


State failure in a globalized world: the Democratic Republic of Congo

A historical analysis on state failure and armed conflict in an era of neo-liberal globalization



Name: Lotte Geboers

Student-number: 4148401

Degree: BA Honours Liberal Arts and Sciences – International Studies

University: Utrecht University

Supervisor: dr. Erik Nijhof

Date: 24 June 2016

Contents

Political map of the Democratic Republic of Congo	4
Map of areas of exploitation in the Congo region	5
Abbreviations	6
1. Introduction	8
2. Theoretical framework: conflict in an era of neo-liberal globalization	12
2.1 Managing the neo-liberal global economy	12
2.2 Conflict in an era of neo-liberal globalization	14
2.3 State failure	16
2.3.1 The nation-state in an era of neo-liberal globalization	16
2.3.2 State failure and armed conflict	18
2.4 The resource curse	20
2.4.1 The neo-liberal global economy and natural resource exploitation	20
2.4.2 The resource curse and armed conflict	25
2.5 Summary	27
3. State formation in the Congo	29
3.1 The making of a colonial state	29
3.1.1 The Congo Free State 1885-1908	30
3.1.2 Belgian Congo: 1908-1960	31
3.2 The birth of 'Zaire': Mobutu's years: 1965-1997	34
3.3 Summary	37
4. State failure in the Democratic Republic of Congo	38
4.1 The Great African War	38


4.1.1 The First Congo war: 1996-1997	38
Map of involved actors in the First Congo war	41
4.1.2 The Second Congo war: 1998-2003	42
Map of involved actors in the Second Congo war	46
4.2 Summary	50
5. Fragmentation and regionalization: the Kivu's	52
5.1 Resources and governance in the borderlands	52
5.2 The future of the state of the Congo	55
5.3 Summary	57
6. Conclusion	58
7. Bibliography	61

Political map of the Democratic Republic of Congo



© Ezilon Maps. <<http://www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/d-r-of-congo-maps.html>>

Map of areas of exploitation in the Congo region



Source: Andreas Exenberger and Simon Hartmann, 'The dark side of globalization. The vicious cycle of exploitation from world market integration: Lesson from the Congo', in: *Working Papers in Economics and Statistics*, no. 31 (2007), 1-23, 3.

Abbreviations

ABAKO	<i>Alliances des Bakongos</i>
AFDL	<i>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre</i>
BCK	<i>Compagnie de Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga</i>
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNDP	<i>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</i>
Conakat	<i>Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katange</i>
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR	<i>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i>
FORMINIÈRE	<i>La Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo</i>
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MNC	<i>Mouvement National Congolais</i>
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MONUC	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo</i>
MONUSCO	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo</i>
MPR	<i>Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution</i>
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
RCD	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i>

RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC	South African Development Community
UMHK	<i>Union Minière du Haut Katanga</i>
UN	United Nations
UNITA	<i>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</i>
US	United States
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

The picture on the cover of this thesis shows military men driving through the capital of the Congo, Kinshasa. A large billboard in the back advertises for Mützig beer, which is locally brewed beer owned by the Dutch company Heineken International. The picture is essentially a representation of a militarized, conflict-torn country in this era of neo-liberal globalization, in which the face of globalization becomes particularly apparent through the products of large MNCs as Heineken International as part of everyday life. This interconnectedness between conflict and neo-liberal globalization in the Congo will be the central focus of this thesis.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is home to 79 million people and over 200 ethnic groups. Congo has large natural resource reserves in amongst others cobalt, copper, petroleum, diamonds, gold, silver, uranium, coltan, coal and timber. The richness of the Congolese soil is, however, not reflected in the country's GDP, with a GDP per capita of 800\$ in 2015, one of lowest in the world.¹ This can partly be explained by the history of the Congolese state and partly by neo-liberal, global forces that have left their marks on Congolese grounds.

The borders of the Congo were determined by its colonizer Belgium. Since its independence in 1960, the country has been involved in several civil and regional wars. The central government in Kinshasa has not been able to administer its entire territory and is virtually absent in some regions, in particular the eastern DRC. Other non-state, regional or international actors have started to fill in this power gap, which has led to a further undermining of the Congolese state.²

The dimensions and different scale dynamics at play in the conflict in the Congo are essentially interconnected. The neo-liberal idea of globalization, enforced by global

¹ CIA Factbook. 'Democratic Republic of Congo' (version 16 June 2016)

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html> (20 June 2016).

² Patricia Daley, 'Challenges to Peace: conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region of Africa', in: *Third World Quarterly* 27:2 (2006), 303-319, 306-307.

institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and United Nations (UN) have had significant impacts on different levels. Although globalization is perceived as one of the greatest promises for development in this century, its underlying neo-liberal philosophy - based on liberalization, privatization and limited government intervention – has deeply penetrated into local societies, fundamentally changing local life and the role of the state.³ The state-building endeavour in the Congo has been troublesome. The Congolese state is often perceived as a ‘failed state’, without the capacity, nor willingness to provide public goods to its citizens and without a monopoly on violence.⁴

Natural resources have played an important part in the country’s trade throughout Congolese history. In this era of neo-liberal globalization, global demand for resources has led to renewed interests of large multinational corporations (MNCs) in the Congo.⁵ This resource trade has defined the Congolese economy and politics and has led to competitive resource-rent seeking activities, resulting in corruption and patronage.⁶ The neo-liberal management of resources in an era of globalization has had significantly impacts on the conflict dynamics in the country. Natural resource extraction from the Congo is furthermore one of the drivers of the continuation of the conflict.⁷

The research question proposed in this thesis is how different scale dynamics have shaped the state-building process and conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The focus will be on the situation in the country since 1996, when many different actors and forces on different scales influenced the situation in the Congo. There are three main underlying components at play in the DRC, namely the influence of the neo-liberal management of

³ Andrew Jones, *Globalization: Key Thinkers* (Cambridge 2010), 76.

⁴ R. Jackson, ‘Regime Security’, in: Collins, Alan (ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies* (Oxford 2007), 146-163, 149.

⁵ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work: the next steps to Global Justice* (London 2007), 159.

⁶ Graham A. Davis and John E. Tilton, ‘The resource curse’, in: *Natural Resources Forum* 29 (2005), 233-242, 240.

⁷ United Nations Development Programme, *Building Peace and Advancing Development in the Great Lakes Region* (New York 2014), 5.

globalization; state failure in a globalized world; and the global demand for resources and the 'resource curse'. The ethnically diverse Congolese population and the Congolese economy and politics are heavily influenced by these global, neo-liberal forces. Through a historical analysis, this thesis will argue that the conflict and state failure in the DRC are essentially linked to the neo-liberal management of globalization.

This issue is interesting because it shows the global influences on a conflict perceived as inherently local. Analysing different scale dynamics at play in the Congo will show how this conflict is essentially interconnected to the broader international system. The neo-liberal management of globalization interconnects local-national-regional-global network chains. Although extensive research has been done on state failure, resources, the impact of globalisation and the conflict dynamics in the Congo, there is a clear gap in the literature on the interconnectedness of these elements on different scales.

For a full understanding of the elements at play in the Congolese conflict, an integrated, broader approach is needed. I will draw on different disciplinary insights and theories from amongst others economics, political sciences and history, to create a more comprehensive understanding. An interdisciplinary approach will enrich this analysis by complicating the picture and therefore reflecting a more realistic version of the real world. This thesis is a literature review of the combined theoretical frameworks of neo-liberal globalization management, state failure in a globalized world and the 'resource curse'. These concepts and theories will be applied to an in-depth case-study of the Democratic Republic of Congo. I have included a political map of the DRC to clarify the setting in which different dynamics play a role (page 3), and a different map shows the areas of exploitation of resources that have been important throughout Congolese history (page 4).

I will introduce the theoretical framework on conflict in an era of neo-liberal globalisation in the next chapter. In the third chapter, I will provide background information on the processes of state formation in the DRC, guided by colonialism and Mobutu's kleptocracy. The fourth chapter will analyse the different scale dynamics at play in the First- and Second Congo wars, and their interconnectedness to the neo-liberal global system. The fifth chapter will zoom in on a particular region in the DRC, the eastern Kivu's, after the end of the Second Congo war, to show the local and regional dynamics at play in the absence of

state authority. This chapter will also briefly look into the future of the state of the Congo. I will end with concluding remarks in the sixth chapter and will answer the research question proposed here as how different scale dynamics have shaped the state-building process and conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

2. Theoretical framework: conflict in an era of neo-liberal globalization

2.1 Managing the neo-liberal global economy

In theory, globalization should benefit all: integrating in the world market by opening up domestic markets to foreign competition will lead to an improved allocation of resources on a global level, which in turn, will increase a country's productivity by focusing on its comparative advantage. Therefore global productivity overall will increase, leading to an increase in global and domestic economic growth and welfare.⁸ In practice, however, context-specific factors play a major role, and there are enough countries today facing serious development problems, despite the promise of economic globalization.

I will adopt a definition of globalization proposed by Joseph Stiglitz in his book *Globalization and its Discontents*. Globalization, then, is "the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication".⁹ This definition not only emphasizes an integration on an economic level, but also on a social and political level. Globalization has been accompanied by the development of global institutions, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), that have tried to manage globalization.¹⁰ These have played a large role in setting up 'the rules of the game' of globalization. Although they are considered as 'global', most of the funding comes from Western countries, therefore the 'global' interest of the world economy is mainly a reflection

⁸ Paul R. Krugman et al., *International Economics: Theory & Policy* (Essex 2012), 55.

⁹ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (London 2002), 9.

¹⁰ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, 9.

of the economic interests of the industrialized countries. Therefore, although economics have been driving the process of globalization, politics have shaped it.¹¹

The most important economic reform agenda, which has had significant impact on the process of globalization, has been the Washington Consensus of 1989, drafted in conjunction with the IMF and WB. The Washington Consensus is a ten-point reform agenda, with a focus on liberalization, privatization, and limited government intervention.¹² Market forces were believed to make a country's economy efficient, as if guided by an 'invisible hand', one of the fundamental aspects of market fundamentalism.¹³ Whenever developing countries asked these institutions for loans or other economic help, the Washington Consensus was presented as a checklist of economic reforms that the country should adopt in order to receive economic support. After 2000, the Consensus was more often criticized, since the reform agenda had not led to the expected results. Although liberalization of markets had been carried out more or less, poverty reduction and economic growth outcomes were disappointing. Furthermore, the Washington Consensus became a one-size-fits-all approach, where country-specific macroeconomic aspects were overlooked.¹⁴

The influence that global institutions - led by neo-liberalist market fundamentalism - have had on economic policy in developing countries lies at the core to the question why globalization has not benefited the world as a whole.¹⁵ We live in a world with global governance, but without a global government.¹⁶ Certain institutions and actors play a major role in determining what globalization looks like, but there is no central authority regulating

¹¹ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work*, 5.

¹² Derek Headey, 'Appraising a Post-Washington Paradigm: What Professor Rodrik Means by Policy Reform', in: *Review of International Political Economy* 16:4 (2009) 698-728, 698.

¹³ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, 73.

¹⁴ Idem, 34.

¹⁵ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work*, 97.

¹⁶ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, 21-22.

them. Therefore, economic institutions as the IMF, WB and WTO have mainly served Western interests and ideology.

Nevertheless, the word 'governance' implies some kind of government-type, even in the absence of a global government.¹⁷ We expect the United Nations (UN) to fill in the gap of global government. The UN, however important as a political institution for the world, can hardly be defined as 'global' institution. It is an international collaboration of different states, not a single, coherent, 'global' institution. Globalization, then, becomes an abstract power that is managed by neo-liberal, semi-global institutions. As said before, fundamental to neo-liberalist ideology is the idea that government intervention in the domestic market distorts the self-adjusting mechanism of the liberal market. Trade barriers should be abandoned in order to benefit the most from international trade flows. The role of the domestic governments is limited. There has been extensive debate about the role of the nation-state in this era of neo-liberal globalization, to which I will turn to later in this chapter. Scholars as Kenichi Ohmae argue that nation-states will lose their power, and have become "unnatural, dysfunctional organizational units for thinking about economic activity".¹⁸ On the other side of the debate are scholars as Joseph Stiglitz, who argue that there is still a role for the state, namely in ensuring social justice and the redistribution of economic wealth, to alleviate market failures.¹⁹

2.2 Conflict in an era of neo-liberal globalization

The changing role of the nation-state in the global economy and the extension of domestic market forces to global networks, can have a significant negative impact on political stability in specific contexts. There are two important dynamics in this era of neo-liberal globalization that can lead to an outburst of violent conflict: state failure and the resource curse. State failure can increase the risk of violent conflict. We need to examine the role of the nation-

¹⁷ Lawrence S. Finkelstein, 'What is Global Governance?', in: *Global Governance* 1:3 (1995), 367-372, 368.

