Democracy of (in)action

Testing the effects of barriers and motives on non-participation in public initiatives

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Preface

This thesis is the final part, the closing act, of a two-year period (give or take, but primarily give, six months) of studying in the Public Administration research master. This entire period, no matter how long it should take or has taken, has been ultimately rewarding. No matter how frustrating it could sometimes be, or how much planning issues could distract you from the things you actually wanted to do, dealing with such challenges as well as taking all opportunities to learn have made these past two-plus years amazing. If only I had started moving towards actual research earlier, instead of just thinking for six months about distrust in government and then distrust in a participatory society, this preface would have been written earlier. But you cannot have it all.

As seems to be customary in the beginning of a master thesis I should probably thank some people for their contributions to this thesis. First of all, then, I would like to thank all of my Resma co-students, without whom these past years would have been far, far less interesting. I also want to thank my supervisors, Ank Michels in particular. Without her help and strict deadlines in many stages of my research, this thesis might still not have been finished. Finally I want to thank my family and friends for dealing with my rants on statistics, on studying, or on life in general. Their help with pre-tests, giving me beers, or telling me to simply get on with it has been invaluable.

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Chapter 1:
Introduction

DUTCH SOCIETY IS CHANGING. The old Dutch welfare state cared for its citizens, aiming to proactively help those citizens that needed assistance. This 'old' notion revolving around passive citizenship is slowly losing its influence on new policies drafted by Dutch government. No longer is the underlying idea one of citizens having an automatic right to assistance. Instead, new policies focus on citizens themselves taking an active stance, nudging them towards cooperating in the overall production of welfare in the Netherlands (Ossewaarde, 2007; Van de Wijdeven, De Graaf, & Hendriks, 2013; WRR, 2012). This coproduction is the key element of the participatory society that the Netherlands is looking to become. In this 'new' type of society, government facilitates rather than acts; it gives space and opportunity to citizens willing to start their own projects that aim to shape an active and pluralistic society out of their own accord (Frissen, 2014). In that respect the participatory society is a democracy of action (Van de Wijdeven, 2012) in which citizens voice their opinions not just by electing representatives, but by actively molding society into their own ideal form.

Freedom to shape society first of all signifies a move beyond a 'simple' representative democracy, and even beyond deliberative democracy forms that more commonly involve citizens in decision making processes (Pateman, 2011). It moves closely to an ideal typical form of a participatory democratic system in which democratic systems are employed in a non-political segment of life, essentially to allow citizens to self-govern multiple aspects of their lives (Hilmer, 2010). In the Netherlands at least, the political sphere has seen such coproducing or self-governing systems for quite some time, although mostly in a deliberative rather than truly participatory sense. Citizen-government cooperation in this older form has been present from the 1970s, where—in so-called first generation participation projects—citizens could talk to government about proper design and implementation of policies (Lenos, Sturm, & Vis, 2006). Such projects are no longer enough, though: the democracy of action requires

that citizens can influence, and ideally can perform both design and implementation of policy in spheres that previously were fully controlled by government (WRR, 2012).

The locus of this citizen action is the public initiative, which in essence is a voluntary association of citizens, initiated by citizens themselves to address a specific (local) issue. Through starting or joining a public initiative any citizen can (theoretically) take all steps in policy creation, from identifying a problem to creating an association to solve that problem on their own terms. The role of government in such initiatives is to facilitate rather than to direct the initiative. The notion of passive citizenship, as a clearly hierarchical relation between citizen and government, thus changes towards a more collegial one, at least in theory.

This development towards collegiality instead of strict hierarchy, towards active instead of passive citizenship (Ossewaarde, 2007) can, perhaps cynically, be seen as a direct response to government budget deficits (e.g. Voorberg, Bekkers, & Tummers, 2015). It may also be considered a tool for reinvigorating low political trust. Either way, a development towards a democracy of action is not necessarily problematic. However, I argue that a participatory society does come with substantial problems of legitimacy and effectivity the root cause of which is found in what the ROB (2004) calls the participatory paradox. This paradox in short posits that a lot of people do not participate, while only a small number of people do engage in initiatives. This leads to a problem mainly because, as a participatory-democratic system, the democracy of action relies on good representation of society. If only a small number of people participate, representation (and ultimately society) logically suffers.

I attribute this suffering to the concept of *parochialism*. Studies into public initiatives in the Netherlands (Uitermark, 2014), or for that matter any association of citizens (Putnam, 1993) indicate that such associations tend to only look after people that are in the same 'parish' as the participants; they care for people 'like themselves'. This would not be a problem if more people participated in the democracy of action—then, more people would be theoretically represented by participants which in turn increases the chance that their needs are met by this self-governing system. However, when—as the participatory paradox posits is the case—few people participate, the same logic applies to signal what I consider a substantial

danger to the participatory society. That is the danger that certain groups of people, while in need of assistance, will not be cared for by the participatory democracy because they are insufficiently represented.

Research problem and question

A potential solution to this problem of societal exclusion is to increase the 'pool' of participants, making sure that those many people not participating are convinced somehow to join the few who do. This would lead to better representation, thereby decreasing the chance of excluding certain marginalized (groups of) people. However, finding ways to come to such an increase requires knowledge about non-participants, a group that is hard to define precisely because of the lack of action that underlies its membership. Research that focuses on Dutch public initiatives has in almost all cases looked exclusively at participants, through case studies focusing on public initiatives in their own local context. This thus provides no information on the people that do not participate.

For such knowledge it therefore makes more sense to look at research into non-participation in the electoral rather than the strictly participatory democracy. In this area non-participation has been studied more extensively, which leads to various insights that guide my research into non-participation in public initiatives. An example of such knowledge is the Civic Voluntarism Model (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995) which is an attempt to synthesize various forms of political participation. This model suggests that non-participants find specific barriers that prohibit them from participating, did not get asked, or simply did not want to participate. Other factors are a lack of skills required for participating, or having a feeling of not being listened to (Lowndes, Pratchett, & Stoker, 2006).

One of the few things known specifically about non-participation in Dutch public initiatives is that there may be roughly three types within which to distinguish them. The first of these would be highly unlikely to participate in any sense, while the second one is willing to talk, but not to act. The final type might be willing to participate, but only if nudged (Tonkens, Trappenburg, Hurenkamp, & Schmidt, 2015). These three types are not necessarily exhaustive, and their relative size is as of yet unclear. Also, most importantly for the research I perform in this thesis, these findings do not expose how current non-participants might be nudged

towards participating, even if they are classified into the third, most-likely group. In short, this more specific knowledge is quite useful as a pathway towards gaining knowledge on non-participation, but more expansion is required for the purposes I have already shortly sketched above. More particularly, more information is needed on what keeps citizens from participating, and on why some citizens are structurally unwilling to participate while others seem to only lack some kind of incentive. Answering such questions is more likely to lead to practical use in the sense of allowing for effective targeting of citizens that might be willing to join a public initiative, but so far have not decided to do so.

This thesis aims to increase knowledge about non-participation by constructing and testing a non-participation model. At the center of this thesis lies the following research question:

> Why do some people not participate in Dutch public initiatives, while other people do?

To answer this question I work from the theoretical assumption that non-participation can partly be explained by the presence of barriers and motives. I will elaborate on this assumption later when discussing the theoretical framework to this research.

I divide the research question asked here into three sub questions. The first sub question looks at the theoretical factors that function as barriers to participation, working mainly from existing research into political participation. This first sub question is formulated as follows:

> (Sub 1) Which individual characteristics can form barriers to participation in public initiatives?

The second sub question looks at the other side of the model, asking which motives people may have to participate. The assumption underlying this question is that apart from barriers, non-participants may lack specific motives that could have driven them to engaging in public initiatives. This second sub question reads as follows:

> (Sub 2) Which motives are most important in driving people to participate in public initiatives?

These first two sub questions will thus be answered by constructing both sides of the model of non-participation.

The third part of this thesis will then test this model. A goal of this third phase, apart from ultimately validating the model, is to identify key avenues through which more people can be driven towards engaging with existing public initiatives or perhaps even starting their own. This third sub question reads:

> (Sub 3) Which barriers are most influential in hindering participation, and which motives are most influential in driving non-participants towards participating?

Before I continue with a short outline of the methodological framework to this research it is important to note that I do not consider non-participation to be a negative thing. Although the participatory society discourse focuses on active citizenship as the good or proper state (Ossewaarde, 2007)—which at least implies that passive citizens are 'bad'—I would argue there are many legitimate reasons for people to not participate. In part these reasons can be barriers to participation, and in part a lack of motive to join. Whatever the reason, non-participation, even if it can lead to societal exclusion, can still be an individually legitimizable choice.

Approach

Considering the methodological aspects of this thesis, I will test the theoretical model of non-participation in two ways. The first step consists of a statistical analysis of barriers to participation in public initiatives using existing data. The datasets used in this phase come from the LISS Panel, administered by Tilburg CentER Data. More particularly I use this panel's data to assess how and to what extent the barriers I have identified in theory apply to participation in practice. In the second step I use a survey constructed and administered for this thesis in order to see if the non-participation model can be validated in its entirety. While also revisiting the barriers to participation, the key element of this survey (and therefore of this analytical step) is that it contains vignettes asking respondents how different motives, as featured in the non-participation model, relate to various kinds of public initiatives. Also, the vignettes are used to see how respondents consider these various motives in their decision to participate, or not, in the public initiatives provided.

Ultimately I hope to present a model of non-participation that, while most likely not explaining all aspects of the individual choices leading to non-participating, can be used as a valuable tool to understand which factors

matter most under which circumstances. I thus attempt to construct and test an analytical aid rather than a fully explanatory model of the individual decision making process. In that way I hope to contribute to filling what I consider a gap in knowledge on non-participation in Dutch public initiatives.

Reading aid

In the next chapter of this thesis I sketch the participatory society discourse in a broader international context, and in its Dutch appearance. I will also note more elaborately how I consider this discourse to come with the potential of societal exclusion of weaker, marginalized citizens, before looking more closely at the concept of the public initiative itself. The third chapter will then discuss and construct the model of non-participation, thus answering the first two sub questions asked in this thesis. In chapter 4 I discuss the methodological framework to this thesis I use in the analytical steps taken to answer the third sub question.

Chapter 5 will present and discuss the results of the first step of the research design, the analysis of LISS Panel data. In chapter 6 I will present the actions taken in, and results of the second research step, which is the survey research using vignettes to assess the barriers and motives contained in the non-participation model. Finally, as logic dictates, chapter 7 features the conclusion and discussion.

Chapter 2:
The Dutch democracy of action

Finding out more about non-participation in public initiatives requires first of all looking at the concept of the participatory society. This concept in itself is not new to Dutch society—various forms of citizen involvement in government action have been present for decades (Bregman, 2014). Equally, theories taking the concept of a participatory society as the center have existed for decades (e.g. Pateman, 1970). In recent times, in part coinciding with the rise of the Big Society discourse in the United Kingdom and the democracy of action discourse in the Netherlands, this strand of theory and research has received increasing attention from researchers and government. Much of this attention is devoted to questions of management and steering of local initiatives (e.g. Bannink, 2013) or the reconfiguration of accountability mechanisms to fit with the new democracy type (e.g. Van Twist, Chin-A-Fat, Scherpenisse, & Van der Steen, 2014). Answering such questions is quite valuable for the proper functioning of public initiatives. However, these questions do not address the problem of societal exclusion that, as I have argued, substantially problematizes the democracy of action discourse.

In this chapter I will look at this democracy of action discourse, first of all by embedding it into participatory democratic theory. I will also consider how this theory has recently found its way into practice (again), zooming in mainly on the democracy of action as it presents itself in Dutch society. This also means focusing on and defining public initiatives as the main exponent of the democracy of action. Finally, I argue how this discourse is open to problems of societal exclusion, and how knowledge about non-participation can help to solve this problem.

2.1 Participatory democratic theory

Contextualizing the democracy of action discourse as it is present in Dutch society requires first of all looking into participatory democratic theory. This strand of theory proscribes a democratic system that allows for "the

maximum participation of citizens in their self-governance" (Hilmer, 2010, p. 43). As one of the first authors to describe a systematic participatory democracy, Pateman (1970) posits her vision of a participatory democracy against the 'simple', contemporary democratic system. Her idea of participatory democracy is an argument for the active involvement of individuals, following an inclusive democratic system, in traditionally non-political areas. Other theories of participatory democracy do focus on the requirement of participation in government, though not in all layers (Macpherson, 1979).

In order to more concretely define the participatory democracy as a theory, it makes sense to see it in contrast with the 'classic' idea of the representative democracy. In an 'extreme' form of such a representative democracy, Schumpeter argues, the main role of the people is "to produce a government" (1994, p. 269). In this theory, participation in the democratic system is nothing more than choosing a leader through a majority decision. That leader then is responsible not just for executing the general will, but also for expanding that general will to encompass the general needs of the people as a whole (Schumpeter, 1994, pp. 270-272). Individuals thus participate in this democracy only through voting in elections. Their ideas and needs are thus expressed only once, and are included in decision making indirectly, through the elected representative(s) (Teorell, 2006, p. 788). Participation in a representative respect thus is not so much acting to influence (the outcomes of) policy creation processes, but choosing the representative one thinks is most capable of doing that in the direction the individual thinks that representative will go.

This is distinctly different from the meaning of participation in a participatory democracy in a number of ways. First and most obviously, in a participatory democracy individual citizens must be directly included in decision making processes, not through electing a representative. Second, following from that, participation is not restricted to a single point in time, but is ongoing. These requirements indicate that participation in a participatory democracy is a form of co-creation and co-production[1] of

[1] The terms 'co-creation' and 'co-production' are often used interchangeably, by and large describing the same concept. In order to avoid confusion, I follow the definition of Voorberg and colleagues (2015). They argue that *co-creation* is the creating of policies or services by government and citizens, and *co-production* is the cooperation of those actors in the actual implementation of such policies.

policy (Voorberg et al., 2015): the drafting and implementing of policy through cooperation of citizens and government. Such cooperation can only be effective if individual citizens are allowed, even encouraged, to voice their opinion in all phases of the policy design process, and if this opinion then informs the following decisions and actions of all individuals in that process. More than just deliberating about the proper outcome of a process, a participatory democratic system requires constant recalibration of the process based on the (changing) preferences of all actors involved.

Participation in a participatory democracy thus is more of a 'grassroots', bottom-up affair, in which citizens (in cooperation with government) develop first their individual view on what constitutes a just policy. Then, through deliberation they come to an inference of some public good as a product of those individual preferences. In contrast, representative democratic, meaning electoral, participation is more like a top-down construction of the public good. Although representatives are chosen 'from the bottom', by citizens, the way in which the notion of what is the public interest is translated into actual policy is through top-level inference of that interest.

Such bottom-up, inclusive participation, though difficult to achieve, is vital for the functioning of a participatory democratic system. More concretely, tracing back this system to the ideas of writers like Rousseau and Mill, there are two functions of participation in a democracy: developing citizenship, and creating more legitimate government policy. Development in citizenship occurs when individuals gain civic and democratic skills from participating in decision making processes. Gaining such skills first of all strengthens citizenship in making individuals more concerned with their environment, or more "part of their community" (Michels & De Graaf, 2010, p. 480). Additionally, these skills will allow the individual to participate more effectively. This means that participation contains an 'educational feedback loop': each act of participation increases skills and citizenship, which allows, strengthens and informs the next act of participation.

The second function is the legitimacy of government policy. As argued by Pateman (following Rousseau), "the only policy that will be acceptable to all is the one where any benefits and burdens are equally shared", an end result that can only be obtained through a fully inclusive

and participatory decision making system (Pateman, 1970, p. 23). This means that actors must first of all engage in a process of discussion, where preferences are heard, considered and weighed, and in which the eventual public interest is formulated into policy. This policy must then be executed in a similarly cooperative fashion (Barber, 2003, pp. 178-179, 209).

2.2 Participatory democratic practices

Although vital for the participatory democratic system, the stringent demands placed on such participation are the main reason why participatory democratic theory is often criticized for its "fuzzy utopianism that fails to confront limitations of complexity, size, and scale" (Warren, 1996, p. 242). This is perhaps the reason Pateman (1970) argues for a participatory democratic system to be started in the workplace: limiting the 'sector' or locus of participation (Hilmer, 2010) is a more practical starting point, that also comes with the benefit of educating citizens to a degree where they can more meaningfully participate in the political sphere in some future.

