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MASTERTHESIS

Job performance and bonus

A study about the relationship between job performance and bonus: the effect of gender and personality, extraversion & conscientiousness.

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Abstract

The purpose of this research is to study the relationship between performance and bonuses and whether this relationship differs across gender and personality traits (extraversion and conscientiousness) of individuals. The study was conducted at a bank, 309 participants filled in an online questionnaire. As expected, results indicated that performance is positively related to bonus. Employees who had higher performance received a higher bonus. There were no significant differences between relations of each performance measure (appraisal, manager's opinion & self-opinion) and bonus. We found a significant interaction effect of gender on the relationship between appraisal and bonus. However we did not find a significant interaction effect for both extraversion and conscientiousness. We can conclude that performance does predict bonus but that the effects are small. This information could be used to arouse further interest in researching what other possible factors influence the receipt of bonus.

Contents

- ABSTRACT**2
- 1. INTRODUCTION**.....3
 - 1.1 Bonus.....3
 - 1.2. Job performance.....4
 - 1.3 Gender.....6
 - 1.4 Personality.....7
- 2. METHODE**.....9
 - 2.1. Participants & procedure.....9
 - 2.2. Measures.....9
 - 2.3 Data analyses.....10
- 3. RESULTS**.....11
 - 3.1 Descriptive Analysis.....11
 - 3.2 Testing the hypotheses.....13
- 4. DISCUSSION**.....17
 - 4.1 Theoretical contributions18
 - 4.2 Limitations & future research..... 19
 - 4.3 Practical implications.....20
- 5. CONCLUSION**.....21

- REFERENCES**.....22

- APPENDIX**26
 - Appendix 1. Employee questionnaire.....26
 - Appendix 2. Manager’s questionnaire.....31

1. Introduction

There is extensive literature on performance in work environment, yet little of this literature has studied the link between job performance and pay, and more specifically job performance and bonuses (Rynes, Gerhart & Parks, 2005). Bonuses are widely used in organizational life to motivate employees. However, does this motivation really show in their performance? Thus far, the effect of bonuses (monetary rewards) on performance in organizations has been inconclusive in the literature.

Instead of focussing on the effects of bonuses, which has been researched often in the past, this study will focus specifically on factors predicting and influencing the receipt of bonuses. It is important to explore which factors influence the receipt of bonuses, to understand better why and to whom bonuses are an advantage or disadvantage. This could also give us more insight in why it has been inconclusive in the literature, and give organizations insights on what to take into account when creating or adjusting their bonus systems when they are not used correctly. Bonus Systems are becoming a standard and therefore needed in an organization to attract employees (Kerr & Slocum, 2005; Waal & Jansen, 2013). It is important to know how to use it to the organization's advantage and get the best performance from employees. Most studies on bonuses have been conducted in the United States. Probably because reward systems including bonuses are quite common in the United States, but the usage of reward systems including bonuses is also rapidly growing in the Netherlands and the rest of the world (Boselie, 2014; Rynes, Gerhart & Parks, 2005; Waal & Jansen, 2013). Therefore it is interesting to study the relations between job performance and the receipt of bonuses in the Dutch population. This might arouse interest for future research on (growing usage of) bonus outside of the United States. The aim of our study is to research the relationship between job performance and receiving bonuses in the Netherlands, and whether this relationship differs across individuals.

1.1 Bonuses

Bonuses are extrinsic monetary rewards, usually a large sum of money given once at the end of the year. Often these type of rewards are less preferred as opposed to intrinsic or non-monetary extrinsic rewards, since bonuses have a higher financial impact (Nujjoo & Meyer, 2012).

The academics and practitioners in favor of bonuses believe that using bonuses increases productivity and organizational performance (Rynes, Gerhart & Parks, 2005; Waal, 2012; Waal & Jansen, 2013). For instance, Bouwens & Van Lent (2006) studied the effect of

bonuses on employee selection and the results indicated that the selection of more superior employees is enhanced if the contracts includes a high cash bonus. Chung, Steenburgh & Sudhir (2013) found that bonuses does enhance productivity in sales. On the other hand, bonuses caused sales employees, who were unlikely to make quota, reduce their effort. But this effect was more than compensated for by the increased productivity of the other sales employees (Steenburgh, 2008). Additionally, more frequently bonuses (quarterly) help to improve performance of the weak performers to achieve their annual sales quotas (Chung, Steenburgh & Sudhir, 2013)

On the other side are the opposers of bonuses, who suggest that bonuses lead to higher pay inequality which results in greater employee turnover and thus has less desirable long-term effects (Bloom, 1999; Waal, 2012; Waal & Jansen, 2013). For instance, bonuses could be used to manipulate employees and stimulate feelings of control and distrust (Nujjoo & Meyer, 2002). This finding was supported by the research of Gill, Prose & Vlassopoulos (2013), they concluded that employees perceived exposure to random bonuses as unfair, providing them a justification for negative reciprocity, which led to increased cheating. This could explain the increase in financial fraud within multinationals. Evidence has been found that fraud often occurs when there is a combination of high targets and high rewards (Soltani, 2014).

Yet, even with the previous mentioned disadvantages, bonuses are becoming more common. An explanation for this is that bonuses could simply be a hygiene factor. Meaning, organizations need to have a reward system(s) as a standard which is considered fair and equitable. Not having a reward system in an organization will lead to resistance from the employees (Waal & Jansen, 2013). Reward systems are part of the corporate culture and emphasize the values and norms of an organization. The effect is even so powerful, that an adjustment of a reward system design can successfully help to change the organization's culture. By using a reward system as a tool to communicate the desired mindset, attitudes and behaviors from the employees, they can change the culture enforcing consistency of the norms and values of the organization (Kerr & Slocum, 2005).

