# Something Old, Something New, Something Yellow and Blue

***An Analysis of Frames on Gender Inequality of Civil Society Members working on Conflict Transformation in Kyiv from a Role Theory Perspective***


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## Abstract

This thesis analyzes the frames of civil society members working on conflict transformation in Kyiv on gender inequality in Ukraine since the Euromaidan using Jabri's role theory and Benford & Snow's framing theory (2000). The role of civil society members in the framing of gender inequality was examined by looking at normative and discursive continuities in Ukrainian society, institutional frameworks of civil society organizations and purposive agency of individual actors. It was found that there is a general lack of constitutive and regulative rules on gender based discrimination in Ukrainian society that limits the possibility of common frames between different groups of the population and incites a possibility of conflict between different understandings of gender inequality and gender based discrimination, most particularly a 'Soviet' understanding, a 'Ukrainian nationalist' understanding and a 'Western/European' understanding. The Euromaidan and the start of the conflict in the East seem to have added fuel to the fire by making the quest of whose 'understanding' prevails even more important. At the same time, organizations practice different beliefs and goals regarding their relationships with other actors, such as the Ukrainian state, the international community and the Ukrainian population, that influence their processes of information gathering on gender inequality. Organizations also position themselves differently towards normative expectations from Western and European donors and other CSOs. In this positioning a difference becomes visible between organizations that view gender equality policies as part of European Integration strategies, organizations that reproduce much of the Ukrainian nationalist rhetoric on gender - even if they are required by Western or European donors to have certain policies on gender- and those that work on gender equality for its inherent value and are not too much influenced by Western or European donors. Individual level factors also influence the framing of gender inequality, as it was found that factors such as gender, age, place of birth and differences in personality have some influence the diagnosis and prognosis of gender inequality as well as the motivation for advocating for gender equality. The frames of civil society members working on conflict transformation in Kyiv, in the end, show 'something new': the perceived opening up of new opportunities and new ways of viewing gender inequality, particularly within a European framework. However, they also show a debate on the old images of gender inequality: 'something old' in the ideas about gender equality in the USSR. Furthermore, it seems that the conflict has also resulted in ideas about Ukrainian traditions on gender becoming more salient, thus 'something yellow and blue' is also becoming more visible, although the content of this nationalist understanding is not clear for everyone.

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*"This situation for sure is not about gender issues. We have more topical problems at least to stop war and stop this, a lot of death."*[2]

*"I think that many people would say that gender issues are not that important nowadays, because we have more important issues on the agenda, but I think that this issue is relevant at any time not matter what is happening in the country. Nowadays, it is women who suffer the most. They are more vulnerable than men."*[3]

*"If you are a woman with a brain and a good education, it is not really hard for you to become what you want to become. I see so many girls here, so I think women can do what they want."*[4]

*"Yes, of course it is very important. It is clearly very connected with Defense, because men they do not realise a lot of aspects I think of life and women could add to that a lot of their expertise. It would change even economics, because we know that those countries that have better gender balance, they have better economics. It would change domestic violence in Ukraine, it would change respect. Education opportunities, better opportunities for jobs. If you have children, you will not have to leave your job, because men do not look after children. So this is the whole spectrum of everything that you need to change."*[5]

*"Very frankly, if you talk to members of our organization, we don't think that gender issues are a problem in the organization and we don't think that it is a problem on the national level. Because in this small organization, we show that each of these issues can be solved."*[6]

*"The issue of LGBT community or other gender issues, Ukrainian try to be more open-minded and be more European, try to act like Europeans. We have many discussions on television about Europe and about European lifestyle, what it means to be Europeans. Of course, the position of women is one of those issues that should be changed."*[7]

*"I never really thought about it. We just came across this issue recently, and we thought: 'Wow this is something new, and it will be popular.' I believe we don't understand the essence of the problem, why women are fighting, why women are demanding their rights."*[8]

[2] Author's interview with a (Appendix IB, Case 1B), 19 March 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[3] Author's interview (IB, Case 2C), 26 May 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[4] Author's interview (IB, Case 2B), 26 May 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[5] Author's interview (IB, Case 3A), 3 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[6] Author's interview (IB, Case 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[7] Author's interview (IB, Case 8A), 26 May 2015, Kyiv
[8] Author's interview (IB, Case 7B), 12 May 2015, Kyiv

## Acronyms and abbreviations

**CEDAW**- Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women

**CSO**- Civil Society Organization

**EPLO**- European Peacebuilding Liaison Office

**IDP**- Internally Displaced Person

**NATO**- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**NGO**- Non-Governmental Organization

**OSCE**- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

**OHCHR**- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

**UNECE**-United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

**WHO**- World Health Organization

**WILPF**-Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

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# Introduction

*[C]ivil society participation in the peace process, let alone the conscious participation and inclusion of women, has been extremely limited (...)Though Maidan has not disappeared from the conscience of civil society, the conflict has blurred the path ahead. It has pushed back and distracted attention from gender equality as a priority. The conflict is deprioritizing women's equal participation.*
(WILPF 2014: 28, 33)

The Euromaidan[9] protests, the annexation of Crimea, the fighting in the East of Ukraine and later the disaster with flight MH17 brought considerable attention to the situation in Ukraine, a country which in my best guess had been unknown to many Dutch people -including me- before. On the other hand, this drama concealed other aspects of the situation. The quote above helps to remind us of some aspects of the situation in the former Communist country that have not been mentioned much in popular news, such as the role of Ukrainian civil society and the gender aspects of the current situation. This research attempts to bring new insights on both this hidden actor and this hidden issue in the Ukrainian conflict,[10] by examining the role of civil society members working on conflict transformation in Kyiv and analyzing their frames on gender inequality in Ukraine since the Euromaidan on three different levels. First of all, as a part of the frames of reference within Ukrainian society on gender inequality. Secondly, as part of the institutional frameworks of their organization and, finally, as determined by personal inclination of civil society members. Before further elaborating on this, a short introduction will be given on the current state of gender relations in Ukraine and it will be explained how this research aims to fill in some of the gaps in researching gender inequality, conflict transformation and civil society in feminist literature.

Scholars have debated if women, through their civic activism at the Euromaidan, were mainly empowered and ready to take on new leadership roles at the local and national level (Phillips 2014: 417,422), or if they were disempowered, because even women in the activist

[9] I use the term Euromaidan, because this is a term that was adopted in reports of international organizations (see Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 2014) and by Ukrainian academics (see Onuch & Martsenyuk 2014) Furthermore, as there have been protests before on the Maidan, adding a name that described the cause, nature or trigger of the protests (such as Tax Maidan, Auto Maidan etc.) helps to keep different protests on the same location apart. However, the extent to which the Euromaidan protests were really about the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union has already been disputed by academics (see Lyubashenko in Bachmann & Lyubashenko 2014; Onuch & Martsenyuk 2014). Thus, referring to the protests as 'Euromaidan' should be seen to cover only the trigger for the protests, not the causes or the sympathy of the majority of the people protesting.

[10] There has been considerable confusion over what to call the current situation in Ukraine. Some international reports, particularly those in the Summer of 2014 just used the term 'situation in the East' (see OHCHR 2014), others used the words 'crisis', and 'conflicts' as well as 'war' (see Mirimanova 2014). However, is must be noted that words such as 'Anti-Terrorist Operation' or 'conflict' were seen by some participants in the research as a way to cover up that the situation in Ukraine is not a 'conflict' or a 'crisis', seeming to denote an internal problem, but a war that was instigated by Russia. Thus, it can be seen as a way of framing the situation in Ukraine in a beneficial way for European diplomats. Although I agree to some extent with this argument of participants and I do think this kind of framing should be brought to light, this research is not about the causes of the current situation as such. Thus, within this research I do not have sufficient evidence to support such a claim and thus I will not take such a strong stance as to call what is happening in Ukraine a war between Russia and Ukraine, and I will just refer to the word conflict or war to describe the situation in the East of Ukraine.

sector were not able to defeat gender roles and norms which portrayed women as either the 'mothers', the 'daughters' or the 'beautiful objects' of the protests (Onuch & Martsenyuk 2014: 117-118). Furthermore, even the Euromaidan was in general a positive experience for Ukrainian women, a re-traditionalized national climate has been noticed after the Maidan.[11] In this climate, women have been the first to lose their jobs in the social sector[12] and form the majority of the unemployed (OHCHR 2014: 33). International reports have also observed that women and children form the majority of Internally Displaced Persons[13] and that women are in need of psychological assistance to support their separated families in the conflict (WHO 2014: 8). At the same time, males can be marked as 'cowards' for leaving the East and even face violence due to this.[14] In addition, rumours of sexual violence have been increasing, but remain hard to check due to cultural stigma associated with rape as well as lack of access to the occupied territories.[15] An increase in domestic violence was also reported by several international organizations.[16] Furthermore, the inclusion of women in formal peacebuilding processes has been extremely limited.[17]

The World Health Organization reports that the "additional burdens that women face are rooted in social, economic and structural issues" (2014: 8). This is consistent with feminist scholarship that argues that the violence women suffer in times of war arises from and is related to the violence they suffer in peacetime (Rehn & Sirleaf 2002: 9). Indeed, academics as well as international reports have claimed that although in theory women and men have equal rights, in practice women still face discrimination in Ukraine.[18] This discrimination is visible in the political sphere, where women are faced with stereotypes of belonging to the private sphere (Martsenyuk 2012; 2013 in Onuch & Martsenyuk: 2014) and their representation rate is rather low.[19] In the economic sphere women are discriminated because of their (potential) role as mothers, they face horizontal and vertical segregation, and earn significantly less than men.[20] Furthermore, women have to deal with considerable reproductive pressure and have most of the tasks related to children and household which inhibits their role in other spheres.[21] In addition, there is a lack of facilities for women who become victims of sexual or domestic violence as well as cultural taboos that prevent reporting of this violence (CEDAW 2014: 18-28). At the same time, men also suffer the consequences of rigid gender roles, as they are more likely to die young, engage in risky behavior or substance abuse and suffer stress from the pressure of having to be economically successful. In addition, men rarely get custody over their children if they divorce (Riabchuk in Hankivsky & Salnykova 2012: 206-207). Furthermore, there seems to be a general lack of awareness of important laws that prevent gender based

[11] See for instance Phillips (2014) and the report of WILPF (2014)
[12] See the report of WILPF (2014: 29) and an article by their Secretary-General,Rees (2014)
[13] See OHCHR (2014: 26), WHO (2014: 5) and Ustymenko (2015)
[14] See WHO (2014: 8) and WILPF (2014: 26)
[15] See WILPF (2014: 27), OHCHR (2015: 16), Ferris-Rotman (2014) and Vikhrest (2015)
[16] See WILPF (2014: 27), WHO (2014: 8) and OHCHR (2015: 16)
[17] See WILPF (2014: 28), WHO (2014: 9) and Ustymenko (2015)
[18] See Martsenyuk (2012), Phillips 2008; Women's Consortium of Ukraine 2008 in Onuch & Martsenyuk (2014: 11), WILPF (2014: 14-15), CEDAW (2014), UNECE (2014), Hankivsky & Salnikova (2012), Flaherty (2012), Chepurko (2010: 29)
[19] According to the website of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, based on information received from national parliaments on 1 June 2015, the degree of women in the Ukrainian parliament is 11.8 per cent in the Lower House (see: Inter-Parliamentary Union. *Women in National Parliaments*. Online availabe on: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm [Accessed 15 July 2015]
[20] See Chepurko (2010: 32), UNECE (2014: 10), WILPF (2014: 14)
[21] See Phillips 2008 in Onuch & Martsenyuk (2014: 110), Zhurzhenko in Hankivsky & Salnykova eds. (2012: 132, 148), Koshulap in Hankivsky & Salnykova eds. (2012: 209, 210, 214, 217)

discrimination among women.[22] According to interviews with feminist activists and researchers, gender based discrimination is often justified by referring to traditions or the fallacies in the behavior of women.[23]

Typically, it is asserted in feminist literature that these structural as well as new inequalities between men and women during conflict are both a struggle and an opportunity. Several authors assert that women tend to concentrate in informal efforts at conflict transformation[24] because this domain is seen as less political and women have less access to the formal political sphere.[25] Women might thus be more able to address certain drivers of conflict as Miall claims that "civil society actors and local NGOs often have an enormous influence on bridge-building between political parties and local communities" (2004: 15). At the same time, however, women's dominance on the local and more informal level of conflict transformation might not always be taken seriously by political actors (Korac 2006) and might even result in the reproduction of certain gender roles, such as women as nurturers and mothers, leading to the limitation of women's agency outside of these roles (Helms 2003). In the literature on gender, civil society and conflict, civil society is often equated with women's organizations in civil society,[26] or authors look at women in women's organizations as opposed to women in politics.[27] Furthermore, an underlying assertion seems to be that women who organize for conflict transformation will also argue for more gender equality in the process.[28]

By looking at the nexus between gender, conflict transformation and civil society in this way, several important considerations are left out of the frame. First of all, looking at women only in either women's organizations or in politics leaves the broader picture of civil society working on conflict transformation out of the gender frame. This assumption clouds the connection between civil society and gender equality and seems to be rooted in the assertion that "[c]ivil society organizations have been instrumental in promoting women's rights and gender equality."[29] Of course, there are *feminist and women's organizations* in civil society that

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[22] See CEDAW report (2014: 10), UNECE (2014: 10)

[23] Author's interviews with two feminist activists and gender researchers (Appendix 1A, 0A & 0B), 5th of March 2015 and the 14th of March 2015 respectively, cafes in the center of Kyiv

[24] Many authors on gender, conflict & peace have thus far used the vague concept of 'peacebuilding'. I use the concept of conflict transformation, both because this includes civil society organizations that don't necessarily promote themselves as 'peacebuilding organizations' and because it gives a clearer idea of what kind of activities should be looked at. Conflict transformation is here understood as "(a) process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict" (Miall 2004: 4).

[25] See arguments of Bouta et al (2005: 51), Rehn & Sirleaf (2002: 19), Porter (2007: 1), Kaufman & Williams (2010: 7),

[26] See the report of the WILPF (2014), in which no clear distinction is made between women in civil society and women's organizations in Ukraine, implying that they have the same goals concerning gender equality, Korac (2006) who writes about women becoming involved in conflict transformation in the former Yugoslavia but seems to imply that women mainly organised for war because they were feminists or organised for other reasons but became feminists in the process; Helms (2003), who writes about women's NGOs in Bosnia and Kaufman & Williams (2010), who write about women becoming involved in women's organizations, and women becoming involved for either traditional or feminist goals (2013)

[27] See Bouta et al. (2005), Kaufman & Williams (2010)

[28] See note 19, authors often seem to imply that the process of conflict transformation either attracts women who are feminists or makes women more feminist in the process, Kaufman & Williams even assert that "women are likely to focus on women's rights issues" (2010: 89)

[29] See the statement of the NATO Secretary General's Special Representative in the open debate in the Security Council on women, peace and security, Skåre (2012). The role of women's civil society organizations in the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts and peacebuilding. *NATO.* Published 30 November. Online available on: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_92693.htm?selectedLocale=en [Accessed 1 July 2015]

have been instrumental in promoting women's rights and gender equality, but does that mean that it should be asserted that all of civil society promotes gender equality? Reverter-Bañón argues that research on the link between gender equality and civil society is in fact still scarce (2006: 6), and that actually, "civil society is an unregulated field, more so if we compare it with the state, which means that it is more vulnerable to sexist and discriminatory practices" (Phillips 2002 in Reverter-Bañón 2006: 10). She also argues that today, in a world where the state is growing weaker and equality is not only about legal equality anymore but also about cultural and social equality, it is all the more important that we look at the potential of civil society organizations as advocates for gender equality (2006: 6).

Secondly, the literature seems to implicate that women, if they are admitted to peace processes, will automatically advocate for women's issues. However, Bouta et al. assert that "women's inclusion in peace processes does not always lead to gendered issues being addressed more" (2005: 53). Finally, looking only at women tends to leave men out of the picture and thus "does not shed light on the relational workings of gender" (Baden and Goetz 1997 in Charlesworth 2008: 359). This creates a kind of dichotomy where women are everything that men are not and vice versa. Thus, if women are the peaceful creatures working for conflict transformation and in the process also addressing gender inequalities, men are the violent others who fight the conflicts and always stand in the way of gender equality. Little attention is paid to the similarities between men and women in civil society working for conflict transformation as a *role,* or "conditions under which contingent actors formulate their preferences and belief systems" (Jabri 1996: 66) and the way this role is connected to 'preferences and belief systems' on gender *inequality*. The puzzle is how working in CSOs on conflict transformation both provides legitimizing and delegitimizing reasons for advocating for gender equality, as mediated through frames on gender inequality that are a result of the interplay between discourses in society, organizational frameworks and personal ideas on gender inequality. Taking CSOs in Kyiv as a case study, the question becomes: how does the current role of civil society members working on conflict transformation in Kyiv influence their frames on gender inequality in Ukraine since the Euromaidan protests?

It was decided to look at both men and women in civil society organizations working on conflict transformation, as the similarities that men and women experienced in their role as civil society members working in the field of conflict transformation seemed more interesting than in the differences they experienced in their role as men or as women in the process of framing gender inequality in Ukraine. The role of men and women in civil society in Ukraine was examined for several reasons. First of all, as was just argued, men and women are having different experiences as a result of the conflict in the East of Ukraine and have experienced inequality for decades before the conflict. Thus, there is definitely something to advocate for in terms of gender equality. Secondly, there has been an increase in civic activism since the Maidan[30] and women are playing a large part in this (WILPF 2014: 3). Civil society as a whole seems to have gained more trust from society since the conflict (WILPF: 33) and the inclusion of several civil society activists in the new government (Ghosh 2014: 4) points to a better relation between the state and civil society as well. Thus, it seems that civil society is well situated to face post-crisis development challenges (Ghosh 2014: 12). This implicates that civil society *can* have an important influence in advocating for gender equality.

Furthermore, civil society organizations in Ukraine are characterized by a dependency on international donors after they took over the support for civil society in 1991 (WILPF 2014: 30; Ghosh 2014: 3), and thus might be more influenced by the new interest in 'European values' since the Maidan and by international norms on gender equality. On the other hand, civil society is linked to Ukrainian society and to the situation that the country is in right now. According to a report of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, most of the energy of

[30] See WILPF (2014: 6), Phillips (2014: 422), OSCE (2014:4), OHCHR (2014), Mirimanova (2014)

organizations since the conflict in the East seems to be devoted to humanitarian work and women have repeatedly been told that “now is not the time to push ‘their agenda’” (WILPF 2014: 39). The aim of this research is thus to identify the frames that are used by civil society members working on conflict transformation in Kyiv and link these both to CSOs and to the larger debates about gender inequality in Ukraine. The argument is that the frames of civil society members, in the end, are related to viewing gender inequality as ‘something old’ connected to the USSR legacy, as ‘something new’, increasingly visible due to the popularity of European values or as ‘something yellow and blue’, something that is connected to ideas on Ukrainian identity. These frames are connected to historical ideas about gender inequality in society and mediated through institutional frameworks and personal inclination of individual members.

