


**Constructing The Cyborg-Soldier:
Posthuman Military Enhancements in Veterans' Autobiographical
Fiction from WWI to the Present**



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INDEX

0. Introduction	2
I. Setting the Framework: Post-human & Cyborg Theory	
◦ Before We Get Beyond Ourselves.....	13
◦ Moving Into the Beyond.....	17
◦ Not Quite the Beyond: Cyborg-ology.....	21
◦ Cyborg Meets Military.....	26
II. The Mechanics of The Great War	
◦ Trenches of Death and Exhilaration.....	34
◦ Writing Modern War.....	39
◦ Trench in Prose.....	42
◦ A Soldier in his Element.....	49
III. World War II: A New Battle	
◦ A War-Made Soldier.....	57
◦ A Meeting of Bodies and Weapons.....	60
◦ The Industrialized Production of Corpses.....	63
◦ The Guts of the War Machine.....	70
IV. The Other One Percent: Afghanistan and Iraq	
◦ The Modern-day Soldier-Machine.....	79
◦ Without Me, My Rifle is Useless.....	85
◦ Without My Rifle, I Am Useless.....	90
◦ The Atomized Soldier.....	94
V. My Rifle Is Human: Conclusions	99
VI. Works Cited	103

Introduction

In April 2015, *The Guardian* reported on the mounting unease in regard to drone warfare and the increasingly complex question of culpability with the headline: “UN urged to ban ‘killer robots’ before they can be developed” (Bowcott n.p.). This concern is just one of the many tokens of the anxieties and debates that have been building in society concerning the intersection of human life and technology, particularly when it comes to warfare. Considering the broader cultural spectrum in which military actions are placed, this includes anxieties about capital(ism), globalization, neo-imperialism, and their consequences. Military efforts aim to erase supposedly flawed human input and the possibility of ‘human error’ to the furthest extent, creating weaponry that is “not bound by human limitations” (Gertler 1). Decades of research have already gone into working towards a “sleepless soldier,” “augmented cognition” (operating weapons by thought), and (semi-)autonomous weapons (Crary 2-3). These topics and subsequent anxieties have become the subject of cultural representations such as films, TV shows, and literature, as well as academic research across disciplines, focusing particularly on the ethical, political, and cultural issues involved. Central to all these approaches is posthumanism, which at its core revolves around the question and critique of what is human. At the same time it also denotes a historical moment in which the human is no longer the center of our worldview due to its partial overlap with technical, medical, informational, etc. networks (Wolfe xv). This thesis addresses the significance of this engineered evolution of the human through the prism of warfare, with a focus on soldiers’ autobiographical fiction. Giving shape to “the veteran’s urgency to tell an untellable tale to home front audiences” (Norris 58), these works give an important “insider perspective” on the interaction between man, machine, and its consequences. In order to understand the dynamics of this interface and the concerns it brings, it is important to look at life writing by individual soldiers, of which there is a rich tradition in the West.

The changes in warfare and the relation between the human and technology in Western cultural imaginaries can be traced back to “The Great War.” A hundred years ago, industrialized weapons were used for the first time on a grand scale by opposing armies,

forcing soldiers to renegotiate their relationship with their own weapons as well as those they were facing in battle. Soldiers and their weapons effectively became “soldier-machines;” combinations of soldier and machine working as one and functioning within the overarching system of the military. The soldier’s experience changed radically as a result, and this is given a distinct voice by soldiers themselves in the shape of autobiographical fiction. These novels are fictional in varying degrees, but always build on the soldier’s own experience. The writing provides the opportunity for the soldier to either counter official narratives or underpin them, but they always grant an intriguing perspective of warfare and the ethical, cultural, and personal issues at stake. My interest lies in the tension that exists between mechanized warfare, its larger cultural imaginary, and the individual experience that is represented in these narratives. War rhetoric and its representation are omnipresent in newspapers, television, military/governmental documents, (computer) games,¹ novels, etc., and combined they shape the cultural imaginary of the “super-soldier” as a nationalist/patriotic ideal. The juxtaposition of the official accounts with the autobiographical representations I study gives a more complete picture of past and current military actions, allowing us to comprehend present-day conflicts better. The premise that “man is made through war” then becomes the question: what *kind* of man is made through war and by what means?

This research will construct an overview of a selection of modern wars: World War I (1914-1918), World War II (1939-1945), the Afghanistan War (2001-2014, 2015-present), and the Iraq War (2003-2011, 2014-present). The period from the beginning of World War I to the end of World War two, and the period from the beginning of the Afghanistan War to the current military (re-) involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq constitute two crisis moments within a larger debate in which ideas about the human, what the human is and what constitutes it, are being challenged. The context of warfare shows that these ideas need to be reimagined after over a hundred years of modern warfare. During these wars new technological developments were invented and utilized on the battlefield. World War I

1. There exists a first-person shooter game, *America’s Army*, which is made by the U.S. Department of Defense and is specifically designed to recruit new soldiers.

2. The Vietnam War also prompted an important body of literature (and film even more so), however, I will not treat this war in this thesis (other than in order to provide context) because I have found the focus to

saw the (industrial) mechanization of warfare. Machine guns, poison gas, tanks, and submarines are only some of the many inventions that were first deployed in the First World War. The Second World War saw an increase in the deadliness of weaponry while strategies were drastically redrawn, giving rise to devastating aerial bombardments, “better” poison gas (nerve agents), and new inventions like the computer and the ultimate weapon: the atomic bomb. The Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts have seen the extended use of innovations that were invented in the years since World War II, such as Kevlar, laser (an improvement in aiming weapons as well as tracking missiles), Global Positioning System (GPS), and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s, commonly known as drones). Though drones were already flown in the Vietnam War,² the contemporary wars in the Middle East mark the beginning of perfected drone warfare. What these four wars have in common is that in both the years of the First and Second World War (1914-1918; 1939-1945), and of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars (2001-2014 and 2015-present; 2003-2011 and 2014-present), the deployed soldiers have either been involved in both wars, or have reached maturity in the interwar years. Thus, they know war as a recent, shared experience, and have experienced the innovative character of the wars (and weapons) for themselves. On a societal level, this entails the creation of a “warrior caste” both during the First and Second World War, and now (Castner, “Degree” n.p.; Ehrenreich xvi). In addition, the current generation of soldier-authors tends to be very much aware of the literary canon of war writing beginning with (but not limited to) World War I. With a specific emphasis on the intersections between the human body and technology, I will investigate these changes in warfare and the notion of the human, the ways governments and their strategists dealt with the changes, and how this affected the experience of the soldiers.

Randall H. Waldron points out that “[i]n war [...] mechanization—and its associate forces of industrialism and statism—reach their most dramatic ascendancy and make themselves felt most immediately. Thus it is in war novels that the man-machine conflict finds its most intense and direct expression” (Waldron 271). I will start with a discussion of

2. The Vietnam War also prompted an important body of literature (and film even more so), however, I will not treat this war in this thesis (other than in order to provide context) because I have found the focus to differ notably from writing on other modern wars. Had there been space for a bigger scope, then, in combination with literature on the Korean War, it might constitute a third set of close-knit wars that influenced one-another. This could possibly be a future endeavor.

the most recent concepts and developments in post-human and cyborg theory, which will provide the theoretical framework for the analysis of the literary works. Historically, the study will be grounded in a discussion of the impact of World War I and World War II on technicity (and electronics) and the cultural conception of the human/soldier. Cyborg research often starts with World War II as it represents the introduction of the computer in matters of war. This thesis will argue, however, that the shift occurred earlier, with the start of mass warfare in World War I. When making sense of (writing on) wars it is necessary to consider its predecessors; each preceding war, its experiences, writings, technologies, and aftermath, influence the next. I will analyze seven texts, providing me with a scope broad enough to give an adequate representation. The authors of these texts are all soldiers and veterans.³ The authors of the twentieth century wars until that moment had no special experience with writing (war) novels, while the authors of the twenty-first century war novels all had a certain degree of creative schooling at university after their deployment. These texts will provide the basis of an overview of war writing in the age of mass warfare. Regarding World War I and World War II, I will discuss *Storm of Steel* [*In Stahlgewittern*] (1920) by Ernst Jünger, *All Quiet on the Western Front* [*Im Westen nichts Neues*] (1929) by Erich Maria Remarque, *The Naked and the Dead* (1948) by Norman Mailer, and *The Forgotten Soldier* [*Le Soldat Oublié*] (1967) by Guy Sajer. *All Quiet on the Western Front* is one of the, if not the, most famous First World War novel. It shows World War I as a scene of senseless slaughter in which the young recruits stand no chance. This novel presents “The Great War” as we have come to know it; a conflict in which an entire generation was killed, maimed or left desolate. *Storm of Steel* holds a very different position

3. Not only were there soldiers who never returned from the front, women also played an important part in World War I, driving ambulances and caring for the wounded soldiers directly behind the front. There is a rich literature of the experiences of these women and the effect the war had on them. I am aware of the fallacy of opposing women’s and men’s war writing—by giving premium to firsthand experience, those that were traditionally denied access to that experience (women) are impeded and/or negated in the validity of their accounts. However, as I am specifically focused on military cyborgs, the infantry soldiers are of interest to me, thus excluding other works that might focus on different aspects of warfare (this is also the reason I will not be addressing Ernest Hemingway’s *A Farewell To Arms*, as he was an ambulance driver, and did not serve at the front). The distinction is still valid today, as women were barred from infantry positions in the U.S. army until December 2015, when Defense Secretary Ash Carter “ordered all military jobs, including special operations, opened to women.” The first woman to be admitted to the U.S. infantry was Capt. Kristen Griest on April 25, 2016. (Dickstein n.p.). This means that until now the infantry and armor fields were male-only.

as Jünger, in spite of the defeat of the Central Powers,⁴ emerged from the war a victor who had survived dozens of direct hits and had developed his own theories on the stalemate of The Great War, which he had actively tried to overcome in the trenches. *The Forgotten Soldier* is the account of the Second World War as it was fought at the Eastern Front (Russia and Finland), showing the hardships of industrial warfare in a war that has become known for industrial killing of a completely different kind. The author was a German soldier of German-French heritage who first fought for the Germans and then joined the French army after the defeat of the Reich, thus referring to himself in his “German years” as the soldier that needs to be forgotten. *The Naked and the Dead* marks the beginning of Mailer’s career as an author, and his novel focuses mostly on the machinic and absurd elements of war. Together, these four novels show the beginning of prose writing on modern war, in narratives that hold very little heroism and no heroes. Even the question of villainy becomes obscured with the onset of World War I, and remains an issue in the later war narratives. These four novels portray an image of mechanized warfare as a metal beast to be fought in and against, and do so in both similar and different ways. These accounts of the first wars of the Twentieth century will then be placed alongside the autobiographical fiction of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.

In the section on these two contemporary wars I will discuss *The Long Walk: A Story of War and the Life That Follows* (2012) by Brian Castner, *The Yellow Birds* (2013) by Kevin Powers, and *Anatomy of a Soldier* (2016) by Harry Parker. These novels show soldiers in three diverse professional positions within the army; Castner was a bomb-disposal technician, Powers a machine gunner, and Parker a Captain in the infantry. The first two men are Americans, and Parker is British. Their accounts encompass several deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan, two temporarily overlapping wars that are named in the same breath more often than not. While Castner and Powers employ more traditional forms of war writing, Parker’s work is experimental and presents us with a narrative that almost literally takes the shape of the events that take place in it. Parker’s work stands out because of this narrative structure, as well as the fact that he is the only one of the veterans discussed in this thesis who has come back from the war physically injured—an element

4. Consisting of Austria-Hungary, Germany, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire.

that is embedded in the narrative. This thesis will demonstrate if and how the literary tropes developed in the twentieth century influence the texts of the later generation of soldiers-turned-authors. This will be gleaned from the texts through discourse analysis and close reading, distilling key tropes/motifs, representational strategies, formal choices and innovations, and similarities and differences in the way industrial warfare is written about. How does modern war influence the soldiers' bodies, in what way are they altered? How does the creation of the cyborg-soldier come about, and what does it entail? Are there distancing and/or humanizing strategies at work in the representation of the enemy and of the the soldier self? What is the agency of the mechanized soldier in these texts? And what strategies are in place for eliciting identification with the soldier, or with the enemy/victim? In how far do the soldier-authors assume responsibility for their actions? In the deployment of narrative strategies, writing on modern war will inadvertently enmesh representation and ethics. In "The Ethics of Reading" J. Hillis Miller assesses the influence of writing and the act of reading (on the reader), and explores the way literature and society relate to each other. He is of the opinion that there is an "ethical moment in the act of reading," which is a moment that leads to "a response to something, responsible to it, responsive to it, respectful of it" (qtd. in Miller 4); it leads to an act. In her own research on war writing, Margot Norris intends to show the way representation and interpretation combine and influence one another, and thus, "however indirectly, literature too, is shaped by, and shapes the ideological constructions that legitimate attitudes that inform public policy" (4) Literary criticism provides the opportunity to provide critique "with relevance for the possibility of intervening in matters of policy" (Norris 4). In the autobiographical fiction the soldiers' moral and physical senses are shown to be constantly under stress; by their orders and their enemy's actions, but also (as their weaponry improves exponentially while their opponents' does not—as is the case in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars), by their own actions.

In the face of the strategies and other such abstractions of war, literature creates a space for reflection that goes further, calling on our sense of ethics and affect. Experiences are projected outward by being written and/or published with an audience in mind, encountering and subverting the very trauma, empathic complexities, and ethical issues the military enhancement seeks to ignore and/or cancel out. Notions such as "us vs. them" are

complicated, we are made aware of ethical conundrums, and we see the life and survival of men that have often chosen their military careers freely, thus bringing ambiguities into the narratives of (heroic) war that are often used as a method of propaganda. The soldier-machine seen from the perspective of the soldier instead of that of the general, scientist, or public, looks decidedly different and far less like the bright future it is often marketed to be.⁵ The novels by soldiers and veterans are grouped into different categories; autobiography, nonfiction, memoir, war novel, *Roman à clef*, etc. but what they all have in common are the wartime experiences of the authors that lie at the basis of these novels. (Military) historians often hold claims of “truth” and “lies” in the highest regard, as if the facts of war (the numbers, the places, the deaths) were the most essential part of the narrative. Tim O'Brien, a veteran-author of the Vietnam War, once stated that “telling a story which is technically inaccurate yet truthful about the sensation of war is one of the most honest ways to convey its experience” (Coker, *Men* 3). These novels are, if not one hundred percent autobiographic fact, authentic. Autobiography is a Western mode of narration that is intimately connected to the humanist tradition (Manzanas and Benito 201-2). The unified “I” as it appears in Western autobiography as a single, integral, and independent point of view reinforces the privileged status the self holds within the humanist tradition (Manzanas and Benito 202). It creates the notion of privileged access to an experience and world-vision that extends beyond the individual to encompass an entire people” (Manzanas and Benito 202). Stefan Herbrechter points out that autobiography is dependent on a (humanist) subject/narrator who can remember, interpret and identify with the life story being told (“Subjectivity” 331). Consequently, we are speaking of a specific form of embodiment that means to present the subject of the narration and the subject of the narrative as identical (Herbrechter, “Subjectivity” 331), and thus as true to life. As nonfiction, autobiography is a narrative “that *purports* to be based on truth” (Eakin 3, emphasis mine), a definition that is vague in spite of its appeal to clarity because

5. The Dutch Department of Defense has a number of advertisements on television (2016), in one of which we see a bomber-fighter pilot at the moment right before contact, while a voice-over states that you have “alle controle, in jouw handen.” This is not only a blatant lie (you always answer directly to your superiors in the military and only fire when given direct orders to), it also seems “glammed-up” in order to attract young people by telling them they are in control of other lives and deaths. The range of ads is a questionable attempt to advertise for such an institution, which is why in some countries (such as Norway) it is forbidden.

ultimately it cannot be claimed that anything is “the truth as it happened.” Aside from the problematic nature of truth claims, the writing of experience is a translation of memory onto and via a medium and it is untenable to state all nonfiction writing is true in its entirety; writing comprises editing, misremembering, rearranging, of the experience. In other words, all writing has some fiction in it and “any book with a readable title page is, to some extent, autobiographical” (De Man qtd. in Herbrechter, “Subjectivity” 335). In this thesis the novels I treat are grouped under the nominative “autobiographical fiction” or “autofiction.” Guy Sajer, whose novel is analyzed in the second chapter, once stated that many ask him questions

of chronology situations dates and unimportant details. Historians and archivists (Americans as well as Canadians) have harassed me for a long time with their rude questions. All of this is unimportant. Other authors and high-ranking officers could respond to your questions better than I. I never had the intention to write a historical reference book; rather I wrote about my innermost emotional experiences as they relate to the events that happened to me in the context of the Second World War. (qtd. in Nash)

Discussions of truth and correlation with historical events as we knew them will eventually serve very little. The soldiers wrote down what they experienced as they experienced it, in the way they chose to write it. These texts are accounts of witnesses and participants, and it serves to remember that “[p]ersonal war journals have long been a persuasive form of witness, since their authors’ combat experience authenticates them as credible texts both ideologically and epistemologically” (Walsh 233). Paul John Eakin points out in *The Ethics of Life Writing* (2004), that “[l]ife writers are criticized *not* only for not telling the truth—personal and historical—but also for telling too much truth” (3, author’s emphasis). The question of ethics in life writing about war is the question of the ethics of war. What side does one belong to? What can one say? What is the convention, the censorship—and how does one interact with these factors? My interest in this thesis lies with the (transmission of) experience rather than with what military facts of the specific wars can be gleaned from the text.

In *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* (2009) Judith Butler writes in response to practices of contemporary war, and the way cultural modes regulate affective and ethical dispositions (1). Butler’s focus is specifically on the framing of violence, working from the

“suggestion that specific lives cannot be apprehended as injured or lost if they are not first apprehended as living” (1). How is the distinction created about who is living or not, and who is, indeed, “grievable?” She continues:

the frames through which we apprehend or, indeed, fail to apprehend the lives of others as lost or injured (lose-able or injurable) are politically saturated. They are themselves operations of power. [...] On the other hand, the problem is ontological, since the question at issue is: What is a life?” (Butler 1)

In the First World War military discipline and practice makes clear that the soldiers are only valuable in their ranks, as parts of the military machine, unless they answer to some notion of heroism (that was negated because of the staggering death tolls). In the Second World War this is far more problematic because of the Holocaust and the subsequent suggestion that everyone within the German army was in the wrong. At the same time World War II generated an astounding number of civilian casualties aside from the specific targeting of Jews and other “unwanted” groups by the Nazis, who were, as Butler suggests, not apprehended as (worth of) living in the first place. The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are no less problematic (they inspired *Frames of War*), as civilians are described as “collateral damage,” with circulating videos and reports that show that, in fact, they are directly targeted by the US military. The key questions are: whose lives are considered valuable, whose lives are mourned, and whose lives are considered ungrievable? Emerging alongside the notion of grievability, is “necropolitics,” a continuation of Foucault’s biopolitics, described as “that domain of life over which power has taken control” (Mbembe 12). Achille Mbembe adapts the notion of (bio)power because he feels that it is not sufficient to account for the contemporary way in which the murder of the enemy is made war’s “primary and absolute objective” (Mbembe 12). In essence necropolitics denotes the “contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death” (Mbembe 39). Butler states that war divides populations into those who are grievable and those who are not; “[a]n ungrievable life is one that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as a life at all” (Butler 38). To Mbembe this is in essence about who has the right to kill (16). Those with the right to kill are grievable in their own media, while those that are killed are not. Necropolitics and grievability, are two sides of the same coin, and find a mirror in literature and the question of whose story is

considered worth telling.

The central importance of the use of varying types of texts in this thesis lies in the analysis of the plurality of voices that constitute narratives. The analysis of these texts will be interwoven with the theoretical aspects of the thesis, as we move chronologically through the selection of wars. The first chapter will explicate the main theoretical approach: posthumanism. The term has generated a myriad of explanations, most notably by Stefan Herbrechter, Rosi Braidotti, N. Katherine Hayles, Cary Wolfe, and Donna Haraway. Cyborg theory is a strand of posthumanism that involves itself with the interface between man and machine and the possibilities of these (embodied) changes of the human being through its technical components. Cyborg theory thus forms a particularly apt lens through which to regard the soldier-machine. The soldier-machine has evolved into a being whose active firepower can be on a different continent than the part commanding it, as is the case with drones that are steered into Iraq from compounds in Nevada. Though drones are claimed to enable “surgical” strikes that minimize collateral damage, through documents such as the *Congressional Research Service's* rapport “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems” (2012) it becomes clear that the two main reasons for the development and use of these weapons are cost-efficiency and reduced risk for the pilots (Gertler 1-3). The potential unintended victims (“collateral damage”) are barely mentioned. Civilian casualties are felt to be the result of human error, and these systems separate the posthuman soldier from emotional and, consequently, ethical “complications” (Gertler 3). Now, at the end of this 100-year spectrum, certain dreams of super-effective military capacities can be realized. Mainstream media and other cultural outlets here and abroad show both the apprehension and fascination the changes cause in society. It is imperative that we continue to reconsider these manifestations and the seeming naturalness of the rhetoric of warfare.

Cyborgs are known mostly through their creatively imagined shapes in the public/cultural sphere in ways that are representative of aspirations, fears and further possibilities that exist within society; they are some of the many interpretations of and reactions to current state of the (Western) world. There are shows and novels that deal with cyborgs in covert or explicit ways, but all are valid interpretations of the organic/machinic (or electronic) symbiosis. Dedicated to the engineered evolution of “post-

humans,” the possibilities of cyborg theory have become instrumental in practice, resulting in programs aimed at perfecting human ability for their utilization (as tools). This is especially true in the case of the military and its attempts to create more-than-human soldiers that, ideally speaking, would be the “true servomechanism, the true slave-machine transcendent in strength and intellect, subservient in will” (Gray, “Cyborgology” 58). What are the effects of this enmeshment of soldier and machine, and how does this influence the cultural imaginary of warfare and the “super-soldier?”

Developments in warfare, as treated for example by Chris Hables Gray who analyzes from a military, technological, and historical standpoint, show the way in which warfare is conceptualized and conducted. Christopher Coker’s work discusses the possible effects of our current trajectory of warfare. Posthuman issues, technological innovations, and literary representations are rarely treated together, as a distinction between them is often maintained, causing the research to differ in focus and method. Elaine Scarry analyses (literary) language in a systematic study on the nature of representing pain and bodily harm (in war context) in *The Body in Pain* (1985), and Margot Norris’ work provides a literary analysis of war novels as representations of the condition of war. Through the prism of the posthuman, I will bring these different strands of scholarly enquiry together in the course of this thesis in order to make a contribution to the debate on current military practices during a time in which it has become fact that “humans have engaged and are engaging ever more thoroughly in intimate connections with technology of all kinds in order to extend themselves on the battlefield” (Blackmore 3). We are living in a time when war and its representation are omnipresent, even if they do not take place on our soil. Our armies are involved in warfare on a global level, and this is coupled with certain responsibilities.⁶ Many soldiers now are familiar with the war writing of previous generations, and consciously interact with the writing of their forbearers in content, structure, general rhetoric, etc. It is important to ask how these accounts interact and reproduce or reject visions of soldiers and warfare as they exist in a cross-temporal dialogue. Literature problematizes the position of the individual soldier as presented in official (and mainstream media) accounts, and encourages us to rethink our justifications

6. The Global Peace Index (GPI) of 2014 revealed that only 11 countries in the world were not involved in conflict. The only European country to stay out of involvement was Switzerland.

and acceptance of war, our definitions of the words enemy, weapon, soldier, and even human, as we consider our entanglement with other living and non-living elements.

I. Setting the Frame: Post-human & Cyborg Theory

[W]e are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics.

— Donna J. Haraway

Before We Get Beyond Ourselves

The question of what is human is ever more prevalent in contemporary times, when that very notion of humanity is put under stress by the technological developments of the last decades. In this time we have witnessed the onset of (technological, ecological, etc.) changes that have challenged the apparent innateness of what we consider to be “human.” Ranging from lung-and-heart machines and mind/microchip operated prostheses to popular visual imaginings such as *The Terminator*, the way we see the human and what we can say is innately human is put under stress, essentially making us question the centrality of the human in our worldview (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 3). Could the world be post-human-oriented, “post-anthropocentric?” (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 3). A variety of critical approaches and discourses all loosely affiliated with the term posthumanism have devoted themselves to the various concerns, challenges, and possible outcomes of this debate (in many ways creating it), and the result is an array of often contradictory definitions for the same term. Stefan Herbrechter writes in *Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis*, that the discursive object of the posthuman has become the “plaything of diverse institutions, which in their strategic statements about factual or possible forms of posthumanity, produce specific and competent ‘knowledge,’ the dissemination of which serves to consolidate the legitimation of these institutions” (37). Rather than creating a new vocabulary, the term is taken up and re-used to suit various purposes. In *What is Posthumanism?* Cary Wolfe makes use of this existing confusion in order to avoid being chained to one definition—sometimes even conflicting with his own earlier writings, such

as his use of the hyphen for example, writing “posthumanism” in 2009 but “Post-humanism” in 1995 (Wolfe xi).

