Paul Celan, metaphor and reality

A phenomenological perspective on truth and correspondence in Celan

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MOTTO

We are all acquainted with this, for instance, in the attempt to translate, in practical life or in literature or whatever; that is, we are familiar with the strange, uncomfortable, and tortuous feeling we have as long as we do not have the right word. When we have found the right expression (it need not always be one word), when we are certain that we have it, then it 'stands,' then something has come to a 'stand.' (Gadamer 2008, p. 15).

CONTENT

INTRODUCTION

Metaphors often express complex ideas in a very concise manner. For instance, when Leonard Cohen writes: "Love is a fire / It burns everyone / It disfigures everyone / It is the world's excuse / for being ugly," he conveys something about the meaning of love that is a lot harder to do with literal phrases, and, in addition, does not share the same rhetoric effect.[1] Another reason for their attractiveness is that metaphors require a sense of creativity; we need our imagination to understand and create them. To understand that love is a fire, we need to visualize its characteristics; for example, we need to think of ways in which love has a burning intensity or destructive nature. These and other features allow metaphors to attract debate in both every day conversation as well as academic writings.

Academic efforts from different disciplines today have tried to determine what goes on in metaphors. Especially since the 1950s, research on metaphor is going through a strong revival. It asks questions like: What are the semantic qualities of metaphors? What is the relation between the literal and the metaphorical use of words? What do we accomplish by using metaphors in communication? What are the effects of metaphors on the way we think and behave? For instance, Davidson and Black ask whether a metaphor can be true, and if so, on which conditions?[2] The work of Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner concentrates on the role of metaphor for the production of cognitive structures.[3] They use larger conceptual metaphors like "life is a journey" or "argument is struggle" to demonstrate that our life is strongly determined by metaphors, and that these pervade our cognitive make-up and social structures.

Finally, there is a larger list of authors that use the concept of metaphor as an inspiration for philosophical thinking. They employ metaphors to analyse the history of philosophy by looking at the predominant metaphors in particular time periods. In addition, they use an analysis of the process of metaphor to work on epistemological and metaphysical questions. Both areas of research share a same basic viewpoint; metaphors illustrate how we can perceive the world anew, because they demonstrate how we relate ourselves to the world. It is this basic idea that has motivated a range of philosophers like Derrida, Ricoeur, Stern, Ortony and Deleuze to write on metaphor, though their standpoints differ substantially.[4]

My thesis is a contribution to the latter literature on metaphor; I attempt to show that metaphors are especially interesting if we give them a central place in the way we relate ourselves to the world. I will discuss two authors that share this perspective, and who can be seen as participants

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[1] Leonard Cohen, 1972, p. 95.
[2] See Davidson 1978/1984 and Black 1955.
[3] See Lakoff & Johnson 1980 and Turner 1988.
[4] See for instance Derrida 1982, Ricoeur 1977/1978, Stern 2000, Ortony 1993 and Deleuze 1997.

of this tradition, Friedrich Nietzsche and Paul Celan. The philosopher Nietzsche is of course well-known; Paul Celan is a Jewish-Eastern European poet with a small, but very well-known, poetical oeuvre. His writings take up a central place in post-second-world-war literature in Germany.

I will claim that a phenomenological reading of Celan presents arguments to formulate a theory of truth as correspondence that does not fall into the drawbacks of traditional theories of truth as correspondence. An important hypothesis guiding this argument is the idea attributed to Celan that a metaphor can be a complex basic phenomenon that is singular, but at the same time a fundamental element of knowledge. This - introducing complex basic elements of experience - forges a strong link to phenomenological theories that will allow to place Celan's poetology in an interesting, and as yet little explored, philosophical context.

I will start chapter one with a discussion of Celan's view on metaphor. Why is it so particular? We will see that his distinct use of metaphor and his viewpoints on metaphor are critique of traditional correspondence relations. These relations are part of theories of truth that argue that truth consists in a relation of language to reality, in which literal language corresponds to facts in reality. In this framework, a metaphor has no direct relation to reality, but is figurative use of language only. I will explain that Celan argues against these types of correspondence relations and claims that metaphors are – in a very direct sense – an experienced reality. I will demonstrate that Celan's views are best understood from a phenomenological context. Methodically, I will analyse Celan's poems on the basis of methods used in literature studies, and explore his concepts on the basis of a phenomenological perspective. In doing so, I will continuously keep the epistemological issues of traditional correspondence relations in mind.

In the next chapter, I will discuss Nietzsche's argument on metaphor. A reason for this is that his views on metaphor are an example that shows why traditional theories of correspondence are not convincing. I will show what his position on metaphor is, and what the consequences of this position are for traditional theories of truth as correspondence. Because Nietzsche's view on metaphor cuts across established subdivisions in discourses, I will demonstrate his view by keeping in mind the fundamental, epistemological paradigm of metaphor that Nietzsche introduces. We will see that this leads to a challenge we have to confront. Doing away with traditional relations of correspondence leads to a problem; how we can meaningfully think, communicate and exist, if language and thought no longer correspond to reality? Suppose we want to maintain that there is a difference between meaningful and senseless communication, what could be an alternative to traditional theories of correspondence? I will demonstrate that Nietzsche's alternative lies in a highly creative use of metaphor, and that, in a way, this is precisely what Celan's poems practice.

Celan's poetry is known for its impenetrability which is, in part, the result of a highly innovative use of metaphors. Despite this, reading his poetry does not lead to an absurd or ridiculous

reading experience, but to a meaningful and compelling one. This is why, in chapter three, I will ask how Celan allows for meaningful poetry. In doing so, I will claim that the concept of 'authenticity' is very appropriate in bringing those standards together that characterize meaningful use of metaphor. I will analyse the general characteristics of the concept of authenticity first, and next explain in what way these are applicable to the views of Celan I have discussed in chapter one.

The fact that Celan allows for, and asks for, authenticity, indicates that a metaphor can have a truth claim, even if this is a truth claim based on characteristics other than traditional correspondence relations. This is the reason why I'd like to pose a critical question to his project: Can't we still detect remainders of correspondence in Celan, and how do we, consequently, have to reassess the way we think about a possible correspondence theory of truth? I will answer this question in chapter four. I will display that concepts borrowed from Edmund Husserl provide a key for a possible theory of truth as correspondence formulated on the basis of Celan's views. I will specify what the main challenges are for such a theory, and I will analyse concepts from Husserl's phenomenology to provide an answer to these challenges.

This will lead to a candidate of a theory of truth as correspondence that is based on Celan's views on metaphor and supports his standards. To assess whether we can defend this theory, I will use Nietzsche, once more, as an example of possible standards. What are the Nietzsche's demands for a possible theory of truth as correspondence, and in what way, can the proposed theory answer to these demands? This is subject matter of chapter five. I will claim that our understanding of the kind of reality and the type of language that is to be addressed in a correspondence theory of truth that is based on Celan's views needs to be revised.

1. CELAN'S USE OF, AND VIEW ON METAPHOR

Celan's life and relation to philosophy

Celan was born as Paul Antschel in 1920 in Czernowitz in Bukovina, which is now considered Ukraine. His parents were Jewish, Celan was their only child, and he came to speak not only Hebrew, but also German and Romanian, as these were the languages common in his birthplace. During the German occupation, his parents were deported and killed, and Celan himself spend time in labour camps. After the war, he studied and lived in Bucharest, Vienna and Paris, and became fluent in European languages such as French, English, German, Russian and Romanian. Celan translated poetry from and into these languages, but wrote the majority of his poems in German. German was the language of his mother, and in writing in German, he sought to commemorate her life. At the same time, Celan had difficulties writing in German, because it was the language of the assassinators of the Jews and responsible for the death of his parents. Celan lived in Paris most of his adult life, with his wife Gisèle Lestrange. They had two sons; François and son Eric. François died shortly after he was born. Important themes in Celan's oeuvre are the horrors of the Second World War, the loss of his parents, and the struggle with language. Celan died in 1970 in Paris, after committing suicide.[5]

Celan exchanged ideas with philosophers and artists throughout his life. For instance, he communicated with Heidegger, Buber, Levinas and Picasso through letters and actual meetings.[6] There is also evidence that Celan read parts of Nietzsche.[7] Besides exchanging with philosophers, Celan's poetry shows philosophical motives and themes. Some of his poems show references to Democritus, Spinoza and Adorno.[8] In addition, his poems are strongly concerned with meta-poetical questions. Celan was continuously exploring poetic forms, trying to find new ways to include conceptual themes in these forms, and trying to embed philosophy into genuine poetry. Because of this, Celan has inspired philosophers such as Derrida, Levinas, Gadamer and Pöggeler. They have written works on Celan that involve interpretations of his poetry, or uses of his poetry to explain philosophical concepts in aesthetics, hermeneutics or metaphysics.[9]

These circumstances make Celan very appropriate for philosophical discussion. Because Celan was so well-acquainted with philosophy and meta-poetical matters, and because he practiced this in his poems, there is a lot to be learned from his writings. In this chapter, I will discuss Celan's views on

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[5] I owe this overview of Celan's life to Felstiner 1986, pp. 251-5 and Felstiner 1995, pp. xv-xix and 3-41,
[6] See Felstiner 1995, pp. 160-1, 115-6, 244-7, 93-4, 288 for some references of these connections.
[7] Compare in this respect Bekker 2008, p. 28. He argues that Celan's early poetry reminds of Nietzsche's book *Also Sprach Zarathustra.*
[8] Celan is concerned with Democritus in the poem *Engführung*", with Spinoza in the poems *Pau, nachts*, and *Pau, später* and with Adorno in a piece of poetic prose called *Gespräch im Gebirg*. For these poems, see respectively p. 113-8, 226 and 226-7. of Celan & Wiedemann 2005. For *Gespräch im Gebirg*, see Celan & Buck 2002.
[9] See Derrida 1987, Levinas 1978, Pöggeler 1986 and Gadamer 1973.

metaphor and demonstrate that he aspires to abandon relations of correspondence between language and reality, and tries to write poetry accordingly. I will also display that Celan shows a highly particular view on the relation language-reality that lends itself especially well to be analysed in phenomenological terms.

Celan does not systematically explain and defend his position on metaphor. However, we can get to an overview of his position on metaphor, if we analyse passages in speeches he gave, notes he made, and poems he wrote. For this purpose, a few texts are studied. First, *Der Meridian*; this is a speech Celan gave upon receiving the *Büchner-Preis*, which is an important literary prize in Germany. It is thematically a very dense text that deals with the purpose of art and poetry. The manuscript material for this speech is published in the Tübinger Ausgabe of Celan's writings, which contains multiple notes about metaphor (Celan 1999). Next, it is also useful to read his *Bremer speech*, a short speech he gave in 1958 when receiving the *Bremer Literaturpreise* (Celan & Kästner 1958). Finally, some of Celan's poems will be discussed as well.[10] These texts taken together reveal a lot of different strands and views on metaphor, and in doing so, evoke different poetical and philosophical debates about the nature of metaphor, and the character of the relation language-reality that are main focus of this thesis.[11] In my discussion of Celan's view on metaphor, I shall draw attention to two different levels in his works. On one hand, I will express what Celan views as an improper interpretation of poetry, and indicate his reasons for this. On another level, I will explain what Celan presents as a proper alternative. I will introduce Celan's view on metaphor through a discussion of a part of the poem 'Wo Eis ist'.

A reading experience of Celan: the poem 'Wo Eis ist'

Reading a poem by Celan evokes different kinds of experiences. I will demonstrate this on the basis of the first two lines of the poem 'Wo Eis ist'.[12]

WO EIS IST
Wo Eis ist, ist Kühle für zwei.
Für zwei; so ließ ich dich kommen.[13]

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[10] For Celan's poems, I have made use of the critical edition from Barbara Wiedemann, see Celan & Wiedemann 2005.

[11] When I present quotes in this thesis, italics and bold typeface are from the author or authors of the quote.

[12] I owe this reading of 'Wo Eis ist' to a commentary of Paul Sars, compare Sars & Roumen 1988, p. 108-16.

[13] For the full poem, see Celan & Wiedemann 2005, p. 68.

Like most of Celan's poems, the words and sentences in it are quite sober. The poem starts with the phrase "Wo Eis ist, ist Kühle für zwei". This phrase reads as a general assertion; 'Where there is ice, there is coolness for two.' If we look at the logical structure of this phrase, it seems to makes perfect sense. One antecedence is followed by a consequence, which is followed by a relational property of the consequence. If there is such a thing as A, there is B, and B has the relational property of C. In our case: If there is ice (A), there is coolness (B), and this, for two (C). Interesting is that coolness does not add any new information to ice. This suggests that the importance lies in the specification 'for two' and implies that there are two steps of interference involved; where there is ice, there is coolness, and if there is coolness, this is for two.

The 'for two' is repeated in the second line: "Für zwei, so ließ ich dich kommen." Or in translation; 'for two, so I made you come'. Interestingly, the two accounts of 'for two' present both a hypothetical statement and an existent situation. The first account refers to a hypothetical situation; if there is ice, there is coolness for two. The second line suggests that this is the case; 'for two, so I made you come'. But are we sure that the precondition A is indeed fulfilled? The answer lies in the title. With the words "Wo Eis ist" Celan presents the antecedence as a precondition that is now met. "Wo Eis ist" can be read as 'there is ice', 'if there is ice' or 'wherever there is ice'. Either way, the antecedence is presented, and this suggest that from a logical point of view, the argument is valid. First, A is presented: "Wo Eis ist". Next, a law of the form 'if A, then B and C' is formulated: "Wo Eis ist, ist Kühle für zwei". In addition, because C 'für zwei' holds, a conclusion is justified: "so ließ ich dich kommen".

Logically, this conclusion can only be correct if the general law "if A, then B and C" is true and if this law is valid for the situation at hand. Through the use of 'so' and a semicolon, Celan suggests that we are justified to make this conclusion. However, content wise this is not transparent, for how can we be sure that the law is applicable? How do we know that that particular situation of ice is fulfilled, and coolness for two is indeed made possible and present, and why does this lead to a situation in which the I of the poem can make the you come? From this point of view, Celan's conclusion seems premature.

To understand how to read Celan's poems in another way, and to answer the arisen conflict between the logical structure and the content of the poem, it is crucial to look again at the title. By entitling the poem 'Wo Eis ist', Celan can claim that the particular situation that the poem refers to is already present in a very literal sense. 'Wo Eis ist' in this sense does not refer to a reality outside the poem, but is literally the poem itself. This is the place and precondition for a possible meeting. The I and you express the self-referential relationship of the language in the poem. The I is the poem itself that, under certain preconditions, can make a you or the language it searches for possible. The

meeting that takes place is only possible because the poem exists and language in it is composed as it is composed.

Celan's critique against traditional interpretations of metaphor
In the previous paragraph I have illustrated that the first lines of 'Wo Eis ist' become meaningful by reading the poem in a highly particular way. This particular poetic style of Celan is directly related to his viewpoints on the relation metaphor-reality. I will explain what these viewpoints are by starting with a passage from *Der Meridian*. The passage mentions the metaphor "schwarze Milch der Frühe" from the poem *Todesfuge*. It is a good quote to start with, because Celan makes some central points about metaphor, which come up in other forms elsewhere.

We can notice both a critical view of metaphor and a first hint towards Celan's own particular view on metaphor. What Celan writes is the following:

Schwarze Milch der Frühe: Das ist keine jener Genitivmetapher, wie sie uns von unseren sogenannten Kritikern vorgesetzt bekommen, damit wir nicht mehr zum Gedicht gehen; das ist keine Redefigur und kein Oxymoron mehr, das ist Wirklichkeit. (Celan 1999, p. 158)[14]

The metaphor "schwarze Milch der Frühe" is Celan's paradigm case here. This metaphor is from Celan's best-known poem 'Todesfuge', that sketches an intense picture of the horrors in a labour camp in the Second World War.[15] The first sentence of this poem is:

Schwarze Milch der Frühe wir trinken sie abends
wir trinken sie mittags und morgens wir trinken sie nachts
wir trinken und trinken
(Celan & Wiedemann 2005, p. 40)

In first approximation, the "wir" in this sentence could refer to the prisoners in the labour camps. The metaphor that contains the oxymoron "schwarze Milch der Frühe" could convey the experience of their horrific situation.[16] Striking is that we normally associate milk, or early milk, with motives like

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[14] This quote is part of the manuscript material for the Meridian speech. The editors of the Tübinger Ausgabe, Böschenstein and Schmull, have reconstructed a very precise and historically accurate overview of the development of the speech. They have done so, amongst others, by using editorial codes and symbols. I will not copy these in my quotes from the Tübinger Ausgabe. My interest lies in the content of Celan's ideas, and not in the precise development of his notes for the speech.
[15] For a full version of the 'Todesfuge,' see Celan & Wiedemann 2005, pp. 40-1.
[16] An oxymoron is "a figure of speech by which a locution produces an incongruous, seemingly self-contradictory effect, as in 'cruel kindness' or 'to make haste slowly'.". See www.dictionary.reference.com.

innocence, nurture and life. However, because Celan uses the adjective "black", the metaphor now expresses a drain of life, and death.

In the passage from *Der Meridian* Celan writes that speaking about "schwarze Milch der Frühe" in terms of "Genitivmetapher", "Redefigur" and oxymoron as I just did, is, or is no longer, an apt way to describe the meaning of the metaphor.[17] In general, genitive metaphors, stylistic figures and oxymora, are linguistic devices used for rhetorical purposes. With the above claim about "schwarze Milch der Frühe", Celan is saying that reading poetry is not about finding the rhetorical devices in a poem and breaking them down into possible references or meanings. Celan expresses a criticism against this style of reading poetry.

Celan had a difficult relationship with literary critics. For instance, after its publication the 'Todesfuge' soon became a standard poem taken up in anthologies and schoolbooks discussed in German teaching programmes. In these anthologies, it was not the content of the poem that was discussed, but the lyrical formation. Supposedly, Celan got disappointed, and was unwilling to continue an inclusion of the poem in these books.[18] As a result, we could argue that Celan's motives for writing this passage are mainly psychological and, for instance, that he is merely ventilating his frustrations. However, when we compare this passage with other notes, we can demonstrate that Celan is actually taking up a poetic and philosophical discussion. He wants to show a different way of reading and writing poetry and wants to address a specific value to metaphor.

In different passages, Celan's notes for *Der Meridian* reveal why he thinks that understanding a metaphor as a rhetorical device is inadequate; most of these are actually variations of the view that this style of interpretation does not do justice to what poetry and poems are about. For instance, Celan writes: "Wer das Gedicht aufsucht, um nach Metaphern zu schnüffeln, wird immer nur – Metaphern finden" (Ibid., p. 157). In addition, a bit further is written: „Wer im Gedicht nur die Metapher findet, der hat auch nichts anderes gesucht; er nimmt nichts wahr; Es gibt, gewiß, die Metaphernpflücker und die dann angebotenen parfümierten Sträuße; es gibt das lyrische Allerlei" (Ibid., p. 159). What Celan repeatedly writes is that those who look for metaphor, will find rhetoric devices only. He voices his dislike against the superficiality that reduces poetry to rhetoric. He seems to feel that if we do so, we miss out on something important, because we fail to discover something else.

In this context, we can reconsider the kind of reading experiences that Celan's poems evoke. Reading the poem 'Wo Eis ist' was confusing when we tried to find meaning in a reality outside of the poem. Fixed symbolism, or fixed traditional metaphorical codifications, as a means to interpretation, did not work. This type of interpretation is based on traditional associations that are habitually made

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[17] A genitive metaphor is a metaphor of the form "The a of x," such as "Milch der Frühe".
[18] Compare Felstiner 1986, pp. 253-5 for a review of the reception of the poem.

through folk-etymology and refer to a collectively shared knowledge of the meanings of words and metaphors. Celan emphatically dismisses this level of meaning.

What is it that we miss out upon if we fail to interpret poetry on the basis of Celan's views? So far, Celan has given two suggestions for this. In the very first quote I mentioned, and after writing that "schwarze Milch der Frühe" is no metaphor, Celan says that this metaphor is – or has become – reality. With the term 'reality,' Celan does not mean the reality of the concentration camps; or the reality of German post war consciousness.[19] Nor does he mean that metaphor has become reality because it evokes private emotions and images. Celan means to say something else. Reconsider the second quote above, where Celan writes about a reader who looks only for metaphor. He writes: "er nimmt nichts wahr"; he does not perceive anything. We will see that the notion of perception is connected to the notion of reality.

