Engineering Change

A case study research on how a formal change program was translated into practice by managers and non-managers through collective and individual processes of sensemaking

Master Thesis Organization, Change and Management

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Preface

Before you lies my master thesis, the final part of the master in Organization, Change and Management at Utrecht University. Seven months ago I took the first steps in tackling this thesis project. I got the opportunity to conduct research at the organization I work for, still called Wincor Nixdorf at the time. The fit between my studies' subjects and the execution of a change program at the organization could not have made for a better research context.

The shape this thesis is in now would have been difficult to reach without the assistance, support and patience of many individuals. First, I would like to thank my supervisor Michel van Slobbe for his time, support and flexibility throughout the process. His questions and constructive feedback helped me finalize this thesis and reach a level of quality I am proud of. Furthermore, I would like to extend my gratitude towards Wincor Nixdorf - my colleagues - for being open to my questions and observations, and taking the time to share their experiences. A special thanks is in order to Florian Hermes, who helped me get access to information, contributed to my understanding of the organization and offered valuable feedback. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support. Especially those of you that joined me in the library: thank you for sharing my excitement after each of my many breakthroughs.

The research process itself, looking into theories of translation work and sensemaking as well as finding out more about the case organization, has been a valuable learning experience. Hopefully, it will offer new insights to you, the reader, as well – or at least prove to be an interesting read.

Abstract

The way managers should go about implementing organizational change is well documented, with plenty of opposing theoretical perspectives claiming the road to success. In practice, however, organizational change still is a difficult exercise. Emergent change theorists claim that between sixty and seventy per cent of planned change programs fail (Beer, 2000; Burnes, 2004). Does that mean organizations should stop planning change altogether? This research contributes to the field of organizational change by documenting the translation of a formal change program into practice within the business unit headquarter of an international information technology organization. In the context of increasingly complex environments with technological development pushing both public and private organizations to reinvent their operations to survive, insights in factors slowing down and stimulating organizational change are relevant to both researchers and practitioners. Two perspectives on organizational change form the basis for the theoretical framework: the planned and emergent school. The planned school argues change needs to be approached through planned programs to realize a fit between changing environments and the relative stable state from the organization (Tushmanelli & Roman, 1994; Lewin, 1951). Emergent change theorists are critical of planned change efforts. Since change is continuous, planned change programs would loose their relevance too quickly for them to have a real (positive) impact. The combined approach argues change can best be planned in some cases, like a quick restructuring process, whereas raising the issue and need for restructuring among the people can best be approached bottom-up and thus from the perspective of the emergent school (Burnes, 2004). The research question is: "*How is change program 'Delta' translated into practice by managers and non-managers and how does this relate to organizational change in everyday practice in Wincor Nixdorf's Software Headquarter"*. The social construction of change into practice is the focus of this study, leading to a qualitative, interpretative approach. Triangulation of document analysis, interviews, and direct and participant observations supported understanding of all sources (Richards, 2005). Interviews were the main source of data, as the experiences of the headquarter members is best relayed through them. In total, twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted in sixty to ninety minute sessions.

I found that the either/or take on adopting an emergent or planned approach depending on the situation is still missing out on advantages of both planned and emergent change. Organizations in complex and rapidly changing environments like the high-tech industry deal with multiple levels of change e.g. on an industry; global; regional; country; institutional; and organizational level. The organization as a whole, it's different sub-groups and individuals each make sense of the pressures for change which translates into their actions (Weick, 2000; de Sonnaville, 2006). For some structure in organizational chaos, planned change programs are a way to exercise normative control as their translation of corporate direction enables shared understanding. Change is continuous in everyday practice, however. A formal program enables actors to focus on change, although the program in itself is also subject to continuous change flows as it is enacted over a longer period of time. In summary, I found that if we do not consider a formal change program's objectives as a measure of its success or failure, it still can be a meaningful vehicle for organizational change since a program: (1) forces organization members to actively rethink organizational reality; (2) offers structure and direction to processes of sensemaking and thus actions of autonomous professionals; and (3) enables connections between divisions in multi-layered organizations in the process.

List of figures

Abbreviations

ATM	Automated Teller Machine
BU	Business Unit
FY	Fiscal Year
GDC	Global Delivery Center
HQ	Headquarter
HW	Hardware
IT	Information Technology
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LE	Legal Entity
POS	Point of Sale
PS	Professional Services
R&D	Research & Development
R#	Respondent (*reference number*)
SER	Services
SW	Software
SYS	Systems
VTI	Variable Taxable Income
WN	Wincor Nixdorf
YoY	Year on Year

1. Introduction

> *"Which ideas brought about by fashion are institutionalized, and which are not?* […] *The answer to the question does not lie, in other words, in inherent properties of ideas, but in the success of their presentation. The same question can actually be put earlier on: which ideas become fashionable and which remain forever local? We think that, on their way to become institutionalized practices, ideas are turned around and about, in this process acquiring object-like attributes, becoming quasi-objects, more like crawling ants than free-floating spirits. Organizational actors, like a collective anteater, catch many, spit out most, and savor some, presumably on the grounds of relevance to some organizational problem. But the match does not lie in the attributes of an idea or in the characteristics of the problem. It can hardly be claimed that the inventor of the camera did it to solve the problem of taking pictures. The perceived attributes of an idea, the perceived characteristics of a problem and the match between them are all created, negotiated or imposed during the collective translation process. All three are the results, not the antecedents of this process. With some exaggeration, one can claim that most ideas can be proven to fit most problems, assuming good will, creativity and a tendency to consensus. It is therefore the process of translation that should become our concern, not the properties of ideas."*
>
> – Czarniawska & Sevón, 1995; 25

1.1 Setting the stage for change translation

Although the citation by Czarniawska and Sevón (1995) might be quite intense to start off with, it immediately helps to understand the focus of my thesis. Change programs are a collection of collectively defined ideas, some of which turn out as planned into practice while others do not. A group of people in the organization has put those formally defined plans together, after which the rest of the organization is expected to execute them and thus translate the objectives into practice. As Czarniawska and Sevón (1995) suggests, this is no easy task. Ideas are interpreted and defined differently, guiding different behaviour of organizational actors (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005; de Sonnaville, 2006). Especially in multinational organizations with actors operating in different contexts, change translations differ and it can hardly be predicted what impact change efforts will actually have. Still, organizations keep on planning change and set out with ambitious goals of large-scale transformations. Organizations in complex and rapidly changing environments like the high-tech industry deal with multiple levels of change e.g. on an industry; global; regional; country; institutional; organizational and managerial level. Is there a way to structure organizational chaos and navigate increasingly complex environments through a formal change program? How do organizations currently handle change? This is exactly what my thesis takes a closer look at: the process of translating change into practice.

The title of this thesis refers to Kunda's (2006) *Engineering Culture*. His book details control and commitment in a high-tech corporation, and one of his key findings is that culture cannot be engineered as organization members never are subject to total corporate control. Organization members will collectively shape the organizational culture. While normative control does have an influence on actions, it does not overtake members' personal selves and replaces it with corporate ones. This research builds on Kunda's (2006) findings of engineering culture by looking at the extent to which change is engineered in organizational settings. In the theoretical framework (chapter 3), a more detailed definition of Kunda's (2006) key findings and core concepts is given.

Organizational change literature is filled with opposing perspectives and paths detailing the best way - if authors argue there is a way at all - to manage change. An example of well-known opposing views on organizational change is the planned versus the emergent, or process, school. In short, authors of the planned school argue there are periods of relative stability in which no major changes are impacting the organization, followed by revolutionary periods of fundamental change episodes (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Weick & Quinn, 1999; Grieves, 2010). These fundamental changes are often formal change programs initiated by upper management, implemented to catch up with the organization's dynamic environment. Different step-by-step approaches for managing change are a result of this perspective on change (e.g. Lewin, 1951; Kotter, 1995). The emergent school views change as constant, mainly due to the need of organizations to constantly adapt to its unpredictable, dynamic environment. According to this view, organizational change happens incrementally and emergent; takes a longer time, and; occurs in smaller steps (Weick & Quinn, 1999). For organizational change is an emergent process, it cannot be managed by planned change efforts. Organization members have to collectively and individually make sense of the new organizational reality. Some meanings become institutionalized and enacted over time through interaction and learning, creating a continuous flow of organizational change (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1995; Burnes, 2004). Obviously, these and all other perspectives make sense in some way or another. Whether defined as a formal program or as incremental continuous changes, research detailing real-life change efforts within organizations is relatively scarce compared to organizational change theories. How do theoretical perspectives relate to real life in organizations? As industries change, how do organizational actors influence firm-specific reasons for success and failure of organizational change? In the next paragraph, I describe the research's broader context from which perspective these questions are viewed, which brings me to the research question at the end of the paragraph.

1.2 Global innovation and change translation

> *"Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!"*
>
> – Carroll, 1886; 33

The citation from Lewis Carroll's (1886) book '*Alice through the looking glass'* paints a picture surprisingly similar to that of the research context. If organizations conduct business according to existing routines, they will not get ahead. Rather, they will fall behind under global pressures of development and innovation (Friedman, 2005). Innovation affects every industry. Rapid technological development is pushing organizations in both the public and private sector to change and reinvent their business models. Healthcare and government organizations need to modernize their legacy IT systems to fit current privacy and business standards (Mergel, 2016). New technologies are disrupting existing business conditions, forcing organizations to change the way they operate in order to survive in the new global economy (Manyika, Chui, Bughin, Dobbs, Bisson & Marrs, 2013; Friedman, 2005). In these increasingly complex environments, insights into the internal process of organizational change become especially significant for both researchers and practitioners. This research contributes to the field of organizational change by documenting the experiences of organizational actors with the translation of planned change into practice. It adds to the more recent trend in academic literature that argues for combining theoretical change perspectives.

Furthermore, it offers insights to organizations as to what the challenges and opportunities are of translating planned change into practice, and how it can affect organization members' commitment, initiative, and, work. Finally, this research offers a fresh perspective to the case organization specifically on how different aspects of organizational change have impacted managers and non-managers, stimulating and/or slowing down change translation into practice as a result.

I conducted qualitative, interpretative research within a business unit headquarter of an international IT company: Wincor Nixdorf[1]. Just a few months before I started my thesis project, I started working at this company. Coincidentally, a formal change program started in April 2015, almost a year prior to my research. Colleagues joked about changes being constant in the office, as well as the inflexibility of the company at other times. From what I heard about 'Delta' early on (a detailed case introduction follows in 1.3), the program was mainly managed on objective financial targets. I chose a more subjective approach in this research: a focus on the experiences of people and the collective process of making sense of organizational changes. This research is set up to be a scan of the organizational unit, offering a detailed picture of the perceptions and experiences of a formal change program by its members. The goal to gain insights into planned change in practice led to the formulation of the following research question:

> *How is change program 'Delta' translated into practice by managers and non-managers and how does this relate to organizational change in everyday practice in Wincor Nixdorf's Software Headquarter?*

In the rest of this chapter, I offer an introduction into the case this research builds on. First, the company's background is detailed in 1.3. The paragraph is split into two parts: I describe the foundation for most of the changes currently going on in the headquarter in "*Transitioning to a Software/Services Organization"* (1.3.1). An explanation on the 'Delta' program set-up follows in paragraph 1.3.2: "*Change program 'Delta'*".

1.3 The Case: Wincor Nixdorf and Delta in Utrecht

Wincor Nixdorf was founded in Paderborn, Germany, by Heinz Nixdorf in 1952 and was named *Nixdorf Computer*. Wincor Nixdorf's main objective is to optimize IT processes for retail and banking customers. For retail customers you can think of solutions for points-of-sales (POS), and solutions for automated teller machines (ATMs) for banking customers. The company was founded as a hardware company, and in the early days a basic type of software was included to make the hardware perform. The company grew in a period of technological developments to become one of the four biggest computer organizations in Europe. This case study looks into the impact of this transition on people's work from the perspective of managers and non-managers that work in the business unit Software headquarter in Utrecht. These people are at the core of the transition to software. Their experiences reflect the actions and the implementation of management interventions. In the following introduction of the case I already bring several respondents in to share some of the core challenges and views on the background of the company. Most of them have been with the company for a long time, and are thus a great help in explaining the company's background properly.

[1] Still going by Wincor Nixdorf at the time my research was conducted, as of August operating under the name 'Diebold Nixdorf'. To avoid confusion, the name Wincor Nixdorf is used throughout the report.

Wincor Nixdorf operates globally with subsidiaries in forty-three countries and is organized in three business units: Software (BU SW), Services (BU SER) and Systems (BU SYS). The world is divided into areas, with subsidiaries – or legal entities (LE) - having a high degree of autonomy in their area. Over the years, software and services grew in importance. Software and services are the fields in which the company can reach higher profits, whereas the hardware business is on its decline. This is partially caused by mobile applications that enable retail and branch staff to interact in other ways with the customer, partially because other companies are able to make hardware at a lower cost than Wincor Nixdorf can. The environment Wincor Nixdorf operates in has changed and has become increasingly complex in terms of innovation and industry change. Respondent seventeen[2] explains why the company's transition from hardware to software/services is necessary:

> *"Because the market is expecting it, because the market is moving in that direction. Also due to hardware, that is ehm- if you look at points-of-sale, those are more and more open machines. They become mobile, mobile machines. That is becoming more generic stuff than specifically produced points-of-sales, by specific eh- retail point-of-sale companies. Like a Wincor, but also like an NCR or an IBM at that time. Where, when points-of-sale got developed especially for retail situations."* – R17

In both the retail and banking sector the dynamic environment is pushing companies to adjust. Respondents told me the company's previous hardware focus would not be sustainable in the long run. Part of this strategic direction towards software/services resulted in the set-up of a Software headquarter in Utrecht. The Utrecht office is the global headquarter of the business unit Software and was relatively recently set up: the first forty people started in the Utrecht office in October 2013. The office itself is a manifestation of the strategic direction towards a more software-oriented company. Currently, around sixty employees work in different departments. The departments are: Professional Services (PS), Product Banking, Product Retail, Finance and HR. These departments consist of people working for either the banking segment or the retail segment, but also of people working for both or not specifically concerned with either one. The company's overall headquarter is located in Paderborn. Taking the software part out of Paderborn and moving it to a new location meant moving an important part of the business away from the company's roots.

With this research, I look into the specific manifestations of change in the software headquarter in Utrecht. Looking into the factors that influenced the actual manifestations of change, and the impact of the most recent change program 'Delta' specifically, is looking into the translation of a formal plan into practice. The next two paragraphs offer more background on the formal plan and strategic direction it is a part of. This strategic focus (1.3.1) forms the basis for most of the changes discussed here, and first needs to be discussed shortly to understand the interventions later on. In paragraph 1.3.2, the Delta program is introduced shortly.

[2] Respondents are identified by number only to maintain their anonymity throughout this thesis. In chapter 3 'Methodology', I further clarify the handling and presentation of (interview) data.