In the discussion regarding posthumanism, there is a subtle distinction that forms the basis of the two poles of the debate. We might speak of “post-”humanism as going beyond the human, or posthuman(ism) as going beyond the humanist (anthropocentric) subject and accompanying worldview (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 7) that finds its origins in the Enlightenment. However, the -ist distinction is not often made when “posthumanism” is spoken of, upholding the anthropocentric but otherwise vague, unhistoricized, and almost mystical notion of “the human,” while we should see the Human species (*Homo Sapiens*) as historical affect and “humanism” as its ideological effect, instead of conflating the two (Herbrechter *Posthumanism* 7). Rosi Braidotti points out that “the posthuman condition introduces a qualitative shift in our thinking about what exactly is the basic unit of common reference for our species, our polity and our relationship to the other inhabitants of this planet” (2). In this inquiry, one of the key problems is humanism’s restricted notion of what counts as human (Braidotti 16). Posthumanism rejects humanism’s narrow notion of the human, and as such “rests on the assumption of the historical decline of Humanism but goes further in exploring alternatives, without sinking into the rhetoric of the crisis of Man. It works instead towards elaborating alternative ways of conceptualizing the human subject” (Braidotti 37). Positioning himself in between the poles of the debate, the “critical posthumanism” Herbrechter steers towards, is *post-human(ist)*, rather than *post-human*, urging us to deconstruct and reconsider the humanist legacy (*Posthumanism* 16). He explains:

To position oneself ‘after’ such a tradition [humanism] – post-humanism – means (in strict analogy with postmodernism and the idea of postmodernity) to embrace a conscious ambiguity that lies in two possible forms of accentuation: the undeniable experience that a certain humanism has reached its end (*post-humanism*); and the certainty that this humanism because of its own plurality and slipperiness cannot just be classified without remainders and representations but needs to be ‘worked through’ in a critical deconstructive sense (hence *post-humanism*). (16)

However, this critical posthumanism does have to consider the fact that we are also dealing with a posthumanizing process that is technologically induced (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 43). Technological developments and (post)humanist thought exist side by side,

influencing one-another, and molding the way we perceive these issues of humanity and humanism. In the context of this thesis and military developments, the *posthuman*—beyond the human, its capabilities and form—seem most fertile because in essence military efforts do not question the position of humans as the center of the known universe, seeking to augment its capacities. This happens in accordance with humanist thought which conceives of the human as something that is endlessly perfectible and in practice this lead to *posthumanism* and even transhumanism. To this quest I will return later in this chapter.

From an ontological point of view, humans have always been technological (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 20). Today, the degree and extent to which ‘the essence of humanity’ is changed and challenged is changing. Cary Wolfe argues along similar lines, stating that humanism names the embodiment and embeddedness of the human being in its biological and technological world, signaling “a prosthetic coevolution” of the human with the technicity not only of tools, but also of language and culture (xv). This twofold of physical tools and symbolic language as prosthetic elements is also pointed out by Herbrechter, who notes that the use of symbolic language as the ultimate onthologizing tool (seeing language as the inescapable human prosthesis) or as the contemporary physical union of human subject and technological object (cyborgization), meaning that “there would be no humanity without technics (i.e. the ontological involvement between humans, techniques and technologies)” (*Posthumanism* 20). Considering the notion of the prosthetic in its broadest sense, it denotes far more than a replaced limb, but instead lies at the base of our experience as humans. Do we not consider ourselves the talking animal? Language and the use of tools are considered to be the two characteristics that set *Homo Sapiens* apart from all the other animals (Herskovits 67), but if language is also a tool, these two special characteristics are collapsed into one—and one we share with other species no less. What is thus put into question is the “apparent opposition between technological development and human nature” (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* viii). Haraway assesses that the cyborg appears here, where the boundary between human and animal is transgressed (“Cyborg” 293). She continues: “[f]ar from signaling a walling off of people from other living beings, cyborgs signal disturbingly and pleasurably tight coupling” (Haraway, “Cyborg” 293). Haraway points to the “opening up” of biological determinist ideology as one of the many ways in which humans have come to be closer to other animals than before, but she

insists on seeing the cyborg as a mainly fictional (ironic) effect of this trend (“Cyborg” 293). In her discussion of irony the cyborg serves Haraway well as a trope, but she neglects the very real (and increasing) cyborgian presence in the (Western) world. Boundaries are transgressed in excitement and obsession over newfound abilities, and after the transgression ideas for further steps are taken. The cyborg appears at the same moment as the transgression, but not as a consequence—rather, it creates its own conditions of existence. Haraway is referring to a process of technicization of life that has yet to find its proper framework while technological development has stopped moving from the inside to the outside, but instead comes from the outside to move inside the body (Esposito 147). Furthermore, thus Esposito, language is a “natural prosthesis,” rather than an artificial one, and the focus should be on the interaction between the organic and the artificial worlds, placing a distinction that implies an interruption of natural selection as we have come to understand it (148). Wolfe adds that in regard to human ontologies and our connections to technology, posthumanism also denotes a historical moment in which the decentering of the human is brought on by that partial overlap with technical, medical, informational and economic networks (xv). Hence the human is historically predetermined and does not ontologically precede “the technical practice destined to transform it” (Esposito 146). Esposito further contends that

now it is the world, in all its components—natural and artificial, material and electronic, chemical and telematic—which penetrates us in a form that eliminates the separation between inside and outside, front and back, surface and depth: no longer content merely to besiege us from the outside, technique has now taken up residence in our very limbs. (147)

In essence, these views on posthumanism suggest that the opposition between technological development and human nature is only apparent, and that they have been entwined (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* viii) since a time that can be traced back beyond our own species, to all tool-wielding animals.⁷ In the challenge of the fixity of human nature in our bio-technological age, our assumptions on what constitutes the grounds of our uniqueness as a species are brought into question (Coker, *Future* xiii).

7. In biological research a distinction is made between tool use and tool making. For example, birds might use stones to crack open clams, but certain primates sharpen sticks to use as a weapon (Roach n.p.).

In altering human beings, as they almost inevitably will, scientists will merely allow us to do what we have always done, but to do it better. And war is what some will continue to do very well.

— Christopher Coker

Moving Into the Beyond

The strand of posthumanism that expresses the most delight with the possible transformation of the human into something beyond the human, is that of transhumanism (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* viii). Beyond the human tends to mean beyond the human form, beyond its capabilities, but mostly its restrictions and limits (both mental and physical). Around the world the questions and possibilities arouse interest and discussion, inspiring transhuman communities. Stefano Vaj, author and secretary of the largest transhumanist association in Italy (*Associazione Italiana Transumanisti* or AIT), defines it as “legitimate and desirable to employ technoscientific means to take charge of one’s own destiny and go beyond the human condition” (Scianca). Transhumanism is dedicated to the enhancement of human capabilities, be they intellectual, physical, or emotional (Wolfe xiii). In its efforts to transcend the human form transhumanism is a direct result of humanist thought since its ideals of perfectibility, rationality, and agency stem directly from Enlightenment (and Renaissance) humanism (Wolfe xiii). Explicit in its goals, transhumanism is also connected to futurism as actively involves itself with the possible futures of the human, however they may look. Before the introduction of the term transhumanism, this acceleration-through-technology fell under the umbrella of futurism as a trend that appealed both to assessing possible futures and the post-1909 Italian movement and its fascination with mechanical processes and its efforts to give formal expression to the dynamic energy and movement of mechanical processes (*Merriam-Webster* n.p.). Biologist Sir Julian Huxley,⁸ who has been accredited with coining the term

8. Brother of Aldous Huxley, author of the 1932 novel *Brave New World*. Interestingly, Julian Huxley was

transhumanism in 1927, stated that the human species can transcend itself in its entirety (rather than some individuals, on some occasions), emphasizing that man needed to remain man, “but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature” (3-17). Braidotti states that at the core of this thought lies “a liberal individualistic view of the subject, which defined perfectibility in terms of autonomy and self-determination” (23). If there is a subject, it can be better.

At present transhumanism means something even more transgressive and is in essence, an “ideology of development” that is taken much further than ever before (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 8), especially because current developments show that many enhancements that only existed in idea before can (almost) become a reality. Thus, transhumanism entails a strong belief in the engineered evolution of “post-humans,” beings who, according to Wolfe, hold basic capacities that radically exceed those of “present humans,” and to such an extent that they can no longer be called “unambiguously human by our current standards” (xiii). However, while Wolfe attempts to debunk the primary position the (male, white) human holds in the (still prevalent) anthropocentric worldview by touching upon animal- and disability studies (the subject of *What is Posthumanism?*), in his introduction he does seem to assume that there is a basis to the human which transhumanism is attempting to move away from. He speaks with a touch of the same vagueness and mysticism that Herbrechter identifies in the debate regarding the posthuman—a sense of the human as holding an essence that makes them quintessentially human (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 7). Perhaps this is not the case in relation to animal studies, but in relation to the possible futures of the posthuman form itself, there is something lacking. It is no surprise, then, to discover that Wolfe’s concise explanation of transhumanism is not his own, but taken directly from journalist and writer Joel Garreau. In *Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies—and What It Means to Be Human* (2005), Garreau describes the possible societal consequences—both good and bad—of what he calls the “radical evolution” that advancements in the fields of genetics, robotics, information technology, and nanotechnology (“GRIN technologies”) could bring to the human species (4, 231). The developments he exhibits as real-life

also a member and president (1959-1962) of the British Eugenics Society.

examples, from a military skeleton that makes carrying 180 pounds feel like 4.4, to the production of egg cells from regular mouse-cells, were already a reality over ten years ago (4, 12). We have moved far beyond these innovations, and have, as Garreau suggested, “started the process of aiming our technologies inward. Now our technologies have started to merge with our minds, our memories, our metabolisms, our personalities” (6), changing our very composition. Artist Neil Harbisson, for example, can only see black-and-white (achromatopsia), but now perceives colours beyond the scope of normal human perception with an electronic eye that turns colours into sounds on the musical scale, allowing him to “hear” colour.

Wolfe states that transhumanism can be seen as an intensification of humanism, and not a departure from it (xiii). However, one can wonder if this is true in reality; can you still speak of the humanist perfectibility of man if this perfection can only be achieved by going beyond the human? Haraway points out that “[i]n the traditions of ‘Western’ science and politics – the tradition of racist, male-dominant capitalism; [and] the tradition of progress” the relation between the organism and the machine “has been a border war” (“Cyborg” 292). The demarcations of the organism/machine and other areas that are conceived as distinct from each other are under constant stress as they are, in fact, not distinct at all, and the failure to see them as overlapping and in flux creates more problems than it solves. Garreau sees three alternative responses, “scenario’s,” to the possibilities of the “inflection point in history” he finds we are evolutionary (or even developmentally) at (6). In the first, the “Heaven Scenario,” humanity is replaced by something “far more grand” within the span of two generations as humans become more and more perfected, if not human (Garreau 12). In the second, the “Hell Scenario,” humanity meets its catastrophic end around 25 years from now, due to these developments gone rampant (Garreau 12). In the third, the “Prevail Scenario,” the future is not predetermined, but it is full of hiccups and reverses that are the result of human beings accepting and reshaping their destinies, and, Garreau adds: “[i]n this world, our values can and do shape our future. We do have choices; you are not at the mercy of large forces. We can prevail” (12). All these scenarios acknowledge the imminent changes the transhumanists that Garreau has interviewed see on the horizon. Transhumanism thus works from three hypotheses: a) this is a time of exponential change, b) such a change has never before occurred in human history, and c)

this change is transforming human nature itself (Garreau 6). The crux of the debate is no longer “will we change?” The question has become “how will we deal with changing?” Seen from this angle, humans are a work in progress, a starting point “that can be remodeled in desirable ways through intelligent use of enhancement technologies” (Garreau 232). The promise of enhanced faculties, ranging from strength to memory and health, in short, enhanced life, outweighs the accusations of “playing God” or “messing with Nature” (Garreau 232). Garreau points out that transhumanists “believe it to be naïve to think the human condition and human nature will remain pretty much the same for much longer. They believe that the introduction of the [aforementioned] GRIN technologies are fundamentally changing the rules of the game” (232).

Garreau's scenarios tap into the hopes and anxieties that stem from contemporary posthuman developments, and which are becoming more and more visible as valid opinions in society. The people Garreau interviewed are mostly professionals involved in some part of the current genetic- bio- technological developments, stretching from building and planning to funding them. Visions of future grandeur tend to negate issues that are already existent in society, such as unequal wealth distribution to name one, and assume a generalizing tone. These changes are said to be good for *all* of humanity, while in reality this could probably only be attained by the wealthy few. There are examples of such technologies benefitting large groups, such as grand-scale vaccinations against polio, but even here whole continents are excluded. The leap forward Julian Huxley saw in the future for humanity, is brought back to the individualistic signification he wanted to remove himself from. As the three scenario's show, the ramifications of these alterations to the human (and its environment, are for everyone.. The Hell scenario holds all the anxieties that the Heaven Scenario ignores, and no longer calling for caution, it assumes unbridled expansion and predicts the end of times. In the middle the Prevail Scenario is rather unclear, but seems to be situated between endless “progression” and fatalism, thus making it the more tenable of the three scenarios; one where we speak for everyone, rather than only for the few that will benefit from the enhancements.

Transhumanism is marked by the positivity with which the possibility to go beyond our species is met. In the eyes of transhumanists, the further evolution of humans has transitioned into an engineered evolution, rather than a naturally occurring one (Garreau

231). In this engineered evolution there exists the allure of the considerable amount of control we would enjoy as we take the role of our own puppeteers. With a little help humans could evolve into stronger, faster beings, that do not get tired and who do not get sick or feel pain. However, with the elimination of disadvantages and pain might also come the elimination of emotions or independent thought and action. There is theoretically speaking no limit to what can be modified, and what is ethically “right” or “just” to change shows itself entirely relative. This positive view towards (re)engineering the human also facilitates the move towards a radical disembodiment that was first advocated by futurist Hans Moravec. He envisioned the human consciousness being downloaded into a machine, thereby living forever but without remaining as it was before its disembodiment (Hayles xii; Wolfe xv). The human turned immortal though inhuman is what Haraway describes as “the awful apocalyptic *telos* of the ‘West’s’ escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space” (“Cyborg” 292, author’s emphasis). Moving along the same lines in its extreme disembodiment, Moravec’s immortal man is a machine in the world. In the effort to get beyond the human (form), the aim is essentially to create something less human, but the eventual, real product might not be an overall improvement of the human, but could be one that enhances the physical abilities and diminishes the emotional—as is often the objective in military efforts. In the autobiographical fiction the modified body of the soldier emerges as the site of negotiation for both the positive and the negative aspects of transhumanist ideals.

A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction.

— Donna Haraway

Not Quite the Beyond: Cyborg-ology

The shape and name of the cyborg has been used in cultural expressions ranging from comics, and (graphic) novels, to video-games, movies and TV shows. Prevailing images of *The Terminator* and the “borg” from *Star Trek* show that “there is no one kind of cyborg” (Gray, “Cyborgology” 2). “Cyborg” is a shorthand for “cybernetic organism,” and was coined

by Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline in 1960. They conceived of “self-regulating man-machine systems” as the adequate response to the issue of survival in space travel (Clynes and Kline 30). Their paper “Cyborgs and Space” seeks to imagine man enhanced for space travel and extra-terrestrial living. Future advancements in space travel would require the ability to adapt the human body “to any environment he may choose” (Clynes and Kline 29). Rather than changing the environment (such as the domes over colonies on other planets that appear in some science-fiction novels), changes to the human are proposed. The term implies the presence the human and the constructed element together, rather than leaving the human behind completely as transhumanism envisions.

Haraway points out that “[m]ost Western narratives of humanism and technology require each other constitutively: How else could man make himself?” (“Symbionts” xv). Haraway sees opportunities for social equality and the possibility of a “post-gender society” personified in the cyborg as an ironic/metaphorical tool. However, there is a difference between the symbolic surrogate, the functional extension of a natural limb, and “the presence of something in the body that is not body” (Esposito 148). The symbolic interpretation is least feasible in the context of this thesis, while the post-*human* interpretation is of most significance here. A new type of human, a human-machine might evolve and thus render the human unrecognizable, but the emphasis is on the interface of the human and the machine. Cyborg theory can therefore be called a strand of transhumanism (Wolfe xiii), but it is decidedly different in that it seeks to unite the human/organic with the mechanical/constructed. Hayles explains that “[t]he posthuman view configures human being [sic.] so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. In the posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation” (3). *The Cyborg Handbook* points out that efforts in cyborg technologies can go into five different directions: normalizing, reconfiguring, enhancing, restorative, and degrading to the human form and/or capabilities (Gray, “Cyborgology” 3). Restorative cyborg technologies are the ones we are most familiar with in everyday life, replacing lost functions with prosthetic limbs and organs. This is to be distinguished from normalizing technologies which are to “restore some creature to indistinguishable normality” (Gray, “Cyborgology” 3). For example, a prosthetic leg that takes over the function of the lost leg is restorative, whereas a glass eye in the place of a

lost eye that has no other function than looking like an eye to others, is a normalizing prosthetic because it lacks the function of that which it replaces. Reconfiguring technologies move within the field of artificial intelligence (AI), but also within cyberspace, creating “posthuman creatures, equal to but different from humans” (Gray, “Cyborgology” 3), appealing more to transhumanism. Enhancing technologies compose the majority of what industrial and military research is focused on, seeking construct “everything from factories controlled by a handful of “worker-pilots” and infantrymen in mind-controlled exoskeletons to the dream many computer scientists have—downloading their consciousness into immortal machines” (Gray, “Cyborgology” 3). Military research is transhumanist in its objectives to both enhance, and where possible transcend, the human component. However, it seems the human is still necessary since the need for large human armies remains (Crary 3), and thus this transhumanist desire takes the shape of the cyborg in practice. Lastly, the possibility of degrading technologies is presented in *The Cyborg Handbook* as somewhat of an afterthought and as the rather new result of post 1960s mind-control research (Gray, “Cyborgology” 3). The degradation is one of the mind, reducing thinking humans to addicts of direct neurostimulation or into perfect soldiers without a will of their own (Gray, “Cyborgology” 3). When the humanist notion of the human is left behind, or when we shift to the military point of view, these alterations are not degrading but solely another step in creating the perfect soldier for whom doubt and emotional judgment are not desired traits. We can ask ourselves if a perfectly controlled human is any less human, and maybe this is where we find the line of severance with robotics and AI. The consensus seems to be that humans are—and should be—easier to manipulate than robots. It could be said that “the mind” is a placeholder for the humanist subject, for that same mystical and insufficiently historicized spirit or essence (which, according to Enlightenment thought, resides in the mind). As such, servomechanics are not so much degrading as they are anti- or transhumanist. However, it must be noted that creation the military servomechanism is dependent on a mental regression that is invited through Basic Combat Training, and serves facilitate the “reprogramming” of the soldier (Martin 67). I will return to this in the chapter on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

Whichever of these five technologies (normalizing, reconfiguring, enhancing, restorative, and degrading) is at play, it could be said that “[t]he relationship between the

human and the technological other has shifted in the contemporary context, to reach unprecedented degrees of intimacy and intrusion” (Braidotti 89). More than anything, the cyborg-incarnation of the posthuman subject “is an amalgam, a collection of heterogenous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction” (Hayles 3). For the creation of this intimacy between parts, the human/organic component is just as essential as the mechanical one, though its creation is also dependent on the way the various elements are conceptualized and thought of:

Central to the construction of the cyborg are informational pathways connecting the organic body to its prosthetic extensions. This presumes a conception of information as a (disembodied) entity that can flow between carbon-based organic components and silicon-based electronic components to make protein and silicon operate as a single system. (Hayles 2)

Information is what is considered the most important element in the man-machine equation (Hayles 51). The questions ‘how much can flow through the system and how quickly does it move through it?’ are now the markers of importance and efficiency (Hayles 52). The notion of information is disembodied. This means that an abstract idea is of fundamental importance, and, in the military context, “the fundamental element of the message is the decision. [...] Control information, and power follows” (Hayles 52). Hayles investigates “the ideology of information” (Hayles 2; Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 95), and comes to the conclusion that there are at least three narratives that lie at the basis of cybernetics. Namely: “How information lost its body” (until World War II); “how the cyborg was created as a technological artifact and cultural icon” (after World War II); and “how a historically specific construction called the human is giving way to a different construction called the posthuman” (Hayles 2; Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 95). These three narratives have formatted the way in which cybernetics have taken up such a prominent position in Western society.⁹ The manner in which information has become entirely disembodied

9. It is noteworthy that several theorists, among which Garreau and Hayles, see developments and progressions in the form of narratives, recognizing the way reality is constructed as narrative. It is important to be aware of this because, as Norris states in *Writing War in the Twentieth Century*, both literature and the sciences shape and are shaped by “the ideological constructions that legitimate attitudes that inform public

creates opportunities to privilege it over material instantiations, as has been done since the ten Macy Conferences on cybernetics that effectively created this vision within their panels (Hayles 2). Consequently, embodiment is moved aside as though it was an accident of history, rather than the experience of life, and with it goes the embodied experience of consciousness that stems from experience (Hayles 3). Informational patterns are considered to be more important, rather than the material medium carrying it—in the case of humans: the human body (Hayles 3). Hayles continues: “[t]he clear implication is that if we can become the information we have constructed, we can achieve effective immortality” (13) thus realizing Moravec’s dream of consciousness separated from its mortal origins as it is downloaded into a computer. However, this reasoning seems to forget that “for information to exist, it must *always* be instantiated by a medium” (Hayles 13, author’s emphasis).

Posthumanist/cyborg theory from this perspective considers the human body the “original prosthesis” (of consciousness, center of the humanist tradition) thus normalizing the thought that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses is possible in “a continuation of a process that began before we were born” (Hayles 3). These steps that edge the consciousness away from the body and towards replacements and extensions configure the human in such a way that it can be synthesized with intelligent machines without issue (Hayles 3). Though nonbiological prostheses are an important element of cyborg configurations, to Hayles the defining characteristics of the posthuman are not centered on the presence of these components but on the construction of subjectivity (4). The incorporation of non-biological elements in the biological body is part of a larger debate on subjectivity and consciousness that has gotten into peril since their centrality in our worldview has been challenged through posthumanist thought, and to which new possible answers are continuously (re)imagined. Boundaries between human and nonhuman (binary) oppositions such as “bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals” are broken down through the debate and the turn towards cyborg-solutions (Hayles 3). According to Braidotti we can start from the assumption that cyborgs are the dominant

policy” (4). Norris appeals to Evelyn Fox Keller who stated that we need to understand that “particular representations are already committed to particular kinds of interventions” (qtd. in Norris 4).

social and cultural formations due to the mediation of electronic machines (90). The plastic and metal does not represent anything, rather it relays information through clear instructions and informational patterns, effectively fusing the human consciousness with electronic networks in their electronic mimicry/duplication of the human nervous system—thus speaking of biomediated bodies (Braidotti 90). In 1959 U.S. Air Force colonel Jack E. Steele coined the term “bionics” to explain the efforts to create artificial constructs (of non-biological elements such as metal, silicone, etc.) that behave according to organic “laws” (62). Thus bionics is “the discipline of using principles derived from living systems in the solution of design problems” (Steele 62). Applying bionics is one way of creating human-machine combinations that constitute a “biological-technological-physical mutation of the human body:” a cyborg (cf Haraway in Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 98).

However, it does seem that the human form takes second place in the way the cyborg and the human are spoken of, collapsing the anthropocentric structure that is the basis of humanism and certain strands of posthumanism. Taking the technological framework as the starting point, human “flesh” is (re)named “wetware” as a counterpart of the (apparently dominant) “software,” and is thus considered only to be the “interface between technological hardware and infotechnological software” (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 53). After being renamed, however, the wetware is still disappointingly human—it decays, expires and is unreliable due to these and other factors. Biological limitations and decay are then to be bypassed, “redesigned” through means such as nanotechnology, genetics (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 53), and servomechanics. The extent to which this modification takes place can be extreme, and without fail the locus of these modifications resides within the military (programs and funding) as the place from which most current innovations come into the world.