In a study on Celan, Szondi gives a hint towards a possible other type of interpretation. He writes: "Die Dichtung ist nicht Mimesis, keine Repräsentation mehr: sie wird Realität. Poetische Realität freilich, Text, der keiner Wirklichkeit mehr folgt, sondern sich selbst als Realität entwirft und begründet" (Szondi 1972, p. 52). Thus, for Celan, it is not the case that poems refer, through metaphors, metonimies and other stylistic or lyric instruments to reality. Nor can they be translated in elements from reality. Instead, Celan claims, poems and metaphor *are* reality.

What does Celan mean to say when he identifies metaphor with reality? Perhaps he means to say that the poem itself is what we should connect with, and that we should avoid situations in which we first imagine what the poem is about, and then connect to that image, instead of connecting to the poem itself. This might be an argument to avoid very private interpretations of poems that disregard any original meaning of the poem. He might also suggest that we should do away with the difference between figurative and literal meaning of words altogether, because the figurative is as real, or perhaps even more real, as the literal. His argument could also ensue that both the figurative and the literal can lead to intense experiences, and that this is precisely what poetry should be about; intense experience. Or, finally, Celan might mean to say that we should do away with the concept of meaning and interpretation of poems altogether, and let go of the difference between words in a poem and what they refer to. Seemingly, Celan considers all of these possibilities in some way or another.

Celan's position on the proper interpretation of metaphor
To get a better understanding of the type of reality that Celan equates with metaphor, let's have a look how Szondi continues after the above. He gives an example from the poem *Engführung* and writes:

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[19] The poem indeed played a role in German post war consciousness, see Felstiner 1986, pp. 251-5.

Der Leser wird in den Versen 4 und 5 mit einer Beschreibung des *Geländes / mit der untrüglichen Spur* konfrontiert: *Gras, auseinandergeschrieben. Die Steine, weiß, / mit den Schatten der Halme*. Die Szenerie ist eine Landschaft, aber eine, die beschrieben wird als eine *geschriebene*: das *Gras* ist *auseinandergeschrieben*. Eine traditionelle Textauslegung, der traditionellen Rhetorik verhaftete, würde zweifellos sagen, das Gras der Landschaft werde mit Buchstaben *verglichen*, und die Analogie zwischen dem einen und den anderen (nach der aristotelischen Definition der Metapher) gestatte dem Dichter, zu schreiben: *Gras, auseinandergeschrieben*, und dem Leser, zu verstehen: dies Gras gleiche in Buchstaben aufgelösten Gebilden. Doch geht es »wortwörtlich« nicht um Buchstaben – und was wäre der poetische Text anderes als die Textur des Wortes? -, sondern durchaus um Gras. Vom *Gras* heißt es, es sei *auseinandergeschrieben*. Mit anderem Worten: die Gräser sind zugleich Buchstaben, und die Landschaft ist Text. Nur weil das *Gelände / mit der untrüglichen Spur* (auch) Text ist, kann der Leser sich dorthin *verbracht* finden. (Ibid., p. 50). [20], [21]

Szondi tries to convey why traditional methods of interpretation are inadequate and where a possible other interpretation lies. Note Szondi's emphasis on "verglichen" and later on "verbracht". We can regard these as key terms to separate two different kinds of interpretation of metaphor. In a traditional interpretation of metaphor, the key word is comparison; we compare one word to another to convey an understanding about the first. For example, we say that life is a journey to convey a view on existence; a view in which the progress we make is more important than the destination we reach. For an accurate understanding of an interpretation of metaphor that Celan supports, the key word is "verbracht" which can be translated as 'driven into', 'transferred', 'transplanted', 'spent' or 'partake'. To be driven into a poem or to partake in it, implies that the reader is part of the poem.

What I have just said, is phrased very abstractly; let's see if we can put it down in more concrete terms. The first step is to realise that Celan contests and redefines the relationship between metaphor and reality. Interestingly, this is also precisely what the first lines of *Engführung* are about. For Celan, words in poetry are poetical reality. As Szondi writes; the gras in the poem is not like the

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[20] The poem 'Engführung' is one of the longer poems of Celan. It is taken up in Celan's book of poetry *Sprachgitter.* These are the verses that Szondi refers to in full:

VERBRACHT ins
Gelände
Mit der untrüglichen Spur:

Gras, auseinandergeschrieben. Die Steine, weiß,
Mit den Schatten der Halme:
Lies nicht mehr – schau!
Schau nicht mehr – geh!
(Celan & Wiedemann 2005, p. 113)

[21] Compare also Felstiner 1995, pp. 119 – 25 for an interpretation of 'Engführung'.

Buchstaben, but *is* these letters. The terrain is not like the text, but *is* the text. We are driven into the "Gelände" or 'landscape' of the poem. Becoming part of the poem, means that traditional relations in which the readers reads one word in a poem in terms of another are put aside. Instead, the reader partakes in the poem in the sense that he actively experiences the poem. We can find support for this reading in the way in which Celan continues the poem. He writes: "Lies nicht mehr – schau! Schau nicht mehr – geh!" (Celan & Wiedemann 2005, p. 113). 'Reading' and 'seeing' are replaced by the imperatives 'look' and 'go'. This is again a request for a kind of interpretation in which partaking in the experience of the poem is decisive for reading it properly, because the poem gives rise to activities such as "looking" and "going".

There is reason to suggest that the type of reality that Celan refers to for interpreting poetry is phenomenological reality, in the sense that the experience of the poem as a phenomenon is starting point for introducing meaning. Celan read and met Heidegger, and was taken with some of his views, such as those presented in *Sein und Zeit.* For instance, he argued against Heidegger on the relation between poetry and time (Lyon 2006, p. 10). Heidegger claimed that a poem should have a certain timelessness. Against this, Celan argued that a poem should connect to and reflect an experience in the recent past. This is a typical phenomenological discussion, because it is an inquiry into the original way in which language appears.

In general, by phenomenological reality, I mean a reality of experience. It is an experience, and as such, a particular instance of undergoing something. By reality I mean that this experience is actually there; it is present here and now. The general assumption here is that phenomenological reality is the perspective from which we, as living subjects, experience the world around us, in the way that we experience it. This is why it comes from a first person perspective. However, it is not personal. This is because, in it, the focus is upon how, we, as human subjects, experience reality, and not how we, as this and that particular personality, experience reality. Another defining notion is intentionality; which implies that experience is always about an object. Objects appear to us in multiple ways, and we can experience them in different ways.

The scholar Gelhard picks up on this phenomenological angle, when she comments on Celan's poem *Ein Dröhnen aus*.[22] She writes: "Das Gedicht selbst ist zu einem phänomenalen Ereignis

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[22]The complete poem reads:

EIN DRÖHNEN: es ist
Die Wahrheit selbst
Unter die Menschen
Getreten,
mitten ins
Metapherngestöber.
(Celan & Wiedemann 2005, p. 206)

geworden. Die Bilder wollen weder Übertragung („Metapher") noch Sinnbild („Emblem") sein, sondern sich den Sinnen zeigende, aufglühende Wahrnehmungen." (Gelhard 2012, p. 81). Hence, Celan's poems and metaphors refer to a kind of reality in the sense that they are perceptions of a sensory, intense kind. Of course, in a sense, all poems are perceived via the senses, but what is specific here is that poetry is specified as a phenomena and a reading experience of poetry is an experience of these phenomena. Celan's poetry in Gelhard's views is about the experience of the poem itself, and of the words in it. It is Important to note is that these are not private experiences of the reader of the poem, but of the poem itself.

The particular domain of phenomenological reality expresses Celan's views on the type of reality that is involved in metaphor. Celan's Meridian-speech clearly presents a poem as having a phenomenal character, or as something that appears (Celan 1995, pp. 2-13). In addition, he writes that, as readers, we can experience this phenomenal character if we really connect to the poem. Here, too, a type of experience is meant. Remember the second suggestion I put forward at the beginning of this chapter. I mentioned that Celan wrote that reading a metaphor is about properly perceiving the poem.[23] We can demonstrate that this occurs on two different levels. It is first about perceiving the poem for what it truly is. A poem does not remain separate from the reader. No, a poem is a proper poem if it is able to evoke a particular kind of experience in a reader. On a second level, it conveys that as a reader, we should connect with the poem. This involves a claim about the right kind of aesthetic experience we need to have. What is the right kind of aesthetic experience, more specifically, about?

We mentioned that for Celan an experience of language is starting point for proper reading. We can further qualify this experience by the following passage:

Zu Metapher, Bild etc:
Bildhaftes, das ist keineswegs etwas Visuelles; es ist, wie alles mit der Sprache Zusammenhängendes, ein geistiges Phänomen. (…) Das ist keineswegs dasselbe wie irgendeine billige impressionistische Lautmalerei, Klangfarbe etc. Es ist, auch hier, eine Erscheinungsform der Sprache… (Celan 1999, p. 107).

Celan writes that by pictorial he does not mean something visual, but a "geistiges Phänomen". To clarify this, we can say that reading metaphor is not about a visual perception per se, or about the images or feelings a metaphor evokes. Instead, a metaphor is a mental phenomenon. Celan writes that this counts for all language; language should not be something pictorial, visual, or symbolic but should appear as a phenomenon. It is this characteristic of metaphor that is needed if we aim for an aesthetic experience of a poem. But how does language accomplish this, and what is more particularly required of the reader of the metaphor?

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[23] See pp. 10-1 of this thesis.

Part of this aesthetic experience is discussed by Celan in terms of 'transference' or 'carrying over', and he considers poetry and metaphors emphatically as untransferrable or untranslatable. This is interesting, because metaphors are always about a transference of meaning. For instance, Celan writes: "Metapher, d.i. mitunter nur ein (Hilfs)wort, eine (Not)lüge im Munde derer, die über das Gedicht hinweg und in den Spiegel gucken; es ist Selbstübertragung, Selbsttransport, Selbstbeförderung. Es steht für Überheblichkeit. Mit Transit als primum und Exit als secundum movens." (Ibid., p. 157).[24] This is a repetition of what we discussed earlier. Celan criticizes a reading of poetry by looking at metaphors as rhetoric devices. Celan's argument in this passage is that this involves a type of selftransference that loses all real engagement. Reading poetry in this way is a means to self-reflection and self-indulgement only.[25] Celan notes: "Als das Unübertragbare, selbst nicht leicht zu Tragende und oft Unerträgliche – unerträglich Schwere – haßt man das Gedicht. Wer das Gedicht nicht mittragen will, überträgt und spricht von Metaphern. So wie der, der vom Gedicht nichts wissen will, von der Kunst und von Können redet." (Ibid., p. 158). What is deliberately missed in the reading of the poem, is carrying with the poem. And those who do not desire to carry with the poem, retort to metaphor in the wrong, rhetoric, sense.

Note that the use of carrying with, or "mittragen", is actually a good definition of metaphor for Celan. Etymologically, the term metaphor refers to words like 'transference', 'carrying over' and 'transport'. The 'meta-', as a proposition in ancient Greek, means both 'together with' and 'across', whereas '-phero' signifies bearing or carrying. Interestingly, this is precisely what Celan expresses when he defines metaphor as 'carrying with.' It confirms that a metaphor for Celan is about an experience that is shared with a reader. Further associations like 'carrying together,' 'taking part in,' 'carrying along,' 'sharing,' 'bearing part of', 'giving support', 'helping to carry' support this definition. Metaphor as "mittragen" carries this whole range of possible meanings. What is especially implied in this definition is that a reader and a metaphor share responsibility for the content of the metaphor, because both exercize it. Both help carry its meaning, and are interdependent in taking part in the content. It a way, both the reader and the poem give support to the poem's aims and take part in the costs, because both are necessary elements for an experience of the poem.

Celan's position on the nature of metaphor
Celan gives further qualifications to a proper view on metaphor. For starters, Celan regards singular experience to be central. In his doctoral thesis, Räsänen mentions several asks questions about singular experience. He writes: "Is this, then, the sense in which we can say that the poem has a will of its own, that it bears witness to the unique moment of writing, to the singularity of an existence? And

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[24] Note that, in this passage, Celan plays with the Aristotelian conception of metaphor as carrying over.
[25] For more about this passage, compare Räsänen 2007, p. 158.

is this the singularity of the writer himself? Or is it rather so that the poem bears witness to the singularity of the "perception", *Wahrnehmung* or *Anschauung*, which is at once a vision and an address directed at a singularity"? (Räsänen 2007, p. 176). If we look at the following quote from Celan, we can begin to answer these questions: „Und was wären dann die Bilder? Das einmal, das immer wieder einmal und nur jetzt und nur hier Wahrgenommene und Wahrzunehmende" (Celan 1999, p. 38). What Celan indicates is that reading a metaphor is a radically singular experience; even after reading the same metaphor, under the same circumstances, and in the same context, it can never be the same experience as before. A poetic image occurs one time only, only here and now. Even if it occurs again, it is another experience.

This view on metaphor is also defended by Lacoue-Labarthe in his *Poetry as Experience* who shows an interesting consequence of Celan's view that metaphor is a singular experience. (Lacoue-Labarthe 1999). He asks about the possibility of interpreting, or finding meaning in Celan's poetry, and concludes that Celan's poetry necessarily escapes interpretation. He finds a cause for this in singular experience. (Ibid., p. 13) He writes: "[T]he singular *experience* coming into writing; it asks if, being singular, experience can be written, or if from the moment of writing its very singularity is not forever lost and borne away in one way or another, at origin or en route to destination, by the very fact of language. This could be due to language's impossible intransitivity, or to the desire for meaning, for universality, that animates voices divided by the constraint of a language that is itself, in turn, only one of many." (Ibid., p. 15). What Lacoue-Labarthe writes here is interesting; if reading and writing metaphors are radical unique and singular experiences for Celan, then the possibility of interpretation and meaning becomes almost absent. If reading or writing a poem is radically singular, and never the same experience, then something like communicating the meaning of metaphor, or even the possibility of finding the definite meaning of metaphor, is impossible. The only thing we can do is try to capture that experience in words, whilst acknowledging that these words, once the experience is gone, are only an expression of an experience, and never the experience itself, and can never evoke that same experience again.

Despite the idea that a metaphor should be a radically singular experience, there is another recurring theme in Celan's notes about metaphor; he writes that the poem has become the place where tropes and metaphors are carried ad absurdum. It occurs for instance in this manuscript note from *Der Meridian:*

Es gibt kein Wort, das, einmal ausgesprochen, nicht auch seinen übertragenen Sinn mitbrächte; und doch meinen die Worte im Gedicht, unübertragbar zu sein; das Gedicht erscheint als der Ort, wo alle Metaphorik ad absurdum geführt wird. (Celan 1999, p. 75).

Let's attempt to see what goes on here. Celan first writes that there is no word that, when spoken, does not bring with it its transferrable meaning. This makes sense; with every meaningful word, we have some semantic association or intentional relationship; it refers to something. Celan continues his argument and conveys that words in poems are meant to be untransferrable. Instead, the poem should appear as the place where all metaphors are carried ad absurdum. Philosophically, the phrase 'ad absurdum' refers to an argument through which we demonstrate a position by showing the absurdity of the position of our opponent. We have seen a similar principle at work in Celan's poem 'Wo Eis ist'. When we followed traditional interpretations of meaning, the content of the poem was absurd and incomprehensible. At the same time, because this reading was absurd, it required us as readers to look for a different kind of meaning.

In the quote, Celan writes that words in poems have a "Sinn" of their own. We can translate this as a 'meaning,' a 'sense,' an 'effect,' or even a 'bearing' or a 'voice'. But why should it be the case that these cannot be transferred or carried over? This claim can be seen as a consequence of Celan's view that a poem is a radically singular experience. If a poem is radically singular, there is no other experience identical with it in token, and it can never be carried over or transferred. This is perhaps reason why Celan uses the terms "carried ad absurdum". Celan's general claim about the interpretation of metaphors is that they should move beyond traditional correspondence to become to exist as singular experience. If this is so they become their own voice, and cannot move beyond their reference. If we reconsider that Celan seeks to claim that metaphors involve singular experience, by showing the absurdity that appears when we read his metaphors traditionally, we can see this as an argument from ad absurdum.

In this context, we can also rethink the content of the poem Engführung:[26]

VERBRACHT ins
Gelände
Mit der untrüglichen Spur:

Gras, auseinandergeschrieben. Die Steine, weiß,
Mit den Schatten der Halme:
Lies nicht mehr – schau!
Schau nicht mehr – geh!
(Celan & Wiedemann 2005, p. 113)

I will give an interpretation of these lines to explain what, I think, Celan is after. The lines "Grass, auseinandergeschrieben. Die Steine, weiß, Mit den Schatten der Halme" can refer to letters, but *are* also letters. As discussed earlier, these two options reveal precisely the two types of interpretation

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[26] Remember also the reading experience of the poem 'Wo Eis ist', see pp. 7-8. It, too, is a good example of these considerations.

that Celan discusses; traditional relations of reference are contrasted with a proper experience of the poem. Now, if this phrase only refers to letters, we cannot be transferred into the landscape that it describes. We can only relate to it, and the choice for the word 'Verbracht' does not seem right. However, if we understand the metaphors "Grass," "Steine," "Schatten der Halme" as real letters, we can properly be transferred into it in the same way that we drive into a landscape. Then we have a proper landscape we can experience. In other words, if we understand the metaphor in terms of reference, our interpretation becomes absurd, because we cannot explain the content of the poem. However, if we interpret the metaphors as real, if the metaphors are the real text, we can properly transfer ourselves into it.

What Celan means by the particular way in which language should appear in poems becomes even clearer in the following manuscript note. Celan writes that metaphors, even when they are at their most figurative and image-like, are actually anti-metaphors. Compare:

Das Gedicht ist der Ort, wo alle Synonymik aufhört; wo alle Tropen und alles Uneigentliche ad absurdum geführt werden; das Gedicht hat, glaube ich, noch da wo es am bildhaftesten ist, einen antimetaphorischen Charakter; das Bild hat einen phänomenalen, durch Anschauung erkennbaren Zug. – Was dich von ihm trennt, überbrückst du nicht; du mußt dich zum Sprung entschließen. (Ibid., p. 74).

Metaphors should actually be anti-metaphors; they should not be a translation of reality, but are themselves phenomenal characters. This is the kind of reality that a metaphor should express. An aesthetic experience of a metaphor for Celan is thus an experience of a metaphor as phenomenological character.

Remarkable is that the phrase I have just used, 'an experience of a metaphor' falls short, because it implies that the experience of the metaphor is different from the metaphor itself. For Celan, they are really the same. For a proper interpretation of a metaphor, the reader needs to partake in the metaphor as experience. If this is the case, we cannot make a distinction between the poem, the object of the poem, and the experience of the poem. They collide into one experience. Evidence for this is that, in the above, Celan writes that a poem involves a "Sprung", or a leap. To get to a proper poetical experience of metaphor, is a jump in the sense that what we experience is a sudden striking collapse into the poem's meaning. It involves a state of experience in which the proper content of the poem become clear to us through the presence of language as a phenomenon. This is carried out in an instance, and requires effort from the reader. Interestingly, this is not a leap forward or a leap to another side, but a leap that leads to a full immersing of oneself into the poem.

Celan on how metaphors are created and on their effects

The first quote I mentioned in this chapter was the sentence that conveyed that "schwarze Milch der Frühe" is no "Genitivmetapher", but reality. To this passage, Celan attaches a further statement: "Genitivmetapher = Nein, ein unter Herzensnot Zueinander-Geboren-Werden der Worte" (Ibid., p. 158). This discloses a further element about the creation of metaphor for Celan. He writes that metaphor is a "becoming-born-to-each-other" under the pressure of "Herzensnot". There is no direct translation of this term "Herzensnot". "Not" can mean need, necessity and emergency, but also trouble and hardship, or distress and anguish. "Herzensnot" is thus an expression of the need, hardship, and necessity of the need and hardship of the human soul.

"Herzensnot" is described as a precondition for the creation of words. This implies that, for Celan, the process of writing poetry is not a wholly cognitive and controlled activity, but deep down a matter of hardship and necessity. At the same time, writing poetry is not a private activity either. Celan writes that metaphors are words which become born to each other. An interpretation of this is that words themselves are responsible as actors in the process. The writer of the poem needs the precondition of 'Herzensnot', but if this is fulfilled, words start to rearrange themselves. This points to another theme in Celan's views on metaphor, that is; the idea that poems, words and metaphors are actors. The scholar Festiner demonstrates this idea when he writes: "[H]e [Celan] was trying to fuse its [metaphor's] two halves, outer and inner reality. That way, words would not refer but would themselves act and suffer." (Felstiner 1995, p. 108). This may not be as vague an expression as it sounds. In a way, we can say that language articulates and transfers experiences. These experiences have consequences, and thus, in a way, act out. They perform a function as an appearance of language and, as such, produce an effect in a reader. The reader is asked to partake in that experience. At the same time, this shows again that, for Celan, there is no proper difference between language and the experience that it expresses. These are identical.