1.2 Job performance

As bonuses are becoming more a standard in organizational life, it is necessary to know what influences the receivment of bonuses. A key factor that could predict receiving bonus is job performance. The common assumption is that if you perform well you get rewarded, congruent to the well-known saying "*Hard work pays off*", but does it in reality?

Does high performance really lead to high bonuses? Topmanagement often get a much higher bonus than lower level employees, even when they don't necessarily perform better (Soltani, 2014).

On the other hand, there is a rising trend to use pay for performance systems (PFP) related to bonus (Boselie, 2014). Most organizations (in the United States) claim to already use pay for performance (PFP) systems. Additionally, the U.S employees voiced that they would like to be paid for their performance (Boselie, 2014; Rynes, Gerhart & Parks, 2005). Given the importance of performance and compensation, we need to validate if there is indeed a relationship between performance and bonuses. Further, we need to validate if the so-called PFP systems are really structured in a way that they are paying for performance. Therefore our research question is: Is there a relationship between job performance and receiving bonus? Following the previously mentioned assumptions and well-known saying "*Hard work pays off*" our hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1a: *Job performance is positively correlated with receiving a bonus.*

Besides, if organizations use these PFP-systems do they really measure the performance or just the reported performance? Performance has always been difficult to measure. Job performance is a broad concept and can be measured in different ways (Perrin, 1998). According to Motowidlo (2003) job performance is defined as, "The total expected value to the organization of discrete behaviors carries over a standard period of time." (p. 39). In other words, the behaviors of an employee while executing work-related activities and how well (or not) they are executing these activities. There are two types of performance measurements Behavior-Based (Subjective) and Results-Based (Objective) measures (Rynes, Gerhart & Parks, 2005). An example of objective measurements in current organizations are appraisal or performance review scores. In this study appraisal is used to stay consistent with the term usage. Appraisal scores are based on the achievement of the employee's objectives which are usually set at the beginning of the year. The scores are often given by their supervisor and/or peers with possible inputs from the employee themselves (Boselie, 2014).

Objective measurements are more likely to be reliable but they leave out factors (e.g., illness, reorganizations and poor decisions by top executives) that are not under the employee's control but nevertheless influence his or her performance. Furthermore, objective measures do not include concepts like work behavior, prosocial behaviors and organizational citizenship behavior (Rynes, Gerhart & Parks, 2005). Our study will research the predictive

value of the different measurements of performance on bonuses. The objective measurement in this study is appraisal.

The subjective measurements in this study includes measures like self-opinion and managers' opinion. Although one would expect these to be similar, often they are not. The self-opinion is more subjective than the manager's' opinion, therefore more likely to be unreliable. Harris & Schaubroeck (1988) found that correlation between respectively self- & peer ratings ($\rho = .36$) and self- & supervisor ratings ($\rho = .35$) were modestly correlated. Whereas the peer ratings were highly correlated with the supervisor rating ($\rho = .62$). This is confirmed in the meta-analysis of Heidemeier & Moser (2009) where they found a low correlation between self - and supervisor ratings ($r = .22$). Moreover they concluded that self-ratings of performance are lenient. In other words, the employees rated themselves higher than their peer or supervisors rated them. Therefore our hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1b: *Appraisal has a higher positive correlation with bonus amount than Manager's opinion with the bonus amount*

Hypothesis 1c: *Manager's opinion has a higher positive correlation with bonus the amount than self-opinion with the bonus amount.*

1.3 Gender

Also interesting are possible gender differences in the relationship of performance and bonuses. Ethically, compensation, including bonuses, should be equal for all individuals. Yet many studies have shown that there are big differences in financial compensation between men and women, also called the Gender Pay Gap. This gap could be due to personal and professional differences, like education level or amount of working hours (Bryant, Winter & Watson, 2012; Lips, 2012). Yet even if these personal and professional differences are eliminated, the gap still exists. Sasso, Richards, Chou & Gerber (2011) found that newly trained male physicians earn \$16.819 more than newly trained female physicians. This difference could not be explained by specialty choice, practice setting, working hours, performance or other characteristics. Additionally, Mesch & Rooney (2005) found that female CEOs earned significantly less than their male counterparts in salary and bonuses. More precisely, women received between \$7000 and \$9800 less in bonus than men, even after controlling for differences in human capital, organizational size, and organizational performance variables. Another study, which had over 5500 individuals employed in the

private sector in the United States, showed that female workers were more likely than male workers to be paid piece rates and less likely to be paid commissions and bonuses (Geddes & Heywood, 2003). Based on this literature, we expect men to receive higher bonuses than women.

The findings of Elvira & Graham (2012) research suggested that receiving bonuses increases the gender pay gap. This gap could be explained by the traditional gender stereotype still existing (Pas, Peters, Doorewaard, Eisinga, & Lagro-Janssen, 2014). The female stereotypical attributes, like warmth and niceness, are opposing the attributes believed to be required for success in many organizational positions. Jobs are associated with more masculine than feminine attributes (Heilman & Eagly, 2008). Men receive more bonus even though they might not necessarily perform better than women do. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that gender is a moderator for the relationship between job performance and bonus. The following hypothesis is formulated:

Hypothesis 2a: Men have higher bonuses than women

Hypothesis 2b: Job performance is positively correlated with the bonus amount and this effect is stronger for men than for women.

