-34 years	women	4	4
724 Metal mo	25-29 years	women	4	4
726 Metal mo	30-34 years	women	3	4
732 Metal mo	45-49 years	women	4	4
731 Electrical	35-39 years	women	4	4
733 Electrical	40-44 years	women	3	4
745 Precision	55-59 years	men	4	4
735 Potters, g	25-29 years	women	3	4
739 Potters, g	35-39 years	women	2	4
734 Craft prin	16-24 years	men	5	4
747 Craft prin	50-54 years	women	3	4
749 Craft prin	55-59 years	women	5	4
746 Wood tre	30-34 years	men	5	4
748 Wood tre	35-39 years	men	4	4
750 Garment	35-39 years	women	3	4
751 Garment	40-44 years	men	5	4
752 Garment	40-44 years	women	6	4
755 Garment	50-54 years	men	5	4
756 Garment	50-54 years	women	9	4
823 Mineral-p	50-54 years	men	2	4
825 Metal-prc	50-54 years	women	1	4
827 Power-pr	45-49 years	women	6	4
817 Industrial	16-24 years	men	5	4
833 Chemical-	45-49 years	women	3	4
837 Textile-, f	45-49 years	women	5	4
844 Food and	60-64 years	women	6	4
840 Agricultu	35-39 years	women	4	4
916 Garbage c	16-24 years	women	3	4
930 Agricultu	40-44 years	women	5	4
938 Agricultu	60-64 years	women	2	4
937 Mining ar	35-39 years	men	2	4
941 Mining ar	45-49 years	men	4	4
943 Mining ar	50-54 years	men	3	4
938 Transport	30-34 years	women	2	4
119 Legislator	40-44 years	men	1	3
128 Directors	35-39 years	women	4	3
138 Directors	60-64 years	women	3	3
123 Other spe	16-24 years	men	2	3
217 Physicists	35-39 years	men	3	3
219 Physicists	40-44 years	men	1	3
229 Life scien	40-44 years	men	3	3
237 Special ec	25-29 years	women	3	3

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

242 Special ec	40-44 years	men	3	3
259 Legal prof	60-64 years	women	5	3
244 Archivists	16-24 years	women	2	3
245 Archivists	25-29 years	men	2	3
247 Archivists	30-34 years	men	2	3
253 Archivists	45-49 years	men	5	3
259 Archivists	60-64 years	men	5	3
247 Social sci	25-29 years	women	2	3
249 Social sci	30-34 years	women	3	3
257 Social sci	50-54 years	women	1	3
249 Religious	25-29 years	women	2	3
252 Religious	35-39 years	men	5	3
257 Religious	45-49 years	women	6	3
252 Administr	30-34 years	men	5	3
255 Administr	35-39 years	women	1	3
249 Psycholog	16-24 years	men	2	3
314 Optical ar	16-24 years	women	5	3
328 Optical ar	55-59 years	women	3	3
316 Safety an	16-24 years	women	0	3
320 Safety an	30-34 years	women	4	3
324 Agronom	25-29 years	women	4	3
336 Life scienc	50-54 years	men	3	3
338 Life scienc	55-59 years	men	3	3
349 Other tea	60-64 years	women	5	3
344 Customs,	16-24 years	men	3	3
345 Customs,	16-24 years	women	7	3
358 Police off	50-54 years	women	4	3
360 Police off	55-59 years	women	5	3
362 Police off	60-64 years	women	1	3
364 Artistic, e	60-64 years	women	3	3
356 Religious	40-44 years	men	4	3
411 Office sec	16-24 years	men	2	3
415 Office sec	30-34 years	men	1	3
417 Office sec	35-39 years	men	0	3
421 Office sec	45-49 years	men	3	3
423e Library a	40-44 years	women	2	3
424e Library a	45-49 years	men	2	3
428e Library a	55-59 years	men	2	3
430e Library a	60-64 years	men	3	3
437 Cashiers,	60-64 years	men	2	3
515 Travel att	30-34 years	men	2	3
519 Travel att	40-44 years	men	5	3
524 Travel att	50-54 years	women	5	3
518e Other pe	30-34 years	men	5	3
618 Crop and	30-34 years	women	2	3
630 Crop and	60-64 years	women	0	3