Much in the same way, recent developments that have served to renew attention for the participatory democratic discourse offer a more tenable type of participatory democracy by focusing participatory systems on specific sectors, institutions, or geographical areas. For instance, Pateman (2011) connects the 'revival' of participatory democratic theory with the success of participatory budgeting programs in Brazil. Similarly, Fung (2009) researched the successful inclusion of citizens in local decision making processes in neighborhoods in Chicago. Another, larger-scale example is the Big Society discourse in the United Kingdom. The Big Society idea was spurred on by the idea that British society was fragmented and broken. To fix this broken society, British government aimed to introduce community initiatives that facilitate active citizen involvement in a wide array of previously government-run facilities, such as libraries or parks (Kisby, 2010).

2.2.1 The democracy of action

Another exponent of the participatory democracy ideal is the Dutch democracy of action (Van de Wijdeven, 2012). Much like the Big Society discourse, the democracy of action wants to reinvigorate the Dutch social sphere by allowing citizen participation in society. Such inclusion is not new

to Dutch politics. There has been a long tradition of co-creation in the Netherlands, through consensual policy creation processes where the demands of stakeholders were a central feature (Edelenbos, 2000, p. 5-6; De Graaf, 2007, p. 13). While initially being restricted to organized groups such as labor unions, from around 1965 individual citizens began to gain access to these processes in so-called 'first generation' participation (Lenos et al., 2006). Such projects, that can be typically placed on the informing step of Arnstein's ladder of participation (1969), are examples of deliberative more than participatory democracy. The democracy of action discourse changes this perspective on citizen involvement in a rather drastic way.

In its ideal-typical form, the democracy of action discourse is a rather complete example of a participatory democracy in local affairs. The aim of the Dutch participatory society is that in a number of policy areas citizens take up all stages of policy design and implementation where previously government used to perform these roles. For instance, in many aspects of social policy, this idea takes shape in a responsibilization of citizens, asking them essentially to co-produce welfare (Ossewaarde, 2007). Co-producing welfare in this respect means looking first at what your own environment can do to (help) solve your social problem, without government having to take such steps. Taking this responsibility would ideally be done through a *public initiative*: a longer-term, citizen-initiated association of individuals that find and solve problems in their environment. In such public initiatives, citizens ideally take center stage: government actors should merely facilitate and assist, rather than interfere or decide (Hendriks & Van de Wijdeven, 2014).

This structure places government and citizens on the same level, perhaps even to the extent that it constitutes a new 'social contract' (Ossewaarde, 2007). In this new social contract, Dutch government essentially puts forward a view of active citizenship, where the 'good' citizen pro-actively replaces government actors in signaling and solving problems in his vicinity. Through this participation, the citizen strengthens his connection to society, thus becoming an even better citizen and 'fixing' the fragmented Dutch society (Ossewaarde, 2007). Much like the 'educational feedback loop' contained in participatory democratic theory, then, the Dutch participatory society is seen as one way to strengthen Dutch society as a whole. Also much like what is contained in that theory, one

important aim of the democracy of action is to increase the legitimacy of the Dutch democracy (Elchardus & Smits, 2002; Tonkens et al., 2015). Empowering citizens to essentially create and produce their own desired policies where possible should lead to legitimate outcomes, following the theory that a participatory system leads to a legitimate outcome.

The democracy of action thus mirrors participatory democratic theory in a number of ways. First, it aims to actively include citizens in policy processes through encouraging the emergence of public initiatives. Second, working in these public initiatives strengthens one's citizenship as defined by the democracy of action discourse, and 'mends' the fragmented Dutch society as a whole. In that respect, the democracy of action focuses on co-creation as well as co-producing of policy, although the 'co' aspect of either concept is ideally absent. More concretely, the discourse asks citizens to create and to produce; government can be a valuable cooperator but should only cooperate to the extent that it enables citizens to engage (Meijer, 2011). This aspect distinguishes the democracy of action from the participatory democracy: in the latter, government and citizens deliberate and act together. In the former, government ideally does not attend the meeting. More than participate, then, the democracy of action asks citizens to *do*.

2.3 Public initiatives

Public initiatives are the way in which citizens are to perform those ideals of the democracy of action. These initiatives can be found in many shapes and forms in the Netherlands. Some are run by only a few people, while others engage a large part of a town. Some attempt to solve a very specific problem, while others aim to influence the quality of life of an entire neighborhood. In short, public initiatives differ in many aspects. Most initiatives are distinctly local, meaning that they function (and thus should be understood) within a very specific context (Boutellier, 2011). This in turn means that while it is easy to spot differences in the functioning of public initiatives, finding common elements is more difficult. Still, or perhaps because of that, I will first define what I mean in this thesis with 'public initiatives', before looking more closely at how they can be expected to function in Dutch society.

Contained in the term 'public initiative' there already are two important definitions of the concept. First, the term 'public' relates to perhaps the most important aspect of the democracy of action, which is that ideally such initiatives are run by citizens only. Additionally, contained in the 'initiative' is the characteristic that such initiatives must also be started by citizens. While perhaps an obvious statement, these two criteria are important to note: a lot of initiatives are actually started, or influenced to a large extent, by government (Michels & De Graaf, 2010; Tonkens et al., 2015) and only later involve citizens. While commonly taken to be a part of the participatory society, in this thesis I consider only those initiatives that are started *and* run primarily by citizens.

That rather 'simple' formulation then entails a number of different criteria. First, I consider public initiatives to be those on the top two rungs of Arnstein's (1979) ladder of citizen participation. In these categories, of *delegated power* and *citizen control*, government transfers most if not all of its decision making powers to citizens, a transfer which I consider a criterion of participation in the democracy of action. While such a transfer also takes place on the lower rung of *partnership*, this denotes a situation in which government is hierarchically above the participating citizens. In such a situation, it would not be suitable to talk of a public initiative.

Second, in order to fall inside my definition of a public initiative, the initiative must feature both the creation and production of policy—without necessarily including government as a cooperator—by these citizens. Following the more common definitions of co-creation and co-production, this means that the public work done by the public initiative must feature an active involvement of citizens (Vargo & Lusch, 2004, p. 12) in a committed, longer-term process (e.g. Meijer, 2011). In other words: I look at public initiatives as a durable, longer-term association that aims to promote a public good. Additionally, as explained above, the initiative must transfer most if not all decision making and implementation power from government to citizens.

Within these criteria, there are a number of ways in which public initiatives can differ. One important difference is that some initiatives try to solve a very specific, small-scale problem, such as a lack of trash cans in a street. Other initiatives look to influence policy design and implementation on a much wider level. The most important example of such an initiative is

the G1000, a citizen initiative that has been performed in a number of Dutch towns, cities and neighborhoods (Michels & Binnema, 2015; Tonkens et al., 2015). The goal of a G1000 initiative is to involve as many citizens as possible in a discussion on the most pressing problems in the area, and on how to best solve those problems.

As a second important difference, the G1000 initiative requires a different type of action from its participants than other initiatives do. In essence, the G1000 is a deliberative forum (Michels & Binnema, 2015), which asks participants to engage in a discussion more than it solicits specific *acts* of participation. In contrast, there are much more applied initiatives, such as a neighborhood gardening project in The Hague,[2] in which participants have to perform such specific acts. These acts range from securing funding and permits to actual gardening, and thus call on a very different type of skills. Where the G1000 initiative would require participants to be able to voice their concerns accurately, the more applied skills of (for instance) accounting, sponsorship acquisition, or gardening would be required for working in the neighborhood gardening initiative.

2.4 The problem of societal exclusion

These public initiatives thus are the prime way in which the democracy of action takes shape, and through which citizens are enabled to promote their own view of a good and proper society. However, these public initiatives, the responsibilization of citizens and the stepping back of government cannot happen without substantial problems and risks. For instance, various authors have pointed towards problems of legitimacy and accountability that may manifest themselves most clearly when mistakes are made in a public initiative (e.g. Van Twist et al., 2014). However, a more consistent threat that I argue lies at the basis of the participatory society is that of societal exclusion, or the idea that certain groups of people will consistently fall outside the scope of public initiatives and the receding government. This is a problem that, as I will argue below, is not exclusive to the democracy of action discourse, but is more likely to occur given its current practice.

As I have noted when discussing participatory democratic theory, citizen participation for a large part serves to strengthen citizenship and civic and political skills. Strong citizenship mainly reinforces social ties,

[2] http://www.emmashof.nl (last visited 2015/07/18).

leading to a stronger civil society, and enables the individual to better consider the needs of others when articulating his own preference. Civic and political skills serve mainly to inform later acts of participation, for instance by allowing the individual to deliberate and act more effectively (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 2003; Macpherson, 1979). This means that acts of participation will increase the value of later acts of participation, which is a vital and valuable part of a participatory democratic system. However, it also indicates one major problem with participatory systems, which is that these skills, and this idea of citizenship, are a precondition for participation to begin with (Macpherson, 1979). People who possess fewer skills can therefore either not participate, or participate far less effectively than their more skilled counterparts. Their non-participation leads to their preferences falling outside the policy design and implementation discussion, meaning that they are not represented, and ultimately, that their problems might not be solved.

This would not be a problem, since ideally, those people that *can* participate effectively could take into account the preferences of the non-participating individuals. Additionally, in a 'normal' participatory democracy, government would still play a role in safeguarding the public good aspect. However, I argue that this ideal situation only rarely occurs in practice. More concretely, three common findings of research into Dutch public initiatives indicate that the threat of societal exclusion is more likely to occur in the democracy of action. These findings are geographical imbalance, parochialism, and the participatory paradox.

Geographically, the degree to which citizens are willing to form initiatives (especially those aimed at assisting 'weaker' or marginalized others) is divided quite unevenly (Putnam, 1993; Uitermark, 2014). People living in areas that feature fewer public initiatives are more likely to fall outside the scope of those initiatives, simply because of the lower 'availability' of assistance. Especially when people cannot mobilize help or raise enough attention because they do not have the right social ties, or do not have enough of them (Walzer, 2004), such marginalized citizens might have to go without the community assistance they need. Notably, the safeguarding role normally taken by government that would usually ensure the needs of marginalized citizens are met does not exist here—a receding

government means that it is mainly up to citizens themselves to either make their demands for help heard, or identify the needs of such 'unseen' people.

This problem is aggravated by the fact that most public initiatives in their 'service provision' tend to adopt a high degree of 'parochialism'. This means they have a tendency to care only for those people that are part of the same social groups as the people working for the public initiative (Tonkens et al., 2015, p. 40). This parochialist attitude is a logical side-effect of strong social ties that exist between people (Coleman, 1990). Nevertheless it is a side-effect that means that the actions of public initiatives often fail to impact those people outside the same social group, even though these people also need the attention of the initiative.

These two findings, as I noted above, would not lead to problems if the people that *do* participate can accurately represent the non-participants. However, the fact that only a few people do participate, while a lot of people do not (the participatory paradox; ROB, 2004) makes such accurate representation unlikely if not impossible. If only the few 'usual suspects' of participation (Drosterij & Peeters, 2011) are the ones voicing their preference and acting accordingly, the more likely it becomes that certain people categorically fall outside the scope of public initiatives.

2.4.1 Non-participation in public initiatives

Given that participatory paradox, a sensible solution is to increase the number of participants in public initiatives. After all, if more people participate, more preferences are represented in the forum of participation, meaning that policies are tailored to a wider group of people. Additionally, the likelihood that even the preferences of those outside the group of participants are taken into account increases. The benefit of more participation thus goes beyond mere democratic benefits of legitimacy: the threat of societal exclusion is also mitigated through heightened representation. In that respect, the participatory society is the cause, but also a potential solution for societal exclusion (Kruiter, 2014).

However, getting more people to participate is easier said than done. Participation, it is argued, is not the common choice; Warren cynically notes that the idea that "democratic participation is attractive activity" is "romantic dogma" that should be dispensed with (1996, p. 243). This notion I find too cynical—if participation indeed is so unattractive, why would some people participate anyway?—but it does point to an important

aspect of the participation paradox: there is little we know about non-participants, and specifically about the mechanisms behind their not participating.

The knowledge that *is* available about non-participation in most cases relates to political or electoral participation. For instance, the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM; Verba et al., 1995) looks at various forms of political participation, ranging from voting to attending demonstration marches. For that conception of political participation, which does not include participation in the sense of public initiatives, they find that non-participants generally did not want to, did not have time to, or did not get asked to participate (Verba et al., 1995). As a sort of expansion of that, the CLEAR model (Lowndes, Pratchett, & Stoker, 2006) notes a lack of resources and efficacy as potential barriers to participation.

We know less about non-participation in the context of public initiatives. One of the few useful studies in that respect is by Tonkens and colleagues (2015), who distinguish three types of non-participants. The first of these, the distant citizen, is unlikely to participate either in a social or political sense, and typically distrusts the democracy of action discourse. The loyal citizen does not automatically reject the idea of the participatory society, but tends to think government has to take action itself in solving social issues. This citizen thus also tends to not engage in public initiatives. Finally, the positive-critical citizen potentially embraces the democracy of action idea. However, it is unclear why citizens in this type have not taken the step towards participating, even though they seem to identify themselves with the idea (Tonkens et al., 2015, pp. 84-97).

These three types offer interesting insights into the dynamics of non-participation but also leave open a lot of questions. The mainly important one is why positive-critical citizens, while an obvious target for anyone wanting to get people to participate, still do not engage in public initiatives. Additionally, the relative sizes of each group are unknown, and it is unclear how each type's attitude towards the participatory society influences their choice to not participate. In short, what is required is more knowledge about why people do not participate in public initiatives, beyond the 'simple' explanations of 'could not, did not want to, or did not have time to'. In the next chapter I will discuss the theoretical assumptions

surrounding non-participation, eventually leading me to construct a model of non-participation.

In this chapter, I have looked at the democracy of action, placing it in the wider context of participatory democratic theory. I have noted how, as part of this strand of democratic theory, the democracy of action aims to include citizens in the design and implementation of policy. Ideally, government enables and facilitates citizens to start public initiatives, through which citizens themselves (without being influenced by government) can identify and solve a social problem they consider important. I have noted how this new relationship between government and citizen in essence forms a new social contract, in which citizens become more and more responsible for actively shaping their own welfare. This is done through public initiatives. I have defined these public initiatives as being durable, long-term associations initiated and run by citizens that aim to promote a public good.

Concluding this chapter, I have noted that the system proposed in the democracy of action discourse comes with the problem of societal exclusion, or the potential lack of representation of marginalized members of society. This societal exclusion is caused by the fact that only a few people participate, meaning that fewer people's interests are taken into account when designing and implementing policy. This, in turn, coupled with the notion that public initiatives tend to reserve benefits for people in the same social group as the participants, means that weaker people are at risk of falling outside the scope of public initiatives. One way to mitigate this problem is to increase the amount of people that participate in such initiatives. However, this requires more knowledge about non-participation in public initiatives than what is currently available. In the next chapter I will take the next step in attempting to fill this knowledge gap, by constructing the theoretical model of non-participation.

Chapter 3:
Constructing a model of non-participation

TRYING TO UNDERSTAND NON-PARTICIPATION can be problematic for a number of reasons. First, one may see it as an attempt to explain a (lack of) behavior by the non-participating individual. Whereas participating in a public initiative is more clearly the result of choice, not participating might be the result of a conscious choice just as much as it might indicate that no choice process whatsoever has been undertaken. If the latter were assumed, trying to explain a state of 'not acting' as being the result of individual and environmental factors would seem a rather useless endeavor. Second, it is easy to argue that any attempt to explain human action based on a limited number of factors means oversimplifying such action. In this chapter, however, I attempt to somehow do both of these things. Thus, it is important to explain, before delving deeper into the mechanisms behind non-participation, why I assume the attempt to model non-participation to be useful as a way to understand this (non-)behavior.

The main use of the non-participation model, I argue, is not that it is going to be able to offer full explanations on why certain individuals do not participate. However, it can help in understanding more about the processes through which people relate themselves to public initiatives. This means I hope the non-participation model I put to the test in this thesis to function as a useful analytical tool to aid in understanding the mechanisms surrounding non-participation in public initiatives. This better understanding can then allow for easier identification of ways to decrease non-participation, and thereby increase the pool of participants in Dutch public initiatives.

