

The Political Economy of Peacebuilding

A study into power relations and the triple transition in Guatemala



Welmoed Barendsen

3494713

Utrecht University

3 August 2015

A Thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights

Name of Author: Welmoed Barendsen

Student Number: 3494713

Name of Supervisor: Dr. G.J.C. van der Borgh

Date of Submission: 3 August 2015

Number of Words: 17,496

Program Trajectory: Internship (15 ECTS)

Research and Thesis Writing (15 ECTS)

Table of Contents

Acknowledgment		4
List of Acronyms		5
Chapter I	INTRODUCTION	7
Chapter II	PEACEBUILDING: A LIBERAL VS. POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH	11
	Liberal Peacebuilding: a Controversial Consensus	11
	Power, Politics and Economy: Providing a Political Economy Approach	12
	Conclusion	16
Chapter III	HISTORY, POLITICS AND CHANGING POWER CENTRES IN GUATEMALA	18
	Spanish Conquest and the Liberal Coffee Revolution	18
	The Conflict: A Contested Land Reform, Guerrilla Movements and “Scorched Earth”	19
	Negotiating Peace	21
Chapter IV	DEMILITARISATION AND THE RULE OF LAW	24
	Policy: Demilitarisation, police reform and modernising the justice system	24
	Power and Pacification	28
	Conclusion	33

Chapter V	CHANGING RULES OF THE STATE: TRANSFORMING AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME INTO A DEMOCRACY	35
	Policy: Democratisation in the search for peace by political means	35
	Power and Democratisation	39
	Conclusion	42
Chapter VI	NEOLIBERALISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	44
	Policy: Structural adjustment and a contested tax reform	44
	Power and Marketisation	48
	Conclusion	50
Chapter VII	CONCLUSION	52
	Bibliography	55
	Appendix - Methodology	63

Acknowledgement

Firstly, I would like to thank Dr. Chris van der Borgh for guiding me through the rigmarole of doing research and writing a thesis. Sometimes it seemed to me that he had more confidence in my ideas than I had, which was rather motivating. His willingness to brainstorm endlessly with me on a suitable research puzzle, his critical and constructive feedback and his ability to make me challenge my own thoughts have been of great help and crucial for the realisation of this thesis.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my fellow graduate students, with whom I could always exchange ideas and whom I could ask all the necessary dull questions. I also owe gratitude to Nathalie van der Aar and Stef Wittendorp for their critical but useful feedback and for taking the time to edit and correct the final version of this thesis.

Finally I am grateful for the support of my significant other, Rob Wittendorp, for his confidence in me and for listening to my boring stories during research and thesis writing. During this period he provided me with the vital support and amusement.

List of Acronyms

APC	Autonomous Power Centre
ASC	Civil Society Assembly
BTI	The Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index
CACIF	Coordinating Committee for Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations
CAFTA-DR	Central American Free Trade Agreement- Dominican Republic
CEPAZ	Business Peace Commission
CICIG	International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GINI	Global Index for National Inequality
IGSS	Social Security Institute of Guatemala
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MINUGUA	United Nations Mission to Guatemala
NT-Mexico FTA	Northern Triangle-Mexico Free Trade Agreement
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAC	Civil Autodefence Patrol (paramilitary)
PMA	Mobile Military Police
PNC	National Civil Police
PSC	Private Security Company
RESDAL	Network of Security and Defence in Latin America
UFC	United Fruit Company
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
URNG	Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity
WTO	World Trade Organisation

I

Introduction

For many Guatemalans [...] the signing of the peace [accords] has not brought an end to the violence. The character of the killing, certainly, has changed: the number of politically-motivated murders has declined sharply; disappearances are now much more infrequent; acts of genocidal state terror are thankfully a thing of the past. Nonetheless, the cessation of formal hostilities between the Army and guerrillas has been accompanied by a marked increase in the incidence of common crime.

(Snodgrass Godoy 2002:643, [amendments of the author])

In the “Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace”, signed in 1996, it is stated that Guatemala faced the task of preserving and consolidating peace and that the peace accords provided the country with a comprehensive agenda for overcoming the root causes of the conflict (UNSC 1997). However, as expressed in the quote of Snodgrass Godoy (2002) above, it seems that Guatemala has not been able to consolidate peace in the nineteen years since the signing of the peace accords (e.g. Briscoe and Rodriquez Pellecer 2010; O’Neill and Thomas eds. 2011; Snodgrass Godoy 2002). Most strikingly, homicide rates have not decreased substantively since 1996: compared to the 35.3 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1996 (UN Data 2015), in 2014 there were still 31 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (Gobierno de Guatemala 2015). It is even argued that this homicide rate is higher compared to the worst years of the armed conflict in the beginning of the 1980s (Sieder 2011; Brands 2010). Precisely in this tragic reality I find a complication that, for me, triggered the following questions: how does it come to be that Guatemala experiences such insecurity and violence as reflected in the high homicide rates? How does it come to be that the peacebuilding programs since the peace accords do not have the desired outcome? What happened since the signing of the peace accords that has led to the situation which is so compellingly described by Snodgrass Godoy (2002)?

In this thesis I analyse the three post-war transformations (pacification, democratisation and market liberalisation) as prescribed by the liberal peace paradigm. In order to unravel what went wrong with the implementation of the triple transition in Guatemala, I discuss both policy and implementation. However, the focus is on shifting power relations within these processes of peacebuilding, as well as the continuity within them. I use the Tillyan concept of “autonomous power centres” which can include “all those interpersonal connections that provide political actors with the means of altering existing distribution of resources, population and activities within the regime” (Tilly 2007:76). The aim of this research is to provide an account of the development of the three transitions in Guatemala and, by taking a political economy approach, provide knowledge of how autonomous

power centres have directly and indirectly, intentionally and unintentionally, challenged these processes from the outset. Following from this, my research question is:

From a political economy perspective, how have autonomous power centres hampered the triple transition of peacebuilding in Guatemala from the signing of the peace accords in 1996 until the present?

In order to answer this question, I divided the main question into four sub-questions. The first concerns the context of the research: what are important historical developments in Guatemala that are significant for this study? Subsequently, for each of the three transitions I pose the twofold question: how did the transition develop since the signing of the peace accords and how has the transition been hampered by autonomous power centres? By answering these questions, this thesis provides an analysis of secondary and open data regarding the triple transition of peacebuilding in Guatemala through a political economy lens. As I explain in chapter II, in this thesis a “political economy approach” entails, based on the definition of Haider and Rao, “the interaction of political and economic processes in a society” and its analysis tries to unravel how power and resources are distributed and contested in different contexts (2010:4).

By not only discussing the implementation of policy, but rather exploring all three transitions and focusing in particular on the role of power in the development of the triple transition in Guatemala, I offer new knowledge on the relationship between power and peacebuilding and contribute to the academic debate on this theme. My approach is academically as well as practically relevant because, as this thesis shows, autonomous power centres have had and still have a tremendous influence on the peacebuilding process in Guatemala. Therefore, this thesis underlines the importance of taking into account the challenges that existing, emerging or proliferating autonomous power centres pose for peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict settings.

As a matter of methodology, this thesis is based on a profound research of mostly secondary and open data. I used the different steps mentioned in Machi and McEvoy’s (2012) “The literature Review: Six Steps to Success” as a roadmap throughout the research. To avoid ending up writing just another essay, I made sure that I followed the steps - select a topic, search the literature, develop the argument, survey the literature, critique the literature and write the thesis - carefully. In addition, I complemented the steps described in Machi and McEvoy (2012) by adding the practice of coding as a crucial aspect of data analysis. I also used triangulation by verifying “facts” in the literature firstly by searching for statistics, reports and other raw data on the topic and secondly by documentaries, news articles and communiqués by political institutes, such as the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN and the EU. As I was doing an internship at the Western Hemisphere Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I had knowledge of which reports were relevant and of value for my research. The internship also made it possible for me to attend meetings concerning Guatemala, such as meetings with the Guatemala NGO platform in the Netherlands, but also with the Guatemalan Ambassador, H.E. Mr Gabriel Aguilera Peralta. Due to

confidentiality, I could not use the contents of these meetings directly, however, it did provide me with useful inspiration and clarification regarding the topic of my research. For a more detailed account of my methodology, see the appendix. I also acknowledge the limitations of my research. First of all, a study based on secondary and open data might lack the personal depth that characterises ethnographic research. What is more, with secondary research, the art is to see through the authors' interpretations. I did my best to overcome these limitations, by using as many sources as possible as well as triangulation. The variety of sources helped me to enrich the story and the arguments I wanted to convey and to distinguish factual information from opinion.

This thesis is structured as follows. In chapter II I start with laying a theoretical foundation by discussing the liberal peacebuilding paradigm and the political economy perspective on peacebuilding, as well as introducing important concepts for this thesis. Then I briefly provide the context of the case study in this thesis in chapter III: post-conflict Guatemala. What are important historical developments that are significant for this study? Here I also introduce some of the main autonomous power centres in Guatemala.

Subsequently, in chapters IV, V and IV, I describe the three post-war transformations in Guatemala, namely the security transition (pacification), the political transition (democratisation) and the economic transition (marketisation). In these three chapters I zoom in on power relations and I discuss the influence of autonomous power centres within the triple transition. How has power been reconfigured and challenged? How have autonomous power centres hampered each of the three transitions of peacebuilding in Guatemala? Finally I conclude the thesis by answering my research question, discussing the implications of my analysis and suggesting themes and topics for further research.

II

Peacebuilding: A Liberal vs. Political Economy Perspective

Liberal Peacebuilding: a Controversial Consensus

Liberal peacebuilding is a label for external interventions in post-conflict societies. Those supporting this thesis assume that a liberally constituted state tends to be more peaceful internally as well as externally (Paris 2004). This idea is rooted in historical experiences of Western Europe and while it may have served well for Europe and Japan after World War II, today the legitimacy of this theoretical framework of peacebuilding is questioned by many.

The liberal peace paradigm united the different interventions by multiple international agencies, such as the United Nations (UN), since the 1990s, because they all opted to implement a “triple transition” of pacification, democratisation and economic liberalisation (marketisation). The underlying assumption is that these transformation processes positively influence each other, leading to sustainable development (Sieder and Wilson 1997; Forman and Patrick 2000; van der Borgh 2007; Kurtenbach 2010). However, by using the case of El Salvador, van der Borgh (2007) argues that the three transitions are not necessarily complementary and can even contradict each other. This is supported by numerous authors (Paris 2004; Weyland 2004; Sieder 2011; O’Neill and Thomas eds. 2013). Weyland (2004) argues for example that the dual effect of neoliberalism (the main component of the marketisation process) has made democracy more solid and sustainable, but has also eroded the quality of it. Paris (2004) mentions another pitfall of the liberalisation process, namely its destabilising effect in the fragile circumstances of post-conflict countries. According to Paris (2004), this is particularly the case because these states do not necessarily have an efficient and working government. Therefore, he argues that the most important and difficult problem in the process of peacebuilding is “how to establish functioning governments and stable nonviolent politics in conditions of virtual anarchy” (Paris 2004:46-47).

Within the liberal peace paradigm, there is often an emphasis on “good governance” together with a call for a “better state” (Paris 2004:23-24; Demmers 2013:66-67). Statebuilding is considered a means to achieve this and refers to “the attempt to (re)build self-sustaining institutions of governance capable of delivering the essential public goods required to underpin perceived legitimacy” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011:199). Lotz (2010) underlines the importance of statebuilding, but he also argues that it has to be a local process. Merely importing policy prescriptions may not be sustainable and risks undermining the legitimacy of the state. Therefore, he argues that “international actors need to align themselves with national actors and processes based on a thorough understanding of local political and social dynamics” (Lotz 2010:227). Many authors align with Lotz (2010), arguing that the failure to take into account local political realities is the main weakness of the dominant paradigm underpinning state- and peacebuilding policy. These authors plead for a context sensitive approach, for example by incorporating a

certain “hybrid political order” (Baker and Sheye 2007; Boege et al. 2009; Debiel and Lambach 2009; Aguirre and van der Borgh 2010). For example, Debiel and Lambach state that the political reality in developing countries consists of “social and political structures that are characterised by institutional hybridity and a blend of traditional and modern norms and practices” (2009:25). Therefore they emphasise the need for a deeper understanding of these local dynamics in the development research agenda.¹

It is clear that the liberal peace paradigm is under fire. The question remains what the exact deficits of the assumptions of liberal peacebuilding are. Is it an incompatibility of the three different transitions or a too state-centric approach and lack of context sensitivity? Are there perhaps also other mechanisms at play contributing to the weak performance of liberal peace interventions? Although there are similarities between different countries, the answer probably remains highly case specific. Below I introduce an alternative analytical lens to scrutinise the liberal peace paradigm.

Power, Politics and Economy: Providing a Political Economy Approach

In this thesis, instead of aligning with liberal peace students, I approach the triple transition in Guatemala through a political economy lens. A political economy perspective focuses on “the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time” (Haider and Rao 2010:4). The analysis tries to unravel how power and resources are distributed and contested in different contexts, providing insights into underlying interests, incentives, rules and institutions (Haider and Rao 2010).

However, Hudson and Leftwich argue that the recent political economy approach “misses what is distinctively political about politics – power, interests, agency, ideas, building coalitions and the impact of contingency” (2014:6). They propose a revision of existing political economy approaches, with analytically sharper definitions and more focus on power, incorporating both structure and agency. They call such an analysis “political analysis”:

Political analysis focuses on how the structures and institutions of power shape how agents behave, and how they do or can strategise, frame, generate, use, mobilise and organise power and institutions to bring about domestically owned deliberation and appropriate change in the politics of development.

(Hudson and Leftwich 2014:7)

¹ This approach could imply that the statebuilding definition of Ramsbotham et al. (2011:199) should be revised, as it speaks only of the delivery of public goods by the *state* and does not seem to include institutional hybridity.

It ultimately argues that to solve problems, power and the politics that maintains the problem need to be addressed.

In such a political economy perspective or political analysis, power appears as an important factor in society. Most people likely share Dahl's intuitive idea of power, which he describes as "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B otherwise wouldn't do." (1957:202-203) Foucault has a more structural approach to power, arguing that "the human subject is placed in relations of production and signification, he is equally placed in power relations which are very complex." (1982:778) He argues that power has different forms and that people struggle against a form of power, not power as such:

This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him. [...] a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.

(Foucault 1982:781)

As I focus explicitly on power relations in this thesis I approach "power" in a more structural and Foucauldian (1982) way.

Having briefly explained the main principles of a political economy approach and political analysis, I continue with applying this approach theoretically to peacebuilding and the triple transition. From a political economy perspective, what are the deficits and weaknesses of the idea of liberal peacebuilding?

Political Economy in the Triple Transition

As explained above, the triple transition incorporates three processes: pacification, democratisation, and marketisation. Does this combination of three transitions really result in peace? To answer this question, the authors discussed below do not solely focus on the implementation of liberal peacebuilding policy. Rather, they make a political analysis of the triple transition by zooming in on power and political processes in and around the implementation of the triple transition.

