

*Political involvement and intra-European migration in the European Union*



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**Abstract** This study examines the political participation of intra-European migrants (i.e. mobile Europeans) in comparison to non-mobile Europeans on European level. As much research has been done on migrants' political participation in the host country and their country of origin, this study focusses on participation on the European level. For the analysis the European Election Voter study 2014 is used, which includes respondents from all 28 European Union member states. The predictors of political participation included in this research encompass: migrant status, political trust, conventional participation and EU identity. The chi-square tests show that migrant status has a significant effect on political trust, however there is no significant effect on EU identity and conventional participation. A binary logistic regression is used to assess if the anticipated models of political participation on the European level fit. The results indicate that migrant status, political trust and conventional participation have a significant effect on voting in the European Parliament elections. EU identity is however not in all the models significant. Intra-European migrants thus participate more on European level than non-mobile Europeans. However, the expected moderating effect between migrant status and political trust, EU identity and conventional participation is not supported. Further research is therefore needed to examine the underlying mechanisms.

**Keywords:** political participation, intra-European migrants, European Union, citizenship, identity

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## **1. Introduction**

Literature predominantly describes the notion of citizenship as a national matter. Citizenship is thereby described as membership to a political community and being a member of this political community encompasses certain individual rights. A well-known distinction of these rights is from Marshall (1950), who states that citizenship entails civil, social, and political rights. Political rights give a citizen the opportunity to participate politically in various ways, such as electoral participation and party membership in a nation-state. However, nowadays citizenship is contested as becoming more denationalized. This implies that citizenship is becoming less solely a national engagement, and increasingly reaches over the borders of a nation-state. For this reason different notions of citizenship are introduced in the literature, such as supranational citizenship (Bosniak, 2000).

The European citizenship, introduced in the Maastricht treaty (that went into effect in 1993), is an example of supranational citizenship. This citizenship encompasses besides the right to move freely, the right to vote in European elections and the right to protection from the authorities of a member state that is not the country of origin (Europe.eu, 2010). To celebrate the rights associated with the European citizenship, the European Union introduced the year 2013 as “the year of the European citizen”. This heightened attention to the rights of European citizenship continued in 2014, with more emphasis on the European Elections that took place in that year (Europe.eu, 2014). Still, despite all the attention given to the (political) rights comprised in the European citizenship, the turnout rate of the European elections in May 2014 was on average 42.54% in all member states (Eurostat, 11-12-2014). This was the lowest turnout since the first elections in 1979 (Europarl.europa.eu, n.d.). In comparison, the average voter turnout in national elections of the member states in 2013 was 67.9% (Eurostat, 11-12-2014). One can conclude that in general, for the whole European population, political participation on a national level is of more importance than political participation on the European level.

The introduction of European citizenship leads to a division of nationality and citizenship (Withol de Wenden, 2009). As the civil, social and political rights are increasingly extended over the borders of a nation-state. Consequently the research on immigration has shifted to a transnational approach that focuses on migrants’ identities and commitments that reach over the borders of the nation-state (Morawska, 2003). At the moment the European Union comprises 28 member states, the citizens of which are allowed to travel freely within the EU external border (i.e. between the member states) (Europe.eu, 2010). Transnational activities of these intra-European migrants lead to a revision of the traditional understanding of citizenship (Bochove & Rusinovic, 2008). Studies conducted within this new research domain, touch upon transnational support networks of migrants, forming of multiple identities, cultural diversity and as well the influence of transnationalism on the political participation of migrants in their native and host countries. The latter studies show that engagement in an ethnic community, social capital and time spent in the host country are some important predictors of political involvement (Tillie, 2004; De Rooij, 2012). However, most of these studies focus on non-Western

migrants in Europe. Research on Western and intra-European migrants' political participation is less available, despite the fact that the population of mobile Europeans has increased over the past years and is becoming more diverse in migration motives (King, 2002). This is fostered by EU legislation and can influence political participation on European Union level.

Political participation is influenced by several micro level indicators, such as political trust, conventional participation and identity. There are reasons to suspect that these indicators affect intra-European migrants and natives in different ways. Political trust of citizens is seen as an evaluative component of the political community. Previous research has indicated that levels of political trust is different for various groups. For example, Andre (2014) found that intra-European migrants have higher level of political trust than natives. Subsequently, types of political participation are found to be different for migrants than for the native population of a country, like conventional (e.g. voting) and unconventional (e.g. demonstrations) participation. Migrants are less likely to participate in unconventional participation than natives (De Rooij, 2012). Lastly, according to Marcu (2014) and Recchi (2008) intra-European migrants may experience their European citizenship differently than non-migrants and might therefore feel more belonging to the European Union. This might be related to the fact that they are more forced to adapt their identity to the new surroundings; also frequent contacts with other Europeans may nurture a sense of European identity (Sigalas, 2010; Marcu, 2014). The question is, if this different sense of belonging to the European Union and types of participation are also expressed in the manner intra-European migrants comprehend and use their political rights, specifically their political involvement on the European level.

The introduction of European citizenship, coupled with the processes of globalization and modernization have changed our understanding of traditional citizenship<sup>1</sup>. However the impact of these changes on a European level has not yet been examined. The focus of this study will be on political participation, political trust, conventional participation and citizenship identity on European level. Hence, the main research question posits: *What is the relationship between political participation, as expressed by voting in the European elections, and intra-European migrant status?*

### *1.1. Interdisciplinarity of the research*

Political participation of migrants is studied in different scientific fields, such as sociological and anthropological. The study of political participation is an interdisciplinary field that encompasses political engagement and manners of participation of citizens, as well as examining various political systems. From these fields of research it is however unclear what the relationship is between migrants' transnational activities and their integration in the new political community (Bochove & Rusinovic, 2008). This study reconciles notions from different fields of research in order to contribute to further

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<sup>1</sup> In these days of globalisation, distance becomes less important and networks connecting people are increasing (Eriksen, 2007:8). Due to modern technology, migrants have the possibility to engage in transnational activities without the necessity of back-and-forth travelling (Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt, 1999).

understanding of the relationship between political involvement and migrant status on European level. This research focusses on political participation at European Union level of intra-European migrants as opposed to other migrant groups and non-mobile Europeans. The theoretical model incorporates political trust, different forms of political participation, and identity in explaining this case.

### *1.2. Thesis design*

The theoretical outline of this paper first discusses citizenship and European citizenship as a prerequisite for political participation. Second, political participation of migrants in general and their participation in the politics on the European Union level are discussed. The theoretical framework for political participation rests on socio-economic theories, post-materialist theory and socio-psychological theories. This will be further analysed based on political trust, conventional participation and EU identity. These aspects stipulate the central argument that poses that intra-European migrants are more political involved on a European level. Next, hypotheses are formulated on why this participation is expected. Subsequently, the European Election Voter Study, which is used for the empirical analysis of the hypotheses, will be introduced. Finally, the results are discussed and the discussion and conclusion are presented.

## 2. Theoretical framework

This study contributes to academic literature on political participation of migrants. The focus of existing literature is mainly on migrants' participation in their host country or country of origin and rarely on a European level. Social networks, political trust and manner of participation are examined as determinants of political participation of migrants. The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to which political trust, manner of political participation and EU identification differs for non-migrants and intra-European migrants, and in particular how this affects political involvement on a European level.

### 2.1. Citizenship

Political participation is an extension of citizenship, wherein citizenship designates membership to a political community (Bosniak, 2000). From this membership citizens derive certain rights, one of them being political rights. Therefore the notion of citizenship is discussed first.

#### 2.1.1. What entails citizenship

In his renowned work *'Citizenship and social class, and other essays'*, Marshall (1950) emphasizes the individual rights that are associated with citizenship. According to Marshall (1950) citizenship entails rights in three areas, namely social, political and civil. Social rights refer to rights that assure basic needs, political rights refer to the right to participate in exerting political power and civil rights refer to rights of individual freedom (i.e. liberty, freedom of speech, and the right to justice). These rights are seen as necessary to obtain full and equal membership in the community (Bosniak, 2000). In various articles citizenship is described as a national engagement, where a nation-state defines the rights and duties of its citizens in the boundaries of its territory (Bosniak, 2000). However, on an international level agreements are made on the rights of citizens that rise above the jurisdiction of nation-states, thus nation-states are not the sole source anymore of enforcing rights (Bosniak, 2000). This is called the denationalisation of citizenship and invokes the development of alternative forms such as global and transnational citizenship.