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729 Building f	60-64 years	women	2	3
736 Metal mo	55-59 years	women	6	3
738 Metal mo	60-64 years	women	4	3
738 Machiner	55-59 years	women	3	3
740 Machiner	60-64 years	women	3	3
727 Electrical	25-29 years	women	3	3
735 Electrical	45-49 years	women	1	3
739 Electrical	55-59 years	women	0	3
744 Precision	50-54 years	women	2	3
733 Potters, g	16-24 years	women	3	3
739 Craft prin	30-34 years	women	5	3
748 Craft prin	55-59 years	men	3	3
754 Food pro	50-54 years	women	2	3
757 Food pro	60-64 years	men	3	3
744 Wood tre	25-29 years	men	4	3
745 Garment	25-29 years	men	1	3
753 Garment	45-49 years	men	7	3
759 Garment	60-64 years	men	3	3
754 Pelt, leatl	45-49 years	men	2	3
811 Mineral-p	16-24 years	men	3	3
821 Mineral-p	45-49 years	men	4	3
815 Metal-pr	25-29 years	women	3	3
823e Wood-p	40-44 years	women	7	3
816 Power-pr	16-24 years	men	6	3
823 Power-pr	35-39 years	women	1	3
827 Chemical-	30-34 years	women	4	3
837 Chemical-	55-59 years	women	2	3
830 Textile-, f	30-34 years	men	3	3
834 Textile-, f	40-44 years	men	2	3
836 Textile-, f	45-49 years	men	2	3
841 Textile-, f	55-59 years	women	4	3
834 Agricultu	16-24 years	women	4	3
846 Agricultu	50-54 years	women	2	3
924 Garbage c	40-44 years	women	2	3
924 Agricultu	25-29 years	women	3	3
932 Agricultu	45-49 years	women	3	3
934 Transport	16-24 years	women	3	3
940 Transport	35-39 years	women	4	3
942 Transport	40-44 years	women	4	3
950 Transport	60-64 years	women	2	3
126 Senior off	55-59 years	men	2	2
126 Directors	30-34 years	women	1	2
216 Physicists	30-34 years	women	3	2
221 Physicists	45-49 years	men	1	2
223 Physicists	50-54 years	men	0	2
218 Mathema	35-39 years	men	3	2

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

215e Architect	16-24 years	women	5	2
225 Life scienc	30-34 years	men	4	2
222 Health pr	16-24 years	men	0	2
225 Nursing a	25-29 years	men	3	2
240 Special ec	35-39 years	men	2	2
257 Archivists	55-59 years	men	0	2
248 Social sci	30-34 years	men	1	2
250 Social sci	35-39 years	men	1	2
251 Social sci	35-39 years	women	1	2
256 Social sci	50-54 years	men	0	2
251 Religious	30-34 years	women	2	2
247 Public ser	16-24 years	men	5	2
250 Administr	25-29 years	men	1	2
326 Optical ar	50-54 years	women	1	2
316e Ship and	25-29 years	men	1	2
322e Ship and	40-44 years	men	2	2
328e Ship and	55-59 years	men	4	2
329e Ship and	55-59 years	women	2	2
328 Safety an	50-54 years	women	4	2
330 Agronom	40-44 years	women	3	2
322 Health as	16-24 years	men	2	2
328 Life scienc	30-34 years	men	2	2
332 Life scienc	40-44 years	men	1	2
340 Life scienc	60-64 years	men	3	2
333 Other tea	16-24 years	women	3	2
334 Other tea	25-29 years	men	5	2
352 Customs,	40-44 years	men	5	2
357 Religious	40-44 years	women	1	2
358 Religious	45-49 years	men	1	2
362 Religious	55-59 years	men	2	2
364 Religious	60-64 years	men	1	2
413 Office sec	25-29 years	men	3	2
423 Office sec	50-54 years	men	2	2
416e Library a	25-29 years	men	2	2
417e Library a	25-29 years	women	2	2
425e Library a	45-49 years	women	2	2
426e Library a	50-54 years	men	2	2
433 Cashiers,	50-54 years	men	2	2
435 Cashiers,	55-59 years	men	4	2
438 Client inf	60-64 years	men	1	2
516 Travel att	30-34 years	women	2	2
520e Other pe	35-39 years	men	1	2
528e Other pe	55-59 years	men	2	2
629 Animal pr	60-64 years	women	2	2
625e Forestry	45-49 years	women	2	2
629 Fishery w	55-59 years	men	4	2

