

Emergence of sectarianism in the diaspora:
The case of anti-Ahmadiyya
discrimination within the United
Kingdom.

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Table of Content:

Chapter one: Introduction.....	p5
Chapter two: Placing things in historical context.....	p14
Gradual excommunication of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.....	p 18
Chapter three: The case of anti-Ahmadiyya prejudice in the UK	p 29
MTKN in the UK	p 32
MCB in relation to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.....	p39
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community’s engagement in countering rise of extremism.....	p44
Ahmadiyya engagement with the Government in raising awareness of extremism.....	p48
Chapter 4: Theoretical considerations	p52
Chapter 5: Conclusion	p71

Chapter one: Introduction to the thesis

On the 24th of March 2016 a popular shopkeeper in the Shawlands district of Glasgow was murdered in what the police labeled a ‘religiously motivated’ attack. As details emerged in the following days after the murder, it was revealed that both the murder and victim were Muslim. Tanveer Ahmad, a Sunni Muslim, had driven over 200 miles from Bradford to Glasgow to kill Asad Shah, an Ahmadiyya Muslim. In a separate incident a few weeks later, the Stockwell Green mosque in London came under intense media scrutiny after it emerged that literature inciting hatred against the Ahmadiyya community had been found on its premise. The high media coverage surrounding Asad Shah’s murder brought to light the sectarianism that the Ahmadiyya community has been facing within the diasporic sphere in the UK. The sectarian tendencies expressed towards the community have not occurred over night, nor are they something that can be understood in isolation from the history of persecution and sectarianism that the community has faced in Pakistan and other Muslim majority countries. The cause of this sectarianism between the Ahmadiyya and wider Muslim community is the differing perception that the Ahmadiyya have of the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood. In Pakistan, this has resulted in the institutional excommunication of the Ahmadiyya community by the state, whereby they cannot self identify as Muslims in public, in addition to regular violent persecution being committed against members of the community on a societal level. Owing to this, the community has had to move its headquarters to London from where the current Caliph leads the global community.

The move to London has allowed the community to practice their interpretation of Islam in a politically safe and open environment, and therefore on a political level the community is safe from legal and institutional persecution. Yet, within the wider Muslim community, owing to the fundamental theological difference that sets the Ahmadiyya apart from the wider Muslim community, the normative belief that the community does not fall within the pale of Islam still exists. What is important to highlight is that this does not necessarily lead to the ostracisation and discrimination

of the community. During my research period, one of the topics that repeatedly came up in my interviews¹ was how anti-Ahmadiyya sentiments and ideologies are being preached within mosques around the country and have been encouraging and inciting discrimination against the community. Given this it is important to understand the difference between theological disagreements regarding faith, and on the other hand, using these disagreements into provoking action against those who you disagree with. Therefore, it must be clarified from the onset that the occurrence of anti-Ahmadiyya discrimination in the UK is coming from a small minority within the wider diaspora and is not something that is widespread, being committed by all those who do not believe Ahmadiyya are Muslims. In this sense, the topic of this thesis is addressing the manner in which a distinctly anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment, characterized by intolerance against the community, has come to the United Kingdom.

Methodology: research and data gathering process, puzzle statement and significance of thesis.

My research time frame began on the 26th of March 2016, two days after the murder in Glasgow. I arrived in London on the same day but with different intentions regarding what my research would be focusing on. After finding out about the murder through the first few unstructured interviews and informal discussions I had with members of the Ahmadiyya community and the media coverage of the incident, I decided to change my focus to the discrimination that the community have been facing in the UK. As this was the case, a form of naturally occurring data collection characterized the initial phase of my research in that I was observing and recording the development of the murder through media outlets that were reporting on the murder, as well as the sense of discrimination the community had been feeling in the aftermath, such as reported by the BBC, Daily Mail, the Guardian and the IBTimes. Media reports proved to be a large aspect of my research and provided vital information when I was unable to obtain interviews with key individuals, as well as cross triangulating certain information that interviewees had provided me with.

¹ Especially with interviewees from Ahmadiyya respondents

In addition to media reports, I collected data through conducting interviews with fourteen individuals that ranged from being unstructured, semi-structured to full structured in nature. Nine of the individuals that I interviewed belonged to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, three were journalists who worked for the Rabwah Times, Double Bind Magazine and the BBC, and the remaining two were with Dr. Farzana Shaikh from the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Siobhain Mcdonagh MP head of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Ahmadiyya Muslims. While I have chosen not to refer to each of the interviews throughout the thesis, they all helped me develop a detailed understanding of the case. The reason that I did not include every interview was because these interviews were conducted before I changed my focus to the topic of the thesis. In certain cases I developed correspondence with some of the individuals interviewed, who then led me to other individuals who I established correspondence with and interviewed outside of the timeframe of my research period. This was done due to timing issues.

Owing to the fact that my research has been focused on an emerging situation, I would like to highlight my data collection period being the 26th of March to the 27th of June 2016. Therefore, I have chosen not to include any development in the case of Asad Shah or other elements discussed in the thesis beyond these dates. As the case of Asad Shah was still in courts during and until the end of my timeframe, no conclusions regarding the motives of Tanveer Ahmad have been stated in the thesis apart from what he said in his statement, which I address briefly in the third chapter. Due to the relative recentness of the public attention on the discrimination that the Ahmadiyya face in the UK², which was brought to the fore once again after the murder and the uncovering of leaflets, the primary focus of my research has been to try and find out from where this anti-Ahmadiyya rhetoric is emerging and which parties in the UK are involved in facilitating discriminatory practices. Although I knew a lot about the persecution of Ahmadiyya Muslims in Pakistan, I myself was only made aware of inter-faith discrimination that members have been facing in the UK after I arrived in London. Therefore, my research has been primarily driven by looking at the empirical reality of what has been emerging in the UK after which I

² During my research period, I only managed to find media reporting on this topic dating back to 2010, which I discuss in my second chapter.

have then shone a theoretical lens on my findings and seen where in the vastness of theory it can fit in.

The question that I aim to answer in this thesis is *how has the socio-political exclusion of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan transferred to the UK diaspora setting, and in what way was this manifested in the spring of 2016?* In order to answer this overarching question I have highlighted four themes within it and formulated them into smaller sub-questions. These are:

A) Why and how has the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community historically faced persecution from religious movements and the state in Pakistan?

B) What have been the mechanisms of transferal through which an anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment has arrived in the UK from Pakistan?

C) In what way has the anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment manifested itself in the UK?

D) How has the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community responded to the recent manifestation of anti-Ahmadiyya discrimination?

Each one of these are important aspects that needs to be addressed in order to understand where the sentiment is coming from and which parties are involved, as well as how the dynamics of the persecution play out in the diasporic setting. Placing the matter of the persecution of the Ahmadiyya community in its historical perspective automatically leads back to Pakistan. Thus in order to understand the significance of what is occurring in the UK, I argue that it is essential to address the development of exclusion that the community has gone through within Pakistan, the manner in which the Ahmadiyya community was construed as the heretical 'other', and which actors were involved in this process. Secondly, looking at how this sentiment against the Ahmadiyya has arrived in the UK brings to attention those who are sustaining this idea in the diasporic setting. Thirdly, the way in which this is manifesting itself in the UK shows the dynamics in which the community is being affected by this sentiment. Finally, looking at the response of the community shows the ways in which they are combating the threat of extremism.

A consequence of the manner in which I approached this research is that my discussion of these four core themes is split empirically and theoretically. The story that I have tried to capture in this thesis was constantly changing throughout my research, which posed a challenge for me in terms of applying a coherent, a priori theoretical framework, and given this I deemed it more appropriate to do my best to capture the story and raise attention to an emerging form of diasporic sectarianism. This has meant that my theoretical considerations have come second to my empirical observations resulting in a framework that is constituted by various different sensitizing concepts borrowed from a variety of different theories each of which is used in discussing each sub-question. Given that my main point of enquiry is how this sentiment has come to the UK, one aspect I have chosen to interpret the situation through is frame theory, through which I address the manner in which the framing of the Ahmadiyya as a heretic other resonated within Pakistan and came to be structurally embedded. In order to make sense of how this anti-Ahmadiyya frame has been transferred to the UK through social movements I turn to diffusion theory. In talking about the manner in which it manifests itself I turn to Kalyvas' concept of alliances to consider the multicausal personal agendas, at the level of the individual, that play into and reiterate the wider anti-Ahmadiyya frame that is being espoused by certain religious movements in the UK. Finally I analyse the Ahmadiyya response by first making a case as to why the community should be considered a diaspora in the Sokefeldian sense as an 'imagined transnational community', and then arguing that their response to the recent events against them and to extremism in a broader sense is an instance of them reaffirming their identity and sense of community in the diasporic space.

The significance of this thesis comes through the fact that it will be one of the first³ to engage in trying to understand the spill over of sectarianism, specifically against the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community from Pakistan to the UK. In addition to this, another component that makes this thesis relevant is the fact that it tries to highlight the

³ Monica Duffy Toft has published a short piece addressing the issue on the 18th of July 2016. 'Networks fighting networks: understanding and combating extremism and radicalization on a smaller scale': <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2050-5876.2016.00892.x/epdf>

paradoxical hidden yet public manner in which this form of discrimination is being carried out. In that as it is being carried out within diasporic spaces it has been hidden from the wider British public's attention until recently. The result of this being that the very movements and institutions that have helped instigate this anti-Ahmadiyya rhetoric in the UK operate openly⁴. Yet because the target audience is found within the diasporic spaces, the very message that is being conveyed through conferences and leaflets is hidden from the wider public's attention owing to the fact that it often is in Urdu. On the other hand, these institutions change their rhetoric when speaking in English and use milder language that is not directly inflammatory⁵.

Motivation, objectives, limitations and chapter outline:

My motivation to research the persecution of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community was sparked by a chance encounter when I first arrived in Utrecht to start my studies. Excited to embark on this new adventure and embrace all aspects of Dutch life, the first thing I decided to do was to go and buy myself a bike. Arriving at the store, I saw the owner standing outside talking on his phone in Urdu. Excited at the opportunity to speak it again after a few weeks away from home, I instinctively turned to the owner and asked him where in Pakistan he came from. His answer of Sheikhpura got me excited, as this city is where my father was from as well. After speaking for a while and sharing with him my fond memories of Hiran Minar, I asked him why he came to the Netherlands. His answer that he left because he is an Ahmadi Muslim and had to leave Pakistan for the safety his family caught me of guard. Having grown up learning about Pakistan all my life, I was quite surprised at myself that I did not know about the persecution that the Ahmadiyya face. Thus my interest in the community and motivation for research began. Driven by the desire to learn about an element of the country that I have such a close ancestral connection to, I took this opportunity to delve into the broad and complex nature of the topic. Researching in the London also had the added benefit of engaging with the issue in a safe environment and being in the same city as where the world-wide headquarters of the community are located. On the whole, conducting research on the Ahmadiyya community and being of non-

⁴ Specifically referring to the Khatme Nubuwwat movement.

⁵ I say this based on the views expressed to me during my interviews with members of the Ahmadiyya community.

Ahmadiyya Pakistani origin myself was a unique experience in itself. The openness and kindness of the community members that I interviewed was something that allowed for a quick rapport to be built, and meant the interview flowed in a natural manner. In almost all of the interviews conducted I was given food and drinks, and given a tour of the Baituh Futuh Mosque on my multiple visits. I was invited to conferences and talks organized by the community in which I was greeted warmly and met a lot of people who were willing to share information and personal stories with me.

One of the primary and main goals in this research project is giving voice to the development of prejudice faced by the Ahmadiyya community and to highlight all the different dynamics at play in order to understand how this is occurring and being sustained. By highlighting connections between the movements in Pakistan and the UK that have been central in instigating the discrimination against the community, and how their relationship with other organizations in the UK evolved, I attempt to convey what is going on at the current moment and place it in perspective to what has happened in Pakistan to show why this development in the UK is especially significant for the community. I do not aim to speak on behalf of the community, nor do I present my findings to suggest an absolute truth. My findings, what people have told me and what I have observed, are presented in a way to give my own perspective on things.

Looking back at the research process itself I feel it important to highlight some of the limitations to doing this research. Firstly, the nature of the research itself posed obstacles during the process. Due to the fact that my research departed from looking into the murder in Glasgow and the hate leaflets in Stockwell Green mosque, I found that trying to speak to people linked to either of the incidents was hard to do. Owing to police involvement in both cases, people were hesitant to disclose information to me. In addition to this, as I came into the research with minimal insight into the scope of the situation, it was only after a while that I started to gain insight into the most relevant actors involved. Owing to the increased media attention on and the investigations into the Stockwell Green mosque, it had been closed down and thus I was not able to contact anyone from there to speak to. Realising the significant role that the Khatme Nubuwwat movement played in what was happening in the UK, I

tried on multiple times to contact the Academy in Forest Gate and understand their perspective but was unable to reach anyone. In regards to the Muslim Council of Britain, I also attempted contact it on multiple times yet was unable to speak to anyone. Therefore I want to make it clear that my discussion related to the Khatme Nubuwwat organizations in the UK and the MCB lack their perspective and are informed by the information obtained from my own observations on what is available on the internet, and interviews with people not affiliated with these groups.

The particular topic that my research has addressed, and the lack of academic literature on it, has meant that the main source of information for the aspects pertaining to my main case came from my interviewees and information taken from the Internet, while the historical context is informed with selected literature that has been written on the matter. In regards to my case, this meant that controlling the information posed a challenge. Thus, I looked at the information that was repeatedly drawn to my attention from analyzing the data and focused on these as the important aspects of the story. This meant that while I was able to cross-triangulate data in certain aspects of the thesis, this was not always possible with what I was told by the interviewees as some of the things told to me reflected their personal opinions. As the story that has been told in this thesis is based on an amalgamation of different perspectives on the prejudice that the Ahmadiyya have been facing in the United Kingdom, the work in this thesis should be taken as a starting point for consideration from where ideas for further research into the topic can come from.

This thesis has been split into three core chapters. The first one deals addresses the first sub-question and gives a detailed historical account of the origins of the Ahmadiyya in colonial Punjab. It then gives a brief account of what sets the community apart from mainstream Islam and looks into how this theological difference was politicized and gained traction after the formation of Pakistan. From here I address the three main events that led to the eventual excommunication of the community and their eventual shift to London. The second chapter addresses the remaining three sub-questions in an empirical manner by discussing the emergence of the Khatme Nubuwwat movement, the branches that operate under its name in the UK and their affiliation to the movement in Pakistan. After that, I discuss the MCB and its investigation into the Stockwell Green mosque, and allegations of certain members of

the panel supporting the Khatme Nubuwwat cause. Then I move onto discussing the response of the Ahmadiyya community. My third chapter is dedicated to theoretical consideration, and attempts to answer the four sub-questions with these considerations in mind. Finally, I end with my conclusion and point to further ideas for research.

Chapter 2: Placing things in historical context: The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and its relationship with the State of Pakistan and religious movements

Introduction:

In order to understand the significance of the rise of persecution against the Ahmadiyya community in the United Kingdom and make sense of it, one needs to look at the history of persecution that the community has undergone in the country it has deep ties to; Pakistan. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to bring attention to the historical development of persecution targeting the community in Pakistan and how this subsequently resulted in the exile of the Fourth Successor to the Promised Messiah Hazrat Tahir Ahmad and the worldwide headquarters of the community being relocated to London. In laying out the historical context in which the prejudice against the community in the diaspora must be considered, I will address the founding of the community in pre-partition India, the key events of the 1953 riots, the 1974 constitutional amendment declaring the Ahmadiyya non-Muslim and the passing of the 1984 Ordinance bills that disallowed the community from self-identifying as Muslims in Pakistan. One core notion that can be identified throughout the history of Ahmadiyya exclusion and persecution, either from the state or from different social movements and political parties is the Islamic tenet of *khatam-i-nabuwwat* meaning the finality of prophethood, and the increasing salience this took in political and social life in the process of exclusion of the Ahmadiyya.