These forms of citizenship comprehend notions of cross-border identities, relationships and allegiances. Although the meaning of citizenship is contested in literature, this study adheres the definition of Bosniak (2000), which states that citizenship encompasses personal involvement and democratic abidance. In this research citizenship is discussed as a foundation of political rights as well as a contribution to identity formation. Political rights are seen as of great importance to citizenship as they entail citizen's membership to the self-governing political community. Furthermore, in comparison to civil and social rights, political rights generally remain restricted to a formal citizenship status (Bauböck, 2007). In other words, whereas civil and social rights are relatively easily extended to noncitizens, political rights are only granted after one achieves full citizenship status (i.e. nationality of the political community). However, this restriction is being alleviated as political rights are increasingly

advanced to noncitizens, albeit primarily on a local level and not on a national level (Bauböck, 2007). Nonetheless, intra-European migrants being European citizens are always allowed to participate politically on a European level, while in Belgium, Cyprus, Greece and Luxembourg this is even mandatory<sup>2</sup>. Whether this means that intra-European migrants are politically more involved on European level than non-mobile Europeans remains to be seen.

### *2.1.2. European citizenship*

As mentioned above, it is not only the nation-state anymore that gives rights to citizens. With the introduction of European citizenship, the European Union also provides rights to citizens of its member states. Among others the right to move and reside freely in the member states, the right to be protected against discrimination and political rights, such as rights to vote and to stand as candidate. Consequently, citizens in the European Union are dealing with multilevel citizenship; membership and rights on a national and supranational level (Bauböck & Guiraudon, 2009). To enhance the ties of citizenship in the European Union, a uniform passport is instated for all citizens of the member states. These factors are assumed to lead to a feeling of belonging and shared identity that goes beyond the borders of the nation-state (Wiener, 1997). According to Wiener (1997) the European Union shifted the focus from the feeling of belonging to legal ties of belonging (i.e. enhanced rights of EU citizenship), in order to increase political participation on European level.

European political rights entail the right to vote and to stand as candidate in European elections, to petition the European Parliament and write to the European ombudsman. But the political rights also extend for European migrants to participate in local elections in member states (“Consolidated Version,” 2012). Besides the right as a non-resident citizen to politically engage (in the country of origin), a non-citizen has political rights as resident (in the host country) (Bauböck, 2007). According to Shaw (2007) this is a clear indication of the European Union as a political union; as the latter is an intrusion of the sovereignty of the member states. However the EU citizenship does not include what is understood as a full democratic membership to mobile Europeans in country of residence. To obtain that, they need the nationality of the country of residence (Shaw, 2007). Shaw calls this the “citizenship deficit” of the European Union. Moreover, in order for individuals to support a European democracy Shall (2012) states that they need to feel that it benefits them more than participation on a national level. This is likely to be the case for intra-European migrants as they have less possibilities to influence political issues on national level than native inhabitants of a European member state.

### *2.2. Political participation*

From the perspective of citizenship, political participation is understood as an active element in which individuals can take part in collective events of a political community (Martiniello, 2005). It refers to acts with which citizens can influence political choices and actions from the government in the

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<sup>2</sup> In those countries, all citizens that are on the electoral roll are obliged to vote (Europea.eu, 16-06-2015).



community (Ekman & Amna, 2012). A commonly used measure of political participation is electoral participation. Besides electoral participation there are several other actions citizens can use to influence the political community, such as party membership and demonstrating (Ekman & Amna, 2012). In this study electoral participation is used to measure political participation.

Research has shown that the political participation of migrants, including intra-European migrants, in their “new” country is very low (Janoschka, 2011). Yet, research on transnational political participation has mainly focussed on migrants’ involvement in either the host country or their country of origin (Tillie, 2004; De Rooij, 2012; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). In the article of Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of migrants’ transnational political participation is examined. Transnational political practices are often multileveled, it includes institutions in host country and country of origin but also supranational institutions. These transnational political practices are mainly done by migrant organizations that negotiate their way through political institutions and non-state institutions to promote their agendas. Tillie (2004) examines the determinants of political participation of migrants in Amsterdam. The study shows that gender, ethnic membership, cross-ethnic membership and social activities influence political participation. Wherein men participate more than women, being a member of an ethnic and/or cross-ethnic organisation and having active friends increases political participation. Also, on a group level the amount of social capital of the ethnic community is of importance to political participation. There is an interaction between individual membership and the social capital of the group membership, where isolated groups have less social capital and thus participate less in politics (Tillie, 2004). De Rooij (2012) examines political participation of immigrants and the majority population of Western Europe on a low-high cost dimension and conventional-unconventional dimension. The study shows that the differences between these two groups cannot be explained by differences in engagement and resources, but the time an immigrant has spent in the host country and the type of network an individual has established (i.e. strong or weak connections). Similar to Tillie (2004), De Rooij (2012) found that social networks are an important influence on political participation. However it is not clear how these new forms of citizenship and political rights translate to political participation on European level. Political engagement of migrants, just like political engagement for all individuals, is related to their level of trust, age, education and income.

### *2.2.1. Political participation at the European level*

When talking about the politics of the European Union many scholars talk about the democratic deficit, the lack of democratic legitimacy of the European Union (Moravcsik, 2004; Saurugger, 2008). Some critics say this is because the European Union has failed to promote transnational political parties and identities. According to Moravcsik (2004) this is not because of citizens that believe participation is ineffective but because the issues the citizens care about are not dealt with on European Union level. So, citizens would participate more on the European Union level if it serves their self-interest. Eigmuller (2013) states that an increasing reference to European law will lead to more awareness of the European

social space, this awareness is very likely to lead to more unification within the European Union. However, Bellamy (2008) specifies that issues from the European Union are conveyed in national politics instead of in a transnational manner and therefore that political participation on EU level is not separate from national politics.

At the European level age is a predictor for how individuals find voting an effective way to influence decision making. In the youngest age group of 15 to 24 a majority regards voting as an effective way to influence decision making, which is higher than for the other age groups (European Commission, 2013). A report of the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) commissioned by the European Commission on participation of youth in the European Union shows that European youth have a stronger European identity than older generations (European Commission, 2013). However, the younger generation participate less in politics by means of voting than older generations do, as younger participants are more likely to choose relatively 'new' forms (e.g. demonstrations) as an effective way to influence decision making (European Commission, 2013; Hadjar & Beck, 2010). Still voting is seen by all the age groups as the best way to express your opinion.

In the literature political trust and manner of participation are described as important aspects of political participation of individuals (e.g. De Rooij, 2012). As this study focusses specific on political participation on European level, European identity is added as determinant for political participation.

### *2.2.2. Trust*

In taking part in a political community, trust is seen as an evaluative component from individuals in a political system (Nardis, 2015). According to Miller and Listhaug (1990:358) it is: "a summary judgement that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny". In the literature different statements are made about the consequences of political trust and distrust. On the one hand it is believed that some political trust is necessary for individuals to enter into various forms of political participation (Hooghe & Marien, 2013). On the other hand, it is believed that distrust stimulates individuals to politically participate (Levi & Stoker, 2000). This accounts for individuals with high political efficacy (Levi & Stoker, 2000). However, authors have associated low turnout rates in national elections with lack of trust by the citizens in the political system (Nardis, 2015; Krampen, 1991). The findings by Andre (2014) support this and concludes that levels of trust in the EU member states are quite low. For migrants political trust is also seen as measurement of political attachment and integration (Andre, 2014). Individuals that are politically more integrated have more trust in the political system (Tillie, 2004; Andre, 2014). On European Union level migrants are found to have more political trust than natives. This was true for intra-European migrants, whereas natives and non-European migrants did not differ in political trust (Andre, 2014).

### *2.2.3. Conventional participation*

Political participation includes conventional participation, such as voting and running for elections, and unconventional participation, like taking part in demonstrations and boycotts (De Rooij, 2012). The manner of participation (i.e. conventional or less-conventional) is found to be more driven by the degree of integration and sense of belonging, than by cost involvement and trust in the new government (De Rooij, 2012). Migrants, who are more integrated and thus have a sense of belonging in the new community, are more likely to participate in a conventional manner. Political acts like voting require less cost involvement as for example demonstrating, meaning that the latter requires organization and substantial time investment from an individual (De Rooij, 2012). On the other hand, various authors argue that political participation is strongly influenced by personal factors, one of which is trust or distrust with the political institutions. Findings indicate that trust in political institutions is positively associated with conventional participation, whereas individuals that distrust political institutions are more likely to participate in unconventional or exposed political activities, such as demonstrating (Krampen, 1991; Fieldhose, Tranmer & Russel, 2007; Hadjar & Beck, 2010). Research also indicates that Western and non-Western migrants are less likely to participate in unconventional manners than natives. However, if non-Western migrants participate in a conventional manner they are also more likely to participate in unconventional acts relative to the native population, which is not the case for Western migrants (De Rooij, 2012).