What I hold is not so much a single weapon as a nozzle on a fire hose of killing technology.

— Tim Blackmore

Cyborg Meets Military

One realm where the cyborg strand of posthumanism is decidedly real is that of the

military. Cyborg technologies have become part of our everyday lives, especially when they are normalizing or restorative, but military research has different goals. These cyborg technologies aim to enhance humans so that their capabilities exceed those of ordinary humans in such a way that they produce a “man plus” (Gray, “Cyborgology” 4). Christopher Coker points out in *Future War* (2015) that posthumanist thought has looked at the possibilities of cyborg theory as existential issues (xiii), while in practice they have become instrumental, resulting in programs aimed at perfecting humans for their eventual (wartime) utilization (such as servomechanics). The difference with other strands of posthumanism, transhumanism and cyborgology, is that the human is not the starting point: the military does not desire better humans, but better soldiers, better weapons. Autonomous weapons are not yet a reality and there are attempts being made to ban this possibility before it becomes a reality. As mentioned in the introduction, in practice the human component is still a necessity for any weapon to operate. By prioritizing the weapon, it is made clear that the qualities of the machine are preferred over those of the human and, consequently, rather than the machine becoming part of man (such as a pacemaker, for example), man needs to become part of the machine. As Chris Hables Gray concedes in *Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict* (1997): in today’s world the soldier is not simply influenced by the weapons used (195) and to say so would be a simplification of the lengths military research has gotten to. Rather,

now he or she is (re)constructed and (re)programmed to fit integrally into weapon systems. The basic currency of war, the human body, is the site of these modifications, whether it is of the “wetware” (the mind and hormones), the “software” (habits, skills, disciplines), or the “hardware” (the physical body). To overcome the limitations of yesterday’s soldier, as well as the limitations of automation as such, the military is moving toward a more subtle man-machine integration: a cybernetic organism (cyborg) model of the soldier that combines machine-like endurance with a redefined human intellect subordinated to the overall weapon system. (Gray, *Postmodern* 195-6)

One cog in various weapons-systems, the soldier is made to be increasingly ‘inhuman’ or mechanized in a number of ways due to mechanical or electronic changes and the soldier’s integration into larger weapons systems (Gray, “Cyborg Soldier” 43). After all, the perfect soldier follows all orders perfectly and without a second thought, brings about greater

casualties, and cancels out affect and empathy so they can keep functioning without asking questions. These new soldiers are the result of efforts by science and marketing analysis that enter into an “uneasy alliance” with military discipline and community, and in the end the weapons themselves are constructing the soldier of today and tomorrow (Gray, *Postmodern* 195).

To be subservient in will or having control over emotions (which always signifies having less of them in practice), are not humanist ideals of individual self-fulfillment. In fact, they are not even posthumanist ideals, but the result of viewing the soldiers within an army as utensils. It is not without reason that the military has been called “the first machine,” with the moving parts made up of the soldiers and their weapons; a “military machine” (Mumford, *Myth* 188). This analogy works both ways, as the view is upheld that “the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep moving with his weapon is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade” (Kennett 134-5). The soldier himself needs the presence of the other soldiers, the other parts of the machine to keep moving. This is also an issue of responsibility; it is shared among the members of a troop. Grossman points out that research supports the claim that on the battlefield “the primary factor that motivates a soldier to do the things that no sane man wants to do in combat (that is, killing and dying) is not the force of self-preservation but a powerful sense of accountability to his comrades” (149). In the military the integration of the different parts has always been essential, ranging from (Roman) battle formations to the different departments and desk-to infantry jobs that now comprise the modern military. Military uniforms (including gear) are important in this respect; showing soldiers not as individuals, but as uniform parts of the machine. Gray further points out that more recently “[t]he special status of weapons, the disciplining of individual soldiers into cleanly working parts, and the military’s fostering of industrialization and automation have all contributed to the drive to integrate humans and machines into effective complex systems” (Gray, *Cyborg Citizen* 56). The army as proto-machine goes back to ancient times,¹⁰ but Gray places the real change at World

10. There is the well-known account of the defeat of Hannibal’s army in 202 BC, in which “[a] Carthaginian dier,” trained specifically to tions within the army/infantryspension. The narrative goes on to focus on various soldier, but welephant charge was nullified by the checkerboard formation in which Scipio disposed his troops; when he launched them in a counter-attack, the Carthaginian army was overwhelmed and Hannibal fled the field” (Keegan 1993, 272). This shows a force that was generated by troops that move

War II, just as Hayles does. The use of computers and increasingly complex human-machine systems mark for Gray a definitive change and the birth of the cyborg (Gray, *Cyborg Citizen*). However, in this thesis I argue that the real change already occurred in World War I. The sudden mechanization of warfare with its exponentially more deadly weapons than in previous wars already forced new relations upon the soldiers, and was a complete change of the conception of war and the men fighting it. I will return to the changes that World War I introduced in the second chapter.

Every cyborg is part of a system or overlapping systems, and Gray points out that this implies that they are often the product of a great amount of institutional support (Gray, "Cyborgology" 2). Technologically speaking, the military is and has always been the driving motor behind the bulk of important innovations in modern times. This holds true for efforts that require the human to be more-than-human, such as deep-sea and space exploration. For example, the Internet, GPS, digital cameras, antibiotics, canned food (C-rations), ambulance services, microwave ovens, aviator sunglasses, safety razors, and (cellulocotton) tampons and sanitary pads are among the inventions to come out of the efforts of military research from various countries (Currie n.p). Legions of people in (state-funded) labs work under military contracts, constructing small parts of what is to be a far larger and more dangerous whole (Hayes 74). A company with a military contract might only be working on abstract software code, which is in reality a component of software to anticipate the range of a long-distance guided missile, while others throughout the country are working on the other parts (Hayes 73-4). We must bear in mind that as a consequence of the military origins of certain objects, "the systems and networks that change the way we live and think" are only ever products developed after the fact of pure war" (Pascoe 245).

Returning to the issue of (post)humanism as a response and attempt to reach beyond humanism; though it would be fruitful to see how the military construct affects the question of (post)humanism, different rules apply. The interest of individual soldiers has always been subordinate to the larger will of the military system. Civilians, the "normal people" most theorists speak of, are a different group, one that counts more as the norm

"as one."

than the institutionalized military. This difference is a sign of the fact that “humans and their humanity are historical and cultural constructs rather than transcendental concepts free from ideology and they therefore have to be placed within larger contexts like ecosystems, technics or evolution” (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 9). The military provides a specific framework that diverges from the norm by its highly disciplined and technologized reality. The context of posthumanism is moving towards something mixed, halting at the symbiosis that is the cyborg rather than moving on to something entirely post-human or transhuman. This means that “[t]he progressive ‘dehumanization’ and cyborgization of the modern military machine seems to form an almost inevitable ‘next step’ within the history of intrahuman sociality” (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 189). Herbrechter is of the opinion that the extension of humans into the battlefield leads to a “technological ‘standardization’ of life for military purposes” (*Posthumanism* 189). A standardization that is heightened in capabilities compared to that of ‘civilians,’ but which is subject to constant modifications that cannot be refused. This standardization is reflected by in the name “G.I.” that denoting American soldiers since World War II. The abbreviation stands for “Government Issue,” and the term G.I. came in use to designate a soldier around 1941 (Kennett 88). Sociologists around that time “determined that “G.I.” implied little or nothing by way of human qualities or values, but rather symbolized as mass-production commodity, a faceless creation as devoid of character as a bottle cap” (Kennett 88). The use of the term by the soldiers themselves was initially self-deprecating and indicated a situation “to which fate had consigned him and against which he inwardly rebelled” (Kennett 88). These are elements of the U.S. soldier in World War II, to which I will return in Chapter III.

In *Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the Posthuman Age* (2001), Gray proves himself a student of Haraway and builds on her idea of using the cyborg and “cyborg politics” to look for and promote positive forms of political agency, in opposition to militarization (*Cyborg Citizen* 26; Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 189). Gray proposes a “Cyborg Bill of Rights” that aims to ask ethical and political questions of the future already in the present (Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* 190). This bill of rights with its ten amendments can be seen as a re-interpretation of prolific “hard” science-fiction writer (and biochemist) Isaac Asimov’s

“Three Laws of robotics” that he articulated in 1942.¹¹ Hard science fiction “uses known or internally consistent science that obeys the laws of physics and scientific verisimilitude” (Blackmore 41-2). Asimov’s three laws apply to robots, who, even with artificial intelligence and/or emotions, are non-organic and belong to a different category and a different set of problems than the cyborg. For example, the robot makes decisions based on logic, rather than emotion (this is where artificial intelligence (AI) comes in), with the possibility of situations such as in the movie *2001: A Space Odyssey*. Here HAL, the super computer guiding the space mission chooses in favor of the mission, rather than the people, because it makes more logical sense. Gray’s laws on the other hand are very specifically designed for the human-machine hybrid—and thus apply to our current times.¹² “The Right

11. 1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm; 2. A robot must obey orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law; 3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law (Bizony n.p.).

12. The ten amendments are as follows: 1. Freedom of Travel. Citizens shall have the right to travel anywhere, virtually or in the flesh, at their own risk and expense; 2. Freedom of Electronic Speech. Electronic and other nonphysical forms of transmitting information are protected by the Constitution’s First Amendment; 3. The Right of Electronic Privacy. Electronic and other forms of nonmaterial property and personhood shall be accorded the protection of the Fourth Amendment; 4. Freedom of consciousness. The consciousness of the citizen shall be protected by the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments. Unreasonable search and seizure of this, the most sacred and private part of an individual citizen, is absolutely prohibited. Individuals shall retain all rights to modify their consciousness through psychopharmacological, medical, genetic, spiritual, and other practices, insofar as they do not threaten the fundamental rights of other individuals and citizens, and that they do so at their own risk and expense; 5. Right to Life. The body of the citizen shall be protected by the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments. Unreasonable search and seizure of this sacred and private part of an individual citizen shall be absolutely prohibited. Individuals shall retain all rights to modify their bodies, at their own risk and expense, through psychopharmacological, medical, genetic, spiritual, and other practices, insofar as they do not threaten the fundamental rights of other individuals and citizens, and that they do so at their own risk and expense; 6. Right to Death. Every citizen and individual shall have the right to end their life, at their own risk and expense, in the manner of their own choice, as long as it does not infringe upon the fundamental rights of citizens and individuals; 7. Right to Political Equality. The political power of every citizen should be determined by the quality of his or her arguments, example, energy, and single vote, not based on his or her economic holdings or social standing. Congress shall permit no electoral system that favors wealth, coercion, or criminal behavior to the detriment of political equality; 8. Freedom of Information. Citizens shall have access to all information held about them by governments or other bureaucracies. Citizens shall have the right to correct all information held on them by governments and other bureaucracies at the expense of these bureaucracies. Institutional and corporate use of information to coerce or otherwise illegally manipulate or act upon citizens shall be absolutely forbidden; 9. Freedom of Family, Sexuality, and Gender. Citizens and individuals have the right to determine their own sexual and gender orientations, at their own risk and expense, including matrimonial and other forms of alliance. Congress shall make no law arbitrarily restricting the definition of the family, marriage, or of parenthood; 10. Right to Peace. Citizens and individuals have a right to freedom from war and violence. War shall be a last resort and must be declared by two thirds vote of Congress when proposed by the president. The Third Amendment shall not be construed as permitting citizens and individuals to own all types of weapons. Freedom from governmental tyranny will not be safeguard through local militia or individual violence. Only

of Electronic Privacy” is one of the demands Gray has incorporated into this Bill of Rights, and it is noteworthy because recently (15 years after Gray’s suggestion) in the case of *Riley v. California* in June 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that

police officers may not, without a warrant, search the data on a cell phone seized during an arrest. [...] Chief Justice John Roberts declared that “modern cell phones [...] are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy. (Wittes and Chong)

In essence it is said here that we *are* cyborgs, and that our privacy should consequently extend to incorporate all our non-organic extremities—which are nonetheless our own, part of our bodily selves. Within the figure of the cyborg, technology and human ability are made to work together, exist together. The pilot of the fighter-bomber plane can target enemies with the eyes, verbally give the command to fire missiles, and monitor his/her body and environs with computers and create a disembodied “God’s eye” view of the battle (Gray, “Cyborgology” 3). The perspective that is created here only exists in synthesis. Through this synthesis we see that “these changes [from the human to the posthuman] were never complete transformations of sharp breaks; without exception, they reinscribed traditional ideas and assumptions even as they articulated something new” (Hayles 6). In the cyborg the human/organic and the technological are combined and cannot operate independently. I argue that not only are the soldiers interacting with nonbiological components, but this interaction also changes the way they perceive the world. It is on this intersection between body, technology, and warfare that the modifications I will address occur.

World War I and II have both been researched extensively, hence, rather than giving a summary of the events, I will highlight some of the major technological changes of both wars and have them interact with cyborg theory in the analysis. The consensus on World War I appears to be that all the soldiers “lose” (at the hands of the generals and machinery), and that this is the crux of that war, rather than the sides the soldiers were fighting on.

solidarity, tolerance, sacrifice, and an equitable political system will guarantee freedom. Nonetheless, citizens and individuals shall have the right to defend themselves with deadly force, at their own risk and expense, if their fundamental rights are being abridged (Gray, *Cyborg Citizen* 27-9)

Stories such as the soccer game during the 1914 Christmas Truce heighten this conception. Therefore, I have chosen to engage with two different attitudes towards the war, rather than two different nationalities, as their juxtaposition will provide more valuable insights than the dichotomy of nationalities. The World War I novels show the soldier's confrontation with modern killing machines in deadpan and evocative language. For the Second World War the national opposition is considered absolutely vital in light of the Holocaust, and in spite of my focus on battle rather than Holocaust memory I abide by this division and will analyze the autobiographical fiction of a soldier of the Reich- and one of the Allied side (something I will come back to in the chapter itself). The two World War II novels take different approaches towards writing war; though both are autobiographical, only Sajer's text can be called an autobiography and adheres more to the World War I writing tradition, while Mailer is more rigorous in setting up an entirely separate narration. The chapter on Iraq and Afghanistan will focus on various aspects of the American war writing, for which Mailer has been an initiator. The texts will show how (and if) these contemporary soldiers interact with the existing heritage of modern war writing. Here, I locate the start of this modern war-writing heritage with the writing of the first industrial war: "The Great War."

II. The Mechanics of The Great War

Trenches of Death and Exhilaration

Nothing can happen [with modern weapons] but the needless and most wasteful and pitiful killing of these poor lads, who make up the infantry battalions, the main mass of all the European armies of to-day, whenever they come against a sanely-organized army. There is nowhere they can come in, there is nothing they can do. The scattered invisible marksmen with their supporting guns will shatter their masses, pick them off individually, cover their line of retreat and force them into wholesale surrenders. It will be more like herding sheep than actual fighting. (Wells 208)

H.G. Wells' war prediction in his *Anticipations* seems as if it was written after the First World War, rather than seven years before its occurrence. The public opinion of the time was far more positive; there had not been a war on the mainland since the year 1871, which marked the end of the Franco-Prussian war (Fussell, *Great* 3), and at its onset it was generally believed the "Great War" would not last more than six months. Though not all his contemporaries were as clairvoyant as Wells, the technological and industrial developments of the time were leading up to a new way of conducting warfare. The Great War took place on a never-before seen scale, with weapons that had never been used before. The scope of the conflict and its manufacture and use of new technologies can only be called "industrial" (Tate 163). The results of the war, its death tolls and the new manner

in which these deaths were made through inventions such as tanks, machine guns, submarines, and poison gas, brought the latent nineteenth-century hope that industrialization would bring peace, prosperity, and progress, to an abrupt halt (Tate 170). The generation that marched to the front in 1914 “believed in Progress and Art and in no way doubted the benignity even of technology. The word *machine* was not yet invariably coupled with the word *gun*” (Fussell, *Great* 24, author’s emphasis).¹³ This soon changed, and the “pinnacle of industrialization” turned out to be a disillusion, resulting in the mutilation and death of immense numbers of (young) people (Tate 170). World War I was humankind’s introduction to their self-constructed, industrialized warfare. Industrial warfare, mass warfare, “modern total technological war” (Gray, *Postmodern* 120), these terms find their origins in World War I; it was man’s first encounter with the phenomenon and its consequences. Soldiers fell in large numbers on both sides, resulting in record-numbers of deaths due to the new technologies used and the stalemate of trench warfare.¹⁴ The manner of warfare was so new and unfamiliar that the people involved were unprepared for the impact it would have on their bodies, minds, and their life after they got back, not to mention society as a whole. On the battlefield an adequate response to the new technologies was lacking at first, creating situations like the battle of the Somme, or, as it was known among the troops, the “Great Fuck-Up” (Fussell, *Great* 12). On the first day, July first 1916, 60.000 (mainly British) casualties occurred (Norris 36) but the lines barely advanced.¹⁵ The death toll was essentially the consequence of sending the infantry forward

13. This is only true for the armies of young recruits of the West—machine guns had been used in colonial contexts against the natives of the colonized places. Gray points out that “neither the European nor the American armies that used the machine gun in colonial wars developed a real understanding of what it would mean when two modern armies met” (Gray, *Postmodern* 126). Fussell drives this point home by stating in *The Norton Anthology of Modern War* (1990) that before the First World War, armies did not seem very interested in the machine gun, instead “preferring to remain with well-tried instruments like man and horse, rifle, and bayonet and saber. There was even a sense that the use of the machine gun was rather unsporting. It was all right to try it out on rebellious natives in colonial Africa, but to aim it at a gentleman was not quite appropriate” (18). Throughout colonial history, which is a history of war and violence, the superiority of the Europeans’ weapons was a deciding factor in a history of “the Spanish blunderbuss against the clubs and spears of the Aztecs and Incas, British matchlocks against the swords and pikes of the Hindus, Royal Navy men-of-war versus Chinese junks and Arab dhows, U.S. Cavalry repeating rifles against Sioux and Arapaho, and machine guns by Gatling and Maxim-Vickers against Arab dervishes, Chinese Boxers, Mescalero Apaches, and massed Zulu spearmen” (Gray, *Postmodern* 110).

14. Trench warfare originated in The Crimean War (1853-1856).

15. “Casualties” in this thesis refers to all fallen soldiers, both dead and injured, as is customary in the military.

in full daylight,¹⁶ in straight files to be met by machine gun fire, as they were not thought capable of dealing with more complex strategies (Norris 36; Fussell, *Great* 13).¹⁷ The intensity of battle was such, and the strategy so inadequate that 20.000 of the soldiers fell in the first twenty minutes alone (Norris 36). In the juxtaposition of modern means and conservative, outmoded strategies, the (foot) soldiers paid the price. Their bodies became the scene of industrialized modernity, one of slaughter. “Herding sheep” is a more adequate description than “battle” compared to how they were fought in previous centuries where battle was straightforward and firepower was limited. “All wars have their horrible moments, but World War I seemed to mark a turning point” (Gray, *Postmodern* 120), it heralded a fundamental change.

Without a preceding war that warned them of the effects of the new weaponry, what was asked of the soldiers in order to survive mass warfare was a “superhuman sacrifice” (Tate 169). In practice, this means that the human soldiers must be made into more than that, for mere humans do not survive for long in such an environment. Gear, machine guns, gas masks, visors; these modern technologies are all means to improve the capabilities of the soldier during wartime. The military has always attempted to make their soldiers stronger, faster, with better aim, etc. as the practice of war uses tools to do more damage than two people using only their bodies would do. Tool use is thus an essential military component as new, continually changing and evolving wars “need[s] soldiers with new military virtues” (Gray, “Cyborg Soldier” 43). In *The Body in Pain* (1985) Elaine Scarry points out that at the core of warfare exist two basic actions, which she groups under the “immediate activity of warfare” (63). The first immediate activity is injuring, the second is the element of competition; war is a contest, she states, because “[i]n participating in war, one participates not simply in an act of injuring, but in the activity of reciprocal injuring where *the goal is to out-injure the opponent*” (Scarry 63, emphasis mine). In order to out-

16. The infantry is made up of all the foot soldiers; those who fight on foot and do not have a role of authority in the field (*Oxford English Dictionary*).

17. In *The Great War and Modern Memory* (1989), Paul Fussell accredits this failing to three things: a lack of imagination on the Allied side, their entire lack of surprise, and the class system that prevailed in the British forces, thus resulting in the “tactic” that was essentially sending troops that they did not think could handle complex strategies and that were weighed down with twenty-nine kilos of equipment ahead in straight files in full daylight (13; Norris 36).

injure the opponent, creating ever-deadlier weapons is essential—enhancing cyborg technologies have thus always constituted the basis warfare and the experience of soldiers.

The major technological changes were and are almost exclusively means of killing the enemy more efficiently, and, in some cases, more cruelly too. Mustard gas and chlorine were new on the battlefield, thanks to its inventor, “the father of chemical warfare” Fritz Haber, whose invention allowed for industrial-scale synthesis of fertilizer (chlorine). Haber played a dubious role as he put his research to use to embark on chemical warfare. He led its first successful demonstration in 1915 at the trenches at Ypres, attacking the unprepared British, Canadian, French and Algerian troops in the trenches.¹⁸ Haber was awarded the 1918 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his advancements in the field—a decision that is still controversial today.¹⁹ The gas masks that consequently became a necessity (which Haber helped develop for the Central Powers), were some of the more radically different innovations that were never before seen on the battlefield, and its various incarnations became a part of the soldiers’ standard gear. Standard gear is an equalizing factor: all soldiers in their uniforms form a uniform whole—cogs in the machine that are of the same building materials. Uniforms, military hierarchy, discipline, training, and rules of war have all been used to try to control the soldiers, “to make them interchangeable and mold them into a single unit of fighting force” (Gray, “Cyborg Soldier” 55). Considering the scale of modern armies, discipline is what makes the difference between a mob and an army (Sheffield n.p.). Still today, the First World War has the reputation of having an “age and class issue;” the older men in the respective countries urged the young men to ‘be heroes’ and fight for their countries while they remained behind, and the infantry that was made up of these young men moved entirely at the behest of its commanders. These commanders initially used outmoded strategies, unnecessarily sending young soldiers to their death (most notably at the Somme and Verdun). This element especially has made the

18. For this reason the feared mustard gas is often called “Yperite,” though the gas used in the demonstration was chlorine (conversation with a resident of Ypres, 19-05-2016).

19. Haber only claimed the prize in 1919, because no Nobel prizes were awarded in 1918. The official website of The Nobel Prize states that “The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1918 was awarded to Fritz Haber “for the synthesis of ammonia from its elements,” and does not mention his actions with poison gas in World War I, focusing instead on how the chemical reaction enabled the production of artificial fertilizer—thus qualifying for a prize that lauded inventions that had “conferred the greatest benefit to mankind” by feeding many in spite of the other work he set to with that invention (n.p.).

cultural perception First World War into that of a war where there were only losers and the soldiers were the victims.

The poison gasses, flamethrowers, tanks (developed to overcome the stalemate of trench warfare on the Western Front at the end of 1914 [Kennedy n.p.]), and machine guns were some of the new developments that assaulted the troops in the trenches without significantly advancing the war (Brunning n.p.). The technologies might have been new, but at the onset of the First World War military strategies barely were. When these old strategies and new weapons came together, chaos ensued; many were killed without truly deciding any battles for longer than a few days.²⁰ In fact, “territorial gains and losses were sometimes nearly zero over the course of a year’s unimaginable carnage” (Norris 35). Medically speaking, this means that there is a legion of injuries that do not have a civilian analogy and that, because of modern warfare’s emphasis on mechanization, generates different types of injuries than those that occurred previously (Bellamy 889). War trauma was not seen as a serious medical problem until the First World War (after considerable resistance by military and medical authorities), as it took new and more manifold forms in the setting of industrial warfare (Tate 169). Tate suggests this might be because the trench warfare of World War I forced soldiers in a dual position of “extreme passivity” while waiting in the trenches to be shelled, while at the same time demanding extreme courage, resourcefulness, and action (169) in moments of attack. Tate continues: “[t]hreatened constantly with death or mutilation, frequently witnessing the grotesque deaths of their friends and companions, men often felt at the mercy of immense machines that always seemed to be winning” (Tate 169). That the soldiers themselves were equally wielding such “immense machines” seems to escape the attention of most soldiers, both sides were turned into instant victims when they fell under attack of the violence that could not be matched by anything human. However, the soldiers on both sides were interwoven with their own gear and their position as, for example, machine-gunners or tank-drivers, ending up decidedly purposeless when divorced from their weapons; either becoming an instant easy target or dying in battle.

20. In the case of the first time gas was used at Ypres, for example, the Germans had not anticipated how well it would work, and thus did not press forward fast enough and eventually barely progressed (Brunning n.p.).