The most obvious expression of the pacification process, the first transition in the triple transition, are peace accords, aiming at ending violence. Peace accords are often followed by demobilisation (DDR) and security sector reforms (SSR) and a focus on democratically controlled forms of violence control (Kurtenbach 2010). However, Aguirre and van der Borgh (2010) rightfully state that "[s]igning peace agreements and building state institutions do not necessarily end violence and war." Kurtenbach (2010) argues that in the pacification process, it is vital to look at the continuity of expressions of violence and the reproduction of violence, as well as new elements of violence, such as new forms of

control or acceptance of violent behavior. Like the authors in the previous section, she focuses on local dynamics, arguing that power is an important factor because “pacification or violence control will depend less on external interventions and more on existing relations of power” (Kurtenbach 2010:102-103). Traditional forms of violence control and the persistence of traditional influence and control by violent actors over economic resources and state institutions are important in this regard.

In a somewhat similar vein, Baker and Sheye (2007) plead for an alternative approach to SSR. This approach does not focus on the state’s capacity of providing services, but rather on the quality and efficacy of the services received by society, regardless of who delivers that service. Baker and Sheye (2007) argue that the current SSR approach relies on two fallacies, namely that the state is capable of delivering justice and security and that the state is the main actor in society. They point to the fact that most of the provision of security and justice in post-conflict and fragile states is carried out by non-state security and justice actors and organisations. Non-state actors are often influenced and shaped by state actors and therefore the distinction between state and non-state security systems is not always sharp.² The authors therefore argue that it is more valuable to look at the interaction between the two in an attempt to strengthen the performance and capacities of providers of security and justice deliverers, in addition to strengthening state capacities (Baker and Sheye 2007).

In order to look closer at the concept of democracy and the process of the second transition, democratisation, I use Tilly’s (2007) work. In his book “Democracy” Tilly approaches democracy in a process oriented way, thereby focusing on “a minimum set of processes that must be continuously in motion for a situation to qualify as democratic” (2007:9). He argues that to determine the degree of democracy, we have to look at the extent to which the state behaves in conformity to the expressed demands of its citizens, implying a focus on the relation between the state and its citizens, also common in social contract approaches to the state (e.g. in Holsti 1996 and OECD 2008). According to Tilly, a regime (the set of relations between states and citizens) is democratic “to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation” (2007:13-14). Tilly describes these four dimensions in the following way: “breadth” refers to the extent of the enjoyment of extensive rights; “equality” refers to the degree of equality among and within categories of citizens; “protection” refers to the degree of protection against the state’s arbitrary action; and “mutually binding consultation” refers to the degree of binding consultation (2007:14). Democratisation then means the process towards this relation of broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation and de-democratisation means the process towards the opposite. However, Tilly (2007) also emphasises the importance of state capacity for democracy, which is most obvious in the “protection” dimension of democratisation, as he argues that weak states can do little to protect its citizens.

² See also Sieder (2011)

As in the pacification process, power plays an important part in the process of democratisation, because as Kurtenbach argues, democratisation restructures the traditional power system (2014:97). This makes it a conflictive process for different actors in a post-conflict society. There is indeed evidence that democratisation is often correlated with high levels of conflict and violence (Hegre 2004; Paris 2004; Aguirre and van der Borgh 2010). Regarding power and democratisation, Tilly mentions the danger of “autonomous power centres” (APC’s) and subsequently the importance of attaching these APC’s to the domain of public politics (2007:76). He argues that APC’s

operate outside the control of public politics and outside of regular citizen-state interactions. They can include all those interpersonal connections that provide political actors [...] with the means of altering existing distribution of resources, population and activities within the regime

(ibid.).

By attaching APC’s, such as warlords, patron-client chains, armies, and religious institutions, to the domain of public politics, this is said to contribute to the democratisation process. This is possible by broadening political participation, equalising access to political resources and opportunities outside the state, and inhibiting autonomous and/or arbitrary coercive power both within and outside the state (ibid.).

The assumption underlying the marketisation process, the third transition, is that neoliberal programs stimulate wealth accumulation. However, Harvey argues that neoliberal programs have redistributed rather than generated wealth and income and this is what he calls “accumulation by dispossession” (2005:159). By this he means “the continuation and proliferation of accumulation process which Marx treated of as ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ during the rise of capitalism” (ibid.). These include, inter alia, the commodification and privatisation of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; conversion of various forms of property rights into exclusive private property rights; suppression of the rights to the commons; commodification of labor power and the suppression of alternative forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets; monetisation of exchange and taxation; the national debt and, most devastating of all, the use of the credit system as a radical means of accumulation by dispossession (ibid.). Harvey (2005) argues that with its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence the state plays an important role in both backing and promoting these processes.

Harvey distinguishes four main features of accumulation by dispossession: 1) the privatisation and “commodification of everything”; 2) financialisation by deregulation; 3) the management and manipulation of crises so that the poor countries are subsidising the richest; and 4) state redistribution by pursuit of privatisation schemes, revision in tax codes and cutbacks in those state expenditures that support the social wage (2005:160-164). In a neoliberal world, he argues, everything is commodified into something with a price tag. Even labor is commodified, so that each individual with emotions, soul and a

character is nothing more than a factor of production for capitalists (Harvey 2005). Therefore some authors, such as Harvey (2005), share the idea that the hegemonic neoliberal globalisation from the 1980s, “tends to encourage new and durable forms of division, inequality and instability” (Demmers 2013:66).

Conclusion

From a political economy perspective, the liberal peace paradigm fails to take into account local dynamics of power, politics and economy, and the interplay between these concepts. Moreover, the authors above agree that the triple transition of peacebuilding is not particularly a magic formula that will unquestionably lead to peace. However, the different critiques identify different deficits of the liberal peace paradigm and accordingly propose different solutions. In this thesis I focus on the role of shifting power relations in peacebuilding, using Tilly’s (2007) concept of “autonomous power centres”. In the next chapters, I unravel the value of complementing policy analysis of the triple transition of peacebuilding with an analysis focusing on power and politics.

III

History, politics and changing power centres in Guatemala

Guatemala is the largest and most populated country in Central America and has a diverse population. There are twenty-one indigenous communities in Guatemala and there are no less than twenty-three languages spoken besides Spanish (Minority Rights Group 2008). Guatemala's population consists of Spanish descendants (*ladinos*) and a large indigenous population (*indígenas*, fifty-one per cent) (ibid.). As a colonial legacy, Landau argues that the *indígenas* were always seen as "somewhat less than human" by the *ladino* elite (1993:196). It is therefore unthinkable to analyse the current situation in Guatemala without taking into account the continuity of colonial power and population control "entrenching itself through the expansion of coffee cultivation in the 1870s [...], and transforming itself in the 1950s into a special relationship between Cold War Washington, multinational business and local conservative land-owning elites" (Briscoe 2009:3).

Spanish Conquest and the Liberal Coffee Revolution

In the 16th century Guatemala was conquered by the Spaniards, paired with atrocities committed by the invaders of Pedro de Alvarado (Briscoe 2009). The ethnic segregation that the colonial rulers imposed in the Central American region, assigning more rights to the "more civilised" *mestizos* and *ladinos* than to the "backward" *indígenas*, has left Guatemala with political and social divisions which were maintained after its independence from the Federal Republic of Central America in 1838 (Kruijt 2008:12). From the mid-19th century on, Guatemala has had a presidency dominated by military leaders. This model lasted until the first democratic period between 1944 and 1954 (Beard 2010). Torres Rivas states that the domination of the military did provide stability, but that ultimately executive power "invaded judicial functions, weakening the functional structure of the state" (Torres Rivas in Beard 2010).

After coffee outstripped the older export crops of indigo and cochineal in the 1870s, General Justo Rufino Barrios led the "liberal coffee revolution" between 1892 and 1898 (Beard 2010). As a result, coffee-producing lands were concentrated into large estates and were gradually concentrated in the hands of a small group of economic elite who became an important power centre (ibid.). These landowning elite acquired wealth through traditional agriculture exports, mostly coffee, and were part of a network of Spanish and later European interconnected families (Sanchez 2009; Beard 2010).

Regarding foreign presence in Guatemala, Jonas (1991) states that until the 1940s, foreign companies such as the United Fruit Company (UFC) and American Electric Bond and Share gained enormous power over the Guatemalan economy by holding monopoly privileges over electrical facilities. With control over as much as forty per cent of the

Guatemalan economy, they could be considered operating as “states within states” in Jonas’ (1991:19) words.

When foreign fruit companies, such as UFC, established themselves in Guatemala, they were welcomed by the local elites: these elites were eager to share land with the companies in return for US military protection against revolution (Landau 1993). As the Guatemalan indigenous people lived too high for coffee cultivation, not much land was expropriated from them. However, well into the 20th century, the elite, together with foreign companies, forced indigenous people to work on the coffee plantations (Landau 1993; Beard 2010).

The Conflict: A Contested Land Reform, Guerrilla Movements and “Scorched Earth”

The skewed division of wealth distribution and the US support to overthrow the second democratically chosen government in Guatemala, under Jacobo Árbenz in 1954, are often seen as causes for the Guatemalan civil conflict (Landau 1993), which officially started in 1960 and ended in 1996. During this war the legacy of discrimination against *indígenas* was reiterated, with its low between 1982 and 1983, when the government launched a brutal counterinsurgency campaign against the guerrillas and their alleged indigenous allies (Valdez 2006 et al.; Briscoe 2009; Brands 2010; Isaacs 2010; Barendsen and van Putten 2013; Fetting 2014).

Between 1944 and 1954, Guatemala enjoyed its first democratic period. In 1944 dictator General Jorge Ubico y Castañeda was forced to resign by a crowd that protested his labor and economic policies. At the time of his departure, only two per cent of the population controlled seventy-two per cent of the land (Fetting 2014). Juan José Arevalo was the first democratically chosen president, and his successor Jacobo Árbenz pursued his social policy and economic diversification program after assuming office in 1951 (*ibid.*). The intent of the democratic presidents Árbenz and his predecessor to diversify the economy led to a new power centre: an emerging class of elite focused on cotton and industry (Beard 2010). This division intensified when Guatemala’s economy gradually became more open to the global market; the economy diversified and export shifted from traditional to non-traditional products. In contrast to the traditional “coffee elite”, the emerging elite were focused on industry, trade in non-traditional products, commerce and finance; they were linked with and related to transnational organisations; and benefitted from their relations with the government (Briscoe 2009; Dudley 2014).

However, Árbenz’ social policies interfered with the interests of the UFC, the traditional and emerging elites, as well as the military oligarchy (Beard 2010). “Decree 90”, which demanded that unused land (including hundreds of thousands of acres belonging to UFC) should be confiscated and turned over to landless individuals, was a final straw in this regard (Perez-Brignoli 1989; Torres-Rivas 1989; Landau 1993; Sieder and Wilson 1997;

Beard 2010; Fetting 2014). In 1954, the CIA sponsored a popular revolt led by Colonel Castillo Armas, with the consequence that Árbenz was removed from power and the land reforms were reversed (Sieder and Wilson 1997; Beard 2010).

The overthrow of Árbenz' government was a starting point for a political model that "repressed popular, social and communist expression through armed violence, playing heavily into the global ideological polarisation of the Cold War" (Valdez 2006:337). In this political model, which lasted until 1985, the military constituted a major APC existing within the state of Guatemala itself. Moreover, as is discussed in the following chapters, the military sought to maintain tremendous influence and power well after the beginning of a new "democratic" era in Guatemala.

In 1960 a group of junior officers initiated a coup against General Manuel Ydigoras Fuentes. The coup was suppressed, but the escaped leaders formed a nascent guerrilla movement, organising an armed uprising in 1962. This insurgency lasted until the 1990s (Sieder and Wilson 1997; Fetting 2010; Isaacs 2010; Beard 2010). In 1982 the different guerrilla groups joined forces and formed the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) (Sieder and Wilson 1997). During the period of armed conflict and until the incorporation of the URNG in the multiparty system in 1996 (Pallister 2013), the different guerrilla movements and later the URNG can be considered important APC's in Guatemala.

In 1958, the Guatemalan Defence Ministry established the Mobile Military Police (PMA). With an original mandate to combat crime, Argueta (2004) argues that in 1965 the PMA operations were broadened to include supporting the National Police with maintaining order in rural and urban areas. Besides the unit within the PMA which was responsible for the counterinsurgency strategy, there was also a unit for hire: the Special PMA. Therewith, Argueta (2004) argues, the special PMA is one of the most important units providing private security services since 1958. They sold out their services to private companies, farmers and the economic elite directly through command officers (Argueta 2004). Chapter IV discusses the emergence of new private security companies (PSC's) since the signing of the peace accords. Viewing them as APC's, I explain in what way they challenged the pacification process in post-conflict Guatemala.

In 1981, under the dictatorship of Romeo Lucas García, the notorious Autodefence Patrols (*Patrullas Autodefensa Civil*, PAC's) were formed. These PAC's were also called "orejas", because they were supposedly "the ears" of the army (Barendsen and van Putten 2013). Chapter IV discusses how local security boards strongly resemble these PAC's and that former members of this paramilitary organisation are involved in the practice of collective lynching. During the counterinsurgency, the PAC's observed people in mostly indigenous villages and municipalities and when they discovered something presumably leftist or communist, the accused person would be taken to the station where he or she would either be killed or forced into the PAC's. This enforcement of mostly indigenous men into these patrols turned family and friends against each other (Landau 1993; Barendsen and van Putten 2013) Indigenous communities were punished for allegedly supporting the

guerrillas, who were foremostly hidden in the mountainous Western Highlands, an area populated mainly by indigenous people (Barendsen and van Putten 2013; Minority Rights Group 2008). In 1982 and 1983, as part of General Efraín Ríos Montt's "scorched earth campaign", over 400 villages disappeared. This counterinsurgency period, often referred to as "*La Violencia*", left a legacy of mistrust between many social groups and the government (Valdez 2006 et al.; Brands 2010; Isaacs 2010; Barendsen and van Putten 2013; Fetting 2014).

Negotiating Peace

Guatemala thus has a recent violent history and endured a period in which the military violently headed the state. It was a political system in which the army did not protect the state, but the regime (Landau 1993); in which the state answered primarily to the needs and desires of a privileged elite (Briscoe and Rodriguez Pellecer 2010); and in which indigenous people were subjected to exploitation, violence and murder (e.g. Valdez 2006 et al.; Brands 2010; Isaacs 2010; Fetting 2014).

Since the 1980s the process of making peace and the process of democratisation ran parallel to and mutually influenced each other (Azpuru 1999; Terwindt and van der Borgh 2014). The peace negotiations in Guatemala can be classified into two different processes: an indirect process, marked by the regional Esquipulas accords and the direct process, started by a meeting held in Oslo in March 1990 (Azpuru 1999). The regional peace process included two accords: Esquipulas I and Esquipulas II. Esquipulas I (1986) was the result of a meeting with five Central American presidents, who agreed on economic cooperation and a framework for peaceful conflict resolution. Esquipulas II (1987) set forth this "Procedure for Establishing a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America" (Azpuru 1999). Along with free elections and the entry into office of democratically elected civilian governments, this second accord made peace negotiations possible in Guatemala (ibid.).