¹⁸ Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies* (London 2008), 16.

¹⁹ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, 218.

state more closely, to see what the impact of its changing role can have, in particular in developing countries. We can then look further into the dynamics of state failure and armed conflict. The second dynamic of neo-liberal globalization and armed conflict is the so-called resource curse. The resource curse states that relatively resource-rich countries often show slower economic growth than countries without resources. These countries are more prone to armed conflict and corruption.²⁰

The dynamics of global markets, the resource curse, state failure and armed conflict are interconnected and influence the stability and development of a country. To further understand armed conflict in this era of neo-liberal globalization, we need to understand the meta-narratives that have shaped our understanding of violent conflict in the last century. The decolonization wave after World War II created a large amount of 'new', postcolonial states. These states have played a large role in the superpower rivalry race between the United States (US) and the Soviet-Union. The end of the Cold War saw the rise of more intra-state armed conflicts. Without superpower support, states and non-state actors started to look for privatized sources of support. Violence in the early 1990s is often understood as triggered by 'ancient, ethnic hatreds', inherently local grievances. The dominant meta-narrative from the late 1990s until now has largely been one of the 'New War', in which violence is perpetrated by individual, criminal, evil, local actors, driven only by greed. New Wars are understood as endemic and are therefore perceived as disconnected from the global system.²¹ Violence is often privatized and supported by an informal, decentralized economy. New Wars are essentially depoliticized.²² The meta-narrative of the 'New War' assists in explaining the scale dynamics of state failure and armed conflict in the DRC from 1996 onwards, the focus of later chapters.

²⁰ Michael L. Ross, 'What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?', in: *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (2004), 337-356, 337.

²¹ J. Demmers, 'Neoliberal discourses on violence: monstrosity and rape in borderland war', in: S. Ponzanesi (ed.) *Gender, Globalisation and Violence: Postcolonial Conflict Zones* (London and New York 2014), 1-20, 1-2.

²² H. Dexter, 'New War, Good War and the War on Terror: Explaining, Excusing and Creating Western Neo-Interventionism', *Development and Change* 38:6 (2007), 1055-1071, 1058-1059.

2.3 State failure

2.3.1 The nation-state in an era of neo-liberal globalization

The nation-state is forced to play a different role in the global economy than it used to. Economic activities are not limited to borders anymore. Kenichi Ohmae, one of the 'hyperglobalizers' in the current globalization debate, argues that the global economy is imposing the neo-liberal discipline on all governments.²³ Ohmae emphasizes in his book *The End of The Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies* that we live in a 'borderless' world today and holding on to the traditional nation-state units as drivers of economic activity would be dysfunctional, states have become bit actors.²⁴ Ohmae follows the neo-liberal notion that for an economy to grow, it needs to open up to the global economy. Growth depends on "creating and leveraging value-adding economic linkages that ignore political borders".²⁵ According to Ohmae, nation-state's electoral competition and popular expectations have led to the transformation of 'national interests' into the interests of a few powerful actors, to preserve centralized power.²⁶ Therefore, states make economic choices in terms of their political consequences, and long-term benefits are sacrificed for direct, tangible results.²⁷ Ohmae argues that regional economies become more important than national economies. Within nations, regions do not prosper uniformly. Each region has its own industries and own abilities to contribute to the global economy.²⁸ In the global economy, this does not have to mean that the two are enemies; the regional economies are entry-ports to the global markets, which can benefit the country as a whole.²⁹ However - and Ohmae acknowledges this -

²³ Andrew Jones, *Globalization: Key Thinkers*, 75.

²⁴ Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State*, 11-12.

²⁵ Idem, 62.

²⁶ Idem, 54.

²⁷ Idem, 42.

²⁸ Idem, 65.

²⁹ Idem, 100.

regional power and autonomy can also be used in the self-interest of certain actors, who can turn onto 'ethnic differences' to legitimize their autonomy.³⁰

Others have argued that Ohmae's 'borderless' world is not realistic. Dani Rodrik emphasizes in his book *The Globalization Paradox* that the world is too diverse to develop into one global community. There are fundamental limits to the power of global institutions, as political identification still revolves around the nation-state.³¹ We need to keep in mind, however, that Rodrik's thesis focuses on advanced industrial countries, with well-established democratic institutions. Post-colonial developing countries might not have a unilateral, domestic political community to identify with. Nonetheless, his ideas remain relevant; there are certain limits to global governance posed by nation-states. Rodrik argues that we should perceive the global system as interactions of a collective of nation-states, instead of a 'borderless' world in which the nation-state does not have a significant role.³² David Held and Anthony McGrew argue similarly, that globalization is a powerful, transformative force behind rapid economic, social and political changes.³³ This force reshapes the relationship between state power and territoriality. They argue that the power of the nation-state is not necessarily declined by the force of globalization, but rather reorganized.³⁴ Governance has become more complex in an interconnected world, and therefore the power, function and authority of the nation-state will undergo fundamental changes.³⁵

A more radical view of the link between globalization and the nation-state is provided by Joseph Stiglitz in his book *Making Globalization Work*. He argues that the problem with globalization is how it has been managed by neo-liberal politics. Economic globalization has

³⁰ Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State*, 119.

³¹ Dani Rodrik, *The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy* (New York 2011), 232.

³² Dani Rodrik, *The Globalization Paradox*, 280.

³³ Andrew Jones, *Globalization: Key Thinkers*, 76.

³⁴ Idem, 77.

³⁵ Idem, 76.

outpaced political globalization, and therefore we have not been able to fully understand and shape globalization.³⁶ We live in a global economy without a global government to regulate it. In the absence of any regulation, multinational corporations (MNCs) become at the centre of economic globalization. The power and wealth that they possess turns them into powerful actors in the global economy. These companies are mainly concerned with locations in the world that ensure their highest profits in certain goods. Their presence influences the competitiveness of local and national enterprises. The lack of global governance and regulations reduces the power of the nation-state in negotiating with these global corporations, therefore often leading to the most favourable agreements for MNCs, which can severely affect the domestic market.³⁷

2.3.2 State failure and armed conflict

State failure has been one of the root causes of armed conflict after the end of World War II. Most failed or failing states were former colonies.³⁸ Mohammed Ayoob explains this trend by comparing the process of state-building in Europe to the process of state-building in postcolonial states. The European state-building process took a few hundred years, and was a chaotic, violent period. Postcolonial states, after gaining independence, were forced to build states in limited time spans.³⁹ This rapid transformation, combined with international pressure to build a state in a 'humane' way and a lack of domestic governing experience due to colonization, has led to the development of 'failed states'.

³⁶ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work*, 269.

³⁷ Idem, 188.

³⁸ Mohammed Ayoob, 'State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure', in: Crocker, Chester A. et al. (eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington 2007), 95-114, 95.

³⁹ Mohammed Ayoob, 'State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure', 98.

A failing state can be defined as the “state institutions’ lack of willingness or capacity to perform core state functions in the fields of security, representation, and welfare”.⁴⁰ Failing states lack a monopoly of violence and the effective institutions through which the state can perform its function to govern.⁴¹ The inability of the state to provide order can endanger peace in the country. Citizens will have to secure themselves, either by forming militias or rebel groups or by seeking protection of warlords.⁴² This situation can impose a security dilemma in the country, in which none of the actors trust one another and are therefore not willing to give up their means of protection. Militias and rebel groups will less likely be disarmed and demobilized.⁴³

State failure has a strong historical component. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue in their book *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, that states fail because of their (lack of) institutions. They argue that economic institutions are shaped by political institutions.⁴⁴ Whether a country prospers or remains poor depends on the type of institutions a country has. Inclusive institutions lead to economic growth, while extractive institutions lead to stagnation or decline of the economy.⁴⁵ Acemoglu and Robinson argue that states fail when they have extractive political and economic institutions, which will enrich an elite at the expense of its citizens.⁴⁶ Extractive institutions do not create incentives to invest

⁴⁰ Volker Boege et al., ‘On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: What is Failing – States in the Global South or Research and Politics in the West?’ in: Fischer, M. and B. Schmelzle (eds.), *Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse on State Failure* (2009), 15-36, 16.

⁴¹ R. Jackson, ‘Regime Security’, 149.

⁴² R. Jackson, ‘Regime Security’, 152.

⁴³ Fen Osler Hampson and David Mendeloff, ‘Intervention and the Nation-Building Debate’, in: Crocker, Chester A. et al. (eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington 2007): 679-699, 687.

⁴⁴ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: the origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (London 2012), 42.

⁴⁵ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail*, 83.

⁴⁶ Idem, 343.

and innovate in the country.⁴⁷ The decolonization wave in the twentieth century has ended a long rule of colonialism, based on mainly extractive institutions. (Postcolonial) States today face different threats than before. Global markets demand the products in which countries have a comparative advantage. For many postcolonial states, their advantage remains in raw materials or resources. Extractive institutions therefore have persisted, now focused on the new political elites.

Globalization can undermine the process of state-building. As mentioned before, globalization can be perceived as a driver of social, political and economic change. This change can act as a promoter for violent conflict by deepening tensions in a society.⁴⁸ Competitive relationships can lead to rigidifying ethnic boundaries.⁴⁹ The combination of marketization and ethnic diversity in a failing state can create social conditions with potentially explosive violent outcomes.⁵⁰ These outcomes become particularly apparent in the case of a country infested by the resource curse. The marketization of resource-rich regions divides the country in have's and have-not's, often divided along ethnic lines.

2.4 The resource curse

2.4.1 The neo-liberal global economy and natural resource exploitation

Neo-liberal globalization becomes particularly apparent in the international trade in natural resources. Resources such as copper, gold, diamonds, coltan, uranium, timber and petroleum are highly demanded by the global community. In theory, resource reserves should be able to enrich a country, as that country's capital stock increases. The neoclassical production

⁴⁷ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail*, 372.

⁴⁸ A. Tidwell and C. Lerche, 'Globalization and Conflict Resolution', in: *International Journal of Peace Studies* 9:1 (2004), 47-60, 47.

⁴⁹ A. Tidwell and C. Lerche, 'Globalization and Conflict Resolution', 51.

⁵⁰ Idem, 51.

function shows that the more capital a country possesses, the greater its output and the higher its income per capita will be.⁵¹ Large natural resources reserves can thus contribute to economic growth and development. The presence of large natural resource reserves, however, does not always prove to be a blessing. On the contrary, there has been extensive research on how natural resources actually lead to slower or negative economic growth under certain circumstances.⁵² This 'paradox of plenty' is often referred to as the 'resource curse'.⁵³

The resource curse is highly significant in this era of globalization for a number of reasons. First, globalization has played a large role in deepening the international division of labour. Once a country specializes in commodities, it will have little incentive or opportunity to invest in other sectors as well. Instead of diversifying the economy, countries will import the goods they do not have from other countries.⁵⁴ Whether or not a country specializes in certain exports depends on its comparative advantage. Its comparative advantage depends on the opportunity cost of a good relative to the opportunity cost of that good in another country. The country will specialize in the good with the *relatively* lowest opportunity cost. If both countries produce the good of their comparative advantage, the introduction of trade will benefit both countries, as there is an overall larger production level.⁵⁵ The model of comparative advantage is often referred to as the Ricardian model, after the classical economist David Ricardo.

There are certain assumptions of the Ricardian model that are heavily criticized. First, the model predicts that the country as a whole will gain from trade, while in practice international trade can have significant impacts on income distribution within countries,

⁵¹ Graham A. Davis and John E. Tilton, 'The resource curse', 234.

⁵² Idem, 235.

⁵³ Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, 'Natural Resources and Economic Development: The curse of natural resources', in: *European Economic Review* 45 (2001): 827-838, 827; World Bank, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Enhanced Integrated Framework Program: Diagnostic Trade Integration Study* (Washington, 2010), 27.

⁵⁴ Dani Rodrik *The Globalization Paradox*, 140.

⁵⁵ Paul R. Krugman et al., *International Economics*, 56.

depending on its abundant and scarce factors.⁵⁶ Secondly, comparative advantage is a relative advantage. According to Gavin Wright and Jesse Czelusta this means that “a comparative advantage in natural resources may simply reflect an absence of other internationally competitive sectors in the economy – in a word, underdevelopment”.⁵⁷ An undiversified economy will experience higher unemployment levels and potentially stagnating growth when opening up to international trade. The government plays an essential role in promoting a diversified economy. The assumption that a country’s comparative advantage is natural and given is false, as governments can choose to use export revenues to invest in other sectors of its economy and therefore create a more diversified economy. We should be wary of taking the neo-liberal assumption of full specialization in a country’s comparative advantage for granted. Having a comparative advantage does not mean that all of the country’s resources have to be invested only in its comparative advantage: governments have a choice in distributing the country’s resources over its different industries.

