Negotiating Security at the Urban Margins:

Expressions of Hybrid Statehood in Cape Town, South Africa

Matt Heath

UNIVERSITEIT UTRECHT

STUDENT NUMBER: 5694256

A thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Arts in Conflict Studies and Human Rights

Supervisor: Dr. Chris van der Borgh

Date of Submission: 3rd August 2016

Programme Trajectory: Research and Thesis Writing only (30 ECTS)

Word Count: 19,508

Cover Image: Police block Vrygrond Avenue, May 2015

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the help and support of numerous individuals and organisations.

I would like to express my gratitude to the University of Cape Town and specifically to Professor Mark Shaw, Director of the Centre of Criminology, for the insight, guidance and Internet access that he so graciously provided during my time in South Africa. Furthermore, I am indebted to Mymoena Scholtz and the staff of Where Rainbows Meet for helping to arrange interviews and providing me with a space in which to conduct them.

I would like to thank Gloria Damons for her generous hospitality, and Brenda Moses for not throwing me out of her house on any of the occasions when she would have been justified in doing so.

Thanks must also go to my supervisor, Dr. Chris van der Borgh, for his advice and seemingly boundless patience over the last six months.

Finally, I am eternally grateful to my long-suffering mum for always knowing when to offer a sympathetic ear and when to give a swift kick up the arse.

Thank you all.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Post-apartheid South Africa is widely regarded as one of the most stable and legitimate states on the African continent. Since opening its borders in 1994, the country has developed rapidly and nowhere is this more evident than in Cape Town, an international tourist hub and one of the great 'world cities'. And yet, the city continues to be plagued by violence and an astonishingly high crime rate.[1] In his book *Gang Town*, Don Pinnock describes the sharp contrasts that co-exist within what is arguably the most beautiful city in the world:

> "Foreigners lounging on palm-lined Camps Bay beach gazing at the steep mountains framed by gossamer clouds would find it hard to imagine the shootouts, drug wars and human trafficking taking place a few kilometres from where they sit. Locals in the mountain suburbs are more aware of places unsafe to venture and the sort of people who look like trouble. They live in hope that 'troubles' won't spill over into their neighbourhoods. Elsewhere, especially after dark, fear stalks the streets, children are locked inside for safety and the nocturnal knock on the door is not answered. Many of these areas are under effective criminal governance and police fear to exit their patrol vans." (2016: 4)

The majority of the most dangerous neighbourhoods can be found on the Cape Flats. Known to many as "apartheid's dumping ground", this area was virtually uninhabited until the 1950s, when the National Party's forced relocation programmes drove non-whites out of urban Cape Town and into racially homogeneous townships. The legacies of apartheid's "separate development" policies are still visible twenty-two years after South Africa's first democratic elections, to the extent that "spatially and socially, Cape Town is [still] perhaps the most segregated city in the world" (Samara 2011: 42). Given the optimism of many South Africans in the early 1990s it may come as a surprise to hear some academics talk of continuities between the NP and ANC governments, but in many ways the experiences of black and coloured populations on the Cape Flats have not changed substantially, save for a brief period in the mid-'90s. In the early days of the post-apartheid era, the new majority government was

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[1] Is Cape Town's Murder Rate Double that of Johannesburg?
https://africacheck.org/spot_check/is-cape-towns-murder-rate-double-that-of-johannesburg/
(accessed 1st August 2016)

sympathetic to the complaints of townships residents and regarded crime as a consequence of repressive state practices (Jensen 2010: 82), but "immediately after the fall of apartheid, state agencies and officials expressed the idea that the violence in the townships was due to apartheid and would disappear once apartheid had been dismantled. However, only a few years into the transition to democracy, state officials were increasingly coming to believe that township residents, especially the gangs, were somehow to blame for the lack of democratic transformation" (*Ibid.* 78). Accordingly, crime prevention strategies focused on social development in the hopes that the resultant advances in service provision would undermine criminal activities. However, the adoption of a US-inspired 'war on crime' signalled the beginning of a rhetorical and practical shift towards "... a discourse and practice of safety and security that takes as its starting point and conclusion that crime is the greatest obstacle the country faces in its transition, displacing an alternative rationale that explains crime as an expression of the shortcomings of the transition thus far" (Samara 2003: 281). To put it simply, contemporary wisdom suggests that security is a prerequisite for development, rather than the other way around. The practical result of this shift has been a "repositioning of Cape Town's poor (and their communities), from victims and survivors of apartheid to problems, in this new aspiring world city" (Samara 2011: 26).

Cape Town's 'world city' status, and the accompanying reliance on tourism, illustrates the link between neoliberal macroeconomics and security "because the industry's profitability [and capacity to act as an 'engine of growth'] is very much tied to perceptions [...] of safety and security" (*Ibid.* 48). The increased reliance on tourism revenue has led to contemporary governance practices designed to sanitise the more economically viable parts of the city by pushing "undesirable elements" into the surrounding townships: "because the campaign is concentrated explicitly on the city centre, a relatively small part of the city as a whole, the crackdown on crime has resulted in crime displacement as much as crime reduction" (Samara 2003: 278). Furthermore, the South African state has adopted increasingly militaristic strategies in its attempts to combat gangsterism in the townships, to such an extent that comparisons can

be, and have been, drawn between the Western Cape's 'war on gangs' and counterinsurgency campaigns in other parts of the world (*Ibid.* 283; Jensen 2010: 79). As a direct result of these trends, the townships of the Cape Flats find themselves in an unusual position: in economic and social terms they are startlingly underdeveloped, but they are simultaneously overdeveloped as objects of law enforcement: "rather than law enforcement and criminal justice being reformed to function as part of broader development initiatives in the townships, they are instead becoming stand-ins for social development" (Samara 2003: 282). One consequence of South Africa's turn to neoliberalism has been the withdrawal of the state from the urban periphery and the subsequent outsourcing of certain governmental functions. This phenomenon has been explored in different ways by multiple authors. For example, one example of 'legitimate' outsourcing can be seen in the South African private security sector's role in helping to "... secure the authority of the state by allowing for the presence of a much larger security force than the state alone could have afforded, thus providing important concrete and symbolic resources for combating post-transition insecurity" (Abrahamsen/Williams 2007: 248). On the 'illicit' end of the spectrum, there is evidence that gangs are performing certain functions of the state within their communities, such as regulating businesses and providing employment, investment and basic services (Lambrechts 2012: 793/798; Samara 2011: 100). In cases such as these, while gangs are not intending to replace the state, they are filling economic and authoritative vacuums that appear as the state withdraws from their neighbourhoods (Lambrechts 2012: 789). On the business front, the gangs' activities range from the illegal (drugs, prostitution, gun smuggling etc.) to the legal (public transport, shops, night clubs etc.) (Standing 2003: 3). Furthermore, as Tony Samara puts it, "organised crime not only provides an alternative economy but can generate alternative forms of institutionalised power as well" (2011: 99). It is the power creation function of such actors that is central to this research.

The Cape Flats comprises some of the most notoriously violent areas in South Africa and security is an overarching, everyday concern for a great number of

residents. Interestingly, residents of these traditionally non-white areas are reluctant to look to the state for security provision, despite the inclusive rhetoric of the post-apartheid 'rainbow nation'. This is not to say that they regard themselves as somehow separate from the state, but rather that they look to non-state actors to provide security on a day-to-day basis. While the relationship between the state and the townships has taken many forms since the end of apartheid, I find Jaffe's model of the 'hybrid state' (2013) to hold the most explanatory value with regards to the contemporary social makeup of the Cape Flats, in which criminal elites, private security companies, community organisations and, in some cases, vigilante groups all perform quasi-statist functions.

A great deal has been written about the various non-state security providers operating in the Cape Flats, namely the gangs, private security companies and vigilante groups such as People Against Gangsterism And Drugs (PAGAD), but there is a noticeable trend of examining each actor in isolation rather than interrogating the relationship between them. The closest to Jaffe's "hybrid state" model is an article by Derica Lambrechts in which it is claimed that "the dynamics of power between local agents of governance, the community and organised criminal gangs is based on beneficial relationships that work in favour of all three" (2013: 806). There is therefore scope for a researcher to 'map' the complex range of security providers that operate on the Flats. This is especially relevant considering the contemporary reconfiguration of security provision into a competitive market in which public authorities are just one provider among many (Abrahamsen & Williams 2007: 242). It is my contention that law enforcement, private security companies, organised criminal groups, community organisations and vigilante groups can all be thought of as providers of security and therefore are involved in constant competition within the marginalised communities of the Cape Flats. Investigating this claim with reference to two demographically distinct neighbourhoods or suburbs would allow further investigation into the complex relationship between race, class and security provision in post-apartheid South Africa.

I therefore set out to answer the following research question: *how is 'security' provided and experienced within the context of a 'hybrid state' in select areas of Cape Town in the years since the Cape Flats War (1996-2002)?*

The Cape Flats War was a six-year-long period of intense conflict between the PAGAD vigilante group, local gangs and law enforcement agencies. At its peak, around the turn of the century, 103 people were killed in a five-month period.[2] Samara argues that its most significant effect was to act as "… a bridge between the counterinsurgency campaigns of the apartheid era and the war on crime of today" (2011: 112), as it reinforced the idea that the townships themselves were inherently dangerous and that the social ills found in these areas could not be blamed on the lingering effects of apartheid. In practice, though, perhaps the most important result of the war was the dismantling of PAGAD and the accompanying decrease in organised vigilante activity, although a smaller iteration of the organisation re-emerged in 2011. The end of the Cape Flats war also marked the beginning of what became known as Cape Town's 'war on crime', but this seems to have been little more than a rhetorical device. While a number of anti-gang initiatives have been implemented since 2002, there has been little to no visible lasting effect. It is interesting to note that this discursive shift took place within the context of an aggressive state-driven neoliberalisation programme, which outsourced certain functions of the state, such as security provision, to non-state actors; as a result the police were essentially withdrawing from the urban margins while simultaneously utilising aggressive, militaristic rhetoric. A good illustration of this is the South African Police Service's (SAPS) dedicated 'gang unit', which was established as a direct result of the Cape Flats War and yet was disbanded in 2003.[3] The purpose of this thesis, then, is to determine the practical effects of the state's partial withdrawal from certain areas of the greater Cape Town area.

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[2] "Cape Flats Gang War Claims 103" http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Cape-Flats-gang-war-claims-103-20010514 (accessed 23rd July 2016)
[3] "Cape Flats Gang Unit Disbanded" http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Cape-Flats-gang-unit-disbanded-20030307 (accessed 23rd July 2016)

Analytical Framework, Methodology and Structure

At its core, this thesis is about *hybridity*. This opaque and ill-defined concept, in its simplest form, concerns "… the complex and shifting interrelations and interactions amongst formal and informal institutions" (Bagayoko et al. 2016: 6) and through this prism we are examining *statehood* and *security* in the Capetonian context. This is a somewhat holistic approach, which means that it is difficult to articulate a single 'framework' that informs the research. Instead, the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis are outlined in two separate sections, one in each chapter.

The research undertaken for this thesis, while obviously categorised as qualitative, was descriptive in approach. That is, I sought to describe the form or nature of 'the state' and its accompanying security structures in select areas of Cape Town. However, it was also to an extent speculative, as I wished to test the applicability of the 'hybrid state' model in this context (Jaffe 2013). In order to do so, it would be necessary to research how state and non-state actors make use of the 'languages of stateness' in contemporary Cape Town; and one 'language' in particular: the use of force. I therefore intended to examine the structures of security provision that exist in selected areas of Cape Town, as well as how local residents, or 'end users' of security, understood that concept in their everyday lives. This research would comprise two elements: a review of existing academic literature and a series of in-depth interviews.

Given the sheer quantity of academic writing concerning security provision on the Cape Flats, and in South Africa more generally, the literature review aspect of my research produced expectations as to the outcomes of interviews, particularly with regard to negotiation practices (actors, arenas and repertoires). A great deal of relevant literature also exists concerning the practices of various governmental actors, such as organised crime and private security companies. What was not clear, however, was how the dynamics of negotiation at the level of security provision were manifested in end users' lived experiences.

The interview phase of the research took place between April and June 2016 and the respondents were grouped into three (not necessarily mutually exclusive) categories: (1) local residents, (2) security providers, and (3) expert observers, such as academics and NGO workers. Of these three, interviews with 'average' residents, or 'end users' made up the majority of the resulting data and thus form the backbone of this research. It was important, therefore, to obtain interviews with as many people as possible across a wide range of age groups and social classes. In particular, I was interested in whether conceptions of security provision differed significantly between working- and middle-class populations. In order to test this, I needed to focus on two particular areas of the city, with significantly different demographics.