### *2.2.4. Identity*

European identity is about the development citizens make in defining themselves as European in contrast to their political and non-political identities (Bruter, 2004). Bruter (2004) defines two types of political identities, first there is civic and second there is cultural identity. Civic identity entails the identification individuals have with a political structure and cultural identity entails the identification of a citizen with a particular group. When referring to identification with the European Union this would be civic identity and cultural identity can be about Europe as a continent (Bruter, 2004). Therefore Mol (2013) stresses the importance that a European identity is not just identification with the European Union and its institutions. According to Sigalas (2012) political identity is one of the several identities an individual can have, but also one of the most powerful that can outweigh other identities. The research done by Bruter (2004) shows that most individuals identify with Europe in a civic manner, so for instance free movement through member states and prosperity. The expansion of the European Union and the mobility that it enhances, has according to Marcu (2014) an impact on identity. Because of the fact that migrants (i.e. mobile Europeans) are more forced to adapt their identity to new surroundings and that mobility is becoming more common, it might be possible that a similar European identity arises.

According to Martiniello (2005) post-national identities and the feeling of belonging to more than one nation-state can lead to transnational political practices, this can also be expressed on a European level.

Political identities are becoming more deterritorialised from the nation-state under the conditions of globalisation (Mandaville, 1999). This does not mean that transnationals produce a new more comprehensive model of political community, but that they recognise politics more beyond the boundaries of a nation-state. So an individual can have several political ties in different nation-states, thus having several political identities (Mandaville, 1999). This can also be true for political ties to the European Union. Jeong and Chung (2012) argue that political participation in the European elections will enhance a feeling of Europeanness. One should keep in mind to distinguish between European citizenship as either a useful instrument for individuals to work or study in other member states or an emotional identification with Europe by the citizens (Quintelier & Dejaeghere, 2008; Arts & Halman, 2006). Emotional commitments are a powerful instrument in shaping views about political items (Marks & Hooghe, 2003).

In the theory of push and pull factors, migration motives are based on forces that either impel them to leave their residence or forces that draw individuals to move to a new country. Where the motivations for migration were relatively certain in terms of types of jobs, destination and likelihood of staying or returning, in today's migration patterns the motivations are much more diverse (King, 2002). The economic aspect of migration has become less important for the mobile Europeans, and the focus is more on improving quality of life. Thus pull factors are now more social, political and culturally motivated (Withol de Wenden, 2009). Therefore Recchi (2008) argues that European mobility is developing as a space of social integration and not just as a unified economic system, which according to Verwiebe (2014) indicates a process of Europeanisation (i.e. process of unification). Intra-European migrants are, according to Favell and Recchi (2009), an example of European integration for which enhanced contacts between Europeans increases the European identity and leads to a European 'we-feeling' (Sigalas, 2010). This contact and identification with Europe can in turn lead to increased political participation among intra-European migrants. Martiniello (2005) states that the political integration (i.e. participation) of immigrants is higher if they identify with their host society.

These new drivers of migration can be of influence on how European citizens experience the European Union. Because of the EU regulations citizens can enjoy these new rights and possibilities, which can make the European Union more important in their daily lives. This can lead to what Martiniello (2005) calls a new type of '*deterritorialised collective identity*' which involves a sense of belonging on European Union level.

#### 2.2.5. *Other determinants*

Political awareness among citizens has been described as political interest, the degree of attention to politics and readiness to participate (Deth & Elff, 2000). The more politically interested citizens are the more actively they participate in elections and campaigns and the more outspoken their attitudes are on political issues. Also voting has a bigger influence on individual attitudes than most authors believe. By

participating in elections citizens can show their opinion about the government and elections are a mechanism for forming political attitudes (Jeong & Chung, 2012). Furthermore political interest has a substantial influence on the coherence of political orientation, whereas citizens that are more politically interested are more coherent on their political beliefs (Deth & Elff, 2000). Several studies have indicated that political participation is dependent on individual resources (Deth & Elff, 2000). These individual resources are education, socio-economic status, gender, age and income (De Rooij, 2012; Deth & Elff, 2000; Hadjar & Beck, 2010). Besides the individual socio-demographic determinants, urbanity has also been established as a determinant of political trust (Andre, 2014).

Political participation is found to be dependent on a person's ability to understand politics (Hooghe & Marien, 2013). Someone's own perception on political competence is related to the level of political activity and has also been related to political trust (Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Krampen, 1991). The participatory democracy theory states that participation leads to awareness among citizens and increases political knowledge and trust in governments (Jeong & Chung, 2012).

From Inglehart's (1981) post-materialism theory, which states a value shift from materialism to emphasis on quality of life, a cohort effect can influence political participation. An age generation that share the same socialisation process, share a general world view (Hadjar & Beck, 2010). Inglehart's (1981) theory states that a younger cohort have a more post-materialistic view and thus participate in politics in less-conventional ways, meaning they participate less in political institutions, such as parties, and participate less in elections by voting. Additionally, research finds that the cohort effect is also true for political interest, where younger individuals show less interest in politics than older individuals (Dalton, 2008). According to Deth & Elff (2000) political interest reaches its peak at one's midlife and then decreases as result from gradual withdraw from public life. Besides age as a variable that can influence political participation, education is also an indicator (Hadjar & Beck, 2010). Higher educated people are assumed to be better able to understand and to engage in political issues. Also from a socialisation perspective, it is assumed that higher educated find themselves more in a social environment where political participation is supported (Hadjar & Beck, 2010). Another individual factor that can influence participation is income, as research has shown that people use cost-benefit calculations in their attitude toward the EU (Jeong & Chung, 2012). From an economic perspective, individuals with good job skills and a high level of education are better able to use the market opportunities that arise from European integration, and are therefore more positive to EU. In addition, Jeong and Chung (2012) mention that higher educated persons have more contact with people from diverse backgrounds, which can have a positive influence on feeling European.

### 3. Hypotheses development

The theoretical outline has described how citizenship and specifically European citizenship is related to political participation and what this entails for intra-European migrants. Furthermore the determinants of political participation are discussed in relation to migrants and the native population. Research has been done on transnational political participation of migrants in their host countries as well as the countries of origin. Still, until now surprisingly little research has been done on the consequences of intra-European migration on the political participation of migrants on the European Union level. This study examines the extent to which political trust, the manner of political participation and EU identification differs for non-migrants and intra-European migrants and in particular how this affects political participation on European level. This results in the main question of this research:

*(Q) What is the relationship between political participation on the European level and intra-European migration?*

Hadjar and Beck (2010) examined in their study why people do or do not vote in the European elections. In their research the focus is on motivational factors like trust in the political system and satisfaction with political institutions. Non-voters have lower trust in the political system and are less satisfied with the institutions (Hadjar & Beck, 2010). Therefore the first sub-question is:

*(SQ1) Do intra-European migrants have more trust in the European political system than non-mobile Europeans?*

In the research done by Andre (2014) some confirmation was found for migrant status as a positive aspect of political trust. Support for European institutions is also found to be higher among intra-European migrants than non-mobile Europeans (Recchi, 2008). Hence, for the first hypothesis it is expected that intra-Europeans have more trust in the European political system and therefore are more likely to vote in European Parliament elections (*H1a*).

Also a distinction that can be made in political participation is between conventional ways and less conventional ways of participating. Conventional ways of participating are voting and running for elections, less conventional ways are for example demonstrations, signing petitions and boycotts (Martiniello, 2005; Bauböck et al., 2007). Individuals that politically participate in a more conventional manner, like voting, tend to be more trustworthy to the government (De Rooij, 2012). Subsequently, the second sub-question is:

*(SQ2) Are intra-European migrants more politically active in a conventional manner than non-mobile Europeans?*

Trust in the political process have been associated with these forms of participation. Some authors claim that trust in the political system is needed for people to politically participate, and other authors claim that distrust leads to less conventional ways of participation (Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Mannarini,

Legittimo & Talo, 2008). Hooghe and Marien (2013) found that political trust is positively related to institutionalised forms of political participation, like voting. Because of this and with reference to the relevant literature discussed in chapter 2.2.3, it is expected that intra-European migrants politically participate in a more conventional manner than non-mobile citizens (*H2a*). Hence, we expect that intra-European migrants have more trust in the political system and Hooghe and Marien (2013) found that this has a positive effect on conventional participation.