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

723 Miners, sl	50-54 years	men	1	2
725 Miners, sl	55-59 years	men	2	2
717 Building f	30-34 years	women	3	2
727 Building f	55-59 years	women	1	2
729e Painters	55-59 years	women	2	2
729 Blacksmith	35-39 years	women	1	2
736 Machiner	50-54 years	women	3	2
733 Precision	25-29 years	men	1	2
742 Precision	45-49 years	women	2	2
737 Potters, g	30-34 years	women	4	2
745 Handicraft	50-54 years	men	1	2
737 Craft print	25-29 years	women	1	2
751 Craft print	60-64 years	women	2	2
756 Food prod	55-59 years	women	2	2
758 Food prod	60-64 years	women	4	2
745 Wood tre	25-29 years	women	0	2
746 Garment	25-29 years	women	3	2
747 Garment	30-34 years	men	1	2
757 Garment	55-59 years	men	1	2
750 Pelt, leath	35-39 years	men	2	2
813 Mineral-p	25-29 years	men	2	2
815 Mineral-p	30-34 years	men	2	2
817 Mineral-p	35-39 years	men	3	2
819 Mineral-p	40-44 years	men	3	2
827 Mineral-p	60-64 years	men	3	2
829 Metal-pr	60-64 years	women	1	2
825 Glass, cer	50-54 years	men	11	2
815 Chemical-	16-24 years	men	1	2
825 Chemical-	45-49 years	men	22	2
827 Chemical-	50-54 years	men	17	2
832 Chemical-	60-64 years	women	5	2
825 Power-pr	40-44 years	women	2	2
829 Power-pr	50-54 years	women	2	2
825 Industrial	40-44 years	men	2	2
823 Chemical-	16-24 years	women	0	2
831 Chemical-	40-44 years	women	3	2
835 Chemical-	50-54 years	women	2	2
828 Printing-,	25-29 years	women	2	2
832 Textile-, f	35-39 years	men	1	2
833 Textile-, f	35-39 years	women	3	2
838 Textile-, f	50-54 years	men	3	2
836 Agricultur	25-29 years	women	5	2
838 Agricultur	30-34 years	women	2	2
838 Ships' de	30-34 years	men	1	2
917 Street ver	35-39 years	men	0	2
927 Helpers ir	55-59 years	men	9	2

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

920 Garbage c	30-34 years	women	1	2
926 Agricultu	30-34 years	women	1	2
929 Agricultu	40-44 years	men	2	2
931 Agricultu	45-49 years	men	3	2
934 Agricultu	50-54 years	women	4	2
939 Mining ar	40-44 years	men	2	2
947 Mining ar	60-64 years	men	2	2
14 Armed for	25-29 years	women	0	1
18 Armed for	35-39 years	women	2	1
19 Armed for	40-44 years	men	1	1
20 Armed for	40-44 years	women	0	1
113 Legislator	25-29 years	men	1	1
120 Legislator	40-44 years	women	1	1
117 Senior off	30-34 years	women	1	1
121 Senior off	40-44 years	women	1	1
124 Senior off	50-54 years	men	1	1
127 Senior off	55-59 years	women	0	1
129 Senior off	60-64 years	women	1	1
123 Directors	25-29 years	men	2	1
124 Other spe	16-24 years	women	1	1
214 Physicists	25-29 years	women	1	1
220 Physicists	40-44 years	women	1	1
225 Physicists	55-59 years	men	1	1
213 Mathema	16-24 years	women	0	1
216 Mathema	30-34 years	men	1	1
220 Mathema	40-44 years	men	0	1
226 Mathema	55-59 years	men	1	1
224 Life scienc	25-29 years	women	2	1
223 Health pr	16-24 years	women	1	1
238 Special ec	30-34 years	men	0	1
244 Special ec	45-49 years	men	0	1
246 Special ec	50-54 years	men	2	1
242 Legal prof	16-24 years	men	0	1
243 Legal prof	16-24 years	women	1	1
246 Social sci	25-29 years	men	1	1
252 Social sci	40-44 years	men	0	1
253 Social sci	40-44 years	women	5	1
254 Social sci	45-49 years	men	3	1
258 Social sci	55-59 years	men	1	1
259 Social sci	55-59 years	women	0	1
246 Religious	16-24 years	men	1	1
253 Religious	35-39 years	women	3	1
249 Administr	16-24 years	women	0	1
251 Administr	25-29 years	women	3	1
324 Optical ar	45-49 years	women	2	1
330 Optical ar	60-64 years	women	0	1