1.4 Personality

Another variable that could influence the relationship between performance and receiving bonus is the personality of the employee. Previous literature however has shown that personality tests should not be used in personnel selection for predicting performance due to the low validity (Guion & Gottier, 1965; Le, Oh, Robbins, Ilies, Holland, & Westrick, 2011). Yet, most literature is consistent with the fact that personality has an influence on individual work behavior, which in turn has effect on work performance (Zhao, Seibert & Lumpkin, 2009; Penney, David, & Witt (2011). The Five Factor Model of Personality, often referred as the "Big Five" is most often used as a measurement of personality in organization (Digman, 1990; Hogan, Hogan, & Roberts,1996). The Big Five has been proven to predict many work related criteria: Barrick & Mount (1991) has found that conscientiousness and extraversion from the Big Five are related to job performance. Conscientiousness is positively related to job performance ($r = .23$) across the majority of mainstream job types. When social interaction was required for the job, extraversion was a valid predictor ($r = .18$). The other three factors, Agreeableness, Openness to Experience and Neuroticism also predicted

Performance, but the magnitude of these correlations relatively small. Therefore, in this study we will focus only on Conscientiousness and Extraversion. Based on these findings, we expect the relationship between performance and bonus to be moderated by Conscientiousness and Extraversion.

Conscientious individuals are described as self-disciplined, determined, hardworking, reliable, organized and achievement oriented (Barrick, Stewart, & Piotrowski, 2002). Employees displaying these characteristics are likely to work harder to achieve a higher bonus. This is confirmed in the research of Judge & Ilies (2002) where highly conscientious persons tend to be more motivated to perform well on the job.

Additionally, highly conscientious employees were more likely to use the resource allocation strategies of goal selection, optimization, and compensation in their work. These strategies aid the employees in managing their limited personal and cognitive resources in order to attain even higher levels of performance, which ultimately leads to a higher bonus (Bajor & Baltes, 2003). Therefore, our hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 3a: Performance is positively correlated with the bonus amount and this effect is stronger for high conscientious individuals than low conscientious individuals.

Extraverted individuals are seen as social, active, energetic and assertive and experience more positive emotions (Barrick, Stewart, & Piotrowski, 2002, Zhao, Seibert & Lumpkin, 2009). Most jobs need social interactions with peers, managers and other stakeholders. Highly extraverted individuals tend to perform better in these type of jobs (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Barrick & Mount, 2005). Since extraverted individuals have more social interactions on the work floor, it gives them more opportunities to display themselves to their peers and supervisor. Especially when they are high performing, which eventually leads to a higher bonus. While introverted individuals might be rated low/regular since there is not enough behaviour observed to appraise them as high performing.

Moreover, highly extraverted individuals are more creative and score high on task performance (Rothmann & Coetzer, 2003). Walters et al (2011) studied the effect of extravert and introvert behaviour, participants were asked to give an evaluation on a domestic robotic displaying extravert and introvert behavior. Results concluded that the participants saw big differences between the behaviours and preferred the extravert robot. Moreover the participants strongly associated extraverted behavior with traits like interest, intelligence, friendliness, and diversity, which is also true in human-human interaction. Thus, it is likely

that extraverted individuals are assessed as higher performing than introverted individuals, leading to a higher bonus. Resulting in our hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3b: *Performance is positively related with the bonus amount and this effect is stronger for high extraverted individuals than low extraverted individuals.*

2. Method

2.1 Participants & Procedure

This study used an existing data file. The data was gathered at the business unit of a bank in the Netherlands. All employees (708 employees) were invited to participate to get an assessment (GITP Big Five test) in an Assessment Centre. The assessment was supposed to be used for their personal development plans, this data was shared with us. Unfortunately: 2 refused to participate, 11 were on maternity/parental leave, 1 was just before retirement, 3 were ill, and 2 left the department/ company (N = 698). 26 months later the participants left were asked to fill an online questionnaire (see appendix 1). 86 employees did not fill in the questionnaire, 12 due to “system error”, 42 had an incorrect email address, 30 had left the company. In total 307 employees (45%) filled in the questionnaire (59.9% male, 40.1% female). The salary levels of the employees ranged from scale 4 (EUR 14.691 to EUR 24.281 annual salary) to scale 15 (EUR 73.889 to EUR 105.550). The average length of service was 21.38 years ($SD= 10.44$). Of this group, 138 employees forwarded a link with a questionnaire to their managers to give their opinion on the employee themselves (see appendix 2). This information was not shared with the employee and was meant for research only. Of the 138 managers, 101 managers submitted their answers (manager’s opinion about the employee’s performance).

Due to the low response rate from managers, there were many missing values for the variable manager’s opinion. Independent t-test were performed to identify differences between the participant who received their manager’s opinion and who did not. We kept the original sample size by not removing the participants with missing values, to retain a greater precision and power.

2.2 Measures

Performance was measured in three different ways: self opinion, manager's opinion and appraisal (a performance review). Each was acquired in the same (performance) period,

about roughly three months. The three performance measures were used separately in each statistical test to examine the differences between the measures.

The *Manager's Opinion* is a three-item measure developed to measure performance ($\alpha = .81$). Managers were asked to rate their employees (e.g., "The employee does a lot of work in terms of output"). This questionnaire is based on the supervisory rating of Chan (2006). A five-point Likert-type rating scale was used (1 = fully disagree to 5 = fully agree). This job performance measure had no financial impact for the employee (in bonus or salary).

The *Self-Opinion* used the same three questions on job performance as the Manager's Opinion measure (e.g., "in my job do I function effectively") and was included in the questionnaire for all employees to fill in. We used a five-point Likert-type rating scale (1 = fully disagree to 5 = fully agree). Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .89. This job performance measure had no financial impact for the employee (in bonus or salary).

