

Struggling over Boundaries

A Case Study to the Influence of Categorization by PEGIDA Supporters on the Self-Identification of Young Active Muslims in Berlin, Germany



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Abstract

In this thesis I examine the influence of categorization by PEGIDA supporters on the self-identification of twenty young active Muslims in Berlin, Germany. Through the theory of ethnic boundary making of Wimmer (2013) I try to explain how the participants respond to the negative categorization of PEGIDA supporters and how this influences their self-identification. This theory focuses on the classificatory struggles and negotiations between actors in society which result in ethnic boundaries. Instead of ethnic boundaries this thesis focuses on the religious boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany. It first examines how PEGIDA supporters are categorizing Muslims and which images and labels are used to contract the boundary and aim to exclude Muslims from German society. It continues with discussing how the twenty young Muslims interviewed for this study perceive PEGIDA and how they respond to this with boundary making strategies of their own.

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1. Introduction

October 2014, Dresden Germany. Lutz Bachmann has founded the organization PEGIDA, *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*, which means: Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West. The organization starts as a Facebook group, and its popularity grows rapidly. Bachmann starts to organize so-called “evening walks”, weekly demonstrations on Monday evening in the city center of Dresden, overlooking the river Elbe. During these demonstrations several speakers express their dissatisfaction with the Islamization of Europe, the high influx of refugees, German politics and German media. The speeches are followed by a walk through Dresden. The organization soon spreads to other cities in Germany such as Berlin, Leipzig, Bonn, Würzburg and Dusseldorf (Geiges, Franz and Marg, 2015). December 2014 and January 2015 are successful months for the organization, with at its peak 25,000 people on the streets of Dresden, participating in the weekly evening walks (Dutta, 2015). This high number of supporters quickly declined after a picture of Bachmann dressed as Adolf Hitler circulates on the internet, accompanied by racist comments regarding refugees. He left the organization soon after (Geiges, et al. 2015). But as of March 2015, Bachmann is back with the organization and has been trying to revive support for PEGIDA. The latest news on the organization has announced that it will participate in the regional elections of four of Germany’s districts next year, not as a political party but as a *Bürgerbewegung* – citizens’ movement (Der Spiegel, 2015). PEGIDA still has 156,000 likes on Facebook as of July 30, 2015 and weekly evening walks are still going on Monday evening (Facebook, 2015).

1.1 Research Topic

The study of Geiges, et al. (2015), shows that PEGIDA supporters feel threatened by Islam and fear it will take over Germany and destroy the German culture as they know it. Hence, I am curious how this affects the Muslims themselves and how they perceive this organization. I focus on young active Muslims since I expect them to be more prone to influences of outside categorization. With this research I aim to explore if and how this negative categorization by PEGIDA supporters regarding Muslims influences how the young active Muslims identify themselves. I also examine how Muslims respond to the actions of PEGIDA. To be able to do so, I have conducted in-depth interviews with twenty young active Muslims between 17 and 33 years old. With this thesis I aim to answer the following research question: *How does the negative categorization by PEGIDA supporters influence the self-identification of young active Muslims in Berlin, Germany, since the establishment of PEGIDA in October 2014?* I will mainly draw from the work of Andreas Wimmer (2013) and his theory of ethnic boundary making to explain the findings. “This theory assumes that ethnic boundaries are the outcome of the classificatory struggles and negotiations between

actors situated in a social field” (Wimmer, 2008:970). This thesis will not focus on ethnic boundaries but on the religious boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims in German society instead.

Categorization by outsiders and self-identification are the two central concepts in this study. First I will break down the concept of categorization by discussing how PEGIDA supporters are executing this and how this relates to the boundary making theory of Wimmer (2013). Additionally, I will examine how young active Muslims perceive this categorization and how they respond to this. The concept of identification will be researched through studying how young active Muslims identify themselves and investigate if and how the negative categorization of PEGIDA has an influence on this. By trying to explain the responses of young active Muslims to negative categorization by PEGIDA supporters I examine the boundary making strategy of Wimmer’s (2013) study. Consequently, I try to contribute to his theory by exploring if it applies to this phenomenon and if I can find indicators which support the specific strategies.

1.2 Animosity towards Muslims in Germany

Muslims are Germany’s largest religious minority and anti-Muslim sentiment seems to be rather high in this Western European country. The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Religion Monitor special study of Islam (2015) has shown that there is increasing animosity towards Muslims and their religion from Germany’s majority population. The representative survey shows that 57 per cent of Germans think that Islam poses a threat to the country. Additionally, 61 per cent thinks that Islam is incompatible with the Western world. Furthermore the study shows: “Among non-Muslim Germans, 40 percent said that they felt like strangers in their own country because there were ‘so many Muslims’ (Vopel, and El-Menouar, 2015: 8). This feeling showed no difference between the Eastern and Western regions of Germany. This was also the case for people who live in areas where very few Muslims are living, so where they almost never engage in contact with Muslims. Especially within Saxony, the district in which Dresden is located and where PEGIDA started. Furthermore, 24 per cent of the population even believes that Muslims should be prevented from immigrating to Germany (Vopel, and El-Menouar, 2015). These figures of high levels of hostility towards Muslims show relevance to further explore how Muslims perceive these negative attitudes from PEGIDA and to find out how they cope with this phenomenon, since anti-Muslim sentiment clearly is present in Germany.

1.3 German Government

Although support for PEGIDA was growing rapidly, it took the German government quite long to comment on the situation. First to respond was Joachim Gauck, the *Bundespräsident* – Federal President - of Germany. During a visit to a refugee shelter in the city Magdeburg, close to Berlin, he stated that

organizations who are hostile against foreigners, like PEGIDA, are chaotic and not helpful. These kinds of organization should not receive much attention in his eyes (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2014). Chancellor Angela Merkel addressed PEGIDA during her 2015 New Year's speech. She called upon the PEGIDA demonstrators to stop following the organization. She urged people to quit going to the demonstrations because the ones calling for people to join PEGIDA have prejudices, coldness and hatred in their hearts (Kade, 2014). Instead of advising to ignore PEGIDA, *Bundesinnenminister* (Federal Minister of Internal Affairs), Thomas de Maizière of political party CDU, stated that since the number of people demonstrating with PEGIDA is so high, their concerns should be taken seriously and politicians should listen and address the issues they have (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2014).

It seems that the German government is struggling with how to deal with the country's religious diversity. For example, in 2004 the regional government in Berlin decided to prohibit all civil servants to wear any religious symbols (Salem, 2013). Additionally, "Chancellor Merkel encourages Germans to accept Islam and its mosques as part of the German landscape but at the same time urges Muslims to understand that they are in a country based on Christian and Jewish values" (Salem, 2013:80). Lastly, until 2000, almost three million Muslims still held the alien status in Germany because of a law regulating citizenship and naturalization made in 1913. This law ruled that only those with German blood could hold German citizenship. Those with a different descent had to reside legally in Germany for fifteen years before being allowed to apply for German citizenship (Sahin and Altuntas, 2009). These three examples combined with the findings of the religious monitor of the Bertelsmann Stiftung shine a light on Germany's struggle with reconciling Islam with the country's traditional foundations.

1.4 Outline

The outline of this thesis is as following: the next chapter will discuss a theoretical framework which provides the foundation for this research and the analytical tools for data analysis. As mentioned earlier, I will use Wimmer's (2013) theory of ethnic boundary making as the main focus. The third chapter sets out the methodology and explains the units of analysis, data collection, and limitations of this research.

Furthermore, the fourth chapter is dedicated to the organization PEGIDA. In this chapter I will provide more background information regarding the organization and its supporters. The main focus of the chapter will be on how PEGIDA supporters are categorizing Muslims. Using Wimmer's (2013) theory, I will discuss what images and labels are used for this categorization are used and how they are connected to societal notions such as integration.

The fifth chapter analyzes the collected data during the twenty in-depth interviews held with young active Muslims in Berlin. It will examine how the young Muslims perceive the categorization by PEGIDA

supporters and struggle over the boundary making strategy of PEGIDA supporters by responding with their own boundary making strategies. Additionally, the chapter will discuss how the participants of this study experience stereotyping and discrimination and if PEGIDA has had an influence on their daily lives. Lastly, the chapter analyzes how the young active Muslims of this study respond to the negative categorization and aims to explain this according to Wimmer's (2013) theory. The last chapter presents a conclusion, discussion, and possibilities for future research.

2. Theoretical Framework

The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework upon which the data analysis in this thesis will be based. First, I will discuss the academic debate around identity, a very important concept in this research. Secondly, I will explain how boundary making strategies are important to this thesis and this chapter will conclude with a description of the analytical tools used to analyze the collected data.

This research focuses on how the *categorization* of PEGIDA supporters influences the *identification* of young active Muslims in Berlin, Germany since the establishment of PEGIDA in October 2014. It will look into the interaction between these two sensitizing concepts, categorization and identification. We identify ourselves but this identification is also influenced by how others see us and how others treat us. To research the dynamics between outside categorization and self-identification I will mainly draw from the theory of boundary making from Andreas Wimmer (2013).

This study takes the interpretative epistemological stance, and aims to understand the social world from within. Demmers (2012) explains this as: “The aim is to examine the ways in which people understand violence and war, and act upon this” (Demmers, 2012:118). This research focuses on how young Muslims understand the categorization from PEGIDA supporters and how they respond to this. This epistemological approach disagrees with the notion of social action being driven by predictable psychological laws, found in social identity theory, or rational choice theory, where utility maximization is the driving force behind action. It also diverges from the idea that social action is driven by natural, given preferences, as discussed in the human needs approach. The epistemological stance of understanding focuses on the construction of meaning (Demmers, 2012).

Ontologically, a research can focus on structures, which understands human action as determined by structures. Or it can take an individualist approach, which emphasizes human agency, and sees actors as purposeful individuals who are able to influence their surroundings. There are problems with both approaches and I agree with Demmers (2012) that they do not need to be mutually exclusive. The individualist stance focuses only on the individual and structuralism only sees the constraining forces of structures. Anthony Giddens (1984 in Demmers, 2012) argues for seeing structure and agency as complementing entities. As Demmers (2012) explains: “Individuals can act purposively, but they are not completely free to do so. We are all ‘children of our time’. We are born into social structures that are both enabling and constraining to us. These social structures do not exist independently of us: we make them, and are made by them. Structures and agents thus stand in a dialectical relationship to one another” (Demmers, 2012:120). Power is an important component in all social systems. Some actors have more

capacities to influence desired outcomes than others. Power is not equally distributed in society, therefore some actors have the power to define (Demmers, 2012). This research takes the ontological stance of structurationism, a combination of structurationalism and individualism as discussed above.

2.1 Definition of Identity: Primordialism vs. Constructivism

Identity and identification are important sensitizing concepts in this research in order to understand what meaning young active Muslims give to their own identity and how they actively identify themselves in response to negative categorization by PEGIDA supporters. The simplest way to distinguish identity and identification is to say that identity is a concept and identification is a process. I will mainly rely on Jenkins for the definition of identity. He defines identity “as the human capacity – rooted in language – to know ‘who’s who’ (and hence ‘what’s what’). This involves knowing who we are, knowing who others are, them knowing who we are, us knowing who they think we are, and so on: a multi-dimensional classification or mapping of the human world and our places in it, as individuals and as members of collectivities” (Jenkins, 2008:5).

In order to discuss the definition of identity, it is inevitable to review the classic debate regarding primordialism and constructivism. Primordialists view identity and group membership as something acquired through birth and therefore see it as a given characteristic of the social world (Wimmer, 2008). In contradiction to this, the constructivist approach states that identity or ethnicity are the product of a social process rather than a biological given. It is made and remade through everyday interaction and influenced by outside factors and the context individuals live in rather than taken for granted and acquired upon birth (Barth 1998 in Demmers, 2012). This research focuses on this social process, how humans make their identity and give meaning to this identity in regard to outside influences.

Demmers (2012) takes the constructivist approach and sees identity as the answer to the question: who or what are you? This definition implies that identity makes an individual unique but also similar to others when it comes to group identity, when multiple individuals share an identity based on group membership. Identity is socially constructed and is serving political and social functions (Demmers, 2012). Another constructivist perspective on identity is provided by Baumann (1999), he argues that identity is a matter of situation and context. It is produced by people’s actions and identifications, not a product of nature working by itself (Baumann, 1999). Brubaker (2004) states that “ethnicity, race, and nationhood exist only in and through our perceptions, interpretations, representations, categorizations, and identifications. They are not a things *in* the world but perspectives *on* the world” (Brubaker, 2004: 44). Brubaker clearly takes the constructivist approach to identity as well, by stating it is only existing through actions of actors.

Wimmer (2008) agrees that identity is socially constructed, it is a result of the social process of boundary drawing and maintaining. He defines identity as “a subjectively felt sense of belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry” (Wimmer, 2008:973).

Primordialists see the group as a natural community but constructivists see the group as socially constructed by actors (Wimmer, 2013). Wimmer (2013) warns researchers not to fall into the “Herderian Trap”. According to philosopher Johan Gottfried Herder, groups are characterized by a shared culture and people are divided by this culture but held together by communitarian solidarity and a shared identity. He considered groups as self-evident units of observation, with three characteristics. The first characteristic is that each group forms a community which is connected by close ties between its members. The second characteristic is that individuals have an identity based on a shared history. Third, each group has its own unique worldview because of its own culture and language. Herder’s theory has an extended influence on different fields of studies. His followers assume that a society can be divided along ethnic lines and take ethnic groups as self-evident units of analysis and observation. Barth (1969) was one of the first scholars to disagree with Herder by stating that ethnic groups do not necessarily share the same culture. He argued that ethnic distinctions are the outcome of making and maintaining boundaries, despite of cultural differences on the outside (Barth 1969 in Wimmer, 2013). Barth (1969) stated that researchers should not focus on the culture of an ethnic group but rather on which boundaries existed between two ethnic groups (Barth 1969 in Wimmer, 2013). This course of the academic debate also relates to what Brubaker (2004) calls groupism: “the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous, and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis” (Brubaker 2004:35). His main argument is that ethnic common sense is a key part of what we want to explain, it belongs to the empirical data, but it should not be used as a tool to explain conflict between groups with. Brubaker (2004) stresses that ethnic conflict is not and should not be understood as conflict between two clearly distinguished ethnic groups. Brubaker (2004) acknowledges that actors in conflict often do belong to certain groups, but these should not be used as categories for analysis without further examination. He further argues that we should understand the concept of reification, how and under which conditions the process of creating group feeling works (Brubaker, 2004). “Reification means thingification, or turning concepts into things” (Demmers, 2012:27). It is a social process which occurs when a commonly agreed upon identity is turned into something fixed and unchangeable (Demmers, 2012). Brubaker (2004) emphasizes that ethnicity, race and nation should be conceptualized as relations, processes and separate components. Groupness should be treated as an event, something dynamic. Therefore, he does not agree with Herder and argues that categories are being contested, they are not naturally agreed upon, as Herder assumes (Brubaker, 2004 in Wimmer, 2013).