The second aspect of how the resource curse is significant is in the case of the so-called ‘Dutch disease’. When resource-rich countries sell their resources to the global market and convert dollars (or another internationally used currency) into their own currency, the domestic currency will appreciate. As the currency of a country appreciates, their exports will become more expensive to importers, and it will be more difficult to export other products besides resources. Therefore, growth in the non-resource sectors will slow down and unemployment is likely to increase, as there are not enough jobs available only in the resource sector.⁵⁸ Dependence on natural resources therefore will not lead to successful export-led growth. Large natural resource reserves can actually crowd-out entrepreneurial activity and innovation in other sectors of the economy, if the wages in the resource sector are high enough for entrepreneurs and innovators to work in this sector.⁵⁹ Finally, global prices of

⁵⁶ Paul R. Krugman et al., *International Economics*, 75.

⁵⁷ Gavin Wright and Jesse Czelusta, ‘Why Economies Slow: The Myth of the Resource Curse’, in: *Challenge* 47:2 (2004), 6-38, 7.

⁵⁸ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work*, 148.

⁵⁹ Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, ‘Natural Resources and Economic Development’, 835.

primary commodities are very sensitive to global price shocks. Such shocks make macroeconomic management and economic planning difficult, and in turn confuse the citizens' comprehension of government performance.⁶⁰

The global economy enforces a powerful 'paradox of plenty'. There is an inevitable conflict between resource-rich countries, whose economic development and growth depends on the price of the resources they export, and MNCs, whose profit depends on buying resources as cheap as possible.⁶¹ MNCs will try to make as much profit as possible. The contracts they make with developing countries are often very sophisticated, and the domestic government may be ill-prepared to force national interests in negotiations. Attracting foreign investment is one of the main goals of developing countries and corporations are aware of the power they have in these negotiations.⁶² In the absence of any kind of global government, there are no regulations for MNCs.⁶³

It is important to acknowledge that not all countries suffer from the resource curse. Botswana has managed to profit from its resource revenues. The mere presence of resources thus does not seem to be enough reason for slow economic growth. What is important is the way in which the resource revenues are managed, by politics. There has been extensive research on why the resource curse does not seem to apply to Botswana's diamond-industry, which is beyond the scope of this theoretical framework. There are however, two important factors that we can keep in mind when we examine the resource curse more specifically in Botswana's socio-economic context. First, Botswana seems to have succeeded in establishing 'good governance', in particular a transparent political process, sound fiscal systems, acceptable regulations and low corruption levels in the public sector.⁶⁴ Second, the society of

⁶⁰ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict', in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:4 (2005), 625-633, 627.

⁶¹ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work*, 159.

⁶² Idem, 140.

⁶³ Idem, 142.

⁶⁴ Atsushi Iimi, 'Escaping from the Resource Curse: Evidence from Botswana and the Rest of the World', in: *IMF Staff Papers* 54:4 (2007), 663-699, 675-676.

Botswana is ethnically homogenous. This mono-cultural nature of the society has led to strong political leadership since Botswana's independence, and political motivation to reinforce effective institutions.⁶⁵

As the Botswana-case demonstrates, there seems to be more to the resource curse than the mere presence of resources. It is important to study the socio-political context of a country to understand how the exploitation of natural resources can lead to slower economic growth. The resource curse is, apart from slow economic growth, also associated with corruption and bad governance. Government officials are tempted in rent-seeking activities, instead of pro-growth activities.⁶⁶ Large resource-rents can lead to a decline in political institutional quality and undermine good governance, developing a rentier state.⁶⁷ Governments, whose power is based on the exploitation of natural resources, will have a different sense of responsibility towards their citizens, as long as they can use resource extraction to remain in power.⁶⁸ Furthermore, "easy money leads to easy spending" and a tendency to profligate decisions.⁶⁹

States that are involved in rent-seeking activities do not need to tax their citizens much. They receive their revenues from external sources and therefore do not have to levy domestic taxes. This makes them less accountable, however, to the societies they are supposed to govern.⁷⁰ Michael Herb discusses that a rentier state may almost be completely autonomous from its society, "winning popular acquiescence through distribution rather than

⁶⁵ Hazel M. McFerson, 'Governance and Hyper-corruption in Resource-rich African Countries', in: *Third World Quarterly* 30:8 (2009), 1529-1548, 1544.

⁶⁶ Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, 'Natural Resources and Economic Development', 835.

⁶⁷ Graham A. Davis and John E. Tilton, 'The resource curse', 240.

⁶⁸ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work*, 136.

⁶⁹ Idem, 145.

⁷⁰ Michael L. Ross, 'Review: The Political Economy of the Resource Curse', in: *World Politics* 51:2 (1999), 297-322, 313.

support through taxation and representation”.⁷¹ The IMF has pointed out in its 2005 *Regional Economic Outlook* on Sub-Saharan Africa that it is important to introduce fiscal rules for natural resource revenues. Profits should be transferred to a special account that can be used for economic and social development, instead of flowing to the rentier state, which would increase susceptibility for political competition over the revenues of resources.⁷²

The key issue for economic growth based on resource exports is then whether the governments invest in public resources and social services, or whether corruption and looting takes over.⁷³ Resource rents in resource-rich countries are susceptible to political competition.⁷⁴ The government officials or elites that engage in resource rent-seeking activities represent only a small group, often related to ethnicity. As argued by Richard Auty and Alan Gelb, “ethnic diversity fosters rent-seeking behaviour that (...) inhibits consensus on investment in growth-promoting infrastructure”.⁷⁵ Ethnic diversity therefore increases susceptibility to political competition over resource rents even further.

2.4.2 The resource curse and armed conflict

At the extreme of the resource curse lie natural resource conflicts.⁷⁶ Natural resources can be linked to armed conflict in two ways: resources can finance and sustain violent conflict, and there can be armed conflict over the possession of resources.⁷⁷ Since the end of the Cold War,

⁷¹ Michael Herb, ‘No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy’, in: *Comparative Politics* 37:3 (2005), 297-316, 298.

⁷² Atsushi Iimi, ‘Escaping from the Resource Curse’, 690.

⁷³ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict’, 630.

⁷⁴ Richard M. Auty and Alan H. Gelb, ‘Political Economy of Resource Abundant States’, *Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Paris* (May 26, 2000), 1-13, 2.

⁷⁵ Richard M. Auty and Alan H. Gelb, ‘Political Economy of Resource Abundant States’, 3.

⁷⁶ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Making Globalization Work*, 136.

⁷⁷ Philippe Le Billon, ‘The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts’, in: *Political Geography* 20 (2001), 561-584, 580.

insurgent organisations have lost foreign financial assistance, therefore turning to corporate or private sources of support.⁷⁸ Natural resource reserves are limited to certain places in the world, and the global demand for resources is high, therefore corporations do not always care whether the resources are extracted from conflict areas.⁷⁹ Global resource-extraction firms usually deal with the 'regime in place', regardless of who the regime in place might be.⁸⁰ While there is an increased risk for a corporation to invest in and extract resources from conflict areas, it will still earn a reasonable profit, even though it might have to pay off the rebel groups or local militias in place.

Wars stagnate a country's economy, which gives actors incentives to continue fighting, because they do well out of war and because there is no foresight to sustainable economic development.⁸¹ Paul Collier argues that civil wars occur only where rebel groups can finance themselves.⁸² The combination of dependence on resource exports, low income, and slow economic growth create incentives for rebels to keep fighting, simply because they remain financially viable.⁸³ Violence becomes the only way to survival, for both the rebels, as well as the government. As rebellion becomes opportunistic and commercialized, the government is likely to do exactly the same as rebels, namely fight for the resource territories and finance this fight through the sale of these resources. The difference is the government and rebel groups become competitors in the extraction of the country's natural resources.⁸⁴ The conflict over the possession of resources gains an ethnic component as only certain ethnic groups will

⁷⁸ Philippe Le Billon, 'The political ecology of war', 562.

⁷⁹ Scott Pegg, 'Globalization and Natural-Resource Conflicts', in: *Naval War College Review* 56:4 (2003), 82-96, 89.

⁸⁰ Scott Pegg, 'Globalization and Natural-Resource Conflicts', 89.

⁸¹ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (New York 2007), 37.

⁸² Paul Collier, 'Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy', in: Crocker, Chester A. et al. (eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington 2007): 197-218, 197.

⁸³ Paul Collier, 'Economic Causes of Civil Conflict', 206.

⁸⁴ Philippe Le Billon, 'The political ecology of war', 564.

have access to resource reserves.⁸⁵ The violent competition for resources severely affects the state's role in protecting its citizens. As confidence in the state decreases, citizens will seek their protection by warlords or local strongmen, often related on ethnicity, which further undermines the authority of the state.

Resource dependence, slow economic growth, low income, ethnic diversity and declining authority of the state can lead to a difficult process of state-building. The competition for access to resources can generate armed conflicts. These conflicts face a higher risk of conflict recurrence, even after a peace settlement, because powerful actors do well out of war.⁸⁶ A conflict over natural resources is thus considerably harder to come to a peaceful solution, as fighting parties do not have incentives to settle for peace.

2.5 Summary

Failing states can turn to the IMF and World Bank for loans to improve the economic situation of the country, but these institutions ask neo-liberal reforms in return. The opening up of markets of failing states can increase domestic inequality and competition, especially when natural resources come into play. Liberalization of markets in a failing state can thus create grievances - often related to ethnicity - worth fighting for. As natural resource revenues start to dominate the reasons to fight, grievances turn into commercial motives, and the conflict continues, now revolving on the possession and profits of natural resources. As the failing state cannot guarantee its citizens' security anymore, people will look for ways to provide security themselves, by forming local militias or seeking protection of warlords. Warlords who have the power over resource-rich regions also become powerful actors in the global economy, further undermining the power of the failing state. The country will remain trapped in a vicious cycle of conflict, because some actors do well out of the war economy that has been created.

⁸⁵ Philippe Le Billon, 'The political ecology of war', 568.

⁸⁶ Siri Aas Rustad and Helga Malmin Binningsbø, 'A price worth fighting for? Natural resources and conflict recurrence', in: *Journal of Peace Research* 49:4 (2012), 531-546, 540.

In this chapter I've tried to discover the connections between state failure, the resource curse and armed conflict in an era of neo-liberal globalization. In an interconnected world we need to ask ourselves what the role of the state should be, and how global institutions can lead to better economic prospects for most postcolonial developing countries. We need to understand the consequences of the deepening international division of labour for domestic peace and conflict. The concepts and theories discussed in this chapter will be applied to the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). By analysing the process of state-making and state-failure in the Congo, I will look into the different scale dynamics of neo-liberal globalization, state failure, the resource curse and armed conflict into more detail.

3. State formation in the Congo

3.1 The making of a colonial state

The arrival of the Portuguese Diogo Cão on the estuary of the Congo river in 1482 marked the beginning the development of the Congo in the global economy.⁸⁷ From the sixteenth until the eighteenth century, the Congo area was involved in the Atlantic slave trade. An estimated four million Congolese slaves were shipped to plantations in mostly Central- and South-America.⁸⁸ A large-scale slave trade developed internally, led by local, native merchants. This trade disrupted entire regions, but also triggered more intense regional trade flows along the Congo river.⁸⁹ The abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century brought an end to the globalized slave trade. In the Congo area, it was replaced by trade in raw materials, such as palm oil and ivory.⁹⁰

Henry Morton Stanley was the first European to map the hinterland of the Congo between 1874 and 1877.⁹¹ At the same time, European nations began their 'scramble for Africa'. News of Stanley's passage through the Congo area reached the Belgian king Leopold II, who was eager for an African colony. Instructed by Leopold II, Stanley returned to the Congo in 1879 to arrange treaties with local chiefs to assign their land to the Belgian king.⁹² The European scramble for Africa led to the Berlin Conference in 1884 - 1885, to set up new 'rules of the game'. It was here that Leopold II, and his *Association Internationale du Congo*, was

⁸⁷ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis* (Zutphen 2014), 34.

⁸⁸ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 34.

⁸⁹ Idem, 35.

⁹⁰ Andreas Exenberger and Simon Hartmann, 'The dark side of globalization. The vicious cycle of exploitation from world market integration: Lesson from the Congo', in: *Working Papers in Economics and Statistics*, no. 31 (2007), 1-23.5.

⁹¹ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 46.