With the introduction of European citizenship the traditional concept of national citizenship has also changed. Recchi (2008) found out that intra-European migrants have a higher support for European integration than non-mobile Europeans. Having a positive view on Europe has been linked to turnout rates in European elections and national elections (Eijk, Franklin & Marsh, 1996). The question is, to what extent, if at all, this feeling of belonging to the European Union leads to more political involvement of intra-European migrants on a European level. Coming up to the third sub-question:

*(SQ3) Do intra-European migrants identify more with the European Union than non-mobile Europeans?*

European citizenship as a transnational community could characterize new forms of belonging and identity, which can develop transnational political practices (Martiniello, 2005). The contact of (mobile) people throughout the member states can result in a collective feeling of Europeanness (Sigalas, 2010). Interaction and communication between people from different member states can result in seeing each other as more similar and therefore increases the feeling of Europeanness as a form of identity (Marcu, 2014). For the third hypothesis we expect that intra-European migrants identify more with Europe and are therefore more politically active on the European level (*H3a*).

Figure 1 displays the hypotheses model with the expected directions influencing voting behaviour on European level.




Figure 1. Hypotheses model explaining voter turnout



## 4. Research design

This chapter discusses the dataset and method of analysis that is used to answer the research question. Reason for the choice of a quantitative research method is that the European Election Study dataset provides a large sample from all 28 EU member states and is therefore suitable to explore differences between intra-European migrants and non-mobile Europeans. Another advantage of a cross-country survey, is that it applies to all members of the European Union and as such enables a thorough analysis of its implications for European policy makers. The dataset encompasses the European Election Voter Study 2014 results, which provides information about the political participation of European citizens and intra-European migrants on a European level. The European Election Voter Study gives the opportunity to include a large population of intra-European migrants from different member states, residing in different member states. The data includes information about voter turnout in the European Parliament elections of 2014 from all 28 EU member states and has a sufficiently large number of intra-European migrants for allowing analysis. Furthermore, this chapter describes the variables and the operationalisation of concepts and methods.

### 4.1. Data

The dataset used to answer the main question is retrieved from European Election Study (EES) database. A group of trans-national researchers started the study in 1979, since then, the study has been repeated every five years. The study focusses on electoral participation, voting behaviour and preferences and perceptions of the EU political regime (EES, accessed on 11-06-2015) A central part of the EES is the European Election Voter Study, which is a longitudinal European cross-national survey programme. For this research the 2014 European Voter Study is used, which is from the last wave of surveys.

The survey of 2014 is held in all 28 European Union member states, per member state the sample size was approximately 1.100 respondents. Malta and Luxembourg were exceptions with a sample size of 50 and the United Kingdom was an exception with a sample size of 1.300. The survey was held using a computer-assisted personal interviewing method and consists of approximately 250 items. Respondents were approached through a multistage sampling method. All respondents are nationals of that country or a European Union citizen resident in that country with sufficient knowledge of the national language to answer the questions. The voter study is a post-election survey and thus was held after the European parliament elections in May 2014. A number of items ('QP' items) in the survey have been commissioned by the EU parliament and the remainder ('QPP' items) by the EES. The survey consists out of the following topics: voting, party ID, engagement and mobilization, media usage, institutions, EU integration, value orientation, domestic and European issues, representation and attribution of responsibility and evaluation of performance<sup>3</sup>. Items concerning socio-demographic

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<sup>3</sup> For the different member states the questionnaires were identical, except for items using party names and country-specific institutions (EES, accessed on 11-06-2015).

factors were provided by TNS-opinion<sup>4</sup>. In this 2014 survey, compared to previous EES's, it is possible to obtain information about intra-European migrants.

#### 4.2. Population

For the quantitative analysis of this research the population are the respondents in the European Election Study of 2014. The respondents are from the 28 European member states and are 18 years and older, except for Austria where it is 16 years and older. This is for the reason that in Austria you are allowed to vote at the age of 16. In four member states voting is compulsory, this is also true for non-nationals that are on the electoral roll of that country. These member states are Belgium, Cyprus, Greece and Luxembourg. Of the 30.064 respondents in the data, 1237 (4.1%) respondents are coded as migrant. Of these respondents 740 (2.5%) have one nationality, 490 (1.6%) have two European nationalities and 7 (.02%) have three European nationalities. In appendix A1 the percentage of migrants is presented per country. In table 1 the general descriptives are presented for the population of the EES 2014 data. In the EES sample 57.4 percent voted in the European Parliament elections in 2014, which is higher than the actual average voter turnout of 42.0 percent in all the member states. This overrepresentation may be caused by the fact that voting is measured by self-reports and voters are more likely to respond to a survey (Fieldhouse, Tranmer & Russell, 2007). However, this does not have to cause major problems with validity, since the focus is on explaining voting and not on comparison of percentages. Therefore, possible social desirability can be considered reasonable (cf. Hadjar & Beck, 2010). In the sample population 55 percent is female in contrast to 51 percent in the European Union (Eurostat, 23-04-2015).

Table 1. General descriptives of the population


<i>Variable</i>	<b>N</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
<i>Voted</i>	29995	0	1	0.57	0.49
<i>Gender</i>	30064	0	1	0.55	0.50
<i>Age</i>	30064	16	99	51.06	17.92

Source: EES 2014

The graph below displays the means of voting by age and migrant status (figure 2). The graph shows a considerable difference in voting per age category, where older age categories are more likely to vote. There is also a difference in voting between migrant statuses. Migrants are more likely to vote than non-migrants for each age category, except for the category 35 to 44. For migrants there is no difference in voting in the age categories 25-34 and 35-44, but otherwise older age categories are more likely to vote. This description is in concordance with Inglehart's post-materialism theory that older age groups are more likely to politically participate by means of voting.

<sup>4</sup> TNS opinion is a research agency that is specialized in research design and analysis. The agency also performs the Eurobarometer surveys commissioned by the EU.

Figure 2. Mean voted by age category and migrant status



Source: EES 2014

#### 4.3. Operationalisation

Descriptive analysis of the EES 2014 data is conducted for voting on two population samples; non-mobile Europeans and intra-European migrants. From the EES data a variable is created that shows the migrant status of the respondents and the number of nationalities of the respondents<sup>5</sup>. From the respondents seven have three nationalities, from which four have two EU nationalities and one non-EU nationality and three respondents have three EU nationalities. In this data anyone with two or more nationalities is also seen as migrant, even though some live in the country from which they are also citizen. Reason for this is that this study is interested in the effect of mobile Europeans and respondents with more than one European nationality are expected to be more mobile. One, two and three nationalities are pooled, considering the low number of respondents that have three nationalities (i.e. 7 respondents). For the descriptive and regression analysis two samples are used; natives and migrants. The survey additionally includes a data item for which respondents could state their main reasons not to vote recent European Parliament elections. These reasons are discussed in the descriptive statistics

<sup>5</sup> The data set contains a variable 'immigrant status'. From this variable it is however not clear how many nationalities a respondent has and it is also not clear whom they categorised as migrant and not. For these reasons this research uses the self-created variable for migrant status.

of the sample. Each reason is coded 1 for 'yes' and 2 for 'no', encompassing sixteen reasons in total. The answer categories are presented in a table in appendix A2.

#### 4.4. Variables

This section describes the operationalisation of the variables. A thorough discussion about the predictors of voting behaviour was carried out in the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2). For the analysis, please note, that *don't know* answers are coded as system missing, with exception of political orientation. Reason for coding *don't know* as system missing is that we do not want to improperly attribute an attitude position to respondents (De Vaus, 2002). It is for these items not clear if respondents genuinely have no view on the matter or if they have a neutral attitude to the matter or do not want to disclose their political orientation. Political orientation has a system missing of 18.9 percent, which considerably higher in comparison to the remainder items (i.e. not higher than 7%), therefore mean scores are assigned to system missing values.

##### 4.4.1. Dependent variable

The dependent variable is measured by the following question from the EES: "The European Parliament elections were held on the 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2014. For one reason or another, some people did not vote in these elections. Did you vote in the recent European Parliament elections?" The item is coded in 1 = yes and 0 = no.