Brubaker (2004) emphasizes the importance of studying how this process of reification works, under which conditions the “crystallization of group feeling” occurs (Brubaker, 2004). When a category will be adopted by the one’s being the label imposed upon and when this does not happen. In academia the primordialist view is mainly used to show what constructivism is not. According to Demmers (2012), the primordialist view is meaningful because “it is an important narrative through which insiders and outsiders understand violent conflict” (Demmers, 2012:24).

2.2 Identification Process

In this research I focus on studying the *process* of identity construction, rather than identity itself. Jenkins (2008) states that identification is an active process, it is not solid but dynamic and must be established by individuals themselves. It is to classify things or persons and to associate oneself with, or attach oneself to something or someone (Jenkins, 2008). He states: “identity can only be understood as a process of ‘being’ or ‘becoming’. One’s identity – one’s identities, indeed, for who we are is always multi-dimensional, singular and plural – is never a final or settled matter. Not even death freezes the picture: identity or reputation may be reassessed” (Jenkins, 2008:17). Brubaker (2004) argues that people make and do identity for their own reasons and purposes. Jenkins (2008) agrees with this by stating that identity is a matter of processes of identification that do not determine, in any sense, what people do.

Jenkins (2000) defines identification as knowing who we are and who others are. He argues that individual and collective identification can be understood as similar processes and that they are entangled with each other which only come into being through interaction (Jenkins, 2008). He defines identification as follows: “my argument so far is that, if for no other reason, identification matters because it is the basic cognitive mechanism that humans use to sort out themselves and their fellows, individually and collectively. This is a ‘baseline’ sorting that is fundamental to the organization of the human world: it is how we know who’s who and what’s what. We couldn’t do whatever we do, as humans, without also being able to do this.” (Jenkins, 2008:13). His point is that identification is a crucial part of our world. It occurs through determining the differences between individuals or groups, classifying these differences allows for identification to happen. He also explains that theorists of difference argue that difference is more significance than similarities, while other scholars argue that the two concepts cannot be seen independent of each other (Jenkins, 2008). For example, Barth (1969) and Hughes (1994) argue that what people have in common with a group is the differentiation from others (Barth, 1969 and Hughes, 1994 in Jenkins, 2008). But, social change cannot be explained by only looking at differences. Social change is imposed by collective mobilization, which occurs because of shared objectives and similarities. Difference does not

mobilize people. Focusing on differences makes it complicated to make theoretical generalizations and comparisons (Jenkins, 2008).

For this research I will consider identification as a process performed by an individual to identify themselves. Identification is an active process, to classify yourself and to associate with or attach to something or someone else (Jenkins, 2008). Baumann (1999) states that identification is a social process of maintaining boundaries and to recognize one's own identity. "When members of an ethnic category self-identify as belonging to a group with little ambiguity, when they share easy-to-identify cultural repertoires of thinking and acting, and when they are tied together by strong alliances in day-to-day politics, we expect strong emotional attachment to such ethnic categories to emerge" (Brubaker 2004: 46-47).

Furthermore, Jenkins states that: "identifying ourselves, or others, is a matter of meaning, and meaning always involves interaction: agreement and disagreement, convention and innovation, communication and negotiation" (Jenkins, 2008:17). Therefore, I will examine how young active Muslims give meaning to their own identity and if this meaning has changed because of the negative categorization by PEGIDA supporters.

2.3 Categorization

This thesis will examine how PEGIDA supporters are negatively categorizing Muslims. According to Wimmer (2013) categorization is defining relevant groups. This is in line with Baumann's (1999) definition of categorization as a process of defining others or being defined by others. People categorize each other in order to manage the world around them (Jenkins 2008). Categorizing someone else could determine the treatment of the other person, based on their identity. Categorization shows the different ways in which identity can "work" without the existence of groups as substantial entities (Brubaker, 2004). He means with this that the relationship between a category and a group needs to be problematized, and not taken for granted. By distinguishing between categories and groups, the degree of groupness correlates with a category in a specific setting. By asking individuals and organizations how they deal with categories, enables a researcher to study how categorization relates to groupness (Brubaker, 2004). "This includes limiting access to scarce resources or particular domains of activity by excluding categorically distinguished outsiders (...) but it also includes more mundane actions such as identifying or classifying oneself or others" (Brubaker, 2004:39).

Jenkins (2000) states that categorization is used by people to better understand the complex world we live in and it is unavoidable if one wants to understand the social world. Individuals have no control over the way they are categorized by others but that does not mean that categorization necessarily is related to stigmatization and oppression, categorization can also be positive and enhancing. Actors being

categorized can internalize or reject the classification. “Striving for autonomy of self-identification, is, however, every bit an effect of categorization. The rejected external definition *is* internalized, but paradoxically, as a focus of denial (Jenkins, 2000:21). This means that being categorized by others can have an effect on one’s self-identification because by rejecting imposed labels is defining one’s identity at the same time. Jenkins (2000) further argues that in order to understand the influence of categorization on self-identification or group-identification, it needs to be understood when, where and why categorization becomes internalized. He states that categorization has consequences, on the individual and the collective level. But there is no such thing as “just categorization”. Categorization by a powerful other has to have consequences on an individual’s or group’s social world, make changes to that world and the experience of living in it (Jenkins, 2000). This could be measured by examining the effect of outside categorization on one’s daily life. The two processes, identification and categorization are interdependent. The implication of “us” means that there also is a “them”. Group identification is highly influenced by the categorization of others. External categorization also influences internal identification because the categorization influences behavior of the categorizers in how they are treating the ones being categorized. (Jenkins, 2000).

2.4 Theory of Ethnic Boundary Making

The process of identity construction can be understood through boundary making, which sees the process of identity construction as made and unmade through everyday social interaction (Wimmer, 2013). The analysis of the data in this thesis will mainly rely on Wimmer’s theory of ethnic boundary making to examine how PEGIDA supporters are trying to draw boundaries and how young active Muslims in Berlin are responding to this with boundary making strategies of their own. Wimmer (2013) presents a comprehensive model which he has assembled after a careful review of the past and current literature regarding ethnicity and ethnic differences. His model follows the primordialist versus constructivist debate by stating that identity is a constructed phenomenon and identity making can be understood through boundary making. The fact that identity is constructed is agreed upon in the academic world, but Wimmer’s (2013) model is a next step to research identity and ethnicity, group formation and group dissolution. His critique on this classic debate is that the variation in ethnic boundaries is mostly overlooked. Therefore he goes beyond the debate regarding ethnicity as such but provides “a processual theory of how existing configurations of boundaries will stabilize or change over time and how we can comparatively understand the varying characteristics that such boundaries assume during the ongoing process of their making and unmaking” (Wimmer, 2013:79).

Wimmer’s (2013) model is based on historical and current case studies from both developing and developed countries. With his model Wimmer (2013) intends to bring together literature from different disciplines and sub-disciplines and aims to provide a comparative model of ethnic boundary making. This

model assumes that actors behave strategically. It focuses on how individuals and collectives give meaning to classification and closure and how actors try to draw boundaries themselves. The model aims to provide a comprehensive model on how ethnic group formation processes have similar mechanisms but are also context dependent. Wimmer (2013) replies research of Barth (1969), Brubaker (2004), and Lamont and Molnar (2002), who all pledge for a systematic study of the different ways in which actors can respond to boundaries and to focus on the making of ethnic boundaries by political movements and through everyday social interaction. Wimmer's (2013) main critique on previous studies regarding ethnic boundary making is that they do not include all logical choices actors can make in responding to a boundary. In other words, the existing typologies of boundary making strategies are not comprehensive because they only focus on specific case studies in regard to immigrant assimilation. He builds upon the work of Lamont and Bail (2005) and Zolberg and Woon (1999). From Zolberg and Woon (1999) he incorporates the three strategies the two authors developed: boundary crossing, blurring and shifting. According to Wimmer (2013), this model lacks Lamont and Molnar's (2002) strategy with which actors do not aim to change the location of the boundary but the hierarchical order of the boundary. Therefore he combines the two models into his own comprehensive model. Wimmer (2013) states: "Thus, the typology introduced here builds on previous efforts by incorporating them into a logically consistent and empirically encompassing framework. It includes examples from both the developing and the developed world, from contemporary to historical periods, from national majorities, from immigrant communities, from domestic ethnic minorities, and from racially defined boundaries to those marked by language, culture, or religion (Wimmer, 2013: 49).

Wimmer (2013) focuses on ethnic boundaries, but this research focuses on religious boundaries because as I will demonstrate in chapter four, PEGIDA supporters are trying to maintain the boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims in German society, by negatively categorizing this group in particular. Wimmer (2013) states that social boundaries emerge when actors differentiate between ethnic categories and therefore treat members of these categories in a different way. He defines a boundary as follows: "a boundary displays both a categorical and a social or behavioral dimension. The former refers to acts of social classification and collective representation, the latter to everyday networks of relationships that result from individual acts of connecting and distancing. On the individual level, the categorical and the behavioral aspects appear as two cognitive schemes. One divides the social world into social groups—into "us" and "them"—and the other offers scripts of action—how to relate to individuals classified as "us" and "them" under given circumstances. Only when the two schemes coincide, when ways of seeing the world correspond to ways of acting in the world, shall we speak of a social boundary" (Wimmer, 2013:9). This does not mean that boundaries are solid and clear distinctions between categories, they may be soft and their consequences unclear.

Wimmer (2013) distinguishes between strategies at three different levels, which are strategic moves to respond to an existing boundary. Boundary shifting and boundary modification at the first level; and expansion, contraction, transvaluation, positional move and blurring at the second level. At the third level he explains actions individuals can take to respond to boundaries (Wimmer, 2013). In this section I will only explain the first level, the general characteristics of boundary shifting and boundary modification. The second and third level will be discussed in the last section of this chapter, in which I will present the analytical tools for data analysis which are used in chapter five of this thesis.

Boundary shifting includes strategies which aim to change the location of the existing boundary by either expanding or contracting the domains of the included. It either includes more people into the category or it excludes humans from it. Boundary modification intends to change the meaning and importance of an existing boundary by either de-emphasizing ethnicity or changing one's own position or collective group's position regarding the boundary or membership of a boundary.

Wimmer (2008) emphasizes: "the concept of boundary does not necessarily imply that the world is composed of sharply bounded groups (...) ethnic distinctions may be fuzzy and boundaries soft, with unclear demarcations and few social consequences, allowing individuals to maintain membership in several categories or switch identities situationally" (Wimmer, 2008:976). With this he explains that there are varying degrees of boundaries, which he outlines in four different dimensions: political salience, social closure, cultural differentiation and historical stability. These variations pose challenges to theory making regarding ethnicity (Wimmer, 2008). I will discuss each dimension briefly.

The first challenge is to understand why some boundaries become politically salient and do not. When boundaries do become salient, it is less likely that the different sides will work together. This depends on the context in which actors live and interact with each other and economic competition could play a role as well. Relevant to this study is that some authors have argued that differences in physical appearances are often used to draw boundaries because they are easy to recognize for people. When a boundary becomes politically salient it has influence on politics and for the one's being included or excluded (Wimmer, 2008).

Other than understanding the political salience of boundaries, the impact of a boundary can be examined through to social closure (Wimmer, 2008). Wimmer (2013) argues that social closure may be a suitable variable to explain the relevance of ethnic boundaries in networks. He states: "depending on the degree of closure, ethnic boundaries may or may not separate "groups" in the sociological sense of the term, implying a widely shared agreement on who belongs to which category as well as some minimal degree of social cohesion and the capacity to act collectively" (Wimmer, 2013:85). It is important to be aware of the possible variation in this because otherwise the researcher falls into the "Herderian trap" as explained earlier

in this chapter. Ethnic categories can change over time and because of a different context. Individuals do not necessarily agree over who belongs to which category (Wimmer, 2013). This is related to the concept of reification discussed earlier in this chapter because social closure influences the process of reifying one's identity. Ethnic categories are not fixed, they are dynamic and can shift in different situations. A high degree of social closure means that a boundary cannot easily be crossed and it has consequences in everyday life, for example access to resources. Social closure also has an effect on the possibility of cooperation between groups (Wimmer, 2008). It will result in cultural differentiation through strategies of symbolic boundary making. When individuals distance themselves from others the boundary is reinforced and new cultural differences are emphasized in order to show how culturally different and inferior the others are (Wimmer, 2008).

Third, cultural differentiation has its influence on boundary making. Wimmer (2008) explains this with the example of Chinese who migrated to Jamaica. It is expected that they see themselves as different from the Jamaicans and that in turn the Jamaicans see the Chinese as different from them. In a situation like this, cultural differentiation and ethnic boundaries may reinforce each other by making a boundary look natural and undeniable or by groups creating new cultural concepts Wimmer, 2008).

Historical stability is the fourth dimension which challenges the comparative understanding of ethnicity. It relates to the rate of change which boundaries are subjective to. For some groups and boundaries it may take several generations to change but other boundaries change in only a couple of years. This relates to transmitting group membership, the degree of boundary stability is typically high when membership is passed over the span of several generations. Unstable boundaries are usually determined by behavioral membership characteristics (Wimmer, 2008).

