



Political polarization in post-apartheid South Africa

A study on institutional design, race and politics in South Africa from 1994 to 2016



Political polarization in post-apartheid South-Africa.

A case study on institutional design, race and politics in South Africa from 1994 to 2016.

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Linda de Klerk (student number 5683270)

l.a.m.deklerk@students.uu.nl

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Abstract

In 1994, a new, democratic South Africa emerged. The legacy of apartheid was a deeply divided society. South Africans lived in separate spheres of society, divided along racial lines. The political protagonists that negotiated the end of apartheid designed a democratic political system that they believed could peacefully manage the divisions in society. This thesis analyses South African national politics in the period from 1994 to 2016 to examine the claim of Sven Simonsen that 'de-ethnicization of politics' leads to reduced political salience of race.

The thesis starts with a discussion of the theoretical debate about political design for divided societies, which include consociationalism, centripetalism and theories of accommodation and integration. The theoretical context is used to identify methods for ethnicization and de-ethnicization of politics that are advocated by academics. Subsequently, Simonsen's methodology is applied to examine de-ethnicization of politics and political salience of race in post-apartheid South Africa. Simonsen identified three levels to investigate de-ethnicization of politics, the neutralisation of politics within a political system without discriminating laws: 1) the constitution and institutions of government, 2) the electoral system and 3) centre-region relations. In addition, case-specific arenas of alienation may be included. In this thesis material reconciliation is included in the analysis. The political salience of race, thus the importance of racial identities for political cleavages, is examined by looking at Simonsen's indicators for political salience. These indicators are the racial census, cross-cutting cleavages and elite behaviour in campaigns. The examination of the indicators is based on sources like vote behaviour, surveys, campaign material, campaign speeches, newspaper articles and academic articles.

The author argues that the post-apartheid political design of South Africa is, to a large extent, an example of de-ethnicization of politics because no political rights are explicitly assigned to racial or ethnic groups. Extensive cultural and linguistic rights, and an electoral system based on proportional representation, are put in place to ensure legitimacy, group representation and minority rights. Political salience of race has been important in post-apartheid politics and a racial census has prevailed in elections. However, almost all political parties have aimed their campaigns at a broad, interracial, constituency. Election campaigns addressed cross-cutting issues and, in general, the main political parties used an inclusive discourse. The thesis argues that, in the case of South Africa, the de-ethnicization of politics has not resolved the political salience of race, but that it has been important in the development towards inclusive politics in which the importance of racial identities has been slowly decreasing. It has offered political parties the space to evolve towards inclusive, interracial parties. The case study shows that de-ethnicization of politics can be suitable for post-conflict divided societies and that it can reduce political mobilization along dividing lines in the long run.

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*'Managing cultural diversity is one of the central challenges of our time. (...) Choices about recognizing and accommodating diverse ethnicities, religions, languages and values are an inescapable feature of the landscape of politics in the 21st century.'*¹

- *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World.*
United Nations Development Programme

Introduction

In the world, over 5000 ethnic groups live within the borders of nearly 200 nations. In two-thirds of all countries the population includes - at minimum - one substantial minority that accounts for 10% or more of the population.² Historically, domination of one hegemonic group has been a common way to govern diversity.³ But this way of governing has been challenged by a global battle for political and cultural rights, and by the 'third wave of democracy' that spread around the world after the end of the Cold War. These democratic developments have occurred in parallel with an increase in intra-state conflict instead of inter-state conflict, partly due to ethnic conflict.⁴ Ethnic groups without access to political institutions are prone to challenge the government and start insurgencies.⁵ Recent history has shown that violations of minority rights contribute to intra-state tensions and can result in violent conflicts along ethnic or other dividing lines: this has happened in countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq. Donald Horowitz even claims that ethnic (communal, racial, religious, linguistic or tribal) riots are probably the most common form of collective violence, which, according to some estimates, took more lives than anything else the twentieth century.⁶

It seems managing cultural diversity is one of the central issues of our time. In general, democratic solutions are seen as the main solution for this problem. Democratic institutions can create a political arena to discuss and resolve conflict in a peaceful manner. As Phillippe van Parijs wrote: 'constitutional design [...] can be so successful in some societies that one loses sight of the fact that they are just as severely divided as others in which conflicts rage.'⁷ But democratic solutions for divided societies are complicated, especially for societies where conflict along ethnic lines has taken place and the salience of ethnicity has increased.⁸ Therefore, finding the right democratic solutions for managing cultural diversity still poses one of the challenges of the 21st century.⁹ This

¹ *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World*, United Nations Development Programme (Carfax Publishing, 2004), 1, accessed November 11, 2016, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/265/hdr_2004_complete.pdf.

² *Human Development Report 2004*, 2.

³ Frans Schrijver, "Ethnic Accommodation in Unitary States," in *Routledge handbook of ethnic conflict*, ed. Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolf (Routledge, 2011), 271.

⁴ Benjamin Reilly, "Institutional Designs for Diverse Democracies: Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Communalism Compared," *European Political Science* 11, no. 2 (June 2012): 259.

⁵ Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, "Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis," *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (2009): 113.

⁶ Donald L. Horowitz, *The deadly ethnic riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 1.

⁷ Phillippe van Parijs, "Power-Sharing versus Border Crossing in Ethnically Divided Societies," in *Designing Democratic Institution*, ed. Ian Shapiro and Stephen Macedo (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 300.

⁸ Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons from Recent Cases," *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 3 (September 2005): 299.

⁹ *Human Development Report 2004*, 3.

thesis will examine the case of South Africa, a divided society where democratic solutions were implemented to reform the constitutional design after apartheid.

South Africa during apartheid was a clear example of a deeply divided society where ethnic and racial lines constituted social and political cleavages. From 1948 to 1994, the white minority ruled through a system aimed at socially and physically separating racial and ethnic groups within South Africa. Laws regulated segregation in employment, in urban residential housing, in public services, and in interpersonal and sexual relationships.¹⁰ The breakdown of the system accelerated in 1989, when the newly elected president Frederik de Klerk of the National Party (NP) set in motion the transition of apartheid towards democracy.¹¹ On 27 April 1994, after four years of peace negotiations, the African National Congress (ANC) won South Africa's first truly democratic elections.¹² Two weeks later, on May 10, 1994, Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first black President.¹³ The interim-constitution of 1993 and the final constitution of 1996 created new democratic institutions, carefully designed to end the era of apartheid, to peacefully manage the cleavages in society, and to unite all citizens in of South Africa - the self-proclaimed 'Rainbow Nation'.¹⁴

The parties that participated in the peace negotiations agreed that 'new South African political institutions would be a key factor affecting the potential for peace and stability'.¹⁵ Negotiators took into account different academic approaches for institutional design in divided societies in order to carefully shape institutions in a way they saw fit to end apartheid and create unity. Nowadays, South Africa's transition is known as a success story: the transition to democracy was peaceful, with only some minor incidents. The Worldbank wrote 'South Africa's peaceful political transition is known as one of the most remarkable political feats of the past century'.¹⁶ In contrast to some other countries which have suffered ethnic conflict, such as Burundi, Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa ranks high on the Democracy index as composed by the Economist (150, 139, 104 and 37 respectively in 2015).¹⁷ Altogether, this means South Africa offers a suitable case for the investigation of democratic solutions for a deeply divided society. By carefully considering the institutional design of post-apartheid South Africa this thesis will examine how it has addressed cleavages in this divided society and whether this has contributed to a united nation.

¹⁰ William Beinart and Saul Dubow, "Introduction: The historiography of segregation and apartheid," in *Segregation and apartheid in twentieth-century South Africa*, ed. William Beinart and Saul Dubow (London: Routledge, 1995), 2-3.

¹¹ Marisa Traniello, "Power-sharing: Lessons from South Africa and Rwanda," *International Public Policy Review* 3, no. 2 (March 2008):35.

¹² Traniello, "Lessons from South Africa and Rwanda," 35

¹³ Dan o'Meara, *Forty Lost Years: The apartheid State and the politics of the National Party, 1948 – 1994* (Randburg: Athens and Ravan Press, 1996),414.

¹⁴ Christina Murray and Richard Simeon, "Recognition without Empowerment: Minorities in a Democratic South Africa," in *Constitutional design in divided societies: integration or accommodation?*, ed. Sujit Choudry, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 420.

¹⁵ Murray and Simeon, "Recognition without Empowerment," 418.

¹⁶ "Country overview South Africa," *The World bank*, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview>.

¹⁷ "Democracy in an age of anxiety," *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, accessed October 15, 2016, <http://www.eiimedia.com/index.php/latest-press-releases/item/2127-democracy-in-an-age-of-anxiety>.

This thesis will focus on the political level to examine political polarization in South Africa in relation to the post-apartheid institutional design. The main question posed is: *To what extent does post-apartheid South Africa, from 1994 to 2016, confirm that de-ethnicization of politics can reduce structural political salience of race?* The main question is derived from articles of the conflict-studies expert Sven Simonsen. He states that peace agreements often rely on power-sharing, what means that negotiation parties compromise on a system that explicitly assures political power for all groups involved, for example through quota for guaranteed minority representation in parliament. The benefits of power-sharing are widely accepted: also in the 2004 Human Development Report, quoted earlier, power-sharing mechanisms are advocated as the best way to build multi-cultural democracies.¹⁸ Simonsen argues the opposite: he claims that ‘institutionalization of ethnicity has become an important hindrance to peacebuilding’.¹⁹ This paper aims to contribute to this debate through a qualitative case study of institutional design and the long-term effects on political polarization.

Simonsen outlined his main arguments in his article ‘Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons from Recent Cases’. In short, Simonsen refutes power-sharing mechanisms that secure group-rights and pleads for what he calls ‘de-ethnicization of politics’. While he sees inclusion as essential to create legitimacy of political institutions, he emphasises ‘institutions should contribute towards long-term de-ethnicization of politics, by encouraging contacts and trust-building across ethnic groups’.²⁰ When ethnic divisions are institutionalized, he explains, they become locked-in. This in turn will contribute to structural political salience of ethnicity and will hinder integration and assimilation. Simonsen argues de-ethnicization of politics ‘may facilitate conflict transformation – specifically, the reduction of the political salience of ethnicity after armed conflict’.²¹ Political salience is the political importance which is attributed to certain matters: a high level of political salience of race, for example, means that race is of significance in politics and that politics are polarized on the basis of racial identities. The causal relation between ethnicization of politics and political salience of ethnicity that Simonsen describes will be tested in this thesis.

To do so, the thesis will build on Simonsen’s methodology to investigate de-ethnicization of politics and political salience. Simonsen identifies three levels on which he measures *de-ethnicization of politics*; 1) constitutional design of institutions of government, 2) the electoral system and 3) centre-region relations.²² In addition, he looks into case-specific ‘arenas of alienation’, issues that he identifies as important for inclusion or exclusion. In this thesis, the same three levels will be used and material reconciliation will be added as case-specific arena of alienation. Regarding *political salience*, Simonsen points out two main entry points which can reveal the level of political salience. The first is

¹⁸ *Human Development Report 2004*, 50-54.

¹⁹ Simonsen, “Addressing Ethnic Divisions,” 298.

²⁰ Simonsen, “Addressing Ethnic Divisions,” 298.

²¹ Simonsen, “Addressing Ethnic Divisions,” 304.

²² Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Ethnicising Afghanistan? Inclusion and Exclusion in post-Bonn Institution Building,” *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (2004): 707.

the existence of cross-cutting cleavages besides the existing dividing lines. Cross-cutting cleavages are policy interests that are shared by individuals from different groups, and that thereby cut through dividing lines. The presence of cross-cutting cleavages can, for example, be revealed by looking at vote behaviour. When all citizens vote based on their group identity, this will cause what Simonsen calls an 'ethnic-census' (an ethnic bias in voting behaviour), which might indicate that cross-cutting cleavages are lacking. The second main entry point is the *strategy of political elites for attracting votes*. Political salience will result in political campaigns revolving around group-lines, which might include the denigration of other groups. On the other hand, low political salience should result in campaigning for support outside (ethnic) groups, based on issues and policy, thereby reinforcing cross-cutting cleavages. In this thesis, examination of political salience of race will be based on several sources: vote behaviour, surveys, campaign material and campaign speeches, newspaper articles and academic articles.

The methodology is derived from Simonsen's articles, with one important difference: his theory will be applied to racial groups instead of ethnic groups. Although race and ethnicity are not interchangeable categories, race and ethnic relations are both the result of group formation and identity structuring and therefore most scholars agree that on a macro level both phenomena can be researched with the same theories.²³ Since race was the main dividing line in the system of apartheid and most data on South Africa is categorised per race, it makes sense to focus on racial groups in this thesis.

This thesis can contribute to the academic debate about institutional design in divided societies for several reasons. First, the methodology of Simonsen offers a clear tool to explore a case while taking into consideration the main theoretical approaches. Second, the qualitative examination of campaigning and cross-cutting cleavages enriches the understanding of South African political salience and its foundations. Third, this case study, with a timespan that covers more than 20 years, can offer insight in the long-term effects of constitutional design. An up to date investigation of South Africa is especially interesting since the African National Congress (ANC), which had a big majority in nearly all elections since 1994, has experienced a historical electoral loss in the 2016 municipal elections. Lastly, political polarization and the racial census in South Africa have often been the subject of studies, but the link with institutional design is unique. It is especially this link that can help to convert the findings of this thesis in a more general recommendation for the peaceful management of divided societies.

This outline of this thesis is as follows. The thesis starts with a discussion of the theoretical debate about democratic political design for divided societies. This discussion is useful to better understand Simonsen's argument within the theoretical context. It also serves to identify methods for ethnicization and de-ethnicization of politics that are supported by academics, as well as their advantages and disadvantages. To ascertain that racial cleavages are the main dividing lines that

²³ John Rex and David Mason, *Theories of race and ethnic relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 11.

have to be taken into account in the analysis of political salience, chapter two briefly discusses the historical context of apartheid. Chapter three will examine the institutional design of South Africa that was established in 1996. In this chapter, the author will investigate whether the new institutional design resulted in *de-ethnicization* of politics, or in *ethnicization* of politics. Chapter four examines the development of political salience of race in South African national politics from 1994 to 2016. Finally, the conclusion will answer the main question and some limitations and recommendations will be addressed.

Chapter 1: Long term solutions for deeply divided societies.

Theories of democratic institutional design for deeply divided societies

Deeply divided societies are societies with deep ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious, cultural or other emotional and polarizing cleavages.²⁴ Citizens of deeply divided societies are segregated along polarizing lines which reduce interaction between different groups within society. Organization along dividing lines can occur by separation in e.g. different schools, neighbourhoods, sports clubs and media, and might be voluntarily or caused by discrimination or discriminating laws. Severe cleavages can result in different segments of society living in parallel spheres, where people are unable to think outside their own group, which could result in alienation and distrust.²⁵ However, even in these cases, members of different groups normally want to voice their interests at national level, where they should co-operate. Politics in divided societies are prone to conflict along dividing lines, especially since groups have different cultures, languages or religions, or a combination of those. State institutions are highly important for establishing sustainable peace, especially in post-conflict deeply divided societies.²⁶ Therefore, a number of theories within political science formulate how institutional design in deeply divided societies can serve to resolve and prevent conflict.