The idea that metaphors are actors marks another interesting theme in Celan's views on metaphor. For Celan, reading poetry is about dialogue and encounter. We have seen that Celan requires his readers to really engage with a poem by carrying with it.[27] Celan also speaks about this in his Bremer Speech, where he compares the poem with a message in a bottle:

Das Gedicht kann, da es ja eine Erscheinungsform der Sprache und damit seinem Wesen nach dialogisch ist, eine Flaschenpost sein, aufgegeben in dem – gewiß nicht immer hoffnungsstarken – Glauben, sie könnte irgendwo und irgendwann an Land gespült werden, an Herzland vielleicht. Gedichte sind auch in dieser Weise unterwegs: sie halten auf etwas zu.
Worauf? Auf etwas Offenstehendes, Besetzbares, auf ein ansprechbares Du vielleicht, auf eine ansprechbare Wirklichkeit.

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[27] See this thesis, pp. 14-5.

Um solche Wirklichkeiten geht es, so denke ich, dem Gedicht. (Celan & Kästner 1958, p. 11)

To paraphrase this passage, Celan writes that a poem is by its very nature an appearance of language and because of this, a dialogue, and always on the way, or on the go.[28] Poems search realities and articulate them in dialogue. The dialogue Celan describes is a dialogue aimed at the heart. Remember in this context also the term 'Herzensnot'. At this point, we can see this is not only a precondition for writing poetry, but for receiving poetry as well. Celan writes that poetry is dialogue because it is en route to a you which can respond, to another reality which can respond. One way to interpret this passage is by emphasizing the term "Wirklichkeit". If this term refers to the kind of phenomenological reality we discussed earlier, direct experience is vital. The poem and the reader both partake in this experience and are interdependent if this experience is to arise. The poem partakes if it is constructed in such a way that traditional metaphorical interpretations do not work, and the language is present as a phenomenon. The reader partakes in this experience if he makes that leap into this particular reality of the poem. If the two can meet, then there is dialogue, and proper interpretation.

This proper interpretation is both obscure and opaque for Celan. Support for this is that he often describes poems in terms of a secret, hushing, or of falling silent; and presents these also as a precondition for expression. Compare for instance this passage in Celan:

Warum es nicht extrem formulieren?: Das Gedicht ist das Einmalige Unübertragbare gegenwärtige – Es kann, als das Gegenständliche, auch dessen Stummheit und Opazität haben; es erwachts erst in der wirklichen Begegnung, die es als sein Geheimnis hat. Darum ist jede wirkliche Begegnung auch Erinnerung an das Geheimnis des Gedichts. (Celan 1999, p. 145)

Here, Celan writes that poems are falling silent as well as once-only open. This makes sense if we remember that poems are singular experiences for Celan; they are experiences that become present momentarily but cannot be repeated. When they are present, there is a sense of meaning because there is a particular experience of the poem, but when they aren't, a proper communication with the poem is lost.

Räsänen shows that the tendency of Celan to call a poem both obscure and opaque is connected to several of the other important features of metaphor we have discussed. He writes: "This opacity that is not hermetic is a dialogue with that which is opaque, an encounter with the manifest

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[28] Compare also *Der Meridian*: "Das Gedicht ist einsam. Es ist einsam und unterwegs. Wer es schreibt, bleibt ihm mitgegeben. Aber steht das Gedicht nicht gerade dadurch, also schon hier, in der Begegnung – *im Geheimnis der Begegnung?* Das Gedicht will zu einem Anderen, es braucht dieses Andere, es braucht ein Gegenüber. Es sucht es auf, es spricht sich ihm zu. Jedes Ding, jeder Mensch ist dem Gedicht, das auf das Andere zuhält, eine Gestalt dieses Anderen." (Celan 1999, p. 9).

opacity of the other, with the singularity and untransportability, the uniqueness of the other, every other, wholly other ("Tout autre est tout autre"), in the antitypous, counter-figurative resistance that belongs to every single being or every "creature", and that is, to every single "figure [Gestalt]" in which we encounter the otherness, or in which the poem encounters it, to every figure assumed by the otherness of the wholly other: "Jedes Ding, jeder Mensch ist dem Gedicht, das auf das Andere zuhält, eine Gestalt dieses Anderen." And this is why every authentic encounter takes place in the memory of the secret of the poem, as Celan writes." (Räsänen 2007, p. 180).[29]

This passage is a good summary of what we have discussed so far, because the different themes in Celan's views on metaphor all come forward. In sum, metaphors are radically singular, unique and untransferrable experiences. They are actors because they articulate experiences that have an effect on the reader. The effect is dialogue, which for Celan is a participation of the reader with the experience of the metaphor. This leads to an aesthetic experience that is both open and closed. This experience is direct and intimate, and reveals a fundamental meaning. As such, its status is compelling. At the same time, however, the experience cannot be repeated, and what was experienced, is lost immediately.

Celan's critique of correspondence theories of truth
Celan's views on metaphor can not only be seen as a criticism against traditional forms of interpretation, they demonstrate a criticism against traditional understandings of the relation language-reality as well. In general, Celan goes against a traditional Aristotelian conception of metaphor.[30] In the *Poetics,* Aristotle defines metaphor in the following way: "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else" (*Poetics* 21, 1457b 6-7). For Aristotle, metaphor is a figure of speech that functions by transferring meaning from one sphere to another. For instance, Aristotle writes: "That [transference] … is exemplified in 'Here stands my ship'; for lying at anchor is a sort of standing" (Ibid., 21, 1457b 7-8).

In Aristotle's view, metaphors are excellent means to bring ideas to an audience in an agreeable and persuasive way. As Aristotle writes: "Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can" (*Rhetoric*, 1405a 8). What Aristotle's texts explain is a basic intuition we have with respect to metaphors. By using a metaphor, in Aristotle's words by "giving the thing a name that belongs to something else," we bring out certain characteristics of that thing. If we say of someone that he has a loose character, we bring focus to specific characteristics of that person, for instance that he has a certain leniency, tolerance or permissiveness in his personality. These are characteristics we commonly associate with the literal word 'loose'. In this paradigm, metaphor is

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[29] Räsänen quotes a passage from Celan Meridian speech. See Celan 1999, p. 9.
[30] For an article about Aristotle's view on metaphor compare Kirby 1997.

considered a rhetoric device; it communicates ideas through comparison, and does so for rhetorical effect.

In the Aristotelian paradigm of metaphor, the difference between literal meaning and figurative language lies in the way it refers to reality. For instance, if I point to a treasure chest in a maritime museum, and say: "this object is a treasure", the treasure I point to is literally a treasure, it is a chest that contains jewels, golden coins or other valuables. In contrast, I could also say of Saul Bellow's novel *Herzog* that it is a treasure. The traditional view on metaphor purported to Aristotle argues that this is figurative language, and has no direct reference to physical reality. Instead, it claims that I am transferring characteristics of the literal use of the word treasure to what is it like to read Bellow's novel.[31]

When Celan writes that "schwarze Milch der Frühe" is no metaphor, and words in poems are not supposed to be transferrable, he makes use of this classical paradigm of metaphor, but strongly reacts against it, moves away from it and redefines it. We discussed that Celan insisted on a definition of metaphor as reality. The kind of reality that is addressed here, is not external reality, but phenomenological reality. For Celan, metaphors are, in a very direct sense, experience; they *are* experience. This is where we can see Celan move away from and redefine the Aristotelian paradigm. Celan presents a redefinition of the literal and the figurative. Whereas for Aristotle a metaphor is a figure of speech that we use for rhetoric purposes, for Celan a metaphor is literal language in the sense that it is literally is the same as a state of experience. As Felstiner puts it: "Celan's lyric almost eliminates metaphor, so interpenetrable are the literal and the figurative" (Felstiner 1995, p. 73).

The view that a metaphor is reality is a criticism against theories of truth as correspondence. In short, these theories claim that language refers to objects from the outside world in terms of correspondence, and that truth in language depends on this. There are many versions of this theory, but basically, it argues that a sentence is true if it corresponds to a state of affairs in the external world that is true.[32] I use the word sentence in a very broad sense here; it can be anything from a belief, an idea, a thought, a statement to a proposition. In debates about theories of correspondence, they are referred to as 'truth-bearers'. Next to truth-bearers are 'truth-makers'; a truth-maker is anything that makes a truth-bearer true. Usually, this is an object or a fact from reality. This is why correspondence

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[31] Though this view is usually attributed to Aristotle in literature on metaphor, Aristotle himself probably did not articulate the difference in this way. Kirby argues that the difference between the literal and the figurative in Aristotle can be more aptly described as a difference between a familiar use of language and an unfamiliar use of language. Compare Kirby 1997, p. 539. For my case, this does not make much difference. What is important is that this sketch presents the ideal type that Celan reacts against.

[32] For my general sketch of theories of truth as correspondence, I have made use of the article 'The Correspondence Theory of Truth' from the *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, see David 2015. For an overview of these, and other theories of truth compare Glanzberg 2013, also in the *Stanford Encyclopedia*

theories of truth usually adhere to metaphysical realism; they argue that the world is as it is independently of how human beings think or conceive it to be.

For instance, we could express a theory of truth as correspondence in the following way: "x is true if, and only if x corresponds to some state of affairs that obtains".[33] The truth-bearer "x" could be a proposition, and the truth-maker refer to an obtaining state of affairs. Based on this, we can test propositions for truth or falsity. For instance, a proposition such as "Amsterdam is the capital city of the Netherlands" is true if and only if it is in fact the case that there is a capital city of the Netherlands, and this capital city is Amsterdam.

When Celan argues that a metaphor is emphatically not a word that, through figurative use of language, corresponds to a state of affairs in an external reality, this is critique against this paradigm. It is critique because Celan calls a figurative interpretation of metaphors in poetry superficial and deliberately offers a case to read and write poetry differently. I will say more about how we can call such a view of poetry in chapter three. For now, I will turn to Nietzsche's views on metaphor. Nietzsche's views are an example of a perspective that expresses why, like Celan, we should not be persuaded by traditional theories of correspondence. In the next chapter, I will reconstruct why Nietzsche thinks correspondence theories of truth are not accurate in their understanding of the relation language-reality.

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[33] Famous advocates of this type of theory of truth as correspondence are Aristotle and Russell. See also Kirkham 1995 for the technical issues relevant to this type of theory.

2. NIETZSCHE'S PERSPECTIVE ON METAPHOR

It is often thought that Nietzsche is primarily critical about philosophical positions and ideas. This is a valid claim; Nietzsche is a specialist in observing where arguments go wrong. However, he frequently presents an alternative position as well. Metaphor is one of the themes in which both aspects are represented; his writings reveal both a destruction of predominant ideas as well as a view to replace these ideas with. I will reconstruct both these strands in this chapter.

During a specific period, that is, the year 1872-1873, Nietzsche concentrated strongly on the topic of metaphor. Three documents are significant here. First, a short essay called *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne*, quoted as *ÜWL*, in which he discussed the origin of the desire for truth in philosophy. This is the most clear-cut presentation of Nietzsche's views on metaphor.[34] Of the same period is a notebook, presented in the *Nachlaß* published by Colli and Montinari and a lecture given to students in Basel entitled *Rhetorik*.[35] These two texts, too, contain passages in which the theme of metaphor is further elaborated upon. I will explain what Nietzsche writes about metaphor by using the *Über Wahrheit und Lüge* essay mainly, and when helpful or informative, refer to either the notebook or the lecture.

Reading advice for Nietzsche's writings on metaphor
When Nietzsche uses the term metaphor, he transforms and plays with the original Aristotelian definition of metaphor. To recapitulate, in the Aristotelian paradigm, a metaphor is defined as "giving the thing a name that belongs to something else" (*Poetics* 21, 1457b 6-7). Metaphor is considered a rhetoric device; it communicates ideas through comparison, and does so for rhetorical effect. Nietzsche overthrows this Aristotelian paradigm and disturbs the categorization of metaphor. He removes it from the domain of rhetoric into domains of epistemology and metaphysics.

This is why a few guidelines are helpful when reading Nietzsche's writings on metaphor. First of all, Nietzsche's use of terms like synecdoche, metonymy and metaphors does not respect the strict technical distinctions.[36] At several points in this chapter, we will see that he calls rhetorical devices

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[34] For *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne*, I have made use of the Kritsche Studienausgabe from Colli and Montinari; see Nietzsche 1967ff, Band I.

[35] For references to Nietzsche's Notebook, see Colli and Montinari, see Nietzsche 1967ff, Band VII. For Nietzsche's lecture, I have made use of the Kritische Studienausgabe from Colli and Montinari, see Nietzsche 1995.

[36] Technically, a synecdoche is a "a figure of speech in which a part is used for the whole or the whole for a part, the special for the general or the general for the special, as in ten sail for ten ships or a Croesus for a rich man". Metonymy is the term used for "a figure of speech that consists of the use of the name of one object or concept for that of another to which it is related, or of which it is a part, as "scepter" for "sovereignty," or "the bottle" for "strong drink," or "count heads (or noses)" for "count people". See www.dictionary.reference.com for the definitions of these terms.

metaphor, whilst they are technically closer to synecdoche or metonymy. In addition, he uses the term 'carrying over' – in German 'übertragen' – to refer to more than rhetorical devices only, and as a result, many phenomena we normally not call metaphor are estimated such.[37] Most importantly however, Nietzsche's working definition of metaphor surpasses the definition of metaphor as a linguistic device, and criticizes philosophical explanations of perception, language and cognition.[38]

Nietzsche's way of handling the term 'metaphor' makes sense if we understand metaphor as a fundamental principle of transference. This position is also held by Murphy, who argues that Nietzsche views figures of speech as different forms of transference. Murphy writes: "Thus, although for Nietzsche the distinctions between metonymy, synecdoche, and metaphor are important, they are finally subsumed as different forms of transference [Übertragung]. (…) [M]etaphor so understood is not simply a matter of language, but denotes the 'fundamental' relationship which humans have to their world. (…) [M]any of the cognitive, linguistic, and hermeneutical acts that Nietzsche describes as instances of transference will *not* be metaphors in the technical tropical sense." (Murphy 2001, p. 23). Murphy's position seems sensible, because Nietzsche's interests lie not in rhetorical devices per se, but in the philosophical problems that arise when we consider metaphor as a fundamental phenomenon of human cognition.

Nietzsche on why we create metaphors
Early in *ÜWL*, Nietzsche asks: "[W]ie steht es mit jenen Conventionen der Sprache? Sind sie vielleicht Erzeugnisse der Erkenntniss, des Wahrheitssinnes: decken sich die Bezeichnungen und die Dinge? Ist die Sprache der adäquate Ausdruck aller Realitäten?" (*ÜWL*, p. 878). Nietzsche's general answer to these questions is that we lack justification to assume that language is an adequate expression of what goes on in reality. He writes: "Was ist ein Wort? Die Abbildung eines Nervenreizes in Lauten. Von dem Nervenreiz aber weiterzuschliessen auf eine Ursache ausser uns, ist bereits das Resultat einer falschen und unberechtigten Anwendung des Satzes vom Grunde" (Ibid., p. 878). His argument is that when we look closely at language, we see that our propositions are never precise enough expressions of objects in reality. They would be precise if one thing was described exclusively and exhaustively. But our language is scarce of words or sentences that do so. Nietzsche has a point. What is the word for the feeling we experience when we get passed in line for the bakery? Dismissal perhaps comes closer than

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[37] This tendency in Nietzsche has led amongst others Schrift to call Nietzsche's view a tropological view of language. Schrift argues that because Nietzsche moves away from a representational model of language towards a rhetorical model of language in which the trope is the paradigmatic case of linguistic usage, instead of the literal expression. Compare Schrift 1985, pp. 379-80.
[38] Nietzsche was very much aware of the technical definitions of metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy. Evidence is his discussion in the *Rhetorik* § 3, see pp. 425-8 and § 7, pp. 442-9. Of course, this makes it interesting to ask why Nietzsche was not true to these distinctions. Compare in this respect Murphy 2001, pp. 21-3, Hinman 1982, pp. 183-4 and Breazeale 1976, p. 304.

discomfort, but is not very precise. In addition, words like discomfort are used for more than only this experience, so how can we properly say that this word describes an event exhaustively at all? Do we even possess the proper words to describe one single experience and cover its meaning totally and completely? These considerations are support for Nietzsche's argument; it is misleading and incorrect to argue that words are true representations of object in reality.

In *ÜWL*, Nietzsche's explanation for this mistake, and its pervasiveness, lies in a human desire for survival. (Ibid., pp. 880-2) I will paraphrase Nietzsche's argument. In his view, human instinct has a deep desire for domination and annihilation, and as a result, is continuously occupied with survival. One of the necessities for survival is the ability to outlive other humans. We do so, amongst others, through conventions. For Nietzsche, conventions are not to ensure our peace and prosperity, but are intricate and rancid means to take over others. Because conventions express and rationalize truth, and because truth has authority, we use conventions to gain power and existence. Truth provides the authority to argue that some people are morally wrong, whereas others are not, and is reason to dismiss others and reclaim ourselves. We can see that Nietzsche believes our existence is quite demeaning and puny. Our desire for truth is part of a desire to survive, making the world our own and solidifying our power. We try to dominate others via purported truths and falsities, but in doing so, are lying. There is no real truth in our statements, they are only powerful means to manipulate others. To make matters worse, we have even forgotten that we lie; we have been doing it for so long, that we have forgotten that we do it.

What is interesting in this sketch of the human condition, is that, for Nietzsche, the process of metaphor plays a fundamental role in the relation language-reality. What we call truth, is the result of a process of metaphor.[39] According to Nietzsche, it involves a process of carrying over meaning from one domain to another. He writes about this in the Notebook:

Ein empfundener Reiz und ein Blick auf eine Bewegung, verbunden, ergeben die Kausalität zunächst als Erfahrungssatz: zwei Dinge, nämlich eine bestimmte Empfindung und ein bestimmtes Gesichtsbild erscheinen immer zusammen: daß das Eine die Ursache des Andern ist, ist *eine Metapher, entlehnt aus **Wille** und That:* ein Analogieschluß.

Die einzige Kausalität, die uns bewußt ist, ist zwischen Wollen und Thun – diese übertragen wir auf alle Dinge und deuten uns das Verhältniß von zwei immer beisammen befindlichen Veränderungen. (Notebook 19 [209], p. 483)[40]

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[39] Nietzsche's view on truth and the relation of truth to the human condition is further discussed in Hinman 1982.
[40] Note that this passage shows Nietzsche's tendency to call non-metaphorical processes, metaphorical. The causality between willing and doing is described as metaphor. Technically, this process is synecdoche, because one thing is singled out, that represents the whole. The causality we experience between doing becomes an

What Nietzsche writes is that we have an inner subjective experience of a causality between willing and doing. What we do is transfer this experience to nerve impressions and visual images, and illegitimately assume that there is a causality between these two spheres. Nietzsche sees this causality as illegitimate and mysterious. He writes:

Ueberhaupt aber scheint mir die richtige Perception – das würde heissen der adäquaten Ausdruck eines Objekts im Subjekt – ein widerspruchvolles Unding: denn zwischen zwei absolut verschiedenen Sphären wie zwischen Subjekt und Objekt giebt es keine Causalität, keine Richtigkeit, keinen Ausdruck… (*ÜWL* p. 884).

In other words, to describe a sensation or expression of an object and then calling it true is illicit for Nietzsche, because he believes that there is no relationship of causality or correspondence between the two, let alone true representation. What is at stake is not a principle of causality, Nietzsche argues. Instead, this is metaphor; we transfer meaning from one sphere to a completely different and separate other sphere.

Nietzsche on the role of metaphor for knowledge
In the process of knowledge, a total of three Nietzschean steps of transference take place. I will describe these steps here. I will first mention the general steps first, and then discuss the arguments and consequences they entail.[41] The first two are described in this passage: "Ein Nervenreiz zuerst übertragen in ein Bild! erste Metapher. Das Bild wieder nachgeformt in einem Laut! Zweite Metapher. Und jedesmal vollständig Ueberspringen der Sphäre, mitten hinein in eine ganz andere und Neue" (Ibid., p. 879). The starting point of the different steps of transference is a nerve stimulus. From this realm of sensation, we make a transfer into the realm of imagination. Next, we act upon another metaphor, when we transfer meaning from our imagination to the realm of language as sound. These are the first two metaphorical steps. The third involves a transference from language as sound into the sphere of concepts.

