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Amsterdam's counter-radicalization policy: Struggling with the separation between church and state

Amsterdam's counter-radicalization policy: struggling with the separation between church and state

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Contents

Introduction

Let me begin by explaining how I have chosen my thesis topic. Almost a year ago, I read that Amsterdam counters radicalization by training Muslims in role model positions to talk to young Muslims on the streets about radical Islam. It triggered my curiosity. How did Amsterdam go about training these role models? What did it do to counter radicalization?

I dived into Amsterdam's policy, analysing its responses to radicalization over the last ten years. This led me to discover an important dilemma within the development of counter-radicalization policy: the balancing of security reasons with human rights such as freedom of religion. It might be that stimulating moderate interpretations of Islam and using role model-Muslims to confront youth susceptible to radical influences is a very effective way to counter Islamic radicalization. However, when does this approach get to the point that it breaches people's freedom of religion? Furthermore, government intervention into religion is limited by the principle of separation between church and state.

The city council and executive board of Amsterdam have vividly debated this dilemma in the past ten years. This thesis aims to research the influence the debate has on the development of counter-radicalization policy. This thesis explores the following main research question:

How does the political debate in the municipality of Amsterdam regarding the security-human rights nexus within its counter-radicalization policy influence the policy process?

This is done by breaking the phenomenon down into its constituent parts and analysing the relationship between them. The first chapter deals with theory on policy processes, forming the theoretical framework. The second chapter explains the security-human rights dilemma. The third chapter elaborates on radicalization and counter-radicalization. The fourth chapter describes Amsterdam's formal policy regarding counter-radicalization. The fifth chapter shows the interplay and discussions about the dilemma within the city council and executive board of Amsterdam. Lastly, the conclusion answers the main research question.

This thesis will give insights in the development of policy in the light of a complex dilemma. Its findings can be valuable to the municipality of Amsterdam, but other municipalities dealing with similar issues can also benefit from the findings.

Chapter 1: the policy process

Introduction

This thesis examines the policy process of Amsterdam's counter-radicalization policy. This chapter will elaborate on the concept of policy and how I interpret this concept. For this I will be using an interpretative epistemology and a structurationist ontology. This chapter provides an answer to the questions of: what is a policy process and how can it be interpreted? The methods of this research are explained at the end of the chapter.

Epistemology and ontology

In this research thesis, I take the epistemological and ontological stances stated above: interpretative and structuration. I believe that agency and structure are mutually constitutive such that action is only meaningful in terms of its relationship to structure and the latter only exists as such in terms of human behaviour (Jabri 1996: 78). The interpretative view on epistemology claims that humans are not guided by general rules of behaviour, but by the meaning they give to the social world. This interpretation of meaning is historically and culturally specific and different for every individual. Therefore one can only make sense of human action by asking individuals about their experiences, motivations and world-view. This is studying the social world from within, looking at the meaning of action (Demmers 2012: 16).

The concept of policy

Policy is a word that is often used to describe the implementation of political decisions. When a political authority makes a decision, policy is developed as a plan to carry out that political decision in which lower levels comply to the high level decision. It has a clear objective, which makes the action carried out because of the policy comprehensible and legitimate. However, when we look more closely at the development and implementation of policy, the policy process appears to be more complex. Colebatch states that there are two dimensions of policy: the vertical dimension and the horizontal dimension (Colebatch 2002: 12).

The vertical dimension of policy is the one described above: it is the exercise of authority to achieve collective purposes. This view consists of three underlying assumptions. Firstly, policy is seen as a means to achieve objectives (instrumentality). Secondly, policy is a formal decision coming from the authority at the top of the hierarchical power pyramid. And lastly, policy is coherent: it is coordination to organize a single system (Colebatch 2002: 16). The thought behind these assumptions is that all organizations are set up to pursue goals. In case of the government, the goal is the optimal improvement of people's welfare. This shows some aspects of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism: the government wants to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people possible.

The vertical policy process can be boiled down into the 'policy cycle'. It always starts with a problem, or a situation that is recognized as a problem. The first step in the policy process is to determine the goals of the policy, which is usually solving the problem. Secondly, courses of actions are chosen according to these goals. Thirdly, the courses of action are

implemented. After implementation, the results of the actions are evaluated. The policy is modified according to the evaluation. In this way, policy consists of a cycle that starts with the recognition of a problem and ends with the problem being solved. It is outcome-oriented and top-down (Colebatch 2002: 50).

The horizontal dimension of policy focuses more on the empirical reality of the policy process. Besides the authority at the top of the hierarchical system influencing the policy process, there is a broad range of different actors that are also able to influence the process. This dimension is not a clear step-by-step process, but is much more complex and diffuse. Participants in the policy process can be employees of the government institutions that are appointed to 'make' policy, but can also be employees controlling the institution's resources deciding on how to distribute these resources within the institution. Other people can be involved in the process as well, like lobby groups, citizens united in an interest group or experts on the specific policy area. This list is not exhaustive.

All of the participants in the policy process interpret a situation or problem differently, and the process is aimed towards negotiating a shared understanding of the situation. In this way, policy is a "multi-person drama in several arenas", according to Schaffer (1977: 148 in Colebatch 2002: 47). Creating and maintaining order amongst the diversity of participants in the process is key, so that a structured interaction can take place. This view is more process-oriented and bottom-up.

Policy as a combination of vertical and horizontal dimension

The vertical view on policy is the dominant paradigm in our society. However, only taking into account the vertical dimension implies a set of determined and clear goals. As appealing as the image might be of an institution that knows exactly what it wants to achieve and works towards that goal in one straight line, often goals are unclear and consist of many overlapping, contradictory or separate smaller goals. Support is needed in order to implement action to achieve certain goals. Broad and unspecific statements of goals are most likely to attract broad support, but are also more difficult to interpret.

I will look at policy taking into account both the vertical and the horizontal dimension. Colebatch's definition of policy is relevant in this respect: "Policy is a term used to refer to the structuring of collective action by the mobilization of a model of governing as authorized decision-making" (Colebatch 2002: 130). A lot of actors participate in the policy process, negotiating a shared understanding of the situation. Deliberation in collective, interactive discourse establishes workable policy, which deals with conflicting values as best as possible (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003: 178). To structure this collective action, the model of the hierarchical and authorized decision-making is mobilized. This legitimates the outcome of the policy process and makes it acceptable to all parties.

Looking at policy as having a horizontal and vertical dimension complies with the structurationist ontology of this thesis. Agency and structure are mutually constitutive. The vertical dimension of policy, as a formal statement by one authorized decision-maker, constitutes structure. The horizontal dimension, as the negotiation of a shared understanding with a range of participants, constitutes agency. These two dimensions are complementary,

not contradictory, and can influence one another. By negotiating a shared understanding of an issue and making policy, the policy participants codify and stabilize practices but can also change practices. Structuration acknowledges that individuals have agency and can make their own choices, but it also takes into account that people are encapsulated within a larger social structure that to a certain extent dictates how they should behave. Individuals are purposive actors, but also role occupants within an institutional framework (Jabri 1996: 70). This institutional framework can be limiting or enabling the actor. This view is thus a duality of structure: structures influence individuals, but individuals also influence structures. This thesis does not merely look at the formal policy documents, but also examines the interaction that took place amongst a selection of policy participants in order to fully understand the policy process, because this gives insight in the meaning the participants attach to the policy problem. This approach reflects the interpretative epistemology of this thesis.

Various participants are involved in the counter-radicalization process, such as frontline professionals, academic experts, but this research limits itself to the city council and the executive board. This is partly a practical choice: their discussions have been recorded in city council records, which are publicly available, which makes it possible for me to research. Furthermore, I think that the municipal board and the city council have the greatest influence on policy processes within the municipality. They are the ones most directly involved in creating policy.

Framing in the policy process

Policy participants have the need to interpret and order the often chaotic situation that is the policy problem. Frames are used in the policy process to represent knowledge and to draw on shared values in order to create order in the chaotic process, to facilitate interpretation, and to guide action. "Actors express beliefs through these normative-prescriptive stories that interpret an uncertain, problematic, or controversial situation into a policy problem that names a phenomenon and implies a course of action" (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003: 174). These frames shape views on what counts as progress and mediate the relationship between thought and action in policy making. Through a policy frame, facts and beliefs can be intermingled to provide a guide for action. Therefore, frames are not simply tools that are used strategically by policy participants to achieve certain goals, but frames are also efforts to make sense of a changing situation and to coordinate action containing aspects of the identity and beliefs of the policy participant. Thus, framing policy offers a framework that enables people and values to be appropriately located and recognized (Colebatch 2002: 61).

A problem can be framed, but can also be reframed. Policy participants can change their mind and have doubts about the validity of the dominant policy frame. Reframing a policy problem can open the way for new policy measures and solutions. This implies that the way a policy problem is interpreted and framed within a policy process has a large influence on which policy measures are viewed as suitable and acceptable. This interaction in a debate causes ongoing redefinition of the sense of a problem and of actor's understanding of their roles in the process.

Method

This section will explain how I went about researching Amsterdam's counter-radicalization policy process. Qualitative research was conducted by collecting and analysing data in the form of policy documents, records of city council meetings, in-depth interviews and relevant academic literature. The relevant academic literature has been used to create a theoretical framework.

First, I collected all of Amsterdam's formal policy documents regarding radicalization in the period from November 2004 until now. I did this as part of an internship at research firm Lokaal Centraal. All formal policy documents are publicly accessible and can be found on Amsterdam's website, just like records of city council meetings. The website has a search engine. I searched for 'radicalization' and 'radicalization policy'.[1] Once I had created a list of all policy documents, the research firm contacted Amsterdam's main policy official on the field of radicalization, she checked the list and sent us a few more documents to complete the list. This enhanced the reliability of the list I had created. I analysed the policy documents to get a picture of the development of the formal policy.[2]

Second, I searched for all relevant records of city council meetings. The website of the municipality of Amsterdam has a city council archive section, in which all of the records, attachments, written questions etc. are stored.[3] I used various key words to search for relevant documents. The key words I used were (translated into English): 'radicalization', 'We, people of Amsterdam', 'separation church state', 'West mosque', 'Marhaba', 'polarisation' and 'jihadism'.[4] I searched for those key words in the period November 2004 – now, each time limiting the search engine to search within a period of one year at a time. Every time I searched for a key word, the search engine generated a lot of documents. About 50 documents were generated per search. I went through the documents one by one and searched for the key words in the documents, to get to the relevant section quickly. Most records of city council meetings contain a minimum of 50 pages. Sometimes the key words I was looking for were used in a different context in the document, like when a city council member incidentally mentioned the word 'radicalization', but the discussion was about a different subject. This 'quick scan' of documents was needed to determine in which city council meetings a debate relevant to the security-human rights nexus in the counter-radicalization policy took place, because only those meetings were relevant to my research. Eventually I created a list of documents containing records of city council meetings relevant to my research. I analysed the development of and interaction in the discussions in the city council records I had downloaded.

Thirdly, I compared the analysis of the city council discussions with the analysis of the formal policy. Looking into the debates in the city council meetings and putting them beside the

[1] The website is: http://www.amsterdam.nl/veelgevraagd/?Zoe=radicalisering&mode=zoek, accessed on 21 July 2015. The key words in Dutch are: 'radicalisering' and 'radicaliseringsbeleid'.
[2] A detailed description and analysis of Amsterdam's formal policy on counter-radicalization in Dutch can be found in the research report that will be published by Lokaal Centraal in fall 2015. My thesis contains a concise analysis of the policy, in the light of this thesis' objective.
[3] http://zoeken.amsterdam.raadsinformatie.nl/cgi-bin/search.cgi/action=search, accessed on 21 July 2015.
[4] The actual key words used in Dutch: 'radicalisering', 'Wij Amsterdammers', 'scheiding kerk staat', 'Westermoskee', 'Marhaba', 'polarisatie', 'jihadisme'.

formal policy documents allowed me to discover connections between the two. I formulated preliminary conclusions from this data analysis.

Lastly, from the city council meetings and the formal policy I determined which politicians have been very influential in the policy process. These were the people that responded every time a new policy plan was presented and had a clear opinion in the debate. I created a list of politicians I wanted to speak to and found out their email addresses by searching online or calling their party office. I contacted all of the people on my list, which consisted of 11 people.

Unfortunately, both Cohen, former mayor of Amsterdam, and the current mayor Van der Laan were not available for an interview. Asscher, who was a city council member and executive councillor in Amsterdam, does not give interviews about his former jobs. He is now minister of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Aboutaleb, a former executive councillor who is now the mayor of Rotterdam, was not willing to cooperate. Four people responded positively to my message. I interviewed three of them. Unfortunately, making an appointment with the last person proved not to be possible due to conflicting schedules.