Alterations to the human form due to injury thus also altered the experience of the soldier. When he came home wounded, with physical and mental injuries that had not occurred before. The type of (advanced) technology that is changing the human form is altering the body in positive and negative ways, as well as the mind. In this context one is inclined to agree with Haraway, who noted “that the human body is no longer a biological given, but a complex field inscribed by sociocultural codes [that are] represented by the hybrid figure of the cyborg” (qtd. in Esposito 147). War does not simply make men, it makes cyborgs, hybrid creatures who are divided between man and machine in a “process of technicization of life that is unassimilable into the socio-cultural or even ontological framework of the modern period” (Esposito 147). This means that the direction of technological development has changed. Technologies are no longer created from inside out, in order to fill a need or desire (to accommodate humans), but from the outside in, shaping the human through technicity as tool (Esposito 147). Haraway points out that this goes hand in hand with one of the central qualities of the cyborg: the switch from biological reproduction to the structure of modern production—production rather than reproduction (“Cyborg” 292). In literature, the radically new relationship between the (militarized) body and the machinic aspects of the war came under artistic consideration, as well as the new type of soldier that had come to be through these events. These are elements that will be addressed in the analysis of the selected novels.

Squeeze into some armor: digging into the earth is useless.

—Tim Blackmore

Writing Modern War

One of the many ways in which the First World War is remembered, is as a “literary war” due to the quantity and quality of writing that has poured out in the aftermath and since then (Fussell, *Great* 155). In addition, it was a moment in time where “it was possible for soldiers to be not merely literate but vigorously literary” (Fussell, *Great* 157). Christopher Coker points out in *Men at War: What Fiction Tells Us About Conflict* (2004) that there is a

tension between history and fiction in war, especially since the novel comes with an emphasis on interior life and the psyche of its main characters, and thus writing about war in the last century has become divorced from the epic and heroic (3). This causes a discrepancy because “[f]or the historian, war continued to be epic; for many novelists it became tragic” (Coker, *Men* 3). Coker asserts that war “affects not only how life afterwards is lived, but how it is understood” (*Men* 1). The latter is certainly true for war writing, as it makes us look at those events anew in a way that was inaccessible before. Coker continues:

Today most recognize that the existential demands that war makes of those who fight it are as important as its existential appeal—on the one hand the sound and the fury and the extraordinary sacrifices it demands; on the other the excitement and the comradeship, and yes, even the aesthetics. This is why fiction is so important—it renders fact back to itself in sharper and shapelier tones. (*Men* 2)

Seen as two completely irreconcilable things, art holds a similarity to war by its ability to both shape and emulate and make “the real more real” (Coker, *Men* 2). Art does not to simply offer us an escape from reality, but rather, it animates reality. Literature of a war that was beyond human experience up until that point in time, still takes cues from older war literature while simultaneously creating entirely new forms, showing itself as the product of a “reciprocal process by which life feeds materials to literature while literature returns the favor by conferring forms upon life” (Fussell, *Great* i). Of World War I literature the work of the “trench poets” is best known (Tate 162), to the extent that the experience of the trenches has become synonymous with the First World War, even though the trenches are not a feature that occurred only in that war. The British poets Fussell discusses in *The Great War and Modern Memory* (1979), (Siegfried Sassoon, Robert Graves, Edmund Blunden, David Jones, Isaac Rosenberg, and Wilfred Owen) memorialized World War I as a historical experience with imaginative and artistic meaning (Fussell, *Great* i). Though the war extended far beyond the images from the trenches in France and Belgium, this is what has shaped the contemporary idea of what the First World War was (Fussell, *Great* i). The legacy of the trench poets is further fortified and textualized by a multitude of studies such as Fussell’s (Norris 33). The sense of disillusionment with the war and the modernized, industrialized world is poignantly present in the corpus of writing on World War I, and thus the literature and poetry are thus often critical of the war and its effects

(Tate 164). Man and his modern ideas were no match for the senseless slaughter that modern warfare came to embody. It is logical then, that in the wake of World War I, the arts emerged as an important means of commemorating the fallen soldiers, and giving voice to the uprooted “Lost Generation” that came of age during the war, and the disillusionments that followed.

All the variables of conflict, such as historical moment, weapons technology, political disposition of the sides involved, and so on, ensure that each conflict has its own poetics (McLoughlin 1-2). The literary innovations of World War I prose and poetry present a profound change in war narratives and the way in which they were narrated. Due to the unprecedented nature of mechanized warfare, the war produced work that presents the abandonment of the heroic war narrative, instead focusing on industrialization, the desperate, even meaningless new reality of war. Language had reached its limits, and the acute sense of discontinuity and fragmentation that is discernable in World War I texts were intimately connected (even a direct consequence of) the new, murderous state of war in the Western world. Trench poetry aspired to become poetry *as* historical referent (Norris 36, author’s emphasis), however despite its evocative power, the poetry and prose of World War I was not directly carried into the literature of World War II (Norris 37). Only later First World War literature would become important in a role of remembrance and commemoration. In *Writing War in the Twentieth Century* (2000) Margot Norris speaks of “the veteran’s need to communicate” (Norris 58). In literature this is important because the events and consequences of warfare are beyond “normal” experience to such an extent that the events need to be “translated” into something that can be understood by others. Scarry argues a similar point and asserts that the nature of pain inherently holds a resistance to language (*Body* 61). Elements such as severe physical and psychological pain are impossible to comprehend for those who have not experienced it (the listener/reader), while it is impossible not to fully understand it as those who have experienced that pain (Scarry 4). Pain either remains inarticulate or, when it is articulated, “silences all else” (Scarry 60). New forms, a new language had to be found to give voice to these developments, and this finds an expression in the soberness of the majority of war narratives (this is true for the poetry as much as the prose). Soldiers are not only made soldier-machines, but in many cases mind and/or body are mutilated. The mutilated body

of the text comes to stand in for the mutilated body of the soldier as literature comes forward as the site where these new realities and concepts are tested, worked out, and represented. Transferring the lived experience of war onto the page “required a strategy of poetic translation, the invention out of the experimental possibilities that had become available in both English and Continental writing during the 1920s of a fictional technique that would adequately narrate World War I” (Norris 58). Even though the events of the war found a direct expression in the poetry of the later war years, elements of censorship and the “sheer nearness of the experience, impeded the broader depiction of war as a social phenomenon” (Midgley 130). Such a social depiction of war came much later in the form of scholarship such as Fussell’s, as it was originally impeded due to the established literary circles’ rejection of the trench poets. The novels that appeared approximately ten years after the war, and especially *All Quiet On The Western Front*, were said to finally tell the truth about the war (Midgley 133). The medium of prose, and especially memoirs and autobiographical fictions, implied “documentary authenticity,” and granted a different authority to a (German) public that was denied access to information before (Midgley 133).

*Over me I saw the granite face of Lieutenant Schrader under his steel helmet, loading and
firing
like a machine.
– Ernst Jünger*

Trench in Prose

During World War I, communication with the home front was limited and subjected to censorship. The most extreme example is “form A.2042,” a postcard that only required the crossing out of what did not apply. The form offers an abstracted, impersonal transmission of (limited) information, and it is “the first widely known example of dehumanized, automated communication, [and] the post card popularized a mode of rhetoric indispensable to the conduct of later wars fought by great faceless conscripted armies” (Fussell, *Great* 186). Though trench poetry appeared almost instantly, providing a stark contrast with the sparse information of the official front-postcards, prose on the experience of World War I entered the scene later. First World War writing countered the uniformity

that pervaded military life. Everything that the front generated, be it mass-death or postcard-forms, it all carried implications for the notion of the uniform identity of humans (Fussell, *Great* 185). The abstraction inherent to death tolls has a similar effect; rather than individuals; one is dealing with faceless numbers that “resist meaningful figuration and representation” (Norris 3). The numbers that are to represent reality, cannot do so because counting numbers is an insubstantial form of speech that moves away from the reality of injured and dead bodies (Norris 3; Scarry 62). As Norris points out, bridging the distance between these numbers and the human bodies that constitute them is problematic when we consider that “thinking of modern wars in terms of these numbers is a desperate and futile gesture [...] [as] their status as dead or injured *bodies* is conceptually irrecoverable or unimaginable in their materiality” (Norris 3, author’s emphasis). Because of these very numbers, the reality of the body, “the body in pain, the body maimed, the body dead and hard to dispose of—is separated from its source” (Scarry 62). Individual accounts by soldiers and veterans counter this, and bring personal narratives that return to physical experience and everyday life, rather than turning to abstract numbers and epic narratives of grand battles won or lost. The dead and wounded that were rendered mute and nameless are returned to body, mind, and life through individual narratives. The mutilation of body and mind, and the radically new relationship of the body to the machinic aspects of the war are addressed in order to express these new experiences and sensations; they give expression to the new type of soldier and man had been called into life through the circumstances of modern war. As the preface *All Quiet On The Western Front* reads: “It [the novel] will simply try to tell of a generation of men who, even though they may have escaped its shells, were destroyed by the war” (5). Ironically, however, in *All Quiet* itself, none of the characters survive.

Ten years after the end of the First World War, Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet On The Western Front* [*Im Westen nichts Neues*] was first published, generating an English translation and the sale of over a million copies that same year. Even though the book has been acclaimed as “the greatest best-selling novel of all time” (Barker and Last 2), its reception has always been mixed. Some hail it as the greatest (anti-)war novel ever written, while others consider it to be barely, if at all, literary (Bloom 2). It also has the strange honor of being one of the books that was publicly denounced and burned by the Nazi

regime in 1933 (Barker and Last 4). Remarque served in World War I at age eighteen in 1916, and, roughly a year later, was wounded and hospitalized for the remainder of the war. His experiences during this year at the front form the basis of the novel. Autobiographical fiction comprises a category that often poses problems of interpretation and reception as it merges autobiographical elements with fiction. In a war context, it seems that this is found problematic when it is not made explicit in the text. In relation to *All Quiet On The Western Front*, critics often point out that some of the scenes Remarque describes are impossibilities, even if they are extremely evocative (Norris 79).²¹ Claims of truth inevitably lead to hazy territory. Early reviews of *All Quiet* stated that it presented “the truth about the war,” while later analysis discredited this, nuancing the argument down to describing *All Quiet* as “the truth about Erich Maria Remarque in 1928” (Norris 79). Norris points out that “Remarque writes his story of the First World War [...] not by techniques of “realism” that convey the “reality” of the trenches, but by poetic techniques that are themselves coeval with cultural and aesthetic technologies” (79). Opposing this analysis, Harold Bloom seems determined to see *All Quiet* not as a work of art, but as “a period piece and a historical document” (4). He comes to this conclusion quickly and brusquely, in four sentences after which he compares it to the hype surrounding the *Harry Potter* series, further ignoring the fact that the “hype” surrounding *All Quiet* has endured for almost ninety years and thus might have deeper (literary) reasons other than the apparently self-explanatory “popularity” (Bloom 4). Highlighting the creative aspect of representation (of making-art) through poetic translation, Norris hints at narrative devices such as Remarque's use of a first-person witness as a means to relay the experience to home audiences which did not seem to have grasped “the enormity of horror” that had occurred (58). The veteran whose story was not told had to find a way to tell it himself. The first-person narrative holds authority as the “I” forges expectations of objectivity and privileged access (in the readers) to the experience of war (Manzanas and Benito 202).

All Quiet on The Western Front describes a series of deaths and the times in-between in moments of forced inaction during “modern trench-warfare” (Remarque 113). Due to

21. The fragment in question reads: “Besides me a lance-corporal has his head torn off. He runs a few steps more while the blood spouts from his neck like a fountain” (Remarque 101). Critics have pointed out that a man with his head blown off could not have kept running—a commentary which Norris finds irrelevant for in-depth textual analysis (Norris 79).

this slow tallying of the dead it can be called a “necrological” novel (Norris 59), in which the focus shifts from the death of anonymous masses to those of individuals. The novel opens *in medias res* with the (unexpectedly positive) consequences of mass death; extra rations are served because out of 150 only 80 soldiers came back from the front line, and it ends with the death of the narrator, who was the last survivor of all the soldiers he enlisted with out of school. We move through the company until there is no-one left, which further emphasizes the desolateness and desperation of the situation at the Western Front. In this body count that starts before any of the known characters actually fall, *All Quiet* presents a narrative of physicality through brusque, fragmented descriptions of slaughter that lend the text a sense of immediacy. We are not spared the details and emphasis on small everyday discomforts becomes increasingly uncomfortable as the deadpan descriptions of the battle scenes, in spite of their gruesomeness, become almost normal events in their occurrence. Burrowed in the trenches, the soldiers needed to renegotiate their relationship with their own weapons, and with those that were fired at them. “Machine” has been forever coupled with “gun,” and consequently to “horror” and “death”—to these men more than anyone. Many other terms have followed suit; “Bombardment, barrage, curtain-fire, mines, gas, tanks, machine-guns, hand-grenades—words, words, but they hold the horror of the world” (Remarque 116). Here, the new weapons are coupled with the attacks and effects as though they are one. While he makes us aware that the abstraction they have undergone render the true meaning untransmissible (to non-veterans). They fail to express the devastation the objects they refer to create; as Scarry has pointed out, they only indicate. For the soldier under attack these words are forever coupled to the experience, memory, and even trauma of what they encountered in action—again, both in assault and as victims. Mines, gas, tanks, machine-guns, and hand-grenades are all weapons, while bombardments, barrages, and curtain-fire (rapid, continuous artillery or machine-gun fire on a designated line or area) are ways to deploy weapons. The names of all these weapons came to represent industrial warfare, and simultaneously the impossibility to represent warfare. In war individual human agency is no longer relevant (the strategists, generals, etc. excluded) because the destructive power of the war machines is paramount. In modern war the individual becomes part of a system, something which lies at the core of Remarque’s narrative—they are all stuck in the trenches. Even as caskets arrive ahead of

the coming battle, caskets that are meant for them, they cannot but comply with their orders, only joke. The narrator finally states: “The coffins are really for us. The organization surpasses itself in that kind of thing” (Remarque 88). This dry and hyper-realist reporting shows the absurdity of the situation, but does not leave space for mourning.

The newness of these weapons cannot be stressed enough—the war had started out with cavalry, and nothing that was used before in Western warfare resembled the new weapons and their power of destruction. John Keegan stresses that the lethality of one soldier is multiplied by forty by the invention of the machine gun: “Given that a good rifleman could fire only fifteen shots a minute to a machine gunner’s six hundred, the point is well made” (*Battle* 229). The nonbiological components that the soldiers were interacting with changes their perception, and this change that is necessary to survive at the front; “We wake up in the middle of the night. The earth booms. Heavy fire is falling on us. We crouch into corners. We distinguish shells of every calibre” (Remarque 93). And a little earlier: “That was a twelve-inch, you can tell by the report; now you’ll hear the burst” (Remarque 50). Shells and other missiles can be heard and distinguished, and as military training has not yet adequately caught up with the events of the front, the proper response can only be learned at the frontline itself (Remarque 50). The soldiers were forced to learn fast and use basic senses such as hearing to its optimal advantage, as the majority of military innovations is aimed at assault, at injuring, and not at warning soldiers of possible dangers (surveillance also constitutes a significant part). New weaponry posed new challenges. Dealing with the presence of these weapons, the risk of friendly fire (a wrongly adjusted machine gun could cause friendly fire), but also the close intimacy with weapons of such a power is displayed and investigated in the text. The enemy is perceived as a series of assault weapons, soliciting a response of equal violence in the extension of the body with these very same weapons. Spoken to a French soldier he just killed Paul Bäumer, *All Quiet’s* protagonist, says:

you were only an idea to me before, an abstraction that lived in my mind and called forth its appropriate response. It was that abstraction I stabbed. But now, for the first time, I see you are a man like me. I thought of your hand-grenades, of your bayonet, of your rifle; now I see your wife and your face and our fellowship. (Remarque 191)

Only in his relationship to others does the enemy become human. Before then, he is a matter of hand-grenades, a bayonet and rifles—all ready and poised to kill or be killed. The Frenchman does not exist as an individual before his death, up until then he was part of a separate war-system, which discourages empathy for anyone on the outside. Throughout the narrative Bäumer and his comrades are presented as the victims. They are conceived as victims of the war, the machinery, the military hierarchy, and the enemy, and it is but rarely they step out of this role. The opposing soldiers as Remarque represents them only become aware of each other as living and grievable people when they come face to face and the danger for their own survival has subsided. Butler addresses the issue of survival through psychoanalyst Melanie Klein:

For Klein, the question of survival precedes the question of morality; indeed, it would seem that guilt does not index a moral relation to the other but an unbridled desire for self-preservation. In Klein's view, I only want the other to survive so that I may survive. The other is to my own survival, and guilt, even morality, are simply the instrumental consequences of this desire for self-preservation. (Butler 45)

The protagonist probably does not care very much about the other person as such, which does not seem uncommon among soldiers. The enemy does not come into focus for him as another who “deserves” to live and whose life depends on the protagonists’ ability to check his own destructiveness (Butler 45). War, of course, preempts this by amplifying the soldiers’ destructiveness as a rule in the effort to out-injure the opponent. Those that are not grievable “do not qualify as lives or are, from the start, not conceivable as lives [...] these lives are never lived nor lost in the full sense” (Butler 1). For a moment in *All Quiet* the enemy does come into focus for Bäumer, and in spite of having had to kill him, acknowledges him as grievable. To each other the opposing side is “destructible” but not “ungrievable.” In the case of Bäumer, the other only becomes grievable when he becomes a victim; the very role the protagonist assumes throughout this text. The nonbiological technologies that his opponent is coupled with make him more than human, and as long as he is that—not human—his presence is one of threat and ungrievability. It is only when the human aspects return by looking the man in the face, that the protagonist can retrieve their likeness. His assimilation with the figure of the victim of these machines prevents him from seeing that as soldier-machines, he and his opponent are the same.

The enemy soldier-machine is still coupled with technological components, and is at times as frail and human as the narrating soldier-as-victim is, but often it is an image of machinery that takes over and represents the enemy in all its destructive power:

We do not see the guns that bombard us; the attacking lines of the enemy infantry are men like ourselves; but these tanks are machines, their caterpillars run on as endless as the war, they are annihilation, they roll without feeling into the craters, and climb up again without stopping, a fleet of roaring, smoke-belching armour-clads, invulnerable steel beasts squashing the dead and wounded—we shrivel up in our thin skin before them, against their colossal weight our arms are sticks of straw, and our hand-grenades matches. (Remarque 238)

Even though the firepower of both sides was well matched, and new inventions were quick to travel, the notion that World War I soldiers were left at the mercy of these great machines persists. As described above, during a bombardment or attack it is man versus machine, and the soldiers on the receiving end will always feel at a disadvantage. However, these machines do not move independently. Inside or behind all of the tanks and bombardments, are soldiers. Soldiers with a fire power that is increased to an inhuman extent, while at the same time the machines would not do anything at all without the humans operating them. This is not represented in any of the literature, where somehow the role of the victim shifts automatically to those that are facing these ‘inhuman’ machines. There are more subtle elements that acknowledge this, however. The men might are no match for these steel beasts, and a comparison is made between the tanks’ “colossal weight” and the soldiers arms and hand-grenades. The hand-grenades are named as an extension of their arms, and they are named instead of hands, as a normal part of their anatomy. They men with only “sticks of straw” for arms, but soldiers who have grenades instead of hands—even if they are matches compared to the heavier weaponry. The soldier’s body is indeed extended, holding new functions due to the cyborg technologies they are coupled with. Through short, repetitive fragments we seen the importance of the rifles as true extension of the soldier, a presence that is always there within reach as part of the standard gear; “I lay hold of my rifle to see that it is in trim. The barrel is wet, I take it in my hands and rub off the moisture with my fingers” (Remarque 105).

Strict discipline and corresponding punishments constituted an important part of

the military culture of World War I, it came with the uniform and gear. The armies involved in the war all maintained severe military discipline, in which desertion (or shell-shocked attempts thereto) was punished by execution in nearly all armies (Sheffield n.p.). Such regulations were strictly upheld throughout the war, especially after the insurrection of the Russian army. Due to these punishments desertion was not a viable option, and it is even said that it is one of the factors that enabled (or forced) the soldiers of the First World War to endure the terrible conditions and high number of casualties (Sheffield n.p.). During a counter-attack in the trenches Remarque's narrator Paul concedes after a heavy shell attack; "If we were not automata at that moment we would continue lying there, exhausted, and without will" (Remarque 101). They are not without will, but without will of their own, as it is handed over to their superiors when they entered the army and its subsequent drills and basic training. Automata seem in form human, but are in reality machines—they aim to imitate humans. Paul and his fellow soldiers have, by being involved in trench warfare, been transformed from humans into machines; beings that only outwardly resemble the human they were before. War has made these men into soldiers.

Light and heavy shells with impact-, fire- and time-delay fuses, duds, empty cases and shrapnels all participated in a kind of madness that was too much for our eyes and ears.

– Ernst Jünger

A Soldier in his Element

On the other end of the spectrum of World War I writing, stands Ernst Jünger's work. Jünger was among the first to publish writing resulting from his experiences in the trenches: *Storm of Steel [In Stahlgewittern]*. *Storm of Steel* is a fragmented narrative that is based on the diaries that Jünger kept during his active service at the Western front. In the corpus of writing on World War I (both poetry and prose) there is a definite sense of disillusionment with man and its modern ideals in the face of the slaughter that modern warfare came to embody. *All Quiet on The Western Front* is the epitome of this emotion, while Jünger's *Storm of Steel* is considered an oddity among World War I books because it does not condemn the war. Jünger is even surprisingly positive about it. Jünger sees the

war primarily as a breeding ground for a new kind of man, and through his writing and military career (spanning both world wars) he gained the reputation of a man who has been made into a true (professional) soldier by war itself (Hofmann 11). There is a stark difference between Remarque's and Jünger's novels in the way they were received; as noted, *All Quiet on The Western Front* was publicly burned during the 1933 book burning, while *Storm of Steel* and Jünger himself were admired by the Nazis (Barker and Last 4; Hofmann 2).²² Jünger was very much a military man, and this showed in the writing. As ter Haar points out, he:

prophesied, embraced, and praised the total domination of technology over all aspects of life, all the while holding on to arch-reactionary views about the need for iron discipline, continuous warfare, and an authoritarian government to be led by revolutionary groups of disciplined veterans such as himself. (6)

A man that had been shot-and-hit over fourteen times, Jünger speaks from a position of luxury—a position of survival. His narrative therefore takes a strange position among World War I novels, which are almost without exception more fatalistic and glum than his account. Jünger's novel however, shows things differently.

Confusion, injury, death and desperation as seen in *All Quiet*, are still components of Jünger's war writing, but he treats them dismissively. In the end, they are the realities of war, and therefore not to be lamented but embraced. Often Jünger does not find things to lament at all, he describes what occurs, without attaching negative emotions to its reasons. War and the military are positives, bringing the soldier into an event—war—that holds transformative potential. This transformation leads to cyborg technologies and servomechanics. Military training and the “iron discipline” Jünger describes is important even though, during wartime, things happen in a way “you wouldn't have thought possible on the exercise ground” (Jünger 335). However, the soldier's response needs to be adequate, or he will perish. Not only were the soldiers inadequately prepared, so were their superiors. Experience of the battlefield came to those who held out without being killed, but that depended on a good amount of luck. Gray points out that to most soldiers on the

22. Hofmann notes that in spite of the controversy this ‘admiration’ still causes, “Jünger was courted, not surprisingly, by the Nazis, and twice offered a seat in the Reichstag, but he wasn't interested. He didn't join the *Deutsche Akademie der Dichtung* [...] nor was he ever a member of the Nazi Party” (14).

front line this meant that they “recognized that the war was like work in an abominable factory” (Gray, *Postmodern* 121), where they would be worked to death in the name of war. In *Storm of Steel* the importance of weaponry, the improbable scale and duration of the battles (and stalemate) and the reaction of the soldiers on the ground to these elements, are the marking elements of the battlefield of World War I. In the novel, the state of warfare is constantly reflected upon, as the text constantly scales out to show the bigger picture, and then move back to individual experiences of bombardments and man-on-man assault.²³ Jünger sees and names the discrepancy in the strategy of warfare and the weaponry used. Regarding the battle of the Somme (where he was present on the German side, so the connotation here is quite different from “the Great Fuck-Up” even if the battle ended in a stalemate) he comments:

What we had, admittedly almost unbeknown to ourselves, been through had been the attempt to win a war by old-fashioned pitched battles, and the stalemating of the attempt in static warfare. What confronted us now was a war of materiel of the most gigantic proportions. This war in turn was replaced towards the end of 1917 by mechanized warfare, though that was not given time fully to develop. (Jünger 163)

Rather than using the first person narrative at all times, Jünger provides insights into the battles, showing the extent of his strategic awareness, and lends the text a detached quality. As Hofmann states in relation to the novel: “It makes no personal appeal. It is a notably unconstructed book. [...] It offers nothing in the way of hows and whys, it is pure where and when and of course, above all, what” (Hofmann 10, author’s emphasis). And in fact, though Jünger gives his analysis, he proffers no alternatives, does not question the military or his superiors, or even the war itself. When it is pointed out that tactics do not function in practice, this is not an attack on leadership, it is simply what was experienced. But this simplicity can be misleading, for “unstructured” does not equal “without goal.” There might be no resolution, not in World War I nor in Jünger’s psychological development—but neither is there the disillusionment that so marks other World War I documents. *Storm of Steel* has been edited and rewritten significantly throughout Jünger’s life, as well as (re-

23. Jünger himself was a member of the “shock soldiers,” a then-new type of offensive soldier trained specifically to infiltrate enemy trenches and attempt to open up opportunities for the rest of the army to break through. The shock soldiers were a strategic attempt to overcome the stasis of trench warfare that pervaded the beginning of the war (Godshall n.p.).