This study employs a theoretical framework of cognitive role theory adapted from the theory of Jabri (1996) and framing theory (Benson & Snow: 2000). Linking role theory and framing provides a way to conceptualize the images and identities civil society members create of themselves and their role in relation to other actors and how these are deployed in certain situations: when people are asked about their opinion on gender inequality in Ukraine. The theories also provide ways to join agents and structures as individual members have their own frames and give their own meanings to gender inequality issues, but are also part of larger structures: of the organization, of civil society and of Ukrainian society. Furthermore, role theory assumes that a role has both enabling and constraining factors tied to it, thus providing a way to conceptualize the contrast between the newfound power of civil society since the Euromaidan on the one hand, and how this relates to constraining factors in the relationship of civil society members with other actors on the other hand. This illuminates how CSOs working on conflict transformation can have both a specific position in advocating for gender equality, but are also connected to larger discourses on gender inequality in society. The theoretical framework will be further elaborated on in the first chapter of this thesis.

This study thus aims to provide more insights into possible relationships between civil society working on conflict transformation and gender equality, particularly in the post-Soviet context. This can help to provide tools to place women’s organizations in the broader context of civil society in future research on gender, civil society and conflict transformation. Another aim is to offer insight into the role of civil society organizations working on conflict transformation in Kyiv and their relationships with other actors, thus presenting a clearer view of civil society actors not for their potential in conflict transformation, but also for their own views and expectations of other actors in this process, and particularly in advancing gender equality. In this sense, two goals are to ‘give voice’ to civil society members in exploring the way that they view gender inequality and to ‘make predictions’ about their behavior in advocating for gender equality in the future (Ragin 1994: 37, 43). Furthermore, the research can lead to more insight into the way that gender inequality frames are connected to the current conflict in Ukraine by interviewing actors in conflict transformation. Finally, this study aims to contribute to role theory by linking role with framing in a comprehensive way.

In the first chapter, the theoretical framework and methodology will be introduced. The second chapter will discuss how gender inequality has been spoken about in Ukrainian society and how this has changed since the conflict. Subsequently, the institutional frameworks of CSOs included in the research will be examined and related to the legitimation of certain views on gender inequality. Finally, the fourth chapter of this thesis will elaborate on the most dominant ways of framing gender inequality by civil society members, and how these are not only related to shared ideas on gender inequality in Ukrainian society and linked to institutional frameworks, but also determined by personal preferences and ideas of civil society members.

# Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework and Methodology

> *This approach presupposes that the role held by decision-makers influences definitions of grievances, perceptions of the enemy, preferences for outcomes, as well as calculations of the distribution of advantage. To understand a particular action, therefore, requires that we situate the party within its identifiable social and institutional position.*
>
> (Jabri 1996: 66)

In the introduction of this thesis it was argued that placing civil society members working on conflict transformation in their social and institutional position to explain why they employ certain frames on gender inequality can add to existing theory. This chapter will elaborate on the current theoretical and methodological framework for researching frames of civil society members working on conflict transformation in Kyiv, Ukraine. However, before further explanation of the theoretical framework for this research and the methodology, it needs to be addressed that this research was commenced with a different framework. Furthermore, the empirical as well as theoretical reasons why it was chosen *not* to employ this framework after being confronted with the situation in the field have to be taken into account.

### 1.1 Changing the Theoretical Framework

This study into the subjects of civil society, conflict transformation and gender was undertaken with a particular 'analytical framework' or an articulation of theoretical ideas about the research topic (Ragin 1994: 58) in mind. After conducting a literature research on gender and conflict transformation, it was found that several authors claimed that women had different motivations, tasks, incentives and opportunities than men in conflict transformation. However, authors frequently warned that this must not be seen as related to essentialized characteristics of women, but rather as a result of their specific position in society.[31] These different roles of men and women in conflict can be viewed as being a part of the concept of gender roles. According to Eagly, Wood & Diekman, gender role theory is derived from the literature on social role, which consists of the shared expectations that apply to persons who occupy a certain social position or are members of a specific social group.[32] Gender role theory holds that men and women are conforming to expectations and information derived from injunctive norms- expectations about what people ought to do or ideally would do- and descriptive norms- expectations about what people actually do (Eagle et al. 2000: 131). In this theory, culture features shared expectations for the appropriate conduct of men and women and these expectations foster sex-differentiated behavior. Gender roles, however, are a dynamic aspect of culture that can change as society's typical distribution of family and occupational roles changes

[31] See Helms (2003), who argues that women NGOs in Bosnia were able to get funding from foreign donors and more leeway from the state because they were perceived as more peaceful and less political, Korac (2006) who writes about the way in which women in the former Yugoslavia organized based on the similarities that they perceived in their position as women, Besell (2001) in Bouta et al. (2005: 68) who argues that "[i]n many conflict situations the socially constructed gender roles allow women a greater scope to become major advocates for peace and reconciliation", and Kaufman & Williams who argue that gender roles can be both constraining and enabling, as they can put pressure upon women to take 'traditional' roles, while at the same time they can offer women more space for political agency (2013: 3).

[32] e.g. Biddle 1979; Sarbin & Allen 1968; Staines; 1986 in Eagly et al. (2000: 130)

(Eagly et al. 2000: 124). Gender role theory thus seemed excellent to explain why the roles of men and women on the Maidan were different.[33] It would also explain why, according to a report of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom published in September (2014: 24), women in civil society were mainly engaged in humanitarian work, while men were increasingly seen as those who needed to defend others by fighting in the East of the country. This research was thus originally meant to find the link between the 'diffuse roles' of men and women- which are the features of culture that describe and prescribe how men and women *could* act and *should* act in a certain way, and the 'specific roles' of men and women. These are those roles that only apply to a specific part of one's daily life (Eagly et al. 2000: 132), such as the role of men and women as civil society members engaging in conflict transformation.

However, halfway through the research it became clear that the analytical framework of 'injunctive and descriptive norms' and 'diffuse and specific roles' was not necessarily very applicable on the ground for multiple reasons. First of all, it was found that most participants in the research asserted that there was little difference in the roles of men and women. This might have been due to a general lack of awareness, the location of the research in a place that was seen as less sexist and discriminatory and the particular properties of civil society organizations, which will be examined in detail later. Also, it might have been due to, contrary to other research on gender in civil society and conflict transformation, researching CSOs where both men and women were present. This might have had the twofold effect of making it harder to identify discrimination against men or women as a group as well as making it harder to talk about discrimination. With data collection methods such as focus groups and observation, gender roles in this climate might still have been researchable. However, due to access problems, language barriers and time constraints the research had to be limited to interviews. Furthermore, men and women could not be compared adequately in the research due to the lack of men who were willing to talk about gender roles.[34] In addition, in most of the other literature on gender, civil society and conflict transformation, the focus was also on organizations that had been found as a result of the conflict. It was assumed that men and women working in these organizations had been personally affected by the conflict in some way. The effect of the conflict on their lives was seen as different and would thus impact on the priorities of men and women in conflict transformation.[35] However, in contrast to the literature on men and women in conflict transformation, the CSOs that I had access to were mainly organizations that had already been established before the conflict. Almost all of the research participants were living in Kyiv and didn't have direct contact with life in the conflict zone. Besides, because of their contact with foreign donors they were very aware of the need to include both men and women in their organizations- although this awareness didn't always result in a balance between men and women.

It became clear that it would be much more interesting to research the role of men and women as civil society members and the effect of their role on the way they perceived gender inequality than to research gender inequality within organizations itself and what this meant for their approach in conflict transformation. Furthermore, a decision was made to focus more on individual agency, as the assertions from gender role theory were seen as somewhat too deterministic in nature. Therefore, halfway through the research gender role theory as an analytical framework was replaced with a focus on the way that individuals in CSOs framed gender inequality in Ukraine and how this could be linked to their role not as men and women, but as civil society members and as members of Ukrainian society. It was decided to keep using

[33] See Phillips (2014) and Onuch & Martsenyuk (2014)

[34] See Appendix V: Limitations of Doing Research with CSOs in Kyiv for more reflections on the limitations of the research.

[35] See Bouta et al (2005), Korac (2006), Helms (2003), Kaufman & Williams (2010), Rehn & Sirleaf (2002)

role theory, but to switch to a more individualist perspective. In the next sections the individualist brand of role theory as used by Jabri (1996) will be introduced, the link to framing theory will be explained and the methodology will be revealed.

### 1.2 The Actor as a Situated Entity

Role theory in international relations was, according to Demmers, greatly influenced by the work of Martin Hollis, one of the foremost theorists of role (2012: 108). According to Hollis, role has two main uses. The first one is to analyze social institutions and practices, which together form the dynamic aspect of a social position. Here, roles are seen to set structure in motion. In turn, each role has normative expectations or duties attached, which are sparked by social interaction. Furthermore, role has specific ends as well as negotiable means, so that role bearers are both enabled and constrained in striving for consistency. Thus, there is already some distinction between the individual and the role (s)he takes on built into the role (Hollis 1994: 96). The second use of role theory is to analyze more intimate aspects of social life, for which Hollis uses a theatrical metaphor:

*[T]he relation of the actors to the characters they play do not yield an easy distinction between men and mask. The self cannot be the mask alone, nor can it be the man alone. Plays have scripts, plots and conventions, which enable and constrain individuals just as norms enable and constrain the incumbent of a social position.*
(1994: 97).

While the latter concept of role is more useful to analyze diffuse roles and roles as social identities, this research focusses on the first use of role. Thus, the concern is to analyze social institutions and practices, but to differ between the individual role bearer and the role of an individual in an institution.

In her perspective on role theory, Jabri also emphasizes individual agency. She sees roles as "conditions under which contingent actors formulate their preferences and belief systems" (1996: 66). Jabri focuses on role as influencing decision-making processes that lead to the use of force as a form of conflict behavior. However, role can also be used to look at other forms of behavior over conflicting interests, among which gender inequality. This is because frames on gender inequality can be seen as both conflicting in itself in some situations, and because they can be linked to the bigger context of a conflict in which certain views can become more salient than others. In the section on framing theory this relation between frames on gender and conflict transformation will be further elaborated on. According to Jabri, there are different levels on which the conditions that determine preferences and belief systems can be found. In the role that an actor holds there is an interrelatedness between purposive agency, institutional frameworks and normative and discursive continuities or 'rules' that situate actors within a wider historical context. In this concept of role, personal and bureaucratic preferences thus interact to produce particular behavior. An actor's response to a situation is first determined by desires and beliefs, which are in themselves influenced by the "normative expectations and processes of information gathering associated with the institutional role that actor holds" (Jabri 1996: 65, 67). The actor's role in itself provides legitimizing reasons for the particular action or response adopted (Jabri 1996: 68, 69). Therefore, in examining an actor's role the institutional position that actor holds -which provides him or her with information and expectations-, the normative and discursive continuities that actor is subject to and the personal inclinations of the actor all need to be taken into account.

This suggests that apart from actors being part of institutions, they also act according to a 'defined appropriateness' that is embedded in normative and discursive structures in society. Apart from role expectations as tied to the institutional role that actors occupy, wider cultural

values and social norms that impact on the decision-making of an actor also need to be examined (Jabri 1996: 70-71). These norms and values can be conceptualized as 'regulative rules' and 'constitutive rules'. Regulative rules define if certain acts are acceptable and can have both positive and negative sanctions attached to their performance, while constitutive rules determine if a particular action is recognizable as such. Communicative acts, such as threats, warnings or complaints, are rendered meaningful by their constitutive rules, as these determine what an action means in a social context, and acceptable by their regulative rules, as these provide the normative structure in which acts can be placed (Jabri 1996: 74). To understand civil society members' framing of gender inequality, the wider norms of 'social appropriateness' they are subject to must be analyzed. Constitutive rules, on the other hand, can help to see what actually is implicated in the meaning of 'gender discrimination' or 'gender inequality' in Ukrainian society and how this meaning translates in the frames that civil society members employ. Thus, examining regulative and constitutive rules helps to determine the wider discursive context that civil society members are part of, and how these 'rules' are used in organizations to talk about gender inequality, assuming that rules provide constraining and enabling elements for communication. In analyzing a role, the relative distribution of influence between individual decisionmakers within the group also needs to be taken into account. This is dependent on the resources of decision-makers as individuals and as role players (Jabri 1996: 66, 67-69). It can be assumed that individuals who are closer to the top of organizations have more influence on institutional frameworks and on the way that 'regulative' and 'constitutive' 'rules' are appropriated within the organizations.

Jabri emphasizes, contrary to Eagly et al. (2000), that choices are not always tied to roles -diffuse or specific- but that an individual also has room to conform or not to conform to expectations. Although a role does often come with pre-defined expectations that may require high levels of compliance from the actor, the level of conformity of the individual role occupant can still vary: both depending on the role and the individual who is occupying the role. Therefore, within Jabri's approach, even the highest degree of conformity to the rules still implies a purposive actor making active choices to obey these rules: they are 'cognitively mediated' (Jabri 1996: 69-70). The actor is thus a purposive actor who is both enabled and constrained by the rules of a role, in the sense that they constrain or demand certain actions, but provide legitimation for others. Jabri sees individuals as 'situated entities', in the sense that they are embedded in an institutional and social context, but also 'purposive agents', in the sense that they have a choice to conform or not to conform to the expectations that come with this position.

This idea of role as 'cognitively mediated' differs from other brands of role theory, most prominently the more structuralist brands of role theory and the interactionist brand. According to Biddle, five different brands of role theory can be defined: functionalist, symbolic interactionist, organizational, structuralist and cognitive (Biddle 1986). For the aims of this research, only the first two perspectives within role theory will be explained, as these form the biggest contrast with the cognitive perspective on role theory (Lynch 2007: 380) that Jabri takes. The first brand of role theory that emerged was functional role theory,[36] whose advocates believed that roles consist of

[36] Lynch takes a different approach than Biddle and contracts the functional and structural perspective on role theory as the perspective which focuses on the way that roles, "as fixed components of complex social structures or cultures, influence the behavior of people" (Hilbert 1981 in Lynch 2007: 380), to form one brand, which is contrasted with the interactionist brand of role theory.

"shared normative expectations that prescribe and explain characteristic behaviors of persons who occupy social positions in a stable system" (Biddle 1986: 71). As this was seen as too static of an interpretation of role, symbolic interactionist theory developed the argument that actual roles "are thought to reflect norms, attitudes, contextual demands, negotiation and the evolving definition of the situation as understood by the actor" (Biddle 1986: 72). Advocators of this perspective thus focused their research on the way that roles emerge in a social context, and on how individuals then negotiate the character of behavioral expectations associated with the role (Stryker & Statham 1985 in Lynch 2007: 380). Although this brand of role theory had more room for individual agency and contextual factors, according to Biddle it was also criticized because the concepts and limits of this theory were seen as 'fuzzy' and inapplicable (Biddle 1986: 72).

Finally, cognitive role theory, to which Biddle feels most attracted himself as expressed in his work, focuses on "social conditions that give rise to expectations" and "relationships between role expectations and behavior" (Biddle 1986: 74). This idea emerges in Jabri's focus on the way that the individual 'cognitively mediates' a role through layers of institutional positions, normative and discursive continuities and personal inclination. It also seems to fit well with what Collier and Callero identify as 'new models of role behavior'.[37] These models assume that roles are sustained by "*cognitive structures* that simultaneously serve as an element in the *construction and reproduction of social structure"* (Collier & Callero 2005: 46, emphasis added). A clear match can be found between this assumption and Jabri's assertion that through their conduct, actors both constitute and transform the social structure which render conduct and social interaction meaningful (Jabri 1996: 74). What is so interesting about this perspective on role theory that Collier and Callero see as 'role as resource'[38], is that it combines different theories, but also "transcends the traditional distinction between a ''structuralist'' view of roles as behavioral expectations[39] and the ''interactionist'' perspective that emphasizes the creative role-making process of interaction" (McCall & Simmons, 1978; Turner, 1978, 1985 in Collier & Callero 2005: 47).

In conclusion, the perspective of Jabri on role theory, as part of a cognitive brand of role theory, can be very useful in determining the different layers of meaning through which actors in civil society construct frames on gender inequality. In her theory, Jabri has explained the mutually constitutive parts which render action possible and meaningful. She has also provided access to certain tools such as constitutive and regulative rules, as well as normative expectations and information gathering, which are helpful in analyzing the way that a role relates to a certain form of behavior. However, so far, it is not quite clear what the relation is between framing and role in Jabri's theory as well as in the wider cognitive tradition in which her theory is situated. Thus, the next section will be devoted to examining the relation between cognitive role theory- in particular Jabri's theory- and framing theory, as well as placing framing within the wider context of researching actors on conflict transformation and researching gender inequality.

[37] e.g., Burke, 1992; Callero, 1986, 1994; Collier, 2000, 2001; Farr, 1987; Morgan & Spanish, 1987; Schwalbe, 1987; Turner, 1985 in Collier & Callero (2005: 46)

[38] Baker & Faulkner, 1991; Callero, 1994 in Collier & Callero (2005: 47)

[39] e.g., Linton, 1936; Merton, 1957 in Collier & Callero (2005: 47)

### 1.3 Framing Theory

Benford and Snow (2000) see framing as an "active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction"[40] that "helps to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action" (Benford & Snow 2000: 614). They write mainly about collective action frames, while this research focuses on the framing of legitimizing reasons for action as well as inaction, as many civil society members working on conflict transformation do not prioritize ameliorating gender inequality. However, the concepts of mobilizing and counter mobilizing ideas is helpful in explaining frames for inaction as well as for action (Benford & Snow 2000: 612). Counter mobilizing ideas can be seen as ideas that delegitimize action such as working on providing gender equality. Benford and Snow's concept of actors as 'signifying agents', or actors that are "actively involved in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers" (Benford & Snow 2000: 613) points to the importance of looking at and explaining the frames that are used by civil society members, as they are not only derived from historical meaning, but also produce meaning which can be reproduced by others when talking about gender inequality. Tarrow argues that movements are "both consumers of existing cultural meanings and producers of new meanings" (1992: 189 in Benson & Snow 2000: 629).

Starting with a wider view of cognitive theory and the links to framing, Collier and Callero have asserted that in the approach to roles as 'resources', roles also serve as a resource for thinking.[41] They believe that roles can be conceptualized as cognitive schemas, which provide central cues helping to process and percept particular information (Collier & Callero 2005: 54). Thus, roles provides cues on how to 'cognitively mediate' particular information and employ certain frames in communicative acts. As Jabri asserts:

*One impact of role is "framing", where an actor's judgment of issues in conflict as well as his/her perceptions of the enemy's motives and capabilities are influenced by a set of pre-existing perceptual formats and prejudices (...) The framing process is itself influenced by the role and social position of an actor, by the norms and values which shape that actor's society and its history. An understanding of an actor's response to an emergent conflict situation must, therefore, incorporate the actor's frame of reference.*
(Jabri 1996: 66-67).

At the same time, she asserts that framing is shaped by a particular institutional setting (Jabri 1996: 94). In researching a role, an actor's 'frame of reference' or the role of an actor as both an institutional position and as an individual that is part of a discursive and normatively organised community therefore needs to be taken into account. This can be examined by looking at the frames that actors employ, for example when talking about gender inequality. The position of an actor can provide legitimizing reasons to speak about issues in a particular way or to 'frame' issues as to justify behavior and decisions taken. Thus, I will look at the way that actors 'frame' gender to determine how these frames can be traced back to particular normative and discursive continuities as seen in regulative and constitutive rules, how they are rooted in a particular institutional context and how they are influenced by personal beliefs and preferences. Framing provides a way to see what actors take from their role to process information and make certain parts more salient than others. At the same time, I see frames as producing meaning and being able to transform a structure, therefore frames can also give clues that help to predict future action of individuals or groups.