Pre-Partition and founding of the Ahmadiyya Movement:

Jamaat Ahmadiyyah is a self-described messianic movement within Islam that was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, Punjab in 1889. The time in which the Ahmadiyya movement emerged was one where there was a 'general feeling of

insecurity amongst Indian Muslims under British rule'⁶. The result of this was a flourishing of various Islamic reform movements in India at the time, however the main theological issue that set the Ahmadiyya Community apart from the other sects of Islam at that time in the Punjab was Ghulam Ahmad's nuanced understanding of the concept of *khatam-i-nabuwwat*. This revised understanding of *khatam-i-nabuwwat*, meaning Finality of Prophethood, comes from Ghulam Ahmad's thought that the second coming of Jesus Christ 'nullified the notion of Muhammad's finality of prophethood as understood by the ulema opposed to him'⁷. Such a belief, that Muhammad was the final prophet of God to bring revelation to earth, was against his theory on prophethood where the Prophet Muhammad was the last law-bearing prophet and the seal of prophethood, but not the last prophet to come to earth. This thought, and indeed his own claims to spiritual eminence in the form of a *mujaddid*, meaning the renewer of Islam, *muhaddath*, a person spoken to by Allah, and indeed his own claim to prophethood, are according to Yohanan Friedmann all rooted in his belief that divine revelation did not stop with the completion of Muhammad's mission⁸. Rather, prophethood continues whenever the Muslim community is seen to deviate from true Islam, but it is a qualified form of prophethood. According to Ghulam Ahmad, the Quranic statement of 'khatam-an-nabiyyin' denotes only the law-bearing prophets, of whom Muhammad is the final, however the statement says nothing of 'shadowy prophets' or *zili nabi*⁹. A full understanding of what the nature of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's claim to prophethood means, with the distinction between law bearing prophet and shadow prophet, can be seen in a passage of his book *Tajalliyat-i-ilahiyya* translated by Yohanan Friedmann:

'No law bearing prophet can [ever] come [again]. A non legislative prophet can come only if he is a member of the [Muslim] community. Accordingly, I am both a member

⁶ See Andrea Lathan 'The Relativity of Categorising in the Context of the Ahmadiyya Die Welt des Islams 48 (2008) 372-393

⁷ Ali Usman Qasmi 'The Ahmadis and the Politics of Religious Exclusion in Pakistan'

⁸ Yohanan Friedmann, *Prophecy Continuous. Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and its Medieval Background* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁹ Supra note 1.

of the [Muslim] community and a prophet. And my prophethood – that is to say the divine discourse [with me]- is a shadow of the prophethood of Muhammad'¹⁰

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's claim to prophethood can be understood through the socio-political dynamics at play during the late 19th century in colonial Punjab. Lathan comments on the fact that he saw the fall of Muslim superiority at the hands of the Christian missionaries active in Punjab to the disunity and tensions within the Muslim Ummah over who was following the right or wrong interpretation of Islam¹¹. After his revelation as the *mujaddid* and *muhaddath*, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed to have fulfilled the eschatological prophecy of being the promised Messiah who would come at the end times. However, differing from mainstream Muslim belief that the Messiah would come in the corporeal form of Jesus Christ, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad argued that the second coming of Jesus must be taken as a 'subtle metaphor'¹² in that the person who has been predicted to come in Islamic Hadith is not Jesus Christ himself but rather a person who resembles him. Justifying his claim as the Messiah through revelations he received from God and qualifying his prophethood as being in the shadow of Muhammad, Ghulam Ahmad took a pledge of allegiance, *bay'at*, from a group of followers in Ludhiana, Punjab in 1889 thus starting the Ahmadiyya Jamaat as an official movement¹³.

At this point it is important to look at the development of intra-faith tensions that were building between the Ahmadiyya community and other Muslim groups that deemed Ghulam Ahmad's claims to prophethood heretical to further illustrate the genealogy of persecution that the Community has faced after the founding of the State of Pakistan and how it has subsequently found itself to the UK in recent years. In doing so, I shall be addressing how these tense relations between the Ahmadiyya and Sunni traditions centred on what the meaning of *khatam-i-nabuwwat* is took a decisively politicised character by leaving the confines of theological polemic after the creation of the State of Pakistan. The creation of religious social movements such as the Majlis-Tahafuz-i-Khatam-e-Nubuwwat, meaning the Association for the Safety of the

¹⁰ Supra note 3 pp 134

¹¹ Supra note 1

¹² For a full account of how Ghulam Ahmad reached at his claim to be the Madhi and Masih I recommend Friedmann's Prophecy Continuous p. 105-118.

¹³ Supranote 1 p 376

Finality of the Prophethood, in 1949 two years after the establishment of Pakistan, can be regarded as a key moment in which theological difference took a political dimension.

The politicisation of theological difference:

Tahir Kamran argues that an exclusionist discourse surrounding the Ahmadiyya community can be traced back to ‘the Islamic activism in colonial Punjab’¹⁴. After the proclamation of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to be a prophet and the commencement of the movement in 1889, the reaction of certain sections of the Sunni Muslim clergy was fierce. Starting from early 1902 there were a variety of *fatwas* put out denouncing the proclamations of Ghulam Ahmad¹⁵. At this point, the agitations against the Ahmadiyya Community was coming from a variety of scholars all in agreement over the controversial understanding of the Ahmadiyya movement towards the Islamic tenet of the finality of prophethood. However, with the emergence of the Majlis-i-Ahrar, those who disagreed with Ghulam Ahmad on theological grounds were able to group together as a political force.

The Majlis-i-Ahrar was formed in Lahore on the 4th May 1931, whose main objective was opposition to the Ahmadiyya Movement. Indeed, two years after the founding of the organisation they passed a resolution stating that no Ahmadi should be elected to public office¹⁶. Farzana Shaikh argues that the founding of the Ahrar was motivated by the will to protect the Muslims of Punjab as a unified single force however the emergence of the Ahmadiyya Movement posed a problem on two fronts; the belief in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet was seen as heretical by those allied with the Ahrar, and the rejection of violent Jihad by Ahmadi thought led some to believe that

¹⁴ Tahir Kamran The Pre-History of Religious Exclusionism in Contemporary Pakistan: Khatam-e-Nubuwwat 1889-1953. Modern Asian Studies, Available on CJO 2015 doi: 10. 1017/S0026749x14000043

¹⁵ Ibid p. 9. A detailed account of the actors and establishments involved in issuing these fatwas can be found here.

¹⁶ See Report of the Court of Inquiry p.10 accessed [http://www.thepersecution.org/dl/report_1953.pdf]. This Report is regarded as one of the most authentic accounts of the 1953 anti-Ahmadiyya agitations in Lahore, therefore a lot of accounts have been taken from here.

the movement was a construct of the British to fracture the Muslim Ummah¹⁷. While there had been confrontations between the Ahrar and the Ahmadiyya Movement leading up to the partition of the Indian Subcontinent, it is only after the formation of Pakistan that the anti-Ahmadiyya campaign was able to gain traction, and culminated in the violent riots of 1953 in Lahore.

The contested identity of the state and the gradual excommunication of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.

In addressing the genealogy of excommunication of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan, one must understand what the role of the state has been. From the outset of the formation of Pakistan debate over what character the State would take has been critical. In his famous speech on the 11th of August 1947, Jinnah declared:

‘You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State’¹⁸

The vision that Muhammad Ali Jinnah had for Pakistan as a secular homeland for the Muslims of India was tested shortly after independence¹⁹. The most illustrative example of this is the passing of the Objectives Resolution in 1949 by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan through the Constitutive Assembly shortly after Jinnah’s death. The Resolution started by declaring that ‘sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone’ and that ‘Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran’²⁰. In stark contrast to Jinnah’s vision of what role the State would play in the religious affairs of Pakistani’s, Khan’s Objectives Resolution directly

¹⁷ Interview with Farzana Shaikh on the 19th May 2016 in Cambridge

¹⁸ M.A Jinnah’s speech, 11 August 1947 in Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol I.

¹⁹ Farhanaz Ispahani’s ‘Purifying the Land of the Pure’ gives a detailed account of the process of Islamisation of the State of Pakistan.

²⁰ ‘The Objectives Resolution’ accessed on
[<http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/annex.html>]

intertwined Islam into the functioning of the state and set a precedent for future leaders to define the state on increasingly religious lines.

The activities of the Ahrar and the Jamaat-e-Islami must be considered in relation to the passing of the Resolution in 1949. Ispahani notes that unlike Shia's or Ahmadi's or even non-orthodox Sunni's, the orthodox Deobandi Sunni ulema, whom constituted the Ahrar, were active opponents of the creation of Pakistan, therefore in the new state of Pakistan the attention of the Ahrar and Maulana Maududi's Jamaat-i-Islami turned to the Islamisation of the state and society²¹. The creation of the state of Pakistan and the fall from grace in political terms of the Ahrar meant that they had to negotiate their position within the newly found state, and this came in the form of the separation of the Ahrar movement and the emergence of the Majlis-i-Tahafuz-i-Khatam-e-Nubuwwat headed by Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari in 1949. The newly founded wing of the Ahrar served the purpose of proselytizing their belief in the absolute finality of the Prophet Muhammad²².

1953 unrest: who were the main parties involved?

After the Objectives Resolution was passed, the Ahrar under its new proselytizing wing as the Majlis-i-Tahafuz-i-Khatam-e-Nubuwwat tested the commitment of the government to the ideals set out in the Resolution by making demands to excommunicate the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community from the pale of Islam through the law at a conference in Rawalpindi on the 1st of May 1949²³. What is interesting to note here is the movements ability to construct and spread vicious stereotypes attacking the Ahmadiyya Community that helped 'establish the Ahmadis as the 'diabolical other''²⁴. Through accusing the Ahmadiyya Community, as being the creation of British imperialists to divide the Muslim Ummah, and on the other hand claiming that the community were Indian agents aiming to undermine the Pakistani

²¹ Supra note 14 p. 56.

²² Supra note 9 p. 22

²³ Supra note 11 p. 13

²⁴ Supra note 9 p. 24

state²⁵, the Khatme Nubuwwat movement were effectively able to construct the Ahmadi as a threat to the Muslims of Pakistan thus warranting a solution. A group of leading Ulema, religious clerics, from various sects organised a conference in which the demand for the Ahmadiyya Community to be declared non-Muslim and members of the community to be stripped of high ranking positions in the government was once again made on the 2nd June 1952, and a committee for action to fulfil these demands was created called the Majlis-i-Amal²⁶.

However, despite the attempts of the committee to convince Prime Minister Nazim ud Din of these demands, he declared that ‘the question of whether Ahmadis should be declared a non-Muslim minority was for the Constituent Assembly to make and he was not willing to make any move in that direction’²⁷. The result of this decision was that the defeated committee decided to take direct action against the government by placarding the house of the Prime Minister and the Governor General. The government’s decision to arrest leading members of the committee who were instigating the direct action led to further tension and lawlessness, and ultimately the city of Lahore was placed under martial law and leading activists in the Khatme Nubuwwat movement, including the Maulana Maududi from the Jamaat e Islami Party were arrested and sentenced to death²⁸

Despite the fact that the aims of the movement were not met in the 1953 unrests, the important point to consider here is the methods through which the notion of khatam-i-nabuwwat as a theological principle came to be expressed in political terms through the split in the Ahrar movement after the independence of Pakistan. The appeal of the movement to mainstream Sunni Muslims was at this point, and as I will show later on in this thesis, has continued to be emotive in that it calls for people to defend and protect the status of Muhammad as the last prophet of God by, in the context of Pakistan, excommunicating them through the law, and within the UK diaspora context, through more subtle and communal level activities such as boycotting.

²⁵ For a full list of accusations leveled against the community by the Majlis Tahafuz Khatm e Nubuwwat see Tahir Kamrans article.

²⁶ Ibid p 28

²⁷ Supra note 11 p. 129

²⁸ For a detailed account of the outcomes of the 1953 riots and unrest see The Report of the Court of Inquiry

1974 constitutional amendment:

The debate surrounding the Islamic identity of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community arose once again in 1974 under the time of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. At the time, Pakistan was still recovering from its loss in the 1971 war against India and the secession of East Pakistan. Ispahani notes that as a result of this defeat the influence of Islamist groups across Pakistan increased significantly. The fact that the Jamaat e Islami party had lent support to the war in East Pakistan meant that a close bond was created between the military and the Islamists²⁹. The resulting increase in influence of Islamist groups such as the Jamaat e Islami meant that Bhutto had to engage in a balancing act of attempting to maintain his liberal outlook for the state and appeasing the increasingly influential Islamists. In doing so, Bhutto had revised his socialist tendencies to be more in line with Islamic principles, thus using the term ‘Musawaat-e-Muhammadi’ (Muhammads principle of equality)³⁰.

The debate surrounding whether the Ahmadiyya Community are Muslim was revived once again in May 1974 as a result of clashes between non-Ahmadi and Ahmadi students in Rabwah, then the global headquarters of the community. The aftermath of the ‘Rabwah Incident’, as it came to be known, was the second constitutional amendment that officially declared the Ahmadiyya Community non-Muslim. Qasmi notes that prior to the Rabwah incident and the following anti-Ahmadi protests across the country, there was a conference held in April by the Rabata Alim-i-Islami organisation, a Saudi-sponsored movement, passed a resolution ‘pressuring Muslim states to declare the Ahmadiyya non-Muslim and enforce their social boycott’³¹. Therefore, the anti-Ahmadiyya rhetoric was once again gaining traction, this time on a more international level. The incident, however, gave impetus to the Jamaat e Islami party, through their student wing, to stage mass protests across the country and shortly after the Majlis-i-Tahafuz-i-Khatam-e-Nubuwwat started to reiterate their demands

²⁹ Farhanaz Ispahani gives a detailed historical account of the political climate at the time in Pakistan that I do not have space to discuss in my body. See Ispahani ‘Purifying the Land of the Pure’ p 94-110

³⁰ Ibid pp 97

³¹ Ali Usman Qasmi ‘The Ahmadis and the Politics of Religious Exclusion in Pakistan’ pp 175

expressed in the early years of Pakistan to declare the Ahmadiyya non-Muslim by law³²

On the 13th of June 1974, Bhutto declared that he would put the question as to whether Ahmadis are within the pale of Islam to the National Assembly, the result of which was the passing of the second amendment to the constitution of Pakistan. The amendment stated:

In the Constitution, in Article 260, after clause (2) the following new clause shall be added, namely--

(3) A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of The Prophethood of MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), or recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law.

Bhutto declared that he had finally solved the ninety year old problem relating to the Islamic identity of the Ahmadiyya Community had finally been solved, indeed stating that the constitutional amendment served as the ‘permanent’ and ‘final solution’³³. The important thing to note here is the way the way in which the State, through legislating on the question of religious identity, was able to bestow upon itself the power to define the meaning of what it is to be a Muslim. The consequence of this being the legitimation of anti-Ahmadiyya rhetoric that often at times led to violent attacks on the community, most recently the 2010 attacks on the Ahmadiyya mosques in Lahore.

Farzana Shaikh argues that the Islamisation process of the State character of Pakistan started under the time of Bhutto. She argues, much like Qasmi, that it was not only internal pressures from movements and parties such as Majlis-Tahaffuz Khatam-e-

³² Farhanaz Ispahani ‘Purifying the Land of the Pure’ pp 101.

³³ Citation of Asad Ahmad “Adjudicating Muslims: Law, Religion, and the State in Colonial India and Post Colonial Pakistan” pp 29-30 found in Ali Usman Qasmi The Ahmadis and the Politics of Religious Exclusion in Pakistan’ p 214.

Nubuwwat and Jamaat e Islami, but also the external influence of Saudi Arabia, who was funding the nuclear programme of Pakistan at the time, and had for a long time banned Ahmadis from performing the Hajj due their belief in the community's lack of Islamic Identity³⁴. Therefore the inclination towards creating the Ahmadiyya as a minority was already there, however the constitutional amendment, did not specifically mention the Ahmadiyya Community in itself, it's terms were based on a strict understanding of the notion of *khatam-i-nabuwwat* seeing Muhammad as the last and unqualified prophet of God. Therefore, despite the State claiming a monopoly of power over defining what a Muslim is, the Ahmadiyya Community were still able to self identify as a Muslim sect, thus creating a gap between the legal and ontological dimension of their identity; in the eyes of the law the question of them being a non-Muslim minority had been settled, this judgement did not have a practical effect on the way in which the Ahmadi Community practiced their faith as self identifying Muslims. However, with the introduction of the Ordinance XX bill under Zia ul Haq this changed, and resulted in the self imposed exile of the fourth Caliph of the Ahmadiyya Community to London.

Different political circumstances in 1953 and 1974:

At this point it is important to understand why the goals of the same religious movements that were campaigning the State for the Ahmadiyya to be declared a non-Muslim minority failed to be met in 1953 yet were successful in 1974. Sadia Saeed argues that 'the Pakistani States shift from the accommodation to exclusion of Ahmadis was contingent on struggles for political and symbolic power within historically specific political fields'³⁵. Borrowing ideas from Saeed's political fields framework, I will examine how the different outcomes came to be.