The involved players in the direct process of peace negotiations were four consecutive governments (Vinicio Cerezo 1986-1991, Jorge Serrano Elías 1991-1993, Ramiro de León Carpio 1993-1996 and Alvaro Arzú 1996-2000), the military establishment, the weakened URNG, organised civil society, the UN and international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF) (Paris 2004; Schultze-Kraft 2012). Chapter VI also discusses the involvement of Guatemala's major business organisation in the negotiations. From 1989 onwards, different accords were drafted by these different players, but until 1992 hardliners of military and economic elites refused to negotiate (Stanley and Holiday 2002; Jonas 2008).

There are different reasons why the different parties finally did start negotiating. Many argue that for the army, the peace negotiations were in fact a strategic choice (Azpuru 1999; Briscoe and Rodriguez Pellecer 2010; Stanley and Holiday 2002). Stanley and Holiday (2002) claim that through a political economy of the conflict, the conflict enhanced the political position of the military, something they did not opt to lose. The

military elite thus committed itself to negotiations in defence of their own interest and this had effects for the implementation of the peace accords. Reasons for other parties to participate in the UN-facilitated negotiating process were a broad national consensus; preventing a war that could go on indefinitely; the fall of the Eastern Bloc; and avoiding falling behind in the global economy (Azpuru 1999; Jonas 2008). The accords were completed by the final accord: “An Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace”, signed on 29 December 1996.

When the war officially came to an end, Guatemalans who had fled the war could - or were obliged to - return home. While living an illegal existence, Guatemalan migrants in the US, especially those in LA, adapted to the US gang culture created by Mexican immigrants (Jütersonke et al. 2009). By deporting these Guatemalan migrants back to their country of origin, the US gang culture was transplanted with them. This was also the case for migrants from El Salvador and Honduras, the countries that together with Guatemala constitute “The Northern Triangle”.³ Upon returning to their home country, these US grown gangs (*maras*) supplanted the home-grown, local gangs, called the *pandillas*. The latter originated in Central America in the 1940s and 1950s (Jütersonke et al. 2009). Chapter IV discusses the consequence of the transplantation of US gang culture to Guatemala and the challenge the *maras* have posed for the pacification process in the country.

By the time the final peace agreement was signed, the triple transition of peacebuilding in Guatemala had already been well underway: the pacification process itself was prepared for by the Esquipulas accords in the 1980s, neoliberal programs by international financial institutions began in the 1990s and democratisation of the Guatemalan state started in the 1980s. The following three chapters analyse the development of policy implementation in the three transitions as well as the challenges that the different APC’s have posed for these peacebuilding efforts.

³ This term stems from The Northern Triangle – Mexico Free Trade Agreement (NT-Mexico FTA), see chapter VI.

IV

Demilitarisation and the Rule of Law

Insecurity, perceived and real, remains a problem in Guatemala. In this chapter I discuss the pacification process since the signing of the peace accords: what were the ambitions regarding this theme in 1996, how did this work out and what were the major obstacles and setbacks? I argue that justice reforms are strongly related to security, entailing its legislative aspects and aimed at punishing certain (violent) behavior that influences the security situation in a given context. Therefore I include justice reforms and rule of law in this section. Furthermore, I analyse the dynamics of power relations in this transition, by unravelling how certain APC's challenged the pacification process in Guatemala.

Policy: Demilitarisation, police reform and modernising the justice system

Ambitions

The general aim of the security programs and reforms stipulated in the peace accords in 1996 was to overcome a militarised and counterinsurgent conception of security. The security programs thus embodied technical changes as well as a transformation of the idea of security provision that had been dominant for more than three decades (Argueta 2004; Rosado 2006). This transformation was prepared for in the peace accords by means of constitutional and organisational reforms of the military and police forces. Regarding the military and defence sector, the "Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of Armed Forces in a Democratic Society" had an ambitious agenda. Firstly and most importantly, it aimed to reduce the role of the military by a revision of article 244 of the Constitution: the deployment of military forces in the country had to be reorganised and the task of the military was defined as *merely territorial defence*, instead of also being responsible for internal security (UNSC 1996b:13). The agreement was committed to demobilise the PMA as well as the notorious PAC's; reduce the size of the armed forces by thirty-three per cent in 1997; and reduce the defence budget by thirty-three per cent in proportion to the GDP in 1999 (Argueta 2004; Rosado 2006; Stanley and Holiday 2002; Kincaid 2000; UNSC 1996b:19-20).⁴

The agreement also demanded a thorough police reform. For example, it stated that the police force was to be reorganised as a single police force under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, and the multi-ethnic and multicultural character had to be reflected in the recruitment, selection, training and deployment of its personnel. All members of the new police force had to receive a minimum of six months of training at the new Police Academy (UNSC 1996b:11; Glebbeek 2011). The budget and size of the police was to be increased: the new National Civil Police force (PNC) should be comprised by at least

⁴ In 1995: 0,9, in 1999: 0,6, to peak to 0,9 again in 2001 and fall to 0,44 in 2014. (IMF, RESDAL)

20,000 members by 1999 (ibid:12). Moreover, the government had to increase its expenditure on public security as a percentage of GDP by fifty per cent over the amount expended in 1995 and the owning and carrying of weapons was restricted (ibid:12-13).⁵

Finally, the peace agreement also aimed at reforming and modernising the justice system. The necessity of it was expressed by the fact that in 1996 the system of justice and the functioning of judicial proceedings within it suffered from faults and deficiencies, such as slow proceedings and lack of supervision of officials and employees of the judicial branch, which bred corruption and inefficiency (UNSC 1996:5-6). It was necessary to prevent impunity and corruption, put an end to inefficiency and to “guarantee free access to the justice system, impartiality in the application of the law, judicial independence, ethical authority and the integrity and modernisation of the system as a whole” (ibid:6). To accomplish this, the agreement demanded, among other things, constitutional reforms. Moreover, it demanded a reform of the Penal Code, giving priority to: the prosecution of elements most detrimental to society, protecting human rights and severely punishing bribery and corruption (ibid:6-7). To conclude, it seems that the intentions were good and ambitions were high regarding post-conflict security provision in Guatemala, but (how) was this agreement implemented?

Implementation

Implementation of the “Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of Armed Forces in a Democratic Society” went well in certain aspects, but also experienced major setbacks and obstacles in the given period, some due to shortcomings and omissions in the agreement. To start out positively, by 1999 commitments regarding the increase of expenditure of the Guatemalan government on public security and the decrease in the budget of the military, were successfully implemented (IMF 2000;2005, RESDAL 2013). Furthermore, in 1998 first steps were made towards a more multi-ethnic police force by the deployment of a group of newly graduated agents of *Ixil* descent (Kincaid 2000).⁶

However, some commitments in the peace agreements were only partially implemented or not implemented at all. One of the consequences being that the police reform was severely delayed. In the military sector the most important example is the failure to revise article 244 in the constitution with the consequence that the Guatemalan Army was still in charge of providing *interior and exterior* security (Rosado 2006, italics mine). Furthermore, “Executive Decree 90-96” of March 1996 authorised the establishment of joint patrols, composed of police and military personnel (Kincaid 2000; Glebbeek 2001; O’neill and Thomas 2011; see also New York Times article, 27 August 1997). These joint patrols would have a transitional character and would be dissolved when the PNC was deployed

⁵ In 1995 0,4% of the GDP was spent on internal security (IMF 2000)

⁶ *Ixil* refers to an indigenous community living in the northern part of the department EL Quiche, the region most heavily affected by the conflict (reference)

throughout the country and strong enough to combat crime by itself. However in 1998 11,000 troops were still acting in support of the police and by 1999 the joint patrols were still not yet suspended (Kincaid 2000; Glebbeek 2001). In addition, the training course of the Police Academy was reduced from the six months stipulated in the agreement to three months, which seems like a short period for changing attitudes and institutional values (Glebbeek 2001). What is more, in an attempt of president Arzú to increase the members of the new police force rapidly, personnel of the old forces (infamous for their corruption, abuse and incompetence), such as the PMA, were incorporated into the new PNC (Azpuru 1999; Glebbeek 2001; Stanley and Holiday 2002; Kincaid 2000; Isaacs 2010; see also New York Times article, 27 August 1997).

Some programs had unintended consequences, such as the demobilisation of the PMA and the PAC's. Firstly, the fact that the reintegration of PAC's is not mentioned in the peace accords has generated major problems of governance, according to Aguilera Peralta (2008).⁷ In addition, Argueta (2010) argues that the demobilisation of the PMA had consequences for the clients of the PMA (private companies and the economic elite), as they were left unprotected. Besides the reincorporation of the PMA into the new PNC, these powerful actors (re)hired former PMA agents to provide for their security (Argueta 2010). Furthermore, demobilisation did not account for the great amount of weapons owned by the PMA and PAC's. Moser and McIlwaine (2004) argue that the high circulation of weapons after demobilisation is linked with the high incidence of murder using firearms.⁸ According to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 85,4 per cent of homicides were committed by firearms in 2014 (UNHRC 2015:11).

In the field of justice reform, there were some accomplishments, while challenges remain. For example, Sieder (2011) states that after the peace agreement there were some positive developments with regards to access to justice in rural areas. She mentions that by the late 2000's in many areas of the highlands state officials were putting in more effort to coordinate with justice systems of indigenous communities. In addition, UNHRC (2015) reports that there is progress in guaranteeing access to justice for indigenous peoples in their own languages, facilitated by the judiciary's "Centre for Indigenous Legal Translation and Interpretation". Nevertheless, UNHRC (2015) also reports that in 2014, indigenous peoples continued to face barriers in accessing the justice system.

The demand of eliminating corruption was perhaps one of the toughest for post-conflict Guatemala. The murder of Bishop Juan Gerardi in May 1998 was a reminder of the remaining challenges. He was murdered two days after the release of an independent report on wartime human rights abuses, published by a church-appointed commission headed by the Bishop. Together with the inept handling of the investigation of the murder, it raised suspicion of military involvement in this murder (Kincaid 2000; Boink and Wirken 2015). When in 2006 the government of Guatemala was still facing difficulties

⁷ Besides being a political scientist, Gabriel Aguilera Peralta is Ambassador of Guatemala to the Kingdom of the Netherlands since November 19, 2014

⁸ See also Brands (2010)

to overcome impunity and corruption and to dismantle illegal armed groups, it decided to request assistance from the UN and signed an agreement for the creation of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) in December 2006, which was approved by Congress in August 2007 (RESDAL 2013). CICIG operates completely within the domestic legal system of its host country and has proven to be quite successful: impunity levels for solving cases of crimes against life have fallen from ninety-five per cent in 2009 to seventy-two per cent in 2012 (CICIG 2013). However, the fact that Guatemala asked the international community for assistance does not imply that Guatemalan elites were unanimously in favor of the establishment of CICIG (Schünemann 2010). This theme is touched upon below.

To overcome the persisting high levels of violence, the government of Guatemala has continued to reform security institutions. From 2009 onwards different agreements and pacts were signed with the aim of, inter alia: the creation of a Ministry of Public Security; regulation of private security firms; promotion of a National Disarmament Plan; the integration of a Commission for Police Reform and strengthening of human rights and the culture of peace (RESDAL 2013).⁹ In the context of this ambition of police reform, in August 2012 the government opened a new police training school and fired 194 police officers as part of anti-corruption measures (Clawley 2013).¹⁰ Parallel to the aim of cleaning up the PNC, there is also the aim to increase the police force substantively. However, since many police personnel leave the institution as graduates of the Police Academy, it requires fundamental changes in order to increase the police force from the 29,798 employees in 2014 to the opted 35,000 employees by 2015 (RESDAL 2013; UNHRC 2015). Moreover, with the aim of increasing territorial coverage, in 2013 thirty-four police stations have been reopened in municipalities where they had been close previously (RESDAL 2013).

Almost twenty years after the signing of the peace agreement there remain challenges for the pacification process of Guatemala. First of all, the apparent dedication of the Guatemalan government to reform the police does not seem to have translated into significant improvements. To illustrate this, in 2013, there was still only one police officer for every 4.16 km² in Guatemala (RESDAL 2013). Because of stagnation of the police reform, reflected, inter alia, in unimproved social conditions within the police force, in January 2013 police officers threatened with strikes (BTI 2014:2). Then Minister of Interior, Mauricio Lopez Bonilla, stated that the government aimed to continue police reform efforts that year (Clawley 2013). However, in a report of International Crisis Group in 2012 and the annual UN Human Rights Report of Guatemala of 2015 it is stated that low salaries, a lack of equipment and fuel continue to affect the operational capacity of the PNC (International Crisis Group 2012; UNHRC 2015:10). Furthermore, the International

⁹ In 2009 the National Agreement for the Advancement of Security and Justice was signed and a Pact for Security, Justice and Peace was signed in 2012 (Resdal 2013).

¹⁰ This has not been the first attempt to clean up the PNC: in 2005, the Berger dismissed 2,500 policemen on the basis of charges of corruption (BTI 2008; RESDAL 2013).

Crisis Group argues that “all too often citizens distrust and fear the police – widely dismissed as inefficient, corrupt and abusive – as much as the criminals” (2012:i).

What is more, impunity is still an important problem for the justice system, as well as corruption, inefficiency, influence of other actors, and a lack of resources (Sieder 2011; BTI 2014). This record of corruption and impunity is reflected in the attitude of the Guatemalan people: in 2006, Guatemala scored an average of forty-six points on a scale from zero to a hundred in confidence in the justice system and although in 2010 the majority of Guatemalans had the opinion that authorities should always abide the law, still almost forty per cent did not view it as a solid requirement (Azpuru 2006; Azpuru 2010). As shown in the next section, this lack of trust in the ability of the state to provide justice and security, together with the high level of impunity has consequences, such as collective lynching and the proliferation of private security companies (Snodgrass Godoy 2002; Gonzalez 2003; Argueta 2004; Moser and McIlwaine 2004; Brands 2010; Sieder 2011).

Power and pacification

Military elite

Despite the fact that the military is no longer directly in control since 1986, they are still excessively involved in internal security institutions and the justice system (Stanley and Holiday 2002; Kurtenbach 2010; BTI 2014; Dudley 2014; UNHRC 2015). This is reflected in the fact that public security institutions are directed by former military officers, many institutions have military consultants, and joint military police patrols have existed ever since the peace agreement (Kincaid 2000; Glebbeek 2001; O’neill and Thomas 2011; BTI 2014; see also New York Times article, 27 August 1997). In fact, instead of complete demilitarisation of society since the peace accords in 1996, the increasing role of the military in Guatemala’s internal security seems to have become institutionalised. Instead of reforming article 244 of the Constitution (discussed above) to exclude involvement of the military in internal security matters, President Pérez Molina legalised and even institutionalised this involvement, by issuing “Government Agreement 285-2012”, approving support of the army to civil security forces (Schultze-Kraft 2012; RESDAL 2013; UNHRC 2015).¹¹ Besides, the military is reported to guard detention centres and give classes, inter alia in family planning, in schools in Guatemala City and Huehuetenango. Unfortunately however, this militarisation has not resulted in visible improvements in security (ibid). The military have thus challenged the pacification process by delaying or even reversing programs to overcome a militarised and counterinsurgent conception of security.