)translated (Hofmann 21). *Storm of Steel* is succinct in style. The text is a (necrological) personal diary in which dates, events, people, deaths are tracked while the narrative very rarely, if at all, moves towards an emotional address. The sober writing style and depiction of military life in the trenches, combined with the apparent “unstructuredness” of the novel, cumulate in its repetitive descriptions of industrial violence that contributes to the novel’s plotless nature. The novel ends when the protagonist is sent to the hospital, emphasizing that for Jünger “[w]ar is all — fighting is all — everything else is cropped away. And, from first to last, in the affirmative” (Hofmann 11). When there is no war to talk about, there is nothing to tell—rather than no longer being able to tell, as in *All Quiet*.

As was the case with *All Quiet on the Western Front*, through *Storm of Steel* it becomes clear that only the soldiers who survived weeks or even months of attacks did so through luck, but also because they had learned via battle how to distinguish and respond to the shells and other triggers around them: “[t]he degree of necessity [to take cover] is something that only an experienced man can determine, who can sense the course of the shell before the new soldier can hear the light fluttering of its approach” (Jünger 329-30). This sense of “hearing” plays a role on different levels in *Storm of Steel*. Instances where soldiers can tell apart the sounds the bombs make as they whistle through the air, as in *All Quiet on the Western Front*, alternate with scenes in which there is nothing but sound to the extent that it generates a lack of (emotional) response. Jünger writes:

Sometimes you hear a whistling, fluttering sound, following a dull discharge. ‘Watch out, trench mortar!’ You rush to the nearest dugout steps and hold your breath. The mortars explode differently, altogether more excitingly than common-or-garden shells. There’s something violent and devious about them, something of personal vitriol. They are treacherous things. Rifle-grenades are a scaled-down version of them. (Jünger 120)

In Remarque’s novel this is pointed out in a didactic manner; new recruits are told how to differentiate between the shells as they approach by the sound they make. In *Storm of Steel* the focus lies on the effect they have on the soldiers, they are anthropomorphized and take on “violent,” “devious” qualities as they attack their enemies (the narrator) with “personal vitriol.” The effect of the shells diminishes however, as the soldiers grow so used to the sound that only excess leaves an impression—and not always a negative one; “[t]he

shelling grew more imposing by the minute, and soon reached that climactic stage that was so thrilling as to produce an almost amused indifference” (343-4). And later on: “[t]he noise now was a sort of absolute noise — you heard nothing at all. Only dimly were you aware that thousands of machine-guns behind you were slinging their leaden swarms into the blue air” (Jünger 459). Jünger relates all this with barely suppressed excitement and, contrary to Remarque's account, there is no cowering away in corners when they hear the shells fall; lethal as modern war is, Jünger is still alive to tell the tale.²⁴ This is a stark contrast between the two novels; Jünger feels excitement and sees potential in the soldiers who make it through, while Remarque tells of boys (rather than men) soiling themselves and on one occasion even barking as a sign of ultimate regression into fear.

Modern, industrial warfare has the potential to change soldiers into a new kind of fighters, into “the modern warrior” (Jünger 392). As Jünger describes him, this soldier is beaten into shape by warfare so that “Nothing was left in this voice but equanimity, apathy; fire had burned everything else out of it. It's men like that that you need for fighting” (Jünger 206). And later: “While we were eating, a shell landed on the house, and three others came down near by, without us lifting our heads. We had seen and been through too much already to care” (Jünger 228). According to Klaus Theweleit, this means that the “new man” that comes into existence through mechanical warfare, “is a man whose physique has been machinized, his psyche eliminated—or in part displaced into his body armor” (162). The body and the armor fuse together in and as the body armor, onto which the lack of emotional responses is added. Theweleit continues:

We are presented with a robot that can tell the time, find the North, stand his ground over a red-hot machine-gun, or cut wire without a sound. In the moment of action, he is as devoid of fear as of any other emotion. His knowledge of being able to do what he does is his only consciousness of self. (162)

Theweleit is clear; this creature is a robot above anything else, a “man of steel” (161),

24. Jünger's excitement connects to the notion of the (technological) sublime. In *The Double-edged Sword: The Technological Sublime in American Novels Between 1900 and 1940* (2003), Zoltán Simon theorizes the “technological sublime” in World War I novels. The technological sublime in this context is seen as an essentially religious feeling, aroused by the confrontation of impressive objects, “such as natural sites, architectural forms, and technological achievements,” that evoke simultaneous awe and fear (24-6). A difference with the sublime, however, is that the fear that is perceived is a very real danger (Simon 26).

whose consciousness does not exceed his actions. The abilities of the man of steel might exceed those of other humans, but of course he is short of being a robot. He is a cyborg, human and nonhuman mechanical components combined into this human form. These men were soldier-machines, proto-cyborgs that had linked their bodies together with nonhuman components. In synthesis they cause unparalleled destruction, as the narrator of *Storm of Steel* pensively states after their own artillery opened up because someone accidentally lighted a red flare, giving the signal to open fire to the troops: “After this orgy of destruction, the shelling quickly flooded back to its previous levels. One man’s slip of the hand had got the whole titanic machinery of war rolling” (Jünger 220). Connected to the machinery, one man(-machine) can create great destruction. Tanks, machine-guns, airplanes—they all still require humans to operate them. They are mighty weapons only when functioning with a human at the controls. Machine-guns required a certain expertise and were manned in shifts, which meant machine-gunners could keep firing practically around the clock, provided that there were enough able soldiers to handle it.

In spite of this fierce power that was unladen on the enemy, to Theweleit this body/machine does not have warfare as its ultimate goal and purpose. Instead his most pressing task is to pursue, cut off and subdue any force that might transform him back into what he was before, “the horribly disorganized jumble of flesh, hair, skin, bones, intestines, and feelings that calls itself human—the human being of old” (160). The battle is one of man against man himself, against that which it used to be, and other fleshy bodies. The creation of the “soldier of steel” mirrors the military as a whole, for the first thing it creates and firmly maintains is itself. Like Jünger’s new man, this being is made to be entirely physical. He is devoid of drives and psyche because they have all been transformed into strict physicality (Theweleit 159) and obedience. Gray and Theweleit both indicate that Jünger’s new man is a utopic construct (*Postmodern* 123; 159), idealizing the body-machine into the perfect soldier machine that does not experience friction with or over the qualities that he has lost. In this view there is no risk of the machine taking over the body because the machine(part) takes over from the body, allowing the soldiers to act in a way that would not have normally been possible (as “the humans of old”), in a way allowing them the release from killing and risking death while still being able to kill and risk death (Gray, *Postmodern* 123; Blackmore 41). In the body-machine the interior of man is dominated and

transformed just like the components of the army as a whole are transformed (Theweleit 159) into a unit operating as one.

For new recruits the first steps were receiving your gear and standard-issue weapons, followed by rigorous basic training (“drills”) which ranged “from the unpleasant to the brutal, the aim being to break down the individuality of the new soldiers and to mold them into a group that would carry out orders unquestioningly” (Sheffield n.p.). Keegan describes the drill as an “extended range of procedures which have as their object the assimilation of almost all of an officer’s professional activities to a corporate standard and a common form” (*Battle* 20). Current U.S. Basic Combat Training is a perfected form of these drills, an aspect of the military I will return to in the last chapter. Thus, “military writing,” and “voice procedure” teach the soldiers to describe combat in set ways (Keegan, *Battle* 20-1). The military thus hopes to secure that its machinery will operate smoothly under extreme stress (Keegan, *Battle* 21). The troops to come out of this are in essence a “combination of innumerable identically polished components,” which take over from the body armor in war context (Theweleit 76, 155). The troops then become form and expression as the strict order and straight lines and rectangles of formation take over—they are “an expression of battle, and of a specific masculinity” (Theweleit 155). Even in the time of the Ancient Romans the goal was turning a soldier into a cog in a machine that would stand and charge (in the modern case: fire) again and again at the enemy as one. Drill as a method of training and conditioning was the primary tool for ensuring that the soldier would do his “duty,” on the battlefield (Grossman 18). The soldier-machine that emerges in World War I would not be misplaced in current military efforts as a being that will follow orders without becoming morally or emotionally compromised as he acts on these orders. New weapons posed dangers when in the hands of the enemy, but potentially also in one's own; mishandling the (unfamiliar) weapons was just as lethal. Technical advantages can be offset or even cancelled out by the lack of control that was encouraged by that very improvement in machinery—relating both to control over the weapons and troops (Keegan, *Battle* 229). Perception and awareness thus play a vital role, as the troops kept spying on each other in their respective trenches, involved in a constant back and forth: “We observe the front line opposite through binoculars or periscopes, and often manage to get in a head shot or two through a sniper’s rifle. But careful, because the British

also have sharp eyes and useful binoculars” (Jünger 123). When it comes to grievability Jünger is very similar to Remarque, not thinking of the enemy until he faces them, but he is less emotional in his addresses and more war-focussed. Jünger's writing shows a respect for brave and good soldiers, whether they die or not, whether they try to kill them or not, they do deserve to live, and as such it is once again the (good) soldier-machines that are grievable. Remarque can said to be on the left side of the spectrum, with a more posthuman critique of the war and its inhumanity, while Jünger and his transhumanist opinions (with all its dangerous implications) is positioned on the right side of the spectrum. Theweleit points out that Jünger, “the most imaginative and philosophically interesting writer of the interwar German right, called his reflections on World War I “Battle as Inner Experience”” (Theweleit “Foreword”). This inner experience, in Jünger’s eyes, created men who were perfect for fighting as “[o]ver four years, the fire smelted an ever-purer, ever-bolder warriorhood” (Jünger 294-5). The results of this are to be found in (the writing of) World War II, which I will address in the following chapter.

III. World War II: A New Battle

Within the domain of warfare there has been no psychological hindrance to murderous invention, except that due to lethargy and routine: no limits to invention suggest themselves.

— Lewis Mumford

War-Made Soldier-Machines

Only twenty-one years lie between the end of the First World War in 1918, and the beginning of the Second World War in 1939. Not only the memory of the Great War was still present, but so were the soldiers themselves, as it is estimated 2.500.000 of the British soldiers in the First World War were under the age of 19 (enlisting limits were set between 18 and 51). New means of human destruction were developed, with their epitome in the extermination camps and the nuclear bomb—which, in turn, find their symbolic expression in the words “Hiroshima” and “Auschwitz” (Wyschogrod ix).²⁵ These two instances can be called “death events,” a term which identifies a phenomenon in which “compressed time” plays a new and important role; attacks are calculated rationally and systematically, and aim to inflict as much damage as possible within the shortest possible time (Wyschogrod x). These are always high intensity attacks with a maximum amount of damage, with the goal of maximizing human destruction, thus out-injuring the opponent completely as fast and efficiently as possible. In the course of the interwar years, it became clear that the impact of World War I on the soldiers and Western society as a whole was detrimental. Robert O’Connel points out that

The Great War had a profoundly lasting and deleterious effect on Western man’s view of himself and his civilization [...] [A]t the root of this crisis of morale was a sudden awareness, engendered primarily by the stalemate on the western front, that military power, when applied, had grown uncontrollable, and that this was directly attributable to weapons technology. (qtd. in Gray, *Postmodern* 122)

The humanist march towards an endlessly improvable human being had achieved inhuman

25. The comparison between the Holocaust and the detonation of the nuclear bomb is made by several people, who all express hesitation in making the comparison, only to then make it all the same (See: Norris, Wyschogrod, Treat).

levels. As the previous chapter shows, the soldier-machine who has been displaced into his body armor cannot be turned back into an ordinary civilian; he has been made for war. This comes to the fore in the subject of Theweleit's study *Male Fantasies* (1989), which concerned the diaries of the men of the *Freikorps* in the interwar years. The *Freikorps* were volunteer armies who hired out their services and often successfully fought "the revolutionary German working class in the years immediately after World War I" (Ehrenreich ix). They were organized by men (mostly officers) returning from the war, and their leaders had often been commanders of "shock troops" (as Jünger had been) and were thus trained in executing daring assaults across enemy lines in an attempt to breach the stalemate (Ehrenreich ix). Barbara Ehrenreich writes in her foreword to the first volume of Theweleit's study that for the professional soldiers (the "warrior caste") "war is not only death production, but a means of *reproduction*; each war deforms the human spirit and guarantees that the survivors—or some among them—will remain warriors" (xvi, author's emphasis).²⁶ This effect is desired by the military, which aims at creating these "warriors" from the moment they enlist. As mentioned previously, Haraway conceives of replication rather than biological reproduction as one of the central qualities of the cyborg, that mirrors the structure of modern (capitalist) production ("Cyborg" 292). Thus, those who started World War II "emerge [...] from the First World War" (Ehrenreich xvi) and came together with the young recruits of that generation to fight the war. Psychological studies conducted in and after World War II showed that less than 25% of the soldiers were actually shooting at the enemy (Gray, "Cyborg Soldier" 58). Their motivation ranges from fear to the refusal to kill (Keegan 109-10). These studies also tell us that

Only 2 percent of all examined soldiers were capable of continued heavy combat of more than a few months. The vast majority of this 2 percent tested out on standard psychological profiles as pure psychopaths with no conscience or emotional involvement in the killing and dying around them." (Gray, "Cyborg Soldier" 58)

This indicates a "limit" that every human has (in war), and transgressing that limit leads to various psychological responses that encompass both Jünger's emotionless 'ideal soldier' as

26. Hitler had been one of the soldiers in World War I who had stayed on in the military (the *Freikorps* Theweleit researches was unofficial) before moving on to politics a few years later. As Paul Fussell tersely points out: "The First World War was said (by Woodrow Wilson) to be undertaken to make the world safe for democracy, but what it made the world safe for was Hitler" ("Modern" 22).

well as his shell-shocked counterparts.

In *On Killing*, Lt. Col. Dave Grossman points out that there is a significant number of studies that support the claim that, at least up until the Second World War, a part of “combatants throughout history, at the moment of truth when they could and should kill the enemy, have found themselves to be unable to kill” (xviii). Problematic as the notion of an essentially “psychopathic” soldier is, it is exactly what is desired by the military, as it seems to be the aim of many military training schemes to produce more of these soldiers (Gabriel qtd. in Gray, “Cyborg Soldier” 58). According to Grossman, the negative connotations of “psychopath” or “sociopath” are inappropriate in this context, exactly because this behavior is desired of soldiers in combat (180). What he means to designate is the person that feels no emotional involvement in the killing, and that will essentially not feel the mental repercussions of his actions (conscience, trauma, etc.). The word psychopath, or the more appropriate sociopath, does not imply bloodlust or erratic behavior; this is still undesirable in the military institution the soldier is subservient to. Grossman adds that there are “natural soldiers,” who step up to the challenge of killing and other violent behavior in the right context (war) and are good and functioning citizens when they are home (180). He states that:

It would be absolutely incorrect to conclude that 2 percent of all veterans are psychopathic killers. Numerous studies indicate that combat veterans are no more inclined to violence than nonvets. A more accurate conclusion would be that there is 2 percent of the male population that, if pushed or if given a legitimate reason, will kill without regret or remorse. (Grossman 180)

The desire for an emotionally detached soldier-machine marks the technological developments after World War I. The soldier-machine must contain the best qualities of the machine, and dispose of the most bothersome human parts, such as being hurt and injured, emotion, judgment or rejection of orders, the need for sleep, etc. The only bodily requirement that goes unquestioned is the need for food—even a tank needs gas.

The military is the deciding, inventing, and implementing organ in these cases. What started with mechanizing the soldiers (and other tools), ended up mechanizing the manner of thinking about conflict and the soldiers, which means that developmentally, war became mechanized in its very organization (Gray, *Postmodern* 128-9). The same kind of thinking

that bureaucratized the messages that soldiers in World War I sent from the front, took flight with the possibilities that the first computer(-like) inventions brought. The ultimate goal from a military perspective is to “improve the integration of human soldiers into the inhuman battlefield” (Gray, “Cyborg Soldier” 59), regardless of what that means for the individual soldiers on a personal level. Ehrenreich and Theweleit place this responsibility with the “warrior caste” (xvi), but as shown, Ehrenreich seems to neglect the part played by the military (drills, weapons, gear, discipline), and does not move beyond the warriors themselves. The soldiers still hold responsibility for their actions, but systemic influences should be included. Theweleit points out that “the [military] machine becomes an expressive multiplicity of semi-human aesthetic forms” (199). As a result the machine becomes an imperfect human, and the human becomes an imperfect machine, whose only option is to propagate the behavior that shaped him (Theweleit 199). The self-mechanization that the military invites serves a crucial function: it allows the soldiers the release of killing and risking death (Gray, *Postmodern* 123). The machinic part of the soldier-machine enables distance between soldiers and their acts, while at the same time, paradoxically, the soldier becomes entirely submerged in this hybrid form and its build for killing (or at least injuring). Further on in this chapter, the analyses of the novels support such claims to an extent, but also move beyond them as the inner life of the soldiers is explored. War writing shows the limitations of language and “so much of war defies those limitations” (Peebles 103).

Although he had married a German woman, my father did not feel particularly friendly toward Germany. He had never shaken off the hatreds of the 1914-18 war, although he himself had been well treated when he was a prisoner.

–Guy Sajer

A Meeting of Bodies and Weapons

In spite of, or maybe because of, the shadow of the First World War, the Second World War exceeded estimates and expectations. In known history, there has never been a conflict that

has been as deadly as the Second World War (“The Fallen of World War II”).²⁷ As Paul Fussell states in “On Modern War,” the wars of the twentieth century are “more extensive, destructive, and cruel than any in history,” and discredited the assumptions that “people are rational, by nature free of the urge to self-destruction, and that the general tendency of society is progressive—toward ever greater enlightenment and decency” (17). In practice the military is focused on progressively improving abilities, and little else of the humanistic debate of the Enlightenment enters into practice. The combination of “neurotic nationalism” and complex technologies lie at the core of the great increase in the cruelty and viciousness of the twentieth century wars (Fussell, “Modern” 17, 19). The war counted 45 million deadly casualties. However, Gray points out in *Postmodern War* that World War II was not only quantitatively “special,” but technologically as well (128). During this time, a legion of new weapons had entered the theatre of war. They were mostly improvements of or answers to existing weapons; faster machine guns, better submarines, nerve gas, etc., together with their new non-violent counterparts, such as early computers. After the killing fields of World War I, it was imagined that air power was the missing element that could decide battles and wars faster (Astore n.p.). Strategic bombing (such as carpet bombing) was based on technologies that had been there before, but with adapted use-strategies. In World War I, only “a few thousand tons of bombs were dropped on strategic targets,” after which it was applied mostly in colonial bombing campaigns (Gray, *Postmodern* 130-1). As had been the case with gas warfare, strategic bombing was seen as a “knockout blow,” crippling the will of the opponent by targeting civilian structures (Gray, *Postmodern* 131). It was believed to be the way to avoid the “endless ground war and the meat grinder of the trenches” (Astore n.p.). Unsurprisingly, aerial attacks only caused a different kind of slaughter, targeting both enemy troops and civilian structures. Aerial bombing is killing made easy, both physically and mentally. Grossman states “there is a direct relationship between the emphatic and physical proximity of the victim, and the resultant difficulty and trauma of the kill” (97). Methods such as bombardments, machine guns and grenades make it easier to kill for the soldiers, because of the physical and psychological distance that they

27. This is about sheer numbers; considering the number of people on earth during different conflicts, there have been conflicts and/or atrocities that, speaking in terms of percentage, killed a larger percentage of humankind at that time (“The Fallen of World War II”).

create. As this chapter will show, the novel *The Forgotten Soldier* displays the impact of these weapons on the side of the soldiers, while the opponent only really comes into view in the form of corpses. The only truly recurring site of war, where the injuries, modifications, and death take place, is the human body. In Sajer's novel, the human body as "currency of war" remains central (Gray, "Cyborg Soldier" 43). No longer is the gear there to help the soldier, the soldier is there to step in where the machinery cannot act by itself (which it still cannot do to this day). Soldiers alone appear as infinitely more vulnerable than those within planes or in trucks and tanks, and the tools that were meant to improve the soldiers' performance in battle (visors, goggles, more lethal weaponry, etc.) came to be seen as the most vital element of that equation. The performance of the soldier is continually improved, as they are coupled with machines. Moreover, the soldier is not only displaced into the body armor, but also into an exterior armor that encases him. Taking the focus away from the human, it is placed on the machinic elements, and not as some abominable enemy as in World War I, but as the most important part of the soldier.

Humans thus appear in a systems context, and "[t]he man is the extension of such machines as artillery pieces or weapons systems generally; he is an adjunct for some limitation the machine has due to some incomplete development" (Radine 89, qtd. in Gray, *Postmodern* 56). This view accepts that machines cannot function independently but "[a]s part of a system, the individual soldier has less of a chance to deviate from expected behavior" (Gray, "Cyborg Soldier" 57). The state of symbiosis is vital to the construction of this soldier-machine. Whatever dreams of total, mechanized war might exist, the human and mechanic components need to work together to function; a machine gun that jams is useless, as is it when the person wielding it is dead. However, in the race to out-injure the opponent, the pace is increasingly led by machines, and not by humans (Coker, *Waging* 174). It seems that the more powerful machines become, the more does the military feel the need to get beyond the "human component" and its human fallibility. The (still) human armies the military still requires consist of soldiers that have been modified in order to be better integrated into the ("inhuman") battlefield, without being the weakest link in the weapons system (Gray, "Cyborg Soldier" 59). The soldier part of the soldier-machine is "reduced to their generic cognitive components, disembodied, decontextualized and depersonified, infinitely adaptable to any and all technological man/machine systems"

(Noble 32). In reality however, this construction had a long way to go even in World War II, and while *The Forgotten Soldier* does not necessarily interact with the notion of the military machine, Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead* explores it in detail through one of the characters. These two novels of the same war are not only the result of different nationalities, backgrounds, and fronts, they deal with the question of being a soldier at war in very different modes, as the analysis will show.