⁹² Andreas Exenberger and Simon Hartmann, 'The dark side of globalization', 5.

personally assigned the *Etat Indépendant du Congo*, or the 'Congo Free State' on the condition that he declared the area open to international free trade.⁹³ The Belgian king had acquired his own 'state', a state that was eighty times the size of its mother-country, the size of Western-Europe.⁹⁴

3.1.1 The Congo Free State 1885-1908

The Congo area was king Leopold's property from 1885 until 1908. The boundaries that came into existence to demarcate the Congo were arbitrarily drawn, not taking into account ethnic, geographic or historical differences.⁹⁵ Leopold's imperialism was strongly economically motivated, but it was also a way to unify Belgium and show the greatness of what Belgium could achieve in Africa.⁹⁶ There was no Belgian bureaucratic state apparatus in the Congo, and hardly any national policy to govern the new Free State.⁹⁷ Economically, the Congo was important for the exploitation of natural resources. Leopold nationalized the production of ivory by nationalizing the 99% of the ground of the state (including its resources) that wasn't inhabited or cultivated. The Belgian king became the owner of most of the country's resources and their profits.⁹⁸ Another valuable resource that the Congo possessed was rubber. The growing demand for rubber transformed Congo into an economic miracle and imperial pride for Belgium. Rubber extractions came to be known as 'red rubber' politics in the Free State however. Rubber became a common tax, and the inability of the Congolese population to live

⁹³ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 68; Guy Vanthemsche, 'The Historiography of Belgian Colonialism in the Congo', in: Lévai, Csaba (ed.), *Europe and the World in European historiography* (Pisa 2006), 89-119, 90.

⁹⁴ Roger Anstey, *King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo under Belgian Rule 1908-1960* (London 1966), 37.

⁹⁵ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 72.

⁹⁶ Idem, 74-75.

⁹⁷ Ibidem.

⁹⁸ Idem, 93.

up to the high quotas resulted in brutal punishments by Belgian officials.⁹⁹ As a result, the normal Congolese became serfs of the state, malnourished and susceptible to diseases; internal trade in the country disappeared, and local farming stalled.¹⁰⁰ The old internal patterns of trade made room for Belgian factories and companies.¹⁰¹ Repression, forced labour, exploitation and brutalities were fundamental dimensions of the Leopoldian rule in the Congo. It should be noted, however, that the Belgians did effectively build roads, railways, schools and hospitals, therefore raising the living standards of some of the Congolese, mainly in the larger cities.¹⁰² It was the 'red rubber' politics, however, that became the intrinsic reflection of the Leopoldian rule.

3.1.2 Belgian Congo 1908-1960

In 1908 the authority of the 'Congo Free State' was transferred to the Belgian parliament. International pressures for reforms of the 'red rubber' politics were primarily responsible for Leopold's surrender.¹⁰³ The Belgian parliament, aware of the investments that Belgian entrepreneurs had made in particularly infrastructure, perceived it as inconceivable that another European power would take over the Congo.¹⁰⁴ The private colony changed into Belgian-Congo.

The Belgian administration of the Congo transformed the former Free State into a bureaucracy.¹⁰⁵ De *Charte Coloniale* became Congo's first constitution. The Belgian administration pressed for radical administrative reforms, of which the most important was that the colony's policy was not the task of the Belgian King, but the task of the parliament. In

⁹⁹ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 102.

¹⁰⁰ Idem, 108.

¹⁰¹ Idem, 81.

¹⁰² Guy Vanthemsche, 'The Historiography of Belgian Colonialism in the Congo', 90.

¹⁰³ Roger Anstey, *King Leopold's Legacy*, 15.

¹⁰⁴ Guy Vanthemsche, 'The Historiography of Belgian Colonialism in the Congo', 91.

¹⁰⁵ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 119.

practice, this was the Belgian ministry of colonies, a newly designed function. Belgian-Congo had to maintain itself financially, so that heavy payments of the Belgian parliament could be avoided.¹⁰⁶ Several private Belgian companies, protected by the state, played an important role in shaping the Congolese economy. The company *Union Minière du Haut Katanga* (UMHK) was founded in 1906 and was exclusively concerned with mineral exploitation from the resource-rich province Katanga. The *Compagnie de Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga* (BCK) provided the necessary railway links between Katanga and the outside world and also exclusively had the right to mineral exploitation in the Kasai basin.¹⁰⁷ The last large company, *La Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo* (FORMINIÈRE) exclusively had the right to mineral exploitation in Kasai.¹⁰⁸ The mining industry was thus almost exclusively in foreign hands.

The impact of the First World War for the Congolese economy was enormous, because of the high demand for copper, which was extracted from Katanga.¹⁰⁹ The effects of these economic peaks were hardly felt by the normal population though. The Congolese economy had not always been attractive for Belgian or foreign investors, and a minimum of capital was invested in the country.¹¹⁰ Particularly in the inter-war years did foreign companies take up a short-run view, in which they took the best of local, natural and human resources in a short time.¹¹¹ Congolese exports declined more than 60% in 1929, because of the Wall Street crash and declining demand for raw materials. The ordinary Congolese citizens had to pay for the crisis themselves, as stated in the *Charte Coloniale*.¹¹² The proportion of the Congolese budgets that the Congolese themselves paid in the form of taxes increased from 14% in 1929

¹⁰⁶ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 118.

¹⁰⁷ Roger Anstey, *King Leopold's Legacy*, 43.

¹⁰⁸ Idem, 43-44.

¹⁰⁹ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 151.

¹¹⁰ Roger Anstey, *King Leopold's Legacy*, 103.

¹¹¹ B. Jewsiewicki, 'The Great Depression and the Making of the Colonial Economic System in the Belgian Congo', in: *African Economic History* 4 (1977), 153-176, 155.

¹¹² David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 170.

to 28% in 1932.¹¹³ The country's economy fell into a vicious cycle, with external loans providing infrastructure necessary for mineral exploitation, which charged the local economy with high interest rates, while the profits of the economic exploitation went to foreigners.¹¹⁴ The demand for Congolese resources grew again during the Second World War, when uranium and copper proved strategic materials for the Allied forces.¹¹⁵ The Belgians had further tried to make a 'model colony' out of the Congo, by developing medicine for tropical diseases and by offering a few Congolese the opportunity to follow an education.¹¹⁶ The Belgian authorities avoided, however, the development of a Congolese intellectual elite, denying the Congolese higher education.¹¹⁷

The late colonial years of the Congo were featured by the rise of ethnographic research; the mapping and categorising of the numerous different ethnic tribes in the country. The population of the Congo was divided into clear, discernible blocks, that all had their own customs and identities.¹¹⁸ The effect of this division was that people started to enact on them, the Belgian administrators, as well as the Congolese civilians. Colonization penetrated deep into society, changing ordinary people's self-image.¹¹⁹ There had always been differences between tribes, but for the first time these differences were anchored in ethnographic research.¹²⁰

The combination of constant economic exploitation and deepening divisions between ethnic tribes slowly grew into an explosive cocktail in the 1950s. The road to Congolese

¹¹³ B. Jewsiewicki, 'The Great Depression', 158.

¹¹⁴ Idem, 160.

¹¹⁵ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 207

¹¹⁶ Guy Vanthemsche, 'The Historiography of Belgian Colonialism in the Congo', 91.

¹¹⁷ Ibidem; Andreas Exenberger and Simon Hartmann, 'The dark side of globalization', 8.

¹¹⁸ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 125.

¹¹⁹ Idem, 123.

¹²⁰ Idem, 129.

independence was bumpy, however. There was a lack of unifying nationalism.¹²¹ Eventually, there was an agreement on a quasi-federalist system, which a provincial legislature and assembly and two national houses: a chamber of representatives and a senate.¹²² The three main political parties in the first democratic elections were the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) led by Lumumba, the *Alliances des Bakongos* (ABAKO), led by Kasavubu, and the *Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katange* (Conakat), led by Tshombe. Apart from the MNC, all political parties were based on ethnicity and their influence was therefore mostly territorial. The rural areas, especially, had no ideas of national unity, and were restricted by the local tribe.¹²³ After the first elections, Congo gained its independence on 30 June 1960 and was re-named 'the Republic of the Congo'. The country was, however, neither prepared for independence, nor united.¹²⁴ Kasavubu, president, controlled the western regions, Tshombe the southern regions – in particular Katanga – and Lumumba, democratically elected as first prime-minister, controlled the north-eastern and central regions.¹²⁵

3.2 The birth of 'Zaire': Mobutu's years 1965-1997

The first five years of the Republic of the Congo were chaotic. On 17 January 1961, half a year after independence, prime-minister Lumumba was murdered.¹²⁶ The state had to deal with two secessionist attempt of two of Congo's resource-rich regions: Katanga and Kasai. The situation in the Congo became a puzzle in which several different 'governments' claimed the country at the same time.¹²⁷ A full analysis of this period is beyond the scope of this thesis,

¹²¹ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 248.

¹²² Roger Anstey, *King Leopold's Legacy*, 241.

¹²³ Idem, 252.

¹²⁴ Guy Vanthemsche, 'The Historiography of Belgian Colonialism in the Congo', 91.

¹²⁵ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 281.

¹²⁶ Idem, 327.

¹²⁷ Idem, 324.

but one of the reasons for the continued power struggle between different (ethnic) political leaders was the superpower rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War.¹²⁸

The chaos ended when the army chief of staff Mobutu – backed by the CIA, as he was perceived as an important anti-communist ally¹²⁹ – committed a coup in 1965. He would be in power for the next 32 years. Mobutu firstly focused on unifying the country by establishing a one-party system to end political rivalries. Mobutu emphasized an ‘African consciousness’ and re-named the country to Zaïre in 1971. From 1973 onwards Mobutu started his ‘Zaïrinization’ by transferring foreign businesses to Zaïrian entrepreneurs.¹³⁰ He institutionalized a system of ‘cleptocray’, in which he took advantage of corruption of officials and was able to acquire his own personal wealth.¹³¹ In this sense, the predatory structures of the Congolese economy had changed little since the Belgian colonization. External resource revenues were the main source of Mobutu’s income and therefore there was a low rate of taxation, resulting in a lack of state-provided public goods.¹³² The lack of other competitive industries than resources – and Mobutu’s lack of interest to invest in other industries – led to a low degree of economic diversification and a vulnerability to global price shocks.¹³³

From 1975 onwards, it became clear that Mobutu’s Zaïre-project was failing. The country was drowning in large debts, soldiers from the state’s military deserted, corruption prevailed, and the state started to lose authority over its territory.¹³⁴ The US backed

¹²⁸ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 316.

¹²⁹ Leonce Ndikumana and James K. Boyce, ‘Congo’s Odious Debt: External Borrowing and Capital Flight in Zaïre’, in: *Development and Change* 29 (1998), 195-217, 208.

¹³⁰ Crawford Young, ‘Zaïre: The Shattered Illusion of the Integral State’, in: *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32:2 (1994), 247-263, 261.

¹³¹ Andreas Exenberger and Simon Hartmann, ‘The dark side of globalization’, 9.

¹³² Ibidem.

¹³³ World Bank, *Democratic Republic of Congo*, 35.

¹³⁴ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 393.

Mobutu's regime until the end of the Cold War in 1989 and had pressured the IMF and WB to provide Zaïre with loans, although well-aware of the corruption of his regime.¹³⁵ Between 1965 and 1991, the US had given Zaïre over \$1.5 billion in military and financial support, in exchange for American MNCs' access to Zaïre's resource reserves.¹³⁶ The US recognized that Mobutu was a 'bastard', but they emphasized that "at least, he is our bastard", their anti-communist ally.¹³⁷ Naniuzeyi argues that Zaïre had become a 'neo-colonial' state, internally ruled by capitalist elites, externally tied to an imperialist, global capitalist system, based on the exploitation of natural resources.¹³⁸ With the loss of US support after the Cold War, Mobutu's patrimonial kleptocracy became under attack. Mobutu was forced to 'democratize' Zaïre, which practically meant including a broader elite into his patronage. These elites, in turn, gained local authority beyond the president's control.¹³⁹ State revenues diminished, as local elites started to control local mining industries. Structural adjustment programs, based on neo-liberal philosophy, diminished further the redistributive capacity of the regime.¹⁴⁰ Mobutu's patronage networks slowly started to moulder, as he was less able to reward the loyalty of his elite clients.¹⁴¹ As a last resort to save his position, Mobutu turned to ethnic tensions as strategy to provoke competition and divide the local elites.¹⁴² In 1991, Mobutu

¹³⁵ Leonce Ndikumana and James K. Boyce, 'Congo's Odious Debt', 210-211.

¹³⁶ Ellen Ray, 'U.S. Military and Corporate Recolonization of the Congo', in: *Covert Action Quarterly* (2000), 1-14, 2; Idem, 211.

¹³⁷ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 399.

¹³⁸ Mabiengwa Emmanuel Naniuzeyi, 'The State of the State in Congo-Zaire: A Survey of the Mobutu Regime', in: *Journal of Black Studies* 29:5 (1999), 669-683, 671.

¹³⁹ William Reno, 'Congo: From State Collapse to 'Absolutism', to State Failure', in: *Third World Quarterly* 27:1 (2006), 43-56, 49.

¹⁴⁰ Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006* (New York 2009), 10.

¹⁴¹ Stephanie Matti, 'Resources and Rent Seeking in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', in: *Third World Quarterly* 31:3 (2010), 401-413, 404.