So, the theory of ethnic boundary making is about struggling over boundaries. It consists of three elements which structures this struggle and influences its outcomes. Actors are constrained in choosing a boundary strategy and institutions provide incentives to pursue particular types of strategies and determine in which social field what type of boundaries can be drawn meaningfully. The nation-state determines much of the political setting of a country, and has the means to categorize and draw boundaries. According to Wimmer (2013), the state provides institutional incentives for political entrepreneurs among minorities to focus on ethnic divisions instead of other types of divisions. It especially provides incentives for the minority to cross the boundary into the dominant majority. According to Wimmer (2013), "in the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland, national identities are more prevalent while "race" as an identifying marker is almost absent from the discursive repertoire of minority politics—conforming to the way the national majority defines its boundaries toward immigrant others (Wimmer, 2013:92). The second structural factor that influences which strategies actors use is power. Power has an influence on the capacity

of actors to affect the outcome of their strategy, have their categorization respected or rejected and if the executed social closure does have an actual impact for the one's being shut out. One's position in a hierarchy of power defines the interests according to which actors choose between different possible levels of ethnic differentiation and determines the means at their disposal to enforce their preferred categorization. According to Wimmer (2013), "discrimination by those who control decisions over whom to hire, where to build roads, and to whom to give credit is much more consequential than the discriminatory practices of subordinate individuals and group" (Wimmer 2013:94). The third factor which influences boundary making is networks, which determine who will be included into an ethnic category and who will not. Networks determine where the boundaries will be drawn, who is included and who is excluded. Wimmer (2013) expects that already existing political networks will have most influence.

Wimmer (2013) distinguishes between four different means to execute boundary making strategies; discourse and symbols, discrimination, political mobilization and coercion and violence. This thesis focuses on the first one, discourse and symbols and how PEGIDA supporters are using these to make their vision on the legitimate divisions of society relevant in Germany. Categorization and identification rely on discourses and symbols. "Both categorization practices (defining relevant groups) and identification practices (determining who belongs to which groups) use discursive and symbolic means to increase the salience of an ethnic boundary" (Wimmer, 2013: 64). This thesis focuses on the interaction between external categorization by PEGIDA members regarding young active Muslims in Berlin and if this has an influence on the internal identification of Muslims in Berlin, Germany.

2.5 Analytical Tools

In order to analyze how the participants in this study give meaning to and respond to the negative categorization by PEGIDA supporters, I will elaborate on Wimmer's (2013) boundary making strategies and connect them to more concrete strategies of Lamont, Morning and Mooney (2002) and Lamont and Fleming (2005) because some of Wimmer's (2013) strategies remain too abstract to be an analytical tool. I will discuss each strategy briefly below to show the analytical tools which will be used later on in chapter five.

2.5.1 Boundary Expansion

Boundary expansion is aimed at changing the location of an existing boundary by drawing more inclusive boundaries. Fusion, which reduces the number of categories is a way to achieve this. Fusion be executed through nation-building when state elites can either redefine an existing group as the nation into which everybody should fuse (incorporation), or create a new national category through the amalgamation of a

variety of groups (amalgamation), or they can emphasize a higher level of categorical distinction that supersedes existing ethnic distinctions (emphasis shift to higher level), “higher-level category for describing minority groups and manage to convince or force minorities to accept it as a category of self-description” (Wimmer, 2013: 54).

Another way to expand an existing boundary is ethnogenesis, which also can be enacted by fusion, reducing the number of categories for those included, or an emphasis shift to lower levels of differentiation, which is not targeted at changing the number of categories but the focus of the specific category. For example: “In many cases, immigrants have insisted on country of origin or even narrower ethnic terms instead of the broader continental or “racial” categories imposed on them by dominant majorities. Such is the case among many “Asians” of Chinese origin in California, who dislike being thrown into the same categorical pot as the Japanese and for whom the finer status distinctions between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese (Wimmer, 2013:55).

2.5.2 Boundary Contraction

“Contraction means drawing narrower boundaries and thus dis-identifying with the category one is assigned by outsiders” (Wimmer, 2013:55). It excludes people from the category. This strategy entails fission, adding a new category and thereby contracting existing boundaries for those who are included. The existing category is split into two new categories. Another option is that actors create a new category in order to dis-identify oneself from the original, encompassing group, in this way, actors make new divisions (Wimmer, 2013). Actors can also shift the emphasis to lower levels of differentiation, as described in section 2.4.1. (Wimmer, 2013).

2.5.3 Transvaluation

Instead of focusing on the location of the boundaries, actors can also aim to change the meaning of the existing boundaries by trying to alter the hierarchical order of a category. A way of achieving this is normative inversion, which means that the actor tries to reverse the existing rank order within a category and aims to establish superiority in status and political power. A minority group tries to change the symbolic hierarchy by making itself superior to the dominant group. They can do this by claiming to be the chosen people and being morally and culturally superior. By trying to make oneself or one’s group equal to the dominant group, stigmatization could be reversed. Actors often use reverse stigmatization, which means that they portray the dominant majority in a negative way. This relates to a strategy described by Lamont et al. (2002), who found in their study that participants emphasize the superiority of Muslims as a group. Participants embrace Islamic moral universalism and explicitly list the differences in their own Islamic

values and the values of the dominant majority and thereby affirm moral superiority over this group. “The criteria of evaluation they use are universalistic in nature in that they do not privilege a priori one group above another; like ‘following a straight path’, they can be met by all. However, these criteria are privileged in their own religious tradition, making them dimensions of a particular universalism” (Lamont et al. 2002:400-401).

Another example can be borrowed from Lamont, Morning and Mooney (2002), who found in their study that participants blame the people who discriminate. Negative characteristics of this group are being emphasized and used to explain the negative behavior (Lamont, et al. 2002).

The second means of transvaluation, equalization, does not aim at superiority but at moral and political equality. I borrowed an example for this strategy from Lamont and Fleming (2005) who found that participants in their study show their competence and intelligence in order to point out equality and disprove stereotypes people have regarding Muslims (Lamont and Fleming, 2005).

2.5.4 Boundary Crossing

Similar to transvaluation, with boundary crossing actors do not aim at the location of the boundary but at the meaning of it. The difference with transvaluation is that actors who use boundary crossing as a strategy accept the hierarchical order of the existing boundaries. But, the actor does not accept one’s own position in this hierarchical order and therefore tries to change one’s own position (Wimmer, 2013).

When an actor tries to change its individual position instead of the collective position, it is called positional move. This can be achieved by individual boundary crossing when an actor is unhappy with the position of the category he or she belongs to. The actor chooses to leave the previous category and crosses the boundary into another one through re-classification or assimilation. When a group tries to change the collective position the positional move is collective repositioning, the group remains a category in this case (Wimmer, 2013).

2.5.5 Boundary Blurring

“Boundary blurring reduces the importance of ethnicity as a principle of categorization and social organization. Other, non-ethnic principles are promoted and the legitimacy of ethnic, national, or ethno-somatic boundaries undermined. Blurred boundaries are less relevant for the everyday conduct of life, less exclusionary and less institutionalized” (Wimmer, 2013:61). This can be attempted through localism, when actors emphasize the importance of the local community instead of focusing on ethnic, racial or national boundaries. Actors can also emphasize a common cultural heritage, through civilizationism (Wimmer, 2013). Lastly, individuals can achieve boundary blurring by emphasizing universal moral qualities that all

individuals share, regardless of ethnic or national background. This strategy called universalism relates to an example from Lamont et al. 2002, that all humans are equal. Participants in this study responded to negative categorization by stating that all human beings are equal, focusing on universal human needs and commonalities with all people. All races, nations and religions are equal (Lamont et al. 2002).

The five boundary making strategies described above will serve as analytical tools to guide the analysis of the collected data for this thesis in chapter five and help to examine how young active Muslims in Berlin give meaning to the negative categorization they experience and how they respond to this. It will explore how the participants respond to the boundary making strategies of PEGIDA supporters. How PEGIDA categorizing Muslims will be discussed in chapter four.

3. Methodology

In this chapter I will outline the research design and data collection.

3.1 Research Approach

This research takes a case-centric approach, which “begins with a *case* that is somehow defined by a spatial, temporal or conceptual boundary (...) and must then discover the most significant variables and values to describe the case or commonalities between cases” (Curtis and Curtis, 2011:7). With this interpretative perspective, this study aims to provide insight in how young Muslims in Berlin give meaning to the social phenomenon of being categorized by the supporters of PEGIDA. Boeije (2009) describes an interpretative study as follows: “an interpretive research approach enables the researcher to an interpretive rendering of the studied phenomenon” (Boeije, 2010). She states that data collection and analysis are a continuous process, where the researcher goes back and forth between the two. This research approach allows for the possible development of new ideas which enables a more abstract, conceptual explanation of the research phenomenon (Boeije, 2010). The interpretative aspect of this study lies in the interpreting of the meaning young Muslims give to negative categorization being imposed upon them.

3.2 Units of Analysis

3.2.1 Unit of Analysis I: Young Active Muslims

This thesis focuses on young active Muslims in Berlin between 17 and 35 years old. The sample used for this study is a non-probability sample, therefore generalizations cannot be made. A non-probability sample indicates that the participants were not selected at random, individuals do not have an equal chance to be selected for an interview. Therefore, the researcher cannot speak about the population, because no statistical claims can be made with a non-probability sample (Curtis & Curtis, 2011). “In qualitative research the sample is intentionally selected according to the needs of the study, commonly referred to as ‘purposive sampling’ or ‘purposeful selection’. The cases are specifically selected because they can teach us a lot about the issues that are of importance to the research” (Boeije, 2010:35). All cases have some features in common, in this study all participants are Muslim and between seventeen and 35 years old. The purposive sampling used in this study is informed beforehand by an existing body of social theory on identity and boundary making (Boeije, 2010). The research questions are based on this theoretical framework, see chapter two.

Since this study takes a case-centric approach it is concerned with specificity rather than with generalizability. It is of importance that the results describe the findings from this specific group of participants in a detailed way (Curtis and Curtis, 2011). This thesis aims to give a detailed description and

analysis of the researched phenomenon: the influence of categorization on self-identification. It is important that the reader realizes that the results from this study are context specific. The implications for the validity and reliability will be discussed in section 3.5 of this chapter. I have chosen to use this kind of sampling since I aim to understand the research topic in detail, for which a case-centric approach is most suitable (Curtis and Curtis, 2011).

The participants' nationality or ethnicity will not be taken into account because the focus of this study is the religious boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims the supporters of PEGIDA try to create. In addition, the negative categorization which is performed by PEGIDA supporters targets Muslims in general, and is not specific to ethnicity or nationality.

The study focuses on young Muslims because I expect that elderly people, who may not speak the German language very well, are therefore less involved in German politics and are less aware of the German media. In addition, I assume that the identity of younger people is easier to be influenced since they are still in their transformative years of studying, just starting to work or starting a family. Because their identity is more influential, recent societal and political developments, such as an organization like PEGIDA, possibly have a stronger effect or will be more influential for young people. Moreover, I expect that young Muslims are more likely to be exposed to negative categorization because young Muslim males are often associated with criminal or radical stereotypes and young Muslim females are considered as oppressed.

The participants interviewed for this study are selected on their active participation in a Muslim community to ensure that they actively identify with their religion based on this participation and that religion plays an important role in their life. I will ask all participants to describe their identity and to explain what it means for them to be a Muslim. This information needs to be established before it can be determined if negative stereotyping and categorization has an effect on self-identification. Participants in this study are active in organizations within their mosque, in DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs), JUMA (Young, Muslim and Active), JUGA (Young, Muslim and Religious), I,Slam (poetry slam group) or in the Muslimische Hochschulgruppe (Muslim student association). This engagement shows their active association with Islam which is beneficial to this research because Muslims who are not actively practicing their religion are probably not as affected by the negative categorization targeted at Islam if they only weakly identify with it. This sample secures that participants will be able to contribute meaningfully to this research.

Eleven female and nine male young Muslims have been interviewed for this research. An anonymized overview of the participants can be found appendix two. As most participants have expressed their preference for their information to be anonymous, I have respected this request. For the same reason,

I have chosen not to include the interview transcripts. Three participants were born outside Germany, all others were born and raised in Germany. The sample contains two converts, one male who has been converted since six years and one male who has been converted since nine years. Since ethnicity is not taken into account in this study, it will not be presented in the overview of participants.

Participants were recruited mainly through the snowballing method, which means that “those who have been interviewed are asked who else they could recommend for an interview” (Merkens, 2004:168). This results in clustered samples, because the nominations take place within a participant’s network of acquaintances (Merkens, 2004). Boeije (2010) states that this method is useful when studying sensitive topics or when the research group is difficult to access. To prevent that all participants are part of the same network, the snowballing method was applied from different starting points, thus from different individuals who were not in each other’s network. I have attended a weekly class in a large mosque in Berlin as one way to meet people and recruit participants.

3.2.2 Unit of Analysis II: PEGIDA Supporters

The second unit of analysis of this study are PEGIDA supporters. In chapter four, the background and demographics of this organization will be described. The chapter will focus on how and why PEGIDA supporters are categorizing Muslims. For this study I have not interviewed PEGIDA supporters but I mainly relied on the book *PEGIDA. Die Schmutzige Seite der Zivilgesellschaft?* Of Geiges, Marg and Walter (2015), and the study conducted by Professor Patzelt of Dresden University (Patzelt, 2015). I have collected other explorative information via news articles, a documentary, social media, and personal observations of one PEGIDA demonstration in Dresden on May 4, 2015 and one PEGIDA demonstration in Berlin on May 11, 2015. During these observations I have made field notes, pictures and short videos. In addition, I have talked with political scientist Professor Werner Patzelt of Dresden University about PEGIDA and with Dutch journalist and correspondent of the NOS, Jeroen Wollaars, on how the German media have reported about PEGIDA.