##### 4.4.2. Independent variables

European identity is operationalized as not just self-identification but also as identification with Europe (Mitchell, 2015). In the EES survey the respondents are asked: 'Please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion; (a) you feel attached to Europe' and '(b) you feel you are a citizen of the EU', where 1 = yes, definitely and 4 = no, not at all. For the analysis the original variables are combined into a European identity scale (Cronbach's Alpha = .816). The scores of the items are for the analysis reversed, so that a higher score indicates more identification with the European Union.

To measure political trust, items are used that measure trust in political institutions (Andre, 2014; Hadjar & Beck, 2010). The following four items are used: 'Please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion, (a) you trust the institutions of the EU'; '(b) the European parliament takes the concerns of European citizens into consideration'; '(c) trust the national parliament' and '(d) the national parliament takes the concerns of national citizens into consideration<sup>6</sup>', where 1 = yes, definitely and 4 = no, not at all. For the analysis the original items are combined into a scale of political

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<sup>6</sup> Note that also for the migrants the items about national parliament are about the parliament in country of resident and not country of origin.

trust (Cronbach's Alpha = .801). The scores of the items are for the analysis reversed, so that a higher score indicates more trust.

Conventional political participation is more than just electoral participation. Discussing politics with friends and family, and contacting officials are also activities that aim to influence public officials (Cicatiello, Ercolano & Gaeta, 2015; Mannarini, Legittimo & Talo, 2008). Therefore, to measure conventional political participation four survey items are used. These indicators are: '(a) *How often did you talk to friends or family about the European Elections*'; '(b) *How often did you attend a public meeting or rally about the Europeans elections*'; '(c) *When you get together with friends or relatives, how often would you say you discuss European political matters*' and '*How often would you say you discuss national matters*', where 1 = often, 2 = sometimes and 3 = never. For the analysis the original items are combined into a scale of political conventional participation (Cronbach's Alpha = .773). The scores of the items are for the analysis reversed, so that a higher score indicates more conventional participation.

#### 4.4.3. Control variables

*Political left/right orientation.* Previous research has shown a relationship between European identity and political orientation, where European identity is higher for people with a political left orientation (Mitchell, 2015). In the EES data respondents are asked to assess their political orientation on a scale from 0 = left to 10 = right. The respondents that refused or answered *don't know* are imputed the average score of the scale (6.08 for natives; 5.92 for migrants and 6.08 for pooled data).

*Political interest.* Political interest can be defined as the degree to which citizens' curiosity is raised by politics (Hadjar & Beck, 2010). And therefore the willingness to involve oneself in (European) politics for example by means of following news and voting in European elections. Political interest proved to be a determinant of political participation and it is presumed that it increases during the life cycle (Mannarini, Legittimo & Talo, 2008; Dalton, 2008), with a maximum of increase in one's midlife (Deth & Elff, 2000). This is measured by the survey item: '*Please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion; you are very interested in politics*'. This was measured in four answer categories: 1 = 'yes, definitely', 2 = 'yes, to some extent', 3 = 'no, not really' and 4 = 'no, not at all'. The scores of the items are for the analysis reversed, so that a higher score indicates more political interest.

*Political efficacy.* To measure political efficacy the following items are used for the analysis: '*Please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion: (a) you had all the necessary information in order to choose who to vote for in the recent European Elections*' and '(b) *sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like you can't really understand what's going on*', where 1 = yes, definitely and 4 = no, not at all. The correlation between the two items is .077 (significant at a *P*-value of .01). The scores of item *a* is for the analysis reversed, so that a higher score

indicates more political efficacy. For the analysis item *a* is referred to as ‘necessary information’ and item *b* ‘politics is uncomplicated’.

Several studies have indicated that political interest is dependent on individual resources (Deth & Elff, 2000). Socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, urbanity and educational level have been found to be determinants of political trust (Andre, 2014). These individual resources have also found to be related to political interest, participation in elections and the manner of participation (De Rooij, 2012; Deth & Elff, 2000; Hadjar & Beck, 2010).

The variables assessing the effects of socio-demographic characteristics include: age, measured in categories (1 = less than 25, 2 = 25-34, 3 = 35-44, 4 = 45-54, 5 = 55-64 and 6 = 65+); gender (0 = male, 1 = female) and education that is measured by the *age when stopped full-time education*. In the EES data this is categorised into 5 groups and for the analyses it is then measured into 4 categories (1 = no full time, 2 = primary-basic, 3 = secondary and 4 = higher)<sup>7</sup>. Urbanity is measured in 3 categories (1 = rural or village, 2 = small or middle sized town, 3 = large town). Last, occupation is measured in 6 categories (1 = self-employed, 2 = employed, 3 = looking after household 4 = unemployed, 5 = retired and 6 = students)

#### 4.5. Method

In the descriptive analysis chi-square tests are used to explore the relationship between voting and the independent variables migrant status, EU identity, political trust and conventional participation. This is also done for the relationship between migrant status and EU identity, political trust and conventional participation. To explain voting behaviour for migrant status by variables of identification, political trust and conventional participation, binary logistic regression models are estimated using SPSS (version 22). The binary logistic regression analysis allows to test models to predict categorical outcomes (i.e. voted). The regression analysis permits to estimate the statistical effect of the causal relation and to determine if the anticipated models fit. Variables will be included hierarchical; this allows for analysing the effects of the variables at different levels (cf. Hadjar & Beck, 2010; Mannarini, Legittimo & Talo, 2008). To see whether the differences between migrant status and voting behaviour is significant, a binary logistic regression analysis is used, while controlling for political orientation, political efficacy, political interest and socio-demographic factors. In total 8 different models are generated, all models are controlled for socio-demographic variables. The indicators migrant status, political trust, EU identity, conventional participation, political orientation, political efficacy, and political interest are added separately to each model. For the last model (model 8) interaction terms are added for migrant status by political trust, EU identity and conventional participation. Table 5 presents the models with values of the Nagelkerke R square to provide the variance explained by the model

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<sup>7</sup> The original data contained 5 groups; no-full time education, -15, 16-19, 20+ and still studying. For the analysis respondents that are ‘still studying’ is merged with the ‘20+ category’.

while additionally showing the coefficients of the parameter estimates. First, descriptive information is given to explore the relationship between the variables. From the findings of the descriptive analysis, the theoretical models are tested through binary logistic regression.

#### *4.6. Scientific and social relevance*

Research has been done on migrants' political participation for their country of origin and for their participation in the host country, however rarely for the effect of migration on participation on European level. Also, it is not clear what exactly local, national, transnational and supranational citizenship means for migrants. This study contributes to the literature on migrants and political transnationalism in the sense that it fills this gap in the literature. Moreover, this research will focus on the micro level characteristics of the migrants, which can lead to recommendations for (European) integration and policy on political participation. Since voter turnout has been constantly decreasing over the years, research on factors that might influence voter turnout can help efforts to increase participation (Malkopolou, 2009).

Since the Maastricht treaty went into effect in 1993 citizens from member states gained certain rights. At present citizens from 28 member states are allowed to travel freely in the Union, are protected against discrimination and gained political rights as resident in a host country. Finding out how people experience their European citizenship and why or why not they politically participate on a European level can be of importance for the debate on the future of the European Union.

## 5. Results and discussion

In this chapter descriptive information is provided for empirical analysis. In this section information is given based on descriptive exploration. First, the relationship is described between voting and the indicators of EU identification, political trust and conventional participation. Thereupon, the relationship between migrants and the three indicators are described. The means and standard deviation are presented for the dependent variables to explore the variance on EU identification, political trust, and political conventional participation.

### 5.1. Descriptive statistics

In table 2 the percentage of respondents that voted is presented per migrant status. In the EES sample 57.2 percent of the non-mobile Europeans voted in contrast to 62.9 percent of the intra-European migrants, 0.2 percent of the respondents answered *don't know*.

Table 2. Percentage voted by migrant status

<i>Voted</i>	<b>Non-migrant</b>	<b>Migrant</b>
<i>Did not vote</i>	42.8	37.1
<i>Voted</i>	57.2	62.9
<i>N</i>	28762	1233

Source: EES 2014

In the EES 2014 respondents that did not vote were asked for the main reason(s) (max. 3 answers) that they did not vote. Overall, the reason with the highest percentage was: *lack of trust in or dissatisfaction with politics*. This is however higher for non-migrants (23%) than for intra-European migrants (17.9%). The second most important reason that was given is that respondents are *not interested in politics* (19.7%). Within migrant status, non-migrants gave this answer slightly less than intra-European migrants (respectively 19.6% against 21.4%). And last, *vote has no consequence* was given as a main reason not to vote. This is however to a small degree higher for non-migrants than for intra-European migrants (respectively 16.1% against 14.0%). The remainder of reasons are presented in appendix A2 as percentage within migrant status and of the total population sample.