¹⁴² William Reno, 'Congo', 51.

declared that he would give up his presidency and that a new head of state would be announced soon.¹⁴³ He remained head of state until 1997 however.

3.3 Summary

Congo's involvement in the global economy was closely tied to its natural resources. As private colony of Leopold II, the Congo Free State was exclusively focused on the extraction of resources, with profits returning to the Belgian king. After the authority of the Congo Free State was transferred to the Belgian parliament, Belgian-Congo received its first constitution and a bureaucratic state apparatus. Belgian enterprises remained their privileged position and predominated the Congolese economy. Investments in infrastructure were mainly focused on the mining industries.¹⁴⁴

Independence in 1960 led to disintegration of the country, as (ethnic) political elites controlled different regions, leading to a chaotic period of five years, until Mobutu committed a coup and became president in 1965. His patrimonial patronage system continued to exist with financial and military support from the US, who were desperate for anti-communist allies in Central-Africa. Mobutu's 'Zairinization' project, widespread corruption, and the increasing competition amongst local elites for territory (including their resources) led to the failing of the Zaïre state. The interconnectedness of local Zairian elites in the global economic networks and international pressures for democratic reforms and openness further led to a deterioration of the state's authority.

¹⁴³ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 417.

¹⁴⁴ Roger Anstey, *King Leopold's Legacy*, 262.

4. State failure in the Democratic Republic of Congo

4.1 The Great African War

Different scale dynamics in the First- and Second Congo war (known as the Great African War) have influenced Congolese politics tremendously. The collapse of the state of Zaïre; the development of a plunder economy based on natural resource extraction; external interventions by regional and international actors, all are factors contributing to the occurrence of these wars.¹⁴⁵ An analysis of the First- and Second Congo war on a local, national, regional and international level, will show the changes in the political and economic environment of the Congo. Before we turn to this analysis, there are two aspects that have had an influence on the situation as a whole. The first aspect is the norms of sovereignty that were reinforced in the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, reaffirming legitimacy to the existing colonial borders and “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence”.¹⁴⁶ The second aspect is that of double citizenship, inherited from colonial rule, in which Congolese citizens have both a civic citizenship – related to the state – and an ethnic citizenship – related to native authority. Ethnic citizenship is most persevering, as it determines the access to social and economic rights, such as land.¹⁴⁷

4.1.1 The end of Mobutu’s Zaïre: the First Congo War 1996-1997

Towards the ending of Mobutu’s regime in the 1990s, tribalism gained renewed importance due to local inequalities and regional ethnic tensions. This period was particularly tensed for

¹⁴⁵ Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, 1.

¹⁴⁶ Jeremy M. Weinstein, ‘Africa’s “Scramble for Africa”: Lessons of a Continental War’, in: *World Policy Journal* 17:2 (2000), 11-20, 11; Organization of African Unity, *OAU Charter* (Addis Abeba, 1963), 4.

¹⁴⁷ Willie Breytenbach et al., ‘Conflict in the Congo: From Kivu to Kabila’, in: *African Security Review* 8:5 (1999), 33-42, 35.

the Congolese Tutsi's in eastern Zaïre: the Banyarwanda in North-Kivu and the Banyamulenge in South-Kivu.¹⁴⁸ In times of economic decline, ethnic boundaries hardened. Throughout the twentieth century there had been local rivalries over resources, land and power, that created cleavages between local tribes. The Congolese Tutsi were more and more perceived as ethnic Rwandese, and therefore since 1981 denied Congolese citizenship and their right to land.¹⁴⁹ The 'indigenous Congolese society' became polarized from the 'nonindigenous Congolese society', based on ethnic citizenship.¹⁵⁰ Inter-tribal relations worsened when a large flow of Hutu-refugees fled into North-Kivu, from the newly established Rwandan Tutsi regime, led by Kagame, resulting in demographic and political change in the region and a continuation of the ethnic tensions between Rwandan Hutu's and Tutsi's on Congolese soil.¹⁵¹ The growing tensions in North-Kivu and the spread of Hutu-refugees - including Hutu-militias - to South-Kivu, led to increased violent outbursts, in which Kagame's regime supported the Congolese Tutsi's.¹⁵² Rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila, originally from Katanga, and his coalition of armed forces, the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre* (AFDL) eventually started to lead 'the rebellion of the Congolese Tutsi's', with the main aim of gaining control over the Kivu provinces.¹⁵³ It is here that local actors from the Kivu's joined with national and regional actors.¹⁵⁴

The eastern Zaïre had gradually become involved in a larger regional conflict. The Rwandan genocide of Tutsi's that took place in 1994 also influenced local relations in eastern

¹⁴⁸ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 436.

¹⁴⁹ Willie Breytenbach et al., 'Conflict in the Congo', 36.

¹⁵⁰ Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (New York 2010), 129.

¹⁵¹ Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, 16.

¹⁵² Idem, 23.

¹⁵³ Willie Breytenbach et al., 'Conflict in the Congo', 36.

¹⁵⁴ Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 129.

Zaire.¹⁵⁵ As the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – a Tutsi defence force, trained in Uganda – gained control over Rwanda again after the genocide, there was a large influx of Hutu refugees and former militias into Zaire. The expansion of Hutu refugee camps in the Kivu provinces was perceived by the new Rwandan Tutsi government, led by Kagame, as easy breeding grounds to develop counterattacks on the Rwandan regime. The presence of these Hutu militias was seen as a security threat to Rwanda.¹⁵⁶ Burundi had similar reasons for considering the Hutu militias in Zaire a security threat. Burundi had had its own Hutu-led genocide of Tutsi's in 1993 and after Buyoya's coup in 1996, its main goal was to secure its borders from any possible Hutu-led invasion from Zaire. Uganda, led by president Museveni, was a close ally of the RPF, and therefore Kagame's regime could count on his support. These three states supported Kabila's AFDL, and it did not take long before the AFDL and foreign troops gained control over eastern Zaire. (An overview of the regional allies is given in the map on page 41). Hutu refugee camps were destroyed and the Rwandan and aligned forces massacred many Hutu refugees. Although breaking the rules of another state's sovereignty as stated in the charter of the OAU, the invasion was perceived as legitimate, due to the non-existence of a Congolese state in the region.

Kabila's AFDL did not stay in the eastern provinces however. After gaining control over the Kivu's in 1996, the AFDL's main goal became the overthrow of Mobutu's regime in Kinshasa.¹⁵⁷ With the support of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola – who joined the anti-Mobutu coalition due to Mobutu's support to UNITA –, and the US – although not enthusiastic, but in conjunction with the Rwandan regime¹⁵⁸ – Kabila was able to commit a coup in 1997. After 32 years the country's name changed from Zaire to the Democratic

¹⁵⁵ Willie Breytenbach et al., 'Conflict in the Congo', 37.

¹⁵⁶ *Idem*, 37.

¹⁵⁷ International Crisis Group, 'Congo at War: A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict', in: *ICG Congo Report* no. 2 (1998), 1-31, 14.

¹⁵⁸ Ellen Ray, 'U.S. Military and Corporate Recolonization of the Congo', 4.

Map of actors involved in the First Congo war



Republic of Congo, and the Mobutist state officially came to an end. The Congo state under Mobutu was severely weakened and had virtually disappeared in some areas. NGOs, warlords, both local and foreign ethnic militias had started to carry out state roles, and

public space was increasingly privatised.¹⁵⁹ What is particularly striking in the First Congo War is the absence of the UN in intervening in the conflict. After the failure of international intervention in the Rwandan genocide, the UN and US in particular, felt guilty and backed Kagame's decision to invade the eastern DRC in order to stabilize the region.¹⁶⁰ At the end of the Cold War the US acknowledged that the Mobutist state was a corrupt dictatorship. The US did not mind the coup against Mobutu, as he had made important resource industries Congolese property under the device of 'Zairinization' and had hindered international free trade in natural resources that were important for the global economy. The US was well-aware of the massacres in the Hutu refugee camps, but did not get involved, giving Rwanda the impression that they could act with impunity.¹⁶¹

4.1.2 The Democratic Republic of Congo: the Second Congo War 1998-2003

Nearly a year after Kabila's takeover of the Congo, tensions on the local level rose again. One of the root causes for the local violence had not been solved. The Banyamulunge and Banyarwanda still faced a status of 'doubtful citizenship' and still did not acquire social, economic or land rights.¹⁶² Furthermore, the war in the eastern Kivu's had disrupted its society and economy. A war economy had emerged, in which both rebels, as well as local citizens were engaged.¹⁶³ Revenues from easy-extractable resources, in particular coltan, funded the continuation of the conflict and gave the local population the means to survive. The different ethnic tribes in the Kivu's still faced a security dilemma, resulting in the formation of various ethnic militias and rebel groups.¹⁶⁴ These were again supported and trained by different

¹⁵⁹ Filip Reyntjes, *The Great African War*, 222.

¹⁶⁰ Idem, 66.

¹⁶¹ Idem, 78.

¹⁶² Idem, 141.

¹⁶³ Theodore Trefon Saskia et al., 'State failure in the Congo: perceptions & realities', in: *Review of African Political Economy* 29:93-94 (2002), 379-388, 382.

¹⁶⁴ Jeremy M. Weinstein, 'Africa's "Scramble for Africa"', 13.

regional and national actors. The remaining foreign presence in the region led to deteriorated relations between both the local groups, as well as Kabila and Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.¹⁶⁵

Kabila's AFDL had been a strong anti-Mobutu, Tutsi-based alliance in the First Congo War, but the AFDL-coalition proved to be a fragile alliance after Kabila established his regime, as not all actors shared the same agenda.¹⁶⁶ It turned out that Kabila was as much as an opportunist as Mobutu had been, and to keep in power and gain Congolese popular support, he demanded foreign troops to leave the eastern Congo immediately.¹⁶⁷ Kabila played on national feelings of mistrust and 'hate' towards the 'nonindigenous society'.¹⁶⁸ Former alliances thus shifted and the AFDL fell apart. The DRC remained a weak state, that did not protect its borders, did not have a monopoly on violence and did not manage its natural resources efficiently.¹⁶⁹ The power vacuum that was created by the collapse of the Mobutist state drew the attention of internal, as well as external actors.¹⁷⁰ A renewed escalation of the situation was a matter of time. The development of an economy of plunder – based on quick gain and quick extraction at a low cost¹⁷¹ – in conflict zones in the eastern DRC led to a competition in exploiting natural resources between domestic and regional actors, and soon power relations between several African states resulted in the Second Congo War, also known as the Great African War.¹⁷²

Kagame did not perceive the security threats posed in the eastern DRC to be over after Kabila's coup. As Kabila became more resistant to his former allies, Rwanda responded by encouraging segments of the AFDL coalition to revolt. Kabila, in turn, started to arm Hutu

¹⁶⁵ Filip Reyntjes, *The Great African War*, 168.

¹⁶⁶ Idem, 140.

¹⁶⁷ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 463.

¹⁶⁸ Willie Breytenbach et al., 'Conflict in the Congo', 39.

¹⁶⁹ Theodore Trefon Saskia et al., 'State failure in the Congo', 382.

¹⁷⁰ Jeremy M. Weinstein, 'Africa's "Scramble for Africa"', 14.

¹⁷¹ Theodore Trefon Saskia et al., 'State failure in the Congo', 381.

¹⁷² David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 463.

resistance militias to fight against the foreign troops.¹⁷³ Many different groups, militias and states with different, often competing, agendas became involved in the Congo war. It seemed like the only thing that mattered was military opportunism.¹⁷⁴ In 1998 the International Crisis Group described the Congo as a country at risk of fragmentation and getting locked into endemic violence.¹⁷⁵ Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda were again involved in the war in Congo, although this time in a power struggle against their former ally Kabila. The largest difference between Mobutu's regime and Kabila's regime however, was the external support of African states and non-state actors given to Kabila. These actors all had their own agenda, and again many 'wars within the war' were fought on Congolese soil. Sudan backed Kabila as an anti-Ugandan force, since the Ugandan government had supported South-Sudanese rebels.¹⁷⁶ Kabila turned to Chad as other French-speaking country in Africa: their alliance was recommended by France, eager to gain more influence in Central-Africa.¹⁷⁷ Angola kept supporting the Congolese government, although now led by Kabila, as UNITA shifted to the opposite 'camp' as well.¹⁷⁸ Zimbabwe's support was economically motivated, and Mugabe managed to get mineral-extraction concessions from Kabila.¹⁷⁹ Namibia had similar economic concerns.¹⁸⁰ Libya, finally, organized the transport of soldiers from Chad to the DRC. It is likely that Kaddafi's involvement was also based on escaping the US-forced international isolation of the country.¹⁸¹ Important non-state allies were the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), an anti-Ugandan rebel group; the *Forces*

¹⁷³ Willie Breytenbach et al., 'Conflict in the Congo', 40.