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

317e Ship and	25-29 years	women	1	1
318e Ship and	30-34 years	men	0	1
326 Safety an	45-49 years	women	1	1
322 Agronom	16-24 years	women	2	1
338 Agronom	60-64 years	women	0	1
324 Life scien	16-24 years	men	1	1
326 Life scien	25-29 years	men	0	1
332 Other tea	16-24 years	men	0	1
346 Police off	16-24 years	women	1	1
352 Religious	30-34 years	men	1	1
359 Religious	45-49 years	women	1	1
365 Religious	60-64 years	women	1	1
419 Office sec	40-44 years	men	0	1
513 Travel att	25-29 years	men	2	1
517 Travel att	35-39 years	men	2	1
518 Travel att	35-39 years	women	3	1
620 Crop and	35-39 years	women	3	1
628 Crop and	55-59 years	women	1	1
617e Forestry	25-29 years	women	1	1
619e Forestry	30-34 years	women	1	1
621e Forestry	35-39 years	women	2	1
623e Forestry	40-44 years	women	1	1
627e Forestry	50-54 years	women	2	1
617 Fishery w	25-29 years	men	0	1
623 Fishery w	40-44 years	men	1	1
627 Fishery w	50-54 years	men	1	1
711 Miners, sl	16-24 years	men	2	1
719 Miners, sl	40-44 years	men	2	1
720 Miners, sl	40-44 years	women	1	1
725e Painters	45-49 years	women	1	1
731e Painters	60-64 years	women	2	1
731 Blacksmi	40-44 years	women	0	1
733 Blacksmi	45-49 years	women	2	1
735 Blacksmi	50-54 years	women	0	1
726 Machiner	25-29 years	women	1	1
728 Machiner	30-34 years	women	0	1
732 Machiner	40-44 years	women	3	1
729 Electrical	30-34 years	women	1	1
732 Precision	16-24 years	women	0	1
734 Precision	25-29 years	women	1	1
735 Precision	30-34 years	men	2	1
736 Precision	30-34 years	women	2	1
738 Precision	35-39 years	women	1	1
740 Precision	40-44 years	women	0	1
746 Precision	55-59 years	women	2	1
732 Potters, g	16-24 years	men	1	1