#### 5.1.1. Political participation

A Chi-square test for independence (table 3) is conducted to determine if there is a relation between voting behaviour for intra-European migrants and non-migrants. There is a significant association between voting behaviour and migrant status  $\chi^2 (1, n = 29995) = 15.88, p = .00, phi = .00$ . The Chi-square test for independence between voting and EU identity indicated a significant association  $\chi^2 (6 n = 29298) = 1150.30, p = .00, Cramer's V = .00$ . This is also done to determine the relation between voting and political trust. A Chi-square test for independence indicated a significant association  $\chi^2 (12, n = 26396) = 2009.79, p = .00, Cramer's V = .00$ . This finding is in accordance with the research done by Hooghe and Marien (2013). For the relationship between voted and conventional participation the



Chi-square test indicated a significant association  $\chi^2 (8, n = 29647) = 3109.25, p = .00$ , *Cramer's V* = .00. Migrant status as well as the three indicators have a significant relationship with voting.

Table 3. Chi-square test independent variables on voting

<i>Independent variables</i>	$\chi^2$	<i>p</i>
<i>Migrant status</i>	15.88	.00
<i>EU identity</i>	1150.30	.00
<i>Political trust</i>	2009.79	.00
<i>Conventional participation</i>	3254.59	.00

Source: EES 2014

### 5.1.2. Political trust

(SQ1) *Do intra-European migrants have more trust in the European political system than non-mobile Europeans?*

The mean scores for political trust are presented in table 4. As can be seen the mean score for migrants is higher than for non-migrants, indicating more political trust. A Chi-square test for independence was conducted to determine if there is a relation between migrant status and political trust. The test indicated a significant association between migrant status and political trust  $\chi^2 (12, n = 26444) = 22.81, p = .03$ , *Cramer's V* = .03. This significant association corresponds with the findings by Andre (2014) that showed there is a difference between intra-European migrants and non-mobile European in political trust.

### 5.1.3. Conventional participation

(SQ2) *Are intra-European migrants more politically active in a conventional manner than non-mobile Europeans?*

The mean scores for conventional political participation for intra-European migrants and non-mobile Europeans are presented in table 4. As can be seen there is a small difference of mean scores between the groups, where non-migrants score slightly higher than migrants. A Chi-square test for independence is conducted to determine if there is a relation between migrant status and conventional participation. The test indicates no significant association between migrant status and conventional participation  $\chi^2 (8, n = 29710) = 7.64, p = .47$ , *Cramer's V* = .47.

### 5.1.4. Identity

(SQ3) *Do intra-European migrants identify more with the European Union than non-mobile Europeans?*

In order to answer this question we analyse the variation of identification with EU for migrant status. Table 4 provides the main scores and standard deviation for the scale measuring European

identification. As we expected, intra-European migrants score higher on the scale than non-mobile Europeans indicating a more European feeling.

Table 4. Means and Chi-square test of independent variables on migrant status

<i>Migrant status</i>		<b>EU identity</b>	<b>Political trust</b>	<b>Conventional participation</b>
<i>Non-migrant</i>	Mean	5.64	9.46	6.58
	Std. deviation	1.75	2.81	1.78
<i>Migrant</i>	Mean	5.75	9.86	6.54
	Std. deviation	1.77	2.77	1.84
	$\chi^2$	11.02	22.81	7.53
	p	.09	.03	.48

Source: EES 2014

A Chi-square test for independence was conducted to determine if there is a relation between migrant status and European identity. The test indicated no significant association between migrant status and European identity  $\chi^2 (6, n = 29356) = 11.02, p = .09, Cramer's V = .09$ .

#### 5.1.5. Preliminary findings

From the descriptive analysis guidelines are given for further exploration of the interrelationships among the variables. According to the mean scores, intra-European migrants have a higher political trust and a higher EU identification than non-mobile Europeans. This is not the case for conventional political participation, the mean scores hardly differ for intra-European migrants and non-mobile Europeans. From the Chi-square tests (table 3) political trust, EU identity, and conventional political participation have a significant association with voting. For migrant status political trust has a significant association. EU identity and conventional political participation are not significant for migrant status (table 4). This is contrary to the expectation that intra-European migrants would identify more with the EU and politically participate more in a conventional manner than non-mobile Europeans.

#### 5.2. Binary logistic regression

To predict voting nine models are tested. The parameter estimates per model are shown in table 5. Below, for each model a description is given of the included variables, significance and direction of effect size. From the descriptive analysis variables are added to the models based on the significant associations of the independent variables.

Table 5. Logistic regression models predicting voting

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>
<b>Intercept</b>	-1.089***	-2.706***	-2.833***	-4.504***	-4.544***	-4.505***	-5.064***	-5.074***
Migrant	.304***	.234***	.238***	.260***	.261***	.238**	.233**	.473
Trust		.191***	.169***	.161***	.161***	.141***	.129***	.131***
EU identity			.061***	.021*	.021*	-.004	-.030**	-.032**
Conventional participation				.347***	.348***	.252***	.228***	.229***
Political orientation					.006	.011	.008	.008
Political interest						.428***	.362***	.362***
Necessary information							.370***	.370***
Politics is uncomplicated							.077***	.077***
Migrant*trust								-.033
Migrant*EU identity								.042
Migrant*conventional								-.024
<i>Demographics</i>								
Gender (female)	-.127***	-.125***	-.124***	-.033	-.032	.047	.068*	.068*
Age: <25- ref.								
Age: 25-34	.265***	.260***	.263***	.196**	.197**	.145	.119	.119
Age: 35-44	.638***	.608***	.613***	.512***	.512***	.445***	.402***	.401***
Age: 45-54	.993***	.971***	.974***	.841***	.841***	.753***	.708***	.708***
Age: 55-64	1.321***	1.267***	1.271***	1.078***	1.079***	.950***	.886***	.885***
Age: 65+	1.567***	1.453***	1.462***	1.290***	1.290***	1.120***	1.065***	1.064***
No full time education- ref.								
Primary-basic education	.497***	.529***	.524***	.396**	.396**	.365*	.363*	.364*
Secondary education	.568***	.522***	.505***	.235	.235	.182	.146	.147
Higher education	1.196***	.987***	.956***	.552***	.552***	.447**	.392*	.392*
Self-employed- ref.								
Employed	-.186***	-.249***	-.245***	-.140*	-.137*	-.139*	-.145*	-.144*
Household	.023	-.008	.000	.172*	.173*	.175*	.160	.161
Unemployed	-.517***	-.439***	-.431***	-.295***	-.291***	-.276***	-.278***	-.278***
Retired	-.399***	-.436***	-.433***	-.310***	-.308***	-.331***	-.338***	-.337***
Student	-.205*	-.262**	-.259**	-.170	-.167	-.177	-.171	-.170
Rural area- ref.								
Small or middle sized town	.048	.053	.058	.007	.007	-.004	-.002	-.002
Large town	.137***	.161***	.159***	.057	.058	.049	.037	.037
<b>Nagelkerke R square</b>	.086	.157	.159	.233	.233	.258	.282	.282

Source: EES 2014 N = 24374 Note: \*\*\* = significant at .001 level; \*\* = significant at 0.01 level; \* = significant at 0.05 level.

The first model (table 5) shows the effect of migrant status on voting in addition to the socio-demographic control variables. The variables education, occupation, and urbanity are included in the model as dummy variables. Migrant status has a positive significant effect on voting, indicating intra-European migrants are more likely to vote than non-mobile Europeans. A possible explanation can be that intra-European migrants benefit more from voting on European level as they have less possibilities to influence national politics in their host country, as stated by Shall (2012). Gender has a negative significant effect, indicating men are more likely to vote than women. All age categories are positive significant, the effect of age increases with older age categories. This is in accordance with the expectation derived from Inglehart's post-materialism theory. The education categories are also positively significant and the effect size increases per category. Indicating that individuals with a higher education are more likely to vote, this is in accordance with findings by Hadjar and Beck (2010). For occupation all the categories, except for looking after household, are negatively significant. Urbanity is only significant for individuals residing in a large town. Individuals residing in a large town have more access to several organisations, membership in those organisations increase political participation (Tillie, 2004; De Rooij, 2012). However, De Rooij (2012) indicates this as a determinant for unconventional participation. On the other hand, urban areas tend to have higher concentrations of migrants (De Rooij, 2012), this could explain significant effect of urbanity as migrants are more likely to vote. The Nagelkerke R square of this model is .086.