Our failure to recognize these transferences as metaphors, leads to a category mistake; when we speak or think of objects, we think we actually know them. But Nietzsche writes:

Wir glauben etwas von den Dingen selbst zu wissen, wenn wir von Bäumen, Farben, Schnee und Blumen reden und besitzen doch nichts als Metaphern der Dinge, die den ursprünglichen Wesenheiten ganz und gar nicht

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essential feature of the relations between perception, language and thinking. For a discussion of the difficulties at stake here, see Murphy 2001, p. 25.

[41] See Murphy 2001 for a more extensive explanation of these steps, starting from p. 27. Compare also Nietzsche's *Rhetorik* § 3, p. 426, which mentions the same three illegitimate steps of transference.

entsprechen. Wie der Ton als Sandfigur, so nimmt sich das rätselhafte X des Dings an sich einmal als Nervenreiz, dann als Bild, endlich als Laut aus." (Ibid., p. 879).

By "Sandfigur", Nietzsche refers to the patterns emerging when a surface sprinkled with sand is put into vibrating modes. For instance, when the vibratory wavelength of the vowel 'A' hits the sand, a specific geometrical figure appears.[42] This is a particularly nice metaphor for what Nietzsche wants to convey. In a sense, a sound has nothing to do with sand, they are radically different entities. Moreover, we cannot see how the transfer from sound to sand is made. We assume that it is there, but we cannot visually perceive how. Nietzsche's argument is that though we can perform a transference between one realm and another, these spheres themselves are radically different. Though we are inclined to think that an object in reality corresponds to its image and nerve stimuli, we have no true access to these objects or nerve stimuli at all. We cannot treat different domains as the same, and cannot argue that we know the truth of one domain through the knowledge of another domain.

Note that there are two types of metaphorical processes present in the transference from nerve stimuli to perception. The transference from one domain to another is metaphor in a first sense, because it involves carrying over meaning between two incommensurable domains. This reminds of Aristotle's understanding of metaphor. We give a thing a name that belongs to another domain. In addition, there is a second metaphorical process present in perception, because it involves a process of ordering images according to a principle of sameness. We immediately categorize objects as leafs, trees or flower, without active conscious operations. This is a metaphorical process, because we treat things as though they are the same; we highlight certain characteristics in favour of others.[43]

The same metaphorical processes are present for language, and because of this, language can never be a true or adequate expression of reality. Nietzsche continues:

[W]ie dürften wir doch sagen: der Stein ist hart: als ob uns „hart" noch sonst bekannt wäre und nicht nur als eine ganz subjektive Reizung. Wir theilen die Dingen nach Geschlechtern ein, wir bezeichnen den Baum als männlich, die Pflanze als weiblich: welche willkürlichen Übertragungen. Wie weit hinausgeflogen über den Canon der Gewissheit! Wir reden von einer Schlange: die Bezeichnung trifft nichts als das Sichwinden, könnte also auch dem Wurme zukommen. Welchen willkürliche Abgrenzungen, welche einseitigen Bevorzugen bald der bald jenen Eigenschaft eines Dinges! (Ibid., pp. 878-9).

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[42] For more details, see Chladni 1802. He is commonly associated with the discovery of the technique responsible for these patterns, which is reason why they are called 'Chladni figures' or 'Chladnische Klangfiguren'. In this book *Die Akustik,* Chladni shows different examples of "Klangfiguren" and explains how they can be produced.
[43] Compare also Hinman 1982, p. 185.

To summarize this passage, we apply words and categories as they appear to us, and believe we are expressing how things are for themselves. However, what we really possess are subjective experiences of individual objects, which we, only through artificial, highly sophisticated processes of arbitrariness and transference, can turn into words like 'hard' and 'snake'. This is a strongly anthropomorphic process; in a fundamental way, language is always an expression of how things appear to us.

The third metaphorical process is present in the creation of concepts. Nietzsche writes:

Jeder Begriff entsteht durch Gleichsetzen des Nicht-Gleichen. So gewiss nie ein Blatt einem anderen ganz gleich ist, so gewiss ist der Begriff Blatt durch beliebiges Fallenlassen dieser individuellen Verschiedenheiten, durch ein Vergessen des Unterscheidenden gebildet und erweckt nun die Vorstellung, als ob es in der Natur ausser den Blättern gäbe, das „Blatt" wäre, etwa eine Urform, noch der alle Blätter gewebt, gezeichnet, abgezirkelt, gefärbt, gekräuselt, bemalt wären, aber von ungeschickten Händen, so dass kein Exemplar correct und zuverlässig als treues Abbild der Urform ausgefallen wäre. (Ibid., p. 880).

What Nietzsche writes here is an important part of his argument. We can say that an object is a leaf, but can only do so by forgetting that nothing is ever the same as something else, and dismissing what is individual and real. This is the process through which we come to believe that words are proper expressions of reality, and words have more than an accidental relationship to concepts. In the Notebook Nietzsche writes it down in the following way: "*Metapher* heißt etwas als *gleich* behandeln, was man in einem Punkte als *ähnlich* erkannt" (Notebook, 19 [249], p. 498).[44] It conveys the central point he is making. We believe that knowledge identifies; because we think that a leaf *is* an extended, usually green organ, generated by a plant. Instead, this identification requires an intricate, illegitimate and selective process.

This is an interesting and complicated position. It is interesting, because the same argument must hold for metaphor. If we are consistent with Nietzsche's claims, then metaphor too is a term that is problematic in quite the same way as a leaf is. It too is the result of a process of metaphor. This points to a complicated part of Nietzsche's position; if all language is metaphor, then meta-metaphorical statements too can never be an adequate description of how things stand. This has severe consequences for the status of knowledge. I will show this in the next paragraph.

The consequences of Nietzsche's perspective for a theory of truth as correspondence

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[44] Strictly speaking, this counts, again, as synecdoche, and not as metaphor. Murphy shows why in Murphy 2001, pp. 24-5. What we do is select one aspect of a thing and represent it as the whole or the essence of that thing. Nietzsche's general point, however, is that no word expresses something completely, but only displays a characteristic.

If we think Nietzsche's analysis of metaphor through, we can see that it has important consequences for the methods of science and philosophy. For Nietzsche, the process from perception to language to concepts, is a repetition of a metaphorical process that shows how things appear to us. In short, truth in language is an anthropomorphic expression of anthropomorphic relationships to anthropomorphic impressions.[45] This is so, because the levels that are involved – perception, language and thought – can be seen as processes of leaving out, forgetting, arbitrariness, anthropomorphisms and one-sided preferences.[46]

We can see that, with this viewpoint, methods of both empiricism and rationalism can be criticized. For starters, a consequence of his view is that generalising from individual cases is profoundly illegitimate. This is because we cannot trust data from sense experience as an adequate source for knowledge. For Nietzsche, all concepts are problematic in the same way as the concept "leaf", because they are based on processes of carrying over and selecting. He regards the realm of reality as absolutely incommensurable with the realm of thought. I will show a basic reason why this is so. A leaf in reality is an individual object, whereas a leaf in thought is a general concept. In what way can we transfer from one domain to another, if not on the basis of abstraction or selecting certain aspects and representing them as essential for the object? The transference of reality to thought already implies that we are making a transference from the individual to the general. From Nietzsche's perspective, this is most fundamentally a process of metaphor. This is so, because we select one individual thing, and carry it over to become a member of a concept. But this is something we, as human intellects, do, and not something that reality decrees.

In conclusion, empirical data has no authority for true knowledge. On the other hand, neither do principles of reason; they cannot secure true knowledge either. This rules out rationalistic means to secure knowledge. We have seen that Nietzsche argues that whilst we think concepts are truths and adequate descriptions of things as such, they have nothing to do with reality, and are metaphors only.[47] In Nietzsche's view, rationalistic categories are more anthropomorphic than they are rational.

In a study on Nietzsche's view on metaphor and truth, Hinman shows that Nietzsche's anthropomorphic organisation is actually two-folded. In a passage from Hinman, we can see the two levels on which Nietzsche operates:

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[45] Compare the Notebook: "Von vorn herein sehen wir ja die Bilder im Auge nur *in uns*, wir hören den Ton nur *in uns* – von da zur Annahme einer Außenwelt ist ein weiter Schritt." (Notebook 19 [217], p. 487).

[46] Compare the Notebook: "Alle *rhetorische Figuren* (d.h. das Wesen der Sprache) sind *logische Fehlschlüsse*. Damit fängt die Vernunft an!" (Notebook 19 [215], p. 486).

[47] See pp. 27-9 of this thesis. Compare also *ÜWL*, where Nietzsche writes about our search for truth: "Sein Verfahren ist: den Menschen als Maass an alle Dingen zu halten, wobei er aber von dem Irrthume ausgeht, zu glauben, er habe diese Dinge unmittelbar als reine Objekte vor sich. Er vergisst also die originalen Anschauungsmetaphern als Metaphern und nimmt sie als die Dinge selbst." (*ÜWL*, p. 883).

Concepts, Nietzsche suggests, organize things according to the ways in which they are related to us. In the more obvious sense of anthropomorphisms, this implies that we organize the world of natural objects in terms of explicitly human forms of organization (e.g., social, political etc.); in the less obvious sense of anthropomorphism, we organize things according to the ways in which they stimulate our nervous system, i.e., as they are related to us through sensation. (Hinman 1982, pp. 188-9).

Nietzsche first presents a critique on an epistemological level. By saying that our relation to the world is metaphorical, he shows that our understanding of reality occurs through metaphorical principles, and claims that our knowledge about reality is highly selective. This is epistemological oriented critique. Both the obvious sense and the less obvious sense of anthropomorphism that Hinman speaks about come to mind here. However, this has profound implications for ontological matters as well. From Nietzsche's point of view, metaphorical processes determine the different types of things that exist. The difference between two objects is determined by the way we perceive reality, that is; by our interests and desires. The real demarcation between one object and another is completely hidden from us.

Next to these consequences, I want to bring attention to a consequence that is central to this thesis. Nietzsche's ideas go against a basic philosophical theory like the correspondence theory of truth. Not surprisingly, Nietzsche dismisses theories like these, because he does not believe we have argument in defence of any such relation between reality and language. Reality, meaning and language are spheres that cannot be connected by relations of correspondence, but by metaphorical ones only.

There is a fundamental argument that lies at the basis of Nietzsche's critique against correspondence relations. Murphy conveys this argument when he writes: "The central thesis is that each sphere of reference: the object as it supposedly exists outside of perception, the nervous system, which 'receives' impressions; the imagination, which constructs an image (*ein Bild)*; and both the sound of language and language itself, each constitute *discrete* domains of reality. As such, and this is the crux of this argument, each sphere is incommensurate with the other" (Murphy 2001, p. 27). In other words, correspondence relations cannot hold, because different realms such as language, reality and thought are incommensurable. This claim disturbs the traditional view about the difference between literal and metaphorical words as we saw with respect to Aristotle. I will discuss this in the next paragraph.

Nietzsche's perspective on the difference between the literal and the metaphorical
For Nietzsche, sense impression is always chaotic. This implies that no experience is ever the same as another. We can see this argument in this part of *ÜWL*:

Denken wir besonders noch an die Bildung der Begriffe: jedes Wort wird sofort dadurch Begriff, dass es eben nicht für das einmalige ganz und gar individualisirte Urerlebniss, dem es sein Entstehen verdankt, etwa als Erinnerung dienen soll, sondern zugleich für zahllose, mehr oder weniger ähnliche, d.h. streng genommen niemals gleiche, also auf lauter ungleiche Fälle passen muss. (*ÜWL*, pp. 879-80).

In other words, because no experience is ever the same as another, and a literal expression is one that exclusively and exhaustively describes one experience, language can never be precise enough to cover that experience.

This has further implications for how we understand the literal. Hinman writes: "[T]his seems to be precisely Nietzsche's point: when we look more closely at the notion of the literal which we take for granted as self-evident, and when we begin to work out the full consequences of this notion, we discover that it is a much less coherent notion than we originally thought" (Hinman 1985, p. 386). A purely literal expression for Nietzsche is one in which no metaphorical principle takes place; there is no carrying over, no leaving out, and no treating similar things as though they are equal, but only an exhaustive description of an experience. Of course, within our use of language, this can never occur. And this is why, from Nietzsche's point of view, the literal is an incoherent notion. We apply it continuously, but do not respect its definition.

If we, like Nietzsche, regard all language as a metaphor, we go against the intuition that literal meaning is primary to metaphorical meaning. A basic intuition is that the metaphorical meaning of a word draws on the characteristics of its literal meaning. Suppose, I would call a lady friend of mine an apple. In explaining this metaphor, we could say that my friend has characteristics an actual literal apple has, but that I now use them figuratively, in order to communicate that she is cheerful, youthful and blossoming. In this explanation, we regard the figurative meaning of the word 'apple' to rely on its literal characteristics. Strangely, all of this makes perfect sense to us. However, it is an explanation of metaphor based on Aristotle's paradigm and not on Nietzsche's. If we look at this example from Nietzsche's point of view, the literal use of the word apple is primarily and fundamentally already metaphorical, and not literal, because it is the result of a metaphorical process.

At this point, we are confronted with a problem: how can we distinguish literal and metaphorical use of words in a Nietzschean paradigm? In our example of the apple, how can we account for the literal and the metaphorical use of this word? Nietzsche has an answer to this. He regards the words and concepts that we regard as literal, as historically stiff, 'dead', metaphors. He uses a particularly nice metaphor, the metaphor of the effaced coin, to describe this. He writes: "[D]ie Wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, dass sie welche sind, Metaphern, die abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind, Münzen, die ihr Bild verloren haben und nun als

Metall, nicht mehr als Münzen in Betracht kommen." (*ÜWL*, p. 880-1). Literal words are dead metaphors; they and are worn out and stiff because they have lost their creative powers. [48] Thus, what we regard as a literal apple is a dead metaphor; its meaning is already decided and determined, and we do not use the creative powers we use in living metaphor. In a living metaphor, we have to actively find its meaning though creative processes, which secures that its definition is open.

For Nietzsche, dead metaphors can exist for longer periods of time as literal images, and have a great impact on our social and cognitive structures. He writes:

[W]enn aber eben dasselbe Bild Millionen Mal hervorgebracht und durch viele Menschengeslechter hindurch vererbt ist, ja zuletzt bei der gesammten Menschheit jedesmal in Folge desselben Anlasses erscheint, so bekommt es endlich für den Menschen dieselbe Bedeutung, als ob es das einzig nothwendige Bild sei und als ob jenes Verhältniss des ursprünglichen Nervenreizen zu dem hergebrachten Bilde ein strenges Causalitätsverhältniss sei; wie ein Traum, ewig widerholt, durchaus als Wirklichkeit empfunden und beurtheilt werden würde. (Ibid., p. 884).

To paraphrase Nietzsche's point in this passage; literal words and images are dead metaphors, that have a great impact on the way that reality appear to us.[49] Interestingly, there is a particular nice sense of historicity in this quote from Nietzsche. If we look at the use of metaphors in a particular time in history, we can use them to analyse how reality appears to subjects from that time. Murphy describes it as: "the individual human perceiver perceives in the context of a history of metaphorical perceptions" (Murphy 2001, p. 28). In other words, metaphor reveals how we can perceive the world anew.

Nietzsche's view on metaphors and creativity

Even in passages where Nietzsche's tone is critical, it is clear that he has high esteem for the metaphorical process itself. This is because he values it as an artistic capacity. We can see this, for instance, when he writes:

Nur durch das Vergessen jener primitiven Metapherwelt, nur durch das Hart- und Starr-Werden einer ursprünglich in hitziger Flüssigkeit aus dem Urvermögen menschlicher Phantasie hervorströmenden Bildermasse, nur durch den unbesiegbare Glauben, *diese* Sonne, *dieses* Fenster, dieser Tisch sei eine Wahrheit an sich, kurz nur dadurch, dass der Mensch sich als Subjekt und zwar als *künstlerisch schaffendes* Subjekt vergisst, lebt er mit einige Ruhe, Sicherheit und Consequenz... (*ÜWL*, p. 883).

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[48] Compare also Notebook 19 [228,9], pp. 490-1.
[49] Compare *Rhetorik* § 4, pp. 428-9.

Nietzsche's critique here, is a summary of the critique we have discussed. If we forget that the words, images and concepts we use, are metaphors of reality, and not literal expressions, we fool ourselves into a sense of peace and certainty. Despite this criticism, what is noteworthy is that Nietzsche describes the same metaphorical process as a product of human phantasy. In addition, he also describes metaphor as a mistake, but, and this is significant, he writes that it is a mistake of an artistic, creative human subject. In other words, we require creative artistic capacities to come up with metaphors.

Why metaphors are the result of a creative power is described in Nietzsche's Notebook. He writes: "Es ist eine Kraft in uns, die die großen Züge des Spiegelbildes intensiver wahrnehmen läßt, und wieder eine Kraft, die den gleichen Rhythmus auch über die wirkliche Ungenauigkeit hinweg betont. Dies muß eine *Kunst*kraft sein. Denn sie *schafft*. Ihr Hauptmittel ist *weglassen* und *übersehen* und *überhoren*. Also antiwissenschaftlich: den sie hat nicht für alles Wahrgenommene ein gleiches Interesse. (Notebook 19 [67], pp. 440-1) In other words, for Nietzsche, constructing a metaphor is a creative process because he thinks that to favour one characteristic over another, to overlook or ignore others is a capability that calls for strong imaginative capabilities.

Contrary to what we might think, Nietzsche has high esteem for the artistic creative capacity of metaphor-making. However, it must be done from the right motives. This is visible in the following passage:

Jener Trieb zur Metapherbildung, jener Fundamentaltrieb des Menschen, den man keinen Augenblick wegrechnen kann, weil man damit den Menschen selbst wegrechnen würde, ist dadurch, dass aus seinen verflüchtigten Erzeugnissen, den Begriffen, eine reguläre und starre neue Welt als eine Zwingburg für ihn gebaut wird, in Wahrheit nicht bezwungen und kaum gebändigt. Er sucht sich ein neues Bereich seines Wirkens und ein anderes Flussbette und findet es im Mythus und überhaupt in der Kunst. Fortwährend verwirrt er die Rubriken und Zellen der Begriffe dadurch dass er neue Uebertragungen, Metaphern, Metonymien hinstellt, fortwährend zeigt er die Begierde, die vorhandene Welt des wachen Menschen so bunt unregelmässig folgenlos unzusammenhängend, reizvoll und ewig neu zu gestalten, wie es die Welt des Traumes ist. (*ÜWL*, p. 887).

I interpret this passage in the following manner: We cannot do without metaphors, for they are fundamental to the way we relate ourselves to the world. But, there is a way in which we can separate untruthful from truthful uses of metaphor. If we forget that the proper nature of concepts is actually metaphor, and employ them for rigid, scientific structures, we should be critical. Mostly, because we easily allow for claims we cannot properly defend. However, when we realise that the concepts we use are metaphors, and replace our desire for objective truth for an artistic creative design, creating metaphor is praiseworthy. It is praiseworthy, because it is done for the right motives; we do not aim

for control and power, but enjoy the creative process of metaphor itself. And because we do not aim for control, we can open to the true workings of metaphor.

Nietzsche's has a nice metaphorical image of a painter without hands to illustrate this. He writes: "Ein Maler, dem die Hände fehlen und der durch Gesang das ihm vorschwebende Bild ausdrücken wollte, wird immer noch mehr bei dieser Vertauschung der Sphären verrathen, als die empirische Welt vom Wesen der Dingen verräth" (Ibid., p. 884). Nietzsche writes that a highly disabled painter – a painter without hands –, who expresses a mental picture in singing, discloses more about a trade between different realms than the empirical world reveals about the nature of things themselves. It seems that, for Nietzsche, an artist is always closer to reality. He does not try to present reality in another way than it is. The only truth Nietzsche defends is artistic truthfulness; a metaphor is true if it shows proper motive, innovation, creative power and artistic beauty. It does this if it freely expresses the less controllable and more chaotic existence, where no experience is ever the same as another. Or in Nietzsche's words: if it is the result of "eine fortwährend einströmende Erhellung" (Ibid., p. 889).