[40] Gamson et al 1982, Snow et al 1986, Snow & Benford 1988 in Benford & Snow (2000: 614)
[41] cf., Callero, 1991, 1994; Schwalbe, 1987 in Collier & Callero (2005: 54)

Framing can be used in different ways. Only the main uses of framing are relevant for this particular research, as they are most easily connected to Jabri's framework. These uses are: framing as a way to make a perception of a political opportunity[42] salient, framing as a way to portray a collective identity, framing as a way to diagnose a problem and place blame, framing as a way to propose a solution to a problem and framing as a way to motivate people to execute a particular solution to a problem. Jabri has argued that role is important because it influences the perception of capabilities and motivations of the enemy (Jabri 1996: 66). Benford and Snow, writing here about political opportunity structures, emphasize that "the extent to which they constrain or facilitate collective action is partially contingent on how they are framed by movement actors as well as others" (Koopmans & Duyvendak 1995 in Benford & Snow 2000: 631). Thus, civil society members' potential for changing gender equality is also influenced by the way in which they perceive opportunities for working on gender inequality within a particular political and social context. Furthermore, framing is connected to collective identities as "[p]articipation in social movements frequently involves enlargement of personal identity for participation and offers fulfillment and realization of the self" (Gamson 1992: 56 in Benford & Snow 2000: 631). Framing can be seen as one of the several mechanism that facilitates a link between personal and collective identity (Benford & Snow 2000: 632). The way in which members of civil society frame gender inequality can therefore provide a source of collective identity, as they can use similar institutional frameworks and normative and discursive continuities, and provides a way for us to see how collective identity can be used to legitimize certain views on gender in civil society organizations.

Finally, Benford and Snow divide framing up into 'diagnostic framing' -problem identification and attributions-, 'prognostic framing' -articulation of a proposed solution and strategies for carrying this out-, and 'motivational framing' -rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action (1988 in Benford & Snow 2000: 615, 616, 617). Thus, in terms of the way civil society members look at gender related problems in Ukraine, there is a need to assess 1) if it is seen as a problem and if so, what kind of problem, and what the symptoms are of this problem; 2) what can be done about the problem or what would be the best way to deal with it; 3) what they can and should do about it, as an organization and as individuals. In conclusion, framing plays an important part in the legitimation that comes with a role, because it facilitates a collective identity and delivers a perception of opportunity structures for action to be taken (or not taken). Using the concepts of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing allows us to see first of all if the interviewees view gender inequality in Ukraine as a problem and what they specifically see as causing this problem. Secondly, it helps to determine how they see this problem being solved and how they view their own as well as their organization's contribution to this. These are all important aspects to describe the impact that an organization can have in both transforming the conflict in the East and transforming Ukraine into a more gender equal society. As Benford and Snow and many authors with them have argued, framing a problem determines the way you will act towards that problem. Therefore, frames that don't even define gender inequality as a problem might be problematic for the future of Ukraine as a gender equal society, particularly as it is now in a process of political transformation in which CSOs that are working on conflict transformation play a large part. The next question that needs to be answered then, is how framing is not only a way to perceive how certain aspects of a role become salient in formulating opinions on gender inequality, but also how framing can produce certain outcomes in working on conflict transformation.

[42] Political opportunity structure is a frequently used concept in social movement theory and can be conceptualized as "specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historic processes for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protests movements in some instances and constrain them in others" (Kitschelt 1986: 58)

Because framing encapsulates both diagnostic, prognostic and motivational aspects, it defines both who or what is to blame for the conflict, how this can be solved and what needs to be done by the actors themselves. Looking at the main author that influenced theories on conflict transformation, Johan Galtung, the changing of frames can be tied to the changing of attitudes within the conflict as framing defines the way that a problem or another actor is perceived. Furthermore, framing can be related to the changing of behaviors -as framing directly influences action that can be taken or how action can be justified- and the addressing of the contradiction within the conflict, as it defines who or what actors blame for the conflict (Miall 2004: 8). Framing relates to what Miall calls 'memories' and which he defines as "each party's socially constructed understanding of the situation, shaped by culture and learning, and discourse and belief." Furthermore, he claims that: "The way groups remember and construct their past is often central to the mobilization for conflict, and thus a crucial matter to address in reconciliation and cultural traditions work" (Miall 2004: 8). Gender relations, as tied to culture and traditions can therefore become part of the conflict, making the way that gender inequality is framed also a part of a particular conflictual context. This can be identified as a constraining factor in advocating for more gender equality.

At the same time, frames that perceive gender inequality as a minor problem or even not a problem at all can have a limiting impact on the representativeness of the political system, a limited impact on the welfare that economic transformation will bring for the population as a whole and the reconciliation component after the conflict.[43] According to Miall, within conflict transformation; "constructive conflict is seen as a catalyst for change" (2004: 4) and thus conflict also presents an opportunity and important momentum to develop new ways of thinking about gender inequality and to change gender relationships within society. This is part of what Vayrynen described as 'issue transformation' in which the agenda of conflict issues can be changed (Vayrynen in Miall 2004: 5). Issue transformations can both change the way in which gender specific problems within the conflict are seen and the way that men and women are included in the process of conflict transformation, which could then in turn influence the entire process of conflict transformation. As Miall says "context, structural and issue transformations all affect the context and contradictions at the heart of the conflict" (2004: 11). Therefore, conflicts can provide enabling factors for new ways of framing gender inequality and new advocacy for gender equality.

In conclusion, it was argued that Jabri's role theory (1996) combined with Benford & Snow's framing theory (2000) provides an excellent frame to look at the constraining and enabling elements of the roles of civil society members in promoting gender equality as observed through their framing of gender inequality. To summarize, Jabri's conception of role theory provides a way to join agents and structures in a three leveled framework: normative and discursive continuities, institutional frameworks and purposive agents. She also provided useful concepts to look for the social norms and cultural understandings in society that determine the frame of reference that actors have (regulative and constitutive rules), and makes us aware of the need to take into account that individuals and institutions differ in the distribution of influence.. Furthermore, her theory provides a way to link roles with framing, as an output of role and something that can show us different layers and aspects of a role. Framing both reproduces structure and provides new structure. Thus, examining frames on gender inequality that members of CSOs working on conflict transformation employ can also provide clues to assess the potential of civil society in promoting gender equality, assuming that there are both constraining and enabling elements in their role. However, Benford and Snow warn that we do need to be aware that the framing of a particular issue or situation can be dependent upon the audience of the message (2000: 630). Therefore, civil society members might frame gender inequality differently when talking to a young Dutch female then when talking to a Ukrainian

[43] See for instance Bouta et al. (2005), Rehn & Sirleaf (2002), Kaufman & Williams (2010)

male for example. Although this 'bias' has to be taken into account, it does not mean that it is not possible to get important insight on gender inequality frames as a non-Ukrainian. In fact, during the research it was discovered that the position of the researcher EU citizen provided more insights into the way that civil society members compared gender inequality issues in Ukraine to 'European' issues, therefore illuminating the construction of a 'Ukrainian' identity as either opposed to or comparable with a 'European identity'.

### 1.4 Methodology

The research was conducted in a period of three months among CSOs in Kyiv. Kyiv was chosen because this is the area in which the government is settled and it was assumed that organizations in Kyiv are seen as most influential on state policies and changing the structural factors that underlie the conflict. The organizations that were selected for the research were mainly found through contact with the British and the Dutch embassy, but also through local organizations and contacts. They were thus pre-selected but in addition a 'snowball method' (Boeije 2010: 40) was used to find new organizations. The organizations were seen as influential in the process of conflict transformation and state policies and they all had some form of relations with foreign donors. Participating organizations were working on different parts of the process of conflict transformation, mainly conducting dialogues, working on reforms, and working on press freedom and the countering of propaganda. In addition, the organizations identified themselves differently with regards to gender equality. One of the organizations was a women's organization working on conflict transformation, some of the organizations were conducting projects on gender equality, others did not have any identifiable policy on gender equality. These organizations thus had something in common: they were influential in the process of conflict transformation, which makes them important study subjects to find clues about the relationship between gender equality and conflict transformation. On the other hand, the CSOs chosen for the research present an interesting mix of institutional frameworks, which means that it will be possible to check the institutional frameworks of organizations against the personal framing of individual members of these organizations and see how different ways of framing gender inequality are developed.

As has been asserted before, Jabri takes an approach that attempts to bridge the structure-agency gap. Ontologically, this research is thus situated in between structure and agency. It examines both individuals and organizations, because organizations consist of individuals that might influence the decision-making in the future, and because smaller details are often not seen when only looking at organizations: an organization consists of individuals. Furthermore, looking at frames as an "active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction" (Gamson et al 1982, Snow et al 1986, Snow & Benford 1988 in Benford & Snow 2000: 614), an 'interpretative' epistemological stance is taken, situating the individual within society as producing and reproducing meaning (Demmers 2012: 17). In line with Jabri's assertion that actors are influenced by three different factors -institutional frameworks, normative and discursive continuities and their own preferences and beliefs-, the methodology consisted of three steps. The first step of the methodology was achieved by a combination of 'secondary research' and 'in-depth interviewing' as data collection techniques (Curtis & Curtis 2011), while the other steps consisted mainly of in-depth interviewing to get a comprehensive understanding of the way that civil society members spoke about gender inequality. These latter phases, however, were combined with some amount of 'secondary research' on civil society in Ukraine to determine bigger patterns. Therefore, in all phases different data collection techniques were used to 'triangulate' the research findings (Boeije 2010:176). After all steps of the methodology were executed, the data was categorized, classified and coded according to the 'thematic framework' method (Ritchie, Spencer & O'Connor 2002: 220).

The first step of the methodology was aimed at discovering what regulative and constitutive rules can be identified in Ukrainian society when speaking about gender inequality. Five interviews with four feminist activists and gender researchers[44] were conducted and several publications of Ukrainian and international academics and reports of international organizations were read with this aim in mind. As it is often asserted that conflict introduces new ways of speaking about gender,[45] constitutive and regulative rules *before* and *after* the start of the conflict in the East were examined. Furthermore, the role of the state, the media, the feminist community and international donors were examined to determine what the distribution of influence was in speaking about gender inequality. The second part of this thesis was devoted to examining institutional frameworks of organizations, and how expectations and information within organizations were expressed through the information organization provided on their websites,[46] as well as through information provided in interviews with eight heads of CSOs or people responsible for PR within organizations.[47] The aim of this was to study the way that institutional frameworks provide a legitimation or delegitimation for advocating for gender equality. The final part of the research analyzed the frames of individuals in civil society more closely to see how they are also influenced by personal experiences and opinions. This was achieved through analyzing the statements of eighteen individuals working in civil society organizations.[48]

[44] See Appendix IA for more details on the gender experts interviewed for this research and IIIA for the topic list of the interviews conducted.

[45] See for instance Rehn & Sirleaf (2002), Kaufman & Williams (2010)

[46] Unfortunately, despite frequent requests, I didn't gain access to documents on organizational policies.

[47] See Appendix IB for details on the organizations that participated in the research and IIIB for additional questions that were asked to heads of organizations or those responsible for PR in organizations.

[48] See Appendix IC for a list of individuals interviewed for the research and IIIC for the topic lists of the interviews.

# Chapter 2: Gender Inequality and Constitutive and Regulative Rules in Ukrainian Society

*The framing process is itself influenced by the role and social position of an actor, by the norms and values that shape that actor's society and it's history. An understanding of an actor's response to an emergent conflict situation must, therefore, incorporate the actor's frame of reference (...) There is, therefore, an interrelationship between purposive agency, institutional frameworks, and the wider normative and discursive continuities which confer meaning on particular acts and situate these in the historical reproduction of society and its institutions.*
(Jabri 1996: 67)

In the previous chapter the importance of examining the way that actors are situated within a historical and social context, or within particular 'normative and discursive continuities', was asserted. These are conceptualized as regulative and constitutive rules that help to give meaning and appropriateness to frames. This chapter will be devoted to answering the question: what are the constitutive and regulative rules of speaking about gender inequality in Ukraine and how is the influence in the production and reproduction of these rules distributed among several actors in Ukrainian society? The aim is to analyze the most important 'rules' on gender inequality in Ukrainian society to provide a context in which the frames of civil society members can be placed. Furthermore, because Jabri asserts that "conflict generates its own set of rules quite distinct from those governing society prior to the onset of violent conflict" (Jabri 1996: 72), constitutive and regulative rules both before the start of the conflict and after the start of the conflict have to be taken into account. Finally, it is important to assert who has the most power to decide which constitutive and regulative rules are agreed upon in Ukrainian society when speaking about gender. Thus, the distribution of influence between the state, the media, feminist organizations and international organizations in speaking about gender inequality in Ukraine will also be examined. These actors were chosen because they appeared frequently both in academic literature, international reports and in interviews with gender experts, either as actors that *should* have a bigger influence upon the way that people speak about gender inequality in Ukraine, or as actors that *do* have a big influence upon the formulation of constitutive and regulative rules.

### 2.1 Before the Conflict

*It must immediately be recognized that the notion of rules as social structure implies that they constitute the continuities of social life in the form of its institutions and dominant discourses…The effectiveness of communicative acts such as threats, complaints or warnings, is dependent on the constitutive rules which these acts meaningful while the question of whether such acts are acceptable relies on the existence of regulative rules which define the contingent normative structure of a particular social situation.*
(Jabri 1996: 67)

In the following sections the constitutive and regulative rules of speaking about gender based discrimination and inequality in Ukraine that appeared most frequently in academic literature, international reports and interviews with gender experts will be examined. The constitutive rules

of speaking about gender based discrimination[49] are understood as the awareness of gender based discrimination, women's rights and inequality in Ukraine, because if there is no awareness of what these concepts actually consists of, then there is no shared meaning with which to talk about achieving more equality. The regulative rules are seen as the way that gender inequalities are justified as well as the particular parts of gender inequality people *do* talk about and the parts that they *do not* talk about and possible sanctions that are attached to speaking about gender in an 'appropriate' way.

### 2.1.1 Constitutive Rules

*A form of behavior is only recognizable through its constitutive rules. If constitutive rules define an activity, their violation would imply that the named activity is no longer being performed (…) constitutive rules cannot be treated as "causes" of action but as inferences of behavior's meaning where they enable communication through a shared understanding of the nature of the "game" being played. That the "meaning" of social action is related to communication points to the central role of language, as a rule governed activity, in understanding the relationships between rules and social conflict.*
(Jabri 1996: 72)

According to interviews with feminist activists and gender researchers, there is not much knowledge of what gender based discrimination, gender studies or feminism mean and encompass. This is supported by international reports of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (2014) and the Commission on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (2014), that state that there is a severe lack of awareness of gender based discrimination in Ukraine among women. In the CEDAW report, it was found that only a minority of women knew of the existence of several important laws concerning gender based discrimination. One result of this lack of legal awareness and the lack of ability to identify gender based discrimination as such, according to the report, is the low number of appeals concerning domestic violence (CEDAW report 2014: 12). The report of UNECE states that citizens sometimes are not able to identify gender based discrimination in their families, at their work and in society as a whole. It places the reasons at the level of women, as they underestimate their own qualities and are therefore not able to identify discrimination against them, as well as at the state level, due to the lack of efforts to raise legal awareness of gender based discrimination (UNECE 2014: 10). Normally, the state is an actor that provides a legal definition of gender based discrimination, thereby setting certain constitutive rules for speaking about the concept. In Ukraine however, although it is asserted that Ukrainian legislation is gender-neutral and free from discriminatory statements, the legislation does not necessarily contribute to the elimination of differences or the balancing of the status of men and women (UNECE 2014: 12). Furthermore, the government has weak capacity for actually enforcing their frameworks on gender equality and does not prioritize gender policy, according to experts (CEDAW 2014: 8,9). Thus, although the government does officially provide some constitutive rules on gender based discrimination, they do not provide the mechanisms to enforce these rules and therefore this idea of discrimination is not shared among the wider public in Ukraine. One result of this are the

[49] I use the CEDAW definition of sex discrimination, which is as follows: "...any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field." See: UN Women. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. *UNWomen.org*. Online available on: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ [Accessed 21 July 2015]

stereotypes that are seen in media, which can be traced back to a lack of awareness of journalists about issues related to gender based discrimination and the notion that gender issues equals sexual minority issues (UNECE 2014: 45, 46).

However, when Ukrainian feminist activists and researchers on gender were asked why they believed there was so little awareness, they mainly related it to the cultural and historical heritage of the population. According to one gender expert: "It was always an odd match for post-Soviet communities because women have had access to so many resources and have had so much that women in Western countries had to fight for (…) And that can cloud underlying issues I feel."[50]Another expert states that the emancipation of women is not perceived as 'good', because of the association with Soviet policies of equality, which left the burden for both work, children and household in women's hands.[51] This is supported by academics, who state that there is a strong feeling among the public that emancipation is not needed, one of the reasons being that women's 'emancipation movements' are associated with communist state ideology (Hrycak et al, 2009; Cerwonka, 2008 in McNee 2013: 13), while at the same time the policy of 'gender equality' during Soviet times has led to a denying of instances of gender based discrimination. The strict Soviet policies on gender for instance regulated the distribution of tasks in the family, alienating males from their parental tasks and stimulating women to play the role of mothers (Bureychak in Hankivsky & Salnykova 2012: 326), but at the same time ignored issues such as domestic violence. Furthermore, although 36 per cent of the members of parliament were women at some point, their influence on the political level was doubtful. According to Hankivsky and Salnykova, the government of independent Ukraine still employed policies of the USSR period (2012: 10, 16). Thus, at least some of the Soviet understanding of gender equality was reinforced by the government as an influential actor.

After the independence of Ukraine, according to Rubchak, the strictly regulated gender policies of the Soviet state were replaced by "weaker, often contradictory social pressures" as well as new contacts with the West (ed. 2011: 1). Although it is claimed that Western donors are an important source of promoting gender equality in Ukraine (UNECE 2014: 6, Hankivsky & Salnykova 2012: 11), the influence of these Western donors on the understanding of gender based discrimination is not clear. A gender expert further explains:

*[speaking about feminist ideas] They have not arrived in mainstream society or when they have arrived in a very jokingly way, like 'look at these weird western ideas' (...) In Ukraine there is some gender based legislation, but it is there almost exclusively because of the lobbying from Western partners and donors and governments. It was introduced not because of mainstream debate on this, but because someone pushed them or invited them to a workshop. And it hasn't arrived in the consciousness of the community as in a broad discussion.*[52]

[50] Author's interview (Appendix IA, 0C), 24 March 2015, conducted through Skype
[51] Author's interview (IA, 0A), 5 March 2015, Kyiv
[52] Author's interview (IA, 0C), 24 March 2015, conducted through Skype

According to McNee, the different history of Ukraine causes disconnection between the experiences of Ukrainian and Western feminists, which is often not adequately understood by Western feminists (2013: 4-5).