This chapter will examine the main academic schools that address institutional design for deeply divided societies. Apart from approaches in favour of democratic solutions, these theories range from theories of self-determination to authoritarian rule at the extreme ends of the spectrum. For example, in 1979, Lustick concluded that theories of hegemonic control, which explain political stability by a dominant group in society using (non-)coercive techniques to keep oppressed groups coordinative, 'may be preferable to the chaos and bloodshed that might be the only alternatives'.²⁷ For the purpose of this thesis, only democratic theories are covered. These theories will serve as the lens through which the case study of South Africa will be viewed. It is important to realize that they all have different propositions for political engineering. Table 1 summarizes the discussed democratic theories for divided societies. The focus in this chapter will be on two prominent approaches within the democratic theories: consociationalism and centripetalism, since these two contrasting approaches have dominated much of the academic literature and have clear prescriptions for institutional design.²⁸ Furthermore, the theories of accommodation and integration will be discussed, since both views are important to put the underlying principles of consociationalism and centripetalism in context.

²⁴ Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional design for divided societies," *Journal of democracy* 15 no. 2 (2004): 100.

²⁵ Ian o'Flynn and David Russel, "Deepening democracy. The role of civil society," in *Routledge handbook of ethnic conflict*, ed. Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolf (Routledge, 2011), 226.

²⁶ Derick W. Brinkerhoff, "Rebuilding governance in failed states and post-conflict societies: core concepts and cross-cutting themes," *Public Administration and Development* 25, no. 1 (February 2005): 3.

²⁷ Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (April 1979): 344.

²⁸ Reilly, "Institutional Designs," 260.

Assimilation ←						Secession/partition →
De-ethnicization of politics ←				Ethnicization of politics →		
	Integration			Accommodation		
Republicans	Socialists	Liberals	Centripetalists	Multiculturalists	Consociationalists	Territorial pluralists
Promotion of the common good	Promotion of class consciousness	Promotion of individualism	Group recognition. Incentivize inter-group coalitions of moderates;	Group recognition; proportionality; cultural autonomy	Group recognition; Cross-community executive power-sharing; autonomy; veto rights	Territorial self-government

Table 1: Democratic theories of institutional design for divided societies.

Based on: John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary and Richard Simeon, "Integration or accommodation? The enduring debate in conflict regulation," in *Constitutional design in divided societies: integration or accommodation?*, ed. Sujit Choudry, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 68.

1.1 Consociationalism and Centripetalism

Consociationalism considers two key elements indispensable for democracy in divided societies: power-sharing and group autonomy. Peaceful cooperation is achieved through an electoral system that assures proportional minority representation, in combination with guaranteed minority rights. Consociationalism relies on political cooperation between elite groups that explicitly represent different segments of society, since group representation is believed to be essential for the legitimacy of government institutions. Arend Lijphart, the founding father of consociationalism, claims that the combination of an electoral system of *proportional representation*, a parliamentary system and federalism is the best institutional design for 'ensuring the election of a broadly representative legislature' and peaceful cooperation.²⁹ Proportional representation is an electoral system that assigns seats in governing bodies according to the share of votes won (so 30 % of votes for a party means 30% of seats in parliament), should result in a multi-party system where different groups, represented in their own political parties, form a grand coalition. This promotes power-sharing and cancels out the risk of 'a majority authoritarian system'. In addition, fair representation in government is guaranteed with ethnic quotas for personnel in cabinet, legislature or other public institutions. Minority rights are protected by politician's right to veto over matters directly affecting their group's members.³⁰ Moreover, consociationalists believe all groups in society should enjoy a high degree of autonomy. This can be achieved with a federal system or through other arrangements securing autonomy with regard to language, culture, education and religion.³¹ An example of consociationalism

²⁹ Lijphart, "Constitutional Design," 100.

³⁰ Reilly, "Institutional Designs," 261.

³¹ Horowitz, "Constitutional design: proposals versus processes," *The architecture of democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy* 15, (2002): 24.

can be found in Belgium, where the constitution dictates that the cabinet must consist of an equal numbers of Dutch- and French-speakers.³² Burundi's constitution also ensures proportional representation: the president is to be assisted by two vice-presidents of both ethnic groups, a Hutu and a Tutsi, and the government has to consist of 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi.³³

Larry Diamond, co-editor of the 'Journal of Democracy' recognises that proportional representation and federalism are effective mechanisms for managing ethnic tensions.³⁴ However, he points out the friction between representativeness and governability: pure proportional representation emphasizes representativeness but has a high trade-off with governability if it results in a fragmented parliament. Diamond argues a somewhat less representative political system, with for example a minimum electoral threshold to enter parliament, might be more stable.³⁵ Pippa Norris 'updated and refined the theory of consociationalism' in her 2008 book 'Driving Democracy' and concludes that power-sharing mechanisms such as a parliamentary system and federalism do result in the highest levels of democracy (compared to power concentrating institutions), although she finds that federalism can result in majority authoritarian power on local levels, for example through the leadership of a traditional chief favouring one group.³⁶

The main argument against consociationalism is the claim that consociational methods result in the 'freezing' of societal cleavages.³⁷ For example, a quota that explicitly states 40 percent of parliament has to be Tutsi (like in Burundi) results in discrimination and is very static; it does not evolve in accordance with demographics. According to Rob Aitken consociational methods - like proportional representation - reward ethnic political mobilization, which is problematic in post-conflict situations. Instead, institutional design should limit the potential of political mobilization along group lines.³⁸ Also, minority vetoes might obstruct efficient politics in a consensual democracy and result in a mutual stalemate.³⁹ Selway highlights that different studies conclude that federalism reinforces separatist movements, and although he is unable to confirm this statement with quantitative research, he does conclude that, 'the combination of consociationalist institutions [the electoral system of proportional representation, a parliamentarian system and federalism] is associated with higher levels of political violence'.⁴⁰ Lastly, Donald Horowitz is sceptical about the importance that consociationalism ascribes to elite cooperation. He poses that the elite of minority groups will be the structural loser in the electoral system of proportional representation. Without any prospect of political

³² Lijphart, "Constitutional Design," 103.

³³ René Lemarchand, "Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *African Affairs* 106, no. 422 (January 2006):8.

³⁴ Larry Jay Diamond, "Three paradoxes of democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 3 (1990): 55-58.

³⁵ Diamond, "Three paradoxes of democracy," 55.

³⁶ Ethan B. Kapstein, "Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?," review of *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?*, by Pippa Norris, *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 4 (December 2009):993.

³⁷ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 586.

³⁸ Rob Aitken, "Cementing Divisions? An assessment of the impact of international interventions and peace-building policies on ethnic identities and divisions," *Policy Studies* 28, no. 3 (2007): 248.

³⁹ Samuel H. Barnes, "The Contribution Of Democracy To Rebuilding Postconflict Societies," *The American Journal Of International Law* 95, no. 1 (2001): 94.

⁴⁰ Joel Selway and Kharis Templeman, "The myth of consociationalism? Conflict reduction in divided societies," *Comparative Political Studies* 45 no.12 (2011): 1564.

power they will lack incentives to cooperate in a grand coalition.⁴¹ In addition, elites are distant for citizens, and while 'politicians can negotiate binding agreements and even enforce them, only ordinary people can change human relations'.⁴²

Horowitz proposes a different approach: *centripetalism*. Centripetalists acknowledge differences and respect cultural group-rights in the private sphere, but they oppose power-sharing mechanisms and recognition of political group-rights in the public sphere, since they argue these facilitate the freezing of existing cleavages.⁴³ Therefore, they argue against politics and political parties based on group-rights and ethnic lines. Centripetalism stresses the importance of an electoral system that creates incentives for political parties to attract voters from different segments of society, so called 'vote-pooling'. They claim a majoritarian system that promotes vote-pooling will result in moderate politics or heterogeneous parties that can bridge cleavages.⁴⁴ To illustrate: if a divided society consists of five ethnic groups of a similar size, a political party in a majoritarian system that wants at least half of all votes, must appeal to a broad public. This leaves no room for politics along ethnic lines. In the long term, vote-pooling should increase trust among different groups and decrease polarization, since political representation and political disagreements do not coincide with existing cleavages. As Reilly describes: centripetalism favours pre-election grand coalitions, build on moderate voter-preferences, instead of post-election grand coalitions, negotiated by the political elite.⁴⁵ The electoral system Horowitz classically promoted is the *alternative vote* (AV). Voters have to rank preferred candidates and if one candidate has the majority of votes, he wins, if not, the second preferences (and if needed the third, etc.) are assigned to candidates to determine who obtains the majority.⁴⁶ Other methods to reduce political mobilization along group-line can be other systems of preferential voting, or requirements of a heterogeneous list of candidates. Furthermore, centripetalism encourages the creation of arenas of bargaining on different levels of society. These should familiarize citizens with cooperation, and help to explore interest that members of different groups share, thereby creating cross-cutting cleavages. Together with vote-pooling, this will reduce political salience through a bottom-up approach. With regard to institutional design, centripetalists favour a unitary, centralized state to minimize group autonomy. They argue that if federalism is implemented, it should cut through group-boundaries, instead of reinforcing them.⁴⁷

While centripetalist scholars share core concepts, they favour different ways of achieving moderate politics and cross-cutting cleavages. Bogaards argues that instead of the alternative vote, 'constituency pooling' (vote pooling among different electoral-districts), possibly with a minimum number of constituencies as threshold requisite, can better serve to promote cross-cutting cleavages,

⁴¹ Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict*, 572.

⁴² o'Flynn and Russel, "Deepening democracy," 231.

⁴³ Schrijver, "Ethnic Accommodation," 272.

⁴⁴ Horowitz, "Constitutional design: proposals versus processes," 24.

⁴⁵ Reilly, "Institutional Designs," 265

⁴⁶ Matthijs Bogaards, "Electoral choices for divided societies: multi-ethnic parties and constituency pooling in Africa," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 41, no.3 (2003): 61-62.

⁴⁷ Horowitz, "Constitutional design: proposals versus processes," 25.

especially in societies with electoral districts with a homogenous population.⁴⁸ Constituency pooling can tackle the often raised objection that centripetalism can only work in societies with at least three ethnic groups since an absolute majority is guaranteed with only two ethnic groups, while surpassing a (high) threshold of electoral districts is not. Barnes stresses the importance of cross-cutting cleavages, but he especially sees a role for civil society, instead of national politics. 'The involvement of citizens in the associations of civil society is a major pathway to the development of a commitment to negotiation and compromise.'⁴⁹

Critics have put forward different arguments against centripetalism. First, they argue that a majoritarian system will result in the rule of the majority with permanent exclusion of minority groups. Lijphart finds it 'hard to imagine that, in the long run, (...) minorities would be satisfied with this kind of moderate [majority] representation, instead of representation by members of their own communities'.⁵⁰ According to Nagle and Clancy, the rationality of individual actors is overestimated. Because it is difficult to separate public and private beliefs, it is reasonable that politics in divided societies will be tight up with culture, religion etc.⁵¹ This implies that centripetal electoral design will not result in moderate politics or cross-cutting cleavages. In addition, numerous scholars have pointed out the lack of empirical evidence for centripetalism. AV has only been applied in two divided societies (Fiji and Papua New Guinea) and the results offer no undisputed success.⁵²

Some researchers bridge the two theoretical approaches of consociationalism and centripetalism by emphasising the need to look at national context when selecting institutional design. Wagner and Dreef criticize the lack of context in the debate and conclude that the ethnic composition of a country, for example the number and size of (minority) groups, determines what electoral system is the best choice.⁵³ Also aspects like geographical concentration of ethnic groups and socioeconomic profiles can determine what institutional design best fits divided societies.⁵⁴

In short, consociationalism and centripetalism result in different views on the most desirable institutional design and electoral system for divided societies. However, they both share two essential beliefs: first, cleavages do exist and need to be acknowledged and accounted for, and second, institutional designs that do this correctly can manage cleavages in the long-run. Theories of integration reject exactly these two beliefs and call for the resolving of cleavages, instead of managing them. During the peace negotiations in South Africa, the need for national unity and integration versus group-rights was a recurring theme.

⁴⁸ Bogaards, "Electoral choices for divided societies," 64.

⁴⁹ Barnes, "The contribution of democracy," 99.

⁵⁰ Lijphart, "Constitutional Design," 98.

⁵¹ John Nagle and Mary-Alice C. Clancy, "Constructing a shared public identity in ethno nationally divided societies: comparing consociational and transformationist perspectives," *Nations & Nationalism* 18, no. 1 (January 2011): 90.

⁵² Wolfgang Wagner and Sofie Dreef, "Ethnic composition and electoral system design: Demographic context conditions for post-conflict elections," *Ethnopolitics* 13 no. 3 (2014): 291.

⁵³ Wagner and Dreef, "Ethnic composition and electoral system design," 294.

⁵⁴ Wagner and Dreef, "Ethnic composition and electoral system design," 293.

1.2 Accommodation versus Integration

In the bigger picture, accommodation and integration are the two major strategies for dealing with divided societies. Both consociationalism and centripetalism fit in the school of accommodation. Accommodation sees the necessity to acknowledge multiple public identities in the public sphere and to incorporate them as equals in society with policies to address the recognition of - and respect for group culture.⁵⁵ As McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon explain: 'accommodation promotes dual or multiple public identities, and its proponents advocate equality with institutional respect for differences. They believe that is what is required for the stable management of deep diversity'.⁵⁶ On the contrary, theories of integration promote single public identities coinciding with the state's territory and oppose the recognition of group identities and cultures: they turn a blind eye to differences for public purposes. The superlative of integration is assimilation, whereby groups give up their cultural identities that distinguish them within society and adopt a new, nation-wide, transcendent identity.⁵⁷ Examples of theories of integration are communism, socialism and liberalism, that all aim to create a common identity that will transcend individual identities.

Essentially, the core disagreement between theories of accommodation and theories of integration lies in the constructivist belief that identities can be shaped and are changeable over time. Consequently, the different theories disagree on the best possible solution in the long run: accommodation wishes to manage cleavages whereas integration wants to resolve cleavages. Accommodationists would agree with Diamond when he wrote: 'The social sciences may have discerned few true laws, but one that can be confidently stated concerns ethnicity: ethnic cleavages do not die.'⁵⁸ In line with this, consociationalists see themselves as 'pragmatists who, in accepting existing divisions within ethnically divided societies, strive to regulate them through complex constitutional engineering'.⁵⁹ Horowitz also fits the accommodation approach since he stresses the durability of ethnic cleavages and pleas for recognition of minority rights, such as multiple official languages. So while centripetalism urges politicians to seek support outside their own ethnic groups, ethnic cultural divisions are considered durable.⁶⁰ Theories of integration, in contrast, consider identities as a social construct instead of a cultural given.⁶¹ Group cultures are wished away in favour of integration towards common identity: communism for example rejected religion. Especially within social sciences and anthropology numerous studies have been conducted on changing identities. Wimmer, for example, identifies five main strategies by which people can change identities, which

⁵⁵ Murray and Simeon, "Recognition without Empowerment," 418.

⁵⁶ John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary and Richard Simeon, "Integration or accommodation? The enduring debate in conflict regulation," in *Constitutional design in divided societies: integration or accommodation?*, ed. Sujit Choudry, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 42.

⁵⁷ Schrijver, "Ethnic Accommodation," 272.

⁵⁸ Diamond, "Three paradoxes of democracy," 59.

⁵⁹ Micheal Kerr, "A culture of power sharing," in *Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict*, ed. Rupert Taylor (London, Routledge, 2009), 209.

⁶⁰ McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon, "Integration or accommodation?" 53.