Creating this model will be the main undertaking in this chapter. More specifically, I look to find answers to the first and second sub questions asked in this thesis—respectively, which characteristics might form barriers against, and which motives might drive people towards, participating in

public initiatives. As these questions clearly imply, I assume the model of non-participation to feature both barriers and motives, meaning I operationalize it as having two sides that operate differently and independently. Before looking to answer these two sub questions, I will first note my reasons for assuming the presence of those two distinct sides, based on knowledge we do have about electoral participation. After that, I will discuss the theoretical considerations on barriers (i.e. the first sub question), and then on motives (i.e. the second sub question).

3.1 Two sides to non-participation

As I have noted in the introduction to this thesis, non-participation in the context of the democracy of action is an understudied phenomenon. Studies into the democracy of action tend to focus on studying initiatives in their own local context, meaning that while some characteristics of participants are known, there is not a lot that can be said structurally about these participants. Even more importantly, that also means that little to no knowledge is present about non-participants. The main exception to this, which I have already discussed in the introduction, is a study by Tonkens and colleagues (2015), which also focuses on studying various public initiatives but in its final chapter also looks into non-participation. The three types of non-participants identified in this research differ mainly in terms of their attitude towards politics, some being altogether distrusting of the participatory society discourse and others being willing to participate, if presented with that opportunity (Tonkens et al., 2015). Such knowledge offers interesting insights into the mechanisms that underlie non-participation, but this study on its own cannot sufficiently cover the most important mechanisms behind non-participation.

This knowledge must thus be expanded upon, which is what I set out to do in this thesis. However, given the fact that non-participation in public initiatives is not studied enough to offer more useful insights, another starting point must be found. The most logical, and much more coherently researched place to start is in the electoral participation literature. As I noted in the previous chapter, the democracy of action discourse is one exponent of participatory democratic theory. This means that, although it can most likely not be translated one-on-one, findings of electoral participation research can be used to construct theoretically reasonable expectations for mechanisms behind non-participation in public initiatives. On this strand of

literature I also base my idea that non-participation can partly be explained by looking at two aspects: barriers keeping one from, and motives driving one towards, participation. More particularly, I consider the SES model (Verba & Nie, 1987) and CVM model (Verba et al., 1995; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995), as well as the CLEAR model (Lowndes et al., 2006) as models that guide the construction of my non-participation model.

The SES and CVM models are the result of some of the most influential studies into various forms of electoral participation. While therefore not explicitly studying non-participation, the starting point for defining models of participation is the question why people would *not* participate. In short, the CVM works off the assumption that people either cannot, did not want to, or did not get asked to participate (Brady et al., 1995, p. 271). The CLEAR model by Lowndes and colleagues (2006) offers clearly similar perspectives contained in their assertion that participants must be able to (*can*), *like* to, and be *asked* to participate. Additionally, this model notes that participants must feel like they are *enabled* to participate, and are *responded to* (Lowndes et al., 2006, p. 286).

Table 1: CVM and CLEAR factors

Factor	Translates into
Cannot participate (CVM, CLEAR)	Resources (time, money, and skills; socioeconomic status)
Does not want to (CVM, CLEAR)	Motivation to engage with politics
Did not get asked to (CVM, CLEAR)	Access to recruitment networks (association membership)
Enabled to participate (CLEAR)	Psychological engagement with politics (i.e. feeling of efficacy, possession of skills, confidence, …)
Responded to (CLEAR)	Perception of 'usefulness' of participation (i.e. feeling of efficacy)

Source: Verba et al., 1995; Brady et al., 1995; Verba & Nie, 1987; Lowndes et al., 2006.

While somewhat simplified at face value, each of these assumptions can be translated into a number of variables that for a large part do seem to influence one's degree of electoral participation (Verba et al., 1995). Table 1 displays each of the factors identified by the CVM and the CLEAR models, and notes the ways in which these factors are translated into actual variables. Most of these factors and their translations indicate the existence of barriers keeping people from participating. For instance, Verba and Nie

(1987, p. 87) note that people who consistently do not participate in an electoral sense tend to also report low levels of political efficacy, meaning primarily they do not consider themselves able to change the way politics work. Such a lack of political knowledge, or the lack of information on what is actually going on in the political sphere, can thus hinder one's level of participation to a degree where non-participation is the logical outcome (Solhaug, 2006). Additionally, a negative attitude towards politics means that an individual is less likely to participate (Soule, 2001). Similarly, a lack of time, money or civic skills can function as a barrier that will lead people to *not* participate in a certain way, despite being asked to (Verba et al., 1995).

On the other side, the motivation to engage with politics and the degree to which someone has access to recruitment networks (i.e. is more or less likely to be asked to join) I argue functions independently from these barriers, and in a distinctly different way. These two factors first of all indicate a specific *desire* to engage in some type of participation without which participation would not occur. This works in a different way from the barriers. More particularly, if I translate the difference between barriers and motives in overly simplified terms, the presence of a barrier would automatically hinder participation even if there is a motivation to join; however, if no barriers are present, a motivation is still required. Participation thus is the logical outcome only if no barriers exist, but someone does have a motivation to participate. As a second difference, a motivation to participate is coupled to a certain type, even *act* of participation, while a barrier exists 'in' the individual even when no act of participation is involved.

In short, this means that (while not aiming to fully explain non-participation) I consider both barriers and motives to be important, separate concepts that both warrant attention in order to gain understanding of non-participation. In the remainder of this chapter I will focus on constructing this two-sided model of non-participation, thereby answering the first two sub questions to this thesis. After constructing the model, I will discuss how I expect this model to function related to differences in public initiatives.

3.2 Barriers against participation

I thus first look at the individual characteristics that could form barriers against participating in public initiatives. Again, this mainly means working

off knowledge available on electoral participation, since non-participation in that area has been more coherently researched. As I noted when discussing the CVM and CLEAR models, there are a number of factors commonly connected to electoral participation that can be expected to function as barriers. First, there are certain *resources* such as time or money, a lack of which means that an individual is not able to participate. Second, certain social and political *attitudes* such as feelings of efficacy can also hinder participation.

3.2.1 No time, no resources

Considering barriers, the CVM explicitly mentions two factor that might be a reason for people to not participate: time and money (Brady et al., 1995). *Time* is an important factor in any kind of activity: there are only twenty-four hours in any given day, and if no free time is left, it is far less easy to engage in any form of political or societal participation (De Hart, 1999, Verba et al., 1995). The obvious expectation with respect to time, then, would be that the less free time available to an individual, the less likely it would be that this person would participate in a public initiative. In that sense free time is the archetypical barrier: having a lot of it does not necessarily increase the likelihood that one participates, but having no time available does take away the possibility to do so. This effect can be expected to exist no matter what kind of public initiative is in play.

Apart from time, *money* is another resource that might be important as a barrier for participation in public initiatives. The CVM finds income is an important factor in various forms of political participation (Verba et al., 1995, p. 516). Unsurprisingly, this influence is most present in the activity of donating money to a political campaign, but also in other forms of participation income does have a significant effect. This supports the idea that income in some way might matter. Income would function as a potential constraint in the sense that an individual might not have enough money to fulfil his or her own basic needs, meaning that there is less room to engage in a public initiative which (in pretty much all cases) is done without any remuneration.

Thirdly, the CVM and CLEAR models note that a lack of civic skills can hinder political participation in most forms. Civic skills in this respect denote actual *skills* such as "the ability and confidence to speak in public or write letters" or "to organize events and encourage others of similar mind

to support initiatives" (Lowndes et al., 2006, p. 286). Additionally, civic skills are contained in the idea of socioeconomic status, where the main reasoning is that a higher level of socioeconomic status signifies stronger citizenship, or a higher ability to influence politics (Verba & Nie, 1987).

The idea that a lack of civic skills can hinder participation is not exclusive to the CLEAR or CVM model: it has also been noted as a potential barrier for societal participation by, amongst others, Putnam (1993) and Fung (2009). This would be the case because civic skills in essence are a requirement for effective participation with other people generally, which indeed makes sense when considering, for instance, more active forms of political participation such as being a member of an action group. Such a membership requires the ability to promote one's views accurately and effectively, cooperate in a meaningful way with likeminded individuals, and possibly involve skills such as being able (and willing) to argue a point publicly against political opponents. What is less clear, and therefore important for the purposes of this study, is how it would relate to types of public initiatives that require not so much deliberation, but action, such as ironing clothes in a care initiative.

Civic skills can be quite hard to define and therefore even more difficult to accurately measure. Therefore it makes more sense to look at the most likely sources of civic skills that *can* be measured in a meaningful way, the most commonly identified one being one's level of education (e.g. Verba et al., 1995; Putnam, 1993; Lowndes et al., 2006). Other indicators (though not necessarily strong ones) include income, being a sort of proxy for level of employment (Lowndes et al., 2006, p. 286), and membership of communities such as a sports club, or a church community (e.g. Wuthnow, 1998).

3.2.2 Social and political attitudes

So far I have looked at the potential barriers contained in *resources*. These barriers are a lack of time, money, and civic skills, the latter of which is commonly measured as one's level of education. The second barriers factor contained in the electoral participation literature is that of *attitudes*. In the conceptualization of the CLEAR and CVM models, this factor mostly signifies the relationship between citizens and government. For example, this thus includes the idea that in order to participate, citizens must have the idea that their key concerns are taken into account by politicians

(Lowndes et al., 2006, p. 289). For electoral participation the citizen-government relationship indeed is the most important one, meaning that I first look into political efficacy and trust as potential barriers. However, when looking at participation in public initiatives, the social and local dimensions also warrant a closer look at the aspects of interpersonal (dis)trust and neighborhood connectedness as barriers to participation.

I will first consider the barrier functions within the citizen-government relationship, however. While the CLEAR model aims primarily at setting standards for government, the idea of responsivity can also be seen from the perspective of the to-be participant. Then, it revolves around the point that an individual needs to have the perception that politicians (local or national) listen to their concerns. Also, it would require that this individual has the idea that he or she can accurately voice those concerns. In that sense, responsivity introduces what in essence is the concept of *political efficacy* as a potential barrier.

Conceptually, political efficacy can be divided in *internal* and *external* efficacy. The former of these relates to the individual belief that one is competent enough to understand politics and political subjects, and can therefore participate effectively in the political sphere. External efficacy refers to the individual's perception of the level of responsiveness of government institutions to the demands and needs of citizens (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990, p. 260; Iyengar, 1980). Both of these forms, when not sufficiently present in an individual, might equally hinder participation, mostly because a lack of perceived efficacy would lead the individual to get the impression that participation would be fruitless. Both forms of efficacy are found to be associated with higher levels of volunteering behavior (Craig et al., 1990; Finkel, 1985; Van Ingen & Van der Meer, 2015).

For internal efficacy this would mostly be the case because of a feeling that one has no effective influence. Considering external efficacy, though, the barrier function is less clear. Most likely this would work quite similarly to another potential 'responsivity barrier', that of *political trust*. Trust in government, or trust in specific government institutions can be an important factor in the willingness of individuals to engage in public initiatives. In this respect, the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy mentions that trust, both from citizens in policy makers and vice versa, is the cornerstone of a well-functioning democracy of action (WRR,

2012, p. 11). Indeed, it is often argued that higher levels of trust are a necessary precondition for a well-functioning democratic society (Bovens & Wille, 2008; Hetherington, 2006).

For public initiatives particularly, it does make sense to argue that at least some degree of trust in government is necessary for citizens to take that step into a previously government-run field. The WRR connects trust, in this respect, to the idea that citizens and government have to be willing to cooperate in order to end up with beneficial initiatives. Without there being reciprocal trust in this cooperation, public initiatives would never be as useful as they could otherwise have been (WRR, 2012). Having said that, there are found to be a (small) number of public initiatives in the Netherlands that seem to be expressly working *against* government rather than attempting to work with it (e.g. Tonkens et al., 2015; Ham & Van der Meer, 2015). Although such initiatives seem to make up only a small part of the overall playing field, it is important to note here that the political trust barrier might not be as important as it would seem at first glance.

With public initiatives being at the center of this thesis, it is clear that such political factors alone do not sufficiently outline the full breadth of participants. There are two social factors, interpersonal trust and neighborhood connectedness, that I assume to be barriers in a similar sense as the political factors discussed above.

Social Capital Theory (SCT) would suggest *interpersonal trust* to be the most important determinant of engagement in public initiatives. This trust can be defined as a relationship of mutual expectations between two specific individuals; if individual x does something for y, he does so expecting that y will return the favor (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam, 1993). SCT's operationalization of interpersonal trust is specifically restricted to two determinable individuals, making it a form of *particularized* or *knowledge-based* trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). As a concept, particularized trust is quite useful and strong; because of its specific nature, it may be quite able to explain participation especially in smaller-scale initiatives where participants and beneficiaries are more likely to know each other well. However, this very particular nature also makes it problematic for research purposes, mostly because assessing one's individual social ties is difficult if not impossible.

A more easily measurable[3] form of trust is *generalized* trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). This type of trust is not an information-based assurance, but rather a *cognitive bias*: it consists mainly as a general attitude towards other people, no matter whether these others are known or unknown. Having a negative cognitive bias towards others (i.e. low trust) would make for a low likelihood of participating in public initiatives, logically because such participation would require at least some degree of trust towards (general or specific) others.

Another way in which people logically relate to others is through their living environment. This environment can in many ways, positively or negatively, lead people to engage in public initiatives. Specifically, I expect that the degree to which people connect to their neighborhood (Tonkens & Verhoeven, 2011; Verhoeven & Tonkens, 2011) can be an important factor in determining one's willingness or refusal to participate. More particularly, not just the length of time a person has lived in that specific neighborhood (Wuthnow, 1998) but also the extent to which people find problems present in their environment (Fung, 2009) can influence the degree to which people want to do something for their neighborhood. Findings of research into Amsterdam public initiatives indicate that high levels of connectedness with a neighborhood are often associated with participation. This in turn seems to point at a barrier function in the sense that if an individual does not care too much about his or her own living environment, chances are that that person will not quickly choose to participate in an initiative aimed at that same environment.

3.2.3 Summarizing the barriers

Looking at the first sub question asked in this thesis, I have identified a number of barriers that theoretically can be assumed to hinder participation. These barriers, shown in Figure 1, can be inferred from the CVM and CLEAR models as well as from other sources on political and societal participation.

[3] The concept of generalized trust can be seen in a large number of surveys, often phrased in what you could call the 'classic trust question' (Uslaner, 1999) of "I think most people can be trusted, versus You cannot be careful enough with other people".

Figure 1: The barriers side of the non-participation model



3.3 Motives for participating

In contrast to barriers, for which far less research has been performed specifically in Dutch public initiatives, a focused investigation into motives people have had for joining such initiatives *is* possible using existing research. Most of this existing research, as mentioned, is essentially a qualitative case study into one or a few specific initiatives, looking not so much at these initiatives and their participants in a broader frame but in a distinctly localized context. These characteristics mean that this set of research cannot allow for good comparison of participants' characteristics that might form barriers. However, the importance of motives as almost a necessary precondition for participation is reflected quite well in research into both general volunteering behavior and participation in Dutch public initiatives (e.g. Denters, Tonkens, Verhoeven, & Bakker, 2013; Rochester, 2006; Verba et al., 1995). Looking at a wide variety of studies and 'meta-analyzing' their findings on motives, it is possible to infer quite a lot about the reasons why citizens decide to become participants. In this section I will look into the most commonly found motives by reviewing a number of studies into Dutch public initiatives. I will outline the four most important kinds of motives and explain how they are found to relate to specific kinds of public initiatives and specific 'groups' of participants. This way I answer the second sub question asked in this thesis (which motives might drive people to participate in public initiatives).

3.3.1 *Being asked*

In the CVM and CLEAR models, motives play a role mainly in the sense that both models assume that participation is less likely (or less fruitful) when participants "do not want to" participate (e.g. Verba et al., 1995). Another interesting assurance made mainly by the CVM is that participation can be the result simply of *being asked*. Indeed, one of the most common findings in Dutch public initiatives and other types of societal and political participation is that a high number of people participate simply because other people asked them to (e.g. WRR, 2012; Tonkens et al., 2015; Hendriks & Van de Wijdeven, 2014).

In a number of researched cases participation would follow after someone close to a person (a friend, neighbor or close acquaintance) who already worked in the initiative specifically invited that person. Such invitation mechanisms seem to be present in a wide variety of public initiatives, ranging from a neighborhood citizen summit (Tonkens et al., 2015) to the setting up of a community center (Ham & Van der Meer, 2015). It can be argued that public initiatives to a certain extent are dependent on such mechanisms occurring within small circles of connected individuals in order to attract enough volunteering members.