3.3 Data Collection

The study will use a combination of generated data; interviews, and naturally occurring data; observations, documentary analysis, social media, news articles etc. For this study three basic forms of social science evidence were gathered: talk, text and observable social interaction.¹ These three data sources will be triangulated for this study. “Triangulation of data combines data drawn from different sources and at different times, in different places or from different people” (Flick, von Kardoff and Steinke, 2000:178). A

¹ Author’s notes from Preparing Social Research lecture by M. Fumerton, January 12, 2015 at Utrecht University

possible negative consequence of data triangulation, is that at a certain point no new data will be collected anymore and saturation will occur (Boeijs, 2009). However, this will corroborate the consistency of data collection and therefore contribute to the reliability of the study. For the source talk, I have conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with young active Muslims living in Berlin. The interviews aim to explore and understand how they perceive and give meaning to negative categorization and how they respond to this social phenomenon.

The in-depth, semi-structured interviews are conducted using a topic list with several fixed questions, which enables the combination of structure and flexibility. It allows for the personal input of the participants and for elaboration on this during the interview. It gives the participant the opportunity to share personal stories or add things they feel are important to address. "In-depth interviews are of most value in exploring an issue about which little is known, or to get a detailed picture of what people think" (Curtis and Curtis, 2011:30). This fits the aim of this study perfectly, since not much is known yet about how young Muslims perceive PEGIDA. There has been a lot of attention for the organization, but not for the group PEGIDA supporters are targeting; Muslims. The interviews allow for the gathering of rich information, following-up on interesting points participants make and to adapt or add topics as the research goes along. Most interviews for this study have taken between forty-five minutes and one hour and fifteen minutes each, depending on the input of the participant. Each interview was individual with the exception of one occasion, in which three women participated at the same time as they highly preferred this. I have treated the output as three separate interviews, since I made sure each participant answered each question or commented on every topic discussed. The interviews were held in either English or German, according to the preference of the participant to ensure the richness of the data. A few interviews were a mix of both languages. Interviews were held at the participant's choice of location, which mostly meant at a mosque or in a café, never at an interviewee's home.

The interviews will start with general questions and progressed to more personal and profound questions towards the end. The topic list can be found as appendix one but I will discuss the course of the interview briefly. Each interview starts with the participant describing themselves and their activities. This is followed by questions regarding PEGIDA, what the participant's opinion is about PEGIDA, why the participant thinks people join an organization like this, how a participant feels when he or she sees PEGIDA on TV or online, and if it is a topic they discuss with family and friends. These questions are aimed at examining how participants think about PEGIDA and how they perceive this organization. After this section of the interview I will ask participants if they feel PEGIDA has changed anything in their daily lives and if yes, what specifically. This topic will be followed by the question if the participant has undertaken any

action against PEGIDA. These questions examine whether or not PEGIDA has an influence on the lives and actions of the participants.

In each interview the topic of discrimination and stereotyping was discussed. During this topic the participants are asked about personal experiences and their response to these events. Towards the end of the interview, the topic identity and religion is addressed. I will ask the participants to describe their identity and what it means for them to be a Muslim. These questions aim to examine how the participants perceive themselves and to ensure their religion plays a role in their lives. Finally, the participants will be asked if PEGIDA has changed the meaning of being a Muslim to them. I realize that it is difficult to measure whether the participant's identity has changed because of PEGIDA or that this has occurred because of other factors, but I think that this straightforward question deals with this problem. The data collected during these interviews will be used to analyze what boundary making strategies young Muslims in Berlin use to respond to the boundaries PEGIDA supporters are trying to draw and maintain.

In addition to interviews with young Muslims, I have had explorative conversations with five experts regarding my research. First, have talked with Professor Hansjorg Dilger from Berlin Free University about general migration to Germany. Second, I have spoken with Berlin Free University PhD student Kristina Dohrn about the Muslim community in Berlin and the issue of sampling in research. Third, I have talked with Professor Werner Patzelt of Dresden Technical University who has studied PEGIDA, about his research and the characteristics of the organization and its supporters. Fourth, I have spoken with Jeroen Wollaars, Dutch journalist and correspondent to the NOS (Dutch public broadcast foundation) about German media and how the German media deals with PEGIDA. Last, I talked with Andy Abbas Schulz, who works at the Violence Prevention Network and teaches Islam in the Sehitlik Mosque in Berlin. He shared his views with me on Muslim radicalization. These conversations have given me more understanding of the context in which my research takes place and have helped me with the focus of this study.

The second source of data: text is used to gather information regarding PEGIDA supporters. I have collected texts from online news articles, reports, studies, and books. This type of data was used to examine how PEGIDA is operating as an organization and to learn more about the background of the organization and the characteristics of its supporters. The data is used to answer the question of how PEGIDA supporters categorize Muslims. It examines what images and labels are used by PEGIDA supporters and how these images and labels are described and defined. It also looks at how the supporters connect these images and labels to societal notions, such as integration. The data also allow for analyzing how PEGIDA supporters use categorization as a boundary making strategy to exclude Muslims from German society.

The third source of data: observable social interaction was gathered to gain insight in the behavior and discourse of PEGIDA supporters. Firstly, I observed two so-called PEGIDA “evening walks”, one in Dresden and one in Berlin, to see how PEGIDA supporters interact with each other, what the speakers say during the demonstrations and what signs and other attributes supporters bring to the evening walks. It provided an excellent opportunity to see the negative categorization of Muslims in real life. I used an audio recorder to record speeches and took pictures and short videos to save the data. In addition, field notes were made during these observations. The findings of these observations will be presented in the next chapter. I also watched a documentary about PEGIDA from the ARD (ARD Television is a joint organization of Germany's regional public-service broadcasters. It maintains and operates a German national television network, also called Das Erste) which interviewed PEGIDA supporters and also the founder, Lutz Bachmann, about their opinions and motivations to join PEGIDA.

3.4 Location: Berlin

The major part of this research has been conducted in Germany's capital city Berlin. Although PEGIDA had by far the most supporters going on the streets in Dresden, there are weekly demonstrations in Berlin as well. Not necessarily all supporters go out on the streets to participate in the “evening walks”. Muslims all over the country are able to follow PEGIDA through the media.

The largest Muslim community of Germany can be found in Berlin. The *Statistisches Bundesamt*, the official German agency for statistics, cannot collect data on the religion of German citizens because of privacy reasons. Therefore, it is difficult to get reliable and specific figures on this topic. Berlin is an interesting city because of its history which has created a rather unique situation in comparison with other German cities. “Because of the German history of separation, it is the only town in the eastern part of the country with a considerable number of foreign, and especially, Muslim citizens. Due to this history, the Muslim community of Berlin is spatially quite isolated. The city also has a more secular political climate than the towns in the western parts of Germany, which sometimes means that issues concerning religion, such as the right to build mosques or provide religious education in schools, can be more difficult for the Muslim communities” (Mühe, 2007:64). According to this same report, approximately nine per cent of the population in Berlin is Muslim, around 200,000 people. Most Muslims live in the neighborhoods Kreuzberg, Neukölln and Wedding. In these neighborhoods most mosques and Islamic organizations and groups are located (Mühe, 2007). In Dresden, the number of Muslims is estimated at only 0.1 per cent of the population and therefore it would be more difficult to reach the research population. Considering the limited time available for this study, Berlin was a more viable option. In addition, Berlin hosts the most mosques, civil society organizations, and Islamic organizations and Muslims groups. This provides a very large pool to select young active Muslims for this study.

3.5. Reliability and Validity

“Reliability measures the extent to which the analysis of data yield reliable results that can be repeated or reproduced at different times or by different researchers. Validity measures the extent to which the research is accurate and the extent to which truth-claims can be made, based on the research – i.e., that it measures what is intended” (Curtis & Curtis, 2011:13). Reliability and validity can be best achieved by a large random sample, where the cases have an equal chance on being selected. But this only grants a surface understanding of social relations. The case-centric approach, used in this study, allows a profound understanding of social relations or a social phenomenon (Curtis & Curtis, 2011). An in-depth understanding is the aim of this study but that does not mean that there is no interest in the improving of the reliability and validity. “Validity is being specific about what you set out to assess” (Boeije, 2010:169). To achieve this, I have tried to assemble a comprehensive interview topic list which was aimed at answering how categorization influences self-identification. In addition, I have tried to increase the validity of this study by using comprehensive variables, which can be achieved by using multiple sources of evidence (Curtis & Curtis, 2011). As described above this study mainly relies on data gathered through in-depth interviews, but information from text and observable social interaction are also included. Reliability means that the outcomes of a study should be the same when the same methods of measurements are used (Boeije, 2010). To improve the reliability of this study I have used the well-established theory of Wimmer (2013) as measurement tools.

3.6 Limitations

As mentioned earlier, the sample of young active Muslims used for this study is not randomly selected. It is an interpretative study, which aims to explore how young active Muslims in the Muslim community of Berlin give meaning to negative categorization by PEGIDA supporters. Therefore, it should be emphasized that this study does not provide generalizations. The aim of this study is to give a detailed overview of the researched phenomenon.

Another limitation of this research is that there is no distinction between the differences within the religion of Islam. The study includes Muslims in general because of the limited time and extent of this study. This limitation provides an opportunity for further research, to examine whether or not negative categorization has a different effect on the identification of the members of the various branches within Islam.

4. PEGIDA

This chapter will focus on the categorization of Muslims by PEGIDA supporters. First, I will provide basic background information regarding the organization, such as the start of the organization and the organizational structure. I will not go into too much detail regarding events because of the aim of this chapter, which is examining how PEGIDA supporters use categorization as a boundary making strategy. This chapter mainly relies on research of others, foremost on the book *PEGIDA. Die Schmutzige Seite der Zivilgesellschaft?* written by Geiges, Marg and Walter (2015) and the study *Was und wie denken PEGIDA-Demonstranten? Analyse der PEGIDA-Demonstranten am 25. Januar 2015, Dresden* of Professor Patzelt. In addition, my personal observations of a documentary and during two PEGIDA demonstrations will be used as data for this chapter.

4.1 PEGIDA's Organizational Structure

PEGIDA started as a group on social media website Facebook and organizes weekly demonstrations in the center of Dresden, Germany. The first PEGIDA demonstration took place on Monday October 20, 2014 in Dresden, Germany. 350 people showed up on that day to show their support. Only four weeks later 3.200 supporters were present, on December 15, 2014 15,000 and in January 2015 approximately 30.000 PEGIDA supporters were on the streets of Dresden. Support for PEGIDA grew very fast (Geiges, Marg and Walter 2015). By the end of January, a picture of Bachmann dressed up as Adolf Hitler circulated on the internet in addition to screenshots of racist comments about foreigners he posted on Facebook. After this, PEGIDA's popularity rapidly declined. On February 2nd, 2015 the demonstrations were cancelled by the organization's leadership (Geiges et al. 2015).

Offshoots of the organization emerged in other cities all over Germany, although in smaller forms. PEGIDA Dresden registered as an official organization on November 14, 2014, a sign of professionalization. In December 2014, the organization of PEGIDA in Dresden decided that all –gida groups in other cities have to sign a declaration of commitment in which the nineteen points of PEGIDA are recognized, if they want to be acknowledged as an official subsidiary group of PEGIDA. Bär-gida in Berlin signs this declaration of commitment, along with many other –gida groups in Germany such as Leipzig, Hoyerswerda, Celle, Erzgebirge, Cottbus, Magdeburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saarland, Baden-Württemberg, Frankfurt-Rhein-Main, Hameln, Oldenburg, Hamburg, Bremen, München, Braunschweig, Kassel, Hannover and Nürnberg. The PEGIDA offshoots in Bonn, Dusseldorf and Kölln are not recognized because they have not signed the declaration (Geiges et al. 2015).

Founder Lutz Bachmann is the founder and head of the daily organization of PEGIDA. Bachmann does not have a clean criminal record, he was sentenced for three years in prison because of sixteen cases

of burglary and theft. He went to Africa to escape his sentence but had to return in 2000 when his visa expired. After his return in Germany he served a sentence of fourteen months in prison. In 2008 Bachmann was sentenced for cocaine possession. Siegfried Däbritz is another core member of the PEGIDA organizational team with the responsibility for security. He is very close to Bachmann and has a criminal past as well. Another core member is Kathrin Oertel, who often appears in the media as the spokesperson on behalf of PEGIDA. The people on the core team of PEGIDA seem to come from very similar backgrounds and milieus (Geiges et al. 2015).

Geiges et al. (2015) have found some structure in reoccurring elements during the weekly demonstrations of PEGIDA. An evening walk always starts with an update about the *Presselügen der Mainstreampresse*, the lies which have been told in the media in the past week. Second, a minute of silence is held for the victims of the *Islamistischer Terrorangriffe* - Islamist terror attacks -, followed by a proud announcement that the number of people present at the demonstration has increased again and a call for compliance to the demonstration rules (Geiges et al. 2015). In Professor Patzelt personal opinion, PEGIDA is not able, not willing, nor prepared to achieve the goals they have set. There are no incentives because the German government is more or less ignoring PEGIDA. The organization lacks a mandate for entering in discussions and negotiations with politicians. Furthermore, Patzelt thinks that there is no proper leadership structure, no legitimacy nor infrastructure to engage in politics.²

4.2 PEGIDA Supporters

The documentary broadcasted by the ARD, *PEGIDA – Zwischen Bürgerprotest und Radikalisierung* (PEGIDA – between citizen protest and radicalization) shows that most PEGIDA supporters present at the Dresden demonstrations are highly educated, have a job and are middle-aged (ARD, 2015). The study of Geiges, et al. (2015), supports these claims. But Vörländer, Herold and Schäller (2015) show a slightly different picture, with most respondents in their study have finished high school only (38 per cent), followed by higher educated respondents (28.2 per cent).

Geiges, et al. (2015) studied PEGIDA supporters in different cities, during four different demonstrations and through online questionnaires. The findings show that men are highly overrepresented with 81.9 per cent (Geiges et al. 2015). Most supporters are between 46 and 55 years old (27.5 per cent) followed by the age group between 36 and 45 years old (twenty-three per cent). Only 10.5 per cent is younger than 25 years old and only 8 per cent is older than 65 years of age (Geiges et al. 2015). The study conducted by Vörländer, et al. (2015) show a similar age distribution, reporting most participants in age group 40 to 49 years old and between 50 and 59 years old. Most PEGIDA supporters are non-religious

² Author's interview with Professor Patzelt on May 5, 2015 in Dresden, Germany.