1.3.1 Transitioning to a Software/Services organization

"Nixdorf was always a hardware company, hardware hardware hardware. And software was always, had a little bit a niche and it was always like that." – R15



Sales (m€)	03/04	04/05	05/06	06/07	07/08	08/09	09/10	10/11	11/12	12/13	13/14	14/15	YoY*	9M 14/15	9M 15/16	YoY
Hardware	950	1,032	1,157	1,254	1,346	1,224	1,140	1,159	1,100	1,185	1,127	1,015	-10%	726	851	+17%
Software/Services	626	712	791	891	973	1,026	1,099	1,169	1,243	1,280	1,342	1,412	+5%	1,042	1,087	+4%
Total	1,576	1,744	1,948	2,145	2,319	2,250	2,239	2,328	2,343	2,465	2,469	2,427	-2%	1,768	1,938	+10%

Figure 1. Shift from hardware to software (Wincor Nixdorf, 2016)

In the early days, software was included with hardware products to make them run, but was not considered to be that important for the business. Organization members see that a transition toward a software/services organization is required to prepare for the future and restructure to operate in the dynamic international environment. As you can see in figure one, the shift to a software and services provider started a decade ago. Although employees and management recognize the importance of software, respondents referred to challenges between the hardware heritage of the company and the new software focus it is currently moving to. All respondents agree that this change was necessary and the Utrecht office has helped to bring more focus to software, if only because it is now a separate location from the Paderborn headquarter. Respondent twenty describes the general feeling among respondents:

"I think it was- first of all I think it was a good change and I think it was necessary to make eh, to make a statement, because we have been trying to make software more important give it more focus. It is just too easy for people to not change, to not have a special focus. It's just too easy for people to continue. So I think eh- on first view a very dramatic step and for some people obviously also a dramatic step if they have to move. Will kind of start from the scratch and make everybody think: "Okay, we are going to do something different now". And I think it was necessary to re-think the entire way we do software now. And I think the move helped." – R20

Although this change was a disruptive move, it was necessary to enable the transition the company faces. The hardware mind-set of the company was, and according to some currently still is, being maintained by 'Variable Taxable Income' (VTI). This bonus is based on a target, and is thus an incentive for people to prioritize those parts of their jobs reflected in them. Respondent two explains how this worked:

> R2: *"Because, why would people sell software? If you, if you can choose between selling five hundred ATMs and you are getting measured on that and you give away a million worth of software?"*
>
> I: *"So the system was set up in a way that hardware was considered to be more important?"*
>
> R2: *"The system was set up in a way that hardware was considered to be more important. And, there was no focus on software. Because who takes here- who is there for software? Who is doing that? What they did, they took software into account in the targets for account managers, but that was one-tenth of their target. You know. Then it still doesn't matter and then they still wouldn't sell it.* […] *What they did then was sort of a transition period between One Wincor and Delta. What they did then, you know what they did? Well okay, looking back... We are-* [pauzes] *starting Utrecht. Utrecht will be our Software factory. All the people, they are all software people: great."* – R2

After the Utrecht office opened, the objective was to reach certain financial targets and to grow the software business further. In the middle of fiscal year 14/15, successes throughout the company were not as great as expected after several previous formal change programs (e.g. One Wincor). A restructuring program, Delta, was set up to speed up the transformation to a Software/Services organization. This meant cutting costs and restructuring the organization to divide the work of those people that were asked to leave.

1.3.2 Change program 'Delta'

A key episode in the company's transition to a software/services organization is planned change program 'Delta'. It is a seven-step program, as detailed in the screenshot of a slide out of the Delta communication package in figure 2. The main ambitions of the program are: 1) significantly accelerate growth and improve margins of software and professional services; 2) grow high-end services and improve margins in services; 3) convert hardware product, development and supply chain strategies; 4) carve-out of Cashless Payment unit; 5) Execute a price excellence program; 6) Streamline G&A costs, and; 7) Align organization set-up.

Delta was managed on multiple levels. The overall set up was defined in consultation with McKinsey. Consultants from this organization talked to different stakeholders throughout the company to identify opportunities for cost-saving and restructuring to prepare for future and current challenges. The outcome was the seven-point plan as described above. A program structure was set up. The seven-point plan was divided over business areas, and then further split up into different workstreams. Each stream is managed by 'owners', the person responsible for the overall workstream. The program architecture can be found in appendix b. Within the headquarter, a group of people worked on Delta. This group is the part of the program team that makes the connection between the Paderborn program management and the SW people in the local country organizations around the world. The different workstreams in the beginning were: PS Restructuring - Nearshoring, R&D Software Restructuring, Implementation future SW setup, M&A and Software reorganization sales. The SW Delta

team communicates with the areas, and reports back to program management and board in Paderborn.



Figure 2. Delta's seven-point plan (Wincor Nixdorf, 2015)

Now - over a year after Delta started - Delta's impact on the financial situation of the company is visible. The nine-month interim report 2015/2016 headlines a summary of key results with: *"Net sales up significantly in first three quarters – Restructuring program takes effect faster than originally predicted and has a positive impact on EBITA"*. Operating profit, EBITA, after one time effects is up from 40 million to 146 million. Sales are up in the regions, with hardware net sales (+17%) showing more growth than software net sales (+4%). The program clearly is about financial growth, with a focus on improving margins and cutting costs. The software/services transformation is still on its way. The underlying reasons and which forces stimulated and slowed down the transition cannot be traced back to financial results of the program only. Organization members of the Software headquarter have helped me to understand successes and challenges of change during Delta from their perspective. People in the headquarter are the connection toward the different areas. They have an influence on the way change is experienced, even those who are not part of the Delta team. As processes change, organization members of the headquarter carry those out together with area professionals. That makes it especially relevant to look at the experience of change by organization members at the headquarter level. What parts of the process have contributed to organization members' ability to act on changes, and which factors of change implementation limited them in their day-to-day work?

The thesis now continues with a literature review in chapter two, detailing the theoretical foundations it builds on. In chapter three, I describe my ontological and epistemological stance, and the methods used to collect and analyse data. In chapter four I get into the key findings of this research, divided in 4.1 "*Communicating change*", 4.2 "*Professionals, hierarchy and change*", and 4.3 "*Changing roles and responsibilities*". These findings are

written down from the respondents' perspective. In chapter five, the findings of chapter one are analysed by linking them to the theoretical framework. This leads up to the conclusion of the thesis: chapter six. In chapter seven, finally, I discuss the side effects of planned change and implied considerations for future research and practice.

2. Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework forms the basis for interpreting the findings in the analysis later on. First, I describe the current status of literature regarding change management in paragraph 2.1. Change is viewed as a planned outcome, or as an emergent process. Each has a corresponding approach to change, resulting from how the social world and thus organizational change is viewed. Recent literature has shifted attention to combining both schools, which will be discussed in 2.1.2. In 2.2 theories regarding sustainable change implementation are reviewed. In short, I describe how authors view the translation of change objectives into practice on a managerial level and how translation and sensemaking processes in the rest of the organization follow. Finally, the view of the professional executing change in specifically bureaucratic organizations is addressed in paragraph 2.3. The key concepts that collectively shape this study's foundation for interpreting translation of change into practice are summarized in paragraph 2.4.

2.1 Change management

Two perspectives on managing organizational change are widespread in academic literature: the planned school and the emergent school. Planned change and emergent change management have long been viewed as two distinct perspectives on organizational change. Planned change literature has been dominant in change literature and management practice in the final half of the last century. In 2.1.1, I discuss the planned school in more detail. The emergent school originated from critiques on the planned school and its assumption that change can be managed from one stable state to the other (Burnes, 2004). I further review the foundations for the emergent school in 2.1.2. In the last decade, studies found combining both approaches on managing change helps organizations deal with the complexity of environments, while at the same time offering some control mechanisms for managers in defining the organizations' direction (2.1.3).

2.1.1 Change as a planned outcome

Lewin's (1951) model of planned change can be seen as the planning school's basis. Through a series of planned steps, in which the current situation first should be "unfreezed", after which the change can be made, and then the situation has to be stabilized and thus "refreezed" in its new state. The act of unfreezing is aimed at discarding old behaviour, before change can be installed and new behaviour is accepted. Lewin's (1951) model is an example of a linear approach to change, with a clear beginning and end. Planned change can be used as a top-down change strategy, if the strategic manager or team leader is the designer, planner and implementer. In that case, planned change is considered to be rather mechanic and inflexible (Grieves, 2010). Another approach to planned change is a normative re-educative model to change (Grieves, 2010). Approaches to change under this model are characterized by their high degree of reflexivity as well as skill and knowledge development of participants, i.e. collective learning (Grieves, 2010; Lewin, 1951). Through identification of forces, or related tensions, within the context of change Lewin (1951) argued the current quasi-stationary equilibrium state could be understood and only then prepared for change. Planned change is often episodic, to catch up with perceived environmental demands and to adapt the organization's structure (Weick & Quinn, 1999). Short-run adaptation is at the core of episodic change, as opposed to long-run adaptability. Romanelli and Tushman's (1994) punctuated equilibrium model paints the picture of organizations as sets of interdependencies which become more or less stable and routinized during a period of relative equilibrium. Just

like Lewin (1951), Romanelli and Tushman (1994) recognize that the equilibrium is only relatively stable i.e. quasi-stationary as compared to the revolutionary periods. In figure three, this revolutionary stage would be period 'A'. Due to increasingly stable patters of connections and processes in combination with an ever-changing environment, the organization needs to change to catch up. Adaptation and effectiveness go down as stability increases, according to Romanelli and Tushman's (1994) study. Thus, the organization enters in a revolutionary period of change, period 'B' in figure three below, which becomes the basis for new equilibrium period 'A'.



Figure 3. The Punctuated Equilibrium Model (Hart & Gregor, 2005)

2.1.2 Change as an emergent process

Emergent change theorists claim that over sixty per cent of planned change efforts fail in reaching their planned objectives according to Burnes (2004), with Beer (2000) even claiming this number is at seventy per cent. Failed change is defined as programs failing to produce bottom-line results, or as programs simply failing to reach objectives it set out to reach (Hall, Rosenthal & Wade, 1994; Boonstra, 2004). Critiques on the planned approach are the source of the emergent approach in managing change. Emergent change theorists argue that change does not occur simply from one stable state to another, especially in the increasingly complex and dynamic business environment of today's organizations. Furthermore, planned change assumes isolated change steps that everyone in the organization has to agree to before it can be executed. Opinions and interpretations of individuals and groups within organizations differ, however, making it essentially impossible for a change to come out as planned (Schein, 1996; Burnes, 2004; Weick, 2005). The emergent change school argues that due to the increasingly complex business environment, planned change interventions will only generate short-term results and thus only add to the level of instability instead of reducing it.

According to Weick, emergent change *"consists of ongoing accomodations, adaptations, and alterations that produce fundamental change without a priori intentions to do so. Emergent change occurs when people reaccomplish routines and when they deal with contingencies, breakdowns and opportunities in everyday work. Much of this change goes unnoticed, because small alterations are lumped together as noise in otherwise uneventful inertia and because small changes are neither heroic nor plausible ways to make strategy"* (2000; 237). Organizations thus change to adapt and anticipate environmental change, encouraging its key members (stockholders, customers, employees) to produce change in behaviour and through processes (Bamford & Forrester, 2003). Continuous adaptation

becomes even more relevant considering no actor is unboundedly rational (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). Through learning and experiencing impacts of change interventions, actors will adjust their strategies and apply newly acquired knowledge to following situations. Weick (2000) makes the first step in arguing for combining both an emergent and planned approach to organizational change. For planned change to have an effect at all, he argues, managers need to understand that routines are flexible and structures are made in everyday practice by people's interactions. More authors have argued for combining both views as they both have components that can be recognized in practice.

2.1.3 Combining planned and emergent perspectives

> *"A dilemma is often seen as an either/or situation in which one alternative must be preferred over other attractive alternatives (…) Dualities, on the other hand, "reflect opposing forces that must be balanced, properties that seem contradictory or paradoxical but which in fact are complementary" (Evans and Doz 1992, p. 85)".*
>
> - Pettigrew, 2000; 245

The punctuated equilibrium model has a focus on the revolutionary periods of change, however its creators do recognize the continuity of change in the relatively stable periods (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). The level of analysis with the model is on the revolutionary periods as those are argued to be the most relevant for organizational change management to create rare bursts of organizational change and reinvention. Other authors zoom in and adopt a more micro-level of analysis as compared to Romanelli and Tushman (1994), in that they focus on those relatively smaller fluctuations and the importance of continuous change for the organization's ability to adapt. Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) argue that for companies in high-velocity industries with rapidly changing competitive landscapes, being able to change continuously is central to company survival. For these companies, rare and revolutionary periods of change would become irrelevant as soon as the change period ends since their complex environment does not stabilize as the organization does. They argue companies' competitive advantage is related to a time-paced, rhythmic and proactive adoption of organizational change. Whereas an event-pacing approach to manage organizations is based on managers reacting to internal and external developments, time-pacing is creating new products and services or changing approaches through regularly scheduled deadlines (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998). It is thus a synchronized, more proactive approach and basically schedules regular change. Not what will be changed exactly is planned, but the rhythm and pace is. Eisenhardt and Brown (1998) argue organizational change is about momentum, and time-pacing enables companies to keep that momentum going. In their words: "*By setting a regular pace for change, managers avoid becoming locked into old patterns and habits"* (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998; 67). Eisenhardt and Brown (1997; 1998) link their approach to complexity theory, as they argue that complex environments make it impossible for organization to measure or predict exactly what will happen next. Planning for the future becomes extremely difficult, although some planning is relevant for much-needed structure in organizational chaos (Boulton, Allen & Bowman, 2015). Burnes (2004) argues that both the planning and the emergent school have their limitations, which is why organizations should choose their approach in managing change depending on the change at hand. In his study, Burnes (2004) found that for a restructuring effort managers first attempted to change behaviour and attitudes of managers and staff through emergent and experimental changes. After organization members were ready and on the same page, the director of the company

decided to implement the structural change through a quick and coordinated approach. Burnes (2004) and Pettigrew (2000) both argue for academics and change managers to use not one, but both strategies in executing change. As Pettigrew repeats in his publications over the years (e.g. 1985; 1990; 2000) much research concerning organizational change was aprocessual, acontextual and ahistorical. With linking context, history and process in researching organizational change comes a stream of literature considering change actions to be context-specific; and the relevance of pace and sequence of actions on organization members' ability to change their behaviour (e.g. Schoenberger, 1997; Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998; Pettigrew, 1985; Pettigrew, 1990; Pettigrew, 2000; Beer, 2000; Boulton, Allen & Bowman, 2015).

2.2 Executing change

Kotter (1995) argues there are certain phases in a change process managers should follow to enable the entire organization to act in the planned strategic direction. Following these eight phases will result in sustainable change implementation. Skipping phases creates the illusion of rapid change implementation, but will not result in satisfying sustainable change. The organization will not be ready for the next step, leading to growing resistance to change. Change should thus follow these stages and take as much time as necessary to complete each stage. The first stage is *"Establishing a sense of urgency",* for example by emphasizing the company's competitive situation or financial performance. Bass and Avolio (1993) add that the present culture of the company needs to be addressed to create a sense of urgency, without forgetting the company's heritage. To make the sense of urgency come across with all organization members, the organization's history has to be linked to current challenges (Kotter, 1995; Bass & Avolio, 1993). *"Forming a powerful guiding coalition"* is the second stage. This powerful coalition will be the first group of actors on change and will have to show off the expected change in behaviour. Without a powerful coalition, not much will happen according to Kotter (1995). Upper management needs to support the change, with change ambassadors trickling down the change to all organization levels. As a third step, a vision needs to be created and the fourth step is to effectively communicate that vision using every communication method possible. The guiding coalition will have to communicate the change by living it and showing of desired behaviours in the new setting. This leads to stage five: *"Empowering others to act on the vision"* (Kotter, 1995). In this step, obstacles that become apparent during the first acts of change are removed. It looks to enable organization members to actually execute the change plan. The sixth stage is *"Planning for short term wins",* to show off the change's successes and visible improvements. Employees that have been acting on changes are rewarded and recognized to further foster commitment and reward desired behaviour. Stage seven then is about *"Consolidating improvements and producing still more change"* (Kotter, 1995). After all of these steps have been followed, step seven is about really continuing on and enforcing the change vision. Now is the time for systems, structures and policies to be changed and new employees to be hired to support the vision further. Finally, step eight is *"Institutionalizing new approaches"*. In this final step, the connection between corporate successes and the changed behaviour has to be made explicit (Kotter, 1995). Kotter (1995) argues that communicating throughout the change process is key in creating support and enabling employees to act on change. Following these stages will take organization members along and help them get on board with the change, just like how showing off successes will mitigate resistance. The difficulty in change communication for managers, however, is how to intervene in processes of sense making (de Sonnaville, 2006).