¹⁷⁴ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 471.

¹⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, 'Congo at War', 2.

¹⁷⁶ *Idem*, 19.

¹⁷⁷ *Idem*, 25.

¹⁷⁸ Jeremy M. Weinstein, 'Africa's "Scramble for Africa"', 14.

¹⁷⁹ Willie Breytenbach et al., 'Conflict in the Congo', 40.

¹⁸⁰ International Crisis Group, 'Congo at War', 21.

¹⁸¹ *Idem*, 25.

Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu armed force; and the Interahamwe, Hutu militias from the refugee camps in the Kivu's.¹⁸² Private security forces, such as the South African Executive Outcomes, also played a role in the war as private militaries on both sides.¹⁸³ Kagame had considerably less allies in Africa, but was supported by the United States, for reasons mentioned earlier, and could therefore still act with impunity.¹⁸⁴ This impunity did not only lead to severe human rights abuses¹⁸⁵, but also to the control of natural resources, which led to a new trans-border war economy between the Kivu's, Rwanda and Uganda.¹⁸⁶ Rwanda's profits on coltan during the coltan rush of 2000 are estimated at \$240 million.¹⁸⁷ Interestingly enough, Rwanda and Uganda were rewarded by the WB for its organised illegal mineral exploitation from eastern Congo. The WB perceived the countries' economies as success stories of structural adjustment programs, as their exports had increased significantly. Both Rwanda and Uganda received additional loans, which directly and indirectly contributed to the financing of the military operations that had made the resource theft possible – so-called 'crimes of globalisation'.¹⁸⁸ Both countries can continue to act with impunity, as the WB and IMF does not seem to be concerned in how the countries' exports increased.¹⁸⁹ The involvement of African states and non-state actors has changed the Second Congo war in 'Africa's Scramble for Africa'.¹⁹⁰ (An overview of the regional actors involved is shown on page 46). The Lusaka cease-fire accord of 1999 seemed

¹⁸² International Crisis Group, 'Congo at War', 14, 19.

¹⁸³ Idem, 23.

¹⁸⁴ Jeremy M. Weinstein, 'Africa's "Scramble for Africa"', 18.

¹⁸⁵ Amnesty International, *Democratic Republic of Congo: a long-standing crisis spinning out of control* (London 1998), 3.

¹⁸⁶ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 465.

¹⁸⁷ Idem, 481.

¹⁸⁸ Christopher W. Mullins and Dawn L. Rothe, 'Gold, diamonds and blood: International state-corporate crime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', in: *Contemporary Justice Review* 11:2 (2008), 81-99, 91, 94.

¹⁸⁹ Christopher W. Mullins and Dawn L. Rothe, 'Gold, diamonds and blood', 95.

¹⁹⁰ Jeremy M. Weinstein, 'Africa's "Scramble for Africa"', 17.

Map of actors involved in the Second Congo war



promising in providing peace, but the various rebel organisations and local militias were not invited to the meeting, and therefore this accord led to nothing.¹⁹¹ Also, foreign troops in eastern Congo did not leave and therefore illegal extraction of natural resources did not stop.¹⁹²

An enormous variety of actors are involved in some aspect of the Congo war and they all have their own agenda for seeking peace in the region.¹⁹³ African regional organizations are among these actors. African leaders have increasingly lost their faith in Western-oriented organizations as the UN – particularly after the mission in Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda – and have started to turn to regional or subregional organizations as the OAU or South African Development Community (SADC). However, these ‘African solutions to African problems’ have not led to the desired outcome, mainly due to uneven development and growth and power disparities among states and a lack of adequate resources.¹⁹⁴ Regional missions are often transferred to the UN in the end.¹⁹⁵ The UN peacekeeping missions are based on the idea of the neo-liberal state, based on ‘good governance’, the rule of law, democracy and economic liberalisation.¹⁹⁶ A standardized conflict resolution model therefore focuses on full implementation of a Western idea of the state: a liberal democracy and an economy based on neo-liberal reforms.¹⁹⁷ The *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République*

¹⁹¹ Ellen Ray, ‘U.S. Military and Corporate Recolonization of the Congo’, 8.

¹⁹² Patricia Daley, ‘Challenges to Peace’, 312; United Nations Security Council, *Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (2003), 14.

¹⁹³ Patricia Daley, ‘Challenges to Peace’, 310.

¹⁹⁴ Jeremy M. Weinstein, ‘Africa’s “Scramble for Africa”’, 19, 16.

¹⁹⁵ Patricia Daley, ‘Challenges to Peace’, 309.

¹⁹⁶ David Moore, ‘Neoliberal globalisation and the triple crisis of ‘modernisation’ in Africa: Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa’, in: *Third World Quarterly* 22:6 (2001), 909-929, 911; Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, ‘The Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peacebuilding, State building and the Reproduction of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in: *International Peacekeeping* 16:5 (2009), 652-666, 653.

¹⁹⁷ Patricia Daley, ‘Challenges to Peace’, 304.

démocratique du Congo (MONUC) was implemented as part of the Lusaka cease-fire in 1999.¹⁹⁸ MONUC was initially an observation mission, but its mandate was adjusted to include improvement of security conditions by all necessary means.¹⁹⁹ The MONUC mission succeeded in stabilizing large parts of the DRC, but the eastern region remained insecure.²⁰⁰ The mission failed to recognize local dynamics, focused on elite-based transition and therefore ignored micro-level tensions, that in turn influenced macro-level stability.²⁰¹ Its unwillingness to adapt to local contexts shows how state-oriented the UN works. State-building is one of the core tasks on the liberal peacebuilding agenda.²⁰² The state of the DRC does not control the eastern regions and is in no position to end the conflict there.²⁰³ It depends heavily on the UN and NGOs to “carry out governmental responsibilities”.²⁰⁴ It seems unrealistic that establishing the rule of law or democracy, in lines with the liberal peacebuilding agenda, will strengthen the state’s capacity, as these neo-liberal reforms are focused on limited government intervention.²⁰⁵ The dominance of neo-liberal ideology in peacebuilding projects has also led to increasing privatization and the development of a ‘peace industry’, with private security firms, NGOs and MNCs entering the ‘peacebuilding’ endeavour.²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁸ MONUC, ‘United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (version 22 June 2016) <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/> (22 June 2016).

¹⁹⁹ Denis M. Tull, ‘Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War’, in: *International Peacekeeping* 16:2 (2009), 215-230, 220.

²⁰⁰ Denis M. Tull, ‘Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 221.

²⁰¹ Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 11; idem, 227.

²⁰² Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, ‘The Liberal Peace Is Neither’, 658-659.

²⁰³ Theo Neethling, ‘From MONUC to MONUSCO and beyond: prospects for reconstruction, state-building and security governance in the DRC’, in: *South African Journal of International Affairs* 18:1 (2011), 23-41, 31.

²⁰⁴ Theo Neethling, ‘From MONUC to MONUSCO and beyond’, 29.

²⁰⁵ Idem, 25.

²⁰⁶ Patricia Daley, ‘Challenges to Peace’, 310.

Global economic actors - the IMF, WB and MNCs – have had an enormous impact in privatizing land and decentralizing the DRC's government.²⁰⁷ In the years before the Second Congo war, the IMF and WB insisted on structural adjustment programmes for the country's economy.²⁰⁸ The development of the Congolese state in an era of neo-liberal globalization has focused on structuring "the national territorial spaces by transnational logic".²⁰⁹ The Congolese mining sector, for example, has been liberalized to the extreme, in order to make the industry competitive. These neo-liberal policies, imposed by the IMF and WB, are more likely to benefit large MNCs, who are highly competitive, instead of domestic enterprises.²¹⁰ This extreme liberalization further undermines the authority of the state, as states become nothing more than an 'intermediate' actor in complex international trade networks. Failed states, then, are "the success stories of global neoliberalism gone mad".²¹¹ The natural resources of the Congo are possessed by the political elites and international private sectors.²¹² The borderlands, the eastern Congo, are not given the opportunity to industrialise or constitutionalise, due to these structures of global accumulation.²¹³ Militias have been able to operate on a global level via extensive global economic networks, and in the absence of state authority, foreign companies are willing to sign contracts with these local strongmen.²¹⁴ Freeports in neighbouring countries are established, without official taxation and without the possibility of tracing resources to its origins, therefore resources can more

²⁰⁷ Jacques Tshibwabwa Kuditshini, 'Global governance and local government in the Congo: the role of the IMF, World Bank, the multinationals and the political elites', in: *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 74:2 (2008), 195-216, 197.

²⁰⁸ Patricia Daley, 'Challenges to Peace', 315.

²⁰⁹ Jacques Tshibwabwa Kuditshini, 'Global governance and local government in the Congo', 198.

²¹⁰ Idem, 203.

²¹¹ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 481.

²¹² Jacques Tshibwabwa Kuditshini, 'Global governance and local government in the Congo', 209.

²¹³ David Moore, 'Neoliberal globalisation and the triple crisis of 'modernisation' in Africa', 920.

²¹⁴ Heiko Nitzschke and Kaysie Studdard, 'The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and peacebuilding', in: *International Peacekeeping* 12:2 (2005), 222-239, 232.

easily enter the global market.²¹⁵ Militias are simultaneously increasingly carrying out state duties and have established state-like institutions.²¹⁶ On the other hand, in the absence of state authority, looting can become particularly common. Various rebel groups in eastern Congo, such as the FDLR, are known for their looting of natural resources, often accompanied with severe human rights abuses such as mass rapes.²¹⁷

4.2 Summary

The First- and Second Congo wars are examples of how local, regional and global actors become interconnected in a conflict over authority in the absence of the state and over profits over easily extractible resources. Recalling the meta-narrative of the New Wars, as explained in the theoretical framework, these 'endemic' wars seem to be more complex and related to international and regional forces. The complexity of ethnicities crossing national boundaries can lead to a conflict spill-over from one country to the next, which can lead to an escalated regional war, without regards to 'official' national borders.²¹⁸ The aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and economic and social grievances of local tribes in the borderlands of eastern Congo rigidified ethnic boundaries in times of economic decline. The absence of the Congolese state, the growth of the informal economy based on natural resources and the global demand for these resources led to a situation in which rebellion became financially viable.²¹⁹ As people start to do well out of war, they have no incentives to settle for peace, as the war economy becomes vital to their existence.

The neo-liberal influence is visible in both the UN missions, as well as structural adjustment programs proposed by the IMF and WB. Peacebuilding missions are essentially focused on the building of a liberal state, based on the rule of law, democracy and neo-liberal

²¹⁵ Christopher W. Mullins and Dawn L. Rothe, 'Gold, diamonds and blood', 93.

²¹⁶ Theo Neethling, 'From MONUC to MONUSCO and beyond', 35.

²¹⁷ Idem, 34.

²¹⁸ Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, 279.

²¹⁹ David van Reybrouck, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis*, 465.

economic institutions. Structural adjustment programs have led to the extreme liberalization of industries, making those only competitive and beneficial for large MNCs. The Congolese state has become a mere intermediate actor in these global economic networks. Local militias in the eastern DRC have been able to create state-like institutions and are able to sign contracts with foreign companies themselves, further undermining the state's authority. Regional actors have been able to illegally exploit Congo's natural resources, as Kinshasa cannot extend its authority to the eastern regions. It seems like everyone likes to grab a hold from the Kivu's riches and this has been made possible by the increased privatization of land and the extreme liberalization of mining industries, based on the idea of a neo-liberal globalization.

5. Fragmentation and regionalization: the Kivu's

5.1 Resources and governance in the borderlands

After Kabila's murder in 2001, he was succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila, who was more willing to end the violence of the Second Congo war. This led to the signing of the Sun City peace agreement in South Africa, in 2002. A transitional government was installed, led by Kabila Jr., and foreign troops started to leave the country. A year later however, thousands of civilians in the eastern DRC continued to die every day from continued fighting, diseases and malnutrition.²²⁰ International and national actors had reached an agreement, but local conflict persisted in the eastern provinces.²²¹ This local violence led to the increased fragmentation of the Kivu provinces from the central authority in Kinshasa and to the rise of local warlords to provide security and basic state functions.

The interconnectedness of local, national and regional dimensions of the conflict was not merely top-down, as local components reinforced national and regional dimensions as well.²²² For the Congolese Tutsi's in the Kivu's, land rights remained a concern and local grievances persisted.²²³ The eastern provinces had long been afflicted by ongoing fragility, insecurity and instability. The absence of the state's authority in the region during the previous wars had resulted in a lack of faith in Kinshasa.²²⁴ The rise of various warlords further undermined the strengthening of a central authority in the region. Strongman Laurent Nkunda, senior officer of the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD) became the

²²⁰ Séverine Autesserre, 'Local Violence, National Peace? Postwar "Settlement" in the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003-2006)', in: *African Studies Review* 49:3 (2006), 1-29, 2.