⁶¹ Andreas Wimmer, "Politics of Identity. The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 113, no.4 (2008): 971.

can result in the transcending of- or redistribution within cleavages.⁶² If identities are seen as changeable over time, integration is the long term solution for divided societies. Schrijver argues that although instruments of accommodation can end a cycle of conflict, they mostly determine the starting conditions for a next, new round of ethnic conflict.⁶³ Integration is the long-term solution. Supporters of accommodation reply by warning that integration can accelerate conflict since the threat of the loss of a minority culture is exactly one of the causes that can provoke ethnic conflict.⁶⁴

1.3 Conclusion

Different theories exist for dealing with divided societies and all of them have their own reasoning on how to bridge or erase differences. Consociationalism favours proportional representation, a parliamentary system and a federal state. Centripetalism advocates a unitary state and an electoral system that encourages vote-pooling. These two theories both urge to officially acknowledge cultural differences, while integrationists refute public recognition of different groups and their cultures. Consociationalist mechanisms will result in ethnicization of politics. Institutional design based on the theories of integration will result in de-ethnicization of politics. Centripetalism includes some aspects of both ethnicization and de-ethnicization, although it leans more towards de-ethnicization of politics. In the light of these arguments, the next chapters of this thesis will investigate the case of South Africa. Did South Africa follow consociationalism or centripetalism recommendation in their institutional design? And if so, how did it affect political cleavages in the long run? Put differently: does the case of South Africa confirm that de-ethnicization of politics through democratic institutional design can reduce structural political salience of race?

⁶² Andreas Wimmer, "Elementary strategies of ethnic boundary making," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 31, no. 6 (2008): 1025.

⁶³ Schrijver, "Ethnic Accommodation," 269.

⁶⁴ Schrijver, "Ethnic Accommodation," 273.

Chapter 2: The institutionalization of racial groups.

Apartheid and the end of apartheid in South Africa

Before the analyses of de-ethnicization of politics and political polarization are conducted in chapter three and four, it is helpful to identify the dividing cleavages. In South African history, social, economic and political developments have contributed to the emergence of a divided society. This chapter will map the main cleavages that were present in the society anno 1994, the starting point of the analyses, and will demonstrate the broad array of domains where these cleavages were relevant.

South Africa -a country with about 50 million citizens- is, and always has been, a multicultural country. The majority of the population, about 80 percent, consists of black South Africans, who are roughly divided in nine ethnic groups (Zulu being the largest group, (28% of blacks) and Xhosa (20% of blacks) the second). These ethnic groups are identified through their home-languages, since linguistic groups largely coincide with ethnic groups. South Africa has a large white population that is deeply rooted. Dutch settlers, who later called themselves 'Afrikaners', started settling in 1652. British settling took off from the 1820's onwards, when Britain obtained colonial power. White population accounted for 21.6% of the total population at its peak in 1911, and for 8.9% around 2014. Coloured South Africans partly originate from lighter-skin Khoisan people, traditional inhabitants, and partly originate from interracial relationships. They compose around 9% of the population, are quite integrated in 'white society', and often speak Afrikaans or English as their first language. Lastly, Indians form a small minority group (about 2,5% in 2014). Their presence goes back to the 1860's, when the British colonizer imported Indian labourers on a large scale.⁶⁵ Table 2 shows the rich diversity of languages that are spoken in South Africa, indicating people's first language (based on data from 2011). English is the principal language used in business and politics. About half of the population is proficient in English.⁶⁶

Although South Africa has an ethnically diverse population, current dividing lines generally coincide with racial cleavages. This is the results of a long history of segregation along racial lines. The Union of South Africa, founded in 1910, laid the basis for apartheid.⁶⁷ From 1910 onwards, the first pre-colonial governments adopted several laws to regulate racial segregation. For example, the 1913 Natives Land Act prohibited black South Africans from occupying land outside their reserves (except as labour-tenants). The 1920 Native Affairs Act established local councils in the African reserves, this way denying their right to participate in urban areas and in central government. Furthermore, the 1923 Natives Urban Areas Act called for separate townships for black population

⁶⁵ "Race, Ethnicity and Language in South Africa," *World Elections*, accessed November 13, 2016, <https://welections.wordpress.com/guide-to-the-2014-south-african-election/race-ethnicity-and-language-in-south-africa/>.

⁶⁶ Dorrit Posel and Daniela Casale, "Language proficiency and language policy in South Africa: Findings from new data," *International Journal of Educational Development* 31, no. 5 (September 2011): 452.

⁶⁷ Paul Maylam, *South Africa's Racial Past: The History and Historiography of Racism, Segregation and Apartheid* (Ashgate, 2001), 150.

livings in urban areas.⁶⁸ But while segregationist laws were put in place, implementation and enforcement were weak.

First language per racial group (in percentages)	isiZulu	isiXhosa	Afrikaans	English	Sepedi	Setswana	Sesotho	Xitsonga	SiSwazi	Tshivenda	IsiNdebele	Others
Black	28.5	20,1	1.5	2.9	11.4	9.9	9.4	5.6	3.2	3	2.6	1.5
Coloured	0.5	0.6	75.8	20.8	0.1	0.9	0.5	0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1
White	0.4	0.3	60,8	35,9	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.1
Indian	1.3	0.4	4.6	86,1	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.8	5.1

Table 2: First language of South Africans, categorized per racial group (in percentages per racial group). Source: *Census 2011: Census in brief*, Statistics South Africa, Report no. 03-01-41 (Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, 2012), 25, accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf.

It was not until 1948, when the Afrikaner National Party (NP) came to power, that apartheid was truly implemented and enforced.⁶⁹ Apartheid was an extensive system of racial segregation and thrived under the rule of the NP from 1948 until 1994. The 1950 Population Registration Act divided the population in four racial groups: white, black, coloured and Indian. Black people were further subdivided in different ethnic groups.⁷⁰ All citizens were classified by the state and race was documented on identity cards. For the next four decades group membership determined almost every aspect of life through a comprehensive system of discriminatory laws of segregation.

The system of apartheid was based on four main pillars: 1) political segregation, 2) territorial segregation, 3) segregation on the labour-market and 4) social segregation, including the so-called 'petty apartheid'.⁷¹ Political segregation meant that only whites had political rights. The 1951 Representation of Voters Act stripped coloured people of all political rights they once had, ensuring a political monopoly for whites. To assure territorial segregation, separate living areas were established for all racial groups. The 1950 Group Areas Act made physical segregation in townships obligated,⁷² the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act established separate, self-governing homelands for the black population, dividing it in ethnic groups. With this policy of divide-and-rule they were forced to move to underdeveloped homelands that were assigned to their ethnic group.⁷³ Living conditions in these homelands were inhumane. Also, due to segregation on the labour market, the uneducated black majority received only low-paid jobs. Finally, social segregation discouraged social

⁶⁸ Maylam, *South Africa's Racial Past*, 147- 150.

⁶⁹ Kristin Henrard, "Apartheid South Africa: Transformation and Reconciliation," *World Affairs* 166, no. 1 (2003): 37.

⁷⁰ Henrard, "Apartheid South Africa," 38.

⁷¹ Maylam, *South Africa's Racial Past*, 180-184.

⁷² Maylam, *South Africa's Racial Past*, 158.

⁷³ o'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 73.

interaction between different racial groups: the 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the 1950 Immorality Amendment Act prohibited interracial marriage and sexual relationships.⁷⁴ Moreover, 'petty apartheid' ensured that all public facilities were designated for specific racial groups, these included facilities such as public transport, parks, toilets etc. Segregation negatively affected black population the most; they ended up poor, uneducated, with bad working and living conditions. Coloureds and Indian made up the 'middle group' and the ruling white minority enjoyed positive discrimination, the best jobs, homes, education and facilities.⁷⁵

As result of apartheid, different social groups lived in separate worlds, which were far apart. In general, whites lived comfortable lives in the suburbs, while impoverished blacks lived in slums or homelands without sanitation. Not only physical and social life, but also political organization followed division along racial lines. The black majority, more than 30 million people without political rights, organized themselves in black movements, such as the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), to fight apartheid.⁷⁶ While opposition started in a peaceful manner, around the early 60's increasing oppression forced black movements underground and opposition attained a more violent character.⁷⁷ Throughout apartheid, different waves of strikes, protests, violence and uprisings aimed at removing the regime were organized by black movements. As black confidence, unrest and dissatisfaction rose, the 1984 constitution, which assigned political right to all racial groups except black citizens, triggered the biggest protests yet and eventually forced the government to reform.⁷⁸

After the elections of 1989, the main task of the new president Frederik de Klerk was to resolve the crisis the country was in. Faced with pressure from all sides, namely on international level, on internal party level and from black society, the NP was forced to integrate the black majority in national politics. When de Klerk opened parliament on Friday February 2nd, 1990, he announced the revocation of the 31 year ban on (inter alia) the ANC.⁷⁹ Nelson Mandela, the leader of the ANC, was released from prison nine days later. The ANC announced the end of the armed struggle in 1991, and formal negotiations between to establish an inclusive democracy started shortly after.⁸⁰ The ANC and the NP were the two main negotiating partners.

From the outset, the political movements involved in the transition-process had very different hopes for the outcome of the negotiations. The NP wanted to implement a power-sharing model and lobbied for a minority veto and a great deal of group autonomy.⁸¹ Some right-wing nationalists pressed for a federal system in which they wished to create a white 'volksstaat'. The IFP demanded

⁷⁴ "A history of Apartheid in South Africa," *South African History Online*, accessed November 13, 2016, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa>.

⁷⁵ o'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 277.

⁷⁶ "A history of Apartheid in South Africa," *South African History Online*.

⁷⁷ "Liberation Struggle in South Africa," *South African History Online*, accessed November 13, 2016, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/genesis-armed-struggle-1960-1966>.

⁷⁸ o'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 325 - 337.

⁷⁹ o'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 404.

⁸⁰ Nancy L. Clark and William H. Worger, *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (Routledge, 2016), xvi.

⁸¹ Murray and Simeon, "Recognition without Empowerment," 418.

autonomy for their Zulu homeland.⁸² The ANC aimed for a majoritarian democracy in which race and ethnicity had no relevance. But most importantly, for the ANC it was unthinkable to negotiate any constitution without a democratically elected parliament, while the NP preferred to negotiate based on the current status quo.⁸³ As a compromise, they agreed on a two-stage process. In the first phase, the 1993 Interim Constitution was negotiated and accompanied by 34 constitutional principles set up by the outgoing government. In the second phase, after the first elections with universal suffrage, the newly elected parliament would have two years to negotiate the final constitution, which had to be in accordance with the 34 principles. The ANC won the first democratic elections in 1994 with a vast majority and Nelson Mandela became the first black president. The outcome of the 1994 elections (ANC won 252 of the 400 seats, NP won 82 and IFP 43) determined what the power leverage each party had in the negotiations for the final constitution, which was approved in 1996.⁸⁴

2.1 Conclusion

The legacy of apartheid was a deeply divided society, in which different segments lived in separate spheres. The main cleavages that were embedded in society were the racial cleavages. Around 1994, racial groups inhabited different areas such as homelands or urban neighbourhoods and spoke different (first) languages. Homelands also concentrated ethnic groups in certain areas to strengthen ethnic identities, but black solidarity had brought these groups together in the struggle against apartheid. Besides these social and political cleavages, apartheid also caused severe economic inequality. Blacks were overrepresented in low-income classes, had little to no property, poor housing, and they generally had enjoyed less education. All these cleavages would have to be addressed in post-apartheid South Africa.

⁸² Maano F. Ramutsindela, "The Changing Meanings of South Africa's Internal Boundaries," *Area* 30, no. 4 (December 1998):294.

⁸³ Henrard, "Apartheid South Africa: Transformation and Reconciliation," 39.

⁸⁴ Murray and Simeon, "Recognition without Empowerment," 423.

Chapter 3: The rainbow nation: United in diversity.

De-ethnicization of politics in South Africa

The 1996 constitution marked the official end of South Africa's transformation to a democratic state. The 'new' South Africa was proclaimed a rainbow nation with the slogan: 'United in our diversity'. In the transformation process the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa chose to adopt a model of reconciliation that emphasized national unity, truth and forgiveness above juridical trails and punishment against alleged perpetrators.⁸⁵ This mentality also prevailed in Nelson Mandela's attitude during the transition and aided a great deal to the peaceful transition process.

This chapter will examine the (de-)ethnicization of politics by looking at Simonsen's three levels: 1) the constitution and institutions of government, 2) the electoral system and 3) centre-region relations. While the 1994 and 1996 constitution were very different from each other, only the 1996 constitution will be taken into account since the 1994 Interim constitution only applied for two years. A fourth level, material reconciliation, is added as a case-specific arena of alienation. Material reconciliation and economic inclusion are important in South Africa: in 2015, 61,4% of South Africans believed 'reconciliation is impossible if those disadvantaged under apartheid remain poor'.⁸⁶ Political debate about material reconciliation, such as land retaliation and affirmative action has been heated, especially from the side of the white (right-wing) population which associated some of these policies with discrimination. Based on these four levels, it is possible to conclude whether *de-ethnicization* of politics or *ethnicization* of politics marked post-apartheid institutional design. In addition, the political system can be positioned in the theoretical schools outlined in chapter one. This helps to identify certain pitfalls, associated with institutional design, which can influence political polarisation.

3.1 Constitution and institutions of government

Article 1 of the 1996 constitution sets out a unitary state: 'one, sovereign, democratic state, based on the values of non-racialism and non-sexism'.⁸⁷ To stress the importance of non-racialism and non-sexism, human rights are prominently represented in the constitution. Chapter two, the Bill of Rights, is included to safeguard the protection of individuals on the basis of equality and non-discrimination.⁸⁸

The political system set up after apartheid is a parliamentary republic, with an executive branch headed by a President. The two-chamber parliament consists of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. The second chamber, the National Council of Provinces, was established 'to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the national sphere of

⁸⁵ Jan Hofmeyr and Rajen Govender, *National reconciliation, race relations, and social inclusion*, South African Reconciliation Barometer Briefing Paper 1 (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2015), 3, accessed December 3, 2016, <http://www.dac.gov.za/sites/default/files/reconciliation-barometer.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Hofmeyr and Govender, *National reconciliation, race relations, and social inclusion*, 7.

⁸⁷ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 1, Article 1.

⁸⁸ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 2, Article 9.

government'.⁸⁹ The President is elected by, and from, the National Assembly. The president pledges to 'promote the unity of the nation and that which will advance the Republic.'⁹⁰ He (or she) may freely appoint the Deputy President and Ministers from the National Assembly (and a maximum of two Ministers from outside the Assembly).⁹¹ This means that a consociational provision that was included in the Interim constitution, stating that each party with a minimum of 20% of the seats in the National Assembly would be entitled a Deputy President, was set aside in the final constitution.⁹²

In general, the 1996 constitution does not include any power-sharing mechanisms that guarantee minority representation. There are no notions of race or ethnicity with regard to members of parliament, the president and the cabinet. Only some minor exceptions to the neutral discourse can be found. For example, chapter eight acknowledges that 'the need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa must be considered when judicial officers are appointed'.⁹³ Also, the need for a representative public administration is stated, although the constitution adds this must be in line 'with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation'.⁹⁴

While the constitution does not assign political rights to minority groups, cultural minority rights are strongly embedded in the constitution. It defines eleven official languages, and both national and provincial governments may use any official language for the purposes of government.⁹⁵ ⁹⁶ All citizens have the right to education in any official language or other languages of their choice. Also, every 'cultural, religious and linguistic community (..) may not be denied the right, with other members of that community, to enjoy their culture, practice their religion, use their language and form cultural associations'.⁹⁷ In addition, the constitution calls for the establishment of The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (CCRLC), 'to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance and national unity among cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and free association'.⁹⁸ However, the government did not prioritize the establishment of the CCRLC. The first legislation on the CCRLC was passed in 2002, and the commission became operational in 2004. Despite the recognition of eleven official languages, English is the dominant one, most commonly used in public life.⁹⁹

So although the diversity of South Africa is recognized, and the constitution assigns a lot of

⁸⁹ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 4, Article 42, §4

⁹⁰ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 5, Article 83.