Vrygrond (literally 'free ground') is the oldest informal settlement on the Western Cape. It is situated approximately twenty-five kilometres south of the city centre, near the beaches of False Bay and is home to around 20,000 people. According to the 2011 census, 77% of households, which on average contained 3.53 people, earned less than R3200 (€200) per month. Clearly, then, this is an intensely impoverished area, but what sets it apart from other townships is its racial, or ethnic, makeup. Due to the policies of 'separate development' instituted under apartheid, most townships tend to be ethnically homogeneous. However, Vrygrond pre-dates the forced removals that created most of the neighbourhoods on the Cape Flats and so it is demographically far more complex than, say, Khayelitsha, which is almost exclusively black, or Hanover Park, which is almost exclusively coloured. Vrygrond's population includes black Xhosa-speaking and coloured Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, as well as immigrants from other African states. I was fortunate enough to coordinate with Where Rainbows Meet, a local NGO, and held the majority of my interviews on their premises.

Heathfield, in Cape Town's southern suburbs, is a majority coloured, middle class neighbourhood that, like Vrygrond pre-dated the forced removals of the apartheid era. It is situated in the imagined buffer zone between the affluent

white suburbs and the Cape Flats and it was here that I stayed between March and June 2016 (and previously in 2012). While some formal interviews were conducted in Heathfield, the majority of information about this area was gleaned through participant observation and conversations that took place off the record.

All interviews conducted as part of this research were semi-structured and guided by a topic list, rather than set questions. The informal nature of these conversations was intended to maximise people's comfort, given that they would be talking about potentially sensitive topics including criminal activity and violence. I used snowball sampling to find local 'end user' participants, whereas interviews with security providers and expert observers used non-representative, purposive sampling.

Structurally, this thesis is separated into two main chapters, which will in turn contain both a theoretical and empirical section. The first chapter focuses on statehood and will begin with an overview of the most significant theories of state. After that will be a discussion of whether state 'fragility' is an appropriate term in the South African context, at which point the concept of 'hybridity' will be introduced. The empirical section of this chapter will investigate whether and, if so, how the various security providers mimic statelike images and practices. The second chapter, which concerns security, will also begin with a theoretical discussion, before using empirical information to examine both the supply and demand 'faces' of security in modern Cape Town.

Chapter One: The State in South African Society

Theories of Statehood: Weber, Foucault and Migdal

In order to theorise the contemporary South African state, it is beneficial to begin by tracking the evolution of understandings of statehood over time. 'Pre-modern' (i.e. pre-Renaissance) states made no distinction between the state and its sovereign ruler, meaning that one could not exist without the other. Since the fourteenth century, however, definitions of statehood have been extensively and repeatedly re-evaluated. Scholars of this period, including Machiavelli, regarded the state as "synonymous not only with the prince, but with the character of the political regime, the geographical area over which sovereign authority was claimed and maintained, and the very institutions of government required to preserve such authority" (ed. Jones 2001:1470). The advent of republican political theory, which sought to establish a "condition of civic liberty", repositioned the state as an autonomous regulatory authority charged with "regulating the public affairs of an independent community" (*ibid.* 1470). Most significantly, republican thinkers were the first to claim the state's monopoly on the use of force, which was derived not from the power of the rulers but from the consent of the ruled. It is here, then, that we begin to observe the genesis of the modern state.

The next noteworthy attempts to redefine the state did not emerge until the seventeenth century. The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes saw the state as entirely removed from both the rulers and the ruled and proposed an 'absolutist' understanding of statehood, in which "(1) individuals within society are presented as subjects of the state, owing duties and their allegiance not to the person of a ruler but to the state itself; (2) the authority of the state is singular and absolute, and (3) the state is regarded as the highest form of authority in all matters of civil government" (*ibid.* 1470). Hobbes' understanding of the basic tenets of statehood did not differ wildly from that of other social contract theorists, while also drawing on earlier republican thought. Simply put, "... political authority derives from the people who are

governed by it, and the state is a utilitarian social artefact, created by the people to enable them to enjoy the benefits of a peaceful and orderly civil society" (Gordon 1999: 1). Importantly, in Hobbes' thinking, the derivation of state authority from the governed population does not weaken its claims to legitimacy. In fact, quite the opposite is true: the state only possesses authority because the people have ceded their power to it as a means of guaranteeing their security. In 1648, three years before the publication of Hobbes' *Leviathan*, the Thirty Years War ended with the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, which, for the first time, affirmed a commitment to the idea of national sovereignty. All notions of statehood from this point forward would either make use of this concept or attempt to redefine it.

German sociologist Max Weber provides us with the pre-eminent theory of statehood. In *Economy and Society* he defines the state in the following terms: "A compulsory political organisation with continuous operations will be called a 'state' insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" (1978: 54). The ubiquity of this definition means that we cannot begin to theorise the South African state without examining Weber's assumptions. We can draw two conclusions from this: firstly, the state in this example is "a set of institutions with a dedicated personnel" (ed. Jones 2001: 1470). It therefore exists separately from the society, or societies, over which it has control – it is an autonomous institution that cannot be explained through reference to societal factors. The second, and arguably more significant, implication of Weber's definition is that "the modern state [wields] a monopoly of authoritative rule-making within a bounded territory" (*Ibid.* 1471). This brings in two of the three elements that comprise his interpretation of the state: namely, territoriality and violence. Without a fixed territory over which to rule and a monopoly on the use of force, even the most complex set of governance structures would not qualify as a state under this definition. Violence is of particular importance here, as Weber outlined in his essay *Politics as a Vocation*:

"Ultimately one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely the use of political force. [...] Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state - nobody says that - but force is a means specific to the state." (1946: paragraph 3-4)

It is imperative that we understand exactly what is being said here before moving on. Weber is not saying that legitimate violence can only be perpetrated by the state itself – indeed, other institutions and individuals may be permitted to use force, but the "right" to do so can only be granted by the state (*Ibid.* paragraph 4).

Legitimacy is the third and final element of the Weberian state. In *The Three Types of Legitimate Rule*, legitimacy (here used as a synonym for 'authority' or 'domination') is said to occur in three forms: traditional, charismatic and rational-legal. Traditional authority, as its name suggests, emphasises the sanctity of tradition and establishes a state in which both the ability and the right to rule are passed down from one generation to the next. Authority that rests on charisma can be problematic as it posits the existence of an inextricable link between the state and its ruler, an individual who is perceived as possessing extraordinary characteristics (*Ibid.* paragraph 5). It is the third form of authority, however, that is most significant. Such states are "empowered by a formalistic belief in the content of the law (legal) or natural law (rational)" (*Ibid.* paragraph 6). It is this form of authority that is most recognisable in the twenty-first century, as "the development of the modern state is identical indeed with that of modern officialdom and bureaucratic organisations" (Weber 1958: 3).

How, then, does post-apartheid South Africa perform with regard to these three elements of Weberian statehood? Well, for one, it exists within a fixed territory and there are no contested or disputed areas to which other states lay claim. Furthermore, the contemporary state possesses a significant amount of rational-legal authority – its claims to legitimacy are rooted in democracy and constitutionalism (it could be argued that charisma played an important role

during Mandela's presidency, but the same cannot be said of his successors). However, the South African state does not possess a clear monopoly on the use of force. A wide range of non-state armed actors claim to provide security for residents and while some of these draw their legitimacy from the state, as Weber said, (e.g. private security companies, neighbourhood watches etc.), others continue to act despite the government's repeated condemnation of their behaviour as illegitimate. This particularly pertains to gangs and vigilante groups, whose employment of violence is a fact of daily life in many areas of the Western Cape.

Perhaps, then, a Foucaultian understanding of the state might be of more use in the South African context. In this model, the state is at once an effect, instrument and site of strategic action. It is therefore simultaneously capable of creating and mobilising a sort of collective will, establishing a 'frontier regime' to establish and maintain clear internal/external, public/private distinctions, and empowering or constraining "the capacity of different political forces to pursue their strategies and to realise their goals" (Lemke n.d.: 10-11). However, "states are not simply functional bureaucratic apparatuses, but powerful sites of symbolic and cultural production that are themselves always culturally represented and understood in particular ways" (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 981). It is therefore necessary to analyse both "the processes through which the state is conceived, on one hand, and the relationship between such conceptions and the institutions, processes and practices of the state, on the other" (ed. Jones 2001: 1474). This clear division between the imagined and practical state is Foucault's most valuable contribution to this debate, as it is difficult to theorise the contemporary state without attention to both sides. As Ferguson and Gupta put it: "through specific sets of practices and metaphors, states represent themselves as reified entities with particular spatial properties … [and] by doing so they help to secure their legitimacy, to naturalise their authority, and to represent themselves as superior to, and encompassing of, other institutions and centres of power" (2002: 982). This dual notion of statehood has been taken up and expanded by Joel Migdal in his "state in society" model, in which states are shaped by sets of 'images' and

16

'practices' (2001: 16). It is important to note that while images of statehood are relatively consistent, their practices are far more diverse. There is a great deal of common ground here with Foucault's theory, particularly his assertion that "the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicised abstraction" (quoted in Migdal 2001: 18), but while Foucault assumes that governmental practices (or 'tactics of governmentality') reinforce the images of the state, Migdal reminds us that this is not necessarily the case and that the two can sometimes directly contradict each other. This is certainly the case in South Africa, and the following definition provides us with an excellent starting point for understanding the state and its role in this context:

> "[The state] must be thought of at once (1) as the powerful image of a clearly bounded, unified organisation that can be spoken of in singular terms [...], as if it were a single, centrally motivated actor performing in an integrated manner to rule a clearly defined territory; and (2) as the practices of a heap of loosely connected parts or fragments, frequently with ill-defined boundaries between them and other groupings inside and outside the official state borders and often promoting conflicting sets of rules with one another and with 'official' law." (Migdal 2001: 22)

Fragility vs. Hybridity: Expanding Notions of Statehood

From a traditional Weberian perspective, it may be tempting to label South Africa as a 'weak' or 'fragile' state. If we take the widely held viewpoint that states exist primarily to provide 'political goods' to its citizens, we may begin to doubt the capacity of the South African state to deliver on this front. Rotberg constructs a 'hierarchy' of political goods, in which the provision of security is the "prime function" of any state (Rotberg 2003: 3). We can point to two dynamics in contemporary South Africa that would seem to undermine the state's capacity to provide security. In the first instance, security provision is not the sole responsibility of the state: as we shall see later, a number of non-state actors (both licit and illicit) make use of violence in their everyday practices. In addition to this, the stratospheric crime rate in the Western Cape

would seem to indicate a low level of state control. In early 2016, the Mexican Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice judged Cape Town to be the ninth-most violent city in the world, with 65.53 homicides per 100,000 residents.[4] Given that Rotberg deems a state to have failed once "… they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants", it is easy to see why the South African state could be dismissed as weak, or even 'failing'. However, such a label comes with its own baggage, as "the failed and fragile state agenda is permeated by Weberian ideals of what a state should look like in terms of monopoly of force, legitimate authority and clear-cut distinctions between state/society, public/private and civil/military" (Steppatut & Engberg-Pedersen 2008: 28-29). As we have already called the Weberian model's validity in this context into question, we must also be wary of applying another closely related framework. Instead, it is far more beneficial to "… focus on the analysis of 'empirical statehood' and actually existing arrangements of authority and security, rather than seeing contemporary states as they are wished to be" (*Ibid.* 29). Statehood, according to Clapham, is a relative concept and as such it is foolish to hold on to the traditional state/non-state binary; instead, "… we should regard different entities as meeting the criteria for international statehood to a greater or lesser degree" (1998: 143). It is clear that this approach cannot be reconciled with a Weberian view of the state, as "in situations where one of several rival groups … is unable to establish permanent control over a contested territory, Weber would maintain that it is more appropriate to speak of 'statelessness'" (Jackson & Rosberg 1982: 2). It would, however, be inappropriate to apply that label to the South African context. Despite "serious empirical weaknesses and vulnerabilities" (*Ibid.* 1), the sovereignty of the post-apartheid state has never been seriously challenged. Perhaps, then, we should focus not on the state as a whole but on particular "areas of limited statehood" within its borders. In such areas, state actors "… lack the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions and a monopoly on the use of force" despite widespread recognition from the international community (Risse 2012: 2). It is important for us to

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[4] "Cape Town is now among the 10 most violent cities in the world."
http://businesstech.co.za/news/general/110133/cape-town-is-now-among-the-10-most-violent-cities-in-the-world/ (accessed 16th July 2016)

differentiate between international sovereignty, or external recognition, and domestic sovereignty, which Krasner defines as "the formal organisation of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity" (quoted in Risse 2012: 4). However, we must ignore the temptation to write such areas off as "ungoverned" or "ungovernable", or to refer to the "failure" of the state(s) within which they exist. In such situations, where the state cannot be relied upon to make rules or provide collective goods, other non-state actors often pick up the slack (Risse 2012: 23-24). It is therefore clear that traditional notions of statehood are inapposite in the context of what amounts to radical privatisation (Clapham 1998: 154).