(70.2 per cent) and 20.6 per cent identifies themselves as evangelical. An interesting finding of this study is that one per cent of the participating supporters is Muslim. Most supporters are married or have a partner (Geiges et al. 2015). 36 per cent of the participating supporters in this study have a bachelor's or master's degree and 75.5 per cent are employed fulltime, which supports the claim by the ARD. 47.5 per cent votes for the AfD (*Alternative für Deutschland* – Alternative for Germany), a rather conservative political party which is against the European Union. It is difficult to place this party on the political spectrum but by some German media it is appointed as a right-populist party (Geiges et al. 2015). Vörländer et al. (2015) found that only 17 per cent of their respondents identifies themselves with the political standpoints of the AfD and 62 per cent of the respondents reported identify with no particular party at all. This question was not directed to find out on which party respondents will vote or of which party they are a member but to examine which political party program they relate to. Besides this political topic, findings from Patzelt's (2015) study and from the study of Vörländer et al. (2015) show similar descriptive characteristics as Geiges et al. (2015) found.

Besides being concerned by Muslims and refugees, German media has been a thorn in the side of PEGIDA supporters. During the demonstration on Monday January 12, 2015 Kathrin Oertel, spokesperson of PEGIDA, complained that the media compares PEGIDA with Islamic terrorists and displays PEGIDA similar to mass murders and bombers (Geiges et al. 2015). The term "*lügenpresse*" is often used during their evening walks. A sensitive term used by Minister of Propaganda of Nazi Germany, Goebbels and in DDR propaganda during the separation of Germany (Geiges et al. 2015). During the most successful months of the organization, the media were paying a lot more attention and PEGIDA supporters were invited to talk-shows on television. Especially after the event in France, the attack on Charlie Hebdo, PEGIDA received even more media attention. On Monday January 12th, 2015 25,000 people joined the "evening walk" according to police reports. During that demonstration a lot more media than usual were present (Geiges et al. 2015). Findings in Patzelt's study (2015) show that 74.2 per cent of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement that media reports regarding PEGIDA are balanced.

As mentioned before, PEGIDA is not fond of the German government. The sentence: "*Die Regierung pisst auf uns und die Medien erzählen uns, dass es regnet*" – The government urinates on us and the media tell us that it rains, can often be heard during the demonstrations (Geiges et al. 2015:35). This slogan indicates the dissatisfaction of PEGIDA supporters with the German government as discussed earlier in this chapter.

4.3 Categorization and Boundary Contraction

This research does not claim that all PEGIDA supporters are negative towards Muslims. Patzelt (2015) shows that only 23 per cent of the PEGIDA supporters participating in his study indicate Islam, Islamism and Islamization as the reason why they joined PEGIDA. To the statement “Does Islam, which is as peaceful as Christianity, belong to Germany” 32.8 per cent agreed and 52.7 per cent disagreed, the rest was neutral (Patzelt, 2015). Results from Vörländer et al. (2015) show that 24.2 per cent of their respondents stated that Islam, Islamists and Islamization are the reasons they attend the PEGIDA evening walks. Even though, since this thesis focuses on if and how the self-identification of young active Muslims in Berlin is influenced, I will only focus on how PEGIDA supporters are negatively categorizing Muslims, since the anti-Muslim sentiment is present, as shown in these studies. The study of Geiges et al. (2015) shows that PEGIDA supporters generalize foreigners and Muslims as one group, whether they are or not. For example Turks are seen as Muslim, even though they might as well not be. This makes no difference for the PEGIDA supporters (Geiges et al. 2015). Research by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2015) makes a similar statement: “*Was jeweils das Eigene und was das Fremde ausmachesoll, ist durchaus variabel. Das Eigene lässt sich in Kategorien von Heimat, Tradition, Bodenständigkeit, Volk, Deutschland, Europa oder Abendland denken; das Fremde kann als rote Zecke, Jude, Ausländer, Migrant, Asylant, Fidschi, Araber oder Neger figurieren.*“ (Rucht, 2015: 12). With this statement the author argues that people make up what defines a foreigner, which can be different things. One can think in terms of homeland, tradition, people, Germany, Europe or the Western world. The foreigner may be a thick, Jewish, foreigner, migrant, asylum seeker, Fijian, Arabic or black (Rucht, 2015).

PEGIDA supporters are trying to shift the boundary between non-Muslims and Muslims in Germany by the boundary making strategy boundary contraction, as discussed in the theoretical framework. I will only discuss this particular boundary making strategy in this chapter since PEGIDA supporters are not trying to expand the boundaries to more inclusive levels, nor are they trying to change the meaning of the boundary. They clearly are trying to contract the boundary between non-Muslims and Muslims and in this section I will argue why. First, I will provide a broader definition of boundary contraction, as in Wimmer’s (2013) theory of ethnic boundary making as discussed in chapter two.

Wimmer (2013) describes boundary contraction as drawing narrower, thus more exclusive, boundaries. He states: “Contraction is an especially attractive strategy for individuals and groups who do not have access to the centers of a political arena and whose radius of action remains confined to immediate social spaces” (Wimmer, 2013: 55). PEGIDA does not have any political power and their weekly demonstrations take place in the centers of different cities in Germany to broadcast their dissatisfactions. Boundary contraction can be achieved through fission and by shifting the emphasis to a lower level of

differentiation. Fission is the division of a category into two new categories. For example distinguishing between “real Germans” and immigrants. Shifting the emphasis to a lower level of differentiation is a strategy which is not targeted at changing the number of categories but shifts the emphasis to lower levels of ethnic divisions (Wimmer, 2013). For example, immigrants emphasize their exact country of origin or even narrower ethnic terms instead of the continent they come from. These actors do not like to be categorized as for example Asian, and therefore emphasize a more specific ethnicity, for example Chinese.

By promoting certain types of classification, by defining what defines Germans and more importantly what defines Muslims and what makes them different from Germans, PEGIDA supporters try to exclude Muslims from German society. They aim to change the location of the existing boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims by contracting the domains of who is included within the boundary. PEGIDA supporters try to dis-identify Muslims from the German nationality and exclude them from this national identity. In their eyes, Muslims cannot be German, even when these particular Muslims are born and raised in Germany and hold German citizenship.

Categorization is the defining of relevant groups (Wimmer, 2013). PEGIDA supporters clearly define two relevant groups in society: Muslims and non-Muslims. By using negative categorization towards Muslims, PEGIDA supporters try to make the boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims more relevant in German society. According to Wimmer (2013), categorization relies on discursive and symbolic resources. As a means to contract the boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims, PEGIDA supporters make use of discourse and symbols acted out in the demonstrations to categorize Muslims in a negative way.

According to Zollberg and Woon (1999) “both boundary crossing and boundary shifting involve an in-between phase, occasionally fraught with awesome tension because it involves an ‘unnatural act’ - the transformation of strangers into members, of the not us into part of us. Thus, an acceleration of boundary crossing and of boundary shifting can provoke negative reactions on the part of the hosts, leading to a crystallization of boundaries, the imposition of conditions that render crossing more difficult and blurring impossible, and perhaps even a redefinition of the host identity amounting to a shift of the boundary in a more exclusive direction. Concomitantly, some of the newcomers may react to increased boundary-crossing opportunities by resisting any sort of identity change” (Zollberg and Woon, 1999:9). PEGIDA supporters are responding to the high numbers of refugees coming into Germany from Islamic countries. It seems that PEGIDA is a response to this ‘in-between phase’ Zollberg and Woon (1999) talk about and supporters see all Muslims, also the ones born in Germany, as a threat to German culture and society.

A quote of Bachmann during the demonstration on Monday January 12, 2015 indicates that the organization is concerned because of refugees: *“Die Schaffung eines Zuwanderungsgesetzes, das die quantitative Zuwanderung stoppe und dafür eine qualitative Regelung nach dem Vorbild der Schweiz oder Kanadas einführe. Er fordert zweiseitig ein Recht auf, aber eben auch die Pflicht zu Integration, womit sich viele Ängste der Menschen vor Überfremdung, Islamisierung und Verlust unsere Heimatlichen Kultur automatisch erledigen würden“* (Geiges et al. 2015:39). Bachmann says with this that he wants an immigration law to stop the large quantities of refugees coming into Germany and for the government to adopt a similar model as in Switzerland and Canada. When integration is regulated as a right and requirement, this will settle the fear of the people for the alienation, Islamization and loss of the German culture.

In October 2014, PEGIDA’s core team composed a document with nineteen goals the organization wants to achieve. As of January 12, 2015 this document has been updated to a new version with only six goals (Patzelt, 2015). I will discuss what PEGIDA’s six wishes for German society are and how they are used to categorize other groups, such as Muslims and refugees.

1. Die Schaffung eines Zuwanderungsgesetzes, welches die unbestritten notwendige qualitative Zuwanderung regelt und die momentan gängige, unkontrollierte quantitative Zuwanderung stoppt. Dies sollte nach dem Vorbild von Kanada oder der Schweiz erfolgen (Patzelt, 2015:15).

This first point states that PEGIDA supporters want an immigration act which regulates the influx of refugees and which stops unregulated migration. This should be similar to the models of Canada or Switzerland. With this demand, PEGIDA indicates a division between Germans and refugees, who have a duty to integrate and conform to German society.

2. Die Aufnahme eines Rechtes auf und der Pflicht zur Integration. Diese Pflicht zur Integration beseitigt, wenn sie denn wirklich kommt, viele Ängste der Menschen zum Thema Islamisierung, Überfremdung und Verlust unserer Kultur automatisch (Patzelt, 2015:15).

Second, PEGIDA wants a law which includes the right and obligation to integration. When this obligation to integration will be set, it will automatically remove people’s fear of Islamization, alienation and loss of German culture. With this point they clearly state there is a fear for Islamization and a loss of the German culture, which points out the difference in culture between Muslims and German culture.

3. Wir fordern eine konsequente Ausweisung bzw. ein Wiedereinreiseverbot für Islamisten und religiöse Fanatiker, welche unserem Land den Rücken gekehrt haben um in heiligen Kriegen zu kämpfen (Patzelt, 2015:15).

Third, PEGIDA supporters state that they call for a restriction of re-entering Germany for Islamists and religious extremist who turned their backs on our country to fight in holy wars. With this requirement PEGIDA supporters want to exclude all Muslims who have left Germany to fight with the Islamic State instead of providing mental health care or rehabilitation support.

4. Wir fordern die Ermöglichung direkter Demokratie auf Bundesebene auf der Basis von Volksentscheiden (Patzelt, 2015:15).

Fourth, PEGIDA supporters call for the facilitation of a direct democracy at the federal level through referendums. With this demand, PEGIDA supporters try to gain more political power for the German population.

5. Wir fordern ein Ende der Kriegstreiberei gegen Russland und ein friedliches Miteinander der Euro-päer ohne den zunehmenden Verlust an Autorität für die Landesparlamente der einzelnen EU-Staaten durch die irrwitzige Kontrolle aus Brüssel (Patzelt, 2015:15).

Fifth, PEGIDA supporters demand an end to the warmongering against Russia and for a peaceful coexistence of Europeans without the increasing loss of authority for the individual EU member states because of the insane control from Brussels. With this claim they indicate their favor for Russia and their dissatisfaction with the United States of America.

6. Wir fordern mehr Mittel für die Innere Sicherheit unseres Landes! Dies umfasst einen sofortigen Stopp beim Stellenabbau der Polizei und die Ausstattung selbiger mit den erforderlichen, zeitgemäßen Mitteln um den gewachsenen Anforderungen gerecht zu werden (Patzelt, 2015:15).

Lastly, PEGIDA supporters want more resources to benefit the security of Germany, their country. This includes an immediate stop to the decreasing police force and providing the police with the essential equipment and resources to meet the growing demand. This demand indicates that PEGIDA supporters are concerned with the safety in Germany, possibly because of the perceived high influx of refugees and Muslims into the country. The findings in the study of Patzelt (2015) show that 77 per cent of the PEGIDA supporters knows these six points, 13 per cent are aware of them and 10 per cent has not heard of this document at all. 71 per cent of the participants in this study agree completely with these points, 16 per cent agrees and one per cent disagrees (Patzelt, 2015).

4.3.1 Discourse and Symbols during Demonstrations

The following section will examine what discourse and symbols PEGIDA supporters use during their demonstrations to categorize Muslims and contract the boundary. It will discuss what images and labels are used to describe and define Muslims and how these are connected to societal notions such as integration.

First, the name of the organization indicates a lot: *Patriotischen Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes* (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West). The fact that the organization calls itself ‘Patriotic Europeans’ states that the founders think Islamization is a problem for Europe, not only for Germany (Geiges et al. 2015). Research among people present at the demonstrations shows that PEGIDA supporters feel threatened by Islam because of what is broadcasted on the news regarding the developments of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria and other Islamic terrorist groups. They do not want shelters for Syrian refugees in the city centers. Supporters are astonished by how little the government cares about the German people who have to live together with refugees (Geiges et al. 2015). As explained in this chapter, PEGIDA supporters are concerned with unregulated migration into Germany. For PEGIDA supporters, Muslims are part of this migration issue. There has been a rise of immigrants into Germany in general, of which approximately two-thirds is Muslim. In addition, the news hasn’t been very positive regarding Muslims, by reporting about the Islamic State, Boko Haram, Charlie Hebdo etc (Geiges, et al. 2015).

On PEGIDA’s Facebook page there are not many explicit negative statements towards Muslims specifically. Many articles regarding refugees are shared and information is given about when and where the next demonstration will take place. All messages posted before December 29, 2014 seem to have been deleted. Nevertheless, during the demonstrations anti-Islam sentiment is easy to spot. A few signs I have seen during my personal observations of PEGIDA demonstrations in Dresden on May 4th, 2015 and in Berlin on May 11th, 2015 stated the following:

“Der Islam gehört nicht zu Deutschland, Frau Merkel!” Islam doesn’t belong to Germany, Mrs. Merkel!

“Der Islam ist eine Kultur des Todes” Islam is a culture of death.

“Islam ist Unterwerfung” Islam is submission.