⁹¹ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 5, Article 91, §3.

⁹² Murray and Simeon, "Recognition without Empowerment," 425.

⁹³ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 8, Article 174, § 2.

⁹⁴ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 10, Article 195, §1.

⁹⁵ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 1, Article 6, §1-3.

⁹⁶ Note from the author: The eleven official languages of the Republic are Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu.

⁹⁷ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 2, Article 31, §1.

⁹⁸ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 9, Article 185, §1.

⁹⁹ Murray and Simeon, "Recognition without Empowerment," 428.

cultural rights for personal and private spheres, there is no notion of group rights on the political level. This means that the constitution and institutions of government fit the principles of accommodation, but without the power-sharing mechanisms that consociationalism prescribes.

3.2 Electoral system

National elections for the National Assembly are held every five years. The distribution of the 400 seats in the National Assembly is based on proportional representation, without a threshold. This means the share of votes a party receives determines their share of seats.¹⁰⁰ A system of proportional representation was chosen to ensure that all minority parties had the possibility to access national politics. In other words, it was expected that the electoral system of proportional representation could function as a non-discriminatory mechanism to facilitate racial or ethnic group-representation, if parties would, as was expected, rely mostly on support from different racial, ethnic or linguistic groups.¹⁰¹ The electoral system of proportional representation is used throughout all levels of politics. Although exact electoral rules differ per province, the constitution requires all elections for provincial and local government spheres to follow the principle of proportionality.

South African national elections work with a closed party list. This means that voters simply vote for the party of their preference, without indicating a specific preference for one candidate. Assignment of seats in parliament occurs based on the order of candidates on the list that is prepared by the political party. According to Vincent, the closed party list was another mechanism to ensure a broadly representative government. With success, he concludes in 2006: 'the ruling ANC's desire to use the closed party list system to create a legislature evincing greater representativity [in terms of race, gender and area of expertise] came to fruition'.¹⁰² But whether closed party lists will always result in representative party lists, is fully dependent on the political parties. The electoral law does not explicitly include requirements or quotas to ensure heterogeneous lists. The Code of Conduct only generally states the 'obligation to facilitate the full and equal participation of women in political activities', together with non-discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, sex, gender, class or religion¹⁰³. An additional mechanism has been put into place that can indirectly increase ethnic diversity of the National Assembly: half of the seats of the National Assembly must be filled with candidates of national lists, the other half with candidates from regional lists.¹⁰⁴ As regional lists are likely to broadly represent a local majority, this can facilitate ethnic groups that are geographically clustered.

The combination of a Presidential republic with an electoral system of proportional representation and closed party lists means that voters can only indirectly influence who will be their

¹⁰⁰ South Africa Electoral Act 73 of 1998, Section 57A, Schedule 1a: System of Representation in National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures.

¹⁰¹ Louise Vincent, "Of No Account? South Africa's Electoral System (Non) Debate," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 24, no. 1 (January 2006): 84.

¹⁰² Vincent, "Of No Account?," 85.

¹⁰³ South Africa Electoral Act 73 of 1998, Section 99, Schedule 2: Electoral Code of Conduct.

¹⁰⁴ South Africa Electoral Act, Section 57A, Schedule 1a.

next president. The electoral system has aroused objections in the public opinion. Critics claimed that the closed party list gave too much power to the political parties, while voters were unable to demonstrate personal preferences. As a result, the Electoral Task Team (ETT) was set up in May 2002 to investigate whether electoral reforms were needed to assure a healthy democratic system in South Africa. Recommendations were made in 2003, but these were not unanimously supported by ETT members, and were not followed. Summarizing, the electoral system stresses the requirement of proportionality and has included some provisions (closed party list, regional candidate lists) that can indirectly increase minority representation, while formal rules that directly ensure proportional representation of different groups are absent. The electoral system fits the consociational school that prefers proportional representation and a multi-party system. It is therefore likely to result in proportional representation of distinct groups of society in national politics through their own, group-based, political parties.

3.3 Centre-region relations

The Republic of South Africa has nine provinces: Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Limpopo, North West and Western Cape.¹⁰⁵ Provincial boundaries have been redrawn after apartheid, but closely resemble the dividing lines during apartheid. This means that new provincial boundaries are similar to not only the ethno-linguistic map




Figure 1: The dominant language in the different regions in South Africa according to the 2011 Census.

Source: "South Africa's languages," *Media Club South Africa*, accessed December 3, 2016, <http://www.mediaclubsouthafrica.com/landstatic/80-languages>

of the country, but also to economic development regions that the NP identified.¹⁰⁶ However, this does not mean that provinces are organized along ethnic lines. As figure 1 shows, several provinces have clear linguistic majorities, but there was not attempted to constitute provinces as linguistically or culturally homogenous as the consociational model suggests.¹⁰⁷ Provincial and linguistic

boundaries that were redrawn did not coincide with ethnic divisions, and all provinces had a heterogeneous population in 1996 (see Appendix I: Population by first language and province).

The Interim Constitution flirted with federalism and bound by the 34 Constitutional Principles,

¹⁰⁵ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 6, Article 103, § 1.

¹⁰⁶ M.M. Khosa and Y.G. Muthien, "The Expert, the Public and the Politician: Drawing South Africa's New Provincial Boundaries," *South African Geographical Journal* 79 no.1 (1997):11.

¹⁰⁷ Murray and Simeon, "Recognition without Empowerment," 433.

the final Constitution had to reflect the notion of self-determination.¹⁰⁸ However, the ANC strongly favoured a unitary state and therefore they assured that the provision set by the Principles was effectively tackled by the wording of article 235:

*'The right of South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the notion of the right of self-determinations of any community sharing common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation.'*¹⁰⁹

In other words, the right to self-determination for a group within the Republic is precluded. The right of self-determination for a group can only be legally proclaimed if it is in accordance with the national government.¹¹⁰ Article 235 sends out a clear message to separatist movements: the right to self-determination is rejected, and the unitary state of South Africa dominates.

South Africa is described by many as a quasi-federal system (although the terms federalism or federal state do not appear in the Constitution).¹¹¹ Within the quasi-federal system provinces have exclusive competence in a very limited list of policy areas, which is incorporated in the constitution. The list only includes minor issues such as ambulance services, liquor licenses, public places and provincial culture and sports.¹¹² Other areas, which include pollution, trade, tourism and welfare services, may be passed to the provinces by the National Assembly if it wishes to do so.¹¹³ But in all areas the central government retains the right to overrule provincial legislation in order to maintain security, economic unity, national standards, or to prevent a province from harming others.¹¹⁴ In practice, this means the powers of the provinces are restricted. Regional bodies act more as a lower body for the implementation of basic services and national regulations, than as an autonomous level of government.¹¹⁵ The dominance of the central legislative is also evident from the concentration of revenue raising power at the centre.¹¹⁶ This leaves little room for provincial initiatives: Lodge states that 'in Limpopo, commitments to salaries and grants and various other fixed obligations account for 80% of the expenditure.'¹¹⁷

Thus, while federal laws and local governing bodies are present, South Africa is known as a 'quasi-federal' system due to the lack of autonomy of the nine provinces. Since the regions are not designed to provide group autonomy on the local level, the limited federal system of South Africa does not fit consociationalism. As explained before, centripetalism favours a unitary state, or, when

¹⁰⁸ Nico Steytler and Johann Mettler, "Federal Arrangements as a Peacemaking Device During South Africa's Transition to Democracy," *The Journal of Federalism* 31, no. 4 (2001):99.

¹⁰⁹ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 14, Article 235.

¹¹⁰ Steytler and Mettler, "Federal Arrangements as a Peacemaking Device," 100.

¹¹¹ Murray and Simeon, "Recognition without Empowerment," 432.

¹¹² South African Constitution of 1996, Schedule 5: Functional Areas of Exclusive Provincial Legislative Competence.

¹¹³ South African Constitution of 1996, Schedule 4: Functional Areas of Concurrent National and Provincial Legislative Competence.

¹¹⁴ South African Constitution of 1996, Chapter 6, Article 146, § 2.

¹¹⁵ Tom Lodge, "Provincial Government and State Authority in South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 31, no. 4 (2005):741.

¹¹⁶ Murray and Simeon, "Recognition without Empowerment," 432.

¹¹⁷ Lodge, "Provincial Government and State Authority in South Africa," 741.

federalism is applied, it argues regional boundaries should cut through group boundaries. The quasi-federal system of South Africa, which cuts through dividing cleavages, fits their outlook to some extent. In addition, the local governing bodies can serve as arenas of bargaining that centripetalism promotes to familiarize citizens with bargaining and cross-cutting cleavages.

3.4 Material reconciliation: land reforms and affirmative action.

As fourth level of analysis, Simonsen uses additional 'arenas of alienation'; issues that he identifies as important for inclusion or exclusion. Besides the political and social inequalities of apartheid that had to be resolved with a new constitution, economic inequalities were deeply embedded in South Africa during the apartheid. After apartheid, oppressed groups often found themselves without decent education, without property and earning low wages. These conditions were the result of exclusion during apartheid. In order to for them to feel included in the new Republic, economic inclusion was important. Therefore, the new democratic republic would also have to deal with this inequality through material reconciliation. The new government promised to improve living conditions for blacks and to create jobs.

The Employment Equity Act and the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act aimed to achieve equal representation on the labour market by advancing people from designated groups. The designated groups included all people of colour, women (including white women) and people with disabilities (including whites). In addition, the Employment Equity legislation required companies with more than 50 employees to design and implement plans to improve the representativeness of workforce demographics and to report the plans to the Department of Labour.¹¹⁸ Apartheid also resulted in a highly unequal land-distribution: numerous black land owners were stripped of their rights and property. This way, the white minority obtained ownership of more than 80% of all land during apartheid.¹¹⁹ Therefore, the redress of land ownership would require land reforms to restore black property.

Affirmative action and land reforms are additional arenas of alienation between the different racial groups and resulted in ethnicization of politics. First, BEE is implemented through legislation that explicitly and positively discriminates certain racial groups (blacks and coloureds). Especially in more recent years the public opinion is divided about this discriminatory law: should the government indeed implement affirmative action to help blacks, or should it help all people below a certain income, irrespective of their colour? Second, because racial and economic dividing lines in post-apartheid South Africa usually coincided, economic reconciliation generally poses a threat to white privileges, while helping blacks and coloureds. As a result, it often fosters discussion across existing

¹¹⁸ "Employment Equity FAQ," *Brand South Africa*, accessed November 6, 2016, <http://www.southafrica.info/services/rights/employmentequity.htm>.

¹¹⁹ San Mayo, *The Politics of Land Distribution and Race Relations in South Africa*, United Nations Research Institute for Social Developments, Programme Paper Number 10, (December 2004), 7, accessed December 4, 2016, [http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/httpNetITFramePDF?ReadForm&parentunid=101C4E46DE4EA2B080256B6D005786F0&parentdoctype=paper&netipath=80256B3C005BCCF9/\(httpAuxPages\)/101C4E46DE4EA2B080256B6D005786F0/\\$file/moyo.pdf](http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/httpNetITFramePDF?ReadForm&parentunid=101C4E46DE4EA2B080256B6D005786F0&parentdoctype=paper&netipath=80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/101C4E46DE4EA2B080256B6D005786F0/$file/moyo.pdf).

racial cleavages. This means the topics are sensitive for debates that enforce dividing lines and in which discourse focussed on race and discrimination. For these reasons these subjects will be part of the analysis of political salience of race in chapter four.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the institutional design of the 'rainbow nation' in order to assess whether the transition resulted in de-ethnicization of politics or in ethnicization of politics. In short, the Constitution is aimed at setting up a unitary state with a concentration of power at the national level. It prescribes a society where differences are recognized, but where (minority) groups are not politically empowered or granted any institutionalized privileges in the political sphere.¹²⁰ This means fair representation is not guaranteed. However, the electoral system is designed to facilitate fair representation and easy access to governing bodies for minority groups. Centre-region relations have not reinforced the autonomy of separate segments in society in the long term. Instead, group autonomy is protected by the constitution through extensive cultural rights and the right to use eleven official languages in politics and education.

Within the context of the theoretical debate, South Africa's institutional design can be seen as a very 'soft' version of consociationalism. Group differences were acknowledged, and groups were assigned cultural and linguistic rights. The question is if this was enough to satisfy minorities, or did separatist movements demand federal autonomy? Power-sharing were not institutionalized, South Africa relied on the electoral system that offered easy access to the political system. Consociationalist would probably argue that solely the electoral system of proportional representation is not enough to safeguard the needs of minorities, while other scholars would claim that the pitfall of this electoral system is that it might result in politics in which organization along racial or ethnic lines dominates. Although neutral language is generally used, policy for material reconciliation offered an exception. One might find this justifiable, or argue this is an example of 'the authoritarian rule of the majority'.

As mentioned before, Simonsen claims that institutions should not fixate group divisions, but should contribute towards de-ethnicization of politics, by encouraging contacts and trust-building across different groups.¹²¹ In general, the institutional design of South Africa satisfies these criteria, although it is unclear to what extent it will encourage interracial contact and trust, since ethnic divisions are facilitated by cultural and linguistic rights and by proportional representation in national politics. It can be concluded that the new institutional design of South Africa, from 1996 onwards, is, to a large extent, an example of de-ethnicization of politics. Following the argumentation of Simonsen, this should result in decreasing political salience of race in the long run. In order to test this statement, developments of the political salience of race are examined next.

¹²⁰ Murray and Simeon, "Recognition without Empowerment," 424.

¹²¹ Simonsen, "Addressing Ethnic Divisions," 298.

Chapter 4: Kicking the ANC off their throne? The political legacy of apartheid and Mandela.

Political salience of race throughout the years

This chapter will examine political salience of race in post-apartheid South Africa from the first democratic elections in 1994 to 2016, the moment of writing. If political salience of race, in other words the importance of race in politics, is low, this means racial lines do not strongly polarize politics. Simonsen indicates two main indicators that can reveal the level of political salience: 1) cross-cutting cleavages and 2) strategy of political elites for attracting votes. This chapter examines these two indicators, using a wide array of sources, such as voting behaviour, surveys, campaign material, campaign speeches and newspaper- and academic articles. The analysis will focus on politics at the national level. Some limitations of Simonsen's approach will also be discussed. Altogether this will lead to a conclusion about the developments in the structural political salience of race in South Africa, the last piece of the puzzle that is needed to tackle the main question of the thesis. But first of all, this chapter will briefly provide some general information about politics in South Africa.

Since 1994, all national elections in South Africa have been won by the ANC with an overwhelming majority. Their number of seats in the National Assembly ranged from 279 (out of 400) at its peak after the elections of 2004, to 249 at its minimum after the 2014 elections. Consequently, all presidents of post-apartheid South Africa have been from the ANC: Mandela (1994-1999), Mkebi (1999-2008), Molanthe (2008-2009) and Zuma (2009 – present). Only in the local government elections of August 2016 ANC's political dominance was seriously challenged for the first time.