Moreover, besides their continuing role in internal security, for the military it is of vital importance that they maintain a certain amount of influence on the judiciary. Dudley

¹¹ I am referring to the Protocol for Inter-institutional Action: Support of the Army to Civil Security Forces (UNHRC 2015).

explains that “[t]he reality of what could happen if they do not control the courts became apparent after Efraín Ríos Montt, was convicted of genocide in 2013.” (2014:13) He argues that the chance of being convicted “spooked” a group of former military officials, including President Pérez Molina (*ibid.*). Obviously, this influence has consequences for the independence of the judiciary. However, the military is not the only APC exerting substantive influence over the judiciary: organised crime bodies, the private sector, powerful economic elites and political parties are also reported to be guilty of this charge (BTI 2014). Dudley argues that the Guatemalan court and the selection of judges, as a consequence, mainly revolve around “trading quotas of power” (2014:15). This trading is done by the above mentioned actors via commissioners in postulation commissions and lawyer’s associations (BTI 2014; Dudley 2014).¹²

Economic elite

According to Schünemann (2010), since the peace accords, the Guatemalan governments have been associated with either the traditional or the emerging faction of the economic elite. These ties provide incentives for the economic elite to prevent certain governments from being prosecuted. In fact, this is exactly the reason why the emerging elite openly rejected the establishment of CICIG in 2005; they feared for an internationally backed investigation into these practices and subsequently, the potentiality of prosecution (Schünemann 2010).

Roberto López Villatoro, a.k.a. “The Tennis Shoe King”, provides an infamous example of a person belonging to the emerging elite with tremendous influence on the judiciary by corrupting the selection process for the postulation commissions (Dudley 2014). Lopez Villatoro, businessman and lawyer, made his fortune selling replica athletic shoes (Briscoe and Rodriguez Pellecer 2010; Dudley 2014). He is also former son-in-law of former general and Congressman Efraín Ríos Montt (Dudley 2014).

Hence, despite the difference between the traditional and emerging elite, they tend to unite in the face of certain common threats (Sanchez 2009; Dudley 2014). Dudley (2014) argues that attorney-general Claudia Paz y Paz, who assumed office in 2010, embodied such a common threat by prosecuting those who committed human rights violations during the military dictatorship of President Efraín Ríos Montt, including the ex-dictator himself. As a consequence, Claudia Paz y Paz was virtually removed as attorney-general, months before her original mandate ended (Dudley 2014; Luis Sanz 2014; Boink and Wirken 2015). As Luis Sanz (2014) formulates it: “Judges living in fear, hidden negotiations and elite networks ensure ‘justice’ remains in line with corrupt interests.”

¹² Dudley on postulation commissions: “These commissions are a mix of civilian lawyers, law school deans and high court judges that, in the case of the high court judges, gather every five years to select the final list of candidates from which Congress chooses the country’s judges.” (2014:16)

Local security boards

As stated earlier, a lack of trust in the ability of the state to provide justice and security, together with the high level of impunity has led to vigilantism and collective lynching (Snodgrass Godoy 2002; Gonzalez 2003; Moser and McIlwaine 2004; Brands 2010; Sieder 2011). An article in the New York Times on 8 March 2003, reports that a mob of 2,000 people burnt two pickpocket suspects alive. In the article, Bishop Alvaro Ramazzini is cited: "People do not believe in the legal system. Instead, it is the law of the strongest, that violence can solve any problem." (Gonzalez 2003)

Snodgrass Godoy (2002) states that the act of collective vigilantism began in the early 1990s and accelerated after the signing of the peace accords. Consequently, collective lynching happens on a monthly basis in Guatemala: from 1996 to 2001, the United Nations Mission to Guatemala (MINUGUA) documented 421 incidents of lynching, an average of seven a month (Snodgrass Godoy 2002). In the first part of 2014, there were even 156 cases of lynching, resulting in seventeen deaths and 136 people injured (UNHRC 2015). An estimated forty per cent of these lynching springs from accusation of less serious offenses like theft (Gonzalez 2003).

The collective physical violence or collective lynching is mainly organised through the estimated 1,500 security boards in the country, strongly resembling the self-defence organisations (PAC's) that were active during the armed conflict (BTI 2014). In fact, Snodgrass Godoy (2002) argues that collective lynching is in many cases instigated or carried out by former paramilitary leaders of the PAC's. Moreover, lynching foremost takes place in indigenous villages, the population most heavily affected by the operations of the PAC's during the armed conflict (Landau 1993; Gonzalez 2003). The argument that collective lynching reflects practices deployed during armed conflict therefore sounds reasonable (Brands 2010; Sieder 2011; BTI 2014). According to Snodgrass Godoy (2002), the paramilitary leaders involved do not only use vigilantism as reaction to impunity, but also to settle old scores. For example, victims that had testified about wartime massacres committed by former PAC members are reported to be lynched afterwards by a former paramilitary group (ibid.).

Gangs and criminal organisations

Turning a blind eye to possible structural causes of violence, gangs and criminal organisations have been made the major scapegoat for security problems in Guatemala (O'Neill and Thomas eds. 2011). In fact, gangs are an increasing problem in the Guatemalan capital but also in small towns and semi-urban municipalities (ibid.). As discussed in chapter II, by deporting Guatemalans back from the US, especially LA, to Guatemala, the US grown gang culture was transplanted with them. The contemporary gang phenomenon in Guatemala could thus be seen as a product of the armed conflict.

Besides these *maras*, transnational gangs and criminal organisations increasingly operate in Guatemala as well. The most infamous example are “*Los Zetas*”, the armed wing of the Mexican Gulf Cartel (Insight Crime 2011). Guatemala has a strategic importance for *Los Zetas* for its high levels of impunity and being one of the most important transit countries for illegal drugs (ibid.). BTI (2014) reports that transnational drug-traffickers, aiming to control the route between producing countries, such as Colombia, to consuming countries, such as the US, increasingly ally with local elites, such as the military elite and the emerging faction of the economic elite in Guatemala.

Gangs and organised crime are increasingly intimate (Briscoe 2009). Regarding criminal organisations, Briscoe states that “[s]tructured and enduring groups, managing and seeking out lucrative illicit businesses, are now the dominant feature of Guatemala’s criminal landscape.” (2009:12) He states that the origins of these criminal organisations are found in state and military initiatives in the 1970s, which then established a counterinsurgency “corporate mafia state” (ibid.). Briscoe (2009) argues that criminal organisations exert influence in many sectors, such as the police, the judiciary and politics. Because these practices sometimes come with (deadly) violence, they also pose a security challenge, such as in the pre-election period in 2007.¹³ The violence during this period was mainly attributed to organised criminals intent on influencing elections and thereby gaining clout within the political system, at the local and national levels (The Economist 2007; Roig-Franzia 2007). An article in The New York Times headed on 4 August 2007: “Drug Gangs Use Violence to Sway Guatemala Vote” (Lacey 2007). What is more, criminal networks have gained more space within the judicial system: like the military and economic elite, they have control over the postulation commissions (Dudley 2014). This provides them with protection in the form of receiving alerts and prevention from being judged (ibid.). This once again shows that Guatemala’s population enjoys little protection against the state’s arbitrary action.

Moreover, by using force, gangs and criminal organisations undermine the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Gangs can use violence for various purposes, such as instilling fear in a community, defending their territory and to settle vendettas (Hazen 2010). BTI (2014) reports that indeed the state’s monopoly on the use of force has eroded and is challenged by criminal networks.

Private security companies

Another APC infamous for its use of force is constituted by private security companies (PSC’s). In an article in The Washington Post on 24 April 2009, Carlos Castresana, then head of CICIG, says that “private security guards are one of the biggest security threats Guatemala faces” (O’Connor 2009).

¹³ In an article of the Washington Post on 9 September 2007, it was reported that in the pre-election period that year at least 50 candidates and political activists representing parties across the political spectrum had been murdered and dozens of others had been attacked (Roig-Franzia 2007).

PSC's and their agents constitute an APC that is fairly new, albeit with socio-historical roots. Due to lack of job opportunities in the formal economy for former combatants and the failure to successfully reintegrate them into the post-conflict society, many of them joined either delinquent groups or PSC's (Brands 2010; Kurtenbach 2010). According to Argueta (2010) and Dudley (2014), PSC's are often controlled by ex-military officers who left service after the downsizing of the army.¹⁴ PSC agents are hired by individuals, but also by firms, for a variety of "security purposes". This includes protection against violence perpetrated by gangs and criminal organisations, but international mining or hydroelectric firms also hire PSC's to confront social movements (O'Connor 2009; BTI 2014; see chapter V).

An increasing perception of insecurity, the circulation of weapons, an increase in crime and scepticism that the current system can provide for basic human security has led to a proliferation of these PSC's (O'Connor 2009; Argueta 2010; Brands 2010; O'Neill and Thomas eds. 2011).¹⁵ In the 1990s there were about 70-80 PSC's in Guatemala, in 2004 about 170, and in 2012 it were estimated to be 280 (Argueta 2010; RESDAL 2013). The PSC's together have an estimated 46,000 employees, compared to the 29,798 employees of the PNC in 2014 (UNHRC 2015:11). Recently, the government has put effort in regulating and controlling the PSC's by including it in the "National Agreement for the Advancement of Security and Justice" in 2009 (RESDAL 2013).¹⁶ However, major challenges persist, such as the fact that currently only 477 of the estimated 46,000 PSC agents are certified (UNHRC 2015:11). The consequences of a lack of registration and insufficient oversight of the PSC's are illustrated by human rights abuses (ibid.). For example, on 28 April 2000, newspaper San Jose Mercury reported that a Guatemalan newspaper photographer was shot and killed by a PSC agent during violent street protests against bus fare increases, as the agent fired at students allegedly looting a business (Mercury News Wire Service 2000).

As explained in chapter II, the PMA was one of the most important units providing private security services since 1958 (Argueta 2010). According to Argueta (2010), the proliferation of PSC's should be viewed as a reactivation of historical mechanisms for social control, such as displacing state functions to the private sector. Therewith, the proliferation of PSC's and its consequences fit a trend of informalisation and privatisation of security in Guatemala, described by O'Neill and Thomas (2011), with the consequence that the means and the direction of violence increasingly seem as an option for a multitude of actors for a multitude of reasons. However, private security is not affordable for all and PSC's are only meant for those well-to-do Guatemalan that can afford them

¹⁴ The owner's former military rank (and the size of the bribe) might even help to speed up the process for obtaining the necessary Ministerial Agreement that legally authorises the operation of a PSC (Argueta 2010).

¹⁵ On a scale of 0 - 100, perceived insecurity of Guatemalans scored 45,5 in 2004 and 39.9 in 2010. Not sure how to explain the decrease, maybe people found ways to protect themselves (Azpuru 2010)

¹⁶ The national Agreement for the Advancement of Security and Justice in 2009 also included the regulation of PSC's and the General Bureau of Private Security Services increased actions to control private security companies (RESDAL 2013)

(Argueta 2010; Brands 2010; Richani 2010). This underscores the inequality that suffuses Guatemalan society.

Conclusion

The peace agreement provided for ambitious commitments that would contribute to the pacification process in Guatemala by taking into account the multicultural character of Guatemala, overcoming a military concept of security and establishing a non-discriminatory, non-corrupt, independent and efficient justice system. However, as described above, the agreement had some omissions and its implementation has proven to be problematic. The main problems in the pacification process were the (re)militarisation of society and stagnation of the police reform. Furthermore, impunity continues to plague the country, and although CICIG has proven to be a worthy opponent, still seventy-two per cent of the registered misdemeanors are unpunished. These problems should not be viewed as such, but rather within a broader context in which different APC's exert influence over different processes within the pacification transition. In fact, the pacification process was heavily challenged by different actors. Some power centres described in this chapter (former military actors, economic elite) seem to directly challenge the state, by intentionally undermining its efforts, in order to maintain some form of power. However, other power centres constitute a more indirect challenge to the pacification process, such as the PSC's, local security boards and gangs and criminal organisations. My findings seem to support the argument of Baker and Sheye (2007) that in post-conflict settings, security and justice is often carried out by non-state security and justice actors and organisations. Congruent with Kurtenbach's (2010) emphasis on the continuity of old and emergence of new forms of violence, it can be stated that in Guatemala, old expressions of violence and control mechanisms seem to have been transformed and adapted to a post-conflict context.

V

Changing the Rules of the State: Transforming an Authoritarian Regime into a Democracy

In this chapter I describe the process of democratisation in Guatemala and analyse in what way different APC's have hampered the process. Because I use the Tillian (2007) approach to democracy and democratisation as described in chapter II, all four aspects of democracy – breadth, equality, protection, and mutually binding consultation- return in this chapter. The democratisation process ran partly parallel to the peace process and it is important to understand how the peace accords came into being in order to understand the context of the political transition after the final agreement in 1996. Therefore, I start with briefly describing the process towards the peace accords.

Policy: Democratisation in the search for peace by political means

Democratisation and peace negotiations as parallel processes

After the first democratic period between 1944 and 1954, until 1985, Guatemala was ruled by authoritarian governments with a strong military character. During *La Violencia*, the period of harsh counterinsurgency between 1980 and 1983, led by general General Romeo Lucas García and Efraín Ríos Montt, Guatemala was the furthest removed from democracy in terms of political participation and protection from the state: Azpuru (1999) and Landau (1993) state that there was no political space and the only political expression as an alternative to retreating was to take up arms against the militarised state. The totally exclusionary economic and political system during this time was defended by conservative elites in the country who tacitly supported the counterinsurgency strategy (Azpuru 1999). However, as Guatemala became more and more isolated from the international community, emerging economic elite began to demand a more open political system (ibid.).

Between 1986 and 1996, democratisation and peace processes were intertwined and influenced each other (Azpuru 1999; Terwindt and van der Borgh 2014). Azpuru argues that “the process of democratisation paved the way for the start of the peace negotiations, and the five years of negotiations themselves advanced the process of democratisation.” (1999:97) This is a rather unique situation because, as Torres-Rivas points out, it is more often the case that a cease fire opens the way for democratic processes and not the other way around (Torres-Rivas in Azpuru 1999).

The elections of 1986 presented a palpable opening for political space and the elected president, centrist Christian Democrat Marco Vinicio Cerezo, had the honor to head the first democracy since the mid-20th century (Azpuru 1999). According to Azpuru, in Guatemala the democratisation process was not equally and simultaneously distributed

throughout the country but initially existed of what she calls “poles”, which experienced more democratic freedom, foremost in the capital and urban areas (1999:99). These poles slowly expanded to other, more rural, regions in the country, which maintained under heavy military control for a longer period.