While this is an interesting argument—in the sense that it might play badly with the 'parochialist' issue discussed in the previous chapter—what is more important for my thesis research is the question how non-participants relate to being asked as a reason to start engaging. It might be that being asked for some people is simply the final nudge they needed to start engaging, but it could also be the reason to start thinking about participating in the first place. Also, such an invitation mechanism might be less effective when considering potential participants that have less social ties in the local area a public initiative functions in.

3.3.2 *Altruism*

A second motive that is quite commonly found to be associated with public initiatives is altruism, or a sense of duty towards general others. The importance of helping others seems like an attitude that would typically be present in all people that work for a public initiative—after all such initiatives by nature revolve around helping other people. Indeed, many quantitative studies into societal participation (e.g. Eklund, 1999) and public initiatives (e.g. Oudijk, Woittiez, & De Boer, 2011; Lammerts & Verwijs,

2009; Hofland, 2014) find that such a sense of duty is present to a high extent in participants.

Importantly, in qualitative studies the altruistic motive is cited far less often, and is coupled mostly to initiatives that revolve around acting to assist specific others (e.g. Fienieg et al., 2011; Stokes, 2010, Verplanke, 2015). The higher presence of altruistic motives in quantitative studies, then, might be caused in part by a higher social desirability factor coming in when asking people specifically whether or not they had altruistic motives in mind. While still one of the more commonly mentioned motives for first joining an initiative, this difference does indicate that the altruist 'perspective' on participating is present mainly in smaller-scale, more hands-on initiatives.

Also, studies that find the presence of such altruistic motives seem to point at the idea that this motive is present mainly for slightly older people, and can also be associated with more religious individuals. This is not too surprising: religious values tend to call for helping others (Uslaner, 1999), and especially in the Netherlands increasing secularization means that young people tend to be less religious (Bekkers, 2005). Although some younger participants (either religious or not) will still likely associate themselves with such a sense of duty towards other people, it seems that generally the primary motivation of those young volunteers might just be much more individual.

As a final note on the altruistic motive, this 'category' is also meant to encompass those situations in which people cite an ideological connection with the theme a public initiative aims to address. In a small number of cases seen in the studies reviewed, participants noted their desire to for instance address environmental issues (Leijenaar & Niemöller, 2009, p. 128) or specifically help marginalized and isolated women (Hendriks & Van de Wijdeven, 2014, pp. 95-96) was the key motive to join or start a public initiative. However, such more thematic connections seem to be less prominently featured than the more general 'helping other people'.

3.3.3 Personal development

Not just in participation in public initiatives but also in other types of volunteering, researchers increasingly find that (especially younger; Faulk, 2009) volunteers cite motives of personal development as a key reason for joining an association or initiative (Dekker & De Hart 2009; Hustinx &

Lammertyn, 2003). For work in public initiatives, such goals of personal development can largely take two forms. The first of these is a rather general sense of improving oneself on a theme or skill. For instance, members of a neighborhood council noted gaining knowledge on political decision making processes as a reason for joining (Lammerts & Verwijs, 2009, p. 19). Other kinds of improving the self can be more instrumental, aimed in most cases at improving one's position on the labor market (e.g. Verplanke, 2015, pp. 54-57).

Given the various ways in which participating in any kind of voluntary association can lead to improving one's position or skills, it should be hardly surprising that this type of motive can occur in any type of public initiative, regardless of its scope or the degree of action it asks of its participants. The main expectation one can attach to the motive of personal development, as argued above, is that it would most likely be more commonly cited by younger volunteers. The reasoning behind that is that these volunteers tend to work more towards a specific goal and will perform actions in a more goal-oriented way, seeing volunteering work as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself (Hustinx & Lammertyn, 2003). Additionally, it can be seen that younger people participate less in the political and societal domains, although this passivity is better interpreted as a monitorial, observational-critical state (Amnå & Ekman, 2013). Having said that, current research into Dutch public initiatives does not clearly support the notion that this 'new volunteer' is driven exclusively by such instrumental motives (Verplanke, 2015, p. 63).

3.3.4 Solving a specific problem

The fourth key motive found to be commonly associated with participation in Dutch public initiatives is that of wanting to solve a specific problem. This motive is tied closely to what Hurenkamp and colleagues (2013) call a 'close to home logic': the idea that participants mainly want to solve some problem that they experience themselves, or that is experienced by someone close to them. As might be expected when looking at a subject matter like the participatory society, such a problem-oriented motive is cited quite often in relation to any kind of initiative that actively aims to address a local problem—which in essence is the hallmark of most if not all public initiatives.

Local problem-solving motives can, for instance, be found in healthcare initiatives (Fienieg et al., 2011), neighborhood watches (Stokes, 2010) and playground construction initiatives (Verplanke, 2015). Especially in smaller towns, where service provision is lost due to government budget cuts, larger-scale public initiatives arise that involve the entire town in building and running, for instance, a community center and supermarket (e.g. Ham & Van der Meer, 2015). Interestingly, this last 'area' of public initiative is the one that also seems to come with the highest *distrust* of government. This might indicate that a trust barrier could perhaps not matter much when confronted with a problem that the individual thinks should be solved.

3.4 The non-participation model and public initiatives

This chapter has answered the first two sub questions asked in this thesis, looking first at the individual characteristics that might hinder participation in public initiatives. Based primarily on findings of research into electoral and societal participation, I identify barriers of *resources* and of *attitudes*. In the first category, I distinguish the specific barriers of a lack of time, money, and civic skills. In the second category, I note that a lack of political efficacy and political trust, low neighborhood connectedness, and a distrust of general others can also be barriers that lead to people not participating in public initiatives. Looking then at the second sub question, research into public initiatives in the Netherlands leads me to conclude there are four key motives to join such initiatives. These four are (1) being asked, (2) altruistic or duty-based motives, (3) personal development, and (4) the desire to solve a specific local problem.

These barriers and motives together make up the model of non-participation I put forward in this thesis, as displayed in Figure 2. In the remainder of this thesis, this model will be tested in two separate statistical analyses in order to answer the final sub question, on which motives and barriers are most influential in which cases. For that reason it makes sense to look at this model, and formulate some assumptions on how both barriers and motives might relate to different public initiatives. As I argued when discussing these public initiatives, there is variation on a number of factors. Most clearly, public initiatives differ in the size of their impact of

action, some impacting only a few people while others potentially influence a complete neighborhood or even a city. Also, while some public initiatives are more deliberative in nature, others require more specific action and therefore more specific skills.

Figure 2: The model of non-participation



These differences may also have implications for the way in which barriers and motives influence one's decision to participate in a specific public initiative. Looking first at the expectations for the attitudinal barriers, I expect that deliberative initiatives see a stronger influence of political barriers than social barriers. Specifically, political trust and efficacy I expect to be more important for those initiatives that feature a political discussion more than a specific problem. For applied initiatives, in contrast, especially those that aim to solve problems on a smaller scale, the social dimension to barriers I would expect to become more influential. Resource barriers should theoretically be equally important across the board of public initiatives. Having said that, by the same logic that relates to political-attitudinal barriers, low civic skills might be a more influential barrier for deliberative than for applied initiatives. Finally looking at motives, the personal development motive I expect to be important mainly for younger prospective participants. Duty-based or altruistic motives, given their content of wanting to help other people, should feature more in applied initiatives than in deliberative initiatives, since those latter initiatives often do not specifically serve to help others or actually solve a specific situation.

Chapter 4:
Methodological framework

THE MODEL OF NON-PARTICIPATION constructed in the previous chapter is tested in this thesis through two separate analyses. Both analyses contribute to finding an answer to the third sub question asked in this thesis, on which barriers and motives are most influential when considering non-participation in public initiatives. In this chapter I outline how the two statistical analyses will help in finding answers to this question. More particularly, the first step looks to test the barriers side of the non-participation model on a larger scale using existing datasets. In the second step, I use a survey containing vignettes to test the barriers, but most particularly the motives side of the model.

4.1 Testing on the LISS Panel

The first step in this research design specifically looks at those individual characteristics that, in the model of non-participation, I assume to form barriers against participation. This step thus aims to answer the third sub question insofar as it asks which barriers are most influential in keeping people from participating. I evaluate the influence of all barriers using existing datasets available through the LISS Panel, administered by Tilburg CentER Data.[4]

This panel offers a representative sample of Dutch citizens, who participate in various online surveys on a wide variety of topics. If necessary to maintain the representativeness of the sample, households that would otherwise not be able to participate are supplied with an internet connection and a computer. Apart from answering topic-specific online surveys, respondents are asked on a monthly basis to fill out recurring questionnaires on background variables such as age, income and living

[4] For more information about the LISS Panel or Tilburg University's CentER Data, please see http://www.lissdata.nl or http://www.centerdata.nl.

situation. The LISS Panel also has recurring questionnaires on various domains such as leisure, political values, and housing situation.[5] For the purposes of the analysis I perform in this part of my research I use these longitudinal surveys as well as the background data available on all respondents in the LISS Panel. Table 10 (in Appendix B) presents the exact datasets used, their data collection timeframes, sample sizes and response percentages.

4.1.1 Analysis

The variables that measure barriers are entered into a logistic regression analysis. The results of this regression analysis can be used to see which barriers indeed can significantly hinder participation. Also, by comparing the effects that barriers have, this analysis can be interpreted to also shed light on which barriers are most influential compared to others.

The dependent variable I use for this regression analysis is participation in two types of voluntary organizations. Notably, this dependent variable does not completely mirror participation in public initiatives. Although both types of volunteering feature some promotion of the public good, there are also a number of conceptual differences that mean the results of the LISS Panel analysis cannot simply be translated one-on-one to public initiatives without taking extra care. Though I will expand on this in the next chapter, when discussing the results of this LISS Panel analysis specifically, it is important to note now that despite this conceptual difference, I still perform this first analysis because the LISS Panel's sample size allows for a first large-scale evaluation of barriers in a closely related field to the one I am studying.

4.2 Surveying non-participants

The second step in my research design investigates the entire model of non-participation, though most importantly the motives. For the purposes of this step I create a survey specifically tailored to this research, that consists of two parts. The first part of the survey is used primarily to answer the first part of the third sub question, asking which barriers are most influential in keeping people from participating. The second part of the survey looks at

[5] http://www.lissdata.nl/assets/uploaded/References_LISS.pdf (last visited 2015/09/20).

the other part of the third sub question, on the motives that are most influential in driving people towards participating in public initiatives.

4.2.1 First part of the survey: barriers

In the first part of the survey I ask general questions to respondents about the characteristics that connect to the barriers to participation. Most of these questions are adaptations of the questions as they are asked in the LISS Panel questionnaires, although some questions have been changed either for clarification, or because the measurement levels as used in the LISS Panel do not allow for meaningful interpretation of results.

4.2.2 Second part of the survey: vignettes

The second part of the survey is the more important part of this research step. In this part I use vignettes to see to what extent respondents consider the four key motives part of my non-participation model in their decision to join, or not join a public initiative. As I have argued before, there is a wide variety of public initiatives, with differences particularly (as I have argued) on the basis of scale and on the deliberative or applied nature of public initiatives. Connected to that, I assume that barriers as well as motives may have different functions when considering different kinds of public initiatives. Therefore I connect these motives to three different examples of public initiatives that vary on these bases.

Table 2: Overview of public initiatives

Initiative	Description	Impact	Nature
Citizen summit	Platform for discussion on a neighborhood level	large	deliberative
Neighborhood garden	Turning an empty plot of land into a garden maintained and used by locals	large to medium	applied, deliberative aspects
Care initiative	Providing basic (health)care to two elderly neighbors	small	applied

The three initiatives I use are a neighborhood citizen summit, a neighborhood gardening project, and a care initiative. Although the initiatives I describe are fictitious, they are made to closely mirror public initiatives that exist (or have existed) in the Netherlands. Table 2 shows the three initiatives I use. In the second part of the survey, respondents thus are first provided with descriptions of these three public initiatives. After

reading a description of each initiative, respondents are asked how likely it is (based on the description alone) that they would join the initiative described.

The three public initiatives

The *citizen summit* initiative is based on the G1000 project that has been undertaken in the Kruiskamp neighborhood in Amersfoort, the Netherlands. This initiative was started by a small group of local citizens, and aimed to be a platform for discussion on various social issues in the area. In a timeframe between October 2014 and January 2015, around one-hundred citizens participated in a number of discussion moments, in which they defined different problems and attempted to find appropriate solutions themselves.[6] The citizen summit initiative is thus included as one that has a large impact size, and is clearly deliberative in nature.

The *neighborhood garden* initiative is based on the project 'Emma's Hof', a neighborhood garden project in The Hague. This project was started by six citizens living in the direct vicinity of an old school building that was to be demolished for the construction of new homes. The six initiators managed to secure funds to change these plans and, with the help of other local citizens, remodel the empty plot into a neighborhood garden. Construction as well as maintenance and upkeep of the garden is still done by residents living near the garden, who have joined the public initiative.[7] This initiative unlike the citizen summit is far more applied than it is deliberative. Also, although it is a neighborhood garden, the impact of action of this initiative I consider to be slightly below that of the G1000-based citizen summit initiative.

Finally, the *care initiative* is based more generally on what Verhoeven and Tonkens (2013, pp. 417-418) call the 'social action' aspect of the English *Big Society* agenda. Part of this agenda, which the authors find is reflected in the Dutch democracy of action discourse, is the social norm of caring for neighbors "in order to reduce citizens' reliance on the state" (Verhoeven & Tonkens, 2013, p. 418). Using such a frame as an example, I include a public initiative that revolves around basic forms of care to two elderly people living in the same street, who require assistance on a weekly

[6] http://g1000nu.ning.com/wijkg1000kruiskamp (last visited 2015/10/05).

[7] http://www.emmashof.nl (last visited 2015/10/05).

basis. This example of a public initiative thus is clearly applied, and has a small impact of action that focuses essentially on these two people.

Public initiatives and key motives

Next, respondents are provided with a total of twelve vignettes, each of which relates one of the three public initiatives to one of the four key motives I identified as part of my model of non-participation. All respondents are presented with all twelve vignettes in a fixed order. The vignettes in this phase follow a rather similar phrasing, each following the format as per the example below:

> Some people join the neighborhood summit because they want to solve a specific problem, such as loitering. Would this be a reason for you to join the neighborhood summit?
>
> (The neighborhood summit is the initiative where around 200 people from your area will meet six times (one evening a month), to talk in groups about problems in your neighborhood.

4.3 Summary of methodology

In order to answer the third sub question asked in this thesis (Which barriers are most influential in 'deterring' non-participants from participating, and which motives are most influential in making non-participants become participants?) I thus perform two separate analyses. First, I analyze the barriers side of the model of non-participation using a large sample, through existing data gathered on the LISS Panel. The results of this analysis will be presented and discussed in chapter 5. Second, I analyze both sides of the model through a survey created specifically for this research. This survey first of all asks respondents about individual characteristics that form barriers for participation, as per the non-participation model. Second, more importantly, the survey contains twelve vignettes in which respondents are asked about the way in which they relate three examples of public initiatives to the four key motives identified in the non-participation model. The results of this second step will be presented and discussed in chapter 6.

Chapter 5:
Analyzing the LISS Panel data

IN FINDING OUT which of the barriers I identified in constructing the model of non-participation are most influential in keeping people from participating, I first perform a statistical analysis of data from the LISS Panel. In this chapter I present the results of this analysis. First, I will shortly outline how I operationalize the barriers contained in the model, and to the construction of the dependent variable used in the regression analysis. Then, I present the results, and discuss how these results provide answers to the question which barriers are most important in hindering people from participating in public initiatives.

5.1 Operationalization of barriers

Since the LISS Panel data cover a wide array of different concepts, it is possible to measure most of the barriers contained in the model of non-participation in a meaningful way. In this section I will shortly discuss the operationalization of all barriers, and the control factors of age and gender. First, I look at the operationalization of the dependent variable.

5.1.1 Dependent variable: participation in voluntary associations

I operationalize my dependent variable as participation in two voluntary associations. In the LISS Panel's Social Integration dataset, respondents are asked whether they volunteer in, amongst other organizations, (1) an organization for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities or immigrants, and/or (2) an organization for youngsters, pensioners or the elderly. If respondents in the dataset are found to volunteer in either of these organizations, their score on the dependent variable is 1. If they do not participate, they score 0. Table 3 provides an overview of the number of participants in these association types.