The in-depth interviews with relevant policy participants allowed me to obtain information about the policy process, which I could not derive from formal policy documents or records of city council meetings. The interviews also helped verify the information I had obtained earlier and preliminary conclusions I had formulated. This established triangulation, obtaining information about the same phenomenon from different sources to enhance reliability of data. Triangulation by means of conducting interviews allowed me to formulate a final conclusion based on documents, the interviews and related to relevant literature.

Conclusion

In researching my main research question, I look at policy as having a horizontal and a vertical dimension, taking in mind Colebatch's definition. "Policy is a term used to refer to the structuring of collective action by the mobilization of a model of governing as authorized decision-making" (2002: 130). I look at the formal policy documents regarding counter-radicalization, but I also examine closely the interplay between the city council and the executive board of the municipality. This provides me with a fairly clear image of the policy process, taking into account the limited time available for this thesis research.

Chapter 2: The security-human rights nexus

Introduction

The city council and executive board of the municipality of Amsterdam are debating about a certain dilemma within counter-radicalization policy. On the one hand, the municipality has to do everything in its power to protect its citizens' safety. On the other hand, the municipality has to guarantee its citizens' ability to enjoy their human rights. These two obligations can conflict. When the two conflict, which one should be given priority over the other? This question becomes especially apparent in the development of Amsterdam's counter-radicalization policy. This chapter will explain the dilemma and highlight its complexity. It answers the question of what the security-human rights nexus entails within Amsterdam's counter-radicalization policy.

Human rights

This thesis focuses on the Netherlands. Therefore, only the human right treaties relevant to this country will be discussed.

The European Union has its own covenant on human rights, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The European Court of Human Rights protects this covenant. The Court can be accessed relatively easy and it is successful in enforcing the ECHR. The ECHR applies in all countries that have ratified the treaty. The Netherlands has ratified the ECHR.[5]
The Netherlands has a constitution, which also contains the basic human rights, but Dutch law prevents citizens from invoking the rights of the Constitution before the court in art. 120 Dutch Constitution. Therefore this constitution can be seen as a 'dead law', which is never tested by judges. In practice the ECHR is always invoked in human rights-related cases before Dutch courts. Furthermore, international covenants supersede national laws meaning that when a national law contradicts an international rule, the international rule prevails, according to art. 94 Dutch Constitution.

Four human rights of the ECHR are especially important to the understanding of the security-human rights nexus. To begin with, the right to life is the most important human right codified in the Convention. This rule states that no one shall be deprived of his life intentionally, only when it is ordered by a court sentence in which the person is convicted for a crime for which this penalty is provided for by law: art. 2 ECHR. Therefore the only entity that has the power to take a person's life is the state, by means of a lawful verdict. The second important human right is art. 9 ECHR: freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right entails the right to change one's religion and to manifest one's religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. The third important right is art. 10 ECHR: freedom of expression. This right includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority. The fourth important right is art. 8 ECHR: the right to respect for private and family life. This right includes the right to privacy in one's home and in one's correspondence.

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[5] As can be seen on the website of the Council of Europe:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTableauCourt.asp?CL=ENG&MA=3, accessed on 20 July 2015.

The member states of the ECHR are the duty bearers of the rights codified in the treaty. That means that they are under a positive obligation to make sure that their citizens can freely enjoy their rights without being limited by any group or person. The state cannot infringe the rights of its own citizens, but must also ensure that individuals unconnected to the state do not infringe the rights of its citizens. Therefore, it is said that the rights in the ECHR are not only vertical, meaning that the apply between the state and the citizen, but these rights are also horizontal and apply amongst citizens. The purpose of this positive obligation is to maximize the effectiveness of all of the rights codified in the ECHR (Akandji-Kombe 2007: 9).

Thus, the state is responsible for protecting and guaranteeing the rights of its citizens, as codified in the Convention. However, sometimes rights may conflict. For instance, when the police suspects a citizen from making plans to kill another citizen, the police may tap the person's phone to obtain more information. This information may lead to evidence about the person's plans and can make arresting of the person possible. This may prevent the person from killing another citizen, and thus protect the right to life of the latter, as stated in art. 2 ECHR. However, the measures have breached the suspect's right to privacy, as stated in art. 8 ECHR, because the police have listened in on his private telephone conversations. There are rules about when a state can justifiably breach a right of the Convention. These rules were made for situations such as the one described above, when two (or more) rights conflict.

The rights in the ECHR are in principle absolute, but can be restricted by a state when the restriction meets certain conditions, laid out in paragraph two of the specific right. These conditions are further explained in the *Sunday Times* jurisprudence.[6] Member states have a 'margin of appreciation' when exercising restrictions, but eventually the European Court of Human Rights decides whether the conditions have been sufficiently fulfilled.

A right can be restricted when all of the following conditions are met:
1. The restriction must be prescribed by law, which is accessible and sufficiently precise;
2. The restriction must be necessary: it must respond to a pressing social need and it must be proportionate;
3. The restriction must serve one of the goals stated in the second paragraph of the specific right in the Convention.

Security is included as a goal in the second paragraph of all of the rights in the ECHR. When a state has serious security reasons to breach an individual's rights and all of the other restriction conditions mentioned above are met, a state is allowed to restrict the human right. For the example mentioned above, this means that when the police has a founded suspicion a person will engage in an act dangerous to society, and telephone tapping can subvert that danger and is prescribed by an accessible and sufficiently precise law, the police is allowed to use that measure in the name of security.

This seems clear-cut and transparent. However, sometimes it is not clear whether a state can fulfil all of the restriction criteria and is allowed to restrict an individual's rights. Only after an individual has filed a complaint before the European Court of Human Rights, the Court reviews the case and tests if the state has acted according to the Convention. This means that

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[6] *The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom,* European Court of Human Rights, 26 April 1979.

it is up to states to decide in first instance whether they are entitled to restrict rights. It is not always clear to states when a restriction falls within the conditions and is thus justifiable. In some cases the state grants itself too much freedom, despite its already broad margin of appreciation. This has also happened in The Netherlands.[7] There can be a thin line between the prevalence of security and the prevalence of the human right. In these cases it is key for states to sufficiently argue why security reasons should overrule human rights.

The case of counter-radicalization policy

Counter-radicalization policy is an interesting field, in which several human rights can conflict. When a person is fully radicalized, he or she can engage in violent acts. For instance, an Islamic radical can bomb a tube station, killing and wounding many people and spreading fear across the country, similar to the incident that took place in London in 2005. Bombing a tube station and killing people is a clear example of violation of citizen's right to life. The state is responsible for making sure its citizens can freely enjoy their right to life. Therefore, the state should protect this right and prevent people from breaching it. The state could even justifiably breach the suspect's human rights in the name of security, because the breach will most probably fulfil all of the restriction conditions laid out in the Convention.

However, the state would want to prevent the bombing instead of arresting the perpetrator afterwards. Preferably, the state would want to intervene as early as possible, when the person is not yet fully radicalized. The earlier the state can intervene, the better, because it is assumed that reversing a process of radicalization is easier when the person is in an early stage of the process. However, in an early stage of radicalization, a person probably will not have planned to bomb a tube station yet or to engage in another act of violence. In the case of the bombings, the threat to security was obvious. When a person makes concrete plans to conduct a bombing, the security threat is also clear. But when a person does not intend to do any of those things, but is opposed to the principle of democracy, or believes that Dutch atheists are sinful, does this constitute a threat to security? Taking measures against such a person, which may breach his or her human rights, can this be justified in the name of security?

There is a grey area within counter-radicalization policy, in which it is not exactly clear whether a person's actions constitute a security threat that justifies taking policy measures that breach the person's right to privacy, or freedom of religion. Police officers, schoolteachers and other frontline professionals are told to report a person who has suddenly started wearing traditional Islamic clothes, or has expressed critical thoughts on democracy.[8] These signs may indicate that the person concerned may be in a process of radicalization. The police may start to follow that person to keep an eye on him, breaching his right to privacy. The municipality may prohibit an imam to speak at a public event because he

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[7] See ECHR factsheet on The Netherlands: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Netherlands_ENG.pdf, accessed 5 June 2015. In the past years, The Netherlands has even unjustifiably violated the most essential right to life several times.

[8] SNRP, folder voor jeugdwerkers, 2015.

has expressed anti-democratic views in the past, breaching his freedom of expression.[9] A district mayor may force a mosque to sign a contract that determines that the mosque has to abide to a moderate interpretation of Islam, breaching the mosque's freedom of religion (Maussen 2007: 21).[10] In these cases, is the risk to security obvious? Intervening at that stage may prevent a person from radicalizing further and ultimately prevent an attack. On the other hand, the individual might never engage in an attack. We cannot predict the future. This security-human rights nexus is what makes counter-radicalization policy a complex field, open to many different interpretations.

The dilemma within counter-radicalization policy in Amsterdam

In the following section, the security-human rights nexus as it is prevalent in the municipality of Amsterdam will be explained. Some information about the background of the dilemma within counter-radicalization policy will help to understand the way the municipality deals with this dilemma.

The security-human rights nexus within counter-radicalization policy has become prevalent in the interplay and discussions within the city council and the executive board of the municipality of Amsterdam. The dilemma in Amsterdam focuses specifically on the balancing of security versus freedom of religion within the security-human rights nexus. This dilemma is operationalized by conducting a discussion about the separation between church and state. Debating about the extent to which policy measures can intervene in people's religion in order to counter radicalization makes the security-human rights nexus manageable and more tangible for the municipality of Amsterdam.[11]

The principle of separation between church and state is one of the constitutional principles of Western democracies. This principle can be interpreted in several ways. Simplistically, there are three main categories of interpreting this principle (Oldenhuis et al 2007: 8). The first is the established church: one religion is privileged and seen as the foundation of society. The UK is an example of a country with an established church. The second way to interpret this principle is that there is a strict separation between church and state, like in France. Here, religion is kept strictly outside of the public domain. The third mode of interpretation is pluralist cooperation, a form historically present in The Netherlands. Religion is not kept out of the public domain and the state can finance the church. A condition is that the church should not intervene in the state's core business and the state should not intervene in the church's core business.

The separation between church and state is closely related to the freedom of religion. Article 9 ECHR states that everyone is free to practice his or her religion. The extent to which the

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[9] This is what the municipality has done to an imam that wanted to speak at youth centre Argan. The municipality received a lot of criticism because of this restriction of freedom of expression and later on admitted that it could have acted otherwise: Municipality of Amsterdam, 'De Argan-brief', 10 March 2015.

[10] This is what a district in Amsterdam has done to the West mosque, elaborated on later on in this thesis.

[11] This dilemma is confirmed by Demant et al. Demant et al have researched the ways in which municipalities can respond to radicalization. They stress a difficulty in stimulating deradicalization, namely the secular character of our society. Because of the separation of church and state, the state cannot freely interfere with religion, which makes it difficult for the state to establish a dialogue with Islamic radicals and be fully involved in their deradicalization process (2008: 96).

state can influence the practice of religion in the public domain depends on how the state interprets the principle of separation between church and state (Maussen 2007: 21). However, the state must always ensure the free enjoyment of the right laid down in art. 9 ECHR.

Neutrality is key when a state intervenes in religion, to make sure that no citizen is discriminated against because of his or her religion (Maussen 2007: 28). Equal treatment ensures neutrality. The state can finance a certain religion, while at the same time financing other religions equally. However, neutrality can be achieved in different ways, it does not require equal treatment all the time. There is exclusive neutrality, meaning not funding any religion. There is also inclusive neutrality, which means funding all religions. And then there is compensating neutrality, which relates to the funding of disadvantaged religions so that all religions have access to an equal amount of benefits.

In relation to measures that aim to counter radicalization, this is what the municipality of Amsterdam is debating about: "To what extent can measures intervene in religion to protect security, without breaching citizen's freedom of religion and the principle of separation between church and state?"

Views differ when it comes to deciding which type of neutrality should be chosen and which interpretation should be given to separation between church and state. When a certain type of religion is believed to counter radicalization, is financing that religion more than other religions necessary for safety reasons, or is it against the principle of separation between church and state? Is it against people's freedom of religion when some religious institutions receive more government funding than others?