But how are true metaphors in Nietzsche's sense created? One answer to this is that a proper creation of metaphor is necessarily dependent on an improper one, because living metaphors react against dead metaphors. I will explain this argument in different steps. Nietzsche writes:

Jenes ungeheure Gebälk und Bretterwerk der Begriffe, an das sich klammernd der bedürftige Mensch sich durch das Leben rettet, ist dem freigewordenen Intellekt nur ein Gerüst und ein Spielzeug für seine verwegensten Kunststücke: und wenn er es zerschlägt, durcheinanderwirft, ironisch wieder zusammensetzt, das Fremdeste paarend und das Nächste trennend, so offenbart er, dass er jenen Nothbehelfe der Bedürftigkeit nicht braucht, und dass er jetzt nicht von Begriffen sondern von Intuitionen geleitet wird. (Ibid., p. 888).

In this passage, Nietzsche makes a contrast between a needy human being and a free intellect. The needy human being is a human being that clings on the framework and planking of concepts for his own preservation. The free intellect, however, destroys these concepts, and plays with them; he throws them through one another, puts them back together, and in doing so, puts together things that are alien whilst keep apart things that are nearest.

The Nietzsche-scholar Tebartz-van Elst explains what these expressions mean for Nietzsche. In doing so, she cites an example of a metaphor in Nietzsche, and explains it. To understand what Tebartz-van Elst writes, it helps to keep Aristotle's definition of metaphor in mind, more precisely, his

fourth type of metaphor as analogy.[50] In this schema four terms are related to each other, in which term "a" is related to term "b", as term "c" is to term "d". Tebartz-van Elst writes the following:

Die Metapher, auf die er sich dort bezieht, lautet ausgeführt: *Der Strom ist der bewegliche Weg, der den Menschen an sein Ziel trägt.* Die Verletzung der logischen Ordnung besteht nun darin, dass das ‚Fremdesten gepaart' und das ‚Nächste getrennt' wird, dass, so können wir jetzt sagen, Begriffe, die verschiedenen Verhältnissen entstammen, miteinander verbunden, d.h. in einer Prädikation gleichgesetzt werden. Dabei entsteht in der Regel eine Unstimmigkeit, in der zum Ausdruck kommt, dass der wörtliche Sinn der Aussage nicht mehr ‚funktioniert'." (Tebartz-van Elst 1994, p. 143).

Let's put what Tebartz-van Elst writes down schematically. Two combinations of two elements are jointed; a paring of strangers and a divorce of alike elements. Using Nietzsche's example, the stream that flows is paired up with human life and its purpose. This is a transfer of meaning between two different spheres; a geographical and an existential one. In addition, two similar elements are separated; that is, the stream and the end of that stream, and human life and the purpose of human life. Note that in the quote from Nietzsche, he called this relation irony. Irony works via a similar principle; it uses words to express a meaning which is opposite to its literal meaning.

The schema I have drawn is what Tebartz-van Elst calls: "Das doppelte Spiel der Metapher, das Spiel des Aufbauens und Zerstörens" (Ibid., p. 141). What Tebartz-van Elst writes is that, for Nietzsche, metaphor is about destruction and construction. Her argument is that the literal meaning of the word no longer works. The literal word is destructed, whereas a metaphorical word is created. This is a particularly nice way of understanding how living metaphors are produced. We make use of the dead metaphors, but destruct the previous relations of transference and replace them with new ones. This is the creative process responsible for living metaphors.

Nietzsche's assessment of the relationship language-reality

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[50] Compare Aristotle *Poetics*, starting from 21 1457b6: "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy. That from genus to species is exemplified in 'Here stands my ship'; for lying at anchor is a sort of standing. That from species to genus in 'Truly ten thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought', where 'ten thousand', which is a particular large number, is put in place of the generic 'a large number'. That from species to species in 'Drawing the life with the bronze,' and in 'Severing with the enduring bronze'; where the poet uses 'draw' in the sense of 'sever' and 'sever' in that of 'draw', both words meaning to 'take away' something. That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second is to the first, as the fourth to the third; for one may then put the fourth in place of the second, and the second in place of the fourth. Now and then, too, they qualify the metaphor by adding on to it that to which the word it supplants is relative. Thus a cup is in relation to Dionysus what a shield is to Ares. The cup accordingly will be described as the 'shield of Dionysus' and the shield as the 'cup of Ares'. Or to take another instance: As old age is to life, so is evening to day. One will accordingly describe evening as the 'old age of the day'—or by the Empedoclean equivalent; and old age as the 'evening' or 'sunset of life'."

For Nietzsche, the relation between language and reality is provided by metaphor, because they are incommensurable realms which can only be bridged by a process of metaphor. Metaphor offers a means of communication between these realms. This implies a major shift in focus when knowledge about reality is concerned. Murphy illustrates this whilst quoting Nietzsche's *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft.* He writes:

He [Nietzsche] insisted on the active, transformative power of language (again, as opposed to mimetic theory of language), arguing that we must "realize that what things *are called* is incomparably more important than what they are. The reputation, name, and appearance, the usual measure and weight of a thing… all this grows from generation unto generation, merely because people believe in it, until it gradually grows to be part of the thing and turns into its very body." Consequently, "it is enough to create new names and estimations and probabilities in order to create in the long run new 'things'". (Murphy 2001, p. 29).[51]

We can interpret Murphy as follows. Nietzsche replaces the predominant epistemological and ontological relationship between object and subject in metaphor with an artistic one, which implies a focus on names and relations instead of "what things are". This implies that, instead of concentrating on objects in reality for knowledge, we need to focus on how we have been identifying objects and what this reveals about how we interpret them.

The analysis of Nietzsche's view on metaphor shows a significant conclusion that plays a central role in my project. For Nietzsche, all language is the result of a metaphorical process. This implies that no metaphor can be hold truer than another on the basis correspondence relations. In the *Rhetorik*, Nietzsche writes: "Es giebt gar keine unrhetorische *Natürlichkeit* der Sprache, an die man appeliren könnte: die Sprache selbst ist das Resultat von lauter rhetorischen Künsten" (*Rhetorik* § 3, p. 249). This quote conveys the same claim; we cannot allow for truth on the basis of correspondence relations to external reality. The only act we can perform is artistically express reality through living metaphors.

This makes Nietzsche's views about truth highly modest in their scope and status. Nietzsche's view on truth is perspectival; if metaphor involves a highly selective activity, then language always shows one perspective on reality, and not a full-fledged version of how things really are. This makes his account also relativist; the historically dead metaphors of one era can differ from another era, and truth is defined by the metaphors that prevail. We can see this modesty when Nietzsche writes: "[Z]wischen zwei absolut verschiedenen Sphären wie zwischen Subjekt und Objekt giebt es … sondern höchstens ein *ästhetisches* Verhalten, ich meine eine andeutende Uebertragung, eine nachstammelnde Uebersetzung in eine ganz fremde Sprache. Wozu es aber jedenfalls einer frei

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[51] See for the Nietzsche quote, Nietzsche 1967ff, Band III, § 58, p. 422.

dichtende und frei erfindenden Mittel-Sphäre und Mittelkraft bedarf" (*ÜWL*, p. 884). Thus, what is at most possible is a process of imprecise carrying over; 'a re-stuttering translating in an utterly alien language'.

Nietzsche's overall perspective on metaphor illustrates why we should not be persuaded by traditional theories of truth as correspondence. In the next chapter, I will return to the poetology of Paul Celan. This is not accidental. In a way, Celan has practiced precisely what Nietzsche suggests that remains after criticising traditional relations of correspondence; a 're-stuttering translating in an utterly alien language.' In addition, like Nietzsche, Celan criticizes traditional theories of truth as correspondence. At the same time, both Celan's highly creative use of metaphors, and his claim that we should do away with relations of correspondence, lead to a further challenge. If language and thought no longer corresponds to reality, how can we distinguish meaningful poetry from poetry that is not meaningful? Part of the answer is what we discussed in chapter one; Celan claims that a highly particular kind of reading experience can lead to a fundamental insight. But in what way does this secure meaningful poetry? In the next chapter, I will answer this question and claim that the concept of 'authenticity' plays a central role here.

3. CELAN ON A PROPER AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE OF POETRY

With the help of Nietzsche, I have demonstrated that traditional relations of correspondence are not convincing to institute meaningful language. However, this leads to a challenge; if we want to maintain that meaningful language is possible, what do we develop as an alternative? Reading Celan's texts, both poetic and theoretical, shows that there is a difference between proper and improper metaphors. Some metaphors meet Celan's standards, whereas others clearly do not. For instance, the metaphor from the 'Todesfuge,' "schwarze Milch der Frühe", is improper, if we read it in terms of figurative meaning and rhetoric, but proper, when it is a singular experience of reality. What are Celan's criteria for this, and why does this experience have a compelling status? To properly assess these criteria, I need to look more closely at what specifically and precisely delimits a proper aesthetic experience in Celan. This involves multiple questions: First, what are the significant necessary characteristics of proper poetry in Celan? Second, what is the kind of reality that is addressed here? We have seen that Celan describes this reality in terms of phenomenality, but what kind of experience is precisely meant? Third, what do proper metaphors ask of language and experience?

I will use these questions as a hallstand for a steady but pressing, step by step search aimed at answering a more general question; what is a proper aesthetic experience for Celan about? For this purpose, we need to broaden our scope by looking not only at what Celan claims about metaphor, but what he writes about poetry in general. In Celan, the presence of authentic metaphor and authentic poetry are strongly connected, because what he clarifies as responsible for making metaphors authentic, is also what makes authentic poems so. If we broaden our scope, we gain more insight into what is essential for both to be examples of authenticity. Note also that though Celan clearly makes a distinction between two types of interpretation of metaphor, he does not use the word 'authentic' in the quotes we have discussed. Despite this, it is a particularly apt concept because it brings together a few essential characteristics of Celan's statements about proper poetry. This is the reason why I will claim that this is a key term in understanding Celan's views on proper poetry.

The concept of 'authenticity'
In general, "the term 'authentic' is used either in the strong sense of being 'of undisputed origin or authorship', or in a weaker sense of being 'faithful to an original' or a 'reliable, accurate representation'." (Varga & Guignon 2016, p. 1). Let's look at a few situations. A first interesting use of the word authentic occurs in social interaction. For instance, someone could say that I did not act authentic in a particular situation. What persuades that person to say this is that somehow my actions were not in accordance with my genuine ideals, motives or desires. This sense of authentic refers to matters of moral psychology, that deal with responsibility and identity. Here, human behaviour is

ideally characterized as a genuine expression of our identity. We genuinely express ourselves, if we act according to our own desires, thoughts, ideals and motives.[52]

Another example of the term 'authenticity,' is concerned with the authenticity of works of art. In this context, we aspire to know whether an object of art is really, that is; originally, from the author. For instance, a particular painting is called an 'authentic Munch', if the painting is actually produced by the author himself, and is not a copy or a falsification. Note that with this sense of authentic, comes a sense of authority. If a particular painting is a real Munch, it receives an elevated status; it gets a central place in a museum, increases in financial cost, etcetera. Another sense of authenticity is present in historical objects. For instance, we call a vase from the Roman Period authentic, if there is unquestionable evidence that supports that it is produced in that time period. These two senses of authenticity both fall under the heading 'being of undisputed origin or authorship'. Next to these stronger versions, there are weaker senses of authenticity possible. For instance, we tend to call a particularly adequate copy of a painting of Van Gogh authentic, if it accurately likens the original. Though it is not originally from Van Gogh, we call it authentic, but only in the sense that it is a reliable representation. In these cases, the original painting is authentic in the strong sense, whereas the copy is authentic in the weaker sense.

A famous and interesting article in this context is an article by Benjamin: 'The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technical Reproducibility' (Benjamin 2003, pp. 251-83). He writes: "The presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity" (Benjamin 2003, p. 254) This phrase can be read as a summary of Benjamin's views on authenticity. For Benjamin, an object of art is authentic if the object is fully present here and now, that is, if it cannot be at more than one place at the same time (Benjamin 2003, p. 254). For Benjamin, authentic works of art are original works of art. With original, Benjamin expresses precisely the above sense of undisputed origin from Varga and Guignon. A work of art is authentic if it can be materially and historically traced back to the artist himself, and not to another artist (Benjamin 2003, p. 254).

This implies that an authentic work of art is unique and permanent; there is only one object that has existed and continues to exist as this particular object of art. For Benjamin, only works of art that have this "presence of the original" are authentic. Reproductions of works of art are not authentic, not even in a weaker sense. Because authentic works of art are unique and permanent, they have authority. They have a superior status over reproductions. For Benjamin, this implies that fields of art that work explicitly through reproduction, such as film and photography, are not properly authentic. He uses this analysis of authenticity to show that the technical opportunities to massively reproduce works of art, profoundly change the effects of art (Benjamin 2003, p. 251).

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[52] Charles Taylor is one of the proponents of this ethics of authenticity. Compare for instance Taylor 1933.

I will compare Benjamin's views with the views extracted from Celan about metaphor in chapter one, to display what I call authenticity. A work of art for Benjamin is authentic as a material and a historical object, however, in Celan, it is the experience of a metaphor that is rendered authentic. In spite of this, his statements on metaphor show that metaphors are authentic if they present a particular kind of experience. For Celan, the experience is authentic, if it is present here and now, and loses its authenticity if we are no longer fully immersed in it.[53] This qualifies authentic experience as a particular state of experience that is also fully present. As such, it is unique and original in a similar way as Benjamin's works of art. An authentic aesthetic experience too, exists as the sole version of that particular experience; that state of experience has no equal and stands on its own. In addition, this also means that it cannot be reproduced. Note that this is authenticity in a strong sense here. Because an experience of a metaphor is singular, it cannot be reproduced.[54] This implies that a reproduction cannot properly exist, neither can it be called authentic or not. Despite these similarities, an important difference is that, for Celan, an authentic experience has no permanency; because a state of experience is singular, it cannot endure through time, and cannot sustain in other forms than that particular state of experience.[55]

We saw that Benjamin attributes a sense of authority to authenticity. For Celan too, an authentic aesthetic experience has a type of authority. In short, this is because an authentic aesthetic experience is a state of experience that lies in a particular connection with the poem as original language. I will summarize this, and explain its constituent parts. An authentic aesthetic experience is a state of experience, because it is an experience of the poem that is present; it feels real and is real. This particular state of experience is not enough; for Celan, we need to connect with language in a particular way. I am now referring to the notion of 'mittragen' and its connotations.[56] In that experience, we need a particular connection with language, in which we share responsibility for its content and the possible insight it hides. Finally, language must be represented in a particular way, namely as an original phenomenon. This refers to what I said about metaphors being phenomenal characters. For Celan, language should not be a medium, but an original appearance.[57] If we connect with this original appearance in that particular way and experience it as a singular experience, Celan's standards are met. Further up in this chapter, I will demonstrate that when they are met, fundamental insights are experienced. This is a part of the reason why authentic experiences have authority; they are singular phenomena but at the same time fundamental elements of knowledge. I will indicate that

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[53] Compare also pp. 15-8 this thesis.
[54] See pp. 15-7 of this thesis.
[55] See pp. 15-8 of this thesis.
[56] Compare p. 15.
[57] See p. 18.

this has ethical connotations, too, because Celan presents a compelling ideal for a proper reading and writing of poetry.

Celan on the nature of a proper aesthetic experience
In 1978, Levinas wrote a short article to answer why Celan's poems and poetology are so exceptional. In this article, he uses two elegant and informative expressions of what a poem for Celan is about.

Here then is the poem – perfected language at the level of an interjection, of an expression as little articulated as the blink of an eye or a sign given to one's neighbour! Sign of what? of life? good-will? complicity? Sign either of nothing or of complicity for no reason: to speak without speech. Or a sign which is its own signified: the subject signals that gift of sign to the point of making itself into a sign. An elementary communication, without revelation – mumbling infancy of discourse, awkward entry into the celebrated "speaking of language," the celebrated "*die Sprache spricht*": a beggar's entry into the "dwelling place of Being. (Levinas 1978, p. 16)

I will take a closer look at two phrases from this larger passage. The first is the phrase: "a sign which is its own signified" and the second is: "the subject signals that gift of sign to the point of making itself into a sign".

Both phrases show the crux of the views from Celan on metaphor that we saw in the first chapter. For instance, the expression "a sign which is its own signified" cannot allow for any relation of correspondence, because for this relation to hold, we need to keep apart the sign and the signified, and we need to uphold some kind of description of a correspondence between the two. Celan's vision of a proper poem, however, as this phrase suggests, is a view where sign and signified overlap completely. We know the consequence; it means that even the most beautiful and poetic expression of a landscape, person or feeling is actually inauthentic, if it does not coincide with that very landscape, person or feeling. For instance, as long as there is a difference between the landscape and the language that articulates the landscape, this allows for relations of correspondence. It allows for a framework where language can be said to correspond to a particular aspect of external reality. Celan deliberately wants to move away from interpretations of poems that allow for relations of reference and correspondence.

For a proper aesthetic experience, Celan wants to let different realms collapse into one singular experience. This is visible in the second passage in Levinas: "the subject signals that gift of sign to the point of making itself into a sign". To understand this sentence, it helps to decode it a bit. Let's take the subject as the writer of the poem, signaling as writing poetry, and the sign as the poetic message. Following this analysis, Celan's position is that the writer of the poem – through the process of writing poetry – becomes the poetic message itself. Being that poetic message itself, means that he,

thus our writer, is now poetic message only, without subject and without object. This is actually not easy to picture, for both intuitively and philosophically we would not readily defend the position that a writer is identical to the poetic message he conveys. Instead, we are prone to argue that these are categorically separate. However, this is not Celan's view. For Celan, a writer is a writer of proper poetry if he can be poetic message only.

For an authentic poetic experience in Celan's sense, there needs to be a lack of a traditional poetic experience. This almost reads like a contradiction. What I mean is that Celan claims that a proper poetic experience is not about reading a poem and relating to its meaning in a personal psychological sense. His poetology is deliberately aimed at avoiding associations like these. For a poetic experience to become a proper poetic experience, it needs to lose the private poetic perspective and exist as a singular phenomenological experience. Gottfried Bern gives us a helpful analysis in describing what Celan is after:

Aber die Form *ist* ja das Gedicht. Die Inhalte eines Gedichtes, sagen wir Trauer, panischer Gefühl, finale Strömungen, die hat da jeder, das ist der menschliche Bestand, sein Besitz in mehr oder weniger vielfältigem und sublimen Ausmaß, aber Lyrik wird daraus nur, wenn es in eine Form gerät, die diesen Inhalt autochthon macht, ihn trägt, aus ihm mit Worten Faszination macht (Benn 2001, p. 21).

We can see the difference between an authentic and an inauthentic experience we just described. For a poetic experience to be a proper poetic experience, it need not be about private experiences. We need to move beyond this, and become the experience of the poem itself. Benn writes that authentic poetry lies "content made autochthonous". One interpretation of Benn is to say that a proper experience of poetry is a particular type of original experience. We can read a poem, and in doing so, have associations and personal feelings. But a proper experience of a poem, is an aesthetic experience in which the experience itself has no equal. This is why it is original and autochthonous; it arises out of the interaction between reader and poem, but as such, exists as a singular state of experience; when it is experienced, it is experienced here and now. This is also reason why it is a state of experience, because it exists solely and exhaustively as an experience.

Celan on the relation of poetry and reader to a proper aesthetic experience
We have described a part of Celan's view on proper poetry as a state of experience. What are his criteria for poetic language and the way we should connect with poetic language to obtain authenticity? For language, the same structural paradox that Celan mentions in relation to experience is visible. In order for language to be language proper, we need to drop a specific use of language, and reconnect with original language. The scholar Lotz writes that language and words in Celan point away

from themselves. Language becomes a passage to what is talked about in speaking. (Lotz 2011, p. 498). Lotz writes: "Only now does it [the poem] emerge as detached from the representing activity of the speakers and consists in the pure appearance [*Erscheinung*] of speaking itself." (Lotz 2011, p. 501). In this passage, we can see again the phenomenological emphasis on original experience of language itself instead of a private experience. Another way in which Lotz describes this process is: "the radical decontextualization of the words used or new words invented in the poem, that open up new surprising connections within these words. It is only in this way that the poem shows a tendency to use language autonomously and to reconnect the act of speaking with what this speaking is about." (Lotz 2011, p. 500).

