

Orange Borders

The royal influence on Dutch-Jordan relations



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International relations in historical perspective
19-08-2016
Word count: 16.130

Picture title page: ANP archive, picture by Cor Mulder, 'King Hussein visits the Netherlands' (10 March 1989)
<http://www.anp-archieff.nl/page/45499/nl> last visited 25-07-2016.

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Abstract- This thesis examines the influence of Queen Beatrix and King Hussein and their personal connection on the Dutch-Jordan relations in the period 1980-1999. The research does not just focus on their involvement but also on the transnational aspect of this involvement. With the help of the theory of transnationalism the position of Queen Beatrix and King Hussein within their national political structure is examined. This thesis concludes that Queen Beatrix and King Hussein did pursue closer Dutch-Jordan ties out of personal preference. Hussein however was able to reunite his policy with national policy and therefore had no need to transcend the level of the national government. Queen Beatrix had very limited formal political power in this period but succeeded in influencing policy makers by using her personal connections, knowledge and position. She stretched her political role as far as possible and in some cases, e.g. Dutch-Jordan relations, her interpretation of her political role was simply too broad.

Introduction

‘The great relations between both our countries are mirrored in the good and warm relations between our families.’¹

Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands spoke these words during a state visit from the Jordanian King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein and Queen Rania eight years after the passing of former friend and monarch of Jordan King Hussein Bin Talal. The friendship between former Queen Beatrix and King Hussein is often, if not always, mentioned when Dutch-Jordan relations are discussed.² When King Hussein passed away in 1999 Queen Beatrix was the only woman to attend his bier, breaking with Arab traditions, to show her last respect to the Arab monarch and her friend.³

Although the friendship between the two monarchs is referred to as common knowledge, the extent of that friendship and the influence of that friendship has never been properly assessed. Because of the limited interactions between the Netherlands and Jordan it is not surprising that the relation between the countries has received little attention. When the Dutch embassy in Amman was opened in 1996 there were only around one hundred Dutch citizens living in Jordan.⁴ There was some economic interaction between the countries but this again was on a small scale.⁵ This reality on the ground did however not stop King Hussein from visiting the Netherlands five times in the period 1984-1997, nor did it stop the Dutch government from inviting King Hussein to speak before parliament during his state visit in 1997, opening a Dutch embassy in 1996 and visiting Jordan in

¹ Dutch Royal archive, ‘Speech Queen Beatrix during visit of King and Queen of Jordan’ (30-10-2006) <http://bit.ly/2aPZMLd> last visited 04-08-2016.

² E.g. National government the Netherlands (hereafter govNL), ‘Dutch-Jordan relations’ (2016) <http://bit.ly/2aO7AHr> last visited 10-08-2016 or Parliamentary archive the Netherlands (hereafter PA NL), ‘Parliamentary Memorial speech about King Hussein by Wim Kok’ (9 February 1999) <http://bit.ly/2bateXx> last visited 14-08-2016.

³ PA NL, ‘Memorial speech King Hussein by Wim Kok’ (9 February 1999).

⁴ Ewoud Nysingh, ‘Beatrix vroeg om ambassade in Jordanië’, *Volkskrant* (16 January 1996).

⁵ Ibid.

1994 for a state visit and trade mission.⁶ The apparent contradiction between limited economic interaction and an extensive diplomatic relation raises questions about involved actors in the Dutch-Jordan economic and political relations. Especially considering the alleged involvement of Queen Beatrix in the opening of the embassy in Amman.

The existing literature about the political role of the Dutch monarch generally concludes that the royal influence is very limited. Jan Vis and Jan Van Deth claim that the political influence of the Dutch queen is seriously hampered by the constitution and the concept of ministerial responsibility.⁷ J.W.L. Brouwer agrees with this and states that the monarch only has real influence in appointing certain officials.⁸ N.S. Efthymiou, in his article about modern monarchies, joins the other authors in their statements although he does emphasize the role of the Dutch monarch as representative of the Netherlands in foreign affairs.⁹ This role as representative across the Dutch borders is however largely symbolic and does not include official substantive power to influence the foreign policy of the Netherlands. Due to the monarch's inviolable status ministers are politically responsible for all official actions of the monarch. The ministers are even responsible in private matters that touch upon the public interest.¹⁰ Therefore the monarch has to have some sort of agreement with the ministers about what can and cannot be said or done.¹¹ This inviolable structure means that the monarch is protected but at the same time bound to the guidelines of the ministries. Although all authors agree that the power of the monarch is, because of the legal framework, very limited, they also all claim that there is leeway for the monarch to increase the political power and that this leeway depends on the situation and the people involved. Because of the difficulty to obtain source material case studies are missing from the debate about political power of the modern monarch, even though a case study is the most fitting way to analyse intervention capacities of the monarch. One case study might not be able to give a full conclusion about the general workings of royal interference but by analysing multiple case studies one could demonstrate the structural workings of this political system. This case study about the Dutch-Jordan relations could be the starting signal for other case study research on the informal political power of modern monarchs.

The involvement of Queen Beatrix in establishing relations with Jordan has been the subject of a public and small political debate but has never been thoroughly investigated. The case study has never been academically researched. This thesis will attempt to fill the existing gap in the literature about the involved actors in the Dutch foreign policy concerning Jordan. Queen Beatrix received criticism for her meddling in foreign policy when Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van Mierlo at the

⁶ Salomon Bouman, 'Beatrix en Claus bezoeken Jordanië', *NRC Handelsblad* (6 December 1994).

⁷ Jan C.P.M. Vis en Jan W. van Deth, *Regeren in Nederland: het politieke en bestuurlijke bestel in vergelijkend perspectief* (Assen 2006) 54.

⁸ J.W.L. Brouwer, 'Beatrix versus Juliana of hoe het regerend staatshoofd het altijd beter doet dan zijn voorganger', *Parliamentary History Foundation* (15 January 1997) 9-20, 11.

⁹ N.S. Efthymiou, 'Modern Koningschap', *Tijdschrift voor constitutioneel recht* (2012) 29-53, 31.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 30.

opening of the Dutch embassy in Amman, Jordan stated that the embassy was opened due to the preference of the Dutch queen.¹² Although this statement resulted in some media attention and a few critical notes on the interference capacities of the queen it did nothing more.¹³ This thesis will challenge the existing knowledge and understanding of the political role of modern monarchs and will analyse the leeway that exists in the Dutch political structure for the monarch to interfere in external relations. The main question in this thesis is: To what extent were the economic and political relations between Jordan and the Netherlands from 1980-1999 influenced by Queen Beatrix and King Hussein?

The period central in this thesis (1980-1999) is chosen because it starts with the coronation of Queen Beatrix in 1980 and ends with the death of King Hussein in 1999. In this period the main characters of this thesis were the ruling monarchs of their respective countries. The years between 1980 and 1999 were also shaped by a lot of developments in the Middle East and Jordan in particular. It includes the Gulf War (1990-1991), the Jordanian recognition of Israel (1994), the opening of the Dutch embassy in Amman (1996) and several visits of King Hussein to the Netherlands. The years between 1980-1999 were turbulent for Jordan. The 1980s were marked by the collapse of an Arab alliance and the search for Western support by King Hussein. The direction that King Hussein took got plenty of criticism from inside the Jordanian borders but he nonetheless pursued it and decided to become an active actor in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.¹⁴ The Dutch foreign policy in this period was characterized by the end of the Cold War, the supremacy of the United States and the cooperation of the European Union and its predecessors.¹⁵ The Dutch policy towards the Middle East was traditionally based on a few characteristics. The Dutch government had and maintained its reputation as friend of Israel, it had to protect its economic (energy) interests and its policy had to be align with peace and international treaties.¹⁶

The question central in this thesis will be answered within the framework of transnationalism theory. The theory of transnationalism focuses on actors in (international) politics that are not part of governmental institutes.¹⁷ In modern democratic societies the government is often not the only actor that can influence or decide policy and non-state actors have used the existing space to increase their power.¹⁸ Transnational actors (TNAs), e.g. non-governmental organisations (e.g. Greenpeace) or multinational corporations (e.g. Shell), work outside of governmental control to exert influence on certain policy fields. Individuals can also act transnationally and this side of transnationalism will be at the basis of this thesis. The actions taken by Queen Beatrix and King Hussein during 1980-1999

¹² Jutta Chorus, *Beatrix: dwars door alle weerstand heen* (Amsterdam 2013) 22.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Russell E. Lucas, 'Deliberalization in Jordan', *Journal of Democracy* 14-1 (2003) 137-144, 140.

¹⁵ Nico Schrijver, 'Nederland in de wijde wereld: Multilateralisme als verheven ideaal in eigen belang', *Internationale Spectator* 60-11 (2011) 552-555, 553.

¹⁶ Fred Grünfeld, 'Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël', *Internationale Spectator* 62-12 (2008) 680-683, 680.

¹⁷ Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, 'Transnational Actors and World Politics: An Introduction', *International Organization* 25-3 (1971) 329-349, 331.

¹⁸ Thomas Risse, 'Transnational Actors and World Politics' in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons ed., *Handbook of International Relations* (2012) 429-430.

that influenced Dutch-Jordan relations will be analysed and judged on their (trans)national origin. Did the royals act within the boundaries of their national government or did they transcend the governmental level to pursue closer ties between the two countries? The transnational theory is relevant for this research because it can reveal the informal political power of monarchs and the lack of control on the side of the national government that may exist.

Theory

Because this thesis examines the influence of Queen Beatrix and to a lesser extent of King Hussein its core touches upon (international) political influence of monarchs. The legal political power of the Dutch monarch is limited. It is restricted to signing laws, appointing formateurs and being the official representative of the Dutch state in international affairs.¹⁹ The official responsibilities of the monarch do not include substantive involvement in foreign affairs. This research therefore focuses on royal proceedings that fall outside of the formal governmental role of the monarch. The theoretical framework used for this research is therefore based on the theory of transnationalism. Transnationalism focuses on non-governmental actors in world politics and emphasizes forms of influence on international politics that fall outside of the traditional political structure. The underlying question in this thesis is: To what extent did Queen Beatrix exert influence on Dutch-Jordan relations on a transnational level?

The first authors to earn serious recognition for their work on transnational actors in international relations were Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. Nye and Keohane published the book *Transnational Actors and World Politics* in 1971 and it marked the beginning of a new theoretical trend in international relations.²⁰ Their definition of transnational interaction was ‘the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental organization’.²¹ Transnational interactions in this definition may involve a governmental actor but has to involve at least one non-governmental actor. Traditionally the research about transnational actors (TNAs) in world politics focuses on multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and transnational advocacy networks (TANs).²² Since 9/11 the literature about religious transnational actors and the danger they can cause has also increased. Jeff Haynes has done research on religious TNAs, analysing the power of the Catholic Church and of the Islamic Conference in modern times.²³ The connection and mutual influence between international and domestic policy is analysed in the scientific debate under the denominator of *linkage politics*. Linkage politics is concerned with research on the influence of international

¹⁹ Efthymiou, ‘Modern Koningschap’, 30-31.

²⁰ Nye and Keohane, ‘Transnational actors’, 331.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Risse, ‘Transnational Actors and World Politics’, 427.