Ambitions

The “Framework Agreement on Democratisation in the Search for Peace by Political Means”, signed on 25 July 1991 and also referred to as “The Querétaro Agreement”, provided a democratic framework for further negotiations (UNSC 1991:10). It stated that the strengthening of a functional and participatory democracy requires, inter alia: pre-eminence of civilian society; the development of democratic institutions; the effective functioning of a state subject to the rule of law; permanent elimination of political repression, electoral fraud and coercion; respect for human rights; and recognition and respect for indigenous peoples and social justice (UNSC 1991:11). It also states that “democratisation means guaranteeing and promoting participation, whether direct or indirect, by civilian society in general in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of government policies at the various levels of government” (ibid.). With this framework in mind, seemingly constituting all four aspects of democracy as described by Tilly (2007:14-15), the government of Guatemala and the URNG had to negotiate a final peace agreement.¹⁷

As it turned out, democracy was indeed a guiding principle in the final peace accords (UNSC 1996; 1996b). Terwindt and van der Borgh argue that the agreement of 29 December 1996 “sought to transform an authoritarian regime that had defended the interests of a small but powerful oligarchy into a democracy that would serve the interest of all, including the marginalised sectors in the country.” (2014:61) The “Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and Electoral Regime” committed the parties to remedy the shortcomings and constraints of the electoral regime, which were identified as “citizens' lack of reliable documentation, the absence of technically prepared electoral rolls, difficulty of access to registration and voting, lack of information and the need for greater transparency in election campaigns” (UNSC 1997b:3). One of these remedies was the establishment of an electoral reform commission (UNSC 1997b). However, fitting into Kurtenbach's (2010) argument that democratisation is a conflictive process as it restructures power relations (discussed in chapter II), certain APC's put a lot of effort into preventing to lose their power as a consequence of such a restructuring. The interests of these autonomous powers, especially those of the economic elite, were therefore reflected in the peace accords, a subject that is also discussed in chapter VI.

¹⁷ Reminder of the four components of democracy in Tilly (2007): breadth, equality, protection and mutually binding consultation

Implementation

Multiparty structure

Since the beginning of the democratisation process in Guatemala, the country formally has had a multiparty structure. However, this multiparty structure is above all a skeleton without much content, because Guatemalan parties have often been and are still built around the image of individual candidates, rather than around durable platforms (Sanchez 2009; Isaacs 2010; Jones 2011; Lemus 2012; BTI 2014). Briscoe and Rodriquez Pellecer (2010) as well as Sanchez (2009) state that political influence seems to be mediated through a web of personal, business or criminal relationships and understandings, reducing political parties to electoral vehicles.¹⁸ The lack of dedication to one particular party is reflected in numbers: over thirty congressmen changed their party affiliation on the first day of legislative activities in January 2012, a phenomenon called *transfuguismo* in Spanish (BTI 2014).¹⁹ Furthermore, at the local level it is not uncommon that mayors serve for multiple terms even after changing party affiliation (ibid.).²⁰

Since political parties are constantly mutating, this provides excellent opportunities for interest groups and individuals to gain a foothold in the state structure. Therefore elections are foremost about the interests of competing APC's that are financing the campaigns or take advantage of the informal modes of access to power, facilitated by the different elite factions (Briscoe and Rodriquez Pellecer 2010; Isaacs 2010). Moreover, the previous chapter already discussed the involvement of criminal organisations in killings and violent attacks in the pre-election period of 2007. This aspect of Guatemala's multiparty structure reflects a form of non-binding consultation: powerful seekers of state interests are able to bribe, cajole, threaten or use third-party influence to receive the benefits they want.

Political Participation

Political participation concerns the breadth and equality aspects of the Tillian concept of democracy. Way before the official democratic opening in the 1980s, organised civil society was vivid in Guatemala: according to Terwindt and van der Borgh (2014) the number of social organisations grew both in urban and rural areas in the 1960s and 1970s, a statement supported by O'Neill and Thomas eds. (2011). What is more, the

¹⁸ To illustrate this, during my own fieldwork in the municipality of Uspantán, in the Western Highlands in Guatemala, I discovered that voting habits had little to do with a social vision or ideology but more with certain benefits one could enjoy for voting for a particular party. For example, people supporting a particular political party found it easier to find employment or received more benefits than other people: the political parties were in this way buying people into votes (Barendsen en van Putten 2013).

¹⁹ <http://www.democracyspeaks.org/blog/run-2015-guatemalan-general-elections>

²⁰ Maybe as a result of this capricious party affiliation, the number of Guatemalan people having confidence in political parties dropped from 40% in 2006 to only 29,1% in 2010. However, the majority of Guatemalan people do believe that democracy cannot exist without political parties. 41.1% of the Guatemalans think that democracy can exist without political parties (Azpuru 2010)

establishment of the Civil Society Assembly (ASC) was of particular importance, stimulating the involvement of women's organisations and coalitions for indigenous organisations. Despite the growth of social organisations in the mid-20th century, since 2004 the percentage of Guatemalan people participating in groups or associations has somewhat stagnated (Azpuru 2012). Furthermore, regarding the influence of these organisations, Falisse and Saenz-Corella argue that although civil society in Guatemala is "vibrant and complex" it has limited capacity to actually influence policy (in Terwindt and van der Borgh 2014:65).

Vast numbers of Guatemalans do not participate in the formal political system (Stanley and Holiday 2002; UNDP 2013). Moreover, in the period between 2004 and 2012, people were foremost unsatisfied with how democracy works in Guatemala (Azpuru 2012).²¹ This dissatisfaction with democracy is fuelled by a lack of trust in the political system in Guatemala, a situation which, according to Briscoe and Rodriquez Pellecer (2010), derives from a profound public suspicion of a democracy that (as described above and in chapter VI) originated out of a realignment of power between different sectors of the elite and a strategic withdrawal by the military rather than a popular demand for participation. The weak participation is also reflected in the voter turnout statistics: voter turnout for parliamentary elections between 1985 and 2011 has fluctuated between twenty-one per cent (1994) to sixty-nine per cent (2011) and voter turnout for presidential elections in this period has fluctuated between thirty-seven per cent (1995) to sixty per cent (2011).^{22 23}

Furthermore, despite the fact that the peace accords emphasised the need to reflect the multicultural character of Guatemala in the state's overall policy, there exists a failure to incorporate indigenous or poor people's movements into national politics (Briscoe and Rodriquez Pellecer 2010).²⁴ This should be placed in context of a history of discrimination and exclusion of indigenous people, explained in chapter III, and it also touches upon the equality aspect of Tilly's concept of democracy. Pallister (2013) has dedicated himself to answering the question of "why there is no Mayan party" and concluded that indigenous groups have foregone a national political party in favor of a more dispersed pattern of political mobilisation at the local level. Isaacs (2010) identifies an increase in Mayan political influence and agency and mentions the participation of Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú in the presidential race of 2007 with party Winaq as an inspiring example.

However, Isaacs argues that the characteristics of the multiparty structure in Guatemala as described above "cannot be written off as just an expression of the normal growing pains that all democratising countries suffer" (2010:115). Instead, he argues that it reflects

²¹ In 2010, slightly more Guatemalans were unsatisfied with the way democracy works in Guatemala (46,6% against 40,6%), which was the same as in 2006 and lower than in 2004 (58,5%) (Azpuru 2012)

²² In the Netherlands, on average there is a voter turnout of 80% for parliamentary elections, since the abolition of obligatory voting (Sources: www.parlement.com)

²³ Despite the relatively low turnout, there has been a preference (around 65-70%) and support (around 60%) for democracy since 1999 (Azpuru 2012).

²⁴ See also Jones (2011)

the continuity of power relations, the consequences of hollow promises of reform and a history of exclusionary politics, military dictatorship and electoral authoritarianism.

Contestation

The class of relations between state and society, especially the (lack of) protection of certain expression of demands and mutually binding consultation, is demonstrated in various commonplace incidents. According to BTI (2014) and UNHRC (2015) violence against social protest movements, trade unions, human rights defenders, and independent journalists is still a common occurrence in Guatemala, with the first year of the Pérez Molina administration seeing a spike in such incidents. This is also reflected in numerous newspaper articles.²⁵ BTI (2014) states that pressure of economic elites to forbid demonstrations on public streets and mining properties has led to Pérez Molina's support of the use of military force to suppress such protests.

Protests mostly revolve around mining, hydro projects (and a lack of consultation) and land (dis)possession. An article in the Guardian of 2 April 2015 reported that a planned "green" dam in Guatemala, whose carbon credits will be tradable under the EU's emissions trading system, has been linked to human rights violations, including the killing of six indigenous people, two of them children (Neslen 2015). In the article it is stated that according to human rights groups, the indigenous community was never consulted about the hydro project, while it forcibly displaced thousands of people. Moreover, when communities are consulted, it remains the question what value the government attributes to the outcome: BTI (2014) reports that Guatemalan governments have neglected the results of consultation processes, producing considerable dissent within the involved communities.

Power and democratisation

Military elite

Fetting (2014) argues that during the peace negotiations and just after the democratic opening, the military's strength and autonomy allowed it to remain a threat for democratic consolidation. President Vinicio Cerezo survived two attempts of military coups (in 1988 and 1989), and the military coup against Serrano Elías (in 1993) was successful. Even after the signing of the peace accords, the military remained very

²⁵ Mercury News Wire Services (2000). "Photographer Killed In Guatemala Protest", *San Jose Mercury News*, April 28, 2000.

Gonzalez, David. (2002) "New Violence over Rights Raises Fear in Guatemala", *New York Times*, May 3, 2002.

Paley, Dawn. (2012) "UK owner of Guatemalan energy firm urged to act after protest deaths". *The Guardian*, October 12, 2012

influential in Guatemalan politics: Isaacs states that “military officers associated with the counterinsurgency have reinvented themselves as democratic politicians” and that senior military officers hold seats in Congress (2010:109). An example hereof is General Ríos Montt, as he was member of Congress between 2007 and 2012 and even joined the presidential races in 2003 and 2007 (Isaacs 2010). Current President Pérez Molina himself provides another example, as he is a former member of the Special Forces (Kaibiles) and served as head of military intelligence (International Crisis Group 2012:7; Barendsen and van Putten 2013).

BTI (2014) reports that other army officials have also gained a high level of political power inside the public administration since Pérez Molina took office. For example, the former head of the Social Security Institute (IGSS), Juan de Dios Rodríguez, the former Minister of Interior, Mauricio López Bonilla, as well as the head of the powerful Security Council, Ricardo Bustamante, all occupied a high rank in the army, have close ties to the president and make sure that the interests of the military elite stay protected (Dudley 2014).²⁶ What is more, BTI (2014) reports that during Pérez Molina’s first year of office, participation by civil society organisations in public security issues declined due to the strong presence of former and active army officials in the field and violence and repression against social movements.

Economic elite

The economic elite have tremendous influence in the political domain. They exert this influence by their access to politicians and government officials, including the president, congressmen, judges and prosecutors (BTI 2014; Dudley 2014). The influence of the economic elite on the justice system is already discussed in the previous chapter. What is more, they have also posed a threat for democratisation. Former president Vinicio Cerezo admits that although he was the elected president in 1986, his power was limited compared to the economic elite, as the private sector had extraordinary leverage in that period (Briscoe and Rodriguez Pellecer 2010). Moreover, BTI (2014) states that because economic associations, such as the Coordinating Committee for Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF), act to protect their own interests, this determines the policy agenda and limits the scope of government decisions. Because these elite want to prevent political parties from gaining too much influence, they encourage the individualistic party system as it exists and take advantage of it (Jones 2000). In fact, Sanchez (2009) argues that the business sector finances most of the political parties and has historically provided and continues to provide a source of candidates for ministerial positions. This claim is supported by statistics: between 1954 and 1992, representatives of the private sector occupied the post of economy minister for seventy-two per cent of the

²⁶ Ironically, in May 2015, de Dios Rodriguez was arrested on charges of fraud, where after President Otto Pérez sacked Lopez Bonilla because of involvement in dubious public contracts, probably to prevent the uncovering of even more scandals. (source: <http://lahora.gt/localisan-a-juan-de-dios-rodriguez-presidente-del-igss/>, <http://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/politica/renuncia-ministro-de-gobernacion>)

time (Briscoe and Rodriguez Pellecer 2010:18). Consequently, economic and political power seem complexly interlinked. However, both the traditional and emerging faction of the economic elite have done and will continue to do anything to maintain their powerful position.

Gangs and criminal organisations

Hazen (2010) argues that gangs do not have the intention to seize state power but rather pose a different challenge to the state. Besides their presence in Guatemala City, (narco)gangs also tend to operate in under-governed areas and in some cases control certain aspects of neighborhood life (e.g. economic activities, local neighborhood dynamics, territorial claims with competing groups), subsequently providing a form of governance, dispute resolution, and security (Hazen 2010; UNODC 2012). In this way, it can be argued that they present an alternative to government. This mostly concerns the border areas, where drug activity takes place (Briscoe 2009). Gangs in Guatemala thus pose an indirect threat to the state in that they take over state functions and therewith undermine governance, democracy, and law and order in the areas they control (Briscoe 2009; Hazen 2010; UNODC 2012).

Moreover, Briscoe (2009) argues that criminal organisations exert influence in many sectors, such as politics. They finance campaigns and cluster in political parties. This emergence of organised crime as a political actor and competitor constitutes a threat to the economic elite, especially the traditional elite, who had already been losing ground during the last decade (see chapter VI). According to Schünemann, this has even led to the acceptance of the establishment of CICIG, despite the fact that historically, the traditional elite have favored a weak state “to control and exploit the country according to their economic political interest.” (2010:20). It thus seems that the traditional elite prefer fighting corruption and impunity in Guatemala over the proliferation and strengthening of organised crime in the political sphere. As Schünemann points out, “a perception is emerging that transnational organised crime is a common threat to all citizens of all factions of Guatemala’s society, regardless of how influential they are” (2010:20). On the other hand, due to ties between political and criminal actors the emerging elite openly rejected the establishment of CICIG, fearing for potential prosecution (Schünemann 2010).

Private security companies

From the above it becomes clear that the main APC’s that have challenged the democratisation process are the military, the economic elite and gangs and criminal organisations. I would like to add that PSC’s have posed a very indirect challenge, as they are, like the military, often involved in confronting social movements. BTI (2014) reports that in the period between 2011 and 2013 there were numerous confrontations between social movements and PSC’s hired by international mining or hydroelectric

firms. It can thus be argued that not only the military but also PSC's contribute and take part in a climate of violence against political expression of society.

Conclusion

After two decades, the democratic commitments and ambitions in the peace accords have not resulted in a consolidated democracy in Guatemala yet. As in the pacification process, in the democratic transition we can speak of a certain continuity; foremost because economic and military elites (albeit the latter in a more indirect way than before) retained a strong hold on the state. They do not hold power directly, but indirectly through a web of illicit relations. It seems like the state is corroded by the influence of powerful non-state actors and criminal networks and a continuing influence of former military control. Regarding the breadth, equality, protection and mutually binding consultation aspects of democracy, it can be concluded from the above that rights and obligations are not equal for every group in Guatemala's society; that a part of the population (especially indigenous communities) faces barriers to full rights of citizenship (e.g. access to justice as described in chapter IV and participation in national politics); that the state is in some cases not willing or able to protect its citizens (e.g. with protests); and that consultation - let alone a form of consultation that is mutually binding - is frequently lacking.