An *appraisal* score is based on the achievement of the employee's goals which were set at the beginning of the year. Scores ranging from 1 = not at all meeting requirements, to 5 = exceeding requirements. Depending on which score a corresponding bonus will be given since this is part of their PFP-system. The amounts differ per level in the organization. A '1' appraisal leads to 0% of the gross salary extra pay (bonus), a '2' = 4%, a '3' = 7%, a '4' = 11% and a '5' = 15%. The appraisal is decided by the manager and the outcome is shared with the employee in an appraisal interview.

The *Bonus* is linked to appraisal, depending on their level and appraisal score the employees will receive a minimum amount of money in Euros. The manager is not bound to certain rules regarding the full amount, except the minimum required based on the appraisal score. The manager has to submit the proposals to their managers and the Human Resources department who can validate or adjust the amount.

Extraversion and *Conscientiousness* were measured using the by the GITP Big Five test, which was based on the NEO-PI-R. It is a personality questionnaire in Dutch consisting of 186 sentences. The sentences were not disclosed to protect the assessment center's products from spreading. The respondent had to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale to what degree he or she thinks the sentence applies to him/her (1 = fully disagree to 5 = fully agree). Both scales conscientiousness ($\alpha = .93$) and extraversion ($\alpha = .92$) were reliable.

2.3 Data analyses

The data was analyzed using the Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS) 23.0. In advance, all measures were tested for outliers, normality, multicollinearity and linearity and

homoscedasticity of residuals. Most assumptions were met. Except the normality test, but with a sample size of 307, the Central Limit Theorem ensures that the distribution will be approximately normal. Hence, our results should be fairly robust against this violation. Even though the correlations suggested no multicollinearity ($r < .9$), the assumption of multicollinearity was violated for the variables conscientiousness and extraversion ($VIF > 10$). Therefore both conscientiousness and extraversion were standardized to avoid multicollinearity. Even with the standardization of the two variables, the assumption of multicollinearity was still violated. However this violation does not affect the overall fit of the model. There were many missing values for the variable manager's opinion. To test the gravity of this issue, independent t-tests were performed to compare the non-responders ($n=206$) with the responders ($n=101$).

A correlation matrix was used to determine the best model (performance measure) predicting bonus: manager's opinion, self-opinion or appraisal. To determine the differences between the models Steiger (1980) equation test was calculated using the tool of Lee & Preacher (2013). Multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between performance (respectively, manager's opinion, self-opinion & appraisal), bonus and moderators (gender, conscientiousness & extraversion). These analyses were conducted using the method of Aiken and West (1991).

Results

3.1 Descriptive Analysis

Table 1 shows the differences between the non-responders on the manager's opinion and the responders. No significant differences were found on all studied variables. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations and correlations of the variables. The mean of bonus was smaller than the standard deviation because of the big differences in Bonus levels. The managers scored the employees quite high on the 5 point Likert scale ($M = 4.08$). Also the employees score themselves quite high on the 5 point Likert scale ($M = 4.17$). The manager's opinion average and the self-opinion average did not differ much, yet the strength of the correlation between the two was rather low ($r = .18, p = ns$). The correlation matrix showed a significant weak correlation between respectively gender and self-opinion ($r = -.16, p < .01$), men scored themselves higher on performance than women. There was also a positive significant relationship between bonus and extraversion, but the effect was weak ($r = .19, p < .001$). Additionally, there is a moderate correlation between gender and bonus ($r = -.34, p < .001$). Indicating that men received a higher bonus than women did.

Table 1. Differences on the studied variables between the participants who had the manager's opinion and who did not have the manager's opinion.

	<i>M</i>		<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
	<i>Response given</i> (<i>n</i> =101)	<i>Response missing</i> (<i>n</i> =206)			
Self-Opinion	4.18	4.10	.93	303	.35
Appraisal	3.47	3.51	-.47	216	.64
Bonus	6457.65	6955.56	-.35	214	.72
Conscientiousness	.16	.20	-.45	294	.66
Extraversion	.03	.17	-1.08	294	.28
Gender Employee	.40	.40	-.12	305	.91

Table 2. Means, standard deviations and correlations between the study variables

Variable	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Managers Opinion	101	4.08	.67	.18	.48**	.26*	.10	.00	.09
2. Self-Opinion	305	4.13	.68		.21	.22**	.08	.10	-.16**
3. Appraisal	216	3.50	.63			.32**	-.03	.12	-.10
4. Bonus	216	6768.84	9994.04				-.11	.19**	-.34**
5. Conscientiousness	296	5.26	2.24					.58	.11
6. Extraversion	296	5.78	1.94						.06
7. Gender Employee	307								

Note: * $p < .05$ and ** $p < .01$.

Gender has been coded, 1 = male, 2 = female.

3.2 Testing the hypotheses

Hypothesis 1:

The relationship between bonus and three measures of performance (manager's opinion, self-opinion & appraisal) was investigated using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. There was a significant positive correlation between bonus and all three performance measures (see table 2). A multiple regression analysis was calculated to predict bonus based on the three performance measures (see table 3). The results indicated that performance (self-opinion, manager's opinion & appraisal) explained 15.38% of the variance in bonus. A significant equation was found ($F(3,76)=4.58, p<.01$). In contrast with our expectations, all three beta's of the performance measures were not significant ($p>.05$). The three performance measures did not significantly predict bonus, yet separately each performance measure does predict bonus. Therefore, hypothesis 1a has been partly confirmed.