²³ Jeff Haynes, ‘Transnational Religious Actors and International Politics’, *Third World Quarterly* 22-2 (2001) 143-158, 143.

developments on domestic policy and the impingement of domestic affairs or actors on foreign affairs.²⁴ The TNA and linkage politics literature mostly concerns transnational groups and pays little attention to the transnational power of individuals. One exception is formed by J. David Singer who in 1969 wrote about the role of individuals in international linkage politics.²⁵ Singer claims that an individual can be of influence on world politics in three ways: the traditional way, taking part in national or international governmental institutes, as part of a coalition that influences the government or by bypassing the national government altogether and directly influence foreign affairs.²⁶ The first question that needs to be answered before analysing the transnational power of the Dutch monarch is if Queen Beatrix is in fact a governmental actor. The monarch has three roles: as head of state, as member of the national government and as a private person.²⁷ Although the monarch has no political responsibility, she/he is an official member of the Dutch government. The official governmental tasks include signing laws, designating formateurs, swearing in ministers and state secretaries and reading the throne speech.²⁸ Beside these official governmental tasks, the monarch also has weekly consultations with ministers and the prime minister. During these meetings the monarch is informed and has the opportunity to advise or give warnings. Because these meetings fall under the ‘secret of Noordeinde’, no one knows what is discussed.²⁹ According to Nye and Keohane transnational interaction can only take place when one of the involved actors is non-governmental. Can interaction between Queen Beatrix and King Hussein, both governmental actors, therefore be transnational? Surprisingly yes. The fact that the king/queen is a governmental actor makes it rather difficult to measure transnational actions because governmental actors can switch between three roles: governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental.³⁰ It is not always clear when these switches take place. Theoretically the Dutch monarch, as a governmental actor, is able to act as a transnational actor if he/she takes on a non-governmental role. This case study will demonstrate if Queen Beatrix and King Hussein mixed their roles as governmental and non-governmental actors to transnationally influence the rapprochement of Jordan and the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s.

According to the transnational theory TNAs can have but two motives: self-interest or morals.³¹ If this thesis shows that the monarchs acted at a transnational level it will be necessary to look at the motives behind their actions. The motives of self-interest and morals do not seem to match this particular case study. This study will therefore focus on different motives and will give attention

²⁴ Geoffrey Pridham, ‘Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement’, in Dimitri Conostas, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External influences* (London 1991) 74.

²⁵ J. David Singer, ‘The Global System and Its Subsystems: A Developmental View,’ in James N. Rosenau, *Linkage Politics: essays on the convergence of national and international systems* (New York 1969) 24.

²⁶ Singer, ‘The Global System’, 24.

²⁷ Efthymiou, ‘Modern Koningschap’, 31.

²⁸ Ibid, 30-31.

²⁹ Vis en Van Deth, *Regeren in Nederland*, 54.

³⁰ Nye and Keohane, ‘Transnational actors’, 334.

³¹ Ibid, 345-346.

to the relevance of personal connections and friendship in international relations. Friendship in international relations is often neglected in the literature.³² Friendship does not have one definition and can include a wide variety of relations between individuals or states and is therefore hard to measure. Although this analysis does not aim to measure the friendship between Queen Beatrix and King Hussein, the friendship between the two monarchs is at the basis of the research question. This thesis will not only contribute to the debate about transnationalism and the transnational power of individuals but will also provide new insights into the role of interpersonal friendships in international relations.

This thesis will be structured with the help of four chapters and sub-questions. In the first chapter the economic and political relations between Jordan and the Netherlands in the period prior to the coronation of Queen Beatrix (roughly 1960-1980) will be analysed. This chapter will show the origin of relations between the two countries and will help explain how the relations developed throughout the twentieth century. This chapter focuses on the involved actors in Dutch-Jordan relations in this period and will analyse whether these actors acted on governmental and intergovernmental level only in establishing the relations. The role of Queen Juliana in the Dutch-Jordan relations is examined in order to compare her position to Queen Beatrix later on in this thesis. Chapter two will focus on the developments of Dutch-Jordan relations in the period 1980-1999, during the reign of Queen Beatrix. The sub-question central in this chapter is: How did the relations between Jordan and the Netherlands change from 1980-1999 and who were the involved parties in these developments? The emphasis in this chapter will be on the process of intensifying Dutch-Jordan relations and the character of this process. Were the new interactions between the countries initiated by the government and governmental actors or did some evolve from transnational interaction? The first two chapters are intended to showcase the visible developments between the Netherlands and Jordan and the involved actors and to reveal at what level these developments were established. They also give a historic overview of the Dutch-Jordan relations that is still missing in the existing literature. The final two chapters dig a little deeper. They are focused on the personal motives of Queen Beatrix and King Hussein. They see beyond the visible developments and with the help of characteristic research will explain what motivated the Dutch and Jordanian monarch to take part in rapprochement between the two countries.

Sources

Due to the limited access of royal source material I am obliged to base this analysis on a wide variety of sources. This research is based on a diversity of primary sources in order to highlight different aspects, storylines and experiences to create a truth-based analysis of the situation. The primary sources used in this analysis are political (Dutch parliamentary archives), diplomatic (Ministry of

³² Andrea Oelsner and Antoine Vion, 'Friendship in International relations: Introduction', *International Politics* 48-1 (2011) 1-9, 1.

Foreign Affairs and embassies) and partly come from the public debate (Dutch newspapers). This research is also based on personal information about involved individuals extracted from interviews and biographies. Besides primary sources the secondary literature will serve to understand the historical context and the foreign policy of the countries involved and are used for the theoretical framework. The textual analysis will be complemented with photographs to give a more compelling and visual understanding of the relation between the monarchs. Biographies will be used to get the best possible understanding of the people involved. Jutta Chorus has recently published an excellent biography about the former Dutch queen.³³ Her work focuses on the years the queen received most criticism (1995-2005) and combines personal and professional stories and sources. Nigel Ashton's biography *King Hussein of Jordan: a political life* and Avi Shlaim's *Lion of Jordan: King Hussein* will be used as a basis for understanding the king of Jordan.³⁴ The focus in this thesis will be on Queen Beatrix because it is to be expected that King Hussein, who was king of a strong and relatively powerful monarchy, could more easily influence foreign affairs. The Dutch queen on the other hand had little direct influence on foreign policy. This makes researching her indirect and personal influence all the more interesting.

This thesis will combine research on history, political structures, international developments, modern monarchies and the personalities of the royals to give an understanding of the Dutch-Jordan relations and the involved parties in the establishment of the relations. Because this thesis focuses on transnational exchanges and informal contact there is a danger of creating a conspiracy theory. This is not the aim of this thesis and I will be extra careful with assumptions. All sources used in this analysis will be critically examined. The status of the key actors will undoubtedly have influenced the information in the biographies, news articles and even governmental sources. Although some form of criticism on the Dutch and Jordan monarchs was/is allowed, it nonetheless remains a sensitive topic for journalists and politicians. It is my aim to use sources on different levels, written by authors with different opinions on the modern monarchy to write a neutral, fact based thesis. Due to the secrecy of certain sources not all information gaps can be filled. Consequently the conclusion will include some substantiated hypotheses.

Relevance

There is no existing literature on the specific economic and political relations between the Netherlands and Jordan. There is also a serious lack of research on the role of modern monarchs in world politics and on the role of personal friendships in international relations. The combination of these topics in this case study has the potential to contribute to debates in various fields. This thesis will not only contribute to research on Dutch relations with the Middle East in the late 20th century but will highlight different aspects of Dutch foreign policy and the role of Queen Beatrix in this

³³ Chorus, Beatrix.

³⁴ Nigel Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan: a political life* (New Haven 2010).

policy. It is a different and critical analysis of the former queen and her position within the political system of the Netherlands. It is not my aim to make a political statement with this thesis. I will not examine or judge the official status and role of the Dutch monarch in the Dutch political system. This thesis is purely focused on the possible transnational and non-governmental actions of the monarch. I hope that this thesis will contribute to the transnational debate within international relations. The focus on individual TNAs is exceptional and can be a valuable addition to the existing debate. This case study about the Dutch-Jordan relations can hopefully be the beginning of broader research on the political freedom and power of monarchs in the Netherlands.

1- Waiting for the ice to break

Dutch-Jordan relations from 1960-1980

This first chapter will analyse the interactions between Jordan and the Netherlands from 1960-1980 in order to get a better understanding of the developments that led to the warm relationship between the countries later in the 20th century. This analysis will form the basis of this research and will reveal whether the relation with Jordan was always as good as it was later claimed to be. The analysis of this earlier period will reveal who the involved actors were in the beginning of Dutch-Jordan relations and will help uncover the present or absent personal influence of the royals in these years. It also reveals whether the creation of Dutch-Jordan relations was a governmental process or included non-governmental actors and transnational interaction. This chapter highlights differences between Queen Juliana and Queen Beatrix as well and forms the beginning of understanding Queen Beatrix as a modern monarch and her influence in international politics.

The origin

In 1946 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan gained independence and was quickly recognized by most of the international community. It did however take till 1955 for Jordan to receive formal recognition by the United Nations.³⁵ In 1952 Hussein bin Talal became king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan after the abdication of his father, King Talal. King Hussein was only 17 years old when he ascended the throne.³⁶ Four years earlier Juliana at the age of 39 was crowned as queen of the Netherlands. The official diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Jordan started in 1956. It was not until 1961 however that the status of the diplomatic mission between the countries was raised to the rank of embassy.³⁷ Although the official rank of embassy stayed in place from 1961 onwards, the Netherlands did not have its own embassy in Jordan or vice versa. Before the Dutch government opened its embassy in Amman in 1996 the Jordanian relations were monitored by the diplomatic delegates at the embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The Jordanian delegation responsible for Dutch relations was seated in Germany, in the embassy of Bonn.³⁸ The first years of Jordanian independence were understandably marked by the consolidation of the state and the Hashemite Kingdom. Jordan had previously been under the protectorate of Britain and had to balance independence, conflicts in the region and the division of the international order in West and East in its first years of independence.³⁹ Relations with the Netherlands were clearly not a priority. The Dutch foreign policy was also occupied with the Cold

³⁵ Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan* (New York 1993) 176.

³⁶ Avi Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan: The life of King Hussein in War and Peace* (London 2009) 15.

³⁷ National archive the Netherlands (hereafter NA NL), telegraph post to the ambassador in Beirut, *Elevation of delegation Jordan to embassy*, 2.05.198, nr 12 (27 January 1961).

³⁸ NA NL, code message to the Jordanian ministry of FA, *Jordanian embassy in Bonn*, 2.05.198, nr 12 (27 February 1961).

³⁹ Ashton, *King of Jordan*, 4-5.