Conclusion

Citizens in The Netherlands can invoke human rights codified in the ECHR. The free enjoyment of these rights should be protected and guaranteed by the state. However, situations can occur in which two or more human rights conflict. Security is a reason for one human right to outweigh another. In case of a risk to security, a state can justifiably limit a human right, like freedom of religion. However, in the case of radicalization, it is not always clear when a person constitutes a threat to security and when his or her human rights can be restricted to avert that risk.

The municipality of Amsterdam has debated about this grey area within its counter-radicalization policy for years. Another concern for the municipality, besides breaching citizen's freedom of religion, is the principle of separation between church and state. Intervening in religion in the name of security may not only breach freedom of religion, but may also overstep the separation between church and state. The dilemmas these questions pose are prevalent in the development of Amsterdam's counter-radicalization policy. Therefore the city council has extensively debated to what extend measures should intervene in religion to protect security, without breaching citizen's freedom of religion and the principle of separation between church and state.

Chapter 3: Radicalization, counter-radicalization and policy responses

Introduction

This thesis focuses on the policy response of the municipality of Amsterdam to the issue of radicalization. Radicalization is a concept that is gaining increasingly more urgency (Schmid 2013: 1). However, the concept is defined in different ways and responses in politics and policy differ widely. This chapter provides a brief description of the theoretical understanding of radicalization dominant in The Netherlands. This is relevant for an understanding of the context of the development of Amsterdam's counter-radicalization policy. This chapter answers the question of what radicalization is and how it could be countered according to the literature.

The problem

The term radicalization was brought into the academic discussion after the bombings in London and Madrid in 2005 and 2004 respectively. Since then, the concept has gained popularity and is used often in the media and by politicians (Schmid 2013: 17). The term has become central to terrorism studies and is used, inter alia, to explain the root causes of terrorism. The majority of the literature focuses on Islamic radicalization, which may be caused by the blowback effects of the US-intervention in Iraq in 2003 (Schmid 2013: 1). It has become one of the main areas of attention of European security practice (De Goede and Simon 2013: 332).

There is no clear definition of the term radicalization. However, having looked at a multitude of different understandings I will use the definition used by the national Dutch government. It was developed by the national intelligence agency. It is dominant amongst the Dutch municipalities and is also used by the municipality of Amsterdam. There are countless other definitions that try to grasp the meaning of radicalization. This thesis does not claim that this definition reflects the meaning of radicalization the best, because this is not the aim of this thesis. Keeping the objective of this thesis in mind, I chose the definition that is used by the municipality of Amsterdam in the process of developing its counter-radicalization policy.

Radicalization is: *"(actively) pursuing and/or supporting radical changes in society, which could pose a threat to (the survival of) the democratic order (objective), possibly with the use of undemocratic methods (means), which may undermine the functioning of the democratic order (effect)."[12]*

The radical Islam, according to the Dutch national government, is a multiform and dynamic phenomenon with a variety of threats: "The diversity within contemporary radical Islam is associated with a variety of perceptions regarding "the evil of Western oppression of Islam"

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[12] Ministry of Home Affairs/AIVD , *Van Dawa tot Jihad*, December 2004, p. 15. Own translation of: *"Het (actief) nastreven en/of ondersteunen van diep ingrijpende veranderingen in de samenleving, die een gevaar kunnen opleveren voor (het voortbestaan van) de democratische rechtsorde (doel), eventueel met het hanteren van ondemocratische methodes (middel), die afbreuk kunnen doen aan het functioneren van de democratische rechtsorde (effect)."*

and differing visions on alternatives for this."[13] Due to this fluidity of radical Islam, the national government has not introduced a universal definition of the concept.

The national intelligence agency has identified three main categories of radical Islam. The first form focuses on the political power of the West. To break this power, an alternative of religious Islamic political power needs to be installed. The ultimate goal is to establish a universal Islamic caliphate. Followers of this type of radical Islam reject the democratic order of Western states and strive for a political system based on their interpretation of Islam.[14] The second form of radical Islam focuses on cultural dominance by the West. The Western lifestyle is seen as depraved and a threat to the pure Islam. The alternative is a society based on Islamic morals, such as the rules laid down in the Sharia. The primary goal is 'purifying' the Muslims that have been under the influence of sinful Western morals.[15] The third and final form of radical Islam focuses on countering both the political and cultural dominance of the West. It is less religiously motivated in its alternative but focuses more on the Muslim identity. An example of this form is the Arabic-European League (Arabisch-Europese Liga).[16]

Islamic radicals are dangerous to Dutch society, according to the national intelligence agency, as they view the Dutch democratic system as illegitimate and see Sharia and an Islamic caliphate as the ultimate goal.[17] They are viewed as a threat to national security (Veldhuis and Bakker 2009: 8). People that have joined the Jihad in Iraq or Syria are seen as the most dangerous because they have gained fighting experience and may have radicalized further while they were amongst more Islamic radicals.[18]

In short, one may say that in The Netherlands, Islamic radicalization is defined as the growing willingness of Muslims to join a form of radical Islam. The radical Islam strives for radical changes in society, which poses a threat to the democratic order.[19] The municipality of Amsterdam relies on the analysis and definitions provided by the national intelligence agency.[20]

Possible causes of radicalization

"The causes of radicalization are as diverse as they are abundant" (COT 2008: 11 in Schmid 2013: 1). This means that it is not clear what exactly causes an individual to radicalize. However, although we are not completely sure, several studies have managed to give an idea concerning the causes of radicalization. Some of the findings will be discussed below.

A term often mentioned in relation to the causes of radicalization is polarisation. Polarisation is, simply put, a growing separation between different groups in society accompanied by

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[13] Ibid. p. 20. Own translation of: "De diversiteit binnen de hedendaagse radicale islam hangt samen met een variatie aan percepties met betrekking tot 'het kwaad van de westerse onderdrukking van de islam' en uiteenlopende visies op alternatieven hiervoor."
[14] Ibid. p. 21.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ministry of Home Affairs/AIVD, *Transformatie van het jihadisme in Nederland,* 30 June 2014, p. 63.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ministry of Home Affairs/AIVD, *De gewelddadige Jihad in Nederland*, March 2006, p. 12.
[20] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Wij Amsterdammers*, 20 January 2005, p. 5.

increasing feelings of hostility. These groups can be divided amongst ethnic or religious lines but can also be a divide between young and old, poor and wealthy, for instance. Polarisation in relation to Islamic radicalization means the growing segregation between Muslims and the rest of the citizens in The Netherlands.[21] Moors et al have studied the relationship between polarisation and radicalization. Their conclusion was that radicalization contributes to polarisation and vice versa (2009: 58).

Other factors that could be of influence in radicalization processes are the public opinion about Muslims and Islam and perceived stigmatization and exclusion (Demant et al 2008: 94; Van den Bos et al 2009: 97; Veldhuis and Bakker 2009: 19). It seems that especially young people who feel stigmatised can turn to religion to find a degree of structure. The sense of exclusion could make them more prone to accepting certain ideologies that proclaim illegal methods. Young people are looking to form their own identity, and religion fulfils that identity impulse by providing shared values, structure and stability (Seul 1999: 567; Moors, Van den Reek Vermeulen and Siesling 2009: 112; Veldhuis & Bakker 2009: 7). Youth often get in touch with religion online, and the social climate of some forums on the Internet can have a large role in Islamic radicalization (Lenselink 2011: 57; Veldhuis and Bakker 2009: 18). Social media like Twitter and Facebook are used for recruitment and indoctrination by fighters in Iraq and Syria (Klausen 2015: 17).

Counter-radicalization

Because Islamic radicalization is seen as a threat to national security, efforts have been made to stimulate processes of 'disengagement' and 'deradicalization' among individuals who are believed to have been radicalized.

The term deradicalization refers to a "cognitive rejection of certain values, attitudes and views – in other words, a change of mind" (Schmid 2013: 29). In relation to deradicalization, disengagement is a term often heard. Disengagement means the behavioural distancing from radical modus operandi. A person can be disengaged in the sense that he or she is no longer participating in, for instance, group discussions or other actions regarding radical Islam, but he or she can still hold radical views. Therefore it is often said that disengagement comes before deradicalization (Schmid 2013: 29). The distinction between ideas and actions is relevant here.

Policy responses

To develop a solution for radicalization aiming to establish deradicalization or at least a degree of disengagement, remedies are sought for the causes of radicalization. This is problematic, as we are not exactly sure what causes an individual to radicalize. A plethora of different approaches has been developed to counter radicalization, not one being the 'perfect solution' to the problem.

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[21] Ministry of Home Affairs, *Actieplan polarisatie en radicalisering 2007-2011*, 27 August 2008, p. 5.

In The Netherlands, the national government and local governments argue for an approach that incorporates repressive and preventive elements.[22] Amsterdam's policy response to radicalization will be discussed elaborately in the next chapter.

Conclusion

Radicalization is the process in which a person rejects the democratic order and pursues or supports radical changes in society, possibly by using undemocratic means to undermine the democratic order. The radical Islam strives for an alternative to the "evil oppression of Muslims by the West". In the last decade, the attention for radical Islam in The Netherlands has grown. There seems to be a link between ideological radicalization and illegal or violent actions. Followers of radical Islam are deemed dangerous by the national intelligence agency because their actions could harm the democratic order. Whether there really is a strong link between ideology and illegal actions is not known, but the government assumes this link is very important. To avert the danger of illegal and violent actions, the government wants to intervene in the radicalization process. The state is looking to effectuate deradicalization, which is a change in thought away from radical beliefs, or disengagement, which is a change in behaviour. Therefore, state agencies can have an interest in promoting a more moderate interpretation of Islam, to reduce the influence of radical Islam. However, notions of human rights or separation between church and state can impede this strategy. The subsequent chapters will elaborately look at how Amsterdam has dealt with this dilemma.

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[22] See for instance the most recent national approach laid out in the Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2014/08/30/actieprogramma-integrale-aanpak-jihadisme.html, accessed on 17 June 2015.

Chapter 4: Amsterdam's formal counter-radicalization policy process

Introduction

The municipality of Amsterdam has a long experience in creating policy regarding radicalization. More than ten years ago the first policy plan was drafted. Amsterdam's policy has served as an example for many other municipalities dealing with similar issues looking to create effective policy. Despite this experience, the debate about the security-human rights nexus has remained vivid in Amsterdam's policy process. In this section, ten years of formal policy are explored. This chapter answers the question of how the formal policy has developed.

Setting the scene

The starting point of my research is the day that critical filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered: November 2nd, 2004. Jihadist Mohammed B. stabbed him to death while Van Gogh was riding his bike in the Linnaeusstraat.[23] Later, Mohammed B. declared to the police that his actions were the fulfilment of a religious duty. Van Gogh had insulted Islam and therefore Mohammed was obliged to defend his religion by killing him.

This event shocked The Netherlands and especially the city of Amsterdam. It raised questions like: do more Muslims feel like Mohammed B.? Are they also capable of such actions? The mayor, municipal executive councillors and the city council were confronted with the issue of Islamic radicalization and the urgency to create some sort of policy on the matter. Before this significant day in 2004, policy had been created on the subject of safety and terrorism, but no policy plan had been especially aimed at preventing and countering Islamic radicalization.

The day after, mayor Job Cohen spoke to the city council. He said that this murder was an expression "of hate and fear between the Dutch and the Moroccans. […] Unfortunately the threat of terror from the fundamentalist political Islam has come very close even in our country."[24] Cohen stressed that the rights laid down in the Dutch Constitution like freedom of expression and freedom of religion belong to everyone. "At the same time, all of us have to more importunately ask ourselves when the freedoms in our Constitution change into unfreedoms, for example when the freedom of expression changes into the freedom to offend. Is that what we want in our society?"[25]

In the next decade, an extensive counter-radicalization policy was created. The first plan was presented by the mayor and municipal executive councillors three weeks after Van Gogh's death, and has been elaborated on and adapted through the years. Today, Amsterdam counts as one of the cities in The Netherlands with the most experience in countering radicalization.

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[23] Remarkable fact: this is the street where I was born.

[24] City council meeting afternoon 3 November 2004, own translation of "haat en angst tussen Nederlanders en Marokkanen. […] Helaas is de dreiging van terreur door de fundamentalistische, politieke Islam ook in ons land zeer dichtbij gekomen."

[25] Own translation of "Tegelijkertijd moeten we ons met zijn allen nadrukkelijker afvragen wanneer de vrijheden uit onze Grondwet omslaan in onvrijheden, bijvoorbeeld wanneer de vrijheid van meningsuiting omslaat in de vrijheid om te beledigen. Is dat wat we in onze samenleving willen?"