³⁴ Interview conducted with Farzana Shaikh in Cambridge 19th May 2016

³⁵ Political Fields and Religious Movements: The Exclusion of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan, " *Political Power and Social Theory* 23 (2012): 189-223. Saeed develops her argument using Bourdieu's field theory and as well as frame theory in explaining the dynamics between the State and religious movements such as the *Majlis Tahaffuz e Khatam e Nubuwwat* and *Jamaat e Islami* in explaining the different outcomes of the 1953 and 1974 anti-Ahmadiyya campaigns.

As has already been elaborated on above, in 1953 the identity of the State in regards to whether it would be based on a secular ideals or Islamic ideals was still ambiguous. With the introduction of the Objectives Resolution, that had a distinctively Islamic undertone, the Khatam-I-Nubuwwat movement, aided by Maulana Maududi's Jamaat e Islami party and other members of the ulema who sympathised with the anti-Ahmadi campaign, saw an opportunity to politically engage with the state in an attempt to get their anti-Ahmadi demands met. In addition to this engagement between the anti-Ahmadiyya movements and the state in establishing the constitutional relationship between Islam and the Pakistani State, the political field comprised of bureaucratic elites and politicians pitted against each other in a struggle for political power³⁶. Therefore, the dynamics of the political field at the time and the anti-Ahmadi movements engagement with this field can be looked at through two levels. The first one is the struggles at the elite level over political power, and the second is the ability of the religious movements in aligning their frames with the dynamics at play in the field.

Saeed notes that Jinnah had vested a lot of power in the Governor General's office that was occupied by Ghulam Mohammad at the time, and he was in the process of consolidating a power nexus between the bureaucratic elite and the military against the elected politicians³⁷. Therefore when the anti-Ahmadi movement failed to align its frame within the dynamics of the political field and attempting to address the issue constitutionally, instead resorting to direct action against the Prime Minister and Governor General, he shut down the movement and dismissed the government of the Prime Minister for failing to deal with the disturbances of the movement adequately³⁸, thus using the agitation of the movement to further consolidate symbolic and political power to the bureaucratic elites and military at the expense of the elected politicians.

By contrast, the political field in 1974 was vastly different to that of 1953. As has been noted earlier, the election of Bhutto as Prime Minister came at the back of the war with India and the secession of East Pakistan. At the time the Islamist parties such as the Jamaat e Islami had gained considerable influence due to their support in

³⁶ Ibid pp 195

³⁷ Ibid pp 204

³⁸ Ibid 205

the war efforts, and other Islamist parties had gained enough seats to form an alliance in opposition³⁹. This shift in dynamics towards a democratic outlook resulted in a 'redefined practical politics in the political field'⁴⁰. The increase in influence within the new political field set in democratic means meant that Bhutto had to define his political aspirations within Islamic terms, as demonstrated through him employing the term 'Musawaat-e-Muhammadi' to convey his socialist vision. Farzana Shaikh told me that Bhutto was aware of having to define Pakistan's identity through Islamic means 'as a defense against those in Pakistan who said the identity of Pakistan had disintegrated after 1971'⁴¹. This is reflected in the fact that Islam was adopted as the state religion in the new constitution, thus giving the anti-Ahmadiyya movement impetus once again to call for a look into the Islamic identity of the Ahmadiyya Community after the Rabwah Incident, except this time they had the opportunity to embed their demands within nationalist discourse over democracy and the Islamic character of Pakistan that had become embedded within the political field at the time.

1984 Ordinance Bills and flight of Caliph and the setting up of 'the transnational imagined community'

The second amendment to the constitution was the point in which the campaign against the Ahmadiyya Community by various social and political movements was officially legitimised by the State. However, as has been mentioned, the States decision to create a non-Muslim minority of the Ahmadiyya Community only effected their identity as Muslims in a legal sense, the fact that the amendment states 'for the purpose of the Constitution and law' is evidence of this. The legislative marginalisation of the Community also occurred through the governments bringing in new legislation requiring those who wanted to identify as Muslims when applying for identity cards or passports to sign a declaration stating 'I consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani to be an imposter nabi and also consider his followers whether

³⁹ Supra note 27 pp 95

⁴⁰ Supra note 33 pp 209

⁴¹ Interview with Farzana Shaikh conducted in Cambridge on the 19th May 2016

belonging to the Lahori or Qadiani group to be non-Muslim'⁴². Not only does this ostracize Ahmadis from participating in Pakistani citizenship as Muslims, it is also a way to make those non-Ahmadi Muslim Pakistanis participate in the discrimination against the community; if one wants to engage with the State as a Muslim Pakistani citizen they have no option but to reify the institutionalised persecution of the community even if they do not agree with it on a personal level, and this effect is still being felt today.

Despite Bhutto's thought that the solution to the Ahmadi question had been solved through the democratic process and reflected the 'will and inspiration of the Muslims of Pakistan', the ulema recognised the gap in the recognition of Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority in the eyes of the law and the fact that they still self-identified and practiced as Muslims in their day to day life.⁴³ After Zia ul Haq overthrew Bhutto in a military coup after the 1977 election, Pakistan entered a ten-year period of martial law under which the process of Islamisation of the State and society began⁴⁴. While his aim was to refine the national identity of Pakistan to be more in line with Sunni Islamic ideals, and as a result causing high levels of sectarianism targeting Shiite Muslims, in 1984 Zia passed a presidential ordinance targeting the activities of the Ahmadiyya Community that were added to the Pakistan Penal Code and constitute a part of Pakistan's Blasphemy laws. The Anti-Islamic Activities of the Qadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance added two new sections 298b and 298c that directly targeted the activities of the Ahmadis and their ability to self identify as Muslims. Together, both subsections criminalised Ahmadis calling their leader Caliph, calling their place of worship a mosque, using the call to prayer, and 'posing as a Muslim, or refers to, his faith as Islam'⁴⁵. Violation of these ordinances brought the punishment of three years of imprisonment and a fine. The passing of this Ordinance bill effectively criminalised practicing Ahmadiyya Islam in Pakistan, and has had a direct consequence on the organisational structure of

⁴² This is declaration is present on passports application forms till today and are present Pakistani consulate and embassies across the world. They are easily accessible online: http://www.phclondon.org/consular/forms/manual_pp_etd_form.pdf

⁴³ Supra note 26 pp 214

⁴⁴ Farhanaz Ispahani gives a detailed overview of the process of Islamisation that Pakistan went through under Zia ul Haq.

⁴⁵ Ordinance XX of 1984 accessed on: <http://stopthepersecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/b-Ordinance-XX.pdf>

the movement; the fourth Caliph of the movement had to go into exile in London to be able to move the community forward.

Conclusion:

This chapter has shown the core difference between Ahmadiyya understandings of the notion of *khatam-i-nubuwwat*, the finality of prophethood, from that of other denominations in Islam. In addition I have placed the foundation of the movement within the political context of colonial Punjab to show the tensions between Ahmadiyya Islam and Deobandi Sunni Islam that existed before the creation of Pakistan, due to the different understandings of this concept. From here I have shown the genealogy of how this theological tension took a politicised form since the founding of the Majlis-i-Ahrar and this group became more politically salient as a pressure group on the government of Pakistan after the founding of the proselytizing wing of the Ahrar the Majlis Tahaffuz e Khatam e Nubuwwat along with the support of other anti-Ahmadiyya ulema and political groups such as Maulana Maududi and his Jamaat e Islami party. I have also looked into how the states involvement in the excommunication of the Ahmadiyya community from the pale of Islam developed from the 1953 agitations to the Ordinance laws passed under the dictatorship of Zia ul Haq, what is important to note here is the changing nature of the State to the demands of the anti-Ahmadi groups identified in this chapter, and how with the changing political dynamics following the 1971 war the State started to move in a more exclusionary direction. The events of 1984 and the exile of the fourth caliph to London form a critical point in which the Ahmadiyya community can come to be an ‘imagined transnational community’⁴⁶ that has the ability to counter frame the accusations of heresy levelled against them by the Majlis Tahaffuz e Khatam e Nubuwwat that has now taken routes in the UK. Explaining the historical context of the Ahmadiyya community’s relationship with differing actors and the state within Pakistan over the identity of the community as Muslim helps understand how the dynamics of exclusionary politics developed to a level where it resulted through formal legislative institutions and in turn how this has had an effect on the community’s ability to identify as Muslim outside of Pakistan; for the purpose of this

⁴⁶ I borrow the term from Sokefeld whose theory on diaspora I discuss in relation to the Ahmadiyya community.

thesis it is how the community has faced exclusion and discrimination within the diasporic context of the UK in recent years and how they have responded to this.

Chapter three: The case of anti-Ahmadiyya prejudice in the UK and the unfolding of events in the spring of 2016

Introduction:

This chapter discusses the emergence of anti-Ahmadiyya discrimination in the United Kingdom, and the increasing presence this has had in the media. Therefore, the background discussion will be focusing on the reporting of anti-Ahmadiyya discrimination in the British media and based on what informants have told me. The empirical findings that form the backbone of this chapter derives from a mixture of primary data gathered from my interviews with members of the community, journalists from Double Bind Magazine and the Rabwah Times, as well as Siobhain McDonagh MP. In addition to interviews I have followed the development in the media, at first indiscriminately looking at all major media outlets⁴⁷ to identify recurring themes, but afterwards focusing my attention on a select few that were reporting more in detail about the Khatme Nubuwwat movement. The journalists I interviewed who I kept in contact with provided some of the reports, including the one in which the table below is found, to me. The critical point from which my research departs is the murder of Asad Shah on the 24th of March 2016, as from this point the prejudice that the Ahmadiyya community have been facing in the UK started gaining wide traction in the British media. With this in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to lay out and discuss the main events that occurred in the Spring of 2016, and using the information that informants have shared with me, develop an understanding of how intra-faith prejudice and sectarianism against the community has surfaced in the UK and how it is manifesting.

The chapter starts by looking at the different Khatme Nubuwwat branches that have been highlighted in the media as playing a central role in agitations against the Ahmadiyya community. While the Khatme Nubuwwat movement is active in various locations my focus will be on the two branches that have been highlighted in the

⁴⁷ The most prominent ones are The Sun, The Daily Mail, BBC, IBTimes, The Economist, Herald Scotland, Daily Express, The Guardian, The Independent, Channel 4, Rabwah Times, Double Bind.

media and by informants as being central in this agitation, the Khatme Nubuwwat Academy in Forest Gate and the Aalmi Majlis Tahaffuz Khatme Nubuwwat in the Stockwell Green Mosque, in addition I discuss the Glasgow Central Mosque and its affiliation with the Khatme Nubuwwat movement. I will then discuss the investigation into the Stockwell Green mosque and the uncovering of hate leaflets at the mosque, and having obtained copies of the leaflets I will look at how they frame the identity of the Ahmadiyya community. I then move on to discuss the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in relation to the rise of anti-Ahmadiyya prejudice, drawing on my interview with political activist Sadaf Ahmad. Here I will elaborate on the controversy surrounding the MCB's affiliation with the Stockwell Green mosque and allegations of MCB's connections to orthodox Islamic politics in Pakistan. The second half of this chapter will discuss the response to the rise of prejudice by the Ahmadiyya community itself, based on the views that various informants have given me as well as the anti-extremism campaign launched in the wake of the murder. Finally, I will address the community's engagement with the government in the aftermath of the murder through the All Party Parliamentary Group for Ahmadiyya Muslims.

Background:

In the aftermath of the 2010 Lahore attacks, an investigation by *The Independent* published on the 21st October reported an increase of literature being distributed in parts of South London calling for the death of Ahmadiyya Muslims⁴⁸. These leaflets were found to label Ahmadi's 'Wajb ul Qatl' a term that translates as 'liable for death'. Additionally, after a satellite television station broadcasted three shows on the topic of the finality of prophethood, Ofcom investigated into allegations of alleged hate speech being aired on the Ummah channel, with one guest speaker on the programme stating "Any kind of contact with them [Ahmadis] is "haram" [prohibited]. Do not eat with them, do not drink with them, and do not sit with them. There should be no dealing with them..."⁴⁹. In the same year, an investigation by Channel 4 uncovered instances where Ahmadiyya Muslims had their shops boycotted

⁴⁸ The Independent. 2010. 'Hardliners call for the death of Surrey Muslims'

⁴⁹ Ofcom. *Broadcast Bulletin issue number 167 11/10/10*.

<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/enforcement/broadcast-bulletins/obb167/#4>

and sightings of anti-Ahmadi leaflets being displayed in shop windows in areas of South London⁵⁰. The leaflet mentioned in the report is still available on the Khatme Nubuwwat Academy's website, titled 'Deceptive Propaganda of Qadianis'. It states 'Through the TV channel and Internet they propagate their infidel beliefs under the guise of Islam. Their dogma is in actual fact blasphemous to Islam' and is signed off by saying 'please make copies and distribute'⁵¹. An informant told me that while discrimination against the community has not been overtly common, there have been instances where other Islamic organisations have discriminated against them at Ahmadi sponsored events at university campuses, 'they have turned up at our events distributing leaflets calling for a boycott on our community, saying that the murder of this community will gain you entrance into heaven'⁵². From the conversations that I have had with informants it appears that the vast majority of cases of discrimination that the members of the Ahmadiyya community have felt in the UK manifest itself latently through social ostracisation that is expressed internally within diasporic communities. However, with the death of Asad Shah, a genuine concern has arisen that the prejudice faced by the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan, often manifesting itself in violent manners, could be finding its way to the UK⁵³.

As discussed in the first chapter, the stigmatisation of Ahmadiyya Muslims in Pakistan has developed through a historical discourse regarding the identity claims over what constitutes a Muslim, based on the tenet regarding the finality of Muhammad's prophethood. The interplay between various social movements, political parties and the state facilitated the exclusion of the Ahmadiyya community from the public sphere and after the Ordinance XX bill was passed in order to continue leading the community the fourth Caliph of the community had to move to London. Shortly after the arrival of the Caliph, The Times reported that an anti-Ahmadiyya conference was held in London where 'President Zia promised to

⁵⁰ Channel 4. 2010. *Hate Crime Investigation into threats against Ahmadi Muslims*

⁵¹ Khatme Nubuwwat Academy.

⁵² Interview with Surfaraz Mustafa. Member of the Ahmadiyya Youth Association UK Interview conducted on 15th April 2016.

⁵³ When speaking to Farooq Aftab, vice-president of the Ahmadiyya Youth Association UK, he expressed his concern to me regarding the importing of violent ideology from countries like Pakistan that can effect the community here.

“persevere in our effort to ensure that this cancer is exterminated”⁵⁴. Since then, the Khatme Nubuwwat movement has established itself in the UK and regularly host conferences in its various branches.

MTKN in UK

The *Majlis Tahaffuz e Khatam e Nubuwwat* (MTKN) as a social movement, as has already been discussed in the previous chapter, was a result of a splintering of the Ahrar movement in colonial India after the independence of Pakistan. The Ahmadiyya understanding of the Islamic tenet of *khatam-i-nabuwwat* has been the main driving factor behind the decision to excommunicate the community from the wider Muslim community in Pakistan. What is important to note here is that due to the Ahmadiyya belief in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet after Muhammad, there is a general understanding that the community are not Muslims in a theological sense. An informant at the BBC told me ‘the non-Ahmadi Muslims that I have spoken to, what you hear is that there is a consensus of the Muslim umma regardless of sect, denomination or caste, there has been a unanimous agreement that Ahmadis fall out of the pale of Islam’⁵⁵. Therefore, the persecution of Ahmadiyya Muslims as it has come to be in Pakistan cannot only be attributed to theological difference; rather it is the politicisation of theological difference that allows for the persecution to take place.

The Khatme Nubuwwat movement has been active in the UK since 1985, when the first meeting was held at the Wembley Conference Centre⁵⁶ and since then the movement and various offshoots have been operating in a number of locations in the UK. According its website one of the objectives of the movement is to arrange ‘preaching and reform trips and conferences in many countries of the world e.g. U.K, U.S and Africa in order to preach Islam, the sanctity of Prophethood of the Holy

⁵⁴ The Times London, 1985. *Meet the Spiritual Leader of 10 million whose life could be at risk*. Found on: <https://www.rabwah.net/the-muslim-feud-pakistan-exported-to-london/>

⁵⁵ Interview with BBC Journalist in London 27/04/2016

⁵⁶ The BBC have published a podcast on the development of the Deobandi movement in the UK and also interviewed the trustee of the Stockwell Green Mosque Toaha Qureshi: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b076cg3d>


Prophet Muhammad and the belief in the finality of the Prophethood of the Holy Prophet Muhammad⁵⁷ Two of the places where the movement have branches in London are the Stockwell Green Mosque, which carries the name Aalami Majlis Tahaffuz Khatam e Nabuwwat, and the Khatme Nubuwwat Academy in Forest Gate, the former being at the centre of media controversy following the murder of Asad Shah. Additionally in 2011, a BBC investigation into the Stockwell Green Mosque revealed that leaflets circulating in Pakistan calling for the murder of Ahmadiyya Muslims listed a website that directed enquires to the Stockwell Green Mosque⁵⁸. At the time one of the trustees of the mosque denied any connection with those who were distributing the leaflets in Pakistan and promised to make efforts to have the Stockwell Green mosque's name removed from the Aalami Majlis Khatam e Nubuwwat's website. The South Asian Terrorism Portal compiled an overview of the Khatme Nubuwwat movement in which they mapped a lineage tree showing the different branches of the movement and highlighting the ones that are active in the UK:

⁵⁷ AMTKN website: <http://www.khatm-e-nubuwwat.com/IntroductionMAJLISENG.htm>

⁵⁸ BBC. 2011. London mosque accused of links to 'terror' in Pakistan.