VI

Neoliberalism and Economic Development

In this chapter I describe the third and last of the three transitions of liberal peacebuilding in Guatemala, namely the economic transition or the process of marketisation. As with the previous chapters, I start with describing the economic ambitions in the peace accords. Then I analyse the different economic (neoliberal) programs implemented in Guatemala and their effects as well as the overall economic development in the country. Finally, I zoom in on the challenge that different APC's might have posed in this transition.

Policy: Structural adjustment and a contested tax reform

Ambitions

In 1996 the "Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation", one of the last and most controversial of all agreements, was signed. This agreement was pressed for by international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Despite the fact that implicitly, both the URNG and the ASC rejected the logic of structural adjustment as the key to success in global competition, the agreement did endorse liberalisation and macroeconomic stabilisation, but also committed the Guatemalan government to increase its levels of social spending (Spence et al. 1998; Paris 2004). Main pillars in the agreement were: the strengthening of people's participation in public life; correcting historical social imbalances; adopting social policies designed to achieve steady growth in GDP of no less than six per cent per year; increasing social investment; promoting a dynamic land market; establishing a land registry system; improving labor protection; and a tax policy designed to enable the collection of resources needed for the performance of the State's functions (UNSC 1996). Taking into account the resistance against the proposed tax reform by both factions of the economic elite, as will be discussed below, it is not surprising that commitments regarding this topic remain vague in the agreement and concrete measures and deadlines were avoided.

This vagueness fits into the overall critique on the agreement, namely that despite the commitment to increase social spending, the agreement did not go far enough to address the socio-economic root causes of the conflict (Palma Murga 1997; Spence et al. 1998; Azpuru 1999). Spence et al. (1998) state for example that few of the commitments in the agreement involve concrete targets, price tags, deadlines, or specific sharing of power and that issues relating to globalisation, economic development policy, macroeconomic management and privatisation were not included in the agreement at all. They argue that for the sake of reaching agreement, "the guerrillas gave up their claims to shape national economic policy, limit privatisation, and effectuate a direct redistribution of private landholdings" and thereby surrendered to the interests of the government and CACIF

(Spence et al. 1998). Palma Murga also criticises the agreement, arguing that “its overly technical, market-driven proposals do not begin to address the economic injustice and inefficiency and the deep historical grievances which are the root causes of past and ongoing rural conflict.” (1997:74)

Implementation

Regional integration in Central America already began in the mid-20th century. According to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), since the “General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration” in 1960, Guatemala has been in a process of regional integration and economic liberalisation with the four other Central American countries, with the aim of constructing an economic bloc by opening up their economies. A hallmark in this regard was the “Protocol to the General Treaty for Economic Integration” (also known as the “Guatemala Protocol”), signed in 1993, committing the state parties to the establishment of a customs union, as well as the Central American tariff policy signed in 1997 (WTO 2001;2008).

Since the democratic opening in 1986, Guatemala aimed at an integrated foreign trade policy (WTO 2008). From 1991 onwards, the WTO (2001) reports that there were stabilisation and structural adjustment programs in Guatemala and main pillars in Guatemala’s economic development were the opening up of economy, market access and promotion of competitiveness. The total trade in goods increased between 1990 and 2000 at an annual cumulative rate of ten and a half per cent (WTO 2001). As a consequence of these structural adjustment programs, most state enterprises have been privatised (BTI 2014). Privatisation however, was nothing “new” in Guatemala: it had already started with the hiring of UFC to control the country’s infrastructure in the beginning of the 20th century (Beard 2010).

Economic liberalisation in Guatemala accelerated since the peace accords. The year 1996 was the start of a new era, dominated by the search for new markets for Guatemala's exportable supply through the negotiated opening up of trade (WTO 2008). WTO states that in the late 1990s, totally conform neoliberal principles, “a fundamental objective of the country’s economic policy has been to reduce the role of the State and promote greater private sector participation” (2001:5). Since that time, Guatemala, which became a member of WTO in 1995, has completed negotiations and concluded free trade agreements with various other states (WTO 2008). An important agreement is for example the “Northern Triangle – Mexico Free Trade Agreement” (NT-Mexico FTA), signed by Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador with Mexico and which came into force in March 2001.²⁷ This agreement has enabled Guatemala to increase goods exports to Mexico through lower tariffs (ibid). Furthermore, the CAFTA-DR is in force since 1 July 2006. This

²⁷ This was the first time that Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador were called as such, later ‘the Northern Triangle’ became associated with violence, gangs and (illegal) migration to the US.

is an agreement between the Dominican Republic, Central America and the US and has been providing legal certainty, especially with respect to trade and investment between the parties (Becker 2005; WTO 2008). With this agreement, the sugar and *maquiladora* industries enjoy enhanced access to the US market (Valdez et al. 2006).²⁸ BTI (2014) states that as three-quarters of Guatemala's trade in goods take place with parties to the agreement, CAFTA-DR is of important value for Guatemala. Finally, on June 29 2012, the EU and the Central American region signed an "Association Agreement", relying on political dialogue, cooperation, and trade. Since December 2013, the trade pillar of the Association Agreement has been provisionally applied with Guatemala (European Commission 2015).

Furthermore, due to neoliberal policies, Guatemala has seen a shift in production: from indigo to coffee, sugar and fruit in the 19th century to concrete and beer at the start of the 20th century and finally to textile production, banking and multinational corporations engaged in telecommunications, retail, and food and drink processing (Valdez et al. 2006; Briscoe and Rodriguez Pellecer 2010). The orientation towards the export of non-traditional foods and products, including textile (*maquila*) and crops such as broccoli and snow peas, initiated in the 1980s (O'Neill and Thomas eds. 2011). The textile industry, represented by *maquiladoras* (generally foreign-owned factories where brand-name clothing is assembled for export) can be seen as a product of a globalised economy in which multinationals seek the lowest labor cost for the production of goods (Valdez et al. 2006). The number of *maquiladoras* has been increasing since the 1980s (O'Neill and Thomas eds. 2011).

This shift towards non-traditional products has considerable consequences. Firstly, according to O'Neill and Thomas eds. (2011) and Beard (2010) it has undermined an important set of cultural practices tied to cultivation and has caused a wave of migration to the city and its surroundings. What is more, only a few indigenous farmers have been able to enter the export market and manage to participate in the global market, while the majority has been greatly disadvantaged by these changes (O'Neill and Thomas eds. 2011:8.). This argument is supported by Alonso-Fradejas, who argues that "land ownership is being (re)concentrated and social relations reshaped: compensation to dispossessed indigenous peasants for their land is insufficient to boost non-farm livelihoods or to regain access to land" (2012:509). In addition, Cabrera-Schneider states that the inequity of the agricultural system in Guatemala is reflected in its current land production and distribution system, also described as "land-grabbing" (2010:137). The practice of land-grabbing entails, according to Zander and Durr: "[A] new process of land concentration, in the hands of national and transnational companies engaged in large scale monoculture plantation farming and cattle ranchers, destroying entire communities and leaving their families without means of subsistence" (2001:2). According to BTI, the

²⁸ During the 2013/2014 harvest a total of 1.9 million metric tons (MT) of sugar was exported. Guatemala currently ranks third in sugar yield, competing with Colombia and Swaziland, which are in first place with 14.6 and 13.9 tons per hectare, respectively (Source: http://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/The_Competitive_Sugar_Industry_in_Guatemala)

fact that a land registration system, as stipulated in the Socio-economic Agreement, is lacking is a major obstacle, as well as the presence of “powerful figures seeking to maintain the status quo” referring to the political and economic elite (2014:23).

Some people in Guatemala also fear the consequences of free trade agreements. For example, apparel manufacturers fear that the CAFTA-DR agreement leads to a locked in dominance of *maquiladoras* of the export market and will allow them to take over domestic sales (O’Neill and Thomas eds. 2011). Those manufacturers argue that *maquiladoras* lower the prices for products by selling apparel in Guatemala that was earmarked for export, while foreign-owned retail chains in the highland region sell imported clothing at lower prices than local producers can possibly sustain (ibid.). What is more, BTI (2014) states that the benefits of trade agreements such as CAFTA-DR has been minimally spread beyond economic elites; it has not brought more formal employment nor lowered its trade deficits with the US.

Overall, O’Neill and Thomas eds. (2011) highlight the negative consequences of neoliberal policies in the cities of Latin America; they state that neoliberal policies have led to a decrease in industry and manufacturing in Latin America, causing a rise in unemployment levels in urban areas, the development of a large informal sector (such as street vendors) and the widespread marginalisation of urban population. This argument is supported by an article of the The Globe and Mail (Canada) on 23 March 2000, stating that the informal economy in Guatemala accounted for sixty per cent of the work force due to peasant migration and free-market policies (Villegas 2000). It can be argued that a decade later this situation has not improved: BTI (2014) reports that in 2010 the majority of the country’s economically active population (almost sixty per cent) was either underemployed or worked in the informal sector.

Seen the huge economic reforms demanded by neoliberal policies, how has Guatemala’s economy developed since 1996? Guatemala is a middle-income country and the largest economy of the region (Valdez et al. 2006). Though Guatemala’s economy has grown, market competition in Guatemala still operates under a weak institutional framework (BTI 2014). Moreover, the economy remains dependent on resource extraction and foreign investment, and is highly vulnerable to swings in international prices (BTI 2014). Macroeconomic growth rates have been quite stable over the last decade, but have declined with the global financial crisis, which began in 2008 (BTI 2014). According to World Bank statistics, export of goods and services had almost doubled in 2013 in comparison to 2005.²⁹ Furthermore, Guatemala’s GDP and its GDP per capita have been growing and poverty has decreased.^{30 31 32} However the 6 per cent of annual economic

²⁹ Export of goods and services has increased from US \$6,8 billion (US\$ 5,5 billion goods and US\$1,3 billion services) in 2005 to US \$12,7 billion (US\$ 10,2 billion goods and US\$ 2,5 billion services) in 2013. (World Bank)

³⁰ From US \$891,85 in 1986 to US\$ 1545 in 1996 to US\$ 3477 in 2013. (World Bank)

³¹ From US \$7,2 billion in 1986 to US \$15,7 billion in 1996, to US \$53 billion in 2013. (World Bank)

³² Poverty has fallen from 56,75 in 1987 to 29,79 in 2011 (-48%); extreme poverty from 38,64 in 1987 to 13,70 in 2011 (-65%). Poverty since 1998: has not substantially decreased (1%, measured from 2 dollar), extreme poverty has decreased by 16% (1,25 dollar). (World Bank)

growth committed to in the peace accords, has since 1996 only been achieved in 2007 and was 3,7 per cent in 2013 (World Bank 2015). In addition, Guatemala's economy increasingly relies on remittances, which are accountable for a substantive percentage of Guatemala's GDP (Valdez et al. 2006; World Bank 2015).³³

Furthermore, despite the growth in GDP, indigenous people are still disproportionately affected by poverty. BTI (2014) reports that inequality is particularly concentrated in departments predominantly populated by indigenous communities. Most strikingly, between 1987 and 2011 the GINI index has been more or less stable around 0.55, with which it scores 160 out of 175 countries in the world. Only Honduras has a higher index in the region (World Bank 2015b).^{34 35} One could thus argue that the benefits of Guatemala's economic development has only maintained the status quo and has not challenged the inequality in wealth distribution, an argument supported by Kurtenbach (2010), Paris (2004) and BTI (2014). The outcome of neoliberal programs in Guatemala fits into Harvey's concept of "accumulation of dispossession" (2005:159) because it seems that they have benefited a lucky few, while they have expropriated the population - mostly rural indigenous communities - from land and means of subsistence.

Power and Marketisation

Economic elite

During the peace negotiation process, lasting from 1986 until 1996, CACIF exerted considerable influence. The organisation, which was founded in 1957, was and still seems to be divided between the traditional and emerging economic elite (Valdez et al. 2006; Jonas 2008; Sanchez 2009; Briscoe and Rodriguez Pellecer 2010; Dudley 2014). Although the first did not acknowledge that the conflict interfered with their activities and thus deemed negotiation unnecessary, the latter saw advantages in a stable environment, seen as a beneficial context for global businesses and investments to thrive in (Valdez et al. 2006; Jonas 2008).³⁶ The substantive role of CACIF in the peace negotiations is shown in the fact that the leading government negotiator had to meet forty-two times with CACIF during the negotiations on the Socio-economic Agreement compared to twenty-one meetings with URNG (Valdez et al. 2006). Instead of joining the ASC, CACIF formed its

³³ From US\$ 699,998 and 0,0097% of GDP in 1986 to US\$375,4 million and 2,38% of GDP in 1996 and US\$ 5,4 billion and 10% of GDP in 2013. (World Bank)

³⁴ "Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution [...] a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality" (source: World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>)

³⁵ Fluctuated, with lowest point being 50,73 (2004) and highest point being 59 (1988). In 2011, the GINI was 52,35 (World Bank)

³⁶ Kurtenbach (2010) argues that during the war, Guatemala did not receive any foreign aid because the international community condemned the gross human rights violations of the state. This however, has led to the establishment of a war economy, including certain structures that have not been dismantled after the war ended.

own peace commission in 1994: the Business Peace Commission (CEPAZ) (Azpuru 1999; Valdez et al. 2006). According to Valdez et al., CEPAZ was created to lead CACIF in determining the private sector's positions on peace negotiations: "CEPAZ created a group of influential businesspeople to pursue two goals: to monitor and exert influence over the peace [process] particularly with regard to the socio-economic issues under discussion and to embark on a mission of persuasion with the private sector." (2006:343, [addition of the author]). However, the friction between the traditional and emerging economic elite in CACIF made the participation of CEPAZ in the peace talks highly ineffective and complicated CEPAZ's capacity to achieve their goals (Valdez et al. 2006). Many authors argue that one of the most problematic issues in the peace process was the proposed tax reform, which was highly contested by both factions of the economic elite (see below) (Diaz-Bonilla 1990; Paris 2004; Valdez et al. 2006; Briscoe and Rodriguez Pellecer 2010).

In fact, the resistance of the economic elite against tax reform proposals is the most explicit challenge they have posed for the triple transition of peacebuilding. Herewith, they prevented the establishment of a tax policy that would enable the collection of necessary resources for the performance of crucial state's functions and public investment (Sanchez 2009). Low tax leads to undersupply of public goods essential for the efficient functioning of institutions and a market economy and therewith present an obstacle to overall development (ibid.). Therefore I argue that, besides the negative effect for marketisation, the economic elites posed and continue to pose a challenge to all three transitions by hampering efficient functioning of crucial institutions (such as security institutions, healthcare, etc.) through resistance against tax reform.

Furthermore, as briefly discussed in chapter II, marketisation and economic diversification provided opportunity for an emerging elite, focused on industry, trade in non-traditional products, commerce and finance, to gain ground. Besides the united struggle of both factions of the economic elite against Claudia Paz y Paz (see chapter IV) and tax reform, the emerging elite have posed a challenge for the traditional elite. For example, in 2000 President Portillo, associated with the emerging elite, increased taxes on alcohol sales and issued liberalised trade rules by presidential decree, opening up traditional economic powers to more competition in various sectors (Schünemann 2010; Dudley 2014).