Despite this impressive experience, the debate in the city council about the scope of counter-radicalization measures has remained vivacious. To what extent should the municipality get involved in people's beliefs? It is not prohibited to have an extreme ideology. Only when those beliefs are acted upon by using violence or hate speech, it becomes very clear that the municipality has to intervene. But before that moment in time, during the stages possibly leading up to the event, there is a grey zone in which it is not clear whether the municipality has a right, or maybe even an obligation, to intervene.

Opinions on the matter have changed during the years; the composition of Amsterdam's city council and the municipal executive councillors has changed, a new mayor has been installed, but the policy on counter-radicalization has constantly continued to develop.[26] Before zooming in on the vivid political discussion about the security-human rights nexus in the counter-radicalization policy, I begin by describing the development of the formal counter-radicalization policy.

Formal policy 2004-2015

The first policy plan that was drafted specifically to prevent and counter radicalization was the plan 'We, people of Amsterdam'.[27] The plan had three main goals: fighting terrorism, countering radicalization and preventing polarisation (by focusing on anti-discrimination for instance). The last goal of preventing polarisation was the main focus of the policy.[28] "Instead of the impending polarisation between Muslims and non-Muslims, the 'in-group' should be made as large as possible."[29] According to the municipality, the in-group means "all people from Amsterdam who reject violence and accept the basic rules of our society".[30] This policy strategy thus entailed convincing people to accept and live by the basic norms of Dutch society. In policy terms, this is called: "promoting good citizenship".[31]

The approach this policy plan strived for was a broad one, with hard and soft aspects. The hard aspects consist of repressive measures aimed at individuals who have already radicalized considerably. The soft aspects encompass investing in activities that connect and empower vulnerable people and counter discrimination and polarisation. This broad approach is continued in the following policy documents regarding radicalization, the 'progress report We, people of Amsterdam' and 'We, people of Amsterdam II'.[32] A special information management centre was installed to receive all reports of (suspected) radicalization.[33] Police

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[26] See the annex on changing political composition of Amsterdam's city council and executive board.

[27] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Wij Amsterdammers*, 20 January 2005.

[28] Ibid. p. 5.

[29] Ibid. p. 5: own translation of: "In plaats van de dreigende polarisatie tussen moslims en niet-moslims, moet de 'wij-groep' zo groot mogelijk worden".

[30] Ibid. p. 5: own translation of "alle Amsterdammers die geweld afwijzen en de basisregels van onze samenleving accepteren".

[31] Ibid. p. 6.

[32] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Voortgangsrapportage Wij Amsterdammers*, 28 April 2005 and *Wij Amsterdammers II*, 28 February 2006. The term 'broad approach' is explicitly mentioned on p. 8 of *Wij Amsterdammers II*.

[33] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Beleidskader van de gemeentelijke informatiehuishouding radicalisering*, 24 October 2006, p. 3.

officers, youth workers and other frontline professionals were trained in recognising signs of radicalization and dealing with people in a radicalization process.

The next addition to the counter-radicalization policy was the plan 'Amsterdam against radicalization' in late 2007.[34] The broad approach was maintained, but the plan included more repressive measures aimed at people in a further stage of radicalization. Detecting early warning signs of radicalization became more important. The policy plan still focused on countering the root causes of radicalization, such as preventing discrimination and polarisation.

For several years, it became quiet on the policy front. A process evaluation of the counter-radicalization policy in 2009 determined that a lot of the counter-radicalization measures would be integrated into existing policy.[35] The budget for counter-radicalization policy halved in 2010, to €2,6 million, instead of the €4,4 to €5,4 million per year that had been available before 2010. The main reason for downscaling the budget and range of counter-radicalization measures was that the perceived threat of Islamic radicalization had become less, according to the national intelligence agency.[36] However, it remained an issue for policy measures.[37] Therefore a lot of counter-radicalization measures were to be integrated into existing policy structures to ensure their continuity.

An important changing point in the policy is the reorientation in 2012.[38] The budget was halved once again. Reasons given for this were the "reduced threat and increased resilience of the population of Amsterdam."[39] The broad approach was explicitly abandoned and the new approach would be 'risk-based' focused on actual identified risks. Measures would be more specific, aimed at individual interventions instead of general prevention of radicalization. A lot of soft aspects of the approach had been integrated into regular policy structures in 2010. Therefore, the specific counter-radicalization policy contained more hard aspects in the form of repressive measures. This is a significant difference from the previous policy plans, the main focus of which was on prevention of polarisation. "In comparison with the previous approach, the above means that less is done under the heading of counter-radicalization policy, but the measures will be more focused and more specific. The risk-based approach means that the biggest risks will be tackled first, which makes the use of instruments and resources more efficient."[40]

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[34] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Amsterdam tegen radicalisering*, 15 November 2007.

[35] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Procesevaluatie Wij Amsterdammers/Platform Amsterdam Samen*, 30 June 2009, p. 7.

[36] Ministry of Home Affairs/AIVD, *Lokale jihadistische netwerken in Nederland*, July 2010, p. 21.

[37] For instance by introducing special counter-radicalization measures in schools: Municipality of Amsterdam, *Beleidsnotitie radicalisering in het hoger onderwijs*, January 2010.

[38] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Herorientatie radicaliserings- en polarisatiebeleid*, May 2012.

[39] Municipality of Amsterdam, city council notice Herorientatie radicaliserings- en polarisatiebeleid, 12 June 2012, own translation of: "de afgenomen dreiging en de toegenomen weerbaarheid onder de Amsterdamse bevolking", p. 5.

[40] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Herorientatie radicaliserings- en polarisatiebeleid*, May 2012, p. 25. Own translation of: "In vergelijking met de eerdere aanpak betekent het bovenstaande dat er minder wordt gedaan onder de noemer van aanpak radicalisering en aanpak polarisatie, maar dat dit wel meer specifiek en meer gericht wordt. Doordat de aanpak risk-based wordt worden de grootste risico's het eerst aangepakt waardoor de inzet van instrumenten en dus middelen efficiënter wordt."

Another significant change introduced by the reorientation is that the focus was more on security risks. Previously, the definition of polarisation used by the municipality of Amsterdam in its counter-radicalization policy was the one used by the national government, which stated that polarisation is "the sharpening of differences between groups in society that can result in tensions between these groups and increasing segregation along ethnic and religious lines."[41] The reorientation stated explicitly that this definition would be abandoned and the following definition would be used, which describes polarisation as "possible tensions between groups that result in a structural increase of the risk to the social security of these groups."[42] The change in definition clearly shows the shift of focus from segregation to security risk.

In 2013 and 2014, international developments caused national governments to put Islamic radicalization back on the top of their political agenda. The rising rebel group Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria explicitly called upon young Muslims in the West to turn their backs on their national governments and join IS in their fight to establish an Islamic caliphate. This confronted many Western countries with an increase in polarisation between Muslims and non-Muslims. In The Netherlands, the national intelligence agency stated that the resilience of Muslims to radical influences had reduced and the threat from radical Islam had increased significantly.[43] Many young Muslims left The Netherlands to join IS in Iraq and Syria.[44] Some of those individuals were stopped at the Dutch border, but some were killed in battle in Iraq or Syria and some of them returned to The Netherlands. These international developments caused the municipality of Amsterdam, the police and the national prosecution to label Islamic radicalization as a top priority in their regional security plan.[45] The risk-based approach as introduced in 2012 would be strengthened as a response to the increased security risk.

The mayor introduced a strengthened counter-radicalization approach in his letter to the Commission of general affairs in May 2015.[46] At the same time, a new policy plan was introduced, which focused on dialogue between different groups in society.[47] The budget for counter-radicalization policy measures was raised considerably, partly accounted for by the national government. The exact budget is not yet known.[48]

Several difficulties in drafting counter-radicalization measures are named in Van der Laan's letter regarding strengthening of the counter-radicalization policy. The most important difficulty is that there is no clear evidence on what kind of measures are effective in

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[41] Definition introduced in *Actieplan Polarisatie en Radicalisering 2007-2011*, Ministry of Home Affairs, 27 August 2007, own translation of: "de verscherping van tegenstellingen tussen groepen in de samenleving die kan resulteren in spanningen tussen deze groepen en toename van de segregatie langs etnische en religieuze lijnen."

[42] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Herorientatie radicaliserings- en polarisatiebeleid*, May 2012, p. 27, own translation of: "mogelijke spanningen tussen groepen die resulteren in een structureel verhoogd risico voor de sociale veiligheid van deze groepen."

[43] Ministry of Home Affairs/AIVD, *Transformatie van het jihadisme in Nederland*, June 2014, p. 61-62.

[44] The estimated number of Dutch citizens who have joined IS is 160, stated by the municipality of Amsterdam in its letter *Aanscherping aanpak radicalisering*, May 28, 2015, p. 2.

[45] Municipality of Amsterdam, police of region Amsterdam-Amstelland and OM, *Regionaal Veiligheidsplan 2015-2018*, 1 December 2014, p. 8.

[46] Mayor Van der Laan, *Aanscherping aanpak radicalisering*, 28 May 2015.

[47] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Actieplan Dialoog 2015/2016*, 28 May 2015.

[48] Mayor Van der Laan, *Aanscherping aanpak radicalisering*, 28 May 2015, p. 14.

countering radicalization. The effect of state interventions on the radicalization process is extremely hard to measure. It is unclear whether repressive measures really help deradicalizing individuals, just like it is unclear whether general preventive measures really prevent radicalization. Another difficulty in drafting policy measures is that some policy measures now seem to have negative effects, like the revocation of passports to stop individuals from leaving the country to join IS.[49] Therefore, the mayor poses the question: "Is it therefore better to place the emphasis on prevention of radicalization and exit?"[50]

The risk-based approach introduced in 2012 is maintained. However, measures are introduced that put more emphasis on protecting vulnerable individuals and groups and countering polarisation. The policy plan focused on dialogue introduces a range of policy measures aimed at dealing with the root causes of radicalization and countering tensions between different groups in society. The main way of achieving these goals is by facilitating dialogue between different groups, sharing knowledge about the background of different groups in society and strengthening the resilience and sense of safety of all people in Amsterdam. Sharing knowledge about the background of different groups in society will create a mutual understanding between these groups and could thus help to alleviate tensions amongst them. This plan thus focuses strongly on soft aspects of counter-radicalization policy, which were not included in the risk-based approach of 2012 because all preventive measures were supposed to be integrated into regular policy structures.

The two policy plans introduced in May 2015 show a move back from a sober, risk-based approach to a broader approach. The current policy does not only focus on hard, repressive measures based on actual identified risks, but also includes soft, preventive measures aimed at all citizens of Amsterdam.

Unorthodox measures in Amsterdam's counter-radicalization policy

In early 2007, Ahmed Marcouch, district mayor of the infamous borough Slotervaart, set up a local pilot project against Islamic radicalization.[51] This policy plan consisted of unorthodox measures aimed at young Muslims.[52] Marcouch found that the religiousness of the youth in his borough, and in general, was neglected, despite religion being a very important factor in the life of those children and their parents. Religion was a blind spot in the municipality's policy. Marcouch also found that when the subject of religion is not dealt with in a good way by parents or by the (primary) school, it could cause radicalization later in the child's life.[53] Therefore, including religion in children's education is very important. The government must facilitate and support children's education, therefore it should also facilitate and support the education of religion. When parents want their children to be taught about Islam, schools should facilitate this and integrate lessons about the Islam into their programme. This will also

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[49] Mayor Van der Laan, *Aanscherping aanpak radicalisering*, 28 May 2015, p. 6.
[50] Ibid. Own translation of: "Is het niet beter om het zwaartepunt te leggen op het voorkomen van radicalisering en uitreizen?"
[51] Slotervaart is a borough with a high percentage of Moroccan youth in which violent incidents happen relatively frequently. Mohammed B. was from Slotervaart.
[52] Borough of Slotervaart, *Actieplan Slotervaart: het tegengaan van radicalisering*, February 2007.
[53] Ahmed Marcouch, Member of Parliament, interview in Parliament The Hague on 30 June 2015.

counter polarisation because children will feel that Muslims are also a legitimate part of Dutch society.