Table 2 showed the strongest correlation is between appraisal and bonus. Employees who, according to their manager, were exceeding the requirements on their achievement goals had a higher bonus than the employees who were not at all meeting requirements ($r = .32, p<.01$). A bit weaker is the correlation between manager's opinion and bonus. Employees who were rated high on performance by their manager received a higher bonus, although the effects were small ($r = .26, p<.05$). The weakest correlation is between the self-opinion and bonus, employees who rated themselves high on performance received a higher bonus, but the effects were small as well ($r = .22, p<.01$). To test the differences between these correlations Steiger's Z-test (Steiger, 1980) was used. The correlations of bonus with respectively manager's opinion and appraisal are not significantly different ($Z = 0.768, p=.44$). Therefore, hypothesis 1b is not supported. Likewise, no differences were found between the correlation of bonus and respectively manager's opinion and self opinion ($Z = 5.773, p = .99$). Thus, hypothesis 1c is rejected.

Table 3. *Summary of the Multiple Regression Analysis performance predicting bonus*

	SE	β
Bonus		
Manager's Opinion	1595.43	.12
Self- Opinion	1414.21	.18
Appraisal	1715.53	.23

Note: $R^2 = .15, F(3,76)=4.58, p<.01$.

Hypothesis 2

The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, Levene’s $F(7, 208)=3.68$, $p<.001$. Since our sample size is bigger than 150, our data is fairly robust against this violation. An independent t-test was performed to examine the difference in bonus between men and women. We found a significant difference $t(202)=5.92$, $p<.001$. Men ($M= 9462.37$) earned on average 6844.72 euros more than women ($M=2617.65$). Therefore, hypothesis 2a was confirmed.

Gender was examined as a moderator of the relation between performance and bonus, using multiple regression analysis. Dummy variables were used to recode gender, 0 is male and 1 is female. Manager’s opinion, self-opinion and appraisal, each separately were entered with bonus as the dependent variable in the first step of the regression analysis. In the second step of the regression analysis, the interaction term between the each performance measure (manager’s opinion, self-opinion & appraisal) and gender was entered. In contrast with our expectations, no significant interaction effect of gender on manager’s opinion and self-opinion was found. Main effects were found for self-opinion, $\beta= .28$, $p<.001$ and managers opinion, $\beta=.44$, $p<.001$ (see table 4).

However a statistically significant interaction effect of gender on the relationship between appraisal was found, $F(1, 212) = 7.59$, $p<.001$ (see figure 1). The relationship between appraisal and bonus is stronger for men than for women. The simple main effect of gender on bonus showed that males significantly received higher bonuses than females. Thus, gender is a significant moderator of the relationship between bonus and appraisal, which confirmed our hypothesis partly.

Table 4. *Summary of the Multiple Regression Analyses performance predicting bonus moderated by gender*

	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>n</i>	<i>R</i>	ΔR^2
Model 1 $F(1, 77) = 3.37, p=.07$			81	.28	.03
Gender	2882.07	.63			
Manager’s opinion	4139.50	.44***			
GenderXMO	708.88	-1.09			

Model 2 $F(1, 210) = 2.30, p=.13$ 212 .15 .009

Gender 7957.33 .27

Self- opinion 1445.62 .28***

GenderXSO 1918.17 -.58

Model 3 $F(1, 212) = 7.59, p=.006$ 216 .23 .03***

Gender 1257.63 -.31***

Appraisal 973.72 .29***

GenderXappraisal 1926.00 -.92***

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. *** $P < .000$




Figure 1. Interaction effect of gender on the relation between appraisal and bonus

Hypothesis 3

Multiple regression analyses was conducted to ascertain the relationship between performance and bonus depends on respectively conscientiousness and extraversion. No significant interaction and main effects were found of conscientiousness on the relation between bonus and each performance measure (manager's opinion, self-opinion & bonus). Main effects for each performance measure predicting bonus were found (see table 5). Thus, no supporting evidence was found for hypothesis 3a.

The multiple regression analyses showed no significant interaction effect of extraversion on the relations between bonus and respectively self-opinion, manager's opinion and appraisal. Again, only significant main effects were found for each performance measure predicting bonus (see table 6). Therefore hypothesis 4b was rejected.

Table 5. Summary of the Multiple Regression Analysis performance predicting bonus moderated by Conscientiousness

	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>n</i>	<i>R</i>	ΔR^2
Model 1 $F(1, 77) = .37, p=.55$			81	.07	.004
Conscientiousness	2882.07	.40			
Manager's opinion	1455.84	.26*			
ConscXmanager	708.88	-.39			
Model 2 $F(1, 208) = .07, p=.79$			212	.07	.000
Conscientiousness	6021.97	-.28			
Self- opinion	1031.02	.22**			
ConscXself	1450.77	.15			
Model 3 $F(1, 210) = .28, p=.60$			214	.12	.001
Conscientiousness	1038.67	-.32			
Appraisal	4038.83	.32***			
ConcXappra	1135.45	.20			

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. *** $P < .000$

Table 6. Summary of the Multiple Regression Analysis performance predicting bonus moderated by Extraversion

	SE	β	<i>n</i>	<i>R</i>	ΔR^2
Model 1 $F(1, 77) = .28, p=.60$			81	.10	.003
Extraversion	6671.09	.56			
Manager's opinion	1449.44	.26*			
ExtraXmanager	1599.58	-.40			
Model 2 3 $F(1, 208) = .91, p=.34$			212	.09	.004
Extraversion	4404.56	-.25			
Self- opinion	983.55	.20**			
ExtraXself	1050.81	.45			
Model 3 $F(1, 210) = 1.64, p=.20$			214	.14	.007
Extraversion	3064.92	-.25			
Appraisal	1026.20	.30***			
ExtraXappraisal	870.55	.42			

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. *** $P < .000$

Discussion

The aim of this study was to study the relationship between different performance measures and bonus. Furthermore, the moderating effect of gender, conscientiousness and extraversion on the relationship between different performance measures and the bonus was examined. Research on the relations between performance and bonus has been relatively scarce outside of the United States, due to the lower use of bonuses in countries outside of the United states. However the use of bonuses is increasing worldwide, with the growing globalization we expect it to increase even further (Boselie, 2014). For that reason, it is important to research these relationships. Furthermore, it is a sensitive topic and organizations are reluctant to have this research conducted at their organizations since the results might be very conflicting.