*A day came when I should have died, and after that nothing seemed very important.
So I have stayed as I am, without regret, separated from the normal human condition.*

– Guy Sajer

The Industrialized Production of Corpses

If World War I was seen as a literary war, World War II was decidedly not (Norris 99). Art after the Great War required and generated new forms of expression but when combatants targeted civilians in World War II, exterminating entire populations, the opposite happened (Norris 99). The question of how to translate such an experience into art was further problematized in the face of such categorical and planned killing. Fussell points out in *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (1989) that “[a]t first everyone hoped, and many believed, that the war would be fast-moving, mechanized, remote controlled, and perhaps even rather easy” (3). The First World War had been a travesty, and surely the generals would know better now. The generals did know better, but the new knowledge was not used to minimize human casualties—quite the opposite: the gas that had been invented during trench warfare now made its way to unprecedented industrialized slaughter in the form of the gas chambers. The question was no longer only how to speak of these events, but it became a question of “*if* one can speak, or should speak, the unspeakable at all” (Norris 99, author’s emphasis). Adorno’s dictum that ‘to write a poem after Auschwitz is barbaric’ echoes in these words, solidifying Norris’s ambiguous notion of “the unspeakable.” There is writing that focuses on the other aspects of the Second World War, and the events at Stalingrad, the Eastern Front, the Pacific Theatre, etc.

are all treated in literature. However, these literary texts are not as innovative as World War I literature, in part because these events are overshadowed by controversy over the (literary) representation of the Holocaust (Norris 100). When we think of World War II literature, Holocaust literature is what comes to mind and the battle-novels pale in comparison to the vast body of Holocaust poetry, literature, memoirs, and so on. Margot Norris asserts that in spite of its significance, her research focused “specifically on military violence and activity, [and thus] the Holocaust could be considered an epiphenomenon of World War II” (99). Norris does treat Holocaust literature, as she feels the death (events) of the trenches extended to civilian populations during this time (99). Though I agree with the importance of this writing, I will not look at Holocaust literature. The analyses will thus concern two novels that treat the situation at the Eastern front and in the Pacific Theatre; Guy Sajer’s *The Forgotten Soldier*, and Norman Mailer’s *The Naked and the Dead*. In German World War II (battle) literature, the role of the soldier as victim of the violent machines and the officer’s whims as we came to know him in First World War literature is problematized as this image is forcibly joined with that of the perpetrator. In the polarized historiography, “right” and “wrong” are spoken of as if such things were clear during wartime. The German soldiers (often unbeknownst to themselves) came to hold a dual role of perpetrator and victim within their uniform (Fritz 3). Fritz points out that

[a]s perpetrators, whether out of conviction or not, these common men existed as part of a great destructive machine, ready and willing to kill and destroy in order to achieve the goals of a murderous regime. In the role of victims, they lived daily with the physical hardships, the psychological burdens, and the often crushing anxieties of death and killing that constitute the everyday life of all combat soldiers. (3)

Collapsing these two categories, there are soldiers that differ very little from those that went before them, apart from the particularly murderous regime they served under, while others were active participants in the Holocaust. The German soldier has become synonymous with the inhuman extermination practices, while the experiences of individual soldiers might be different. This is only one example of the issues of guilt and villainy that occur in World War II writing where the question of culpability remains a difficult one. Stephen Fritz points out in *Frontsoldaten* that out of the twenty million men that made up the German armed forces, fewer than 1 percent were officers (ranking as major or higher),

and the remaining 99 percent of the *Wehrmacht* consisted of noncommissioned officers, enlisted men, and junior officers who experienced the war “from below,” a space where the problems of everyday life in the army were “frighteningly concrete” (Fritz 3). It is within this space of combat hardships that Sajer’s narrative is positioned.

Infantryman Guy Sajer was part of the German army during the Second World War, fighting at the Eastern Front, the experience that inspired him to write *The Forgotten Soldier*. Aside from alluding to the figure of “the unknown soldier,” that has fallen in battle and which has a strong presence and resonance in World War I literature, memory, and remembrance, it is a reference to the author himself. Born as Guy Monminoux to a French father and German mother, Sajer took on his mothers’ name when he enlisted for service in the German army. It is the name of the soldier “Guy Sajer” that needs to be forgotten after the defeat of the Third Reich.²⁸ Though Sajer served when he was only sixteen (until the age of nineteen), *The Forgotten Soldier* was only published in the late 1960s. The novel spans his years at the Eastern Front, and very briefly touches on this return and his quick integration into the French army. *The Forgotten Soldier* shows the elated beginning of the war, but then slowly turns into a downward spiral of overwhelmingly lethal attacks, extreme hunger and cold, and the eventual retreat of the German forces. The novel has generated considerable critical attention after its publication, which focused primarily on the “truthfulness” of the account. It has been claimed that Sajer’s story is not a true one, mostly on account of mistaken or unclear dates and places within the text (Nash n.p.). Some critics even go so far as to claim Sajer never served in the army, though this is rather far-fetched, considering some of the misinformation and historical focus that was held by the critics.²⁹ As mentioned in the introduction, Sajer never intended to write a historical reference book, but instead wrote of his inner emotional experiences during the Second World War (qtd. in Nash).

28. After listing his fallen friends, *The Forgotten Soldier* ends with the statement: “There is another man, whom I must forget. He was called Guy Sajer” (300).

29. One of the most vocal critics, Douglas E. Nash seems to be under the impression Sajer was a *nome de plume* for the purpose of writing *The Forgotten Soldier*, while it was in fact his (German) mothers’ maiden name, and the name under which he enlisted in the army. This misunderstanding refutes one of his most substantial claims, namely that a General who was called upon to verify Sajer’s service remembered the last name, but could not have done so because, as Nash claimed, there was never a Sajer in the German Army (n.p.). Consequently, the claims are considered insubstantial and quite excessive by many, including myself.

The question of the novel's factual truth causes friction, because it concerns an autobiographical work with a narrating "I" which, because of that very "I" and the humanistic tradition it stems from, is "a very specific form of embodiment that usually conveys trust in the impression that the subject of the narration is identical to the subject of the narrative" (Herbrechter, "Subjectivity" 331). This model implies that there is one singular, factual truth and thus divergence is punished by doubt and the rejection of the narrative as holding any kind of truth that extends into the life of the author. The narrating human(ist) subject has to adhere to certain rules to be able to claim the title and authority of being a subject, and the ambiguity in this text puts this notion under stress. However, the lapses in memory can be seen as an interesting stylistic feature. Through what he cannot recall, we see the limit of the narrative scope of the autobiographical "I." Holes appear into the narrative as it alternates between meticulously narrated instances of death and mutilation and whole stretches where he simply states that "I no longer remember exactly what happened" (Sajer 151). In his position, at his age, certain things were outside Sajer's line of vision (Varner 125); outside of what his "eye," and as such his "I," could perceive and narrate. The world of this soldier does not extend beyond himself, his comrades, and the close-proximity violence. Similar to Remarque's narrative, there does not seem to be a world outside of immediate experience, but the narrative voice in *The Forgotten Soldier* is less direct, giving the impression of emotional detachment after the events. Death does not have the suddenness with which it comes in *All Quiet on the Western Front*, but is foreshadowed, creating a lack of suspense throughout the text that is offset against the brutality with which the soldiers (and prisoners) find their end.

We are once again reminded of Theweleit's assertions and the way in which war makes men when the narrator states that "The laughter of men who lived through the war has something forced and desperate about it" (Sajer 168) due to that very war. The narrative continues: "It does them no good to say that they must now make use of the experience; their mechanisms have been run too hard, and something has gone out of balance" (Sajer 168). The mechanisms of the soldier have been changed by war; they have lived through experiences from which there is no real coming back. As a consequence there is something mechanical about this soldier now. He continues: "It seemed as if the war would mark men for life. They might forget women, or money, or how to be happy, but they

would never forget the war” (Sajer 167-8). Even “the victory ahead” he envisions would not be the same for what they had survived in Russia. In the text this is represented in the meticulously described mass-deaths of soldiers that have a distressingly precise quality to them. It is in this context that Sajer quite flippantly, and quite often (well over a dozen times), mentions how his comrades go mad. This is the same terrifying madness that occurs in *All Quiet on the Western Front* when the sheer volume and incomprehensibility of the attacks become too much for the soldiers to bear. As Tim Blackmore phrases it: “The soldier’s mind cannot bear the weight of the flesh’s destruction” (37). While in the text the fighting almost always happens at the front, there is a subtle difference from the literature that concerns the stalemate of World War I. In *The Forgotten Soldier*, there is more conflict over territory that results in great gains and losses, and these are made with the awesome power of heavy machinery—machine guns, tanks, and planes. As shown, World War I knew slaughter that was primarily caused by old tactics and new materiel, shooting and bombing soldiers in their foxholes from afar before engaging in battle on the no-man’s land. The only exceptions were planes and shock troops such as Jünger belonged to. In the beginning of the novel, Sajer attempts to become a *Luftwaffe* pilot, but does not pass the necessary test and ends up in the infantry. This failure is mirrored by the end of the novel, in which air raids decide the outcome of the war for Sajer’s battalion: “The Russians were using planes against us, and it was above all their air power which overwhelmed us in the end” (Sajer 289). The aerial bombardments are described, but in less evocative terms than the other scenes of slaughter. Defeat already tinges the narration at this point, and the planes, however deadly, always remain distant in the sky.

In a letter to a critic, Sajer is known to have once said that he has “acknowledged the courage and good will of German *Landsers* in a climate where one was not permitted to talk about them” and that he has “proudly glorified the honor of all German soldiers at a time in history when they were slandered and reviled. In my opinion this was my duty and I asked for nothing in return” (qtd. in Nash n.p.). The unfairness Sajer feels in the negation of the experiences of the German army is problematic considering the Holocaust took place simultaneously with the fights of these ‘honorable soldiers.’ What Sajer is protesting is the inversion of who is grievable. In the framing of the Nazi worldview, large groups of people were ungrievable; they were life “that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that

is, it has never counted as a life at all" (Butler 38). Even as the narrative is not directly involved with the killing of Jews or other ungrievable people, it does show a quiet agreement with these practices that take place within the military machine. The people that become grievable are the ones who are, by chance, given back their bodies:

What I saw next froze me with horror. I wish I were a writer of genius so that I could do justice to the vision which appeared before us. [...] A twin-mounted machine gun covered the rest of the train, which consisted simply of open flatcars like ours, but loaded with a very different kind of freight. The first one of these to pass my uncomprehending eyes seemed to be carrying a confused heap of objects, which only gradually became recognizable as human bodies. Directly behind this heap other people were clinging together, crouching or standing. Each car was full to the bursting point. One of us, more informed than the others, told us in two words what we were looking at: "Russian prisoners." [...] "Did you see that?" he whispered. "They've piled up their dead to shield themselves from the wind." In my stupefaction I could only reply with something like a groan. Every car was carrying a shield of human bodies. I stood as if petrified by the horror of the sight rolling slowly by: faces entirely drained of blood, and bare feet stiffened by death and cold. (Sajer 16-7)

It is not stated why the dead Russians are imprisoned, nor is there further inquiry, and the suggestion that these piles of corpses might be something other than prisoners of war (POW) lingers. It is only through seeing the corpses of prisoners, and the number in which they pass by, that the notion becomes upsetting to the soldiers. Visible dead bodies are kept from ordinary burial rituals and other customs of respect through their situation of prisoners in transit, but also by the sheer desperation of those that are still alive. This suggests that the German soldiers might feel both empathy for the living and shame towards the dead (for seeing them without ritual in this way (taboo), not necessarily because of feelings of guilt). This complicates the notion of grievability because most likely the corpses that are seen were killed or died as a direct effect of their consideration as ungrievable; they are the product of applied necropolitics. The death camps of World War II are "the extension to the 'civilized' peoples of Europe of the methods previously reserved for the 'savages,'" (Mbembe 23) and savages are historically speaking not grievable, they do not belong to that of life which is living. It seems that these prisoners of war (if that is what they are) enter into a similar grey area as they are killed outside of combat (and were thus

without defense). The right to wage war becomes the right to take life, the right to kill (Mbembe 23). The soldiers are shocked by the sight of the dead prisoners, likely due to the number of bodies and the way in (and reason for) which they are piled up. As soldiers they kill their enemy, but here they are confronted with industrialized mass death as a problematic concept. This is reflected in the use of the dead bodies: rather than receiving the ritual of death, the bodies are utilized as protection from the wind, and as such (as no longer living) have become truly transhuman, beyond the humanist ideal of perfectibility—as ungrievable in wartime, they become (no better than) things, objects.

Throughout the novel, the Holocaust is not mentioned in any direct way, but allusions are made as to it as it haunts the text. The piles of dead bodies are a mirror of the slaughter Sajer's troop suffers under. Early on in the novel, when the squadron is on its way to the Eastern Front, the narrator remarks:

We cross a large piece of Poland, stopping for several hours at Warsaw. Our detachment goes sightseeing in the city, including the famous ghetto—or rather, what's left of it. We return to the station in small groups. We are all smiling. The Poles smile back, especially the girls. (Sajer 5)

The “famous” ghetto is mentioned but immediately glossed over. It is noted that there is not much left, but there are no emotions displayed or discussed. What does happen is that everyone is smiling—every person that is present in the scene, Poles, Polish girls, German soldiers, they all seem to be happy or content. Why the ghetto is famous is not mentioned, nor are there any reactions, thoughts, or reflections on touring this site. The reasons for these smiles never become clear, but at this point in the narrative the soldiers have not yet fought in the war and have not seen any real human suffering for themselves. The rather abstract presence of the ghetto might appeal to whatever they might have been told about the Jews and this place, rather than appealing to anything more profound and empathic. Bodies are absent in the ghetto, there is no-one left and the site itself is no longer whole. For the soldiers there is no confrontation as upon seeing the Russian prisoners. It is only through the visual confrontation with the stacked corpses that thus move outside of abstraction that the notion of the mass death (of others) becomes upsetting to the soldiers. The Jewish Poles of whom only a destroyed ghetto remains are denied this identification. In

another instance the narrator is surprised that the (Russian) civilians they pass are smiling at them—are they not the enemy? At no point does he reflect that the reason could be one beyond the emotion smiles normally display. The narrative glosses over these elements and Sajer's lack of understanding seems almost willful—it is doubtful he did not know what went on at the Ghetto at the time of his writing twenty years later, but this is not what the book is about. As Sajer has stated, the account is to repatriate the German soldier, even if the ghost of the Holocaust haunts the text.

Through the corpses and endless assaults on the German soldiers, the Russian troops are shown to be inexhaustible in numbers (generating corpses) and materiel. The situation of the German troops slowly deteriorates, and the juxtaposition between the seemingly endlessly replenishable Russians and increasingly depressed and defeated Germans is a ghostlike parallel with the events at the camps that remain unmentioned. The novel essentially asserts that in spite of their delegation to the ranks of the ungrievable after the Holocaust, the German soldiers are in fact grievable as soldiers, while the Jews and Russians are not unless the narrator is directly confronted with their (mass-)death. The Holocaust could only happen in the context of war, and the two (Holocaust and war) are closely entwined in the industrial production of the corpses *The Forgotten Soldier* describes—be it in the camps or in battle. The camps are not a direct, narrated experience, and they are not mentioned in spite of the fact that Sajer must have known about them at the time of his writing, but the Holocaust is present, as a ghost, in the evocation of an empty ghetto and trains that carry heaps of corpses.

[I]n battle, men are closer to machines than humans. A plausible acceptable thesis.

– Norman Mailer

The Guts of the War Machine

The perspective of American World War II veterans is quite different from the European. Walter Hölbling points out that American troops were involved in a multitude of different theaters, operations, and types of military action, while they simultaneously had to come to terms with the awesome destructive power of the nuclear bomb they unleashed in the

Pacific (212). For the Americans, The Second World War was the start of the military formation as we know it today. After misjudgments in World War I (such as underestimating poison gas and thus finding themselves with a shortage in gas-masks, which their allies had to make up for), the U.S. forces adopted policies with a heavy reliance on innovation and materiel. In *G. I.: The American Soldier in World War II*, Lee B. Kennett writes that the G.I. seems to have been an “improviser by nature. Many of the ideas for improving weapons and equipment came from him, and often he made the changes before the Army Service Forces did” (Kennett 108). The technology continued to improve and resulted in the ability of both the high command and the troops “to employ high-tech weaponry efficiently in more mobile battle structures. In the Second World War, infantry soldiers rarely died in prolonged trench warfare” (Hölbling 213). For the U.S. the Second World War was a “good war;” fought and won for a good cause, and after its end the U.S. emerged as a military powerhouse (Hölbling 213). World War II generated a significant amount of American literature: there are between 1.500 and 2.200 American Second World War novels, the majority of which was published between 1945 and 1958 (Hölbling 213). American World War II literature is often considered relatively good, but the body of (American) post-World War I literature is not as innovative as the literature of the Great War had been. Hölbling explains that the novels “were neither formally nor thematically innovative, nor did they have the wide and powerful effects on their audience that many novels about the previous war had achieved” (213). In the American postwar context, this innovation would eventually come with postmodern novels such as Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse 5* (1969) and Joseph Heller's *Catch-22* (1961). Through irony, absurdism, and sci-fi they take such a departure from other soldiers' accounts that a reflection the wartime experience and relationship to the soldier's weapons becomes near impossible. It must be pointed out that the American postmodern novel emerged in unison with the Vietnam War, generating works that are written “under the shadow of the escalating Vietnam conflict” and thus “present quite different (fictional) realities from those in the mimetic mode” (Hölbling 218). These American postmodern novels of the war thus represent something quite different from other World War II novels. Hölbling continues:

[m]ost importantly, “war” in these novels is no longer a concrete historical event limited in space and time, but becomes a complex metaphor for our contemporary industrialized society in which traditional distinctions between “peace” and “conflict” are rapidly losing their validity. (218)

War and peace became defined by the geographic situation rather than a historical timeline, which “reflects the real situation in the Vietnam War, where one of the most difficult feats for the G.I.’s to handle was the quick transition from ‘Nam’ to ‘The Real World’ via jetliner” (Hölbling 218), a problem that is still present in later literature of Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Naked and the Dead is Norman Mailer’s debut novel, and was first published in 1948 when the author-veteran was 25 years old. Mailer served in the Pacific Theatre at the end of the war, and his experiences resulted in this autofictional work. The extensive novel mixes biographical elements with extended episodes of analepsis as the lives of approximately ten of the characters in the company are sketched. The relationships between the characters show developing issues of authority within the army and of the army as an overarching structure. The platoon is stationed on the imaginary Pacific island of Anopopei, where the U.S. soldiers must penetrate the enemy lines and take the island back from the Japanese. This forward movement across the island is paired with episodes of external analepsis to the soldiers’ lives at home in the U.S. and the personal issues they face there. Structurally, the novel begins and ends with the operation on Anopopei, is interspersed with flashbacks to American life, and ends with the extremely bloody takeover of the island. Unlike the other novels in this thesis so far, *The Naked and the Dead* does not have a singular narrative “I.” There are around ten main characters, who range from foot soldiers to the General, and for which there is a constantly shifting third-person narration that only sees the “I” in dialogue. Though not the autobiographical, humanist “I,” humanist ideals of perfectibility and progress come to the fore. This does not happen in the individual narratives, but is created in the composite effect. The characters represent different elements of the human psyche: all have complete and individual lives, but certain qualities are foregrounded to the extent where they might be held as representative for certain types. In spite of the lack of an autobiographical “I,” the novel is limited to the direct experience of the American soldier during World War II. *The Naked and the Dead* is not the

story of war in its entirety, but that of the range of a single unit, bringing a broad scope of that unit in its plural perspective. All the men in the unit bring different backgrounds and experiences to the war, and in spite of its third-person narration, the novel does not abandon the humanist ideal. Rather, the “I” is expanded upon, finding expression in the accumulative body of the various members of the war machine as it operates on the ground. The emphasis in *The Forgotten Soldier* lies heavily on emotions and experiences, rather than how they were relayed in a stylistic manner that reaches beyond harsh soberness. In Mailer’s novel, the analepsis divides the past at home and present in the Pacific Theatre while this move also ensures that we see the flow between these moments in time. Life is not cut off from anything that might come after the disastrous events of the war as was the case in World War I literature, for the analepsis reduces the perceived distance between the two places. The grim situation at the Eastern Front that Sajer describes is at its core harder and more traumatic than the Second World War seems to be for the characters in *The Naked and the Dead*. It almost makes one wonder if the events were traumatic at all, and it is obvious that if they were, we are not speaking of the same scale (of both death and trauma) as was the case for *All Quiet on the Western Front*, *Storm of Steel* or even *The Forgotten Soldier*. The G.I.s are uncomfortable and upset with a great many things, but in the narration there is no madness of the level and scope as was the case in the literature from the fronts in Europe. Violence does not come in the large altercations of the Western and Eastern fronts, it is confined to a small island and the focus is placed more on the relationships between the characters and their home front. The G.I. “was in the Army while others evaded the draft and remained at home; or he was in a combat unit while other soldiers lived comfortably behind the zone of operations” (Kennett 88), and thus the draft created discomfort and resentment. This is a very different level of distress and mortal danger than that which was present in the other novels so far. In the character relationships, issues of authority within the army and of the army as an overarching structure are developing and gain importance.

The initial reviews of *The Naked and the Dead* were mixed, as some found it falling short of its ambitious premise of narrating war from the American perspective, while others hailed it as one of the most “ruthlessly honest” American war novels (Dempsey n.p.). In spite of the specificity of wars, the issue that is pressed repeatedly in these war novels is

that it could be any man, any soldier, in any war. The “variations” in which the Japanese find their end are grueling in their emotionlessness, a sentiment that is underscored by the final perspective of the character of Major Dalleston. The Major is mostly concerned with bureaucratic elements: the take-over took a week longer than planned, the first parade and inspection are coming up, and the training of the new recruits is about to start again. Shortly after the graphic description of the killing of Japanese soldiers, the Major “ruminated pleasurably” on the events as they transpired (Mailer 477). Killing the enemy is nothing out of the ordinary in wartime and the enemy is considered ungrievable in their otherness. It is only the cruelty among the men that are (supposed to be) comrades that is questioned and explored. In both the World War I novels and in Sajer’s work, there are scenes of absolute slaughter: mortars, poison gas, tanks running over people—the violence is of a magnitude and quantity that is upsetting. Mailer’s novel, however, writes of violence that is juxtaposed with his mundane descriptions, undermining its effect. In one of the first altercations with the enemy Mailer describes:

Abruptly, he heard the mortars again, and then right after it a machine gun firing nearby. A couple of grenades exploded with the loud empty sound that paper bags make when they burst.[...] Perhaps he felt the explosion before a piece of shrapnel tore his brain in half. (Mailer 25)

Mortars, a machine gun, and “a couple of grenades” make the sound of a paper bag? That sound seems rather singular and understated compared to the violence we have come to know through the First World War narratives. Similarly, “A machine gun began to fire far away, and the sound carried to them in separate bursts, deep and empty, like a man beating a carpet” (Mailer 81). This recurs in another clash between the two sides:

Occasionally, they would hear the crackling of some rifles in the distance sounding like a bonfire of dry twigs on an autumn day, and often a shell or two would arch lazily overhead, sighing and murmuring before it crashed into the jungle beyond their lines. (Mailer 123)

The descriptions are dry, and do not veer into any emotional reaction *to* the sounds, the sounds are only spoken of. In fact, the whole scene lulls along rather calmly, as though the shells crashing around them are only decorative fireworks. Twigs on an autumn day are in

no way comparable to the slaughter these weapons can cause, but throughout the novel it is suggested it is in fact that mundane and seems rather displaced in a situation of war. It is, however, in line with the banality of the other comparisons that are made. Due to the lightness of these comparisons, which might very well serve to give people who have nothing to relate warfare to, the violence and lethality itself seems minimized and suggests the narrative takes little from earlier war writing traditions instead evoking scenes from everyday life in the U.S. at that time. In spite of the apparent simplicity of the metaphors somehow suggests the untranslatability of war in Mailer's need to resort to mundane similes in order to approach the war impressions (especially to a public for whom the last major war had been a distant European affair). In this context the awareness of the impossibility of grand heroic gestures in this war as the second, following a devastating and disillusioning first, might explain the constant understatement of war situations. There are no grand heroisms, and neither are there unfathomable lows. The emphasis of the story ends up moving away from these scenes of bombardment and ear-crashing mechanic violence, and it no longer feels like they show "the reality of warfare" as they did in earlier war novels.