A number of scholars have suggested that the discourse of state fragility is too reductive and have introduced the concept of 'hybridity', which rejects the existence of a clear-cut state/non-state binary and instead places the emphasis on "… the complex and shifting interrelations and interactions amongst formal and informal institutions" (Bagayoko et al. 2016: 6). Whilst a clear definition is difficult to come by, Boege et al. offer the following explanation for their decision to use the term:

> "We use the term 'hybrid' […] because it is broad enough to encompass a variety of non-state forms of order and governance on the customary side […]; because it focuses on the combination of elements that stem from genuinely different societal sources that follow different logics; and because it affirms that these spheres do not exist in isolation from each other, but permeate each other and, consequently, give rise to different and genuine political orders that are characterised by the closely interwoven texture of their separate sources of origin." (2009: 17)

In situations where the state is unable to maintain its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, or where the delivery of public goods is severely compromised, non-state entities primarily step up to fill the vacuum. This means that the authority, legitimacy and capacity normally reserved for the state is shared amongst multiple institutions that simultaneously contradict and complement one another (*Ibid.*). While informal institutions can increase

the resiliency of the state by supplementing and subsidising its operations, they also erode its normative legitimacy, leading to the emergence of "… dual, overlapping hierarchies and systems of power in which both modern and traditional elites are invested, but which are to a very large extent regulated (if at all) by norms emanating from outside the 'rational-legal' sphere" (Bagayoko et al. 2016: 7). The most extreme of these cases, in which notions of statehood offer little explanatory benefit, can be categorised as Hybrid Political Orders (HPOs); that is, "… forms of socio-political organisation that have their roots on both non-state indigenous societal structures and introduced state structures" (Boege et al. 2009: 17). HPOs are characterised by the existence of three "political spaces of negotiation" in which state and non-state actors coexist, collaborate or compete: 'unsecured borderlands' ("spaces where state authority is suspended or violently challenged by alternative claimants to power and providers of security, including non-state armed groups", e.g. the Cape Flats), 'contested Leviathans' ("states and security structures whose authority and capacity to deliver security are weak, disputed or compromised", e.g. law enforcement agencies, local government) and 'securitised policy spaces' ("policy arenas in which international actors […] intervene to ensure peace and security, claiming to act for poor and vulnerable end users as well as for the international community", e.g. 'zero tolerance' policing, private security) (Luckham & Kirk 2013: 10-11, 13, 15). While it is possible to find examples of these in contemporary South Africa, the model is more suited to polities in which the legitimacy of the state has been fundamentally challenged. The South African state, in contrast, still enjoys a great deal of normative legitimacy despite its shortcomings concerning the delivery of public goods. What is needed, then, is a theoretical framework that recognises the importance of the interactions between formal and informal institutions but does not reject the centrality of the state. This leads us nicely to Jaffe's model of the 'hybrid state'.

Jaffe defines the hybrid state as "an emergent form of statehood in which different governmental actors … are entangled in a relationship of collusion and divestment as they share control over urban spaces and populations"

(2013: 735). During her research in Kingston, Jamaica, she noted the existence of "unstable yet enduring coalitions between governmental officials and criminal organisations [that] make it difficult to separate formal state governance and the rule of criminal dons" (*Ibid.* 737). These relationships, Jaffe argues, have emerged in the wider context of neoliberalism, and can be conceived of as illicit public-private partnerships in which state duties are *de facto* outsourced to criminal actors (*Ibid.* 736). Indeed, "if [the dons'] rule were not accompanied by so much violence, their 'success' at governance might be considered a measure of the state's success in adapting to the exigencies of neoliberalism" (*Ibid.* 737). It does not take a great deal of imagination to see how the hybrid state model might also be applicable to South Africa, despite the number of governmental actors involved being significantly higher. In Cape Town, as in Kingston, "… it has become increasingly difficult to understand the formal and nonformal [*sic*] systems of rule and belonging as distinct. In practice, urban governance is achieved through the hybrid state, a political formation that connects different governmental actors and mechanisms" (*Ibid.* 745). Like Migdal, Jaffe differentiates between the images and practices of state and emphasises the importance of examining both aspects so as to ascertain which actors perform state-like functions. Making use of this model therefore allows us to combine Migdalian understandings of statehood and notions of hybridity in one coherent framework.

How, then, might we go about testing the efficacy of Jaffe's hybrid state model in the Capetonian context? It will be necessary to investigate which actors perform state-like functions in the areas of Cape Town where the research was conducted, but how can we theorise these functions? Well, it stands to reason that we should operationalise the concept in the same manner as Jaffe, who looks at the everyday role of "statelike institutions and practices" (*Ibid.* 736). While her article does not refer directly to Migdal's work, the influence of the 'state in society' approach can be seen throughout. Jaffe talk of the need to examine "… how 'the state' is produced and contested through everyday practices and discursive constructions" and it does not take a great deal of imagination to recognise the similarities between these categorisations and

Migdal's images and practices of state (*Ibid.*). These concepts, however, are too vague to use as a starting point for research and so we will look instead at Hansen and Steppatut's work on the "languages of stateness". The languages, which are separated into "symbolic languages of authority" and "practical languages of governance", provide us with a way of interrogating the images and practices of the state at the local level (*Ibid.*). The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows: firstly, we will examine which actors make use of "symbolic languages of authority", of which two examples, permanent symbols (flags, logos, uniforms etc.) and codes of conduct, are used here. Thereafter, we will turn to the "practical languages of governance" and to two in particular: taxation and violence.

Images of State, or "Symbolic Languages of Authority"

In this section we will examine how formal and informal governmental actors make use of symbols and imagery to communicate their presence to the residents of the areas in which they operate. In the first instance, we are interested in "… the materialisation of the state [and/or other governmental structures] through permanent symbols" (*Ibid.*). We will therefore look at each actor's use of such tangible symbology in turn, beginning with the state.

The most fundamental symbol of the modern state, and by extension its governmental structure, is the flag. The modern South African flag, which was adopted on the day of the country's first democratic elections in 1994, holds significant meaning for many of the country's residents. Not only is it inextricably linked to the creation of a democratic society, the design itself is said to represent unification and progress:

> "Officially, the South African flag colours do not hold any symbolism, although they have unmistakable historical origins. Black, yellow and green are the colours of ruling ANC party. Red, white and blue are a nod to both the flags of the European colonists as well as the old Boer republics … [the] "Y" represents a

convergence of diversity, which can be interpreted as the convergence of diverse elements within South African society, taking the road ahead in unity." [5]

Displaying the flag can therefore be interpreted as an indication of belief in the fundamental legitimacy of the post-apartheid state. This is not to say that it is necessarily an endorsement of policy or of the ruling ANC party, rather it shows a commitment to the *idea* of a free, democratic South Africa. It is therefore noticeable that South African flags are highly visible in Vrygrond, even as residents bemoan the practical absence of the state.[6,7,8] Flags are displayed above buildings that have no financial or institutional relationship with the state, such as daycare centres and libraries (see Figure 1) and are frequently painted onto walls and other surfaces. The ubiquity of the flag, then, would suggest that the state retains a significant amount of normative legitimacy even in disadvantaged communities. In Heathfield and other traditionally middle class areas, sightings of the flag are much less common.

Figure 1: A South African flag flies over Rainbow Educare Centre in Vrygrond, Western Cape.
© Matt Heath, 2016

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[5] "Rainbow Flag for a Rainbow Nation"
http://www.southafrica.net/za/en/articles/entry/article-southafrica.net-south-african-flag-design (accessed 19th July 2016)

[6] Author's interview with Mymoena Scholtz, founder of *Where Rainbows Meet*, Vrygrond, 28th April 2016

[7] Author's interview with Isaac Goliat, assistant coordinator, Vrygrond Community Development Forum, Vrygrond, 4th May 2016

[8] Author's interview with Natalie, local resident and activist, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

Law enforcement agencies, as the enforcement arm of the state, are expected to maximise their visibility as a way of communicating a sense of security. This is certainly true of the police officers themselves, who make their presence known through their marked cars (some of which are armoured) and extensive use of sirens as an audiovisual indication of authority, all the while wearing uniforms to signify their privileged role as the formal protectors of law and order. Police presence, however, is at best intermittent in poorer areas of Cape Town. Often, these symbols arrive and leave with the officers themselves. There is no consistent presence, either symbolic or practical. Vrygrond has no dedicated police station; instead, locals must travel approximately five kilometres to the nearby tourist hub of Muizenberg. Similarly, Heathfield residents must journey to Steenberg. This was a particular point of consternation among interviewees, as it is twice as far away from Heathfield as their previously used station in Diep River.[9],[10] But the inability to project a continuous presence is not solely due to the lack of a permanent base in the community; even in the notoriously dangerous Cape Flats neighbourhood of Lavender Hill, which is divided between two separate police stations, law enforcement visibility is limited. As one woman explained in the 2014 documentary *Township Lessons from the Cape of Good Hope*:

> "If we speak about Lavender Hill, it's in sectors. We are in sector four and you have two police officers, one police vehicle that has to protect all of these people. So you could maybe say three quarters of the Lavender Hill sector four is protected by two individuals." [11]

Moving away from the public sector, the private security industry plays an integral role in security provision in South Africa and can therefore be seen as a governmental actor of sorts. It is notable, therefore, that these private companies can be seen to mimic state and law enforcement imagery in a number of ways. Like the police, private security companies (PSCs) use the

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[9] Author's interview with local resident (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

[10] Author's interview with two PHEW Neighbourhood Watch volunteers (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

[11] Michael Fischer, 2014. Video, online: http://www.michfischer.ch/styled/index.html (accessed 19th July 2016)

militaristic imagery of uniforms, marked cars and weapons to project authority and intimidate 'wrongdoers'. In middle and upper class areas, there is often much more of a private security presence than there is of law enforcement. Local residents actively encourage the proliferation of these companies' symbols and demand a high degree of visibility. As one Heathfield resident told me:

> "There was a time when I wanted to cancel [my contract], because I thought 'why must I pay for something that I don't see?' but now I see the guys in their uniforms riding past on their bicycles, or in those black cars of theirs [...] and the visibility of them being around makes me feel safer." [12]

Another significant use of imagery by the private security sector can be seen in the signs and logos that adorn the buildings under these companies' protection. In Heathfield, almost every house displays at least one PSC logo (in most cases where two logos are displayed, this is because one company operates the alarm system and another supplies armed response units), as do local businesses and centres of community activity (see Figure 2). The CEO of a locally owned private security company in Fish Hoek, a majority white, middle class area, echoed interviewees' assertions that the use of militaristic symbols and images has a practical effect in terms of decreasing the chance of crime, while also acknowledging that there is a more cynical, business-orientated reason for these companies to maximise their visibility:

> "We have signs, weapons, ballistic jackets, black uniforms, driving marked cars [...] it's impressive for the guy who's trying to break into a house. When he sees these guys coming round the corner, he's going to scoot off. So it's visibility and it's marketing, all together." [13]

In middle and upper class neighbourhoods like Heathfield and Fish Hoek, demonstrations of private security presence are seen as deterrents to crime. This makes sense when PSC subscription is the norm, but in poorer areas it can have the opposite effect. Even if the family or individual concerned can afford to pay the fees, displaying a private security company's logo in a township is "…

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[12] Author's interview with local resident (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016
[13] Author's interview with Yann Mouret, CEO and Operations Manager of YMA Security Services, Fish Hoek, 6th June 2016

like putting a massive neon sign on your house, saying 'I've got a flat screen TV', or, at the very least, 'I'm hiding something in here".[14] This means that the visible presence of PSCs in poorer areas can, ironically, increase the risk of harm befalling those companies' customers and as a result there is very little use of private security protection for individual homes. In Vrygrond, the majority of buildings that serve a communal purpose (e.g. libraries, schools, NGOs) are protected by alarm systems, but company logos are not displayed as clearly as in more affluent areas. The scale and effectiveness of the imagery utilised by these companies therefore varies between neighbourhoods and is dependent on the economic status of the client.

Figure 2: Exterior of Heathfield Preschool. The sign on the left reads "BH Tactical Response: 24 Hour Emergency Control Centre".
© Matt Heath, 2016

Community-based anti-crime organisations play an important role in everyday life in Cape Town. Not all of them, however, make use of permanent symbols in the same manner as other governmental actors. In terms of visibility and imagery, the most significant of these organisations tend to be neighbourhood watches. The organisations occupy a wide spectrum of formality; some have

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[14] Author's interview with academic researching gang activity on the Cape Flats (anonymous), Stellenbosch, 3rd May 2016

been created in conjunction with law enforcement agencies as part of larger "community policing" schemes (Fourchard 2011: 608-609), while others have no formal recognition whatsoever. For the purposes of this thesis, we are interested in formal neighbourhood watches that have working relationships with local police and Community Policing Forums (CPFs). There have been numerous attempts over the years to set up officially sanctioned neighbourhood watches in Vrygrond, with varying degrees of success. Some residents expressed doubt over the effectiveness of such organisations, given the frequency with which they are created and disbanded in the township.[15] The current incarnation, which was created through the CPF, is widely disparaged and even deemed unfit for purpose.[16] In contrast, Heathfield residents speak of their local watch in glowing terms. The Punts Estate, Heathfield, Elfindale and Windsor Park (PHEW) Neighbourhood Watch was formed in late 2015 and is thought to be the first official (i.e. police-sanctioned) watch to operate in Heathfield.[17] Volunteers are issued with fluorescent jackets and batons, and are supported by a small numner of dedicated patrol cars.[18] In an interview with the *Retreat People's Post* in May 2016, PHEW's chairperson affirmed his belief that the presence of a formal watch, even in a purely symbolic sense, has had a profound effect on the security of the area as a whole: "with more visibility there is less crime. It is much safer to be in the area. No one comes into our area to commit crime [any more] because we are watching all the time".[19] Permanent symbols and quasi-statist imagery, then, are important tools for community-level organisations of this ilk.