“Hauptstadt der Angst? Nicht mit uns!” Capital of fear? Not with us!

These slogans indicate a fear of Islam and a severe rejection of the religion in Germany. By stating that Islam does not belong to Germany, in response to what Chancellor Merkel said during her 2015 New Year’s speech as discussed in the introduction of this thesis, PEGIDA supporters state they disagree with her by not wanting Islam to be a part of Germany and therefore do not want any Muslims living in the country. By claiming that Islam is a culture of death and forces people to submission, it becomes clear these PEGIDA supporters think very negatively of Islam. The last quote indicates that living with Muslims means living in fear, which PEGIDA supporters want to eliminate. During the evening walk of May 11, 2015 in Berlin, the first speaker addressed Islamization. He stated that the freedom of Germany needs to be protected. When Islamists will dominate it will be over with this freedom. The third speaker on that evening

expresses his discontent with mosques being built everywhere in Berlin. He states that freedom and security have to be protected for the future of Germany.³

Geiges et al. (2015) present a few other sign slogans in their book:

“Heimatschutz statt Islamisierung neben” Homeland security is below Islamization.

“Islam = Karzinom” Islam = Carcinoma

“Lieber aufrecht zur Pegida, als auf den Knien gen Mekka” Rather straight up towards Pegida than on the knees towards Mecca.

“Keine Sharia in Europa” No Sharia in Europe.

“Für Heimat, Frieden & Deutsche Leitkultur. Gegen Religiösen Fanatismus. Gegen Islamisierung & Multikulti” Pro homeland, peace and German culture. Against religious fanaticism. Against Islamization and multiculturalism.

From these quotes it becomes clear that PEGIDA supporters think Islam and Germany are impossible to reconcile with each other. By comparing Islam with a spreading tumor sends a strong message that PEGIDA supporters feel that their perception of the German culture is threatened. In the ARD documentary *PEGIDA – Zwischen Bürgerprotest und Radikalisierung – PEGIDA between citizen protest and radicalization*, this fear is addressed. A male PEGIDA supporter who attends the Dresden demonstrations states that he is afraid that Muslims will become the majority and will suffocate Germany with their religion. Another woman adds that the own people should be heard first, then the rest. According to the documentary makers, recruitment of PEGIDA supporters seems to be done through the common fear of so-called radical Islam. Another supporter states that the German justice system is Islamized, Muslims receive special rights, like polygamy. The documentary makers argue that the media has a big influence on the spread of this common fear, by almost solely broadcasting negative images of Islam, like the Islamic State and Boko Haram. Other supporters call Islam a totalitarian ideology, Muslims can be moderate but Islam cannot and will never be moderate. It simply does not belong in Europe (ARD, 2015).

In a video reporting by the New York Times (2015) this fear of Islam is also shown when a female PEGIDA supporter says: “They will take over Europe and even the whole world. That is the plan of all Muslim people”. Another male demonstrator says: “There are too many of them here already. That’s the problem with Islam. We (the German people) are already the minority” (NYT, 2015). Leader Lutz Bachmann states: “I’m talking about the gradual phasing out of our Christian heritage from our society. It’s

³ Author’s personal field notes of May 4, 2015 in Dresden, Germany and May 11, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

already begun in Berlin and in other cities” (NYT, 2015). Vice News (2015) also reported on PEGIDA, filming during a demonstration in Dresden after the attacks in Paris on Charlie Hebdo. A male supporter states: “What happened in Paris is just the beginning. Where does it end? That’s the point. I want my children to grow up in peace and not under Sharia” (Vice News, 2015). All these quotes clearly indicate a deep fear of Islam which is linked to the notion that Muslims cannot integrate in Germany and will only destroy the German culture as the PEGIDA people perceive their culture to be. Muslims have no place in Germany according to these supporters because of their religion.

The most used slogan by PEGIDA supporters is: *Wir sind das Volk* (we are the people). Who they exactly include within this ‘we’ is not entirely clear. These four words go back to the Monday demonstrations in 1989 when protests against the political conditions in the DDR took place (Geiges et al. 2015). But the use of ‘we’ implies there is also a ‘them’. One of the interviewee’s in the study of Geiges et al. 2015 wants a restriction on the influx of foreigners because two third is Muslim. He states that Muslims don’t integrate, promote forced marriages and suppress women. He continues by saying that history has shown that Muslims don’t integrate and if Germany allows more Muslims into the country the future of the country will not become any better. In interviews with PEGIDA supporters, Geiges et al. (2015) find that Muslims are a big concern. It doesn’t matter if Muslims came to Germany as a refugee or were born here, all are categorized into the same group. One interviewee states: “*Migranten sind nicht das Problem (...) Das Problem ist der Islam (...) Migranten können kommen, so viele sie wollen, mich stört nur der Islam* - migrants are not the problem, the problem is Islam. Migrants can come as many as they want, my concern is only Islam (Geiges et al. 2015:123). Another participants says: “*Von den Polen, die hier einwandern, hörst du nichts, die integrieren sich alle*“ – The Polish who came to Germany don’t cause any problems, they all integrate (Geiges et al. 2015:123). The authors state that during the interviews, participants respond to the theme integration as if there is no integration problem in Germany but only a Muslim integration problem. Participants respond to this in an intense, very unfavorable and hostile manner. Another participant states that Muslims are simply not willing to integrate. He supports this argument by stating that when Muslims do not want to change their name, which is possible in Germany, this shows their unwillingness to integrate. In general, Islam is seen by participants as culturally backwards, violent and dangerous. Other negative claims are that the birthrate for Muslims in Germany is a lot higher than of the German population and Muslims are more willing and likely to use violence. Islamic countries are chaotic and inhumane, for which female mutilation is an often used example to support this claim (Geiges et al. 2015). “*Besonders bin ich gegen die zunehmende Einwanderung von Muslimen. Diese Religion ist definitiv niemals in der Lage, sich zu integrieren, sie ist menschen- und besonders frauenfeindlich, gehört ins Mittelalter und nicht in unser modernes Europa.*“ This quote from the article of Rucht (2015) of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung indicated that this PEGIDA supporter is opposed to the increasing Muslim

immigration in particular. The religion is definitely unable to integrate, it is violent towards humans and in particular women, belongs in the middle ages and not in our modern Europe. An additional critique of PEGIDA supporters regarding Islam and Muslims is that they are building parallel societies. The neighborhood Neukölln in Berlin is used as an example for this, it is seen by some supporters as a center for Islamic terrorism in Germany (Geiges et al. 2015).

Summarizing, PEGIDA supporters are using discourse and symbols during their evening walks to categorize Muslims in a negative way. They try to contract the boundary between non-Muslims and Muslims in Germany by excluding Muslims from the category German. PEGIDA supporters think Muslims do not and cannot integrate into Germany because the religion is impossible to reconcile with German culture. Furthermore, PEGIDA supporters are afraid that Muslims will destroy the current German culture and Islamization will change the country drastically.

5. Struggling over Boundaries

This chapter presents an analysis of the collected data during in-depth interviews with eleven female and nine male young active Muslims, between the age of 17 and 33 years old, as described in chapter 3. First, it will discuss how the participants of this study perceive PEGIDA as an organization and the negative categorization from its supporters. Second, it will analyze which boundary making strategies the participants use to respond to this negative categorization and examines if this influences their self-identification. The second section will draw from the theory of ethnic boundary making as discussed in the theoretical framework (Wimmer, 2013).

5.1 Categorization

As discussed in the previous chapter, PEGIDA supporters are negatively categorizing Muslims in Germany. In order to analyze how participants respond to the contracting boundary making strategy of PEGIDA supporters, it is first essential to explore how the participants perceive this negative categorization.

5.1.1 Perceiving PEGIDA

Participants expressed a mix of negative feelings they have in regard to PEGIDA. Half of the participants were scared or deeply concerned by the organization. These ten participants were afraid that PEGIDA will grow and spread all over Germany and thus becoming a more threatening and dangerous organization. During the interview, an eighteen year old male described his feeling: “the first big shock came when the news said that 30.000 people gathered in Dresden and we said: ‘okay what the heck is going on there? After that, the news followed the topic and reported that every week, every Monday, 20.000, 30.000, 40.000 people gathered in various cities to express their support for PEGIDA. We were like: ‘okay what is going on?’ It was discussed all over the media in Germany and we started to become more sensitive”.⁴ This quote clearly shows that the participant is concerned because of the quickly increasing number of PEGIDA supporters and that it was an important topic of discussion within his cultural surroundings.

However, fear is not the only emotion participants expressed, eight of them declared to feel grief towards the situation since they think people are joining the PEGIDA without thinking. They question if demonstrators realize what PEGIDA truly stands for. It makes them distressed that people think negatively about Islam and they feel that their religion is blamed for problems that are not related to Islam. People do not acknowledge the difference between a refugee and a Muslim, or an immigrant and a Muslim. A 21 year old male participant explained: “We don’t actively say that we want the West to become Islamic. In Islam, Islamization does not exist. In Islam we invite people, they can accept or decline, we don’t punish them for

⁴ Author’s interview with participant 8 on May 26, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

not joining us. We don't force them. We just invite people."⁵ This quote shows how this participant feels Islam is misunderstood and the foundation of PEGIDA is already wrong.

In addition, six participants shared not to be very surprised by the emerging of an organization like PEGIDA. They perceive PEGIDA as a logical consequence of a larger development of Islamophobia within Germany which has started since the attacks in New York City at September 11, 2001. A 27 year old male participant states: "It is not something recent. Since 9/11 it has started to grow and each year it is increasing. PEGIDA is nothing new, it is just another level of Islamophobia. It has become more visible."⁶

Furthermore, PEGIDA has given four participants the feeling of not being welcome in Germany. A 25 year old female participants explains: "it makes you feel like you are not part of this society. It makes you feel like you don't belong here. It was really shocking to see 30,000 people saying: you don't belong here. And you're like: where am I supposed to go? I am born here, what country is going to take me? You can't tell me to go back to Pakistan because I wasn't born there".⁷ This quote shows that this woman feels she is not accepted in a society where she was born and in which she is actively contributing to.

Besides these feelings, six participants cannot take PEGIDA seriously. A 26 year old male states: "I can only laugh about it, I think it is funny because they are so stupid. I can only laugh about their stupidity".⁸ His quote clearly indicates that he is not impressed by the organization and therefore it does not affect him strongly.

Although none of the participants are happy with the presence of PEGIDA in Germany, three participants see the organization as something positive, as a chance for German Muslims to improve the image of Islam and as an opportunity to engage in dialogue with non-Muslims and break down prejudices. They think it is positive that when Islam appears in the media because it makes people curious and ask questions about Islam.

Despite of the perceived negative categorization, fifteen participants believe that demonstrators did not join PEGIDA because of anti-Islam purposes only. In their view, supporters have joined because of problems which are not related to Islam at all, such as unemployment, financial insecurity, and dissatisfaction with German politics. Muslims are used as a scape goat for other problems these people have in their lives. The participants do not understand why these fears have to be blamed on Islam. A 33 year old female participant argues: "I personally feel it is mainly frustration with different things. Most people

⁵ Author's interview with participant 18 on June 18, 2015, in Berlin Germany.

⁶ Author's interview with participant 19 on June 18, 2015, in Berlin, Germany.

⁷ Author's interview with participant 20 on June 19, 2015, in Berlin, Germany.

⁸ Author's interview with participant 14 on June 15, 2015, in Berlin, Germany.

who join are not really against Islam but don't have an idea what Islam is or what we preach and believe. It is the frustration about other things that joins them together. Maybe unemployment and something else. Maybe personal issues they might have had with a Muslim.”⁹

In addition to this, seven participants think that PEGIDA supporters feel heard by the organization and feel a sense of belonging by joining the demonstrations. A 26 year old female participant shares her opinion: “I believe they are feeling heard by PEGIDA. They have these thoughts for a long time and now they find someone who says the same.”¹⁰

Opposed to this, people join PEGIDA out of fear for Islam according to nine participants. Mainly because people relate Islam to terrorism. A 29 year old male participant describes the fear he observes: “We are going to be overrun, we are going to be suppressed. They are peaceful as long as they are a minority, but as soon as they are the majority they are going to suppress us. It is just fear, fear, fear. We are going to be suppressed and all our freedoms will be cut off. Everything will change”.¹¹ This fear is related to the assumption of eleven participants that a lack of contact with Muslims stimulates people to join PEGIDA. This can be related to the expression of five participants who claim that a lack of knowledge regarding Islam is a reason for people to support PEGIDA. A 30 year old male participant states the following: “Personally I see PEGIDA as a group of confused people who are scared but do not know for what exactly. It is a fear of the unknown which does not really exist. This is due to ignorance fed by prejudices. Nothing can be confirmed because they have no contact with Muslims”.¹² According to these participants, there is a lot of stereotyping of Islam because of a lack of knowledge people have about the religion. People believe stereotypes because they do not know Muslims in real life to show they are wrong. There is not enough dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims to take away these prejudices. The fear of Islam, a lack of knowledge and a lack of contact are all related to the way Islam is portrayed in the media, which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

5.1.2 Media as a Problem

Although participants expressed mixed feelings regarding PEGIDA and certainly perceive the unfavorable categorization mainly in a negative way, they do not see PEGIDA as the main problem in Germany. All

⁹ Author's interview with participant 5 on May 22, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

¹⁰ Author's interview with participant 11 on June 3, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

¹¹ Author's interview with participant 1 on April 10, 2015 in Berlin, Germany

¹² Author's interview with participant 3 on April 29, 2015 in Berlin Germany. Original quote: “*Ich selber halte Pegida für verwirrte Menschen die Angst haben aber eigentlich nicht wissen wovor. Es ist eine existenz Angst dass sie haben oder eine Überfremdung Angst die real nicht da ist. Die sie aber für sich as Realiteit deklarieren. Das beruht auf Unwissenheit, das beruht auf Vorurteilen. Also nichts was wirklich bestätigt ist, weil sie auch kein Kontakt mit Muslime haben.*“

twenty participants blame the media for the negative image Islam has and as one of the main reason why people join an organization like PEGIDA.