Marcouch's vision led to innovative policy measures in Slotervaart. The policy included closely cooperating with and training of primary school teachers, and other people in key positions within the socialization domains of children, to make sure that religiousness was integrated into their everyday work instead of being neglected.[54] When Marcouch was not re-elected as district mayor, the innovate project in Slotervaart stopped. This was because his successors did not have the same drive and affiliation with the subject as he had.[55]

Marcouch's use of people in key positions was taken as an example by the central municipality in their development of the 'key figures project'. This project, which started in late 2007, provides workshops for Muslims who are in an influencing position in their neighbourhood, such as youth workers. In these workshops, the key figures are taught about different interpretations of Islam, the position of Muslims in our society and the dilemmas that come with it. They are also taught certain skills like having a dialogue and reasoning. After their training, each key figure has to organize an event in his or her neighbourhood that aims to counter polarisation.[56] The municipality of Amsterdam hopes that by having learned these skills, the key figures can reach people in their neighbourhood who are looking to form their own identity or are in an early stage of radicalization, talk to them and help them in their search for identity. This may increase their resilience to the influence of the radical Islam. The key figures project is presented as a success, and has been a part of Amsterdam's counter-radicalization policy for the past seven years.[57]

Conclusion

As we have seen above, Amsterdam's counter-radicalization policy has developed constantly through the years. The most significant changes were the introduction of a risk-based approach in 2012 and the move back to a broad approach in 2015. The reorientation in 2012 and Van der Laan's letter in 2015 both refer to reports of the national intelligence service to explain the change in policy. In 2010, the threat coming from Islamic radicalization was downscaled, whereas it was increased in 2014 due to international developments like the rise of Islamic State. The budget allocated to counter-radicalization measures shows a similar curve. Until 2010, the budget available ranged from €4,4 to €5,4 million a year. In 2010, this was halved to €2,6 million a year. In 2012, the budget was cut significantly to €0,4 million a year.[58] In 2015 the budget was raised remarkably, although the exact amount is not yet known. The change to a risk-based approach in 2012 and to a broader approach in 2015 seem to correlate significantly with the threat assessments by the national intelligence service and the funds available for counter-radicalization policy.

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[54] Borough of Slotervaart, *Voortgangsrapportage Actieplan Slotervaart: het tegengaan van radicalisering*, February 2008.

[55] Ahmed Marcouch, Member of Parliament, interview in Parliament The Hague on 30 June 2015.

[56] NCTV, 'Praktijkvoorbeeld Amsterdam sleutelfiguren', http://www.polarisatie-radicalisering.nl/praktijkvoorbeelden/amsterdam-sleutelfiguren/, accessed on 21 April 2015.

[57] Municipality of Amsterdam and NCTV, Symposium '7 jaar sleutelfiguren', March 31, 2015.

[58] Keep in mind that a lot of the preventive, soft aspects of counter-radicalization policy had been integrated into regular policy structures. Therefore these measures are left out of the budget allocated especially to counter-radicalization.

Chapter 5: Discussion security-human rights nexus

Introduction

Van Gogh's murder confronted the municipality with the urgency of Islamic radicalization. The need to establish policy especially aimed at countering radicalization posed several important dilemmas. The biggest dilemma, as described in the security-human rights nexus chapter, is the balancing of far-reaching measures based on security considerations with the rights all citizens of Amsterdam have, such as freedom of religion and expression. This difficult topic has been hotly debated in the city council of Amsterdam. This chapter answers the question of how the debate in the city council concerning the security—human rights dilemma has developed in the past ten years.

Debate cycle

Before going into detail about the security-human rights discussion in the city council, I want to give some insight into how I chose the sections that are shown below. Because ten years of records of city council meetings consist of thousands of pages of text, I have carefully chosen the bits of discussions that are relevant to my main puzzle statement. While examining ten years of city council meetings and keeping the development of the formal policy in mind, I noticed a pattern in the interaction between the city council, mayor and municipal executive councillors within the security-human rights discussions. The pattern is as follows:

Spark →	Discussion separation church/state →	Suggestion for special discussion →	Period of relative calmness
The spark is an incident in the city, a news report or the presentation of a new policy document. This spark triggers a discussion on separation between church and state.	A discussion arises in one or multiple city council or commission meetings. All parties express their opinions on the matter. No agreement can be reached.	A city council member suggests having a separate debate especially for discussing the separation between church and state. All agree on this.	After the suggestion, the discussion subsides. The separate debate is not conducted. This calm period lasts for 2 months up to 2,5 years.

The four different stages form a cycle. After the discussion has subsided by the promise of a separate debate, the subject is no longer mentioned. The separate debate is usually not conducted. It was held once in 2008, but this produced no clear outcome. The discussion resurfaces after a period of time when an event, media report or presentation of a new policy document regarding radicalization or separation between church and state occurs.

To provide support for my claim, I will highlight the cycles that the municipality of Amsterdam has gone through in the period 2004 – present.

Van Gogh's murder

Spark	Discussion separation church/state	Suggestion for special discussion	Period of relative calmness
Van Gogh's murder and the following policy plan 'We, people of Amsterdam' in late 2004	-City council meeting 4 November 2004 -Com. GA 11 November 2004 -Amendment Spee 23 March 2005 -City council meeting 1 June 2005	City council member Asscher in city council meeting 1 June 2005	Discussion subsides until February 2007 despite separate debate not being conducted.

Van Gogh's murder was the reason for introducing the first policy plan 'We, people of Amsterdam', aimed at countering and preventing radicalization. The murder and the following policy plan sparked a lively debate about the scope of the measures of the municipality.

City council member Asscher from PvdA, biggest party in the coalition, stressed a week after Van Gogh's murder "the case is an attack on the rule of law and the main principles of democracy."[59] Mayor Cohen took the case very seriously and announced that the municipality would act very tough on intolerant behaviour. However, the starting points should be "the separation of powers, fundamental rights, freedom of expression, equality, freedom of the individual. [...] These should be the starting points, anyone who is intolerant thereto needs to be properly addressed."[60] Cohen stressed the importance of balancing of rights. Intolerant people should be addressed and dealt with while keeping fundamental human rights in mind.

The plan 'We, people of Amsterdam' came up in the following city council meeting. Asscher argued: "the separation between church and state – thus also between mosque and state – should be clear. Strong and clear boundaries are a precondition for real tolerance."[61]

Mister Van der Burg from liberal party VVD, second biggest party in the coalition, talked about the plan and stated: "Close down mosques in which intolerance is preached continuously. [...] Make clear what we stand for in The Netherlands and do not bargain with that in any way."[62] In other words, the VVD argued for 'zero tolerance for intolerance'.[63]

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[59] Commission of general affairs, meeting 11 November 2004, own translation of "Het gebeuren is een aanslag op de rechtstaat en op de sterkste beginselen van de democratie."
[60] Ibid. Own translation of "de scheiding van machten, de grondrechten, vrijheid van meningsuiting, het gelijkheidsbeginsel, vrijheid van het individu. [...] Dit moeten de uitgangspunten zijn en wie ten opzichte daarvan intolerant is moet goed aangepakt worden."
[61] City council meeting afternoon 24 November 2004. Own translation of "De scheiding tussen kerk en staat – dus ook tussen moskee en staat – moet duidelijk zijn. Harde en duidelijke grenzen vormen een voorwaarde voor echte tolerantie."
[62] Own translation of: "Sluit moskeeën waar continu intolerantie wordt gepredikt. [...] Maak duidelijk waar wij in Nederland voor staan en marchandeer daar op geen enkele wijze mee."
[63] Derived from p. 38 in which Van der Burg says: "zero tolerance" in dealing with intolerant and asocial people.

Council member Asscher responded: "Chairman, in principle I agree with the story of mister Van der Burg about fighting intolerance, but I want to know where the boundary lies for him as a liberal, before he intervenes in a church or a mosque or another place in which intolerant thoughts are expressed, and before he comes to a decision to close it down. Determining the boundary is extremely important, and I want to get another criterion from mister Van der Burg than just 'intolerance'.[64]

This remark from Asscher gets to the core of the debate: what is a legitimate criterion for the municipality to decide to intervene in people's freedom of belief and expression? The law does not permit the closing down mosques in which "just intolerance" is preached.

Mister Van der Burg agreed with Asscher: "of course there is a very complicated interface between freedom of expression and crossing the line."[65] He argued that intolerance crosses the line when it undermines society.

CDA-council member Spee-Rouppe van der Voort asked: "But which task is the government now facing? The main task of the government is ensuring security. It is the government's duty to protect its civilians […]."[66] She argued that in the name of security, there are limits to the freedom of expression and religion. "This freedom only thrives when the core Dutch values are accounted for."[67] In her amendment to the plan 'We, people of Amsterdam', she suggested that the municipality should not ban religion from the public sphere, but instead should support cultural and religious institutions because they stimulate people with different beliefs and backgrounds to live together harmoniously. And when people are able to live together harmoniously, security is enhanced.[68] At the time, CDA was the third party of a coalition that consisted of PvdA, VVD and CDA.

Mayor Cohen reacted to the amendment in the city council meeting on April 28, 2005. He introduced a progress report of the plan 'We, people of Amsterdam', which incorporated the new insights gained in, inter alia, the city council debates.[69] "It contains a lot of elements that are also included in the amendment by the CDA."[70]

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[64] Own translation of: "Mijnheer de Voorzitter, ik kan me op zich in grote lijnen vinden het verhaal van de heer Van der Burg dat je intolerantie moet bestrijden, maar ik wil toch even precies weten waar dan voor hem als liberaal de grens ligt, voordat hij ingrijpt in een kerk of in een moskee of een andere plek waar intolerante gedachten worden geuit, en voordat hij tot een beslissing komt om te sluiten. Dat luistert ontzettend nauw, en ik zou daar van de heer Van der Burg een preciezer criterium voor willen krijgen dan alleen maar "intolerantie"".

[65] Own translation of: "En natuurlijk ligt daar het zeer moeilijke grensvlak tussen vrijheid van meningsuiting en het punt, waarop men echt de grens over gaat."

[66] Own translation of: "Maar voor welke taak ziet de overheid zich nu gesteld? Voorop staat dat de primaire taak van de overheid erop gericht is om de veiligheid in een samenleving te waarborgen. Het is de plicht van de overheid om burgers te beschermen […].".

[67] Own translation of: "Deze vrijheid gedijt alleen als er rekenschap wordt gegeven van de gedeelde Nederlandse kernwaarden."

[68] Notice 'Onderbouwde actie en geen ondermijnende reactie; wat er mist in het actieplan "Wij Amsterdammers"', Spee-Rouppe van der Voort, 23 March 2005.

[69] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Voortgangsrapportage Wij Amsterdammers*, 28 April 2005.

[70] City council meeting 28 April 2005. Own translation of "Er zitten veel elementen in die ook in het stuk van het CDA staan."

The aforementioned discussion about the limits of municipal intervention is reflected in the progress report. It does not give a clear answer to the questions raised in the city council meetings, but it acknowledges that "for an active role of the municipality, it needs to be clear what the unwanted expressions of radicalisation are and how these can be recognised, and that the municipality and her partners know which measures can be taken in which situations and by whom."[71]

Asscher once again gets to the core of the debate in a city council meeting, when he says: "it is a good thing that there are so many debates about the Islam. It is also a good thing that extremist excesses are named and fought. But let us make clear that it is a fundamental right that everyone in this city can have his own identity and his own religion. 'We, people of Amsterdam' means having respect for each other, respect for religions of others and for each other's background. Unless that same religion means that same respect is not paid to others. And especially this makes the debate about the secular city so important. When can the government get involved and when can it not? We are getting involved in extremism. That is clear. And The Netherlands has a long tradition of negotiating the theme of 'church and state'. The French model has never been applied here. Still it remains a difficult debate."[72]

Asscher suggested having a separate debate in the city council about how to deal with the separation of church and state. This preludes the third stage of the cycle: a suggestion for a separate debate. The mayor responded by saying that he thought a separate debate could be useful. The municipal executive councillor Aboutaleb (PvdA) stated that society urges the government to get involved in religion. However, the government cannot play an active role in religious matters. The role the government can play will be discussed in the city council: "then you are all as involved as possible in the way we choose to go and whether that is acceptable to all of us, given the separation of church and state."[73]

After Asscher's suggestion to have a separate debate about the interpretation of the separation between church and state, the discussion subsided. The separate debate was not conducted. This constitutes the fourth stage of the cycle.

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[71] *Voortgangsrapportage Wij Amsterdammers*, p. 5, own translation of "Een actieve rol van de gemeente vergt wel dat: 1) duidelijk is wat de ongewenste uitingen van radicalisering zijn en hoe deze kunnen worden herkend en dat 2) de gemeente en haar partners weten welke maatregelen in welke gevallen kunnen worden genomen en door wie."