2.2.3 Sensemaking and translation work

Sensemaking is the process that informs and constrains identity and action. It becomes explicit in cases of disruption, when the current state of the world is different from the desired or expected state (Weick et al., 2005). Sensemaking is done in everyday practice both collectively and individually. Institutionalized ideas become the norm and contribute to the organizational culture. Organizational culture guides routines and is expressed as the 'way of doing things around here' (Scott & Yanow, 1993; Schein, 1996). Organizational culture is constructed and sustained through interactions among members of the organizations. The social construction of culture does not only happen through verbal interactions, but also through other artefacts of the organizational culture. Artefacts of organizational culture can be symbolic objects, symbolic language and symbolic actions. Artefacts are always present, not only in times of change (Scott & Yanow, 1993; Schein, 1996). In cases of major organizational change, organization members are challenged to rethink the way the organization operates and thus some of its core operating assumptions. Sensemaking happens through interpretation of situations and actions of organization members in those situations (Weick et al., 2005; de Sonnaville, 2006; Boonstra & de Caluwé, 2006). Abstract concepts, like 'strategy problems' and 'cultural problems', are often used to describe change programs and its necessity. De Sonnaville (2006) argues those abstract classifications can best be understood by applying a social-constructionist view. When you consider the world to be constructed through social interaction, it becomes clear that it matters for the execution of change how people individually and collectively interpret and make sense of organizational issues. Abstract classifications bring order to the social world, but attributed characteristics to the concepts will contribute to a certain way of thinking and reasoning. Classifications of organizational issues create the illusion of controllability and measurability as they become reified (de Sonnaville, 2006). Looking at organizational change in this manner means that organization members themselves are maintaining organizational issues. Furthermore, it implies that sensemaking of organizational issues and change programs by organization members has an impact on the way change is translated into practice. In this case, translation can be used literally, since management might mean something else than interpreted on lower levels or in different organizational contexts. Differences in sensemaking lead to differences in execution of (change) policies (Lipsky, 2010; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1983; de Sonnaville, 2006; Weick et al., 2005). How people make sense of circumstances and make it explicit in words *"serves as a springboard into action"*, as argued by Weick et al. (2005; 409).

Sensemaking can be applied to organizational change specifically by using the concept of "funnel of interests": aligning the perceived interests of various actors with change (Whittle, Suhomlinova & Mueller, 2010). Considering processes of sensemaking means that change agents need to become aware of different interpretations that inform actions of organizational members. Whittle et al. (2010; 17) argue that *"change agents* […] *need to act as change "translators" by using discourse (among other things) to convince recipients that change is "in their best interests"*." Translation assumes that actors modify changes to fit their specific needs in time and space and thus transforming them in the process. When change agents act as translators, their goal is to create a funnel wherein various interests come together (Whittle et al., 2010). Translators of change can use two strategies. The first is representing ideas in a way that makes others recognize it is in line with their interests and desires. Another approach is to make it clear that actors cannot continue on without adopting a similar view. For organizational change to be sustainable, interest of different actors need to be aligned with the change, or at least not be obstructing the change execution (Whittle et al., 2010; Brown & Humphreys, 2003).

Storytelling and using narratives is a way of making sense and reducing complexity of changing organizational life. It can facilitate understanding by relating various abstract classifications with each other, creating a narrative of causal relationships that fit current organizational life and its near future (Brown & Humphreys, 2003; Beech, 2000). Brown and Humphreys' (2003) study of change in a post merger organization found that senior managers expressed a narrative of "epic tales", whereas other organization members told "tragic tales". Managers are empowered by the organization to direct change processes and thus to introduce the new outline that informs and redirects understandings and actions. In change processes, the possibility to extend managerial hegemony becomes clearer in the sense that managers are informed better. Brown and Humphreys (2003; 123) argue that the extension of managerial hegemony is *"merely a punctuation in the flow of organizational life"*, since the actual manifestations of organizing processes depend on the interpretation and sensemaking of all organizational members. Managers cannot simply generate meanings and drop them on other organization members in a vacuum. Sensemaking happens in a continuous process of interaction between managers and non-managers (Beech, 2000).

Managers can thus guide the process through different phases, as Kotter (1995) suggested, and do their best in providing order and help organization members make sense of the expected changes (Brown & Humphreys, 2003; Beech, 2000). As market environments change, an organization's ability to innovate and adapt is essential. Probst and Raisch's study on organizational change failures found that "*the failure of the examined group of organizations can be traced to a rigid clinging to a formula for success that was becoming increasingly obsolete. Powerful forces within the organizations prevented each attempted change. The lack of change and innovation led to increasingly outdated product offerings and cost structures significantly above the competitive level"* (2005; 96). Powerful forces within organizations have the ability to shape the company's direction, although possibly being stuck in out-of-date interpretations of the situation themselves. At the same time, organization members' have their own interests that might not align with those of managers. Parker (1997) argues there are not two, but various divisions and identities representing different interests in organizations. These different identities result from a division of labour following specialization. Division of labour enables organizations to operate globally and coordinate remote processes. It does, however, create the problem of surveillance for the manager. As the complexity of the organization increases, so does the opportunity of organization members to act in other interests than that of the organization and managers (Parker, 1997).

Since sensemaking is the basis for action and interpretation of current and future situations, it is crucial to understand how organization members translate change into practice in everyday organizational reality. The next paragraph looks at these organization members on an operational level within professional organizations.

2.3 Professionals and change

A professional organization is characterized by a high specialization of work (Mintzberg, 1980). The way professionals act is the way the organization operates. If we follow this reasoning and consider professionals as key actors in executing the change, it makes sense to take a closer look at specific characteristics of this group.

Professionals are highly trained and there is a relatively low level of formalization of work, meaning they have a certain degree of professional autonomy (Mintzberg, 1980). The professional autonomy means organization members work freely not only of the administrative hierarchy, but also of their colleagues. The main coordination mechanism is

the initial selection of organization members based on their skill level. A certain standard skill set determines whether professionals get access to the organization and what type of access they get related to their functional role. Middle managers are professionals as well, to have power and legitimacy in the professional organization (Lipsky, 2010; Mintzberg, 1980). This type of organization guides expected behaviour based on professional expertise. At the same time, professionals have discretionary leeway in their everyday work and are thus relatively free of the organization's control mechanisms (Mintzberg, 1980; Lipsky, 2010; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1983). Lipsky (2010) argues that professionals are actually policy makers, not the managers, due to their high degree of discretion and relative autonomy from organizational authority. The manifestation of a policy is created through actions of the professional in the operating core of the organization. Pressman and Wildavsky (1983; 217) call this the *"dual implementation processes"*. The first implementation process is the original change program with its formally defined and expected set of causal links necessary to result in the desired outcome. The other is the "*unexpected nexus of causality that actually evolves during implementation"* (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1983; 217).

2.3.1 Divisions and normative control

Implementation gaps lead to different enactments of the change programs. These gaps result from different interest to different interpretations of the change program, as discussed earlier. Pervasive differences in perception and interpretation contribute to segmentalism, where organization members focus on one part of the organization rather than seeing the bigger picture (Parker, 1997). Parker (1996) argues this happens as a result of the high specialization of work especially seen in professional organizations. Through a continuous process of identification organization members have multiple identities within one organization. Simply put, organization members have different role commitments that manifests differently based on time and space. A manager identifies with his team at certain points, while clearly identifying as a part of the management team of the organization in a board meeting.

Spatial/Functional	Geographic and/or departmental dividing – 'them over here, us over here'
Generational	Age and/or historical dividing – 'them from that time, us from this time'
Occupational/Professional	Vocational and/or professional dividing – 'them who do that, us who do this'

Figure 4. "Three Divisions of Dividing" from: Parker (1997; 121)

To structure possible identities, Parker (1997) suggest three methods by which organization members are divided as shown in figure four. Different identifications, especially professional identification, can be used to sponsor change or to hinder it. By using an identification as an argument to support or block change, organization members point out that 'their' group best understands the organizational issue(s) (Parker, 1997). At the same time, different identities have different levels of access to organization's resources like information and are thus differently enabled to act on changes. And then, even if organization

members agree fully with the proposed changes, there are multiple influences that can hinder change execution. Pressman and Wildavsky's study on policy implementation showed seven reasons for organization members to agree with a proposal, but still oppose or fail to facilitate its enactment: 1) "*direct incompatibility with other commitments*"; 2) "*no direct incompatibility, but a preference for other programs*"; 3) "*simultaneous commitments to other programs";* 4) "*dependence on others who lack a sense of urgency in the project*"; 5) "*differences of opinion on leadership and proper organizational roles*"; 6) *"legal and procedural differences",* and; 7) *agreement coupled with a lack of power"* (1983; 99-101).

The nature of professionals in highly specialized organizations thus brings specific barriers to, and opportunities for, change implementation. Like Pressman and Wildavsky (1983) argue, it seems to be a miracle that implementation efforts work at all in these types of organizations. Kunda (2006) offers a different account of control mechanisms in professional organizations. Because these professionals are so very specialized and thus committed to their work, they become "unmanageable" in the traditional sense. Kunda's (2006) study showed that does not mean their behaviour is totally autonomous, however. Processes of normative control make that organizational members act in the organization's best interest because they consider that to be in their own best interest as well. Kunda defines normative control as " […] *the attempt to elicit and direct the required efforts of members by controlling the underlying experiences, thoughts and feelings that guide their actions*. […] *They are driven by internal commitment, strong identification with company goals, intrinsic satisfaction from work*." (Kunda, 2006; 11). Organization members do not act in the best interest of the company for instrumental reasons like economic rewards and sanctions only. Rather, the employee's self is claimed by the corporate interest through experiential transaction, in which symbolic rewards are exchanged for a moral orientation to the company (Kunda, 2006). Manifestations of normative control in Kunda's (2006) study within a high-tech corporation can be clearly seen in his description of presentation rituals. Presentation rituals are performed on three levels, which Kunda (2006) identifies as 1) Talking down; 2) Talking across, and; 3) Talking around. "Talking down" are the top management presentations in the company, where usually the managerial perspective on key aspects of the business or industry is articulated. "Talking across" is done by lower-level managers or experts on the topic and usually performed in the format of a workshop for which a specific group of people can sign up. Finally, "Talking around" is done by spokespersons of certain ideologies or interests in the organization who are close in functional role or level to the intended audience (Kunda, 2006). Normative control can be done and enforced by actors on different levels of the organization, and through different spokespersons in various types of presentation rituals. Normative control basically is a way of guiding autonomous professionals' behaviour through controlling the message and guiding the interpretation of organization members, and thus their sensemaking and enactment of organizational policies. Normative control, however, has its downsides. By shaping and interpreting ambiguous definitions of reality, corporate management can maintain and enhance its power. Subtle forms of domination are forms of domination nonetheless, which Kunda (2006) brands the culture trap: *"combining normative pressure with a delicate balance of seductiveness and coercion"* (Kunda, 2006; 224). Normative control can create conflicts between employees' organizational self and personal self: an attack on the boundaries of their privacy.

> *"At Tech, indeed, analysis of role, use and social consequences of the company's technology was conspicuous by its absence; rather, such issues are glossed over by words like "innovation", "productivity", "profit", with their connotations of inevitability and rightness. Is this typical of engineering organizations? Of the high-tech industry? Perhaps. But the system of normative*

control and its anticipated and unanticipated consequences described here seem both to enhance and disguise this effect, in an industry that claims a major role in shaping not only the technologies of the future, but also the people who make and use them." (Kunda, 2006; 226).

Kunda's (2006) study taught us that the process of engineering corporate culture is paired with constant conflict between organizational and personal self, leading to members showing signs of resistance and other unanticipated consequences. Although seemingly desirable for management, controlling culture will thus reinforce and recreate the situations it looks to correct (Kunda, 2006). Normative control can be linked to translation work in organizational change, as both look to steer the sensemaking and enactment of organization members in corporate situations. Although the message can be funnelled and translated to make it easier for organizational actors to imagine the new organizational reality, processes of sensemaking can never be fully steered. Professionals will make their own interpretations following their specific contexts, and through everyday interaction.

2.4 Engineering change

"The struggle between organizations bent on normative control and individuals subjected to it is over the definition of reality, and it is a difficult one, for meanings both personal and collective have become part of the contested terrain."

– Kunda, 2006; 227

Planned and emergent change originally were two opposing views on organizational change. Organizational change can be approached either through planned efforts, or through a bottom-up, continuous process of smaller steps (Grieves, 2010; Weick & Quinn, 1999; Weick, 2000; Burnes, 2004). Recently, a group of authors started to argue for combining both approaches and not view them as mutually exclusive (e.g. Bamford & Forrester, 2003; Burnes, 2004). Bamford and Forrester (2003) argue that managers need to have attention for both emergent change processes in organizations and their context, reacting to emergent processes with planned change efforts. Within these planned change efforts, Bamford and Forrester explain that "*the creation of organizational meaning, i.e. effective change, appears to be an emergent process"* (2003; 563). The actual enactment of change by organization members is thus an emergent, gradual process that cannot be directed by a change program's objectives. Actions are an expression of the sense people make of their situations (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005; De Sonnaville, 2006; Burnes, 2004). Different interpretations of a change program lead to different enactments of people from different parts of the company. Various authors argued for managers to use this relation between sensemaking and execution in the change management process (e.g. Whittle et al., 2010; Pettigrew, 2000). By funnelling interests through the change message, or translating the change message, in a way that it becomes clear that it is in both the corporate's best interest and the individual's best interest to change. Furthermore, translating change to the individual and group level enables organization members to act on change, because it clarifies what it means for them in their everyday work. Translating change is in essence a way to control underlying experiences, thoughts and feelings that guide organization members' actions, which Kunda (2006) defines as normative control. Kunda's (2006) study within a high-tech corporation on culture and commitment warns of the downsides of normative control. Tensions arise due to constant conflict between the organizational and personal self, visible in moments of conflict,

ambiguity, cynicism and irony of organization members (Kunda, 2006). Autonomous professionals have their discretionary leeway to handle according to their own expert knowledge, making it even more difficult for managers of the organization to guide the translation of change into practice. At the same time, divisions in the organization along spatial/functional, generational and occupational/professional lines further complicate shared sensemaking within the organization (Parker, 1997). These authors argue that neither the culture nor the change of organizations can be engineered entirely. At the same time, studies point out that translating change through a formal program does enable professionals to act on changes more successfully in ever-changing, complex environments.

3. Methodology

In this chapter, I introduce the ontological and epistemological assumptions reflecting the adopted interpretative approach (3.1) that serve as the basis for further methodological choices. An explanation of the choice for the qualitative methods, the case study design (3.1.1) and the quality criteria follow (3.1.2). I describe the process of data collection and analysis in 3.1.3. Finally, I shed some light on my dual role as a researcher and an employee during the research process (3.2).

3.1 Interpretative approach

The ontological and epistemological assumptions are part of the research philosophy; concerned with the way researchers view the world and what methods can be used to collect knowledge about this world. Taking on an interpretative approach is assuming that every actor in an environment has their own perception of reality, their own interpretation. The interpretation of their world by actors is how people make sense of the world and serves as input for their actions (Deetz, 1996; Yanow, 1996). Since different actors have different views on reality, based for example on their specific context, relationships and social position, the world cannot be measured objectively. Reality is viewed as a social construct.

Following the interpretative approach, a case study design looking into the specifics of the research context was adopted. Data cannot be viewed objectively: data is also constructed through interaction with the researcher. The interviews would not have existed without my interference, for example. The researcher's interpretation plays a role. Since the presence of a researcher has an effect on the context, this research does not look for objectivity or asprie to offer objective, quantitative results. Rather, it looks to offer a perspective on organizational change processes that fits the experiences of actors in real-life organizations. The results of this thesis can be used for analytical generalization (Yin, 2003). Although the findings are specific to the case organization, the analysis can and should be used to build upon with other research.

3.1.1 Case study research design

Qualitative research methods follow from the adopted interpretative approach and research question. Qualitative research can be used to deep-dive into the specific complexities of a phenomenon in a certain context. This case study focuses on the Utrecht office of Wincor Nixdorf, the Software HQ. Although Delta is implemented in the whole organization, the local context and actors of each sub-unit of the organization have an influence on the way it is experienced and thus enacted. Data was generated by conducting interviews, observations and document analysis. Thus, a triangulation method was adopted. The three sources of data were complementary to each other and enabled analysis (Richards, 2009). The experiences and perceptions are leading in this research, which is why the interviews are most prominently featured in the findings. Observations and document analysis were ways to improve my understanding of the different aspects of the program set-up, everyday change flows and of the way the program team and other organizational actors operated.

3.1.1.1 Document analysis

Document analysis is what started my research process. By accessing the Intranet, I could find a lot of information about the history of the various change programs in the organization over the years as well as documentation on the Delta program. A specific Delta program page

was set up on the Intranet, where newsletters with status updates were placed. Annual reports were reviewed and offered background in interpreting interview data. By asking around for additional Delta information, especially to the respondents of my four exploratory interviews (see 3.1.1.3 'Interviews), I got more background information. As these data were mainly used as background data, I read the data and made short memos of document highlights. These highlights were things that seemed relevant to me, for example the focus on financial figures and organization charts. These document reviews were the foundation my research and interviews built on. Documents could be retrieved from the start of the program, making it helpful to understand how the first setup was communicated to the people within the organization as compared to other change programs.