Violence and crime

Guatemala's business and economy is challenged by insecurity: a survey by the World Bank revealed that for eighty per cent of Guatemalan businesses, crime was a major constraint on their activities and for forty-two per cent crime causes direct losses (Briscoe 2009:18; Brands 2010:28). Paradoxically, while undermining the state by resisting tax reform, the economic elite in Guatemala simultaneously insist on the need for a strong state to combat insecurity (Briscoe 2009). Indeed, according to the World Bank crime and violence "carry staggering economic costs at the national level." (2011:ii) Crime and

violence not only drag down economic growth, but also pollutes the investment climate. From a pure economic perspective, the World Bank argues that a ten per cent reduction in the violence levels of Guatemala (and other Central American countries with high murder rates), “could boost annual economic growth per capita by as much as a full one per cent.” (World Bank 2011:ii). From this point of view, perpetrators of violence and crime, including APC’s such as gangs, criminal organisations, PSC’s and local security boards, indirectly constitute a challenge for economic growth in Guatemala.

Conclusion

Guatemala has embarked on a neoliberal program since the 1990s and this process accelerated after the signing of the peace accords. However, neoliberal programs, such as the diversification of exports, has not led to accumulation of wealth for all, as promoters of neoliberalism claim they do, but has rather resulted in “accumulation of dispossession”, using Harvey’s (2005:159) concept: it has benefited a small nucleus of Guatemalans, while it has been in the very least unpropitious for the majority of people, especially the rural indigenous communities. In the same vein, as Guatemala’s economy has grown, the disproportional inequality of wealth distribution has not been corrected.

In addition, it can be stated that the economic elite, divided by a traditional and emerging faction, both associated in CACIF, have had an enormous influence on the negotiation of the Socio-economic Agreement. As mentioned above, many authors blame their influence for the vagueness of the commitments and delay of implementation of the provisions in the agreement, such as a tax reform. What is more, besides the challenge that the emerging elite may pose for the traditional elite by promoting the opening up of Guatemala’s economy, both of them seem to be challenged by the flourishing of, mostly criminal, APC’s. By upholding a climate of violence, gangs and criminal organisations, PSC’s and local security boards are indirectly challenging the marketisation process as insecurity hampers foreign investment and economic development.

VII

Conclusion

This thesis started with a quote of Snodgrass Godoy (2002), stating that the signing of the peace accords has not brought an end to violence. Indeed, the high homicide rate in Guatemala contradicts the supposed outcome of the triple transition of pacification, democratisation and marketisation stipulated in the peace accords, namely: peace.

As touched upon in chapter II, the underlying assumption of a certain “triple transition” in peacebuilding is that pacification, democratisation and marketisation positively influence each other and lead to sustainable development (Paris 2004; Kurtenbach 2010). However, this assumption has not proven valid in the case of Guatemala: nineteen years after the signing of the peace accords, Guatemala is far from being at peace (e.g. Briscoe and Rodriquez Pellecer 2010; O’Neill and Thomas eds. 2011; Snodgrass Godoy 2002). From a political economy perspective it could be argued that the liberal peace thesis seems to fail to take into account the political economy of peacebuilding, especially the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals.

Building on this and in order to come to grips with the contradiction described above, I used Tilly’s concept of “autonomous power centres” (APC’s) (2007:76) and I posed the question: *From a political economy perspective, how have autonomous power centres hampered the triple transition of peacebuilding in Guatemala from the signing of the peace accords in 1996 until the present?*

To answer this question, I put on political economy spectacles and dove into existing literature, documentaries, reports and statistics. I analysed the implementation of policy in each transition and zoomed in on the challenges that various APC’s have posed from the outset in the threefold peacebuilding process.

As discussed, the peace accords in Guatemala included ambitious commitments regarding peace, democracy and economic development. The main aim regarding peace and security was to overcome a military concept of security and to provide an efficient and non-discriminatory justice system (UNSC 1996; Argueta 2004; Rosado 2006). Democracy was a guiding principle in the peace accords and even before that, democratisation and peace processes were intertwined and influenced each other (UNSC 1996;1996b; Azpuru 1999; Terwindt and van der Borgh 2014). Regarding marketisation, the agreement endorsed liberalisation and macroeconomic stabilisation, but also committed the Guatemalan government to increase social spending through a tax increase (UNSC 1996; Spence et al. 1998; Paris 2004).

As the peace accords aimed at overcoming a militarised concept of security, the discussed (re)militarisation of Guatemalan society could be identified as one of the main challenges for the pacification process. This (re)militarisation has also severely delayed the necessary police reforms. Focusing on power, the pacification process has been hampered by all five main APC’s identified in this study. An identified recurrent theme here is the

transformation and adaptation of old expressions of violence and violence control into the post-conflict era. However, newer APC's, such as gangs and organised crime, also hampered the pacification process. My analysis of the pacification process in Guatemala thus supports Kurtenbach's (2010) claim that it is vital to look at the continuity of expressions and the reproduction of violence, as well as new elements of violence.

The democratisation process in Guatemala had the aim of changing the rules of the state apparatus, transforming it from an autocracy into a democracy (Terwindt and van der Borgh 2014). However, democracy has never really consolidated in Guatemala in the two decades following the peace accords. Borrowing Tilly's (2007) terminology and the concept of democracy, the political relation between the Guatemalan state and its citizens is far from featuring broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation. Based on chapter V it can be argued that Guatemala has democratised since the counterinsurgency period of the 1980s, but that this process has somewhat stagnated since the political opening of 1986. This stagnation can be, albeit partly, attributed to various APC's, which have posed a challenge by entering the political domain via a web of illicit relations.

The transition of marketisation has not been challenged by APC's as vigorously as the other two transitions. Power seems to have shifted from the traditional economic elite to the emerging elite and economic growth is hampered by the violence and insecurity plaguing the isthmus. However, the problem in this transition is above all to be found in false assumptions regarding the outcome of neoliberal programs, namely that they would stimulate wealth accumulation. In Guatemala, there has been economic growth, but wealth is still distributed very unequally. Furthermore, especially indigenous people are disadvantaged by diversification of export-products and free trade agreements (Zander and Durr 2001; Cabrera-Schneider 2010; O'Neill and Thomas 2011; Alonso-Fradejas 2012). The conclusion of my analysis of the marketisation transition in Guatemala thus underlines Harvey's (2005) claim that neoliberalism is far from being a magic formula.

Guatemala provides an example of a situation in which policy implementation and power relations come across in a peacebuilding context. With this thesis, above all, I provided knowledge on the relation between APC's and the triple transition in Guatemala. Based on the findings in this thesis, I argue that in search for the answer of how does it come to be that Guatemala is such a violent and insecure country despite the peacebuilding commitments in the peace accords, it is insufficient to look at what went wrong in the three transitions separately. Rather, for the feasibility of peace accords, it is more valuable to focus on the political economy of peacebuilding and thus the role of power and its distribution. This corresponds with the importance that Kurtenbach (2010) attributes to existing power relations in peacebuilding.

This thesis has shown that the distinguished APC's all contribute to a certain vicious circle of power and policy implementation. The inefficient and fragile post-conflict state of Guatemala seems unable to provide (a perception of) security, a solid democracy and equal distribution of the benefits of economic growth. In turn, various actors take advantage of this void and use it for their illicit activities (gangs, criminal organisations)

or to privatise security functions (such as local security boards and PCS's). Others (such as the economic and military elite) more intentionally resist the process of peacebuilding and the associated reconfiguration of power and try (with success) to co-opt state institutions. These practices undermine and further erode the already porous state of Guatemala; a downward spiral.

For anyone involved in the peacebuilding project in Guatemala (academics, policymakers and non-governmental organisations alike, both national and international), it therefore seems wise to at least take into account the political economy dimension of peacebuilding. However, the emphasis on the vicious circle of power centres and the implementation of the triple transition in Guatemala also raises a series of new questions. First of all, how to break this vicious circle? And how could international as well as national actors anticipate on the emergence and proliferation of main APC's in a peacebuilding context? More research is needed to fully understand the mechanisms at play in the challenge that the main APC's in Guatemala have posed for the triple transition of peacebuilding.

Moreover, is it enough to look at APC's in the peacebuilding process, or do other processes also play a role? For example, it could be argued that besides looking into the relations between power centres and the triple transition, it also matters how the different transitions relate to each other. Could it be that the transitions of post-war transformation in Guatemala are actually incompatible and that sequencing is just as important as shifting power relations? These questions bring to light the fact that the complexities and difficulties of the triple transition of peacebuilding should not be trivialised.

I am not trying to argue here that liberal peacebuilding is a total fallacy, rather, I would like to pose that while the triple transition did work out quite well for Europe and Japan, it has proven not to be a universal formula of all times. This emphasises the need for new (pragmatic) ideas on the triple transition, as well as peacebuilding as such. More importantly, it stresses the need for actually translating these new ideas into policy and practice. Although this thesis is based on extensive research itself, it could also function as a comprehensive theoretical framework for further research with such a pragmatic aim.

Bibliography

- Aguilera Peralta, Gabriel. (2008) "Lessons learned and prospects for the future - What type of peace is possible in Guatemala?" Online available at http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-defis-205_en.html
- Aguirre, Mariano and Chris van der Borgh. (2010) "Building peace, states and hybrids: International operations in post-conflict countries," Broker Online, February 2, 2010. Available online at: www.thebrokeronline.eu
- Alonso-Fradejas. (2012) Land control-grabbing in Guatemala: the political economy of contemporary agrarian change. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 33(4):509-528.
- Argueta, Otto. (2010) Private security in Guatemala: The pathway to its proliferation. GIGA working papers, no. 144.
- Azpuru, Dinorah. (1999) "Peace and Democratisation in Guatemala: Two Parallel Processes." Chapter 4 in Arnson, Cynthia eds. *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- (2006) The political culture of Democracy in Guatemala Report. Vanderbilt University.
- (2008) The political culture of Democracy in Guatemala Report. Vanderbilt University.
- (2010) The political culture of Democracy in Guatemala Report. Vanderbilt University.
- (2012) The political culture of Democracy in Guatemala Report. Vanderbilt University.
- Baker, Bruce and Eric Sheye. (2007) Multi-layered justice and security delivery in post-conflict and fragile states. *Conflict, Security & Development* 7(4):503-528.
- Barendsen, Welmoed and Elske van Putten. (2013) Healthcare as a Building Brick? Unravelling the Importance of Healthcare in Post-Conflict Guatemala. Thesis of Utrecht University.
- Beard, Avri. (2010) The Violent North: Guatemala and El Salvador, Independence to 1980. Centre for Latin American & Latino Press Working Paper.
- Becker, Elisabeth. (2005) "A Push for a Central American Trade Pact," New York Times, May 13, 2005.
- Boege, Volker et al. (2009) On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: What is Failing - States in the Global South or Research and Politics in the West? Berghof Handbook Dialogue, No. 8. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.

- Boeije, Hennie. (2010) *Analysis in Qualitative Research*. London, New Delhi, Singapore and Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Boink, Joey and Sander Wirken. (2015) *Burden of Peace*. Directed by Joey Boink and Sander Wirken. Framework Production, the Netherlands.
- Borgh, van der., Chris. (2007) "Triple transition and governance in El Salvador" Chapter in Demmers, Jolle et al. (eds). *Good governance in the era of global neoliberalism: conflict and depoliticisation in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa*. Pp. 116-133. New York en London: Routledge.
- Borgh, van der., Chris and Carolijn Terwindt. (2014) *NGOS under Pressure in Partial Democracies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brands, Hal. (2011) Crime, Irregular Warfare and Institutional failure. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34(3): 228-247.
- Briscoe, Ivan. (2009) *Criminal Bargain: State and Security in Guatemala*. FRIDE Working Paper No. 88.
- Briscoe, Ivan and Martín Rodríguez Pellecer. (2010) *A State Under Siege: Elites, Criminal Networks and Institutional Reform in Guatemala*. The Hague: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
- BTI. (2008) *Guatemala Country Report*.
- (2014) *Guatemala Country Report*.
- Cabrera-Schneider. (2010) *Trade Liberalisation, Corn Prices and a Rural Community in Guatemala*. Dissertation of Anthropology Department, University of Nebraska.
- CICIG. (2013) "Sixth Report of Activities of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala." Available at <http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/2013/COM-045-20130822-DOC01-EN.pdf>
- Clawley, Marguerite. (2013) "Nearly 200 Guatemalan Police Removed for Criminal Ties in 2012." February 19. (www.insightcrime.org)
- Dahl, Robert. (1957) The Concept of Power. *Behavioural Science* 2(3):201-215.
- Debiel, Thomas and Daniel Lambach. (2009) How Statebuilding Strategies Miss Local Realities. *Conflict, Security and Development* 21(1):22-28.
- Demmers, Jolle. (2013) *Theories of Violent Conflict*. New York and London: Routledge.

- Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio. (1990) "Structural Adjustment Programs and Economic Stabilisation in Central America." An EDI Policy Seminar Report, No. 23. Economic Development Institute of the World Bank.
- Dudley, Steven. (2014) *The War for Guatemala's Courts*. InsightCrime. Available online at www.insightcrime.org/investigations/the-war-for-guatemala-s-courts
- European Commission. (2005) Trade - Central America. Website, available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/central-america/> (accessed on June 26, 2015).
- Fetting, Nathaniel. (2014) *Enablers and obstacles to democratic consolidation and civil-military relations reform: a comparative analysis of Argentina and Guatemala*. Thesis of Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California.
- Forman, Shepard en Stewart Patrick (eds). (2000) *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery*. Boulder en London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Foucault, Michel. (1982) The Subject and Power. *Critical Inquiry* 8(4):777-795
- Fox, Edward. (2012) "Guatemala to Deploy Controversial Force to Mex Border." 10 May, 2012. (www.insightcrime.org)
- Glebbeeck, Marie-Louise. (2001) Police reform and the Peace process in Guatemala: The Fifth Promotion of the National Civilian Police. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 20(4): 431-435.
- Gobierno de Guatemala. (2015) "Presidente Pérez Molina afirma que bajó promedio diario de muertes violentas." Press Release, January 3, 2015. Online available at www.guatemala.gob.gt/index.php/2011-08-04-18-06-26/item/10676-presidente-p%C3%A9rez-molina-afirma-que-baj%C3%B3-promedio-diario-de-muertes-violentas
- Gonzalez, David. (2003) "Justice in Guatemala Can Be Gasoline and a Match," *New York Times*, March 8.
- Haider, Huma and Sumedh Rao. (2010) *Political and Social Analysis for Development Policy and Practice*. GSDRC Issues Paper, International Development Department, University of Birminham.
- Harvey, David. (2005) "Neoliberalism on Trial" Chapter in *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Pp. 152-182. Oxford: University Press.
- Hazen, Jennifer M. (2010) Understanding gangs as armed groups. *International Review of the Red Cross* 92(878):369-387.