As a result of the electoral system based on proportional representation, it is relatively easy for small parties to enter parliament. An average of thirteen parties has been represented in parliament between 1994 and 2016, and many more have competed in elections. In this thesis only the bigger parties at the national level, in general the three biggest parties in parliament after elections, will be discussed. Relevant opposition parties in national politics have been the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the NP (which was renamed the New National party (NNP) in 1997 and ceased to exist in 2005), the Democratic Party (DP) and its successor the Democratic Alliance (DA), the Congress of the People (COPE) and, finally, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), that entered the stage in 2013. Generally speaking, the ANC, the IFP, the COPE and the EFF are considered to be 'black' parties, while the NP, the DP and the DA are considered to be 'white' parties. Figure 2 shows the number of seats in the National Assembly that the aforementioned parties have won in post-apartheid national elections.




Figure 2: Number of seats (of the six selected parties) in the National Assembly of South Africa by election year.

In the two decades after apartheid, South Africa has made impressive progress under the rule of the ANC. In 2015, South Africa was an upper middle-income country and the largest economy of the African continent.¹²² In the first 14 years of democracy the black middle class more than doubled in size.¹²³ Also, programs such as accessible healthcare, social security services and other programs which help the most vulnerable in society are praised.¹²⁴ Nonetheless, South Africa has one of the highest inequality rates in the world and one of the highest numbers of HIV-infections worldwide. The biggest problems facing South Africa are poverty (in 2015 more than half of all citizens lived below the national poverty line¹²⁵), unemployment (in 2015 the unemployment rate was 25%¹²⁶), HIV, crime and corruption.

¹²² David Malingha Doya, "S. Africa's Economy Regains Rank as Africa's Biggest on Rand," *Bloomberg*, August 10, 2016, accessed November 6, 2016, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-10/south-africa-s-economy-regains-rank-as-africa-s-biggest-on-rand>.

¹²³ Tara Kangarlou, "South Africa since apartheid: Boom or bust?," *CNN*, November 27, 2013, accessed November 6, 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/27/business/south-africa-since-apartheid/>.

¹²⁴ Kangarlou, "South Africa since apartheid: Boom or bust?".

¹²⁵ "Shocking levels of poverty in South Africa revealed," *BusinessTech*, August 3, 2015, accessed December 4, 2016, <https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/94849/shocking-levels-of-poverty-in-south-africa-revealed/>.

¹²⁶ "Shocking levels of poverty".

4.1 Cross-cutting cleavages and the racial census

The first point put forward by Simonsen to indicate political salience, is the existence of cross-cutting cleavages, which will, inter alia, be revealed by the absence of a racial census. Based on data from the Afrobarometer, figure 3 maps the most important problems facing South Africa over time, according to its citizens. The Afrobarometer is a continent-wide survey and concerns a wide array of subjects. In South Africa it was conducted six times since 1999, with an average of about 2400 participants.

First, it must be acknowledged that the general trends in the eight most important problems (selected from over 30 items) are rather similar over time for all racial groups. Overall, all racial groups also identify




Figure 3: Percentage of a group that answered one of the selected problems for the question "What are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? Which of these is most important." Answers crossed by race. Graphs in order of importance (please note scales differ per graph). Data from: Afrobarometer, accessed November 20, 2016, <http://afrobarometer.org/>.

the same problems as the most important problem facing South Africa: up to 2009 all groups consider unemployment the biggest problem. However, the outcomes show that different groups have different priorities when asked what the most important problem is. Different outcomes are, for example, seen with regard to the 3 main issues (unemployment, crime and security and corruption). While unemployment is a major problem for the majority of blacks, they hardly ever selected crime and

security or corruption as most important problems. The opposite is true for Indians and whites, who, especially since 2009, have often prioritized crime and security and corruption, but are less concerned about unemployment. This means that although all racial groups agree on the major problems, and cross-cutting cleavages thus exist, different groups do not fully agree on the most important problem the government should address first. The next paragraphs will look at the racial census to see whether cross-cutting cleavages or identity prevail in voting.

By looking at voting behaviour, Karen Ferree, professor in political science, identified a racial census in South African national elections. She found that in the elections of 1994, 1999 and 2004 respectively 91, 95 and 86 per cent of blacks voted for denominated ‘African parties’, while respectively 90, 81 and 74 per cent of whites voted for denominated ‘white parties’ (see Appendix II). Results for coloureds and Indian citizens were mixed.¹²⁷ Unfortunately, Ferree’s article only includes three elections, but the Afrobarometer can provide additional information, including for the missing years.

Figure 4, that is composed with data from the Afrobarometer, maps the percentage of a racial group that answered ANC or DP/DA to the question ‘If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for?’. Figure 4 shows that the ANC enjoyed overwhelming support from blacks in the years following the 2004 election. Support for the DA (and previously the DP) grew in the last years. Especially support from whites, but also support from coloureds and Indian voters, increased. But although support for the DA has grown significantly, support from black voters remained relatively low. Ferree’s findings in combination with these data on voting behaviour, suggest a racial census was present for all years from 1994-2015.




Figure 4: Percentage of a group indicating to vote for the ANC or DP/DA as response to the question ‘If presidential elections were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for?’ Answers crossed by race of respondent. Data from: Afrobarometer, accessed November 20, 2016, <http://afrobarometer.org/>.

¹²⁷ Karen E. Ferree, *Framing the race in South Africa: The political origins of racial census elections* (Cambridge University Press, 2010),6.

In line with this conclusion about a racial census in voting, Ferree also found that different segments of society held different views of political parties. In 1999, 98% of blacks answered they saw the ANC as 'inclusive', while, in contrast 89% of whites viewed ANC as 'exclusive'. In the same year the DP was viewed as inclusive by 73% of whites while it scored 13% on inclusiveness among blacks, 27% among coloureds and 29% among Indians. Surprisingly, the NNP (the successor of the NP) scored well among all segments of society: it was viewed as 'inclusive' by 53% of Africans, 59% of coloureds, 60% of whites and 79% of Indians.¹²⁸ This did not help the NNP however; they only won around 7% of the votes in the 1999 elections. Another survey conducted among 3009 respondents more than 10 years later, in 2013, shows the persistent distrust towards the 'white' DA: an overwhelming 52% of the black respondents believed that if the DA had an election victory, they would bring back some form of apartheid. This belief was less supported among other groups: 26% of Indians, 21% of coloureds and 19% of whites shared this view.¹²⁹ Developments are heading the right way however: the South African Reconciliation Barometer, a yearly survey, shows that interracial mistrust steadily dropped from 40,6% in 2003 to 28,1% in 2013. Mistrust is highest for black South Africans, but also for this group it dropped throughout the years: from 47% in 2003 to 32.3% in 2013.¹³⁰




Figure 5: Percentage of a group indicating party affiliation to the ANC, the DA, or no party as response to the question: "Do you feel close to any party, and if so, which?" Answers crossed by race. Data from: Afrobarometer, accessed November 20, 2016, <http://afrobarometer.org/>

Based on data from the Afrobarometer, figure 5 maps party affiliation, which should be closely aligned with voting behaviour. In the period 1999 - 2015 an average of 64% of those

¹²⁸ Karen E. Ferree, "Explaining South Africa's Racial Census," *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 4 (November 2006): 810.

¹²⁹ Shauna Mottiar, "The Democratic Alliance and the role of opposition parties in South Africa," *Journal of African Elections: South Africa's 2014 Elections* 14, no.1 (2015): 113, accessed December 3, 2016, <https://eisa.org.za/pdf/JAE14.1Mottiar.pdf>.

¹³⁰ Kim Wale, *Reflecting on Reconciliation. Lessons from the past, prospects for the future*, South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey, 2014 Report, (Institution for Justice and Reconciliation, 2014), 16- 17, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://reconciliationbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/IJR-SA-Reconciliation-Barometer-Report-2014.pdf>.

interviewed felt affiliated with a political party. Of all groups, the Indians ranked the lowest on affiliation with an average of 61,8% that not felt affiliated with a political party. Again, differences are most extreme between blacks and whites. Blacks mostly feel affiliated with ANC, while whites are increasingly feeling affiliated with the DA, a party that scores low among blacks. Notable is that in general few whites feel affiliation with a political party, while blacks score high. Thus the numbers suggest that the ANC has a stronger relationship with their constituency.

Generally speaking, several sources confirm that the different groups support different political parties. The ANC has been the biggest party since 1994, and as the data show, support for this party comes mainly from the black segment of society, while white support for the ANC has been neglect able. Other parties, like the DP and later the DA, have enjoyed support among white voters. But the fact that the DA has been growing in recent years is related to diversification of their constituency, mostly to growing support from Indians and coloureds. In short, the developments from 1994 to 2016 show that a racial census has been present in South Africa, although there appears to be a slight decrease in that census, as the DA is attracting a broader support base, while party affiliation with the ANC shows overall decrease after a peak in 2011/2013. However, the existence of a racial census alone does not equal political salience of race, or an absolute absence of cross-cutting cleavages. To illustrate: a racial census might be the result of polarizing cleavages, but it might also be the result of rational voting, based on policy preferences that one group may share.¹³¹ As indicated by figure 3, the different groups have some different policy priorities that might explain their political preferences. To understand what motivates voters, it is important to look at elite behaviour and party-campaigning strategies, to learn whether parties attract people by emphasising issues or identities.

4.2 The development of elite behaviour in campaigning

As Simonsen explains, an analysis of elite behaviour and campaigning can help to examine political salience, and will also help to gain a better insight in the cross-cutting cleavages. The next section will examine national election campaigns in the period from 1994 to 2016. The analysis aims to reveal how the big political parties have presented themselves. Did they rely on identity, emphasising group-differences, or on issue-based campaigning, by appealing voters based on problems and policy, in other words, cross-cutting cleavages? Where possible, the qualitative analysis is based on sources that were publically accessible and aimed at the regular voter, such as campaign speeches on rallies and campaign materials like commercials and manifesto's. Unfortunately, these primary sources were not always available so newspapers, academic literature and other secondary sources have been included as well. Only the campaigns of relevant parties, in general the parties that came out of the election as first, second or third party, are covered.

¹³¹ Ferree, "Explaining South Africa's Racial Census," 803.

4.2.1 The elections of 1994

The two main contenders in the 1994 national elections were the ANC, led by Mandela, and the NNP, led by de Klerk. The elections of 1994 were very important since the outcome would determine the composition of the parliament that would be charged with writing the new – final - constitution of South Africa. Some white parties at the far right demanded that the new constitution would set up a white homeland. The IFP fought for independence of their Zulu-homeland and argued that the Interim Constitution did no justice to this demand. Therefore, they initially decided to boycott the elections.¹³² As a result, the run up to first elections was accompanied by political violence, mostly between members of the ANC and the IFP. But just before election day a deal was negotiated: all leaders committed themselves to look in to federal or homeland solutions if the elections results would show significant support for these plans. As a result, the IFP decide to run for parliament last-minute and the elections proceeded peacefully.

On one side of the political spectrum the peace agreement, that prescribed a unitary state, resulted in protest and sharpening of ethnic cleavages. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the IFP claimed: 'We want autonomous regions, because that is the only way in which the people of this region will be happy.'¹³³ He warned against an ANC victory which, according to him, would destroy regional identities.¹³⁴ However, the separatists still took a pragmatic stance as the Zulu IFP bridged racial cleavages and co-operated with the former enemy, the white extremist parties, in the '*Freedom Alliance*'. The alliance was united in their fear for the majority, as Constand Viljoen, leader of the Freedom Front explained: 'If you apply the one-man-one-vote majority rule, you very often get tyranny and oppression.'¹³⁵ But eventually, the outcomes of the 1994 elections showed little support for these parties that chose to focus their campaign on federal demands.

On the other side of the spectrum, the two big parties, ANC and NNP, chose to highlight their views of a new, inclusive and united South Africa. Nelson Mandela urged for unity and cooperation:

*'We must base ourselves on our tradition of unity and purpose in action. Unity, so that our children can walk in peace and learn in purpose. Unity, so that our aged can live out the rest of their lives in dignity. Unity, so that we can build one nation, one people, one country.'*¹³⁶

Like Mandela, de Klerk aimed at a broad interracial electorate: 'Today we have before us, thousands of South Africans. It is not important whether they are white or black or brown, they are all south

¹³² "1994: Freedom Front, IFP, common ideals," Youtube video, 04:00, posted by "briantw1," November 5, 2010, accessed December 5, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GfR38CQ9cpM>.

¹³³ "1994: Freedom Front, IFP, common ideals," 02:22.

¹³⁴ "1994: Friday roundup, Buthelezi interview," Youtube video, 3:59, Interview with Mangosuthu Buthelezi by CNN presenter Bernard Shaw, posted by "briantw1," November 5, 2010, accessed December 5, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RMR9qmI_Jvs.

¹³⁵ "1994: Freedom Front, IFP, common ideals," 01:15.

¹³⁶ "Nelson Mandela's speech at unveiling of Gandhi memorial Pietermaritzburg, 6 June 1993," *South African History Online*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/nelson-mandelas-speech-unveiling-gandhi-memorial-pietermaritzburg-6-june-1993>.

Africans and they are here together because they believe in the same mission for the future.¹³⁷ Moreover, both the NP and the ANC emphasised that they would work for the poor, and rolled out policy proposals on how to improve the economy and quality of life for the poor.

Both parties that won most seats in parliament (252 for the ANC, 82 for the NP) were those that had chosen to run reconciliatory and issue-oriented campaigns, in which they mostly succeeded according to Eldridge and Seekings.¹³⁸ Although the IFP, that stressed federal claims, joined the elections last minute and therefore did not really run a campaign, they had moderate success with 43 seats.

4.2.2 The elections of 1999

Five years after the first elections, South Africa had installed a new constitution and progress had been made in housing, the delivery of clean water and economic welfare. However, South Africa suffered from a high unemployment rate, poor education, rising inequality and high crime rates.¹³⁹ In the elections of 1999, the ANC contested with a new party-president, Thabo Mbeki, and they increased their majority in parliament to 266 of the 400 seats. The Democratic Party (DP) and the IFP were the main opposing parties and won respectively 31 and 34 seats. The 1999 election signalled the first demise of the NNP, which had difficulties to shake of its dark past. It shrank to 28 seats.

During the 1999 national election campaign, unemployment, crime, education, healthcare and corruption were clearly identified as the key issues: all party-manifesto's agreed that these were the issues that had to be tackled.¹⁴⁰ In fact, over the following years these issues remained the key issues in South African politics, as we will see later on. But although there was consensus about the key issues, the ANC, DP and IFP chose different campaign strategies to appeal to voters.

The ANC manifesto of 1999 directly states the two main arguments that were emphasised throughout their campaign: 'Why Vote ANC? Because the ANC, together with the people, brought freedom. [...] Because the ANC has led five years of struggle for change.'¹⁴¹ The campaign strongly relied on ANC's role of liberator and their achievements during Mandela's presidency. Confident as the ANC was, they pronounced their hope of winning a two-thirds majority, which would ensure that they could govern without difficulties of opposition. Their campaign proved to be successful, mostly among black voters.

The DP, led by Tony Leon, opted for an aggressive campaign style, directly opposing the

¹³⁷ South Africa - Election Campaign," Youtube video, 1:04, Speech of F.W. de Klerk on January 22,1994, posted by "AP Archive," July 21, 2015, accessed December 5, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K6RL0tpgdQ8>.