3.1.1.2 Observations

Two observation methods were used: participant observation and direct observation. Participant observation was done in everyday organizational life, possible due to my dual role as both an employee and a researcher. Even though participant observation normally involves a bias due to the researchers manipulation of events, my dual role here meant that the events would have happened even if I did not conduct the research (Yin, 2003; Silverman, 2011). The only difference now was that I would make memos of relevant events as they occurred. The (use of) physical artefacts was taken into consideration through its everyday use as an employee as well. Direct observation covers events in real time and covers the context of events (Yin, 2003). I performed this type of observation by joining seven Delta bi-weekly team meetings. Both types of observations helped me to contextualize findings from the interviews, and thus creating a better fit between my assumptions and respondents' perspectives (Silverman, 2011).

3.1.1.3 Interviews

I started off my research with four sixty-minute informal, exploratory interviews. These interviews were not recorded and were mainly done to get a first idea of the history of the company and the basics of the Delta program. They were open-ended interviews to allow for maximum flexibility (Silverman, 2011). I created the topic list for the formal interviews based on the highlights from document analysis and exploratory interviews. After the four informal interviews, twenty formal interviews of between sixty and ninety minutes were conducted over a two-month period. The twenty formal interviews were semi-structured. The stories of the respondents remained leading for the direction of the interview, while a topic list ensure that each relevant topic distilled from the exploratory interviews and document analysis was covered (Silverman, 2011). Each of these formal interviews was recorded after consent of the respondent and transcribed using ExpressScribe software. Interviews were conducted with people from different nationalities and thus mainly in English. To prevent double translation errors, interviews with native Dutch speakers were conducted in Dutch. Only when a quote of these interviews was used in the findings chapter, the extract was translated into English. The two topiclists (English-Dutch) can be found in appendix A.

All respondents were offered anonymity. To maintain respondent anonymity, quotes from interviews used throughout this thesis are not linked to functional roles. Only in a few exceptions additional information is used to describe data, for example disclosing whether the respondent was a manager or not. As organizational change can be a delicate topic and the respondents were so very open in their interviews, I made maintaining their anonymity a priority over disclosing additional background information about teams, roles, or levels.

Respondent's reference numbers were shuffled, meaning the number identifying each individual respondent does not relate to the order in which participants were interviewed.

Interpretations and experiences might differ between groups in the headquarter, as well as between experience levels with the company. To ensure sample diversity, I divided an overview of employee start dates from HR into three categories (see figure 5[3]). Category A consists of the people that started working for the organization immediately when it opened in Utrecht three years ago. As you can see in their average years at Wincor Nixdorf, they had been working with the company before that for a long time. Seven people were randomly selected from category A, controlled for their functional background to ensure diversity. From category B I also interviewed seven people. Category C was really smaller than the other two groups, which is why five respondents were sufficient to paint a representative picture of the experiences of this group.

Category	Respondents	Total Category	Started in Utrecht	Average years with Wincor Nixdorf
A	8	20	October 2013 – December 2013	16
B	7	17	Started January 2014 – August 2014	3.5
C	5	15	Started September 2014 – September 2015	5.5

Figure 5. Respondent Overview.

Each interview transcript was uploaded to NVivo, after which coding could start. Interview data was analysed using NVivo software, making it easier to compare data and bring order based on the frequency and importance of nodes. The first phase in the coding process was 'open coding', where each relevant text block was given a specific code displaying the essence of the text (Boeije, 2005). Similar subjects and sentiments were given the same code, which became easier toward the eleventh interview as a general picture started to appear in each interview. The next step is, following Boeije's (2005) approach to analysing qualitative data, 'axial coding'. Axial coding is the process of reasoning from code to data and checking whether the codes sufficiently cover the data depicted in them. Codes were clustered and ordered in sub- and headcodes according to relevance. Finally, 'selective coding' was done to select the relevant data in line with the theory and specific research focus and thus create a more structured picture (Boeije, 2005). The coding tree emanating from this step in the process became the broad outline for the findings chapter.

3.1.2 Quality criteria

Three criteria Yin (2003) described to improve research quality are relevant to this research: 3.1.2.1 covers 'Construct validity'; 3.1.2.2 covers 'Internal and external validity'; and 3.1.2.3 covers 'Reliability'.

[3] Data regarding total people per category and average years as of 01-05-2016.

3.1.2.1 Construct validity

Construct validity is a test to the set of measures to ensure that operational measures fit the concepts being studies (Yin, 2003). Construct validity is a difficult one in qualitative research, especially when considering interpretations and perceptions. Construct validity can be improved by using multiple sources of evidence; establishing a chain of evidence, and; have key informants review a draft of the case study report (Yin, 2003). All three aspects were done in this study. Through triangulation the interpretation of the documents and observation could be checked with the interpretations of respondents. On several occasions, my interpretation of change interventions based on documents was corrected by respondents' stories. A chain of evidence increases reliability and repeatability, as it allows readers and other researchers to follow the process from initial research questions to conclusions. In the methods and throughout the findings chapter, I refer to the data sources consistently mainly by citing relevant interviews. Furthermore, interview questions can clearly be linked to interview data and thus conclusions. Finally, one key informant has read a draft of the case study report and suggested improvements. Due to time constraints in the final stages of this thesis process, I did not allow other respondents to read the report and thus slightly reducing construct validity.

3.1.2.2 Internal and external validity

Validity of a research is composed of internal and external validity. Internal validity refers to whether you are measuring what you want to measure, whereas external validity refers to the extent that the findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case study (Yin, 2003; Silverman, 2011).

Internal validity is difficult in single-case study research looking into interpretations and perceptions of people. My interpretation as a researcher plays a role in connecting the dots. Again, my assumptions were checked and corrected in interviews and through conversations with colleagues throughout the process. Triangulation further improved validity and checks between data sources (Silverman, 2011). My dual role as a researcher and employee might have further influenced internal validity. My belief is that this has actually improved internal validity, since it forced me to look closely at my findings and look for nuance and alternative explanations. Especially the stronger claims and causal links in this document are supported by a large amount of respondent stories. And, also referred to as such to show my case is based not on my interpretation alone, but formed by that of respondents.

External validity is the extent to which these findings and conclusions can be generalized and applied to other contexts. The findings itself and the experiences of the respondents are of course tied to the researched context of the Software headquarter. The conclusion, however, can be generalized to other organizational settings. Although this is a single-case study and findings are thus more contextualized than those of a multiple case study would have been, the links with already established theory and this study's findings are clear. Analytical generalization of the findings is thus possible (Yin, 2003). As it is a qualitative study, future studies would have to find support for the findings of this research in different contexts.

3.1.2.3 Reliability

Reliability is improved by extensively demonstrating the steps the researcher took, enabling other researchers to repeat the study with the same results (Yin, 2003; Richards,

2009; Silverman, 2011). Errors and bias should be kept to a minimum to improve reliability. Case study databases are a way of improving reliability. By using the software to code data, data is stored well and each code is linked to its corresponding interviews. Reliability is further improved simply by documenting the methodology in this chapter in detail, to improve the transparency of the research process. One important aspect of reliability is to minimize researcher bias. In the next paragraph, 3.2, I document advantages and disadvantages of my dual role during this research that is, of course, related to possibilities for bias.

3.2 Dual role: researcher and employee

In October 2015 I started working for Wincor Nixdorf as a working student next to my studies. It helped me to link theories from my studies to practice and get some real world perspectives on change issues. I got the opportunity to conduct my thesis research at the organization as well. As it is a very dynamic context and the organization was executing a formal change program, this would be the perfect subject for my research. At the same time, I had been working there for a few months and was thus also relatively used to the way people were used to doing things around there. I just started working for the organization and was thus still learning everyday, but the learning process itself taught specific rules of the context. If I think about how my socializing as an employee might have influenced my role as an independent researcher, one key episode stands out. At our first intervision meeting, I was sharing a short story about how people left and entered the organization and how this was relatively easy, without people really noticing or giving it too much attention. I was not very surprised: people leave and enter and considered that to be organizational life. My fellow students were more surprised and interpreted it as a high level of individualism which was especially relevant to the nature and situation of the organization. Their case study organizations were very different and they were thus able to point out that it is specific to this organization, not something that each organization creates necessarily. As a researcher, I feel like it is important to be critical of the research context and to offer a fresh perspective. At the same time, being critical can be easy. Especially when looking back with today's knowledge in interviews. From that intervision meeting on, I focused more on various aspects of everyday organizational life and tried to keep my assumptions of what is normal and not to a minimum, while checking findings and assumptions with fellow students to compare organizational realities.

Further in the research process, a second challenge occurred that relates to my dual role as a researcher and employee. After the first four exploratory interviews it became clear that experiences of the change program were not all positive and differed greatly. Some were very positive and saw change as an opportunity, whereas others were filled with more negative experiences. Everybody was very open and every respondent I asked immediately agreed to help me with the interviews. During the interviews, however, at least half of the respondents had a moment in which they did not want to share their story completely with me initially, or they would ask me at the end of the interview: "*Was that not too negative?"*. By ensuring respondent anonymity during the interviews, some of the respondents most likely shared more with me than they would have done otherwise. Others would stop sharing after one key episode, probably feeling like they had helped me enough at that point. The extract below displays the tension clearly. I purposely left out the respondents' identification number, as it is unnecessary to relate it to other citations in the findings chapter:

I: *"Okay. Do you have an example?"*

R#: [Explicitly] *"No! No. No."*

I: "*Okay* [pauzes three seconds]"

R#: "*Not giving you an example. I'm sorry. [laughs hard] I can. I'll let somebody else give you an example. No. Eh. I'd rather not give an example*." –R#

Of course, it was a challenge to get as much relevant stories and data to be able to write my thesis while at the same time letting respondents be comfortable to share what they wanted to. I think my dual role had an influence on people sometimes not wanting to share every detail and warning me explicitly to pay attention to how I would phrase things in my report. Luckily, I gained enough trust to have generated a saturated dataset for the key findings of this thesis, and these challenging instances actually contributed to my understanding of the context.

4. Translating change program 'Delta' into practice

This chapter is structured around factors stimulating and slowing down the transition to a Software/Services organization during Delta. Some of these factors are specific to Delta and a direct result of interventions under Delta, some are more general and specific to organizational actors in dealing with the multiplicity of changes currently going on in the company and its direct context. The first section (4.1) offers a closer look at the way change was communicated. Communication has had a big impact on the way change was received and how professionals were able to act on those changes. In short, I describe in section 4.1 how change communication influenced the translation of the program into practice. Section 4.2 offers a closer look at how experienced professionals deal with all the frequent changes as a result of the increasingly complex environment. Processes and structures are changing, and organization members therefore need to change their everyday routines as well for it to stick. The final section (4.3) outlines changes in roles and responsibilities as well as the headquarter's connection with the areas and how that has changed over time. As we are looking at change from a headquarter perspective, it is relevant to consider the challenges the relatively young headquarter has experienced in working with the areas.

4.1 Communicating change

> *"It's about communication and really, really, very clearly, very transparently, eh- transparent, communicating to the people what is happening and not trying to treat your employees as little idiots, because they are not little idiots. They have very, very good senses and eh- quite often it happens that rumours are spreading and someone has heard something and someone else has heard something else and when passing by a meeting room someone saw something on the whiteboard and then immediately rumours are spreading, and they can become extremely creative and completely chaotic."* – R6

Communication was the single most talked about topic in the interviews. Everyone agrees that communication is key for implementing change and for enabling organization members to act on change. Although everybody recognizes that, it is only as central of a topic because there were multiple occasions where people were not informed at all, heard parts of the story via their informal network before it was formally communicated, or only got the high-level information. Respondents admitted that in a few cases it was about information that was nice-to-know and not vital for them to know to survive in their day-to-day job. The problem here is that people *will* hear something via their informal networks, which is more often than not an interpretation of the real story as respondent six explained above. Those interpreted pieces of information gave organizational actors an unsettled feeling and fed into frustration and resistance towards changes. Information sharing has thus influenced the experience of change. The way information was shared gave organization members a sense of certainty at some points in time, while adding to their experienced level of uncertainty at others.

Information sharing can be split into two channels: the formal (4.1.1) and informal (4.1.2) channel. In Wincor Nixdorf, these two were both extensively used to manage the Delta program and communicate everyday organizational changes. Managers learned from their experience with other change programs over the years. Several respondents told me that in the case of Delta, formal communication was more than ever. At the same time, people still felt that information was often unclear or only very high-level. This made them look in their informal network for additional information. In the next two sections I describe how organization members experienced both channels.

4.1.1 Formal channels

Formal channels are the channels through which organization members communicate with each other in a way that is more or less controlled by the organization. In the case of Wincor Nixdorf, examples of formal channels are an all-hands meeting in which Delta was communicated to the entire office in a presentation performed by management, the Delta newsletters which were posted on the Intranet, the CommIT-magazines sent out to the offices, or the Lunch & Learn sessions in which people could request topics that other colleagues would clarify further. In the specific case of Delta, the company learned from earlier change programs and formally communicated the program extensively. Delta was introduced in April 2015 to all employees. Respondents found out about Delta in different ways and at different points in time, mainly depending on their involvement in Delta. The group that was not involved in Delta until April 2015 heard about Delta for the first time at an all hands meeting:

> *"They* [management] *gathered the whole HQ and they explained ehm- I remember the session, I remember we left the room we understood: "Okay, there is a* ***big*** *change". Eh- but it was really again a communication thing: not clear what does it mean for me, as a person.* […] *But it was not clear okay, what does it mean to HQ? And we didn't know if they did not mention that because they- they don't see a change. So we will remain more or less the same. Or they did not mention that because that's not the place to discuss changes but they need to do that individually. And in the end I think it was a mix. They didn't really* ***know*** *what changes they will do at that time."* – R11 [bold = emphasised by respondent]

The all-hands meeting was a way to reach the whole office at once. It turns out, however, that respondents felt like this communication was unclear. They were mainly interested in: *"what does it mean for me?"* (R11). Although there was a lot of formal communication around the program, respondents felt that this translation to the people was missing. After the first communication of Delta, organizational members did not know what the program's impact would be on their work in the headquarter. They did know what to expect for the areas, with clearly defined targets for cost-savings and for moving headcount from local areas all over the world to East Europe (i.e. nearshoring). As respondent eleven states, the general feeling was that it was not really clear what would happen at headquarter level. Although they could find information on the Intranet, this information was perceived as only very high-level or as a collection of nice buzzwords. Respondent eighteen explains how he felt information was falling short, limiting action on the program's objectives:

> *"Ja, it's nice to create a glossy paper. But would you buy a washing machine just because of a glossy paper? No: you want to know the insides. You want to know the facts. Maybe washing machine is a bad example, but a computer for instance."* – R18

Managers and non-managers that worked on Delta were involved in an earlier stage to set up the different work streams, the different sub-topics of the program. These streams are managed on different levels by different 'owners', the person responsible for the overall work stream. These people were in the loop a few months before the rest of the office, because they helped defining the program on a more detailed level than the top-down, overall program. External consultants came to talk with different headquarter professionals to get a better view on the company. Respondent two explains how he was involved in specifying Delta for the business unit Software:

"I was pre-informed by, with Delta, because I was involved in the preparations of Delta, because Delta had to do with […] *setting up the business unit Software.* […] *And when they were working hard to define Delta as in what does it mean and how would you do certain things, I had a few conversations about that. But it was not as if I was a policymaker for Delta. But I did try to get it on paper a little bit more structured- if you are talking about the business unit Software: what does that mean?* […] *You can say it, but you also have to be able to argue it, not on a nitty-gritty level but like its general outline."* – R2

People that had experience with the specific subjects of the program were involved early on in the conversations and were able to contribute to specifying the change. As respondent two explains, he was able to help define what the change program meant for the business unit software. The respondents that were involved earlier on were all generally positive about the changes and happy to help out those external consultants in setting up the program. Organization members who were not involved in the program early on spoke about the influence the presence of these consultants had on them. At this time, this group of respondents did not know what the program was about yet. Several respondents shared how external consultants entering the office had an impact, and at least got people talking. Respondent eleven describes the experience of these 'outsiders' entering the office:

"People were laughing that: "The Germans are coming". [laughs] *Like an invasion. And: what is going on? And should we worry? So it was more eh- it also was not communicated because- and in a lot of cases, you see that it's all about communication.* […] *Because it's a small office. And if five or seven people are coming, it's relatively- it has an impact. You see them, you feel them. So no one was there to say: "Guys, okay, we have these people, they will work on Delta. They might need you, they might ask you questions."* – R11

The unannounced presence of those external consultants contributed to uncertainty among this group of people. Furthermore, some respondents feel like information is *"hidden"*. They apparently do not have the access to information they would like to have, and felt like updates regarding changes were even purposely kept from them. Respondents shared that although they think this is to not make them worry and keep them focused on the job, it generally has the opposite effect. They will hear something via their informal network, which is often not the full or true picture. Respondent fifteen shares how this resulted in increased uncertainty:

"Now with the change we are not longer informed that much as we have been with [manager X]. *Things are more hidden and more… And then you get hit by the surprise sometimes."* – R15

As managers explained, it is the responsibility of a manager to communicate to their teams what is going on. Respondents spoke about some of their managers being very open. They appreciate it when a manager tells them what is going on, even if it is not certain what the actual outcome will be. Transparency about what is happening, even when it is not certain yet, helped organizational members focus on their work. Respondent twenty explains about how his manager helps him and his team to not worry about uncertainties too much by sharing what he knows:

"He is very open in communicating everything that he knows. Eh- and also be transparent about eh, what could happen, but what is not finalized. So: let's very open talk about what is the fact, what are the facts, keep to the facts and then you can also talk about what if, and what if in another direction. […] *He talks to us about consequences that scare us, for example, and is that really a reason to be scared? And then also, there are ways to position yourself as a group and he really helps us to do this. Ehm – shielding from change. I mean, I think it's important that ehm- that we as a company don't forget that we have to support our regions selling our products because you can talk a lot about change and Delta but if you don't bring the numbers – ehm, what is it worth for?"* – R20

The respondents I talked to from this team do not use their informal network as a primary source of information, which is different compared to other respondents from different teams. Respondents with managers that share less, or with managers that have changed frequently over the past few months, have experienced more uncertainty. Several respondents spoke about the impact the frequently changing management had on their job. The challenge here is that professionals work autonomously. They really do not need a manager to tell them what to do exactly. On the other hand, even autonomous professionals like to be up to date about important changes in their work or what happens to the organization they work for. Respondent four shares how he is now used to change and is not that worried about change consequences:

"But at a certain point you are not that worried anymore if you hear those kinds of things. At [Company X] *you had the same, before that, it also happens at other employers: then there will be lay-offs, that's what it basically comes down to for the people. Yes, you get used to that and you are not that worried about it anymore. You will hear it when it's time."* – R4

A group of respondents shared they adopted a wait-and-see approach like respondent four. In one way, it is an accomplishment that organization members are able to go on with everyday organizational life and simply not consider changes that much. On the other hand, it is a reactive experience of organizational change. "*You will hear it when it's time"* sounds rather fatalistic, and suggests not much action or initiative in implementing or seeking new solutions to organizational challenges. In paragraph 4.2. ('Professionals, hierarchy and change'), I will discuss that challenge between professionals' proactive and reactive attitudes towards change further. Respondent four's reaction is really one of frustration and distrust with formal communication. Delta was communicated as a way for the company to remain independent. Although the company would have to cut costs and count its losses in terms of downsizing, the independence of the company would be the prize. Around October 2015 the news of American competitor Diebold taking over Wincor Nixdorf came out.

"I don't know. The ehm – Look, if you are really adamant in something I really do not see how you can spontaneously switch, because it is not something small. Then I feel like, okay, please do not talk at all because at that moment you could have also said: "Yes when the time is right…" – I don't know "we will see what the possibilities are", but it was really now stressed that that was not even an option. And half a year later you did it anyway. Although- it leaked via via and they had to come out with it at that point." – R4

Other respondents shared a similar sentiment, and the company missed the chance to communicate the new turn of events to its members beforehand. Clearly, one of the key tasks of a manager is to share information and be transparent about what is happening on the levels the team is not in contact with. In the case of Wincor Nixdorf, change was first defined on a managerial level. The change was then cadenced down to other parts of the organization. Business units were involved to define what the change meant for their specific line of operations. Areas were involved in discussions on defining targets for their specific location. Respondent eight describes how the process of communication change formally is influenced by managers' and non-managers involvement in the change process.

> *"If you are CEO, you want to change something. But you start discussing with your peers in a very small group so just the managing directors of the company: you want to change something. But for example, you have this meeting early January. Then it takes weeks and months until it's really let's say, ja, if you have a concreter idea how to change. Ja? But your idea and your thoughts go back to first of January as you had the meeting. And then before you inform your organization eventually comes May or June. Ja? But this is a first communication to people indeed, ja? May or June. But you have it since five – five months in your head. And you do not understand why people are not understanding, but in fact people did never hear before May of June. Ja? When they, when you talk first time to people. So I would say, communication is key. And change to, to conduct a let's say a successful change, it's not just sending out a message, or sending change agents in a country and then let them return. You have to constantly communicate and you have to also change your internal systems to support the change."* –R8

Respondents did experience difficulties in the execution of changes, because often changes are communicated late or not at all. Several respondents described cases in which a new process was uploaded on a Sharepoint-site and it was considered to be implemented. Or the case in which a large document describing the process was sent out to a few people, and it was expected that people would then start working according to that process. The following quote from my interview with respondent four details respondents' experiences in executing change:

> *"Every now and then there are changes at this headquarter, and it is simply not communicated. So then everybody goes: "Yes, but that is the new rule for which we- by which we have to do it". But nobody has ever heard that it is truly the case. So yes, how can you expect from your people that they do their work according to those rules?"* – R4

Organization members are in contact with the different parts of the company and hear bits and pieces everywhere. Colleagues not always being present in the office further complicates information sharing. Since it is an international organization, managers and professionals all travel to areas or work from different locations. It means that information does not always reach everyone through the formal channels, and the informal channel thus becomes the way to be in the loop.

4.1.2 Informal channels

> *"I think eighty per cent of what I hear, I have never received any formal communication about."* – R5

Wincor's informal channels are everywhere according to respondents. Organization members exchange information in online calls, gossip when walking around the office, at the coffee machine, check stories via text message or exchange the latest news when on the road towards another location together. Informal channels are useful to receive the latest news. On the other hand, informal information is often full of interpretation. Interpretation in this case is distorting the original message, and painting a more pessimistic picture than the true story would. Almost every single respondent spoke about the importance of their informal network in doing their work and having access to information. Respondent ten summarizes what people told me in the following quote:

> *"That is Wincor of course as well, just like any other company, an organization in which the corridors often know more and know it faster than, let's say, the formal channels. So that has to do with your network again, hm? The more people you know the faster you know what's going on."* – R10

Several respondents referred to Wincor Nixdorf as the 'rumour company'. The informal network is the way to get your information. In the software headquarter, a group of people have worked for Wincor Nixdorf their whole working lives. Most of these people started in Paderborn and have worked in several locations before coming to Utrecht. Their informal network is large and widespread as a result. Respondent fifteen explains that getting information from the informal network is the way people work within Wincor:

> *"It makes it difficult for new people, to get access to this Nixdorf Family thing* [laughs], *whatever. But for people who are long in the company it's ja: the way of working. And I think that never changed."* – R15

The way organizational actors use their informal network has not changed with Delta. Although respondents described how changes were communicated more frequently than ever, it did not limit the use of the informal channels for additional information. Respondents did share that the information they get from their informal network is usually more "*pessimistic"* than the true story. All respondents pointed out that this was not ideal. Accessing information through the informal network is partially done to get more of an idea about what is going on with all the changes. But there is more to it. As respondent one shares, using the informal network is "*the way of working"*. Several respondents explained that getting information from different parts of the company can be difficult. Knowing whom you need to contact to get the right information helps. Although this might seem obvious, the next quote shows how important it apparently is:

> *"You have to know people. Wincor is the business of ja, having relationships. And if you don't have relationships, especially to headquarters, you are dead right away. So you need to have relations."* – R18

Respondent eighteen and others shared that getting the right information is dependent on whom you ask. This does not only apply to information about what is going on, but also to actual data required for their jobs. Often, there is no uniform system in different parts of the company resulting in extra barriers to correct information. It creates the situation that the

correctness of your information depends on whom you ask. Most respondents learned to navigate the system: build bigger networks to know what is going on. The informal network is important in having access to information, just like sharing information is done carefully and based on relationships as well. Respondent fifteen explains how sharing information almost equals politics:

> *"Ja, depends on with whom I work together. So if I'm- normally, I try to be very open. But it really depends with whom I work and if I have the feeling that the other colleague is maybe not sharing information, or is also doing politics, then I also can play politics."* – R15

Respondents relate sharing and receiving information to politics. Information is power, and withholding or delaying that information can be a powerful tool. Respondent four shared how in a project that concerned changing a process in people's day-to-day job, one person was not behind the project's objective. The project was delayed because this person did not share information. Respondent four explained how withholding information can be a tactic to oppose a certain change:

> *"Not sharing information, you have to pull every little piece of information out of* [person X]. *We just don't make progress.* […]. *But it's also possible, what in this specific case at the moment could also be, that if you do not share information you can also hide that you do not know stuff. It would not surprise me if that was the case." – R4*

Withholding information like in the example of respondent four relates to the perception of hidden information as discussed under formal communication (4.2.1.1). The perception of respondents is that formal information is sometimes hidden or delayed purposely. Respondent five explains that nobody thinks this is ideal, but that it is very hard to change:

> *"And I do notice, this is the first time I am really working at a global headquarter and I do not think it is Wincor-specific, I think it is everywhere, that there is a lot of politics going on. I think you have heard that from other people as well, that people eh- have good relationships with other people and based on that decisions are made and then I think, ja, that cannot be. And that then everybody you talk to agrees, but still nothing changes." – R5*

Clearly, this is not great for the mood and fuels frustration among organization members. Most respondents perceive politics as something that happens mainly at the managerial level. Respondents stress the importance of their informal network on the one hand, but share their frustration about politics and decision-making based on relationships on the other hand.

4.1.3 Sub-conclusion: communicating change

Formal information sharing was done frequently and in various ways. Organization members appreciated this and felt like the big picture was clear. Everyone accepted the change in the sense that the reasons for it were accepted and understood. The smaller changes, e.g. processes or responsibility changes, that had to be implemented in everyday organizational life, however, have been met with frustration and reactive approaches. Because managers were involved months earlier, they were able to make sense of them in a similar

way and in the defining stages of the program. Non-managers felt like information was not detailed enough, leaving them guessing about the actual impact it would have on their job. Unclear formal communication made organizational actors use their informal networks for access to information. Communicating with other actors informally gave them more information, but often did not fully reflect the truth. Moreover, informal information sharing was used as a political tool, leaving some people with more access to information than others. Withholding information was used as a tactic by professionals to resist changes, and people felt like information was purposely hidden at other points. Although the informal network is important for both managers and non-managers, it is also a source of frustration when decision-making seems to be based on relationships.

4.2 Professionals, hierarchy and change

Wincor Nixdorf is a mature company and has developed processes and structures over the years, helping professionals do their job according to certain routines. An example of such a process is the Delivery Framework (DFW), where every step of the delivery of a project from the pre-sales phase to the closing phase is described. It is stored on the company's Intranet, where employees can click on each sub-phase to get more information about the process, download templates and view examples. With decision gates and quality gates ensuring alignment with headquarter experts, this process is set up to support the business of area organizations working on customer projects. Existing processes and structures are a result of the heritage of Wincor Nixdorf over the years. In the current transition phase, many of the processes are subject to change as well. This paragraph details how professionals deal with changes, and how changing processes impact them in their day-to-day work. Sometimes, a split is made between managers and employees when their accounts of change influences differ. The first paragraphs details the account of professionals being able to shape change by taking ownership (4.2.1). Not all respondents shared this perspective, however, which is why their view on shaping change follows in paragraph 4.2.2. Finally, the influence of change frequency and example setting by management on the abilities of organization members to act on change is detailed in paragraph 4.2.3.

4.2.1 Taking ownership in shaping change

When I asked respondents to describe Wincor Nixdorf as a company, many talked about the company's *"German-ness"*. Although it has subsidiaries in 43 countries, the German roots are apparently still a key characteristic of the company. When asked what respondents mean when they describe the company as German, their explanations all referred to concepts of *"hierarchy"* and *"process-oriented"* (R2; R4; R5; R8; R11; R12; R13; R16; R17; R19). Professionals generally want to have some discretionary leeway to work according to their professional knowledge. While that is appreciated and expected, and taking ownership is praised, heritage and hierarchy can make it difficult to actually operate in that way. Respondent eleven describes how hierarchy influences taking ownership:

> R11: "*Very hierarchy. I mean: the German-thing. So hierarchy does matter. But this also relate to changes or influence let's say, so when I used to work in* [Company X] *you could make a lot of changes because it's not a very hierarchy company. Very flat. So you can go to management and say I really have a good idea, let's try that. And if they like it: pff, let's do that! Here, you have to go many, so many people, ehh- that can no- not many people can make decisions and it has to go*

through a lot of, eh- a lot of hierarchies in order to make a very- a decision that will in the end will make an impact."

I: "*And how- because you have your earlier experience, how does that affect your work?"*

R11: *"It makes you less eh, creative, not creative but, when you come to a new place you have a lot of ideas and you want to make a lot of changes eh- so you realize soon that: okay, let's choose your battles. Really choose one or two things that really makes a difference for you and that you really want to do, focus on that. Because you cannot make a lot of changes in a short time. You might* [make] *one or two in a* ***very long time****. So, choose your battles, or choose the things that really wa- you really want to make a difference. And focus on them, because otherwise you will not succeed."* – R11 [bold = emphasized by respondent]

Organizational actors in the headquarter are mainly experienced professionals. It is expected that these people work autonomously, and "*take ownership"*. But, as respondent eleven described, it can be difficult to transform your ideas into practice due to the hierarchical nature of the company. In times of change, taking ownership seems to be especially important. According to respondents, dealing with change is about taking initiative. It is expected of the professionals to simply *"deal with it"*. Respondent nine explains that the outcome of change is determined by how individuals respond to it and manage it themselves:

"Especially right now with everything going on, of course the change is happening rather quickly. But I think it's about making it work. Ja? Ehm- 'Cause none of these things that you're doing are, you know, necessarily geared towards eh- they're certainly not geared towards breaking anything you know? So it's – to me the- the change is highly determined by the how you as an individual deal with it." –R9

The responsibility to deal with change is thus placed at the individual. Being a part of the change helps you build something that you can later be a part of. In setting up the Delta workstreams for example, respondents recalled how it could take a while before an approach was agreed. One respondent shared how organization members went back and forth without coming to a first draft of the process for weeks. At that point, this respondent decided to take the initiative to draft a process and propose it in the next meeting to build on that. This is one small example of multiple similar cases of taking ownership. In these examples, respondents were proud to *"make their mark"*. People feel committed to the company and are motivated to develop with the organization. Respondent nine clearly explains what he means by taking ownership, and how that can benefit people in their work in times of change:

"You need to be ready to do it and you need to be able to take ownership. It's not if you, if you wait for it, if you wait for somebody to– ask you, normally, that can work as well, but it let's say its not as- yeah it doesn't generate as much potential. […] *It doesn't get you as far. As if you try to be on the leading side of the change. So therefore, ja I – my basically, let's say my general view has been that always when it comes to changes - change normally is always good. But the way that you kind of appreciate the change the best is if you put yourself into a mode where you shape it early yourself. Right? So, and if you, if you get in early in to these change programs, if you embrace it, then you get to also shape it, mold it a little bit, the way that you think it's right. And that, you know, is- makes it a lot easier for you to deal with it."* –R9

Being involved in the change helps organization members understand what is going on and enables people to act on changes. That way, organization members are not in the reactive mode but are proactively shaping it themselves. This group of respondents views change as an opportunity to create something new (*"make their mark")*.