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

741 Potters, g	40-44 years	women	1	1
736 Handicraf	25-29 years	women	0	1
743 Handicraf	45-49 years	men	2	1
744 Handicraf	45-49 years	women	1	1
747 Handicraf	55-59 years	men	1	1
735 Craft prin	16-24 years	women	3	1
736 Craft prin	25-29 years	men	0	1
740 Craft prin	35-39 years	men	6	1
750 Craft prin	60-64 years	men	2	1
747 Wood tre	30-34 years	women	1	1
751 Wood tre	40-44 years	women	0	1
753 Wood tre	45-49 years	women	2	1
755 Wood tre	50-54 years	women	2	1
757 Wood tre	55-59 years	women	0	1
748 Garment	30-34 years	women	2	1
749 Garment	35-39 years	men	2	1
746 Pelt, leatl	25-29 years	men	1	1
747 Pelt, leatl	25-29 years	women	1	1
752 Pelt, leatl	40-44 years	men	1	1
753 Pelt, leatl	40-44 years	women	1	1
755 Pelt, leatl	45-49 years	women	0	1
758 Pelt, leatl	55-59 years	men	1	1
825 Mineral-p	55-59 years	men	1	1
821 Metal-prc	40-44 years	women	3	1
823 Metal-prc	45-49 years	women	5	1
815 Glass, cer	25-29 years	men	4	1
816 Glass, cer	25-29 years	women	2	1
821 Glass, cer	40-44 years	men	8	1
823 Glass, cer	45-49 years	men	11	1
827 Glass, cer	55-59 years	men	4	1
830 Glass, cer	60-64 years	women	1	1
815e Wood-p	16-24 years	women	3	1
817 Chemical-	25-29 years	men	8	1
820 Chemical-	30-34 years	women	3	1
823 Chemical-	40-44 years	men	26	1
831 Chemical-	60-64 years	men	8	1
821 Power-pr	30-34 years	women	2	1
831 Power-pr	55-59 years	women	2	1
833 Power-pr	60-64 years	women	1	1
819 Industrial	25-29 years	men	2	1
820 Industrial	25-29 years	women	1	1
821 Industrial	30-34 years	men	0	1
823 Industrial	35-39 years	men	1	1
829 Industrial	50-54 years	men	0	1
825 Chemical-	25-29 years	women	3	1
839 Chemical-	60-64 years	women	1	1

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

827	Textile-, f	16-24 years	women	2	1
828	Textile-, f	25-29 years	men	0	1
831	Textile-, f	30-34 years	women	2	1
840	Textile-, f	55-59 years	men	2	1
842	Textile-, f	60-64 years	men	3	1
831	Locomoti	16-24 years	men	0	1
832	Locomoti	16-24 years	women	1	1
833	Locomoti	25-29 years	men	1	1
836	Locomoti	30-34 years	women	1	1
840	Locomoti	40-44 years	women	0	1
844	Locomoti	50-54 years	women	1	1
836	Ships´ de	25-29 years	men	0	1
842	Ships´ de	40-44 years	men	1	1
921	Street ve	45-49 years	men	0	1
922	Street ve	45-49 years	women	1	1
924	Street ve	50-54 years	women	1	1
927	Street ve	60-64 years	men	0	1
918	Garbage c	25-29 years	women	1	1
922	Garbage c	35-39 years	women	3	1
928	Garbage c	50-54 years	women	0	1
930	Garbage c	55-59 years	women	4	1
932	Garbage c	60-64 years	women	0	1
927	Agricultu	35-39 years	men	1	1
928	Agricultu	35-39 years	women	1	1
937	Agricultu	60-64 years	men	2	1
932	Mining ar	16-24 years	women	1	1
940	Mining ar	40-44 years	women	1	1
948	Transport	55-59 years	women	1	1
16	Armed for	30-34 years	women	0	0
22	Armed for	45-49 years	women	0	0
24	Armed for	50-54 years	women	0	0
26	Armed for	55-59 years	women	0	0
28	Armed for	60-64 years	women	0	0
111	Legislator	16-24 years	men	0	0
112	Legislator	16-24 years	women	0	0
114	Legislator	25-29 years	women	0	0
115	Legislator	30-34 years	men	0	0
116	Legislator	30-34 years	women	1	0
117	Legislator	35-39 years	men	0	0
112	Senior off	16-24 years	men	0	0
113	Senior off	16-24 years	women	0	0
114	Senior off	25-29 years	men	0	0
115	Senior off	25-29 years	women	0	0
116	Senior off	30-34 years	men	0	0
118	Senior off	35-39 years	men	1	0
119	Senior off	35-39 years	women	0	0