[72] City council meeting afternoon 1 June 2005, p. 49, own translation of "Het is goed dat er zoveel over de islam gedebatteerd wordt. Het is ook goed dat de extremistische uitwassen benoemd en bestreden worden. Maar laten we ook duidelijk maken dat het een grondrecht is dat iedereen in deze stad zijn eigen identiteit en zijn eigen geloof mag hebben. "Wij Amsterdammers" betekent respect hebben voor elkaar, respect hebben voor elkaars geloof en voor elkaars achtergrond. Tenzij datzelfde geloof betekent dat datzelfde respect niet aan anderen wordt betoond. En juist dit maakt het debat over de seculiere stad zo belangrijk. Waar mag de overheid zich wel mee bemoeien en waarmee niet? Wij bemoeien ons al met het extremisme. Dat staat vast. En Nederland heeft een lange traditie van polderen rond het thema "kerk en staat". Het Franse model is hier nooit in zwang geweest. Toch blijft het een moeilijk debat."

[73] City council meeting evening 1 June 2005, p. 27, own translation of "Dan bent u zelf optimaal betrokken bij de vraag of de weg die ingeslagen wordt voor ons allen aanvaardbaar is, gezien de scheiding van kerk en staat. Ik vat de discussie daarover ook niet lichtzinnig op."

West mosque

Spark	Discussion separation church/state	Suggestion for special discussion	Period of relative calmness
Facts about the financing of the West mosque became known, causing turmoil in the media in 2006/07	-Com. diversity and urban policy 11 October 2006 -City council meeting 13 June 2007	Van 't Wout in city council meeting 13 June 2007	Discussion subsides despite separate debate not being conducted.

In 2007, an event sparked the debate about the separation of church and state again. This had to do with the newly discovered land deal the municipality had agreed on with the board of a mosque that was to be build in Amsterdam, the Westermoskee, or West mosque. This mosque was supposed to be built in borough De Baarsjes on an undeveloped piece of land. In order to finance this building project, the board of the mosque had come to an agreement with housing corporation Het Oosten and the borough De Baarsjes. De Baarsjes financed part the purchase of the piece of land, 2 million euros in total, in the form of a ground lease.[74] Furthermore, in 2006 the board of the mosque and De Baarsjes had entered into a contract that seemed to steer the board regarding the kind of Islam the mosque would be practising. To be specific, in the contract, the board agreed to respect the Dutch Constitution, prevent radicalization, stimulate imams to preach in the Dutch language and stimulate an emancipatory attitude amongst its members.[75] In January 2007, the board of the future mosque pulled back from the contract, saying that it had been pressured into signing the agreement.[76] The disagreement about the contract caused the board of the mosque and the municipality of Amsterdam to lose faith in their cooperation.[77] Since then, the board of the mosque has raised independent funds to resume the building of the mosque.

The issue gained a great deal of media attention, which brought attention of the city council to the matter. The contract about a liberal Islam appeared not to be known by the city council. This caused indignation on the side of the council. In late 2006, the issue had been brought up in a meeting of the commission concerning diversity and urban policy. In this meeting, municipal executive councillor Aboutaleb had assured the commission that the municipality did not determine the religious or social course of the organisation. This statement was met by resistance of mister Flos from VVD, who questioned the statement. Aboutaleb replied: "It would be bizarre for a municipality to interfere in the religious course

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[74] NB: a ground lease is a form of long-term loan. Somsen, O. (2010) *Ayasofya en het Westermoskeeproject,* Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=175015, accessed on 7 July 2015.

[75] AD, *De Baarsjes en Stichting Westermoskee ondertekenen convenant,* September 18, 2006. http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1041/Amsterdam/article/detail/2292500/2006/09/18/De-Baarsjes-en-Stichting-Westermoskee-ondertekenen-convenant.dhtml, accessed on 7 July 2015.

[76] Trouw, *Voorwaarden aan moskeebestuur schenden de scheiding tussen kerk en staat,* 25 January 2007. http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1653305/2007/01/25/rsquo-Voorwaarden-aan-moskeebestuur-schenden-de-scheiding-tussen-kerk-en-staat-rsquo.dhtml, accessed on 7 July 2015.

[77] Municipality of Amsterdam, 'answer to written questions of Sargentini of February 7, 2007', 2007, 1, 248.

or leadership of an organization."[78] This appeased the commission and the issue was not discussed further, nor by the commission or the city council, until June 2007.

In a city council meeting in June 2007, the issue of the West mosque came up again.[79] Various city council members suggested having a separate debate about the principle of separation between church and state, in which could be discussed how to handle situations like the West mosque-case. This is the third stage of the cycle.

City council member Van 't Wout from opposition party VVD: I think it will be a good thing to discuss in the city council how we view the separation between church and state. […] The VVD will examine the possibility to take initiative for such a discussion, to prevent us talking about it after incidents have happened by discussing it beforehand.[80] Limmen from CDA agreed: "what seems good to me is to conduct a fundamental discussion about our attitude towards these kind of cases, the relationship between the church and the state etc."[81] Mayor Cohen replies: "I must tell you that I support your proposal to conduct a debate about the separation between church and state. […] Let us first conduct a debate about this. I think that there will be differences in opinion in this city council. If I remember VVD's position correctly, it is: faith is a private matter and no one else can interfere. That is a position with which I heartily disagree. Why? You know, I am an atheist. That always makes a difference, but there are many people for whom religion is extremely important. And whether you like it or not, religion has a role outside of the private sphere. As a public organisation and thus as municipality you have to deal with this. […] What is actually the core of the separation between church and state? As a state, you should not want to influence the church, like the church should not want to influence the state. That is the core of the principle and there are all sorts of opinions possible about the periphery, which we need to discuss with each other. Therefore I am a supporter of your proposal, mister Van 't Wout, to have such a discussion."[82]

After Van 't Wout's suggestion, the discussion subsided, which constitutes phase four of the cycle. No separate debate was held.

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[78] Meeting of Commission of diversity and urban policy on 11 October 2006. Own translation of "Wethouder ABOUTALEB denkt dat het bizar zou zijn als een gemeentebestuur zich zou mengen in de religieuze koers of het leiderschap van een organisatie."

[79] City council meeting 13 June 2007.

[80] Ibid. p. 35. Own translation of: "denk ik dat het goed is om in deze Raad te debatteren over hoe wij de scheiding tussen kerk en staat zien. […] De VVD zal dan ook bekijken of we daartoe een initiatief kunnen nemen, om te voorkomen dat wij in de toekomst alleen maar achteraf over dit soort zaken praten en niet vooraf."

[81] Ibid. p. 36. Own translation of: "wat me sowieso goed lijkt: om met elkaar een fundamentelere discussie te voeren over onze houding ten opzichte van dit soort zaken, de verhouding tussen kerk en staat et cetera."

[82] Ibid. p. 38. Own translation of: "Ik moet u zeggen dat ik uw voorstel om een debat te voeren over de scheiding van kerk en staat zeer steun.[…] Laten we eerst eens het debat daarover voeren. Ik denk namelijk dat daar wel verschillen over zullen bestaan in deze Raad. Als ik het standpunt van de VVD hierover ken, dan is dat: geloof is een privézaak en daar heeft verder helemaal niemand iets mee te maken. Dat is een standpunt waar ik het zelf hartgrondig mee oneens ben. Waarom? U weet, ik ben atheïst. Dat scheelt altijd een stuk, maar er zijn veel mensen voor wie het geloof een ongelooflijk belangrijke rol speelt. En of u het nu leuk vindt of niet, dat geloof speelt ook een rol buiten de privésfeer. Als publieke organisatie en dus ook als gemeente heb je daarmee te maken. […] Wat is namelijk de kern van het onderscheid tussen kerk en staat? Je moet als staat geen invloed op de kerk willen uitoefenen, zoals de kerk geen invloed moet willen uitoefenen op overheidsorganisaties. Dat is de kern ervan en over de rest kun je allerlei opvattingen hebben en die moeten we maar eens met elkaar bespreken. Daarom ben ik een groot voorstander van uw voorstel, mijnheer Van 't Wout, om een dergelijk debat te voeren."

Marhaba

Spark	Discussion separation church/state	Suggestion for special discussion	Period of relative calmness
Efforts to set up an Islamic centre, Marhaba, by the municipality in 2006/07	-Com. GA 6 September 2007 -Com. GA 6 December 2007	Reference to it in Com. GA 6 September and 6 December 2007	Until August 2008. The separate debate is not conducted in this period.

In 2006/2007, there was a sense in the city council of Amsterdam that Muslims in Amsterdam lacked a place where they could talk about Islam and share religious knowledge. The underlying assumption of this is that when Muslims are educated about their religion, they will resist the bold promises the radical Islam makes because they know that the radical Islam is not the 'right' Islam. This view is expressed, *inter alia*, in the discussion memorandum that was presented by the PvdA to prepare for a discussion in the Commission of general affairs: "The majority of Dutch Muslims come from areas where the conservative Islam was the only form practiced. Orthodox forms of Islam that have answers to questions regarding individuality and modernity in religion are often forms that encourage radicalization. These radical movements are precisely the ones that have gained popularity in this modern society. It must therefore be shown that there are multiple ways to develop yourself within religion."[83]

To achieve this aim, the municipality funded the creation of Islamic cultural centre Marhaba. The thought behind encouraging the creation of Marhaba was that it would help Muslims to develop their religious identity and make them less susceptible to the influence of radical Islam.

Marhaba's objective met with resistance from CDA-member Limmen: "Should politicians discuss what an acceptable form of Islam is and what is not? I have my doubts about that."[84] Van der Burg, leader of biggest opposition party VVD, also had his doubts: "It is not the task of the government to determine how a good Christian or a good Muslim should live. I do not want to have that discussion. I can imagine that is a task for the spiritual and religious leaders in Amsterdam."[85] At the time, the PvdA was the biggest coalition party. The parties that resisted the objective, CDA, VVD, SP and D66, were all opposition parties, VVD being the

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[83] Discussienota Van der Garde, PvdA, 6 September 2007, point three, own translation of: "De meeste Nederlandse moslims komen uit gebieden waar de conservatieve variant van de Islam de enige was. De orthodoxe stromingen die een antwoord hebben op de vragen rondom individualiteit en moderniteit in religie zijn vaak stromingen die ook aanzetten tot radicalisering. Die radicale stromingen zijn juist degenen aan populariteit hebben gewonnen in deze moderne samenleving. Er moet dus worden getoond dat er meerdere mogelijkheden zijn om je binnen het geloof te ontwikkelen."

[84] Commission of General Affairs, 6 September 2007, own translation of: "Moet de politiek bediscussiëren wat een aanvaardbare islam is en wat niet? Spreker heeft daarover zijn twijfels."

[85] Ibid. Own translation of: "Toch vindt hij het geen taak van de overheid om te zeggen hoe een goede christen of een goede moslim moet leven. Hij wil die discussie niet voeren. Hij kan zich voorstellen dat daar een taak ligt voor de spirituele en geestelijke leiders in Amsterdam."

biggest one. There was no resistance to the objective from the coalition parties PvdA and GroenLinks. Mayor Cohen responded: "I have the idea that the discussion about religion is covered by the decision about Marhaba, in a way that the municipality itself does not interfere."[86]

Eventually, the municipality decided to stop funding Marhaba, because the activities it had organised were disappointing and its board lacked structure and organizational skills.[87] Cohen said in this regard: "Marhaba's objective was supported by the council and is still supported. Enough time should be taken. […] I think it is the subject but also the circumstances that have caused Marhaba not to work. There is no form of 'true' Islam, just like there is no 'true' Christianity or Judaism. There are all different kinds of forms. […] It is sensible to think about how [Marhaba's] objective can be reached in a different way."[88] The separate debate about the separation between church and state was referred to as a moment to discuss issues like Marhaba and create agreement amongst the city council members.

Memorandum separation of church and state

Spark	Discussion separation church/state	Suggestion for special discussion	Period of relative calmness
Introduction of memorandum separation church and state in 2008	-Com. GA 28 August 2008 -City council meeting 30 October 2008	The two meetings are seen as THE debates about separation church/state.	Until August 2010.