Turning to the illicit end of the spectrum, we must examine how gangs bastardise state-like imagery to project authority. To all intents and purposes, graffiti is the gangs' equivalent of the state flag; gang signs are painted onto

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[15] Author's interview with Natalie, local resident and activist, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016
[16] Author's interview with Mymoena Scholtz, founder of *Where Rainbows Meet*, Vrygrond, 28th April 2016
[17] Author's interview with local resident (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016
[18] Author's interview with two PHEW Neighbourhood Watch volunteers (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016
[19] "PHEW, No More Crime", *Retreat People's Post*, 3rd May 2016

walls as a way of showing which gang 'owns' that particular turf.[20,21] Graffiti of this kind is most common in the majority coloured areas of the Cape Flats, where gang allegiances work on a block-by-block basis, but can also be seen in areas where the gangs' presence is much smaller. In Heathfield, for instance, gang-inspired graffiti can still be found, but it is often the work of local youth with no real affiliation to the groups in question.[22] What this does show, however, is how pervasive the gangs' symbology is in Cape Town. As one academic reported, children in areas of acute gang activity absorb the imagery at a very young age:

> "When I asked [young children in Manenberg] for a picture, they automatically showed me these [gang signs]. For them, in terms of identification, the first point of association is the gang, or a gang; it's not anything else. The first point of association with regards to symbols is the gang sign." [23, 24]

The specific dress codes of the various gangs serve a similar purpose to the uniforms worn by more legitimate actors. The preferred style of clothing differs between gangs, but more importantly all members are expected to tattoo their gang's signs on their body. When taken together, the language, signs and tattoos of the gangs produce a highly salient image for their members to rally behind. The following excerpt, taken from an article published by the Daily Maverick, illustrates the hold that these symbolic devices have over individual gang members:

> "When we meet, Calvin speaks to Mikey in prison language to demonstrate what he has learned. In response, and to the laughter of the adults around him, Mikey raises his arms, with his index and middle fingers pointed and thumbs extended in the 28s salute, shouting "son af." The phrase means 'sunset' – a key symbol of the gang, which operates in prison by night. [...] If he is to [join the gang], Mikey must show loyalty by 'taking blood' and marking himself with his gang's tattoo.

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[20] Author's interview with academic researching gang activity on the Cape Flats (anonymous), Stellenbosch, 3rd May 2016

[21] Author's interview with ex-member of the Junky Funky Kids/26s (anonymous), Steenberg, 10th June 2016

[22] Author's interview with two PHEW Neighbourhood Watch volunteers (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

[23] Author's interview with academic researching gang activity on the Cape Flats (anonymous), Stellenbosch, 3rd May 2016

[24] For further illustration of this phenomenon, see preface to Jensen, 2008

But once it is 'blood in,' it is also 'blood out' – a reminder that the most common way out of gang membership is death." [25]

It is clear that the gangs of the Cape Flats make deliberate use of permanent symbols and state-esque imagery, as do the majority of governmental actors in Vrygrond and Heathfield, whether they be affiliated with the state or not. We will therefore turn now to the second symbolic language of authority put forward by Jaffe: the institutionalisation of law (2013: 736).

In this section we will examine to what extent the governmental actors in Vrygrond and Heathfield can create laws. For the purposes of this thesis, we are expanding 'law' to include rules and codes of conduct, as laws themselves remain the sole preserve of the state. We can therefore take it as read that the state has the both the capacity and the legitimacy to produce laws, which law enforcement agencies are then tasked with implementing. Besides upholding state law, however, police have actively attempted to formalise "basic safety measures". In just one example of this, Lieutenant Colonel Maggie Rossouw, acting station commander for the Muizenberg branch of the South African Police Service (SAPS) suggested a list of such measures, which included "never walk alone, instead try to walk in a group", "when leaving on vacation, cancel all newspaper and magazine deliveries" and "report any suspicious characters to the police and ensure that you memorise a complete description of the suspect".[26] Of course, none of these 'rules' are legally enforceable, but this could be interpreted as an attempt to create a subset of rules that complement existing laws while shifting responsibility for everyday security from the police to the individual.

On a fundamental level, private security companies lack the ability to create or enforce rules, or even 'codes of conduct'. In this respect they lack an essential function for governmental actors. They are employed by individual clients on a

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[25] "GroundUp: Recruiting Child Soldiers on the Cape Flats"
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-11-16-groundup-recruiting-child-soldiers-on-the-cape-flats/#.V53SrY7d5KX (accessed 28th May 2016)
[26] "Community Must Be Alert", *Retreat People's Post*, 3rd May 2016

contractual basis and do not seek to impose regulatory systems onto the wider community, whether they be informal, customary rules or the laws of the land:

"We're not enforcing laws, we're just protecting the people who pay us to protect them. If we see somebody loitering, or dumping garbage, we have the same rights as a member of the public. We don't have a police function. Anything else we do, it's our goodwill towards the community, that's all, but that's not part of our mandate." [27]

There was no clear consensus amongst the interviewees as to whether community-run organisations are capable of institutionalising codes of conduct at the local level. Some respondents argued that these organisations are merely responsible for agenda setting within their spheres of operation, and have no way of creating regulatory structures as such.[28] In Vrygrond, community leaders and activists bemoan their inability to enforce rules, particularly with regards to housing, and argue that the community should be able to make its own 'laws':

"For sixteen years we've been staying without rules. And after sixteen years, we wanted to implement some rules. It's just going to be for the benefit of Vrygrond, because we now have rats, which we never had. We have those big industrial cockroaches and we never had that. If you go to any public space you'll find there's such a lot of dirt, god knows where it comes from. [...] Today, if my house burns, all the shacks in my yard and my neighbour's house burn. So for all those kind of risks we need to put some kind of ruling down: you may just have 'x' amount of people living on your premises, and you must build with brick." [29]

Amongst younger, more radical residents, the lack of official endorsement for informal, localised rule making does not negate the legitimacy of the exercise. One resident, a supporter of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), expressed his belief in the community's 'right' to enforce customary laws and even moral codes:

[27] Author's interview with Yann Mouret, CEO and Operations Manager of YMA Security Services, Fish Hoek, 6th June 2016
[28] Author's interview with academic researching gang activity on the Cape Flats (anonymous), Stellenbosch, 3rd May 2016
[29] Author's interview with Natalie, local resident and activist, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

"The community can create rules, or it will create rules; we only newly started this forum. [...] If we see that there is a house that is installing stolen goods and the people who stay there are not good to be with other people, we will have a right to just chase them and hand the house back to the state, because these are houses that were given to us by the state. So we want the people that are good to stay with the other people. For example, there was a guy who raped… no, wanted to rape, but killed a ten-year-old child: that person can't come and stay with the people, you understand? They must go and stay somewhere else. That's a rule that is not there by the law but we can't stay with the people like that, who don't behave normal." [30]

At this point, we could be forgiven for thinking assuming that community-based rule making is inherently limited and that informal codes of conduct cannot be translated into codified laws without the involvement of the state. However, in Vrygrond we find an exception to this rule. The Vrygrond Community Development Forum is a relatively new organisation that was established in order that residents might have more of a say in local matters, but it is somewhat unique in that its executive committee, which is comprised of representatives of the forum's fifteen different sectors, has codified its rules into a written constitution.[31,32,33] While the scope of the constitution may be largely limited to procedural matters at this stage, the fact that a small, localised organisation has managed to create a set of written rules that are explicitly described in statist terms is very telling.

Questioning whether gangs are capable of creating rules may seem somewhat facile, given that all gangs (and, indeed, most organised criminal groups) have their own internal codes. What is less clear, though, is whether gang rules can successfully be imposed on a wider community. For example, ordinary residents are not obligated to submit to the same violent punishments for transgressions as gang members, even if they live within a territory that is *de*

[30] Author's interview with Isaac Goliat, assistant coordinator, Vrygrond Community Development Forum, Vrygrond, 4th May 2016
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] Author's interview with Mr. Galela, Vrygrond Community Development Forum member (environment sector), Vrygrond, 4th May 2016
[33] Author's interview with Linamandla, executive committee member and interim chairperson (education sector), Vrygrond Community Development Forum, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

facto controlled by the gang in question.[34,35] However, the gangs do play an important role in regulating the flow of drugs in and out of their neighbourhoods, and have been known to target drug users who buy from rival gangs.[36] Furthermore, taxi routes in poorer areas are 'owned' by specific gangs, who demand payment from any unauthorised drivers (i.e. those not affiliated with the gang in question) and use the cash-based business as a cover for laundering money from illegal activities such as prostitution and drugs (Lambrechts 2012: 795). The most visible, and most troubling, aspect of gang rule-making is reflected in their 'ownership' of space, and, by extension, the people within that space. In the most notorious areas of the Cape Flats, such as Lavender Hill and Manenberg, territory is divided between the gangs on almost a block-by-block basis. Given the complex spatial 'patchwork' that emerges, as well as the fierce antagonism between rival gangs, many gang members and unaffiliated locals are "… confined to one small block of streets", unable to step outside the relative safety of their block for fear of being attacked by an 'enemy' gang (Standing 2003: 4).[37] These may not be 'rules' as such, but it is clear that the spatial organisation of the gangs informs the everyday behaviour of most, if not all, residents in the most dangerous coloured townships.

In this section, we have seen how multiple state and non-state actors utilise "symbolic languages of authority" in modern Cape Town. These languages, or 'images', can be exercised in a number of different ways and the exact manner in which they are expressed differs varies significantly according to the socioeconomic makeup of the area in question. What has been shown, however, is that private security companies, community organisations and gangs are all capable of using quasi-statist imagery in order to project authority and, with the exception of PSCs, they are all able to create rules to a

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[34] Author's interview with Dariusz Dziewanski, consultant/PhD student (SOAS), Rondebosch, 9th June 2016

[35] Author's interview with NGO worker/ex-member of the Americans (anonymous), Wynberg, 8th June 2016

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] Author's interview with ex-member of the Junky Funky Kids/26s (anonymous), Steenberg, 10th June 2016

certain degree. As Migdal said, though, we must conceive of the state in dual terms; we therefore cannot look at images without also looking at practices.

Practices of State, or "Practical Languages of Governance"

Migdal's practices of state, or "the routine performance of state actors and agencies", are the functional properties of the governmental structures within a given society (Migdal 2001: 18). Note that he refers to more than one structure, echoing Foucault's assertion that the practical element of the state is a "composite reality" (quoted in Migdal 2001: 18). It is thus assumed that multiple governmental actors can perform statelike functions at any one time. The most obvious example is the legitimate use of force, and we will return to that in time, but first we shall explore how both state and non-state actors are able to force residents into paying 'taxes'. For the purposes of this thesis, we are using 'tax' as a colloquial term for extortion and protection rackets, as well as formal state tax.

It goes without saying that the South African state has the moral and legal legitimacy necessary to impose taxes on its citizens, but, as is the case with most contemporary African states, its legitimacy far outweighs its capacity. In 2013, the number of registered individual taxpayers was 15.4 million (South African Revenue Service & National Treasury 2013: 1).[38] However, estimates suggest that the current adult population of South Africa is closer to 35 million, meaning that the state is actually receiving tax from fewer than half of those potentially eligible.[39] Indeed, these numbers become more troubling the closer you examine them. In 2012, just 3.3 million people accounted for 99% of income tax nationwide, despite a total of 13.7 million individuals being

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[38] "Tax Statistics", South African Revenue Service/National Treasury (annual report, 2013)
[39] "Over third of SA population under 18 – Unicef"
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Over-third-of-SA-population-under-18-Unicef-20140812 (accessed 23rd July 2016)

registered.[40] This is of course a major barrier to state-led development, as the income from taxes is the main source of funds for social welfare projects in most contemporary states. The contemporary South African state is therefore failing in the performance of one of its most basic functions: obtaining contributions to state revenue. The upshot of this is that very little real tax is being collected in South Africa, as payments to any other governmental actor cannot be legally considered tax, even if that is the word being used.

Law enforcement agencies, in contrast, do not possess a tax collection function, in fact, quite the opposite: they are financed with public money. As such, police cannot be said to be involved in taxation, but it is common knowledge in South Africa that many officers are engaged in extortion. As one interviewee told me, despite widespread belief that most protection rackets are run by gangsters, local business owners are more likely to be targeted by police officers soliciting bribes.[41] Allegations of this type are not mere hearsay; corrupt cops are uncovered with alarming regularity by the national media. Derica Lambrechts talks about officers' propensity for accepting bribes rather than confiscating guns recovered from the townships (2003: 803) and in July 2015, six police officers appeared at the Specialised Commercial Crime Court in Belville, Cape Town, to answer numerous charges of extortion, fraud and corruption.[42] Additionally, just four months ago, in April 2016, two officers appeared at the same court after soliciting a bribe from the son of another police official:

> "According to the charge sheet, they were on patrol in the early hours of the morning in June 2013, when they stopped a car and accused the driver, Sisa Yanta, of drunk driving.
>
> They told Yanta they were taking him to the Athlone police station for a blood test, and Yanta lamented that he needed to be at his place of work early in the morning.