Table 1

Lineage Tree of the MTKN



This diagram helps visualise the lineage of the Khatme Nubuwwat movement from the historical founding of it in colonial India to the present day, and see the various offshoots of its international section. However, it does not give a full or detailed account of each branch or what it means, or indeed the full scope of which Islamic institutions are affiliated with the Khatme Nubuwwat movement. Therefore, a conclusive understanding of the movement cannot be drawn simply from this. However, it does give an indication of how the movement is spread out in the UK.

One of the groups listed on the table under the *Aalami MTKN*, the *Jamiat Ittehad-ul-Muslemeen*, is the charity trust that governs the Glasgow Central Mosque⁶⁰. In the

⁵⁹ South Asia Terrorism Portal. *Majlis Tahaffuz Khatme Nubuwwat*. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/papers/Majlis_Tahaffuz_Khatme_Nabuwwat_MTKN.pdf

wake of Asad Shah's murder, IBTimes reported on the mosque's long-standing links with the Khatme Nubuwwat movement where anti-Ahmadiyya scholars were invited to speak at an annual conference in 2014⁶¹. One of the speakers at the conference, Maulana Allah Wasaya, had been granted a visa to the UK from Pakistan despite video evidence of hate speech at conferences in Pakistan. In one video he is found warning ex-governor of Punjab Salman Taseer, who called for reforms to Pakistan's Blasphemy laws, that those with an aim in mind to alter the laws in place protecting the finality of prophethood would be eliminated before any laws changed⁶². Additionally, at a Khatme Nubuwwat conference in Sargodha, Punjab he refers to Ahmadiyya as *zindeeq*⁶³, an Arabic term used against those who claim to be Muslim but hold opposing beliefs, and warns against associating with them. Videos on the Internet show that this has not been the first time that Allah Wasaya has come to the UK to speak at a Khatme Nubuwwat conference, in 2010 he appeared to talk at a Khatme Nubuwwat conference in London in which he accused the Ahmadiyya Community itself of orchestrating the Lahore attacks in order to gain political leverage on the international stage and to ruin the name of Pakistan⁶⁴.

In light of the media coverage on the Khatme Nubuwwat branches in London, a spokesperson of the Academy in London denied any connection to the Stockwell Green mosque where anti-Ahmadiyya leaflets had been found⁶⁵. At the same time the trustee of the Stockwell Green mosque told the BBC that the leaflets that were found at the mosque in April 2016 were 'produced maliciously by someone else' and that the only connection that the mosque in London has with any Khatme Nubuwwat

⁶⁰ Information on the Charity can be found on the Scottish Charity Regulator website: <http://www.oscr.org.uk/search-oscr/charity-details?number=SC013142#results>

⁶¹ IBTimes. 2016. *Glasgow Central Mosque accused of hiding links to anti-Ahmadi 'hate speech' group.*

⁶² Allah Wasaya's speeches at Khatme Nubuwwat conferences can be found on Youtube easily, the one threatening Salman Taseer
<<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8cwgPyGi4&feature=youtu.be&t=7m3s>>

⁶³ Allah Wasaya 2013 Sardgodha. <
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yeq_Xett5CU&feature=youtu.be&t=16m3s>

⁶⁴ Allah Wasaya at Khatme Nubuwwat conference in London:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOci9zKMHEs>

⁶⁵ IBTimes. 2016. Khatme Nubuwwat claims there is nothing illegal in kill Ahmadi leaflets.

organisation is purely for reference on theological matters⁶⁶. However, Asif Basit from the Muslim Television Ahmadiyya informed me that after visiting the charity commission's website it was clear that an affiliation was present, 'on the website it says we are affiliated with the parent company Majlis-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatme Nubuwwat in Multan'⁶⁷. Within the British media, it appears that the two branches of the Khatme Nubuwwat movement in London have attempted to keep a distance from one another and the activities of the movement in Pakistan. Yet, according to an informant at the Rabwah Times news website there does appear to be a link between the branches in the UK to one another and also to the movement in Pakistan. He told me that he spoke to two senior members of the Khatme Nubuwwat movement in Pakistan who disclosed to him that almost all the organisations that are working under the Khatme Nubuwwat banner are in regular correspondence with one another through a forum online, as well as offline, and most relevant to the case at hand, stated that various branches of the movement in the UK including the ones in London, specifically mentioning the Khatme Nubuwwat Academy, are a part of this alliance⁶⁸.

Investigation in the Stockwell Green Mosque:

The investigation into the Stockwell Green mosque occurred a few weeks after the murder of Asad Shah, and while there is no evidence that the two events are linked to one another, the media did comment on the fact that the leaflets were found so soon after the murder. The BBC revealed that leaflets written by prominent Pakistani Khatme Nubuwwat cleric Yusuf Ludhianvi, were found in a pile next to the literature rack at the mosque⁶⁹. While the trustee of the Stockwell Green mosque had denied the existence of a connection to the movement in Pakistan aside from theological matters, the address of the Stockwell Green mosque is printed on the leaflets and, until recently, was listed as the overseas office of the Aalami Majlis Tahaffuz Khatme

⁶⁶ BBC. 2016. The Deobandis. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b076cg3d>

⁶⁷ Interview with Asif Basit head of MTA conducted on 23rd May 2016. The financial statements of the mosque lists the branch in Multan as an associate. http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Accounts/Ends15/0000328715_ac_20110831_e_c.pdf

⁶⁸ Interview with journalist from the Rabwah Times 13th July 2016. Audio recording available as evidence.

⁶⁹ 'Kill Ahmadis' Leaflets Found In UK Mosque - BBC News". BBC News. 2016. Web. 31 July 2016

Nubuwwat on their website. Additionally, according to the interview that my informant at the Rabwah Times had with Khatme Nubuwwat figures in Pakistan⁷⁰, the Aalami Majlis Tahaffuz Khatme Nubuwwat is a part of the forum that has been created to coordinate the various different factions and groups that operate under the Khatme Nubuwwat banner. The leaflets themselves, while not calling for direct action against the Ahmadiyya, do frame the identity of the community as being non-Muslim and against Islam.

- what the leaflets say about the Ahmadiyya community?

The leaflet, titled *Qadianis: Difference with other non-Muslims*⁷¹, states that ‘to have any kind of relation with Qadianis is prohibited’ and that ‘Qadianis are apostates (Murtad) and dualist-infidels (Zindiq)’ It then goes on to explain the difference between Ahmadi’s and non-Muslims by setting out three different categories of Kafirs, or non-believers. The first category, Mutlaq Kafirs, is the one in which non-Muslims such as Jews, Christians and Hindus fall into. The second, Munafiq Kafirs, are those who claim to be Muslim but are not genuine in their heart. The third category, which specifically targets the Ahmadiyya, is the Zindiq Kafir, or dualist-infidels, and states that ‘They present pure *Kufr* in the nomenclature of Islam by twisting the verses of the holy Quran, the sacred Ahadith of the Prophet, the statements of his companions and sayings of revered saints in order to prove their *Kufr* as Islam’.

By framing the Ahmadiyya interpretation of Islam as being treacherous, in that it betrays the tenet of finality of prophethood by taking Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet after Muhammad, the leaflet invokes Shariat interpretation of punishment for traitors, which is capital punishment, ‘the rationale behind this punishment is that an apostate is regarded as traitor in Islamic law and every legal system gives the same punishment to traitors’. Going further, the leaflet presents a case as to why the beliefs

⁷⁰ The two figures in question are Ghulam Nabi Nuri and Sayid Mubashir Raza

⁷¹ The leaflet, along with another titled ‘Qadianis: Fact and reality’ are available online. Copy of the first one is: <http://www.khatm-e-nubuwwat.org/english/pamphlets/Difference/Book.pdf>

of the Ahmadiyya are worse than apostasy due to the fact that it presents its apostasy in the guise of Islam therefore making Ahmadi's dualist-infidels. The leaflet claims that the punishment for this, like apostasy, is capital punishment. The leaflet explicitly states that the injunction of Shari'at regarding dualist infidels dictates that 'afford him a chance first, give him three days to repent and permit him to return; to the Islamic fold. If within three days he does so, leave him unscathed, otherwise it is obligatory to award him capital punishment'. Therefore, while the leaflet appears to present the Ahmadiyya beliefs as being inherently against Islamic value, it seemingly does not call for people themselves to engage in direct action against Ahmadis.

The leaflet ends with a discussion regarding the 'commands of Shari'at for descendants of Dualist Infidels', claiming that due to the fact that Ahmadiyya belief falls into the third category of Kafir, one where they present their apostasy as being within the fold of Islam, 'they may multiply up to ninety nine generations; still the hundredth one will continue to be Dualist-Infidels ... every Qadiani, whether he is so by conversion, or by birth, or by heritage is a Dualist Infidel under the Shariat's law because his crime flows unending through his lineage'. It frames the relationship between Muslims and Ahmadis in a way to suggest that the Ahmadiyya are inherently against, not only Islam itself, but also Muslims, 'Qadianiat has tried to break our relationship with Hazrat Muhammad, they call us Kafir even though we accept the religion of Muhammad ... how should we respond to such a person? To administer capital punishment is the right of an Islamic State. If there is no Islamic State, individuals cannot and should not administer this punishment. Then what can be done at an individual level? We should boycott them. We should not establish social ties with them.'

What can be seen through the way in which the leaflet frames the identity of Ahmadiyya as being inherently opposed to Islam is that it does not itself state that one should go and kill Ahmadiyya themselves. Rather, it appears to present the Ahmadiyya as a group that through their unorthodox understanding of the finality of prophethood and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad continuing as a prophet after Muhammad, are traitors to the Muslim Ummah. As a result of this treachery, and the continued insistence of the Ahmadiyya as being Muslim, they are deceiving Muslims through being dualist infidels, which in accordance with the Shariat carries the punishment of

capital punishment. However, what is important to note here is that it explicitly states that individuals should not carry out direct action in a land that is not governed by Islamic law, calling instead for a disassociation from the Ahmadiyya Community through social boycotts.

Putting this in perspective with Pakistan, the implication of this is that the dynamics of prejudice against the Ahmadiyya will play out differently within the diasporic sphere in the UK. The anti-Ahmadiyya laws in Pakistan legitimated the persecution of the Ahmadiyya in social life and this has allowed for the creation of a space where calls for direct violent action against the Ahmadiyya have occurred in the public. For example, *The Persecution of Ahmadi's* website compiled a report on instances of hate campaigns against the community in 2015, in which it details an instance where a book by Yusuf Ludhianvi, the same man who wrote the pamphlets found in Stockwell Green and former head of the Aalami Majlis Tahaffuz e Khatam e Nubuwwat, was given to an Ahmadi family. It translates a paragraph of the book which reads, 'What does the sense of honour and shame demand from Muslims? In fact, it demands that not a single Qadiani should be left alive on earth. Seize each one of these malignant individuals and kill them'⁷². However, within the diasporic sphere of the UK, the legal and political dimensions have not allowed for such a public space to be created, and therefore the prejudice faced against the community has not had an impact on wider British society until the murder of Asad Shah and the media's attention on the community.

Muslim Council of Britain in relation to the Ahmadiyya Community:

The Muslim Council of Britain is the UK's largest umbrella association of Muslim organisations having over 500 affiliations. Humayun Ansari notes that the MCB was borne out of efforts to 'achieve national coordination and establish an organisation which was not closely aligned to any particular tradition ... which the state would be prepared to recognise'⁷³. Thus the MCB is non-sectarian and has an affiliation representing a vast background of Muslim sects, whose aim is to represent a unified

⁷² The full report can be accessed here: <https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/anti-ahmadiyya-campaign-in-pakistan/>

⁷³ Humayun Ansari. 2004. *The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain since 1800*.

voice of Muslims to wider society. In the aftermath of the murder of Asad Shah and the medias increased attention on the discrimination that the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community have been facing within the wider Muslim community, the MCB seemed to also gain the medias attention, largely due to the fact that the Aalami Majlis Tahaffuz Khatam e Nubuwwat branch at the Stockwell Green Mosque has been an affiliate of the Muslim Council of Britain. The day after the murder, the secretary general of the MCB released a statement saying ‘I condemn the murder of Asad Shah ... There is no place for hatred of this kind and I condemn it utterly’⁷⁴. A few weeks after the condemnation of the murder, under apparent pressure to clarify their position on whether or not they accept the Ahmadiyya Community as Muslim, they issued a further statement:

‘The Muslim Council of Britain reflects the clear theological position expressed across Islamic traditions: namely that the cornerstone of Islam is to believe in One God and in the finality of the prophethood of the Messenger Muhammad, peace be upon him. We understand that this is not the view subscribed to by the Ahmadi community. The MCB Constitution requires our affiliates to declare that Messenger Muhammad peace be upon him is the final prophet and whoever does not subscribe to that declaration cannot be eligible for affiliation with the MCB. Given this fundamental theological difference with the Ahmadi community, the MCB is not in a position to represent or be represented by the Ahmadi community. Despite our clear theological beliefs, we note that pressure is mounting to describe this community as Muslim. Muslims should not be forced to class Ahmadis as Muslims if they do not wish to do so, at the same time, we call on Muslims to be sensitive, and above all, respect all people irrespective of belief or background’.⁷⁵

The statement appears to be keeping in line with the normative understanding of Islamic identity being based on the acceptance of the Prophethood of Muhammad being the last Prophet of Allah. However the Ahmadiyya Community voiced concerns regarding the apparent implications of the statement. Speaking to the Huffington Post,

⁷⁴ MCB. Murder in Glasgow statement: <http://www.mcb.org.uk/murder-in-glasgow-mcb-condemns-religiously-aggravated-attack/>

⁷⁵ MCB. Position Statement: Muslim Council of Britain and Ahmadis. Accessed on <<http://www.mcb.org.uk/position-statement-the-muslim-council-of-britain-and-ahmadis/>>

Basharat Nazir drew attention to these perceived implications, ‘The key point (in the statement) was that Muslims should not be forced to accept Ahmadis ... no one is forcing them ... and why should Ahmadis be made to call themselves non-Muslims? ... This is a time to show solidarity against all forms of discrimination, extremism and hate rather than make declarations about people’s beliefs.’⁷⁶. Indeed the statement of the Ahmadiyya Community in response to the MCB’s position on the Islamic identity of Ahmadis drew attention to the persecution of the community in Pakistan and their inability to self identify as a Muslim community, and how this precedent should not be set elsewhere, ‘in a free and fair society like the UK, it is unacceptable that any group would seek to follow such a dangerous precedent by denying Ahmadi Muslims the right to self identify as Muslims’⁷⁷.

The position statement of the MCB was issued a few days before the investigation into the Stockwell Green Mosque uncovered the anti-Ahmadiyya leaflets. As a result of the leaflets, the MCB created a panel to investigate its affiliation with the mosque⁷⁸. The investigation has been set up to look into the nature and severity of the allegations levelled against the mosque and decide whether any further affiliation can be maintained with the mosque. However, reports in the media started surfacing about how the investigation panel itself had individuals with anti-Ahmadiyya sympathies⁷⁹, one of whom had spoken at a Khatme Nubuwwat conference in the past.