The military machine and the hierarchies and place of the soldier within that machine is something of importance in the novel, recurring on several occasions in the thoughts of and the discussions between the soldiers. While Remarque hints at the soldiers' existence as automatons, one of the characters in *The Naked and the Dead*, Cummings, has a notebook for his ruminations on war, including the one on "life of weapons." He writes that from his point of view, "[i]t's a not entirely unproductive conceit to consider weapons as being something more than machines, as having personalities, perhaps, likenesses to the human" (Mailer 376). In this view, weapons are not immense machines against which the soldiers must fight only to survive as a unit, and not as an individual because so many die in the process. Such close proximity can only occur if the weapons are in an intimate, relationship with the human wielding them. When human and machine meet as the soldier-machine, the machinic aspects, the weapons, are extensions of the human body. Gray's assertion that every cyborg is part of a system is explored here: the "man-plus" that is reconfigured as a soldier-machine fights under the umbrella of the military *for* the military (Gray, "Cyborgology" 2-4). Emphasizing the extension of the soldier's body through

weaponry, the same notebook entry continues:

The tank and truck like the heavy ponderous animals of the jungle, buck and rhinoceri, the machine gun as the chattering gossip snarling many lives at once? Or the rifle, the quiet personal arm, the extension of a man's power. Can't we relate all of them?" (Mailer 377)

The soldiers have been analogized with the machinic as such since its conception: the army moves as one, within the overlapping machine of warfare. Literature adds not only the possibility of having that very discussion, as in Mailer's novel, but also allows for narratives that convey "immediacy of experience that reveals the particular of an experience" that moves beyond the "packaged image" of war that is usually presented (Peebles 103). In the fragment above too, the immense possibility for destruction of the tank is minimized in order to be held within the body of an animal, and an animal is by definition not invented to kill, like a tank explicitly is. In essence, much, like the sounds of the explosives did not do justice to their destructive powers, the weight of a tank as a means of destruction is diffused. Cummings' writing continues even further into the bowels of this question of the soldier-machine:

And for the obverse, in battle, men are closer to machines than humans. A plausible acceptable thesis. Battle is an organization of thousands of man-machines who dart with governing habits across a field, sweat like a radiator in the sun, shiver and become stiff like a piece of metal in the rain. We are not so discrete from the machine any longer, I detect it in my thinking. We are no longer adding apples and horses. A machine is worth so many men; the Navy has judged it even more finely than we. The nations whose leaders strive for Godhead apotheosize the machine. (Mailer 377)

Machines are first likened to animals, then the soldiers are likened to machines: we are all animals, some more destructive than others. All the descriptions of things happening to human bodies take on machinic qualities as Mailer draws on the substance and language of the machinic itself. The machine, rather than maddening, brute force, is a controlling power that keeps the soldiers equal in their subjugation to the machinic and "collective war body" (Blackwell 12). We see here that "[t]he central conflict in *The Naked and the Dead* is between the mechanistic forces of "the system" and the will to individual integrity" (Waldron 273). War is not challenged through actions, but is only chronicled. The machine

had been thoroughly assimilated into Western, and especially American culture at this point, and as such, a response such as in the First World War is impossible, but there is still some friction and protest that comes forward here (Waldron 272). War, battle and the army might “stand as a complex of figures for the machine age” (Waldron 273), but the vastness of these concepts is broken up as the form of the soldier-machine comes into focus as a singular part of this whole. Cummings, the character writing this fragment, seems well aware that “[t]he military understands that fresh bodies are, in themselves, useless. The soft civilian body must be replaced by an infinitely tougher, trained creation, one able to withstand and perform in the war machine” (Blackmore 11). It can even be stated more strongly, as we see here that these bodies need to be replaced to become part of the war machine. We are not simply shown men during modern, mechanized warfare, “but men in mechanized society, the epitome of which is war” (Waldron 274). The fragment, and in fact the novel, does not dramatize man’s assimilation into the machine (Waldron 277), which would mean they are fundamentally opposed. Instead, it tells of the evolution of man and machine through a hybrid form: the soldier-machine or cyborg. Mailer’s approach allows for rumination on the characters in an altogether more modern way, while Sajer’s novel is clearly a product of the World War I legacy that does not allow for vision outside of the immediacy of battle. Mailer’s soldier-machine focus contrasts with the production of corpses in Sajer’s novel, and combined they show the silent contemplation and mass effects of war. Remarque emphasized the negative, destructive force of war and the consequent meaninglessness, and Sajer’s war text is a continuation of those tropes as the corpses are reduced to things with a use-value (shielding others from the wind) as the ultimate posthumanist destruction of humanist ideals. Sajer’s tone is not as desolate as Remarque’s, but it is clear he is defeated as the text leads up to not only the loss of the war but also to that of Guy Sajer the German soldier. Jünger emphasizes war’s positive aspect, creating new and better men, a step Mailer never quite makes, though the lack of desperation throughout the novel and in particular the ending with the perky, optimistic Major shows that this war is a place to move forward from. The soldiers do not become better men, but they often wish they would, as the emphasis shifts towards the machinic on a micro- and macroscale. As an American war text, there are several elements that foreshadow the novels of later American wars. Though their mode of writing is decidedly different than Mailer’s, and all

choose to narrate from an “I,” the issues that originate in fighting a foreign war are still present and even exacerbated as the war is still ongoing even when they go home. Mailer’s war text signals the beginning of the back- and forth movement between the two continents, between war abroad and peace at home. The soldiers of the later wars interact with this movement in a way that interacts with other, older war texts such as the ones I have discussed so far. The final chapter will treat these American novels, as well as a British one, and their exploration of the way in which the lives of postmodern soldier-machines/cyborgs can be narrated successfully.

IV. The Other One Percent: Afghanistan and Iraq

This is my rifle. There are many like it, but this one is mine.

It is my life. I must master it as I must master my life. Without me, my rifle is useless.

Without my rifle, I am useless.

I must fire my rifle true. I must shoot straighter than my enemy who is trying to kill me.

I must shoot him before he shoots me. I will. My rifle and I know that what counts in war is not the rounds we fire, the noise of our burst, nor the smoke we make. We know that it is the hits that count. We will hit.

My rifle is human, even as I am human, because it is my life. Thus, I will learn it as a brother. I will learn its weaknesses, its strength, its parts, its accessories, its sights and its barrel. I will keep my rifle clean and ready, even as I am clean and ready. We will become part of each other.

Before God, I swear this creed. My rifle and I are the defenders of my country. We are the masters of our enemy. We are the saviors of my life.

So be it, until victory is America's and there is no enemy.

– (U.S.) Rifleman's Creed

The Modern-day Soldier-Machine

Almost sixty years separate the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Since then, a number of significant international conflicts and technological developments occurred that further changed the scene of warfare. Industrial warfare has further developed, bringing new gains, problems, and critiques. Since the presence of British troops in North America during the American Revolutionary War, the U.S. has never had conflicts with foreign armies on their own soil, and thus the U.S. home base is always in a state of (relative) peace, while war rages somewhere abroad (Hölbling 219). As mentioned in Chapter III, in the postmodern writing that was conceived during the Vietnam War, war loses its historical, linear quality and becomes a matter of geographical positioning. In our contemporary world, this is still the case, as “our current situation at the

beginning of the twenty-first century is that “war” and “terror” can be localized permanently (and simultaneously) in various parts of the globe” (Hölbling 219). Postmodern war writing seems to have foreseen the perseverance of this element of modern warfare. The war writing of soldiers who served in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is not necessarily postmodern, but the novels are written by military men who are well aware of World War I and II literature, as well as the practice of telling a truthful story about the sensation of war by conveying its experience rather than its facts (Coker, *Men* 3). In this chapter I will provide a short overview of the innovations that were created in the years between World War II and the contemporary state of warfare.

In the period between the Second World War and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, one of the most prominent conflicts was the Vietnam War (1965–1973). The Vietnam War was fought and lost under entirely different circumstances than previous American campaigns, with the exception of the (unsuccessful) U.S. involvement in Korea (1950–1953), and the Korean War does not carry the same cultural significance as the Vietnam War. These conflicts showed the U.S. the new realities of warfare as the advanced technologies deployed by the U.S. “proved insufficient to achieve victory in either the cold, mountainous terrain of Korea or the paddy fields and jungles of Vietnam” (Walsh 226). Ultimately, neither war was seen as morally justifiable as the fight against fascism and genocide in World War II (Walsh 226). The defeat in Vietnam and severe unpopularity of the war among the population at home in the U.S., led to a situation where “[i]n literature, as in life, Vietnam still exerts a post-traumatic stress effect, reminding Americans of a failed military enterprise and warning of the dangers of ill thought-out foreign policy” (Walsh 237). The aforementioned postmodern war novels are an example of this trend in literature. O'Brien's *The Things They Carried* (1991) is one of the American Vietnam War books that has been “influential in offering a different template for addressing the war, one that breaks with realism while not entirely supplanting it” (Walsh 232). This is not an entirely new trend, as the criticism Remarque and Sajer received shows that war narratives have always had a complicated relationship to factual truth. However, the level of invention in the memoir-like novels is more subtle; everything could be true, and the text gives no reason to doubt the account (rather than pointing out that scenes might be invented, or telling them various times with slight alterations such as O'Brien does, for example).

While in the First World War the countries involved had roughly the same expenses (with the exception of Russia, who withdrew after the revolution of 1917), in the Second World War the budgets had changed significantly (Nagdy and Roser). At the height of the Second World War the U.S. already spent more on the defense budget than any of the other countries involved, and this number has increased exponentially in the last seventy years (Nagdy and Roser n.p.).³⁰ Currently the U.S. spends more on its defense budget than the next ten countries on the list with an astounding \$598 billion in 2015 (Tailor and Karklis).³¹ The *International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance Report of 2016* exposed another striking point: it states that the introduction of

New technologies mean that the West in general and the United States in particular are losing their technological edge, the report found. Countries such as Russia and China have been showcasing new systems and technological advances that show the balance of power may be shifting. (Tailor and Karklis)

The U.S. might be losing its “technological edge,” but the budget in combination with the fact that the vast majority of the new inventions has been sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), not to mention their bases across the globe, means that the U.S. still is the most lethal power. The U.S. is also the most aggressive military force: aside from being the only one to detonate nuclear bombs, they are responsible for launching 201 out of the 248 armed conflicts between the end of World War II and 2001 (Wiist et.al. e34). Since 1944, the U.S. military has initiated numerous studies in an effort to understand future war, structurally bringing futurists, scientists, military personnel, science-fiction writers, etc. together in state-funded conferences (Gray, *Cyborg Worlds* 47). The U.S. DoD has been a forerunner in this regard, deeming new technologies crucial in future wars (Gray, *Cyborg Worlds* 47). Gray continues: “Since World War II the Pentagon has institutionalized and magnified this understanding into ‘Strategy of High Technology’ that posits technological innovation as the decisive factor in shaping strategy and winning actual wars” (*Cyborg Worlds* 47). Battlespace was expected to go through significant

30. The U.S. military expenditure exceeded \$700.000.000 while Germany spent a little over \$400.000.000 in 1945 (Nagdy and Roser n.p.).

31. The next ten countries are, respectively: China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the U.K., India, France, Japan, Germany, South Korea, and Brazil (Tailor and Karklis n.p.).

changes which must be explored in tandem with the possible modifications of the soldiers' bodies, because as it stands now, soldiers as we now know them will not be able to fight effectively under the conditions of the new battlespace (Gray, *Cyborg Worlds* 48). The forecast that soldiers need to change in order to be (good) soldiers at all is, as shown, not new. What is new, however, is the extent to which new technologies can be integrated with the human body. In the modern conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan there is the absence of two static armies trying to win ground, as was the case in World War I and II. Conquest, acquisition, and takeover of a territory do not seem among the objectives of wars of the globalization era, which is a hit-and-run affair (Bauman in Mbembe 30). In this twenty-first-century battlespace, "soldiers might overcome the panic of existing in a fluid war zone by focusing on personal agency: the soldiers' personal weapon, personal body armour, personal skin beneath that armour" (Blackmore 13). The accounts of our contemporary wars mirror this in their literary style, as the analyses will show.

Inventions ranging from the Internet and GPS to the microwave and Kevlar are military inventions, but the extent to which their creation (and use) is interwoven with our lives often goes unnoticed or is ignored. The level to which "defense technologies" are integrated into our lives is underestimated, their lethality and original purpose forgotten. This is already happening with drones, which can now be acquired commercially as toys as though they were not created for war and injuring. Society, and its citizens are not bewildered by the capabilities of the machines, but rather we are surprised that our amazing toys (phones, drones, etc.) have other, more lethal purposes—that is, if we think about these purposes at all. This denial is reflected in the way defense contracts are set up between the DoD and private companies; the contracts remain secret ("classified") and are split up into various components that are handled by different people—none of whom know what they are working towards (Hayes 74). The integration of these elements of warfare into our lives is a worrying indication of militarism, defined as "the deliberate extension of military objectives and rationale into shaping the culture, politics, and economics of civilian life so that war and the preparation for war is normalized, and the development and maintenance of strong military institutions is prioritized" (Wiist et.al. e37). The result is that the various elements of war are normalized. Wiist and his research team state explicitly that

Militarism is intercalated into many aspects of life in the United States and, since the military draft was eliminated, makes few overt demands of the public except the costs in taxpayer funding. Its expression, magnitude, and implications have become invisible to large proportion of the civilian population, with little recognition of the human costs or the negative image held by other countries. (e 37)

War might not always seem to be prioritized in daily life, but the DoD budgets speak otherwise. War, its technologies and the damage they can do are equally present in the media (which holds an abstract graphic imagery that is similar to the images of the Gulf War) as in literature and other artistic expression. It is striking that neither the U.S. imagery nor the literature of war seem to necessarily concern itself with their victims. There are exceptions, of course, but the discussion appears polarized. Bennet writes that in this situation the “moralized politics of good and evil, of singular agents who must be made to pay for their sins (be they bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, or Bush) becomes unethical to the degree that it legitimates vengeance and elevates violence to the tool of first resort” (38). In effect the military way of dealing with issues—by violence—becomes the preferred course of action. Lieutenant Colonel (USAF) William Astore points out that “[f]rom Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, dropping bombs and firing missiles has been the presidentially favored way of “doing something” against an enemy [...] [I]n our world, [it] has the added allure of the high-tech” (n.p.). Drones and similar inventions are appropriately new and flashy to the public at home that desires certain actions from their leaders, but both the public and the executive powers seem to ignore the very real effects: the impact on “soft targets” (people), the destruction of cities, landscape, and collateral damage of these soft targets (Astore n.p.).

The use of drones and other “smart” technologies are misleading in both their effectiveness and “smart-ness.” The technology and precision weapons are conceived of as “munitions so smart they’re ‘brilliant,’ according to their makers [and they] give way to heavy power and indiscriminate power” (Blackmore 7). This is in accordance with the notion of necropolitics and necro-power, which accounts for the various ways in which weapons are deployed in our contemporary world (Mbembe 40). The deployed weapons are meant to create maximum destruction, creating “forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of *living dead*” (Mbembe 40, author’s emphasis). These “living dead” are comparable to Butler’s

ungrievable populations who were “never living.” Grievability and necropolitics thus become more pronounced in globalized warfare. Technologically advanced weapons are utilized to coerce the enemy into a certain political position through (the threat of) death and, as Astore underlines:

Its suasion, such as it is, comes from killing at a distance. But its bombs and missiles, no matter how “smart,” often miss their intended targets. Intelligence and technology regularly prove themselves imperfect or worse, which means that the deaths of innocents are inevitable. (Astore n.p.)

Language once again influences the perception of military actions, as it is utilized to make the technologies sound more capable and infallible than they are. The issue of “collateral damage” is central in these conflicts, as well as the accounts thereof,³² not to mention the increasing popularity of drones in video games.³³ Literature seems to fall behind on this trend, possibly in part because of the highly visual nature of (the representations of) drone warfare. Interestingly, the Gulf War also generated a smaller amount of literary work, and one might wonder if there is a parallel between the visual-ness of the representation of drone warfare in the media and the lack of existing literary representation. One could also speculate about the type of soldier that flies these drones (as they are often recruited in malls and via gaming activities) might be less inclined to create literary work than the soldiers that were also English or Literature Majors. Unfortunately, it seems too early for veteran drone-pilot literature, making it difficult to say anything conclusive on the matter. In this chapter I will discuss the novels of infantrymen.

The novels I will analyze in this chapter provide a counter-voice to the official military accounts, which obscures the elements that are not truly functional and aim to make every part of the military seem like the well-oiled machine we have come to know

32. Current anxieties are also expressed in theatre and film, such as *Unmanned* (2015), a play about a pilot that is demoted to drone pilot because she is pregnant, the movie *Eye in the Sky* (2016), which revolves around the ethical repercussions of the choice whether or not to drop a bomb to kill a terrorist and stop a suicide-vest from being made—a kill that would also take out a little girl playing in the garden of the house.

33. Aside from *America's Army* and its overt intention of recruiting new soldiers, there are games such as *Call of Duty*, which has a mission called “Death From Above,” in which you are guided through a drone attack that is more abstracted than any other part of the game (speaking of “targets,” for example), or *Unmanned* in which the website states “you get to play the newest kind of soldier: one who remotely drops bombs on foreign soil during the day, and at night goes home to his family in the suburbs” (Munroe n.p.).

through the mainstream media. The accounts however, still mostly concern the soldiers themselves. Katherine Hayles points out that as literary texts are shaped by different conventions than such official accounts: they shine a light on a spectrum of issues that other texts “only fitfully illuminate, including the ethical and cultural implications of cybernetic technologies. Literary texts are not, of course, merely passive conduits. They actively shape what technologies mean and what the scientific theories signify in cultural contexts” (21). The consequences of the wartime technologies have come forward in the texts of World War I and II as a visceral threat, and the contemporary novels continue to engage with the issues of bodily biological and nonbiological presence. literature shows an intensified relationship between the soldiers and their personal weapons, as well as an increasing cooperation with technologies that give the soldiers other abilities and dependencies besides inflicting damage, as will be shown.

Your brain was always on, your back never turned, your rifle always ready, finger on the trigger.

— Brian Castner

Without Me, My Rifle is Useless

Shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center of 9/11 the U.S. Congress passed an “Authorization to Use Military Force” (AUMF) in Afghanistan.³⁴ Military force unleashed an air campaign in this paradoxical “War on Terror,” a month later on Oct. 7, 2001, when U.S. and British war planes bombed Taliban targets as the start of “Operation Enduring Freedom.” Two short years later the U.S. military also invaded Iraq, starting a second war with a significantly poorer nation. Equal to its predecessor, this operation started out with aerial bombardments. No troops were put forward in the initial attack. Instead, several precision-guided bombs were dropped on a bunker complex in which the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, was believed to be meeting with senior staff (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*).

34. The U.S. Congress has refrained from formal declarations of war since F.D. Roosevelt declared war on Japan in 1941 (Koroma n.p.). Instead, they issue an “Authorization to Use Military Force” (AUMF), which is in effect, a declaration of war.

This war initiated a little over a decade after the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), which had already become known as the “Video Game War” due to the images of soldiers engaging with targets through video screens that showed the distant impact of bombs while the world watched. It is often felt that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are a continuation of the previous (failed) foreign interventions in the region. Author and veteran Brian Castner hints at a similar percentage of soldiers that seems especially equipped for war in the article “One Degree of Separation in the Forever War” (2015): “This longest war in American history has created a warrior caste. Less than one percent of the US population, the “Other One Percent,” served in Iraq and Afghanistan” (n.p.) This one percent served in the ongoing wars, and a very small percentage of those soldiers served six or more times. These are likely the same fearless, emotionless men that made the true soldier machines in the First and Second World War. And in fact, in “many works emerging out of the ar on error, we can trace key commonalities that link contemporary American warfare and its literature to the Great War” (Hawkins 95). I will return to this element in the *The Yellow Birds*.

Brian Castner himself served three tours in the Middle East as an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) officer in the U.S. Air Force from 1999 to 2007, deploying to command bomb disposal units in Balad and Kirkuk in Iraq in 2005 and 2006. *The Long Walk: A Story of War and the Life That Follows* narrates this experience and the life before and after deployment. Castner and his team were the ones to diffuse “Improvised Explosive Devices” (IED), either with a robot, or by themselves.³⁵ The narrative cuts between his time in training, his life in the unit, and the life back home that is heavily influenced by what he calls “the Crazy.” Psychological difficulties have come to be recognized, as the narrator states: “In World War I they called it shell shock. [...] In World War II they didn’t talk about it at all [...] Today we call it Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. PTSD. That’s what the crazy feeling is” (Castner 227-8). Scenes and imagery become repetitive as he describes the sudden anxieties he faces that prevent him from living an ordinary life. In the initial moments of his deployment, however, it becomes clear that war narratives form in part the soldiers’ conception of war itself. Castner describes an evening in which; “We puffed on our

35. Coincidentally, Fritz Haber, the “Father of Chemical Warfare” makes a comeback in this context, as one of the main components of the IED’s in Iraq and Afghanistan is fertilizer.

cigars, and blew smoke rings, and told war stories, and watched new ones being written, in the glow of the tiki torches and colored lights, until late into the night” (*Walk* 28). The scene described is almost romantic, and forms a stark contrast with the violent war stories as we have come to know them. There is an awareness of the war as a set of events and experiences that has been passed on by earlier generations as a narrative structure. In a remembrance that only occurs in contemporary conflict, the memory of those war stories is adopted and internalized. The sense of communion the men feel originates in the shared quality of these stories which they all seem to know (they do not specify which stories), combined with the fact that war is still abstract to them. Soon after this, the initial haze clears and reality infringes on the constructed narratives. Other veteran-authors of Iraq and Afghanistan also point out the important role of older war stories. Literature gives access to the experience of war for those who are not decedents of a line of military men, and who have not had these experiences themselves (see: Peebles).

The Long Walk is narrated from the point of view of an autobiographical “I” that indeed, in humanist tradition, explores what it means to be human while that notion that is put under stress as Castner grapples with the psychological repercussions of his service. The problems Castner faces affect his memory and thus problematizes this notion of autobiography as “[t]he very idea of autobiography relies on a subject (or a narrator) who is capable of remembering, interpreting and identifying with his or her life story” (Herbrechter, “Subjectivity” 331). It is through the narrative of *The Long Walk* (and *The Yellow Birds*) that it becomes clear that the intersection of narrating life and (theorizing) the posthuman show the complications posthumanism brings to the humanist understanding of concepts such as “me” and “human” (Herbrechter, “Subjectivity” 332-3). Castner points out that “Soldiers on both sides survived explosives detonations that would have killed in World War II, Korea, or Vietnam. [...] But they were not unhurt. The symptoms of their injuries only appeared later” (*Walk* 186). He continues: “The soldiers had a new kind of wound, a kind not previously recognized because no victim that had ever received one survived long enough to tell about it. The name for this new condition? Blast-induced Traumatic Brain Injury” (Castner, *Walk* 187). Blast-Induced Traumatic Brain Injury (bTBI), is a 21st century occurrence, specifically in counter-insurgency operations (the type of warfare the U.S. is currently involved in Iraq and Afghanistan), and it is marked

by the absence of physical impact with an object. Instead of the impact of a missile or shrapnel, the blast itself induces traumatic brain injury that detrimentally affects the brain (Cullen n.p.). The brain injury manifests in different ways, Castner, for example, lacks certain memories, like those of the birth of his son. Such lapses in his memory pose most of Castner's problems with the idea of a "me" or "myself" in the narrative. The missing memories are stressed as there are lapses where the men wait anxiously, similar to the situation in the trenches, and the silence becomes oppressing.

The Long Walk first presents us with a narrator that is an exemplary soldier-machine, who casually interacts with the technology he is coupled with; "I readjusted my rifle again, I popped open the dustcovers on my optical sight" (Castner, *Walk* 21). Throughout the text it is shown that the gear is an integral part of his experience as a soldier, more so than it was in the previous wars. In the (forced) interaction with technology in the writing of World War I and II, the equipment itself was not quite as sophisticated and smooth as we see it here. It is as if the displacement of the body into the body armor Theweleit described has made place for something more intricate and thorough. The offhand descriptions indicate a symbiotic relationship between the human soldier and the (cyborg) technologies he is coupled with. Once the soldier is familiarized with the enhancements, through military drills, the extensions are no longer felt: they are invisible and their complex features are part of the human body (in battle). The use of "arms" as a word for weapons (which is otherwise perfectly normal) in this context gains an extra dimension as the human and the machine can no longer be told apart as "I was asked to hand over my sidearm" (Castner, *Walk* 57). Without explicit knowledge of what a sidearm would be, its meaning becomes ambiguous. This ambiguity is interesting in regard to the narrator's interaction with his rifle, both on mission and back at home. On mission the rifle is always there, as the most important part of his standard gear. When the soldier returns home he has to hand in his rifle before he re-enters civilian life, and subsequently the weapon is missed, like a phantom limb. In *The Long Walk* we see the soldiers during moments of stress the veterans reach for their usual solution to stressful situations: the rifle. The weapon is not only experienced as a lack, it is actively shaping the soldier's behavior, even when it is not there. Castner describes the narrator as he finds himself in an overcrowded airport—a stressful situation for a veteran; "For a moment, I do more than

just consider going back. [...] I grasp my rifle, which has been waiting for me at my shoulder. I need to leave this airport terminal right now. I need to get out" (*Walk* 232-3). The rifle is not experienced as missing at all, it is waiting at its usual spot on his shoulder. This is an experience that is analogous with phantom pain in a lost limb, where the sufferer perceives pain in a limb even though it has been amputated. Indeed, there are several veterans that compare the condition to phantom pain (Martin 64).

Veteran Travis L. Martin has called this "Phantom Weapon Syndrome." He describes it as "particular to those who have served in modern combat" (Martin 63-4). Other veterans Martin worked with (and he himself) suffer pangs of loss over their rifle, which is described as "a feeling of losing "an extension" or "part of my hand that is missing" [...] It's like you left a door unlocked or the oven on... but its every ten seconds for the rest of your life" (64). The relationship of dependence that causes this sensation is purposely created by the military. Here the degrading qualities of certain cyborg technologies become clear. As noted in Chapter I, the distinction that "degrading cyborg technologies" make (Gray, "Cyborgology" 3), implies that alterations to the mind are harmful or even unethical while those that alter the body go practically unnoticed. The Basic Combat Training fully intends to create "a pathological relationship between the soldier and an object—the weapon (Martin 66). The weapon functions as a child's security blanket, an object that must bring comfort and security (Martin 66, 70). Basic Combat Training creates a "temporal regression that enables the military institution to reprogram young men and women as soldiers" (Martin 67). Such mind-altering procedures are degrading because they intend to cause a developmental regression (which is then utilized). Upon returning home, the rifles that are the sources of safety fall away, but the psychological dependence, as well as a physical reaction remains (Martin 67). What we see here is a continuation and intensification of the fetishes Theweleit identified. More than being displaced into their body armor, the nonbiological weaponry has been adopted into their own body and mind as part of their own anatomy.