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

120 Senior off	40-44 years	men	0	0
122 Senior off	45-49 years	men	1	0
123 Senior off	45-49 years	women	0	0
125 Senior off	50-54 years	women	0	0
121 Directors	16-24 years	men	0	0
122 Directors	16-24 years	women	0	0
124 Directors	25-29 years	women	0	0
211 Physicists	16-24 years	men	2	0
212 Physicists	16-24 years	women	0	0
213 Physicists	25-29 years	men	1	0
218 Physicists	35-39 years	women	1	0
224 Physicists	50-54 years	women	0	0
226 Physicists	55-59 years	women	0	0
227 Physicists	60-64 years	men	1	0
228 Physicists	60-64 years	women	0	0
212 Mathema	16-24 years	men	0	0
214 Mathema	25-29 years	men	0	0
215 Mathema	25-29 years	women	0	0
217 Mathema	30-34 years	women	0	0
219 Mathema	35-39 years	women	0	0
221 Mathema	40-44 years	women	0	0
222 Mathema	45-49 years	men	1	0
223 Mathema	45-49 years	women	0	0
224 Mathema	50-54 years	men	1	0
225 Mathema	50-54 years	women	0	0
227 Mathema	55-59 years	women	0	0
228 Mathema	60-64 years	men	0	0
229 Mathema	60-64 years	women	0	0
221 Life scienc	16-24 years	men	0	0
222 Life scienc	16-24 years	women	0	0
223 Life scienc	25-29 years	men	0	0
238 Life scienc	60-64 years	women	0	0
223 Nursing a	16-24 years	men	0	0
224 Nursing a	16-24 years	women	0	0
234 Special ec	16-24 years	men	0	0
235 Special ec	16-24 years	women	0	0
236 Special ec	25-29 years	men	0	0
243 Archivists	16-24 years	men	1	0
244 Social sci	16-24 years	men	1	0
245 Social sci	16-24 years	women	0	0
260 Social sci	60-64 years	men	0	0
261 Social sci	60-64 years	women	0	0
247 Religious	16-24 years	women	0	0
248 Religious	25-29 years	men	2	0
248 Administr	16-24 years	men	1	0
313 Optical ar	16-24 years	men	1	0

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

314 Ship and	16-24 years	men	0	0
315e Ship and	16-24 years	women	0	0
319e Ship and	30-34 years	women	0	0
321e Ship and	35-39 years	women	0	0
323e Ship and	40-44 years	women	0	0
325e Ship and	45-49 years	women	0	0
327e Ship and	50-54 years	women	0	0
331e Ship and	60-64 years	women	0	0
321 Agronom	16-24 years	men	2	0
334 Agronom	50-54 years	women	1	0
336 Agronom	55-59 years	women	0	0
330 Life scienc	35-39 years	men	1	0
345 Police off	16-24 years	men	0	0
348 Religious	16-24 years	men	0	0
349 Religious	16-24 years	women	0	0
350 Religious	25-29 years	men	1	0
351 Religious	25-29 years	women	0	0
353 Religious	30-34 years	women	0	0
354 Religious	35-39 years	men	0	0
355 Religious	35-39 years	women	1	0
361 Religious	50-54 years	women	0	0
363 Religious	55-59 years	women	0	0
427 Office sec	60-64 years	men	0	0
414 Library ar	16-24 years	men	0	0
415e Library a	16-24 years	women	0	0
418e Library a	30-34 years	men	0	0
420e Library a	35-39 years	men	0	0
422e Library a	40-44 years	men	1	0
521 Fashion a	16-24 years	men	0	0
522 Fashion a	16-24 years	women	0	0
523 Fashion a	25-29 years	men	0	0
524 Fashion a	25-29 years	women	0	0
525 Fashion a	30-34 years	men	0	0
526 Fashion a	30-34 years	women	0	0
527 Fashion a	35-39 years	men	0	0
528 Fashion a	35-39 years	women	0	0
529 Fashion a	40-44 years	men	0	0
530 Fashion a	40-44 years	women	0	0
531 Fashion a	45-49 years	men	0	0
532 Fashion a	45-49 years	women	0	0
533 Fashion a	50-54 years	men	0	0
534 Fashion a	50-54 years	women	0	0
535 Fashion a	55-59 years	men	0	0
536 Fashion a	55-59 years	women	0	0
537 Fashion a	60-64 years	men	0	0
538 Fashion a	60-64 years	women	0	0