War division and with the start of European cooperation. The relations with the Middle East were limited in this period although the Dutch government did build its warm relations with the state of Israel.⁴⁰

Although Queen Beatrix later claimed that the friendship between the two monarchies was a product of interactions between multiple generations, Queen Juliana and King Hussein actually had limited contact. Juliana never made a state visit to Jordan during her reign. She visited the Middle East only once, during a state visit to Iran in 1963. She was accompanied by her daughter Princess Beatrix on this trip.⁴¹ When King Hussein got married to Queen Muna in 1961 the Dutch ambassador Philipse send several letters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the absence of a gift to the happy couple from the Dutch queen. Although he assured the ministry that he had no intentions to recommend or order royal actions he did emphasize that gifts were highly valued in the Arab culture and by the Jordanian king.⁴² He proceeded with the notion that the marriage was unpopular in Jordan and that any demonstration of Western approval was extensively reported in the media.⁴³ The ambassador clearly felt awkward about the absence of a Dutch present. Although this anecdote should not be taken too seriously it does show that the relation between King Hussein and Queen Juliana was not notably warm or close in these first years. Queen Juliana showed no personal interest in the relations with Jordan or the Hashemite royal family and acted only as head of state of the Netherlands during their limited interaction.

Conflict and tension

The political relation that did exist between the Netherlands and Jordan in the mid-20th century was framed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Six Day War of 1967 and the War of 1973 highlighted the tensions between the Western Israeli allies and the Arab region. Although the Dutch government officially adopted UN Resolution 242 after the Six Day War and thereby believed to maintain a neutral position in the conflict, the Arab countries did not perceive the Dutch position in the same way.⁴⁴ The reputation of the Netherlands in the Middle East underwent serious damage during and after the outbreak of the 1973 War. This was caused by several Dutch (alleged) actions. The Arab countries were indignant about the possible weapon deliveries from the Netherlands to Israel, the presence of the Dutch Minister of Defence at a pro-Israel protest and the Dutch advice to Arab

⁴⁰ Grünfeld, 'Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël', 680-681.

⁴¹ Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau (hereafter ANP) archive, ANP Foundation, 'Koningin Juliana bezoekt Iran' (1 October 1963) <http://bit.ly/2aQcjP4> last visited 25-07-2016.

⁴² NA NL, Confidential message to the Minister of FA, *letter Ambassador Philipse to Ministry of FA*, 2.05.198, nr. 9 (11 August 1961).

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ NA NL, Code message by ambassador Vroom in Beirut, *Press conference Minister van der Stoel on the Middle East*, 2.05.204, nr. 158 (30 October 1973).

countries to abandon certain land victories.⁴⁵ Minister of Defence, Henk Vredeling, had joined a pro-Israel protest in Amsterdam on 13 October 1973. His presence there reinforced the belief of the Arab states that the Netherlands and its government were fully committed to the Israeli side.⁴⁶ All these actions added up to a reputation of the Netherlands as a friend of Israel and an enemy of the Arab countries.⁴⁷

The relations with Jordan were particularly affected by the war and the position of the Dutch government during and after the 1973 conflict. The Dutch government was actually quite surprised when the relations between the Netherlands and Jordan deteriorated after the war. The ambassador reported in November 1973 that the anti-Dutch propaganda in the Arab region was so extensive that even pro-Western countries such as Lebanon and Jordan were convinced that the government of the Netherlands had taken on an anti-Arab position and policy.⁴⁸ When the ambassador revisited Amman a couple weeks later he concluded that the sentiment had not changed. Right before his visit to Jordan the nine members of the European Community had released an official statement about their position in the conflict.⁴⁹ This statement generally had a positive effect on the reputation of the EC member states in the Middle East. The Lebanese government saw the joint statement as a peace offer and moderated its attitude towards the member states.⁵⁰ Jordan however did not change its attitude in the same way. The Dutch ambassador even concluded that the Netherlands was singled out and treated as the scapegoat without good reason.⁵¹

The Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace negotiations and treaties that followed the conflict resulted in an awkward position for the Dutch government. During the Six Day War the government had been able to support the standpoints of the international community without angering Israel and without severely harming Dutch interests in the rest of the Middle East.⁵² The 1973 War and the oil boycott that followed showed the dependence of the West on the Middle East and the potential dangers for the Dutch state. The economic and political unrest that followed the 1973 War showed the Dutch government that good relations with the Arab countries could in fact be in their interest.⁵³

⁴⁵ NA NL, Concluding findings after a five-week trip around the Middle East by ambassador De La Valette, *Arab opinions about the Netherlands*, 2.05.204, nr. 158 (25 May 1974).

⁴⁶ Duco Hellema, Cees Wiebes and Toby Witte, *Doelwit Rotterdam: Nederland en de oliecrisis 1973-1974* (The Hague 1998) 41.

⁴⁷ NA NL, *Arab opinions about the Netherlands*, 2.05.204, nr. 158 (25 May 1974).

⁴⁸ NA NL, Confidential code message from embassy Beirut, *The improvement of the understanding between the Netherlands and the Arab countries*, 2.05.204, nr. 158 (4 November 1973).

⁴⁹ NA NL, Confidential code message from embassy Beirut, *Report on the Middle East Conflict*, 2.05.204, nr. 199 (4 November 1973).

⁵⁰ NA NL, *Arab opinions about the Netherlands*, 2.05.204, nr. 158 (25 May 1974).

⁵¹ NA NL, Confidential correspondence between embassy Beirut and the Dutch Ministry of FA, *Understanding Jordan-Netherlands*, 2.05.204, nr. 158 (22 November 1973).

⁵² Grünfeld, 'Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël', 680.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 682-683.

Economic interactions

Although the Dutch government was upset about the continuing anger of Jordan, this anger had a smaller effect on the country than the anger of the major oil producing states. It is not easy to find data on economic transitions between the Netherlands and Jordan in the 20th century. This is mostly due to the small scale of economic activities between the two countries. The first figures on Dutch-Jordan trade come from 1970 and are in *gulden*, the former Dutch currency. In 1970 the export to Jordan was around 10 million gulden. The import from Jordan to the Netherlands was a meagre 23.000 gulden. The Dutch import from Jordan mostly consisted of raw materials whilst the export to Jordan was made up of machinery and chemical products.⁵⁴ Compared to the trade with other Middle Eastern countries the economic interaction between the Netherlands and Jordan was extremely limited. The import figures in the region were generally higher than the export figures due to oil. This was however not the case for Jordan. As a non-oil producing country Jordan had little to offer the Dutch market. The embassy archive does contain figures on trade between the Netherlands and the Middle East but Jordan is often not included in the documents because of its small scale trade.⁵⁵ This was not due to lack of trying. In 1956 the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs received its first request for a trade-agreement with Jordan from the Ministry of FA. The Dutch deputy send a discouraging message back claiming that ‘the Jordan export package, that is very small, has so far not been attractive to the Netherlands’.⁵⁶ The primary export product from Jordan at that time was phosphate, not an appealing product for the Dutch market.⁵⁷ The import from Jordan consisted and still consists mainly of (unpopular) raw materials. Table 1 shows the value of trade between the Netherlands and Jordan throughout the last decades. The figures are all converted to the euro value of 2015 to give a better comparison. It shows a steady increase in import and export throughout the twentieth century. The figures are nonetheless still insignificant in comparison to the trade with other countries in the region.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ GovNL, ‘Economic relations the Netherlands and Jordan’ (2016) <http://bit.ly/2aO7AHr> last visited 01-08-2016.

⁵⁵ NA NL, Code message, *The economic relations of the Netherlands with the oil producing countries and with Egypt and Yemen*, 2.05.204, nr. 88 (April 1972).

⁵⁶ NA NL, Memo to the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs by F. Dongen, *Trade agreement Jordan-Netherlands*, 2.05.204, nr.12 (12 March 1956).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ NA NL, *The economic relations of the Netherlands with the oil producing countries and with Egypt and Yemen*, 2.05.204, nr. 88 (April 1972).

Table 1. Trade between the Netherlands and Jordan (x1000)

Economic interaction	1970	1971	1993	1996	2011	2015
Jordan → Netherlands	€45,13	€878	€ 24.494	€ 68.583	€ 47.653	€47.364
Netherlands → Jordan	€19.966	€ 43.480	€ 121.772	€ 110.129	€ 263.509	€347.994

Source: NA NL, code message embassy Beirut, *Trade relations between the Netherlands and the Middle East 1972* and <http://bit.ly/2bu39Yk> last visited 04-08-2016.

Beatrix as ice-breaker

The interactions between the Netherlands and Jordan were not particularly exciting or remarkable throughout these years. Princess Beatrix was the first royal to show a real interest in the country and the cooperation with the Netherlands. In 1978, two years before the princess would become queen, Beatrix and her husband Prince Claus visited Jordan for the first time. The two left in November 1978 and stayed in Jordan for five days. They were there as guests of Crown Prince Hassan Bin Talal and his wife Sarvath El Hassan. The invitation followed a four-day visit to the Netherlands by Prince Hassan in 1977.⁵⁹ The royal couple amongst others visited irrigational and agricultural projects that the Netherlands financially supported. They also visited the ancient town of Petra.⁶⁰ The trip to Jordan was a combination of a state visit and an informal study trip. The royal couple went on many different trips in the years prior to the coronation of Beatrix. Jordan was not the first country in the Middle East that they visited. In 1976 the couple had already visited Israel and Egypt.⁶¹ Beatrix had a special interest in international affairs and liked to be informed on developments in the Middle East. During her visit to Israel in 1976 she spontaneously scheduled a meeting with the advisor of Ministry of Defence Peres to discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁶²

Detente

The fact that the Dutch royal couple was invited to Egypt in 1976 and Jordan in 1978 indicates that the tensions between the Netherlands and the Middle East had subsided. The oil boycott against the Netherlands was lifted in July 1974 and the tensions between the Arab region and the Netherlands slowly diminished over the following years. The Dutch government has realised that its support of Israel was too vocal and not in line with the policy of the other members of the European Community.

⁵⁹ ANP archive, ANP Foundation, 'Visit from crown prince El-Hassan Bin Talal' (30 March 1977) <http://bit.ly/2bn5QH9> last visited 12-07-2016.

⁶⁰ Author unknown (A.U.), 'Prinselijk paar in Jordanië', *Reformatorisch Dagblad* (21 November 1978).

⁶¹ ANP archive, picture by Arthur Bastiaanse, 'Beatrix and Claus visit Egypt' (1 November 1976) <http://bit.ly/2aQguKq> last visited 22-06-2016.

⁶² Femke Deen, 'Het temperament van Beatrix', *Historisch nieuwsblad* (2013) <http://bit.ly/2aMamx5> last visited 10-08-2016.

It used its power in the European Community to enforce a boycott-lift and was eventually successful. The Dutch policy concerning the Middle East in the years following the war and the boycott were formed by closer cooperation between the European member states and by the belief that a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict was only possible with interference of the United States.⁶³ The European involvement in the peace process was put on the back burner and the United States took the lead with the Camp David negotiations in 1977.⁶⁴

The relation between the Netherlands and Jordan in the period 1960-1980 was based on small scale trade, political tensions because of the Arab-Israeli conflict and European and American interaction with the Middle East. There were no transnational actors involved. Jordan had little to offer the Dutch market so there were no multinational corporations with a particular interest in the country. Although Jordan was already known as a pro-Western country, it was critical of the Dutch policy. During her exploration of the Middle East in the late 1970s Beatrix took a first step to improve the relations between both countries. Although she was not yet official head of the Dutch state she did use the visit to Jordan to visit projects financed by the Netherlands and to promote cooperation between the two countries. During her first trip to Jordan Beatrix acted partly as head of state, she was there to introduce herself as future queen but also enjoyed the trips on a personal level. She was thoroughly informed on international affairs and the Middle East conflict and used her visits to educate herself and to connect to governmental and royal members. The first twenty years of Dutch-Jordan relations were government-led and had no remarkable or transnational actors involved. Queen Juliana had not shown any particular interest in the external relations and was not personally involved in rapprochement to Jordan. The visit from Princess Beatrix to Jordan in 1978 was the first sign that the royal families of the countries were on good terms. Beatrix was able to combine her personal interest in the region and her role as representative of the Netherlands during these visits and thereby combine her governmental and non-governmental roles. This method, of mixing official with unofficial tasks remained intact after Beatrix's coronation and would form the basis of her involvement in foreign affairs.