4.1 Theoretical contributions

The main findings of this research are that all performance measures positively related with bonus. Performance predicted 15.38% of the variance in bonus. Notably, each performance measure (self-opinion, manager's opinion and appraisal) was not able to significantly predict bonus in the multiple regressions. Yet all correlations between the performance measures and bonus were positively significant. These contradicting results could be due to the low sample size ($n=80$), which made the data is not robust against the violation of normality. Although linear regression analyses tests are fairly robust against violations of normality, a small sample size might not have the power and precision to detect the significancy. Each performance measure does predict bonus, therefore findings did confirm our expectations.

Interestingly, the explained variance of performance is rather low. We expected a high explained variance of performance since the banking unit where the survey was conducted used a PFP system (the appraisal). Moreover, the correlation between bonus and appraisal was quite low ($r= .32$), expected would be a correlation of 1 if they only used the PFP system to determine the bonus amount. This indicated that PFP-systems might not be used correctly and need to be reviewed. Receiving a bonus is only explained for a small part by performance and 84.62% of it is explained by other factors. Employees want to be rewarded for their performance and employers use bonuses to increase productivity (Rynes, Gerhart & Parks, 2005; Waal & Jansen, 2013). Both parties are aligned, yet the reward system used are not structured in a way to do so. As mentioned previously, bonuses might be not be a determining factor for high performance. If an organization does not have an fair and equitable reward system, it will run into trouble with the organization's employees and improving job performance will be difficult. A more efficient way to increase performance is to create a reward system that is transparent and honest. To create an honest system, input from the employees is needed since each organization have their own perception of an honest system (Waal, 2012; Waal & Jansen, 2013).

Even though we found significant correlations between each performance measure and bonus, the differences between these correlations were not significant. Thus, there are no differences in the strengths of the correlation between each performance measures and bonus. Resulting in the rejection of our hypothesis. Interestingly, manager's opinion positive correlation with appraisal was significant yet self-opinion did not correlate significantly with either manager's opinion and appraisal. This confirms previous research where self- & supervisor ratings are relatively low compared to peer- & supervisor ratings (Harris &

Schaubroeck; Heidemeier & Moser, 2009)

Our results reaffirmed the findings that men receive a higher bonus than women (Geddes & Heywood, 2003; Mesch & Rooney, 2005; Sasso, Richards, Chou & Gerber, 2011). The moderation effect of gender on the relationships between job performance and bonus was also examined. The results suggested that there is a relationship between performance and bonus and this relationship is stronger for men than for women. This is confirmed by the research Elvira & Graham (2012), the gender pay gap seems to increase because of bonus. Although it should be noted that these results should be assessed with caution due to the violation of the assumption of multicollinearity.

The results from the correlation matrix suggested that high extraverted employees received a higher bonus than low extraverted employees. Interestingly, our results also suggested that high conscientious employees received a lower bonus than low conscientious employees but the correlation was not significant. In contrast with our expectations, our results indicated that personality did not have an influence on the relationship between performance and bonus. This indicates that the effect of performance on bonus is equal for employees with low or high extraversion and conscientiousness. This is confirmed in previous literature, the big five does not predict all aspects of performance, Hertz & Donovan found that the big five factors do not predict contextual performance. Additionally, Huang, Ryan, Zabel, & Palmer (2014) suggested that the big five do not predict adaptive performance. Therefore, results might have been different for other types of performance. There is extensive literature on the big five, especially extraversion and conscientiousness, predicting performance.

4.2 Limitations and future research

Even though some of the hypotheses have been confirmed, caution should be taken in interpreting the results due to limitations. First, we had a very low response rate on the questionnaire for managers, which led to many missing values for variable manager's opinion. This is probably due to lack of time of the managers. All managers are also employees, so they filled in the questionnaire for employees. On top of that they had to the questionnaire about their subordinates. Furthermore, they might had to do this several times if they had more than one subordinate, which could be very time consuming during their regular work. In the future, the amount of items should be limited for the manager questionnaire

Second, the data violated some important assumptions: normality, homogeneity of variance and multicollinearity. Although in research assumptions are often

violated and the tests are robust against these violations, it is rare to have to have three assumptions violated, which decreased power and reliability of the results. It could be due the different response rates for each variable. In the future this study should be replicated with a bigger sample size to increase the power of the study.

Third, the current study was performed in one business unit of a bank in the Netherlands, therefore generalizing the results for the all braches in Netherlands would not be possible. It would be interesting to examine whether these effects are also found in other countries to generalise it on worldwide level. More specifically, it would be interesting to see if the same results would be found in other types of organization. Banks are known to be more commercial and focused on net profits, therefore the employees there might view the importance and effect of bonus higher than other types of organizations. Results might be different for example in family businesses.

Last, the most important limitation is the validity of the performance measures: self-opinion and appraisal. The reliability of the manager's opinion and self-opinion were quite reliable, having a cronbach alpha above .80. However, there were only three items for respectively the self-opinion and manager's opinion. Although, there are no special guideline regarding the minimum number of items needed to assess a domain, literature recommended four to six items per construct or dimension (Hinkin, Tracey & Enz, 1997). Especially with jobs becoming more dynamic and complex, the questionnaire used in this study might not completely measure a difficult construct like job performance (Perrin, 1998). In the future research the items for these questionnaires should be revised to improve the validity and reliability of both performance measures.