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

614 Crop and	16-24 years	women	2	0
615e Forestry	16-24 years	women	0	0
629e Forestry	55-59 years	women	0	0
631e Forestry	60-64 years	women	0	0
615 Fishery w	16-24 years	men	1	0
616 Fishery w	16-24 years	women	0	0
618 Fishery w	25-29 years	women	0	0
619 Fishery w	30-34 years	men	0	0
620 Fishery w	30-34 years	women	0	0
621 Fishery w	35-39 years	men	0	0
622 Fishery w	35-39 years	women	0	0
624 Fishery w	40-44 years	women	0	0
625 Fishery w	45-49 years	men	0	0
626 Fishery w	45-49 years	women	0	0
628 Fishery w	50-54 years	women	0	0
630 Fishery w	55-59 years	women	0	0
631 Fishery w	60-64 years	men	0	0
632 Fishery w	60-64 years	women	0	0
712 Miners, sl	16-24 years	women	0	0
714 Miners, sl	25-29 years	women	0	0
716 Miners, sl	30-34 years	women	0	0
718 Miners, sl	35-39 years	women	0	0
722 Miners, sl	45-49 years	women	0	0
724 Miners, sl	50-54 years	women	0	0
726 Miners, sl	55-59 years	women	0	0
727 Miners, sl	60-64 years	men	4	0
728 Miners, sl	60-64 years	women	0	0
727e Painters	50-54 years	women	1	0
723 Blacksmi	16-24 years	women	0	0
725 Blacksmi	25-29 years	women	0	0
727 Blacksmi	30-34 years	women	1	0
737 Blacksmi	55-59 years	women	0	0
739 Blacksmi	60-64 years	women	0	0
730 Machiner	35-39 years	women	2	0
734 Machiner	45-49 years	women	0	0
737 Electrical	50-54 years	women	4	0
741 Electrical	60-64 years	women	0	0
748 Precision	60-64 years	women	0	0
734 Potters, g	25-29 years	men	0	0
736 Potters, g	30-34 years	men	2	0
733 Handicraf	16-24 years	men	0	0
734 Handicraf	16-24 years	women	0	0
735 Handicraf	25-29 years	men	0	0
737 Handicraf	30-34 years	men	1	0
738 Handicraf	30-34 years	women	0	0
739 Handicraf	35-39 years	men	0	0

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

740 Handicraf	35-39 years	women	0	0
741 Handicraf	40-44 years	men	0	0
742 Handicraf	40-44 years	women	0	0
746 Handicraf	50-54 years	women	0	0
748 Handicraf	55-59 years	women	0	0
749 Handicraf	60-64 years	men	0	0
750 Handicraf	60-64 years	women	0	0
742 Wood tre	16-24 years	men	3	0
743 Wood tre	16-24 years	women	1	0
749 Wood tre	35-39 years	women	0	0
759 Wood tre	60-64 years	women	1	0
743 Garment	16-24 years	men	1	0
744 Garment	16-24 years	women	0	0
744 Pelt, leatl	16-24 years	men	0	0
745 Pelt, leatl	16-24 years	women	0	0
748 Pelt, leatl	30-34 years	men	1	0
749 Pelt, leatl	30-34 years	women	1	0
751 Pelt, leatl	35-39 years	women	1	0
756 Pelt, leatl	50-54 years	men	0	0
757 Pelt, leatl	50-54 years	women	0	0
759 Pelt, leatl	55-59 years	women	0	0
760 Pelt, leatl	60-64 years	men	0	0
761 Pelt, leatl	60-64 years	women	0	0
812 Mineral-p	16-24 years	women	0	0
814 Mineral-p	25-29 years	women	0	0
816 Mineral-p	30-34 years	women	0	0
818 Mineral-p	35-39 years	women	0	0
820 Mineral-p	40-44 years	women	0	0
822 Mineral-p	45-49 years	women	0	0
824 Mineral-p	50-54 years	women	0	0
826 Mineral-p	55-59 years	women	0	0
828 Mineral-p	60-64 years	women	0	0
813 Metal-pro	16-24 years	women	1	0
817 Metal-pro	30-34 years	women	0	0
819 Metal-pro	35-39 years	women	0	0
827 Metal-pro	55-59 years	women	1	0
813 Glass, cer	16-24 years	men	6	0
814 Glass, cer	16-24 years	women	2	0
817 Glass, cer	30-34 years	men	6	0
818 Glass, cer	30-34 years	women	1	0
819 Glass, cer	35-39 years	men	6	0
820 Glass, cer	35-39 years	women	1	0
822 Glass, cer	40-44 years	women	1	0
824 Glass, cer	45-49 years	women	2	0
826 Glass, cer	50-54 years	women	1	0
828 Glass, cer	55-59 years	women	3	0