In 2008, the mayor and the municipal executive councillors introduced a separate memorandum about the subject of separation between church and state.[89] With this memorandum, the mayor hoped to bring more clarity into the debate and settle the discussion in the city council about the separation between church and state. The memorandum states that the traditional way of interpreting the separation between church and state is no longer sufficient due to developments in society. The rapid rise of Islam is a recent relevant development. The spread of this religion in Dutch society poses new dilemmas in policy-making. The mayor and municipal executive councillors asked the advice of an academic, Marcel Maussen, who formulated the most important paradox the city council is experiencing in relation to the rise of Islam and the separation between church and state. This paradox is included in the memorandum:

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[86] Ibid. Own translation of: "Hij heeft het idee dat met de besluitvorming over Marhaba de discussie over het geloof is gecoverd terwijl de gemeente zich er zelf niet mee bemoeit."
[87] Commission of General Affairs, 6 December 2007.
[88] Ibid. Own translation of: "De doelstelling van Marhaba is door de raad ondersteund en wordt nog ondersteund. Hij vindt dat er de tijd voor moet worden genomen. […] De burgemeester denkt dat het aan het onderwerp maar ook aan de samenloop van omstandigheden ligt dat het niet goed is gegaan. Er is geen sprake van de islam evenmin als van het christendom of het jodendom. Er zijn allerlei verschillende groeperingen. […] Hij geeft toe dat het verstandig is erover na te denken op welke manier de doelstelling wel bereikt kan worden."
[89] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Notitie scheiding kerk en staat*, 28 June 2008.

"There is obviously a double standard. When it comes to initiatives that provide space to Islam and encourage dialogue, the separation of church and state is at stake. However, when it comes to countering the negative effects of Islam, principles such as equality, freedom of religion and separation of church and state are put aside. A curious paradox."[90]

The Netherlands has always cooperated with churches and does not have a strict separation between church and state like for instance France. However, how this cooperation should be approached is subject for discussion. From the extract of the memorandum above, it appears that the principle of separation between church and state is interpreted less strict in times of security threats. The memorandum is meant to redefine the interpretation of the relationship between religion and the government to make clear how the municipality has to deal with issues involving Islam. In this context, three terms are introduced in relation to government neutrality: exclusive, inclusive and compensating neutrality.

The memorandum states that the municipality of Amsterdam is inclusively neutral, taking a compensating approach to neutrality when necessary. This means "there can be a task for the government when special circumstances make this necessary, located in historical or structural inequalities or social disadvantages of specific religions or ideologies. To effectively guarantee the equality of all religions and philosophies, the government can give extra support to disadvantaged groups."[91] Emphasized is the need to give sufficient arguments for the deployment of compensating neutrality in each case.

The memorandum concludes by relating the principles of compensating neutrality and separation of church and state to the policy regarding counter-radicalization. It states that thus far, the counter-radicalization policy has not breached any of the principles mentioned in the memorandum. However, since the policy field is relatively new, the municipality has to constantly view its measures critically. "When it is decided for safety reasons that a radicalising youth needs an intervention, the decision-making process is about which means best serve security. In some cases, this can be by deploying religious infrastructure."[92]

The city council reacted strongly to this memorandum.[93] The mayor's own party PvdA, biggest party in the coalition, the biggest opposition party VVD and CDA had big doubts about certain

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[90] Memorandum p. 2, own translation of: "Er wordt blijkbaar met twee maten gemeten: als het gaat om initiatieven die ruimte bieden aan de islam en aan dialoog zou 'de scheiding van kerk en staat' in het geding zijn. Wanneer het er echter om gaat de islam 'keihard aan te pakken', worden principes als gelijke behandeling, godsdienstvrijheid en de scheiding van kerk en staat met voeten getreden. Een merkwaardige paradox."

[91] Memorandum p. 8, own translation of: "Er kan een taak voor de overheid weggelegd zijn, wanneer er sprake is van bijzondere omstandigheden die gelegen kunnen zijn in historische of structurele ongelijkheden of in maatschappelijke achterstanden van bepaalde godsdiensten of levensbeschouwingen. Om de gelijkheid van alle godsdiensten en levensbeschouwingen daadwerkelijk te garanderen kan de overheid in voorkomende gevallen groepen die achterblijven extra ondersteunen."

[92] Memorandum p. 13, own translation of: "Wanneer vanuit het oogpunt van veiligheid wordt besloten dat een interventie bij een radicaliserende jongere noodzakelijk is, gaat de afweging over de vraag met welk middel de veiligheid het beste is gediend. In voorkomende gevallen kan dat zijn door het inschakelen van de zogenoemde religieuze infrastructuur."

[93] Het Parool, *Raad: geen steun religieuze groepen,* 29 August 2008. http://www.parool.nl/parool/nl/5/Politiek/article/detail/29646/2008/08/29/Raad-geen-steun-religieuze-groepen.dhtml, accessed on 7 July 2015.

parts of it, especially the notion of 'compensating neutrality'.[94] "What is it exactly and who benefits from it? This is what has gone wrong in the past" is a statement made by CDA-member Limmen.[95]

Only party GroenLinks responded positively to the compensating neutrality in the memorandum. However, Sargentini remarked: "I can imagine that discussions like the ones about Marhaba and the West mosque will not belong to the past. The memorandum does not address the issues causing those debates."[96]

Mayor Cohen poses a question in the commission: "Can the municipality use a religious organization relying on the Koran to confront radicalizing youth?"[97] Member of biggest opposition party VVD Van 't Wout replies: "The VVD struggles with that. It is a grey area. So far, the end justifies the means."[98] PvdA party leader De Wolf replies: "I do not deny that it could work. But it could just as well work the other way around. That is why we should be careful."[99]

Van 't Wout states: "However, I read the memorandum as an ideological and administrative agenda of the mayor and municipal executive councillors. It is a logical consequence of what the mayor has argued for a number of years. I see that there is no majority for that approach in the city council."[100]

In the following city council meeting, the discussion about the memorandum is repeated.[101] PvdA party leader De Wolf files a motion to change the memorandum, taking inclusive neutrality as the main approach and only using compensating neutrality in special circumstances after having discussed the issue with the city council.[102] This motion was signed by the PvdA, CDA and VVD and accepted by the entire city council. In this respect, Van 't Wout from VVD says: "It is good that we are discussing this, because the mayor has been dealing with this for a number of years now. In several speeches he has shown that he wants to define the separation between church and state as less absolute than we are doing now. It is good that the city council is discussing this now."[103]

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[94] Commission of General Affairs, 28 August 2008.

[95] Ibid. Own translation of: "Spreker vraagt zich af wat dat dan precies is en voor wie deze compenserende neutraliteit geldt. Daar is het in het verleden mis gegaan."

[96] Ibid. Own translation of: "Zij kan zich echter voorstellen dat debatten zoals die over de Westermoskee niet tot het verleden zullen behoren. De notitie behandelt de oorzaak van het voeren van die debatten niet."

[97] Ibid. Own translation of: "Burgemeester COHEN vraagt of de heer Van 't Wout vindt dat een religieuze groepering kan worden ingezet om met een beroep op de Koran een appel op radicaliserende jongeren te doen."

[98] Ibid. Own translation of: "De heer VAN´T WOUT zegt dat de VVD het daar moeilijk mee heeft. Het is een schemergebied. Tot nu toe heiligt het doel de middelen."

[99] Ibid. Own translation of: "De heer DE WOLF ontkent niet dat het zou kunnen werken. Maar het zou net zo goed de andere kant uit kunnen werken. Daarom wil hij er zo voorzichtig mee zijn."

[100] Ibid. Own translation of: "Hij leest de notitie echter ook als een ideologische en bestuurlijke agenda van het college. Het is een logisch uitvloeisel van wat de burgemeester al een aantal jaren betoogt. Hij constateert ook dat daarvoor geen meerderheid bestaat in de gemeenteraad."

[101] City council meeting, 30 October 2008.

[102] Motion of council member De Wolf and others, Gemeenteblad afd. 1, nr. 468.

[103] City council meeting 30 October 2008. Own translation of: Het is ook goed dat we het hierover hebben, omdat het gaat om een punt waarover onze burgemeester al een aantal jaren bezig is. In meerdere toespraken

The criticism on the motion was that it was a broad statement. "I think the discussion is still quite unclear. When looking at the motion filed by PvdA, VVD and CDA, then you wonder who can be against it. The starting point in The Netherlands is certainly inclusive neutrality. That is a fact and here it is presented and decided again.[104]

The memorandum plus the accepted motion of De Wolf determine the municipality's policy on the separation between church and state from 2008 and onwards.

Period after the memorandum and motion Separation between church and state

In 2010, a new mayor was installed in the municipality of Amsterdam: Van der Laan from PvdA. The composition of the city council and the municipal executive councillors also changed. PvdA remained the largest party in the coalition, together with GroenLinks, but VVD joined the coalition instead of being the biggest opposition party. D66 became the biggest opposition party.

The cycle was repeated several times in the period after the memorandum was introduced. I will deal with these cycles together instead of looking at every cycle separately, because the basic principles of the cycle-mechanism have become clear in the previous section, however, I will mention the following cycles to sufficiently support my claim.

Spark	Discussion separation church/state	Suggestion for special discussion	Period of relative calmness
Early 2010: funding of an Islamic prayer room on a cemetary	-Com. of Diversity and Integration, 26 August 2010.	By new mayor Van der Laan in meeting	Until March 2011. No separate debate is conducted.
Early 2011: media article: 'no headscarf behind the counter in the city hall'	-City council meeting 16 March 2011	By municipal executive councillor Van der Burg in meeting	No separate debate
Early 2012: funding of Islamic cultural center De Verbinding	-City council meeting 14 March 2012	Reference to suggestion made in 2011	No debate
August 2013: funding of the Blue Mosque	-Com. of General Affairs 29 August 2013	By city council member Shahsavari-Jansen in meeting	No debate

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heeft hij al aangegeven dat hij de scheiding van kerk en staat wat minder absoluut zou willen opvatten dan wij dat nu doen. Het is goed dat wij als raad daarover een keer debatteren.
[104] Ibid. Own translation of: "Het is volgens mij nog steeds een vrij onheldere discussie. Als je bijvoorbeeld kijkt naar de motie die zojuist is ingediend door de PvdA, de VVD en het CDA, dan vraag je je af wie daar tegen kan zijn. Het uitgangspunt in Nederland is natuurlijk de inclusieve neutraliteit. Dat is een feit en dat wordt hier nog een keer voorgesteld en besloten."

In early 2010, the municipality had funded the building of an Islamic prayer room on a cemetery in Amsterdam. This allowed Muslims to wash themselves and pray before visiting a grave, an Islamic tradition. The fact that the municipality had granted a subsidy for this caused turmoil amongst the city council members. The principle of separation between church and state came up in the discussion. Mayor Van der Laan states: "The terms inclusive and compensating neutrality do not excel in clarity. […] The moment when the municipality manoeuvres in the grey area of separation between church and state, this will be discussed as openly as possible with the city council. […] I think it is useful to have a fundamental discussion on the basis of concrete cases with all facts and circumstances known. A discussion with the city council will be held for each case of compensating neutrality. We should save up concrete cases and discuss them every two years. Since the last fundamental discussion took place in 2009, we could have one again in 2011."[105]

In early 2011, an article in a newspaper caused turmoil in the city council. The article discussed wearing a headscarf while working in public position, such as behind the counter in the city hall. Municipal executive councillor Van der Burg, from coalition party VVD, said: "I think it will be good to have a more fundamental discussion about the separation between church and state. I think that will bring us much further than when we talk about these sort of issues now."[106] The city council responded positively to this suggestion. The discussion subsided and no separate debate was held.