Table 3: Overview on dependent variable: participation in two types of voluntary association

Respondents in Social Integration Dataset:	**6 643**	
Participation in humanitarian (type 1) org.:	154	2.3%
Participation in social (type 2) org.:	141	2.1%
Participation in both types of org.:	31	0.5%
Total number of participants in dataset:	326	4.9%

Notably, using volunteering as a factor for a dependent variable means moving somewhat away from the concept of participation in public initiatives. When trying to do statistical research into Dutch public initiatives one of the main problems is that there are little to no datasets that allow for a large-scale analysis of a wide variety of participants' characteristics. The LISS Panel does allow for such a large-scale analysis, but does not provide a variable that measures participation in public initiatives alone. I therefore use the variables available on volunteering in these two types of associations, since these types come closest to capturing the idea of working for a public initiative. However, since volunteering generally is a much broader concept than participation in such public initiatives, it is important to note that interpretation of results needs to be done with additional care.

5.1.2 Controls

Research into the characteristics of participants in public initiatives points towards diffusion in common control variables such as age and gender. Still I choose to include these two factors as control variables for two reasons, the first simply being that there *may* be some effect in the dataset used in this thesis which in turn would be cause for further consideration. Second, speaking in a statistical sense, it is important to control for the effects of these three background variables in order to better assess the relative influence of other factors. Age and gender are present by default in the LISS Panel's background data. Gender is measured as a dummy variable (0 = female, 1 = male), age is measured in whole years.

5.1.3 Time and resources

The amount of time available can be measured in a number of ways. Although the LISS datasets do have some questions related to free time and

use of leisure time, including such questions would lead to a high number of missing variables. Therefore I choose to use a measure of hours spent working, measured in full hours per week. Although this does not fully measure free time, I assume working hours can be seen as the main factor taking up 'non-sleeping' time (De Hart, 1999).

Similarly the LISS datasets do not offer too many options for measuring civic skills. Therefore I choose to use the level of education as a proxy. Education is measured as the highest level completed with a degree, using a Dutch Statistics Bureau (CBS) scale of 1 (primary school) to 7 (university). Finally, I include a measure of money as the household income of the respondent, measured in a scale of 1 to 16 in brackets of five hundred euros income per month.

5.1.4 Being responded to

Political efficacy is measured in the LISS Panel using six questions that in their wording seem to be a slight adaptation of the CPS's 1970-1976 political studies in the United States (Iyengar, 1980). In order to test the presence of two separate types of efficacy (internal and external efficacy) a factor analysis has been performed which shows clear support for the presence of these two concepts. The results of the factor analysis, as well as the Cronbach's alpha for the two resulting scales, are presented in Table 11 (Appendix B).

Notably, the consistency of the internal efficacy scale is rather low ($\alpha = .527$), although this is most likely caused by the restrictive measure of efficacy in the LISS questionnaire (true or false). I will use both internal and external efficacy in the statistical analyses, then, but it needs to be said that any results especially regarding the internal side would have to be interpreted with care. Both internal and external efficacy are coded positively, meaning that a higher score indicates a higher level of efficacy.
Trust in government in this study will be operationalized as one's level of confidence in Dutch government institutions. The LISS's Politics dataset asks questions of confidence on a 0-to-10 scale (0 = no confidence). For this study, I have created a variable containing mean confidence scores for the Dutch Parliament, government, politicians and political parties, which taken together form a highly reliable scale, $\alpha = .954$ with no items to be deleted.

The concept of generalized trust is measured using the 'classic' interpersonal trust question (most people can be trusted, or you cannot be too careful; Uslaner, 1999). This variable is coded on a scale of 0 (low trust) to 10 (high trust). Neighborhood connectedness is included in three ways in this analysis, the first being the year a respondent has first moved into his current house. The second measure relates to the satisfaction a respondent has with his neighborhood, and is measured on a scale from 0 (dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). The third measure is an additive scale of a yes (1) or no (0) score for five different problems in the respondent's neighborhood.

5.2 Analysis

To see which characteristics matter when looking at participants for public initiatives, I have performed two binary logistic regressions. Logistic regression is a variation on 'normal' multiple regression procedures, used when the dependent variable is categorical (Field, 2013). In this case, the participation variable, that measures whether a respondent is either volunteering or providing informal care, is dichotomous, meaning it scores either 0 (no volunteering or informal care) or 1, meaning that binary logistic regression should be used.

In logistic regression, like in normal multiple regression, the outcome or dependent variable *Y* is predicted through an equation consisting of a constant, and the included independent variables multiplied by a slope or regression coefficient. However, unlike in multiple regression, this regression coefficient relates to the *odds* or probability of *Y* occurring for every one-unit increase in the independent variable. For this study, the outcome variable *Y* is participation. The *odds*, noted as exp(B), that a one-unit increase in the dependent variable lead to the outcome variable *Y* being 1 (i.e. the respondent is participating) are higher when above 1, and lower when below 1. As in multiple regression, higher values indicate a stronger relationship, although now the amount of deviation from 1 gives some idea of the relative strength of the effect (Field, 2013). The results of the logistic regression are displayed in Table 4.

Table 4: Results of logistic regression

	Beta	Exp(B)	SE(B)
Working hours (time)	-.019*	.981	.007
Education (civic skills)	-.010	.990	.074
Household income	-.030	.970	.040
Political efficacy: external	.495	1.640	.299
Political efficacy: internal	.524	1.689	.311
Political satisfaction	.038	1.038	.062
Generalized trust	.102	1.107	.056
Problems in neighborhood	.413**	1.512	.123
Time living in neighborhood	-.009	.991	.008
Neighborhood satisfaction	.034	1.035	.074
Gender	-.214	.807	.207
Age	-.006	.994	.008
Constant	13.989	>1000	16.659
Model Chi Square	38.042***		
-2 Log Likelihood	880.759		
Nagelkerke's R^2	.049		

*Dependent variable: participation in two types of voluntary association (0 = no participation, 1 = participation). N = 2 480. *: p<.05, **: p<.01, ***: p<.001 .*

5.3 Discussion

The statistical analysis of barriers on the LISS Panel provides only limited support for a number of barriers. More particularly, based on the logistic regression results it seems to be that the barriers of time, and part of the neighborhood connectedness concept indeed function as thought, potentially hindering participation. However, looking more closely at barrier functions this finding only really rings true for the barrier of (lack of) free time. Even though the dependent variable in this analysis is more generally volunteering behavior, the nature of the time barrier suggests that this finding can also be translated to participation in public initiatives.

As to the significant influence of the amount of problems a person has in the neighborhood, a different mechanism seems to be in play. Neighborhood connectedness as a barrier I would expect to exist in the sense that if a person feels unconnected to the neighborhood, he or she is unlikely to join a public initiative to improve that neighborhood. The amount of problems a person sees in the area, however, is not necessarily a barrier. Instead, the presence of more problems can be a driver for participating. This is especially true when considering public initiatives over the volunteering concept measured here, considering the finding that a close-to-home logic exists in many participants in these public initiatives (Hurenkamp et al., 2013). A lack of problems, however, is not a barrier—it merely is a lack of driving force.

Three variables are found to be significant at around $p \approx .09$, which, while not necessarily acceptable given the sample size, does indicate that some sort of barrier function might be present. This is the case for generalized trust, and for both political efficacy variables. While no barrier function can be conclusively assumed based on this analysis, it is likely that low efficacy as well as a general distrust of other people indeed might function somehow as barriers.

For the other variables, the mainly interesting finding is that barrier functions seem to exist only to a very limited extent. This indicates that at least for volunteering behavior these barriers play only a very limited role. Translating these findings to the concept of participation in public initiatives, and particularly to an answer to the third sub question to this thesis, only the barrier of a lack of free time can currently be seen to deter people from participating in public initiatives. As to the influence of the other barriers, no significant barrier effect is visible in the LISS Panel data. This means that it is very likely that for the decision whether or not to join a public initiative, these other barriers do not seem to play a substantial role. In other words, non-participation in public initiatives does not seem to be a result of, for instance, a lack of money or a distrust towards other people. While a lack of free time may indeed be a reason why people do not participate, it is possible that the good cause served by work in public initiatives means that people are less influenced by barriers, and more influenced by motives. This idea cannot be tested using the LISS Panel data,

but will be revisited when discussing the results of the non-participation survey in the next chapter of this thesis.

In this chapter I have discussed the results of the first test of the barriers side of the non-participation model. The results of a logistic regression performed on existing data show mixed, though generally little support for the barriers that were found to theoretically hinder participation in public initiatives. More particularly, it seems that only the barrier of a lack of free time is a reason why people do not participate in public initiatives. No indication is found for the idea that the other barriers contained in the non-participation model have a similar effect. In the next chapter, I will report the process and findings of the next research step, in which I use a survey to test the non-participation model in its entirety.

Chapter 6:
Investigating barriers and motives

IN THE FINAL STAGE of this research I look at the model of non-participation in its entirety. I do this by creating a survey inquiring into barriers to, and into motives for participating in public initiatives. In this chapter I report the steps taken to construct this survey, and the analyses performed on the survey data. These analyses inform the answer to the third sub question asked in this thesis, on which barriers and which motives are most influential in either hindering, or promoting participation in public initiatives.

6.1 Survey design

In order to test both the barriers and motives sides of the non-participation model I construct a survey that consists of two parts. The first part contains questions on various individual characteristics of the respondent, that relate specifically to the barriers identified in the theoretical part of this thesis. The second part of the survey consists of twelve vignettes, each of which combines a description of a (fictitious) public initiative with one of the four motives contained in the non-participation model. The codebook for this survey, which contains the questions in Dutch and in English, is attached to this thesis as Appendix A.

6.1.1 Survey construction

The first part of the non-participation survey looks at the individual characteristics that I hypothesize to function as barriers, keeping people from participating. These barriers as well as some supporting characteristics (such as age and gender) were also part of the analysis of the LISS Panel data. To allow for better comparison of the LISS Panel analysis and the analyses performed on this non-participation survey, most questions on individual characteristics follow the phrasing and measurement levels of the LISS questionnaires. For some questions, most notably the ones relating to

political efficacy, measurement levels were changed to allow for a more meaningful interpretation of that concept.

In the second part, containing the twelve vignettes, I first present all three public initiatives (the citizen summit, the neighborhood garden, and the care initiative) in turn. After reading a description of one initiative, respondents are asked how likely it is that they would join such an initiative. Next, I include the twelve vignettes, each of which first of all features a description of one of the public initiatives. Next, one of the four key motives contained in the non-participation model is added to the vignette. Respondents are then asked to state to what extent they consider that motivation to be a good reason to join the initiative included in the vignette. The twelve vignettes are included in the survey in a fixed order, making sure that no same initiative or same motive is repeated immediately. The survey codebook (Appendix A) includes the order in which these vignettes were presented to the respondents.

6.1.2 Pre-testing

Before distribution of the survey I have performed two rounds of pre-testing. In the first round I pre-tested the survey on six people ranging in age (from 18 to 52), gender, and level of education. As a consequence of this first round of pre-testing I have made a number of changes to the survey composition. In the first part of the survey, on individual characteristics, I have taken out the question on income since a number of pre-test participants found this question hard to answer accurately, or considered it too private. Since the LISS Panel analysis showed a negligible influence of income, the most practical choice is to remove the income question altogether. Similarly, I have taken out the question on the year a respondent started living in the current neighborhood.

On the side of the vignettes, the pre-tests have led to a number of reconsiderations. First of all, the formulation of the questions inquiring into the motives (would motive x be a reason for you to join initiative y) has been changed to avoid confusion, as some of the pre-test participants noted thinking the question inferred asking whether or not they would join the initiative. Additionally, to avoid this same confusion, I have added the questions asking how likely it is for the respondent to join an initiative based on the description of the initiative alone, before moving on to the twelve vignettes that do include motives. Thirdly, the descriptions of the fictitious

public initiatives have been shortened on their second and third appearance and have been written to slightly change each time, to try and make sure that respondents read all text before answering the question.

After making these changes a second round of pre-testing was performed on two participants that had already participated in the first round of pre-testing. In this round I specifically focused on the changes made to the questionnaire and on the overall time it would take to fill in the survey. The findings of this second round indicated no further changes would have to be made to the survey.

6.2 Sampling and data collection

I have chosen to send out the questionnaire through the internet mainly for reasons of efficiency. The survey was entered into ThesisTools,[8] an online tool specifically designed for scientific survey distribution. In initial distribution I invited a self-constructed sample of 80 respondents to fill out the online survey. The sampling frame was constructed based on respondents being Dutch people aged 18 and above, varying on age and level of education. For this sampling frame I sampled from my family members, members of the sports club I am a member of, and other friends and acquaintances. The survey itself was conducted anonymously, making sure respondents (though known through the sampling frame) could not be traced back to individual surveys.

Due to a rather low response on the sample invitations (39 respondents, making for a response rate of 48,8%) a second round of distribution was performed in two ways. First, an invitation was sent out to students of the Executive Master in Administration and Policy, through which 9 people replied.[9] Second, an open invitation to fill out the survey was shared on social media, and was shared on my request with more members of my sports club, which as far as can be reasonably inferred should be a rather good representation of the Dutch population. In total, 87 people filled out the survey in response to this open invitation. Table 5

[8] http://www.thesistools.com (last visisted 2016/02/03)

[9] For each different stage of distribution of the survey, potential respondents were provided with a different link to the survey. In the end, three different surveys with the exact same (order of) questions were entered in ThesisTools, making it possible to distinguish the respective sources of all available data.

shows an overview of all three sampling stages. Survey distribution over all three stages took place between December 2015 and January 2016.

Table 5: Overview of sampling rounds

Stage	N	Response rate
1 (sampling frame)	39	48.8%
2 (Executive Master)	9	N/A*
3 (social media)	87	N/A*
Total:	**135**	N/A*

**: Due to the self-selection nature of the second and third sampling stages, no data on response rates can be provided for these stages, nor for the total sample.*

6.2.1 Sample characteristics

In total, 135 people filled in the questionnaire. Respondents range in age from 17 to 85 years, the average age being 38,1. Age thus is somewhat positively skewed, which most likely is due to the fact that the self-selected group's average age is quite a lot lower than that of the other groups. More particularly, while the Executive Master group and the 'Sampling Frame' group's average age is 45,9 and 40,8 respectively, the self-selected group scores at 30,1 average. Of all 135 respondents, a total of 96 (or 71,1%) are female. Similar distributions can be found within the three distribution groups, although the 'female over-presence' is strongest in the 'Sampling Frame' group (6 males to 33 females, or 84,6% female). Education is negatively skewed with most respondents having completed university level education (N = 41, or 30,4%). Table 6 gives an overview of the most important sample characteristics. Figure 3 displays the spread of the average likelihood of participation in all three initiatives. Individual charts for the likelihood of participation in each of the three public initiatives are displayed in Appendix B.

Generally then, it seems the overall set of respondents does not completely mirror the population, or in more statistical terms would not be completely normally distributed on all variables. Having said that, with a sample size of over 100 the central limit theorem would apply indicating that the assumption of normality (which applies to most of the analyses to be reported in the remainder of this chapter) can be assumed to have been met (Field, 2013).

Table 6: Overview of sample characteristics by sample frame, in total

Characteristic	Stage 1 (Smpl. frame)	Stage 2 (Exec. Master)	Stage 3 (social media)	Total
Age, in years				
Mean (SD)	30.08 (11.91)	45.89 (5.159)	40.84 (15.471)	38.07 (14.94)
Range	17—61	40—54	19—85	17—85
Gender				
Female	33 (84.6%)	6 (66.7%)	27 (65.5%)	39 (28.9%)
Male	6 (15.4%)	3 (33.3%)	30 (34.5%)	96 (71.1%)
Education level (0 = none/primary school, 6 = university)				
Mean (SD)	4.79 (1.418)	5.67 (.500)	4.33 (1.282)	4.56 (1.331)
Range	2—6	5—6	0—6	0—6
Likelihood of participation				
G1000: Mean (SD)	3.40 (1.684)	5.63 (1.685)	3.41 (1.649)	3.56 (1.741)
NBH Garden: Mean (SD)	4.40 (2.103)	4.62 (1.506)	4.03 (1.764)	4.18 (1.854)
Care init.: Mean (SD)	4.80 (1.530)	3.75 (1.165)	4.59 (1.763)	4.59 (1.668)
Overall: Mean (SD)	4.20 (1.118)	4.67 (.960)	4.01 (1.178)	4.11 (1.151)
N	**39**	**9**	**87**	**135**

Figure 3: Distribution of average likelihood of participation in all three public initiatives



N = 116 (missing data for 19 respondents).