- Hegre, Håvard. (2004) Disentangling Democracy and Development as Determinants of Armed Conflict. Center for the Study of Civil War, PRIO, Oslo. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/disentangling_democracy_and_development.pdf [accessed 30 May 2015]
- Holsti, Kalevi. (1996) *The State, War, and the State of War*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Hudson, David and Adrian Leftwich. (2014) From Political Economy to Political Analysis. DLP Research Paper.
- International Monetary Fund. (2000) Guatemala: Statistical Annex. IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/09
- (2005) Guatemala: Statistical Annex. IMF Staff Country Report No. 05/361
- International Crisis Group. (2012) Police reform in Guatemala: Obstacles and Opportunities. Latin America Report n43. Online available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/043-police-reform-in-guatemala-obstacles-and-opportunities.pdf>
- Insight Crime. (2011) "The Zetas in Guatemala." Available at <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/part-1-the-incursion>
- Isaacs, Anita. (2010) Guatemala on the Brink. *Journal of Democracy* 21(2):108-122.
- Jonas, Susanne. (1991) *Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process*. Boulder: Westview Press Inc.
- (2008) Democratisation Through peace: The Difficult Case of Guatemala. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42(4):9-38.
- Jones, Mark. (2011) Weakly Institutionalized Party Systems and Presidential Democracy: Evidence from Guatemala. *International Area Studies Review* 14(4):4-30.
- Jütersonke, Oliver et al. (2009) Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central America. *Security Dialogue* 40:373-397.
- Kincaid, Douglas A. (2001) Demilitarisation and Security in El Salvador and Guatemala. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42(4):3-42.
- Kruijt, Dirk. (2008) *Guerillas: War and Peace in Central America*. London: Zed Books.
- Kurtenbach, Sabine. (2010) Why is Liberal Peacebuilding so Difficult? Some Lessons from Central America. *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 88:95-110.
- Lacey, Mark. (2007) "Drug Gangs Use Violence to Sway Guatemalan Vote." *The New York Times*, August 4, 2007.

- Landau, Saul. (1993) *The Guerilla Wars of Central America: Nicaragua, El Salvador & Guatemala*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lemus, Jonatan. (2012) The Private Sector and Political Parties: Guatemala, a Case Study. *Journal of Politics and Society* 23:188-218.
- Lotz, Christian. (2010) International Norms in Statebuilding: Finding A Pragmatic Approach. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organisation* 16(2):219-236.
- Luis Sanz, José. (2014) "Guatemala: The Fall of Paz y Paz, the End of a Judicial Awakening." August 15, available at: www.insightcrime.org
- Machi, Lawrence A. And Brenda T. McEvoy. (2012) *The Literature Review: Six Steps to Success*. Thousand Oaks: Corwin.
- Mercury News Wire Service. (2000) "Photographer Killed in Guatemala Protest." San Jose Mercury News, April 28, 2000.
- Minority Rights Group International. (2008) World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Guatemala : Maya. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/49749d163c.html> [accessed 7 June 2015]
- Moser, Caroline O.N. and Cathy Mc Ilwaine. (2004) *Encounters with Violence in Latin America: Urban Poor Perceptions from Colombia and Guatemala*. Routledge: New York and London.
- New York Times. (2007) "New Democracies, Old Police." August 27, 1997.
- Neslen, Arthur. (2015) "'Green' dam linked to killings of six indigenous people in Guatemala." *The Guardian*, April 2, 2015.
- O'Connor, Anne-Marie. (2009) "Guards in Guatemala: Protection and Threat; Poorly Paid Sentries Often Turn to Crime." *The Washington Post*, April 24, 2009.
- OECD. (2008) *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations, from fragility to resilience*. Paris: OECD.
- O'Neill, Kevin Lewis and Kedron Thomas (eds). (2011) *Securing the City: Neoliberalism, Space and Insecurity in Postwar Guatemala*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Paley, Dawn. (2012) "UK owner of Guatemalan energy firm urged to act after protest deaths." *The Guardian*, October 12, 2012

- Palma Murga, Gustavo. (1997) "Promised the Earth: Agrarian Reform in the Socio-Economic Agreement." London: Conciliation Resources.
- Pallister, Kevin. (2013) Why no Mayan party? Indigenous Movements and National Politics in Guatemala. *Latin American Politics and Society* 55(3): 117-138.
- Paris, Roland. (2004) *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Boulder: Cambridge University Press
- Perez-Brignoli, Hector. (1989) *A Brief History of Central America*. University of California Press.
- Ramsbotham, Oliver et al. (2011) *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- RESDAL. (2013) Public Security Index, Central-America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
- (2014) A comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and Caribbean.
- Richani, Nazih. (2011) State Capacity in Postconflict Settings: Explaining Criminal Violence in El Salvador and Guatemala. *Civil Wars* 12(4):431-455
- Roig-Franzia, Manuel. (2007) "Killings on the Campaign Trail." *Washington Post*, September 9, 2007. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/AR2007090800704.html
- Rosado, Ana Glenda. (2006) Transparency and Reform of the Security Sector, Defense Sector: Guatemala Case. Paper for Special session 3: Security Sector Reform & Making Change Happen in a Defence Ministry 12th International Anti-corruption Conference International Transparency, Guatemala City, Guatemala.
- Sanchez, Omar. (2009) Tax Reform Paralysis in Post-Conflict Guatemala. *New Political Economy* 14(1):101-131.
- Schultze-Kraft, Markus. (2012) Security and the Rule of Law in Guatemala: Priorities, Trade-off and Interdependencies. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 4(1):135-157.
- Schünemann, Julia (2010). "Looking the Monster in the Face: The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala and the 'Rule of Law-builders Contract' ." Initiative for Peacebuilding, Country Case Study. Available at: www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/GuatemalaOct.pdf
- Sieder, Rachel. (2011) Contested sovereignties: Indigenous law, violence and state effects in postwar Guatemala. *Critique of Anthropology* 31(3): 161-184.

- Sieder, Rachel and Richard Wilson. (1997) "Negotiating rights: The Guatemala peace process." London: Conciliation Resources. Available at http://www.c-r.org/sites/default/files/02_Guatemala_1997_ENG_F.pdf
- Snodgrass Godoy, Angelina. (2002) Lynchings and The Democratisation of Terror in Postwar Guatemala: Implications for Human Rights. *Human Rights Quarterly* 24(3):640-641.
- Spence, Jack, et al. (1998) "Promise and Reality: Implementation of the Guatemalan Peace Accords." Hemisphere Initiative Report. Available at <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/hemisphereinitiatives/promise.htm>
- Stanley, William and David Holiday. (2002) Broad Participation, Diffuse Responsibility: Peace Implementation in Guatemala, in Stedman, John et al. (eds.) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- The Economist. (2007) "Guatemala's pre-election violence," August 9, 2007. Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/9622057>
- Tilly, Charles. (2007) *Democracy*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Torres-Rivas, Eldelberto. (1989) *Repression and Resistance: The Struggle for Democracy in Central America*. San Francisco: Westview Press, Inc.
- (2010) *El Estado de Guatemala*. Guatemala City: Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo.
- United Nations Data. (2015) "Intentional homicide, number and rate per 100,000 population." Available at data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5 Accessed on June 24, 2015.
- United Nations Development Program. (2013) *Ciudadanía Intercultural: aportes desde la participación política de los pueblos indígenas en Latinoamérica*. New York: UNDP.
- United Nations Human Rights Council. (2015) Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General. 28th Session, Agenda Item 2. Document number: A/HRC/28/3/Add.1
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2007) *Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire*. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
- (2012) *Transnational Organised Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment*. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

- United Nations Security Council. (1991) Report of the 46th Session of the General Assembly, Agenda item 31, Ref. Nr. A/46/713/S/23256: The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives. Annex: Querétaro Agreement (pp. 9-13).
- (1996) Report of the 50th Session of the General Assembly, Agenda item 45, Ref. Nr. A/50/956: Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation
- (1996b) Report of the 51st Session of the General Assembly, Agenda item 40, Ref nr. A/51/410S/1996/853: Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society.
- (1997) Report of the 51st Session of the General Assembly. Agenda item 40, Ref nr. A/51/796S/1997/114.
- (1997b) Report of the 51st Session of the General Assembly. Ref. Nr. A/51/776/S/1997/51. Annex I: Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime.
- Valdez et al. (2006) "Case Study: Guatemala". In *Local Business, Local peace: Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector*. International Alert.
- Villelabeitia, Ibon. (2000) "Guatemala's informal economy booms; Peasant migration and free market policies have fuelled growth in underground enterprises." *The Globe and Mail*, March 23, 2000.
- Weyland, Kurt. (2004) *Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A Mixed Record*. *Latin American Politics and Society* 46(1):135-157.
- World Bank. (2011) "Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge". Sustainable Development Department and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region.
- World Bank Data Base. (2015) Full data Guatemala. Downloaded on January 30th from: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala>
- (2015b) GINI index (World Bank estimates) <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>
- World Trade Organisation. (2001) *Trade Policy Review Guatemala* (report by the Government).
- (2008) *Trade Policy Review Guatemala* (report by the Government). Document number: WT/TPR/G/210
- Zander, Markus and Jochen Durr. (2011) *Dynamics in land tenure, local power and the peasant economy: the case of Petén, Guatemala*. Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing 6-8 April 2011.

Appendix 1 Methodology

For this thesis, I used the different steps mentioned in Machi and McEvoy's (2012) "The Literature Review: Six Steps to Success" as a roadmap. I complemented this roadmap with three types of coding, as explained in Boeije (2010): open, axial and selective coding. Coding has helped me to define what my data describes. My data collection technique consisted of the collection of literature, statistics and reports, use of evidence collected by governments and NGO's, participation in meetings and conversations concerning Guatemala and watching documentaries. On the one hand I was searching for data that would give me a detailed and correct account of the ambitions and commitments in the peace accords of 1996 and the implementation thereof. On the other hand, I was searching for data from which I could derive the main autonomous power centres in Guatemala in the given period and gather knowledge on the way they posed a challenge for the peacebuilding process. I made sure that data from different decennia were represented in my thesis; as a consequence the collected data is published in a time span from 1990 to 2015. I have visualised the interaction between data gathering and analysis in figure 1.

In the first step, I decided that "the triple transition of peacebuilding" in Guatemala had to be the topic of my thesis, as I have affiliation with the country and I am concerned about the violence and insecurity that has been plaguing the country before and during the conflict, but also ever since the signing of the peace accords. As this topic was too broad, I spent quite some time reading literature to refine the topic and determine an analytical framework. Finally I came to a suitable and provoking topic namely: autonomous power centres and shifting power relations in the triple transition of peacebuilding in Guatemala. I subsequently made a research design and wrote a research proposal.

In the second step, I selected the literature and documents to review, I previewed the material, I selected the appropriate literature or documents and I organised them. Here I began with the first round of analysis, by breaking down the phenomenon of "peacebuilding in Guatemala" into its constituent parts. In this phase I used open coding: I read all the data carefully, divided it into different fragments and I placed segments of the data together. I tried to find relevant themes and named them. On the basis of what I found, I refined my research puzzle. In this way, I determined which literature and documents would help me find the information to address the key ideas in my research puzzle. I did not only include data that would supposedly support my own presumptions, but I also looked for arguments contradicting my presumptions: I selected literature purposefully, but with an open mind. I already determined some of my codes, based on theory, but I also looked for recurring themes in the data, therewith I combined a deductive with an inductive approach to coding.

During the third step, I built a case for what is known about the topic of my research and determined how this knowledge addressed the research question. As it is important that I derive the thesis from different sources and from developed arguments, I filled

knowledge gaps by conversations with experts, documentaries and newspaper articles on the topic.

Through axial coding, categories and propositions generated through the first steps were put to the test by comparing them with new material. I looked for relationships between different categories and made sure that the codes I developed constituted a complete list and that they covered my data sufficiently. I determined the most important elements in the research and reduced and reorganised the data set. Finally I tried to determine the properties of the categories.

In the fourth step of the literature survey I gathered the prior knowledge about the subject of my study and assembled the information gathered in step two and three. I have carefully catalogued the information to provide the opportunity for patterns to appear. I have interpreted the meaning of the assembled works and the current understanding of the research topic in the fifth step and determined how this knowledge answered the research question. In this phase, I synthesised data by looking for connections between categories in order to make sense of what is happening in Guatemala (selective coding). I developed an inductive argument: the argument of discovery. Finally, in step five, I analysed how current knowledge answers my research question. I asked: what is the answer to the research question I have posed, given what I know about the subject? I developed the deductive argument of advocacy and defined the unanswered questions. I have deliberately created, moulded, and refined my data and made a thesis outline. Hereafter, I started writing.

During every step I revised and rethought my work and when I discovered a knowledge gap, I returned to collecting data until I reached saturation: any more data would not have had a significant contribution to my argument in this thesis. However, the data failed to provide me the type of information leading to a full understanding of which mechanisms are at play in the challenge that the main autonomous power centres in Guatemala have posed for the triple transition of peacebuilding. I did not deem this as a problem as I realised that time and word constraints did not allow me to provide such a deep and thorough analysis.

I registered every activity I undertook in a logbook which I sent to my supervisor. Moreover, for the sake of validity, I used triangulation in the following way: I verified "facts" in the literature firstly by searching for statistics, reports and other raw data on the topic and secondly by documentaries, news articles and communiqués by political institutes, such as the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN and the EU. As I was doing an internship at the Western Hemisphere Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I had knowledge of which reports were relevant and of value for my research. The internship also made it possible for me to attend meetings concerning Guatemala, such as meetings with the Guatemala NGO platform in the Netherlands, but also meetings with the Guatemalan Ambassador, H.E. Mr Gabriel Edgardo Aguilera Peralta. Due to confidentiality, I cannot use the contents of the meetings directly, however, it did provide me with useful inspiration and clarification regarding the topic of my research. All in all, I am confident that this thesis is more than

“just an essay” and my findings are sufficient to make valid statements about the peacebuilding process in Guatemala.

STEPS
(Machi and McEvoy 2012)

DATA

Data collection & Analysis Interaction
(Boeije 2010:90)

RESULTS

Step 6 - Write the thesis

Analytical activities
Writing the thesis
Reflect on findings

Step 5 - Critique the literature:
argument of advocacy
(analyses and critiques the
gained knowledge to answer
research question)

Conceptual Model

Step 4 - Survey the Literature:
argument of discovery (current
state of knowledge on topic)

**Data needed to support
links between categories**

Selective coding:
synthesising data by
looking for
connections between
categories

Last round of data collection:
filling the last knowledge gaps

Step 3 - Develop the argument

**Data needed to fill
categories**

Axial coding of literature,
reports, statistics,
conversations,
documentaries and
newspaper articles

Data collection: filling knowledge
gaps by conversations with
experts, documentaries and
newspaper articles.

List of categories

Step 2 - Search the literature

Data

Open coding of
literature, reports and
statistics

Data collection: previewed
material, selected appropriate
data and organised data. Refined
thesis topic.

List of codes

Step 1 - Select a Topic

Topic
Autonomous
power centres and
the triple transition
in Guatemala