Therefore, it can be argued that one of the reasons why the universal definition of what constitutes of gender based discrimination as formulated by the CEDAW seems not to be shared in Ukraine is due to the different historical associations with gender equality. A lack of constitutive rules shared by actors such as the Ukrainian state and international donors makes it harder to speak about gender inequality in a way that is understood by all parties and by the Ukrainian population. In the absence of these rules, however, there should still be ways to speak about gender that are seen as more 'appropriate' than others, which have positive or negative sanctions attached to them. In the next section the regulative rules for speaking about gender will be examined.

### 2.1.2 Regulative Rules

*If rules are conceived as "regulative" of social life, they may either allow or disallow particular courses of action carried out by individuals or collectivities. Conflict may arise from varying interpretations of regulative rules or in the contestation of their differential application. Social norms, both domestic and international, are a form of regulative rule defining at one and the same time guides for action and the possibility of penalty or reward.*
(Jabri 1996: 72)

According to both feminist activists interviewed and academic literature, to identify as a feminist is a very controversial thing in Ukraine, as in other post-Soviet countries.[53] A gender expert explains:

*There is some general knowledge that feminists are like women who are waging war against men and all that stuff, or maybe they don't have enough sex or maybe they are ugly (...) I think there is not enough knowledge of what it means, almost non-existent people who call themselves feminist (...)*[54]

Martsenyuk argues indeed that the feminist movement has not been recognized as a key actor in political and human rights issues (2012; 2013 in Onuch & Martsenyuk 2014: 106). Therefore, in terms of determining regulative rules of speaking about gender, the feminist community does not seem to have a lot of influence or ability to sanction people for non-compliance to their rules. At the same time, it can be deduced from these statements that there is already a sanction that can result from calling oneself a feminist: being called a 'man-hater' for example. Furthermore, in the previous section it was already asserted that the state did not have the right enforcement mechanisms to counter discrimination, thus implying that there is a lack of sanctioning of discriminatory statements on gender. Hankivsky and Salnykova recall a situation in which former president Yanukovych refused to enter a debate with -presidential candidate at that time- Yulia Tymoshenko, claiming that her place was in the kitchen. His prime minister at that time made matters even worse, claiming that the lack of women in his government was due to the inability of women to conduct reforms (Hankivsky & Salnykova 2012: 16). The state seems to reinforce regulative rules of speaking about men and women as having 'separate spheres', as

[53] See Kis on the 'allergy to feminism' (2012: 225), Funk (1993) about the feminist label in Eastern and Central Europe in McNee (2013: 5) and Hrycak et al. (2009) about the fear of being feminist in Central and Eastern Europe in McNee (2013: 20)
[54] Author's interview (Appendix IA, 0B), 6 April 2015, Kyiv

these kinds of frames are allowed by the lack of sanctions at the highest level. According to a Ukrainian women's organization, the media plays an important role in perpetuating certain stereotypes of men and women, hereby justifying inequalities and strengthening the view that women are incompetent (WICC 2011: 16-17). Other reports and individuals have also noted this influence of the media,[55] as well as the lack of sanctions to counter discrimination in the media (CEDAW 2014: 27-28). Therefore, both the state and the media don't seem to be very influential in enforcing the official rules on gender based discrimination.

How can we explain this lack of regulative rules as part of the normative and historical continuities of Ukrainian society? According to scholars, it was already a practice during the Communist period to make Ukrainian women believe that they were the superior sex and celebrate their 'womanhood' to cover up gender inequalities.[56] An example of this is the practice of International Women's Day, a Soviet state holiday that celebrated but also essentialized women and was continued after independence by the Ukrainian government (Kis 2012: 219). After the fall of Communism, according to Hankivsky and Salnykova, the process of statebuilding in Ukraine was connected to the invention of an 'ideal' female citizen: the pure, self-sacrificing mother, which can be seen as part of the idealization of pre-Soviet gender roles (2012: 10, 11). Rubchak explains that this kind of discourse can be traced back to a Ukrainian legend of a prehistoric clan society with a women as 'Berehynia', a sort of mythical guarder of the 'family hearth', which has come to be seen as a progenitor, custodian of family values, and national identity (ed. 2011: 1).

Opposed to this ideal of the 'essentially feminine woman' as expressed on International Women's Day both in the USSR period and after the independence of Ukraine, there is also a continuity in a 'militaristic' male ideal as devoted to state principles and heroism, although the Communist ideal of a loyal citizen has been replaced by an ideal of the pre-Soviet Cossack hero (Bureychak in Hankivsky & Salnykova 2012: 204). Interesting is that, according to Zhurzenko (2001), this idea of men and women having separate roles in the nationalist project, as well as the idea that women's emancipation is secondary to the goal of nation-building, has been reproduced by the women's movement in Ukraine. Thus, the women's movement can be seen to have produced and reproduced some of the regulative rules of speaking about gender as connected to nation-building. These 'rules' are connected to historical myths or legends about women's supposedly important roles as matriarchs or mothers and men's roles as heroes and defenders of the country. They can even be reinforced by 'positive sanctions', in the sense that these rules can serve to legitimize ignoring real inequalities and actually taking action on them. At the same time, because of this 'celebration' of women and men's 'natural qualities', one can imagine that it becomes hard to bring up questions about discrimination in other fields. In the example of International Women's Day, the role of the state in reproducing certain regulative rules on framing gender inequality becomes visible.

Furthermore, an interesting contrast is that gender experts claimed that, although there was a matriarchal myth that claimed women's superiority, often gender inequality is justified by fallacies in the behavior of women. This is combined with the idea that women do have the appropriate resources and legislation, so if they are not able to use these, it is their own fault. According to one expert:

*Pay gap may be justified by women being less professionals than men, domestic or sexual violence may be justified by victim blaming, lack of political representation- that 'women do not*

[55] See for instance Rees (2014), CEDAW (2014), UNECE (2014: 10)

[56] See Kis (2012), Hankivsky & Salnykova eds. (2012), Rubchak ed. (2011)

*work hard enough.' This rhetoric ignores systematic inequality, gender order, power relations that excludes women and puts women in a subordinate position.*[57]

Then apart from seeing instances of gender based discrimination as part of 'national traditions' or claiming that women are at fault, there is also a reluctance to speak about certain issues. One gender expert claimed that:

*For example, the issue of domestic violence was brought up by women's NGOs long time ago...It's never a priority and to take a stand for it politician has to fight for it consistently and then it means that politician is not a really popular one, I guess (...) political underrepresentation of women is more easily seen, it doesn't cause a lot of resistance from audience. But if you start to be more critical (...) it's totally not a promising topic to raise, if a politician wants to be popular.*[58]

This statement illustrates a relation between communicative acts such as talking about domestic violence, and the sanctions that are attached to this, which is a lack of public approval as a politician for instance. This connects regulative rules to certain sanctions.

In conclusion, the lack of sanctions connected to ignoring the official regulative rules on gender discrimination can be explained by different historical ways of speaking about gender inequality. First of all, there is a tradition of honoring women and proclaiming gender equality that ignores systematic gender inequalities inherited from the Communist period in Ukrainian history. This kind of discourse was produced by the Soviet state but reproduced by the Ukrainian state after independence, most notably in the celebration of International Women's Day. Furthermore, there is an idea of the 'natural role' of women as mothers and men as heroes of the nation that is connected to the Ukrainian nation-building project but also bears resemblance to some of the Soviet propaganda on gender roles. Finally, a discourse was found that focused on women being at fault for the lack of equality. Sanctions for not following these 'regulative rules' of connecting gender to the superiority of women, to women as 'natural mothers' and men as 'national heroes' or to the inferiority of women are not always that explicit. However, according to feminist experts, they can involve moral shaming, such as calling feminists man-haters and public disapproval, for example in the case of a politicians speaking about such 'inappropriate issues' such as domestic violence. These sanctions give regulative rules for speaking about gender their power to enforce conformity. Both the state and the media seem to be a powerful source for these kinds of regulative ways of speaking about gender, particularly the more 'traditional' idea about women and men having different tasks in nation-building. Furthermore, this idea is reproduced by some women's organizations. Now that the lack of constitutive rules on the concepts of gender inequality and some of the regulative rules of speaking about gender inequality in Ukraine are understood, in the next section the impact of the conflict in the East on these rules will be discussed.

[57] Author's interview (Appendix IA, 0A), 5 March 2015, Kyiv
[58] Author's interview (Appendix IA, 0A), 5 March 2015, Kyiv

## 2.2 After the Conflict

*Conflict, and especially violent conflict, implies a breakdown of some rules and the generation of others. The relationship between rules and conflict may be conceived in terms of three possibilities, namely:*

- *that specific rules generate the conflict, where they are the matter for contention;*
- *that the rules of social life, as historical continuities, enable the choice of violence as an acceptable mode of conflict behavior;*
- *that the conflict generates its own set of rules quite distinct from those government society prior to the onset of violent conflict so that behaviors considered taboo in peacetime are glorified in times of war.*

(Jabri 1996: 71-72)

Consistent with both Jabri and international feminist research,[59] it is expected that normative and discursive continuities on gender change when a country is in conflict. Indeed, it can be argued that there has been a slight change, which is mainly present in the regulative rules on speaking about gender inequality. However, there does seem to be an opportunity for a change in the constitutive meaning of gender discrimination, as there is a chance that after the Euromaidan the increased interest in 'European values' will enable a constitutive understanding of gender discrimination that is based on a European framework. However, there are also several reasons why this new development should be regarded with caution.

### 2.2.1 Constitutive Rules

Previously it has been asserted women and men's experiences in conflict often differ, in which Ukraine is no exception. This section will examine how this changing of the *type* and *extent* of gender inequalities since the conflict has translated into the way that individuals in Ukraine understand the constitutive meaning of gender inequality and discrimination. As was argued in the previous section, regulative rules might present a different 'appropriateness' in speaking about domestic violence than speaking about political representation of women before the conflict in the East of Ukraine started. Since then, as was asserted in the introduction, one of the issues that has emerged in international reports on gender issues in Ukraine is an alarming number of calls on domestic violence. According to a gender expert: "Now with the conflict and the austerity and the violence, it is just exploding. I mean, this is definitely changing and a lot of people talk about it. Including people who are really far from feminist discourse."[60] She shares with us a story of an army commander who made a call to a women's NGO to warn them that there would be a cohort of soldiers send back to their homes and that they had to be prepared for these men who were psychologically damaged, so that they could stop the soldiers from hurting their families. A noble and helpful gesture one would say, as the reintegration of soldiers is indeed often related to the chances of women suffering from domestic violence during and after the conflict in feminist literature.[61]

However, according to this gender researcher, although it is great that there is a basis of communication between an army commander and a women's NGO as well as an understanding of the effect that trauma acquired in the role of a soldier can have on their families, there are also several critical notes on this story from a feminist point of view. First of all: "You also have a thing where the government completely avoids its responsibility. They should be helping these

[59] See for instance Theidon & Penice (2011), Sjoberg & Via (2010: 11) and Korac (2006)

[60] Author's interview (Appendix IA, 0C), 24 March 2015, conducted through Skype

[61] See for instance Rehn & Sirleaf (2002), Kaufman & Williams (2010), Bouta et al. (2005)

soldiers."[62] This points again to the role of the Ukrainian state in displaying certain messages about the content and importance of gender inequalities. Second of all, she asserts that: "Do all these people in the military, do they understand that there are gendered reasons for that? (...) The violence against women is an expression of the patriarchy and not just because you happen to have fought."[63] Thus, although there might be an understanding of the *existence* of things such as domestic violence, that doesn't mean that it is understood as a part of the larger inequalities between men and women. This is supported by a statement of another gender expert, who states that:

*Actually, with us, violence is not that much identified by the majority of the population as gender based violence. These are specialists and organizations, they use this terminology. But people, just regular, average people, they do not call it this way. They just call it beating or violence as well, but they do not relate it to gender based.*[64]

During this research, it has not been possible to find reports on the awareness of gender based discrimination since the conflict in the East has started. Therefore, the information in this section is solely the input of interviews with gender experts and researchers. However, it can still be asserted that these statements provide us with important clues on how to look at the changing of constitutive rules since the conflict within CSOs working on conflict transformation, as it was found that many of the civil society members interviewed did either not view domestic violence as a problem or didn't view it as a problem related to gender inequalities. In conclusion, the constitutive rules of gender based discrimination -that weren't very clear from the outset already in wider public discourse- don't seem to have expanded to because of the higher level of violence that the conflict in the East has created.

### 2.2.2 Regulative Rules

While the constitutive rules don't seem to have changed much yet, the conflict in the East of Ukraine seems to have made some of the regulative rules that were found before the start of the conflict even stronger and more salient. An example of this is the way that people talk about, or in fact not talk about, sexual violence in the conflict zone. According to an article of the *Women Under Siege* project, the Ukrainian media has written about women that were violated by the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, but hasn't written about the extent to which sexual violence in the conflict zone is perpetrated possibly because it is not prioritized in light of Ukraine's many other problems.[65]Another article as part of this project emphasized that a wider discussion might reveal rape cases that are perpetrated by Ukrainian soldiers and would be problematic in the heightened atmosphere of patriotism in which Ukrainian soldiers are seen as the heroes and protectors of the country.[66] This is supported by a report of the WILPF, which claims that there is a growing militarism and patriotism noticeable in Ukraine since the conflict, which requires men to take on the role of 'Defender' while women are supposed to fulfill a role of 'Supporter' (WILPF 2014: 23, 24). According to one gender expert, this growing nationalism and patriotism celebrated men *and* women carrying arms. However, she claims that the portrayal of women with arms is very 'pin-uppy' and neglects to reflect the real contribution women make on the front or the effect that militarism has on gender equality and gender relations. The image of women seems to be reduced to two variants: the woman with arms and the ethno-nationalistic

[62] Author's interview (Appendix IA, 0C), 24 March 2015, conducted through Skype
[63] Author's interview (IA, 0C), 24 March 2015, conducted through Skype
[64] Author's interview (IA, 0D), 2 April 2015, conducted through Skype
[65] Ferris-Rotman (2014)
[66] Vikhrest (2015)

image of a peasant girl with flowers in her hair, supposedly representing the Ukrainian nation.[67] How can we explain this lack of genuine attention for women in the conflict zone? "Most people think that it is not for women to be at war, and to participate and to be active. And fear, people are scared about participating or speaking up on these things."[68] This seems to indicate that the negative sanctions for complying to certain regulative rules of speaking about gender have become stronger. Indeed, as gender expert claims that:

*It is very rare that you would find organizations who would question this idea of masculinity as protection, especially now in an uneasy political situation, there is a situation of war and more and more people are reproducing this nationalistic project and there is very little space to interpret events differently...And I think that this idea of men as protectors and women as supporters and mothers is very rarely challenged by [women's] organizations.*[69]

Another expert shares a story about a competition that was held by a Ukrainian women's organization in response to a discriminatory remark of a male protester during Euromaidan who claimed that women belonged in the kitchen. The organization challenged people to send them photo's contradicting this statement, but then uncritically turned the photos they received of women in uniforms into 'pin-uppy' posters that glorified women carrying arms.[70] Thus, the women's movement seems to allows some ways of speaking about gender, while sanctioning others. Jabri would call this a conflict over the differential application as well as the varying interpretation of regulative rules (1996: 71-72). Again, the case of gender inequalities is tied to the nationalist project in Ukraine, although the sanctions seem tied to a fear bigger than just disapproval.

At the same time, there might be a factor that could change the way in which people speak about gender based discrimination and allows for a shared constitutive meaning. A gender expert explains:

*In the beginning there were no women in the top ten of the party lists (...) From the very beginning nobody talked about that in the parliament and then when you started talking about European values and democracy, they were like; 'Ok, here you are, take it.' And that was not the original goodwill, that was done under pressure.*[71]

This statement seems to imply that there is now a form of negative sanctioning available if politicians don't follow the new rules after the Euromaidan: public shaming. However, if this will result in a more shared understanding of constitutive rules of gender discrimination in a European sense and regulative rules that disallow discriminatory statements can be questioned on two grounds. First of all, according to one gender expert:

*Even if people today say we define ourselves as anti-Soviet. That is where their package of ideological...their toolkit comes from (...) On the one hand they will say: 'We are pro-Europe, pro-Maidan, pro-modernity, pro-democracy, and on the other hand they use imagery and concepts to explain their nation and what the nation should be that is anything but Western, or European, or modern, or democratic.*[72]

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[67] Author's interview (Appendix IA, 0C), 24 March 2015, conducted through Skype

[68] Author's interview (IA, 0D), 2 April 2015, conducted through Skype

[69] Author's interview (IA, 0B), 6 April 2015, Kyiv

[70] Author's interview (IA, 0C), 24 March 2015, conducted through Skype

[71] Author's interview (IA, 0D), 2 April 2015, conducted through Skype

[72] Author's interview (Appendix IA, 0C), 24 March 2015, conducted through Skype

Portnov and Portnova add that Europe is often understood by the Ukrainian population to be an almost mythical place of freedom and the rule of law, which transcends the reality of the EU (2014: 11). It seems therefore, that there is a lack of constitutive rules not only on what gender equality consists of, but also what 'European values' consist of. Even if acts such as the toppling of Lenin statues after the Euromaidan[73] are symbolic for the disregard of the USSR heritage in Ukraine, this does not mean that the legacy of Communist rule in Ukraine will that easily be erased as it still forms an 'ideological toolkit'. Secondly, according to the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, the 'powerful stimulus' of the desire of the government to meet the obligations of the European Union leave the commitments of politicians to gender equality a mere form; as currently the government doesn't even recognize the existence of gender based discrimination.[74] It is also not clear how much support there is for 'European values' among the population, as it is argued that there are important divisions among people of different age groups and regions concerning their attitude to European Integration (Lyubashenko in Bachmann & Lyubashenko eds. 2014: 64, 76). Furthermore, the majority of the population in the occupied territories is not EU-friendly and considers the EU's policies to be a trigger of violence (Mirimanova 2014). Thus, if gender equality is tied to European Integration too much, this might add to a division over European Integration that is already existing in Ukraine.

In conclusion, the regulative rules of framing gender inequality after the conflict are reinforcing some of the earlier regulative rules. It can be seen as 'inappropriate' to speak about certain topics such as gender based violence, because this might damage the nationalist project. Furthermore, the contribution of women apart from their role in the family or domains that bear on the 'female virtue' of women are often ignored. Men, on the other hand, are seen as the heroes and the protectors of the land. Furthermore, rather than the sanctions for non-compliance to these rules being 'merely' public disapproval, in a more tense nationalist atmosphere regulative rules seem to be followed out of fear of saying something 'inappropriate' that might damage the nationalist project. On the other hand, there is more space to advocate for 'European values' concerning gender equality. However, there seems to be little understanding of what 'European values' consist of and there are clear divisions among the population concerning the support for European Integration. It is therefore also not clear what a European framework will entail for gender equality.