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[40] "3.3 Million South Africans Pay 99% of All Income Tax" http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/33-Million-South-Africans-Pay-99-of-All-Income-Tax-20131120 (accessed 23rd July 2016)
[41] Author's interview with NGO worker/ex-member of the Americans (anonymous), Wynberg, 8th June 2016
[42] "Six Cops in Cape Court for Extortion, Corruption and Fraud" https://www.enca.com/south-africa/six-cops-appear-cape-court-extortion-corruption-and-fraud (accessed 23rd July 2016)

Prosecutor Xolile Jonas alleges that they suggested to Yanta that they "talk about it".

Yanta understood this to mean that they wanted money for his release, and offered them R50.

According to the charge sheet, the two police officials considered the R50 an insult, and laughed at him." [43]

These instances, and many more like them, give us just a hint of the scale of the corruption within the South African police and the abuses of power that occur on a regular basis.[44]

Unlike the other actors under consideration here, private security companies are hired by their customers on an individual basis to protect their property. These companies conceptualise security as a good, or service, that can be bought and sold. Clients pay a monthly subscription fee to the provider of their choice (or, at least, their preference out of the limited number of suppliers operating in the area) in return for an alarm system, or protection by armed response unit. This is obviously not a 'tax', as it is not compulsory, but many South Africans regard it as a "grudge payment".[45] Many home insurance providers offer significant discounts for customers whose houses are alarmed or monitored by a private company and as a result homeowners are coerced into paying for expensive systems that they may not have wanted in the first place. In fact, in parts of the city that are deemed 'high-risk', home insurance is often contingent on the installation of an alarm system.[46] For a great number of South Africans, then, their private security subscription is an unavoidable expense and as such it can be compared to the 'taxes' levied by other security providers. This may go some way to explaining why these companies' clients are so keen for them to maintain a visible presence (see footnote 10). As the quote below demonstrates, the sheer cost of installing an alarm system and

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[43] "Cops in Dock for 'Insulting' R50 Bribe" http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/cops-in-dock-for-insulting-r50-bribe-2006671 (accessed 26th July 2016)
[44] Like most people in South Africa, I have experienced police officers' solicitation for bribery firsthand
[45] Author's interview with Yann Mouret, CEO and Operations Manager of YMA Security Services, Fish Hoek, 6th June 2016
[46] *Ibid.*

paying a monthly subscription is a point of consternation if the resulting service does not live up to their expectations:

> "Living Hope [a local NGO] got burgled three times in a row, with the security system. Now you tell me, what's the worth? And when they come, they first phone you to say 'the alarm has been activated at two o'clock in the morning'! Why are you phoning me? We're paying you for a service! And when they get there the places have been vandalised, burgled, whatever, so it's useless." [47]

For a great number of people, then, particularly those who live in poorer areas where response times are significantly slower, the decision over whether or not to pay for private security is a case of damned if you do, damned if you don't. It is therefore understandable that subscription charges for substandard private security seemed to arouse just as strong, if not stronger, feelings in respondents than extortion on the part of the police or the gangs.[48,49,50]

The forms of extortion utilised by the gangs of the Western Cape are more easily related to formal taxation than anything practiced by the other securitising actors under consideration here, if only for the fact that they actually call it "taxation" (Lambrechts 2012: 795).[51] This reinforces the somewhat romanticised, but not inaccurate, idea that "… organised crime [operates] as a form of 'organised counter-government' during an era in which the state is 'retreating' from certain areas of society" (Standing 2003: 12). Gang taxes are a part of everyday life in many areas of the Cape Flats, but some interviewees felt that the gangs were less intrusive than has been made out. One ex-gang member told me that their requests for payment tend to be one-offs, or at least infrequent, whereas police are more willing to harass people on a daily basis.[52] It would seem from my interviews that what extortion does occur in Vrygrond is largely the result of low-level gangsters taking the initiative and is only rarely sanctioned by their bosses. 'Taxation', on the other

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[47] Author's interview with Natalie, local resident and activist, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016
[48] *Ibid.*
[49] Author's interview with local resident (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016
[50] Author's interview with Albertina, Proportional Representation (PR) Councillor for Ward 67, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016
[51] Author's interview with NGO worker/ex-member of the Americans (anonymous), Wynberg, 8th June 2016
[52] *Ibid.*

hand, is authorised at the highest level, but, unlike in areas where gang activity is more intense, local businesses are only expected to pay if they are directly affiliated with a gang.[53] Informal taxation by the gangs is therefore not perceived to be as big a problem in Vygrond as you might expect.

At this point we must ask whether any community-level organisations can be said to 'tax' local residents. There is of course a great deal of variation in the practices and structural makeup of the numerous local bodies that operate throughout the Western Cape, but the short answer is that no, there does not appear to be anything at the community level that could be compared to taxation. Neighbourhood watches, community development forums and the like, these are all run by volunteers who receive no remuneration for their services and they tend not to ask for money from the community at large. The conclusion that can ultimately be drawn from this examination of formal and informal taxation practices is that the state lacks the infrastructure to collect tax revenue, meaning that police officers and gang members who obtain revenue through extortion arguably fill the state's role of managing the local economy through 'taxation' and, in the case of some gang bosses, reinvestment (Standing 2003: 10; Lambrechts 2012: 793).

Finally, we turn to that most important "language of stateness": violence. As was argued in the theoretical part of this chapter, true hybridity can be observed when the state must share its traditional monopoly on the legitimate use of force with other actors. To what extent, then, does the state retain the normative right to use force in Cape Town? As one interviewee explained, the national government cannot intervene militarily in the Cape Flats without sustaining a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the state:

> "If we look at it on a grand scale, at South Africa as a whole, the state is only supposed to provide us with security from threats from the outside. The problem on the Cape Flats and in places like Manenberg is that we have a threat coming directly from inside our borders. That's why President Zuma and the national government are so reluctant to bring in the army. OK, the state is

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[53] Author's interview with Natalie, local resident and activist, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

supposed to provide security and security cannot be secured in these areas of the Cape Flats, but if you bring in the army and if the national government gives the OK for the army [to enter these areas], it means that they have failed so significantly that they used a force that is supposed to protect against external threats in order to secure the interior and that is indicative of significant state failure. To bring in the army, the government would have to acknowledge that they have failed with regard to providing security." [54]

Despite the national government's understandable hesitancy in authorising a military presence on the Cape Flats, the army has been deployed to these problem areas a number of times, the most recent of which was in 2015, when soldiers assisted police with searching for drugs and weapons in Manenberg as part of Operation Fiela.[55] Indeed, this marked the second time in as many years that military operations had been conducted on the Cape Flats. While, as noted above, the government continues to be fearful of conceding that it has failed to bring security to these areas, the decision to send in the army has been greeted enthusiastically by locals weary of the violence: "[earlier] this week, Cape Flats residents handed a petition to parliament demanding a crackdown on violence in the area. But as one resident said: 'Soldiers need to be [in Manenberg] all the time".[56] It would seem that, ironically, the government boosted its legitimacy amongst the locals by doing precisely what they feared doing for so long. This is not to say, however, that a permanent military presence in the townships of the Western Cape would retain that legitimacy in the long run, as it would suggest that the national government has labelled these areas ungovernable, a word that has string connotations with the twilight years of the apartheid regime (Jensen 2005: 557).

Using a state's military to deal with internal problems is a controversial, high-risk strategy. Law enforcement, on the other hand, have every legal right to use force against internal threats, but their moral legitimacy has been compromised by years of what Samara calls "containment policing", meaning

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[54] Author's interview with academic researching gang activity on the Cape Flats (anonymous), Stellenbosch, 3rd May 2016
[55] "Manenberg Needs Soldiers All the Time" http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/manenberg-needs-soldiers-all-the-time-1861584 (accessed 28th July 2016)
[56] *Ibid.*

"… the practice of establishing and securing the borders that separate the poor from the wealthy" (2003: 305). Many years of treating the Cape Town's poor population as a dangerous Other, both under apartheid and in the post-transitional state, has eroded residents' faith in the police as providers of security:

> "Years back I had police come to violate my own house. I was at work, at that time I was still working at Muizenberg clinic. They pepper sprayed my children, just because my daughter had confiscated the TV of a tenant who was refusing to pay. The police came and pepper sprayed my minor children, I mean, I'm talking less than ten years old, with no adult in the house. What sort of security is that? They broke down my door, because they are police, and afterwards the case faded. I was violated in my own house. So I've got no faith in security." [57]

A large proportion of the people I spoke to during my time in South Africa had either been on the receiving end of police violence or knew someone else who had been, at least in the townships. The poorest members of this society have been targeted by law enforcement for so long that they reject the idea that the presence of police should make them feel safer.[58,59,60] The end result of this is that the state's law enforcement agencies lack the necessary moral legitimacy to work effectively with township residents, even as they are imbued with the legal right to use force.

Private security companies occupy a unique position in South Africa, in that they are the only non-state actors with a mandate to use force.[61,62] Furthermore, many of these companies market themselves specifically as "armed response" units. While the companies themselves claim that they take extensive precautions to avoid violence, there is a worrying lack of oversight:

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[57] Author's interview with Prudence, member of staff at Where Rainbows Meet, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] Author's interview with ex-member of the Junky Funky Kids/26s (anonymous), Steenberg, 10th June 2016
[60] Author's interview with Isaac Goliat, assistant coordinator, Vrygrond Community Development Forum, Vrygrond, 4th May 2016
[61] Author's interview with academic researching gang activity on the Cape Flats (anonymous), Stellenbosch, 3rd May 2016
[62] Author's interview with Yann Mouret, CEO and Operations Manager of YMA Security Services, Fish Hoek, 6th June 2016

> "[Research] shows that the burgeoning sector is riddled with flaws and loopholes […] there is no proper record of private security company munitions, and no central data repository for information on deaths or injuries caused by private security employees. [According to Natalie Jaynes:] 'In addition to a lack of information on the extent of firearms and rounds of ammunition held by PSCs (private security companies), there is a lack of knowledge of the extent of misuse and abuse of PSC firearms. Currently, neither PSiRA [the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority] nor the South African Police Services (SAPS) keep a record of cases of death and injury perpetrated with PSC firearms specifically'." [63]

The absence of firm regulation is particularly worrying given the sheer size of South Africa's private security industry, which "… is worth about R50bn a year, employs 2-million people and consists of some 12,000 different firms". [64] PSCs are therefore granted the legal right to use force, but without strict guidelines there is no need for these companies to strive for the moral legitimacy enjoyed by other actors.

We turn now to the actors most associated with the use of force in the Western Cape: the gangs. While the legal right to use force continues to emanate from the state alone, with PSCs' authority stemming from the state's endorsement of the industry, gangs seek to create their own forms of legitimacy. As such, they conjure up a romantic image of the friendly neighbourhood gang, protecting their home turf from external threats:

> "[Gangs] used to be very territorial; well, they're still territorial, but there used to be an element of 'hey, we're going to band together to keep the other gangs out of our community to keep our people safe' and definitely the gang members still buy into that sense of identity based on community protection, and to a certain extent the people that live within the community are keen to see the problem of violence as originating from the other side. There's a cognitive dissonance there, especially with parents, who retreat behind defence

[63] "Unregulated and Taking Root: SA's Private Security Peril"
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-11-19-unregulated-and-taking-root-sas-private-security-peril/#.V5_J0Y7d5KU (accessed 28th July 2016)
[64] "Private Security Industry is Worth R50bn a Year"
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2014/07/30/private-security-industry-is-worth-r50bn-a-year (accessed 29th July 2016)

mechanisms and say 'no, our boys are just reacting to those guys coming over here and shooting at them'. And you can see why that would be useful from the point of view of self-protection, especially for a parent." [65]

In the most dangerous parts of the Cape Flats, violence may not be seen as strictly legitimate but it is certainly normalised to an extent. When death is literally an everyday occurrence, it is easy to see how people might become somewhat desensitised to it.[66] As Dariusz Dziewanski explains:

"There's a sort of insidious process of people's experiences with violence where you just encounter violence so much that you become… not immune to it, but it does become normalised in that sense. […] It's an everyday thing. When there's a lot of shooting going on, it becomes very much like a … maybe not a video game, but I hear a lot of sporting analogies used: 'oh, we scored this many points against them today, let's see what happens tomorrow' and it's this kind of back and forth. Somebody gets shot, you know, it's the topic of conversation for the next few days, everyone goes to see the body, it's very much embedded in people's lived social experience. You don't have a large outcry, so in that sense you do have a process whereby social sanctions are eroded, but at the same time people will speak out about gangsterism and the ills of violence, the ills of domestic abuse and sexual violence, and yet these are the repertoires of behaviour that a lot of people go to. And so while on the one hand you may speak out aginst it, on the other hand it probably occurs within your home. If your masculinity is challenged in some way, the first reaction will probably be to fight somebody else. So this is very much the frame within which life is animated." [67]