4.2.1 The outsiders' perspective on shaping change

Not all organization members seem to have the same level of access to act on the different changes, however. Several respondents shared examples of how their ability to take ownership was limited. Some respondents, mainly on a managerial level, were able to shape the change early on. Others heard about changes at a later stage, or only experienced the program's outcomes due their functional role. Therefore, this paragraph specifically focuses on those that perceived themselves to be outsiders to change. These respondents did not experience a lot of impact of Delta on their role. They were aware of what was happening and thus offered me their more general perception of the program. At the same time, these people played a role in communicating the change (either formally or informally) to their colleagues in the areas. They felt the impact of change in the sense that processes they follow in their day-to-day work changed, as well as roles and responsibilities of people in their direct work environment.

> *"It's obviously in my interest to help people to follow the processes and the changes and make sure they get along with everything here. And I am helping the people also to understand this process and if I don't, then I walk to people who have introduced these new processes."* –R20

They offered somewhat of an outsiders' perspective on (self-)managing change, since they were only reactively dealing with changes. Respondent thirteen is one of these respondents. He has experienced various change programs over the years, and became more sceptical of the impact the different change programs have had, and the impact Delta has had so far:

> *"The change programs One Nixdorf, x, y, z. Whatever they were called. I would, if I was being frank, have they been executed? That would be my question. Have they been executed to full? Or have they been executed to a certain position, or level. And then that last, or second, or third phase has been said "Oh, we don't have to do that". So in theory, these change programs have all been good. They've all been defined by so-called industry experts or consultants or whatever. So they must be good.* […] *But have they been executed the way the people who designed them, have they been executed that way or has* [pauzes shortly], *which is my feeling, Wincor Nixdorf taken those designs and said: "Oh, let's make them Wincor Nixdorf".*" – R13

This respondent argued that change programs involve restructuring and another way of working in terms of dealing with processes and collaborating with different organizational units. He, along with other respondents, feels like many changes do not stick because the final stages of the program are skipped or changed quickly after initial communication. Several respondents shared they feel this is related to organizational actors on a managerial level not wanting to change, since it might impact them and their areas of responsibility. A group of respondents feel this is a positive thing, since a manager can then *"shield"* his team against changes that are irrelevant (R10, 'Communication': 4.2.1). Not all changes are relevant to all organizational levels, and a manager can enable his team to work without worrying about

minor changes in other parts of the organization. Other respondents perceive the shaping of change respondent twelve was referring to as something that can have a suboptimal impact on the effect of change, because it is not really breaking with previous behaviour then.

> *"We didn't really take probably the advice to say: "Okay, we execute it as you proposed it to us"."* – R18

Respondents explained that shaping the change can also mean removing some of its core benefits, because people continue on in the same mind-set as before and only carry out those changes that are not a huge break from previous behaviour. Respondent thirteen explains that by shaping that part of the change that is impacting the management level, intended benefits of the change program are diluted:

> *"So you are removing a lot of the benefits which such a change program- which can be very dramatic."* – R13

Other outsiders to shaping the change felt like people were trying to better their own positions, instead of looking out for the best interest of the organization. Respondent five represents these respondents with the following quote:

> *"To put it nicely, I think right now there are also quite a lot of people that ehm-* [pauzes five seconds] *are trying to- to put down their structure in which, in which they create a good position for themselves, let's say. And if you don't put it that nicely, it is about you saving your own ass."* – R5

Respondents usually paused a lot while sharing these details and specifically asked me to not quote them on the topic. After reassuring respondents that I would not use their names and switch respondent numbers around, they eventually would share their more critical views. After the recording stopped, many respondents asked me whether their accounts were not *"too negative"*. It says something about how people do not want to be too negative on change, and want to build the organization further while recognizing its challenges. At the same time, one could interpret this as people fearing for their positions and not wanting to criticize the company. The account of respondent thirteen on the execution of change was the first time this happened, in relation to the implementation of changes by management to a certain extent:

> *"So and, this is what I am saying. The change program was only executed 'till a certain level. Wasn't continued.* […] *The management that caused the problem in the first case, which the change program tried to maybe restructure, change their working, do whatever. They said: "Ah, we don't need that, we just stop". Ja? That's what I am saying. This is me, don't quote me on that. But this is my perception of how the, this is my- as a normal worker."* – R13

4.2.3 Change frequency and living the change

Respondents spoke about the importance of management *"living the change"*. Not only do professionals need to be able to act on changes in their everyday work, management needs to internalize new approaches as well. It enables the rest of the organization members to act on the changes as it clarifies the expected behaviour. Although these people are mainly experienced professionals, they felt it was challenging to act on all of the changes without knowing what was expected from them and when. Obviously, this relates back to the earlier discussion on transparency of information and communication as well. Living the change and having support on a managerial level can make or break change execution, according to respondents.

> *"In the end it is essential that management wants it. That they want to change and that the board and* [manager X] *and his peers also want it, if they do not want it then we cannot work in that way. And the whole organization can't. And you noticed, simply, there is- was a certain kind of resistance. Ehm- because, you know, let's just do it in the traditional way* […] *the way we are doing it since the last hundred years."* – R10

Having support on the managerial level gives legitimacy to decisions. The picture of the tension between the professional and the hierarchical organization is becoming clearer at this point. Employees appreciate processes that enable their work to follow certain structures, as well as clear roles and responsibilities. At the same time, professionals are looking for some flexibility to handle according to their own judgement. There seems to be a tension between the need for more processes and the processes changing so frequently none of them really stick. Respondent twenty explains that more processes help him in his work, although flexibility went down:

> *"We have been very successful in being very customer-driven and not following too many processes. I think in the last couple of years due to growth and also the necessity to implement some processes, we ehm- we on the other, on the one hand we lost some flexibility and some ehm, ja, let's say, call it flexibility but we also implemented the necessary processes to- to allow for growth because I do realize that with the ambitions we have you cannot just do project by project without following a clear strategy and process"* –R20

Respondents accept that flexibility goes down when an organization matures, although they indicate that processes being subject to change every few weeks are also not ideal. What makes keeping up with these changes difficult, is that it is not always clear when a new process is adopted (see communication 4.1.1). Some examples of how new processes get communicated are that they are sent out via e-mail, uploaded on the intranet, or shared in a meeting where it was immediately required to be used. When I asked how they deal with that level of unclarity, most respondents told me that that was simply the way things go around here. Several respondents spoke about the typical Wincor way. Respondent five shortly explains the attitude for us:

> *"Well then you bring something up like: "How can this be?" And then you get: "Yes. Yes. That is typical Wincor." And then that's it."* – R5

So, parts of these frequently changing processes are not sticking. It results in a reluctant acceptance of the way things are, and irony-filled jokes about it being typical for Wincor. Besides jokingly accepting that this is "*the Wincor way"*, respondents state that they also simply ignore parts of the changes when that helps them carry out their tasks. Ignoring change in this case means professionals use their discretionary leeway, earned from their experience in the company, to justify that their way is the right way to approach a certain task. Hierarchy plays a role in respondent's ability to ignore change and work according to their professional opinion. Respondent thirteen phrases it as follows:

> *"You can't ignore it, but what you try to do is you say, well you know, the goal is still the same. The objective is still to get to there* [holds out arm], *to get to Z. Ja. And I'm at A. Ja. Okay, how do I get to A. Well, in the past I would go right, left, right, left. Now I have to go a bit left and right, left, left right. Ehm- Just. The bits I can ignore, I will ignore. Because I know they won't for me, in my work, what I'm doing- don't make sense. Other people and other projects, other software, other tasks, they make sense. But because of m- the field I'm in, the field I do. And it may be just specific for me. I have it- I can ignore them. I can say: "Doesn't bother me". Ja. And it doesn't have any effect on me. That process, that change, that thing they did does not affect me. And I make that decision, and I just ignore it. Where it does affect me or if I had a- something where I say okay, hang on actually I do have, I will do it. I will participate in the process. I will initiate the process. I will start the process. Then I will do it. But that's the luxury I have. In what I am doing.* […] *But I can do it. I can ignore certain things, because of what I do."* – R13

After first stating it is not possible to ignore the overall changes that are going on, he continues on by explaining that the parts that he *can* ignore, he will. This respondent distances himself from other people and other parts of the company by saying that although he can do so because of his field, that does not mean others would or should also ignore changes. Ignoring parts of change is possible, since they are not communicated in a way that the whole company is up to speed with the latest adjustments. Professionals thus have some room for their own interpretation of the change program, affecting how the change is translated into practice. Moreover, respondents shared that due to their experience or their knowledge about the product, they usually know what is the right way to go. When you relate that to change, implementing change becomes especially challenging. Respondent twenty contributes to this topic with the following statement:

> *"I think at Wincor here, everybody can make a decision whether he really lives the change or whether he lives it and lets it pass. So it would be my – it would be my vision that ehm- we are a little bit more precise in what really needs to be done and ehm- make a careful decision what needs to be changed. But then consequently perform the change end-to-end, measure it and then say okay: done."* – R20

Several respondents continued on this train of thought. They generally agreed that change is good and necessary for Wincor Nixdorf, with Delta being the prime example. On the other hand, these people have worked in a certain way for a long time and have a lot of professional experience. Their knowledge about the products, the processes and the level of autonomy they enjoy in their work makes it difficult to implement each and every change. Especially when processes change very frequently, employees feel like they can distance themselves from the changes they do not perceive as ideal or if they take too much time to adjust to. Professionals

do see the usefulness of change and are thus "open" to change. Respondent ten explains how the frequency of change influences the openness to change of organization members:

> *"I think we are definitely open to change. Ehm- but that maybe the change frequency is often a little bit too high. So ehm- the one improvement action or change action is not over yet, is not implemented yet, or the next one is already planned and parallel to that one a third one is started." – R10*

Frustration starts when processes change too frequently. Respondents emphasize that processes and structures are important to be able to do their work. Especially when communicating with the areas, it is important to follow certain structures to enable collaboration. All these different areas are basically sub-organizations with each having their own local customs, issues and priorities. The problem with being process-driven is that the organization can become inflexible, while the problem with being too flexible is that everybody randomly does something they consider to be the best approach. The current struggle is that processes seem to get adjusted shortly after they are communicated to the organization. Or, respondents state, processes are communicated which are not agreed upon yet leading to confusion about which process to actually follow in practice. Respondent five spoke about the tension between hierarchy and processes of the organization, while at the same time allowing people to ignore those processes in some situations:

> *"And maybe also- you need to see how you phrase this in your report, but you do notice that this is a German organization. Meaning that hierarchy, and eh- processes are considered to be very important. So I think that is pretty difficult sometimes, that that is very important at certain points in time, and then in another situation we all allow that people work completely passed it. And that, yes, I think that is very strange." – R5*

Although change is frequent, organization members are used to change and recognize its importance for the company. As stated before, the need for change seems to be clear and accepted by everyone. Several respondents indicate that the reason for this open attitude to change is due to the mix of backgrounds and the modern office set-up. People came here from different jobs and were open to change in the sense that they moved their jobs. Others did not only move jobs, but also countries. This makes it a *"dynamic"* group of people that was attracted by the new organization (R8; R15; R16; R18; R20).

4.2.4 Sub-conclusion: professionals, hierarchy and change

Wincor Nixdorf's professionals want to take ownership and shape changes. They feel committed to make their mark and want to help the organization grow. There seems to be a different level of access to shaping changes based on functional roles. A group of people was involved early on to help build the changes and define the foundations. In that sense, it stimulated the implementation of change because people were motivated to participate actively. The others, I referred to them as the outsiders, were only able to reactively deal with changes. The level of involvement in changes relates to the perception of changes in the sense that outsiders tended to be more critical of the execution of change. This created a slowing force on the implementation of change. The high frequency of change made it more difficult

for professionals to act on changes. It contributed to people ignoring some changes according to their own professional judgment, and created more unclarity for organizational actors.

4.3 Changing roles and responsibilities

> *"And a different person, a different vision, hm?* [Manager X – new manager] *has undoubtedly received certain tasks from management and he will have a different perception which is why things will change again."* – R5

The next hot topic during the interviews was the multiple management changes that went on in the office. People left the organization, people were placed in different roles and people joined the organization. Every now and then organizational members got an email with the latest change of roles, but often it silently changed or changes were communicated in a new organization chart. Many of the respondents told me these changing roles and responsibilities were key moments of change for them. Changes in management meant a change in the way Delta was managed (4.3.1). At the same time, people entering and leaving is everyday life in this organization. Although respondents considered it to be normal for people in organizations to enter and leave frequently, it is relevant to look into the impact it had on the professionals in the headquarter. In paragraph 4.3.2, I describe how people leaving the organization affected the execution of changes both positively and negatively.

4.3.1 Delta and the changing headquarter-area collaboration

> *"The headquarter is not the most popular unit- unit when you talk to an area, because usually headquarter comes with: you have to do this and that and they have requests on numbers and they want it instantly. Ja, so the areas actually have to deal with the customer and then headquarter comes and you have to fill in tons of questionnaires or excel sheets or whatsoever.* […] *So they are really fed up because they say: "We have to focus on our business", and that's why it's so difficult for them."* – R1

Delta is set up in a way that the people from the software headquarter work together with the areas to implement changes regarding the software side of the business. The headquarter is still relatively young, but has seen a big change in approaching the areas already. Respondents shared that the headquarter was first set up with a top-down approach to the areas. Areas were ordered to deliver data to the headquarter, enabling the headquarter to define processes and directions. Areas were used to operate independently, as small organizations under the bigger organizational umbrella of Wincor Nixdorf. With the change program before Delta, called One Wincor, a centralization effort was started that aimed to standardize the way business was done around the globe. As respondent one shared, with the growth of the business came global customers that expected a similar way of working in different countries. The centralization effort meant a top-down approach of headquarter towards the areas. Initially, Delta continued with this approach. Respondent three explains the way they worked clearly in the next quote, branding it the 'patronizing approach':

"Pretty much a year ago, when we were still in the patronizing approach, […] *I was really chasing the people in the areas* […] *And that's what I mean with patronizing, so we told them really on an operational level what to do. And ehm – well you know, I mean, if I was feeling comfortable with that or not, really doesn't matter because* [knocks on table] *it's the job and I did it and I succeeded so that was okay. Ehm- because we hit the target basically*." – R3

As the story of respondent three suggests, the approach of the headquarter in managing Delta, and collaborate with the areas in general, changed over time. Respondents shared this was changed because the areas as well as headquarter organization members recognized it was not the way to go and independently shared it with the board. This message coming from both directions helped contribute to the change, as respondent seven explains:

"That basically was the trigger to change things. That the areas were also in direct contact with the executive board and that they got the same message. Because at a certain point in time that message came from the HQ, as well as from the areas, and the executive board then decided to implement some changes. But that should then, at that point in time, first happen at that level before we can of course incorporate it in the actual execution of the program." – R7

For the people working on Delta, it became clear in the months before that the patronizing approach was no longer viable. Although they recognized it, it was only changed after the areas also communicated a similar message to the board that the executive board agreed to change the approach. Not only this needed to happen to enable change actions, according to respondents a change in management around that time further helped to actually install that change in the headquarter's approach. Respondent seven explains how a change in leadership gave the change the boost it needed to succeed:

"But you felt that, okay, this does not give the maximum result and at a certain point you have, let's say, have a leadership change. If there is a leadership change, in terms of the program manager as well as the overall responsible manager as well as the managing director are moved out, move away – then you have a new impetus, new impulses. And then you can implement that." – R7

From a patronizing approach, the headquarter went into a more supporting approach. This was in line with the role every respondent described the headquarter should have in their eyes: supporting the areas and their business. Respondent three explains the approach clearly, referring to the new approach as the 'supporting approach':

"And today it's a similar situation but with a different approach, because today it really is the supportive approach where ehm- and that's what I hear from the people ehm- they basically see us more like, mentors. Like, really, you know, mentoring them and you know supporting them and helping them and being more in a dialogue. Instead of, like a year ago, where it was actually more like a one-way conversation. And ehm- well for them, apparently- I am very sure for them it is much more comfortable." – R3

4.3.2 Leaving and entering the organization

Changing roles and responsibilities did not only mean a different approach of the headquarter in working with the rest of the organization. In the next two paragraphs I zoom back into the level of people's perceptions of changes within the headquarter. In this case, leaving and joining the headquarter is split into two paragraphs. 4.3.2.1 covers the two perceptions organization members had on people leaving the organization and its impact on change implementation. Paragraph 4.3.2.2 offers a description on how changing roles and responsibilities resulted in more cohesion between teams, as well as increased individualism of organization members.