The municipality had funded the creation of a cultural youth centre, De Verbinding. It appeared, however, that the people who worked there taught Koran lessons and openly criticized Dutch values. This matter was discussed in the city council.[107] It brought about the discussion between church and state and the memorandum and motion that were accepted in 2008. Several city council members argued that the memorandum and the motion are too vague and that they should be evaluated and adapted. Mayor Van der Laan seemed to be very much against this suggestion. He said: "The mayor and municipal executive councillors are completely in favour of the motion De Wolf like it was just explained […]. I think the mayor, municipal executive councillors and the city council all agreed to it during the motion's decision-making process. [..] You know, there are enough current and future research questions. If you do not mind, I will just say that we agree."[108] Van der Laan was therefore of

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[105] Commission of Diversity and Integration, 26 August 2010. Own translation of: "De termen inclusieve en compenserende neutraliteit blinken niet uit in helderheid. […] De burgemeester zegt toe dat op het moment dat wordt gemanoeuvreerd op het grensvlak van de scheiding tussen kerk en staat, dit zo open mogelijk besproken zal worden met het college en de raad. […] Hij denkt dat het nuttig is om de principiële discussie te voeren aan de hand van concrete casusposities met alle feiten en omstandigheden. Het college zal derhalve in ieder concreet geval waarbij compenserende neutraliteit speelt, een discussie met de raad voeren. Hij stelt voor om concrete voorbeelden op te sparen en deze eenmaal in de twee jaar te bespreken. Aangezien de laatste principiële discussie in 2009 plaatsvond, zou deze in 2011 weer gevoerd kunnen worden."
Note: the fundamental discussion that Van der Laan is refering to, took place in late 2008, not 2009.
[106] City council meeting 16 March 2011. Own translation of: "Ik denk dat het goed zou zijn om een meer fundamentele discussie te voeren over de scheiding van kerk en staat. Ik denk dat we dan veel verder komen dan door nu op dit soort punten in te gaan."
[107] City council meeting 14 March 2012.
[108] Ibid. Own translation of: "Het college staat volledig achter de motie-De Wolf zoals ze net nog is uitgelegd […]. Volgens mij zijn het college en de raad weer op één lijn gekomen door de besluitvorming over die motie. […] Weet u, er zijn genoeg actuele onderzoeksvragen en waarschijnlijk ook toekomstige. Als u het goed vindt, dan houd ik het erop dat wij het eens zijn."

the opinion that everyone had agreed on the memorandum and the additional motion and that therefore there was no need to revise them.[109]

In August 2013, a city council member referred to having a separate debate about church and state again. This time, the debate was revived by facts about the funding of the Blue mosque. This time, Van der Laan did not object to having such separate debate. He just did not want to cause any delay by having such a discussion.[110]

It has remained relatively quiet since August 2013. However, the debate about the separation between church and state and the possible adaptation of the memorandum are still not executed. As seen from the term programme in April 2015, it was still on the political agenda to redefine the memorandum about separation church and state. However, the term programme states that the mayor and the municipal executive councillors will first deal with other issues before coming to this point in the programme.[111]

After the introduction of the two new policy plans regarding radicalization in May 2015, the issue has disappeared from the term programme. It appears that the mayor and municipal executive councillors think that the issue has been solved by the introduction of the new policy plans. In the two policy plans, the separation between church and state is lightly touched upon, but it is not explained what it means or under what circumstances the municipality breaches the principle.[112]

Interviews

After finding this pattern in the interplay between the city council and the executive board in city council and commission meetings, I wanted to verify my findings by interviewing politicians who have been involved in the counter-radicalization policy.

I interviewed Ahmed Marcouch from PvdA, who was district mayor of borough Slotervaart from May 2006 until December 2009 and city council member from March 2010 until September 2010. He is now a Member of Parliament for the PvdA. As can be seen in the part about Slotervaart's policy, Marcouch is a supporter of a pragmatic approach and confronting the issue of radicalization directly. About the discussion in the city council, he said: "That discussion was, you could say, typical for the feeling of unease. Well, I thought that those

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[109] Also stated explicitly in Van der Laan's answer to written questions of De Wolf. Questions asked on 21 September 2010 and answered on 15 July 2011. Notice the big time gap between the two.

[110] Commission of General Affairs, 29 August 2013. Van der Laan: "Hij heeft daar geen bezwaar tegen. Hij wil alleen verder geen vertraging organiseren."

[111] Term programme ('termijnagenda') 2 April 2015: "Stand van zaken: De toezeggingen 'scheiding kerk en staat aanvullen met casussen' (TA2012- 000152) en seculiere stichtingen en religieuze organisaties (TA2012- 000155) worden gezamenlijk opgepakt. De reden dat het College de toezeggingen samen wil oppakken is dat de onderwerpen nauw verbonden zijn. Gevallen waarin er een relatie is tussen een seculiere en een religieuze stichting kunnen worden opgevat als casus voor de bespreking van de notitie scheiding kerk en staat. De precieze uitwerking van deze toezeggingen moet nog worden gemaakt. Het college gaat nu eerst aan de slag met de inventarisatie van niet- marktconforme huurprijzen. Het College volgt de lijn uit de notitie scheiding kerk en staat en de motie De Wolf dat alleen het uitgangspunt van inclusieve neutraliteit wordt gehanteerd en wijst op de verantwoordelijkheid van subsidieverstrekkers om te zorgen dat dit wordt nageleefd."

[112] Municipality of Amsterdam, *Actieplan Dialoog 2015/2016*, 28 May 2015, p. 6: "Weigeringsgronden [voor activiteiten – red.] zijn onder andere scheiding kerk en staat." More is not said in this respect.

people generally were at odds with themselves and dug themselves into their own conservative trenches. This prevented them from sharply analyzing the problem and thinking of a solution. When religiousness is not a cause or factor, it does not matter at all. But when it is, we have to see it, name it, and see what we can do about it."[113]

I also interviewed Judith Sargentini, who was a city council member for GroenLinks from 2002 to 2009. She is now in the European Parliament. She confirmed that the memorandum separation church and state from 2008 did not solve the discussion about the issue because it could not give a satisfying answer. She said that after the many discussions in the city council about the separation between church and state, the mayor felt he needed to do something: "Eventually as municipality, or as mayor, you have to do something, and then you say: 'you know what, we write it down again properly'. Then you get a special memorandum about separation church/state that eventually does not solve anything of course. Because you are looking for the grey area in the separation, because you see that the separation between church and state does not suffice when a group with one dominant religion is economically and socially disadvantaged."[114]

Another politician I interviewed is Diederik Boomsma, who shares the CDA seat in the city council with Marijke Shahsavari-Jansen since 2010. When I asked him about the memorandum church and state and the motion from De Wolf, he said: "That is still the current policy of the municipality. When Eberhard van der Laan was installed as mayor, it was thought that he would change the course. But the fundamental discussion about the separation between church and state and how we deal with that is actually constantly postponed. I think he did not want to have a discussion on that level. But it will definitely return."[115]

The statements by the interviewees show that the discussion about the separation between church and state is trapped in a cycle that is going nowhere.

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[113] Ahmed Marcouch, Member of Parliament, interview in Parliament The Hague on June 30, 2015. Own translation of: "Die discussie was, je zou kunnen zeggen, typerend voor de kramp. Nouja, ik vond dat die mensen over het algemeen vooral met zichzelf in de clinch zaten en zichzelf ingroeven in hun eigen conservatieve loopgraven waardoor er niet nagedacht kon worden over het scherp analyseren van het probleem en nadenken over de oplossing. Als religiositeit geen bron of factor is, dan doet het er ook verder helemaal niet toe. Maar als het er wel is, dan moeten we het zien, benoemen en kijken wat we eraan kunnen doen."

[114] Judith Sargentini, Member of European Parliament, telephone interview on July 1, 2015. Own translation of: "Dan moet je uiteindelijk als gemeente, of als burgemeester iets doen, en dan zeg je weet je wat we doen, we schrijven het nog eens goed op. En dan krijg je een speciale notitie scheiding kerk en staat die uiteindelijk natuurlijk niks oplost. Want je bent aan het zoeken naar juist het schemergebied in die scheiding, omdat je concludeert dat die scheiding kerk en staat niet voldoet op het moment dat je een bevolkingsgroep hebt die economisch en sociaal een achterstand heeft en één overheersende religie."

[115] Diederik Boomsma, city council member in Amsterdam, interview in city hall of Amsterdam on June 26, 2015. Own translation of: "Dus dat is nog steeds het staande beleid van de gemeente. Toen Eberhard van der Laan aantrad werd gedacht dat hij een andere koers zou gaan varen. Maar de fundamentele discussie over scheiding kerk en staat en hoe we daarmee omgaan is eigenlijk steeds vooruit geschoven. Ik denk dat hij geen zin daarin had, om dat op dat niveau te gaan voeren. Maar het komt zeker wel terug."

Conclusion

The previous pages have shown an immense involvement of the city council and executive board members with the issue of Islamic radicalization. It is clear that all parties have the intention to protect the security of the people in Amsterdam and take the threat coming from radical Islam seriously. However, opinions on how to counter this threat differ widely.

Liberal parties like VVD strongly oppose extensive involvement of the municipality in Islam, because they support a strict separation between church and state. On the other hand, parties like GroenLinks support the notion of compensating neutrality in that respect, allowing the municipality to get involved in religion when that religion is disadvantaged compared to other religions.

The discussion in the city council about this dilemma is trapped in a cycle, consisting of four phases. The first phase is the spark, which can be an incident in the city, a media report, or the presentation of a new policy plan against radicalization. The spark triggers the second phase: a discussion about the separation between church and state in relation to counter-radicalization measures. Framing is used to try to convince other city council members. No agreement can be reached on the issue. The suggestion to have a fundamental, separate discussion about the separation between church and state constitutes the third phase. Everyone agrees. The fourth phase is a quiet period, in which no reference is made to the dilemma. This phase can last up to 2,5 years. No separate debate about the separation between church and state is held. It was conducted only once, in response to the memorandum about the separation between church and state. However, this discussion did not lead to a satisfactory outcome. When a spark occurs, the cycle starts again.

On the other hand, the formal policy does not seem to be trapped in a cycle at all. It has developed constantly over the years. This may have something to do with the fact that the mayor is head of the police and has to act immediately when the security of the citizens is threatened. This may cause the mayor to have a more practical approach to counter-radicalization policy than the city council.

In the main conclusion, the consequences of these findings will be discussed.

Main Conclusion

This thesis aimed to answer the main research question:

How does the political debate in the municipality of Amsterdam regarding the security-human rights nexus within its counter-radicalization policy influence the policy process?

In the previous chapters, the theory on policy processes was explained, the security-human rights nexus and theory on radicalization was dealt with, and the process of the development of the formal policy was described. Lastly, the lively debate about the security-human rights nexus in the city council was analysed. This leads to the following findings.

The debate about the security-human rights nexus among the city council and executive board members is trapped in a cycle. No agreement is reached on how Amsterdam should deal with the dilemma of countering radicalization without breaching human rights and overstepping the separation between church and state. Based on my data, I have found that the discussion has commenced and ended without agreement eight times in the previous decade. As there is still no satisfactory agreement on how to handle the security-human rights dilemma, it is very probable that the cycle will repeat itself in the future.

In contrast, the formal policy regarding radicalization has developed continuously over the past ten years. The formal policy focused on soft aspects, such as preventing polarisation, until 2010. From 2010 until 2015 it mainly focused on security risks and did not include as many soft aspects. In early 2015 the emphasis was put back on preventing polarisation and the policy now includes more soft measures. The development of formal policy seems to correlate with national developments like the threat assessment of radicalization by the national intelligence agency and the availability of funds for counter-radicalization measures.

The discussion about the dilemma does not seem to influence the development of the formal counter-radicalization policy. It appears that the municipal executive councillors, the mayor and their civil servants develop the policy measures they deem necessary to protect security. Controversial policy measures like the pilot project in Slotervaart were not stopped because of the debate in the city council, but because Marcouch was not re-elected as district mayor. The controversial use of role model Muslims in countering radicalization has steadily continued since the project started seven years ago. The policy documents barely mention the separation of church and state or freedom of religion, only to say that these principles should be taken into account.

There seems to be a gap between the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of the policy process regarding the dilemma within counter-radicalization. City council members in the horizontal dimension of the policy process keep debating about the separation of church and state and the hierarchy of fundamental rights, whereas the mayor and executive councillors in the vertical dimension of the policy process pragmatically deal with these dilemmas in the light of security. This may have something to do with the fact that the mayor is head of the police and has to act immediately when the security of the citizens is threatened.

Further research could be done on how to bring these two processes in the vertical and horizontal dimensions closer together. It may be helpful to examine how the city council can break out of its cycle to have more influence on the formal policy regarding radicalization.

It may also be helpful to examine how other municipalities or countries deal with the security-human rights nexus within counter-radicalization policy. Is the same cycle apparent in their policy process?

Another suggestion for further research is to include other policy participants in the research. This research only focused on the city council, executive councillors and the mayor, but it may be interesting to see whether the security-human rights debate is also conducted amongst frontline professionals for instance, and to see whether this has effect on the way they implement counter-radicalization policy measures. How has the security-human rights nexus been interpreted by the Muslim community? And how has this affected their behaviour?

Annex: Composition of political arena in Amsterdam 2004 – present

In this section, an overview is given of the political arena in the municipality of Amsterdam. The parties of the coalition are named, the number of executive councillors mentioned in brackets. The biggest opposition party is named.

2002 - 2006	
Coalition	Opposition
PvdA (3) VVD (2) CDA (1)	GroenLinks

2006 - 2010	
Coalition	Opposition
PvdA (4) GroenLinks (2)	VVD

2010 - 2014	
Coalition	Opposition
PvdA (3) VVD (2) GroenLinks (2)	D66

2014 - present	
Coalition	Opposition
D66 (4) VVD (2) SP (2)	PvdA

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