⁶³ Grünfeld, 'Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël', 682-683.

⁶⁴ William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington D.C. 2016) 32-33.

2- Becoming close friends

Dutch-Jordan relations 1980-1999

‘A country to my heart, where I always feel at home.’⁶⁵

King Hussein of Jordan spoke these words about the Netherlands almost twenty years after the first visit of Queen Beatrix to Jordan in 1978. The analysis above has shown that the relations between the two countries were not particularly warm or tight till the 1980s. Something had apparently changed in the twenty years that had passed that resulted in Hussein’s love for the Netherlands. This chapter will focus on the period of Queen Beatrix’s reign till the death of King Hussein (1980-1999). How did the relations between Jordan and the Netherlands change from 1980-1999 and who were the involved parties in these developments? The new and closer ties between the two states are carefully examined and measured on their national, international or transnational origin. With the help of mostly primary source material this chapter will build on the results of chapter 1 and will reveal whether there were obvious transnational actors or actions involved in the rapprochement of the Netherlands and Jordan at the end of the twentieth century.

A frequent guest

Although there was hardly any personal interaction between the Dutch and Jordan monarchs during the 1960s and 1970s, this all changed during the 1980s. King Hussein suddenly became a frequent guest of the Netherlands and of the new queen. King Hussein visited the Netherlands three times during the 1980s. His first visit was in October 1984 and he was joined by his fourth wife Queen Noor. The royal couple stayed in the Netherlands for three days and visited amongst others the airplane factory Fokker.⁶⁶ Although the visit was not an official state visit, it was too short and slightly less ceremonial, the program was typical for a state visit from a foreign head of state. Hussein revisited the country in April 1987 and in March 1989 he again stepped on Dutch soil to participate in a global conference on environmental issues.⁶⁷ Although King Hussein was there for other reasons, he was welcomed and picked up from the airport by the Dutch royal family.⁶⁸ He continued this visit streak with visits in 1992 and 1997.⁶⁹ Although the programs during these visits were filled with formalities and ceremonial traditions, the photographs of the meetings between the royals show the warm connection that had arisen between them.

⁶⁵ A.U., ‘Koning Hussein noemt Beatrix “dierbare zuster”’, *Algemeen Dagblad* (12 June 1997).

⁶⁶ ANP archive, picture by Ben Hansen, ‘King Hussein visits Fokker’ (2 October 1984) <http://bit.ly/2bn8hJy> last visited 13-07-2016.

⁶⁷ A.U., ‘Hussein en Beatrix waren dik bevriend’, *Reformatorisch Dagblad* (8 February 1999).

⁶⁸ ANP archive, picture by Cor Mulder, ‘Queen Beatrix welcomes King Hussein’ (10 March 1989) <http://bit.ly/2aY7XCP> and ‘King Hussein in the Netherlands’ (6 April 1987) <http://bit.ly/2bl8wFL> last visited 28-07-2016.

⁶⁹ A.U., ‘Hussein en Beatrix waren dik bevriend’, *Reformatorisch Dagblad* (8 February 1999).

This uncommon interest in the Netherlands raises questions about Hussein's motives for this rapprochement. Was it part of the wider foreign policy of Jordan or was it purely motivated out of personal preference? The 1980s were for Hussein marked by two major developments. First of all the foreign policy of Jordan in this period was under the influence of the alliance with Iraq and Saddam Hussein. King Hussein backed Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988 and supported Saddam Hussein personally.⁷⁰ Secondly the Middle East peace process and all conflicts involved in this peace process shaped Hussein's statecraft. The dissatisfaction about the Camp David accords, the Israeli attack on Lebanon and the tensions with the PLO all contributed to a stubborn and steadfast position of King Hussein.⁷¹ Both these developments also influenced Jordan's relation with traditional ally the United States. In an interview in 1984 King Hussein stated that:

The implications are that as far as I'm concerned, the positions we have adopted over the years, of trying to establish a dialogue with Washington and the United States, of trying to contribute to the creation of a more balanced approach to the problem, which is in the interests of all of the parties to this conflict, have failed.⁷²

Although Hussein was pragmatic enough to not let this statement forever ruin his relations with the United States, the 1980s for Jordan were more about regional activities and relations. The foreign policy was occupied by regional developments and rivalries and King Hussein was an active player in all of them. The king had no active policy aimed at Western alliances or cooperation with Europe. The rapprochement to the Netherlands during these years is therefore remarkable. It does help explain why the rapprochement was rather one-dimensional. The reputation of King Hussein in the West was not without controversy and he had not yet gained international admiration for his efforts in the peace process.

Hussein the peacemaker

The worst reputational damage that King Hussein suffered during his long reign was during the Gulf War of 1990-1991. As briefly explained above, Hussein had supported Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s. His support for the Iraqi side was not just caused by distrust of Iran but was based on personal admiration for Saddam Hussein. That is why he continued his support for the Iraqi dictator at the outbreak of the Gulf War. Hussein's standpoint was incredibly unpopular in the West and caused him great reputational damage.⁷³ Yet he succeeded in gaining international recognition as the peacemaker of the Middle East only three years later. This major reputational boost

⁷⁰ Ashton, *King of Jordan*, 210.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 233-234.

⁷² A.U., 'Interview with King Hussein', *New York Times* (15 March 1984) <http://nyti.ms/2bs61AS> last visited 02-08-2016.

⁷³ Ashton, *King of Jordan*, 263.

was due to the Jordan-Israeli peace treaty of 1994.⁷⁴ On 26 October 1994 King Hussein became the second Arab leader to sign a peace treaty with the state of Israel.⁷⁵ He and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made history that day by signing the treaty. The rapprochement between the two states followed the Egypt-Israel peace treaty from 1979.⁷⁶ The treaty contained agreements on trade, water division and land adjustments.⁷⁷ The treaty received cheers and its signatories congratulations in the West. The reception in the Arab countries was rather different. Not everyone agreed with King Hussein's rapprochement to the Arab enemy and many were disappointed in their king.⁷⁸ The personal involvement of King Hussein in the treaty and the peace process that led to the treaty opened doors for Western cooperation and relations. The Dutch ambassador for Jordan stated that this peace process made it possible for the Netherlands to seek closer ties. He also concluded that Jordan had become increasingly popular with monarchies around the world.⁷⁹ The first explicit result came in the shape of a state visit to Jordan from the Dutch royals in December 1994. The Dutch delegation consisted of Queen Beatrix, Prince Claus and Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Mierlo.⁸⁰ The royals stayed in Jordan for three days and their visit was perceived by King Hussein as support of the Middle East peace process.⁸¹ The aim of the visit was also to reinforce economic relations between the two states. Van Mierlo's program in Jordan was filled with appointments focused on increasing Dutch-Jordan cooperation and trade.⁸² The interactions between the states were limited at the time of this visit. The royal couple met several people of the in total 70 members of the Dutch community in Jordan during their stay.⁸³ The trade between the countries had increased over the last twenty years (see table 1 for the official figures) but the economic interaction was still limited.

1996: The year of change

The state visit of 1994 seemed to be the beginning of a true rapprochement between Jordan and the Netherlands. In the years following this visit the Dutch embassy in Jordan was opened, King Hussein was invited to speak for the Dutch parliament and the trade and cooperation between the two states increased. As mentioned in the introduction the diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Jordan had been monitored by the embassy in Beirut, Lebanon and later on by the embassy in Damascus, Syria. There had never been a Dutch embassy on Jordanian territory. According to the ambassador for Jordan this was due to budgetary problems and in no way because Jordan was not

⁷⁴ Lucas, 'Deliberalization of Jordan', 140.

⁷⁵ Robert Satloff, 'The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty: A Remarkable Document', *Middle East Quarterly* (March 1995) 47-51, 47.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 48.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 49.

⁷⁸ Lucas, 'Deliberalization of Jordan', 137-138.

⁷⁹ ANP archive, Grutterink, national affairs, 'U treft het. Uw koningin komt ook!' (5 December 1994).

⁸⁰ ANP archive, Grutterink, national affairs, 'Koningin Beatrix laaiend enthousiast' (6 December 1994).

⁸¹ ANP archive, 'Koningin Beatrix laaiend enthousiast', (6 December 1994).

⁸² ANP archive, Grutterink, national affairs, 'Beatrix en Claus in Jordanië' (6 December 1994).

⁸³ ANP archive, 'Koningin Beatrix laaiend enthousiast' (6 December 1994).

important enough.⁸⁴ However in January 1996 Minister van Mierlo opened the very first Dutch embassy in Amman, Jordan. Van Mierlo claimed that the opening of the Amman embassy was based on potential water cooperation between the Netherlands and Jordan, new financial capacities of the ministry and royal wishes.⁸⁵

The first affair that exposed tensions about the political power of Queen Beatrix was the opening of the embassy in Amman. As mentioned above Van Mierlo stated that the embassy was opened due to royal wishes. Little did he know that this opening speech would be cited countless times in the following years and would become part of the discussion about the intervention power of the Dutch monarch.⁸⁶ Although he spoke about the relations between the Netherlands and Jordan and about future projects and cooperation, he emphasized the role of the friendly relations between both monarchies.⁸⁷ The opening of the Amman embassy was slightly surprising. Two years earlier, during the state visit to Jordan, Minister van Mierlo had made clear that a Dutch embassy in Amman was not realistic. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a tight budget at the time and embassies in Middle- and Eastern European countries were given priority. Van Mierlo also stated that there was no ‘bitter necessity’ for an embassy in Jordan.⁸⁸ The diplomatic relations were maintained via the embassy in Damascus and this was sufficient for Dutch-Jordan relations. At the time (1994-1996) there were around 70-100 Dutch people living in Jordan.⁸⁹ The economic interactions were also limited. The reluctance of Van Mierlo to open a new embassy is understandable considering these facts. However a mere year-and-a-half after this visit Van Mierlo was back in Amman and officially opened the embassy. He even mentioned his previous visit to Jordan and claimed that it was the state visit of 1994 that had shown him the importance of Dutch-Jordan relations and the necessity of a Dutch embassy.⁹⁰ The economic and political relations between Jordan and the Netherlands had not significantly changed over this period of 18 months or so. It is therefore extra credible that the personal preference of Queen Beatrix influenced his final decision.

So what were the direct results of the Dutch embassy in Jordan? The costs of opening the Amman embassy in 1996 were 4,5 million gulden. The costs for 1997 were calculated at 2,3 million and for the years after that an amount of 1 million gulden was reserved to pay for permanent costs of the embassy.⁹¹ Although this was just a speck on the total budget of the ministry it was an extra expense for a ministry that had little financial leeway. It is remarkable that the export from Jordan to the Netherlands tripled from 1993 till 1996. Part of this increase was due to the increased import of

⁸⁴ ANP archive, ‘U treft het. Uw koningin komt ook!’ (5 December 1994).