¹³⁸ Matt Eldridge and Jeremy Seekings, "Mandela's lost province: The African National Congress and the Western Cape electorate in the 1994 South African elections," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 22, no. 4 (1996):519.

¹³⁹ "History of elections in South Africa: The South African general elections: 1999," *South African History Online*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1999>.

¹⁴⁰ Rupert Taylor and Thabisi Hoeane, "Interpreting the South African election of June 1999," *Politikon*, 26, no. 2 (1999):133.

¹⁴¹ "1999 National Elections Manifesto: Why Vote ANC?," *African National Congress*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.anc.org.za/content/1999-national-elections-manifesto-why-vote-anc>.

ANC, with the slogan 'Fight Back'.¹⁴² Intentionally or unintentionally, the slogan was perceived as a call to fight back the country's transformation, and political opponents of the DP transformed the slogan to 'Fight Black'.¹⁴³ Furthermore, the liberal policy that the DP proposed condemned the affirmative action programmes and called for merit-based opportunities.¹⁴⁴ Affirmative action formed an arena of alienation, and the DP's position was not well received by the black constituency. In an ANC newsletter, Mbeki spoke of 'the transformation of the DP into a right wing political party'.¹⁴⁵ Leon kept defending the party and its liberal and democratic founding principles. Although the campaign of the DP was issue-oriented, in general it resulted in rejection by the black constituency and support from minorities.

Meanwhile, the IFP aimed at a broader constituency outside their own ethnic group, while they maintained the issue of a federal state as their key signature. Buthelezi hoped to appeal to voters nation-wide with 'the recognition that each province has its own characteristics and features which must be respected'.¹⁴⁶ Also, he emphasised 'that there is no future for South Africa if we cannot forgive one another. Without forgiveness there will be no unity'.¹⁴⁷ And, like the other parties, they campaigned for more teachers, better hospitals and the need to deal with unemployment and criminality.¹⁴⁸ But they emphasised the need of a federal approach to achieve this all, and to better meet the specific needs of individuals and communities.¹⁴⁹

While the political parties did not explicitly seek for support based on identity in their campaigns for the 1999 elections, it is obvious how different racial groups developed a preference for specific parties. The ANC built on strong support from blacks, based on their past. The DP especially attracted voters who opposed the ANC, attracted by their slogan 'Fight Back'. In general, these were minorities who wanted to protect their own interest and feared future ANC rule. The IFP won some support with the continued struggle for a more federal South Africa, although in reality the 1996 Constitution had already determined the fate of a unitary state with restricted powers for the provincial level, something difficult to reverse. It is Noteworthy that this party, originally a Zulu-separationist movement, broadened its outlook to the national level and wanted to bridge cleavages.

¹⁴² Kimberly Langegran, "South Africa's 1999 Election: Consolidating a Dominant Party System," *African Today* 48, no. 2 (2001): 93.

¹⁴³ Sydney Letsholo, "How the ANC Won the 2004 Elections: Perspectives on Voting Behaviour in South Africa," EISA Occasional Paper Number 31 (April 2005):6, accessed December 5, 2016, <https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/OP31.pdf>.

¹⁴⁴ Langegran, "Consolidating a Dominant Party System," 92.

¹⁴⁵ "ANC Today," Volume 1, no. 46 (December 2001), *African National Congress*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.anc.org.za/docs/ancctoday/2001/at46.htm>.

¹⁴⁶ "Freedom Day Celebrations," Speech by Mangosuthu Buthelezi at King's Park Stadium (April 27, 1999), *Inkatha Freedom Party*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://archive.ifp.org.za/Speeches/270499sp.htm>.

¹⁴⁷ Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "Message for Publication on the Occasion of Easter 1999," *Inkatha Freedom Party*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://archive.ifp.org.za/Speeches/010499sp.htm>.

¹⁴⁸ "IFP Rally," Speech by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Tembisa (January 10, 1999), *Inkatha Freedom Party*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://archive.ifp.org.za/Speeches/100199sp.htm>.

¹⁴⁹ "IFP Rally," (January 10, 1999).

4.2.3 The elections of 2004

In the run-up to the 2004 national elections, the same protagonists led the campaigns of the three biggest parties. Mbeki ran for a second term for the ANC, Buthelezi headed the IFP and Leon ran campaign for the Democratic Alliance, a merger of the DP with, inter alia, the NNP. HIV, poverty, unemployment, crime and corruption were the central issues of the elections once again. In this round, the DA and the IFP formed a pre-election coalition – the Coalition for Change- to create a strong opposition against the ANC. Not surprisingly, the two opposing fronts contested one another fiercely, and political commentator Chris Landsberg (of the Johannesburg-based Centre for Policy Studies) expressed his worries about the amount of hostility in the campaign: 'I am struck by how some political parties are obsessed by tension, fear and attacks during the campaign.'¹⁵⁰

The ANC maintained the emphasis on their past, with the struggle against apartheid and their achievements as ruling party, stating in their newsletter that: 'the important themes arising from this review process was not only that great progress had been made towards achieving a better life for all South Africans, but that this progress had been made possible only by the ANC's ability to unite South Africans in working together to achieve transformation.'¹⁵¹ In their manifesto called 'A people's contract to create work and fight poverty' they focused mainly on improving the life of the poor, while stating that 'Non-racialism, non-sexism and programmes to prevent other forms of discrimination are at the centre of our values and our practical actions.'¹⁵² But while the ANC's emphasised unity in official documents and speeches, they attacked their opponents with hard, polarizing, language. Different commentators criticized the campaign that 'went well beyond robust electioneering to suggest a coordinated campaign to demonise and delegitimize [the DA].'¹⁵³ Mbeki denigrated the IFP-DA coalition by accusing the IFP of allying with right-wing groupings to protect 'white interests' since 1992. Mbeki also claimed that the DA had absorbed all white right-wing voters of the NNP.¹⁵⁴

In an election rally, Buthelezi responded to these claims by saying 'There is a tendency of running these elections in a manner which talks about what happened ten years ago' and 'The South African people do not wish to be confused with meaningless expressions like right-wing, left-wing [...], [or] any other label that certain people are now trying to introduce, in these election campaigns. The issues are clear.'¹⁵⁵ He reasons that a vote for the ANC will convict the country with five more years of the same problems. But simply the existence of the Coalition for Change shows that the opposition parties know how strong the ANC is. So they have gathered strength and thereby they gave an

¹⁵⁰ Moyiga Nduru, "SA's muddy, polarised election campaign," *Mail & Guardian*, March 24, 2004, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://mg.co.za/article/2004-03-24-sas-muddy-polarised-election-campaign>.

¹⁵¹ "ANC Today," Volume 4, no. 1 (January 2004), *African National Congress*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.anc.org.za/docs/ancctoday/2004/at01.htm>.

¹⁵² "2004 National Elections Manifesto: A people's contract to create work and fight poverty," *African National Congress*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://anc.org.za/content/2004-national-elections-manifesto>.

¹⁵³ Vincent, "Of No Account?," 88.

¹⁵⁴ "Mbeki attacks 'right-wing' coalition," *IOL*, March 26, 2004, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mbeki-attacks-right-wing-coalition-209270>.

¹⁵⁵ "IFP Rally," Speech by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Madadeni (February 21, 2004), *Inkatha Freedom Party*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://archive.ifp.org.za/Speeches/210204sp.htm>.

example of bridging racial differences with cross-cutting cleavages, of which they were very aware. As Buthelezi tells the crowd in Nongoma:

*'I have begun the policy and politics of coalition by developing the Coalition for Change with the Democratic Alliance to show how different political parties can work together on the basis of a similar commitment to development, development, development. The Democratic Alliance and I have shared many common visions, strategies, proposals and solutions on how to develop our economy, create real employment and place South Africa on a path of sustainable but accelerated economic growth.'*¹⁵⁶

Remarkably, federalism is no longer on the forefront of the IFP's agenda: their 2004 manifesto contains the word federalism exactly one time, in the introduction, but it is not mentioned in the 6 chapters covering their policy proposals.¹⁵⁷

While the DA was a newly founded party, its campaign was, to a certain extent, a continuation of the DP electoral campaign of 1999. With its slogan "South Africa deserves better" it opposed to the ANC and their failed policies on job creation and combatting AIDS of the last ten years, claiming to be the only true alternative.¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, the DA directed their campaign towards a more representative constituency, with Leon doing things 'one could never have imagined him doing a decade ago': he visited townships, hugged black people and almost danced (traditional dancing and singing are usually part of ANC election rallies).¹⁵⁹ Moreover, the DA party list reflected a greater representation of South Africa's racial groups.¹⁶⁰

Although the developments toward a more inclusive DA and the Coalition of Change seemed promising, the ANC won a big majority of the votes once again. Sydney Letsholo explains that: 'The ANC manipulated its dominant position to intentionally organise political discourse aimed at demonising the opposition as racist and to reinforce the social cleavage between blacks and whites into a political white-black opposition, that has prevented the successful politicisation of competing lines of division, be these based on interest groups, ethnic identities, or class'.¹⁶¹ The 2004 elections showed that, although official party programs and campaigns were carefully crafted to stress unity and proposed policy to improve South Africa for all, discourse between opposing parties remained polarised on race.

¹⁵⁶ "Oudtshoorn Public Meeting," Speech by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Oudtshoorn (March 20, 2004), *Inkatha Freedom Party*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://archive.ifp.org.za/Speeches/200304sp.htm>.

¹⁵⁷ "IFP National Manifesto: Real Development Now: Let's make a Difference – Together," *Inkatha Freedom Party*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.polity.org.za/article/ifp-manifesto-2004-january-2004-2004-01-18>.

¹⁵⁸ "South Africa: Opposition Improves On Record," *Vanguard*, April 16, 2004, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200404160666.html>.

¹⁵⁹ Paddy Harper, "DA spin machine sells slick self-confidence," *IOL*, February 22, 2004, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/da-spin-machine-sells-slick-self-confidence-206385>.

¹⁶⁰ "Few surprises on DA election lists," *Mail & Guardian*, February 15, 2004, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://mg.co.za/article/2004-02-15-few-surprises-on-da-election-lists>.

¹⁶¹ Letsholo, "How the ANC Won the 2004 Elections," 6-7.

4.2.4 The elections of 2009

Preceding the 2009 elections, the ANC had some turbulent years. The Deputy President Jacob Zuma faced charges for fraud and corruption. Zuma was acquitted on all charges in 2008, but the affair caused internal conflict around president Mbeki, who was accused of politically influencing Zuma's case. Urged by ANC's leadership Mbeki resigned on September 21, 2008, joined by ten ministers. Kgalema Motlanthe fulfilled the last year of the presidency and Zuma became the presidential candidate for the next elections.¹⁶² The whole affair also resulted in the foundation of an ANC split-of party: the Congress of the People (COPE). COPE seemed to compete with the ANC for a similar constituency and the 2009 elections were anticipated with excitement.

Another new component of the 2009 campaign, also closely related to Zuma's charges, was the emphasis on morality and protection of the constitution. In an open letter, dated October 2, 2008, Mbeki wrote: 'the leadership has taken a direct and unadulterated departure from the Freedom Charter [...]. What happened to 'There shall be equality before law?' Buthelezi from the IFP (that dropped to 18 seats) said 'I believe that in many respects our Constitution has been betrayed.'¹⁶³ and 'The IFP is here to restore that moral leadership (...) [because] how can we fight criminality when a never-ending stream of ANC politicians see nothing wrong with helping themselves to the public purse?'¹⁶⁴

The new party COPE, that claimed to be the 'true ANC', also fiercely attacked the ruling ANC on similar points. In their manifesto, they stressed the importance of honest leaders, to defend the constitution, to uphold the rule of law and to fight corruption.¹⁶⁵ This was all needed since 'the people of South Africa are held hostage by their leaders'.¹⁶⁶ The electoral system, with a closed party list and indirect elections of senior representatives, came under attack as COPE also called for adjustment to implement direct elections for senior representatives such as the President, Premier and Mayors.¹⁶⁷ Some South Africans hoped that COPE would seriously threaten the ANC's hegemonic power, but COPE only obtained 30 seats in parliament. This was in part because the party fell victim to similar problems that they attacked the ANC on: in-fighting, conflict over leadership and corrupt officials. Besides this, Ndletyana explains that COPE's firm stand against affirmative action, which was aimed at the young voter from the interracial middleclass, caused an image of an 'anti-black' party and alienated a big group of potential voters.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶² "Ten South African ministers resign with Mbeki," *CNN*, September 23, 2008, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/09/23/south.africa.resignations/>.

¹⁶³ "IFP Rally at Bethal," Speech by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Mzinoni Stadium, Bethal, Mpumalanga (March 14, 2009), *Inkatha Freedom Party*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://archive.ifp.org.za/Speeches/140309sp.htm>.

¹⁶⁴ "Address At The Election Closing Rally," Speech by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Enseleni (April 19, 2009), *Inkatha Freedom Party*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://archive.ifp.org.za/Speeches/190409asp.htm>.

¹⁶⁵ "2009 Election Manifesto: A New Agenda for Change and Hope for All," *Congress of the People*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/copcs-manifesto-for-the-2009-election>.

¹⁶⁶ "Wrap ANC Rally, appearance by Nelson Mandela, Zuma, COPE Rally," Youtube video, 3:59, Speech by Mvume Dandala, Presidential Candidate for the COPE, at Seshogo stadium, Polokwane on April 19, 2009, posted by "AP Archive," July 21, 2015, accessed December 5, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K6KylX2OIF0>.

¹⁶⁷ "2009 Election Manifesto," *Congress of the People*.

¹⁶⁸ Mcebisi Ndletyana, "Congress of the People: A Promise Betrayed," *Journal of African Elections* 9, no. 2 (2010):41.

Despite ANC infighting, Zuma secured support from the national hero Nelson Mandela, who appeared at the last election rally to share the message: 'let us remember our primary task: it is to eradicate poverty and ensure a better life for all. The ANC has the historical responsibility to lead our nation and help build a united, non-racial society.'¹⁶⁹ So like in the past elections, the ANC relied on their past achievements and history. The storyline of their first TV-commercials, which made appearance in the 2009 elections, expressed exactly these arguments.¹⁷⁰ Besides this, prioritised issues were aimed at voters from poor and rural segments of society and in their official discourse the ANC called for a non-discriminatory and united South Africa.¹⁷¹ Nonetheless, some have accused Zuma (a Zulu himself) of playing the 'Zulu card'. Several ways of expression associated with Zulu-culture, like songs, were part of his campaign and he ended all speeches with 'Amandla' – power in Zulu. Finally, Zuma addressed the issue of protection of the constitution, often brought up by the opposition, by stating 'There is nothing in the Constitution that says a massive majority for the ruling party is bad for democracy, especially a party that has a track record of upholding the Constitution like the ANC!'¹⁷²

The DA of course hoped to benefit from the turmoil at the ANC. They hoped to diversify and increase their support as they re-imaged their party under the leadership of Helen Zille. In early 2009, Zille launched the new 'DA brand' that included a new logo: 'a morning sun rising over the rainbow nation. It signals hope; it heralds change; it speaks of opportunity; and it reflects our love for diversity.'¹⁷³ She stated 'We will ensure diversity inside our party, and fight for it outside our party, it is a core value of the DA.'¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, the DA (like the ANC) launched their campaign in all 11 official languages to reach a wider audience and during her speeches Zille often used one-liners in Afrikaans and Zulu. In the manifesto 'One Nation, One Future', the DA states a list of top five priorities which should have a broad appeal, consisting of reducing poverty, education, healthcare, fighting crime and corruptions and protecting the Constitution. Also, the DA made similar proposals as COPE to reform the electoral system; direct elections for the president and a 1% threshold for seats in parliament.