²²¹ Séverine Autesserre, 'Local Violence, National Peace?', 3.

²²² Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 176.

²²³ Luisa Ryan and Dominic Keyzer, 'Everyone for themselves' in DRC's North Kivu', in: *FMR 43: States of fragility* (2013), 24-27, 25; Amnesty International, *Democratic Republic of Congo: North-Kivu: Civilians pay the price for political and military rivalry* (London 2005), 20.

²²⁴ Luisa Ryan and Dominic Keyzer, 'Everyone for themselves' in DRC's North Kivu', 26.

‘murdering guardian angel’ of the Congolese Tutsi’s in the Kivu’s. Backed by Rwanda, he fought against the MONUC forces, the Hutu militias, the Congolese state army and other local militias to provide the local Tutsi’s with security.²²⁵ In 2007, Nkunda founded his own political party, *the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP). He started to perform more state functions and developed own symbols of statehood, as well as governing mechanisms.²²⁶ Warlords such as Nkunda present major challenges to the Congolese state-building endeavour.

The Kivu’s are borderlands: they are “key arenas within which distinct conflicts within neighbouring states become entangled within regional conflict formation”.²²⁷ The situation in the borderlands after 2002 was one of attempts of political centralisation of the state in Kinshasa on the one hand, while oriented on outward, regional economic activity on the other hand.²²⁸ During the Great African war, the Kivu’s were significant in the coltan rush between 1999 and 2001.²²⁹ Coltan is used to extract tantalum from, a substance used in electronic products. The extraction of coltan requires minimal expertise and is therefore and easily lootable resource. Africa owns 80% of the world’s coltan, of which the majority in the eastern DRC.²³⁰ The coltan trade is inherently linked to the global economy. Local entrepreneurs buy the resource from eastern border cities as Goma, frequently co-operating with local militias, and sell it to neighbouring foreigners, who again sell it to buyers in the US, Japan and Europe,

²²⁵ Danielle Beswick, ‘The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building: The Case of Laurent Nkunda in Eastern Congo’, in: *The Round Table* 98:402 (2009), 333-346, 340.

²²⁶ Danielle Beswick, ‘The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building’, 341.

²²⁷ Stephen Jackson, ‘Borderlands and the transformation of war economies: lessons from the DR Congo’, in: *Conflict, Security & Development* 6:3 (2006), 425-447, 425.

²²⁸ Stephen Jackson, ‘Borderlands and the transformation of war economies’, 429.

²²⁹ *Idem*, 439.

²³⁰ Nadira Lalji, ‘The Resource Curse Revised: Conflict and Coltan in the Congo’, in: *Harvard International Review* (Fall 2007), 34-37, 35.

thus inherently linking the eastern region of the DRC to the global economy.²³¹ It seems paradoxical that coltan - used to increase the interconnectedness of the globalized world via mobile phones and other electronics - is one of the causes for the internal fragmentation of the DRC.²³² Today, the situation in the Kivu's remains insecure and violent, despite the renewed authorization of the *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo* (MONUSCO) in 2010.²³³ As long as local and regional conflict dynamics are ignored by international peacebuilding efforts, it is unlikely that their missions will stabilize the Kivu's anytime soon.

Zooming in on the Kivu's allows us to examine different scale dynamics more closely. Recalling the New War- and greed-theory, this case shows that local violence is not merely economically motivate. The links between grievances and greed become apparent in these borderlands.²³⁴ Rebel groups in the Kivu's have formulated political aims, that – through the economization of conflict – can transform into natural resources extraction for private – or communal - gain. Greed and grievances are thus interconnected.²³⁵ Explaining the conflict in the DRC as inherently local falls short to the interlinked national, regional and international dimensions. Local violence can further severely influence other levels. The New War in the DRC is not simply endemic, criminal and apolitical, it rather shows the violent consequences of a resource-rich failed state incorporated into the neo-liberal global economy.

²³¹ Jeffrey W. Mantz, 'Improvisational economies: Coltan production in the eastern Congo', in: *Social Anthropology* 16:1 (2008), 34-50, 42.

²³² Jeffrey W. Mantz, 'Improvisational economies', 48.

²³³ MONUSCO, 'United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo' (version 22 June 2016) <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background> (22 June 2016).

²³⁴ Stephen Jackson, 'Borderlands and the transformation of war economies', 438.

²³⁵ Filip Reyntjens, 'Regulation, taxation and violence: the state, quasi-state governance an cross-border dynamics in the Great Lakes Region', in: *Review of African Political Economy* 41:142 (2014), 530-544, 541.

5.2 The future of the state of the Congo

Although not the main purpose of this thesis, it is useful to look into some possible solutions for the future of the Congolese state. I will focus here on three aspects that can prove valuable in building a Congolese state. A first radical solution would be to redraw post-colonial borders to take into account trans-border ethnicities, to create more homogenous ethnic regions.²³⁶ The problem of the Congolese state is that its entire system is a copy from Western values, not embedded in Africa. A rebuilding of the state based on ethnic groups as essentially modern constructions should be at the core of a new post-colonial African state.²³⁷ It is unlikely that this will happen in the near future however, as the charter of the OAU reinforces and is committed to maintain the colonial boundaries.²³⁸ It is also not easy to divide the Congo along ethnic lines and it is furthermore not certain that this division will change local opportunities and grievances. It is interesting that, against all odds, the Congolese state still persists. There is a certain feeling of national unity among the 'indigenous' Congolese and despite ethnic diversity, citizens also feel 'Congolese'.²³⁹ Although the state has been virtually absent for many years now, Congolese citizens acknowledge that the Congolese state still offers a minimum level of certainty about life.²⁴⁰ The presence of Rwandan and Ugandan troops during the Great African war furthermore triggered national sentiments against a 'common enemy'.²⁴¹ The desire for Congolese federalism is generally stronger than the desire for

²³⁶ David Moore, 'Neoliberal globalisation and the triple crisis of 'modernisation' in Africa', 918; Willie Breytenbach et al., 'Conflict in the Congo', 42.

²³⁷ Theodore Trefon Saskia et al., 'State failure in the Congo', 386.

²³⁸ Andreas Exenberger and Simon Hartmann, 'The dark side of globalization', 10; William Reno, 'Congo', 53.

²³⁹ Pierre Englebert, 'Why Congo Persists: Sovereignty, Globalization and the Violent Reproduction of a Weak State', in: *QEH Working Paper Series* 95 (2003), 1-40, 5.

²⁴⁰ Pierre Englebert, 'Why Congo Persists', 9.

²⁴¹ Idem, 29.

separatist solutions, which shows the interesting phenomenon of Congolese nationalism in a fragmented country.²⁴²

A second solution could be taking into account more hybrid forms of governance, emphasizing more regional and local forms of governance, rather than reinforcing a historically non-existent central authority.²⁴³ The interconnectedness of local-regional dynamics in the Congolese conflicts calls for more regional approaches to peacebuilding.²⁴⁴ In fragmented states, the 'state' is perceived as, physically and psychologically, alien.²⁴⁵ In this case hybrid political orders could be new options for governance. In these orders, the 'state' shares its legitimacy and authority with other local or traditional structures, that enjoy greater legitimacy.²⁴⁶ Critique on these orders is, however, that it can lead to the "embedding of illegitimate forms of order in the machinery of the state", as the informal economy is protected and promoted by including non-state militias and as not all non-state actors are locally perceived as legitimate.²⁴⁷

A third solution relates to the exploitation of Congo's natural resources on the global market. Trade reforms and certain rules for resource extraction in conflict zones could limit the trade in resource conflicts, therefore decreasing incentives of extracting local militias and foreign illegitimate actors to continue resource extraction to fund their fight. A relatively successful campaign in ending the trade in conflict diamonds was the Kimberley Process in 2003, a series of intergovernmental meetings.²⁴⁸ Although its success has yet to be seen, the

²⁴² Pierre Englebert, 'Why Congo Persists', 34.

²⁴³ Danielle Beswick, 'The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building', 343.

²⁴⁴ Patricia Daley, 'Challenges to Peace', 317.

²⁴⁵ Volker Boege et al., 'On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility'', *Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management* (2008), 1-21, 9.

²⁴⁶ Volker Boege et al., 'On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States', 10.

²⁴⁷ Kate Meagher, 'The Strength of Weak States? Non-State Security Forces and Hybrid Governance in Africa', in: *Development and Change* 43:5 (2012), 1073-1101, 1085, 1097.

²⁴⁸ Andrew J. Grant and Ian Taylor, 'Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and the Quest for Clean Gems', in: *The Round Table* 93:375 (2004), 385-401, 392.

Process changed the general idea that purchasing conflict minerals is not acceptable.²⁴⁹ The WTO could play a role in leading these conversations, although that seems unlikely in the near future as they explicitly stay away from trade reforms related to human rights or environmental issues. The problem of Congolese resources is mainly the high global demand for resources that almost exclusively exist on Congolese soil, such as coltan. In the end, this is essentially a question of what we want our global economy to be based on.

5.3 Summary

Zooming in on the Kivu's after the Sun City peace agreement has allowed us to see the local-national-regional-global dynamics of conflict in a fragmented country into more detail. The problem of state failure is essentially linked to all levels, and is particularly worsened by the rise of powerful warlords who are able to grow into global economic networks. The fact that the Kivu's possess a large amount of resources, in particular coltan, leads to both internal and external interests in trade with the region. In the absence of the state, MNCs often sign contracts with local rebel groups, or resources are sold via intermediaries. The neo-liberal forces of globalization have penetrated deeply into the local, national, regional and global dynamics of the conflict. The future of the Congolese state remains uncertain, although multiple possible solutions have briefly been proposed here. Most importantly right now, however, is to recognize that the conflict in the Congo is not inherently local and endemic, but rather complex interconnected with different scale dynamics.

²⁴⁹ Andrew J. Grant and Ian Taylor, 'Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds', 396.

6. Conclusion

Congo's part in the global economy has mainly been based on the presence of its natural resources. Its inability, however, to profit from resource revenues have led to economic decline, rent-seeking activities by corrupt officials, systems of patronage, growing inequality and poverty of the population, which is also referred to as the 'resource curse'. This inability to profit from resources is largely due to the failed state of the DRC. Historical analysis of the processes of state formation in the Congo has shown its troublesome state-building endeavour. The Congo Free State as private property of king Leopold II lacked political and administrative institutions. The Free State was developed into an extractive colony, based on the ivory trade and 'red rubber' politics, whose profits returned to the Belgian king. After authority of the Free State was transferred to the Belgian parliament, Belgian-Congo received its first constitution and bureaucratic state apparatus. This did not lead to the development of strong state institutions, however, but rather to a continuation of king Leopold's politics of resource extraction. Belgian corporations invested in the mining industry and the infrastructure necessary for this industry, industrialization therefore did not occur.

Congolese independence came too soon in 1960. The country was hardly united and political leaders lacked experience and education to govern. Five years of violent power struggle between different ethnic political leaders followed, until the army chief of staff Mobutu committed a coup. From 1965 until 1997, the Mobutist, 'Zairian' state was characterized by rent-seeking activities, corruption, patronage and the elite's ability to acquire personal wealth. The introduction of the Washington Consensus in 1989 led to growing international pressure for democratic and economic reforms. Mobutu was forced to share his power with a wider diversity of political elites, leading to more intensive rent-seeking activities and corruption than before, as local elites were able to gain more authority in local context than the central government of Kinshasa. Structural economic adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and WB, in the forms of extreme liberalization and increased privatization of, in particular, the mining sector, led to the entrance of amongst others MNCs in the country, which came to dominate large parts of the Congolese undiversified economy, based on natural resources. The interconnectedness between neo-liberal reform agendas of global economic

institutions, rising regional ethnic tensions due to local discrimination and the disappearing Congolese state in certain areas were the drivers behind the First- and Second Congo war.

In these wars, the forces of neo-liberal globalisation become apparent on all levels and have deteriorated conflict dynamics in the DRC. On a local level, the Congolese Tutsi's fought for a recognition of their Congolese citizenship and their right to land, supported by regional powers as Rwanda and Uganda. On a national level, the First Congo war led first to the control over the eastern Kivu provinces by the AFDL and regional forces and second to the end of the Zaïrian state and the beginning of Kabila's Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwanda and Uganda strongly supported the Congolese Tutsi's and the Tutsi-based AFDL, to maintain their border security for counterattacks from the Hutu refugee camps, based in the Kivu's. The Second Congo war involved a large variety of African state and non-state actors, all occupied with an own agenda, not rarely based on the economic profits they could gain from Congolese resources. Privatized organizations, such as NGOs or private security forces, joined the 'playground' as well. The MONUC mission, authorized in 1999, had an essential liberal peacebuilding agenda and a state-centrist approach, therefore focusing on securing peace between national and regional state actors, ignoring local conflict dynamics. Its liberal approach to peace- and state-building focused on establishing the rule of law and democracy and economic liberalisation. Continued pressures from the IMF and WB for economic reforms in combination with the liberal MONUC mission show the importance of the neo-liberal ideology behind the global institutions that manage globalization.