⁸⁵ Nysingh, ‘Beatrix vroeg om ambassade in Jordanië’, *Volkskrant*.

⁸⁶ Chorus, *Beatrix*, 22.

⁸⁷ Nysingh, ‘Beatrix vroeg om ambassade in Jordanië’, *Volkskrant*.

⁸⁸ Bouman, ‘Beatrix en Claus bezoeken Jordanië’, *NRC Handelsblad*.

⁸⁹ Nysingh, ‘Beatrix vroeg om ambassade in Jordanië’, *Volkskrant*.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Theo Westerwoudt, ‘Ambassade in Jordanië is de verkeerde keus’, *Volkskrant* (22 januari 1996).

potassium, a chemical element used in fertilizers, machinery and transportation.⁹² The increase does seem to indicate that the intensification of Dutch-Jordan relations had a positive effect. In the years around the opening of the Amman embassy the cooperation between the Netherlands and Jordan also intensified in the field of water cooperation. The Netherlands got involved in the Regional Water Banks Project that was supposed to stimulate cooperation between Israel, Palestine and Jordan concerning water management. The RWBP started in 1995 and was coordinated by the United States. The Netherlands was however one of its primary funders.⁹³ The Netherlands also participated in the Executive Action Team (EXACT) with two representatives. EXACT managed and coordinated water projects and their implementation. EXACT was formed in 1995 and remains in operation till this day.⁹⁴ In 1996 The Middle East Desalination Research Centre was created. This centre was coordinated by Oman, the U.S., Jordan, Palestine, Israel, Korea, Japan, Spain, Qatar and the Netherlands. The objective of the centre was to do research on water and peace and build the capacity to deal with water issues in the Middle East.⁹⁵ Although involvement of the Netherlands is to be expected in international water cooperation because of its reputation as water management specialist, it is striking that these projects were all established around the time of the Dutch state visit and the opening of the Amman embassy. The Dutch-Jordan rapprochement also had political effects. Days before the opening of the embassy Prime Minister Wim Kok received a high distinction from King Hussein. Kok did not understand the reason behind the distinction but saw it as a symbol of gratitude for the Dutch state.⁹⁶

Hussein's European tour

‘Europe is an example and inspiration. I hope that I may witness an Arabic parliament, with representatives of all people from the Arab world.’⁹⁷

In June 1997 King Hussein and his wife Queen Noor visited the Netherlands as part of an European tour. After their trip to the Netherlands the royal couple visited France, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. The purpose of the trip was to discuss Euro-Jordanian cooperation and the peace process of the Middle East. The visit of the royal couple was seen as a joyous occasion and King Hussein was even asked to speak before the Dutch Upper and Lower House, a very uncommon invitation for

⁹² PA NL, ‘Parliamentary questions trade with Jordan’ (March 1997) <http://bit.ly/2bu39Yk> last visited 12-07-2016.

⁹³ Regional Water Data Banks Project, ‘EXACT factsheet’ <http://exact-me.org/> last visited 19-06-2016.

⁹⁴ GovNL, ‘Dutch-Jordan relations’ <http://bit.ly/2aO7AHr> last visited 01-08-2016.

⁹⁵ Middle East Desalination Research Centre, ‘MEDRC Research Program MEDRC Training Program’ <http://bit.ly/2aSxOih> last visited 21-06-2016.

⁹⁶ Bas Paternotte, ‘Gedwongen huwelijken’, *HP/De Tijd* (29 January 2010) <http://bit.ly/2bqb0F1> last visited 04-08-2016.

⁹⁷ PA NL, ‘Speech King Hussein in the Dutch Parliament’ (11 June 1997).

foreign heads of states. Before the speech of King Hussein the chairman of the Upper House, Mr. Korthals Altes, gave a welcoming address. Korthals Altes praised Hussein for his efforts to discuss pressing matters with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence and called it proof of the excellent relations between the two countries. He assured Hussein of Dutch sympathy for his personal efforts in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict and the democratization of the Jordanian political system. Korthals also mentioned the European Union as an example of successful cooperation between old enemies. He ended his speech with stating that the Dutch government believed in the European Mediterranean Partnership and foresaw better cooperation in an area of ‘dialogue, peace, stability and prosperity’.⁹⁸ The farewell speech was given by Lower House chairman mr. Bukman. Bukman focused on the similarities of Jordan and the Netherlands. He spoke of the common fate of small, dependent nations, of the Jordanian and Dutch monarchies and the existence of an elected parliament. Despite praising Hussein and his lasting effort to foster peace in the Middle East, Bukham did mention the differences in the political structure of the countries and the power distribution. He also stated that ‘we have not always agreed with the position of your country’, but that the Dutch government did admire that Hussein was on speaking terms with every nation in the region.⁹⁹ After his speech Hussein had a meeting with Prime Minister Wim Kok and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence. After his meeting with King Hussein Wim Kok stated that the United States and the EU had to work closely together with King Hussein in order to reach a solution for the Middle East conflict. Kok also stressed that the EU had a political responsibility, as well as the ‘socio-economic duty’ to participate in the peace process.¹⁰⁰ Although both men agreed that the EU had an important role to fulfil in the negotiations, they also agreed that it was a must for the United States to stay involved. Although the visit of the Netherlands was part of an European tour, Hussein did mention several times that the Netherlands had a special place in his heart. King Hussein emphasized the friendship of Jordan and the Netherlands and showed gratitude for the interest and understanding of the Dutch government.¹⁰¹ He also explicitly mentioned his warm relations with Queen Beatrix and spoke of her as his ‘dear sister’.¹⁰² The visit from Hussein in 1997, that was followed by a Jordanian delegation a few months later had a positive effect on the relations with the Netherlands and the other EU member states. In 1977 the European Community had already signed a Cooperation Agreement with Jordan. This was followed by an Association Agreement in November 1997, that entered into force in 2002.

The difference between the Dutch-Jordan relations in the period 1960-1980 and 1980-1999 is quite substantial. The early interactions between the two countries were initiated by the national governments and monitored by governmental and diplomatic staff. From 1980s onwards a variety of

⁹⁸ PA NL, ‘Welcoming Address Mr. F. Korthals Altes, Member of the Dutch Upper House’ (11 June 1997).

⁹⁹ PA NL, ‘Farewell speech Mr. Bukman, Member of the Dutch Lower House’ (11 June 1997).

¹⁰⁰ ANP archive, national affairs, ‘Kok hoopt op nieuwe vredesinitiatieven Midden-Oosten’ (11 June 1997).

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² PA NL, ‘Speech King Hussein in the Dutch Parliament’ (11 June 1997).

actors got involved and initiated closer ties. King Hussein transcended Jordanian foreign policy to seek rapprochement to the Netherlands and Queen Beatrix in the 1980s. His actions seemed to be based on personal preference and did not align with foreign policy of Jordan at that time. Queen Beatrix participated in this interaction but did not actively pursue rapprochement to Jordan in the 1980s. She became more personally involved in Dutch-Jordan relations in the course of the 1990s. The Amman affair showed that Beatrix was willing to use her carefully constructed personal power to influence Dutch external relations. The economic ties between the countries remained limited but due to several water management projects, there were more non-governmental actors involved in Jordan.

3- The accession of a new queen

‘She is invisible but very present’.¹⁰³

The introduction briefly addressed the constitutional power of the Dutch monarch. This chapter will focus on the interpretation of this legal framework by Queen Beatrix. It will explain the role of the queen in Dutch politics and analyses the transnational level of her actions during her reign. This chapter will first focus on Beatrix’s personality and her way of ruling. Who was Queen Beatrix during her reign, how did she see her role as queen and how did she feel about international politics? Thereafter two affairs that Beatrix was involved in will be analysed, the above mentioned Amman affair and the Roëll affair. These affairs are examples of the queen’s political power and the merger of her governmental and non-governmental roles. The affairs show the responses of politicians and journalists to this excessive royal interference. With the help of the legal political framework of the Dutch state, this chapter will reveal whether Queen Beatrix operated transnationally and if so how she used her limited political power to the fullest. The chapter is based on personal accounts, biographies and news coverage about Queen Beatrix. With the use of sources on different levels this chapter will provide an understanding of the character of the former queen, her official tasks and her interpretation of these tasks.

Beatrix: strict, bright and fearless

When Beatrix was crowned queen in 1980 she decided to adopt a radically different position from her mother. Beatrix valued tradition and wished to be a real, strict and serious queen. She embraced traditional values and costumes and thereby increased the distance between her and the people. She did however take her role as Dutch monarch extremely serious. Beatrix was from the beginning interested in state affairs and international politics. As a young student Beatrix had taken several courses on international relations and state policy.¹⁰⁴ When she was crowned queen in 1980 she made sure she was henceforth informed on all state affairs and called for weekly meetings with ministers. Her different approach to ruling was not well received by all. Her popularity with the Dutch public fluctuated. Her marriage to German Prince Claus in 1966 had been a source of unrest and criticism.¹⁰⁵ It is safe to say that the public had to get used to the new queen and her royal attitude. But the general public quickly warmed to her. There was no vocal opposition to the queen during the 1980s and early 1990s. Criticism on the queen and her policy only increased in the late 1990s. Beatrix’s personal involvement in the love life of her son Willem-Alexander showed people that the queen was not

¹⁰³ A.U., ‘Beatrix onzichtbaar, maar zeer aanwezig’, *Volkskrant* (18 September 1996) own translation.

¹⁰⁴ Chorus, *Beatrix*, 77.

¹⁰⁵ Deen, ‘Het temperament van Beatrix’, digital publication.

always warm and welcoming.¹⁰⁶ The criticism on her personal meddling coincided with the criticism on her political power and the misuse of this power.¹⁰⁷

Dries van Agt, former prime minister of the Netherlands, described Queen Beatrix as ‘vivacious, bright and highly intellectual’.¹⁰⁸ The biography of Van Agt showed a glimpse of the life and work ethic of Beatrix. She wished to be as actively involved in politics as possible. This desire expressed itself in her reading letters of heads of state, all parliamentary questions that concerned the royal family and being informed on cabinet discussions.¹⁰⁹ Queen Beatrix’s interest in international affairs was further developed under the influence of Prince Claus, who used to be a German diplomat and had worked as an ambassador for several years.¹¹⁰

The Dutch monarchy

After the Second World War the political power of the Dutch monarch had continually decreased. Beatrix’s mother, Queen Juliana, was involved in several crises during her reign that resulted in limitations on the formal political power of the monarch. The Greet Hoffman’s affair in 1956, the tumult around the wedding of Princess Irene in 1965 and the Lockheed affair in the 1970s all contributed to a more cautious interaction between the Dutch government and the monarch.¹¹¹ Ministers and the prime minister were increasingly involved in the personal matters of the queen. The division between the queen as a private person and as a monarch faded. Appointing officials remained the only frequent political task of the monarch.¹¹² Despite this development Queen Beatrix did not necessarily have less power than Queen Juliana. The degree of royal intervention power became more dependent on personality and personal connections throughout the twentieth century. As a result it is impossible to measure the extent of royal political influence. However in 1996 a survey among Dutch citizens about the power of the monarchy concluded that a majority of the people believed that the political power of Queen Beatrix was more extensive than the political power of Queen Juliana.¹¹³

Leading lady in affairs

As mentioned above the Amman affair was the first political affair that Queen Beatrix was involved in and that damaged her reputation as queen. Minister Van Mierlo had slipped up and had given the public a glimpse in the behind the scenes workings of royal power. The affair sparked discussions in newspapers about the role of the Dutch queen in the national government. One of the critical

¹⁰⁶ Chorus, *Beatrix*, 15.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Paternotte, ‘Gedwongen huwelijken’, digital publication.