4.3.2.1 Mature people versus legacy people

> *"The team was real mature, a lot of people I know since, I know for twenty, twenty-five years. I saw many, many of them disappearing, because of Delta. Many many decided to leave or were kind of forced to leave."* – R15

Two challenges with experienced people in the organization came up: 1) the problem of mature people leaving, and; 2) the problem of legacy people becoming rusty and stuck in routines. In a complex industry like that of Wincor Nixdorf, people with experience and in-depth knowledge are especially valuable. Respondents referred to these people as *"mature people"*. These people are experts on their topics, and are especially crucial in driving projects in times of changing roles and responsibilities. Respondents shared the example of the global delivery centres (GDCs). Resources were moved to the GDC under Delta, as a cost-cutting exercise as well as a standardization effort. In the process, however, mature people had to leave the organization and new people joined in the two GDCs in Katowice and Plzen. Even if these new members have expert knowledge on topics, they need to become familiar with the specific products Wincor Nixdorf offers before being on a comparable level with the people that left. Respondent thirteen explains:

> *"I have the consequences of Delta. Where resources that were there because of the Delta- one of the key areas of Delta, if I remember correctly, was, I think it was Delta, was the creation of these so-called Global Delivery hubs in Prague and Katowice- or not Prague: Plzen. The consequence of that was* [knocks on table] *that projects* [knocks on table] *have been either:* [knocks on table] *we could not deliver, or: the reason why we had this late call, was because- I was in a call, because we didn't have the resources. Because the people, we had in the past, who could have delivered a project, have left the company. And we haven't re-trained, we haven't developed these resources internally."* – R13

Besides people leaving due to the nearshoring exercise of the GDCs, people left for other organizations by choice. One part of the restructuring program was people leaving the organization, as respondents recognized is often the case. Organization members that have been with the company for a long time have felt the impact of their peers leaving more than newer members. They built relationships and were used to work together for a decade or two, especially relevant if you consider the discussion on the importance of the informal network in 4.1.2.

"They offered this Delta program thing- payment to all the employees. And it's not the employees that you want to loose that leave. […] *But what happened with the Delta in general, in R&D and wherever, not only in Professional Services, there was this offer about- if you resign you get this payment, of whatever. And this was also taken by many people that know that wherever they go they immediately go- they get a new job. So it's nothing better for them, to say: "okay, why- Why should I stay here? Maybe the future of the company is not as secure anymore or whatever. So better I take the money and I know I will get a job in the next month"."* – R15

Respondent fifteen's story on people leaving is the account of someone that is first of all disappointed in seeing colleagues leave. Besides that, the quote paints a similar picture as respondent thirteen's account on the effect of moving resources to the GDCs. Mature people left the organization either by choice or due to their jobs being moved to the GDC. An important addition is: *"Maybe the future of the company is not as secure anymore"*. Apparently, people left because of insecurity and feeling like another company could offer them something better than Wincor Nixdorf could. Although a group of respondents felt like these mature people leaving is a big loss, there is also a different view on the topic.

"And I think people who are most surprised, you know, if you are used since ten years to work for the same person and then immediately change comes, then you are entirely surprised. Ja. But if change comes every year and you know it's more a kind of a flow, then it's not a big surprise to people so people can navigate in an organization and you do not have all the dust on the tables, ja. And all the, ja really these eh, this heavily carved environment. So people are very much more open. Because change is not, it's not a management task. You know, you can just manage successfully change if it's in the head of everybody and everybody is committed." – R8

The second challenge for the organization with a large group of experienced people is that these people are unwilling to change, and are thus actually slowing change execution down. People with a lot of experience and knowledge can be out of touch with the modern challenges of the industry. In that case, respondents did not refer to the experienced professionals as "mature people", but as "legacy people". Respondent ten shares how it made sense to let some experienced people go:

"Well, I wasn't really surprised. I mean, I was walking around here for a year and I saw that we did have some fat on our bones. In HQ as well as in the areas. Eh- the market was, is, was-is, under pressure, so, ehm- ja. I did have the mindset of: yes, this doesn't really surprise me. You know, a worldwide company with 10.000 people, lots of legacy systems, lots of legacy people also, especially in Germany. Ehm- so I think in essence, yes, in my whole professional life I have experienced reorganizations, and let's say the slimming down and those kinds of things, so it's really a little bit- it wasn't unexpected." – R10

This quote mentions "[…] *legacy systems, lots of legacy people also* […]". The respondent continued to explain that due to systems and people being in the company for a long time, the company became inflexible. The systems are not supporting challenges of the current time, making work harder instead of easier. "Legacy people" are not developing with the company and become stuck in older routines. Respondent seventeen explains:

"People say: "I always did it this way, why would I change?" That's a part of a change process. "I am doing it this way for twenty years, why would I change that now after all these years?"." – R17

Respondents thus perceive people leaving in two ways: 1) change execution was slowed down by valuable mature colleagues leaving the organization due to increased uncertainty, and; 2) change execution was stimulated by legacy people leaving the organization, since they had become stuck in routines.

4.3.2.2 Movers and commuters

"[Manager X] *as our manager or our main manager, so if I would say it was* [manager Y], *then* [manager Z], *then* [manager Y]. *So we lost* [Manager Z] *and* [manager Y] *and* [manager Z] *out of nowhere, and then* [manager Y] *changed his role as well. So we were completely without management. So, yes, so everyone started to talk to everyone. Because we lost- kind of direction. At the end, it was not a bad thing. But it might become chaos in a different organization or with different people."* – R11

The company is organized in a matrix structure, which means teams fall under a functional reporting line and a dotted line with both responsible managers having fifty per cent say in decision-making. The matrix structure was already in place before Delta. In the Delta period, roles and responsibilities changed. Just like processes discussed earlier in paragraph 4.2, these roles and responsibilities are subject to frequent change and are not as frequently communicated as they are changed. Respondents shared that it contributed to coordination between teams in the sense that people needed to work together. Respondents, like respondent eleven, shared that there were certain moments they did not have a manager, or did not know who their manager was. Changing roles and responsibilities actually contributed to collaboration and change implementation, because organization members were able to work out together what they needed to do. It showed once again that this group of professionals works autonomously. Furthermore, it contributed to team cohesion. People were used to working independently, but due to frequent changes in processes and management they needed to look to each other more than ever to align their actions. Teams in the headquarter looked to each other to divide tasks, growing closer in the process. Respondent seventeen describes how the headquarter teams are collaborating more:

"There is way more, there is much more a team being built at the moment. That is still in progress, though. But ehm- there is much more a team also to really, like a unit, to operate like a team. Also because that unit is now […] stands for the same objectives now. Exactly the same objectives this time." – R17

Respondent seventeen shortly references objectives of the teams now being the same. Other respondents shared how conflicting objectives were an important factor contributing to divisions between teams. Within teams, people would work closely together. Respondent eight explains why teams did not collaborate well with other teams:

"Everybody has his own KPI – do not underestimate the power of KPI. So everybody is being and needs to be measured on concrete numbers, ja. And these numbers are KPIs. Could be chargeability, could be net sales, could be incoming orders, EBITA, something like this. Ja. And for example if I am sitting on an organization which is let's say steered on one KPI, I do not personally, I do not interest – I am not so much interested in the KPI you know my colleague, my colleague is being measured, managed on, ja? So and, and this was, we were steering the organization in a wrong way. And this is something we recognized." – R8

Apparently, this has changed. Objectives were aligned and people were able to work together more closely in the Utrecht office. Respondents shared that the Utrecht office helped them find people better, simply because they now worked in the same physical environment. The office matured over time in its approach, as well as in its connection between organization members. People now know each other better and are used to the set-up. Although the collaboration between teams improved, there still seems to be a way to go:

R20: *"The eh- the collaboration between the different units in Utrecht ehm, is very limited.* […] *Retail is okay. What should be more is with PS. So I think if there is room for improvement then the open communication and working together with PS should be- should be improved"*
I: *"And why is that not with PS, you think?"*
R20: "*I don't know. Ehm – I really don't know, but if I would be a manager I would on both sides, I would force this. To work closer together. And we do work together, but it's individual people working together. And that works pretty well. But the overall organization that we feel like okay, let's- we are now together here in Utrecht, let's do this together and let's fix issues without finger pointing ehm – is not enough. I don't know why that is."* – R20

So, people collaborate closely mainly *within* teams. Collaboration *between* teams is less well established, although it has improved since the first set-up of the office as respondent ten shared with us. In parallel to Delta and other changes the office matured as an organization, which contributed to collaboration between teams. Collaboration and cohesion among the organization members grew as the office matured and people were around longer. On the other hand, respondent ten recalls that people started look out for themselves more due to increased uncertainty that came with Delta:

"I also saw that in the sense that we, ja, were really focusing on cost-cutting and thus could not hire unlimited resources anymore. That in the spirit of Delta it was really closely examined like- who is needed where at which location. […] And just people around you that kind of freeze due to Delta. Who think: "Well okay, I am now watching what I am doing precisely and I am not going to take any risks for a while, I am just going to keep doing what I am doing." And you notice that. That you notice in the organization as well." – R10

Delta influenced organization members' perceived level of certainty and security within the organization. Several respondents shared examples of co-workers not wanting to implement certain changes before it was sure they would last, or before they got a sign from others (e.g management) that it was "*okay*". That is what respondent ten also shared, in explaining how people took less risk. It relates back to every level of the organization *"living the change"*, and being impacted by the frequency of changes as discussed earlier in this

chapter. During my research, it was clear that the company would be taken over by American competitor Diebold after institutional approval was secured. That knowledge further added to the level of uncertainty and people's implementation of changes. Since it was unsure what the new company would look like, people preferred to wait with implementation of changes before executing something only for it to be changed again after a few months. On the other hand, people are very used to dealing with changes and people leaving the organization. Respondent twelve explains:

> *"I think it is especially remarkable that for all those people, that actually so much has changed already and that they just go on so easily. That really is due to the set-up of this organization, because with other organizations I would have been way more in shock or ehm- that would have been more of a pressure on people, if you work with them really closely in a team and you are really fond of each other and have been working together for years. And if people then leave, that has more of an impact and now it is more normal, because the contacts are all a little bit more superficial due to everything."* – R12

People leaving the organization frequently thus contributed to individualism. People look out for themselves more than in stable environments. At the same time, respondent twelve explained that people focusing on their own work has also helped them deal with changes. Respondent twelve clarifies the point further in the next quote:

> *"So the set up of this company makes it, I think, easier for people to just continue. Because it is all* […] *change is a relatively constant factor here. And flexibility and absence of people, and ehm, so yes, I think it is because of that.* […] *You're not used to everyday being the same, he."* – R12

People are frequently absent, because they travel back and forth between areas, Paderborn and wherever their homes are. A group of people in the office moved to Utrecht when it was set up, while another group of people commuted between their homes and workspace. This means they come in on Mondays and leave for their homes, mostly in Germany, on Thursdays or Fridays. In the words of respondent thirteen:

> *"I was a mover from day one. So there's different phases. There is people who travel and there's people who are movers.* […] *So* [manager X]*, my boss, or my line manager. I don't know, what do you want to call him- but anyway.* [Colleague Y]*, and myself, we moved from Paderborn. Or from Germany to Holland. So we were movers. And there are people are travelled, Mondays. And Fridays, or home on Thursdays."* – R13

Multiple respondents spoke about the difference between the 'Movers' and the 'Commuters'. Movers were often proud of their decision to move *"from day one"*. Since people go in and out of the office on a regular basis anyway, it is less noticeable if people leave the organization. Both managers and non-managers have movers and commuters among them. This feeds into a higher level of individualism and autonomy as well, since people are used to not having all their co-workers in the office at all times.

4.3.3 Sub-conclusion: changing roles and responsibilities

Delta was paired with management changes and people leaving the organization. Changing roles and responsibilities turned out to be an impulse for changing the way Delta was managed. From a top-down approach, the program management moved to a more cooperative approach. This supportive approach was considered to be best by respondents and something that came with maturing of the headquarter. Legacy people versus mature people show two different interpretations and thus experiences of the same topic. Whereas a group of respondents recognized that experienced people leaving the organization had a negative impact on their job since they lost a group of experts, other respondents felt these people were stuck in older routines and needed to go in order for change to happen. Finally, respondents argued that the change program had contributed to individualism and people *"freezing"* in everyday routines. At the same time, the program made people look to each other for figuring out the new organizational reality, leading to cohesion among colleagues.

4.3 Sub-Conclusion: Translating change into practice

> *"Consequently, it is a culture riddled with contradictions between ideological depictions and alternative realities: where democratization is claimed, there are also subtle forms of domination; where clarity of meaning and purpose is attempted, there is intentional and deeply ingrained ambiguity; where an overarching morality is preached, there is also opportunistic cynicism; and where fervent commitment is demanded, there is pervasive irony."*
>
> – Kunda, 2006; 222

Three main tensions can be recognized in the case of Wincor Nixdorf: 1) control versus autonomy; 2) insiders versus outsiders to change, and; 3) divisions. These divisions are A) between departments in the spatial/functional dimension of Parker (1995), noticeable by the physical use of the office and variations in their lived experiences of Delta and other change; B) between manager and professional, Parker's (1995) functional division, noticeable by different levels of access and support of change, and; C) Parker's (1995) generational division is the last one, as there is a group of people with very strong networks and experience with the company versus a group of people with external experiences or that started when the office in Utrecht was set-up. It is very clear that the reasons for Delta were understood by every respondent in the headquarter and along divisional lines. The framing of the change program made sense to people. Translating the communication is a way to control the message. In formal communication about the program, however, the translation to the individual and group levels missed. People were able to access information about Delta, but it was only high-level information. It led to people looking in their own networks to find out more detailed information, leading to the change message being translated into more pessimistic and dramatic interpretations. Managers basically missed the opportunity to funnel the interests of the change program, and professionals set out to look for it. Professionals expressed they missed direction at certain points, due to changes in management and undetailed communication. At the same time, it made professionals look to colleagues for direction and alignment on Delta as well as everyday topics, leading to processes of shared sensemaking within and between groups. People going to each other contributed to a shared interpretation of the message and deeper connections between teams and individuals. Multiplicity of changes, changes originating from both the program and continuous change flows of everyday organizational life, enabled people to change fundamental approaches in their daily

work. People are committed to act in the best interest of the organization and want to make their mark. The combination of the Delta program team recognizing collectively a change in approach was needed, the changes in management and the maturing organization of the headquarter enabled organization members to make the change in approach in collaborating with the areas, for example. Not all organization members were involved in Delta, and these 'outsiders' experienced more difficulties in change execution. Although Delta did not impact all of them directly, they are part of the same organization that is undergoing those multiple changes. Some of these changes affect all divisions of the organization, while others do not. Outsiders became more focused on their everyday work and adopted a wait-and-see approach, opposite to the desired taking of ownership. Making sense of changes in different processes was then done on an individual level, even leading to professionals using their autonomy to ignore certain changes.

5. Delta: a vehicle for meaningful change

Between sixty and seventy per cent of planned change efforts fail (Beer, 2000; Burnes, 2004). Does this mean large-scale planned change should never be used in practice again? Despite inevitable tensions between plan and practice, changes were realized in the case of Wincor Nixdorf through the formal program's execution process. The case of Wincor Nixdorf showed that the process of a change program (1) makes organization members rethink organizational reality actively; (2) offers structure and direction to processes of sensemaking and thus actions of autonomous professionals in complex environments, and; (3) enables connections between divisions in multi-layered organizations in the process.