4.3 Practical implications

The practical implication is that performance does predict bonus yet the effect is not as big as we expected based on previous and our current research. The effect can be increased by informing the results of this research. By communicating this their need to be rewarded for their performance will be confirmed. These are favorable outcomes for both the employee and employer. Moreover having a fair and transparent reward system (including bonus) will motivate them even further which might increase their engagement and organizational commitment. Additionally it would be interesting if this effect would be stronger if you combine it with different strategic human resources management (HRM) practices. Foss, Pedersen, Fosgaard & Stea (2014) suggested that an internal fit between HRM practices is very important. The effect of a single HRM practice will not be effective. Whereas the effects

of multiple HRM practices with an internal fit are highly effective. For example, employees who are exposed to transparent rewards experience higher levels of autonomous motivation when they are simultaneously exposed to autonomy in their job and have work climate that support transparency.

Furthermore, knowing that there are gender differences in the relationship between bonus and performance it provides another opportunity for an organization to focus on gender equality. A way to do this is by researching the possible reasons for the found gender difference. There has been a growing focus on gender equality, and many organizations are branding themselves as open and fair, equality for everyone. By showing effort into changing the current problem they could brand themselves better to their employees and possible future employees, which could increase the organization commitment.

5. Conclusion

The current study provides a contribution to knowledge regarding the relationships between bonus, different performance measurements, gender, extraversion and conscientiousness. From the present study we conclude that performance does predict bonus but that this effect is small. All different performance measures are correlated with bonus but the strengths of each correlations do not differ from each other. The positive relationship between performance and bonus is stronger for men than for women. Men earn more bonus than women. Furthermore, personality has no influence on the relationship between between. Future research needs to reaffirm these findings.

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Appendix 1: Employee Questionnaire

Hoeveel zelfstandigheid heb je in je werk? Dat wil zeggen, in welke mate beslis jij zelf wat je moet doen?

Hoeveel afwisseling is er in jouw werk? Dat wil zeggen, in welke mate moet je verschillende dingen doen bij jouw werk?

In welke mate moet je bij je werk met cijfers werken?

In welke mate kom je tijdens je werk in aanraking met mensen van buiten de Bank?

In welke mate heb je tijdens je werk contact met mensen binnen de Bank?

Het werk vereist een grote vakbekwaamheid.

Het werk bestaat uit erg eenvoudige routinewerkzaamheden.

Ik heb geen enkele ruimte om mijn werk naar eigen inzicht en goeddunken uit te voeren.

Ik heb heel wat gelegenheid om mijn werk zelfstandig te doen.

Ik kan makkelijk communicatie bevorderen tussen mensen.

Ik ben zeer effectief in het delegeren van verantwoordelijkheid voor taken.

Ik kan taken en activiteiten van een groep effectief coördineren.

Ik ben in staat conflicten tussen individuen effectief te beslechten.

Het integreren van informatie en suggesties van anderen in een plan is iets waar ik niet erg goed in ben.

Ik heb het gevoel dat ik zeer goed een leiderschapsrol in een groep op me kan nemen en effectief kan zijn.

Als ik plannen maak, weet ik vrijwel zeker dat ik ze laat slagen.

Mijn leven wordt bepaald door mijn eigen acties.

In mijn werk is mijn zelfvertrouwen groot.

Ik heb een goede greep op de dingen in mijn werk.

Ik voel mij volledig in staat mijn werk te doen.

Voor mijn werk heb ik ruim voldoende kundigheid/bekwaamheid.

Ik ben tevreden met mijn werk.

Ik ben enthousiast over mijn werk.

Ik heb plezier in mijn werk.

Ik vind mijn werk leuk.

Mijn direct leidinggevende is vriendelijk en open.

Mijn direct leidinggevende zorgt ervoor dat ik me op mijn gemak voel.

Mijn direct leidinggevende kan goed met mensen opschieten.

Mijn direct leidinggevende neemt snel de leiding.

Mijn direct leidinggevende bepaalt in detail wat er moet gebeuren en hoe het moet gebeuren.

Mijn direct leidinggevende treedt snel/krachtig op als het nodig is.

Mijn direct leidinggevende pleegt ook over belangrijke zaken een echt wederzijds overleg.

Mijn direct leidinggevende geeft voldoende verantwoordelijkheden aan de medewerkers.

Mijn direct leidinggevende handelt zonder zijn mensen te raadplegen.

Mijn direct leidinggevende heeft voldoende overzicht op de werkzaamheden van zijn medewerkers.

Mijn direct leidinggevende maakt mij bewust van belangrijke gemeenschappelijke waarden, aspiraties en idealen.

Mijn direct leidinggevende creëert een gemeenschappelijk gevoel aan een belangrijke opdracht/missie te werken.

Mijn direct leidinggevende draagt een duidelijke visie op mogelijkheden in de toekomst uit.

Als we het ergens niet over eens zijn krijgt degene gelijk die de beste argumenten heeft.

Ik kan mijzelf gemakkelijk in de positie van andere mensen verplaatsen.

Ik heb nooit spijt van een genomen beslissing.

Ik ben mij er scherp van bewust hoe andere mensen mij zien.

Als ik mijn mening eenmaal gevormd heb kunnen andere mensen daar weinig meer aan veranderen.

In sociale situaties weet ik altijd precies wat ik moet zeggen en doen.