Additionally, the Muslim Council of Britain has come under media controversy in the past due to allegations placed against it of having elements of radicalisation within its affiliates⁸⁰. An Observer investigation by the Guardian in 2005 stated that Khurshid

⁷⁶ Basharat Nazir, Media Spokesperson for Ahmadiyya Community, speaking to Huffington Post UK: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/asad-shah-murder-sectarian-row-with-british-muslim-council-rejecting-admadi-muslims_uk_570632e8e4b0ad0f20caff92

⁷⁷ AMC. Ahmadiyya Muslim Community UK response to MCB statement < <http://www.loveforallhatedfornone.org/ahmadiyya-muslim-community-uk-response-to-mcb-statement/>>

⁷⁸ MCB.Independent investigation into AMTKN: <http://www.mcb.org.uk/amtkn-april-2016/>

⁷⁹ Chaudhry Kasif. 2016. *The Muslim Council of Britain appoints extremists to investigate extremism*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kashif-n-chaudhry/the-muslim-council-of-bri_b_9844608.html

⁸⁰ In 2005 a BBC Panorama documentary ‘A Question of Leadership’ looked into how some of the affiliates of MCB have brought fundamentalist ideology to Britain.

Ahmad, a prominent figure in Pakistan's Jamaat e Islami party, founded one of the affiliate organisations of the MCB, Leicester's Islamic Foundation⁸¹. Most recently, a report released by David Cameron's government stated that the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement that has drawn heavy influence from the ideology of Jamaat e Islami, 'played an important role in establishing and then running the Muslim Council of Britain'⁸². As has been discussed in the first chapter, the Jamaat e Islami party, as well as the Khatme Nubuwwat movement, was an integral force in the 1953 anti-Ahmadiyya riots, which was an attempt to force the government to legally declare the Ahmadiyya non-Muslims.

The Aalami Majlis Tahaffuz Khatme Nubuwwat at Stockwell Green is not the only institute that has connections with the Khatme Nubuwwat movement in Pakistan; another affiliate of the Muslim Council of Britain is the Glasgow Central Mosque, which as I have discussed above has hosted prominent Khatme Nubuwwat preachers from Pakistan at their conferences. The ideology shared by the Khatme Nubuwwat movement and the Jamaat e Islami party regarding the position of Ahmadiyya Muslims cannot be taken in isolation here. The Majlis Ahrar, which splintered into the Tahaffuz e Khatam e Nubuwwat movement and the Jamaat e Islami party were both prominent campaigners of making Pakistan an Islamic State in accordance with their own view about Islam, and one of the core issues that they agreed upon was that Ahmadiyya, due to their different understanding of the finality of the prophet, are not Muslim. The politicisation of this thought through the campaigning of social and religious movements played a large part in the exclusion of Ahmadiyya in Pakistan.

One person who has been critical of the Muslim Council of Britain and its investigation into the Stockwell Green mosque has been Sadaf Ahmad, a political activist from London. In regards to the link between Khatme Nubuwwat preachers coming from Pakistan to speak at MCB affiliated institutes in the UK, she maintains that the proselytizing of this theological tenet that often targets the Ahmadiyya Community, as being non-Muslim, is taken to be a 'normative view' by the MCB that all Muslims hold, while not looking at the historical and political development of how

⁸¹Guardian. 2005. Radical links of UK's moderate Muslim Group
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/aug/14/religion.immigrationpolicy>

⁸² Muslim Brotherhood: Main findings.
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/aug/14/religion.immigrationpolicy>

this view came to be in the first place⁸³. While the Ahmadiyya understanding of the finality of prophethood has always been a contentious issue regarding their Islamic identity, it is important to note that after the constitutional amendment of 1974 this issue was politicised to the extent that the barring of Ahmadiyya from the pale of Islam was legitimised through the state. Before this point, while there had been a number of campaigns against the Ahmadiyya, most notably the 1953 riots, they were considered to be a sect of Islam by the state. According to Ahmad, this ‘normative view’ of the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim is now affecting communities in the UK, ‘Until 1974 and the amendment people thought that Ahmadis were Muslims, but since then when constant preaching by the Khatme Nubuwwat movement has taken hold of the younger people it is seen as an age old truth enshrined in stone that Ahmadis are non-Muslims, and it is now affecting the diaspora’⁸⁴.

One of the panel members of the investigation, Maulana Shahid Raza Naeemi, has been one of the main speakers at a Khatme Nubuwwat conference in Holland. In a video of the conference he is seen to be saying that ‘their religion is false. People are being entrapped in their religion and the ones who are being trapped are Muslims. They are targeting us ... I want to say that meeting with them is worse than drugs and alcohol on the mind. The intake of alcohol might make you an alcoholic but at least you have your faith. Taking drugs might make you a drug addict but at least you have your faith. Mixing with Qadianis is not bad for your heart or lungs, but takes away the “window of faith”’⁸⁵. The Stockwell Green Mosque closed following the investigation set up by the MCB, however Ahmad views this to only be temporary, ‘they have not closed it they have suspended it, it’s a four week suspension while they investigate ... unless the pressure is kept up in another two and a half weeks they will turn around and say that their ‘investigation’ proved nothing’⁸⁶.

⁸³ Interview with Sadaf Ahmad in London on the 26/05/2016

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵ Hazrat Allama Shahid Raza Naeemi Khatme Nubuwwat Holland 1999:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gE_HtziCtxI

⁸⁶ Interview with Sadaf Ahmad I have attempted to contact the MCB to discuss the investigation myself however have not received any replies to my inquires.

Part 2 The Ahmadiyya engagement in countering the rise of prejudice:

The Ahmadiyya Community has been extremely active in campaigning for peace, both after the murder of Asad Shah, and before. The community have been hosting an annual national peace symposium every year, and have host local level symposiums within the local communities they are present in. The motto of the community is ‘Love for all, Hatred for none’ the Ahmadiyya movement has been committed to portraying itself as a pacifist movement, opposed to violence.

Following the murder of Asad Shah, the Ahmadiyya Community released a statement condemning the murder and stating: “In any society, all members of the public have a right to safety and it is up to the Government and police to protect members of the public as best they can. In this context, it is up to the Government to root out all forms of extremism and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community has been speaking about the importance of this for many years”⁸⁷. The murder of Asad Shah was the first instance of manifest violence, specifically murder, against the Ahmadiyya community in the UK. The severity of this for the community can be seen through their response in urging the government to address the issue of extremism within the country, and therefore the response of the community has been based on raising awareness of extremism through legal and political channels. The response of the Ahmadiyya Community to the rise of anti-Ahmadi sentiments in the UK cannot be divorced from its wider campaign against extremism.

In a wider sense, the community have been active for a number of years in combatting extremism and spreading their motto of ‘Love for all, Hatred for none’. There is an active presence online, through social media, especially Twitter and the community’s own websites⁸⁸ through which the community can engage with a wider audience about combatting extremism as well as talking about the persecution that the community is facing, not only in Pakistan, but also in other parts of Muslim majority countries such as Indonesia. Central to all of the campaigns that the community undertakes is the notion of ‘removing misconceptions of Islam’ as a violent religion.

⁸⁷ <http://www.loveforallhatredfornone.org/statement-by-the-ahmadiyya-muslim-community-uk-on-the-horrific-murder-of-mr-assad-shah-glasgow/>

⁸⁸ www.loveforallhatredfornone.org is one of the community’s websites that publishes updates on the community’s activities across the world.

In this sense, the community is prolific in producing and distributing literature on their interpretation of Islamic teachings regarding Jihad, violence and extremism⁸⁹.

One of the methods through which the community have expressed their condemnation against extremism in the past has been through their United Against Extremism campaign that has been launched in the wake of the Paris and Brussels attacks in late 2015. Ahmad Konadu, the external affairs secretary of the Glasgow Ahmadiyya mosque informed me that the campaign was brought to Scotland as a consequence of the murder to unite all different faith groups together against extremism, ‘the purpose of this campaign, for us, was to really get people to understand the true nature of Islam as a peaceful religion. After the murder, we wanted to show the people of Glasgow that Islam is not a violent religion ... this campaign showed that what unites us as a group of people is a lot stronger than what divides us, and the fact that we had leaders from almost all of Glasgow’s faith groups shows this’⁹⁰.

The campaign itself involved launching 50 buses in Glasgow, and 25 buses in Edinburgh and Dundee with the slogan of ‘United Against Extremism’ placed on them.

The growing threat of Muslim sectarianism targeting the Ahmadiyya community in the UK is something that the community has been facing and dealing with for a number of years, but only recently has started to be taken seriously. Ahmad Konadu informed me of the fact that the Ahmadiyya mosque in Glasgow have known about the Khatme Nubuwwat movements presence in Glasgow Central Mosque for a number of years, ‘We have sent recordings of the conferences and what they are saying about our community to the police, but it has been seen taken as freedom of speech until what happened to Mr. Shah’⁹¹.

⁸⁹ Literature on these matters is freely available on their website.

⁹⁰ Interview with Ahmad Konadu. External Affairs Secretary Baitur Rehman Mosque. Conducted on 19th July 2016.

⁹¹ Ibid

Common concerns that have been raised during interviews:

Interviewees from the Ahmadiyya community expressed a concern for the way in which the anti-Ahmadiyya rhetoric, being circulated within minorities of the diaspora, is being preached under the guise of freedom of speech. Speaking about the distribution of anti-Ahmadi literature Asif Basit stated that ‘the literature that has been found in Stockwell Green or being handed out in areas of South London is not directly inciting violence or hatred but they are referring you to literature which is directly inciting hatred against the Ahmadiyya’⁹². Additionally he drew attention to the fact that the literature that is being distributed and is freely available online is often not in English, ‘Another thing that needs to be looked into is the fact that they can have leaflets in whatever language they want ... for example I can have a webpage in English, which is spick and span, and then I can have links to it in a particular language that many people would not understand, the aim of which is to target a particular audience’⁹³. The concern expressed by Asif Basit seems to be the fact that the character of prejudice that is emerging in the UK against the Ahmadiyya is not visible to the wider British public because it is being expressed within diasporic spaces. So while anti-Ahmadiyya literature and sentiments that are being espoused in English do not use overtly inflammatory language against the community and therefore might not fall under hate speech, by referring to literature on the Internet in Urdu or other languages the concern is that it is indirectly propagating a hostile environment. The website on the pamphlet found at Stockwell Green shares links to the book written in Urdu by Yusuf Ludhianvi that the Stop the Persecution report stated was given to an Ahmadiyya family calling for the death of Ahmadis.

The response of the community members that I interviewed pointed to the fact that the government must be more attentive to the growing rise of anti-Ahmadiyya prejudice in the UK, as it plays into the wider picture of extremism in general and impedes on the cohesion of a peaceful society. Imam Daud Qureshi of the Glasgow Ahmadiyya mosque raised concerns about the ease through which anti-Ahmadiyya

⁹² Interview with Asif Basit head of MTA conducted on 23rd May 2016. The literature that Mr. Basit is referring to is authored by Yusuf Ludhianvi, former head of the *Aalami Majlis Tahaffuz e Khatam e Nubuwwat*

⁹³ Ibid

preachers have in gaining visas to the UK, ‘this is in the hands of the government, especially the Home Office, they should try to restrict the transportation of hatred and extremism from other countries. These hate preachers come here and give hate speech and nobody stops them’⁹⁴. Ahmad Konadu stated that the main causes for the increase of sectarianism targeting the Ahmadiyya is the fact that anti-Ahmadiyya preachers from the Indian Subcontinent are being allowed to come to the UK to preach at mosques and Islamic institutes, and the government, through the Home Office, needs to start addressing this issue, ‘it is up to the government to tighten the laws surrounding immigration, the community cannot do this ourselves’⁹⁵.

The concern regarding the influx of clerics coming from Pakistan to speak in mosques was added to by the fact that Hanif Qureshi, a Barelvi Sunni cleric who allegedly inspired the assassin of ex-governor of Punjab Salman Taseer, was given a visa to speak at the Jamia Islamia Ghousia Trust in Luton on the 4th of May⁹⁶. In the sermon that allegedly inspired Mumtaz Qadri to assassinate Salman Taseer, which is available on Youtube⁹⁷, he states that ‘Allah has given us the courage and power to strangle the throats of blasphemers, to cut the tongue from their throats, and to riddle their body with bullets’. It was reported in the press that this was not the first time that he had been invited to speak, having been invited to speak at the same mosque in 2014 as part of its annual Khatme Nubuwwat conference⁹⁸.

The ability of preachers with a distinctly anti-Ahmadiyya mindset to travel and preach in mosques in the UK, while not being the sole cause of the rise of sectarianism against the community, does appear to play a facilitating role in creating a space for prejudice to take place. This aspect of it comes down to the nature of the anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment with its origins in the Indian Subcontinent, and being based on

⁹⁴ Interview with Imam Daud Ahmad. Head missionary of Scotland Ahmadiyya Community conducted in Glasgow on 16th June.

⁹⁵ Interview with Ahmad Konadu. External Affairs Secretary Baitur Rehman Mosque. Conducted on 19th July 2016.

⁹⁶ IBTimes. 2016. Son of murdered Pakistani liberal outraged as cleric who inspired assassin is allowed to speak in the UK.

⁹⁷ Hanif Qureshi Speech: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8QEtLWYY6Tk>

⁹⁸ DoubleBind. Tackling anti-Ahmadi bigotry is not the job of the MCB- they’re part of the problem. <http://doublebindmagazine.com/tackling-anti-ahmadiyya-bigotry-isnt-a-job-for-the-mcb>

the contentious issue of the finality of prophethood. Asif Basit believes that the affinity Muslims have for the Prophet Muhammad is being exploited to serve the anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment, which ‘gives people a very limited choice. They say “you have to love the Prophet if you are a Muslim’ ... then you make propaganda that the founder of the Ahmadiyya Community claims to be higher than the Prophet, does not respect him, talks in vain language about him. How do you react? To show your love you need to react in a certain way to defend his honour. Now this compulsion that is being indoctrinated is bringing confusion that most of the Muslims in Britain cannot get rid of because they have to respond’⁹⁹. While most Muslims in the UK do not outwardly act discriminatorily towards the Ahmadiyya, the flow of preachers coming from Pakistan as well as the literature that is easily accessible online is aiding in, not only bringing the sentiment to the UK, but also creating a diasporic space within which it can be expressed.

Ahmadiyya engagement with the Government in raising awareness of extremism:

The Ahmadiyya Community is also active in engaging with the Government in voicing its campaigning against extremism and the persecution that it has faced. One of the ways in which the Community have set up dialogue with the Government is through the creation of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Ahmadiyya Muslims. The group was set up in 2010 as a result of the Wimbledon Guardian reporting on instances of discrimination against the Community in South London following a Khatme Nubuwwat conference at the Tooting Islamic Centre, where preachers had warned listeners to boycott Ahmadiyya businesses and cut ties with Ahmadis¹⁰⁰. Since then the activities of the APPG for Ahmadiyya Muslims have included speaking to Ofcom regarding the broadcasting of anti-Ahmadiyya sectarian shows, talking with ambassadors of countries where Ahmadiyya face persecution as well as holding debates within the British Parliament to raise awareness of the persecution of

⁹⁹ Interview with Asif Basit head of MTA conducted on 23rd May 2016

¹⁰⁰ Wimbledon Guardian. 2010. *Ahmadiyya Muslim sect thanks Wimbledon Guardian and Wandsworth Guardian for exposing hate.*

the Ahmadiyya Community¹⁰¹. Most recently before the murder of Asad Shah, the group held a debate in Parliament to bring light to the persecution that the Community faces in Pakistan, and what the British Government can do in getting the Pakistani Government to repeal its Blasphemy laws.

In light of the murder of Asad Shah, the chair of the group, Siobhain McDonagh, wrote to the Home Secretary urging for a meeting to discuss its concern regarding the overspill of sectarian tendencies from Pakistan to the UK, drawing on the fact that the Khatme Nubuwwat movement has branches in the UK and is a registered charity¹⁰². However, following the revelation that Hanif Qureshi was granted a visa to speak at the Luton mosque in the aftermath of the murder and the uncovering of pamphlets in Stockwell Green, the group also raised the issue of how hate preachers from Pakistan have been able to gain visas to the UK through legal channels¹⁰³. The view of Siobhain McDonagh in regards to the role that the Government can play in stopping the spread of anti-Ahmadiyya sectarianism is by ‘fully knowing what is going on, it needs organisations to look at where the sources that incite this discrimination comes from and clearly satellite TV stations are very important. There also needs to be established procedures for monitoring and requiring that Imams can speak English and for making sure what their histories are especially if they are granted clearance from other places’¹⁰⁴. The role of media and the Internet in being a source for the spread of sectarianism was also highlighted by a number of interviewees as something that needs to be addressed¹⁰⁵. On the 29th of June, Siobhain McDonagh led a debate in Parliament on UK security and entrance clearance procedures in which she revealed the outcome of her meeting with the Home Secretary, who did not have any knowledge of Hanif Qureshi being granted a visa to the country. In addition, until

¹⁰¹ Interview with Siobhain McDonagh MP. Chair of the APPG Ahmadiyya Muslims. 6th June 2016

¹⁰² Letter to the Home Secretary:
<http://www.siobhainmcdonagh.org.uk/upload/docs/Letter%20to%20HomeSec%20Ahmadi%20McDonaghS.pdf>

¹⁰³ Interview with Siobhain McDonagh MP. Chair of the APPG Ahmadiyya Muslims. 6th June 2016

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ahmad Konadu in particular expressed concerns regarding the fact that ‘we do not have limitations on what can currently be broadcasted on satellite TV and as a result people still watch programmes from Pakistan that preach against us’

recently the High Commission in Islamabad did not have the adequate resources to understand the content of who was on the Pakistani watch lists unless they were translated because they did not have an Urdu speaker in their intelligence office¹⁰⁶.