The word 'autonomous' captures another essential part of Celan's characterization of authentic experience. The term shows that authenticity for Celan lies in connecting with language and experience in such a way that they acquire a sense of independency and freedom of expression that they did not have before. Remember in this context what Celan wrote about metaphor and carrying over. Metaphor should not carry over meaning from one domain to another; instead, we should carry with metaphor.[58] This means that the subject writing or reading the poem is no longer autonomous, but language as phenomenological experience is. This is proper carrying with, and part of what settles authentic language. Lotz writes: "Once arguments are understood and decided we can leave them behind; once we have read a newspaper article, we can throw the paper away. Language, in these cases, does not appear as such and as what it is; rather, it is used for something else after which it disappears as a phenomenon." (Lotz 2011, p. 501). In other words, inauthentic language is language that is a medium for expressing reality, but authentic language is not a medium, but an original appearance of language.

In conclusion, Celan claims that writing poetry does not involve any distance between seeing and that which is seen; there is solely participation in experience. Poetry is about participating in the poem to the extent that one becomes the experience of the poem. Language, and on a smaller level, metaphor, succeeds, and can be authentic, if it takes place, or collapses into this experience. But for this, language needs to appear as an original instantiation, it needs to appear as an original phenomenon.

Note that the terms 'autochthone,' 'autonome' and even 'authenticity' all have 'auto' as a constitutive element. This demonstrates that an authentic aesthetic experience, for Celan, is an experience that is limited by an experience that stands on its own and originates in itself. Authenticity in poetry and metaphor lies in connecting to language to the extent that there is no "connecting"

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[58] Compare in this respect pp. 14-5 of this thesis.

present. At this point, experience, language and reality completely coincide, and phenomenological reality is fully experienced and present.

Celan on the fundamental insights we experience in a proper aesthetic experience
Another characteristic of Celan's aesthetic experience is that it is singular as well as universal. An experience of poetry is both a separate and singular experience, as well as an experience that reveals universal content, because it captures something in a fundamental and compelling way. For instance, in Der Meridian, Celan speaks about Büchner's *Dantons Tod*. In this play, Büchner lets Marion say to Danton: "Danton, deine Lippen haben Augen". About this sentence, Celan makes the same claim he made in regard to the *Todesfuge*. He writes: "das ist keine moderne Metapher, das ist Wissen, von weither, um das Wissen Seherische eines Munds" (Celan 1999, p. 159). In other words, the phrase should not be understood as a metaphor, but as 'the visionary insight of a mouth'. What could Celan mean?

There are two ways of interpreting Marion's words. If we read the sentence, "Danton, deine Lippen haben Augen" as a traditional metaphor that involves correspondence, we could say Danton's expressions have a sense of sharpness or insight according to Marion. In first approximation, eyes are regarded as the dominant sensory organs with which we relate ourselves to the world. Lips are those body parts that are responsible for speaking and affection. In consequence, by comparing lips with eyes, or by attributing characteristics of eyes to lips, Marion is saying that his words are observant, insightful, or sharp, or that he is expressing affection through his lips.

All of these levels may combine in Danton, and this might be a defendable interpretation of Büchner's intentions here, but this is not the point Celan wants to make. As the *Celan Handbuch* mentions: "Dichtung wäre hier die aus dem Todesbezug stammende Wahrnehmung der bevorstehenden Wahrheit und nicht die künstliche Übertragung eines Organs auf das andere durch bloße Metapher…" (Markus, Goßens, & Lehmann 2008, p. 173). This shows another reading. In the face of death, where no control is possible, truths often enforce themselves upon us. We can no longer deny their existence. Lips become eyes in the sense that there is no additional transference needed between what is seen and what is expressed. It is not that we see a truth, and next, express it, and that these acts belong to different domains. No, if lips are eyes, insights are identifiable with language. It expresses Celan's main point about authentic poetry; if we can come to an authentic aesthetic experience of poetry without relations of correspondence, we can directly experience fundamental insights. A phrase like "Danton, deine Lippen haben Augen," can, if we ensure an authentic experience of it, come to exist as a universal insight. This is why Celan's argument for authentic experience has authority, because it leads to an experience of fundamental insights that are superior to traditional interpretations of poetry.

Note that 'experiencing insights' is a very interesting phrase in this context, because it combines the cognitive and emotional aspects that are involved in aesthetic experience. On the one hand an authentic insight has a cognitive aspect; we are in possession of an element of knowledge. At the same time, part of the insight is emotional. It is the part that feels that what we now know is new, fundamental and compelling. An insight is not only an understanding, but also a feeling of an understanding. These two aspects are united in the phrase from above.

Note also that there is a strong ethical dimension to these claims. What Celan expresses is normative and value-laden, because it proclaims proper and improper communication with poetry. The way we communicate with poems is ethical because poems for Celan are actors. As such, they have an immediate effect our emotional and cognitive make up, and effect aesthetic behavior. The idea is that we should not read poems from a distance and think about its rhetorical devices, meaning, or references. Instead, we should carry with the poem by becoming it. This is an ethical ideal not only for reading properly, but also for a proper writing of poetry. As a consequence, the way we relate ourselves to poetry is altered greatly; it changes how we interpret it, understand it, appreciate it, accept or deny it as art, and it changes the way we relate ourselves to the objects in that poem. Traditional ways of interpretation that look for the meaning of a poem are replaced by experience. We understand a poem if we properly experience it, not if we know where its metaphors stand for. The difference between proper and improper poetry lies in whether it evokes an authentic aesthetic experience.

In this chapter, I have aimed to show that the concept of authenticity is very apt in squaring Celan's statements about proper metaphor, because it combines the qualities unique, original and authority and because it expresses an ethical ideal. The fact that Celan makes this difference, shows that metaphors in Celan can indeed have a possible claim for truth. They can claim to be authentic or not. This allows for a critical question to Celan's project; can't we still detect remainders of correspondence in Celan, and, consequently, how do we have to reassess a theory of truth as correspondence? If we specify truth as authenticity, and define authenticity as a state of experience that is in an appropriate connection with an original instantiation of language, could this be a candidate for a theory of truth as correspondence?

To illustrate that there a way to present a theory of truth based on Celan's views, I will look at the phenomenological position of Edmund Husserl on truth and correspondence. There are two reasons for this. First, because I need to structurally explain how Celan's equation between a metaphor and a state of experience can allow for a relation of correspondence that secures authenticity. I will address this problem with Husserl's emphasis on the notion of fulfilment. In addition, I need to show how reality as experience, and not reality as physical reality, can be a starting point for a process of knowledge that leads to truth. Experience is precisely Husserl's starting point of

an analysis of the process of knowledge. Important to note is that, in the attempt to build up a theory of authenticity based on Celan, I will utilize Husserl's concepts for my own aims and motives.

4. HUSSERL'S KEY CONCEPTS FOR A THEORY OF TRUTH AS CORRESPONDENCE

Main challenges for a theory of truth based on Celan's views

In this chapter, I will show that Husserl offers basic concepts that show that we can formulate a theory of correspondence based on Celan's statements and standards.[59] I will demonstrate the challenges a theory of correspondence based on Celan faces and how we can answer these challenges with the help of Husserl. The general challenge a theory of truth as correspondence based on Celan's views faces is that a correspondence theory of truth is usually made up of three components; truth-bearers, truth-makers, and a relation of correspondence.[60] The possibilities for connecting truth-bearers and truth-makers in terms of correspondence relations are ample, but in Celan, matters are different from the start. There are two possible ways to formulate Celan's position with respect to correspondence. We can either claim that that there is no correspondence or claim that there is a total correspondence. We can say that there is no correspondence in Celan in the traditional sense. Language and reality cannot be related in terms of correspondence relations, because Celan believes that in authentic experience they collapse. At the same time, and precisely because language and reality collapse, we can say that there is total correspondence. For authenticity to appear, we need correspondence relations in which both elements from language and from reality simultaneously correspond.

Thus, truth lies in a lack of correspondence relations between language and reality or in a complete overlap between language and reality. But could we properly call either of these positions a correspondence theory of truth? Isn't it a necessary feature of correspondence theories of truth that these are separate, but can be equated to allow for truth? The entire possibility of a correspondence theory seems lost, because there are no real candidates to secure its structure and sense. Thus, the challenge is to find amidst the entities that collapse into identity, a relation that can be called correspondence. It means that, in some way, we need to find some sort of difference in each and every identity relation.

In a general outline of different types of correspondence, the scholar Mosteller writes of two of these possibilities (Mosteller 2014, pp. 111-114). His target is different, because it is aimed at showing the problems for correspondence theories such as those from Russell, Wittgenstein and Austin, but his insights apply. Mosteller starts with making a list of different possible candidates for a

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[59] Husserl's views have altered through different phases of his life. His views in the *Ideen* are not those of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, and again not those of later periods. I have used his views anachronistically. My aim is to see whether concepts from Husserl can help to construct a theory of truth as correspondence. I use his views in the *Ideen* to support my argument that experience can be the starting point of fundamental knowledge, whereas I have apply his thoughts from the *Logische Untersuchungen* to show how a singular experience can allow for relations of correspondence.

[60] Compare pp. 20-2 for a general sketch of theories of truth as correspondence, and for references to literature.

relation of correspondence, such as thing/fact and mind/proposition. One of these candidates is a relation of correspondence between mind/mind. A mind-mind correspondence theory regards thoughts, beliefs or concepts to be true in terms of correspondence with other thoughts, beliefs or concepts. This works especially for propositions we regard to be true, but that do not exist independent from minds.

For instance, the proposition "it is 3 degrees Celsius outside" may be a proposition we regard as being objectively true, nevertheless, when we look more closely at this phrase, we can see that it is also a mind-dependent truth. We can objectively establish the truth of this proposition by going outside and making repeated observations on temperature scales, and we can have these duplicated by different people to solidify these observations. However, the temperature scale we use and the criteria for objectivity we apply are based on human choice and convention. Fahrenheit and Celsius scales are human standards. With Nietzsche, we can argue that propositions like this do not get truer or more objective if we go outside and check. There are fundamental gaps between the realms of thought, language and reality. Thus, even a proposition in which only a minimal sense of mind is involved, is actually strongly dependent on mind-mind relations. Mind-mind theories of correspondence are able to explain the truth of propositions in terms of correspondence to other beliefs. Naturally, they are often relativistic about truth-claims that are dependent on states of affairs or facts in the outside world.

The similarity of mind-mind theories with our case is their structure; in mind-mind theories of correspondence the truth-bearer is identical in type with the truth-maker. This was also our challenge with respect to Celan. In Celan, authentic experience arises when the phenomenological character of the poem corresponds with the phenomenological experience of the subject. Thus, here too, the correspondence takes place between a truth-bearer and a truth-maker that are identical in type; phenomenological experience must correspond with phenomenological experience. According to Mosteller, correspondence in mind/mind cases can work. He writes: "[T]here are at least two reasons that the relation of mind/mind is acceptable in ways that thing/thing, proposition/proposition, or fact/fact are not. First, with minds (thoughts, beliefs, or concepts within minds) there is the possibility or two different minds entertaining the same thought, belief or concept. Thus, truth might consist in the relation of two minds entertaining the same thought, belief, or concept." (Mosteller 2014, p. 112).

If we apply this to Celan, it would mean that correspondence lies in a correspondence between the experiences of different readers, or reader and writer. This does not reflect what we have read about Celan sofar, and is not a proper image of Celan's motives either. Though authentic poetry for Celan is defined as dialogue, his aim is explicitly not that poetry evokes similar experiences in different subjects, or that they are authentic if their content is shared. Instead, Celan claims that metaphor and poetry are radically untransportable and singular; an authentic metaphor is by

definition and necessity a non-shared metaphor. Thus, this possibility is not helpful in our case. What Mosteller's example indirectly shows however, is the fact that authentic poetry for Celan is actually a very independent and secluded experience.

This is problematic, because of its implications. If authenticity cannot be shared amongst different subjects, the perpetual insights that arise from authentic experience are secluded too. Because authenticity lies in an experience that lacks correspondence, authentic statements are isolated. This may be difficult to understand, especially if we think of the universal insights that singular poetic experiences bring. Aren't these in some sense shared, we might ask? For instance, does the sentence, "Danton, deine Lippen haben Augen", not express a general insight that is shared between subjects that experience the insight?

For Celan, it seems we cannot secure authentic insights. To explain why, I will have a look at the writings of Anton Marty, more specifically his *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie* (Marty 1908). Working on the application of Brentano's descriptive psychology, Marty writes about the concept of "Uneigentliches Vorstellen". The basic idea is that in naming things, we often have improper presentations of these names. Marty uses the example of the number "million"; we cannot precisely apperceive a sum of a million units and examine these in our imagination, we can only perceive it somewhat abstractly as "a very high number". The fact that we lack precision and accuracy makes these presentations improper. (Marty 1908, p. 459) We have seen a similar argument in Nietzsche with regard to experience.[61] For Marty, the philosophical problem is this; if most of our perceptions are improper, how can we claim that I have the same perception of a name as another person? This question becomes even more acute, if we ask of two persons, one has a perception of "million" and the other a perception of "thousand times thousand", whether they share or don't share the same presentation. Compare this quote:

Aber auch in Fällen, wo der Sprechende und Angeredete gleichmäßig bloß eine uneigentliche Vorstellung des genannten Gegenstandes besitzen, etwa weil eine eigentliche die Kräfte unseres Vorstellungsvermögens überhaupt übersteigt (wie wenn es sich um den Begriff einer größeren Zahl oder um den Begriff Gottes handelt), geht es in allen den Fällen nicht an, die Erweckung einer in beiden sich Unterredenden inhaltgleichen Vorstellung als mittelbare Intention des Namens zu bezeichnen, wo dieser nicht eben die uneigentliche Vorstellung zur Bedeutung hat (d.h. im Hörer erwecken will), die dem Sprechenden als Surrogat dient. Derselben eigentliche Begriff, z.B. der Begriff Tausend, kann ja, wie wir wissen, surrogativ durch verschiedene andere vertreten werden. (Marty 1908, p. 463)

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[61] Compare p. 31-2 of this thesis.

I will explicate this quote. Marty argues that meaningful communication is possible even if concepts can only be improperly presented. We can communicate these concepts through the use of surrogates. Concepts that by their nature exceed proper presentation are concepts like a million or God. We cannot properly imagine these in definite presentations. But we do possess presentations of these concepts; these are improper and differ between subjects. Marty calls these improper presentations surrogates; they are surrogates because they are different substitutes for one concept. This means that different individuals can use the same concept, but have different presentations of it. This means that, even if individuals have improper presentations, they can successfully communicate. In conclusion, Marty argues that we can possess complex presentations, presentations of God or of a million, that do not really correspond, because they have no adequate presentation. He also argues, that despite this, meaningful communication is possible.

However, for Celan this is different. The reason for this is that an improper presentation can never be an authentic presentation, and an authentic presentation can never be shared. An improper presentation is not authentic because it lacks full presence of phenomenological reality. In addition, a proper presentation can never be shared, because this allows for relations of correspondence and a loss of authenticity. For Celan, these distinctions do not matter. It does not matter whether there is a difference between a concept and our presentation of it, of whether concepts can be properly presented or not. He does consider these distinctions vital, because he considers the existence of a presentations as a particular kind of experience important. A presentation is proper if it is a state of experience that connects with a particular instantiation of language.

There is another option of mind-mind correspondence that Mosteller mentions. He continues: "Second, one individual mind can entertain similar thoughts, beliefs, or concepts. One's mind can at the same time entertain similar thoughts of what the world is like where the coherence of the relations between one's thoughts, beliefs, or concepts putatively determines what is true about the world" (Mosteller 2014, p. 112). This second possibility might apply to Celan if we are able to contain a singular phenomenological experience in one person, that is, if we can precisely describe the content of that experience. That way, we can compare it with others for coherence and truth. But as Mosteller immediately continues: "If this is how truth as correspondence is understood, then one is faced with the difficulty of showing how mere coherence of similar beliefs within minds can make those beliefs true". (Mosteller 2014, p. 113).

In our case, Mosteller's challenge is even more daring. The general challenge was that we need to construct a correspondence relation that can secure truth between a truth-bearer and a truth-maker that are identical in kind; both belong to phenomenological reality. In Celan's wiritings authenticity is exhausted by one singular experience. This adds a further difficulty to our challenge.

We need to show how truth, in the sense of authenticity can be based on one token; that is, on one singular experience.

General connections between the views of Husserl and Celan

I will show that we can answer this challenge with the help of concepts borrowed from Husserl. There is a lot of Husserl that resonates in Celan. I will indicate the general similarities that are important for our aims in this paragraph. First of all, both authors allow experience to be a central concept in thinking about relations of language, reality and subject, and think that truth obtains within experience. Their aims are different though. Husserl is after a foundation for philosophy as rigorous science through redefining fundamental philosophical concepts.[62] Celan's intention is to question the nature and purpose of true art. However, the choice of experience as the location for truth is the same; it is here that either rigorous science or authentic poetry obtains. Note that the kind of reality that is addressed is very different from other versions of correspondence theories. Traditional correspondence theories of truth speak of reality and refer to facts, state of affairs, events, objects, things, properties, tropes, etcetera, that are regarded to exist in the outside word of physical reality (David 2015, heading 2.2). Both Husserl and Celan speak about reality in terms of a reality of experience.

For Husserl, the structure of this experience is constitutive of knowledge. Objects appear in a specific way to consciousness; as perceptions, memories, interpretations, etcetera. For Husserl, it is the way that objects appear to consciousness that is responsible for our knowledge of them. I will give an example to make this more specific. Suppose we are listening to a performance of Vladimir Horowitz playing Robert Schumann's *Träumerei.* For Husserl, true knowledge of this musical piece, for instance knowledge about rhythm, harmony or intonation is ultimately not determined by the musical instruments, or by the physics of sound. Neither is this knowledge completely based on subjective criteria. It is not the case that knowledge of, for instance, a crescendo in the piece is based on dreams, hopes or desires of the listener. Instead, for Husserl, it is the experience of the music that serves as starting point for an analysis of knowledge. This is middle ground between theories that argue that the external world is dominant in the constitution of knowledge and theories that claim that our internal world is responsible. In Husserl's case, the realm of experience is where truth can be determined and solidified. The basic term to keep here in mind is intentionality. Objects appear as they appear for consciousness, and consciousness appears as it appears, because it is directed towards objects. This counts for Celan as well. For Celan, too, experience is central for authenticity.

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[62] Husserls views regarding this theme are in the essay 'Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft'; see Husserl 2009 or Husserl 2003 for an English translation.

Another general structural similarity between Celan and Husserl reminds of the Apellian theme. Apelles was a Greek painter, who supposedly tried again and again to capture the foam on a horse's mouth. He failed time and time again, and because of this, was said to become so angry that, he threw the sponge he used to clean his plate, against the painting.[63] Unsurprisingly, it hit the exact part of the horse's mouth, and reflected the foam he so much desired and endeavored to catch. This structural motive, in which you can only truly capture something if you let go, is visible in both Husserl and in Celan. In Husserl's case, this is through the phenomenological and eidetic reductions. These are cognitive techniques that involve letting go – or putting between brackets – our judgments about the nature and existence of reality. This is to ensure the proper objects of knowledge, namely phenomena or experiences. This holds for Celan as well. It is through letting go of language, experience and reality in the traditional sense, that we gain language, experience and reality in the authentic sense. The operations of letting go, coincidence and purification differ of course, but, what is important for our purposes is that truth can be the result of a specific process. This will be an essential part of the theory I propose.

Another parallel is that both Husserl and Celan speak about phenomenological reality in terms of direct and immediate access. Husserl argues in the *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie*, that in the eidetic seeing we perform in phenomenological experience, we have immediate and direct access to essential characteristics of objects. According to Husserl, the perception of an object starts with what is originarily present in the experience of that object. He observes that when we see, think or speak about things, we possess specialized, original intuitions about the manner in which objects appear to us in experience. The way we experience objects shows that we perceive not only particular and factual details about objects, but also types of and principles of objects. Husserls calls these "originary intuitions of experience". He writes:

Die fundierenden Erkenntnisakte des Erfahrens setzen Reales *individuell*, sie setzen es als räumlich-zeitlich Daseiendes… (…) Ein individueller Gegenstand ist nicht bloß überhaupt ein individueller, ein Dies da!, ein einmaliger, er hat als „*in sich selbst*" so und so beschaffener seine *Eigenart*, seinen Bestand an *wesentlichen* Prädikabilien, die ihm zukommen müssen… (*Ideen* I, 2, pp. 12-3).[64]

In other words, ordinary perception already posits the factual existence and expresses the essential characteristics of the object. Husserl has a point of course; the fact that we use a cup to drink from

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[63] In the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, Sextus Empiricus uses this story of Apelles to explain the concept of ataraxia in the pursuit of happiness. See Sextus Empiricus 1933, p. 19.
[64] Reference to the Husserl's *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologishen Philosophie* occurs as follows: the abbreviation *Ideen* I, 5, p. 12 refers to the first book of the *Ideen*, paragraph 5, and page 12 in the Husserliana edition. For the *Ideen,* see Husserl 1950, Band I. For an English translation of the text, compare Kersten 1983.

and a book to read in, and do so without further ado, shows that we assume them to exist and know what they are essentially about.