In this manner, the gangs of the Western Cape have succeeded in turning extreme violence into a fact of daily life. Most of the gang members themselves have grown up around violence and so they are simply communicating those lessons into their adult lives. Major General Jeremy Vearey of the South African Police Service put it in the following terms:

[65] Author's interview with Dariusz Dziewanski, consultant/PhD student (SOAS), Rondebosch, 9th June 2016
[66] Author's interview with ex-member of the Junky Funky Kids/26s (anonymous), Steenberg, 10th June 2016
[67] *Ibid.*

> "On the Cape Flats, your first experience with violence is not on the streets, it's in the house. By the time that you're 14, 15, 16, you've seen a hell of a lot more than what you've seen on the street when it comes to gender-based violence, when it comes to fighting." [68]

It would be inaccurate to speak of legitimate gang violence *per se*, but the use of force can become tacitly accepted within their communities through a combination of complex psychological processes. At its core is a desire to distance one's own group from the root causes of violence and bemoan the gangs' use of force as a necessary evil and a natural response to threats from the external Other:

> "People do very much see what goes on in their space as a reaction to violence that originated somewhere else. Generally, it's not couched in the language of any political resistance or even social resistance. Violence writ large is something that largely vilified, even by the people that do it." [69]

Community-based organisations have also been known to use violence against people who are deemed to have violated existing moral codes. One obvious example of this is PAGAD, the vigilante group that is most famous burning a gang leader alive outside his home in Salt River in 1996. Despite almost disappearing altogether in the early years of the twenty-first century, the group has undergone a minor resurgence since 2011 and continues to enjoy a great deal of support, particularly among Cape Town's Muslim population. Interestingly, while the best-known organised vigilante groups originated in coloured areas, similar tactics are employed in black townships like Masiphumelele, where mob justice is an all-to-frequent occurrence.[70] Violence of this kind, which is organised within the community and targeted at designated 'wrongdoers', is legitimised by painting it as an example of the community taking matters into their own hands as a result of the state's

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[68] "The Cape's Youth Gangs: Bigger, Deeper, More Dangerous"
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-05-26-the-capes-youth-gangs-bigger-deeper-more-dangerous/#.V5_rDI7d5KX (accessed 29th July 2016)
[69] Author's interview with Dariusz Dziewanski, consultant/PhD student (SOAS), Rondebosch, 9th June 2016
[70] GroundUp: Accused in Masiphumelele Mob Justice Murder gets Bail"
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-11-03-groundup-accused-in-masiphumelele-mob-justice-murder-gets-bail/#.V58ceo7d5KU (accessed 30th July 2016)

disengagement. One woman told me that such mob tactics were also used in Vrygrond as recently as ten years ago:

> "I know of a young man that burgled somebody's house as they were moving over homes, that was in the early 2000s, they actually strapped him to a pole, put tyres underneath and burnt it while he was there, so his feet were literally burning. And this was a warning to never walk where you shouldn't be walking. Another guy they necklaced with razor wire and then beat him brutally up next to the blue church up the way. And they were going to kill him, but then they stopped. He eventually died in hospital because of his bruises. And that's the kind of thing that they used to do here, but they don't do it anymore."

A persuasive argument can be made that the state has tacitly encouraged these behaviours by surrendering its traditional monopoly on the use of force. As a result, extreme violence has come to be seen as a valid alternative to the legal and judicial structures of the state. This interpretation was supported by clinical psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, who testified before the Khayelitsha Commission set up to investigate the deterioration of the relationship between police and the local population:

> "Vigilante action [is] best understood as a political statement, rather than the actions of a senseless crowd [...] people [are] generally traumatised by the levels of violence and [vent] their anger on people considered to be the cause of their shared community fears." (Pinnock 2016: 76)

In this chapter, we have examined the role of the state in South Africa and attempted to decide on an appropriate theorisation. We began with traditional definitions of the state, ultimately deciding that Migdal's 'state in society' approach, with its dual focus on the 'images' and 'practices' of the state, holds the most explanatory value with regards to contemporary South Africa. The concept of hybridity was then introduced as an alternative to the reductive 'state failure' discourse, at which point it was suggested that Jaffe's hybrid state model might prove the best way to synthesise Migdalian duality with notions of hybridity. This conceit was then tested against empirical evidence, at which point we found that a wide range of state and non-state actors, including but not limited to law enforcement, organised criminal groups (i.e. gangs), private

security companies and neighbourhood watches, make use of both the symbolic and practical "languages of stateness". With regard to the images of state, we found that all the relevant quasi-governmental actors use permanent symbols to visually project their authority, but that some are more successful than others when it comes to the institutionalisation of rules. Similarly, on the practical side, not all security providers are able to extract 'taxation' from the people they protect, but all of them are able to use violence in ways that are considered legitimate, at least in certain contexts.

Chapter Two: Security Provision in the Hybrid State

Theories of Security Provision: Global Security Assemblages and Hybrid Security Networks

In order to understand how local residents experience the hybrid state in their everyday lives, it is beneficial for us to look at emergent networks of security provision. Even in hybrid systems, where the role of the state is diminished, security is regarded as the preeminent public good. Traditional definitions of the term are somewhat simplistic; for example, Krause and Nye understand security as "the absence of acute threats to the minimal acceptable basic values that a people consider essential to its survival" (1975: 330). While such a definition may hold some explanatory value in the context of strong states, the reality in hybrid systems is far more complex. In such cases, two "competing yet interlinked conceptualisations" must be examined, comprising both the 'supply' and 'demand' sides of security. For the purposes of this chapter, we are primarily concerned with the 'supply-side', in which security "… can be seen as a process of political and social ordering established and maintained through authoritative discourses and practices of power, including but not confined to organised force" (Luckham & Kirk 2013: 5). In analysing the supply of security, we must look at "… global, national and local power structures and security arrangements" (*Ibid.*), while also asking how 'end users', that is, the people on the ground, "… navigate … terrains of violence and seek security in unsecured borderlands [where state authority is challenged]" (*Ibid.* 17). In hybrid systems, particularly Hybrid Political Orders, the security domain is structured in a non-state-centric manner, meaning that in practice "[the] security field is … characterised by the coexistence and cooperation of different institutional arrangements. In other words: hybrid domains of security, rather than a state monopoly of legitimate physical force, prevail" (Boege et al. 2009: 18). These hybrid domains of security, also characterised as "hybrid security governance", emerge as a result of interactions between various state and non-state actors, all of which believe that they are in some way responsible for the provision of security (Bagayoko et al. 2016: 7). This "multilateralisation" process has led to

the creation of 'security networks', which are defined as "[sets] of institutional, organisational, communal or individual agents or nodes that are interconnected in order to authorise and/or provide security to the benefit of internal or external stakeholders" (Bayley & Shearing in Dupont 2004: 76; Dupont 2004: 78). As Loader suggest, this is indicative of a larger, global structural and normative shift that radically repositions the role of the state:

> "We are living in the midst of a potentially far-reaching transformation in the means by which order and security are maintained in liberal democratic societies, one that is giving rise to the fragmentation and diversification of policing provision, and ushering in a plethora of agencies and agents, each with particular kinds of responsibility for the delivery of policing and security services and technologies. What we might call a shift from police to policing has seen the sovereign state – hitherto considered focal to both provision and accountability in this field – reconfigured as but one node of a broader, more diverse 'network of power'." (Quoted in Abrahamsen & Williams 2009: 2)

The security networks that have emerged within this context represent a kind of market, in which the state is just one potential provider, albeit a particularly important one (Abrahamsen & Williams 2007: 241-242). It should not be surprising, then, that some scholars view the pluralisation of security provision as necessarily detrimental to the state:

> "Political elites tend to coordinate formal state with informal security policies to control policing, power and representation down to the most local levels. Hence neo-patrimonial patronage and other forms of networked influence tend to usurp governance structures at the expense of public interests and thus to corrupt security systems, degrade their capacity to deliver security and justice, and to damage public perceptions of their fairness and impartiality." (Bagayoko et al. 2016: 12)

Abrahamsen and Williams, however, reject the theory that increased privatisation of security automatically leads to the erosion of state authority. It is too simplistic, they argue, to regard private security actors as existing in a "zero-sum game of opposition to public power" (2009: 6). The emergence of non-state security structures does not mean that the state is 'retreating'; rather

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it is undergoing a complex transformation process (Abrahamsen & Williams 2007: 237). This is part of a wider global trend in which the relationship between public and private power and authority is being rearticulated in response to three separate but interrelated developments. The first of these is the emergence of neoliberalism as the dominant ideology on the international stage. Since the 1970s, there has been a decisive shift "... away from the vertically integrated, hierarchical, and state-centred structures of service provision characteristic of the welfare state, toward more diverse, horizontally linked complexes of actors", as part of an ideological commitment to downsizing the state and outsourcing its functions (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009: 4). This turn to neoliberalism has been accompanied by new normative understandings of security, which emphasise economic considerations over 'welfarist' ones and have been used to justify increasingly punitive approaches to crime (*Ibid.*). Furthermore, the 'commodification' of security means that it is no longer as closely identified with state authority. Instead, it has been de-politicised to such an extent that it is now seen as a form of expert knowledge and a service to be bought and sold on a free market (*Ibid.* 5).

It is difficult, therefore, to maintain the view that private security companies and other non-state actors exist purely in opposition to the state, particularly as numerous public institutions, including the World Trade Organisation and the European Union, have actively encouraged the expansion of the security sector to include private actors (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009: 5). The result of all this has been the transformation of the relationship between public and private actors, and the emergence of 'global security assemblages': "... settings where a range of different global and local, public and private security agents and normativities interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices, and forms of security governance" (*Ibid.* 3). By examining these assemblages, we can observe the wider processes that have led formerly clear-cut public/private, global/local distinctions to become increasingly blurred, but it is difficult to translate this theory into purely local contexts. Let us turn instead, then, to Dupont's 'local security network' model, which he defines as "... initiatives that seek to harness the public and private resources available in

local communities in order to overcome complex crime problems that find their origins in deteriorating social conditions" (2004: 79). It stands to reason that such networks might be observable in Cape Town, given that it is characterised by highly publicised security concerns, dynamics of political transformation and extensive security privatisation (Abrahamsen & Williams 2007: 239). Indeed, the involvement of non-state actors in providing security has been countenanced at the highest levels. In 2004, the South African Police Service (SAPS) called on "… the police, the public, elected officials, government, business and other agencies to work in partnership to address crime and community safety", a sentiment echoed by the Department of Community Safety when it conceded that SAPS "[could] no longer be seen as the sole agency responsible for fighting crime" and that "other sectors of society with a force multiplying capacity" should offer up their support (both quoted in Abrahamsen & Williams 2007: 246). Abrahamsen and Williams use the term 'hybrid security networks' to describe emergent forms of security provision that are "… neither disconnected from state authority, nor reducible to it" (2007: 250), and it is this term that we find to hold the most explanatory value, as it combines the security network theory advocated by Dupont with notions of hybridity that are, as discussed earlier, crucial to understanding contemporary South Africa.

It is important as this point to look back at Luckham and Kirk's article and their assertion that researchers cannot hope to accurately describe security provision in a hybrid system without looking at both the supply-side and the demand-side. Going forward, then, we will endeavour to do just that. The next section will examine how security is supplied in Cape Town and specifically how different security providers interact and negotiate with one another. After that, we will look briefly at security from the demand perspective; asking how local residents perceive their security and the actors ostensibly providing it.

Supply: "Collusion and Divestment"

The theoretical bases of our conceptualisation of security provision in the Western Cape have been discussed above, but if we were to attempt to

painstakingly map the security networks that operate in Vrygrond and Heathfield, not only would it take an enormously long time but it would also lead us further away from our starting point of Jaffe's hybrid state. Perhaps there could be a way to examine the interactions between the security providers that could marry our interest in networks with the focus on the hybrid state? Happily, our answer can be found in Jaffe's assertion that the hybrid state is characterised by the entanglement of multiple governmental actors in "a relationship of collusion and divestment". Examining these relationships in turn may provide us with the best way of illustrating the security arrangements in Cape Town. As we will necessarily be dealing with more than one actor at once, it would be difficult to structure this section in the same manner as the previous chapter. Instead we will divide it into licit and illicit relationships, and examine each possible combination in turn.