¹⁰⁹ Deen, ‘Het temperament van Beatrix’, digital publication.

¹¹⁰ Sander Pleij, ‘Prins Claus Von Amsberg: hup de monarchie’, *De Groene Amsterdammer* (30 April 1997) <http://bit.ly/2aV9OXu> last visited 08-08-2016.

¹¹¹ Brouwer, ‘Beatrix versus Juliana’, 14.

¹¹² Ibid, 11.

¹¹³ Ibid, 10.

responses to the Amman affair came from Theo Westerwoudt in an article in newspaper *Volkscrant*. Westerwoudt stated that diplomatic relations in the first place had to be in the service of national interest. He saw the economic relations between the Netherlands and Jordan as too insignificant for a fully dressed embassy and concluded that the diplomatic delegations in Damascus and Cairo were more than capable of monitoring the diplomatic relations.¹¹⁴ Westerwoudt criticized the financial burden of the Jordanian embassy at a time when rapprochement to Eastern European states was much more important.¹¹⁵

The unrest about the Amman affair was just settling down when a new affair presented itself. In 1996, only a few months after the reveal of Minister van Mierlo, the *NRC Handelsblad* published an article about the role of the queen in the recall of ambassador E. Roëll from South-Africa.¹¹⁶ Roëll had brought his Danish girlfriend with him to South-Africa, even though his wife was left in the Netherlands, in 1992. The queen, in preparation of a state visit to South-Africa, allegedly asked for an early recall of the ambassador because she did not agree with his personal affairs. It should be mentioned that it was Beatrix's normal policy to not allow girlfriends of her male entourage to join her. Even unmarried ministers who were in a long-term relationship were asked not to bring their partners.¹¹⁷ The following weeks and months multiple articles were published about the Roëll affair. The queen and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied the influence of the monarch. In parliamentary questions Van Mierlo confirmed that private matters had nothing to do with the recall of ambassador Roëll.¹¹⁸ During the state visit to South-Africa of Queen Beatrix and Crown Prince Willem-Alexander the queen assured journalists that she had nothing to do with the decision and that the publications about her interference were absurd.¹¹⁹

The affair itself was not per se a big deal. Ambassador Roëll continued to work for the ministry and was appointed as ambassador of Belgium. What the affair represented was however significant. Queen Beatrix had previously received criticism on her policy and interventions but the Amman and Roëll affair sparked a debate about the power of the Dutch monarch. The 'secret of Soestdijk' (later Noordeinde), the agreement not to speak about interactions and conversations between ministers and the monarch, made it very difficult to discuss these type of affairs. Although there were parliamentary questions from political parties *GroenLinks* and *D66* about the affairs, no one seriously questioned the role of Queen Beatrix. They were more concerned about her motives.¹²⁰

¹¹⁴ Westerwoudt, 'Ambassade in Jordanië is de verkeerde keus', *Volkscrant*.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Willebrord Nieuwenhuis, 'Beatrix liet ambassadeur vervangen', *NRC Handelsblad* (4 September 1996).

¹¹⁷ Kees Versteegh, 'Buigen voor wensen Beatrix is de regel', *NRC Handelsblad* (5 september 1996).

¹¹⁸ PA NL, Parliamentary questions, 'Questions MP Sipkes (GroenLinks) about the replacement of the Dutch ambassador in South-Africa' (17 September 1997) <http://bit.ly/1XGt6Cy> last visited 12-07-2016.

¹¹⁹ Kees Versteegh, 'Beatrix ontkent betrokkenheid bij ambassadeurskwestie', *NRC Handelsblad* (2 October 1996).

¹²⁰ Willebrord Nieuwenhuis, 'Hoe Beatrix boos werd, Van Mierlo boog en Röell verdween', *NRC Handelsblad* (10 October 1996).

When MP Sipkes asked Van Mierlo about the personal involvement of the queen and about the constitutional justification of this involvement his answer was simple: ‘Considering article 42 of the Constitution it is against written and unwritten Dutch state law to speak about the nature and content of discussions by the queen with her ministers.’¹²¹ He did however state that personal circumstances played no role in the decision.¹²² Prime Minister Wim Kok responded indirect to the allegations in his reaction to the queen’s speech of September 1996. He claimed that the queen had ‘no unwanted or uncontrolled power’ over governmental policy. Kok did state that the queen was very much part of the government and hence had leeway.¹²³ Although the Roëll affair does not relate to the Dutch-Jordan relations or Queen Beatrix’s connection to King Hussein, it does reveal an interference in international politics by the Dutch queen on the basis of personal preference. The affair is also a fine example of how royal actions or involvement is protected by the political actors and the constitution.

A malleable legal framework?

To understand whether the Dutch queen acted transnationally or non-governmental in her interference with the embassy in Jordan it is necessary to look at the normal legal procedure of opening embassies. In a parliamentary letter from 1991 former Minister of Foreign Affairs Van den Broek proclaimed that diplomatic posts are opened with consideration of ‘the importance of the relations with the countries concerned’, available financial capacity and ‘diplomatic and specific local and temporal factors’. This explanation is vague and broad. How does the opening of a new embassy actually work? The department of legal advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs distinguishes nine steps that need to be completed before a new Dutch embassy can be opened. The normal procedure starts with a business case proposal of the regional management, in this case the department of North Africa and the Middle East. This draft is send to the council of the secretary general and the directors general. When they agree on the proposal they consult with the minister of FA. The minister agrees and presents the plan to the cabinet. After they send information to the parliament and inform local authorities a royal resolution is drafted. The final steps involve the Chef de Poste, the diplomatic representation and the creation of a plan of action.¹²⁴ The monarch is technically only involved during the signing of the royal resolution. However the queen can use her connection and contact with the minister to stir him in the right direction. If she had been able to influence the minister he had to make sure all previous steps of the procedure were completed, otherwise there would be no business case and background information for him to pass on to the cabinet and parliament.

Several ministers admitted that Queen Beatrix, with her interest in state affairs and

¹²¹ PA NL, ‘Questions MP Sipkes (GroenLinks) about the replacement of the Dutch ambassador in South-Africa’ <http://bit.ly/1XGt6Cy>.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ U.A. ‘Beatrix niet buiten het boekje’, *De Stem* (18 September 1996).

¹²⁴ Janet de Vries, Personal e-mail contact between the undersigned and Mrs. De Vries, ‘Embassy structure’, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Legal department* (14 June 2016).

international relations, was perhaps an invisible but still very present part of the Dutch government during her reign.¹²⁵ The queen asked for frequent consultations and wished to be kept informed. The secrecy that surrounds her makes it difficult to measure her true political influence. The two affairs analysed above are examples showing that the queen sometimes struggled with balancing her different roles within the Dutch state. The Amman affair in particular can be seen as an intervention by the queen that had serious consequences. Despite these affairs the position of the queen was never seriously questioned. The involved ministers had to answer to the criticism and they stated that Queen Beatrix had not crossed the boundaries of her political power. It is however a very broad interpretation of her political tasks. Beatrix's personality and her position as queen of the Netherlands made her want to be part of the national government. She did not want to be a ribbon cutting queen and she therefore made sure she stretched her governmental role as far as possible. It is not possible to prove that Beatrix acted transnationally in the Dutch-Jordan case with the sources available at this time. It is however fair to say that she used her position and personal connections to the involved ministers to the fullest to pursue certain goals.

¹²⁵ Paternotte, 'Gedwongen huwelijken', digital publication.

4- Hussein in search of Western friends

‘High Jordanian officials are somewhat irritated that a number of small European countries do have an embassy in Amman and that the Netherlands, despite its good relations with Jordan, does not.’¹²⁶

An article in Dutch newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* opened with the above mentioned statement on 6 December 1994. Although the author does not give any further details on the apparent irritation of these Jordanian officials it is nonetheless a remarkable comment. This chapter will focus on the Jordanian standpoints and King Hussein’s attitude towards the Netherlands and Dutch-Jordan cooperation. What was the explicit involvement of King Hussein in the Dutch-Jordan relations and what motivated him to take on this role? Chapter two has shown that King Hussein was personally motivated to pursue closer ties to the Netherlands in the 1980s. The analysis down below will give a better understanding of his motives and the (trans)national characteristics of his foreign policy. It also explains the changes he made in this policy during the 1980s and 1990s.

King for life

To give a better understanding of Hussein’s actions this section will delve into his personal motives. This is easier said than done. Hussein was king from the age of 17 till his death at the age of 63. The man Hussein and the king Hussein were difficult to separate, their fates and personality intertwined. Thanks to the multiple biographies written about him it is however possible to get a glimpse in the life and personality of King Hussein of Jordan.

The most important fact that shaped King Hussein’s faith and actions was his belief that he, as part of the Hashemite family, was the descendant of Prophet Muhammed. This descent legitimized his ruling for over 40 years. The second belief that influenced the reign of Hussein was his support for Arab nationalism. The Hashemite family had its own interpretation of Arab nationalism and Hussein remained a supporter throughout his life. He ultimately believed in an independent Arab nation, without the interference and control of outside power. Hussein believed that the Hashemite family was the natural leader of the Arabs.¹²⁷ The descent of Muhammad and the fact that Hussein’s great grandfather had led an Arab revolt against the Ottomans during the First World War contributed to Hussein’s confidence about his own position as king and as potential leader of the united Arabs.¹²⁸

At a young age Hussein studied in Britain and had spent several years in London.¹²⁹ His time spent in the West had given him an understanding and appreciation for Western culture and tradition.

¹²⁶ Bouman, ‘Beatrix en Claus bezoeken Jordanië’, *NRC Handelsblad*, own translation.

¹²⁷ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, digital publication.

¹²⁸ Ashton, *King of Jordan*, 5.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 85.

Throughout his life he married 4 different women, two of which were from the West.¹³⁰ Despite his interest in Western culture he was a convinced Muslim and Arab. Hussein was often spotted wearing modern suits combined with the traditional Arab *keffiyeh*. Even in his clothing he knew how to combine East and West, ideals and realism.¹³¹ His belief in Arab nationalism seems to contradict many of Hussein's actions. He became known for his ties with Israel, the United States and Europe. Nevertheless he stayed true to his belief in Arab independence. His rapprochement to different allies emerged from an understanding of Jordan's situation. Jordan is a small country, has limited natural resources and is surrounded by political turmoil and powerful oil states. Hussein foresaw a bright future for Jordan but was realistic enough to know that the political and economic situation of the country and its ties with Arab neighbours had to improve first.