Husserl calls the activity with which we see essential characteristics intuition and what it is we see by phenomenological intuition, the essence or Eidos of an object. He continues with writing: "*[Es gehört] zum Sinn jedes Zufälligen, eben ein Wesen, und somit ein rein zu fassendes Eidos zu haben*, und dieses steht nun unter *Wesens-Wahrheiten verschiedener Allgemeinheitsstufe*…" (*Ideen* I, 2, p. 12). This means that, in experience, objects appear to us in a way that presents their essence, and this can be perceived in a clear or unprejudiced manner. But what are essences and what is intuition more precisely? With respect to essences, Husserl also describes them as "the What of an Individuum (*Ideen* I, 3, p. 13)," and gives an example. He writes: "So hat z.B. jeder Ton an und für sich ein Wesen und zu oberst das Allgemeine Wesen Ton überhaupt oder vielmehr Akustisches überhaupt – rein verstanden als das aus dem individuellen Ton (einzeln, oder durch vergleichung mit anderen als „Gemeinsames") herauzuschauende Moment…" (*Ideen* I, 2, p. 13). What Husserl means to say is that from the perception of one individual tone, in one single moment, we can identify the essence of tone itself, that is to say, that it is a sound. We do this immediately and instantly, without any explicit cognitive descriptions. Thus for Husserl, there is something immediate and direct in knowing, for instance, that a tone is a sound and not a color, or that a giraffe is an animal and not a color. This may seem trivial, but for Husserl, it is essential, because he regards this capacity as highly basic and fundamental for truth. It is through a further analysis of this process that he presents his foundation for philosophy and science.[65]

Celan, in turn, too believes that we can have direct access to fundamental insights of our experience of reality. I have analyzed that authentic experience is the key to these insights. In an authentic experience, we have direct access to phenomenological reality, and because of this, we can experience fundamental insights. In contrast to this, indirect access is access that is not authentic, does not have this direct access, and is attached to correspondence relations. This implies untruths in the sense of non-authentic truths. Though they may lead to alleged insights like "A thing of beauty is a joy for ever" as a figurative expression of the meaning of beauty in life, these are not the fundamental insights that Celan appeals to.[66] Not because they are trivial, but because they do not go beyond a traditional explanation of metaphors. Both Husserl and Celan therefore believe that there is a type of inner experience that is both available and necessary to access and objectify truth.

The concepts of 'correspondence', 'experience' and 'fulfilment' in Husserl

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[65] For more about Husserl and eidetic seeing see Kohák 1978, Detmer 2013 and Lomar 2010.
[66] The line "A thing of beauty is a joy forever" is the first of John Keats' poem Endymion, see Keats 1988, p. 106.

The starting point of Husserl's ideas is that we should suspend our judgments about reality and focus our attention on experience instead. Through a process of reductions, and his so-called eidetic method, Husserl claims that there is a place in which the realms of reality and consciousness come together. This is the realm of experience. Sparrow explains to what realm Husserl refers. He writes: "The proper object of phenomenological study is the "pure phenomenon," that which is not taken as something real, but as something that is immanent to consciousness, which itself it not to be taken as real." (Sparrow 2014, pp. 28-9) By immanent Husserl means immediately self-given to consciousness. Our thoughts and experiences are self-given whereas objects in the outside world are not. External objects are objects we can only see from a particular angle, but never all at once. These restrictions do not count for our inner experiences. This is because, according to Husserl, we have an immediate and transparent access to our thoughts that we do not have regarding external objects. This is why they are self-given.[67]

This means that correspondence, for Husserl, does not lie in a correspondence of a thought of an object to the external object itself, or even in the correspondence between a thought of the object and a perception of the same object. Willard explains: "The "match up" here between the consciousness and the object is not, like that between the thought of the object and the perception of the object, an identity of the partial intentions or meanings. It is an intentionalistic correspondence between the meanings in the encompassing act through which the object is bodily present and the constituents (parts, properties, structures) of the object itself. It is this correspondence which Husserl determines to be truth, and which can be itself made "bodily present" by reflection on cases where the synthesis of fulfilment is carried out" (Willard, 1991, p. 6) An even better, clearer and more precise, explanation is that correspondence, and as an immediately consequence truth, exists, when the intentionality of consciousness and the intentionality of the object completely overlap. This is what Willard calls intentionalistic correspondence. It is a correspondence between the way that objects appear to us in consciousness, and the way consciousness expects the object to be. We know a truth about a musical piece if and only if the way that the musical piece is present in experience coincides with the way that our consciousness experiences that musical piece. If these totally correspond, there is fulfillment. We experience the object just as it appears.

Truths arising from this are of the type: 'a note is a sound', or 'a sound has a frequency' and 'a sound has a timbre'. They present universal insights, but can only be extracted from particular experiences. This dynamic, arriving at universal ideas through particular experiences, is related to Husserl's theory of seeing essences. Husserl describes perception in terms of "originary presentive intuition" (*Ideen* I, 3, p. 13). Perception is a type of experience, that allows objects to be given - or to

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[67] See also Carman 1999, pp. 208-210 for a further explanation of these terms.

be presented - in an original way. Objects are given solely and wholly as they appear to consciousness. Husserl's claim is, that in this immediate consciousness, the object is given to us in its evident essentialities, and thus that we can come to know universal characteristic of objects through singular experiences. The scholar Sowa calls this "eidetic abstraction", and shows precisely how the singular and universal are combined for Husserl. His example case is the experience of a new kind of headache. About this case he writes:

What in immediate, pure and simple feeling is something absolutely individual, unique, and private – this utterly particular pain, persisting in exactly this way and localized in thus and such a place in my head, this individuated pain belonging only to me – thereby becomes something upon which an act of meaning is based, a nominal and propositional "categorical consciousness" [*Denkbewusstsein*] that grasps the particular quality of this pain as a "new type" of pain, raising it to *the sphere of the universal, the ideal*. (…) [W]e "borrow" the entire content of the currently felt pain and "transpose" it into the universal through deictic ideation. (Sowa 2011, p. 14)

The idea is that original, particular and individual experiences of eidetic seeing, bring forward universal elements. These can be less or more straightforward; for instance, they can lead to simpler cases like "this is a sound", but also to judgments that require more analysis, like; "this musical piece is based on improvisation". Later on, we will see that this idea offers a strong contribution to a possible theory of truth as authenticity.

The way that Husserl builds a theory of truth as correspondence, brings inspiration for a possible theory of truth that is able to meet the challenges from Mosteller. To repeat the challenge, we need to show how a structure of identity between poetic language and a subject's experience can secure truth in the sense of authenticity, and we need to show how this can be based on one singular experience. We are in need of a theory of truth that allows for correspondence as differentiation first, but that makes truth dependent on identity. A way to meet this challenge is through a phased process of truth. This reminds again of Husserl's theory of truth. His views about this are most precisely described in the fifth chapter of the *Logical Investigations* VI. In this chapter, Husserl tries to show how truth arises. I will quote a larger passage in which Husserl summarizes his theory:

So weist die Erwägung der möglichen Erfüllungsverhältnisse auf ein *abschließendes Ziel der Erfüllungssteigerin* hin, *in dem die volle und gesamte Intention ihre Erfüllung*, und zwar nicht eine intermediäre und partielle, sondern *eine endgültige und letzte Erfüllung* erreicht hat. Der intuitive Gehalt dieser abschließenden Vorstellung ist die absolute Summe möglicher Fülle; der intuitive Repräsentant ist der Gegenstand selbst, so wie er an sich ist. Repräsentierender und repräsentierter Inhalt sind hier identisch Eines. Und wo sich eine Vorstellungsintention durch diese ideal vollkommene Wahrnehmung letzte Erfüllung verschafft hat, da hat sich die echte *adaequatio rei et intellectus* hergestellt: *das Gegenständliche ist genau als das, als welches es*

intendiert ist, wirklich „gegenwärtig" oder „gegeben"; keine Partialintention ist mehr impliziert, die ihrer Erfüllung ermangelte.

Und damit ist eo ipso auch das Ideal jeder, und somit auch der signifikativen Erfüllung gezeichnet; der intellectus ist hier die gedankliche Intention, die der Bedeutung. Und die adaequatio ist realisiert, wenn die bedeutete Gegenständlichkeit in der Anschauung im strengen Sinnen gegeben und genau als das gegeben ist, als was sie gedacht und genannt ist. Keine gedankliche Intention, die nicht ihre Erfüllung fände, und zwar ihre letzte Erfüllung, sofern das Erfüllende der Anschauung selbst nichts mehr von unbefriedigten Intentionen impliziert. (Husserl 1984, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Band XIX/2 VI §37, pp. 647-8).

In general, fulfilment is a term Husserl uses for an experience of coincidence. In this passage, he starts with saying that there is something like partial fulfilment and final fulfilment of mental acts. The latter, final fulfilment, arises when intuition corresponds to intention. It arises when the act we perform when we see an object, corresponds to the act through which thought understands the object. In other words, what we conceive as the meaning of the object completely corresponds with the way the object appears to us in perception. This is the point where an ideal of complete correspondence is arrived at, and where an object is itself, as it is in itself. Truth arises precisely in the complete overlap between what is meant and what is given.

In conclusion, at the point where the object is present precisely and fully as it is intended, the truth of the object is obtained. Mosteller explains this as follows: "Husserl attempts to make a phenomenological characterization of knowledge as the fulfilment of an intuition (a mental state derived by seeing an object) by an intention (a concept in the mind directed toward some object) which in its final form is "being in the sense of truth, *correspondence* rightly understood, the *adaequatio rei ad intellectus*" (Mosteller 2014, p. 144). Imagine we are looking at the first edition of Celan's *Sprachgitter*. The way that this volume appears to us in experience is what Husserl calls the intuition of the object. For example, we perceive the front cover of the edition, we see the title inscribed, and we see the color and size of the book. In this intuition, the object already appears to consciousness in a specific way. We possess preliminary concepts that explain how it will look like in size, color, function and condition. This is on the account of intention; it is that part of experience that is already directed to objects in a particular way. Now, if the intuition and the intention completely overlap, in other words, if the way that the object appears to us completely corresponds to the preliminary concepts we have about the object, we have arrived at a stage of fulfilment. At this stage, our perception of the object completely corresponds with our conception of the object. Note that for perceptions of physical objects, complete fulfillment is difficult. We can never see a book from all angles at the same time, but only see one side, thus a complete fulfilment of perception and thought is impossible.

A way of conceptualizing this process is by saying that in the stages leading up to fulfilment, there is correspondence of parts, but no identity. Though parts of the intuition are fulfilled by the intention, others are not. In the phase of final fulfilment, there is complete identity present; the content of the intuition and the content of the intention completely overlap. We can no longer pull apart what was intuited and what was intended. If this stage is reached, truth obtains. Husserl's concept of fulfillment shows that a structure of identity between reality and consciousness can allow for truth on the basis of experience.[68]

This schema is crucial, because it is a way to meet the challenges I posed. Celan's views on poetry express that in reading poetry we start out with relations of correspondence and reference, in which the realms of experience, language, reality and the subject are separate. This is inevitable. However, despite this initial reading, Celan claims that for an authentic aesthetic experience of poetry, we need to have a very particular type of experience. In this experience, different realms collapse into each other to such an extent that we cannot pull them apart. They make up one singular experience. Thus, though we start with correspondence relations, we arrive at an experience of identity. It is this process that allows for fundamental insights, for only the result of this experience, an authentic aesthetic experience is a fundamental insight. Interestingly, Husserl's concept of fulfilment fits Celan's singular experience very well. They are similar in structure and effect. The idea that truth is the result of a process of correspondence leading up to identity, the concept of fulfilment, and the emphasis on a particular experience as basis for fundamental truths, give a framework that supports the standards raised by Celan. In the next chapter, I will evaluate this theory of truth as authenticity further.

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[68] I need to say that for Husserl the two acts remain formally separate. Compare: "Man bemerkt, daß die Vollkommenheit der Adäquation des „Gedankens" an die „Sache" ein *doppelte* ist: einerseits ist die Anpassung an die Anschauung eine vollkommene, da der Gedanke nichts meint, was die erfüllende Anschauung nicht als ihm zugehörig vollständig vorstellig macht. Offenbar sind darin die früher unterschiedenen beiden Vollkommenheiten zusammengefaßt: sie ergeben das, was wir als „objektive Vollständigkeit" der Erfüllung bezeichneten. Andererseits liegt in der vollständigen Anschauung selbst eine Vollkommenheit. Die Anschauung erfüllt die in ihr terminierende Intention nicht selbst wieder in der Weise einer Intention, die noch der Erfüllung bedürftig wäre, sondern sie stellt die *letzte* Erfüllung dieser Intention her. Wir müssen also unterscheiden: die Vollkommenheit der *Anpassung an die Anschauung* (der Adäquation im natürliche und *weiteren* Sinn) von der sie voraussetzenden Vollkommenheit *der letzten Erfüllung* (der Adäquation an die „Sache selbst)." (Husserl 1984, Band XIX/2, *Logische Untersuchungen Band* II, VI, §37, p. 648).

5. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF TRUTH AS CORRESPONDENCE BASED ON CELAN

The essence of a theory of truth based on Celan's views

The reconstruction of Nietzsche's argument on metaphor in chapter two illustrated that he has specific standards for the relation truth, language and reality. In this final chapter, I will use Nietzsche's standards as an example to demonstrate whether a theory of truth as correspondence based on Celan's views can be defended. I will discuss why this theory does not fall into the drawbacks of traditional correspondence theories, and I will discuss two further charges that can be made on behalf of Nietzsche; a charge of anthropomorphism and one of relativism. But first, I will describe what the essential features of the correspondence theory based on Celan's views are about.

As a recapitulation, I will summarize Celan's views by quoting and paraphrasing a larger passage from *Der Meridian*. Celan writes:

But this as-always [of the poem] can be nothing more than verbal communication - not, then the abstract concept of speech - and presumably a "correspondence to," and not only because this is suggested by another form of communication, a "correspondence with." But language become reality, language set free under the sign of an individuation which is radical, yet at the same time remains mindful of the boundaries established for it by language, of the possibilities laid open for it by language. This as-always of the poem can, to be sure, only be found in the poem of that person who does not forget that he speaks from under the angle of inclination of his existence, the angle of inclination of his position among all living creatures. Then the poem would be – even more clearly than before – the language of an individual which had taken on form; and, in keeping with its innermost nature, it would also be the present, the here and now. (Celan and Glenn 1978, pp. 35-6).

With "as-always" Celan refers to the potential way in which a poem always exists for us. Even if we do not properly experience a poem, it always exists as a possible authentic experience, and this experience can come to existence if we properly read a poem. In the quote, Celan expresses how we can do this. As he writes, we should replace "correspondence to" with "correspondence with." We should not allow for "abstract concepts of speech," and for traditional interpretations of poetry, but properly carry with language. If we carry with language, we can become reality and connect with a particular state of experience. This leads to what Celan calls "individuation;" it leads to a singular but original experience that experiences a fundamental insight. In this experience, language appears to us in a specific way, because we are restricted to an original appearance of language as a phenomenon. This implies limitations, but, at the same time, it is only through these limits that the possibility of fundamental insights arises. This then is the "as-always" of the poem that is now present; underneath correspondence to, there is always the possibility of correspondence-with. We can connect with this, if we appropriately connect with the poem; that is, if we carry with the poem. If we can make that

particular connection with original language in this original way, we are able to "speak from under the angle of our existence", we can express fundamental insights about how things appear to us. This is not a personal experience nor a personal insight, but a singular experience that is at the same time an insight. It leads to "the language of an individual which has taken on form", it leads to universal insights made possible through singular acts of experience.

For Celan, poetry is paradoxical. When a reader starts out reading poetry, every entity involved expresses relations of correspondence; reality is not met, but expressed; the reader is involved in private experiences; language is a means to convey a message; and metaphors and poems present rhetorical instruments. Authenticity is reached at the point where these different realms collapse into a particular state of experience. I have explained this as a state of experience that lies in an appropriate connection with an original instantiation of language. Truth, in the sense of authentic truth, was formulated as both a complete lack of correspondence, and a complete presence of correspondence. I have used the paradoxes in Celan to support the thesis that truth as authenticity can lie in a process that is necessarily phased, in which we start out with relations of correspondence between language and reality, but end with a singular experience of phenomenological reality in which these different realms collapse.

In essence, the theory based on Celan comes down to the following. Truth in poetry is specified as an experience of authenticity. An experience is an introspective state of being. Initially, such a state experiences relations of correspondence between language, reality and subject, where the meaning of poetry is expressed in terms of traditional correspondence relations. However, for this experience to objectify truth, it needs a structure of fulfilment, where language, an experience of reality and the experience itself all collapse into one singular experience. I have specified this as a state of experience, that is in an appropriate connection of 'mittragen' with an original instantiation of language. If these standards are met, authenticity obtains. Experience is present in an original and unique way, and has authority. This is an authentic experience of poetry; it is real because it is present, and it feels real because it is an experience of a radical singularity that is at the same time a fundamental insight of a poem.

Nietzsche's main critique against correspondence theories of truth
Despite their differences in style, aims and motives, Celan and Nietzsche have similar views about the relation language-reality. For instance, they both regard metaphors as primary in determining the nature of this relation. Nietzsche's arguments for doing so are philosophical. He dismisses the correspondence theory of truth by showing that, from a conceptual point of view, the literal is an incoherent notion; no word ever expresses something completely and exhaustively. The way we primarily and predominantly relate ourselves to reality is through metaphor. Nietzsche also shows that

we have no proper grounds to argue that reality and language are connected in referential relations upheld in traditional correspondence theories of truth. This critique shows that language itself, as well as the relationships between reality, imagination, language and concepts are essentially metaphorical; they carry over meaning from one sphere, but do so without any defining structure of correspondence. For Nietzsche, these realms are absolutely incommensurable.

Celan also separates his views about the relation between reality and language from a correspondence theory of truth, and offers a creative inversion of it. Metaphors, in his view, do have a reference, in the sense that they *are* the very reference. In Celan's view, metaphors and poems, if authentic, are solely phenomenological reality. In authentic language, the distinction between metaphor and what it refers to, is absent; there are no traditional relations of correspondence. In addition, Celan too, considers metaphors dominant to literal words. If authentic metaphor is actually anti-metaphor, if it is a singular phenomenological experience that reveals fundamental truths, then it is this experience that is primary and has authority. The request for this type of experience is compelling; it asks of us to aim for authentic experience in poetry and promises that this will lead to fundamental insights. It assures us that if we are able to connect with language in such a way that words themselves speak, an experience that requires maximum attentiveness, focus and phenomenality, we will experience authentic reality and possess fundamental elements of knowledge. Thus, Celan, like Nietzsche, regards metaphor as a key concept in relation language-world.

Celan and Nietzsche also follow a similar tactical approach. They redefine metaphor and, with this concept, attack what they consider wrong about traditional approaches to metaphor. Nietzsche defines metaphor as 'any carrying over whatsoever', and uses this scope to show that a theory of truth as correspondence is inconsistent. Nietzsche illustrates the untruthful, anthropomorphic and pretentious ways in which traditional correspondence theories of truth adhere to metaphysical realism. Celan insists upon a definition of metaphor as a phenomenological reality in which 'no carrying over whatsoever' takes place. He argues that in metaphor as a rhetorical device, too much carrying over, and no carrying with, takes place. He calls this inauthentic use of metaphor, and contrasts it with authentic use of metaphor. He rejects any view that looks for metaphors and their meaning in the traditional sense, and dismisses any concept of metaphor that includes a relationship of correspondence. In this context we can remember the quote about his poem 'Todesfuge', in which he wrote: "Schwarze Milch der Frühe: Das ist keine jener Genetivmetaphern …, dat is Wirklichkeit" (Celan 1999, p. 158).