### 2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter it was argued that there is a lack of awareness of gender discrimination and inequality, which can be conceptualized as a lack of constitutive rules or shared meaning of the concept. Among at least some part of the population, the concept of gender equality seems to be tied to the 'gender equality' policies of the USSR. Two actors that have a big influence on gender equality, the state and the media, have not really provided a way to create a shared meaning of the concept of gender discrimination. Furthermore, these actors have added to the lack of negative sanctioning of discriminatory remarks, thereby creating a new set of regulative rules which endorses a way of speaking about gender in an essentialist way. Furthermore, the women's movement in Ukraine seems to be divided between different kinds of goals for women,

[73] Birnbaum, M. (2014) Ukrainians just pulled down a massive Lenin statue. What does that signal for Russia? *The Washington Post*. Published 29 September. Online available on: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/29/ukrainians-just-pulled-down-a-massive-lenin-statue-what-does-that-signal-for-russia/

[74] Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. *Human Rights in Ukraine 2014: VII Protection Against Discrimination*. Online available on: http://helsinki.org.ua/index.php?id=1433408135 [Accessed 21 July 2015]

and the connections between gender equality and Western values also do not always aid the credibility of the concept in the eyes of the local population. Between all these regulative rules and constitutive rules there are a few sources for conflict. According to Jabri, there are three possible relationships between rules and conflict:
-Specific rules generate the conflict itself
-The rules of social life enable the choice of violence
-The conflict generates it's own set of rules (Jabri 1996: 71-72)

Applying this to the analysis of constitutive and regulative rules and the distribution of influence when speaking about gender inequality, a conflict in the sense of different sorts of rules becomes visible. There are parts of the population that understand gender equality in the universal definition, parts of the population that see gender equality in the Soviet sense of the word and parts of the population that tie gender equality to the Ukrainian nation-building project, in which men and women have distinct roles. This also leads to different regulative rules connected to sanctions, for instance a politician who might not speak about certain issues out of fear of public disapproval or even being labeled as a Communist or unpatriotic. Discriminatory remarks of politicians and in the media, however, seem not to be sanctioned on a broad scale, and it can even be claimed that the absence of sanctions for high officials already provides a positive sanction for others to follow in their example. On the other hand, according to Jabri, conflict can also arise from the differential application of regulative rules (1996: 72), which seems to be the case in the women's movement, where some women endorse the inclusion of women into a militaristic nationalism while others disapprove of this. This differential application of rules also emerges between part of the women's movement in Ukraine and international organizations working on gender equality. Moreover, we can say that in some sense the 'rules of social life' are enabling the choice of gender based discrimination, as this is not effectively punished or even socially sanctioned and the people that should function as examples exemplify a kind of rules that endorse gender based discrimination. Since the conflict, it doesn't seem like there has been a completely new set of rules created concerning frames on gender equality. However, as has been asserted in this chapter, the framing of gender inequality is connected to bigger concepts such as the legacy of the USSR, the nationhood of Ukraine and its relationship with Europe. As the conflict has changed the way that these concepts are viewed, there is a possibility that this will lead to a changing or rules on framing gender inequality as well. Furthermore, as the "absence of a shared normative structure will have effectiveness for communicative acts at the outset of conflict as well as during attempts at conflict resolution" (Jabri 1996: 74), it will be important to assert what the absence of constitutive rules and regulative rules in Ukrainian society in general means for the way that CSOs frame gender and how this will resonate with the local population.

# Chapter 3: Gender Inequality and Institutional Frameworks

[*O]ne input into the frame of reference is the actor's role within the institutional make-up of the party in conflict. The role occupied by a decision-maker not only impacts on the decision-maker's judgment, but usefully provides "legitimizing reasons" to justify decisions taken in accordance with expectations associated with the role (…) the contingent actor's subjective evaluations seem to be shaped by that actor's institutional setting.*
(Jabri 1996: 67)

In the previous chapter the 'frame of reference' of constitutive and regulative rules of speaking about gender discrimination in Ukrainian society was examined. Furthermore, it was argued that a lack of clarity of these rules presents a possibility of conflict between different groups of the Ukrainian population and different actors in Ukrainian society. This chapter will analyze the way in which institutional frameworks incorporate certain constitutive and regulative rules that were examined in the previous chapter. The aim is to answer the question: how do institutional frameworks of civil society organizations working on conflict transformation provide a certain (de)legitimation for promoting gender equality? This question needs to be addressed in order to place the frames of individual civil society members on gender inequality in their institutional contexts. As was explained in the methodology, it needs to be taken into account that the organizations implicated in the research were working on different parts of the process of conflict transformation and had different policies on gender. However, this presents an excellent opportunity to identify legitimizing factors that differ across organizations, but also factors that are similar within these organizations. The first step in answering the central question in this chapter will be to analyze the way that the goals of civil society organizations influence their relationships with other actors and how these relationships and goals foster certain processes of information gathering as well as normative expectations. These processes of information gathering and normative expectations within organizations are important to look at, because they can determine what kind of constitutive rules and regulative rules present in Ukrainian society are reproduced and how new rules are produced by organizations. It will be asserted that there are both constraining and enabling factors for the legitimization of working on gender equality in the goals and relationships of CSOs working on conflict transformation.
Subsequently, I will examine how these processes as well as constitutive and regulative rules that were examined in the previous chapter provide certain legitimizing views on both promoting gender equality internally and externally. In this chapter I will look at statements of heads of organizations or -if these were unavailable for interviews- those responsible for public relations in organizations, because they are seen as most familiar with the institutional frameworks of organizations. In the next chapter I will elaborate on differences and similarities in framing gender inequality *within* organizations, but in this chapter I will examine only the differences and similarities *between* organizations.

### 3.1 Processes of Information Gathering

*[A]n actor's response to a situation, which may be an emergent conflict with another party, is first determined by that actor's desires and beliefs. These are in themselves influenced by the normative expectations and processes of information gathering associated with the institutional role that actor holds.*
(Jabri 1996: 67)

This section will be devoted to examining the way that information about gender inequality is gathered within CSOs working on conflict transformation in Kyiv. There were four sources of information that were seen as important in organizations' goals, their proposed solutions for the conflict and their views on gender equality. These were the state, international donors, Ukrainian society and feminist organizations, in sequence of the sources that were the most frequently mentioned. The kind of information organizations received from these particular sources will be examined to see how constitutive and regulative rules influence the processing of information in CSOs. In the final section of this chapter, it will be explained how these processes of information gathering together with regulative and constitutive rules in Ukrainian society can serve as a legitimation or delegitimation for working on gender inequality.

#### 3.1.1 The State

Consistent with the regulative rules examined in chapter two, it can be expected that political representation would be an easier topic to speak about than other topics such as domestic violence. Indeed, organizations often seemed more comfortable to talk about, or started talking about, political representation of men and women when discussing gender inequality. This might have been reinforced due to the cooperation and/or consultation between most organizations and the state,[75] giving them more information on the state than about other inequality issues. Although Ljubownikow argues that Soviet policies fostered a civil society that was not separate from the state, leaving a legacy of paternalistic state-society relations in post-Communist countries (2013: 155, 156), others have argued that important changes in the relation between the state and civil society have been made since the Euromaidan protests.[76] Organizations were often quite critical towards the state. This seems to fit within a general role ascribed to civil society since the Maidan, as a report of the WILPF in September already noted that many activists described the protests as "a tool to reclaim government" (2014: 32). Furthermore, this 'critical role' also connects with the specific goals or organizations, as many of the organizations participating in the research had goals related to democratic governance and reforming the system, even if these were not their main goals. Interesting was that the two organizations that did not identify as women's organizations but did implement gender projects in the past or the present were both most critical towards the state structure in general and most critical towards gender issues in the state structure. Moreover, these organizations were both previously seen as 'enemies of the state', according to their statements and thus seemed to have internalized a more critical role than some other organizations that were working with the state.

A slight majority of the organizations did feel like there was still a problem with the political representation of women. However, in different organizations there were different ways that information on gender in the state system was received. A media organization for example focused more on the portrayal of women in the media: "[W]e do not see the assessment of their professional qualities, but how they look like; what dresses they wear and what lovers they

[75] See Appendix IA Table of organizations included in the research for an overview of activities of the organizations interviewed in conflict transformation as well as their relationships with other actors.
[76] See WILPF (2014), Phillips (2014), Ghosh (2014)

choose, but not what draft laws they wrote."[77] Two organizations that were working on Euro Integration, on the other hand, blamed it on fallacies of the old system and a lack of European values:

*It's because we still have the old political system, the elites haven't changed after the revolution...And in this situation, women do not have access to resources that were earned not in very transparent ways. And if you do not have access to the resources, it is very difficult to, become a member of parliament or a member of the local legislative body (...) Actually, the situation is different than a year ago, very different. But it is still not a European political system.*[78]

On the other hand, several organizations asserted that there was still a legacy of the Soviet political system in the state structures which made it harder for women to enter the political system. Thus, in this sense we see an understanding of gender equality policies as related to the Soviet system being perceived as rather bad, while at the same time European values are seen as a cure for the situation. This seems to relate to the changed regulative rules of speaking about gender inequality: a tendency to get rid of the Soviet heritage and more room for viewing European values as a standard for Ukraine.

However, although most people did recognize that there was an unequal balance between men and women, it was not often identified as gender based discrimination, which can be traced back to the constitutive rules that are apparent in civil society:

*I know that if we look into the parliament right now, we can see that there is not a good balance (...) But I think it is changing right now and I think it is about the wish. I didn't see the situation where someone said: 'You can't be in this position because you are a woman'.*[79]

Some organizations described gender relations in the state as 'democratic',[80] others described it as a 'lack of respect' for women.[81] These different ways of viewing relationships in the state can be related to different ways of information gathering, but also to the general lack of constitutive rules on the meaning of gender inequality. Should gender inequality, for example be seen as the lack of women as a result? Or should it be seen as the lack of access for women as a result of discriminatory practices or a lack of resources? Different views concerning this issue existed among CSOs. At the same time, regulative rules identified in the previous chapter of claiming that if women are not present somewhere it is most probably their own fault, also became visible.

[77] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 3A), 3 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[78] Author's interview (IC, 2A), 16 March 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[79] Author's interview (IC, 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[80] Author's interview (IC, 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[81] Author's interview (IC, 2A), 16 March 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

### 3.1.2 The International Community

*Also, double standards of many international organizations involved in this process are a very important tool to keep this conflict.*[82]

Organizations that participated in the research not only expressed considerable critique on the Ukrainian state, but also on the role of the international community and the role of the EU in particular. This seems to fit well with earlier research, in which it was found that many CSOs expressed critique on the approach of the EU to the conflict in Ukraine, the failure to reassure citizens in the East about the upcoming Association Agreement and the inefficiency and even contra productivity of their sanctions (WILPF 2014: 22). One of the organizations advocating for gender equality also expressed critique on the lack of information international organizations provided:

*[W]hen we appealed to the Special Monitoring Commission, to the Gender Officer about the gender sensitive approach, formally they said yes but one day one of the monitors who works in the conflict zone said to me: [name of interviewee removed to provide anonymity] 'You asked me about gender sensitivity, it will never happen. We have no analysis; we have no other kinds of tools that could keep it.'*[83]

This illustrates that the information that organizations received from the international community wasn't always very stimulating. On the other hand, some organizations expressed that the international community could indeed be helpful in showing Ukrainians best practices and helping with financial resources in the current conflict. The organizations that were working on European Integration were most positive on the international community's help. However, they also complained about the lack of information provided to Ukrainian citizens about the European Integration process: "Ukraine should get a sign from the EU that Ukraine is welcome and when everything would be ready, when reforms would be implemented, it would get candidate status."[84] According to some organizations, this affected the position of Ukrainian citizens: "[T]here is a feeling among ordinary Ukrainians that nobody wants us in the EU."[85] In conclusion, it seems that the information from the international community isn't always clear or stimulating for viewing gender inequality within a European or international framework.

At the same time, some organizations expressed that because of their Western or European donors they did receive more information on gender inequality: "[B]ecause you understand that you work with western organizations and you have this knowledge, gender inequality is a serious problem."[86] "I was in different trainings and so on in gender issues and I know how for example, how they look from the European side."[87] However, this didn't always mean that they saw this information as more valuable than their own: "We don't think so. No one in Ukraine thinks that quotas can help us (laughs)."[88] Therefore, one the one hand some donors seem to attempt to build a set of constitutive rules that provide a shared understanding of gender based discrimination but in the process different organizations also give confusing messages. Furthermore, a European or international framework for viewing gender inequality

[82] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 5A), 8 April 2015, Kyiv
[83] Author's interview (IC, 5A), 8 April 2015, Kyiv
[84] Author's interview (IC, 8A), 26 May 2015, Kyiv
[85] Author's interview (IC, 8A), 26 May 2015, Kyiv
[86] Author's interview (IC, 6A), 14 March 2015, Kyiv
[87] Author's interview (IC, 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[88] Author's interview (IC, 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

doesn't sit well with all organizations. This is connected to the information organizations get from Ukrainian society, which will be addressed in the next section.

### 3.1.3 Ukrainian Society

*Whilst the conflict has certainly led to increased outward demonstration of pride in being 'Ukrainian', it is simultaneously causing individuals, communities and the broader Ukrainian society to reflection upon what it means to be Ukrainian today. Beyond agreement on maintaining the territorial integrity of the country and sovereignty over its decisions, there seems to be little consensus on the component values of Ukrainian identity*.
(WILPF 2014: 21)

It became apparent during the interviews that there were not only diverse understandings of gender inequality but also diverse ways of speaking about Ukrainian culture, traditions or identity. While some organizations clearly related Ukrainian identity to European values, others asserted the difference between Ukraine and Europe: "I don't think it will be like in Europe... I agree that Ukrainian society may be more conservative."[89] Often in terms of the conflict, there was a reproduction of certain regulative rules of speaking about gender in combination with traditional Ukrainian identity in which men were the protectors: "Because this conflict gave an opportunity for men to show their masculinity, their traditional role."[90] While most organizations saw possibilities due to the interest of the population in 'European values', others saw the need to keep the 'Ukrainian traditions'. An executive director of an organization promoting democracy explains why:

*It is like a tradition, but I think it is a good tradition. It is like the mental tradition of the Ukrainian nation. It helps us to stay together. Even if we have differences, and there are many differences in different regions, this are common values that keep us together. We can have different political views, but these values keep us together, family is good and so on.*[91]

In an interview with a member of the board of another organization which was implementing a project on gender equality, it also became apparent that national unity often takes priority over gender inequality issues. [I showed the participant a picture of a Ukrainian pin-up girl with arms, see Appendix IV] "Actually, it's kind of an awful poster." Researcher: "Yeah, so it is kind of about women…'"Not only because of the women, because of the slogan." Researcher: "Tender Ukrainization right?" "It doesn't work on national unity, sorry."[92] This illustrates how the regulative rules that were examined in the previous chapter are also influencing the way that people speak about gender inequality in CSOs, relating it to the nationalist cause. Particularly, 'Ukrainian traditions' that have an impact on gender relations are seen as needed to keep the country together in the face of a lack of consensus of what it actually means to be Ukrainian.

[89] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[90] Author's interview (IC, 2A), 16 March 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[91] Author's interview (IC, 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[92] Author's interview (IC, 2A), 1 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

### 3.1.4 Feminist Organizations

While as Ukrainian organizations CSOs can hardly ignore the opinion of the Ukrainian population, another actor was curiously absent from the discourse on gender equality. This were the feminist organizations. An organization that implemented a gender project explains why:

*When we contacted some feminist organizations, we saw that they didn't communicate with journalists. Moreover, they were aggressive towards journalists, they said that journalists twist their words and it is better not to communicate with journalists. And for us, they looked like a very close club, they only communicate with themselves. So I think this is a problem, the bad communication of these organizations. And another problem is that they are very affiliated with LGBT, there is really no big separate movements for gender rights, for women's rights. There is a movement for LGBT and women's rights, a small part of this whole thing*.[93]

At the same time, when this organization wanted to develop legislation to implement quotas: "[F]eminist organizations, they are against it (…) they said: 'This is humiliating for us to introduce quotas, no, we do not need quotas.'"[94] Therefore, it seems that within civil society organizations it is also noted that the feminist community is very fragmented and marginalized and not always able to produce a shared meaning in their agenda.

### 3.2 Normative Expectations

*Roles contain elements that are both constraining and enabling. The constraining elements derive from the normative expectations associated with every role (...) Roles are, therefore, also enabling, in the sense that they provide decision-makers with legitimating reason for their preferences in situations of conflict with external parties.*
(Jabri 1996: 69)

This section will deal with the normative expectations that are expressed by CSOs concerning their role in advocating for gender equality. It will be showed that these expectations are mainly based on promoting gender equality internally, although some organizations also expressed willingness to promote gender equality in events or did projects on gender. It seems that international donors are an important source of expectations in the form of requirements for internal balance between men and women within the organization. However this doesn't necessarily lead to advocacy for gender equality in external policies of organizations. At the same time, other CSOs are also a source of expectations. They don't seem to be important for promoting internal gender balance, but they might be a source for certain normative expectations about promoting gender equality externally.

[93] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 3A), 3 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

[94] Author's interview (IC, 3A), 3 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

### 3.2.1 International Donors

*International bilateral and multilateral donors have provided the lion's share of assistance to CSOs. Some analysts contend that dependency on external donor funding has led to an »NGO-cracy«, in which »professional leaders use access to domestic policymakers and Western donors to influence public policies, [although] they are disconnected from the public at large«. On this view, NGOs are not sustainable and the same NGOs and groups repeatedly receive funding from donors.*

(Ghosh 2014: 4)

Academics and civil society funders have argued alike that civil society in Ukraine is mainly supported by Western donors.[95] Lewis explains that the fall of Communism led to new enthusiasm among Western countries and organizations in supporting democratization in the new post-Communist countries (Lewis 2002 in Ljubownikow et al. 2013: 156*)*. On the other hand, some academics have argued that this is a negative development, as "civil society discourse has enabled the domination of a particular type of civic organization: an elitist and technocratic community of 'professionals without a profession'" (Pishchikova 2006: 189). Ghosh also ties the dependency of Ukrainian civil society on donors to a low level of acceptance by society (2014: 3). As has been asserted in the previous section on information gathering processes from contact with Ukrainian society, there was a contrast between those organizations who argued that 'Ukrainian traditions' and 'European values' were already closely related and those emphasizing the need to keep 'Ukrainian traditions' different from 'European values'. This section will further elaborate on the role of international (and particularly European) donors and how there is a possibility of conflict between the constitutive rules and regulative rules of international donors on gender equality and the constitutive and regulative rules of some Ukrainian CSOs, which is mainly present in the frames on promoting external gender equality.