Ik ben heel zeker over mijn oordeel.

Ik ben in het bijzonder goed in het aanvoelen van de motieven en verborgen agenda's van anderen.

Ik vergis me nooit.

Ik ben er goed in om op te vallen bij invloedrijke mensen in mijn organisatie.

Ik ben goed in het begrijpen van andermans lichaamstaal.

Ik ben in staat om mijn gedrag aan elke situatie aan te passen.

Mijn functioneren in mijn werk is zeer effectief.

De hoeveelheid werk die ik aflever is groot.

De kwaliteit van het werk dat ik aflever ligt boven het gemiddelde.

Ik heb mijn dossiers altijd op orde.

Ik ben gedisciplineerd.

Ik vind het goed dat er een grote nadruk ligt op compliance binnen de Bank.

Heb je wel eens te weinig tijd om al je werk af te krijgen?

Zijn er wel eens momenten dat je extra hard moet werken?

Zijn er wel eens momenten dat je het rustig aan kunt doen tijdens je werk?

Heb je wel eens meerdere opdrachten tegelijkertijd onderhanden?

Heb je wel eens moeite met je werk omdat het te ingewikkeld is?

Moet je wel eens werk doen dat te moeilijk voor je is?

De totale hoeveelheid werk die ik te doen heb is zeer groot.

In mijn functie heb ik te maken met verschillende partijen.

Mijn functie bestaat uit routinematig werk.

In mijn functie heb ik te maken met complexe problemen.

Het werk dat uitgevoerd moet worden is gemakkelijk.

In mijn huidige baan vormt een hele dag werken een zware belasting voor mij.

In mijn huidige baan voel ik mij 'opgebrand' door mijn werk.

In mijn huidige baan voel ik me aan het einde van een werkdag leeg.

In mijn huidige baan voel ik me vermoeid als ik 's morgens opsta en er weer een werkdag voor me ligt.

Ik voel me mentaal uitgeput door mijn werk.

Ik voel mij sterk.

Ik voel mij opgewekt.

Ik voel mij actief.

Ik zou ABN AMRO aanbevelen als een goede werkgever.

Ik pas goed in de cultuur van mijn Business Unit.

Ik ga verder dan het strikt noodzakelijke om mijn Business Unit te helpen slagen.

Ik ondersteun de 'corporate values' (bedrijfswaarden) en 'business principles' (bedrijfsprincipes) van ABN AMRO volledig.

Er moet veel gebeuren voor ik naar een baan bij een ander bedrijf uitkijk.

Ik geloof sterk in de doelstellingen van mijn Business Unit.

Ik neem vaak extra verantwoordelijkheden op mij.

Ik ben er trots op deel uit te maken van mijn Business Unit.

Ik ben er trots op deel uit te maken van ABN AMRO.

Ik denk er op dit moment serieus over om ABN AMRO te verlaten.

Alles in aanmerking nemend ben ik zeer tevreden om voor ABN AMRO te werken.

Ik ga verder dan wat van mij verwacht wordt om mijn team te helpen slagen.

Ik beschik over de juiste kennis om mijn werk goed te doen.

Ik help nieuwe werknemers te oriënteren zelfs als dat niet vereist is.

Ik help anderen die afwezig zijn geweest.

Ik help anderen die zeer veel werk hebben.

Ik ben altijd bereid collega's om mij heen een handje te helpen.

Ik ben graag bereid collega's te helpen die werkgerelateerde problemen hebben.

Ik kan goed onder hoge druk werken.

Onder spanning kan ik beter denken dan normaal.

Ik heb een hekel aan onduidelijke taken in mijn werk.

Ik creëer altijd kansen voor mijzelf.

Ik blink uit in het zien van kansen.

Ik zie kansen voordat anderen dat doen.

Wat er ook gebeurt, als ik ergens in geloof, dan komt het voor elkaar.

Ik heb plezier in het overwinnen van obstakels om mijn doelen te realiseren.

Ik werk in een multicultureel team.

Het team waarin ik werk is gemengd wat betreft man-vrouw verhouding.

Appendix 2: Manager Questionnaire

De betreffende medewerker verzet veel werk.

De kwaliteit van het werk van de betreffende medewerker is hoog.

Het werktempo van de betreffende medewerker ligt hoog.

De betreffende medewerker functioneert zeer effectief in zijn/haar werk.

De betreffende medewerker is innovatief.

De betreffende medewerker is in staat complexe problemen te doorzien.

De betreffende medewerker beschikt over de juiste kennis om het werk goed te doen.

De hoeveelheid werk die tot de taak van de betreffende medewerker hoort is groot.

De betreffende medewerker moet onder hoge tijdsdruk werken.

Het werk dat de betreffende medewerker doet is zeer complex.

De betreffende medewerker haalt afgesproken (financiële) doelstellingen.

De betreffende medewerker werkt in een multicultureel team.

Het team van de betreffende medewerker is gemengd wat betreft man-vrouw verhouding.

De betreffende medewerker is gedisciplineerd.

De betreffende medewerker presteert beter dan ik zou verwachten van een medewerker op dat niveau.

De betreffende medewerker is klantgericht. (U kunt deze vraag overslaan indien dit niet van toepassing is)

De betreffende medewerker heeft het potentieel om door te groeien naar een functie met meer verantwoordelijkheid en complexiteit.

Hoeveel salarisschalen kan deze medewerker nog doorgroeien in zijn/ haar loopbaan?

Ik leg grote nadruk op compliance. (U kunt deze vraag overslaan indien dit niet van toepassing is)

Ik bepaal in detail wat er moet gebeuren en hoe het moet gebeuren.