6.3 Measures

Many of the measures of individual characteristics that might form barriers are similar (in style of questioning and in breadth of measurement) to the questions asked in the LISS Panel's questionnaires. For the barrier of time, I use the same measurement of working hours measured in full hours per week. For lack of a better proxy I also re-use educational level to measure civic skills. Education is measured as the highest finished level with a degree on a 0-to-7 scale, where 0 equals no education and 7 equals university level education.

I adopt a slightly adapted measure of political trust than the one included in the LISS Panel. Next to inquiring into the level of trust respondents have in Dutch government and Parliament, politicians, and political parties, I also inquire into trust in the respondent's local city council, local politicians, and local parties. I do this mainly to account for the possibility that, due to the localized nature of public initiatives, trust in national government matters less than trust in local government. A factor analysis on all political trust variables (Table 12 in Appendix B) shows some support for the existence of two separate scales; only when adopting an eigenvalue cutoff of ,95 rather than the more commonly used 1,00 (Field, 2013) does a component separation between local and national politics appear. Given the possibility of important differences in effects, I choose to construct two scales, one measuring local and one measuring national political trust, as the mean of all respective scores. Both scales thus run from 1 (low) to 7 (high trust). Furthermore I include a measure of general political satisfaction, where 1 equals no and 7 equals very high satisfaction with recent government functioning.

Political efficacy is measured using the same constructs as included in the LISS Panel's questionnaires, using six questions to measure internal and external efficacy. In order to better measure the efficacy concept I use a 5-point rather than a 2-point scale for respondents to judge statements on. A factor analysis shows that there is no clear division between internal and external efficacy based on the dataset gathered for this thesis. Theoretically, the top three questions listed in the table would be internal, and the bottom three external efficacy (Iyengar, 1980). The results of the factor analysis performed here (Table 13 in Appendix B) show one question loading on both components. Additionally, the scale reliability of internal efficacy is

quite low at $\alpha = .591$, external efficacy scoring better at $\alpha = .712$. Still, given the theoretical strength of the internal and external efficacy construct I use the two as separate scales, though again it is important to stress that the explanatory power of both types of efficacy is somewhat compromised.

Interpersonal trust is measured in the same way as in the LISS Panel questionnaires, asking respondents to choose between 'most people can be trusted' (scoring 7) or 'you cannot be careful enough' (scoring 1). Two measures of neighborhood connectedness are included. The first is an additive scale of five problems people might perceive in their neighborhood. The second is a general measure of one's satisfaction with the current neighborhood, on a scale of 1 (low) to 7 (high satisfaction).

6.4 Analysis of barriers

I take multiple steps to answer the third sub question asked in this thesis through analyzing the vignettes survey. I first look at the barriers hindering people from participating by performing regression analyses, using the likelihood of participating in a public initiative as dependent, and the barrier variables as independent variables. The results of these analyses will inform the answer to the question which barriers are most influential in hindering participation in public initiatives.

6.4.1 Analyzing the barriers

First looking at the barriers, I take two different steps. The first step is a regression analysis using the barriers as independent variables, and the mean score of the likelihood of participation on all three public initiatives as the dependent variable. The aim of this step is to get a baseline indication of the strength of the barrier effects of the different factors. The results of this first step are displayed in Table 7.

Importantly, of the barriers only three—the two neighborhood connectedness variables and generalized interpersonal trust—are found to be significant. Unlike in the previous statistical analysis (reported in chapter 5) the amount of working hours now turns out to be completely insignificant. In summary, although the level of explained variance in participation likelihood by barriers is quite high, there are limited reasons to assume that the barriers side of the model can do a lot in explaining non-participation.

Table 7: Results of regression analysis on barriers

	B	SE(B)
Working hours (time)	-.003	.007
Education (civic skills)	-.018	.093
Trust in local politics	.005	.124
Trust in national politics	.108	.177
Political satisfaction	-.128	.119
Political efficacy: internal	-.022	.153
Political efficacy: external	-.069	.179
Interpersonal trust	.242*	.094
Satisfaction with neighborhood	.265*	.116
Problems in neighborhood	.478*	.194
Gender	.162	.256
Age	.016*	.008
Constant	.133	1.157
Model F	38.042***	
R^2	.176	

Dependent variable: average likelihood of participation in all three public initiatives. N = 103.
**: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 .*

To check for differences in barriers between different types of public initiatives I run a similar regression analysis, only changing the dependent variable to be the likelihood of participation in the specific public initiative. Consequently, using the G1000-type citizen summit initiative as a reference, I calculate whether the differences in regression slopes are significant using a *Z*-test that calculates the difference between the standard errors of two Beta-coefficients, according to the below formula (Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, & Piquero, 1998):

$$Z = \frac{(b_1 - b_2)}{(SE_{b-difference})}$$

where

$$SE_{b-difference} = \sqrt{(SEb_1)^2 + (SEb_2)^2}$$

The results of this analysis and the subsequent significance test of regression slope differences are displayed in Table 8.

Table 8: Results of three regression analyses on barriers

	G1000	NBH. garden		Care initiative	
	B	B	Z	B	Z
Working hours (time)	-.006	.006	-.737	-.009	.193
Education (civic skills)	.003	-.063	.316	.006	-.015
Trust in local politics	.057	-.047	.354	-.002	.222
Trust in national politics	.001	.270	-.678	.054	-.139
Political satisfaction	-.048	-.011	-.140	-.325	1.088
Political efficacy: internal	.333	.065	.781	-.465*	2.426^
Political efficacy: external	-.087	-.511	1.061	.391	-1.247
Interpersonal trust	.065	.476**	-1.957^	.185	-.595
Satisfaction with nbh	.225	.361	-.525	.208	.068
Problems in nbh	.305	.560	-.587	.570*	-.636
Gender	.364	-.103	.813	.226	.251
Age	.031*	-.008	2.121^	.025*	.339
Constant	-.792	-.467		1.659	
Model F	1.116	2.023*		1.586	
R^2	.115	.191		.156	

Dependent variable: likelihood of participation in public initiative x. *N = 103 for all analyses.*
**: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 . ^'s denote significance of B-difference at the same levels of p denoted by *'s. Reference for B-difference: G1000 regression slopes.*

6.4.2 Discussion of results

Much like the results of the LISS Panel analysis, the results of the statistical tests performed on my survey data offer very limited support for the existence of barriers hindering participation in public initiatives. Most importantly, while in the LISS Panel analysis the amount of free time was a significant barrier, the vignettes survey analyses offer no support for that barrier. This may mean that, much like the barrier of income, prospective participants in public initiatives do not consider free time to be important in the decision whether or not to participate.

Looking at the results especially of the second regression analysis, which analyzes the barriers for each initiative individually, it seems that the same applies to all barriers contained in the non-participation model. For the citizen summit (G1000-type) initiative, no barrier-related variables are significant, meaning no barrier functions can be assumed. This is the case

even for the political variables, which due to the deliberative and political nature of this initiative would be expected to be more important. In contrast, internal political efficacy is significantly related to participation in the care initiative, but features a *negative* relationship. This means that a lower perception of one's own influence on politics is associated with an increase in the likelihood of participation, which is completely opposed to the barrier idea.

The barrier of interpersonal distrust is significant only for the neighborhood garden initiative. This in itself is not surprising—working in this initiative requires close cooperation with other people and doing some good for them. What *is* surprising is the fact that this variable is significant only for that initiative, and not for the equally closely engaged care initiative. Having said that, the care initiative is constructed as taking care of two people that are closely connected to the respondent. This means that not generalized, but particularized trust might be a barrier in that case.

Thus, summarizing the results of the survey data on barriers, the answer to the first part of the third sub question (which barriers are most influential) is that the analyses performed here indicate that barriers do not play an important role whatsoever in non-participation. This seems to be the case even for the barrier of a lack of free time, which in the LISS Panel data was found to significantly influence participation in voluntary associations. There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. First, it is quite likely that the nature of work performed by public initiatives—the idea of promoting a local good cause, most particularly—means that prospective participants are more driven by motives than by barriers. This idea will be investigated more closely after the analyses on the motives side of the non-participation model.

Also, it may be that the survey sample is somewhat biased towards those people that are more likely to participate. Higher-educated females are clearly over-represented in the sample, and might also be those people more likely to be participants anyway (e.g. Verhoeven & Tonkens, 2011, p. 423). Additionally, it may be that respondents do not expressly factor in barriers such as a possible lack of free time when answering the survey questions on their likelihood of becoming a participant. In that sense, there could be a social desirability bias in the survey data which causes the effect of barriers to be underestimated. Having said that, the fact that in the LISS

Panel data—in which actual rather than hypothetical participation in voluntary associations is used, meaning social desirability does not affect the answer provided by respondents—only free time is a significant barrier does provide more support for the idea that barriers quite simply do not play an important role.

6.5 Analysis of motives

Next, I analyze the data coming from the twelve vignettes. I first analyze, for all three public initiatives individually, which motives correlate most strongly with the likelihood of respondents becoming participants. Additionally I test whether different motives relate more strongly to different people, looking into the possibility that certain motives are more commonly invoked by certain types of people. The results of these analyses will inform the answer to the second part of the third sub question, on which motives are most influential in leading people towards becoming a participant in public initiatives.

6.5.1 Analyzing the motives

In order to analyze the influence of motives on the decision to participate I perform two different correlation analyses. First I work from the public initiatives, looking for each which kinds of motives seem to be most influential in making the decision to participate. Second, working more from the perspective of the motives I try to find whether the different motives appeal to different people.

The results of the first step of correlational analysis are displayed in Table 9. For this step I correlate the scores respondents give for each motive with their likelihood of being a participant. Additionally, I look at mean scores for the motives to see which motives have been scored most influential. Importantly, for the problem-solving motive I do *not* directly use the answers provided by respondents on the neighborhood garden and the care initiative. This is because both initiatives presuppose the presence of a rather specific problem, unlike the G1000-type citizen summit initiative which can be entered to solve any kind of problem. Therefore I use a measure of the extent to which a respondent would consider the situation contained in the initiative a problem, by the degree to which the respondent finds the problem-solving motive a good reason to join the initiative.

Table 9: Means and correlation coefficients for motives and likelihood of participation

		Citizen summit	Neighborhood garden	Care initiative
Altruism	*Mean*	3.85	4.42	4.64
	Pearson	.430***	.531***	.464***
	N	108	113	111
Personal development	*Mean*	3.03	3.09	3.46
	Pearson	.211*	.292**	.392***
	N	114	112	113
Solving a specific problem	*Mean*	3.83	3.38	3.88
	Pearson	.344***	.561***	.647***
	N	115	108	113
Being asked	*Mean*	3.70	4.32	4.28
	Pearson	.245**	.481***	.519***
	N	113	114	110

Rows display mean scores for motives; Pearson correlation coefficients (range between -1 and +1, where negative scores indicate a negative effect; scores of (+/-) 1 indicate a perfect effect; Field, 2013, pp. 266-267) between strength of motive and likelihood of participation; and N.
**: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01, ****: p < .001 .*

The results of this first step offer some important insights that help to answer the third sub question asked in this thesis (which motives are most influential…). As a note before looking at these most influential motives, interpreting the data listed in Table 9 requires looking not so much at levels of significance but mostly to the mean scores, and to the effect size contained in the Pearson correlation coefficients (*r*). For the latter, it is generally assumed that an effect size of r > .50 constitutes a large effect size, r > .30 a medium effect, and r > .10 a small effect (Field, 2013, p. 82).

6.5.2 Discussion of results

In order to answer the sub question on which motivations are most influential in driving people towards becoming a participant in public initiatives I perform two different analyses. First, I correlate the motives with the likelihood of becoming a participant and check which motives score highest, on average, for each of the three public initiatives, as displayed above in Table 9. Second, I analyze all motives to see whether particular motives are more commonly invoked by certain 'types' of people.

Key motives per public initiative

Looking first at the citizen summit initiative, the altruistic and problem-solving motives are most commonly associated with the likelihood of joining that initiative both based on average scores and on effect size. The lower score for personal development lies within reason: a largely deliberative, non-active initiative like a neighborhood summit would not be the prime example of a 'personal skills training ground'. Generally, the G1000-type initiative seems to be the least popular one, with all of the four motives being only somewhat influential. This could be because of the deliberative nature or the political cooperation contained in the initiative. Having said that, this latter assumption can be rejected largely based on the fact that the likelihood of participating in this initiative does not correlate with any of the political barrier factors (efficacy and trust) in any way.

For the neighborhood garden initiative, in terms of mean scores the altruism motive and being asked score highest, though the effect size of the problem-solving motive is the strongest at $r = .561$ ($p < .01$). This difference is interesting, as it indicates a discrepancy between what respondents consider a personally valid motive for joining the initiative and which motive actually seems to relate best with their likelihood of becoming a participant. More particularly, although respondents generally see altruism as the most valid reason for participating, the degree to which they see and want to solve a problem seems to be a better predictor of the likelihood they will become a participant.

Finally looking at the care initiative, the strongest effect sizes are in problem-solving ($r = .647$) and being asked ($r = .519$). In terms of mean scores, though, altruism (4.64) and being asked (4.28) score highest. As was argued for the neighborhood garden, this difference between mean scores and effect sizes is quite interesting. It makes sense to see that altruism motives have a higher mean score, as helping other people is the prime characteristic of the care initiative. The question though is why the effect size of altruism is lower. Most likely this would be because the altruistic motive calls on a more general attitude of helping unspecified other people and improving the neighborhood quality of life. The care initiative could be seen to not do that, in the sense that it only aims to solve a specific problem experienced by two people that in turn affects the (prospective) participants

of the care initiative. This idea would be supported by the strong effect size of the problem-solving motive.

Relative influence of motives

Judging the influence of motives also requires looking from the perspective of the motives themselves. Beginning with being asked, theory suggests this factor is an extremely important driver for participation and volunteering behavior (Verba et al., 1995; Lowndes et al., 2006; Rochester, 2006). Indeed, the data gathered in this thesis show that being asked is consistently one of the most important motives for people to consider joining an initiative, with the weakest influence being on the G1000-type initiative.[10]

Additionally, there are no indications that specific 'types' of people (for example distinct age groups) might be more strongly influenced by being asked. The perceived strength of being asked as a motive to join public initiatives has a medium-strength correlation with religion ($r = .295$, $p < .01$) and generalized trust ($r = .246$, $p < .01$), but the effect size of these correlations are too low to indicate a true effect of these characteristics on one's responsivity to being asked to join a public initiative.

The personal development motive, as noted in the theoretical framework, is also widely suggested to be an increasingly important motive especially for younger participants (Hustinx & Lammertyn, 2003; Rochester, 2006; Rochester, Paine, & Howlett, 2010). The data gathered here provide little to no support for that idea, even despite the over-representation of younger respondents in the dataset. The personal development motive, first of all, consistently scores lowest in terms of mean scores as well as effect sizes for all three public initiatives, even below the midpoint of 4. The low scores on means can perhaps be due to respondents finding personal development motives a rather non-socially-desirable answer. Additionally, the notion that especially younger participants relate well to personal development motives is not supported by my data, as there is no correlation between the development motive and age.

Altruistic motives consistently score high in all public initiatives, at least in the sense of their mean scores always being the highest of all motives. In terms of effect size, altruistic motives also score first- or second-

[10] Having said that, research into similar initiatives often finds that people would not have joined the initiative if it were not for a (personal) invitation to do so (e.g. Tonkens et al., 2015).

highest in the neighborhood garden and G1000 initiatives. Only for the care initiative the effect size, while still high at $r = .464$ ($p < .001$), scores below that of problem-solving and being asked. The high influence of altruistic motives in all initiatives is not surprising: wanting to help other people is necessarily connected with public initiatives, or at least those used in this survey. Also unsurprisingly, the importance of the altruistic motive relates relatively strongly with generalized interpersonal trust ($r = .419$, $p < .001$), which would be expected since helping others would be quite difficult if one were to be apprehensive in trusting other people. More interestingly, in the theoretical part it was noted that older and more religious people would be more likely to note altruistic motives for participating. The results of the correlational analyses provide no support for either statement, although there is some evidence pointing vaguely in the direction of a religion effect ($r = .174$, $p = .065$).