We begin with the most visible example of officially sanctioned collusion between governmental actors in contemporary South Africa. Since the adoption of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act in 2001, private security companies have taken on a central role in security provision in South Africa, and are widely seen as being crucial to the maintenance of law and order (*Ibid.* 243). According to one fairly conservative report from 2011, the ratio of private security contractors to police officers stood at 2.57:1.[71] The private security industry therefore acts as a "force multiplier" for the police and goes some way towards obscuring the state's lack of capacity for service provision.[72] This was not always the case; in the immediate aftermath of apartheid the ANC government regarded the country's private security industry with caution, owing in no small part to the characterisation of the industry as "... a largely white-owned sector [employing] a predominantly low-paid, black labour force to guard white wealth" (*Ibid.* 244). Various politicians argued that these companies, particularly those owned by foreign

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[71] "Does SA have the Largest Private Security Industry in the World?" https://africacheck.org/reports/does-sa-have-the-largest-private-security-industry-in-the-world/ (accessed 31st July 2016)
[72] Author's interview with Yann Mouret, CEO and Operations Manager of YMA Security Services, Fish Hoek, 6th June 2016

multinationals, constituted a threat to national security, prompting a swift and unequivocal response from the World Trade Organisation, largely at the behest of the United States (the country of origin for the largest private security companies:

> "[Opposition to foreign private security companies operations in South Africa] would be taken as a clear sign that South Africa was breaching liberal economic principles and that foreign investment (which the government was actively soliciting) was neither welcome nor secure in the country." (*Ibid.* 245)

In the fifteen years or so since the, the private security sector has expanded exponentially and has become a vital component of South Africa's domestic security apparatus, to the extent that "… it is fair to say that the South African private security sector […] enjoys an unprecedented acceptance and endorsement of its contributions to safety and security" (*Ibid.*). The private sector has therefore become an essential part not just of the security sector, but also of the national economy.[73] At both the national and local levels, the largest multinational PSCs work closely with government structures, to such an extent that smaller companies can find it difficult to operate in certain areas; when Sniper Security Solutions attempted to set up a guard hut in the affluent Rondebosch neighbourhood, they found that the local residents' association and the city council had such a close working relationship with ADT that they were unwilling to allow any competition to work in the area. As such, police forcibly removed Sniper's hut within a month of it being erected.[74] There is, unsurprisingly, a very close working relationship between law enforcement agencies and PSCs, but this can sometimes create security concerns of its own:

> "The police do not know the PSiRA regulations, so they will work with just about any security company. I was invited to a meeting at the police station that was described to me as a forum for police and private security officials to discuss the challenges we face. So I went to the station commander and thanked him for setting up the meeting, but I told him that I would only share crime intelligence

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[73] "Private Security Industry is Worth R50bn a Year" http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2014/07/30/private-security-industry-is-worth-r50bn-a-year (accessed 29th July 2016)
[74] Author's interview with Managing Director of Sniper Security Solutions (anonymous), Rondebosch East, 8th June 2016

with companies recognised by PSiRA and I knew for a fact that some of the companies he had invited were not registered. He told me that if I did not like it I would have to excuse myself from the meeting, so that's what I did." [75]

What is clear, therefore, is that the state and its law enforcement agencies are visibly engaged in "collusion and divestment" with the private security sector. In fact, it is easier to observe collaboration between the state and these private companies than it is to find examples of direct cooperation between SAPS and the Metro Police,[76] suggesting that South Africa's law enforcement agencies have more faith in PSCs than they do in each other.

Another formally recognised form of collusion and divestment takes place at the local level between police and community organisations. One example of this is the emergence of Community Police Forums (CPFs), which were designed to ease tensions between poor non-white neighbourhoods and police, immediately following the 1994 elections. The aims and objectives of CPFs are outlined in SAPS Act 68 of 1995:

"18 (1) The Service shall, in order to achieve the objects contemplated in section 215 of the Constitution, liaise with the community through community police forums and area and provincial community police boards, in accordance with sections 19, 20 and 21, with a view to-

    a. establishing and maintaining a partnership between the community and the Service;

    b. promoting communication between the Service and the community;

    c. promoting co-operation between the Service and the community in fulfilling the needs of the community regarding policing;

    d. improving the rendering of police services to the community at national, provincial, area and local levels;

    e. improving transparency in the Service and accountability of the Service to the community; and

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[75] *Ibid.*

[76] Author's interview with academic researching gang activity on the Cape Flats (anonymous), Stellenbosch, 3rd May 2016

f. promoting joint problem identification and problem-solving by the Service and the community." [77]

It is through these forums that residents have been able to form officially recognised neighbourhood watches, which receive training, equipment and information from SAPS.[78,79] We can therefore see that there has been a concerted effort by law enforcement agencies to integrate community members into the emerging security networks.

Let us now turn our attention to illegitimate forms of collusion and divestment between providers of security. In the first instance, complicity between police officers and gang members is well documented and is an assumed fact of life for many Capetonians.[80,81] As a result, residents of areas like Vrygrond have very little faith in the police:

> "I think most people think the police are corrupt. Not all of them, obviously, but some of them are corrupt and those of us who live in the community see them every day. We see them arrest someone and then the next day he's out; the docket [case file] disappeared. How can a docket disappear? It must be the police. That is why people don't want to go to them."

This corruption can be manifested in different forms, ranging from the aforementioned case of the disappearing docket (which is a remarkably common occurrence) to the diversion of police resources to the gangs.[82,83,84] At the most extreme end of the scale, one respondent had even heard of police

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[77] South African Police Service Act 68, Section 18: 'Objects of community police forums and boards' (1995)

[78] Author's interview with two PHEW Neighbourhood Watch volunteers (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

[79] Author's interview with Mymoena Scholtz, founder of *Where Rainbows Meet*, Vrygrond, 28th April 2016

[80] Author's interview with Prudence, member of staff at Where Rainbows Meet, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

[81] Author's interview with ex-member of the Junky Funky Kids/26s (anonymous), Steenberg, 10th June 2016

[82] Author's interview with NGO worker/ex-member of the Americans (anonymous), Wynberg, 8th June 2016

[83] Author's interview with academic researching gang activity on the Cape Flats (anonymous), Stellenbosch, 3rd May 2016

[84] Author's interview with Dariusz Dziewanski, consultant/PhD student (SOAS), Rondebosch, 9th June 2016

squad cars being used to carry out gang hits.[85] However, as a former gang member pointed out, it is too simplistic to demonise all the cops who cooperate with gangsters. For those police officers who live in the townships, fostering a good relationship with the local gang(s) is a survival strategy:

> "To be honest with you, the police know everyone and everything. They know who the gangsters are but they don't do anything about it. There are police that I know sit with the gangsters, smoke with the gangsters, and the reason why they are doing that? Protection. They work during the day in their uniform and at night they come back home to the same township, the same community. So whatever they do during the day, during their working shift, the gangsters must understand that they are just doing their job and when they leave that environment they want to come back to their community and just be a normal person. So that's why they befriend these people; they're not trying to fish things out. A cop might know a lot about a certain gang – where they hide their drugs, how they sell them – but if he's not in uniform then it has nothing to do with him. But if he's in his uniform and it's a bust, then he's just doing his job and the gang must understand he wasn't the one that gave them away. Because if they think it was him then his life is in danger." [86]

The patterns of collusion and divestment between law enforcement and the gangs, then, are incredibly complex and can be motivated by a range of psychological factors, but they come about through everyday interaction between individual police officers and gang members on the ground. But the corruption is not limited to the police, or to street-level gangsters. Indeed, illicit collusion and divestment occurs at the highest echelons of the state between politicians and the gang bosses themselves.

In November 2015, the *Mail & Guardian* published a report alleging that President Zuma had personally met with the two of the Cape's most notorious gang leaders in the lead up to the 2011 provincial elections. At the time, both men exerted enormous influence over the traditionally DA-voting coloured population of the Cape Flats:

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[85] *Ibid.*

[86] Author's interview with NGO worker/ex-member of the Americans (anonymous), Wynberg, 8th June 2016

"Two independent sources have confirmed that [President Zuma] met alleged crime bosses – including Quinton 'Mr Big' Marinus and 'Americans' gang leader Igshaan Davids, known as 'Sanie American' – at his official Cape residence on May 2 2011, shortly before the May 18 local government elections.

[…]

According to one version [of events], the party political nature of the meeting was clear. Marinus said at one point: 'Mr President, we will mobilise our members and work hard for you.'

Either he or Davids said: "Mr President, we will win the province back for the ANC."

Zuma asked: "How will you do this?"

Marinus said: "We have our troops inside each community. We will mobilise them and we will swing the vote."

He then added: "Sir, we're having big problems with Sars [the South African Revenue Service]."

Zuma listened. He said: "We will look into that." [87]

President Zuma, his aides and the two named gang bosses all strenuously deny the charges levelled at them by the *Mail & Guardian*, but the belief that the political class actively protects gangsters is widespread. One interviewee had heard more specific allegations:

"I know of gang members, high-ranking gang members, and politicians sitting and talking about aligning themselves [with each other]. They go to restaurants and they talk about it. I know this because my friend told me; he's a member of [one of the largest gangs]." [88]

The conclusion that we can draw from all this is that collusion and divestment between governmental actors occurs consistently in Cape Town, from the local level right up to the national government. This can occur legitimately, as shown by the state, the police and private security companies working together and

[87] "Zuma's 'Deal' with Cape Gang Bosses" http://mg.co.za/article/2015-11-20-00-zumas-deal-with-cape-gang-bosses (accessed 24th June 2016)
[88] Author's interview with NGO worker/ex-member of the Americans (anonymous), Wynberg, 8th June 2016

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sharing information within a clearly defined network that has emerged as a direct consequence of the South African state's aggressive neoliberalisation practices. Alternatively, illegitimate collaboration, specifically with the gangs, has been shown to occur at the national and local levels, through law enforcement officials and politicians of varying importance, all the way up to the President. Therefore, if we remove the imagined division between licit and illicit cooperation, it is possible to conceive of government, police, private security and organised crime as existing within a single hybrid security network. This tells us that we are right to assume the existence of a single hybrid state, rather than a number of separate parallel states. The previous chapter demonstrated that multiple actors make use of 'languages of stateness', but theoretically they merely exist in a vacuum as independent, autonomous entities. The sheer scale of the "collusion and divestment" between them, however, demonstrates that in reality each operates with the tacit approval of the others. Jaffe's hybrid state may have been modelled on Jamaica, but if anything an even more complex version exists in South Africa and, specifically, on the urban margins of the Western Cape.

Demand: Experiences and Perceptions of "End Users"

Having examined the dynamics of "collusion and divestment" that exist between the various security-providing actors operating in the greater Cape Town area, it is interesting to unpack end users' perceptions of their security and those who claim to provide it. We begin by looking at competing understandings of security. For many respondents, security is synonymous with safety or even protection.[89,90] The obvious question, then, is 'security for whom (or what)?'. According to one interviewee with extensive experience in the most dangerous areas of the Cape Flats, there is a sort of security hierarchy: "... first is the securing of the individual and secondary to that is the

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[89] *Ibid.*

[90] Author's interview with local resident (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

securing of the property".[91] In Vrygrond, respondents supported this claim by regarding freedom of movement as a key indicator of security.[92,93] End users in the township were significantly less concerned with the wellbeing of their property or possessions than they were with what we might call 'human security', were it not for the associative baggage of that term. The founder of a local NGO explained her priorities to me thusly:

> "We need support to protect what is on the premises and who is on the premises. Buildings and stuff is not so much of value to me, it is the human beings affiliated with the foundation who need protection. So security for us is very important to have." [94]

Outside the township, in more affluent areas, the 'hierarchy' suggested above begins to break down. In Heathfield, with its middle class population and extensive private security infrastructure, residents talk of the need to "feel safe in [their] own home".[95] As such, the protection of the property and the exclusion of external threats is paramount and some residents construct ever-more elaborate security apparatuses to keep 'undesirables' away (see Figure 3). This says something about the difference in mentality between a member of the middle class and someone who lives in abject poverty. Despite possessions such as mobile phones, TVs and cars being worth more in the township, in a comparative sense as a proportion of a person's overall assets, their true value is always less than that of human life.

In order to ascertain what the existing security structures look like from the perspective of end users, we will take each of the major providers in turn and ask how they are perceived by the people for whose security they are allegedly responsible and whether these perceptions differ markedly between Vrygrond and Heathfield.