Prior to the 2009 elections, some hoped that after fifteen years the ANC majority rule would

¹⁶⁹ "Wrap ANC Rally, appearance by Nelson Mandela, Zuma, COPE Rally," 1:19.

¹⁷⁰ "ANC launches TV election campaign," Youtube video, 0:34 – 1:29, ANC commercial for the 2009 national elections, posted by "MarkLives," February 27, 2009, accessed December 5, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=655guoOEMzk>.

¹⁷¹ "Address by President Jacob Zuma on the occasion of the celebration of the 97th Anniversary of the African National Congress and launch of the 2009 Election Manifesto," Speech by Jacob Zuma, Absa Stadium, East London (January 10, 2009), *African National Congress*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.anc.org.za/content/address-president-jacob-zuma-occasion-celebration-97th-anniversary-african-national-congress>.

¹⁷² "Address by ANC President Jacob Zuma to ANC Election Siyanqoba Rally Coca-Cola Park and Johannesburg Stadiums," Speech by Jacob Zuma, Johannesburg (April 19, 2009), *African National Congress*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.anc.org.za/content/address-anc-president-cde-jacob-zuma-anc-election-siyanqoba-rally-coca-cola-park-and>.

¹⁷³ "DA: Zille: Speech by DA leader Helen Zille at the launch of the party's 2009 election campaign," Speech by Helen Zille (January 31, 2009), *Polity*, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.polity.org.za/article/da-zille-speech-by-da-leader-helen-zille-at-the-launch-of-the-partys-2009-election-campaign-31012009-2009-01-31>.

¹⁷⁴ "Helen Zille Speech at 2009 DA Brand launch" Youtube video, 9:57, posted by "Alexander du Plessis," July 6, 2013, accessed December 5, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3GJ2g94fOcl>.

end. The ANC candidate was controversial and the COPE offered a new alternative. However, the COPE did not live up to the expectations. The DA, led by Zille, showed a big effort to reach out to diverse racial and ethnic groups and kept growing, winning 67 seats in parliament. The ANC remained the biggest party with 264 seats and Zuma became the next president. The issue of federalism seemed to be definitely waved away from the political agenda, while a new constitutional matter, the country's electoral system, started to be questioned by the opposition parties.

4.2.5 The elections of 2014

In the 2014 elections, the regular players (the ANC with Zuma and the DA with Zille) were challenged by a new party: the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a split off from the ANC, led by the former leader of the ANC youth league, Julius Malema. The IFP (that won 20 seats) and COPE (3 seats) saw their role in national politics being marginalised. Nelson Mandela died in 2013 and his name and legacy became prominent in the political discourse of the 2014 elections. Already in 2009 some South Africans hoped that COPE would challenge the continuous ANC power, but in 2014 the public outcry against the ANC was even bigger. Several media in South Africa openly asked voters not to vote for the ANC. A week before the elections the newspaper Mail & Guardian (M&G) wrote: 'Never before has the M&G urged readers to oppose the ANC. But we do so now because the aim is to make the ANC more effective and responsive.'¹⁷⁵ The Financial Mail and the Economist also openly urged voters to vote for the DA and opposed the ANC, which they held accountable for unemployment, bad management of the economy and growing corruption.¹⁷⁶ Protesters, supported by ANC veterans and famous South Africans such as the religious leader Desmond Tutu, took the streets with the slogan 'Vote No'.

On behalf of the ANC, Zuma ran campaign for his second term. Despite the heavy criticism towards the ANC and the Vote No campaign, the ANC secured 249 seats in parliament. The 2014 campaign was similar to campaigns of previous years, repeating all the work that had been done in the last years:

*'We have done what has never been done by any liberation movement in the continent of Africa. The manner in which we have delivered for the poor people. There is no country in the world that has a policy to give poor people houses, free of charge.'*¹⁷⁷

In the wake of Mandela's death, the ANC honoured their first black South African president by dedicating their manifesto to Tata Madiba (an alias for Mandela). To address the dissatisfaction

¹⁷⁵ "Editorial: Vote tactically to dilute ANC power," *Mail & Guardian*, May 2, 2014, accessed December 5, 2016, <http://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-01-editorial-vote-tactically-to-dilute-anc-power>.

¹⁷⁶ "Editorial: Difficult choice in a confusing poll," *Financial Mail*, May 2, 2014, and "Time to ditch Mandela's party," *The Economist*, May 3, 2014, accessed December 9, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21601513-ruling-african-national-congress-sure-triumph-again-it-no-longer-deserves-time?fsrc=scn/tw_ec/time_to_ditch_mandela_s_party.

¹⁷⁷ "Zuma wraps up Limpopo election campaigning trail," Youtube video, 0:17, posted by "SABC Digital News," April 17, 2014, accessed December 5, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H_jCr3ID42g.

among their support-base, the ANC promised, inter alia, to fasten up land reforms.¹⁷⁸

The DA campaign also shows a continuation of with the 2009 campaign. Again, Zille aimed to gather a broad, interracial and interethnic support base and in the DA campaign and in speeches a rich variety of languages was used. The whole campaign centred on the promise of job-creation under the title 'Together for Change, Together for Jobs'.¹⁷⁹ The party prioritised speeding up land reform and improving the policy of Black Economic Empowerment.¹⁸⁰ Also, as Zille addressed the crowd at the final mass rally of 2014 with 'blue people' [the logo and shirts of the DA are blue], racial identities were replaced by a new identity: the 'democratic identity'.¹⁸¹ What is interesting, is that in the run-up for the 2014 elections, the DA highlighted their struggle against apartheid, to appeal to black voters and eradicate their distrust. In 2013 the DA launched a 'Know your DA' campaign, to inform the people of the 'untold story that the DA was and remains part of South Africa's struggle for freedom'.¹⁸² At a rally Zille states: 'We will never forget the people and organisations who struggled together against Apartheid. We are proud to count many of them in the DA's ranks today.'¹⁸³ However, the 'Know your DA' campaign was not appreciated by all black voters; some were insulted, saying it is by no means fair to compare and equalize the struggle of black freedom fighters and white activist.¹⁸⁴ Also, in the sequel of his death, Mandela and the first years of ANC-rule are praised by the DA, although the DA TV-commercial directly adds: 'The politics of Mandela no longer exist, in today's [ANC] politics it's all about what you want to do for yourself.'

In the 2014 elections, Julius Malema, who had earlier been expelled from the ANC, led the EFF. He was the first post-apartheid leader of a big party that vigorously and openly discriminated specific racial groups. Some political commentators were alarmed by the emergence of the EFF.

*'It means that populist politics [...] are firmly on the menu, with the [...] usual rancid sauce dished up by neo-fascist movements: nationalism, xenophobia, racial scapegoating, and an increasingly confiscatory and violent anti-constitutionalism. While the silly berets and the grandiose self-awarded military titles are comical, the rhetoric is scary.'*¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁸ "Address by ANC Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa at the ANC Gauteng manifesto launch rally in Atteridgeville," Speech by Cyril Ramaphosa, Atteridgeville (January 19, 2014), *African National Congress*, accessed November 30, 2016, <http://anc.org.za/content/address-anc-deputy-president-cyril-ramaphosa-anc-gauteng-manifesto-launch-rally>.

¹⁷⁹ "Manifesto Election 2014: Together for change, together for Jobs," *Democratic Alliance*, accessed November 30, 2016, <http://www.da.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/DA-Manifesto-2014.pdf>.

¹⁸⁰ "Manifesto Election 2014: Together for change, together for Jobs," 5.

¹⁸¹ "Helen Zille leads DA vote for jobs rally," Youtube video, 7:40, Speech of Helen Zille at DA's final mass rally of the 2014 election campaign, 3th of May, 2014, Johannesburg, posted by "SABC Digital News," May 3, 2014, accessed November 30, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9zRvOabLk0>.

¹⁸² "Know your DA: The story of the Democratic Alliance," Youtube video, Campaign Know Your DA, video released by the DA in mid-2013, posted by "Dave Watson," May 25, 2013, accessed November 30, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EDLRCpUB_jw.

¹⁸³ "Together for Change, Together for Jobs," Speech by Helen Zille, Polokwane, Limpopo (February 24, 2014), *Democratic Alliance*, accessed November 30, 2016, <https://www.da.org.za/2014/02/together-for-change-together-for-jobs-2/>.

¹⁸⁴ Brad Cibane, "Know Your DA insults blacks," *Mail & Guardian*, June 11, 2013, accessed November 30, 2016, <http://thoughtleader.co.za/bradcibane/2013/06/11/know-your-da-an-insult/>.

¹⁸⁵ William Saunderson-Meyer, "South African election day: 'the vote will change nothing, and everything'," *The Guardian*, May 7, 2014, accessed December 9, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/south-african-election-day-vote-will-change-nothing-and-everything>.

The EFF stood for a socialist policy, comprising of land expropriation, nationalization of certain sectors and redistribution of wealth. Their ideology was strongly anti-colonial as they 'want to do away with colonial patterns of property ownership in South Africa'.¹⁸⁶ The party openly blamed whites for inequality, since 'wealth is spread in a deeply unequal manner, due to prejudicial historical circumstances. Those who own the lion's share of South African wealth today acquired it illegally through colonial wars'.¹⁸⁷ In addition, the ANC blamed the ANC for protecting white interest to maintain the unequal status quo. Using discriminatory language, Malema aimed his campaign towards black voters, stating 'Our mission is a mission to restore the dignity of African masses'.¹⁸⁸

The 2014 election campaigns included a re-emergence of attention for the struggle against apartheid, which was caused by Mandela's death in 2013. This time, all big parties relied on this theme as all competed for the vote of the black majority. The discourse of the campaign also hardened in comparison to previous years. This was not only the case for the EFF campaign, which openly called for an anti-colonialist (anti-white) policy, but was also evident in protests and broad media-support for the 'Vote No' campaign. The ANC was the winner of the elections once again, winning 249 seats in parliament. Although the EFF entered parliament with 25 seats, they were no serious threat for the ANC. The DA won 89 seats, but despite their campaign aimed at interracial, poor constituency, they still struggled to win the votes of the black constituency.¹⁸⁹

4.2.6 The status quo - South African politics in 2016

Of course politics did not stand still since the 2014 elections. At the time of writing, the ANC still is the biggest party with Zuma as acting President, but several signs indicate that the ANC is losing support. Not only did confidence in the ruling party fall, due to high levels of corruption in South African politics, also economic issues added to social unrest. Protest of people demanding better basic services, such as housing, water, electricity and education, happen on regular base.¹⁹⁰ While support for the ANC seems decreasing, the DA has had some recent successes. The election of a new black party leader in 2014, Msumi Maimane, seems to have increased the popularity of the DA among black citizens and especially in urban areas support for the DA has grown.¹⁹¹ The results of the most recent elections, the local municipality elections of August 2016, surprised many. Overall, the ANC won 54% of the votes (their all-time low), the DA was second with 26%, and the EFF followed with 8% of all votes.¹⁹² Moreover, the DA won a majority in three important cities:

¹⁸⁶ "Julius Malema addresses the nation at the EFF's manifesto launch (Part 2)," Youtube video, 2:08, posted by "eNCA," February 22, 2014, accessed November 30, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jvvoh-_KTts.

¹⁸⁷ "Election Manifesto 2014," *Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)*, accessed November 30, 2016, <http://efffighters.org.za/election-manifesto/>.

¹⁸⁸ "Julius Malema addresses the nation," 1:50.

¹⁸⁹ Mottiar, "The role of opposition parties in South Africa," 113.

¹⁹⁰ "South Africa's President Jacob Zuma - a profile," *BCC News*, April 1, 2016, accessed November 30, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17450447>.

¹⁹¹ "South Africa local elections: Four things we have learnt," *BBC News*, August 5 2016, accessed November 30, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36986305>.

¹⁹² "South Africa local elections: Four things we have learnt".

Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay.¹⁹³ Following the 2016 local elections, numerous newspapers claimed the outcome showed that South African politics ceased to be based on race and of course it is true that in order to reach 26% of the votes, the DA managed to gather support from all racial groups.

Political discourse however continued to be harsh. Malema was scrutinised for an aggressive remark he made in a speech: 'We are not calling for the slaughtering of white people, at least for now' [but for peaceful occupation of the land].¹⁹⁴ Nonetheless, the racist discourse does not always reflect public opinion, as the South African Institute of Race Relations concluded. In their 2015 survey they found that 62% of South Africans (and a majority within each racial group) agreed that 'All this talk of racism and colonialism is an attempt by politicians to find excuses for their own failures.'¹⁹⁵

4.3 Limitations and reflection based on literature

Simonsen's methodology, which focusses on analysis at the political level, has some limitations. While the methodology is very helpful to link institutional design with political salience, it ignores some other factors that can determine political salience. In the case of South Africa, a lot of research about the causes of the racial census has been conducted. This research offers insight in other aspects that contribute to political salience of race and therefore it will briefly be addressed here.

First, According to Moodley and Heribert, 'economic racial inequality survives as the most significant indicator of an apartheid past' and 'the emphasis on race camouflages the deepening class distinctions which still overlap to a large, but diminishing, degree with race'.¹⁹⁶ In other words, they highlight economic inequality as the main cause of political polarization. Since economic inequality is a major issue in South Africa and economic class distribution largely coincides with racial cleavages in South Africa, inequality can explain why racial cleavages persist and blacks and whites oppose each other in politics. A 2015 survey where 30,3% answered inequality is the first source of social division, against 23,5% answering race, confirms the economic argument, although differences are small (See Appendix III). A thorough investigation of this argument does not fit in the scope of this thesis, but the careful examination of campaigns partly tackles this argument. The DA strongly favours policy aimed at job creation, affirmative action, and supporting the poor, therefore poor blacks who voted based on issues could also see the DA as an eligible party. Thus the absence of black support for the DA cannot be fully explained by economic inequality.

¹⁹³ Andrew Kenny, "South Africa just had its most hopeful elections ever," *The Spectator*, August 13, 2016, accessed November 30, 2016, <http://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/08/south-africa-just-had-its-most-hopeful-elections-ever/>.

¹⁹⁴ Tshidi Madia, "Malema defiant after court appearance: 'We will take our land, no matter how'," *Mail & Guardian*, November 7, 2016, accessed November 30, 2016, <http://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-07-malema-defiant-after-court-appearance-we-will-take-our-land-no-matter-how>.

¹⁹⁵ *Race relations in South Africa. Reasons for Hope*, (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 2016), 6, accessed December 3, 2016, <http://irr.org.za/reports-and-publications/occasional-reports/files/race-relations-in-sa-2013-reasons-for-hope-2013-29feb16.pdf>.

¹⁹⁶ Kogila Moodley and Adam Heribert, "Race and nation in post-apartheid South Africa," *Current Sociology* 48, no. 3 (2000): 63.