All participants are concerned by the image of Islam displayed in the media, which mainly focuses on what in their eyes are not real Muslims, but individuals who abuse Islam for their own benefit. A 22 year old female participant describes the feeling all participants express that the media has a very big influence on people. She states that when something happens in a Muslim family or a family with an immigrant background the media reports this as a terrorist or Islamist matter. If a similar event happens in a German family, media report about it as a family drama and the use of words is less negative. A 25 year old female participant uses similar arguments that as soon as a Muslim does something crazy it will be all over the news since media only show Muslims who are terrorist and not the Muslim who are positively engaged in their community. A 29 year old male participant describes the process as follows: “People say: ‘okay the Muslims who are not extremists, they are not real Muslims. The real Muslims are those who are extremists. So there is no concept of somebody who believes and lives by the Quran every day and is liberal at the same time. He can’t be tolerant, and he can’t be a good person because he is living by the Quran. Of course there are so many people who follow the Quran very peacefully. People think that following the Quran and being peaceful is impossible. Then he is not a Muslim”.¹³ This quote shows how the participant thinks the image of Muslims is very wrong.

Since many people do not have contact with Muslims in real life, the only information they receive is from the media. An eighteen year old female participant describes why this is a problem for her: “There is an image of Islam. It is a pity how we young people have to fight against this. They do not see us but they always see terrorists. Or they think that the woman is suppressed because she wears a headscarf”.¹⁴ Participants think that people do not think for themselves and simply believe everything the media broadcasts.

Besides the media, three participants have also expressed their dissatisfaction with the German government in regard to their actions to counter Islamophobia. One 22 year old female participant states there are politicians with similar opinions as PEGIDA supporters. This very much concerns her. These three participants state that there is no trust between the government and the Muslim community and they wish for more support from them. They do not feel supported by their government. There are government projects and actions but no efficient ones, according to them.

¹³ Author’s interview with participant 1 on April 10, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

¹⁴ Author’s interview with participant 10 on June 3, 2015 in Berlin Germany. Original quote: “*Es gibt ein Bild von Islam. Es ist schade warüber wir Jugendlichen jetzt dagegen ankämpfen mussten . Mann sieht nicht uns aber Mann sieht immer Terroristen. Oder sie denken das die Frau sind unterdrückt weil sie ein Kopftuch trägt*“.

5.1.3 Stereotyping and discrimination

As mentioned earlier, it became clear during the interviews that the young active Muslims do not see PEGIDA as the main problem, but as a symptom of a larger development within Germany. Besides the negative influence of the media, half of the participants experience stereotyping and discrimination in their lives, for example on the streets or at university. Because the focus on how young active Muslims respond to negative categorization, I also have chosen to include the negative categorization which is not coming directly from PEGIDA. I will first discuss if PEGIDA has an influence on the daily lives of the participants, followed by an overview of other categorization they face.

PEGIDA has not changed anything in the daily lives of eleven participants. Three participants indicated that PEGIDA has had some kind of effect on them, in terms of having to speak about their religion a lot more than before PEGIDA. A 25 year old female participant stated that sometimes when she sits in the subway in Berlin she looks around and wonders who belongs to PEGIDA. She says it makes her uncomfortable to think that someone may be sitting close to her who hates her. PEGIDA supporters are hard to spot because they do not look different from normal people. The most outspoken example came from a 24 year old female participant who had to pass PEGIDA demonstrations on her way home from university: “that was a funny feeling. It was not nice to go to home from university. They do not understand I am German like them.”¹⁵

Although PEGIDA does not have an influence on the daily lives of most participants, half of them think that PEGIDA did affect German society. On one hand it has a negative effect because the participants think it has become easier for people to be negative towards Islam because they feel empowered by PEGIDA. On the other hand, it has a positive influence because participants feel there is more awareness for Islamophobia which provides the opportunity for improvement of this problem. It has increased the attention that something needs to change. Some participants notice that more non-Muslims come to the mosque to ask questions and learn about Islam. They see this as a positive development.

Besides negative categorization by PEGIDA supporters, nine participants have expressed to be dealing with stereotyping and discrimination from Germany’s majority population. The other participants shared stories about friends and family. A 25 year old female participant stated: “I always say I hit the jackpot in discrimination because women are discriminated on the labor market, immigrants are discriminated against, if you’re brown it is obvious you are an immigrant and also my names gives away

¹⁵ Author’s interview with participant 10 on June 3, 2015 in Berlin, Germany. Original quote: “*Das war eine Komische gefühl. Es war nicht schön um zu die Hochschule zu fahren. Ich denke ich bin auch Deutsch aber auf eine art und weise verstehe sie das nicht so.*“

that I am from an immigrant background. Muslims are discriminated against and on top of that I am also wearing a scarf. If I were black it would be the ultimate thing. I got it all covered. You can spot it right away when a girl wears a scarf. With guys, you can't really tell if they are Muslim because they do not wear a scarf."¹⁶ From the experiences of all participants it becomes clear that women wearing a hijab encounter more discrimination and stereotyping than women who do not. An eighteen year old female participant describes that her university is located in East Berlin and she frequently hears people say: *Kopftuch raus* – headscarf leave. She started wearing a headscarf two years ago and has noticed a change in how people look at her and respond to her. People are surprised she speaks German very well or that she goes to university. Before she wore a headscarf she did not have similar experiences. The prejudice of women wearing a hijab being suppressed and not developed is very strongly present in German society according to all twenty participants in this study.

5.2 Boundary Struggles

Wimmer's theory of ethnic boundary making serves as the foundation for the analysis of the collected data in this study. This theory will be used to try to explain how and why participants are responding the way they do. The data show that the struggle over boundaries takes place on two levels; on a religious level and a national level.

5.2.1 Identity Mix

Struggling over the boundary of nationality is an issue eleven participants indicated to deal with and explained that their identity is a mix of multiple identities: a mix between their German identity, the identity from their immigration background and their Muslim identity. These participants state that they are born and raised in Germany, therefore they are German. But, since they are raised by parents who come from for example Turkey, they grew up with that culture as well. A 23 year old male participant explains that he speaks the German language better than the Turkish language, and that he wants to be part of the German society but culturally he feels also connected to the Turkish culture. A 27 year old female participant explains that she grew up between two identities, she can choose the best parts of both cultures. She sees this as something beautiful, taking what she likes from each culture and developing her religious identity at the same time. There are certain aspects she likes about the Turkish and German culture but there are also characteristics that she dislikes and therefore she focuses on the positive aspects and connections between her three identities; Turkish, German and Muslim.

¹⁶ Author's interview with participant 20 on June 19, 2015, in Berlin Germany.

This feeling of having a mix of identities could be explained by Wimmer's (2013) strategy of boundary expansion. As discussed in the theoretical framework, this means that an individual is shifting an existing boundary to a more inclusive level. These participants do not shift the emphasis to a lower level of differentiation, which is one way to expand an existing boundary but achieve this by making a new comprehensive category: an identity which includes multiple nationalities and a religion. The number of categories is reduced, which Wimmer (2013) calls fusion and which aims at including the mix of identities into one category.

A 17 year old male participant feels slightly different about this, he feels mostly Turkish and does not want to forget about his immigration background but he also feels German. He clarifies his feeling by stating that when Germany plays a soccer match he does not care so much but when Turkey has to play he is very excited. He feels more connected to Turkey but explains that he also has German characteristics like punctuality and discipline, which he likes very much. A 30 year old male participant indicated he struggles with this question since his homeland is Germany, it is where he is born and raised and where he feels comfortable. He built his life in Germany, his friends and family are here and he speaks the German language better than the Arabic language. But he explains that he does not like certain features of German society. A 33 year old female participant who grew up in Australia but moved to Berlin years ago says: "I'm not really Pakistani, I'm not really Australian. I am not sure what I am becoming. I am a multicultural person. I am not sure where I fit in".¹⁷ A 22 year old female participant states there is no clear answer to the question of what her identity is. Therefore she states it is a mix because she is born in Germany but does not want to forget her immigrant background. This way of dealing with the question of what one's own identity is fits the strategy of boundary expansion since this category includes all identities a participant feels and picking the positive characteristics of each culture.

5.2.2 Dismissing German Society

None of the participants tries to exclude her- or himself from German society. They do not try to close themselves off from other groups in Germany but actively engage in society and explain to be open to dialogue with non-Muslims to explain their religion. Therefore I have found no indicators for the boundary making strategy boundary contraction. This strategy is defined by Wimmer (2013) as contracting boundaries and dis-identifying with the category being imposed by outsiders. With this strategy people will get excluded from the category. As discussed in the theoretical framework, actors can try to contract a boundary in two ways, fission and emphasis shift to a lower level of differentiation, which I have not found during the interviews (Wimmer, 2013).

¹⁷ Author's interview with participant 5 on May 22, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

5.2.3 Focusing on a Different Meaning

Although most participants expressed negative feelings towards PEGIDA supporters and others who discriminate against Muslims, they do not return this discrimination or claim to be superior over them. Instead, all twenty young active Muslims in this study strongly emphasize the importance of dialogue with non-Muslims and people of other faiths to take away misunderstandings about Islam and breaking down prejudices. To achieve this, eight participants are tour guides in their mosque in order to inform people about Islam and hopefully take away misunderstandings people have about the religion. It is also to educate themselves to be able to debunk these prejudices with solid arguments. One participant went to Dresden with his community to set up an information stand in the shopping street every Saturday to hand out flyers and engage in a dialogue with non-Muslims. Another important annual activity is open mosque day, when the mosques invite all people to come visit the mosque and inform themselves and talk with Muslims. A male participant is involved in a poetry slam group called I,Slam and he explains that they go on stage to show a different image of Muslims. It gives youth the opportunity to speak for themselves and to show through art that Muslims are not different but very normal. Art is a good way to reach society. Additionally, several participants are members of JUMA (Young, Muslim and Active), which focuses on altering the negative image of young Muslims in Germany through a range of activities.

Another action several participants take is engaging in interreligious dialogue. During Ramadan, a 22 year old participant organized breaking fast with ten Muslims, five Christians and five Jews. They were invited for dinner to talk with each other and allow the organizers to show that Muslims, Christians and Jews are not so different from each other. He emphasizes that they all have the same problems. Other participants are member at the organization JUGA (Young, Muslim and Religious) which organizes all sorts of activities to break down barriers between people of different religions.

This behavior of reaching out to others to try to break down prejudices can be explained by Wimmer's (2013) strategy of transvaluation. Instead of focusing on the location of the existing boundary, the participants aim to change the meaning of the existing boundary. They focus on a different aspect of the comparison between Muslims and non-Muslims. The data show that actors emphasize the equalities between Muslims and non-Muslims through engaging in dialogue. According to Wimmer (2013), to achieve transvaluation actors can apply equalization to establish moral and political equality in regard to the dominant group.

In this study eight participants think that being a good Muslim means always means trying to be a better person and to help others. A 24 year old male participant explains it as follows: "Islam is always positive. Islam is always a utopia for me. The belief to be the best and to carry out the best for me and for

everybody else. A Muslim should always be nice and try to be the best possible person.”¹⁸ A 22 year old female participant said that she is studying to become a teacher partially because of her religion, because she wants to be a better person. This response could be explained with the boundary making strategy of transvaluation because the participants are trying to show the positive side of Muslims and therefore establish moral equality.

5.2.4 Leaving one’s Muslim Identity behind

None of the participants wants to forget about their Muslim identity. On the contrary, Islam is very important to each participant interviewed for this study. Fifteen participants describe their religion as a way of life which gives them a certain perspective. A 24 year old female participant explains that Islam makes her life easier. It is her attitude towards life with which she is very happy. It helps her with making choices and choosing what is the right thing to do. An eighteen year old female participants agrees with this by stating religion is not meant to make someone’s life harder but to provide guidance. A seventeen year old male participant explains it as a lifestyle which defines how you can live, not how you need to live. He emphasizes that it is a direction not a restriction.

These statements are examples that I have not found indicators for Wimmer’s (2013) boundary making strategy of boundary crossing. The difference between transvaluation and boundary crossing is that actors who use boundary crossing as a strategy accept the hierarchical order of the existing boundaries. But, the actor does not accept one’s own position in this hierarchical order and therefore tries to change one’s own position. This can be achieved through individual crossing, by re-classification or assimilation an actor aims to change the one’s own position in regard to the existing boundary. Or through collective repositioning, which aims at changing the position of the entire category. This is not the case for any of the young Muslims interviewed for this study.

5.2.5 Emphasizing the Community

Besides focusing on religion or nationality, three participants rather emphasized their local community. A 25 year old female participant explains her identity and underlines: “Even though I was born in Germany and I just feel German actually and more specifically I feel South German. From my area, where I am from. I am from there”.¹⁹ Another female participant feels similar and explains that she rather describes herself as a *Berlinerin* because she is a foreigner everywhere. In Berlin she feels at home and comfortable. She

¹⁸ Author’s interview with participant 4 on May 15, 2015 in Berlin, Germany. Original quote: “Islam ist immer das Positive. Islam ist immer für mich ein Utopie. Die überzeugung das besten zu sein das besten aus zu tragen, für mich und auch für alle anderen. Ein Muslim muss immer Nett sein und versuchen die best möglichen Mensch zu sein.”

¹⁹ Author’s interview with participant 6 on May 22, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

likes the multicultural character of Berlin and wishes to always come back to this city. A 33 year old female states that she feels culturally connected to Turkey but emphasizes: “Sometimes when I am so active in this community, I really feel as I am a part of it and then I feel German. Maybe it is not the feeling of being German. It is the feeling of being part of Berlin. To be a Berliner. To be part of the city and of the community here.”²⁰

This identification can be explained by Wimmer’s (2013) strategy of boundary blurring, which can be achieved by localism. Localism is the emphasis on the local community and reducing the importance of ethnicity as a principle of categorization. The participants emphasized other non-ethnic principles as most important for their identity. Wimmer defines this strategy as follows: “boundary blurring reduces the importance of ethnicity as a principle of categorization and social organization. Other, non-ethnic principles are promoted and the legitimacy of ethnic, national, or ethno-somatic boundaries undermined. Blurred boundaries are less relevant for the everyday conduct of life, less exclusionary and less institutionalized” (Wimmer, 2013:61).