The Sun City peace agreement ended the war in 2003, but rebels and militias remained to fight in the eastern regions. Zooming in on the Kivu's provinces in this period has shown how local conflict dynamics were again not taken into account, as the Sun City agreement did not involve local actors or warlords. The combination of an extreme liberalization and privatization of the mining industries, in particular concerned with coltan, have transformed the region's economy into one of plunder. Global MNCs, neighbouring states, the state's fragmented army and the local militias and rebel groups have all tried to take a hold of the region's resources. The Congolese state, relying for its security on the MONUC and later MONUSCO missions, is virtually absent in the region. The state is perceived as alien to the eastern Congolese, due to its physical and psychological distance from the region.

The above analysis shows that the answer to the research question proposed in this thesis, how different scale dynamics have shaped the state-building process and conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is multiple and complex. To understand the nature of the Congolese state we have looked into the development of its extractive institutions and its inability to perform core state functions. Global economic institutions, based on neo-liberal ideology, have worsened the state's authority by insisting on economic liberalization and privatization to support developing countries' economy. Local-national-regional dynamics of the conflict in the DRC have further been reinforced by neo-liberal globalization, particularly in the exploitation of natural resources, leading to a continuation of the fighting. This analysis of the interconnectedness of local-national-regional-global dynamics and the interlinked phenomenon's of state failure and the resource curse in the DRC provides us with a more comprehensive understanding of state failure and conflict in an era of neo-liberal globalization. The conclusion that state failure and armed conflict are intrinsically linked to the broader neo-liberal international system in which we live, is important for our understanding of present-day armed conflicts. Policymakers and politicians should be aware of the influence of neo-liberal reforms on conflict dynamics. Furthermore, UN peacebuilding missions need to extend their idea of liberal peacebuilding to a more grassroots level, to include all levels of the conflict and the IMF and WB need to recognize that their reform programmes can worsen political instability. However, first and foremost, the Congolese state needs 'good governance' to gain control over its territory and to invest and distribute public goods, so that global economic networks can actually benefit the local Congolese.

7. Bibliography

- Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: the origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (London 2012).
- Amnesty International, *Democratic Republic of Congo: a long-standing crisis spinning out of control* (London 1998).
- Amnesty International, *Democratic Republic of Congo: North-Kivu: Civilians pay the price for political and military rivalry* (London 2005).
- Anstey, Roger, *King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo under Belgian Rule 1908-1960* (London 1966).
- Autesserre, Séverine, 'Local Violence, National Peace? Postwar "Settlement" in the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003-2006)', in: *African Studies Review* 49:3 (2006), 1-29.
- Autesserre, Séverine, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (New York 2010).
- Auty, Richard M. and Alan H. Gelb, 'Political Economy of Resource Abundant States', *Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Paris* (May 26, 2000), 1-13.
- Ayoob, Mohammed, 'State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure', in: Crocker, Chester A. et al. (eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington 2007), 95-114.
- Beswick, Danielle, 'The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building: The Case of Laurent Nkunda in Eastern Congo', in: *The Round Table* 98:402 (2009), 333-346.
- Boege, Volker et al., 'On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility'', *Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management* (2008), 1-21.
- Boege, Volker et al., 'On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: What is Failing – States in the Global South or Research and Politics in the West?' in: Fischer, M. and B. Schmelzle (eds.), *Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse on State Failure* (2009), 15-36.

- Breytenbach, Willie et al., 'Conflict in the Congo: From Kivu to Kabila', in: *African Security Review* 8:5 (1999), 33-42.
- CIA Factbook. 'Democratic Republic of Congo' (version 16 June 2016)
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html> (20 June 2016).
- Collier, Paul, 'Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy', in: Crocker, Chester A. et al. (eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington 2007), 197-218.
- Collier, Paul, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (New York 2007).
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, 'Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict', in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:4 (2005), 625-633.
- Daley, Patricia, 'Challenges to Peace: conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region of Africa', in: *Third World Quarterly* 27:2 (2006), 303-319.
- Davis, Graham A. and John E. Tilton, 'The resource curse', in: *Natural Resources Forum* 29 (2005), 233-242.
- Demmers, J., 'Neoliberal discourses on violence: monstrosity and rape in borderland war', in: S. Ponzanesi (ed.) *Gender, Globalisation and Violence: Postcolonial Conflict Zones* (London and New York 2014), 1-20.
- Dexter, H., 'New War, Good War and the War on Terror: Explaining, Excusing and Creating Western Neo-Interventionism', *Development and Change* 38:6 (2007), 1055-1071.
- Englebert, Pierre, 'Why Congo Persists: Sovereignty, Globalization and the Violent Reproduction of a Weak State', in: *QEH Working Paper Series* 95 (2003), 1-40.
- Eriksen, Stein Sundstøl, 'The Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peacebuilding, State building and the Reproduction of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo', in: *International Peacekeeping* 16:5 (2009), 652-666.

- Exenberger, Andreas and Simon Hartmann, 'The dark side of globalization. The vicious cycle of exploitation from world market integration: Lesson from the Congo', in: *Working Papers in Economics and Statistics*, no. 31 (2007), 1-23.
- Finkelstein, Lawrence S., 'What is Global Governance?', in: *Global Governance* 1:3 (1995), 367-372.
- Grant, Andrew J. and Ian Taylor, 'Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and the Quest for Clean Gems', in: *The Round Table* 93:375 (2004), 385-401.
- Hampson, Fen Osler, and David Mendeloff, 'Intervention and the Nation-Building Debate', in: Crocker, Chester A. et al. (eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington 2007), 679-699.
- Headey, Derek, 'Appraising a Post-Washington Paradigm: What Professor Rodrik Means by Policy Reform', in: *Review of International Political Economy* 16:4 (2009), 698-728.
- Herb, Michael, 'No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy', in: *Comparative Politics* 37:3 (2005), 297-316.
- Iimi, Atsushi, 'Escaping from the Resource Curse: Evidence from Botswana and the Rest of the World', in: *IMF Staff Papers* 54:4 (2007), 663-699.
- International Crisis Group, 'Congo at War: A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict', in: *ICG Congo Report no. 2* (1998), 1-31.
- Jackson, R., 'Regime Security', in: Collins, Alan (ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies* (Oxford 2007), 146-163.
- Jackson, Stephen, 'Borderlands and the transformation of war economies: lessons from the DR Congo', in: *Conflict, Security & Development* 6:3 (2006), 425-447.
- Jewsiewicki, B., 'The Great Depression and the Making of the Colonial Economic System in the Belgian Congo', in: *African Economic History* 4 (1977), 153-176.
- Jones, Andrew, *Globalization: Key Thinkers* (Cambridge 2010).
- Krugman, Paul R. et al., *International Economics: Theory & Policy* (Essex 2012).

- Kuditshini, Jacques Tshibwabwa, 'Global governance and local government in the Congo: the role of the IMF, World Bank, the multinationals and the political elites', in: *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 74:2 (2008), 195-216.
- Lalji, Nadira, 'The Resource Curse Revised: Conflict and Coltan in the Congo', in: *Harvard International Review* (Fall 2007), 34-37.
- Le Billon, Philippe, 'The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts', in: *Political Geography* 20 (2001), 561-584.
- Mantz, Jeffrey W., 'Improvisational economies: Coltan production in the eastern Congo', in: *Social Anthropology* 16:1 (2008), 34-50.
- Matti, Stephanie, 'Resources and Rent Seeking in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', in: *Third World Quarterly* 31:3 (2010), 401-413.
- McFerson, Hazel M., 'Governance and Hyper-corruption in Resource-rich African Countries', in: *Third World Quarterly* 30:8 (2009), 1529-1548.
- Meagher, Kate, 'The Strength of Weak States? Non-State Security Forces and Hybrid Governance in Africa', in: *Development and Change* 43:5 (2012), 1073-1101.
- MONUC, 'United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo' (version 22 June 2016) <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/> (22 June 2016).
- MONUSCO, 'United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo' (version 22 June 2016) <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background> (22 June 2016).
- Moore, David, 'Neoliberal globalisation and the triple crisis of 'modernisation' in Africa: Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa', in: *Third World Quarterly* 22:6 (2001), 909-929.
- Mullins, Christopher W. and Dawn L. Rothe, 'Gold, diamonds and blood: International state-corporate crime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', in: *Contemporary Justice Review* 11:2 (2008), 81-99.
- Naniuzeyi, Mabiengwa Emmanuel, 'The State of the State in Congo-Zaire: A Survey of the Mobutu Regime', in: *Journal of Black Studies* 29:5 (1999), 669-683.

- Ndikumana, Leonce and James K. Boyce, 'Congo's Odious Debt: External Borrowing and Capital Flight in Zaire', in: *Development and Change* 29 (1998), 195-217.
- Neethling, Theo, 'From MONUC to MONUSCO and beyond: prospects for reconstruction, state-building and security governance in the DRC', in: *South African Journal of International Affairs* 18:1 (2011), 23-41.
- Nitzschke, Heiko and Kaysie Studdard, 'The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and peacebuilding', in: *International Peacekeeping* 12:2 (2005), 222-239.
- Ohmae, Kenichi, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies* (London 2008).
- Organization of African Unity, *OAU Charter* (Addis Abeba, 1963).
- Pegg, Scott, 'Globalization and Natural-Resource Conflicts', in: *Naval War College Review* 56:4 (2003), 82-96.
- Ray, Ellen, 'U.S. Military and Corporate Recolonization of the Congo', in: *Covert Action Quarterly* (2000), 1-14.
- Reno, William, 'Congo: From State Collapse to 'Absolutism', to State Failure', in: *Third World Quarterly* 27:1 (2006), 43-56.
- Reybrouck, David van, *Congo: Een Geschiedenis* (Zutphen 2014).
- Reyntjens, Filip, 'Regulation, taxation and violence: the state, quasi-state governance and cross-border dynamics in the Great Lakes Region', in: *Review of African Political Economy* 41:142 (2014), 530-544.
- Reyntjens, Filip, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006* (New York 2009).
- Rodrik, Dani, *The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy* (New York 2011).
- Ross, Michael L., 'Review: The Political Economy of the Resource Curse', in: *World Politics* 51:2 (1999), 297-322.
- Ross, Michael L., 'What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?', in: *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (2004), 337-356.

- Rustad, Siri Aas and Helga Malmin Binningsbø, 'A price worth fighting for? Natural resources and conflict recurrence', in: *Journal of Peace Research* 49:4 (2012), 531-546.
- Ryan, Luisa and Dominic Keyzer, "Everyone for themselves' in DRC's North Kivu", in: *FMR 43: States of fragility* (2013), 24-27.
- Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner, 'Natural Resources and Economic Development: The curse of natural resources', in: *European Economic Review* 45 (2001), 827-838.
- Saskia, Theodore Trefon et al., 'State failure in the Congo: perceptions & realities', in: *Review of African Political Economy* 29:93-94 (2002), 379-388.
- Stiglitz, Joseph, E., *Globalization and Its Discontents* (London 2002).
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., *Making Globalization Work: the next steps to Global Justice* (London 2007).
- Tidwell, A. and C. Lerche, 'Globalization and Conflict Resolution', in: *International Journal of Peace Studies* 9:1 (2004), 47-60.
- Tull, Denis M., 'Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War', in: *International Peacekeeping* 16:2 (2009), 215-230.
- United Nations Development Programme, *Building Peace and Advancing Development in the Great Lakes Region* (New York 2014).
- United Nations Security Council, *Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (2003).
- Vanthemsche, Guy, 'The Historiography of Belgian Colonialism in the Congo', in: Lévai, Csaba (ed.), *Europe and the World in European historiography* (Pisa 2006), 89-119.
- Weinstein, Jeremy M., 'Africa's "Scramble for Africa": Lessons of a Continental War', in: *World Policy Journal* 17:2 (2000), 11-20.
- World Bank, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Enhanced Integrated Framework Program: Diagnostic Trade Integration Study* (Washington, 2010).
- Wright, Gavin and Jesse Czelusta, 'Why Economies Slow: The Myth of the Resource Curse', in: *Challenge* 47:2 (2004), 6-38.

Young, Crawford, 'Zaire: The Shattered Illusion of the Integral State', in: *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32:2 (1994), 247-263.

Cover photo

Deutsche Welle. 'DR Congo crackdown on pro-democracy activists' (version 16 March 2015)

<http://www.dw.com/en/dr-congo-crackdown-on-pro-democracy-activists/a-18318715> (23 June 2016).