Second, Ferree investigated the origin of the racial census by testing three hypotheses to explain vote behaviour: 1) voting as expression of identity, 2) voting as an expression of policy preferences and performance evaluation and 3) voting based on 'racial heuristics'.¹⁹⁷ Voting based on racial heuristics means voters use perceived 'racial credentials' and party image as a short-cut to determine expected party behaviour and political preferences. Ferree found voting behaviour is partly determined by policy preferences, but also strongly dependent on racial heuristics. According to Ferree this means that changes in the racial census are possible and 'depend (..) on the ability of parties to change their racial credentials and party labels'.¹⁹⁸ The racial heuristic could indeed be an explanation of the strong black loyalty to the ANC, but these psychological aspects of voting could not be accounted for in this thesis.

A third factor that is overlooked in this thesis is ethnic political mobilization. As explained in chapter 1, some scholars argue that the demographic composition of a population, and the relative size of different segments in society, determine institutional design will function best in divided societies. Eric McLaughlin investigated whether the ANC benefited from the large number of (black) ethnic groups in South Africa, which could never win a majority on their own. He zoomed in on municipal elections in South Africa, where a variety of (local) opposition parties participates in the elections. He concludes that the ANC is the biggest in municipalities where black citizens are heterogeneous, so where a variety of ethnic groups is present. If one (black) ethnic group prevails, the ANC is likely to be smaller.¹⁹⁹ This implies that ethnic mobilization, which is often overlooked due to the focus on racial cleavages, is still relevant in South Africa. It does not appear at the national level since voters of an ethnic minority do not want to see their vote go to loss. Throughout the period from 2007 to 2011, the Reconciliation Barometer did indeed find that ethnicity was important: it was the second biggest indicator for primary identity associations. From 2011 onwards (up to 2013) race became second. Throughout the whole period, from 2007 to 2013, language was most often chosen as the primary determinant of identity, while South African nationality scored lowest.²⁰⁰ Also in the 2015 Reconciliation Barometer most people answered that they associated most strongly with the group with the same language (31,6%), followed by racial group (23,7%), same economic class (13,4%), and South African identity (12,7%).

Unfortunately, there are factors that influence to political salience of race, that could not be included in the analysis of this chapter. Nonetheless, based on all aspects that were included in the analysis in chapter four, it is possible to identify the main developments in the structural salience of race in South African politics from 1994 to 2016.

¹⁹⁷ Ferree, "Explaining South Africa's Racial Census," 803.

¹⁹⁸ Ferree, "Explaining South Africa's Racial Census," 804.

¹⁹⁹ Eric S. McLaughlin, "Beyond the Racial Census The Political Salience of Ethnolinguistic Cleavages in South Africa," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 4 (2007): 433.

²⁰⁰ Wale, *Reflecting on Reconciliation*, 16.

4.4 Conclusion

Is political salience of race important in South Africa, looking at the racial census, cross-cutting cleavages and elite behaviour in campaigns? If so, how did it develop over the last post-apartheid decades? Figure 6 summarizes the division of seats in National Parliament over time.

A racial census has been present in South African politics, although it seems to be decreasing. In general, the different parties drew support from different segments in society throughout the years. The ANC has

been the major 'black' party, while one big opposition party (NP/DP/DA) was perceived as 'white'. Interracial mistrust, which is persistent, but also decreasing, can explain why voters prefer to vote for certain parties that have a certain 'racial image'. The DA did well in the 2016 local elections and the new DA-leader Maimane might also attract new voters in the next national elections.

In general, issue-orientated campaigns have always been the norm. The key issues in South African politics are clear and have been constant over the last five elections: poverty, inequality, unemployment, basic services, AIDS, crime and corruption. Different racial groups agree on the major problems, but have slightly different priorities. As a result, the key issues have not truly resulted in cross-cutting cleavages. This was, for example, visible in the 1994 and 1999 elections. Party programs were quite different from each other: the ANC aimed their campaign at a diverse, poor, audience, the IFP started out as a one-issue party advocating federalism and the DP had a very liberal outlook. These different positions, in an issue-based campaign, reinforced racial cleavages that coincided with the rich-poor division. Moreover, it seems that in particular the stance that a political party took on affirmative action determined their appeal to the black constituency. But in later elections differences between the big political parties diminished, as they focused on the same issues in their manifestos. From 2009 onwards, the ANC and DA both aimed their campaigns at the interethnic and interracial middleclass, as well as at the poor. But while the two big political parties did address similar cross-cutting cleavages, they have had different results.

Racism has not been a big problem in elite behaviour in campaigning. The opposite is true: from 1994 onwards political leaders have stressed the need for unity, forgiveness and cooperation in their speeches and manifesto's. But while official discourse focussed on conciliation, harsh, hostile and racist discourse still seemed to play a role in all elections. Denigration of opponents has been part of the political discourse. Political issues are easily transformed into racial issues and the ANC has been accused of using their power to depict their opponents as racist, right-wing, white parties in




Figure 6: Division of seats in the National Assembly from 1994 to present.

several elections. Also, apartheid and the struggle against apartheid continue to be of relevance in political discourse. In the most recent elections, Malema took the use of hostile discourse one step further as he openly attacked whites, calling them colonizers. Despite, or maybe thanks to, this racist discourse, the EFF is a popular party. This is a negative outcome, confirming increasing political salience of race, at least within the group of EFF supporters.

In South Africa, more than 20 years after apartheid, political salience of race still dominates politics. This is especially evident in the racial census and in the manner political opponents attack one another. However, political parties (besides the EFF) have never openly appealed to voters on the basis of identity, and issue-based campaigns, targeted at an interracial, interethnic audience remain the norm. This, together with the decreasing interracial distrust, is hopeful for the future. The final conclusion will address these findings in relation to the main question.

Conclusion

Within political and social science a range of theories addresses institutional design for divided societies. Various forms of institutional design, in relation to different long-term goals, can be identified. Consociationalism favours power sharing and group autonomy to peacefully manage cleavages, and considers a combination of proportional representation, political group-rights and federalism best fit for divided societies. Centripetalism argues that an electoral system that creates incentives for moderate, inclusive politics should be put in place and advocates a unitary state with a majoritarian system. While theories of accommodation stress the importance of institutionalized cultural rights, theories of integration refute public recognition of differences and claim that in the long run divisions should be resolved by the creation of a shared, unifying identity. In relation to the main question it can be concluded that consociationalism is an example of ethnicization of politics, while theories of integration fit de-ethnicization of politics. Centripetalism is somewhere in between.

In South Africa, racial lines emerged as the main dividing cleavages as a result of severe racial segregation during apartheid. Next to racial divisions, ethnic cleavages and economic inequality continue to divide society. During the two-phased transition process, negotiators set up a new political system to create the democratic Republic of South Africa. The main characteristics are: a multi-party system, proportional representation, cultural and linguistic group rights and a strong central government with a quasi-federal system. Although most of these characteristics fit consociationalism, no power-sharing mechanisms that explicitly denote political group-rights are installed and neutral, non-discriminatory language is used throughout the Constitution. Group-rights are acknowledged in the private domain, but in the political domain neutral, non-racial politics dominates. Therefore, the analysis of the 1996 institutional design led to the conclusion that the political system is, to a large extent, an example of de-ethnicization of politics.

Chapter four examined the political salience of race from 1994 to 2016. A racial census was present in South African politics, although it has been slightly decreasing. Cross-cutting cleavages do exist since all racial groups agree on the key issues in South Africa, but due to high economic inequality that largely coincides with racial cleavages, these issues reaffirm group lines rather than cutting through them. The analysis of political campaigns led to some more optimistic results, although the findings are twofold. On the one hand, official discourse is uniting and issue-based. Especially in the first two democratic elections all political leaders stressed the need for unity to overcome apartheid. The efforts of big parties such as the ANC and the DA to reach out to an interethnic and interracial audience, mostly from 2009 onwards, should also be praised. On the other hand, un-official language in political campaigns is hostile and the apartheid and racism remain recurring, polarizing themes in election campaigns. The EFF has even openly used racist discourse in their most recent election campaign. Altogether, the analysis confirms that South African politics after apartheid have suffered from political salience of race in.

Before addressing the main question, some limitations of this thesis have to be

acknowledged. A few of these, related to the analysis of political salience, have already been discussed: economic inequality, the psychology of voting and ethnic mobilization. Moreover, other literature has identified factors that contributed to the peaceful transition and inclusive politics but were not taken into account. These factors include religion, political and religious leaders, the strong legal tradition and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Further research is needed to enrich the understanding of post-apartheid South Africa. It would be interesting to investigate the current 'racial-image' of the DA, to see to what extent income determines party preferences, or to examine why the ANC has continued to receive a majority of the votes, while it has simultaneously been confronted with protests and harsh criticism. Also, the author recognizes that investigation of the political level leaves out other factors that influence success of political reforms, such as the role of traditional chiefs, economic factors and many more.

Nevertheless, the performed analysis on the political level qualifies to conclude to what extent the case study confirms that de-ethnicization of politics can reduce structural political salience of race. It has proven to be very difficult to resolve the racial cleavages in South Africa and of course, it is unrealistic to expect this to happen overnight. Therefore the thesis examined a longer period, from 1994 to 2016. It has shown that the new institutional design that resulted in de-ethnicization of politics, did not result in an absence of political salience of race. Nonetheless, de-ethnicization of politics has proven to be important in South Africa because it leaves an open space for political parties to continue to work towards inclusive, non-racial politics. The developments of the DA from 2009 onwards, are moving in the right direction and would have not been possible if group differences would have been institutionalized. De-ethnicization of politics created a political system that is adaptable to a changing society and that can evolve towards a non-racist political system, step by step. Simonsen's belief that de-ethnicization of politics will lead to reduction of political salience might become true in South Africa one day, may it be in the very long run.

By the investigation of South Africa, this thesis can contribute to the broader debate about institutional design of divided societies. Most importantly, the case study shows that de-ethnicization of politics can be suitable for post-conflict divided societies and that it can reduce political mobilization along dividing lines in the long run. Moreover, some findings underpin or oppose arguments that have been discussed in the theoretical debate. While consociationalism claims that federal arrangements are important to assure group autonomy, this is not confirmed by the case study. Cultural and linguistic accommodation proved to be satisfying, as demands for federal arrangements disappeared from the political agenda rather quick. It is even likely that federal arrangements would have obstructed the transition by fixating group-differences, although this cannot be proven by this case study. The centripetalist argument that minorities have no incentive to participate within a system with proportional representation, where they will be the structural loser, is not confirmed by the case study. Political discontent of minorities in South Africa has mostly been expressed by political means (inter alia by the IFP and the Freedom Front), instead of by violent

means. This means that proportional representation, with a low threshold to enter politics, has proven to be effective in South Africa. In addition, proportional representation is also refuted by centripetalist since it would foster political mobilization along dividing lines. While this thesis confirms this argument, since racial identities strongly determine vote behaviour, it also shows that political parties can develop their strategies over time. Because of the political objective to obtain as many votes as possible, a political party can reject a focus on merely their own group and replace it for an inclusive outreach. Furthermore, this shows that voters can be satisfied with political representation by leaders from outside their own group, something consociationalism rejects. Additional research can further explore these and other arguments that can contribute to the theoretical debate. In particular, more research about centripetalism is needed since empirical evidence supporting this theory is scarce. While preferential voting systems that centripetalism promotes can rarely be found, other incentives for moderate, inclusive politics that can be found in majoritarian systems might offer alternatives for similar research.

Appendixes

Appendix I: First language spoken per province in 1996

2.8 Home language by province (percentages)*

	Eastern Cape	Free State	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Mpumalanga	Northern Cape	Northern Province	North West	Western Cape	South Africa
Afrikaans	9,6	14,5	16,7	1,6	8,3	69,3	2,2	7,5	59,2	14,4
English	3,7	1,3	13,0	15,8	2,0	2,4	0,4	1,0	20,3	8,6
IsiNdebele	0,0	0,2	1,6	0,0	12,5	0,0	1,5	1,3	0,1	1,5
IsiXhosa	83,8	9,4	7,5	1,6	1,3	6,3	0,2	5,4	19,1	17,9
IsiZulu	0,4	4,8	21,5	79,8	25,4	0,3	0,7	2,5	0,1	22,9
Sepedi	0,0	0,2	9,5	0,0	10,5	0,0	52,7	4,0	0,0	9,2
Sesotho	2,2	62,1	13,1	0,5	3,2	0,9	1,1	5,1	0,4	7,7
SiSwati	0,0	0,1	1,3	0,1	30,0	0,0	1,2	0,5	0,0	2,5
Seiswana	0,0	6,5	7,9	0,0	2,7	19,9	1,4	67,2	0,1	8,2
Tshivenda	0,0	0,1	1,4	0,0	0,1	0,0	15,5	0,4	0,0	2,2
Xitsonga	0,0	0,5	5,3	0,0	3,5	0,0	22,6	4,7	0,0	4,4
Other	0,2	0,3	1,3	0,5	0,4	0,8	0,3	0,5	0,6	0,6
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

* Excluding unspecified

Source: *The People of South Africa. Population Census, 1996*, Statistics South Africa, Report no. 03-01-11 (Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, 1998), 11, accessed December 16, 2016, <https://apps.statssa.gov.za/census01/Census96/HTML/default.htm>.

Appendix II: Racial census elections 1994, 1999 and 2004

TABLE 1.1. 1994 Reported Vote by Race (percent)

	Africans	Whites	Coloureds	Indians
<i>"White" Parties</i>	4	90	67	50
Democratic Party	0	10	0	0
National Party	4	66	67	50
Other White	0	14	0	0
<i>"African" Parties</i>	91	9	28	42
African National Congress	81	2	28	25
Inkatha Freedom Party	8	7	0	17
Other African	2	0	0	0
<i>Other</i>	5	1	5	8

Table based on data reported in Reynolds (1994).

TABLE 1.2. 1999 Reported Vote by Race (percent)

	Africans	Whites	Coloureds	Indians
<i>"White" Parties</i>	3	81	40	34
Democratic Party	1	57	6	18
National Party	2	16	34	16
Other White	0	8	0	0
<i>"African" Parties</i>	95	5	60	30
African National Congress	82	5	60	30
Inkatha Freedom Party	11	0	0	0
Other African	2	0	0	0
<i>Other</i>	2	14	0	36

Table based on data reported in Reynolds (1999).

TABLE 1.3. 2004 Reported Vote by Race (percent)

	Africans	Whites	Coloureds	Indians
<i>"White" Parties</i>	<1	74	20	18
Democratic Party	<1	66	10	18
National Party	0	4	10	0
Other White	0	4	0	0
<i>"African" Parties</i>	86	<1	59	36
African National Congress	81	<1	59	36
Inkatha Freedom Party	4	0	0	0
Other African	1	0	0	0
<i>Other</i>	3	7	12	14
<i>Refused</i>	10	18	11	32

Table based on the Comparative National Election Project (CNEP) survey, conducted in September 2004.

Source: Karen E. Ferree, *Framing the race in South Africa: The political origins of racial census elections* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5-6.

Appendix III: Primary sources of social division

Table 2: Primary sources of social division

	First choice	Second choice	First and second choices combined
Inequality (rich and poor)	30.3	23.9	54.2
Race	23.5	25.3	48.8
Political parties	20.9	18.1	39.1
Language	4.2	16.2	20.4
Prejudice about communicable diseases	6.2	7.7	13.9
None	7.2	4.8	12.0
Don't know	5.5	3.0	8.5

Source: Jan Hofmeyr and Rajen Govender, *National reconciliation, race relations, and social inclusion*, South African Reconciliation Barometer Briefing Paper 1 (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2015), 16, accessed December 3, 2016, <http://www.dac.gov.za/sites/default/files/reconciliation-barometer.pdf>.

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