The candidate for a theory of truth as correspondence I have proposed does not fall into the drawbacks Nietzsche's perspective on metaphor illustrated. This is because it shares Nietzsche's doubts and demands on the relation truth-language-reality. In the end, authenticity, is not based on correspondence relations. Instead, it acknowledges that the relation language-reality is essentially a

metaphorical one, on the basis of the idea that a metaphor is most fundamentally an experience, and that experience is the only realm we have proper access to. Authenticity is explicitly not defended through correspondence relations of language to the outside world, but on the basis of experience only. It reflects that knowledge of the world that is object for us, is already present in experience, and that by arriving at a proper experience, we can have access to this knowledge. Authenticity is structured by a collapse of different realms, in which one singular experience experiences a fulfilment of the relation language-reality. It is the structure of fulfilment together with the notion that experience is fundamental for knowledge, that allows for authentic insights. These are present as singular experiences, that cannot be repeated or be transferred. On this level too, no traditional correspondence relations take place.

A charge of anthropomorphism

A further critique from Nietzsche can be that a theory of truth based on experience is anthropomorphic. For Nietzsche, concepts are nothing but psychological needs and desires in disguise. This critique is especially forceful against phenomenologically based theories like the one I have proposed, because these theories are based on a first person point of view or introspective experience. We can easily argue that the knowledge gained is essentially subjective. However, this is only relatively the case. The theory purposefully does not point to experience as personal human experience, but to phenomenological experience, in which the "human" in human experience, after a correspondence of different realms, such as reality, consciousness, language, is actually lost in its subjective sense.

Instead, it secures authentic knowledge in a way that human experience is the medium in which knowledge appears as it appears to human beings, but not as human personalities. This is where singular experience properly takes place; in the realm of phenomenological reality. The authenticity of experiences even depends on it, because the moment a private experience is present, a singular experience is gone. The theory I am defending is anthropomorphic in the sense that it is concerned with human experience; it is about the way we, as human beings, relate ourselves to the world, or how the world appears to us as human beings. But because this is the only thing we can do, because we do not have access to other realms, it is not vulnerable to Nietzsche's critique. It does not allow for any claims about other realms, nor their objective or absolute status.

But does this not leave the theory vulnerable to a further critique: if authentic truth isn't about objective and absolute truths, then what is the status of an authentic insight? I will explain this by looking at a further similarity between Nietzsche and Celan; they both argue that metaphors have a hidden and an open side. Nietzsche articulates this in the idea that we are both infinitely gifted and infinitely limited in artistic expression, because within that expression, we can only accomplish "eine

nachstammelnde Uebersetzung in eine ganz fremde Sprache" (*ÜWL*, p. 884). We have no reasons to assume any kind of safe access to reality, but can only rely on our artistic talents to carry over meaning from one domain to another. This too allows for hidden as well as open sides of metaphors; on the one hand, reality is never accessible, but on the other hand, there is an expression of reality possible.

Celan shares this view on language. He often speaks about true poetic experience in terms of dialogue, passage or encounter, which are opaque as well as hidden. Celan calls a poem "einmalig Unübertragbar und Gegenwärtig" (Celan, 1999, p. 145); an authentic poem hides an authentic experience that cannot be copied or transferred. Nevertheless, it is an authentic proper experience and, as such, a fundamental insight. Nietzsche and Celan thus both feel that no single experience can be the same as another, and that our language is extremely poor in expressing these. At some points, Celan comes actually very close to Nietzsche in voicing this. For instance, Celan writes in *Der Meridian* that writing poetry is "in eines Anderen Sache zu sprechen – wer weiß, vielleicht in eines ganz Anderen Sache" (Celan 1999, p. 8). This is comparable to Nietzsche's metaphor of expression: "eine nachstammelnde Uebersetzung in eine ganz fremde Sprache" (*ÜWL*, p. 884).[69]

For Celan, there is no proper language; no mother tongue for writing poetry. This makes sense especially in the light of Celan's multilingual background and difficult relationship with German language. He grew up in an environment speaking Hebrew, German and Romanian, he wrote most of his poems in German. As mentioned in the introduction to chapter one, German was the language of his mother-tongue, but also the language of the assassinators of the Jews and responsible for the death of his parents. Celan felt he has to transform the German language to make it authentic again. (Felstiner, 1986, p. 251-2).[70] In a way, we can see Celan's poetry as an overall answer to this, for both Celan poems and his poetology express a search for ways in which language can become authentic.

In any case, both Nietzsche and Celan believe we should try to capture experience, despite the fact that this is difficult, and that what we gain has little status. For Nietzsche, the attempt to do so lies in the aesthetic relationship between language and reality, and in our ability as aesthetic subjects to express ourselves. We can express the chaos of reality in language by creating living metaphors. For

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[69] More passages between Celan and Nietzsche are compatible in this manner. Celan writes: "Gedichte sind poröse Gebilde: Das Leben strömt und sickert hier aus und ein, unberechenbar
eigenwillig, erkennbar und in fremdester Gestalt." (Celan 2005, p. 108) This reminds of Nietzsche's metaphorical characterisation of the relation between the realm of sensation or imagination and that of language. Compare his quote about the disabled painter: "Ein Maler, dem die Hände fehlen und der durch Gesang das ihm vorschwebende Bild ausdrücken wollte, wird immer noch mehr bei dieser Vertauschung der Sphären verrathen, als die emprische Welt vom Wesen der Dinge verräth (*ÜWL*, p. 884) Another example is Nietzsche's characterisation of the transference between a nerve impression to an imagination to a reference to Schlegel in *Der Meridian*, Celan writes: "F. Schlegel: Das Bild ist die Erlösung des Geistes von dem Ding. Indem er ein Bild von ihm dichtet, ist das Ding nicht mehr." (Celan 1999, p. 160).
[70] Compare p. 6 of this thesis.

Celan, this attempt lies in art as well, but more specifically in writing or reading poetry as an authentic experience.

This idea that authentic experience has closing as well as opening aspects, that are mutually dependent, is in different ways part of the theory of truth as authenticity. First, we can say that traditional correspondence relations close authentic experience, whereas when these relations collapse authentic truths are opened up. Second, though authentic experience reveals fundamental insights, these are closed for others. Because every authentic experience is singular and unique, it cannot be transferred, and truths remain locked in a momentary singular experience. In conclusion, truth lies solely in what is expressed in the authenticity of a singular phenomenological experience, and claims about the sustainability of truths cannot be made. Fundamental and universal elements of knowledge cannot endure beyond the presence of singular phenomenological experience in time and place. The structure of authenticity itself keeps these elements of knowledge closed, because they are captured and bounded by the limits of language, subject, and reality as they are present in authentic experience.

Thus, truth is determined by a singular phenomenological experience, and though it expresses a universal part of phenomenological reality because of its authenticity, it is immediately lost, if it stops being this experience. Even when the experience has become language, when it is written down, it needs to become an authentic experience again before it can be called true again. By that time, the reality of before has changed, and the experience of insight is no longer the same as before. In a way, this part of the theory gives a new understanding of Nietzsche's definition of the literal. One of Nietzsche's arguments was that the literal should involve a complete and exhaustive description of an experience. Nietzsche thought that this could never be accomplished. In a way, however, our singular phenomenological experience is Nietzsche's literal, because in its authenticity, it expresses that reality completely and exhaustively.

The theory is thus a strongly relativist one; it conveys that there is a type of experience that actualizes truths and leads to fundamental elements of knowledge, but at the same time argues that these truths vary depending on context. Not only what we can express, but also the truth of what we can express and the extent to which we can communicate truth is very limited. This cannot be otherwise, for authentic experiences are singular and cannot be shared. For a correspondence theory of truth, this means that though we can localize truth in authentic experience, we cannot retain it. We cannot share it intersubjectively, nor accumulate it in ourselves. Authentic experience is thus volatile; it evaporates as soon as it has arisen. It is a matter of finding it, experience it, and losing it again. Thus, authentic singular experience brings fundamental and universal truths, but not absolute nor objective ones.

A charge of relativism

The previous analysis has important implications for the status of the theory. If the statements in this theory, too, are based on authentic experiences that are volatile, then how can we claim that they are superior to other theories? This relates to a charge that Nietzsche holds against correspondence theories; he demonstrates that self-application of theories of correspondence often leads to inconsistencies. In this context, we can remember what Nietzsche argued about the concept of the literal. If we take serious what correspondence theories of truth define as the literal, we see that it is an incoherent notion. Is my candidate inconsistent as well, because it claims that truths are volatile, but at the same time fundamental? Perhaps we do not have to claim that they are superior. Celan and Nietzsche show why. Compare this passage from Nietzsche:

Alles was den Menschen gegen das Thier abhebt, hängt von dieser Fähigkeit ab, die anschaulichen Metapher zu einem Schema zu verflüchtigen, also ein Bild in einen Begriff aufzulösen; im Bereich jener Schemata nämlich ist etwas möglich, was niemals unter den anschaulichen ersten Eindrücken gelingen möchte: eine pyramidale Ordnung nach Kasten und Graden aufzubauen, eine neue Welt von Gesetzen, Privilegien, Unterordnung, Gränzbestimmungen zu schaffen, die nun der anderen anschaulichen Welt der ersten Eindrücke gegenübertritt, als das Festere, Allgemeinere, Bekanntere, Menschlichere und daher als das Regulirende und Imperativische. (*ÜWL*, p. 881-2)

I will look at this passage from a meta-metaphorical point of view, or in other words, I will look at the metaphors that Nietzsche uses for metaphorical processes. In the above case, Nietzsche explains the metaphorical transference from image to concept. He uses different verbs to explain the process of this transference; he calls it "verflüchtigen," "aufzulösen," "aufzubauen" and "schaffen". Some of them, like 'volatilizing' and 'dissolving' belong to a domain of chemistry, where substances have the ability to vaporize or dissolve. The other two, 'constructing' and 'generating,' are metaphors associated with construction work.

However, and this is what is interesting, these are not the only two umbrella metaphors that Nietzsche uses for the concept of metaphor. In other cases, metaphor is expressed in artistic qualifications. An example of this is: "Mit schöpferischem Behagen wirft er die Metaphern durcheinander und verrückt die Gränzsteine der Abstraktion, so das z.B. den Strom als den beweglichen Weg bezeichnet, der den Menschen trägt dorthin wohin er sonst geht." (*ÜWL*, p. 888). Though some of the metaphors for metaphor lie again in the sphere of construction, for instance when he speaks about "Gränzsteine", others express creation or a pleasing game. In addition, in other passages, Nietzsche associates metaphor with the Grecian gods Dionysius and Apollo; metaphor is

now a natural force, irrational and chaotic or, in contrast, rational and law-like (*ÜWL*, pp. 880-891). In other words, Nietzsche uses different overarching metaphors in his treatment of metaphor.

Celan acts in the same way as Nietzsche; he uses different and multiple umbrella terms to characterize metaphor. He often calls a poem a journey that is travelling or following a path. For instance in this sentence: "Das Gedicht ist einsam, Es ist einsam und unterwegs" (Celan 1999, p. 9).[71] He also speaks of a poem and of metaphors in terms of a location or a crossroad. One particularly nice example is the meridian, which is the geographical term for the imaginary lines that walk from north to south pole; these lines square the latitude circles parallel to the equator (Celan 1999, p. 12).[72] Often, metaphor or poems "meet" on the meridian or crossroad (Celan 1999, p. 12). Sometimes they "speak" and thus express communication or contact.

Further examples of metaphors for metaphor in Celan are the "I which has forgotten itself" or "the actor without person". Another, very powerful, metaphor for metaphor is "Sprachgitter". Sprachgitter points to a kind of grid or lattice through which communication is possible.[73] This could refer to the slit plates that are used in the double split experiment in physics; they show the characteristics of the way that light and matter move through space. We can also associate it with the grid through which visitors talk to prisoners in a prison, or monks in a monastery. Finally, it can also refer to a coordinate system, such as that of the meridian. I think Celan's idea with this term is that we can truly experience reality only through a grid of language. This grid is responsible for its boundaries, but also specifies the way in which it is experienced. It communicates the idea that, for an authentic experience, we should connect with an original instantiation of language.

The use of different metaphors for metaphor brings strong support for the positions of Celan and Nietzsche, as well as for the candidate I present, because it reflects that the only way to meaningfully say something that cannot be captured, is to say it again and again, in different terms. Ted Cohen shows very elegantly why this is disturbing, but also convincingly consistent. He mentions an example from the Yom Kippour liturgy:

> We are Your people

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[71] Compare also: "Geht man also, wenn man an Gedichte denkt, geht man mit Gedichten solche Wege? Sind diese Wege nur Um-Wege, Umwege von dir zu dir? Aber es sind ja zugleich auch, unter wie vielen anderen Wegen, Wege, auf denen die Sprache stimmhaft wird, es sind Begegnungen, Wege einer Stimme zu einem wahrnehmenden Du, kreatürliche Wege, Daseinsentwürfe vielleicht, ein Sichvorausschicken zu sich selbst, auf der Suche nach sich selbst… Eine Art Heimkehr. (Celan 1999, p. 11)

[72] Celan writes: "Ich finde das Verbindende und wie das Gedicht zur Begegnung Führende. Ich finde etwas – wie die Sprache – Immaterielles, aber Irdisches, Terrestrisches, etwas Kreisförmiges, über die beiden Pole in sich selbst Zurückkehrendes und dabei – heitererweise – sogar die Tropen Durchkreuzendes –: ich finde ... einen Meridian." (Celan 1999, p. 12).

[73] Compare Sars & Roumen 1976, pp. 158-9 for a discussion of the possible backgrounds of the term "Sprachgitter".

You are our King

We are Your Children

You are our Father

We are your possession

You are our Portion

[and so on…] (Cohen 1997, p. 231)

Of this example, Cohen makes a comment: "With nothing literal possible to say, the author of this poem has suggested a brilliant address. He will speak a metaphor. But he will not leave it at that, for there is the perilous possibility that the metaphor will be taken literally, or that it will be taken to exhaust what is to be said about God and God's relation to the people. And so he goes on, with metaphor after metaphor, each of them compelling *and each of them unsettling the others*." (Cohen 1997, p. 234) Of course, this is precisely what both Celan and Nietzsche undertake; that is, they use different metaphors for metaphor and in doing so, avoid claims about absolute truth. This why reading Celan and Nietzsche is unsettling; a precise, in the sense of definite and exhaustive description of the meaning of metaphor is never reached. We cannot generate a theoretical proposition that explains it in a different way.

For the candidate I have defended, I have done the same; I have described the process involved in authenticity with the use of different metaphors, concepts and images. I will collect a few examples. The basic description of the theory was in terms of the concepts of authenticity, phenomenality, correspondence and collapse. These is terminology from a philosophical domain. In addition, I have also been using geographical metaphors, like location, place, realm, and connection. In this context, authenticity occurs at a particular place and lies in a particular connection with that place. I have mentioned the motive of Apelles, where we propose to achieve something by trying and trying again, but only achieve it by letting go. This is an existential-psychological way of phrasing the argument. On another level, I have mentioned the qualities of openness and closedness to express the argument. In this context, I argued that traditional correspondence relations close truth relations whereas phenomenality opens up possible truths. There are other ways of expressing the theory possible too. For instance, we could say that words act as pointers; that point to a direction in which they can acquire a new meaning. Or that truth in a complex theoretical discussion needs to become an individual experience to be truly true. All these different metaphors express the main point of the theory I have proposed.

In conclusion, we need not make claims about the superior status of the theory, because we cannot and should not. We cannot because of Nietzsche's argument; that is, we cannot allow for claims that equate thinking with being. And we should not, because we would make claims we cannot

uphold and are not truly convinced of. The only thing we can do is convey it again and again in different ways. Why? Because the use of multiple metaphors makes it possible to express ourselves in meaningful language, but makes it impossible to give one metaphor an absolute and objective status. In addition, the use of different metaphors shows that though we can express ourselves meaningfully in language, language can never exhaust what we want to convey.

CONCLUSION

We have arrived at a point of conclusion. We started out with acute criticisms from Celan and Nietzsche concerning the appropriate grounds to assume language-reality relationships. Celan dismissed traditional understandings of these relations altogether and Nietzsche illustrated that any theory of truth as correspondence that allows for an equation between language and reality is illegitimate. This criticism has lost its urgency. Through a new analysis of truth as authenticity, the starting point of reality as experience, and a process of both correspondence and fulfilment, we have developed a possible theory of truth that is based on Celan's views and survives Nietzsche's radical critique. Nietzsche's charges of consistency, anthropomorphism and relativism leave behind a type of theory of truth as correspondence that is highly modest. Are we content with this result, for would we not prefer a theory that really solidifies truth?

Celan's poems are so unique, because they deliberately make words and sentences so sober that we are forced to make an effort, we are forced to reconnect and recapture the words in it. However, his poems are not made of abstractions, there is a large private and historical context present. It is dense with private themes and situations, multiple references to literature, testimonials of religious texts, and allusions to philosophy. As a reader you cannot surpass this, for there is no proper reading possible without it. Reading a poem of Celan is a process. A first reading presents a wall of impenetrability and attractiveness; you have no clue about the content of the poem, but are drawn to it because of the purity of the poetic style. Next, you start theorizing about the poem. You think: 'Perhaps the word almond refers to an eye or seeing', 'Perhaps that word here refers to that poem by Hölderlin or this passage there to that line in Rilke'. But then, after this, you realize that these constructions do not work. It feels almost like Celan is deliberately putting words together in such a way that a negative definition arises; we should not be able to make anything out of the poem with fixed meanings of metaphor. And as a result, we are forced to look for something different. And once we let traditional constructions go, we can truly experience the poem in Celan's sense, and experience an insight. For this, we need a kind of introspective experience that requires strong focus, attention, being present, and letting earlier judgments and interpretations be at hand, without identifying with them. At some point a clearing comes up and an insight presents itself. The earlier structures that were necessary to dive into the poem lose their aptness as possible interpretations, and are given proper place in the fundamental insight that is experienced.

Celan's style expresses the main argument of this thesis in another way. It conveys that singular yet universal elements of knowledge start with correspondence relations between reality, language and thought, but become authentic and true in a particular identification with

phenomenological reality. A reading experience of Celan shows a process we can apply to aesthetics. It shows that though we can and should allow for a good deal of conceptual engineering, for proper truth, in the sense of authenticity, something else needs to occur. In short, we need an authentic experience to truly experience a work of art. The lack of transference in metaphor is a good description of an aesthetic experience, because especially in poetry, authentic experience needs to be conjured up again and again for it to be authentic. This may be a modest truth in the sense that is neither absolute, nor blessed with a special objective status, but in its modesty it is a fundamental insight nevertheless. In addition, concepts can keep an open character. Instead of being definite and limited in content, concepts can be transformed and redefined. Because their character depends on a process that is not wholly cognitive, in which processes of language, and of the way that the world appears to us, take part, it is allowed to transform in other ways.

A lot of questions remain. I will mention some smaller ones and several that are more fundamental. Some point to possible problems or further challenges in my argument. For instance, Celan's poems show that a metaphor can have a similar meaning in different poems. On top of this, some poems are deliberately meant to be read together. For instance, the poems 'Fernen,' 'Wo Eis ist' and 'Von Dunkel zu Dunkel' are a good example of this.[74] Their topic is a meeting; one poem presents the request for it; the other the preconditions, and the third the significance of this meeting. They have the same topic, and present a coherent and linear story. Is this a counter argument against the idea that only one singular experience secures an experience of authenticity? That remains an open question. In addition, I have not discussed how we can actually, in a very practical sense, get from an inauthentic to an authentic experience of a poem. This seems to happen in an instant, but how? Is there a way to be more precise about this process?

There are fundamental questions that can be asked as well. A basic presupposition of this thesis is that there is something like meaningful communication. Why do we look for it at all? If we do, why is Celan's view important? If it is, what are our views about his statements, and why should we share them? Can we share them? Furthermore, what I have suggested, is that there is a way to explain truth in poetry. Could this be claimed for other domains as well? If so, which? Art? Philosophy? Other domains? Finally, with Nietzsche as an example, I have shown that traditional theories have their limits, because the metaphysical realism that is involved gives only an appearance of control. On the other hand, the proposal for a theory of truth based on Celan has strong limitations. Though it does not fall into the fundamental difficulties of traditional theories of truth as correspondence, its scope it radically limited. We cannot, in any way, sustain its insights. It seems that either way, the result is

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[74] They are in Celan's second book of poems, *Von Schwelle zu Schwelle*, see Celan & Wiedemann 2005, pp. 67-8.

minimal. What is it that I have accomplished, and in what way is this a progress if we compare it with traditional perspectives on the relation truth-language-reality?

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