The relation with European partners and donors seems to be important in organizations as many CSOs identified gender equality as a specific goal of European Integration. Although some organizations were fairly critical towards European policies in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict as has been previously argued, there is still a belief among other organizations that European and international organizations can help to create a better future. Many organizations have about half of their partners from Western or European countries and recognize the influence of European partners and donors on their organizations. This leads to specific expectations, which within some organizations led to a framing of gender equality as an important goal for Ukraine, although a goal that was very new to them and they were inexperienced with:

*Actually, it is the first project that deals with the gender issues. But we decided that it is very actual and one of the main topics of us before this was Euro Integration issues. And we can't speak about Euro Integration without speaking on gender issues.*[96]

Thus, these organizations expressed certain normative expectations that arose from their goals in promoting European Integration for the promotion of gender equality. However, conforming to the expectations of European partners and using a European framework also has certain dangers attached, as it has been argued in the previous chapter that there might be different

[95] Also see: Ljubownikow et al. (2013), WILPF (2014: 30), Pishchikova (2006)
[96] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 2A), 1 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

understandings of 'European values' and that the support of Ukrainian society for the pursuit of these values is not clear. This is also something that needs to be taken into account in the work of civil society organizations, as they are also dependent on support from society. The danger that the policies of CSOs on gender equality are not supported was also noticed by organizations that did want to adopt policies advocating for gender equality: "We need positive discrimination so it will turn into something good in the future. But our society is really against it."[97]

Other organizations which were not specifically focused on European Integration did express that there were some constraining elements connected to working with international organizations or European donors in the sense that they would provide certain rules: "In CSOs it is not as bad. But it depends if the organizations are donor driven. Because of they are, they have some formal rules."[98] At the same time, there are powerful sanctions involved: "The whole civil society, in the whole developing world is totally dependent mainly on Western financial resources (...) So there is huge dependency."[99] However, CSOs also expressed that there was room for negotiation: "I never had the case when any donor or foundation which was financing us, has somehow intervened in our activities (...) Because there is agreement from the beginning."[100] Involvement of international donors could lead for example in some organizations to gender inequality being discussed more: "[B]ecause inside we talked about this and we discussed this issue and also gender issue, is it a problem and so on…Because we saw that donor organizations gave it priority and so on."[101] On the one hand, it was asserted that European donors might sometimes have different priorities: "The agenda which is important for Germany, for the Netherlands, this is a little bit different than the agenda of the people here."[102] On the other hand, this didn't seem to be too *constraining*: "For example that sometimes they try to put this issue on the agenda and we discussed if it is a problem, and we think in general that it is not a problem."[103]

### 3.2.2 Civil Society

There also seemed to be different ideas on the relation between civil society and gender equality. The majority of the organizations in the research expressed that civil society was probably the most democratic sector in Ukrainian society: "I think CSOs are maximum democratic in this sense, if we will compare with national or business, because here you can always agree and we are focused on the result."[104] Others were less optimistic: "[I]n other organizations they are headed by men and the work is done by women (laughs)."[105] However, it was not always clear why organizations thought that civil society was more gender equal: was this because there were more women working in civil society, because the policies were more flexible for women or because people were more open-minded concerning topics such as gender equality? Or, as was previously claimed, was it because of the information and requirements from Western donors on gender equality? Again, this points to a lack of constitutive rules on gender equality within CSOs as well as within Ukrainian society. At the

[97] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 3A), 3 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[98] Author's interview (IC, 5A), 8 April 2015, Kyiv
[99] Author's interview (IC, 6A), 14 March 2015, Kyiv
[100] Author's interview (IC, 6A), 14 March 2015, Kyiv
[101] Author's interview (IC, 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[102] Author's interview (IC, 6A), 14 March 2015, Kyiv
[103] Author's interview (IC, 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[104] Author's interview (IC, 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[105] Author's interview (IC, 3A), 3 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

same time, there was an interesting incident where one organizations conducted a project on gender inequality and was severely criticized by fellow civil society members:

*Even our fellow civic society members...We had a very big scandal in our community which I did not expect at all. In the internal google group [name removed to provide anonymity], we were blamed that we were thinking out an artificial problem. That women can have access everywhere and if they don't have access it is their personal problem and it is not an obstacle in real life and there is no discrimination, it is something with our brains, it was really a big discussion.*[106]

This signifies that apparently, it can also be a 'faux pas' to speak about gender inequality in civil society. In conclusion, there seem to be certain expectations that civil society is a place where gender equality is practiced, but also normative expectations that incite disapproval of CSOs that do advocate for an end to gender inequality on a national scale. In this statement a confusion over what gender inequality exactly entails as well as how it should be spoken about can be discovered, thus indicating a possibility of conflict over constitutive and regulative rules within civil society.

### 3.3 Legitimation

The previous sections examined how processes of information gathering and normative expectations among organizations foster certain ideas as well as certain requirements on gender equality. This section will further elaborate on how these ideas and requirements can form a certain legitimation or delegitimation for working on gender inequality. There seem to be three different currents within organizations concerning the legitimation or delegitimation for promoting gender equality in their external policies. The first category of organizations mainly based their ideas on gender inequality on information from Ukrainian society and delegitimized advocating for gender equality by stating that the Ukrainian population does not need it and there are more important things to worry about now. Some organizations even claimed that the things that were seen by Europeans as 'gender equality' were Ukrainian traditions that kept the nation together despite their political differences. These CSOs thus tapped into a Ukrainian nationalist understanding of gender equality, and sometimes argued against the 'European values' discourse. The second category of organizations were those who were all for European Integration and legitimized their advocacy for gender equality by stating that it is part of 'European values' and that the Ukrainian population is, in fact, very ready to learn more about European values. Another legitimation that they used was that it was time to get rid of the legacy of the USSR in the political system, thus also tapping into wider discourses in society. Although these organizations were also often more critical towards state structures, they also employed a discourse that justified the lack of women in politics by claiming that there were not enough professional women. Therefore, these CSOs saw the solution for the lack of political representation of women in training women to become more professional and ambitious. The third category of organizations also tapped into an anti-Soviet discourse in wider society a bit, but mainly legitimized advocating for gender equality because it would help the country grow more prosperous and obtain new perspectives on the current situation. This seemed more in line with international understandings of gender equality. However, they also saw that their more far-reaching ideas about gender equality would require educating the Ukrainian population and even civil society. Between these categories of organizations, a lack of constitutive rules on gender equality and a difference in regulative rules becomes visible.

[106] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 3A), 3 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

In promoting gender equality internally, most organizations expressed some problems. Some complained that it was hard to hire women that had enough experience or professionalism while others complained that men didn't want to work in their organizations because they could get a better salary in business. Particularly organizations that promoted gender equality openly had more trouble with getting enough men:

*You know it is a common issue when in gender issues, women are involved more and men are involved less. I think it is important to work not only for our organization, but to involve more men who are conscious, who are sensitive and who are motivated to do it*.[107]

Most of the organizations saw these problems as representative for bigger tendencies in Ukrainian society, however, and not particularly for civil society. Furthermore, when they were asked about their gender policies, most organizations immediately began to speak about the number of men and women in their organizations. Often they also spoke about men and women occupying leading positions, but not about what kind of functions men and women had, their policies on parental leaves, part time work, sexual harassment and so on. This signifies that the constitutive rules of gender equality might also not always fit with a more Western idea of gender equality, but with an idea of a balance between men and women in the workforce which seems more connected to Soviet gender policies. It could also be connected to regulative rules that render speaking about such things as sexual harassment not appropriate. It seemed in general that the regulative rules of organizations were more connected to promoting normal working relations between men and women and being flexible, than an explicit set of rules. Some organizations did speak of paying attention to gender when hiring but in the sense of regulative rules there was a fear of having to hire unprofessionals people, just like in the discourse on women in politics. At the same time, it was interesting that some members justified their lack of external gender policies by their internal gender balance, thus providing a link between the two:

*Very frankly, we don't think that gender issues are a problem in the organization and we don't think that it is a problem on the national level. Because in this small organization, we show that each of these issues can be solved*.[108]

### 3.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the processes of information gathering and the normative expectations that are identified within the institutional frameworks of organizations have important consequences for the legitimation of internal gender balance as well as the legitimation of externally promoting gender equality. The relation of organizations with state structures can be enabling in terms of promoting gender equality externally, in the sense that it gives CSOs insight into structural inequalities within these structures and the leverage to change things. This is particularly enabling if it is combined with normative and discursive continuities that claim that Ukraine needs more European values and less of the USSR legacy in the state system. On the other hand, just as in the wider societal structures, in CSOs there was also a lack of constitutive rules found on gender inequality. Furthermore, not many organizations argued for more far-reaching measures to provide gender equality in the state such as quotas. A reason for this can be the regulative rules claiming that women are at fault for their own position in Ukrainian society.

Another main source of both information and expectations seem to be international donor organizations and, for organizations working on European Integration in particular, European

[107] Author's interview (Appendix IC,5A), 8 April 2015, Kyiv
[108] Author's interview (IC, 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

partner organizations. However, the distribution of influence is not so tilted that international donor organizations have the last word over gender equality issues: some CSOs expressed a frame on gender inequality where they acknowledged that the European view was different, but saw their view as more 'Ukrainian' or more appropriate for their organization. In this sense, the relation of organizations with Ukrainian society was constraining, as it provided a legitimation for keeping certain 'Ukrainian traditions' to prevent more division and the lack of support for certain measures on gender inequality was a legitimation for some organizations not to implement these. On the other hand, some organizations also expressed that this might be the right time to teach Ukrainians about gender based discrimination, as people might be more open to it after the Euromaidan protests.

In the way that civil society members reacted to information and expectations, they tapped into existing regulative rules in speaking about gender inequality in Ukraine, such as the 'European Integration' discourse or the 'traditional Ukrainian' discourse. However, they also provided new ways of speaking about gender inequality, such as viewing the way that gender equality was organised as part of a 'democratic' society or claiming that because there was no gender inequality in civil society, it also didn't exist in Ukraine as a whole. These seem to be new frames that can be directly linked to their institutional frameworks. A difference can be made in focus between different categories of organizations and the way they used existing discourses to legitimize their policies. Some organizations viewed the Ukrainian society as the main source of information and delegitimized advocacy for gender equality because it was not seen as a priority in Ukrainian society, and might even lead to division. Other organizations viewed European donors as main sources of expectations and legitimized gender policies by referring to gender equality as part of 'European values'. The third category of organizations mainly legitimized their policies on gender by tapping into anti-Soviet discourses in society but also because of its inherent value. Thus, in this chapter it was argued that apart from civil society members being part of a larger structure of Ukrainian society which has certain regulative and constitutive rules on speaking about gender inequality, there are also particular enabling and constraining factors in the legitimation of advocating for gender equality that are specific to the CSOs in the research, but are possibly also found in other civil society organizations. The next chapter will examine the frames of individual civil society members in more detail to show how these relate to institutional frameworks and normative and discursive continuities in Ukraine but also differ among individual actors due to factors such as age, gender, place of birth and personal experience with gender based discrimination.

# Chapter 4: Framing Gender Inequality and Purposive Agency

*However, the fact that role occupancy brings with it a set of predefined expectations where compliance acquires high salience does not negate the possibility of variation in conformity depending on the role and the specific individual who occupies that role. Even the highest degree of conformity to expectations implies purposeful actors making active decisions to obey the rules, whether these are formal or informal. This individualist approach argues that institutional roles are "cognitively mediated" through and by the actors who occupy them.*
(Jabri 1996: 70)

In the previous chapter it was argued that there are certain similarities in the institutional frameworks of CSOs in the sense that all organizations have goals that relate to each other as parts of the process of conflict transformation. Furthermore, organizations are involved with the same actors: mainly the state, international organizations, other CSOs and Ukrainian society. However, the processes of information gathering and normative expectations that arise from the combination of their goals and relationships and the way in which these legitimize certain policies on gender equality differ very much across organizations. As between different actors and groups within Ukrainian society, there is a lack of constitutive rules concerning what gender inequality encompasses as well as the lack of a shared structure of norms to ameliorate it between different categories of CSOs. This chapter will examine how institutional frameworks and normative and discursive continuities in society influence the individual decision-maker, by looking at how they 'cognitively mediate' their role in the framing of gender inequality. The first step will consist of taking into account other factors that participants mentioned which could influence their framing of gender issues such as identification with a certain age group, their gender or their place of birth. Finally, the most dominant ways of framing gender inequality will be examined and it will be analyzed among which individuals in which organizations certain frames are more salient, in order to link their framing to both the constitutive and regulative rules in society, the institutional frameworks of organizations and personal preferences of individuals.

### 4.1 Personal Inclination

*The roles of individuals are embedded in institutional contexts while at the same time treating the role players as purposive actors with independent standpoints.*
(Searing 1991: 1252 in Jabri 1996: 70)

This section will examine factors dependent on other markers of identity that can influence the framing of gender inequality. Here the constitutive and regulative rules that were examined in chapter two are elaborated further to see how they could possibly influence individuals within specific groups of the population differently. Furthermore, it has to be asserted that there is also a kind of 'identity framing' traceable in the way that individuals linked their identification with a particular gender, age group or region to their thoughts on gender inequality. However, it was often hard to really check how different factors influenced framing both because the sample of people interviewed was not necessarily representative for the civil society sector and because many of the 'identities' of individuals intersect. At the same time, analyzing individual level factors does provide a more nuanced understanding of the workings of institutional roles as compared to social roles in the framing of civil society members. It will not be claimed that there is a deterministic relationship between individual level factors such as gender, age and place of

birth and frames on gender inequality. The aim is rather to point at possible explanations for different views other than institutional frameworks.

### 4.1.1 Gender

It was observed that although, as was explained in the first chapter of this thesis, gender was not the main factor that influenced the framing of gender inequality, it still had a particular impact. This was due to several reasons. First of all, women had more experience with gender based discrimination, and those individuals who had more experience with gender based discrimination were also more likely to prioritize gender equality. This might have also been due to women being more aware of discrimination than men. While conducting the interviews, it was also observed that women were more willing and open in speaking about gender. According to Diekman and Schneider, who write about gender gaps in political attitudes, female and male attitudes to certain issues differ for several reasons. First of all, stereotypical beliefs about 'men's issues' and 'women's issues' might lead to men and women being exposed more to their 'speciality issues'. Furthermore, gender-normative attitudes might be more likely to be expressed because the 'audience' directs a conversation accordingly. Finally, the speaker might expect a more positive reaction from the expression of such attitudes (Diekman & Schneider 2010: 489).

Therefore, in this sense it needs to be taken into account that the role of a female researcher of gender frames might have also had a different effect on men and women, women being more able to express their experiences and men feeling more defensive because this is a 'women's issue' and they do not want to talk about it. As previously stated, it was already an interesting sign that heads of CSOs almost exclusively offered women[109] to interview and had trouble arranging men to interview when this was asked. On the other hand, for women who did not see gender inequality as that much of an issue, the fact that they were women and they had not (knowingly) experienced gender based discrimination also gave extra justification to their views: "And I always say that I am a woman and I never had a problem working in the public sector to be promoted"[110]

It was also observed that organizations that did work on gender equality tended to have both more women in the organization in general and frequently a woman in charge, which according to a founder of a women's organization "can be said about most of the NGOs in Ukraine, concerned about gender issues."[111] This also signifies women being more exposed to gender inequality issues than men. However, there is also a problem with this, as explained by a male member of an organization promoting women's rights:

*In Ukraine there are also a lot of issues of discrimination against men, but men do not usually care about that, because how can men be discriminated? (...) I think they do just not feel discriminated against and they are ashamed to admit that there is any discrimination against men.*[112]

[109] See Appendix V for more on the limitations of doing research in Ukrainian CSOs.
[110] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 2A), 16 March 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[111] Author's interview (IC, 5A), 5 May 2015, Kyiv
[112] Author's interview (IC, 5A), 5 May 2015, Kyiv

Moreover, within the organizations that had projects on gender, the men that were interviewed did not prioritize gender equality as much as their female counterparts. Although this might have also been due to other factors, such as a lower identification level with the organization in general, it was still noticeable. If men did talk about problems with gender inequality, it was observed that they talked more about a general context: "[I]t is a problem of mentality. We should change the mentality and then a lot of problems will be solved, gender, media and so on."[113] In addition, men more often asserted that gender inequality did not exist at all as opposed to women, who were almost all aware that at some point in time, there had been obstacles for women due to certain traditions. However, many women thought this was changing now or was only present in certain regions.

### 4.1.2 Age

Individuals also quite often referred to a 'new generation' or a 'new consciousness' when speaking about gender. This 'new generation' or 'new consciousness' was often seen to be young people who were more open to European values:

*I think it is a natural transformation. We are observing EU standards and borrowing some of their ideas. We see that it can be different, we see that women are not just cooking but have political positions. Especially people who are my age and people until 40. People who are older who grew up in the Soviet Union, they have a different mindset. It is difficult for them to adapt to these changes.*[114]

Here this 'new generation' is contrasted with an older generation who is still stuck in the 'old ways'. In this sense, the ideas on gender equality and particularly on European values and gender equality are related to a certain 'identity' based on age. The idea of the 'new generation' also seemed to be mainly connected to the new female politicians that arrived from civil society. One individual explained why one of these young women from civil society was so popular: "[S]he represents the European values and European thinking. She is not corrupted in this system."[115] In this sense, the framing of the identity of the 'new generation' and the identity of a civil society member seem to be related, as both were often identified by individuals to be open to European values and particularly on gender equality. These ideas can be derived from the collective memory of the Euromaidan, which was started by a group of pro-European students and continued to have about one third of protesters who in the ages of 18 to 29 (Lyubashenko 2014: 70-72). However, as has been previously asserted, European Integration wasn't the main reason to join the protests for most. Although the name Euromaidan as well as the trigger for the protests might suggest otherwise, several authors have argued that joining the European Union was not the main reason for most protesters to join (Phillips 2014; Onuch & Martsenyuk 2014; Lyubashenko in Bachmann & Lyubashenko 2014).

It was observed that most of the individuals who were above thirty also spoke less about European values and sometimes had a different idea about the significance of the Euromaidan: "Euromaidan was about ourselves. It was not about Yanukovych or EU: it was for ourselves and for our values."[116] People who were over thirty also often were less optimistic about gender issues and expressed less trust in the 'new generation': "[I]t is a never ending process. New

[113] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 3B), 19 May 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[114] Author's interview (IC, 7B), 12 May 2015, Kyiv
[115] Author's interview (IC, 8A), 26 May 2015, Kyiv
[116] Author's interview (IC, 5A), 8 April 2015, Kyiv

generations could have new stereotypes, new bias."[117] Although there are other factors that need to be taken into account for this as well, such as that most of the people interviewed who were older than thirty also came from organizations that had gender projects, it also makes sense that an older generation would be a bit more cautious in believing that Ukraine had taken an entirely different path since the Euromaidan. Indeed, older people also did see gender discrimination more tied to a legacy from the USSR, while younger people spoke more about Ukrainian traditions that produced inequality. What was furthermore interesting was that although individuals from different age groups prioritized working on gender inequality, those who prioritize it least, or thought it didn't exist, were almost all in the age category of twenty to thirty. Thus, while the an identity frame of a 'new generation' open to European values and new ideas on gender equality was popular, it did not imply that individuals under thirty also saw gender equality as an important goal. This could be related to more optimism because of the changes that were seen in the Maidan and before that, while older people had more personal experience with gender based discrimination in both the USSR and the Ukrainian state. For younger people, the changes in gender inequality might have seemed more linear as they had not experienced the USSR but only the Ukrainian state in which there were some improvements in gender inequality in recent decades. In conclusion, for young people gender equality relatively got better, while older people might have also been more sensitive to the losses in gender equality when the Soviet Union collapsed.[118]

### 4.1.3 Place of Birth

Apart from age and gender, some people also expressed that views on gender inequality might differ across regions:

*[T]hese Ukrainian right wing groups, they appeared from the very traditional Western Ukrainian society where there is more respect for women. And I would say that the violence of these groups towards women is rather lower. But when we are speaking about the left, they appeared from the Soviet society which had no respect towards women. That's why I think that the level of violence could be higher.*[119]

Again, a kind of identity framing becomes visible, although this time not between young and old but between different regions. However, it has also been asserted that dividing Ukraine up into East and West or North and South misses a lot of differences within these regions as well as similarities between them (Balcer in Bachman & Lyubashenko eds. 2014: 87). Mainly people from the Center and West of Ukraine participated in the research, and thus no definite conclusions can be given, but there did seem to be a correlation between age and place of birth in the sense that young people from the West were most likely to refer to Ukrainian traditions more than to Soviet traditions in speaking about gender inequality. On the other hand, these individuals also tended to prioritize gender equality less because they saw it as something that would naturally be solved in the Ukrainian nation-building process. Therefore, identity framing not only connects age and occupation, but also regional origins, age and ideas about gender inequality within the nation-building process. However, this kind of view can also lead to more division within the West and the Center, as some people did see Ukrainian identity as something that keeps Ukraine together in this time of division and other people saw it as something that is fading already, or something that is only still present within certain regions.