The Jordanian king had a passion for international politics and a talent for diplomacy. He was less interested in administrative tasks or economic policy. He was surrounded by a group of trusty supporters or family members whom he entrusted with these less important tasks. The reason that Hussein was able to maintain relative good relations with leaders from all over the world was due to his charisma and his realism. He was a kind man with a warm personality and genuinely believed in conflict prevention. Hussein was never permanently resentful. He sometimes had his enemies but was willing to forgive and forget if it suited him and Jordan better. Hussein was a fierce anti-communist in the early years of his reign but was willing to accept Soviet arms supplies and financial aid in the 80s and 90s.¹³² Although this pragmatic approach sometimes led to criticism it also resulted in appreciation and admiration in all regions of the world.¹³³

Although King Hussein became known for his personal efforts in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of 1994, his motives were not strictly political. Hussein had to keep Jordan and its economy afloat. His decision to stay neutral during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 put a dent to his reputation in the West, especially in the United States. Because Jordan is a country that is naturally dependent on others due to lack of resources and water, it needs its allies, preferably powerful and rich allies to survive and secure its place between the Levant and the Gulf. The political developments in the 1980s and 1990s had weakened the economy of Jordan and its ties with the Arab countries and the United States. The decision for a peace treaty with Israel cannot be separated from these geopolitical developments. King Hussein was disappointed in the support of the United States after his huge efforts in the negotiations with Israel. His policy therefore became focused at other potential allies, e.g. The Netherlands and the European Union. Hussein had tried to modernize the political structure of Jordan but quickly realised that the upcoming opposition formed an obstacle. He was convinced of his own right and valued his policy and his direction over popular

¹³⁰ Noor Al-Hussein, *Koningin Noor van Jordanië: Een leven in teken van vrede. Memoires* (Amsterdam 2003) 53.

¹³¹ Ashton, *King of Jordan*, 5.

¹³² Galia Golan, 'Gorbachev's Middle East Strategy', *Foreign Affairs* 66-1 (October 1987) 41-57, 50.

¹³³ Ashton, *King of Jordan*, 1-2.

support. He was not even really trying to conceal the fact that he was reversing political reforms. The political structure of Jordan had relied on the king for so long that Hussein was able to pull this off without causing serious disruption in Jordan.

Political structure of Jordan

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was a traditional, political monarchy from the start. The king was official head of state and he and his family were the most powerful actors of the country. Before 1989 the state had no real democratic characteristics. This started to change when the circumstances pushed King Hussein to liberalization. In late 1987 the first Palestinian intifada broke out. The uprising of the Palestinian people persisted and received a lot of support from the substantial Palestinian-Jordanian community living in Jordan.¹³⁴ The many developments in and around Jordan resulted in more prominent political opposition. King Hussein decided to allow for some political reform to please the opposition without endangering his own position. In 1989 the first national parliamentary elections were held in twenty years.¹³⁵ King Hussein also formally ended Martial Law in 1991, diminished press censorship and had the National Assembly legalize political parties.¹³⁶ Despite these political reforms the most important issues, economy and foreign politics, were still dealt with by the king himself. Hussein also implemented several economic reforms in order to be eligible for financial aid of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).¹³⁷

These years showed Hussein that allowing more political freedom did not go hand in hand with his economic reforms and his international wishes. His rapprochement to Israel and his dependence on the IMF were sources of fierce opposition. In 1993 Hussein issued new electoral reforms that diminished the democratic characteristics to safeguard his own position.¹³⁸ In 1997 new parliamentary elections were scheduled. King Hussein again diminished the power of the opposition as a response to criticism on his policy and position. Hussein had a little flirtation with a democratic political system but was not afraid to reverse political reforms when he believed that the position of the monarch was in danger.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ Robert Satloff, 'Jordan Looks Inwards', *Current History* 89 (February 1990) 57-64, 58.

¹³⁵ Lucas, 'Deliberalization in Jordan', 139.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Curtis, R. Ryan, 'Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and The International Monetary Fund', *Middle East Policy* 6-2 (October 1998) 54-66, 56.

¹³⁸ Beverley Milton-Edwards, 'Facade Democracy and Jordan', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20-2 (1993) 191-203, 202-203.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 192.

In need of new allies

In 1990 the Gulf War broke out when Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait.¹⁴⁰ Although the war was mainly fought by Iraq and the United States it had profound consequences for Jordan and for King Hussein. All parties that were involved in the conflict were tied to Jordan in some shape or form. King Hussein had to take economic motives, personal relations and the international world order into account. His decision to support or at least not condemn the actions of Saddam Hussein had a prolonged effect on the economic and political position of Jordan and of the king himself and was an important factor in the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994.¹⁴¹ The chaotic years in the 1980s and early 1990s had a profound impact on Jordan and King Hussein. Traditional alliances had crumpled, the economy was in desperate need of help and the democratic experiments did not have the desired effect. Hussein was however not one to despair. He quickly found a new region to focus on: the European Union. On 31 July 1997 King Hussein of Jordan wrote a letter to the political leaders of the EU member states.¹⁴² In this letter he asked for an European help fund that would support the socio-economic development of Jordan. Hussein emphasized the important role Jordan had played in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations and as peacekeeper of the Middle-East. Hussein continued his letter with showing gratitude to the European leaders for their friendship and support during these years. He wrote: ‘Your support has gone a long way in establishing the foundations of the new model of stability, peaceful coexistence, and economic cooperation in the Middle East.’¹⁴³

Hussein assured the European leaders that although the peace process was in a difficult period, he still had an unwearingly wish to contribute to permanent peace in the region. He wrote that ‘we are encouraging popular support’ but that the upcoming elections in Jordan in November were a major threat to the political efforts of the Jordanian parliament.¹⁴⁴ This is exactly the reason why King Hussein reversed some of his political reforms that same year. He was afraid that the popular support for him and his supporters was so small, due to the peace process and the bad socio-economic situation of the country, that he wanted to be sure that he could continue his reforms and international politics without the intervention of an opposing parliament.

In September 1997 a Jordanian delegation arrived in the Netherlands.¹⁴⁵ The plea by King Hussein for a European support fund had its effects. Even before the meeting with the Jordanian officials in September the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs was positive about the proposal. Italy

¹⁴⁰ Fred Halliday, ‘The Gulf War 1990-1991 and the study of international relations’, *Review of International Studies* 20-2 (1994) 109-130, 113.

¹⁴¹ Ashton, *King of Jordan*, 283.

¹⁴² NA NL, Personal letter from King Hussein to Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker, *Hussein letter to Juncker*, 2.05.81, nr. 81 (31 July 1997).

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ NA NL, Message from PA Ambassador’s office to Mrs. De la Parra, *Composition of the Jordanian delegation*, 2.05.81, nr. 88 (8 September 1997).

and the United Kingdom had already responded positively to this proposal and it was believed that France would agree too. In November of that same year the European Union signed an Association Agreement with Jordan. Although this Agreement did not go into force till 2002, it is safe to say that the mediation of King Hussein had a positive effect on the Euro-Jordan relations.


The European tour of King Hussein and Queen Noor in 1997 should be seen in the lights of these developments. The objectives of King Hussein during his European visits were clear. He was there to encourage participation in and hope for the Middle East peace process. Hussein liked to be seen as the peacebuilder of the Middle East and worked hard in and outside of Jordan to keep this reputation in place. This objective cannot however be separated from his second goal: economic support for Jordan. As mentioned above, the European leader were notified in July 1997 that the Jordanian king wanted the establishment of an European help fund. Hussein's timing is admirable. He visited the EU members in June/July 1997, send a request for financial aid a few weeks later and send a delegation to discuss the matter two months later. His admiration for the European experiment was not just diplomatic posturing but was based on Hussein's genuine belief in cooperation and Arab nationalism. The European Union was a confirmation that different people could be combined in a supranational political structure.

King Hussein was the main, perhaps only, actor in foreign policy decisions. He had a clear idea about what he wanted for Jordan and believed that befriending foreign powers would help him achieve these goals. He was in that sense pragmatic although he always stayed true to his beliefs about a great Arab empire. King Hussein was convinced that closer ties to Western powers, to Europe, to the Netherlands in the 1990s would be economically beneficial and would help build his reputation as peacemaker of the Middle-East. In the light of these developments did the relation between the Netherlands and Jordan blossom. Because of the lack of democracy in Jordan and the great personal power of the monarch the roles of Hussein were different from Beatrix's roles. The three different roles of monarchs that Efthymiou distinguishes relate to King Hussein to a lesser extent. His power was based on a merger of the functions of head of state, personal and governmental member. Despite the fact that King Hussein was guided by his personal beliefs and preferences during the Dutch-Jordan rapprochement, the political structure of Jordan at that time made his actions, national actions.

Photo gallery



ANP archive, picture by Arthur Bastiaanse, 'Princess Beatrix and Prince Claus in Petra' (23 November 1978)
<http://www.anp-archief.nl/page/84844/nl> last visited 02-08-2016.



ANP archive, picture by Arthur Bastiaanse, 'Princess Beatrix and Prince Claus in Petra' (23 November 1978)
<http://www.anp-archief.nl/page/2143614/nl> last visited 02-08-2016.



ANP archive, picture by Arthur Bastiaanse, 'Princess Beatrix and Prince Claus in Petra' (23 November 1978)
<http://www.anp-archieff.nl/page/2143612/nl> last visited 02-08-2016.



ANP archive, picture by Ben Hansen, 'King Hussein arriving at IJpenburg airbase' (1 October 1984)
<http://www.anp-archieff.nl/page/45506/nl> last visited 25-07-2016.



ANP archive, picture by Cor Mulder, 'King Hussein visits the Netherlands' (1 October 1984) <http://www.anp-archief.nl/page/45502/nl> last visited 25-07-2016.



ANP archive, picture by Arthur Bastiaanse, 'Prince Claus saying goodbye to Queen Noor at Amman Airport' (8 December 1994) <http://www.anp-archief.nl/page/50441/nl> last visited 25-07-2016.



ANP archive, Benelux Press, 'State visit to Jordan by the royal couple' (December 1994) <http://www.anp-archief.nl/page/237061/nl> last visited 26-07-2016.



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ANP archive, ANP Foundation, ' Queen Beatrix arriving in Jordan' (6 December 1994) <http://www.anp-archief.nl/page/50288/nl> last visited 28-07-2016.

Conclusion

It is not enough to compare the relations between the Netherlands and Jordan before and after 1980, the year of Beatrix's coronation, to understand the influence of the queen and her friendship with King Hussein. Beatrix was only a small actor in the interactions between the countries and during her reign the relation was influenced by many international and national developments and actors. This thesis has tried to showcase this complexity by combining research on different involved parties and the economic, historic and political context of the involved states. Due to the delicate nature of this research and the limited transparency of primary sources not all information gaps can be filled. By analysing the circle of developments around the core this thesis has wanted to deliver an analysis as complete as possible.

The relations between Jordan and the Netherlands were in the beginning of low intensity. After the Second World War and the creation of new borders and states in the Middle East, the Jordanian Kingdom consolidated and created its own identity in the Middle East and in the rest of the world. Although the relations with the Netherlands were in no way remarkable, Jordan was early on known as a pro-Western country. Because of this pro-Western attitude and the connections with the United Kingdom and the United States the Dutch-Jordan relations were relatively good. The relations between the Dutch and Jordan royals were on a standard level. There was no special interaction between Queen Juliana and King Hussein.