The engagement of the Community with the Government through the APPG in campaigning against extremism and raising awareness of the persecution that they have been facing around the world and in Britain has now taken an increased relevance following the first murder of an Ahmadiyya in the UK and the medias coverage of the Stockwell Green Mosque. In addition, given the chronology of the events that took place in the spring of 2016, the activities of the Parliamentary group, through Siobhain Mcdonagh, have helped bring to the Government's attention the existence of intra-faith sectarianism.

Conclusion:

The discrimination that the Ahmadiyya Community have been facing in the UK has not been something that has recently emerged. In fact, low-level latent forms of discrimination and segregation has been something that many Ahmadiyya have had to face within diasporic spaces. During my research Ahmadiyya Muslims have told me about how the discrimination that they have faced manifests in the form of social ostracisation through social boycotts and in more extreme circumstances even intimidation. While a generalising claim cannot be made that this is the experience that the entirety of the community faces in the UK, or that the general Muslim population holds anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment, the increasing discrimination that is being faced has caused the community to increasingly speak out against it. The case of Asad Shah, not only brought media attention to the intra-faith sectarianism faced by the community, but also increased concerns that the low level discrimination could now take a violent form.

While the cause of anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment being acted out in the UK cannot be pinned as coming exclusively from one source, I have focused on the Khatme

¹⁰⁶ UK Security and Entrance Clearance Procedures: Transcript available <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-06-29/debates/16062963000001/UKSecurityAndEntryClearanceProcedures>

Nubuwwat movement's proselytizing against the Ahmadiyya as a source of spreading this sentiment because of the movement's historical role in the persecution of the Community in Pakistan, and the fact that it operates in various locations in UK. Due to this, it is important to look at anti-Ahmadiyya sectarianism within the UK in relation to the historical and political 'othering' of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan, and the role that Khatme Nubuwwat movement has had in this process. Based on my interview with Sadaf Ahmad, it appears that the Muslim Council of Britain's response to the Ahmadiyya Community's discrimination, through not recognising the Ahmadiyya as Muslim and the investigation with the anti-Ahmadiyya views of some of its panel members, has not been adequate enough to address the systemic roots of why the Ahmadiyya are being increasingly discriminated against in the UK. Raising concerns, as expressed in elements of the media, that the MCB is facilitating an anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment.

Finally, based on the views of informants within the Ahmadiyya Community, the concern of the spread of anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment is that it is being facilitated through the access that preachers from Pakistan have in gaining visas to the UK and preaching at conferences around the country. Other factors include the availability of anti-Ahmadiyya hate literature that is aimed at targeting a particular audience and satellite TV channels having broadcasted programmes in the past targeting the Ahmadiyya Community, and the potential of this happening in the future. The engagement of the Community with the Government in tackling the causes of prejudice arising in Britain through the activities of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Ahmadiyya Muslims has allowed for the Community to gain political recognition, which has taken increased relevance following the murder, uncovering of leaflets, and the fact that in the aftermath of these events a known hate preacher with particular anti-Ahmadiyya views was granted a visa to preach in the UK.

Chapter 4: Approaches through which to theoretically consider the spring of 2016 and the discrimination occurring within the diaspora

Introduction:

Having given the historical background and development of the persecution and prejudice faced by the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan, and giving an overview of the emergence of anti-Ahmadiyya discrimination within the UK diaspora setting and what has been developing since the beginning of my research phase, I now turn to look at how one can theoretically understand and view this. Owing to the developing nature of the research topic at hand and my own focus being on giving voice to the emergence of anti-Ahmadiyya discrimination within the UK, the theoretical considerations have come second to the findings discussed and derive from what I believe can theoretically make sense of what has occurred during the spring of 2016. With this in mind, I have identified four theoretical aspects that can together make sense of the themes identified in this thesis. These are frame theory, which I discuss using the works of Benford and Snow (1986, 2000), diffusion theory with a focus on diffusion within social movements drawing on McAdam and Rucht (1993), diaspora mobilization and the diasporic condition as discussed by Martin Sokefeld (2006) and Jolle Demmers (2007), as well as the notion of alliances as presented by Stathis Kalyvas (2003). In what follows I set out and discuss each theoretical approach separately, laying out the core components of each one and discussing them in connection with different elements of the thesis. After this, I look at how they help bring theoretical understanding to each of the themes and sub-questions introduced earlier.

Social Movements and Framing

Benford and Snow use Erving Goffman's understanding of 'frame' to mean 'schemata of interpretation that enables individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and

label occurrences within their life space and the world at large'¹⁰⁷. In this sense, frames and the framing process are ways in which to make sense of the plethora of phenomena that occurs in the world and to categorise and ascribe meaning to them. Taken in this regard, frames are critical in the construction of meaning, and it is through them that we are able to say that we 'know' what we do. Social movement actors and those who are engaged in the work of constructing frames are seen as 'signifying agents' who work in producing this form of meaning through the medium of frames. According to Benford and Snow, the meaning construction or framing process 'denotes an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction'¹⁰⁸ the end result of which is known as collective action frames.

Collective action frames function to make sense and meaning in the world but with the aim of mobilizing potential supporters to engage in action. In this sense, collective action frames are 'action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of social movements organizations'¹⁰⁹. These frames have been broken down into three core framing tasks, which aim to address the issue of consensus mobilization and action mobilization¹¹⁰, the former aimed at harnessing agreement and the latter aimed at incentivizing action. These framing tasks have been referred to as diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framings. Diagnostic framing addressing consensus mobilization by looking at an aspect of social life as problematic and in need of change and aims to identify the source that is causing the problem. Prognostic framing deals with the process of presenting a solution to the problem that has been pointed out by the first core framing task, and thus is engaged in the business of action mobilization. The third core framing task, motivational framing is where the rationale to engage in action is presented, according to Benford and Snow, through the construction of an appropriate vocabularies of motives that include severity, urgency, efficacy, and propriety¹¹¹.

¹⁰⁷ Benford and Snow 1986

¹⁰⁸ Benford and Snow 2000 p. 614

¹⁰⁹ Ibid p 614

¹¹⁰ Snow and Byrd. *Ideology, Framing Processes and Islamic Terrorism Movements* 2007 p 124

¹¹¹ Ibid p 124

Benford and Snow have distinguished between the two characteristic features of collective action frames, the action orientated core framing tasks that I have described above, and the discursive processes that aid in the development of the frames that are then divided into three separate processes, discursive, strategic and contested. In the first instance, these processes refer to the ‘talk and conversation’ aspect of the development of frames and involve *frame articulation*, which involves the ‘connection and alignment of events, experiences and strands of moral codes so they hang together in a unified way’¹¹² and *frame amplification* involving ‘accenting and highlighting some issue, events or beliefs as being more salient than others’¹¹³. Strategic processes refer to framing processes that involve the social movement organization linking their interpretive frames to those of potential adherents, and this alignment process involves four elements, *frame bridging*, *frame amplification*, *frame extension*, and *frame transformation*. Finally, collective action frames are characterized by going through a contested process. As actors engaged in the construction of meaning through frames are involved with the ‘politics of signification’, they cannot impose any interpretation of reality that they want. The end frame that is produced is a result of a contested process that goes through the challenge of ‘*counterframing*’ by movement opponents, bystanders, and the media; *frame disputes* within movements; and the *dialectic* between frames and events’¹¹⁴. The most important element of this contested process that can be seen taking place in regard to the frame of the Ahmadiyya as a non-Muslim sect is the process of counter framing that has been defined as attempts to ‘rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person’s or group’s myths, versions of reality, or interpretive framework’¹¹⁵. The collective action frame of the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim and as being against Islam can be counter framed by the community in the diasporic sphere of the United Kingdom, something that was not possible in Pakistan.

In addition to the characteristic features of the collective action frames, Benford and Snow have highlighted the features of these frames that include the frames *problem identification and direction of attribution*, *flexibility and rigidity*, *variations of scope*

¹¹² Ibid 130

¹¹³ Benford and Snow 2000 p 623

¹¹⁴ Ibid p 625

¹¹⁵ Benford 1987: 75 as found in Benford and Snow 2000: 626

and most importantly the *resonance* they have within the target audience and culture. The concept of resonance attends to the question of why certain frames resonate more widely with a target group of adherents than others. Therefore, this is of central importance in understanding why the framing of Ahmadis as non-Muslim and against Islam has resonated in Pakistan and elements of the diaspora in the United Kingdom. Benford and Snow highlight the importance that the salience of the collective action frame can have to the targets of mobilisation. Within this, the issue of centrality plays a key role, because ‘the more central or salient the espoused beliefs, ideas and values of a movement to the target of mobilisation, the greater the probability of their mobilisation’¹¹⁶. A core element of the anti-Ahmadiyya frame is defending and safeguarding the finality of prophethood, which plays a very significant role in the beliefs of all Muslims regardless of sect. The use of this in the framing strategies of the anti-Ahmadiyya movements resonates with its target audience, the wider Muslim community, because of the fact that it is so central to their beliefs.

Cross National Diffusion and Social Movements

I shall be using elements of diffusion theory as applied to social movement theory to explain how the frame of the Ahmadiyya as a non-Muslim threat to Islam as espoused religious movements in Pakistan has managed to spread or diffuse cross-nationally to the United Kingdom. In doing so, I shall be using the work of McAdam and Rucht *The Cross National Diffusion of Movement Ideas* in setting out the core ideas within diffusion theory as understood within the context of social movement theory and then show how these concepts can be applied to the situation of the movements operating under the banner of the Khatme Nubuwwat concept within the United Kingdom.

Diffusion refers to when something spreads from one area or context to the next. Therefore, within sociology, diffusion theory is the study of how this spread of innovation occurs. It has been defined as ‘the spread of something within a social system’ with spread being taken as ‘flow or movement from source to adoptor, paradigmatically via communication and influence’¹¹⁷. Within social movement

¹¹⁶ Ibid 621

¹¹⁷ Strang and Soule.

theory, diffusion can help one answer the question of how social movement organizations ideas, practices and tactics manage to influence and spread across various parts of the globe. As well as what the conditions need to be present before the actual process of diffusion takes place for it to take place successfully, and what the modes and mechanisms are for it to happen¹¹⁸.

While diffusion is defined in a broader sense simply as the spread of an innovation, McAdam and Rucht define the concept of diffusion as ‘the acceptance of some specific item, over time, by adopting units-individuals, groups, communities-that are linked both to external channels of communication and to each other by means of both a structure of social relations and system of values, or culture’¹¹⁹. Therefore, a necessary condition for diffusion to occur is for there to be some mode through which a relation between the adopter of the item being diffused and the transmitter can occur for the process itself to happen, in addition to an understanding of similar values and beliefs so that the diffused item can fit within the overall project of the adopters. For this process to happen, they argue for four elements to be present, ‘(1) a person, group or organization that serves as the emitter or transmitter; (2) a person, group or organization that is the adopter; (3) the item that is diffused such as material goods, information, skills, and the like; and (4) a channel of diffusion that may consist of persons or media that link the transmitter and the adopter’¹²⁰.

The channel through which the diffusion can take place is an extremely vital component of the process of diffusion, for if there is no adequate connection between the adopter and the transmitter than the object of diffusion will not get sufficient exposure. For this reason, McAdam and Rucht distinguish between two models of diffusion that each has a distinct channel of diffusion. The first is known as the relational model of diffusion, and the second is the non-relational. A direct form of contact characterizes the former where there is a high level of interpersonal contact between the adopting group and the transmitting group, while the latter is characterized by a form of diffusion that occurs without interpersonal exposure and through routes such as the mass media and literature¹²¹. Diffusion that occurs through

¹¹⁸ Walso-Russo

¹¹⁹ Katz in Mcadam and Rucht

¹²⁰ Ibid p 59

¹²¹ Ibid 59

non-relational channels can be seen as playing a large role in the cross national diffusion process where transmitters and adopters are separated geographically, being in different parts of the world. McAdam and Rucht maintain that the process of diffusion involves a mix use of both relational and non-relational channels, however when it comes to cross-national diffusion 'it is simply the distribution and relative importance of these two channels that shift as we move from geographically proximate to geographically distant groups of actors'¹²², meaning that both will still be playing a role, but the extent to which one plays a more prominent role in the process depends on geography.

When applying the concept of diffusion to the study of social movements, McAdam and Rucht discuss the cross-national links between movements. In looking into the causal dynamics of how social movements are influenced and adopt certain items from one another, they argue for a 'model of cross-national diffusion that emphasizes the complementary of relational and non-relational channels in the adoption of movement ideas'¹²³. In presenting their case for this, they draw attention to the importance of an *attribution of similarity* between the adopters and transmitters, the thought is that if a successful diffusion is to occur there needs to be some form of identification that the adopting group have with the transmitting group. McAdam and Rucht maintain that the more interesting cases where diffusion occurs is when there is a greater level of identification between those who are adopting the object of diffusion and the transmitters, due to the fact that a greater level of identification that an adopter has allows for a wider scope of adoption of items from the transmitter. In looking at what factors allow for identification, they employ the concept of *institutional equivalence*¹²⁴ arguing that in regards to social movements those that share a similar structural basis with counterparts abroad will tend to look to one another as models on which to base themselves.

¹²² Ibid 60

¹²³ Ibid 63

¹²⁴ The term is borrowed from David Strang and John Meyer

This concept also fits well with the how the Khatme Nubuwwat movement is operating in the United Kingdom. As the *persecution of Ahmadis* website notes¹²⁵ the Khatme Nubuwwat movement as it exists in Pakistan is constituted by various different groups and people who each are involved in anti-Ahmadiyya activities. The different branches of Khatme Nubuwwat that operate are institutionally equivalent to those that operate in Pakistan, in that they are all aimed at ‘safeguarding the finality of the prophet’, and therefore the facilitation of cross national diffusion of the anti-Ahmadiyya frame is easier.

‘Imagined Transnational Community’ and the Diasporic Condition:

The flight of the fourth Caliph of the Ahmadiyya Community to London can be regarded as the moment in which the transnational dispersal of Ahmadiyya Muslims became a Diaspora in the sense of an ‘imagined transnational community’ as described by Martin Sokefeld. By theoretically defining the Ahmadiyya diaspora in the United Kingdom in these terms, and by looking at the diasporic condition, as defined by Jolle Demmers, in which the Community exists in the United Kingdom, we can make sense of how the Ahmadiyya Community were able to respond to the manifestations of anti-Ahmadiyya sentiments that occurred in spring 2016.

In making a case for diaspora to be understood as an imagined transnational community, Sokefeld takes the standpoint of constructivism. Building on this, he points to the fact that constructivism views ethnic identity as result of a process of attribution, however he argues that this does not diminish the importance of essentialist conceptions of identity due to the fact that ‘primordialism is a very powerful political device’¹²⁶. The important thing to note here is that by arguing that identity is a social construction, Sokefeld does not mean to lessen the real effects that these constructions or imaginations can have on us ‘imagined communities- nation, ethnic groups or others – are real because they are imagined as real, because they are

¹²⁵ A full account of how the movement is constituted by a splinter of different groups and what they do can be found here: <https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/the-on-going-anti-ahmadiyya-hate-campaign/>

¹²⁶ Sokefeld 266

taken as real and because they therefore have very real effects on social life'¹²⁷. Sokefeld maintains that given the fact that essentialist conceptions of identity becomes politically effective when they are endorsed by a number of people the crucial question is 'how these people are mobilized for such an identity, how they are made to accept and assume it' and in that sense 'identity becomes an issue of movement and mobilization'¹²⁸. With this in mind, when it comes to diaspora key essentialist identity markers such as the 'sentiments of belonging, attachment to a home and ideas of a place of origin'¹²⁹ are not the core that constitute diasporas, but rather the referent factors from which one can imagine it. It is because of this that Sokefeld proposes defining diasporas as imagined transnational communities defined as 'imaginings of community that unite segments of people that live in territorially separated locations'¹³⁰. He argues that defining a diaspora in this sense allows for both an objective and subjective definition of diasporas in that to count as a diaspora a collective group 'has to be a transnationally dispersed collectivity that distinguishes itself by clear self-imaginings as community'¹³¹. Therefore, within the new Sokefeldian definition of diaspora, a dispersal of a group from its original homeland is a necessary but not sufficient condition to qualify as a diaspora, what is also needed is a reflexive self-imagining of community that can happen through looking at the codes that imagination is facilitated through.