Because trust has a significant association with voting and migrant status, the variable political trust is first included in the analysis (Model 2). Political trust has a significant positive effect on voting. This corresponds to previous research that found that this relationship is due to the fact that individuals will only vote if they trust that the political system will acknowledge their vote (Hadjar & Beck, 2010). In addition, research done on political trust in European member states indicated that trust was related to higher voter turnout in national elections and EP elections (Nardis, 2015). Therefore it is suggested that political trust and voter turnout are determinants of democratic validity (Andre, 2014). With adding this variable the effect of migrant status decreases but is still significant. The socio-demographic control variables remain mostly the same. The Nagelkerke R square for model 2 is .157.

By including EU identity the effect of political trust decreases and the effect of migrant status remains approximately the same (Model 3). The variable EU identity has a positive significant effect on voting, thus the higher EU identity the more likely someone is to vote. Research done by Janoschka (2011) on political participation in Spain, suggests that citizens who are politically active on European level, relate more to a European identity. By participating politically on European level, citizens will increase their awareness of their ties to other European citizens and therefore perceive a 'we-feeling' (Jeong & Chung, 2012), our result supports these previous findings. The effect of the age categories slightly increases with adding EU identity. The effects of occupation decreases, for both variables the difference is however negligible. The Nagelkerke R square for model 3 is .159.

By adding conventional participation the effect of migrant status increases (Model 4). This is consistent with previous findings that Western migrants participate more in a conventional manner than natives and non-Western migrants (De Rooij, 2012). Political trust remains roughly the same and the effect of EU identity decreases. Gender is not significant anymore and the same applies for the effect of living in a large town (i.e. urbanity). For education, secondary education is not significant and being a student has no significant effect on voting. The Nagelkerke R square increases to .233.

For the next model political orientation is added (Model 5). This variable has no significant effect on voting. Mannarini, Legittimo and Talo (2008) did find a significant effect of political orientation on conventional participation, where voting is a part of. The difference can be explained by the fact that they included several other items for measuring conventional participation. These items included subjects about party affiliation (i.e. membership and displaying campaign badge). However party affiliation indicates that an individual has a strong political orientation, which could explain the difference in results. For all other variables applies that the effect remains approximately the same as in model 4. In comparison to model 4 the R squared does not change.

For model 6 political interest is added to the variables. The effect of political interest is positively significant, which is in accordance with research done by Hadjar and Beck (2010). Individuals with higher political interest are more likely to discuss political issues with friends and family and follow media and therefore more likely to vote (Hadjar & Beck, 2010). Fieldhouse, Tranmer and Russell (2007) found that political interest is significant in relation to socio-economic factors. Thereby stating that individuals with more resources are more likely to participate (Fieldhouse, Tranmer & Russell, 2007). By adding political interest the effects of migrant status, political trust and conventional participation decline, but are still significant. In this model the effect of EU identity is however not significant. The age category of 25 to 34 is not significant, all other categories are significant and the likelihood of voting increases with each age category. The effect of education also decreases. The Nagelkerke R squared for this model is .258.

The two items of political efficacy, '*necessary information in order to vote in the European elections*' and '*politics is uncomplicated and you can understand what's going on*', are added to the previous indicators (Model 7). The two indicators of political efficacy have a strong positive effect on the likelihood of voting. Prior research found similar results (Hadjar & Beck, 2010; Fieldhouse, Tranmer & Russell, 2007; Hooghe & Marien, 2013). Political efficacy is someone's perception on their competences and skills to consort with political issues, higher efficacy leads to more participation (Hadjar & Beck, 2010). These indicators decrease the effect of migrant status, political trust and conventional participation. What is interesting is that the effect of EU identity in this model is significant and negative. This indicates that by adding political efficacy, the more an individual identifies with Europe the less likely he or she is to vote in EP elections. This not in line with the expectations derived

from the literature and is counter-intuitive, further research is needed to examine the mechanism between EU identity and political efficacy. Also gender is significant with addition of political efficacy, this effect is however marginal. The effect of gender is now positive, indicating that women are now more likely to vote than men. This is opposite to the previous models in which men were more likely to vote than women. Prior research indicated ambivalent findings in relation to gender on voting behaviour (Hadjar & Beck, 2010). According to Hadjar and Beck (2010) women have lower political efficacy and political interest than men, and are therefore less likely to vote. In contrast, the findings of the results of our analysis suggest that political efficacy and political interest stimulate women to vote, as opposed to men. However, Fieldhouse, Tranmer, and Russell (2007) found that women are more likely to vote when social capital (i.e. voluntary activities in social organisations) is taken into account. According to the social capital theory, participation in social organisations encourages trust and political involvement (Fieldhouse, Tranmer & Russell, 2007). Curiously enough, in the models 1, 2, and 3 men are more likely to vote and EU identity is also positively significant related to voting, however, after adding the efficacy variable women are more likely to vote and the EU identity variable becomes negative. While many speculations are possible, a positive identity that is negatively associated with voting seems highly counter-intuitive, additional research needs to shed further light on this. The effect of education has further declined, in which primary-basic and higher education are now marginally significant. On the other hand, the effect of occupation has slightly increased for the employed, the unemployed and the retired categories.

To see if there is an interaction between migrant status and the indicators political trust, EU identity and conventional participation interaction terms are added (model 8). All three interaction terms are not significant in the model. Thus, intra-European migrants are more likely to vote than non-mobile Europeans, however their participation levels do not increase from having more political trust, more conventional participation or a higher EU identification. This is not consistent with previous findings in literature on migrants' political trust, manner of participation and EU identification (e.g. Andre, 2014; De Rooij, 2012; Janoschka, 2011). Except for migrant status, the effects of all the other indicators do not considerably differ from the former model. However the change in effect for migrant status is not significant, this result is therefore inconclusive. From the socio-demographic variables urbanity is not significant for all three categories. Primary and higher education have a positive marginal effect on voting, secondary education is not significant. It is surprising that secondary education has no significant effect on voting while primary education does. Higher education still has the strongest effect on voting which is in accordance with findings by Hadjar and Beck (2010). Who states that a higher cognitive ability leads to more understanding and political competence and therefore leads to an improvement of participation. For age, the category 25-34 is not significant, all other categories are highly significant and the likelihood of voting increases with each age category. For occupation all categories are significant and have a negative effect except for the category looking after household

which is not significant and has a positive direction. Being a student only has marginal negative effect on voting. Gender has a positive significant effect on voting, indicating women are more likely to vote than men. There is no change in the Nagelkerke R square between this model and model 7.

### 5.3. Summary

The effect of migrants status on voting decreases for the first 2 models, after that the effect increases for model 3, 4 and 5 with the addition of conventional participation to the models. By adding political efficacy the effect decreases again and so does the significance level ( $p = 0.01$ ). EU identity is in models 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 significant and in model 6 not significant. What is interesting is that with adding political interest to the models EU identity gets a negative effect on voting instead of positive. This is only significant in model 7 and 8, when the indicators for political efficacy, *necessary information in order to vote in the European elections* and *politics is uncomplicated and you can understand what's going on* are added. The significant effect of political efficacy on probability of voting is accordance with findings by Fieldhouse, Tranmer and Russell (2007) on national elections in the EU member states. Political trust is also significant in all models, just like conventional participation. Both indicators decrease in effect when other variables are included. Political orientation was expected to have an influence on voting behaviour, however the regression shows that in all the models the effect is not significant. However, the expected moderating effects of migrant status on political trust, conventional participation and EU identity is not confirmed. From the demographic control factors, age is significant and the effect increases with older age categories. This is consistent with Inglehart's post-materialism theory, and indicates a value change from materialist to post materialist and unconventional participation (Hadjar and Beck, 2010). The education categories are significant in the first three models. After adding conventional participation secondary education is not significant anymore and the significance level of the other education categories decreases as well. For occupation all categories are negatively significant except for looking after household. The expected influence of urbanity is not confirmed. Only in models 1, 2, and 3 living in a large town is significant after adding conventional participation urbanity has no significant effect on voting. When examining the Nagelkerke R square of the models, the largest increase is between model 1 and 2 and between model 3 and 4. Indicating that political trust and conventional participation have a strong predictive power for the likelihood of voting on a European level.