One important caveat when analyzing the altruism motive is that the consistently high scores can be caused by at least two factors that problematize interpretation. First, noting altruistic motives as being important reasons for participating can be regarded as giving a socially desirable answer. Even though an online survey does not necessarily 'pressure' people into giving such a desirable answer, it is quite possible that such a desirability bias has somewhat influenced the scores for the altruism motive. A second problem is that there seems to be some overlap between the problem-solving and the altruistic motives, which has not been picked up in the survey construction and pre-test phases. The altruism motive was now taken to include both wanting to help other people, and improving the quality of one's living environment. That second part at least treads on the ground that should be covered by the problem-solving motive, and makes the altruism motive look somewhat like a catch-all category.

Finally looking at that problem-solving motive, it seems that this motive is most strongly influential (though not necessarily perceived to be by respondents) when looking at those initiatives that actually aim to solve a specific problem, which in this study is shown in the neighborhood garden and the care initiatives. For the G1000-type initiative, the effect size is quite high as well, but still quite clearly lower than for the other two. Interestingly, mean scores for the problem-solving motive are all quite similar at around 3.80, below the midpoint of 4, meaning that respondents

generally see problem-solving as a relatively bad reason to join a public initiative. However, given that the effect size is rather big, there is strong support for the idea that public initiatives revolving around solving a specific local problem would do well to actively engage those people known to be strongly affected by that problem.

6.6 The influence of barriers and motives

Summarizing the results of the statistical analyses performed on my own survey data, there is very mixed support for the model of non-participation I have constructed in the theoretical part of this thesis. More particularly, looking at both the LISS Panel data analysis and the analyses performed on my own data, it seems that barriers cannot explain why some people do not participate in public initiatives. Relating this to the model of non-participation, the explanation for why people do not participate thus must be that non-participants do not participate because of a lack of motive to do so, not because they have barriers that might hinder them from participating in public initiatives. In short, it cannot be said that people do not participate in public initiatives because they could not participate, or did not have time to do so. While this notion might hold for political participation, my data indicate that this is not the case for participation in the democracy of action.

Regarding these motives, three out of the four key motives contained in the non-participation model are important drivers for people to engage with all three examples of public initiatives used in this study. The one exception is the personal development motive, which contrary to the hypothesis is not even more strongly invoked by younger people. The relatively low influence of this motive may well be due to a social desirability favoring the altruistic motive over that of personal development. Being asked is a strong motivation for all public initiatives, most strongly for the care initiative. Finally, the altruism and problem solving motives play the most important roles. Altruism, again possibly in part due to a social desirability effect, is seen by respondents as the key motive to join most public initiatives. Solving a specific local problem is not considered a key motive by respondents, but does correlate most strongly with the two applied initiatives that revolve around such a specific problem.

In contrast, the deliberative citizen summit initiative seems to be more likely to be joined by people with a stronger desire to help general others.

This means that the most influential motives driving people towards participating in public initiatives are the altruism or duty motive, being asked, and the motive of solving a specific local problem. The latter motive is important especially when considering smaller-scale applied initiatives. Being asked is an important driver across all types of initiatives. Indeed then, as is the case with electoral participation, some people do not participate in public initiatives simply because they are not asked to. Additionally, people that do not feel a strong desire to help other people when they experience problems are less likely to become participants. Finally, if people experience a specific problem but do not feel a need to solve that problem themselves, or do not feel personally affected by that problem, it is quite likely that they will not participate in public initiatives.

Chapter 7:
Conclusion and discussion

IN THIS THESIS I have looked at the democracy of action as it exists in the Netherlands. More particularly I have engaged myself with the large group of people that as of yet do not participate in public initiatives. Despite its size, little knowledge exists on this group of non-participants, which I have argued can be a problem for the functioning of the Dutch participatory society. This is because the public initiatives that exist, run by a select group of individuals, often work in a distinctly parochialist way. This means that in their functioning, they tend to address only those problems experienced by, or affecting people that are within the same socioeconomic spheres as the initiative's participants. Those people that, while needing help, are not within the scope of these public initiatives therefore are at risk of not being assisted. This is the case especially when Dutch government continues to withdraw itself from various policy areas, as it is doing now in order to create openings for public initiatives to flourish.

This problem of societal exclusion exists within, but can also be solved by a democracy of action. However, this requires that more people participate, which in turn requires more knowledge about non-participants. More particularly, it is unclear why so many people do not participate, while other people do. In this thesis I have attempted to address this knowledge gap by creating and testing a model of non-participation consisting of both barriers hindering, and motives promoting participation in public initiatives. The research question at the heart of this thesis reads as follows:

> Why do some people not participate in Dutch public initiatives, while others do?

Constructing the non-participation model

I divide this research question into three sub questions, where the first and second sub question specifically relate to the construction of the non-participation model based on theories on various forms of societal and political participation. More specifically, I start by assuming that non-

participation can, for an important part, be explained by a combination of barriers and motives. This combination I assume to exist in the sense that only if an individual experiences no barriers and has one or more motives to join a public initiative, participation is the logical outcome. In any other situation non-participation would be more likely. I base this assumption on common findings of research into electoral participation (e.g. Verba et al., 1995) stating that non-participants in the electoral sense experience such barriers, or lack motives to participate. Therefore I start the construction of my non-participation model by answering the first sub question asked in this thesis:

> (Sub 1) Which individual characteristics might form barriers against participating in public initiatives?

Based primarily on studies into electoral and societal participation, I identify a number of characteristics that I hypothesize to function as barriers, keeping people from participating. Looking first at aspects contained in the CVM and CLEAR models (Verba et al., 1995; Brady et al., 1995; Lowndes et al., 2006) I consider a lack of free time, a lack of money, and a lack of civic skills to be such barriers. Additionally, a low perception of one's political efficacy, as well as low trust in politics are included as potential barriers in the model. Based on the social, interpersonal nature of public initiatives I also conclude that low interpersonal trust (i.e. a general distrust towards others) can be a barrier that hinders participation in public initiatives.

Next I look at motives people may have for participation, looking at the second sub question:

> (Sub 2) Which motives are most important in driving people towards participating in public initiatives?

To answer this question I review multiple case studies into (participants of) Dutch public initiatives, looking to identify the most important motives that participants have provided for first joining a public initiative. The findings of this review lead to a 'taxonomy' of four key motives. The first of these is the altruistic, or duty motive, focusing on the desire to help other people if they experience some problem. Second, some people join public initiatives more for personal development, for instance to gain skills or to increase job experience. Third, an oft-mentioned motive is the desire to solve a specific local problem simply because the individual feels personally affected by that problem. Finally, a lot of participants in Dutch public initiatives indicate that

they have joined the initiative because they were asked to join by someone close to them.

Thus, I end up with a model of non-participation containing barriers on the left, and motives on the right side, as depicted here in Figure 4.

Figure 4: The complete model of non-participation (revisited)



Testing the non-participation model

The third sub question asks which barriers and motives are most influential in, respectively, hindering and promoting participation in public initiatives. This means testing the model of non-participation, which I do in two separate analyses. First, I use existing data from the LISS Panel to analyze the barriers on a large sample. I perform this analysis because the sample size allows for a reliable insight into whether or not these barriers exist. Having said that, since the LISS Panel questionnaires do not inquire into participation in public initiatives, I use participation in voluntary associations as a dependent variable. This means that the results of this analysis, while providing some insights into the field of (non-)participation in public initiatives, must be interpreted with care.

The results of the analysis performed on the LISS Panel data provide very limited support for the presence of barriers hindering people from participating in either public initiatives, or voluntary associations. Only two variables included in the analysis have a significant influence on participation, and of these two only the factor of free time actually seems to function as a potential barrier to participation. Apart from that barrier, the mainly interesting conclusion of the LISS Panel analysis is that people seem

very much unaffected by barriers when deciding whether or not to participate. This might be because the 'good cause' served by working in public initiatives (which I argue is equally present in voluntary associations) means that people will more easily step over barriers such as a lack of money or distrusting other people. This cannot be done with the barrier of time, since a lack of available time to engage with either an initiative or a voluntary association more fundamentally hinders participation.

As a second research step I analyze data from a survey specifically constructed and distributed for this thesis research. This survey relates to both the barriers and the motives side of the non-participation model. To measure the barriers I start the survey by asking respondents various questions on individual characteristics related to those barriers. To measure which of the four key motives are perceived as most important related to various types of public initiatives, I include twelve vignettes. These vignettes each include one of the four key motives, coupled to a description of one of three fictitious public initiatives: a G1000-based citizen summit, a neighborhood garden initiative, and a care initiative. These initiatives vary both in the scale of their impact, and in their deliberative versus applied nature.

Looking first at the barriers side of the non-participation model, the results of the analyses I perform on my own survey data support the findings of the LISS Panel data to the extent that indeed, barriers might not be important whatsoever for individuals deciding whether or not to engage in public initiatives. This is the case even for the potential barrier of free time, which in my own survey analysis is found to be non-significant. This lack of influence of barriers holds equally for participation individually in the three public initiatives I include in my survey, meaning that barriers are equally (un)important for deliberative versus applied, or small- versus large-scale initiatives.

Looking next at the motives, three of the four key motives that are part of the non-participation model are important drivers for people to engage in public initiatives. Only the motive of personal development is less influential in determining the likelihood of someone being a participant, in all types of public initiatives. Also, this motive is considered less desirable as a motive to join by respondents. Across all three public initiatives, being asked turns out to be a strong determinant of the likelihood of participation

of respondents. The altruistic or duty motive is consistently seen as the most desirable motive to join a public initiative. Finally, the desire to solve a specific local problem, somewhat expectedly, is most strongly associated with the applied, smaller-scale initiatives that are specifically started to address one specific problem. For the deliberative, more general citizen summit initiative, the desire to solve a specific problem turns out to be less important.

Why do people not participate, while others do?

The results of the various analyses I perform lead to mixed support for the model of non-participation I construct and test in this thesis. The question of why some people currently do not participate, while others do, thus cannot be answered on the basis of both motives and barriers. More particularly, my research findings suggest that non-participation in public initiatives is not the result of individuals experiencing barriers that keep them from participating. There is also no support for the idea that participation in itself is an undesirable activity—generally, respondents of my own survey are quite likely to join either of the three public initiatives I include in the survey, although the citizen summit initiative is least popular. The combination of this high likelihood to participate, and the lack of influence of motives, indicates that people do not participate mostly because they lack a motive to join.

Specifically, as argued for electoral participation by the CVM (Verba et al., 1995), non-participation in public initiatives can simply be the result of individuals not having been asked to join. Also, current non-participants may lack the desire to help other people if they experience problems, or lack the urge to solve a local problem that affects them personally. They may also not feel affected by that local problem at all, meaning that there is no real motivation to solve it. My results indicate that a presence of either of these motives is likely to have been a driver for participation for those few individuals that did already start to work for a public initiative. This means that only one side of the model of non-participation as I have constructed it in this thesis works as expected, though with only three of the four key motives identified being significant drivers, as depicted below in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Outcome of the analyses on the non-participation model



Relevance

Looking at these findings it seems public initiatives have a lot to hope for; when confronted with an initiative the respondents in my dataset consider themselves relatively likely to join that initiative. There is little support for the notion that working in public initiatives is an uninteresting activity from a rational perspective. The only slight exception to this is the G1000-type initiative, for which the motives were also found to have a relatively low influence on the likelihood of joining. For the other two initiatives, that I would say are more indicative of the democracy of action ideal, there generally is quite a lot of support.

There is an interesting discrepancy between perceived best motives and the actual best predicting motives (mean scores versus effect sizes). Coupled with the often high mean scores on the altruism motive and the high effect size of being asked, it seems that in most cases it might be best to actively appeal to the helpful nature of prospective respondents. My findings indicate that such a proactive approach would be valuable especially when coupling that with an appeal on the possibility to help other people—most strongly with deliberative initiatives—or, with applied initiatives, on the idea that working in a public initiative can be a good way to solve a specific problem that affects the non-participant. Noting the possibility that working in a public initiative allows one to develop in some way is less valuable, even for younger participants that were expected to more strongly relate to such motivation.

In that sense, both initiators and government would do well to adopt a more proactive position that revolves around inviting other people. For government actors particularly, such a suggestion would go against the more common advice of 'letting go' and making sure the initiative can develop on its own (e.g. Hendriks & Van de Wijdeven, 2014; Tonkens et al., 2015). Still, such an attitude would allow for public initiatives to, first, function better simply due to there being more assistance, and second, function more legitimately and effectively through increasing its scope of action. In that respect, solving the problem of societal exclusion through developing the democracy of action further is quite possible, even though it requires a slightly different stance of government (and of initiators of public initiatives) in the early stages of such initiatives.

Academically this research has made a start to fill in the knowledge gap on non-participation in public initiatives. Interestingly, there is incomplete support for the electoral participation-based notion that people do not participate simply because of a lack of time, money or civic skills. This simple barrier idea, then, it seems does not apply strongly if at all to forms of participation other than the electoral. It also indicates more generally that studying participation in public initiatives means moving well beyond electoral, and certain forms of societal participation literature.

Discussion

Having said that, there are a number of ways in which the results of this research can be made more reliable. First looking at the barriers side of the non-participation model, although the relevance of barriers for now seems to restrict itself to theory, it still makes sense to look further into the barrier functions as a potential cause of non-participation. However, this would mean that a number of shortcomings of this study need to be addressed. One first shortcoming is the overrepresentation of females and younger respondents, as well as the more highly educated, in the vignettes survey. This overrepresentation as well as the relatively small size of the sample used here would be one first point of attention for future research into such barriers.

Additionally, though using vignettes in that survey works well for measuring the importance of motives for participation, the same can be said only to a lesser degree for barriers. More particularly, it is possible that the significance of barriers is found to be lower here simply because survey

respondents determined their likelihood of joining one of the hypothetical initiatives without considering whether or not they experienced barriers. In other words, since the vignettes already present a fictitious and hypothetical situation, it is quite possible that respondents are more likely to report a high willingness to join the hypothetical initiative without considering their actual situation.

Second, the insignificance of effects of barriers may in part be due to the unsubstantive measures of some of these barriers. This is the case mainly when considering civic skills. Although using education as a proxy for civic skills is not considered unusual (e.g. Lowndes et al., 2006), this proxy might not accurately cover the barrier effect that civic skills could fulfil. More particularly, measuring actual skills (such as actual presenting or writing skills) could be useful in assessing the barrier effect of civic skills on various types of individuals. After all, there are enough theoretical reasons to assume that a lack of civic skills does indeed hinder participation (e.g. Wuthnow, 1998). Similarly, measuring time as working hours may perhaps not be the most reliable construct, as work is only one of many potential sources for a reduction in free time.

Where the motives side of the non-participation model is concerned, the results are more supportive. First, they support the notion that being asked is one of the most influential pathways towards becoming a participant. What is less clear, and cannot quite be explained based on the findings of my research, is why the personal development motive does not come across quite as well for respondents to my survey, although it is theoretically assumed to be increasingly important for volunteering. This may well be due to the fact that social desirability bias goes against listing the personal development motive highly as a reason to join a public initiative.

Still, although this branch of the non-participation model is more clearly an important avenue for studying the reasons for not participating, there are a number of shortcomings to this study that could provide useful insights for future research. One first shortcoming, as shortly touched upon in the theoretical part, is that non-participation might be an active choice rather than a lack of motive or a presence of barriers. In this thesis I consider motives as almost explanatory factors that inform a decision to participate, rather than working from the assumption that there might be specific

motives to *not* participate. Such motives might well be present—at least one of the three 'non-participant types' identified by Tonkens and colleagues (2015) would likely have such motives. Incorporating such an option in future research could further increase knowledge on non-participation.

Second, if the influence of the altruism motive is to be better analyzed, it may make sense to do something with the current convolution of wanting to help others on the one hand, and wanting to improve the living quality of one's environment on the other hand. Now, it is less clear to what aspect of the altruism motive respondents did in fact relate when scoring the altruism category highly. That would explain, for instance, the high score of altruism on the G1000 initiative. Joining such an initiative would seemingly not be explained through wanting to help other people when they experience problems, and much more by wanting to improve the quality of living environment—but that aspect then treads on the ground that the problem-solving motive would cover. This might mean that, apart from losing explanatory power, the influence of the altruism motive might very well be over- or under-estimated in this research.