The first time that the economic and political relations between the Netherlands and Jordan got a serious blow, was during and after the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. The entire West block received criticism for the way it acted and supported Israel. The actions of the Dutch government in particular angered the Arab countries. Even pro-Western countries, like Lebanon and Jordan, gave fierce responses. The oil boycott that followed the 1973 war specifically targeted the Netherlands due to its open support of the state of Israel. The Dutch government believed this specific targeting to be unfair and tried to rectify the situation by sending a special representative to the Middle East. The boycott persisted even after the joint statement of the EC member states. It took several years for the relations between the Netherlands and Jordan to recover from the 1973 crisis. There does not seem to be an actual turning point but the relations slowly improved, mainly due to the EC and the increase of Euro-Arab dialogue. The first sign of friendly relations between the two states was the invitation of King Hussein's brother and his wife to Princess Beatrix and Prince Claus to come and visit Jordan in 1978. The visit of the Dutch royal couple was part of a series of visits around the world, with a focus on the Middle East.

Even though King Hussein was occupied with other international developments and regional conflicts in the 1980s, he took the time to build his relation with the Netherlands and the Dutch queen. The 1980s marked the beginning of the friendship between the two monarchs but the international order prevented the two countries from seriously intensifying its relations. The rapprochement from

Hussein to the Netherlands in the 1980s seems mainly based on his personal relation with the royal family. He, at that time, had no specific policy that can explain the increasing interaction. This all changed during the first half of the 1990s. King Hussein gained international recognition for his work as mediator and peacekeeper of the Middle East. This improved his reputation in the West and opened doors for interaction between the Netherlands and Jordan. Although the Dutch government had not shown any particular interest in Jordan during the 1980s, it adopted a more active policy towards Jordan during the 1990s. The good relations between both royal families stimulated this development. During the 1990s the economic interaction between the states increased somewhat but the changes were mostly political. King Hussein saw his rapprochement as part of the bigger European puzzle whilst the Dutch government saw the interaction with Jordan as a stimulant of the Middle East peace process. Queen Beatrix agreed with the Dutch government that rapprochement to Jordan was a stimulant of the peace process and a way of showing gratitude to King Hussein for his personal efforts in the process. She was however more convinced of the importance of the rapprochement due to her personal connections to the Jordanian royals.

Looking back at the interactions between the two countries across the 20th century, the years of 1994 till 1998 stand out. The expansion and strengthening of the Dutch-Jordan ties in these years, economic and political, are not comparable to the years before. The explanation of these developments involves different international circumstances and the willingness of involved parties. Queen Beatrix liked King Hussein and his wife Queen Noor but also admired Hussein for his role as mediator and peacekeeper in the Middle East. The peace treaty with Israel that Hussein signed was thanks to a huge amount of personal effort by the king of Jordan. King Hussein also liked Queen Beatrix on a personal level but his motives to enter into closer ties with the Netherlands were more pragmatic and served as a means to an end. His rapprochement to the Netherlands can be seen as part of the foreign policy that he started after the Gulf War. Hussein was in desperate need of rich, stable and willing allies that would help Jordan overcome its economic depression.

The question that was central in this thesis was: to what extent were the economic and political relations between Jordan and the Netherlands from 1980-1999 influenced by Queen Beatrix and King Hussein? The political structure of Jordan allows for more personal influence of the reigning monarch. Because the formal power of the monarch is so extensive and includes pretty much all policy fields, the monarch has no need to act transnationally. Nye and Keohane state that a governmental actor can take on different roles, as a governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental actor. Due to the tight connection between the function of private person and monarch in Jordan at the time of the reign of King Hussein, the roles of governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental actor overlapped. The depth of the monarchical power in Jordan was at the time so substantial that King Hussein was in charge of a large majority of governmental policy and almost all intergovernmental policy. Even if he wanted to act non-governmental, his function and his overwhelming personal power made it impossible to do so, with the exception of some of his private

matters. His actions equalled national actions. In this case, the rapprochement to the Netherlands and the Dutch royal family in the 1980s originated from his personal preference. It started off in the 1980s as a non-governmental process led by King Hussein, but quickly became governmental and intergovernmental because he saw a willing partner in the Dutch government and royal family in the 1990s and because he was able to convince the Jordanian national government that this rapprochement was the right thing to do. The main difference with the Dutch political system is that this ‘convincing’ part does not take a lot of work because the national parliament is subordinate to the power of the King. Although there was and is a parliament in Jordan, the strings remain in the hands of the royal family. Hussein was especially interested in foreign policy and made sure he had complete freedom to implement his policy. The separation of the different roles is not as strict for the Jordanian monarch as it is for the Dutch monarch. Despite this personal freedom he did not let personal feelings dictate his actions in the case analysed here. His friendship with the Dutch queen most likely helped the relations between the two states but it was not the main reason for Hussein to seek closer ties to the Netherlands in the 1990s. Hussein was a pragmatist and juggler of international allies and based his rapprochement to the Netherlands on economic and political motives.

The political structure of the Netherlands allows for very limited personal influence of the reigning monarch. The formal power of the Dutch monarch is limited and because of the principle of ministerial responsibility all actions of the queen/king are under someone else’s responsibility. This structure protects the monarch but moreover limits the freedom of the queen. When Minister van Mierlo misspoke during the Amman opening speech, he and Queen Beatrix both received criticism. Van Mierlo was however the only one accountable and the only one that had to defend his statement and policy. The legal structure in the Netherlands limits the potential personal influence of the monarch but it also limits public access. All interaction between the queen and ministers is confidential and this prohibits real understanding of the personal influence of the monarch.

It is not unlikely that Queen Beatrix declared her personal preferences in foreign policy to the involved parties. Although it is hard to prove, there are several cases where the queen’s personal preferences seemed to influence foreign policy. This also seemed to be the case during the years of increased Dutch-Jordan cooperation. It did not hurt the Netherlands in any way to seek closer ties to Jordan, nor did it have a huge impact on the economic or political position of the country. The only special aspect of their relation was the cooperation in the field of water management. The Netherlands was known as a water management specialist, so it is understandable that the government wanted to take part in water projects in and around Jordan. The timing however does show that this could not have been the only reason for the Netherlands to seek rapprochement. There had been several water projects in the past in Jordan that were executed without the help of the Dutch. The rapprochement to Jordan was based on a confluence of factors. Jordan had proved itself a valuable Western ally in the Middle East, Hussein was looking for European friends and was open to new cooperation. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Minister Van Mierlo as its representative received encouraging

reports from different actors. The queen believed rapprochement was a good idea, the water partners were on board and Jordanian officials openly asked for closer ties. In the end the support group outweighed the negative aspects. There was little open criticism on the closer relations with Jordan. There were some negative comments about the costs of this rapprochement but the budget of the ministry seemed to cover it all. Although there were no significant gains from the Dutch-Jordan relation it did not bother anyone enough to protest.

The theory of transnationalism is extensively covered in the introduction and has been at the basis of this analysis. One of the questions central in this thesis was whether Queen Beatrix acted as a transnational actor in the case of Dutch-Jordan relations. The answer to this question could prove that Queen Beatrix did in fact operate outside of governmental control and that the political structure of the Netherlands allows for too much informal power of the ruling monarch. This clashes with the principles of the Netherlands as a constitutional monarchy. I personally believe that Queen Beatrix, because of her interest in international affairs, her interest in the Middle East, her friendship with King Hussein and her contact with Minister Van Mierlo, was involved in the intensification of Dutch-Jordan relations throughout the 1980s and especially during the 1990s. However this analysis concludes that this did not happen in the traditional transnational method. Individuals can be of influence on (foreign) policy in two ways: committing to a transnational organisation (e.g. an international NGO) or by influencing policymakers. Queen Beatrix clearly chose the latter. Beatrix did not act as a transnational actor but she made sure during her reign that she was imbedded in the national political structure of the Netherlands. Although her official tasks were limited, she made sure that she was accepted as a serious political actor/advisor. Beatrix asked for constant updates on international and national affairs and frequently gave advice, wanted or unwanted, to policy makers. Her relationship with the involved minister was decisive for her intervention power.

According to transnational theory TNAs generally have two motives behind their political meddling, either personal gain or morals. King Hussein clearly had national and so personal gains on his mind when he decided to pursue closer ties to the Netherlands. The interesting thing about this case study is that Queen Beatrix's actions do not match the personal or moral motive. She personally had nothing to gain from rapprochement to Jordan. The Jordanian royals certainly showed gratitude to the Dutch government and the royal family but it did not have an effect on the personal position of Queen Beatrix. She was not led by a moral motive during the Jordanian rapprochement either. She was grateful for Hussein's personal effort in the peace process but these feelings were not strong enough to explain her dedication to Jordan. Only Beatrix herself knows exactly what her motive was but my hypothesis is that her interference with the Jordanian relations was based on two motives: friendship and power. Beatrix's friendship with Hussein motivated her to push for closer relations between the Netherlands and Jordan. She knew King Hussein was working on closer ties with European countries and I believe Beatrix saw a Dutch embassy in Jordan as a friendly gesture that had high symbolic value with a low risk. Her second motive is based on her desire to be involved, to be

valued and to be determinative. Queen Beatrix wanted nothing more than to be respected for her role as queen, as head of state and as part of the national government. She wished to be fully informed on state and international affairs. My hypothesis is that her involvement in the Dutch-Jordan relations was a way of showing her involvement, understanding and power.

This thesis concludes that the monarchs of the Netherlands and Jordan influenced their foreign policy aimed at each other's respective countries. King Hussein lay the groundwork for Dutch-Jordan relations in the 1980s with his visits to the Netherlands and his close relations to the Dutch royal family. He let go of personal preferences during the 1990s and stimulated rapprochement to the Netherlands based on economic and political motives. Due to the political structure of Jordan and the interweave of his functions Hussein did not act on a transnational level. He as a person and as a king had full power over foreign policy and did not have to transcend the national level to exert influence, he was the national level. The position of Queen Beatrix was however rather different. She let her personal connections with the Jordanian king influence her standpoint on international affairs and directly or indirectly made her wishes clear to the responsible minister. The opening of the Amman embassy was not in its entirety a transnational decision because the idea was fully incorporated in the legal procedure. The ministry was involved and the cabinet and parliament were informed. The transnational aspect of her involvement lies in the preparations of Dutch-Jordan rapprochement. Her connection to Hussein led her to value relations between the Netherlands and Jordan unrealistically high. In the end the queen used her political power and the personal connections she had to influence policy. This was however not a fully transnational action because she operated within the legal and political framework of the Netherlands. Did she misuse the political power she was given? It is clear that all other involved parties seriously looked at the proposals that would lead to closer ties with Jordan. The decisions were thought through thoroughly and had no bad consequences for the economic or political position of the Netherlands. I would imagine Queen Beatrix to be very aware of the situation in the Middle East and Jordan and understanding of the possibilities and impossibilities between the two countries. I do however believe that the concept of ministerial responsibility, the secret of Noordeinde and the vague definition of the monarch's political power sustains an opaque political structure that promotes arbitrariness. An open and honest discussion about the future of the Dutch monarchy is made impossible by this lack of transparency.

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