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[91] Author's interview with academic researching gang activity on the Cape Flats (anonymous), Stellenbosch, 3rd May 2016
[92] Author's interview with Linamandla, executive committee member and interim chairperson (education sector), Vrygrond Community Development Forum, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016
[93] Author's interview with Ashwin, local resident, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016
[94] Author's interview with Mymoena Scholtz, founder of *Where Rainbows Meet*, Vrygrond, 28th April 2016
[95] Author's interview with local resident (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

Figure 3: In addition to the high walls and electric fence, this house in Heathfield uses two separate private security companies; one for the alarm system and another for armed response. © Matt Heath, 2016

For residents of both areas, the only way of directly interacting with the state is through their ward councillor. Respondents frequently bemoaned their councillors' absence from the community and claimed that they were "unreachable".[96],[97] In their defence, the 'wards' of Cape Town often consist of more than five separate neighbourhoods or suburbs, meaning that these councillors are expected to act as gatekeepers to the institutions of state for huge numbers of people:

> "[If] something is not happening, or if you're unhappy, you call in your ward councillor and you express to him 'what are you doing to ensure the safety and security of your community? You're responsible for the ward, so what measures is there in place to protect our people, because the crime is on the increase and the policing is not around'. Then it's up to him to go and address those issues and it's up to us to get the feedback from him in order to tell the community,

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[96] *Ibid.*

[97] Author's interview with Isaac Goliat, assistant coordinator, Vrygrond Community Development Forum, Vrygrond, 4th May 2016

'these are the measures that is being put in place in order for the community to feel safe and secure'." [98]

Such caveats notwithstanding, ward councillor inaccessibility is a major source of consternation for large numbers of people. The resulting frustration has led more active members of the community to search for alternative points at which to access the political structures:

"We don't worry with our ward councillor. He doesn't care about us, so we don't bother with him. When some kids were knocked down here by the taxis, I rode straight to the department of transport, to the minister of transport. We'd rather go to the top and then they can filter it down. But we won't speak to that man."[99]

Clearly then, the state itself is not widely seen as a viable source of recourse. What, then, of police? As was discussed earlier, corruption in the police force is widely acknowledged, but some interviewees argued that this was down to individual officers and was not indicative of systemic failure.[100,101] Arguments regarding police inefficacy as security providers largely centred on lengthy response times rather than concerns as to their integrity.[102,103,104] This same charge was frequently levelled at private security companies, which is interesting given that many PSCs in South Africa publish and boast about their average response times. For many people, response time is the most important factor when decided which security provider to use at any given time:[105]

"We do have an alarm system in here, we test it many times to see how long it takes ADT to respond to a particular crime, and like I said, by the time they come to the foundation somebody could already have been killed. Their response time is not good at all." [106]

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[98] Author's interview with Mymoena Scholtz, founder of *Where Rainbows Meet*, Vrygrond, 28th April 2016

[99] Author's interview with Natalie, local resident and activist, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

[100] Author's interview with Isaac Goliat, assistant coordinator, Vrygrond Community Development Forum, Vrygrond, 4th May 2016

[101] Author's interview with Ashwin, local resident, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

[102] Author's interview with Mymoena Scholtz, founder of *Where Rainbows Meet*, Vrygrond, 28th April 2016

[103] Author's interview with local resident (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

[104] Author's interview with two PHEW Neighbourhood Watch volunteers (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

[105] Author's interview with local resident (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

[106] Author's interview with Mymoena Scholtz, founder of *Where Rainbows Meet*, Vrygrond, 28th April 2016

Despite these complaints, most residents in more affluent areas and some business or NGO owners in the townships feel obligated to continue paying for private security protection, as it is the only way of guaranteeing that some sort of response will be forthcoming, even if it takes far longer than would be acceptable under ideal circumstances.

Throughout this thesis, we have used neighbourhood watches as the primary example of community-level security providers, but we have not questioned the legitimacy and efficacy of such organisations in the eyes of local residents. In Heathfield, the PHEW Neighbourhood Watch is widely held in high regard. Volunteers are lauded for their commitment to keeping the community safe and there is a general belief that the area is better off for having a formal neighbourhood watch that coordinates with the police.[107,108] The communal goodwill towards the watch and its members may be partially the result of its being the first official, coordinated watch to have operated in the area. In poorer, more crime-afflicted areas, neighbourhood watches and similar organisations are created and dissolved all the time and so residents are decidedly more cynical about the effectiveness of such locally run initiatives.[109,110] In poor communities organisations of this type are severely hampered, both by their reliance on volunteers ("Imagine you work nine hours a day and then when you get home you're expected to walk the streets for five hours for no pay, while fearing for your life. Fuck that!"[111]) and by the insular character of these communities:[112]

> "We've had neighbourhood watches before, but it's never been a case of, 'shit, there's the neighbourhood watch'. It's more like, 'shit, there's my friend's daddy

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[107] Author's interview with two PHEW Neighbourhood Watch volunteers (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

[108] Author's interview with local resident (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

[109] Author's interview with Natalie, local resident and activist, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

[110] Author's interview with Prudence, member of staff at Where Rainbows Meet, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

[111] Author's interview with ex-member of the Junky Funky Kids/26s (anonymous), Steenberg, 10th June 2016

[112] Author's interview with Mymoena Scholtz, founder of *Where Rainbows Meet*, Vrygrond, 28th April 2016

that I smoke with'. I could be carrying a gun, but he's not going to stop me. I know his son, I've slept at his house before, so he'll vouch for me." [113]

In poorer communities, then, residents have become disillusioned with the idea of the neighbourhood watch as a locally owned and operated form of security provision and openly question the effectiveness and integrity of such organisations. Perhaps such scepticism is simply born of having seen countless similar initiatives rise and fall and one example of an effective neighbourhood watch would be all it took to alter perceptions fundamentally. It seems more likely, however, that neighbourhood watches and other organisations of their ilk are simply unsuited to dealing with the challenges to security that are found in Cape Town's poorest neighbourhoods.

Finally, let us examine residents' perceptions of gangs and their role in security provision. It should not be controversial at this point to say that the people's views of the gangs will differ across socioeconomic lines, but it is interesting to note that opinions are more consistently negative in areas where gang activity is minimal. In Heathfield, where there is no real gang presence to speak of, there is widespread fear of poor coloured youth, who are seen as "trouble" regardless of whether they actually have any affiliation to a gang.[114] This is a stark contrast to Vrygrond, where people tend to demonstrate a more nuanced understanding of gangs' place in the community. This is not to say that people hold positive views of gangsters, or that their presence in the community is welcomed. Indeed, township residents tend to see street gangs as a primary source of insecurity.[115] However, most will happily make turn to the gangs for recourse in the event that one of the members has wronged them.[116,117,118] This leads to an interesting situation in which high-ranking gangsters are looked at

[113] Author's interview with ex-member of the Junky Funky Kids/26s (anonymous), Steenberg, 10th June 2016

[114] Author's interview with two PHEW Neighbourhood Watch volunteers (anonymous), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

[115] Author's interview with Reneen, local resident, Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

[116] Author's interview with ex-member of the Junky Funky Kids/26s (anonymous), Steenberg, 10th June 2016

[117] Author's interview with NGO worker/ex-member of the Americans (anonymous), Wynberg, 8th June 2016

[118] Author's interview with Dariusz Dziewanski, consultant/PhD student (SOAS), Rondebosch, 9th June 2016

in a more positive light than their subordinates, despite the fact that the gang leaders are the ones ordering the violence that so concerns 'average' residents.

What, then, can we conclude from this brief interrogation of end users' "vernacular understandings of security"? The most important finding would seem to be a very simple one: that perceptions of security and security providers are strongly influenced by socioeconomic background. This would seem to have a fundamental effect on conceptualisations of security itself, with a stronger emphasis on the security of the individual found in areas where violence is a more frequent occurrence. With regard to specific providers, opinions of private security companies and community-level organisations vary dramatically between neighbourhoods, as their effectiveness is either boosted or curtailed by the specific characteristics of the area in question. Attitudes towards law enforcement and gangs tend to be more uniform, but are still subject to change across socioeconomic boundaries. Interestingly, popular perceptions of gangs are essentially the opposite of law enforcement: while the police are widely thought to be either inept or corrupt, or both, they are still seen as a legitimate and necessary source of authority in contemporary South Africa; in contrast, gangs are largely vilified, yet for most "end users" they offer the best chance of recourse.

Conclusion

This research project consisted of two mutually supportive components. In the first instance, I set out to ascertain whether Jaffe's hybrid state model could be used to describe the governance structures that have emerged on the Cape Flats since 2002; this would be accompanied and enhanced by an examination of security provision from both the supply and demand sides. If a hybrid state could be said to exist at the margins of Cape Town, then it was expected that we would be able to observe clear examples of "collusion and divestment" between the various governmental actors. If such collaboration did indeed occur within the field of security, which is traditionally the sole preserve of the state, then we could say with a degree of certainty that both the South African state and "end users" of security have at the very least tacitly accepted the authority of non-state actors as legitimate, at least in particular spaces and contexts. This conclusion chapter will summarise the findings, before discussing the implications of this research with regard to policymaking and further research.

The findings were numerous and convincing. For one thing, it became clear that the most important security providers in the neighbourhoods under consideration here all make use of "languages of stateness" in one form or another. Four such languages were examined: two "symbolic languages of authority" and two "practical languages of governance". In the first instance, it would appear that a wide range of non-state actors, including private security companies, organised criminal groups (i.e. gangs) and community initiative such as neighbourhood watches all mimic the imagery of the state to some degree by using permanent symbols to communicate their spatial authority. The second symbolic language, the institutionalisation of law (or, in this case, the creation of rules or codes of conduct) varies significantly more in its usage between these actors, and while it may not be possible for them to create rules *per se*, they are certainly able to influence the behaviour of individuals within the areas under their control through the construction or modification of logics of appropriateness. Similar findings were forthcoming with regard to the

"practical languages of governance". Gangs and law enforcement agencies both routinely impose informal taxation tariffs onto these communities, while all the actors examined at length in this thesis are able to use force with a certain degree of legitimacy. For private security companies, this legitimacy stems from their legal mandate and contractual relationships with their clients, while for gangs and community groups that err on the side of vigilantism, their violence is either justified as a response to another actor's antagonism, or they simply operate in areas where violence is such an everyday occurrence that it becomes normalised and acceptable. These findings would certainly seem to support the applicability of the hybrid state model to modern Cape Town, as it is clear that a wide range of actors perform quasi-statist functions; however, these findings alone are not sufficient to prove the existence of a hybrid state, as each actor could be acting in isolation, without active cooperation (or at least collaboration) from their competitors.

This research also uncovered numerous examples of collusion and divestment between providers of security, both legitimate and illegitimate. The state, law enforcement agencies, private security companies and community organisations are all engaged in information sharing and can very easily be placed into a neoliberal 'security network'. On the more transgressive side of things, corruption has brought the gangs into structures of security provision at both the local and national levels, whether wittingly or not. If we remove the licit/illicit distinction, we can conceive of the state, law enforcement, private security, community organisations and gangs as all coexisting within a massive (and truly 'hybrid') security network. It is hard to imagine a better example of a system in which "different governmental actors ... are entangled in a relationship of collusion and divestment as they share control over urban spaces and populations" (Jaffe 2013: 735).

These findings raise some interesting points of consideration for South African policymakers, in that they show how the security-provision-as-market logic is a fallacy. The outsourcing of state functions is not inherently negative, but the state should be much more selective about which areas it withdraws from. It's

perfectly valid to encourage people to use private security as a way of stretching limited police resources, but downsizing the police presence in areas where most people cannot afford to pay for PSC protection guarantees that desperate locals will turn to 'illegitimate' forms of security provision. In short, the imposition of an aggressive neoliberalisation policy onto a post-authoritarian state that lacked basic infrastructural capabilities has exacerbated hybridity and gone some way towards legitimising non-state actor violence in South Africa.

Having completed this research project, at least two avenues for potential further research are visible. Firstly, our understanding of state hbridity in South Africa would benefit from more detailed examination of some of the community-level organisations that were only superficially covered here, such as Community Police Forums and Street Committees. Additionally, it would be interesting to investigate whether hybridity is strictly limited to security provision, or whether it has spread to other sectors such as healthcare and education.

To sum up, the research undertaken in preparation for this thesis has provided us with a possible answer as to how gang violence can be so prevalent in one of South Africa's 'strongest' states. The violence occurring at the urban margins of the Western Cape is not symptomatic of state weakness and will not be solved by 'hard policing' strategies. Instead, the involvement of criminal groups in security provision is demonstrative of state hybridity and can only be mitigated through constructive engagement and dialogue with these communities. The growth of the private security sector and the ever-increasing involvement of gangs in security provision and dispute settlement have both come about as a result of neoliberalisation. Ultimately, the integration of organised criminal groups into networks of security provision is just privatisation by another name.

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Appendix One: List of Interviews

- Mymoena Scholtz (founder, Where Rainbows Meet), Vrygrond, 28th April 2016

- Kyle (project manager, Where Rainbows Meet), Vrygrond, 28th April 2016

- *Anonymous* (academic), Stellenbosch, 3rd May 2016

- Mr. Galela (Vrygrond Community Development Forum member, environmental sector), Vrygrond, 4th May 2016

- Isaac Goliat (Assistant Coordinator, Vrygrond Community Development Forum), Vrygrond, 4th May 2016

- Prudence (staff member, Where Rainbows Meet), Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

- Linamandla (executive committee member, Vrygrond Community Development Forum), Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

- Natalie (activist and Vrygrond resident), Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

- Mr. Phambaniso (pastor and Vrygrond resident), Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

- Ashwin (Vrygrond resident), Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

- Reneen (Vrygrond resident), Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

- Albertina (PR Councillor, Ward 67), Vrygrond, 12th May 2016

- *Anonymous* (Pelican Park resident), Pelican Park, 25th May 2016

- Yann Mouret (CEO and Operations Manager, YMA Security Services), Fish Hoek, 6th June 2016

- *Anonymous* (NGO worker and former member of the Americans), Wynberg, 8th June 2016

- *Anonymous* (Managing Director, Sniper Security Solutions), Rondebosch East, 8th June 2016

- *Anonymous* and *Anonymous* (volunteers, PHEW Neighbourhood Watch), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

- Dariusz Dziewanski (PhD candidate, School of Oriental and African Studies, London), Rondebosch, 9th June 2016

- *Anonymous* (Heathfield resident), Heathfield, 9th June 2016

- *Anonymous* (former member of the Junky Funky Kids and 26s), Steenberg, 10th June 2016