5.1 Rethinking organizational reality

Looking at the process and experiences of organization members in the headquarter showed that organization members actively rethought organizational reality. Where formal communication fell short organization members looked to each other for additional information, making sense of the program together and turning ideas into reality. Some took on a fatalistic, wait-and-see approach and were seemingly reactive in shaping change. In everyday practice, however, these professionals were in contact with the areas and thus had an impact on the perception of change in other company units. Just like the pessimistic interpretation of other company units reaches the headquarter professional, so does the action or inaction of the headquarter professional reach the other company units. If we consider the importance of momentum in continuous change, reactive approaches are not ideal (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998). Organizational actors shape organizational success and failure. Actively rethinking organizational reality is a process that all members contribute to, even if they do so reactively or from the sidelines. Like Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) argued, the process of implementation is a dual one, where ideas are formed and enacted first in the definition phase by managers and program members; and secondly shaped, re-interpreted, and enacted in the execution phase by professionals in practice. In the case of Wincor Nixdorf, the missing translation to the people really meant a dual implementation, where new interpretations led to re-evaluations of Delta's objectives and differences in interpretations eventually meant changing roles and responsibilities.

I started this thesis with Czarniawska and Sevón's (1996) quote on the translation of ideas into practice. Translation of ideas into practice is not done only by setting up a program and communicating it to the organization. Rather, ideas are assessed and judged, used and discarded, until a more or less shared objectification comes to life in everyday practice (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996). The change in headquarter approach from top-down to supportive was not a planned objective for example, but the process of executing the program did enable organization members to address existing issues in area-headquarter collaboration. Context, time and space mattered in addressing these issues. For one, the combination of management change and areas recognizing the same issue offered the impulse to break with the previous approach. Historically, areas are used to being independent sub-units within the company. Centralizing similar processes to enable the organization to deal with global issues made sense. When asked what respondents considered to be the main role of the headquarter, the answer always was "*supporting the areas*". Centralization first meant a top-down approach in demanding information from areas, for example. Later on, its meaning was re-defined to constitute the 'supportive approach'. Centralization now means support and expert advice from headquarter members, with areas being experts of the business in their local contexts and processes as a way to support collaboration.

5.2 Structuring sensemaking processes in complex environments

Change is translated into practice in different and unanticipated ways. Communication can be done extensively, but still fall short in funnelling the interests of various organizational actors. Whittle et al. (2010) recognized change needs to be translated to the various organizational divisions by change agents to show actors it is in their best interest to participate. In the case of Wincor Nixdorf this translation was missing, leading to justifications for ignoring change; opportunities to withhold information; frustration; gossip; individualism from fear of what is coming next, and; divisions between groups able to shape and unable to shape change. Although these slowing forces on change execution definitely are meaningful, the stimulating forces were just as meaningful. The program forced people to collectively shape new interpretations and their related actions, adding to cohesion, enabling the organization to learn and mature in the process. Although actors of different levels interpreted the objective of "transformation to software/services organization" differently in practice, the general necessity of the change program was shared and understood. It basically was a continuation of the strategic direction chosen when setting up the Software headquarter in Utrecht. The company managed to translate that part of the change message to the people and connect it with their lived experiences in the company. Now, the context of the software headquarter might have influenced the recognition and support for the program. Of course it is in the best interest of the software-people to support that transition, as they will most likely benefit in the future. Hardware-people, however, probably have a different experience. This was apparent in the stories of those people with bigger networks and links to Paderborn: the more pessimistic interpretation and stories came partially from people in the hardware domain who lost colleagues or had to leave themselves. Some level of resistance will be inevitable in any restructuring program where people leave the organization after years of service. At the same time, change agents could have done more to enable shared sensemaking and foster actions in line with set goals. Due to hierarchy emergent processes were barely considered, leaving the momentum they generated unused (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1997; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998). Priorities differ between groups, and abilities to act differ between organizational levels and functional groups. A group of people was able to realize meaningful change by addressing existing issues, whereas another group was able to ignore changes and froze due to increased uncertainty.

When processes changed, so did responsibilities and roles. Normative control can be used to structure the change message and guide the interpretations of people, like the funnelling of interest as discussed earlier (Kunda, 2006; Burnes, 2004). Besides the high-level program, communication was limited to zero. Changes in roles and responsibilities were sent out rarely and seemingly at random. As respondent four formulated it: how can you expect people to work following new rules and contact new responsible people, when the changes are not shared? People have to look for additional information, which is a challenge considering the complex environment with its time constraints and continuous changes. To some extent the company was able to structure processes of shared sensemaking, which generated support for the Delta program. At the same time, the translation to the people and specifically the headquarter people was missing. Literally missing in this case, in the sense that respondents suspected change agents had not thought about it before their first communication in the all-hands meeting.

5.3 Enabling connections between divisions

In both previous paragraphs the important shortcoming in change execution is the missing translation to the people. It could have structured processes of shared sensemaking,

potentially making it easier for people to rethink organizational reality as a group and to act on the changes without having to work around different interpretations of abstract classifications (Weick, 2000; de Sonnaville, 2000). It did force people to look to each other, however. Professionals within Wincor Nixdorf are used to their autonomy and independence. If information is not coming to them, they will go out and find it somewhere else. In that sense, the company's formal change agents missed and opportunity to structure the message whereas informal change agents in the form of professionals took up that role together.

Applying Parker's (1995) three divisions helps me to clarify existing divisions found in the case. Parker's (1995) divisions were: a) the spatial/functional division; b) the generational division, and; c) the occupational/functional division. The spatial/functional division in the organization can be recognized by the physical location of teams, first of all. Each team has its own corner in the office. Although it is a flex-working office, most people have the same position on a day-to-day basis. These teams do have minor variations in their sensemaking of change. The team that was shielded by its manager was able to focus on the primary process of everyday work better than others, for example. The 'shielding manager' funnelled the change narrative in such a way that it was easier for team members to enact the relevant changes. The generational division between organization members is clear as well. Some have been working for the company for decades and have established a strong network and routines. They became experts in their fields of work. The people that have just started their careers at Wincor Nixdorf, either as a first step in their career or as a next step, are accepting the change narrative more easily. If we consider the concepts of resilience and adaptability of complexity theory, it makes sense that the 'fresher' people in the organization are able to deal with fluctuations more easily. The experienced organization members are used to change, but have also developed routines for primary processes. When those need to change as well, it is a bigger shock to their system than it is to relatively newer members (Boulton, Allen & Bowman, 2015). Finally, the occupation/funcational division is one of the clearest of the three. There is a divide between banking and retail professionals, a divide between managers and non-managers, between delivery and sales, et cetera, while the company's goal with the setup of the office in Utrecht was to enable collaboration and cohesion between divisions. Respondents felt like in-group and between-group cohesion rose and related it to the maturing of the headquarter organization. People are not always present in the headquarter location, but still know where to find each other via the various digital channels. Experienced people know whom to contact for the right information and thus recognize the importance of relationships throughout the company. The complexity of the environment and the changes in the company enabled people to connect with different divisions, as the necessity to do so grew.

5.4 Planned change as an umbrella for constant change flows

Although the actual translation of change into practice might not be in line exactly with objectives the program set out to reach, it did generate meaningful change in the headquarter location alone through the shared understanding of the necessity to change. Instead of measuring the program's success by its financial impact, I focused on the process of the program. The process showed a development in the way the program itself was managed, which went hand-in-hand with maturing of the organization and flows of changes in management, changes in people, changes in roles and responsibilities, the news of the takeover by Diebold, and so on and so forth. Experiences and interpretations of people were related to their specific context, and the history of individuals as well as that of the company. Commitment was high, with highs and lows related to change flows and peoples positions in the company. It does not help cohesion and trust when organization members feel like

information is hidden. Luckily for the organization, its group of experienced autonomous professionals knows how to navigate the system and make light of situations through ironic jokes with informal connections. Generally, people want to make their mark and are motivated to create a better future for the company. The shared understanding of the need for the change program's strategic direction meant organization members had at least and overall frame in which they could classify emergent processes. That way, the program enabled shared sensemaking.

6. Conclusion

How is change program 'Delta' translated into practice by managers and non-managers and how does this relate to organizational change in everyday practice in Wincor Nixdorf's Software Headquarter?

In the case of Wincor Nixdorf we saw multiple stimulating and slowing forces on change enactment by organizational actors related to the formal program and change in everyday practice. Formal translation efforts were performed in an attempt to convince people of the need for change. Interests were funnelled by arguing this transition was crucial for company independence, thus by stressing how the dynamic environment of the company was forcing them to change. The general objective to 'speed up the transition to a Software/Services organization' made sense especially to people from the Software headquarter, as this was simply continuing on the road they had already been on since the set-up of the office. The need for change as such was thus relatively quickly accepted and understood.

Resistance came from a lack of translation to the people mainly, leading to people looking in their own network for additional information that was often a pessimistic interpretation of the story. The company missed an opportunity by not translating the program in a more detailed way to headquarter organization members. As the headquarter professionals are the connection between multiple levels of the organization, e.g. the areas as well as other headquarter locations, their actions especially have an effect on the entire system. Managers and a small group of non-managers had access to more information of the Delta program, since they were involved in the program team. This group was able to define and shape what the program meant for the business unit Software, contributing to their support for the program. Outsiders to shaping change show more resistance, simply because they experience higher levels of uncertainty of what is coming next. At this level, you see tensions originating from separate processes of sensemaking. When access to information is limited, i.e. the translation to the people is missing; the translation will come from somewhere else. Change agents loose their ability to generate shared sensemaking and can try to, for example, comfort feelings of uncertainty by shielding team members from change. Sensemaking is now done through individual informal networks, contributing to people not taking any risks; ignoring changes and justifying it with arguments of professional expertise; and taking on reactive and fatalistic approaches. Even if translation efforts were only high-level, they did enable organization members to act on change to a certain extent. The professionals of organizations like Wincor Nixdorf are used to their autonomy and independence. As the need for change was accepted and understood, people started to make sense of the actions related to that understanding themselves. Initiatives to change rose and fell, some being collectively organized and others were individual initiatives. The program thus forced organization members to actively rethink organizational reality to enact that shared understanding of the need for change. A shared understanding for the need of change led to several different streams of change, thus offering structure and direction to processes of sensemaking in everyday practice. Finally, the shared understanding of needing to change combined with a lack of managerial control due to management changes led to people looking to each other and collectively and individually growing even closer in the process. The formal channels became less important, as people know they can also navigate the complex organizational dynamic through their informal networks.

Engineering a change program is possible, engineering change in practice is not. We saw that multiple processes led to different interpretations and unexpected outcomes. It cannot be

ideal that the planned program is not adapting to and with the environment it is meant for, and it is not realistic that it does not do so during the process of execution. Emergent processes will impact the ability of people to act on planned change. The opportunity of planned change lies in its formality. It can become the umbrella under which all other changes are classified, offering a shared understanding of change necessity and structure to future (collective) reactions of professionals to emergent change processes. Planned change thus becomes a vehicle in realizing meaningful change and offers direction to continuous change efforts. Emergent change theorists state that sixty to seventy per cent of planned change efforts fail in reaching their planned objectives (Burnes, 2004; Beer, 2000). They did not, however, consider the meaningful impact a change program has. When not considering the program's set of objectives to be the ultimate goal it must achieve, planned change can become a meaningful vehicle for change actions in complex, dynamic environments.

7. Side effects of planned change

Planned change can be a useful strategy to break through set routines unfit for dealing with organizational challenges of the present and future. At the same time, data shows that planned change has its side effects. It does not come out as planned purely, and its unknown outcomes are not all positive. Although the professionals in the case of Wincor Nixdorf were able to collectively and individually deal with changes very positively in many ways, they also disclosed stories of frustration, resistance and disappointment with organizational behaviour. Kunda's (2006) warning of the dark sides of normative control is applicable to planned change as well. Although planned change is a way to structure the change message, funnel the interests and thus get everybody within the organization on the same page, it can also become a (political) tool that enables a smaller group of people to implement changes in their best interest and not necessarily in that of the organization as a whole. In that case, the program can become a way to legitimize actions actually maintaining the mold of the status quo. In the case of Wincor Nixdorf, respondents saw that happening at both the managerial and non-managerial level. Normative control, and planned change as a way to exercise it, has the potential to limit people in their ability to act on changes when excluded from the change process. In that case, it contributes to divisions in the organizations; inefficient and counterproductive processes; and people becoming increasingly locked into their routines while feeling fatalistic and frustrated.

In the stories of respondents and of authors like Burnes (2004); Beer (2000) and Weick et al. (2005), opportunities for planned change can be recognized. In the case of Wincor Nixdorf the potential of the planned change program as a way to offer structure and direction to organizational chaos was clear. Professionals can navigate complexity. Slowing forces on change however, can be reduced if change agents communicate more frequently and bridge divisions through transparent information sharing. Furthermore, if change agents recognize the continuous nature of change and its effect on the program, planned change can become a way to bring order to organizational chaos and enable actors to execute change on multiple organizational levels. Openness to change thus is not something that comes from the actors on the receiving side of change only. If the program itself is open to change it can increase its relevance to the organization and be a relevant driver of change efforts. Objectives are a way to guide organizational change, but are time specific and thus likely to be out of touch with organizational reality as the change process progresses. Then, a change program clinging to objectives it set out to reach a year ago hinders instead of enables organization members to act on changes. In the case of Wincor Nixdorf, we saw the program evolved in its collaboration with the areas. As the focus shifted to the transition towards new company Diebold Nixdorf, focus on the program became less. It was stressed, however, that the program would be carried out until completion. Although out of scope for this research, it would be interesting to find out in further research what completion means; and how organizational actors relate to changes in everyday practice without the framework of such a program. Furthermore, additional research looking into the translation of change in other parts of the company as well as other companies entirely is needed to build on the findings of this thesis in other research contexts.

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Appendices

a. Topic Lists

i. English version

Background

- Job and roles
    - Retail and/or Banking
    - What does this entail specifically?
- Way to Wincor
    - Previous jobs and roles
    - Move to Utrecht HQ?

Change implementation

- Change interventions: what interventions have been made or have you had to implement in your work? Can you tell me some examples?
- Communication of change
    - How did you first hear of Delta?
    - How do you get updated on Delta?
    - Do you communicate with colleagues about changes?
- Managing change
    - Is it clear how Delta is managed?
        - How transparently are change managed?
    - Biggest change for you: how was it implemented?
    - What is your view on the implementation of changes?

Impact of Change

- Can you tell me some key events of change you experienced since April 2015?
    - Why was this a key event for you?
- Change impact
    - Influence on work
        - What has changed for your job/roles?
    - What is your view on the role of the HQ?
        - What has changed in the roles of the HQ vs areas?
    - Do you have contact with areas as part of your role?
        - What is important in communication with the areas?
        - What is different in communication with the areas?
    - Influence of the changes on team?
    - Non-changes:What stayed the same?
- View on Changes
    - What do you think of the changes?
    - How do you experience and view the changes?

Ending

- Additional input/important stories/key events?

ii. Dutch version

Achtergrond

- Wat is je functie?
  - Retail en/of Banking
  - Wat houdt dat precies in?
- Hoe ben je bij Wincor Nixdorf in Utrecht terechtgekomen?
  - Eerdere ervaring
  - Vanaf Paderborn?

Implementatie van verandering

- Communicatie van Delta
  - Hoe hoorde je voor het eerst van Delta?
  - Hoe wordt je op de hoogte gehouden van Delta?
  - Hoe praat je met collega's over de veranderingen in kantoor?
- Wat voor interventies hebben er plaats gevonden of heb jij moeten implementeren in het kader van Delta?
- Managen van verandering
  - Hoe wordt Delta gemanaged?
  - Is duidelijk wat van je verwacht wordt?
  - Hoe transparant vindt je het Delta programma?

Impact van verandering

- Wat was een voor jou belangrijke verandering die je hebt meegemaakt sinds april 2015?
  - Waarom was dit belangrijk voor je?
- Invloed van verandering
  - Wat is er veranderd in jouw werk sinds invoering van Delta?
  - Wat is jouw visie op de rol van het hoofdkantoor in Utrecht?
    - Wat is er veranderd in de rol van het hoofdkantoor?
  - Heb je contact met de areas als onderdeel van je rol?
    - Wat is anders in communicatie en samenwerking met areas?
  - Wat is invloed van verandering op het team waar je in werkt?
  - Wat is hetzelfde gebleven sinds de invoering van Delta?
- Visie op verandering
  - Hoe kijk je naar verandering?
  - Hoe ervaar je de veranderingen?

Afsluiting

Aanvullende verhalen: ben ik iets belangrijks vergeten?

b. Delta program architecture