In a general sense looking at the entire study, perhaps the most obvious pathway for future research lies in the fact that I have chosen to use a quantitative method to test non-participation. Given the mixed support for a barriers-and-motives model in the data gathered for this thesis research it makes sense to suggest looking at non-participation through a more qualitative study. This might potentially open up more information about the functioning of barriers, for instance about whether or not there are moderating effects between barriers and the likelihood of becoming a participant. It might also uncover attitudinal factors that I have not factored into this study. Similarly, it could also find specific motives for *not* participating, or perhaps different categories of motives for joining than the ones that could be identified through analyzing current research into participants in public initiatives.

Despite such possibilities for improvement there are some clearly useful findings in this study. One example is the idea that asking people to participate will be particularly effective when focusing on the idea that the public initiative aims to help others. Additionally, the low scores for personal development motives indicate that for non-participants, public initiatives are not considered a good method to work on one's skills or

improve oneself in other respects. This in essence calls for an approach to non-participants that is far more active than the common advice of 'letting go'. Although the concept of barriers does not currently add much to finding solutions to the participatory paradox, it could very well do so in the future. In that sense, the model of non-participation constructed and tested in this thesis may have taken a small step towards 'solving' the participatory paradox, but more needs doing if we want to fully understand the Dutch democracy of action.

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Appendix A: Survey codebook

1.	What is your age? *Wat is uw leeftijd?*
2.	What is your gender? *Wat is uw geslacht?* 0 – male 1 – female
3.	What is the highest level of education you have finished with a degree? *Wat is de hoogste opleiding die u met een diploma heeft afgerond?* 1 – primary education 2 – vmbo / mavo 3 – havo / vwo 4 – mbo 5 – hbo 6 – wo 0 – no finished education 8 – other
4.	Would you consider yourself to be a religious person? *Beschouwt u uzelf als een religieus persoon?* 1 – not at all … 7 – completely
5.	Would you generally think that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be careful enough? *Denkt u, in het algemeen, dat de meeste mensen te vertrouwen zijn, of dat je niet voorzichtig genoeg kan zijn?* 1 – you cannot be careful enough … 7 – most people can be trusted

6. How satisfied are you with the neighborhood you are currently living in?
Hoe tevreden bent u met de buurt waarin u nu woont?

1 – very dissatisfied
…
7 – very satisfied

7. How satisfied are you, generally, with what Dutch government has done in recent times?
Hoe tevreden bent u, in het algemeen, met wat de Nederlandse regering in de afgelopen tijd heeft gedaan?

1 – very dissatisfied
…
7 – very satisfied

7. People can have a lot of problems in their neighborhood. Can you say how often you experience the following problems in your neighborhood?
Mensen kunnen in hun buurt veel verschillende problemen ervaren. Kunt u aangeven hoe vaak u de volgende problemen in uw buurt ervaart?

(a) Noise from traffic / companies
Geluidsoverlast door verkeer / bedrijven
(b) Noise from neighbors
Geluidsoverlast door buren / omwonenden
(c) Vandalism or crime
Vandalisme of misdaad
(d) Loitering
Overlast door (hang)jongeren
(e) Littering
Overlast door zwerfvuil

1 – (Almost) never
…
5 – (Almost) every day

8. How many hours per week do you work, on average?
Hoeveel uur per week werkt u gemiddeld?

9. There are different ways of influencing politicians and political parties. Can you say in which ways you have tried to influence politicians or political parties in the past five years?

Er zijn verschillende manieren om invloed uit te oefenen op politici en op politieke partijen. Kunt u zeggen op welke manieren u in de afgelopen vijf jaar hebt geprobeerd om invloed uit te oefenen?

(a) Through radio, tv, newspaper or other media
Radio, tv, krant of andere media ingeschakeld

(b) Through a political party or political organization
Een politieke partij of politieke organisatie ingeschakeld

(c) Joined a government-organized discussion meeting
Meegedaan aan een door de overheid georganiseerde discussie- of inspraakbijeenkomst

(d) Donated money to a political party
Geld gedoneerd aan een politieke partij

(e) Joined an action group
Meegedaan met een actiegroep

(f) Joined a protest action, march, or demonstration
Meegedaan aan een protestactie, -mars of demonstratie

(g) Voted in an election
Gestemd in een verkiezing

(h) Became / remained a member of a political party
Lid geworden / gebleven van een politieke partij

1 – yes
0 – no
99 – don't know (missing)

10. You will see a number of political institutions. Can you say to what extent you trust these institutions?

U krijgt nu enkele politieke instellingen te zien. Kunt u aangeven hoeveel vertrouwen u heeft in elk van de volgende instellingen?

(a) Dutch government *De Nederlandse regering*
(b) Dutch Parliament *Het Nederlandse Parlement*
(c) National politicians *Landelijke politici*
(d) National political parties *Landelijke politieke partijen*
(e) Your local city council *De Gemeenteraad in uw gemeente*
(f) Local politicians *Gemeentelijke politici*
(g) Local political parties *Gemeentelijke politieke partijen*

1 – no trust at all
…
7 – complete trust

11. You are now presented with six statements. Can you say to what extent these statements relate to you?
U krijgt nu zes stellingen te zien. Kunt u aangeven in hoeverre iedere stelling op u van toepassing is?

(a) I am well capable to play an active role in politics
Ik ben zeer goed in staat om een actieve rol te spelen in de politiek
(b) Members of Parliament care about the opinion of people like me
Kamerleden bekommeren zich om de mening van mensen zoals ik
(c) I have a good idea of the most important political problems
Ik heb een goed beeld van de belangrijkste politieke problemen in NL
(d) Political parties only care about my vote, not my opinion
Politieke partijen zijn alleen geïnteresseerd in mijn stem, niet mijn mening
(e) People like me have no influence on government politics
Mensen zoals ik hebben geen enkele invloed op de regeringspolitiek
(f) Sometimes politics seems so complicated that it is hard for me to understand what is going on
Soms lijkt de politiek zo ingewikkeld, dat het moeilijk voor mij is om te begrijpen wat er speelt

1 – not applicable to me
…
5 – fully applicable to me

Internal efficacy: mean of A, C and F (reversed)
External efficacy: mean of B, D (reversed) and E (reversed)

Part 2: Public initiatives

V1	*G1000-type / citizen summit initiative*
V2	*Neighborhood garden*
V3	*Care initiative*

MA	*Altruistic motive*
MB	*Personal development*
MC	*Specific problem*
MD	*Being asked*

12. **A neighborhood summit will be organized in your neighborhood. The goal of this summit is that around 200 people from your area will meet six times (one evening a month), to talk in groups about problems in your neighborhood.**

The goal of the summit is to decide together what the most important problems are, and to discuss together about how these problems can best be solved. Politicians and civil servants from your municipality will be present at all evenings.

In uw buurt wordt een burgertop georganiseerd. Het idee van deze burgertop is dat ongeveer 200 mensen uit uw buurt zes keer (één avond per maand) zullen samenkomen, en in groepjes gaan praten over de problemen die in uw buurt spelen.

Het doel van de burgertop is om in overleg te bepalen wat de belangrijkste problemen zijn, maar ook om samen te discussiëren over hoe deze problemen het beste kunnen worden opgelost. Ook politici en ambtenaren uit uw gemeente zullen bij deze avonden aanwezig zijn.

How likely is it for you to join an initiative like this 'citizen summit'?

Hoe waarschijnlijk is het dat u zou deelnemen aan deze burgertop?

1 – definitely not

…

7 – definitely yes

13. **Behind your house there is an empty plot of land. A number of your neighbors want to collect money from the municipality and companies to buy this plot and turn it into a neighborhood garden. This garden will be a relaxing area for nearby residents and a playground for kids, and it will be constructed by local people. Maintenance (for instance cutting trees and plants) will be done by local people as well.**

To make sure this garden will be constructed, local people are required that can help (for instance) get enough funding, and request the proper permits. Also, people are needed to help constructing and maintaining the garden.

Achter uw woning is een stuk grond dat al langere tijd leegstaat. Een aantal buurtbewoners willen geld inzamelen bij de gemeente en bij bedrijven om dit stuk grond te kopen, en er een buurttuin van te maken. Deze buurttuin is bedoeld als ontspanningsplek voor omwonenden en een speelterrein voor kinderen, en zal worden aangelegd door mensen uit de buurt. Ook het onderhoud (bijvoorbeeld het snoeien van bomen en planten) zal worden gedaan door buurtbewoners zelf.

Om te zorgen dat deze buurttuin uiteindelijk echt kan worden aangelegd, zijn er buurtbewoners nodig die kunnen helpen met (bijvoorbeeld) het werven van sponsoren, en het aanvragen van vergunningen. Ook zijn er buurtbewoners nodig die willen helpen bij het aanleggen en het onderhouden van de buurttuin.

How likely is it for you to join an initiative like this neighborhood garden?

Hoe waarschijnlijk is het dat u zou deelnemen aan deze buurttuin?

14.		**In the street you live in, there are two elderly people you know well. They are increasingly dependent on other people's help, but due to budget cuts they no longer get such aid. These elderly people need help with basic household tasks (such as vacuuming, shopping, and cooking) two to three times per week, because their own family cannot help all week.** Another resident in your street suggests starting a care initiative consisting of about 4 other street residents. They can provide such care in turns. ***In de straat waar u woont, wonen ook twee bejaarde mensen die u goed kent. Zij worden steeds afhankelijker van hulp van anderen, maar door bezuinigingen krijgen zij geen thuiszorg meer. Deze bejaarden hebben allebei twee tot drie keer per week hulp nodig met huishoudelijke taken (zoals stofzuigen, boodschappen doen, en eten koken), omdat hun eigen familie niet op alle dagen kan helpen.*** *Een andere bewoner van uw straat stelt voor om een hulpgroep op te richten die bestaat uit ongeveer 4 straatbewoners. Die kunnen dan afwisselend deze hulp verzorgen.* How likely is it for you to join an initiative like this care project? *Hoe waarschijnlijk is het dat u zou deelnemen aan deze hulpgroep?*
15.	V1MC	Some people join the neighborhood summit because they want to solve a specific problem, such as loitering. Would this be a reason for you to join the neighborhood summit? *Sommige mensen doen mee aan de burgertop omdat ze een specifiek probleem in hun buurt ervaren, zoals overlast door hangjongeren, en dat probleem willen oplossen. Zou dit voor u een goede reden zijn om mee te doen aan de burgertop?* 1 – definitely not … 7 – definitely yes
16.	V2MD	Some people join the neighborhood garden initiative because they are asked by friends, acquaintances or neighbors to join. Would this be a reason for you to join the neighborhood garden project? *Sommige mensen doen mee aan de buurttuin omdat ze door vrienden, kennissen of buren gevraagd worden om mee te doen. Zou dit voor u een goede reden zijn om mee te doen aan de buurttuin?*

17.	V3MB	Some people join the care initiative because they want to develop themselves personally, for instance through gaining contact with neighbors or because they can enrich their resumes. Would this be a reason for you to join the neighborhood summit? *Sommige mensen doen mee aan de hulpgroep omdat ze zichzelf persoonlijk willen ontwikkelen, bijvoorbeeld doordat ze hierdoor meer contact krijgen met buurtbewoners of omdat ze hun CV kunnen aanvullen door mee te doen. Zou dit voor u een goede reden zijn om mee te doen aan de zorg-groep?*
18.	V2MA	Some people join the neighborhood garden initiative because they want to help other people with problems they experience, and want to contribute to the neighborhood's quality of life. Would this be a reason for you to join the neighborhood garden initiative? *Sommige mensen doen mee aan de buurttuin omdat ze graag andere mensen willen helpen met problemen die zij ervaren, en ze graag willen bijdragen aan de leefbaarheid van de buurt. Zou dit voor u een goede reden zijn om mee te doen aan de buurttuin?*
19.	V1MB	Neighborhood summit / personal development
20.	V3MCproblem	Some people join the care initiative because they are personally affected by the idea that the two elderly people need help, and they want to solve that problem. To what extent would you feel personally affected when such a problem (two elderly people needing basic care) would present itself in your street? *Sommige mensen doen mee aan de hulpgroep omdat ze het zich persoonlijk aantrekken dat de twee bejaarde mensen hulp nodig hebben, en dit probleem graag willen oplossen.* *In hoeverre zou u het zich persoonlijk aantrekken wanneer er zich in uw straat een dergelijke situatie (twee oudere mensen die basishulp nodig hebben) zou voordoen?*
	V3MC	Would this be a reason for you to join the care initiative? *Zou dit voor u een goede reden zijn om mee te doen aan de zorg-groep?*
21.	V1MD	Neighborhood summit / being asked
22.	V3MA	Care initiative / altruism
23.	V2MB	Neighborhood garden / personal development
24.	V3MD	Care initiative / being asked

25.	V2MCproblem	Some people join the neighborhood garden initiative because they are personally affected by the empty plot behind their house, and/or the lack of playing areas for kids and green areas in the neighborhood. To what extent would you feel personally affected when such a problem (the empty plot of land behind your house) would present itself in your street? *Sommige mensen doen mee aan de buurttuin omdat ze het zich persoonlijk aantrekken dat er een leegstaand stuk grond achter hun huis is, en/of dat er te weinig groenvoorzieningen en speelplekken voor kinderen in hun straat zijn..* *In hoeverre zou u het zich persoonlijk aantrekken wanneer er zich in uw straat een dergelijke situatie (een leegstaand stuk grond achter uw huis) zou voordoen?*
	V2MC	Would this be a reason for you to join the neighborhood garden initiative? *Zou dit voor u een goede reden zijn om mee te doen aan de buurttuin?*
26.	V1MA	Neighborhood summit / altruism

Appendix B: Tables and figures

Table 10: LISS Panel datasets used

Dataset	Wave	Collection Period[a]	Response[b]	N
Social Integration and Leisure	7	2014/02/03 2014/03/25	88.3%	6 643
Religion and Ethnicity	7	2014/01/06 2014/02/25	89.4%	6 190
Work and Schooling	7	2014/04/07 2014/05/27	82.6%	6 570
Personality	7	2014/11/03 2014/12/31	84.8%	6 561
Politics and Values	7	2013/12/02 2014/01/28	88.7%	5 690
Economy	7	2014/10/06 2014/11/25	81.3%	4 122

[a]: All datasets used feature data collected in two instances: one initial survey, and one re-sent to non-respondents on the first measure. Collection period here relates to the total timespan between the start of the first, and the end of the second data collection period. [b]: Total response percentage after re-sending to non-respondents.

Table 11: Factor analysis results for political efficacy

	Component	
	1	**2**
Parliamentarians do not care about the opinion of people like me	.845	
Political parties are only interested in my vote, not my opinion	.856	
People like me have no influence on government policy	.743	*-.218*
I am well capable of playing an active role in politics		.661
I have a clear picture of the most important issues in our country		.799
(rev) Politics seems so complicated that people like me can hardly understand what is going on		.665
Scale Alpha	.762	.527

Suppressed values < .200. Rotated Component Matrix after Varimax rotation. Non-italicized scores indicate to which component a variable is taken to belong.

Table 12: Factor analysis results for political trust

	Component	
	1	**2**
Dutch government	.905	*.218*
Dutch Parliament	.850	*.411*
National politicians	.860	*.396*
National political parties	.854	*.422*
Local city council	*.377*	.856
Local politicians	*.343*	.916
Local political parties	*.323*	.914
Scale Alpha	**.956**	**.959**

Suppressed values < .200. Rotated Component Matrix after Varimax rotation. Non-italicized scores indicate to which component a variable is taken to belong.

Table 13: Factor analysis results for political efficacy

	Component	
	1	**2**
I am well capable of playing an active role in politics	.777	
I have a good idea of the most important political problems	.867	
Sometimes politics seems so complicated that it is hard for me to understand properly	.444	
Members of Parliament care about the opinion of people like me	*.622*	.436
Political parties care about my opinion as well as about my vote		.894
People like me have a lot of influence on government politics		.885
Scale Alpha	**.591**	**.712**

Suppressed values < .200. Rotated Component Matrix after Varimax rotation. Non-italicized scores indicate to which component a variable is taken to belong.

Figure 6: Distribution of likelihood of participation, citizen summit



Figure 7: Distribution of likelihood of participation, neighborhood garden initiative



Figure 8: Distribution of likelihood of participation, care initiative