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

829 Glass, cer	60-64 years	men	7	0
816 Chemical-	16-24 years	women	1	0
818 Chemical-	25-29 years	women	2	0
819 Chemical-	30-34 years	men	5	0
821 Chemical-	35-39 years	men	9	0
822 Chemical-	35-39 years	women	5	0
824 Chemical-	40-44 years	women	7	0
826 Chemical-	45-49 years	women	7	0
828 Chemical-	50-54 years	women	11	0
829 Chemical-	55-59 years	men	15	0
830 Chemical-	55-59 years	women	6	0
817 Power-pr	16-24 years	women	0	0
819 Power-pr	25-29 years	women	0	0
818 Industrial	16-24 years	women	0	0
822 Industrial	30-34 years	women	0	0
824 Industrial	35-39 years	women	0	0
826 Industrial	40-44 years	women	0	0
827 Industrial	45-49 years	men	2	0
828 Industrial	45-49 years	women	0	0
830 Industrial	50-54 years	women	0	0
831 Industrial	55-59 years	men	0	0
832 Industrial	55-59 years	women	0	0
833 Industrial	60-64 years	men	0	0
834 Industrial	60-64 years	women	0	0
826 Textile-, f	16-24 years	men	0	0
829 Textile-, f	25-29 years	women	0	0
834 Locomoti	25-29 years	women	0	0
835 Locomoti	30-34 years	men	0	0
837 Locomoti	35-39 years	men	0	0
838 Locomoti	35-39 years	women	0	0
839 Locomoti	40-44 years	men	0	0
842 Locomoti	45-49 years	women	0	0
846 Locomoti	55-59 years	women	0	0
848 Locomoti	60-64 years	women	0	0
844 Agricultu	45-49 years	women	0	0
850 Agricultu	60-64 years	women	0	0
834 Ships´ de	16-24 years	men	1	0
835 Ships´ de	16-24 years	women	1	0
837 Ships´ de	25-29 years	women	0	0
839 Ships´ de	30-34 years	women	0	0
840 Ships´ de	35-39 years	men	0	0
841 Ships´ de	35-39 years	women	0	0
843 Ships´ de	40-44 years	women	0	0
844 Ships´ de	45-49 years	men	1	0
845 Ships´ de	45-49 years	women	0	0
846 Ships´ de	50-54 years	men	0	0

Dataset on occupation in Kronoberg divided by occupation, age-group, sex and 2013, 2014

847 Ships´ de	50-54 years	women	0	0
848 Ships´ de	55-59 years	men	0	0
849 Ships´ de	55-59 years	women	0	0
850 Ships´ de	60-64 years	men	1	0
851 Ships´ de	60-64 years	women	0	0
911 Street ve	16-24 years	men	0	0
912 Street ve	16-24 years	women	0	0
913 Street ve	25-29 years	men	0	0
914 Street ve	25-29 years	women	0	0
915 Street ve	30-34 years	men	0	0
916 Street ve	30-34 years	women	0	0
918 Street ve	35-39 years	women	0	0
919 Street ve	40-44 years	men	1	0
920 Street ve	40-44 years	women	0	0
923 Street ve	50-54 years	men	0	0
925 Street ve	55-59 years	men	0	0
926 Street ve	55-59 years	women	0	0
928 Street ve	60-64 years	women	1	0
926 Garbage (45-49 years	women	0	0
934 Mining ar	25-29 years	women	0	0
936 Mining ar	30-34 years	women	0	0
938 Mining ar	35-39 years	women	0	0
942 Mining ar	45-49 years	women	1	0
944 Mining ar	50-54 years	women	0	0
946 Mining ar	55-59 years	women	0	0
948 Mining ar	60-64 years	women	0	0
946 Transport	50-54 years	women	1	0