The structure of *The Long Walk* marks a significant difference with World War I and European World War II writing; it also tells of his life back home after he returns. The narrative does not end with war, nor does it end with death or disillusion. Instead we are told of the difficulties of reentering society after going through the intense and traumatic experience of combat. In *The Naked and the Dead* there was the beginning of this trend,

leading one to suspect that the physical distance between home and the front or base is an important aspect for American war writing. In the war literature of Afghanistan and Iraq however, the sequences in the U.S. are not only illustrations of the formative forces back home before the war started as is the case in Mailer's novel. Instead the soldiers speak of the times "back home" *after* their deployment, thus exploring the difficulties they have reintegrating into society and "normal" life—something that also prominently features in Vietnam War writing. The same construction occurs in almost every single instance of Iraq and Afghanistan War literature, including *The Yellow Birds*, which is the subject of the following analysis.

*A yellow bird/ With a yellow bill/ Was perched upon/ My windowsill
I lured him in/ With a piece of bread/ And then I smashed/ His fucking head...*
– Traditional U.S. Army Marching Cadence (epigraph to *The Yellow Birds*)³⁶

Without My Rifle, I Am Useless

The Yellow Birds by Kevin Powers has a strikingly similar structure to *The Long Walk* in the way the narrative moves from deployment an reintegration back home. Powers composed the novel after several tours of Iraq before he was honorably discharged and started studying English. He earned an M.F.A. in Poetry in 2012. His literary grounding is visible throughout the text, where echoes of literary works such as Steinbeck's *Of Mice and Men*, Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway*, David Jones' epic World War I poem *In Parenthesis*, Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse 5*, etc. This occurs purely on a textual level. Phrasings are borrowed—for example, one paragraph ends with "So it goes," a famous line from *Slaughterhouse 5* that reoccurs through the text. However, the actual interaction with these texts is minimal aside from small, literal references and quotations. There is, however, an overarching connection with World War I writing, in the way Powers' representational strategies depend quite heavily on those of the Great War writers (Hawkins 95). The war scenes in *The Yellow Birds*

36. The song gives us an insight into the way music has been weaponized in the last decades, not only as an accompanying factor in acts as war, but also as a weapon that functions very similar to Blast-induced Traumatic Injury (Ross n.p.).

are placed within a structure that is similar to *All Quiet on the Western Front* and the works of many other World War I writers. Powers' story concerns a young protagonist who goes to war, and who, through the disillusionment with the brutal experience of industrial warfare, "descends," rather than ascends into adulthood (Hawkins 95). Powers, like Castner, maintains the division between deployment and life upon return, alternating between Virginia and Iraq. Through these alternating scenes, the sense is conveyed that even as the novel ends with life back home, it might only be a lapse before new deployment. The point where Powers' text marks a radical departure with earlier wars since World War I, is that Powers' (and Castner and Parker's) generation is not a "lost generation" however different their experience is from a normal life, (Hawkins 95). Hawkins further states that "modern combat severs today's American veterans from a postmodern culture of distraction, fragmentation, and simulation" (96), not life itself cut short, as it is in Remarque-esque World War I literature. Instead, it is even further fragmented, and paired with an angry and violent energy that pushes the text forward that is not dissimilar to Jünger's professional soldiership. Because the U.S. military is a volunteer army (there is no longer a draft), modern-day veterans feel themselves alone in their sentiments.³⁷ From the very start, the epigraph-song about the yellow bird, the novel brings into view the hyper-masculine world of the (U.S.) military abroad, in which the soldiers struggle with the new "counterinsurgency" code of conduct which calls for less aggressive force, even though use of force is what they are trained for. Similar to *The Long Walk*, the novel shows struggle with warfare and its trauma, but is in essence not a necrological novel. Life continues in a manner more akin to Jünger's (and Theweleit's) writing; awaiting the next moment in which one will know exactly what to do and how to behave—awaiting the next war or deployment.

The crucial difference between the soldiers that are depicted in *The Long Walk* and *The Yellow Birds* is their position within the infantry—Castner was an EOD, while Powers was a machine gunner. *The Yellow Birds*, too, tells the story of a soldier in combat, and that same soldier coming home as a troubled veteran after his tour of the Middle East, and we

37. The U.S. volunteer army creates a situation in which "few civilians in America's a-historical culture wish to share any responsibility for today's wars" (Hawkins 95-6). This allows most Americans the safety of distance from military service and war, but also from their fellow soldier-citizens and, most importantly, distance from the (feeling of) responsibility for those wars (Hawkins 98).

see the recurrence of a phantom weapon. On his way back to the U.S., the narrator suddenly seems to experience an alternate version of reality:

I knew where I was: a road in Germany, AWOL [Absent Without Official Leave], waiting for the flight back to the States. But my body did not: a road, the edge of it, and another day. My fingers closed around a rifle that was not there. I told them the rifle was not supposed to be there, but my fingers would not listen, and they kept closing around the space where my rifle was supposed to be and I continued to sweat and my heart was beating much faster than I thought reasonable. (Powers 54)

In this fragment it is not the psychological burden of his familiarity with and dependence on his rifle, instead this sounds like a variant on muscle memory. His head, his brain, is aware of what is happening, but the movement of reaching for a rifle is such a reflex that his muscles cannot be stopped. Here too, this sensation of a phantom limb/weapon occurs several times throughout the text. It is pointed out repeatedly that the rifle is not there, and yet somehow it is there in the mind and the soldier's hands close around its shape. Both the narratives of Castner and Powers are successful in conveying the confusion that arises with Phantom Weapon Syndrome and the uselessness of stopping these ingrained impulses. Powers is aware of his body acting out of order when the scene of war suddenly falls away, and attempts to control his disobedient (or too obedient) body, while Castner focuses on the aspect of "The Crazy" or PTSD, and in this transgresses boundaries between presence and absence, mind and body. Both have fully become a soldier-machine, even when the soldier and machine are separated in (geographical) peace-time (peace latitude). For the soldiers experiencing their phantom weapon, it is the personal, physical realization of Haraway's claim that "[l]ate twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines" ("Cyborg" 293-4). The soldier is the cyborg, not body and not machine; the soldier-machine made flesh.

This shift towards Phantom Weapon Syndrome and the various ways in which it is narrated certainly has to do with the duration of the narratives, that extend into the "life after" the later Middle Eastern wars. The phantom weapon is only one example of a larger break away from the tradition World War I and II novels initiated. The sensations that are

described are placed more on the body, even if they do not refer to the body but to weapons and other gear. The narratives do not just present the confusion, filth, and physical hardships of the machines of war acting upon their bodies, the pain of impact upon death, but the impact of technologies that are not acting on them with direct violence. The soldiers that write about their current involvements in these wars are often the party that is carrying out the violence against a weaker force. Therefore they are coupled with their weapons and gear in an intense, performance-based manner, rather than as a matter of defense such as occurred in the trenches. The sounds of shots and bombardments that are not due to shells raining down on *them*, as is the case in *Storm of Steel*, rather the soldiers are the ones who fire:

I began to fire, too, and the noise of the rounds exploding in the chamber pushed in my eardrums and they began to ring and the deafness expanded as if someone had struck a tuning fork at perfect pitch, so that it resonated and wrapped everyone in the orchard in his very own vow of silence. (Powers 117)

Though we are familiar with the descriptions of overbearing and deafening sound, the context is changed significantly due to the active position the soldier with his rifle takes. Rather than the diminished human body standing in the shadow of grand mechanical violence, it is the soldier himself that is the instigator of the violence, showing the body as an assault weapon. Still, the victims (or “targets”) cannot be forgotten as whole populations are made ungrievable. These conflicts are asymmetric wars in which the most sophisticated technologies available are opposed to older or individually manufactured (such as IED's) weapons.

Considering the position of U.S. soldiers as the dominant military power in these wars and the extent to which that power is superior to their opponents, it is quite remarkable that the position of the soldier is still narrated as that of a victim. As was the case in *The Naked and the Dead* the soldiers are victims of circumstances, of stress, of superiors and their orders, of having to adhere to the new counterinsurgency code of conduct while they stand in the desert with their nerves on edge and their weapons on sharp. Remarque once pointed out the various words that held death and destruction in their name—and they still do. The list has become longer, but now this never means death

and destruction for the (Western) narrating troops anymore; they are the ones commanding the firepower, and their opponents have weapons that are disproportionately makeshift. As pointed out before, the highly technological nature of war means that the U.S. military is losing its edge (but by no means its excessive firepower). U.S. weaponry improves, and so does that of those they fight against. The soldiers barely take any direct hits from rifle bullets or other weapons that require an altercation, instead roadside bombs are the biggest. Part of the reason why there are no direct hits is because in line with globalized warfare, there is no conventional war being fought in Iraq: “We had no front line in our war. A front line only exists when two standing armies look over a field at one another” (Castner, *Walk* 238). The novels so far, ranging across 100 years, have shown soldiers who were—with the exception of *All Quiet on the Western Front*—very fortunate, and made it out of their respective wards. In the face of mortal danger some were physically injured, as Jünger tells, but none of them left with permanent injuries. The story of Harry Parker is different, in more than one way.

[A]n infrared light appeared that he could only see through me. [...] BA5799 lifted me and could see little through the murk without my enhancement, then dropped me back down so the line of men reappeared.

— Harry Parker

The Atomized Soldier

Anatomy of a Soldier is Captain Harry Parker’s debut novel. Ever since the First World War, Parker’s family has been on the battlefield and when Parker left the military in 2013 “it was the first time for 100 years that there hadn’t been a Parker in the services” (Parker qtd. in House n.p.). While deployed in Afghanistan, Parker stepped on an IED, costing him a leg, after which he lost the other due to an infection later in the hospital (House, n.p.). Captain Tom Barnes, the protagonist in *Anatomy of a Soldier* also loses both his legs: one to an IED in Afghanistan and the other to an infection. The story, and in particular the way it is told, diverge from reality from this point on. This piece of autofiction is narrated in its entirety by 45 objects that surround Barnes shortly before, during, and after the impact of the IED.

These narrating objects range from military equipment such as a bullet and a field bed, to medical and everyday objects such as a bone saw, a catheter and a razor. None of the objects seem to be sentient. They only narrate the actions, and at times the thoughts, of the human beings they interact with. Through this device emotional distance is created, because everything that happens to Barnes is seen from the outside. However close these objects are physically, they are all represented as separate "I's," while Barnes is only seen through the objects that surround him. The objects initially present only abstract information such as: "My serial number is 6545-01-522" (Parker 1), or "I was made in China, a genuine copy" (Parker 49). The narrator-object is introduced without directly naming what it is. What is narrating rarely names itself, but is instead identified its use:

I was split with twenty identical others from the cardboard box we were packaged in. I clicked against them as we rolled out across the green mattress.

BA5799 lined us up in rows of ten and then thirty and pushed us one by one into a magazine. He held me between his thumb and finger and rolled me through the jaws, sliding me back so I could descend and depress the spring. I was fifth from the top, one above a tracer round tipped with red. (Parker 194)

The bullet can be recognized as it is placed in a magazine. Through this narration, Barnes becomes an object like all others and is even named by his number, BA5799, by the object-narrators. Barnes the human thus becomes near-indistinguishable from the objects; "000001111001101. Switched on. Initialized. I was in an olive-green day-sack. BA5799 crouched over me" (Parker 95). Through this alienating narrative device the tone of the novels is detached, and brings to mind the explosion at the center of the narrative; it is a series of fragments that move outward from one moment or object, like shrapnel that flies every which way.

This exploded structure does away with conventional methods of war writing. In the other war novels in this thesis, the role of the soldier himself, and his opinions on war, death, and destruction have all moved outward from the ("I" of the) soldier as an individual in the humanistic tradition. The soldier has always been the narrating locus, as well as locus of the narrative itself, whatever the extent to which they were enmeshed with their weapon or the military as a weapons system. In *Anatomy of a Soldier*, the human body is perceived as a divided thing as it is literally being divided, ripped apart into pieces. The

human body acting human is only one of many components of the soldier. Components, as we have seen though the novels of four different wars, which are both biological and nonbiological, and it is through the forceful expansion of this notion through mutilation that we see the extent to which the soldier is coupled with technology; the extent to which he is a soldier-machine, a cybernetic organism, rather than merely human. It has been pointed out before that the narrating of lives intersects with theorizing the posthuman because the posthuman puts concepts of embodiment, memory, and subjectivity (which are vital to life writing) under pressure (Herbrechter, "Subjectivity" 332). In the humanist tradition "autobiographies by subjects other than human become literally unthinkable" since it is a human-centered discourse (Herbrechter, "Subjectivity" 333). Parker's approach can be called revolutionary because it moves beyond critical posthuman theory into practice. His narrative does not take on anthropomorphism in the traditional sense "in which a human subject merely takes on the identity of a non-human actor" (Herbrechter, "Subjectivity" 333); the narrating objects are decidedly nonhuman but are given their own, singular "I". One might argue that in this process Barnes also becomes nonhuman, as he does not have the narrative authority as a subject, but is only present as one of the objects. The non-anthropocentric worldview that critical posthumanism implies (Herbrechter, "Subjectivity" 333) is taken up in this war novel. Veteran's novels are shown to explore how the soldier learns to function within the army and during wartime, learning how to survive in a narrative of personal development (even if that development is descending, not ascending). *Anatomy of a Soldier* completely subverts this genre where the objects are telling the story and there is no single "I" but multiple ones, and we get different and non-human viewpoints. Paul de Man points out that autobiography does not preoccupy itself with the narrative denotation since "[t]he autobiographical moment happens as an alignment between the two subjects involved in the process of reading in which they determine each other by mutual reflexive substitution" (qtd in Herbrechter, "Subjectivity" 333). It could be said that readers cannot recognize a (human) subject in *Anatomy of a Soldier* because there is no human subject "like us" present that allows us to both determine ourselves and the other. However, the abandonment of the singular, human, autobiographical "I" does not inhibit affect or a meaningful discussion of the (plural) subject in wartime because something more profound happens: the subject of inscription

and the inscription process are “no longer controllable by a ‘liberal humanist subject’ and instead will lead to new forms of (posthumanist) agency (Herbrechter, “Subjectivity” 330). The narrative itself has become posthumanist.

What *Anatomy of a Soldier* offers through this posthuman embodiment, is a different view on grievability as the text grants a small insight into what the U.S. and British soldiers might look like to the opposing side. The narration of the battery that ignites the explosive device that dismembers Barnes shows a small group of Afghans plotting an attack on the intruding soldiers. This perspective is unique in contemporary war fiction in which the opposing side, “the enemy,” is rarely seen from another point of view (than that of the soldier). When the focus is turned on the soldiers from the outside we see that “They looked like machines, encased in equipment and armour, with devices that let them see farther and weapons that could kill like magic” (Parker 91). It is clear that the Afghans and their weapons, revolving around a rusty battery and a fertilizer-made bomb, are no match for the machine-like, incomprehensible force of the Western soldiers. In these wars there is no mighty machine against which the soldiers must battle, or in which they are merely a cog, now it is them, the soldiers, who are the deadly machines. The Afghans are not soldiers, and their human flesh is particularly frail in comparison to the gear of the soldiers. It is as if only through the disintegration and destruction of the soldier-machine that we see how inhuman they are/have become. When Barnes is hit, for example, the same Afghan boy is described seeing that: “His helmet had appeared and it was hard to work out which parts were human and which machine” (Parker 93). Even in disintegration they are simultaneously human and machine. One critic stated that *Anatomy of a Soldier* “scatters the individual along the plain of death” (Amis n.p.), but the point rather seems that there is no individual in wartime, that the soldier is a compartmentalized soldier-machine, constructed from a manifold of components. One element that stands out in the military cyborg technologies encountered so far through the literature, is that there is one border that the technologies do not cross—that of the skin. We are reminded how easy it is for industrial warfare to penetrate the body. Blackmore points out that

[t]he skin is a bag for the body, also the soldier’s first line of defense – but a weak one, easily breached. [...] “the war machine may possess the soldier but the skin defines the edge of that possession. [...] [barriers] keep the soldier in and together

and the world external and apart. (13)

In spite of the extremely close physical relationship with and psychological dependence on the weapons that make them soldier-machines, they are not integrated on a physical level, such as implants and many medical technologies. Here we see the human body is truly no longer a biological given as Esposito stated before, it is now it is the world in all its components that moves inside the body and thus moves away from analogous (external) conceptions of the body (Esposito 146-7). Barnes becomes an object, “one on which many painful and interminable processes are carried out, from life-saving treatment to reconstructive surgery to physio” (Power n.p.). This is constructive because he is one of many parts that construct his cyborg self. Parker says this himself in the title and it is reflected in the structure of the book: the anatomy of a soldier consists of all these objects that surround him and he is in interaction with. The mode and level of that interaction, or even integration, determines the specific individual that is the soldier-machine in literature.

V. My Rifle is Human: Conclusions

War has shown to be the site where mechanization and industrialization make themselves felt most immediately (on the body), thus it is in war novels that the union between man and machine in the form of the soldier expresses itself most intensely and directly (Waldron 271). As demonstrated throughout this thesis, “[t]he making of soldiers into machines is scarcely a new phenomenon, continuing to signify the constitution of the body as a primary site of technological inscription” (Masters 113). Ever since the First World War, the circumstances of war have forced the soldiers fighting it to merge with the weapons they wield. Through the military efforts to enhance the abilities of the soldier, soldier-machines are created, and as the novels demonstrate, this means the experience of war has changed. Veterans’ autobiographical fiction shows this inscription and its repercussions and since it builds on the soldier’s own experience, it lays claim to a “visceral authority” (Peebles 106). This is in part dependent on the authority of the autobiographical “I” as a product of the humanist tradition. The seven analyzed novels show that this humanist notion is put under stress until it eventually moves away from the humanist tradition entirely in the construction of a posthumanist narrative.

In this thesis I have interacted with war literature from four different wars. The war literature that narrates these experiences of veterans have been analyzed through the prism of cyborg technology and the subsequent (presence or absence of) grievability. Throughout the chapters I have demonstrated that soldiers and the machines they are coupled with are symbiotic wholes, which is presented in the literature as something that (more often than not) refers back to World War I tropes. In World War I literature it became clear that on the one hand the soldiers see themselves as the undisputed victims of trench warfare, waiting to die as they are forced into passivity. Remarque and Jünger oppose each other in the perceived purpose of war. *All Quiet on the Western Front* is a (necrological) novel that counting the dead in a way that shows war is cruel and pointless, without justice or goal. The simple but detailed descriptions various ways of dying in war and the eventual death of the narrator underline these sentiments. On the other hand there are soldiers such as Jünger, who see war as the only thing that will make a man a true

soldier (and man), in spite of the obvious inadequacy of even their superiors. *Storm of Steel* presents polar opposite to Remarque's text; narrating the same war, on the same side, but the experience of war that is conveyed is one of (almost sublime) exhilaration in which attacks become enthralling as the narrator lives to tell the tale. In both cases the narrative of becoming a soldier is one in which the (new) recruit survives due to luck as they are subjected to the "large-scale confrontation with the sublime of destruction that the increasingly efficient, technological, and organizational military machine became capable of" (Simon 47). Both novels maintain the notion of an narrating "I," but this "I" is already notably put under stress; the soldiers lose their individuality in the trenches of slaughter as death by machine gun is a realistic possibility but escaping the situation is not.

In Second World War writing these notions are further problematized. *The Forgotten Soldier* holds on to the traditional (non-heroic post World War I) war narrative, seeing his comrades as victims of the violence of war. Both World War II novels continue the trend of the grievability or "victimhood" of the soldier as he is dwarfed by the military and its violence (even as he is part of it) as it was presented in World War I literature. This narrative of victimhood in *The Forgotten Soldier* only shifts focus as the narrator encounters mass death on a passing train. The autobiographical "I" is showing cracks, from the very start, as he can no longer identify with "Guy Sajer, the German soldier." Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead* has very little to say about the Japanese opponents, other than the emotionally detached moments in which they are killed. Life in the U.S. and in the Pacific Theatre as the military institution is critiqued in an equal distant manner. The soldiers in Mailer's novel describe their time there in a dry, rather bored tone. Descriptions of boredom and inertia that have come to be familiar elements of modern-war writing form a contrast with the cruelty that the soldiers inflict throughout the text, and specifically at the ending (though the tone remains deadpan). The intensification of the humanist tradition within the military creates soldiers (both body and mind) that only see other such soldiers as "real" or "worthy" enemies, because they are augmented humans like them (rather than human like them, because the soldiers are no longer "just human"), thus creating a distinction between being killed/killing and being fought/fighting. World War I literature had very little civilian casualties as the soldiers themselves were soldier-civilians, new to the military or drafted in the first place, but soldiers. There, the dilemma is being killed

(and killing others) with modern means. The “I” in Mailer’s novel is fragmented, but the scope of their vision remains one of a human scale that does not see outside of the bounds of the troop.

The narrative “I” seems to be the perspective of choice for the American author-veterans. It is often felt that “[f]or the individual soldier, the sweeping facts of history are accurately written not in the omniscient, third-person plural but in the singular first” (Peebles 106). What becomes clear in the literature about the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, is that the soldiers are celebrated (in the guise of their comrades and superiors), the violence is often justified though the extreme focus on the inner workings and anxieties of those soldiers and as such, the loss of the lives of American soldiers are considered one of two significant tragedies of war. The other is the personal trauma that these soldiers experience. For the texts this means that there is not real critique of the war, why it is started, or the policies that enable its continuation. Both *The Yellow Birds* and *The Long Walk* have in common that they do not seem to criticize the military (institution). In the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars the U.S. and its allies are fighting extremely asymmetrical wars in which a great number of civilians become “collateral damage;” the death of ungrievable people. Aside from the seven novels that have been analyzed there were another eight texts under consideration, and of these fifteen novels only two attempted to imagine the motivations of the opponents in a more profound way than a mere passing thought. Of the novels about the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan only one novel (*Anatomy of a Soldier*) addresses this.³⁸ In the other novels Iraqi’s and Afghans are mentioned, but it is obvious that they do not have the same “status” as the soldiers; they are not people whom the soldiers would be too worried about harming. I have suggested in the beginning of this thesis that military practices are focused on the continuation rather than the transcendence of the humanist legacy of teleological development. The challenge to humanist ideals in literary form comes most prominently in the novel of Harry Parker. *Anatomy of a soldier* shows the posthumanization process as Hayles and Herbrechter envision it, reinscribing embodiment under new conditions, and finding a new

38. This might be an issue of genre; the autobiographical undertone of war writing seems to ask for personal, subjective thought (as is the tradition of the autobiographical “I”), while film (*The Hurt Locket*, for example) and poetry (author/poet Brian Turners book of poetry *Here, Bullet*) for example, often seem to have a less polarized perspective.

understanding of posthuman autobiography (Herbrechter, "Subjectivity" 330). As Stefan Herbrechter has argued: "once the writing (of a) life, life writing, narrating lives, testimonies of lives and so on, that are no longer (exclusively) done by human subjects new autobiographical forms become possible" ("Subjectivity" 340). Parker has written an innovative posthuman narrative that truly pushes beyond the boundaries of the humanist narrative "I."

What future influences might lead in terms of literary work to is a particularly interesting question during these times in which new technological advances come forward every week. For example, remote drone-flying crews have a completely different perspective, and their literature might provide an entirely new narrative. There are, of course, many more forms these expressions could take. The growing influence of social media is a changing factor (and narratives might take the shape of blogs, such as the novel *Kaboom* by Matt Gallagher started out), as well as video games. Both would be interesting objects of study, especially when paired with the literary perspective, though unfortunately in the scope of this thesis there has been no space for either. Similarly it would be fruitful to expand the scope of both the novels and the wars that are analyzed. As pointed out earlier, the Korean and Vietnam War would be interesting additions, as well the Gulf War. The soldier is "perpetually a 'work in progress', like a book that is still being written" (Coker, *Men* 54), similar to the actual literature that is being written. The literary forms that will be—and are being—generated by these soldier-machines and cyborgs would be a promising continuation of this research and further explore what we consider to be human.

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