An important element to the imagination aspect of diaspora is the ability for members to be able to feel a sense of community that occurs discursively, and in giving his explanation of how this discourse of community comes to take place within a group and how it is that members engage with and participate in it, Sokefeld states that the construction of a diaspora deals with social mobilisation and thus needs to be looked at through the lens of social movement theory. He focuses on the three core elements of the theory that deal with social mobilisation that are *political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing*, and states that each one of these can be used in analyzing the mobilisation of transnationally dispersed people. Political opportunities in relation to diaspora mobilisation include means of communication, media,

¹²⁷ Ibid 266

¹²⁸ Ibid 266

¹²⁹ Ibid 266

¹³⁰ Ibid 267

¹³¹ Ibid 267

transport, and the legal and institutional frameworks through which claims to community can be expressed. In regards to mobilizing structures, Sokefeld states that by establishing networks the discourse of community can be maintained. Finally in regard to frames, he maintains that they include ‘all the ideas from which an imagination of community is composed’ but most importantly, he states that for diasporas, the notion of identity is a vital master frame that can be used to discursively solidify community sentiments. Framing processes and dynamics play a key role in bringing together the imagined transnational community through referring to specific events that effect the whole community and creating resonance within them.¹³²

In addressing how individuals are mobilized for identification with the imagined transnational community, Sokefeld highlights a few areas in need of consideration of which I will discuss three. These are the formation of diaspora in response to a specific event, agents of diasporic imagination, and the practices of mobilizing for this imagination¹³³. Firstly, Sokefeld states ‘events that trigger the emergence of a diasporic imagination ... can be regarded as ‘critical events’ in Veena Das’s sense, namely events that cause new modes of imagination and action to come into being’¹³⁴. Here the distinction drawn between the dispersal of a people and an imagination of community can be seen clearly. People can be living out of their homeland for a long time before an event triggers this imagination, meaning that there can be a varying lapse of time between the two. In instances where this is not the case, Sokefeld maintains that this is a consequence of persecution or communal violence. With regards to the second issue, agents of diasporic mobilisation, events can only be seen as having meaning and being critical when they have been framed in such a way, and actors are crucial in this process. He notes that initially it is going to be individuals within the community who will act as these agents and then over time these agents will come to be community institutions. Finally, Sokefeld argues that the mobilisation for imagination is facilitated through annual events and functions so that the imagination of the community can continue to occur over time. These can range from commemorations to large-scale conventions and gatherings. Applying these ideas to

¹³² Ibid 270-271

¹³³ Ibid 272

¹³⁴ Ibid 273

the Ahmadiyya Community in the United Kingdom, the critical events can be looked at in two manners, that of the 1974 constitutional amendment, which begun a large scale migration from Pakistan, or the 1984 Ordinance XX bills and the flight of the Caliph. While there has been an Ahmadiyya presence in the United Kingdom since 1913, these two events can be regarded as the main ‘critical events’ that kick started this imagination. The flight of the Caliph brought the organisation of the community itself to the diasporic context which has made it easier to harness this sense of community globally, through things such as the Muslim Television Ahmadiyya, And in terms of mobilizing practices, the annual peace symposiums and *Jalsa Salana* (annual community gathering) all help perpetuate this imagination of the community.

In her discussion of the diasporic condition, and the ways in which the context of the host country can enable and constrain diasporic imagination and action, Jolle Demmers highlights the role of diaspora lobbying and foreign policy¹³⁵. The host governments national and international policies and the way in which diasporas organize to engage with that is an important element in being able to raise awareness of the political situation in the country of origin. In the case of the Ahmadiyya diaspora, their response to the rise of prejudice against them in their host country and the way in which they have formed a lobbying group in the government to raise awareness of the persecution that they face around the world and to raise the governments awareness of their campaign against extremism is an example of how the political and structural context of the United Kingdom, an aspect of the diasporic condition, has given the Ahmadiyya diaspora the ability to mobilize in response to the on going persecution it faces around the world.

Alliances and dynamics in sustaining discrimination

In order to gain a theoretically informed understanding of the manifestations of prejudice against the Community in the United Kingdom, I use Stathis Kalyvas’ concept of *alliances*. Kalyvas has developed these thoughts in order to gain a better understanding of the complex dynamics at play during civil wars, however I use them to argue that the rise of discrimination that the Community have been facing in recent

¹³⁵ Demmers, J. 2007. *New wars and diasporas: suggestions for research and policy*

years should be understood in the context of private individuals carrying out their own private agendas that might be informed by the wider anti-Ahmadiyya frame, and in turn gives momentum to the wider cleavage against Ahmadis. Looking at it through this manner allows agency at the level of the individual, highlighting the various motives behind the acting out of prejudice. The purpose of arguing in this way is to address the fact that anti-Ahmadiyya hostility does not come from one source, but is multi-causal, therefore the discrimination that the Ahmadiyya are beginning to face in the United Kingdom is a result of private agendas. I take Kalyvas' concept of *alliance* and understand it in the sense of *discursive alliances*. By this I mean

Kalyvas' argument is based on showing that civil wars are not binary conflicts but complex and ambiguous processes that involves a plethora of identities, both political and private, at play in engaging with and adding to the civil war dynamics and therefore civil war should be studied at the two ontological levels of what happens on the elite level and on the ground at the level of the masses and local reality¹³⁶. While a full account of his argument is not needed for the present purpose, the concept of *alliance* is very helpful in understanding the dynamics of prejudice at play against the Ahmadiyya in the United Kingdom. Kalyvas defines *alliance* as 'a transaction between supralocal and local actors, whereby the former supply the latter with external muscle, thus allowing them to win a decisive local advantage; in exchange the former rely on local conflicts to recruit and motivate supporters and obtain local control, resources, and information'¹³⁷. While Kalyvas develops this concept as a way to understand civil war, it can also be applied to different forms of conflict, in the case of rising anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment, dynamics of sectarianism.

As has already been established, the belief that Ahmadiyya are not Muslim because of their acceptance of a prophet after Muhammad is one that is widely accepted within the Muslim community, but does not mean that discrimination or persecution will follow as a result. In addition, the anti-Ahmadiyya sentiments and hostilities, either in Pakistan or the United Kingdom is not coming from one central organization, rather there are a multitude of sources, such as religious social movements, are advancing

¹³⁶ Stathis Kalyvas. The Ontology of 'Political Violence': *Actions and Identities in Civil War*. 2003

¹³⁷ *ibid*

the master narrative and frame that is against Ahmadiyya. Thus, in the UK when instances of discrimination are carried out by private individuals it feeds into the wider anti-Ahmadiyya master frame that is being perpetuated by the Khatme Nubuwwat movement on a more top down manner and therefore sustains this anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment on the local level. Therefore the transaction and alliance between the supralocal and local actors can be purely discursive in the sense that instances discrimination can be cloaked in the anti-Ahmadiyya master frame that is being espoused by these groups, even if individuals might not be acting with them in mind. For example, one of my interviewees at Muslim Television Ahmadiyya told me that it is not uncommon to hear of cases where, even though not having anything against Ahmadis stayed away from them because they heard that they aren't Muslim¹³⁸. This illustrates the point that while anti-Ahmadiyya movements promote boycotts and social exclusion in their frames and sentiments against the community, on the ontological level of the individual dynamics play out in a different manner.

Placing these theories within the key themes of the thesis:

Historical exclusion and 'othering' of the Ahmadiyya:

The historical context of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan shows the development of a constructed identity created in part by the anti-Ahmadiyya movements that occurred through the way in which the community were framed as the 'diabolic other', and the consequences this had for them first from being accommodated in 1953 to being excluded from Muslim citizenship in 1974. It is important to look at the way an anti-Ahmadiyya frame held differing levels of resonance at different points during the historical development of the exclusion of the Ahmadiyya. One of the main aims of the Ahrar particularly in the form of the MTKN was to oppose the activities of the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistani society. After the independence of Pakistan their framing of the Ahmadiyya as a threat to Islam was a point of mobilization for support. The finality of prophethood being a central element in the anti-Ahmadiyya frame meant that it was able to gain widespread salience across a number of adherents and create mobilizing potential within them. The centrality of the finality of prophethood

¹³⁸ Interview with Ghalib Khan MTA conducted on 23rd May 2016

and the need to safeguard it from the dangers of the ‘Qadianis’¹³⁹ has allowed for anti-Ahmadiyya movements to conjure up ideas of the Ahmadiyya as a threat to Muslims. This tactic can be seen in the way that the MTKN used these theological differences to frame Ahmadis as ‘agents of the British’ to undermine the Muslims, and label Ahmadiyya politicians like Zafarullah Khan as working to undermine Pakistan’s interests for the sake of the western imperialists¹⁴⁰. Framing the Ahmadiyya identity within religious and nationalist discourses, in the fact that they are portrayed as deceiving the world of their Islamic identity because of their rejection of the finality of prophethood, and that they are conspiring with the west against Pakistan, had the ability to garner extensive resonance by playing on emotive religious and nationalist sentiments of the masses.

The way in which this frame is articulated through varying discourses throughout the history of Pakistan helps understand the way impact that the frame has had in Pakistan. The way the anti-Ahmadiyya religious movements played on the political dynamics at the time in articulating their frame is an example of the discursive processes involved in collective action frames. So for example, in 1953 the prognostic frame, which included declaring the Ahmadiyya non-Muslim, involved an element that was against the state in the fact that it sought direct action against the government to achieve this. However in 1974, this frame was articulated within the predominant discourse of the day that included renewed notions of Islam’s role in the Pakistani state and notions of democracy and the will of the people¹⁴¹. As has been addressed in the first chapter, the political settings, which formed the backdrop of the constitutional amendment, involved the humiliating defeat of Pakistan in the Bangladesh war, and the election of large numbers of Islamist parties who formed a coalition in opposition to Bhutto’s party. Thus, after the ‘Rabwah incident’ the anti-Ahmadiyya movement, comprising of the Islamist parties in Parliament such as the Jamaat e Islami and the Majlis Tahaffuz Khatme Nubuwwat, were able to reignite anti-Ahmadiyya frames, including the solution of declaring them non-Muslim and embed these within discourses of democracy and the will of the Muslims of Pakistan.

¹³⁹ Qadiani is a derogatory religious slur used against the Ahmadiyya community

¹⁴⁰ Taken from Kamran 2015, as discussed in the historical chapter

¹⁴¹ Saeed 2012 196

Mechanism of transferal of anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment and frame:

One way in which the anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment has arrived in the United Kingdom is through diffusion. Religious movements, such as Khatme Nubuwwat, are one clear way through which this diffusion process can occur. The various branches who operate in London and elsewhere in the United Kingdom can all be regarded as sharing the same values and beliefs to the movement in Pakistan, and in that regard also being *institutionally equivalent* to them in that all those who operate under the banner of Khatme Nubuwwat are aimed at protecting the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad and refuting the claims of Ahmadiyya Islam. Additionally, all four elements for diffusion to occur that McAdam and Rucht talk about are present in this case; the Khatme Nubuwwat movement in Pakistan acts as the transmitter, the different branches in the United Kingdom act as the adopter, there is an item that is being diffused which is the anti-Ahmadiyya frame, and there is a very direct channel of diffusion which links the two.

Both models of diffusion, the relational and non-relational are present in the cross-diffusion of the anti-Ahmadiyya frame from the movement in Pakistan to the United Kingdom. Additionally, while McAdam and Rucht argue that in cases of cross-national diffusion between groups in different areas of the world will have more of a non-relational aspect to it, the fact that there are various instances of Khatme Nubuwwat preachers coming from Pakistan to the United Kingdom to preach shows that in this instance high levels of relational diffusion, characterized by interpersonal contact, is present. Additionally, non-relational channels can also be identified through the fact that Khatme Nubuwwat conferences held in Pakistan, including speakers who come to the United Kingdom, are widely available on Youtube and other video-sharing channels online, and literature espousing anti-Ahmadiyya views are available on all Khatme Nubuwwat related websites. While the online availability of this material are a form of non-relational models of diffusion between movements, the wide accessibility of it has effects at an individual level too. What is important to note about this case is that the great level of identification between the movements who operate under the banner of Khatme Nubuwwat means that there will be a high

rate of ideas, literature, people and other forms of media being diffused between them.

Manifestation of discrimination and dynamics involved:

As has been discussed throughout, the empirical manifestation of prejudice against the Ahmadiyya Community has presented itself in the form of boycotts, anti-Ahmadiyya conferences, leafleting and most recently a murder. Owing to the complexity and multifaceted origins of anti-Ahmadiyya hatred, its manifestation in the UK cannot be understood as coming from only one source. Looking at the different occurrences of anti-Ahmadiyya prejudice through a modified understanding of Kalyvas' though on *alliances* allows one to see the varying motives behind the manifestation of prejudice, and that it is not necessarily a result of top down indoctrinations by anti-Ahmadiyya social movements. In his statement following the murder, Tanveer Ahmad stated that he did not kill Asad Shah for any other reason than the fact that he 'disrespected the messenger of Islam the Prophet Muhammad. Mr Shah claimed to be a prophet'¹⁴². The Imam from Glasgow's Ahmadiyya Mosque did inform me that the Community itself had been aware of the claims Mr. Shah had been making seeing it as signs of mental illness and were trying to help him¹⁴³. Therefore while the murder was framed within the context of anti-Ahmadiyya hatred coming to the UK, and while it has brought a genuine fear within the Community, the killer himself appeared to be driven by his own personal agenda against Asad Shah. Nevertheless, the murder was congratulated on social media by a Khatme Nubuwwat page, and the same master frame of the love of prophethood that the Khatme Nubuwwat movement is based on drove it. The uncovering of leaflets and the murder of Asad Shah, rather than showing an orchestrated agenda being acted out by one source, shows that prejudice against the Community is multi causal.

In the case of the leaflets being uncovered at Stockwell Green, Benford and Snow's three core framing tasks can be used to show how the identity of Ahmadiyya Muslims is constructed to be against Islam and what people should do about it. In the two

¹⁴² <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-35976958>

¹⁴³ Interview with Imam from Glasgow

leaflets, *Qadianiat Facts & Realities* and *Qadianis Differences with other non-Muslims*, Ahmadiyya Islam is portrayed as a lie that deceives innocent Muslims. In terms of *diagnostic framing*, the first leaflet states ‘the spiteful snake of the false prophethood of Mirza Qadiani is trying to swallow the faith of young Muslim generations’. The Community is described as ‘a cancer for the Muslim Ummah’ and ‘a conspiracy of enemies of Islam’ and owing to them being dualist-infidels, their threat to Muslims follows from them putting ‘a label of Islam on his Kufr and deceives Muslims by saying this is Islam’. Therefore, the problematic condition addressed is the Ahmadiyya harming the Muslim Ummah using Islam to spread their agenda around the world. In terms of *prognostic framing*, the overriding understanding of how to protect Muslims and safeguard the finality of the Prophet Muhammad is through educating people about the concept of finality of prophethood, raising awareness of the truth of Ahmadis and boycotting them ‘do not let Qadianis attend you functions, weddings and funerals. They should be resisted at all levels’. The *motivational framing* and the rationale to act are presented in vocabulary of urgency of protecting Islam from those who deny Muhammad’s finality ‘denying this belief means destroying the whole structure of Islam’.

The response from the Ahmadiyya community and what it can tell us:

Whereas Sokefeld applies his framework in terms of the formation of diaspora, I argue that the response of the Ahmadiyya community can be analysed as an instance of social mobilization and a way of strengthening community ties and thus reaffirming a sense of solidarity amongst the Ahmadiyya community in the UK. Given the fact that Sokefeld’s model focuses on the way discursive practices can help construct and maintain imaginations of community, it is necessary to look at how the discrimination the community has been facing fits into the broader narrative of persecution that they have faced around the world and caused the headquarters of the movement to relocate to London. It is for this reason that I said before the response of the community cannot be divorced from its wider response to extremism around the world. Looking at the Ahmadiyya diaspora as an imagined transnational community, we can understand their response through the lenses of political opportunity, mobilizing practices and framing. Specifically in regards to the last concept, the

prolific activities of the community in trying to dispel the bad image of Islam and portray itself as the true sect of Islam can be seen as a form of counter framing the notion that they are not Muslim.