Furthermore, four participants identify themselves as Muslim and do not connect their identity to a specific ethnicity because religion knows no nationality. A 28 year old male participant explains: “I identify just as a Muslim. The idea of nationality is a modern construct. I identify as Muslim because identifying with a nation is something related to territory. I understand that Islam has no relation to territory, we are one humanity. The idea of nationality divides humanity. Identifying with a nation divides us from each other. Non-Muslims are also considered as part of the entire humanity.”²¹ Here he emphasizes the importance of a universal humanity over ethnicity, blurring the boundary between different ethnicities. This response can be explained through Wimmer’s (2013) strategy of boundary blurring through universalism, when universal moral qualities that all individuals share regardless of ethnic, national or religious background is being emphasized. So actors respond to negative categorization by stating that all human beings are equal, focusing on universal human needs and commonalities with all people.

5.3 Self-Identification influenced by Others

Six participants have indicated that it depends on what others think or how others treat them how they identify themselves. For example they want to feel German but feel that Germans do not accept this. Or when they are in the country of heritage, they do not feel accepted there either. So it depends on the location where the participants find themselves in, how they identify themselves. A 33 year old female participant describes her feeling about this: “When I am in Turkey I feel I am more German. That is very interesting.

²⁰ Author’s interview with participant 2 on April 28, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

²¹ Author’s interview with participant 19 on June 18, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

When I am in other countries then I feel often that I am very German. But in the German community I feel Turkish.”²² A 24 year old female participant has the same experiences and explains that for Arabs she is not completely Arab because she is also Turkish. For Turks she is not completely Turkish because she is partially Arab. And for Germans she is not German at all.

A 23 year old female participant describes how the response of others affects her self-identification: “Muslims nowadays are the black sheep for everyone. I was born here, I grew up here, and I live here. So I would say I am German because I identify myself more with the German culture than with the Pakistani culture. But I prefer to say I am Muslim. Because in Germany if I say I am German, they say: ‘no, no, we are asking, where are your parents from.’ They don’t accept that I am German, despite the fact that I was born here and grew up here. They always think about your background because you have a different skin color. It is difficult to define yourself with this country like that because I never feel welcome or accepted. I feel more German than Pakistani. I would say I am German. But I prefer to say I am Muslim because that is something I am sure about.”²³ Another female participant of 25 years old explains that she always described herself as a German but realized she was not accepted as such. Then she asked herself if she wanted to belong to Germany if Germans do not accept her. Therefore she decided to identify herself as German Pakistani. Although she presents herself as a mix, her thinking process seems different from the participants I have discussed in section 5.2.1. The participants in section 5.2.1 present their identity as mixed because they connect to the multiple identities. The participants discussed this section, 5.3, clearly indicated that because of the responses from others, they changed the way they identified themselves. The type of behavior presented in this section cannot be explained by a boundary making strategy of Wimmer (2013). Therefore I have chosen to create a new category called self-identification influenced by others.

5.4 Influence of PEGIDA

Because PEGIDA is categorizing Muslims in a negative way, I asked the participants if PEGIDA has influenced the way in which they see or experience Islam. Twelve participants have indicated that PEGIDA has not changed anything for them about being a Muslim. For the other participants it has had some kind of positive effect, encouraging them to be more actively engaged in breaking down prejudices regarding Islam. For example educating themselves more to be better able to respond to negative opinions and critical questions. A 29 year old male participant explained it as follows: “It affects me in a way that I feel that I have to answer, I have to explain. I have to basically clear the misconceptions. I have a responsibility to do something about it, in that way it influences me. It doesn’t make me more or less Muslim. Islam was always

²² Author’s interview with participant 2 on April 28, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

²³ Author’s interview with participant 7 on June 22, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

important for me. It is true it makes me more aware of my responsibility to deal with this situation in a way in which I can explain and remove the stereotype.”²⁴ This quote shows that PEGIDA does not affect religiosity but it does effect the positive social engagement of these twelve young active Muslims in Berlin. This quote shows that PEGIDA strengthens the Muslim part of their identity for these Muslims.

Nevertheless, PEGIDA has influenced two participants in a negative way. A 24 year old male participant explains that he is more reticent about sharing that he is a Muslim with new people he meets. Not because he is scared to be rejected but because he has no energy left to discuss the Muslim stereotypes over and over again. An eighteen year old male participant states that it gives him the feeling that because he is a Muslim, he has to be more careful and watch his step at all times.

²⁴ Author’s interview with participant 1 on April 10, 2015 in Berlin, Germany.

6. Conclusion and Discussion

This thesis has examined the influence of categorization by PEGIDA supporters on the self-identification of twenty young active Muslims in Berlin, and has tried to explain this with the theory of ethnic boundary making from Wimmer (2013). It first examined how PEGIDA supporters categorize Muslims and how this is used as a boundary making strategy. The animosity towards Muslims from PEGIDA supporters is expressed in a fear of Germany being “Islamized”, taken over by Muslims as soon as they will outnumber the Germans. Images and labels PEGIDA supporters use to categorize Muslims is seeing Islam as a backwards and violent religion and Muslim women as suppressed. These negative images and labels are connected to the problem of integration, some PEGIDA supporters believe that Muslims are unable and unwilling to integrate. They believe Islam is impossible to reconcile with Western culture (Geiges et al. 2015).

First, research has shown (Geiges et al. 2015, Patzelt, 2015 and Vörländer et al, 2015) that the negative categorization of Muslims is used by PEGIDA supporters to contract the existing religious boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims in German society. By using negative labels and images like described above, the organization’s supporters are trying to exclude Muslims from belonging to the “real German” population.

Second, the results of this thesis show that the twenty young active Muslims interviewed for this study perceive PEGIDA in different ways. This varied from a fear that the organization will spread over Germany and become more influential and dangerous, to participants who were unable to take the organization seriously because the people joining PEGIDA were “so dumb”. All participants were distressed by the misunderstandings people have regarding Islam. They were divided regarding the question why people would join PEGIDA. Half of them thinks a fear of Islam is the main motivating factor, whether the other half pointed at other problems such as financial instability and unemployment which are not related to Islam as the reason for people to show support to PEGIDA.

Third, the findings present that the young active Muslims interviewed for this study do not see PEGIDA as the main problem in Germany but as part of a larger development in the country regarding animosity towards Muslims and immigrants. According to them, this is caused by a lack of contact between Muslims and non-Muslims, the negative image of Islam portrayed by the media and a lack of knowledge about the religion. These three problems are interrelated and reinforcing each other.

Furthermore, PEGIDA does not have a strong effect on the lives of young active Muslims, other than having to talk about the issue more. Only one participant indicated that PEGIDA make him feel uncomfortable about living in Germany. Regardless of this, findings show that PEGIDA has had both a

positive and a negative influence on the perception of German society for the participants. Positive on the one hand because they feel there is more awareness for the problem of islamophobia in Germany since PEGIDA which creates the opportunity to solve these issues. On the other hand the organization has a negative effect because some participants feel that it has become easier for people to mouth anti-Muslim sentiment in Germany because they feel empowered and heard by PEGIDA.

Additionally, the findings show evidence for three out of five strategies of Wimmer's (2013) theory. Results indicate behavior in favor of the strategies of boundary expansion, transvaluation and boundary blurring, while no support was found for the strategies boundary contraction and boundary crossing (Wimmer, 2013). By emphasizing a mix of different identities and including them all in one encompassing identity, participants expanded the existing boundary. Fusing their German, immigrant background and religion in one new identity.

Several activities of the participants to engage into (interreligious) dialogue present that they are trying to show that Muslims are equal to the majority of Germany's population and to people of other faiths and are certainly not a threat. By breaking down prejudices and taking away misunderstandings these young active Muslims aim to change the meaning of the existing boundary and achieve moral equality, which matches with Wimmer's (2013) strategy of transvaluation.

Furthermore, the results show support for the strategy of boundary blurring (Wimmer, 2013). Participants have emphasized their local belonging, to Berlin, or identify themselves as "just Muslim". With these responses, they de-emphasize ethnicity as a factor of separating different groups of people.

The results do not show evidence for the strategies of boundary contraction and boundary crossing since none of the participants tries to close themselves off from German society nor do they leave their Muslim identity behind. Religion is an important element in each of the lives of the twenty young Muslims who participated in this study.

The main research question this thesis aimed to answer is: *How does negative categorization by PEGIDA supporters influence the self-identification of young active Muslims in Berlin, Germany since the establishment of PEGIDA in October 2014?* According to the findings of this study, the negative categorization from PEGIDA does not influence the self-identification of the twenty young active Muslim in Berlin. Six participants have indicated to be influenced by PEGIDA in the sense that they are more actively working on breaking down prejudices about Muslims. What I did find is a strategy which did not fit in Wimmer's theory (2013) and which enables me to partially confirm that negative categorization does influence self-identification in general, but not from PEGIDA specifically. Six participants in this study have indicated that it depends on how others see them and treat them on how they identify themselves.

They would like to identify as Germans but that is not accepted by Germany's majority population. Therefore, the construction of their identity is dependent on the context, on how they are seen by others.

6.1 Discussion

This study has tried to give more insight in the five boundary making strategies Wimmer (2013) provides with his theory. The theory remains too abstract at times, with no clear practical actions to carry out the different strategies. It remains too vague what actors can do specifically to respond to an existing boundary. Therefore, with this study I have tried to contribute empirically to this theory by trying to explain the self-identification and actions of the participants to PEGIDA to these five strategies. During the in-depth interviews I have asked the participants regarding their identity and how they respond to PEGIDA.

Furthermore, I consider Wimmer's (2013) theory to be slightly incomplete. He provides abstract theories on how actors can respond to existing boundaries present in their surroundings. This thesis tries to contribute theoretically to the theory of ethnic boundary making by adding another strategy to the theory. One of the main findings as discussed earlier in this chapter, could not be matched with one of the strategies of Wimmer (2013). Therefore I created a new boundary making strategy, which indicates that actors define themselves according to how others see them and treat them. They do this as a response to outside categorization, because others do not see the individual as the individual likes to see him- or herself.

The participants in this study have shown great willingness to counter the negative image of Islam. I believe that when there would be more contact between non-Muslims and Muslims, a lot of the prejudices would be debunked and the levels of animosity towards Muslims would go down as well.

6.2 Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research

The empirical evidence of this study relies completely on the self-identification of twenty young active Muslims who have been interviewed in-depth for this study. Due to the time constraint for this research, the focus on categorization by PEGIDA supporters is rather limited, which is a limitation of this thesis. The evidence relies mostly on research of others and on two personal observations of PEGIDA demonstrations. Therefore, a recommendation for further research is to also collect empirical data for the categorization process to better enable the researcher to investigate the dynamics between the two concepts central to this study: categorization and identification. This includes conducting in-depth interviews with PEGIDA supporters about their motivations and actions instead of questionnaires and surveys.

Additionally, further research should draw from a larger and more representative sample of participants to be able to include ethnicity and the different branches within Islam. Again due to the limited time for this research, I have chosen not to include either of those aspects but to fully focus on the religious

boundary Muslims perceive in Germany. Therefore, this research serves as a starting point for investigating the dynamics between categorization and identification. It should be seen as a first step into that direction. I have chosen to focus on active young Muslims to ensure their engagement in a Muslim community and actively identify with their religion based on this participation. Further research could also focus on Muslims of different ages and those who are not actively engaged in organizations and see if this results in any differences in the results. I expect that elderly Muslims will be less influenced by negative categorization because they are more educated about their own religion and therefore are less influenced by negative categorization towards it. Last, comparing Muslims from different cities is an option for further research as well.

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Appendix I: Interview Topic List

Before the interview

- Introduce myself and the research
- Ask if the participant has any questions beforehand
- Ask permission to record interview

Background information participant

- Ask participant to tell something about him/herself (place of birth, education, job, etc.)
- Ask the participant about their activities within their organization

Topic: PEGIDA

- Ask participant to explain PEGIDA
- PEGIDA about Muslims
- Reasons for PEGIDA supporters to be negative towards Muslims
- Reasons to join PEGIDA
- How does it make you feel when you see PEGIDA demonstrations on TV or read about it online / in the newspaper?
- PEGIDA as discussion topic in social network
- Do you respond to PEGIDA? If yes, how? If not, why not?
- Has PEGIDA changed anything in your daily life? If yes, how?

Topic: Stereotyping and Discrimination

Topic: Identification

- Friendship network
- Identity
- Meaning of being a Muslim
- Influence of PEGIDA on meaning of (religious) identity

Appendix II: List of Participants

Participant #	Gender	Age	Organizational affiliation	Interview date
1	Male	29	Khadija Mosque	10-04-2015
2	Female	33	Sehitlik Mosque DiTiB	28-04-2015
3	Male	30	Violence Prevention Network I,Slam	29-04-2015
4	Male	24	I,Slam	15-05-2015
5	Female	33	Khadija Mosque Ahmadiyya Women's Organization	22-05-2015
6	Female	25	Khadija Mosque Ahmadiyya Women's Organization	22-05-2015
7	Female	23	Khadija Mosque Ahmadiyya Women's Organization	22-05-2015
8	Male	20	JUMA I,Slam	26-05-2015
9	Female	24	JUGA Sehitlik Mosque	01-06-2015
10	Female	24	JUGA Sehitlik Mosque	03-06-2015
11	Female	26	JUGA JUMA Sehitlik Mosque	03-06-2015
12	Male	23	New Mosque	03-06-2015
13	Female	27	Sehitlik Mosque	06-06-2015
14	Male	26	New Mosque	15-06-2015
15	Female	22	<i>Muslimische Hochschulgruppe</i> Muslim Student Association	15-06-2015
16	Female	18	Sehitlik Mosque	17-06-2015
17	Male	17	Youth group in mosque	18-06-2015

18	Male	21	Turkish Education Organization Turkish German Student Association	18-06-2015
19	Male	27	<i>Muslimische Hochschulgruppe</i> Muslim Student Association	18-06-2015
20	Female	25	Khadija Mosque Ahmadiyya Women's Organization	19-06-2015