[117] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 5A), 8 April 2015, Kyiv

[118] See Hankivsky & Salnykova (2012), Rubchak (2011) for a more elaborate review of gender policies during the USSR and changes since the independence of Ukraine.

[119] Author's interview (IC, 2A), 16 March 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

On the other hand, people who were born in the South were more likely to speak about gender inequality as related to USSR traditions and more likely to prioritize it. This might have been due to the fact that the three people who were from the South in the research were all members of organizations who had gender projects, but it also makes sense that the place of birth matters because people in the South and East are more exposed to traditions of the USSR (Balcer in Bachmann & Lyubashenko eds. 2014: 90). It would make sense that blaming USSR traditions leads to a higher prioritization of gender issues, as it fits within general attempts to shed the legacy of Soviet times while continuing the nationalist project. At the same time, it can also be seen as something that creates more division between the different regions of Ukraine. Soviet traditions are mainly present in the South and East and thus blaming gender issues on Soviet traditions can also cause more division among different groups within the population. Again, a particular identity framing connected to framing gender inequality reveals the differences between groups of the population.

Furthermore, individuals often also referred to differences between big cities such as Kyiv and smaller cities: "Maybe in some smaller towns the roles are still more traditional but in Kyiv young families don't have this tradition where the wife is cooking all night and men can sit and drink beer or something."[120] What was interesting was that although people who did prioritize working on gender inequality were from different regions, none of them were from small villages in Ukraine. This might have been because it seems that compared to growing up in a village, Kyiv is rather free concerning gender issues and thus it is felt that gender inequality is only a local problem. In conclusion, there seem to be different views on gender inequality present in different part of Ukraine that are both divided along the axis of regions that are less influenced by Soviet heritage and more by Ukrainian traditions and vice versa as well as the common difference between big cities where people are more exposed to different ideas and small villages where people are less exposed. These regional differences in identity framing that are visible through the framing of gender inequality might be problematic in attempting to rebuild the country while also addressing gender issues.

### 4.1.4 Other Factors

Other factors that stood apart from the institutional frameworks and were reported by research participants to also have sufficient influence upon the framing of gender inequality were experiences abroad: "I think nowadays with more people going abroad it changes your idea on certain issues (…)"[121] Then of course, some parts of framing are also dependent on personality. Although this is hard to check, there were some clues in references to personal preferences in interviews. For example, some people said that they were "more emancipated"[122] or more tolerant than their surroundings.[123]

## 4.2 Framing

*Collective action frames are constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change.*
(Benford & Snow 2000: 615)

[120] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 1C), 19 March 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[121] Author's interview (IC, 1C), 19 March 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[122] Author's interview (IC, 2C), 26 May 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[123] Author's interview (IC, 5A), 5 May 2015, Kyiv

Apart from the factors mentioned above which are connected to identity framing, as well as the impact that institutional frameworks have, there still seems to be a lot of room for different interpretations and a lot of overlap in diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. Thus, there is not really one 'collective action' frame to be found in civil society organizations working on conflict transformation in Kyiv. Furthermore, as previously asserted, there were both *mobilizing* and *countermobilizing* frames visible within organizations. It does seem that there is indeed a lot of room for purposive agency in defining oneself against gender inequality. On the other hand, there are definitely some tendencies and similarities in the way that gender inequality is framed, intersecting across normative and discursive continuities, institutional frameworks and purposive agency. This section will take a closer look at the frames that were found and how they collide with certain regulative and constitutive rules in Ukrainian society, how they were specifically defined by civil society members against their individual frameworks and how individual level factors may also influence the particular frame used.

### 4.2.1 Diagnostic Framing

This section will deal with the extent to which there was a 'shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation in need of change' found among organizations. As has been asserted previously, among organizations the main problem was often seen in the political representation of men and women. This can be related to regulative rules that render it more 'appropriate' to speak about political representation, but also to the specific role of organizations who often took a critical stance towards the state. Indeed, this frame was mainly found among organizations that were working on European Integration and those that were implementing gender projects, the two categories of organizations that were most critical towards state structures. However, even within organizations, not everyone agreed on priorities. One of the members of an organization implementing a project on political empowerment for example prioritized countering the sexual objectification of women rather than political empowerment. A reason for this could have been the division between individuals in different age categories, as younger people were often more optimistic on the political representation of women. There was also a difference in men and women in terms of priorities, as men more often prioritized equality in the economic sphere and women more often in the political and domestic sphere. Therefore, even if there was a shared understanding within organizations that gender inequality was a problem, the location of the most 'problematic condition' still often differed. This seems to point at a large degree of purposive agency concerning the specifics of frames on gender inequality.

Diagnostic framing is also concerned with 'making attributions concerning who or what is to blame'. In this sense, as has been previously asserted, there was a difference between individuals of different ages and regional origins. Very frequently, individuals referred to the existence of a certain heritage from the period that Ukraine was a part of the USSR. However, while some organizations - mainly the organizations who were not working on gender- defined this heritage as not very influential anymore in terms of gender inequality, others- mainly the organizations working on gender- defined it as still a large factor explaining gender inequality today. Furthermore, even within organizations individuals sometimes had different opinions about this, for example in one organization that was working on gender issues the head of the organization claimed that the Soviet heritage was still an important factor explaining gender inequality,[124] while another member claimed that:

[124] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 3A), 19 May 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

*[I]n the Soviet Union it was a very natural thing that men and women were equal. And now also, you don't think; 'is this a proposition of a man or a woman?' You just don't distinguish, it doesn't matter. They are equal.*[125]

The latter view is one that seems connected to one of the understandings of gender equality that was seen in the chapter on normative and discursive continuities in society, where academics claimed that it is often still asserted that Ukraine does not need gender equality as they have had a long history of men and women being equal in the Soviet Union. This was however, not frequently heard in CSOs and a general view that Soviet policies had mainly had a negative effect on gender equality, as well as on other aspects of life in Ukraine, was present both among younger people and older people. As previously asserted, however, people above thirty often diagnosed it as a bigger problem than younger people, who more frequently felt like these traditions were already changing.

An alternative frame was that it was due to Ukrainian traditions that there was gender inequality, although this views also collided with attributing gender inequality to Soviet policies sometimes. Mainly younger people related to this view, although there was, again, a difference in people who thought that these traditions were still present or that they had largely faded. The latter view was mainly present among organizations that were not working on European Integration or gender. Alternatively, other people evaluated Ukrainian traditions as rather positive, either because of its connection with European views or sometimes rather because of its disconnection with European views and values. Sometimes, these views differed within organizations, for instance within an organization which saw European Integration as one of the main goals, where one member saw Ukrainian culture as very respectful towards women and connected to European values,[126] while another individual evaluated Ukrainian traditional family values as more negative.[127] It was interesting to see that there was quite some confusion over if certain gender issues -particularly the role of women in politics- were related to USSR heritage or Ukrainian traditions, signifying a lack of clarity on what exactly constitutes the 'Ukrainian identity' apart from the Soviet heritage. At the same time, it emphasizes again how identity framing influences the framing of gender inequality. People for example had very different ideas about the essentialization of Ukrainian women as mothers. While some said this the focus on this identity only can be harmful, both for women themselves and for men who have a marginalized role in parenting, others claim that the role of women as mothers is part of a great tradition that keeps the Ukrainian nation together.

Very few individuals related the gender inequalities in Ukraine to bigger patriarchal structures. The few people who did this were all members of women's organizations or organizations that were implementing projects on gender. Alternatively, some people related the gender inequalities in Ukraine to other countries with gender inequalities to show that they were not the only ones struggling with this issue and thus it was not such a big problem.

### 4.2.2 Prognostic Framing

In the previous section it was shown that, even if there was agreement between or within organizations that gender inequality was a problem, the priorities were often different within organizations. Furthermore, there was a large difference in who or what the blame was attributed to. This section will examine how civil society members articulated 'alternative sets of arrangements'. However, it has to be taken into account that often there was no particular alternative set of arrangements articulated. Some of the people who were aware of the

[125] Author's interview (IC, 3B), 19 May 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[126] Author's interview (IC, 2A), 16 March 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[127] Author's interview (IC, 2C), 26 May 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

inequalities that were reproduced both in the USSR and in independent Ukraine, claimed that this 'attitude' was already changing: "I think this is because of post-Soviet mentality that men are more appropriate for politics, for politics of the national level...Because in Ukraine woman is a mother, not worker, not politician. But of course this attitude is changing."[128] This kind of demobilizing frame on gender inequality was mainly present among younger people. Even among people who were working in organizations that argued for European Integration, some people felt like the influx of European values had already sufficiently changed some gender issues such as the representation of women in politics, or would change it in the near future. Other younger people, however, felt like there was still sufficient bias in Ukraine, particularly if they had been exposed to gender based discrimination themselves.

One solution that was mentioned by the people who saw gender inequalities as still present was to educate and make people more aware of gender based discrimination. However, there was a difference in emphasis: while individuals in organizations working on European Integration more often related this to teaching women about their rights and training them to 'be more ambitious', organizations who had projects on gender more often related this education to teaching people in general about gender based discrimination. In addition, the latter organizations also favored more far-reaching measures such as quotas. Only one organization that was not implementing a project on gender saw quotas as a solution. Most of the organizations favoring quotas also had less tight relations with the state, which might suggest that quotas are not very popular among state officials either. Furthermore, it was interesting that although most people in the research were younger than thirty, there was no one in this age category that favored quotas. Although some of the younger people did notice that there was a problem with the representation of women in political and economic life, most of the them were quite optimistic that this problem would fix itself, as a 'new generation' of women from civil society would enter politics. This also signifies a particular identity framing of women in civil society as more qualified than other women in Ukrainian society. Others, even in organizations that did favor quotas, thought quotas wouldn't be a solution because there was a problem with facilities for women rather than a lack of access because of other factors.

This kind of a demobilizing frame concerning quotas as an alternative arrangement can both be related to the optimism of the younger generation, which has mainly seen the political representation of women grow, and to the fear of having 'unqualified women' in politics. The individuals interviewed who were under thirty were also much more likely to speak about the unqualified women who had gotten into parliament because of the nepotism within Ukrainian politics. This fear of having women in politics who could not answer basic questions about Ukraine seemed to be an important motivating factor, particularly for younger people, to strive for 'quality not quantity'. However, in this they were also reproducing a discourse that claimed that it was women own fault that they were not seen as professional. In the words of a gender expert:

*[N]obody speaks about unprofessional men. Who just go there, without any doors, they are just there, represented actively. Unprofessional men. But then when we speak about women's representation, there is the question: 'Is the woman a professional, is she qualified, is she smart enough to make decisions?' But we see men who are not smart enough to make decisions, and we see excellent women, whose voices are not heard. That's why, I think this critique is really discriminative.*[129]

### 4.2.3 Motivational Framing

[128] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 2C), 26 May 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[129] Author's interview (Appendix IA, 0D), 2 April 2015, conducted through Skype

In the previous sections, both *countermobilizing* and *mobilizing* diagnostic and prognostic frames have been examined. In terms of countermobilizing frames, mainly younger individuals in organizations that were not concerned with European Integration or gender equality asserted that gender inequality did not exist, was only present in certain regions or was already changing. On the other hand, mobilizing frames were also found, which were mainly based on attributing blame to certain traditions. This suited a prognostic frame that education was the most important 'alternative arrangement' to be made, although there was a difference between organizations that emphasized training and educating women and educating the whole population. This section will focus on mobilizing -those that convince others to act to achieve change- and countermobilizing -those that urge others not to act- motivational frames that were found among individuals.

The most frequently heard countermobilizing frame on gender inequality was that there were more important things to worry about now: "In my subjective opinion, gender issues were not in top 20 problems before Maidan and they are not in the top 20 now."[130] In fact, this was the opinion of almost all of the individuals who were not working on European Integration or gender and who did not have personal experience with gender based discrimination -or were not aware of this experience. This is more of a political opportunity frame than a motivational frame, claiming that even if there are some problems, now is not the time to work on these problems because there are more important things happening. Furthermore, this frame was heard mainly among younger people and among males. Even among people in organizations who did argue for such measures as quotas in the long run, some individuals thought that now was not the right time because the priorities were different now. Another frame was that certain traditions should be kept, because they create unity. Although this frame was not frequently formulated within civil society, it could be representative for a larger part of the population, as many individuals in civil society did speak about different approaches to 'Ukrainian traditions' within different regions and between the rural and urban population. At the same time, some of the traditions such as family values and particularly the role of women as mothers, seem to fit both within older Soviet policies and with 'Ukrainian traditions'. Thus: "It helps us to stay together. Even if we have differences, and there are many differences in different regions, this are common values that keep us together."[131]

On the other hand, individuals within organizations that were working on European Integration as well as some individuals within other organizations expressed that gender equality was part of 'European values'. Thus, individuals argued for gender equality because it created a message both to the Ukrainian public and to their European partners that they were willing to fully commit to the European values and principles. Again, this was a mobilizing frame that was mainly heard among younger people, although some of the older people actually did see this as a good opportunity: "[I]t is a good moment, because a lot of people are supporting European Integration, and if you say that Europe means gender balance, they will accept it."[132] Another frame that sometimes seemed to collide with the frame that European Integration was an important motivation for working on more gender equality, was that gender inequality was part of the old Soviet heritage and thus this was a good time to work on eradicating this heritage. However, among individuals different opportunity structure frames were found: some felt like this was the right time to eradicate 'old habits' from the USSR, others felt like these habits would not be given up so easily, as it was something that was imprinted upon the mentality of Ukrainians. Mainly older people employed the latter frame and also mainly people who were working on European Integration, which would make sense because they would have more information on the struggle of the government in eradicating USSR 'traditions' and people

[130] Author's interview (IC, 4B), 24 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[131] Author's interview (IC, 4A), 14 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv
[132] Author's interview (Appendix IC, 3A), 3 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

who were working in organizations that were working on gender, which were also more pessimistic about changes in gender inequality in general. On the other hand, gender equality measures such as quotas were in this sense sometimes also seen as useful in eradicating some of this heritage.

A frame that was not so frequently heard was that more gender equality would not only be good for women, but would also be beneficial for the country as a whole:

*Yes, of course it is very important. It is clearly very connected with Defense, because men they do not realise a lot of aspects I think of life and women could add to that a lot of their expertise. It would change even economics, because we know that those countries that have better gender balance, they have better economics. It would change domestic violence in Ukraine, it would change respect. Education opportunities, better opportunities for jobs. If you have children, you will not have to leave your job, because men do not look after children. So this is the whole spectrum of everything that you need to change.*[133]

This was found only among organizations that were working on gender equality already and also often among people who had more experience with gender based discrimination themselves.

Finally, it was interesting that even individuals who did see civil society organizations as not necessarily gender equal, or even more so, experienced discrimination themselves, did not always feel like they could change something. Thus, sometimes the solution was to look at other types of organizations, instead of wanting to change something in their own field. This indicates that in the disconnection between attributions of blame -diagnostic frames- and the urges to affect change -motivational frames-, there is also a purposive agency visible. A justification for the lack of a motivational frame is often seen in the framing of political opportunity structures: either there is a lack of a way to change it or change is already underway, thus there is nothing to be done about it. Furthermore, it was also interesting to see how individuals working in organizations that were doing projects on gender issues didn't necessarily all agree with the projects. As these were not individuals with a low position in the organization, it can be assumed that it is not necessarily a lack of information but rather more personal inclination of members depending on their own experiences with gender inequality. This section aimed to be quite comprehensive and connect all the pieces of the puzzle in the previous chapters. As such, the concluding notes on this chapter will be provided in the final conclusion in the next section.

[133] Author's interview (IC, 3A), 3 April 2015, office of the organization in Kyiv

# Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to provide more information on the possible relationships between civil society working on conflict transformation and gender equality. In order to do this, the frames of civil society members on gender inequality within CSOs in Kyiv that were working on different parts of the process of conflict transformation and had different policies on gender were analyzed. A central concept within this thesis was the notion of role as being 'cognitively mediated' and therefore influencing behavior through framing. The role of civil society members was examined by looking at three different layers. First, the constitutive and regulative rules of speaking about gender inequality that could be found in Ukrainian society as a whole were analyzed to place civil society organizations and members within wider normative and discursive continuities. Through interviews with gender experts and literature on gender in Ukraine, it was found that conflicting historical views about the concept of gender equality as well as a change in historically 'appropriate' ways of speaking about gender invited the possibility of conflict. Most predominantly, there seemed to be a difference in opinion between such influential sources of discourse on gender inequality as the state and the media on the one hand, and international donor organizations supported by a marginalized group of feminists on the other hand. While the conflict in the East of Ukraine opened up new space to speak about European rules and values concerning gender equality on the one hand, it also made certain ways of speaking about gender as connected to the Ukrainian nation more salient and other ways, such as speaking about the Soviet idea of gender inequality, less 'appropriate'.

Subsequently, the organizations that participated in the research were analyzed and it was examined how their institutional frames legitimized certain ways of speaking about gender while delegitimizing others. The outcome was that within the organizations that were not working on European Integration or gender equality, international donors formed the main influence that legitimized working on an internal gender balance or implementing measures to ensure a gender balance in conferences and other events that were held by these organizations through their normative expectations of organizations. On the other hand, these organizations also perceived that Ukrainian society wouldn't stand for certain measures (such as quotas) to provide more gender equality. Organizations that were working on European Integration perceived that advocacy for gender equality was a part of their work, thus the goals of their organizations in itself seemed to legitimate working for gender equality. Furthermore, these organizations were more critical towards the state and the 'old system' that also made it harder for women to enter politics. Thus, the critical role of these organizations towards the state also provided legitimation for these organizations to work on the political representation of women. However, in these organizations it was also found that some of the discourses within Ukrainian society were reproduced, such as that women were at fault for their own position. The last category of organizations were the organizations that were working on gender inequality for its inherent value. These organizations perceived less influence from international donors or European partners and were more critical towards the state. On the other hand, they also perceived an influence from Ukrainian society, which seemed to delegitimize measures such as quotas, as well as from civil society which seemed to delegitimize even speaking about gender inequality as 'inappropriate'. Between these categories of organizations, there was a lack of constitutive rules of what gender equality consisted of as well as a lack of shared regulative rules.