In terms of political opportunity, the very diasporic condition that is available to the community in the UK is an opportunity to mobilize around an imagination of community. This is not to say that there is no ability to mobilize around an imagination of community in Pakistan, rather it is to point to the apparent fact that owing to the various anti-Ahmadiyya laws in place, this imagination cannot happen in the public sphere. Therefore the legal and institutional frameworks, including the freedom of religion, are an opportunity for the community to openly practice their own beliefs. Additionally, the APPG Ahmadiyya is an example of the way in which the community is using their diasporic condition as an opportunity to engage with the British government in addressing the persecution of the community who are still living and suffering in Pakistan. The debate in Parliament regarding the murder and the frequency of hate preachers coming to the UK is another illustration of how the community has mobilized in response to an event that shocked the community, and how they used the opportunities present in their own condition to lobby the government about it, something that is simply not possible in Pakistan.

In terms of the mobilizing structure and practices that allow for an imagination of an Ahmadiyya ‘community’, I see these practices that allow for an imagination of community coming from the unity and rigid structure with which the Ahmadiyya operates. The united against extremism campaign that was launched in Scotland can be looked at as a commemorative event which served two functions; the first reflecting outward where the campaign was to show the solidarity of communities together over fear and religious violence, and the second being that it reaffirmed communal bond through discursively reifying thoughts of the Ahmadiyya motto ‘love for all, hatred for none’ within the community.

Sokefeld’s thought on identity as a vital master frame for diasporas also applies to the Ahmadiyya community, and can be most notable in the aftermath of the murder and media attention into anti-Ahmadiyya prejudice. Identity and the right to self identify as a sect of Islam has been an extremely significant factor for the Ahmadiyya given

their situation in Pakistan. The Ahmadiyya as a peaceful sect of Islam who promote ‘love for all, hatred for none’ was one of the central focus points of the media and the politicians who addressed the murder in Parliament. The community for its part has also promoted this image of itself to the British public, ‘we want to portray ourselves as a positive way of how to integrate into society. You can be a Muslim and still be British’¹⁴⁴. The freedom within the UK that the community has to portray itself as a denomination of Islam has led to a type of ‘framing contest’ between those who deny the Muslim character of Ahmadis and the community itself. Additionally, each frame carries differing levels of resonance within the British public and the diaspora sphere. The frame of the Ahmadiyya identity as being Muslim resonates more with the wider British public, and media framing aids this. On the other hand, the frame that the Ahmadiyya are non-Muslim tends to resonate more within the diasporic sphere¹⁴⁵. The ‘unite against extremism’ campaign also shows the symbolic and discursive contestation against the framing of Ahmadiyya being non-Muslim. As discussed in the previous chapter, the purpose of it was to show the people of Glasgow ‘the true nature of Islam as a peaceful religion’. In light of the murder causing fear of a spillover of sectarianism, characterized by a denial of Ahmadiyya identity as Muslims, the community used this as an opportunity to condemn extremism in the name of Islam thereby reifying the imagination of the Ahmadiyya community as a Muslim sect.

Conclusion:

Within Pakistan, religious social movements such as the MTKN used the tenet of the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood, and the need to protect it, in constructing a frame of the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim. This was aided by the social and political dynamics at play in Pakistan, where religion has always been a salient feature of social life. Given this, the anti-Ahmadiyya frame was able to resonate within society because of the centrality that this tenet plays in the beliefs of so many Muslims. The

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Ghalib Khan. Muslim Television Ahmadiyya. 23rd May 2016

¹⁴⁵ I say this from my own observations during research and numerous informal discussions had with non-Ahmadiyya Pakistani Muslims. As this is an observation it cannot be said that this is an absolute truth. Additionally, everyone I spoke stated their opposition to the persecution faced, but maintained that because they believe in a prophet after Muhammad, Ahmadis do not qualify as Muslims.

states decision to institutionally embed this in through the second amendment and the Ordinance XX bills has allowed for it to be discursively reified within society through state policy¹⁴⁶ and has artificially created a religious minority within Pakistan. The diffusion of this frame, and the sentiments within it, to the UK diaspora setting occurs through the high levels of interpersonal contact between the movement in Pakistan and the UK. Owing to the same reason it does in Pakistan, this frame also resonates within small minorities of the Pakistani Muslim diaspora, that then manifests as latent inter-diasporic discrimination that is hidden from the wider British public's eye. The diaspora condition of the UK allows Ahmadiyya community to respond in a way that reaffirms their sense of community and also results in counter frame process whereby the community maintains their notion of Islamic identity

¹⁴⁶ The Muslim declaration on passports being an example

Chapter 5: Conclusion.

The focus of this thesis has been on drawing attention to a phenomenon that has only recently started to gain wider attention; the discrimination faced by Ahmadiyya Muslims within the wider Muslim community in the UK. Thus the question asked in this research has been *how has the sociopolitical exclusion of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan transferred to the UK diaspora setting, and in what way was this manifested in the spring of 2016?* In attempting to address how discrimination targeting the community has surfaced in the diasporic setting of the UK, I have highlighted the importance of placing this in context with the history of persecution that the community has faced in Pakistan. Doing so brings to light how the theological difference that sets the Ahmadiyya apart from the wider Muslim community, the finality of prophethood, entered the political realm as a point of contention in deciding whether the community belonged to the fold of Islam or not, thereby socially constructing and structurally embedding the identity of the community from without as a non-Muslim minority and resulting in the Caliph's shift to London. With this in mind, I set out to look at how the ideology that promoted this excommunication of the community has transferred onto and is being manifested within the diaspora setting of the UK, as well as the response from the community, with a focus on the main anti-Ahmadiyya incidents that took place during my research period.

Realising the broadness of the question posed, I have focused my attention on one mode through which I see this transferal of anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment taking place, which is the transnational activities of the Khatme Nubuwwat movement and the different branches in the UK that operate under its guise. Doing this has allowed me to bring theoretical light onto the empirical reality observed during my research by seeing how an antagonistic frame of the Ahmadiyya is actively being brought to and spread within the UK. By focusing on modes of transferal between Pakistan and the UK I do not address other causes for anti-Ahmadiyya prejudice that might arise from the diasporic context itself. However, addressing the situation through the perspective that I have is in accordance with the concerns that informants have discussed with me as well as what I have observed during my research; that the frequent travel of anti-

Ahmadiyya clerics to the UK to preach at mosques, the free availability and distribution of literature¹⁴⁷, a lot of which has been produced in Pakistan by branches of the movement there, and the free online availability and accessibility of anti-Ahmadiyya¹⁴⁸ conferences hosted in the UK and Pakistan are all factors in the spread of this sentiment. Therefore, the way in which the transferal of this particular anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment occurs through this mechanism, and the way that it manifests and is being sustained in the UK is an important element in understanding the inter faith discrimination faced by the Ahmadiyya in the diaspora setting. By splitting the main research question into four key themes of inquiry, a clearer picture as to how anti-Ahmadiyya discrimination has arrived and taken hold within the diaspora setting can be given.

In addressing the first theme and answering its corresponding sub-question, we must look at theological difference and the framing of this in alienation and persecution of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan. The historical process through which the anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment gained traction and eventually became institutionally embedded in Pakistan should be looked at through the manner in which anti-Ahmadiyya movements framed their sentiments about the community. This was done in a manner that from a societal perspective played on the fears of the masses. And from a political perspective, in 1953 targeted their grievances against the government, then in 1974 managed to articulate these sentiments through narratives about democracy and the will of the people. This process of constructing the identity of the Ahmadiyya as a heretical other was a result of interplay between the state and anti-Ahmadiyya movements of which the Majlis Tahaffuz e Khatme Nubuwwat has been a key player. Looking at the Ahmadiyya in the historical context of Pakistan, I argue that the notion of the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim came to be as a result of political Islam in Pakistan. The shifting nature of the state and its relationship with Islam, and the gradual increase of influence and power of the Islamic parties and movements, meant that politics was

¹⁴⁷ The Khatme Nubuwwat Academy in London extensively publishes books and leaflets in Urdu and English about the Ahmadiyya. A frequent preacher at the academy is Sohail Bawa, who Asif Basit told me was the editor of the Khatme Nubuwwat magazine in Multan that is dedicated to promoting anti-Ahmadiyya rhetoric.

¹⁴⁸ Mostly from what I have observed from the internet and what people have told me these conferences are organized by the Khatme Nubuwwat movement

increasingly defined and justified through Islam. While the politicization of the theological difference began much earlier through the formation of the Ahrar and subsequently the MTKN, the institutionalization of this difference in 1974 reified these differences in such a way that it embedded the Ahmadiyya as a non-Muslim minority in public discourse.

In addressing the second theme and answering its corresponding sub question, the Khatme Nubuwwat plays a large part. While not being the only factor in the construction of the Ahmadiyya as a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan, I have stressed the importance of highlighting the historical role that the MTKN has played in its opposition to the Ahmadiyya community due to the fact that it has been one of the main sources active in preaching against the Ahmadiyya in the UK. As pointed out in chapter three, it has been active in the UK since 1984 and since has established itself in different locations and branches. In my discussion of the movement I have focused on the two mosques and one academy that have been the most prominent in the media's attention during my research phase. The connection that they have with the movement in Pakistan is more than a shared ideological understanding, although this does play an important role in the transferal of anti-Ahmadiyya sentiments and frames. The fact that there are preachers coming to the UK and speaking at Khatme Nubuwwat conferences is an apparent illustration of a 'relational model of diffusion' that involves high levels of interpersonal contact between the transmitter and adopter of the object of diffusion that in the case of the Khatme Nubuwwat movement is an anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment through an antagonistic frame.

In addressing the third theme and answering its corresponding sub question, what I have discussed in my empirical chapter is the fact that the latent form through which it has expressed itself was brought to public attention following the murder of Asad Shah¹⁴⁹. In this regard the dynamics in which the anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment affect the forms of discrimination within the diasporic setting are different to that of Pakistan, where the legal framework has given sanction to violent persecution on the societal level. This contrast in the legal and political setting of Pakistan and the UK diasporic context means that the discrimination against the Ahmadiyya will inevitably play out

¹⁴⁹ From what I gather, the Channel 4 news piece was the first to address anti-Ahmadiyya discrimination in London.

in a way that is hidden to the non-diasporic eye. While I have focused on one source from where the sentiment calling for these discriminatory practices emanates from, this leads to the question of who participates in the discrimination itself and for what reasons. To assert that it is all being orchestrated by one source is unjustly simplifying the situation, does not give agency to the individual and is also not true. By employing Kalyvas' notion of alliance, we can account for how the individual, informed by the master narrative against Ahmadiyya but acting on his or her own agenda or beliefs through taking part in discrimination are then feeding back into this master narrative. This can be seen through the way in which the murder of Asad Shah was welcomed by a Khatme Nubuwwat facebook page¹⁵⁰ despite the fact that the motives of Tanveer Ahmad, based on what his police statement says, had not been primarily due to the fact that Asad Shah was an Ahmadiyya. In addition to this, what I find to be an interesting point of consideration when addressing the question of how the sentiment has manifested in the UK, is the statement condemning the murder of Asad Shah and clarifying its position on the community released by the MCB. Given that fact that it is the largest national representative umbrella body for Muslims in the UK, the statement is symbolic in the way that it reifies the identity boundary between the Ahmadiyya and wider Muslim community. While the statement in itself cannot be construed as a manifestation of discrimination, members of the community I spoke with did feel a sense of division caused by the statement, as one interviewee put it 'what is being said is "people can believe you are not Muslim, but we condemn the violence"'¹⁵¹.

Finally, looking at the fourth theme and answering its corresponding sub-question, the response of the community to anti-Ahmadiyya discrimination being expressed in the UK should not be divorced from its wider campaign against extremism and Islamic terrorism. The engagement of the community with the government through its lobbying parliamentary group, and its nationwide 'unite against extremism' campaign, as well as its engagement with the wider British public in showing Islam as a religion of peace, through holding annual peace symposiums on a national and local

¹⁵⁰ Picture can be accessed on the daily mail website:
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3513888/Facebook-page-posts-Congratulations-Muslims-message-peace-loving-Islamic-shopkeeper-stabbed-death.html>

¹⁵¹ Interview with Surfaraz Mustafa

level are a few of the examples of its push against extremism. Specifically relating to the discrimination that the community has been facing in the UK, they have continued to urge the government to address the issues that are affecting their sense of security, the most pressing issue repeatedly brought to my attention during the research being the travel of well known hate preachers coming from Pakistan and preaching at anti-Ahmadiyya conferences across the UK. These ways of engaging with the British public and government are examples of how the Ahmadiyya community in the UK have used political opportunity in the diaspora setting for mobilization to discursively reconstruct imaginations of a sense of community from within, but also how it has used this setting in raising awareness and gaining support in tackling this particular form of extremism and intolerance that targets the Ahmadiyya by placing it within the wider threat facing everyone from religious extremism.

Finally, putting these aspects together and giving an answer to the main research question posed, the socio-political exclusion of the Ahmadiyya community has transferred onto the diaspora setting by a diffusion of a particular anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment that is characterized by antagonistically framing the community as being non-Muslim and against Islam due to their differing understanding of the finality of Muhammad's prophethood, which played a large part in the exclusion of the Ahmadiyya on a state and societal level. One channel in which this process of diffusion is occurring within is the proselytizing activities of the Khatme Nubuwwat movement in the UK and its close ties with the movement in Pakistan. The manifestation of this in the spring of 2016 came to light within the media following the murder of Asad Shah and the unraveling of the latent discrimination faced by the community within the diasporic sphere often hidden from the non-diasporic public sphere. As a result of this, the community has once again, through the use of political and legal channels as well as on its own, renewed efforts to raise awareness of and tackle the extremism faced by members of its own community as well as the threat that extremism poses to the wider British public.

The way that the discrimination against the Ahmadiyya is being propagated and justified by the Khatme Nubuwwat movement in the UK shows how the socio-

political exclusion of the Ahmadiyya from the ‘Muslim citizenship’¹⁵² in Pakistan has had far reaching consequences outside of its own borders. The distribution of leaflets targeting the Ahmadiyya across London and other cities in the UK, the boycotting of Ahmadiyya owned shops, social ostracisation of someone because they are an Ahmadi, and most recently the murder of Asad Shah are illustrations of the very real consequences that the politics of sectarianism in Pakistan are now beginning to have around the world.

Taking a step back and looking at everything that has happened and unfolded during the time span of my research period, something that I have found myself grappling with is how to connect all the elements together in a manner where I could see for myself and convey to others the significance and wider impact of what has happened. There are so many elements to this story that I have only managed to capture a snapshot of it, and present it in this thesis. As my primary focus was on the development of this story within the media and the community itself, the argument that I have constructed as to how the discrimination against the Ahmadiyya has gradually taken root in the UK has been based purely on what I have discovered within my three months of research and speaking to members of the community, journalists and politicians who have all been engaged in raising awareness of the discrimination and the sources of it. Therefore, what has been presented in this thesis is based on my own interpretation of events, which has quite naturally been influenced by the informants I have spoken to. Because of the time frame of my research and the natural course of events that have taken place, quite a few points of inquiry have been left unanswered one of them being the decision on the investigation into the Stockwell Green mosque by the MCB. The outcome of the investigation will be an interesting development to note, given the background of certain members of the panel that were brought to attention by the media.

The present case at hand is shedding light onto a new and emerging phenomenon that is taking place at the moment. It shows a new dynamic in diaspora politics, in that the homeland conflict and ideology of hatred that vast numbers of the Ahmadiyya

¹⁵² I borrow this term from Saeed 2007

community, including its leadership, had to flee from in Pakistan has now begun to manifest itself outside of this homeland setting. While the Ahmadiyya community have found a space within the United Kingdom to express itself free from persecution and prejudice, the same mindset that has allowed this to occur in Pakistan is now beginning to take hold within small minorities of the British Pakistani diaspora. In applying the model of Sokefeld's 'imagined transnational community' to the Ahmadiyya community in the UK, a diaspora within a diaspora can be identified, and the characteristics in mobilizing for an imagination of community can be seen playing out as a consequence of the events in the spring of 2016. As yet, we must wait and see what the aftermath of the events will be, both on a national wide level for the UK, but also within the Pakistani diaspora community. However, one area for further research that I believe is important in light of its prominence in the media and the interviews conducted in this research is an in-depth frame and discourse analysis of the Khatme Nubuwwat movement and the particulars of how they frame the Ahmadiyya. While I have touched upon frame theory in my theoretical considerations, I believe an in depth look into this component would advance what has been discussed in this thesis.

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