## 6. Conclusion

The objective of this study is to scrutinize the relation between political participation and migrant status on European level. Studies have been done on migrant political participation in their host country and their country of origin but not the level of the European Union. Therefore this study examines the relationship between intra-European migrants and the political involvement on European level. The focus is on individual determinants of political participation that encompass political trust, conventional participation and EU identity. Prior research on migrant political participation has mainly focussed on the influence of networks. Membership to various types of migrant organizations is said to promote migrants political involvement (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Tillie, 2004). Among other factors, the European Union promotes new migration patterns and global identities. Because of the borderlessness of the European Union its citizens can easily move between its member states. This new possibility that comes with European citizenship leads to more transnational activities. It is argued that this contributes to a process of Europeanisation and an increase in European identity (Recchi, 2008; Sigalas, 2010). Therefore, this study takes migrants European identity into account as an indicator for political participation. In contrast to other studies this paper examined individual determinants of migrants' political participation instead of networks.

*(SQ1) Do intra-European migrants have more trust in the European political system than non-mobile Europeans?*

For the first sub-question the hypothesis was formulated that intra-European migrants would have more political trust than non-mobile Europeans. From the descriptive analysis a significant association was found between migrant status and political trust. This finding corresponds with findings in previous research done by Andre (2014). Thus, hypothesis 1 is accepted. From the regression models political trust also had a significant effect on voting. This effect does however decline when other variables are incorporated in the model. The positive effect of political trust on voting is in line with previous research (Hadjar & Beck, 2010; De Rooij, 2012). Subsequently, the descriptive statistics of the sample indicated that lack of trust is the main reason why respondents did not vote in the recent European Parliament elections.

*(SQ2) Are intra-European migrants more politically active in a conventional manner than non-mobile Europeans?*

For sub-question two, Hypothesis 2a states that we expect intra-European migrants to participate in more conventional manner than non-mobile Europeans. From the descriptive analysis no association was found between intra-European migrants and conventional participation, therefore hypothesis 2a is rejected. The regression analysis shows that conventional participation has a significant positive effect on voting.



*(SQ3) Do intra-European migrants identify more with the European Union than non-mobile Europeans?*

For sub-question 3 the hypothesis was formulated that migrants would identify more with the EU than non-mobile Europeans. From the results, based on the descriptive analysis the hypothesis has to be rejected. No significant association was found between migrant status and EU identity. On the other hand the association between EU identity and voting was found to be significant. In the regression model however the significance of EU identification was dependent on other indicators included in the model. Initially the effect of EU identity was positively significant, by adding conventional participation to the model this effect decreases. However, when the determinants of political efficacy were included in the model, the effect is negatively significant.

*(Q) What is the relationship between political participation on the European level and intra-European migration?*

In the first part of this study the relationship between intra-European migrants and political trust, conventional participation, and EU identity is examined. From the descriptive analysis no significant association was found between migrant status and EU identity and conventional participation. This indicates that for these variables there is no difference between intra-European migrants and non-mobile Europeans. For political trust a significant association was found, indicating intra-European migrants have more political trust. EU identification has in three models a significant effect. In the model with migrant status and political trust, EU identity is positive significant. However, with addition of political efficacy, EU identity has a negative effect on voting. Conventional participation has in all the models a positive significant effect on voting, this is also true for political trust. Migrant status also has in all the models a positive significant effect on voting, thus migrants are more likely to vote in EP elections than non-mobile Europeans.

From the remainder independent variables all have a significant effect on voting, except for political orientation. Political interest is found to be highly significant for voting. This is in accordance with the initial findings from the sample that non-voters indicated that '*not interested in politics*' is a main reason not to vote. The socio-demographic control variables show a significant effect for gender and age. Where initially men are more likely to vote, this significant effect disappears when conventional participation is added to the models. The effect even reverses when political efficacy is taken into account, then women are significantly more likely to vote than men. For age applies that the older age categories are more likely to vote. This indicates a cohort effect, in that younger cohorts may have more post-materialist and unconventional participation values (Inglehart, 1981). Occupation has a negative significant effect on voting except for '*looking after household*', which is not significant in all the models. The effects of education are only marginally significant and for secondary education not at all significant when all indicators are included in the model. Thus the socialisation perspective, where

higher educated are assumed to politically participate more (Hadjar and Beck, 2010), is partly supported by the findings.

### *6.1. Limitations*

This brings us to the limitations of this study. The European Election Voter Study is not aimed at including as many migrants as possible. Although the sample was large enough for the analysis, migrants that participated in the survey had to have sufficient knowledge of the national language to participate. The scale which measures EU identification is rather limited due to the dataset. For further research this can be more extensively examined with more items, in order to see if there really is no difference between intra-European migrants and non-mobile Europeans. Another limitation has to do with the insufficient items in the dataset to measure unconventional participation. Therefore it was not possible to properly incorporate this in the analysis. The limitation of the possible overestimation of voting by social desirability has been discussed in the population section.

### *6.2. Recommendations for future research*

This research has contributed to the onset of explaining intra-European migrants' political involvement on European level. Intra-European migrants are an important group as they are seen as the model examples of European integration. Migrant status is found to be positively significant for voting in European Parliament elections, it is however not confirmed that this is due to the fact that they feel more European. The finding that the effect of EU identity is negative significant when political efficacy is added to the model, is remarkable. Further research is needed to examine this relationship. The association between migrant status and political trust and their significant effect on voting has been established. Developing more political trust and political efficacy among European citizens can be conducive for the European Union in increasing political participation. Both indicators are highly significant in the models and this is supported by the literature. The findings of the socio-demographic variables are largely consistent with the expectations from the literature. However the effect of gender is miscellaneous, as well as described in the literature as in this study. Although, the determinants examined have the anticipated effect on voting, they are not specific for intra-European migrant participation. It might be though, in accordance with the assertion from Shall (2012), that intra-European migrants benefit more from voting on European level as they have less possibilities to influence national politics in their host country. Further research is needed to examine this possible difference between intra-European migrants and non-mobile Europeans on voting behaviour on European level.

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## Appendices

Table A1. European migrants as a percentage of the population of the country of residence according to EES data (18 years and older)

Country	N	% European migrants EES
<b>Austria<sup>a</sup></b>	1114	6.8
<b>Belgium</b>	1084	5.8
<b>Bulgaria</b>	1123	1.5
<b>Croatia</b>	1078	0.9
<b>Cyprus</b>	530	6.2
<b>Czech Republic</b>	1177	1.1
<b>Denmark</b>	1085	1.5
<b>Estonia</b>	1087	1.4
<b>Finland</b>	1096	3.0
<b>France</b>	1074	2.6
<b>Germany</b>	1648	3.2
<b>Greece</b>	1085	1.5
<b>Hungary</b>	1104	1.3
<b>Ireland</b>	1081	10.3
<b>Italy</b>	1091	1.5
<b>Latvia</b>	1055	0.5
<b>Lithuania</b>	1096	3.3
<b>Luxembourg</b>	538	35.3
<b>Malta</b>	544	4.4
<b>The Netherlands</b>	1101	2.5
<b>Poland</b>	1223	2.7
<b>Portugal</b>	1033	1.6
<b>Romania</b>	1108	1.5
<b>Slovakia</b>	1095	2.3
<b>Slovenia</b>	1143	1.6
<b>Spain</b>	1106	3.4
<b>Sweden</b>	1144	3.6
<b>United Kingdom</b>	1421	17.8

<sup>a</sup>In Austria respondents were 16 years and older.

Table A2. Reasons for not voting in EP elections 2014 in percentage

	<b>Non-Migrant</b>	<b>Migrant</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>N</b>	12321	457	12778
<b>Sick or health problem</b>	7.7	7.9	7.7
<b>Away from home</b>	10.1	10.7	10.1
<b>Too busy</b>	13.0	9.6	12.8
<b>Involved in different activity</b>	6.5	6.8	6.5
<b>Registration or voting card problem</b>	2.7	5.9	2.8
<b>Lack of trust in or dissatisfaction with politics</b>	23.0	17.9	22.8
<b>Not interested in politics</b>	19.6	21.4	19.7
<b>Not interested in European matters</b>	10.1	10.7	10.1
<b>Not satisfied with the European Parliament</b>	7.9	7.9	7.9
<b>Opposed to the EU</b>	3.5	2.6	3.5
<b>Do not know much about the EU or EU parliament</b>	6.3	6.3	6.3
<b>Vote has no consequences</b>	16.1	14.0	16.0
<b>Rarely or never vote</b>	10.1	11.8	10.2
<b>Did not know there were EU elections</b>	1.2	1.1	1.2
<b>Lack of public debate or electoral campaign</b>	2.5	3.1	2.6

Source: EES 2014