This became even more apparent when examining the frames of individual civil society members. Axis of age, place of birth and gender became visible that provided some clues about general tendencies and differences in frames among the Ukrainian population. Furthermore, even within organizations there seemed to be big differences in diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames. The main contrasts were found between the people who diagnosed gender

inequality as a result of Ukrainian traditions, of Soviet traditions or of general patriarchal tendencies. The frame that gender inequality was 'something old' and therefore it was not necessary to work on it anymore was mainly found among organizations that did not work on European Integration or gender, but also sometimes among individuals in organizations working on European Integration. Furthermore, mainly young people held this prognostic frame. The frame that gender inequality was 'something new' connected to European Integration for which there was now more space was mainly held by individuals in organizations working on European Integration but also among some younger individuals in other organizations. Then there was also a frame found that some of the things that might be perceived as gender discrimination in Europe were in fact 'something yellow and blue': connected to Ukrainian traditions and therefore important to keep the unity within Ukraine. Different motivational frames also arose from these tendencies in diagnostic and prognostic framing. On the one hand, some individuals asserted that now was the time to work on gender inequality because after the Euromaidan there was an increasing interest in European values. On the other hand, individuals asserted that the heritage in culture and traditions from the USSR needed to be changed before there could really be gender equality and that this was not an easy task to change, thus viewing a lack of political opportunity structures. In conclusion, it seems that among individuals in civil society the centrifugal forces of confusion on gender inequality in Ukraine as a whole are reflected, mediated through institutional frameworks within different organizations as well as personal inclination.

What do these frames on gender inequality tell us about the potential scenarios for the gender situation in Ukraine? Judging from the frames that were found among civil society members and the normative and discursive continuities in Ukrainian society, it seems like there are three different scenarios. The first scenario was already more or less mentioned by a report of the WILPF in September 2014. This scenario can be called the 'ride along' scenario. In this scenario, gender equality will be dependent on the political position of Ukraine and the outcome of the nation-building process that it is in now. The result for gender policies will then be dependent on what is kept from the heritage of the Soviet policies on gender and the policies on gender since independence. The rights of men and women will be subject to how well these rights fit within the nationalist project and gender equality will not be prioritized as an important goal on its own. This scenario risks missing the potential for women and men to gain new roles and loosen traditional ideas of masculinity and femininity during and after conflict. An example of this kind of scenario is the former Yugoslavia.[134] Although it can be said that the nationalist policies in these countries are not comparable to the nationalism within Ukraine at the moment, this example does shed light on the disaster that such a scenario could cause. If women are seen as the bearers of cultural traditions in a situation of war and men as the protectors, there is a great risk of gender based violence which serves to 'pollute' women and humiliate men for not being able to protect women or themselves.[135] Furthermore, it means that Ukraine will miss an important chance to involve women more in politics as well as formal peacebuilding processes. This should be a goal because of its inherent value for democracy, but is argued by some authors to also possibly result in new ways of solving conflicts.[136] If individuals in CSOs working on conflict transformation don't look critically at the way that nationalism can hurt gender relations and keep reproducing nationalist discourses on gender, there is a risk that this scenario becomes the reality.

[134] See Korac (2006) and Helms (2003) for an account of men and women in the nationalist project in the former Yugoslavia.

[135] See for an account of gender based violence and the connections with nationalism Rehn & Sirleaf (2002), Bouta et al. (2005), Kaufman & Williams (2010)

[136] See for an account of women and men in peacebuilding Bouta et al. (2005), Korac (2006), Helms (2003)

The second scenario is the 'EU scenario', which involves a closer relationship between the European Union and Ukraine, in which the process of gender equality is modelled after European Union models. On the one hand, this could lead to some of the more 'traditional' ideas on gender such as that women should mainly have the role of mother and that men should be strong, becomes less salient and new models to emerge. On the other hand, there is a chance that 'European values' become just as eclectic as 'Ukrainian traditions' concerning gender equality, leading to conflicts over different meanings of gender equality within a European context. Furthermore, this process could stimulate more conflict between parts of the population that do and do not wish to adopt more 'European values'. Even more so, this could lead to a scenario such as in Poland, where European Integration has not stopped a conservative movement punishing abortion.[137] Some authors have also argued that within the process of European Integration, the EU also spreads some of the more masculine norms of the institutions and the free market idea which can have negative effects on gender equality within the countries that are admitted to the Union (Locher & Prugl 2008). For this scenario to end well, it would thus require CSOs working on European Integration to see gender equality not only as a part of European Integration, but as a basic conditions for human rights to flourish which should always be taken into account.

The third scenario seems the most positive one, but possibly also the most utopian. This is called the 'Reconciliation scenario', where the conflict offers more room for women to gain positions of power, as the implementation of resolution 1325 enables their transfer from volunteering in civil society organizations to the higher military and political levels. This can offer them a chance to be an important force in reconciliation as well and remain in powerful positions after the conflict. Thus, a scenario in which the conflict provides room for women to experience that they were limited in their pre-war roles, as well as space to engage in new activities that will also lend them more political power. There were some encouraging signs in the statements of civil society members about women in new roles within politics as well as in the army. This could lead to such a scenario as in Rwanda, which has the highest number of women in their government[138] after a horrible genocide and the reconciliation process thereafter. On the other hand, the danger in this is that women are only allowed to play new roles because of their utility for the conflict transformation process and that as the war ends, they will end up back in their old roles or even worse of because of the domestic violence and economic marginalization that often continues after a conflict.[139] In conclusion, for this scenario to end well it would require CSOs to argue for including more women in political processes not only because of the instrumentality for reconciliation, but also because of the inherent value for promoting democracy and human rights.

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[137] See Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States. *Proposed Constitutional Amendment Continues Poland's Assault on Sexual and Reproductive Rights*. Online available on: http://www.siecus.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Feature.showFeature&featureID=1097 [Accessed 1 August 2015]

[138] According to the website of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, based on information received from national parliaments on 1 June 2015, the degree of women in the Rwandan parliament is 63.8 per cent in the Lower House of parliament and 38.5 per cent in the Upper House (see: Inter-Parliamentary Union. *Women in National Parliaments*. Online availabe on: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm [Accessed 15 July 2015]

[139] See Charlesworth (2008) for examples of this kind of scenario in Timor-Leste and Bougainville

# Further Research

The goal of this research was to provide a framework to research the connection between CSOs and gender equality by looking at the role of individuals in civil society organizations in framing gender inequality as mediated through wider discourses in society, institutional frameworks and personal inclination. This framework was then used to examine ideas that exist on gender inequality in Ukraine and particularly among CSOs working on conflict transformation in Kyiv. However, in the course of the research several other interesting ideas for research came up that could not be included within the time frame of this research but might be interesting for future studies. Although this research analyzed frames on gender inequality and did use some ideas from feminist theory, these frames were not analyzed from a particular feminist point of view. However, often the frames did collide with particular theories on gender and nationalism, as research participants often spoke about men and women having different roles in the conflict and an increase in militarist nationalism. This might be interesting to research further in the future, both within CSOs and in other kinds of organizations working on conflict transformation.

Furthermore, the research was originally set out to cover gender roles instead of gender frames, but it was found that Kyiv was not the best place to do this, nor were the organizations encountered in the research the best places to study the phenomenon of gender roles. However, gender roles among civil society actors could still be researched within different types of organizations -those that were established after the Euromaidan and are mainly based on volunteering and providing humanitarian assistance- and different regions -a bit closer to the conflict zone, where there are more connections to make between men and women's personal experiences as a result of the conflict and their roles in conflict transformation. In the course of the research it was also realized that because of the connections between the type of CSOs that were studied -those with paid employees, good connections with the state and with European donors-, CSOs based on volunteering and the state it would be interesting to examine how the frames on gender inequality that were found during this research differ within different 'levels' of the conflict transformation process. Particularly because the state and the new CSOs based on volunteering can also be seen as a space where new roles and new ideas on gender are formulated. At the same time, it was found during the research that there might be big differences in the way that gender inequality is framed in different regions, thus it might also be interesting to adopt a role theory perspective to examine the framing of gender inequality in different regions. In the end, it would be an admirable goal to conduct more elaborate research on the different frames on gender inequality that are present in Ukraine to understand how particular measures on creating more equality are supported by different actors in society and by parts of the population.

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# Appendix I: Tables of Research Participants

As anonymity has been ensured in the Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix II), names of organizations or main goals of organizations have not been included. Individuals are also protected by leaving their names and functions, if they worked within organizations, out of the final document. All other relevant details can be found in the tables below.

**A. Gender Experts Interviewed**

| Case ID | Activities | Place of Interview | Date of Interview |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0A | Feminist Activist, Gender Researcher on Ukraine | Kyiv | 03/05/2015 |
| 0B | Feminist Activist, Professor in Gender Studies in Ukraine | Kyiv | 03/14/2015<br>04/06/2015 |
| 0C | Gender Researcher on Northern Caucasus and Ukraine | Kyiv (conducted through Skype) | 03/24/2015 |
| 0D | Gender Expert for Ukrainian Women's Organization | Kyiv (conducted through Skype) | 04/02/2015 |

**B. Organizations Included in the Research**

| Case ID | Conflict transfor-mation | State | European donors | Gender balance | Gender projects |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Nation-wide dialogue | Coopera-tion | Yes | Male director, 6 women working under him | No |
| 2 | National dialogue | Coopera-tion & consulta-tion | Yes | No women in higher boards, 1 woman in board | Yes |
| 3 | Protecting journalists in conflict zone | Consulta-tion | Yes | Female ex. director, mainly females | In the past |
| 4 | Building new govern-ment system | Coopera-tion & consulta-tion | Yes | Female ex. director, 8 males, 8 females | No[140] |
| 5 | Advocacy for Resolution 1325[141] | Coopera-tion & consulta-tion | Yes | Female founder, mainly women | Yes |
| 6 | Study trips to Georgia, Ukraine-Russia meetings | Consulta-tion | Yes | Female founder, mainly women | No |
| 7 | Reintegra-tion of soldiers, | Coopera-tion & consulta- | Yes | Female founder, mainly | No |

[140] This organization did conduct an analysis on the local gender mechanisms but this project wasn't about the content of the gender policies as such, therefore I have decided not to include this in the definition of a 'gender project'.

[141] UN resolution 1325 was adopted on 20 October 2000 and constitutes "a watershed political framework that makes women – and a gender perspective – relevant to negotiating peace agreements, planning refugee camps and peacekeeping operations and reconstructing war-torn societies" (Rehn & Sirleaf 2002: 3). This organization was helping to create a National Action Plan to apply the resolution in Ukraine.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | training social workers | tion | | women | |
| 8 | Security policy analysis | Consulta-tion | Yes | Mainly women | No |

**C. Individuals Interviewed**

| Case ID[142] | Date/Place | Gender | Age | Place of Birth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1A | 03/19/2015 Office of the organization[143] | Female | 26 | West (M)[144] |
| 1B | 03/19/2015 Office of the organization | Female | 23 | West (S) |
| 1C | 03/19/2015 Office of the organization | Female | 30 | West (M) |
| 2A | 03/16/2015 04/01/2015 Office of the organization | Female | 35 | South (M) |
| 2B | 05/26/2015 Office of the organization | Male | 27 | West (L) |
| 2C | 05/26/2015 Office of the organization | Female | 26 | South (M) |
| 3A | 04/03/2015 Office of the organization | Female | 35 | Center (L) |

[142] The case ID consists of the number of the organization and the letter of the person first interviewed in that organization.
[143] All places mentioned are in Kyiv.
[144] I have decided not the use names of cities and villages, but just the notion of West, Center or South, as well as (M) for an averagely large city, (S) for a village and (L) for a large city, as these seemed the factors most relevant for the research. This is with the exception of two individuals who were born outside of Ukraine, where I have included the full name of the city.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3B | 05/19/2015 Office of the organization | Male | 32 | West (L) |
| 3C | 05/19/2015 Office of the organization | Female | 23 | West (L) |
| 4A | 04/03/2015 Office of the organization | Female | 27 | Center (L) |
| 4B | 05/19/2015 Office of the organization | Male | 26 | West (?) |
| 4C | 05/19/2015 Office of the organization | Male | 28 | Ukraine[145] |
| 5A | 04/08/2015 Cafe | Female | 57 | Orinburg, Russia |
| 5B | 04/08/2015 Cafe | Female | 35 | South (M) |

[145] This interview consisted of a list of questions that the participant was sent through email in which he did not indicate a city or specific place in Ukraine. Later attempts to contact the participant were unsuccessful.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5C | 05/05/2015<br>Cafe | Male | 62 | Center (L) |
| 6A | 04/14/2015<br>Cafe | Male | 31 | Tbilisi, Georgia |
| 7A | 05/12/2015<br>Cafe | Female | 40 | Center (L) |
| 7B | 05/12/2015<br>Cafe | Female | 21 | West (M) |
| 8A | 05/26/2015<br>Cafe | Female | 26 | Center (M) |

# Appendix II: Participant Information Sheet

This interview is part of the research on gender framing[146] in CSOs engaging in conflict transformation in Kyiv which is conducted by the interviewer for the purpose of completing a master's thesis in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. The master's thesis will be accessible online for participants to read. No names of organizations or persons will be named in the final thesis.

Answering the questions is not obligatory and the interview can be stopped at any moment by the participant as well as the interviewer. Furthermore, if the participant has any additional comments to a previous question or would like to suggest a different sequence for the questions, this is also welcomed.

The interviewer consents to sending a transcript of the interview to the participant within two weeks, after which the participant has a week to read it and suggest possible changes to the transcript.

A follow-up interview can be scheduled when both the participant and the interviewer feel the interview hasn't been sufficient for acquiring all the needed data for the research.

The interview will be recorded if the participants consents to this, but no names of participants or participants organizations will be mentioned in the final product of the research.

The participant consents to having read the information sheet and taking part in the interview:

Signature

Date and place of signing

The participant consents to the recording of the interview:

Signature:

[146] During the research the topic changed from gender roles to gender frames and the participant information sheet was changed accordingly.

# Appendix III: Topic Lists

**A. Interviews with Gender Experts[147]**

Background information
Experience with topic/specialization
Nationality

General
Most important inequalities
Difference among regions
Awareness of gender inequality among the population
Justification of gender inequality
Influence of traditions
Most important areas of inequalities

Areas of inequalities
Political sphere:
-Roles of men and women in politics
-Fields in which men and women are involved
-Promoting gender equality in politics
-Influence of Maidan on political representation
Economic sphere:
-Education of men and women
-Horizontal segregation on the labour market
-Vertical segregation on the labour market
-Unemployment of men and women
-Recent economic changes and the results for men and women
Domestic sphere:
-Distribution of tasks between men and women
-Domestic violence
-Reproductive discourse

Actors in gender policy
Most important actors in gender policy
Role of the state
Role of the media
Influence of feminism/women's organizations

Influence of the conflict
General ideas on changes in gender relations since the conflict
Influence of nationalism
Influence of militarism
Occurrence of gender based violence
Men and women as IDPs
Other impacts of the conflict on gender relations

[147] This topic list changed somewhat during the research, as new clues came up. It was also adapted to the specialities of the research participants. This is the latest and most representative version.

**B. Organizations**

Main goals of the organization
Contribution of the organization to the process of conflict transformation
Relations of the organization with the Ukrainian state
Relations of the organization with European donors
Gender policies (internal)
Gender projects (external)

**C. Individuals**[148]

Background
Age
Place of birth
Marital status
Any children
Education
Previous work experience
Function in the organization

Identification with organization
Specific task within the organization
Motivation for working in organization
Impact of the conflict on life of the participant
Solution for the conflict
Role of the international community
Motivation for working in civil society
Importance of job in the organization for participant

Gender policies in the organization
General ideas on gender policies of the organization
Division of tasks between men and women within the organization
Representativeness of gender policies in the organization for civil society

Gender inequality since the Maidan
General ideas on gender relations since the Maidan
Participation of men and women in the protests
Political representation of women since the Maidan
Influence of the conflict on men and women
Women and men in the conflict transformation process
Importance of eliminating gender inequality in future
Any issues that should be prioritized

[148] This topic list was also changed as a result of the changing of the research focus. This is the most updated version.

Personal experience with gender based discrimination
General experiences to share
Education & horizontal segregation on labour market
Judgment of females in politics/higher positions
Combining job & parenthood
Stereotypes and roles

# Appendix IV: Pin-up poster of Ukrainian woman


Pin-up posters by Sviatoslav Pashchuk feature young, provocatively dressed women who represent various kinds of Ukrainian troops. The ironic slogans on this one reads “Tender Ukrainization.” [149]

[149] Sheremeta, Bozhena (2015) Pin-up girls pose to support military. *Kyiv Post*. Online available on: http://www.kyivpost.com/guide/people/pin-up-girls-pose-to-support-military-370931.html [Accessed 27 July 2015]

# Appendix V: Limitations of doing research in Ukrainian CSOs

There were several advantages connected to working with Ukrainian civil society members during this research. First of all, most individuals were able to eloquently voice their thoughts on topics and taught me a lot about the context in which they are operating. Organizations were also often easily researchable online, I could interview multiple members at a time and was provided a place to conduct the interviews. However, there were also some constraints connected to interviewing civil society members, which I will elaborate on below.

**A. Selection of participants**

Usually, the participants from a particular organization were chosen by the contact person who had been appointed to me by the organization. This could have meant that I got a very biased view, in which most of the individuals in organizations had the same view. However, usually the selection process seemed to be mainly based on who was available at that time and since I got quite diverse views, I do not think that this process had much influence on the results of the research. It would have been interesting to speak to some more people from the Eastern or Southern research of Ukraine to get a more diverse view but, as I have indicated in the discussion, this could be done in future research on this topic. However, the selection process in itself was interesting because I was mainly pointed towards women and towards younger people. This collides with the ideas expressed in the research that younger people and women were more open to speaking about gender inequality. Besides, in qualitative research it is always an issue that one cannot predict the exact characteristics of the research participants.

**B. Language**

Luckily, most of the individuals I spoke to were willing to conduct the interview in English, although I had arranged an interpreter and given them the choice to conduct the interview in Russian or Ukrainian. However, I did notice that the language barrier made it harder to contact some organizations and to do observations while interviewing. Furthermore, it might have also created a little bias since it was easier for everyone to have interviews in English and thus it might have had some influence on the selection process. It is possible that this had reinforced some of the tendencies of the selection process such as the dominance of younger people. If I had spoken to some older people as well, it might have given more clues about the views on gender equality within an older generation of Ukrainians. Nevertheless, I think I was able to obtain the needed data and in the end, as speaking to mainly English speaking people didn't seem to imply that they were necessarily very European oriented. Thus, I still had research participants who had more 'traditional' views and those who had more 'modern views'. Furthermore, it is a utopian fantasy that every perspective can be heard or described in the research.

**C. Time**

A bigger constraint was time, since this was something that all the participants were clearly lacking. There were a few times when not all the questions could be asked due to time constraints. Usually, I was able to solve this by scheduling a follow-up interview or by emailing some questions after the interview. It does need to be taken into account, however, that not all the questions could be asked to all the participants. In general, everyone did answer the questions on the top of the topic list, but some interviews lacked the bottom questions on the topic list. I decided to solve this by using mainly the questions on the top of the topic lists for the analysis, thus minimizing the effect of the missing data in some participants accounts.